CAB ONE Part Thirty Eight CAB ONE JMT

TOP SECRET Confidential filing

Situation in the Middle East

Conflict between Iraq/Kuwait/Saudi Arabia et al

UK Policy towards the conflict

MIDDLE EAST

Part 1 : May 1979

Part 38: January 1991

CAB ONE

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
~~15.1.91~~							
17.1.91							
19.1.91							
PART ENDS							

PREM 19/3443

HMSO Dd8953031 6/88 C60 GP2265 CCN13412 (3932)

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB
Telephone 071-21 82111/3

MO 6/17/15/1J

19th January 1991

CF
pl. re-unite with other papers & await new draft.
CDP 20/1

Dear Charles,

KUWAIT: RECONSTRUCTION

I have received a copy of Simon Gass' letter to you dated 17th January.

As the Prime Minister knows, the MOD have also been in dialogue with the Kuwaiti Government-in-Exile about their future defence equipment requirements. Alan Thomas, Head of Defence Export Services, was in Ta'if on 14th January for this purpose. It would be very helpful if the Prime Minister were to mention our wish to help. I attach a draft paragraph which you may care to add immediately before the last.

I am copying this note to the other recipients of the earlier draft.

Yours sincerely,

Bryan Wells

(B H WELLS)
Private Secretary

Sir Charles Powell KCMG
10 Downing Street

DRAFT MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO THE AMIR OF KUWAIT

Additional paragraph

We in the UK are also committed to helping Kuwait to rebuild and develop its defence forces. On January 14, the Head of our Defence Export Services Organisation again visited Ta'if to assure your Foreign Minister and Defence Minister of our determination to assist with your short term defence equipment requirements; and to convey our intent to play a substantially larger part in fulfilling your future defence equipment needs. In this respect, I trust that you will approve the acquisition of Active Skyflash to exploit the capability of your new F-18 aircraft.

135227
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SECRET
FM WASHINGTON
TO DESKBY 192130Z FCO
TELNO 191
OF 192040Z JANUARY 91
AND TO DESKBY 192130Z CABINET OFFICE
INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK, ACTOR

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OUR TELNO 190 (NOT TO ALL): IRAQI ATTACKS ON ISRAEL

SUMMARY

1. US DEPLOY PATRIOT MISSILES TO ISRAEL. HUNT FOR SCUD LAUNCHERS A MAJOR PRIORITY.

DETAIL

2. TUR REPORTED SHAMIR'S UNDERTAKING TO PRESIDENT BUSH TO REFRAIN FOR THE TIME BEING FROM RETALIATION FOR IRAQI MISSILE ATTACKS. WHILE THIS UNDERTAKING WAS NOT UNCONDITIONAL, NSC (WELCH) SAID THAT SO FAR THE US HAD DETECTED NO DESPERATION IN THE ISRAELI ATTITUDE. THERE WAS INSTEAD A SOBER APPRECIATION OF THE WIDER POLITICAL SITUATION AND UNDERSTANDING OF THE COALITION'S POSITION.

3. WELCH SAID THE US HAD DEPLOYED PATRIOT MISSILES TO ISRAEL TO STRENGTHEN ITS AIR DEFENCES. THESE WOULD BE OPERATIONAL VERY SOON. US/ISRAELI INTELLIGENCE EXCHANGES WERE ALSO BEING INTENSIFIED. THESE MEASURES SHOULD BOOST ISRAELI CONFIDENCE. US/ISRAELI DEFENCE OFFICIALS WERE ALSO IN CLOSE CONTACT. BUT STATE (CLARKE, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, POL/MIL) TOLD US THAT THE AMERICANS HAD NOT/NOT YET DISCUSSED MILITARY ACTION WITH TEL AVIV NOR ATTEMPTED TO COORDINATE ANY ISRAELI ATTACK ON IRAQI TARGETS WITH THE ON-GOING ALLIED EFFORT.

4. CLARKE ADDED THAT THE HUNT FOR SCUD LAUNCHERS WAS A MAJOR PREOCCUPATION (THEY HAD NOTED THE PRIME MINISTER'S EMPHASIS ON THIS MISSION IN HIS PRESS CONFERENCE ON 19 JANUARY). THERE WAS NO DOUBT THAT AIR ASSETS WERE BEING DIVERTED TO THIS END, ABOVE AND BEYOND WHAT HAD BEEN CATERED FOR IN THE ORIGINAL PLAN. CLOUDY WEATHER WAS STILL MAKING TARGET LOCATION DIFFICULT. CLARKE COMMENTED THAT THE US DID NOT KNOW HOW MANY MOBILE LAUNCHERS AND MISSILES REMAINED.

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MR P J WESTON
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MR BROOMFIELD
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CHIEF OF ASSESSMENTS STAFF
MR REEVES CAB OFFICE
MR APPLEYARD CAB OFFICE
MR D GOWAN CAB OFFICE
PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE
HD/SEC (O) (C) MODUK
MR J HILL LAW OFFICERS
(ATTORNEY GENERAL'S DEPT)

NNNN

PRIME MINISTER

I am sorry to say that we have just lost a third Tornado. It was hit while attacking Taleel airfield, and crashed a hundred miles within Iraq. The pilot and navigator ejected but there is no further news on them at present. Once again the Tornado was based in Bahrain. No publicity is being given to this until next of kin have been informed.

(C. D. POWELL)

19 January 1991

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39(a-c)



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING
WHITEHALL
LONDON SW1A 2HB
Telephone: 071-21 82111/3

MO 6/17/15/1J

19th January 1991

Dear Charles,

REPORT FROM RIYADH

The Defence Secretary's colleagues may like to see the attached report from Commanders on operations today in the Gulf.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries, to members of OPD(G) and to Sir Robin Butler.

Yours sincerely

S J AMBLER-EDWARDS
(Private Secretary)

Sir Charles Powell KCMG
10 Downing Street

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Repro Copy No. 1 of 7

Copy No. 1 of 3

CDS 2066/2/1

19 Jan 91

PS/Secretary of State

THE VIEW FROM RIYADH 191730Z JAN 91

1. The main concern of Gen Schwarzkopf today has been to discourage the Israelis from carrying out retaliatory attacks on Iraq. Amongst the arguments employed were that it was too difficult, in the time available, to coordinate Israeli flights through Allied airspace today and also that, in line with his assurances of yesterday, the Allies were clearly concentrating on and winning the battle against SCUD as only 3 had landed in Israel last night. Schwarzkopf's assessment is that there is a 50-50 chance of a continuing hold off if only one, or better none, strike Israel tonight. However, his attempts to neutralise more launchers today had been hampered severely by thick cloud, particularly over Kuwait and Eastern Iraq. This also led to the cancellation of over 100 sorties against the RGFC and, thus raids today had concentrated on bombing fixed targets through cloud. The weather remains unsettled but there is promise of a few clear days after 21 Jan.

2. Details of todays activity, other than that which you will have gathered from the Media, are:

a. For the first time Iraqi fighters had appeared in some strength. 11 Fulcrums and 2 Mirage F1s from 3 different airfields had grouped to attack A10s operating against SCUD sites in central southern Iraq. Escorting US F15s had accounted for 4 Fulcrums shot down, 1 Fulcrum forced to make an emergency landing, 1 probable F1 and possibly a second. This gives a total so far in the air to air war of 15 probables, plus a further 12 aircraft destroyed on the ground. The Fulcrum tally is now 10 from an original 40 (plus 1 trainer which is of limited combat capability).

b. UK Jaguars had been busy and particularly notable was an 8 Jaguar attack early this morning through very heavy AAA in which 7 bombs secured direct hits on 3 SA2 (Surface to Air) missile sites. A film of this attack has been released to one of the Media Response Teams. However, the last daylight sortie had turned back from its target in very poor weather conditions.

c. The US Navy has mined the exit from Umm Qasr, was involved in the attack on Iraqis operating from oil platforms (reported in the media) and has also mounted air attacks against Silkworm anti-ship missile sites in Eastern Iraq.

d. Before the night is out a tqtal of 250 Tomahawks ie 50% of original US holdings in theatre will have been fired.

e. A large US raid had been mounted against the Iraqi nuclear research establishment at Tuwaitha which had received "a real pasting".

f. 2 Patriot missiles were launched in error today from the vicinity of Riyadh. This has highlighted a software fault which is being investigated with all speed.

3. The air plan tonight calls for a very heavy commitment from UK air forces. Concentration of effort remains in western Iraq against airfields and SCUDs.

a. Tabuk. 2 raids of 10 aircraft each followed by 2 further raids of 4 aircraft each against airfields and airfield defences.

b. Muharraq. 2 raids of 8 aircraft.

c. Dhahran. 1 raid of 8 aircraft.

d. There will also be up to 4 recce flights by Tornado GR1A, giving a total of 54 sorties in all all Tornado GR1s.

e. Tornado F3 and tankers will continue to provide support.

NOTE: as attack planning is now hot (see last report) I am unable to be more specific about future targets.

4. The Joint Commander and CDS discussed the threat from floating mines to supply shipping. To date there has been no noticeable effect on either UK or US logistic supply. Battle damage assessment ,which has featured in the previous 2 reports, is now becoming more timely but only for some attacks. It is difficult to achieve proper assessments via radar from attacks through heavy cloud.

5. Commanders remain content with the progress of the air campaign which is being hampered by atrocious weather although there is some disappointment that SCUD launchers and the RGFC could not be given proper attention today. In theatre they are heartened however, that the Iraqi air force contribution is still very limited and bested whenever it does threaten. Crews are bearing up very well and allied losses remain much lower than predicted.

D G LITTLEJOHNS
Cdre
PSO/CDS
MB6173 83353MB

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CDS 19/1

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SECRET AND PERSONAL

file

38.

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

19 January 1991

Dear Simon,

THE GULF CONFLICT: ISRAELI RETALIATION

I asked General Scowcroft this evening about stories coming out of Washington to the effect that the Israeli Cabinet had decided not to retaliate for the Iraqi SCUD missile attacks.

General Scowcroft said that the Israelis had undertaken not to retaliate tonight, but had given no assurance beyond that. They had presented this as being a considerable concession: in fact the weather in the area was poor, and they would have found it difficult to take action. Nonetheless, the Americans found the Israeli reaction encouraging. It showed that they were not totally committed to retaliation, and every day gained was an advantage. But he expected further very difficult discussions with them.

I am copying this letter to Richard Gozney (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and to Sir Robin Butler.

Yours ever,

C. D. POWELL

Simon Webb, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence.

SECRET AND PERSONAL

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SECRET AND PERSONAL

The National Archives

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Extract details: Letter from Powell to Binstead dated 19 January 1991	
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This should be an indication of what the extract is,
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10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

19 January 1991

PRIME MINISTER
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T25/91

Dear Prime Minister,

Thank you for your message of yesterday which I very much appreciated. Since then, I have heard the news of the further Iraqi missile attack on Israel early this morning. It shows once again what an unspeakable regime we are dealing with in Baghdad, with not the slightest regard for human lives or international law. I am relieved to know that casualties are relatively light. But I can only too well imagine how deeply unpleasant and troubling it must be for your people to live under this sort of daily - or worse nightly - threat.

I also recognise the extremely difficult decisions which you face. Israel has the right to defend itself and there can be no question of that: and I can understand that your people want to see their government take action to defend them from further attacks. That is wholly natural and wholly understandable.

Against that, I am sure you are weighing the points which I know George Bush will have put to you about the risks to the cohesion of the multi-national alliance against Iraq, if Israel were to take retaliatory action. The restraint which Israel has shown so far has been of immense help in that respect. It is a sign of strength and not weakness and is recognised as such. And every day, indeed every hour gained, gives the United States and others of us more time to deal ourselves with the remaining threat to Israel and to Saudi Arabia from Iraqi missiles. As you know, everything possible is being done to

locate and destroy these. If Israel were to intervene directly - and believe me, I can understand the pressures - that intervention would be exploited to the full by Saddam Hussein in his effort to widen the conflict into an Arab/Israel one. That is patently his aim and we should avoid conceding it to him if humanly possible.

I am sure you have these considerations very much in mind and I do not pretend to tell Israel how to provide for its own defence. I only wanted you to know that Israel's friends share the agony with you and hope you will reach wise decisions which meet both the needs of your defence and the importance of enabling the multi-national alliance to prosecute its campaign against Iraq to a successful conclusion. If at the end of the day you decide that <u>some</u> action has to be taken, I hope it will be such as to minimise political embarrassment to Arab governments who are supporting the multi-national alliance and the pressure which they would come under from their own populations.

With every warm good wish.

Yours Sincerely

John Major

His Excellency Mr. Yitzhak Shamir

10 DOWNING STREET

Charles

Gus rang. He says Shamir has gone on TV to tell his people Israel will retaliate. Gus presumes this will be at night and was wondering if you thought a statement should be prepared covering what we might say in the event.

He has now gone home but says do ring him if you want. Speak to his answer-phone & he will lift the receiver (it is permanently on to repel journalists).

D.

ZCZC
CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO
TO DESKBY 190900Z CAIRO
TELNO
OF
AND TO DESKBY 190900Z DAMASCUS, RIYADH, BAHRAIN, DOHA,
AND TO DESKBY 190900Z RABAT, WASHINGTON, ABU DHABI
INFO DESKBY 190900Z TEL AVIV, JERUSALEM
INFO IMMEDIATE MUSCAT, SANA'A, ALGIERS, TUNIS, PARIS, UKDEL NATO
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, JHQ HIGH WYCOMBE

SIC
JHQ HIGH WYCOMBE (FOR POLAD)

MY TELNO 43 TO CAIRO AND MY TELNO 28 TO TEL AVIV (NOT TO ALL):
IRAQI ATTACKS ON ISRAEL

1. According to press reports eleven Iraqi missiles landed in the Tel Aviv area at about 0530Z. Casualties and damage were slight.

2. On my instructions Fairweather has spoken to the Israeli Ambassador to express our sympathy and to urge the Israeli government to continue to exercise whatever restraint they can in the circumstances. Israeli restraint will contribute to the maintenance of the cohesion of the coalition. HMA Tel Aviv will take the same line in his contacts with Israelis. We have told the US Embassy that we are taking this action.

3. The Prime Minister has issued this morning a statement

ATTACK

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deploring the attack. News Department will take the following line:

- We deplore this further unprovoked attack by Iraq on civilian targets in Israel. We express our sympathy with the Israelis and our relief that casualties were apparently light. We continue to urge the Israelis in London and Tel Aviv to exercise their wise restraint.

4. It is now much more likely that the Israelis will retaliate against Iraqi targets. If and when action addressees receive confirmation that the Israelis have retaliated Arab posts should, preferably in a joint approach with your US colleague, make the following points to host governments:

- Draw attention to statements by the Prime Minister on 18 and 19 January and my statement to the House on 18 January.

- Note that we have kept in close touch with the governments most concerned over the last two days. I spoke to the Israeli and Egyptian Foreign Ministers on 18 January.

- Stress that the Israelis have been very patient in the face of unprovoked and indiscriminate attacks against civilian targets. They did not retaliate after the first attack.

- Urge that our Arab allies are restrained in their public reaction. The need to maintain the cohesion and solidarity of the alliance is paramount.

- (If appropriate). The Israeli response was proportionate and directed against carefully selected military targets directly related to the attacks on Israel. They have not attacked civilian targets.

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IRAQ/KUWAIT

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OF 190040Z JANUARY 91
AND TO DESKBY 190100Z CABINET OFFICE
INFO PRIORITY MIDDLE EAST POSTS, UKMIS NEW YORK, ANKARA, PARIS
INFO PRIORITY MOSCOW, MODUK, ACTOR

SIC
OUR TELNO 169: IRAQ/KUWAIT: WASHINGTON SITREP
SUMMARY
1. PRESIDENT EXPRESSES OUTRAGE AT MISSILE ATTACK ON ISRAEL. EMPHASISES THAT THE US IS UNITED BEHIND THE ARMED FORCES. FIRST DAY OF DESERT STORM COSTS HALF A BILLION DOLLARS.
DETAIL
2. ACCORDING TO OUR CONTACTS IN THE WHITE HOUSE, THE PRESIDENT REMAINS PLEASED WITH THE PROGRESS OF DESERT STORM, ALTHOUGH THERE IS FRUSTRATION THAT BAD WEATHER HAS MADE IT DIFFICULT TO GET PRECISE DAMAGE ASSESSMENTS.
3. A MAIN CONCERN ON 18 JANUARY HAS BEEN THE AFTERMATH OF THE IRAQI MISSILE STRIKE. THIS PUNCTURED THE NEAR EUPHORIA IN WASHINGTON AND ACROSS THE COUNTRY GENERATED BY MEDIA REPORTS OF EARLY US AND ALLIED AIR SUCCESSES. THE ATTACKS PROVOKED WIDESPREAD REACTIONS OF PUBLIC OUTRAGE, MINGLED WITH RELIEF THAT CHEMICAL WEAPONS HAD NOT BEEN USED. THE PRESIDENT CAPTURED THE NATIONAL MOOD IN A BRIEF PRESS CONFERENCE ON 18 JANUARY, WHEN HE CALLED THE IRAQI STRIKE QUOTE AN ACT OF TERROR UNQUOTE. IT PROVED THAT NO NEIGHBOUR OF IRAQ WAS SAFE AND REVEALED AGAIN THE NATURE OF SADDAM HUSSAIN. THE PRESIDENT PRAISED ISRAEL FOR ITS RESTRAINT FROM THE OUTSET OF HOSTILITIES, BUT THE POSSIBILITY OF ISRAELI RETALIATION REMAINS A MAJOR CONCERN (SEE OUR TELNO 178).
4. WHILE HIS VERDICT AFTER 36 HOURS OF DESERT STORM WAS QUOTE SO FAR SO GOOD UNQUOTE, THE PRESIDENT WENT ON TO REINFORCE HIS SOBER MESSAGE (OUR TELNO 158) THAT THE MILITARY EFFORT WOULD TAKE TIME. WHILE NO-ONE SHOULD DOUBT ULTIMATE SUCCESS, IT WOULD NOT BE QUOTE CHEAP AND EASY UNQUOTE. MINIMIZING CASUALTIES WAS A MAJOR OBJECTIVE BUT CASUALTIES WERE INEVITABLE. THE PRESIDENT MADE A PARTICULAR POINT OF EMPHASISING THAT THE NATION WAS QUOTE FUNDAMENTALLY UNITED UNQUOTE BEHIND THE US FORCES IN THE GULF, DESPITE WELL-PUBLICISED ANTI-WAR DEMONSTRATIONS. THE WHITE HOUSE TOLD US THAT THE PRESIDENT WAS DISTURBED BY REPORTS THAT TELEVISED DEMONSTRATIONS WERE CONVEYING THE IMPRESSION TO

US FORCES OF STRONG ANTI-WAR FEELING AND DAMAGING MORALE.
5. CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT IS ALSO HOLDING UP. DESPITE NEARLY A DAY OF PARTISAN WRANGLING (TUR), THE SENATE EVENTUALLY PASSED UNANIMOUSLY (98-0) A RESOLUTION WHICH QUOTE COMMENDS AND SUPPORTS THE EFFORTS AND LEADERSHIP OF THE PRESIDENT AS COMMANDER IN CHIEF IN THE PERSIAN GULF HOSTILITIES UNQUOTE. IT ALSO EXPRESSED QUOTE UNEQUIVOCAL SUPPORT UNQUOTE FOR THE US ARMED FORCES. CONFINING PRAISE FOR THE PRESIDENT TO HIS ROLE AS COMMANDER IN CHIEF REFLECTS THE UNEASY BUT FOR THE MOMENT SUSTAINABLE COMPROMISE BETWEEN REPUBLICANS AND DEMOCRATS. THE HOUSE SHOULD ADOPT A SIMILAR RESOLUTION ON 18 JANUARY.
6. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET EXPERTS ESTIMATED THAT THE FIRST DAY OF DESERT STORM HAD COST AT LEAST 500 MILLION DOLLARS. THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SENATE BUDGET COMMITTEE PREDICTED THAT THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD ASK FOR AN ADDITIONAL 20 BILLION DOLLARS FOR FISCAL 1991 (WHICH ENDS 30 SEPTEMBER). HOUSE SPEAKER FOLEY PLEDGED ON 17 JANUARY THAT US FORCES WOULD RECEIVE EVERYTHING THEY NEEDED TO ACHIEVE A SWIFT AND SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION.
7. DEMONSTRATIONS CONTINUE IN NEW YORK, BOSTON AND SAN FRANCISCO, WITH OUTBREAKS OF VIOLENCE AND LOOTING. A PERMANENT THOUGH SMALL DEMONSTRATION (200-300 PROTESTORS) HAS BEEN CAMPED IN FRONT OF THE WHITE HOUSE SINCE 16 JANUARY.

ACLAND

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MR W D REEVES CABINET OFFICE
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

MR BERMAN (LEGAL ADVISERS)
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HD/CONSULAR D
HD/ECD(E)
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HD/NENAD
HD/SECPOL D

SIR ROBIN BUTLER, CAB OFFICE
LT COL CRONIN CAB OFFICE
MR SHAPLAND CAB OFFICE
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RESIDENT CLERK

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Use black or blue pen to complete form.

Use the card for one piece or for each extract removed from a different place within a piece.

Enter the department and series,
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CONFIDENTIAL

FILE SW a/c

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

19 January 1991

Dear Simon,

KUWAIT AND ECONOMIC INTERESTS

John Gieve wrote to me on 18 January with the Chancellor's view that the Kuwait Government should be pressed to contribute much more substantially to the British military effort. He sympathises with this view. Whether an approach on this subject should be included in a letter dealing with our prospects of benefitting from post-war reconstruction is a matter of judgment. It might be better to separate the two approaches: and we would then have to decide which to make first - and the contribution to the costs of our forces is surely the more urgent.

I am copying this letter to John Gieve (HM Treasury) and to the other recipients of his letter.

Yours ever,

(C. D. POWELL)

Simon Gass, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

Suspended.

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

As you know from my letter to you of 9 January I was very pleased so soon after my appointment as Prime Minister to have the opportunity to talk to you in Ta'if. I welcomed the opportunity to convey to you our continuing firm commitment to the liberation of Kuwait and the restoration of legitimate government. We will not flinch from what needs to be done.

At our meeting I pledged Britain's help with the reconstruction of Kuwait. Our companies, who have been very active in the past in Kuwait and are represented all over the Gulf, are ready to participate in reconstruction both in the immediate emergency relief and in the longer term rebuilding of Kuwait's infrastructure. We have now formed a joint Government/private sector task force to identify how best we can help you. I know that this will be welcome to you and that you will wish to instruct members of your Government, particularly those immediately concerned with procurement, to respond very positively to this initiative. The opening of a procurement office in London which would work with major US based project managers would be a valuable first step which I strongly recommend. This would match the action your Government has taken in Washington. In addition, a general procurement contract issued to the Crown Agents, who have unique, unbiased and varied purchasing experience for overseas governments would be of considerable value in your reconstruction efforts. I trust you will use their services.

Our people will be in touch with yours very soon about how best to follow up this request. One basis might be to agree on guidelines for procurement business based on recent OECD market shares of Kuwaiti imports before the invasion. As the reconstruction programme is likely to double the US share of some 20 per cent, we trust that you would wish to ensure that Britain (with some 10 per cent) received at least similar treatment.

In short, the British people are making great sacrifices for the liberation of Kuwait, and do so willingly in the cause of justice and international law. But they also wish to have full part in the constructive task of participating in the positive work of reconstruction once Iraq has been ejected and the legitimate government restored. But we need the active guidance and co-operation of your Government (particularly in the instruction of US project managers) if we are to do so quickly and effectively. I hope very much, in the light of our excellent discussion in Ta'if, that you will feel able to help.

His Highness Shaikh Jabir Al Ahmad Al Sabah, G.C.M.G.

CONFIDENTIAL

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

19 January 1991

Dear John,

GULF: OTHER COUNTRIES' CONTRIBUTIONS TO UK MILITARY COSTS

The Prime Minister has noted the Chancellor's minute of 18 January about financial and material assistance from other countries towards the costs of our military operations in the Gulf. OPD(G) touched on this on 18 January and, as the Chancellor says, FCO officials are preparing a paper. In the light of that, we shall need to decide rapidly how best to proceed.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries to members of OPD and to Sir Robin Butler.

Yours sincerely,

C. D. POWELL

John Gieve, Esq.,
H.M. Treasury.

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FILE

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

19 January 1991

GULF: SOVIET VIEWS

Mr. Kossov of the Soviet Embassy telephoned me this morning to tell me, on instructions, that President Gorbachev had sent a message to Saddam Hussain. This was to the effect that, if Saddam were to announce his intention to withdraw from Kuwait, Gorbachev would raise the question of a pause in military action, which would of course be reciprocal. President Gorbachev wanted the Prime Minister to be aware of this proposal.

I said that I would of course pass it on, but in my own view it was not helpful. The situation had changed after 15 January and our forces were directly engaged. A pause in hostilities would simply give Saddam Hussain time to re-group and re-stock, and therefore risk further casualties. A statement of Iraq's intention to withdraw would not be enough to warrant taking that risk: we could not put any confidence in Saddam Hussain's statements. There would need to be concrete evidence that actual withdrawal was taking place. I referred Mr. Kossov to answers which the Prime Minister had given following his statement to the House on 17 January.

Mr. Kossov duly noted these comments and said that he would pass them back.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

(C. D. POWELL)

Richard Gozney, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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TELNO 37
OF 191000Z JANUARY 91
AND TO DESKBY 191030Z CABINET OFFICE
AND TO DESKBY 181030Z ACTOR
AND TO DESKBY 181030Z MODUK
INFO ME POSTS WASHINGTON PARIS UKMIS NEW YORK

MY TELNO 35: GULF WAR: ISRAEL

SUMMARY

1. SECOND CONVENTIONAL MISSILE ATTACK ON TEL AVIV. CASUALTIES REPORTEDLY AGAIN LIGHT. RETALIATION MUST NOW BE ON THE CARDS.

DETAIL

2. THE SIRENS SOUNDED AT 0725 LOCAL TIME FOLLOWED BY FIVE POSSIBLY SIX EXPLOSIONS AUDIBLE FROM HERZLIYA PITUACH AND OF THE SAME INTENSITY AS MOST OF THE EXPLOSIONS FROM THE PREVIOUS NIGHT. THE EMERGENCY UNIT WAS INFORMED. THE ALL CLEAR WAS GIVEN HALF AN HOUR LATER WHEN IT WAS ANNOUNCED THAT THE MISSILES HAD CARRIED CONVENTIONAL WARHEADS AND HAD FALLEN IN THE TEL AVIV AREA (BROADLY DEFINED). ONE SEEMS TO HAVE FALLEN WITHIN ONE KILOMETRE OF THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE IN TEL AVIV. THE IDF NOW SAY THERE WERE TEN LIGHT CASUALTIES (AGAIN NO DEATHS). ALTHOUGH SOME REPORTS MENTION SIXTEEN.

3. AT APPROX 0930 LOCAL TIME I PASSED YOUR MESSAGE REQUESTING CONTINUED ISRAELI RESTRAINT ''IF YOU CAN'' TO THE MFA - I HAD YESTERDAY OF COURSE SPOKEN TO THEM AS INSTRUCTED IN YOUR TELNO 28. THERE WAS NO SUBSTANTIAL REACTION ON EITHER OCCASION. COMMENTS BY GOVERNMENT MINSTERS THIS MORNING (DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER NETANYAHU, JUSTICE MINISTER MERIDOR AND HEALTH MINISTER OLMERT) HAVE ALL SUGGESTED THAT THE TIME FOR RETALIATION IS NEARING AND THAT SOME RETALIATION IS INEVITABLE.

4.THERE HAD BEEN FALSE ALARMS OVERNIGHT IN TEL AVIV, HAIFA AND JERUSALEM, ONE OCCASIONED BY THE APPARENTLY VISIBLE RE-ENTRY OF A PART OF THE SOVIET SOYUZ SATELITE TO WHICH WE HAD PREVIOUSLY DRAWN ISRAELI ATTENTION.

5. FOR THE RECORD, SIGNIFICANT ISRAELI STATEMENTS YESTERDAY EVENING AFTER THE FIRST IRAQI ATTACK WERE FROM LEVY, WHO SAID THAT ISRAEL RESERVED THE RIGHT TO CHOOSE THE TIME, PLACE AND THE MEANS TO

RETALIATE, AND ARENS, WHO SAID IN A RADIO INTERVIEW ''WE HAVE SAID THAT IF WE ARE ATTACKED WE WILL RETALIATE, AND WE HAVE BEEN ATTACKED'', ADDING THAT WHILE THE DAMAGE FROM THE ATTACK WAS NOT SIGNIFICANT THE ACT ITSELF WAS VERY SIGNIFICANT AND CALLED FOR AN ISRAELI RESPONSE.

COMMENT

6. YESTERDAY'S DEBATE HERE ON THE RETALIATION QUESTION APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN FINELY BALANCED. MY HUNCH IS THAT THIS SECOND ATTACK WILL TIP THE BALANCE IN FAVOUR OF RETALIATION. THERE IS CONTINUED LOCAL SPECULATION ABOUT THE FORM THIS MIGHT TAKE: ONE SUGGESTION IS THAT A LIMITED 'ENTEBBE-STYLE' COMMANDO OPERATION OF SOME SORT MIGHT MAKE THE RIGHT SORT OF POINT WITHOUT NECESARILY WIDENING THE CONFLICT UNDULY.

7. THE FACT THAT THE ATTACK TOOK PLACE IN DAYLIGHT HAS ALSO BEEN NOTED. AT LEAST TODAY I SHALL TAKE FURTHER STEPS TO LIMIT THE NUMBER OF STAFF TRAVELLING FROMSU WOPGFNYJVVNL EMBASSY.

8. MY DEFENCE ATTACHE HAS BEEN SUMMONED TO AN IDF BRIEFING AT 1100 LOCAL TIME.

9. ALL CORE STAFF WELL, AS REPORTED TO EU.

ELLIOTT

YYYY

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MR GORE-BOOTH
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(CABINET OFFICE)
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MR APPLEYARD CABINET OFFICE
MR W D REEVES CABINET OFFICE
SIR C CURWEN CABINET OFFICE
MR CHARLTON CABINET OFFICE
PS/NUMBER 10 DOWNING ST
SIR P CRADOCK, 10 DOWNING ST

CONFIDENTIAL

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

19 January 1991

THE GULF: MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT MITTERRAND

When the Prime Minister spoke to President Mitterrand on the telephone yesterday, the President mentioned that he had just signed off a message to the Prime Minister about criticism in the British media of the last minute French peace proposal. The message has now arrived and I enclose a copy. As you will see it goes well beyond complaints about criticism of the media and talks about the President's surprise at the Prime Minister's own comments and those of members of the Government which he says he bitterly resents.

My own view is that we should not make any further response to this message and regard the Prime Minister's conversation with the President yesterday as drawing a line under the matter. But I would be grateful if you could let me have a translation of the President's message for the Prime Minister together with any comments which the Foreign secretary wishes to make.

(C. D. POWELL)

Richard Gozney, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T22A/91
Subject cc Master ops

FILE

cc MOD
FCO

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

18 January 1991

Dear Brian,

I was delighted to hear that your Government has decided to send a Canadian field hospital with over 500 personnel to Saudi Arabia, in support of our forces in the Gulf. I know that our military staffs are already working urgently on the details.

Your generous contribution is particularly welcome in view of the close and longstanding relationship between our armed forces, as well as providing a welcome and very visible demonstration of Canada's commitment to the multinational forces. We are truly grateful to you and the people of Canada.

Yours Ever,
John

The Right Honourable Brian Mulroney

SECRET
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FM PARIS
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OF 181750Z JANUARY 91
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SIC I9M/ZAC/U2G/U2H

FOR JOC ASSESSMENT CELL, SEC(O)(C) AND DIS CRISIS CELL FROM BRITDEFAT. UPDATE ON FRENCH GULF OPERATIONS 17-18 JAN

FRENCH RESTRICTION ON OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS TO KUWAIT ONLY

1. OUR TELNO 59 REPORTED DUMAS AS SAYING THAT FRENCH AIRCRAFT WOULD ONLY UNDERTAKE OPERATIONS IN KUWAIT (NOT IRAQ). BRITNAVAT IN OUR I9M/LDQ 171727 JAN AND FRENCH PRESS QUOTE CHEVENEMENT MAKING SIMILAR STATEMENTS. ON 17 JAN HE WAS QUOTED AS SAYING THAT THE DECISION TO LIMIT MILITARY INTERVENTION HAD BEEN TAKEN BY MITTERRAND, HOWEVER WE ARE GETTING A DIFFERENT STORY FROM MILITARY SOURCES.

INDEED NOTHING HAD BEEN DONE TO REVOKE THE AIR TASKING ORDER ISSUED BY CHEVENEMENT BEFORE CHRISTMAS GIVING FORMAL AUTHORITY FOR JOINT PLANNING/OPERATIONS AGAINST TARGETS IN IRAQ (OUR I9M/ZAC/U2G/U2H 041528Z REFERS). WAS CATEGORIC THAT AIR OPERATIONS AGAINST IRAQ WOULD BE UNDERTAKEN SHORTLY. HE CONFIRMED FRENCH GROUND FORCES REMAIN AN INTEGRATED PART OF ANY ARMY OFFENSIVE AND WILL UTILISE FAF FOR AIR SUPPORT. HE SAID THAT CHEVENEMENT (CURRENTLY ON HIS WAY TO SAUDI ARABIA FOR 2-3 DAYS - 6TH VISIT SINCE 2 AUG 90) WAS USING THE FACT THAT CURRENT FAF MISSIONS WERE BEING TASKED AGAINST KUWAIT (AS ARE RAF JAGUARS) FOR INTERNAL POLITICS: MITTERRAND FOR HIS OWN REASONS WAS LETTING HIM PURSUE THIS LINE BUT WOULD STEP IN WHEN NECESSARY.
COMMENT:

GIVEN THAT KUWAIT TASKING MAKES PRACTICAL SENSE, DUMAS/CHEVENEMENT COMMENTS FIT IN WITH CONTINUING DOMESTIC POLITICAL REQUIREMENTS (I.E. KEEPING LEFT OF SOCIALIST PARTY ON BOARD, EVEN AFTER MASSIVELY FAVOURABLE VOTES IN PARLIAMENT).

DAILY /

DAILY BRIEFING IN FRENCH MOD

2. THE BRIEFING BEING GIVEN TO US FORMALLY BY FRENCH MOD IS A VERY ANODYNE AFFAIR.

WE WOULD BE ABLE TO OBTAIN MORE - FORMALLY - IF MODUK COULD GIVE A HIGHER CLASSIFICATION BRIEFING TO FRENCH COLLEAGUES.

AIR

3. FRENCH CARRIED OUT A 12 AIRCRAFT MISSION AGAINST AN AMMUNITION DEPOT NEAR KUWAIT CITY USING 4 X AIRCRAFT ARMED WITH LASER GUIDED BOMBS. 3 CONFIRMED DH, 1 POSSIBLE. OTHERS USED FREE FALL BOMBS WITH SOME APPARENT SUCCESS. SEVERAL SAM WERE FIRED BUT FRENCH AIRCRAFT EVADED THESE, UTILISING ECM/CHAFF, AND RETURNED SAFELY. OF THE 4 JAGUARS DAMAGED 17 JAN, 3 ARE NOW SERVICEABLE QUOTE THANKS TO BDR TECHNIQUES LEARNT FROM RAF UNQUOTE. 4 EXTRA JAGUARS HAVE BEEN DEPLOYED TO THE GULF 18 JAN. FRENCH FLEW CAP MISSIONS CONTINUOUSLY FOR 24 HOUR PERIOD FROM OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES.

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LAND FORCES

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4. (NTR)

NAVY

5. THE JEAN DE VIENNE UNDER US OPCON IS CURRENTLY ESCORTING US LOGISTIC FORCE IN GULF OF OMAN.

FERGUSSON

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MR J HILL LAW OFFICERS (ATTORNEY GENERAL'S DEPT)

From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

Prime Minister
AF 18/1

HOME OFFICE
QUEEN ANNE'S GATE
LONDON SWIH 9AT

18 January 1991

Dear Andrew

GULF CRISIS: DEMONSTRATIONS ON 18, 19 AND 20 JANUARY

... The Home Secretary has asked for the attached details to be circulated to members of OPD(G).

I am therefore copying this letter and enclosures to Private Secretaries to members of OPD(G) and to Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely

C. Roberts

MISS C ROBERTS
Assistant Private Secretary

Andrew Turnbull, Esq., CBE.
No 10 Downing Street
LONDON, S.W.1.

DEMONSTRATIONS TAKING PLACE IN RELATION TO THE GULF CRISIS - FRIDAY 18 JANUARY 1991

Birmingham

5.30pm	Demonstration organised by 'Walford Road Mosque', Small Heath. About 50 persons expected. Public order potential - low.

London

6.00pm	Peace vigil on the steps of St Martins in the Field. Number unknown but not expected to be many.

DEMONSTRATIONS TAKING PLACE IN RELATION TO THE GULF CRISIS - SATURDAY 19 JANUARY 1991

Avon and Somerset

U/K	Demonstration outside the BBC. Studios and Conservative Party Office by about 2,000 persons. Public disorder is not anticipated.

Derbyshire

12.00 noon	Demonstration by the 'Derby Committee to Stop War in the Gulf' in Market place, Derby. Previous events have attracted 250-300 persons.

Harlow

1.00pm	Demonstration and march by Bishop Stortford and Harlow Anti-War Group in Harlow Town Centre. About 65 people are anticipated. Peaceful demonstration expected.

Norfolk

10.00pm	Demonstration in Gentlemens Walk, Norwich. Organisation and numbers not known at present.

Oxford

1.00pm	Meeting organised by a group of Muslims - anti-American to be held at Cowley Road Hospital. No public order problems are anticipated.

3.30pm	March through Oxford City Centre by about 500. Mixed CND, Students Union and Labour Party. No public order problems are anticipated.
<u>Staffordshire</u>	
U/K	'Peace March' scheduled to take place in Stafford. Further details unknown at present but it is not anticipated that disorder will occur.
<u>Upper Heyford</u>	
N/K	Protest organised by West Midlands CND. 30+ persons expected.

DEMONSTRATIONS TAKING PLACE IN RELATION TO THE GULF CRISIS - SUNDAY 20 JANUARY 1991

Huntingdon

2.00	Demonstration outside the Prime Minister's home. 8-24 personsexpected.

Slough

4.45	Rally at the Stadium Centre, Slough believed to be organised by 'Pakistani Welfare Association'. Numbers unknown.

(2)

MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT MITTERRAND TO THE PRIME MINISTER
DATED 19 JANUARY

Prime Minister

This is a translation of President Mitterand's message. I think we should let it go by on the legal side. Your telephone call drew a line under the incident CDP 20/1

TRANSLATION

Dear Prime Minister

I was surprised by your reactions and those of members of your Government, and also by the media campaign against France, regarding the final French peace plan which was designed to avoid war while calling on Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait, in application of the Security Council resolutions.

I must tell you that I strongly resented these unjustified criticisms. The aim of our proposal was to not neglect any chance, minimal though it might be, to save peace before the expiry of the deadline fixed by the United Nations. The great majority of the countries of the European Community, who publicly supported it, as well as the non-aligned countries, most Arab countries and a great many other nations in the world understood the meaning of this last appeal

It was in accordance with what I had said to the United Nations on 24 September. It took account of the position of the Europeans and it did not put in question the date of 15 January.

I wish to believe that these campaigns will not deeply impair the relations between our two countries. Perhaps the misundertanding arose from the fact that I did not inform you of this plan during your visit to Paris. I want you to know that at the time when we parted I had not yet settled the form of our initiative. The friendly atmosphere established between us during your visit, which I recall with pleasure, allows me to hope so.

(Courtesy ending)

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T23/91
subject cc Rather
OPS

MONSIEUR LE PREMIER MINISTRE,

J'AI ETE SURPRIS PAR VOS REACTIONS ET CELLES DE MEMBRES DE VOTRE GOUVERNEMENT, AINSI QUE PAR LA CAMPAGNE MEDIATIQUE HOSTILE A LA FRANCE, A PROPOS DU DERNIER PLAN DE PAIX FRANCAIS CONCU POUR EVITER LA GUERRE TOUT EN SOMMANT L'IRAK D'EVACUER LE KOWEIT, EN APPLICATION DES RESOLUTIONS DU CONSEIL DE SECURITE.

JE DOIS VOUS DIRE QUE J'AI VIVEMENT RESSENTI CES CRITIQUES INJUSTIFIEES. L'OBJET DE NOTRE PROPOSITION ETAIT DE NE NEGLIGER AUCUNE CHANCE, FUT-ELLE MINIME, DE SAUVER LA PAIX AVANT L'EXPIRATION DU DELAI FIXE PAR LES NATIONS UNIES. LA GRANDE MAJORITE DES PAYS DE LA COMMUNAUTE QUI L'ONT SOUTENUE PUBLIQUEMENT, DE MEME QUE LES PAYS NON ALIGNES, LA PLUPART DES PAYS ARABES ET DE TRES NOMBREUSES NATIONS DANS LE MONDE, ONT COMPRIS LE SENS DE CET ULTIME APPEL.

IL ETAIT CONFORME A CE QUE J'AVAIS DECLARE AUX NATIONS UNIES LE 24 SEPTEMBRE. IL TENAIT COMPTE DE LA POSITION DES EUROPEENS ET NE REMETTAIT PAS EN CAUSE LA DATE DU 15 JANVIER.

JE VEUX CROIRE QUE CES CAMPAGNES N'ALTERERONT PAS EN PROFONDEUR LES RELATIONS ENTRE NOS DEUX PAYS. PEUT-ETRE LE MALENTENDU EST-IL VENU DU FAIT QUE JE NE VOUS AI PAS INFORME DE CE PLAN LORS DE VOTRE VISITE A PARIS. JE TIENS A CE QUE VOUS SACHIEZ QU'A L'HEURE OU NOUS NOUS SOMMES QUITTES JE N'AVAIS PAS ENCORE DETERMINE LA FORME DE NOTRE INITIATIVE. LE CLIMAT AMICAL QUI S'EST INSTAURE ENTRE NOUS LORS DE VOTRE VISITE - DONT J'AI, POUR MA PART, GARDE LE MEILLEUR SOUVENIR - ME PERMET DE L'ESPERER.

JE VOUS PRIE D'AGREER, MONSIEUR LE PREMIER MINISTRE, L'EXPRESSION DE MES SENTIMENTS LES MEILLEURS ET CORDIAUX.

SIGNE : FRANCOIS MITTERRAND.

CONFIDENTIAL

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

18 January 1991

Dear Richard,

GULF CRISIS: SOVIET UNION

I enclose a copy of a further message to the Prime Minister from President Gorbachev which was delivered by the Soviet Embassy (Mr. Kossov) this afternoon. It seems a clear attempt to show that the Soviet Union is fully on side and continuing to work with the multinational coalition in the Gulf. I think it would probably be right to send a short reply and I would be grateful for a draft.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely,

(C. D. POWELL)

Richard Gozney, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T22/91

Subject cc Nasser
OPS

The Rt.Hon. Mr.John Major, MP
Prime Minister of Great Britain

Dear Prime Minister,

It is with concern and alarm that we received the news of Iraq having delivered last night a series of missile strikes on the territory of Israel, clearly striving to make the situation in the Middle East and the Gulf even more acute.

From the very beginning of the Kuwait crisis we have constantly and persistently warned about the danger of this type of plans, and stressed that their execution would be a reckless and unjustifiable action which would only aggravate the position of Iraq and create the risk of a new upsurge in Arab-Israel confrontation.

As a matter of urgency we called on Israel, Arab leaders to show restraint and not to succumb to emotions. I believe that relevant approaches undertaken on your part would contribute to prevent a possible escalation of the conflict.

M.GORBACHEV

Moscow, Kremlin
18 January 1991

Его Превосходительству
господину Джону Мейджору,
Премьер-министру Великобритании

Уважаемый господин Премьер-министр,

Мы с озабоченностью и тревогой восприняли сообщение о том, что Ирак в явном стремлении еще более обострить ситуацию на Ближнем Востоке и в Персидском заливе нанес сегодня ночью серию ракетных ударов по территории Израиля.

С момента возникновения кувейтского кризиса мы постоянно и настойчиво предупреждали об опасности такого рода планов, подчеркивали, что их осуществление будет безрассудным, не имеющим оправдания актом, который лишь усугубит положение Ирака, создаст риск новой вспышки арабо-израильского противоборства.

Мы в срочном порядке обратились к Израилю, арабским лидерам с призывом проявить сдержанность, не поддаться эмоциям. Полагаю, что предотвращению возможного разрастания конфликта способствовали бы и соответствующие обращения с Вашей стороны.

М.ГОРБАЧЕВ

Москва, Кремль
18 января 1991 года

file
bc. PC

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

18 January 1991

Dear Simon,

GULF

The Prime Minister had a brief talk on the telephone this evening with General de la Billiere.

The Prime Minister said that the campaign seemed to be going well so far. General de la Billiere agreed, remarking that the most striking feature was the very small number of casualties suffered by the multinational force. The Prime Minister asked for his particular congratulations to be conveyed to Air Vice Marshal Wratten and others involved with the air campaign.

The Prime Minister asked whether the ground forces were in good shape. General de la Billiere said that the current air campaign made little difference to their daily life. They were extremely busy at present: the Prime Minister would know what they were doing.

The Prime Minister referred to the excellent press coverage of the activities of British forces. General de la Billiere agreed that the press had so far behaved responsibly.

The Prime Minister asked whether liaison with the Americans was working well. General de la Billiere was enthusiastic, noting that he now shared a desk with General Schwarzkopf in his war room. This symbolised the extremely close cooperation between the two of them.

Yours sincerely,

(C. D. POWELL)

Simon Webb, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence.

chex.kf/tt/9 **CONFIDENTIAL** (1)

Prime Minister

I think you will want to support this.

CDP 18/1

Treasury Chambers, Parliament Street, SW1P 3AG
071-270 3000

Yes. This is right & supports the line taken in OD(G) on Fri. morning. 18.1

PRIME MINISTER

GULF: OTHER COUNTRIES' CONTRIBUTIONS TO UK MILITARY COSTS

I have been considering the extent to which we have secured financial and material assistance from other countries towards the costs of our military operations in the Gulf. I had been intending to write on this and I gather the subject came up at OD(G) this morning. Thanks largely to the efforts of Douglas Hurd and Tom King and of their Ministerial colleagues and officials, significant assistance has been obtained. I am of course most grateful for those efforts. We have also, as you know, successfully argued that the extent of our military contribution means the cost of economic aid to the front line states should be borne primarily by others.

However, although firm information is difficult to obtain, the United States have it seems secured assistance equivalent to a much larger proportion of their costs than we have. This will not be easy to explain.

I feel there is a strong case therefore for the UK to press for significant further assistance from a number of countries who have so far made useful but not over-generous contributions. The costs (financial and other) of hostilities further strengthens our case. I have in mind of course Japan, European allies like Germany which are not making a significant military effort, Gulf states

including Saudi Arabia and of course Kuwait itself. I do not think we can accept that the Kuwaitis should contribute only a few £ million to us but some $2,500 million to the US.

I look forward to seeing the paper which I understand Douglas Hurd's officials are now preparing on who should be approached and how. In addition to Kuwait and other Gulf states, this will no doubt cover the Japanese and Germans. I also see merit in maintaining contact with the Americans and seeking their cooperation and understanding; the Japanese for example were previously reluctant to provide help to us without American acceptance. I therefore plan to raise the point in general terms with Secretary Brady, Mr Hashimoto and Herr Weigel in the margins of G7 on 20-21 January.

Britain has made a substantially greater contribution than most other countries. In my view we will face serious political criticism if we cannot demonstrate that we have proportionately as good a deal as the Americans. I do not feel that is the case at the moment and there is growing press interest in the position.

I am copying this minute to members of OPD and to Sir Robin Butler.

[N L]

18 January 1991

chex.kf/jg2/10 **CONFIDENTIAL**

Treasury Chambers, Parliament Street, SW1P 3AG
071-270 3000

18 January 1991

Sir Charles Powell KCMG
Private Secretary to
the Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
LONDON
SW1

Dear Charles

KUWAIT AND UK ECONOMIC INTERESTS

The Chancellor has seen the Private Secretary letter from the Foreign Office of 17 January. He strongly supports the recommendation that the Prime Minister should sign a strongly worded message to the Amir of Kuwait.

The Prime Minister may wish to be aware that the Bank of England have authorised the National Bank of Kuwait to use sums provided by the Kuwait Investment Office of up to $100 million in order to honour obligations under letters of credit in favour of suppliers of goods to, or for the benefit of, the legitimate Government of Kuwait. This lends force to the proposals in the draft message that the Kuwaitis should open a procurement office in London, and issue a general contract to the Crown Agents.

As the Prime Minister will know from the Chancellor's minute of today, the Chancellor is strongly of the view that the Kuwaiti Government should be pressed very hard for a worthwhile contribution to the cost of the British military effort to recover their country. He feels that this point needs to be highlighted in the message at least as much as the points about reconstruction contracts, especially as financial assistance could be secured now whereas assurances about contracts could only be promises for the future.

He suggests therefore that a revised draft which highlights the point should be agreed between interested departments for despatch early next week.

I am copying this letter to Martin Stanley (Department of Trade and Industry), Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence), John Neilson (Department of Energy), Suma Chakrabarti (Overseas Development Administration), Simon Gass (FCO) and to Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

Yours,

JG.

JOHN GIEVE
Principal Private Secretary

The National Archives

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TOP SECRET

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Prime Minister

A sober assessment

Jp 01277

Copy No 1 of 5 copies

SIR CHARLES POWELL

c Sir Robin Butler

Iraq: Damage Assessment

I have tried to draw up, with the help of the Ministry of Defence, a very broad-brush assessment of the damage inflicted so far on Iraq's military machine by our air attacks. This has been a difficult task, partly because information is being tightly held by the theatre and partly because we are trying to photograph a moving target. The bombardment continues and there is inevitably a time lag in getting clear pictures. Nor can I be sure that every detail in the attachment is accurate.

2. Nevertheless the message is a clear one: that, although our attacks have been extremely effective, there is a very long way to go. The size of the Iraqi military machine as a whole and of many of the individual airfields and storage centres is such that we are likely to require a significant period of intensive bombardment before we have emasculated Saddam as we would wish. The overhead pictures bear out this impression. In some cases we may not need totally to destroy our targets: for example, we may be able after a certain period to leave attacks on Iraqi airfields and concentrate more on Kuwait. Nevertheless, there are certain targets, in particular those relating to nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, where we have to complete the job. You will see that so far we have destroyed only one storage tank at Salman Pak. There are a large number and the research and production facilities remain untouched. Equally, the Republican Guard apparently remain so far virtually untouched and extremely well protected by anti-aircraft and surface-to-air missiles.

b

3. These are of course very early days. With the attrition of the air defences the going should get easier. Iraqi morale may crack. But on the basis of this very rough early assessment I begin to think that the period originally provided for air bombardment may not prove excessive.

PERCY CRADOCK

18 January 1991

The National Archives

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134422
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ADVANCE COPY

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FM MODUK
TO IMMEDIATE AIG 4116
TELNO U/N
OF 182359Z JANUARY 91
AND TO IMMEDIATE AIG 4366

SIC ACA/I9M
OPERATION GRANBY GENERAL SITREP ONE HUNDRED AND SIXTY TWO 182359Z JAN 91
ADDRESSEES SHOULD DISSEMINATE INFORMATION WITHIN THEIR COMMANDS AS REQUIRED
1. ENEMY SITUATION.
A. THE IRAQI SCUD ATTACKS ON ISRAELI TARGETS ATTRACTED CONDEMNATION BUT WERE CONSIDERED MILITARILY INEFFECTIVE. THE MISSILE FIRED AT DHARAN (AND DESTROYED BY PATRIOT) WAS CONFIRMED TO HAVE BEEN A SCUD. ALL THESE MISSILES CARRIED CONVENTIONAL PAYLOADS. THE ARTILLERY BOMBARDMENT OF THE OIL INSTALLATION NEAR AL MISHAB WAS FOLLOWED TODAY BY AN IRAQI ASTRO ROCKET ATTACK IN THE VICINITY OF HQ 1 MEF. THERE WAS NO DAMAGE AND NO CASUALTIES. 4 ZHUK CLASS ML WERE ENGAGED BY US CAP, 2 WERE DESTROYED, 2 OTHERS WERE THE SUBJECT OF A SEARCH BY LYNX FROM GLOUCESTER AND CARDIFF BUT WERE NOT RELOCATED. IRAQI CAP TRAILING AN A10 FORMATION WERE INTERCEPTED BY RAF F3 CAP BUT CONTACT WAS LOST WHEN TARGETS BROKE AWAY BEFORE ENGAGEMENT. THERE HAS BEEN MODERATE IRAQI AIR ACTIVITY WITH OCCASIONAL REACTION TO ALLIED OPERATIONS BUT WITH NEGLIGABLE EFFECT.
B. IRAQI FRONT LINE TROOP FORMATIONS IN KTO HAVE REPORTED ONLY LIGHT CASUALTIES AFTER ALLIED AIR ATTACKS BUT AIR DEFENCE CO-ORDINATION IS ASSESSED TO BE FRAGMENTED AND INEFFECTIVE THROUGHOUT THE IRAQI MILITARY
C. POTENTIAL REMAINS FOR SCUD ATTACKS ON ISRAELI AND SAUDI TARGETS OVERNIGHT
D. IRAQI LOSSES - 10 AIRCRAFT (6 MIG 29/3 MIRAGE F1/1 SU22) ALSO POSSIBLE 3 F1/1 MIG 25/1 MIG 29
2. POLITICAL SITUATION.
A. DESPITE THE UNPROVOKED SCUD ATTACKS UPON HER CITIES, ISRAEL HAS SHOWN GREAT RESTRAINT AND HAS NOT ENTERED THE CONFLICT. SHE DOES, HOWEVER, STRESS THAT SHE RETAINS THE RIGHT TO RETALIATE
B. SPANISH CONGRESS HAS APPROVED A MOTION SUPPORTING ALLIED POLICY AND THE CONTINUED PRESENCE OF A SPANISH WARSHIP AND LOGISTICAL SUPPORT
C. DANISH PARLIAMENT HAS AGREED TO CONTINUED SUPPORT OF THE ALLIED BLOCKADE

D. INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS PLANS DEPLOYMENT OF 5 FIELD HOSPITAL MODULES (EACH 100 BEDS) AND 5 SURGICAL TEAMS. THESE TEAMS WILL BE DEPLOYED ON BOTH SIDES OF THE CONFLICT
E. TURKISH PARLIAMENT APPROVED USE OF AIRFIELD FOR US OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS, THIS FACILITY ALREADY UTILISED
3. ALLIED OPS.
A. AIR OFFENSIVE OF COMBINED AIR AND SSM ATTACK CONTINUES WITH BALANCE NOW TO BE STRUCK BETWEEN ATTACKS ON IRAQI AIR ASSETS AND GROUND FORCES IN KTO. SUCCESSES INCLUDE MOBILE SCUD SYSTEMS, AIRFIELDS, AAA AND VEHICLES
B. NIGHT BOMBARDMENT WILL NOW CONCENTRATE ON AAA UNITS RATHER THAN SAM, TO REDUCE THREAT TO ALLIED AIRCRAFT
C. TOTAL MISSIONS FLOWN 2170 WITH 196 MISSILES LAUNCHED. 80PC SUCCESSFUL
D. ALLIED LOSSES 8 AIRCRAFT (4 RAF AIRCREW STILL MISSING) BREAKDOWN 1 F18/1 F15/2 A6 (US)/2GR1(UK)/1 GR1 (ITALIAN)/1 A4 (KUWAITI)
4. RN OPS ALL UNITS OPERATIONAL IN ASSIGNED PATROL AREAS. GLO AND CAR IN CLOSE AAW SUPPORT OF TLAMS OPERATIONS
5. LAND OPS.
A. 1 (BR) ARMD DIV HAS CONTINUED TO REDEPLOY TO ITS CONCENTRATION AREA. UP-ARMOURING AND COMBAT PREPARATIONS HAVE BEEN PROGRESSED
B. S OF S TODAY APPROVED DEPLOYMENT OF A PW HANDLING FORCE. ADVANCE ELEMENTS OF THIS INF BN GP, CONSISTING OF 1 COLM GDS AND AN RE TP WILL FLY TO THEATRE 20 JAN. BALANCE WILL DEPLOY 25-28 JAN
C. UK FORCES HAVE COMMENCED NAPS TREATMENT AS A PRECAUTION AGAINST NERVE AGENT ATTACK
6. RAF OPS. 42 TORNADO SORTIES FLOWN BY NIGHT AND 7 JAGUAR SORTIES BY DAY. GR1S TASKING TO AIRFIELD DENIAL WITH JP233. JAGUARS ATTACKED VEHICLES AND AAA ASSETS IN KTO AS WELL AS STORAGE FACILITIES ON COAST. HEAVY AAA EXPERIENCED OVER TARGET AREAS. OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE MISSIONS CONTINUE. 3 GR1 APPROVED FOR DEPLOYMENT FROM UK TO REPLACE 2 LOST IN ACTION AND 1 WHICH SUFFERED BIRD STRIKE. GR1A (RECCE VARIANTS) FLEW FIRST MISSIONS TONIGHT
7. LOGS. PREPARATIONS PROGRESSING SATISFACTORILY FOR THE LAND BATTLE AND ON COURSE FOR READINESS BY TARGET DATE 31 JAN. AIR ORDNANCE EXPENDITURE IS AT PLANNED RATE WITH NO SUPPLY PROBLEMS
8. MOV. NOW RE-ESTABLISHED AFTER TEMPORARY MOVEMENT SUSPENSION YESTERDAY
BT

YYYY

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

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PERSONAL

34a-d

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB
Telephone 071-21 82111/3

MO 6/17/15/1J

18th January 1991

Dear Charles

REPORT FROM RIYADH

The Defence Secretary's colleagues might find it useful to see the attached report from Commanders on Operations today in the Gulf.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries to members of OPD(G) and to Sir Robin Butler.

Yours sincerely

pp (S WEBB)
Private Secretary

Sir Charles Powell KCMG
10 Downing Street

PERSONAL
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CDS 2066/2/1

MOD Repro Copy No 1 of 7

18 Jan 91

PS/Secretary of State

THE VIEW FROM RIYADH 181945Z JAN 91

1. CDS and the Joint Commander discussed today's operations with inputs from General Schwarzkopf, Gen de la Billiere and AVM Wratten. The main subject of discussion was last night's SCUD attacks. Gen Schwarzkopf reported that, contrary to media statements, of the 7 missiles apparently fired towards Israel 2 had landed in Iraq, 1 in the Mediterranean, and 4 on Israel. He had been bombarded all day with "wild schemes" for retaliation by the Israelis which almost went so far as to demand US support for their implementation. Not unnaturally this had worried him considerably and he had despatched the Vice Chief of his Air Force with a planner to explain to the Israelis all that the USA was doing to contain the threat. They would emphasis that they cannot give a 100% guarantee of protection but that SCUD fixed and mobile sites were being given top priority in allied attack plans. Incidentally, he is also under similar pressure from the Saudis. You will be aware that 2 groups of mobile launchers were found and attacked in Southern Iraq today by A10s, F16s and F18s. 6 in one group and 4 in the other had been destroyed but bad weather had intervened although radar guided bombing of these targets continues. Gen Schwartzkopf also added that he expected more SCUD activity overnight and he doubted that the Israelis would not respond to a second attack. (He felt that the Egyptians and Syrians would be more understanding of Israeli retaliation if the Iraqis were to use CW weapons.) Schwarzkopf is under considerable pressure also from Washington to act against SCUD launchers. As a result planned raids by UK Tornados tonight from Muharraq and Dhahran have been cancelled as their supporting defence suppression aircraft have been deployed to take part in very heavily concentrated raids on targets in Western Iraq.

2. To review activities today:

a. Allied Air Forces had continued to attack strategic targets such as missile storage sites and nuclear reactor sites, the latter being targeted by US F111s from Turkey. It was acknowledged that earlier attacks on nuclear sites had not been very successful.

b. Power stations which showed signs of coming back on line had been revisited but the main emphasis, apart from SCUD, had been on the airfields H2 and H3.

c. 155 sorties had been planned against Republican Guard Forces today but few had been mounted due to heavy cloud cover. B52s had carried out high level bombing runs and would continue to do so although the forecast is for poor weather until 21st of January. The Northern RGFC Divisions are still formed in target rich concentrations which makes them more vulnerable than when deployed tactically.

d. UK Jaguars had been in action today in the Kuwait theatre of operations but had again been hampered by poor cloud cover although they had achieved a good attack on a military storage area on the coast.

3. Planned activity overnight includes:

a. 2 UK Tornado GR1a (recce) sorties, airborne at the time of writing, to search for mobile SCUD launchers. They are flying without defence suppression aircraft relying on high speed at low level.

b. Between 8 and 10 sorties of Tornado GR1s from Tabuk will contribute to raids on H2 and H3.

c. The USN will launch a further 93 Tomahawks. Schwarzkopf has been very impressed by their accuracy and reliability (no misfires to date).

4. Response by the Iraqi Air Force remains very light and there has been no deployment of their offensive aircraft which remain in protected shelters. 2 Fulcrums had been downed by US F15 Fighters in the vicinity of Al Assad airfield and 1 US OV-10 (artillery spotter aircraft) had ditched in the Gulf. After the first 40 hours or so of the air plan, reactive hot planning is now being used and is working well. A particular feature of this is a review of the worth of continuing to attack airfields which are very heavily defended by AAA when other targets might prove to be more lucrative. An interesting snippet was that 2 Iraqi Russian built Ilyushin-76 CANDID passenger aircraft were escorted by Iraqi fighters today in Northern Iraq to a boundary with Iran whence they were taken on to Tehran by Iranian fighters. They could have been transferring VIPs. The attacks against Saddam Hussein last night by F117As were thought to be unsuccessful and the whereabouts of Saddam Hussein is now unknown.

5. In response to questions from CDS the Joint Commander confirmed that Gen Schwarzkopf is under no pressure from Washington to introduce ground forces. He has stated categorically that he will not do so, as a part of a planned offensive, until he is ready in mid-February but retains the option to take advantage of any collapse in Iraqi positions before that date. He will, however, maintain a weather eye on the attrition rates of the RGFC formations.

6. Other points:

a. All commanders agree that battle damage assessment remains unsatisfactory but most of this is attributable to inclement weather.

b. The Joint Commander is not optimistic about the fate of the crew of the second Tornado which was lost. A report that Bedouins had found them was discounted as the position was inside Kuwait and 70 miles away from where the aircraft was known to have crashed very close to the Shaibah airfield in Iraq.

7. In conclusion Commanders were very pleased with the air campaign and although initial success rates had been lower than they would have liked (but realistic) and that as a result there would be a need to revisit more targets and more often, they were most gratified by the low attrition rates of our air forces.

D G LITTLEJOHNS
Cdre
PSO/CDS
MB6173 83353MB

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1A 2AH

18 January 1991

Dear Dominic

Debate on the Gulf: 21 January

Thank you for your letter of 18 January about the proposed official Labour amendment to the Government motion.

As I said on the telephone to Andrew Turnbull and you, the Foreign Secretary would prefer to see the amendment refer to the international community returning with renewed vigour to [illegible] policies to secure a solution to wider problems of security in the Middle East. He would also like to see the deletion of the reference at the end of the amendment to the specific UN Security Council Resolutions.

I have told Matthew Hooberman in Mr Kaufman's office that thoughts on these lines have been fed to the Lord President and Chief Whip and that it therefore made little sense for this office to try to negotiate language with Matthew Hooberman or Mr Kaufman.

Yours ever

Richard Gozney

(R H T Gozney)
Private Secretary

Dominic Morris Esq
10 Downing Street

MIDDLE EAST: Jrl Pt 38



please help
VAS

10 DOWNING STREET

CHARLES

General de la Billiere

Tonight it will have to be on Brahms.
010 966 1 465 3666

Tomorrow, Brahms or STU (?) (via MOD).

MOD would like to know as Gen de la B is turning in shortly.

D 18/1

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Sign and date next to the reason why the record is not available to the public ie. Closed under FOI exemption; Retained under section 3(4) of the Public Records Act 1958; Temporarily retained; Missing at transfer or Number not used.

Your ref:
Our ref:

DM no see
CM 18/1

Scottish National Party

18 January 1991

Rt Hon John Major MP
The Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
London SW1

Dear Prime Minister,

OPPOSITION PARTIES' BROADCASTS ON THE GULF WAR

I understand that, following your television broadcast on the Gulf war yesterday evening, the Leader of the Opposition is to be given a response this evening and the Leader of the Liberal Democrats may be afforded a similar opportunity.

In view of the vital importance of this issue, I am sure you will agree it is essential that all parties' views on events in the Gulf are given fair treatment. Whilst the Scottish National Party of course supports the allied forces, we do as you know have criticisms of several aspects of Government policy which are shared by many people in this country, although not by the leaders of the Labour or Liberal Democratic parties, but which, as part of the democratic process, deserve to be given an airing.

You may well recall previous issues raised by the SNP regarding replies to Ministerial broadcasts, e.g. following the Budget. Given the centrality of events in the Gulf to politics at present, I trust you will agree that it is even more important that the second largest party in Scotland is able to put across its point of view on this issue on a fair and equal basis.

I would therefore ask you to support the request I have sent today to the BBC and the Independent Television Commission that the Scottish National Party be given the opportunity to make a similar broadcast, to be carried by BBC Scotland and the Independent Television companies in Scotland. In view of the urgency of the situation, I would ask you to reply to me by fax at this number (031-226 7373) as soon as possible.

Yours sincerely,

Alex Salmond MP

pp Alex Salmond MP
National Convener, Scottish National Party

Scottish National Party, 6 North Charlotte Street, Edinburgh EH2 4JH.

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DEPARTMENT/SERIES PREM 19 PIECE/ITEM 3443/3 (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract details: Letter from Powell to Gozney dated 18 January 1991 – THE GULF	[redacted]
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Enter the department and series,
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Enter the piece and item references, .
eg. 28, 1079, 84/1, 107/3

Enter extract details if it is an extract rather than a whole piece.
This should be an indication of what the extract is,
eg. Folio 28, Indictment 840079, E107, Letter dated 22/11/1995.
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TO DESKBY 181930Z FCO
TELNO 178
OF 181923Z JANUARY 91
AND TO IMMEDIATE DAMASCUS, RIYADH, BAHRAIN, DOHA, TEL AVIV
AND TO IMMEDIATE JERUSALEM, MUSCAT, SANA'A, ALGIERS, TUNIS
AND TO IMMEDIATE PARIS, UKDEL NATO, UKMIS NEW YORK, ACTOR

ADVANCE COPY

OUR TELNO 175: IRAQI ATTACK ON ISRAEL

1. ON 18 JANUARY WE SPOKE TO THE WHITE HOUSE (CHARLES) TO FOLLOW UP OUR TALKS WITH HER LATE ON 17 JANUARY (WHICH WERE REPORTED AT THE TIME BY TELEPHONE TO THE EMERGENCY UNIT). WE HAVE ALSO SPOKEN TO STATE (COVEY).

2. BOTH SAID THAT AFTER INTENSIVE CONSULTATIONS LAST NIGHT BETWEEN THE US AND ISRAEL, THE LATTER NOW SEEMED TO HAVE DECIDED NOT TO RETALIATE. (NEITHER WERE ABLE TO CONFIRM THAT ANY HARD AND FAST GUARANTEE HAD BEEN OBTAINE. THE PRESIDENT WAS ASKED AT A PRESS CONFERENCE ON 18 JANUARY WHETHER THE ISRAELIS HAD AGREED NOT TO RETALIATE AND FUDGED HIS ANSWER.) THE KEY-ELEMENTS IN THE ISRAELI DECISION WERE PROBABLY THE LIMITED CASUALTIES AND THE FACT THAT CW HAD NOT BEEN USED.

3. WE UNDERSTAND THAT IN HIS TALKS WITH ARENS, CHENEY MADE CLEAR THAT THE US ALREADY HAD ALL THE POSSIBLE MILITARY TARGETS AGAINST WHICH ISRAEL MIGHT WANT TO RETALIATE COVERED. HE ARGUED STRONGLY THAT ISRAELI ACTION WAS THEREFORE UNNECESSARY.

4. BOTH THE WHITE HOUSE AND STATE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE EXTREMELY HARD TO RESTRAIN THE ISRAELIS AGAIN IF THE IRAQIS WERE ABLE TO LAUNCH ANOTHER ATTACK. BOTH WERE APPREHENSIVE ABOUT WHAT MIGHT HAPPEN: POSSIBLY TONIGHT AND, IF NOT THEN, IN THE FUTURE. THE POSSIBLE SCENARIOS WERE OBVIOUS. WE HAVE REPORTED SEPARATELY (OUR JICTEL 11) THAT THE US ASSESSMENT IS THAT IRAQ STILL RETAINS A SERIOUS MISSILE CAPABILITY.

5. COVEY SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN BRIEFED ABOUT OUR PROPOSED PLAN OF ACTION IN THE EVENT OF ANOTHER IRAQI ATTACK WHICH LED TO ISRAELI RETALIATION (YOUR TELNO 43 TO CAIRO). HE SAID THAT THE US WOULD CERTAINLY WANT TO TAKE SIMILAR ACTION AND AGREED THAT IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO TRY TO DO SO IN PARALLEL.

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SIR P CRADOCK, 10 DOWNING ST
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CHIEF OF ASSESSMENTS STAFF
(CABINET OFFICE VIA H29)
MR REEVES CAB OFFICE (VIA H29)
MR APPLEYARD CAB OFFICE (H29)
MR D GOWAN CAB OFFICE (H29)
HD/SEC (O) (C) MODUK
RESIDENT CLERK

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10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

18 January 1991

ISRAEL/IRAQ

I enclose a copy of a letter to the Prime Minister from Mr. Shamir.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

CHARLES POWELL

Richard Gozney, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

(2)

EMBASSY OF ISLAND
2 PALACE GREEN
LONDON, W8 4QB
Telephone: 071-937 8050
Fax: 071-937 5184

שגרירות ישראל
לונדן

18th January 1991

Dear Prime Minister,

I have been requested by Mr Yitzhak Shamir, the Israeli Prime Minister to transmit to you his enclosed message.

Sincerely,

Y. Biran

Yoav Biran
Ambassador of Israel

The Rt. Hon. Mr John Major, MP,
Prime Minister,
10, Downing Street,
London S W 1.

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
PALACE GREEN
LONDON, W8 4QB
Telephone: 071-937 8050
Fax: 071-937 5184

שגרירות ישראל
לונדון

Subject cc master
ops.

18th January 1991

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T21/91

Dear Prime Minister,

I would like to extend to you and through you to the Royal Armed Forces, our heartfelt wishes for great success in your Mission in the Gulf, side by side with the U.S. and other forces, which we follow closely. May God be with you in these fateful hours and days. Our heart is with the families of the pilots missing in action.

May I take this opportunity to acknowledge gratefully the sympathy you have shown to our country following the inhuman, unprovoked and unjustified Iraqi missile attack on our civilian population. Unfortunately, it has been yet another proof to the vicious nature of the Iraqi tyrant and his regime.

With our warmest wishes,

Sincerely,

Y. Shamir,



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A. FRANCE

Subject cc Marker

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

18 January 1991

PRIME MINISTER'S TALK WITH PRESIDENT MITTERRAND

The Prime Minister had a talk with President Mitterrand this morning lasting some 15 minutes.

The Prime Minister began by thanking the President for his hospitality in Paris on 14 January. He had found their meeting most enjoyable and profitable. President Mitterrand said that by a coincidence he had just signed off a letter to the Prime Minister. The letter came in two parts. The first expressed surprise about the tone of comments in the British media concerning France's peace initiative in the Gulf. The second identified a possible reason for this anti-French campaign. There may have been a misunderstanding when he and the Prime Minister had met. He had distinctly told the Prime Minister that France would pursue initiatives to avoid a conflict in the Gulf right up to the deadline. But, at the time he and the Prime Minister had spoken, he had no specific initiative in mind and the matter was entirely undecided. He wished to apologise if the Prime Minister did not feel that he had been fully informed. The Prime Minister said it was most kind of the President to have written. He fully understood that the President had not at the time of their talk formulated an initiative. He had himself taken the opportunity in the House of Commons the preceding day to welcome the French contribution to the military campaign to remove Iraq from Kuwait. He was sorry to see that two French aircraft had been damaged. The President said there had been no fatalities. For his part, he mourned the loss of two British aircraft.

The Prime Minister said he wanted to make two points to the President. First he thought it would be useful if he and the President could keep in close and regular touch, particularly in this very difficult period, and discuss events as they unfolded. President Mitterrand interjected that this was very easy: he was always available. The Prime Minister continued that his second point concerned the even greater difficulties which would now be encountered as a result of Iraq's attack on Israel. We had gone to some trouble during the night to persuade Israel not to respond but it was, of

course, asking a great deal of any country not to respond when it had been attacked. The Iraqi action had imported a new and dangerous element in the Gulf conflict. President Mitterrand commented that some of the reactions in Israel had been absurd. Mr. Ben-Elissar had attacked France for supplying Iraq with missiles. His predecessor had let Iraq have the elements of a nuclear power station, while he had refused to rebuild it after it had been destroyed by the Israelis. This had embittered his relations with Saddam Hussein. The Israeli reaction had not gone down at all well in France. The Prime Minister referred to the missile attack on Dhahran during the night. The President, seeming to think that France was being accused once more, observed emphatically that they were Soviet missiles. The Prime Minister said we could only wait and see how Israel responded to the Iraqi attack. If they felt they had to do something he hoped that they would move against military and not civilian targets. President Mitterrand thought it would be a great mistake for Israel to respond. They could not do nearly as much damage to Iraq as could the United States.

The Prime Minister concluded that he had only wanted to have this brief exchange with the President and suggest they make a habit of talking regularly. President Mitterrand said they should certainly do that. He had noticed and welcomed what the Prime Minister had said about France in the House of Commons. They should talk again very soon, and he would initiate the call next time.

The President was a little starchy throughout and by the sound of things his letter may turn out to be rather stiff. He seems convinced that France is being unjustly pilloried by the British media (and the Israelis) and does not like it.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence) and to Sir Robin Butler.

C.D. POWELL

Richard Gozney, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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file

subject cc master

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

18 January 1991

PRIME MINISTER'S TALK WITH CHANCELLOR KOHL

The Prime Minister had a further talk on the telephone with Chancellor Kohl this morning about the situation in the Gulf.

The Prime Minister said it had been a lively night with the SCUD attack on Israel and Dhahran. It had been a stroke of good fortune that the missiles had not caused much greater damage and loss of life. Chancellor Kohl suggested that it also showed that the Israelis were not quite as alert and technologically capable as often supposed. The Prime Minister continued that we had devoted some effort to trying to persuade the Israelis not to retaliate, pointing out that the multi-national force were better placed to deal with Iraqi targets than the Israelis. He was not at all sure that the Israelis would hold back, but we had to make the attempt. We probably should not know until they actually took action. It was quite likely that Saddam Hussein would launch a further attack against Israel.

The Prime Minister continued that the first 24-hours of the air campaign had been successful, although not so much of a clean sweep as the press suggested. It took some while to assess the detailed results of the air strikes but the dominant impression was how much remained still to be done. He did not expect the conflict to be brought to a speedy end. Chancellor Kohl said that even so, the air campaign had gone better than he expected. He noted that President Gorbachev had called on Saddam Hussein to desist and withdraw, but his appeal was likely to have no effect. Personally he had always cherished the hope that Saddam Hussein would withdraw at the very last minute. But he seemed to be someone with a bunker mentality, who had lost all touch with reality.

Chancellor Kohl said he recognised that the Prime Minister had some very difficult decisions to face. He simply wanted to extend his heartfelt sympathy and good wishes. The Prime Minister said they should keep in close touch in the days and weeks ahead.

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I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence) and to Sir Robin Butler.

CHARLES POWELL

Richard Gozney Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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FCS/91/012

HOME SECRETARY

Gulf Crisis: Immigration Controls on Iraqi Nationals

File with CDP

1. Thank you for your minute of 17 January proposing a number of steps to tighten immigration controls on Iraqi nationals.

2. I agree to the introduction of the three measures you propose, though I hope the change in the Immigration Rules providing for Iraqi nationals to be refused visas, entry or extensions of stay can be implemented flexibly.

3. I am copying this minute to the Prime Minister, other members of OPD(G), the Secretary of State for Transport and Sir Robin Butler.

(DOUGLAS HURD)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
18 January 1991

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

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c: Soviet

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

18 January 1991

SOVIET UNION: THE GULF

Thank you for your letter of 17 January enclosing a draft reply from the Prime Minister to President Gorbachev. This may issue in the very slightly amended form enclosed.

Charles Powell

Christopher Prentice, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

18 January 1991

Dear Richard

We have had through the usual channels the text of the amendment the Opposition have in mind to the Government motion for Monday's debate. Their draft is attached. At first blush I am far from enthusiastic about it. But I would be grateful for your quick comments.

Yours ever

Dominic

Dominic Morris

Richard Gozney Esq

Proposed Labour Amendment

Reafirms the aims of the action in the Gulf set out in the Security Council Resolutions and the efforts to minimise casualties in the region; and expresses its determination that, once the aggression in Kuwait is reversed, the UN must return with renewed vigour to pursuing policies to secure a just and lasting solution to the wider problems of security in the Middle East on the basis of Security Council Resolutions 242, 338, 672 and 681.

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

18 January 1991

THE GULF: DEBATE ON 21 JANUARY

It is unclear at present who will open the debate on the Gulf on Monday 21 January. One possibility is that the Prime Minister will do it: the Defence Secretary is the most likely alternative. In either case the speech will have to deal with the military situation over the first four or five days of hostilities in the Gulf, and we would need to look to MOD for a draft. It would be very helpful to have some material at least by tomorrow 19 January if at all possible.

I am copying this letter to Richard Gozney (Foreign and Commonwealth Office).

Charles Powell

Simon Webb Esq
Ministry of Defence

MANAGEMENT IN CONFIDENCE

c: Special

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

18 January 1991

Thank you for your letter of 17 January setting out the position on the proposal that a special allowance should be paid to Service personnel serving in arduous conditions in the desert in Saudi Arabia. The Prime Minister is content with the approach proposed in the penultimate paragraph of your letter.

Charles Powell

Miss J.R. Binstead
Ministry of Defence

MANAGEMENT IN CONFIDENCE

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PRIME MINISTER

cc Sir Robin Butler
Sir Percy Cradock

OPD(G): 18 January: Overnight Action Points

You may want to deal with these points at the start of Item 1.

Iraqi missile attack on Israel

2. You will want to discuss the implications of the Iraqi missile attack on Israel. Seven Scud missiles with conventional warheads struck Israel with 2 landing in Tel Aviv, 2 in Haifa and 3 south of Tel Aviv. There were only light casualties (7 people slightly injured) although there was extensive damage. You might ask the Defence Secretary and Sir Percy Cradock to summarise what we know of the military/intelligence background.

3. You might say a word about the contacts between Number 10 and the White House overnight and your statement condemning the attacks, about which President Bush also expressed outrage. Mr Cheney spoke to Mr Arens to urge restraint and (we understand) President Bush contacted Mr Shamir later. The Foreign Secretary can report the approaches made by our Ambassadors in Tel Aviv and Amman to deliver a similar message.

4. So far the Israelis have acted with commendable restraint though (understandably) they have reserved the right to defend themselves. The Israeli Government has announced that it was approached by the US and British Governments and the Israeli Cabinet is meeting now. The indications are that the Israelis may hold their fire for

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b.

the moment, while the allied air forces continue their hunt for the mobile missile launchers, putting their present restraint into their political credit account with the US Government. If there are further, more serious attacks, that could well be a different matter. (I shd. jehow).

Air campaign

5. You will have seen the note overnight from the Chief of the Defence Staff on General Schwarzkopf's analysis of the campaign so far. Overnight another Tornado loss was recorded with no news of the crew. The aircraft crashed on a mission near Al Rumaylah, where the first Tornado was also lost. Tornado operations continue with 7 sorties earlier this morning. US aircraft flew their first sorties from Turkish airbases. There are reports of further US aircraft lost.

6. There were reports from the theatre of Iraqi deploymanet of Mirage F1s to Jordan, presumably to keep them safe from attack. Sir Charles Powell mentioned this to General Scowcroft overnight but the latter had no information. The FCO are pursuing this with the State Department to see whether there is any foundation in the report which could, if true, have serious implications for Jordan.

LV Appleyard

L V Appleyard

Cabinet Office
18 January 1991

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SIC

OUR TELNO 158: IRAQ/KUWAIT: WASHINGTON SITREP

SUMMARY

1. HIGH LEVEL OF PUBLIC OPTIMISM CONTINUES BUT ADMINISTRATION LOOK TO A LONGER HAUL. GOOD MEDIA COVERAGE OF BRITISH CONTRIBUTION.

DETAIL

2. THROUGHOUT 17 JANUARY THERE HAS BEEN INTENSE PREOCCUPATION HERE WITH THE PROGRESS OF THE WAR. ACCORDING TO A GALLUP POLL ON 17 JANUARY, PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN THE CONDUCT OF OPERATION DESERT STORM IS HIGH (84 PER CENT), AS IS PRESIDENT BUSH'S PERSONAL APPROVAL RATING (81 PER CENT). EIGHTY SIX PER CENT SUPPORT THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION TO GO TO WAR (ALTHOUGH WELL-PUBLICISED DEMONSTRATIONS CONTINUE IN MAJOR CITIES).

3. DESCRIBING DESERT STORM AS A MILITARY OPERATION OF QUOTE UNPRECEDENTED SIZE AND COMPLEXITY UNQUOTE, THE WHITE HOUSE SPOKESMAN CONFIRMED THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD BEEN HEARTENED BY REPORTS OF INITIAL SUCCESS AND LOW ALLIED CASUALTIES. BUT THE PRESIDENT WARNED AGAIN ON 17 JANUARY OF THE NEED FOR PERSPECTIVE: QUOTE NO ONE SHOULD ASSUME THIS CONFLICT WILL BE SHORT OR EASY UNQUOTE. ASKED WHETHER HE SOUGHT IRAQ'S UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER, THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT HE WAS NOT INTERESTED IN SEMANTICS. THERE WOULD BE NO CONCESSIONS TO IRAQ. SADDAM HAD TO QUOTE GET OUT OF KUWAIT UNQUOTE AND THE USE OF FORCE WOULD CONTINUE UNTIL IRAQ COMPLIED FULLY WITH SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS. ASKED ABOUT CONTACTS WITH IRAQ, STATE SAID

THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO DIRECT OR INDIRECT CONTACTS SINCE HOSTILITIES BEGAN: THERE WAS QUOTE NO DIPLOMACY GOING ON UNQUOTE.

4. THE WHITE HOUSE HAVE SAID THEY ARE PLEASED BY THE BROAD BIPARTISAN SUPPORT FROM CONGRESS. BUT SENATE ATTEMPTS TODAY TO AGREE A RESOLUTION SUPPORTING US FORCES IN THE FIELD HAVE BEEN DELAYED BY ARGUMENTS OVER A TEXT. THE DEMOCRATIC LEADERSHIP ARE WARY OF INCLUDING AN ENDORSEMENT OF THE PRESIDENT'S POLICY: REPUBLICANS ARGUE THAT IT WOULD BE INVIDIOUS TO SUPPORT US FORCES WITHOUT SUPPORTING THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF. THE DIFFICULTIES ARE MORE ACUTE IN THE SENATE THAN THE HOUSE AND PROVIDE EVIDENCE THAT THERE IS MORE OPPOSITION TO DESERT STORM BENEATH THE SURFACE THAN CONGRESSMEN ARE WILLING TO ADMIT IN PUBLIC. BUT THE HILL'S CONCERN AT THIS STAGE WILL BE TO AVOID ANY ACTION THAT WOULD UNDERMINE EFFORTS IN THE GULF (OR COULD BE HELD AGAINST THEM IN THE EVENT OF A QUICK VICTORY).
5. SATURATION COVERAGE OF THE WAR CONTINUES. THE PROMINENT BRITISH ROLE IN THE INITIAL AIR STRIKES HAS BEEN WELL RECOGNISED, WITH MEDIA REFERENCES TO QUOTE A MASSIVE DEMONSTRATION OF US AND BRITISH AIR POWER UNQUOTE. PRIME MINISTERIAL AND OTHER STATEMENTS HAVE BEEN CARRIED LIVE THROUGHOUT THE DAY ON TELEVISION AND RADIO.

ACLAND

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

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HD/UND
MR PRIDDLE, DEPT OF ENERGY
MR APPLEYARD CABINET OFFICE
MR W D REEVES CABINET OFFICE
SIR C CURWEN CABINET OFFICE
MR CHARLTON CABINET OFFICE
PS/NUMBER 10 DOWNING ST
SIR P CRADOCK, 10 DOWNING ST

MR GOULDEN
MR JAY
MR BERMAN (LEGAL ADVISERS)
HD/MED
HD/AMD
HD/CONSULAR D
HD/ECD(E)
HD/NAD
HD/NEWS D
HD/NENAD
HD/NPDD

CABINET OFFICE DIO
SIR ROBIN BUTLER, CAB OFFICE
LT COL CRONIN CAB OFFICE
MR SHAPLAND CAB OFFICE
AUS (C) MODUK
HD/SEC (O) (C) MODUK
MR LS SMITH BANK ENGLAND
MR WICKS HMT
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SIC

IRAQI ATTACK ON ISRAEL
1. SHORTLY AFTER RECEIVING NEWS OF THE IRAQI MISSILE ATTACK ON ISRAEL INVOLVING SOME CW USE, THE ADMINISTRATION CONTACTED THE ISRAELIS TO URGE RESTRAINT. CLARKE (POL MIL BUREAU) HAS TOLD US THAT AS OF 180130Z JAN. CHENEY WAS SPEAKING TO ARENS AND EAGLEBURGER WAS TRYING TO GET THROUGH TO SHAMIR.
2. WE ALSO UNDERSTAND FROM THE WHITE HOUSE THAT SCOWCROFT IS SPEAKING TO SIR C. POWELL, SUGGESTING PARALLEL UK ACTION.

which we are taking off.

ACLAND

YYYY

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RESIDENT CLERK

Prime Minister

Friday 18 January 1991

CMS
18/1

HOME SECRETARY SENDS GULF POLICY MESSAGE TO BRITAIN'S MUSLIM COMMUNITY

The Home Secretary, the Rt Hon. Kenneth Baker MP, today underlined the importance of the British Muslim community's contribution in terms of the economy, the professions and in many other walks of life. He was concerned that events in the Gulf should not be allowed to divide the communities in their day to day lives in this country.

Mr Baker's comments came after the unavoidable cancellation of a projected visit tomorrow to Glasgow, including the Glasgow Central Mosque. The Home Secretary said he much regretted that the pressure of events in the Gulf required his presence in London and had caused his visit to be postponed. He was anxious that an opportunity be found to rearrange the visit in the near future.

Mr Baker's statement said:

"Had I been with you, the message I would have given to the Muslim community is this.

The action which the international community is taking against Iraq is on behalf of a Muslim country and is supported by still more Muslim countries. This is not an international disagreement based on religious differences. It is about the principle that nations such as Kuwait have the right to independence and freedom. That right is being upheld by the United Nations, and the Allied forces are being deployed in the Gulf at the express request of Muslim states.

The Muslim community in Britain will have different views on how the situation in the Gulf should be resolved. The right to hold different views is a fundamental freedom which all of us in Britain enjoy. But the different perceptions of what is happening in the Gulf held by some parts of the British Muslim community should not be seen as calling into question their loyalty to their adopted country.

I was therefore deeply concerned to learn of the arson attack on a mosque in Batley earlier this week. I was particularly shocked at the thought that this mindless attack might perhaps have been made by people who believe, wrongly, that all Muslims in this country are active supporters of the aggressor, Saddam Hussein.

I want to make it clear that we will not tolerate any such actions taken against law abiding citizens in this country.

The Muslim community in Britain makes a great contribution to family life and economic life. We respect your contribution and your beliefs. Britain has traditionally offered a home to a diversity of cultures and views. Our long tradition of free expression and tolerance is strong enough to let all these views be expressed."



Israel (Iraqi Attack)

11 am

The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Mr. Douglas Hurd): Earlier this morning, seven Scud missiles, fired from mobile launchers in Iraq, struck Israel. They are reported to have landed at or near Tel Aviv, in Haifa and near Nazareth. The missiles carried conventional warheads.

The Israeli Government have shown great restraint over the past five and a half months, restraint which we warmly applaud. Earlier this morning, the Prime Minister issued a statement saying that he was appalled at the Iraqi attack. The House will want to join the Prime Minister and myself in condemning this outrageous attack on Israel's civilian population. It will be seen in all parts of the world as a reckless ploy to widen the conflict. The House will note that the attack was wholly indiscriminate, and it is a miracle that no one was killed.

During the night we were in close touch with the United States' Administration and with the Governments of Israel and certain Arab countries. I have spoken this morning to the Israeli Foreign Minister and to the Egyptian Foreign Minister.

We understand fully the anger of the Israeli Government and people and their responsibility for the defence of their own country. We have asked them to understand in turn the need to retain the greatest possible support for the military action being undertaken against Iraq, including among the Arab nations who have joined us in that action or who support it. Israel has the right of self-defence, and no one can take that decision from them; but we believe that restraint by Israel at this time would be interpreted as strength not weakness, given the powerful military operation now under way against Iraq in pursuit of the objectives laid down by the United Nations.

Mr. Gerald Kaufman (Manchester, Gorton): I am grateful to the Foreign Secretary for his statement. The House would appreciate it if the right hon. Gentleman or a relevant colleague would continue to provide statements to the House whenever appropriate.

The Opposition totally condemn the missile attack on Israel, an attack entirely without provocation on a country that is in no way involved either in the Gulf dispute or the current hostilities. It is a wanton act of aggression, based on vicious prejudice. I share the relief that there were no serious casualties.

While I understand completely the sense of outrage of the Israelis at the deliberate provocation, I trust that they will not be provoked. Their restraint so far has been exemplary. Saddam Hussein has taken this action cynically to set a trap for the Israelis. I hope that the Israelis will not fall into that trap by making a military response. The cause of ending Saddam Hussein's aggression will more likely be damaged than enhanced by an Israeli military response.

This action emphasises the basic evil of the Iraqi regime, from which the Iraqi people, the Kurds and, most recently, the Kuwaitis, have suffered. Now that military action by the coalition, under United Nations authority, is under way, it is more essential than ever that it be brought to a speedy and successful conclusion.

Mr. Hurd: I am grateful to the right hon. Member for Manchester, Gorton (Mr. Kaufman) for what he said, which suggests that there is widespread agreement on the subject in the House.

Mr. Michael Stern (Bristol, North-West): Does my right hon. Friend agree that the statements appearing to emanate from the Israeli Government that they are prepared not to take action in retaliation are one of the most hopeful signs that have emerged from the conflict so far? Does he agree that, if they are seen to follow the precept set out by Shakespeare in Act 4 of "The Merchant of Venice"—that

"The quality of mercy is not strained"—

they will materially contribute to a successful conclusion to many of the problems in the Gulf?

Mr. Hurd: When I spoke to Mr. Levi, this morning, the meeting of the Israeli Cabinet was still proceeding, and he courteously came out to speak to me, so I cannot confirm what my hon. Friend said. I laid before Mr. Levi certain considerations. The Israelis have a difficult decision to make, and we understand fully the difficulty in which they are placed.

Sir Russell Johnston (Inverness, Nairn and Lochaber): Does the Foreign Secretary agree that this happening underlines the luck in war, because there could have been hundreds of dead instead of seven slightly injured? We pay tribute to the restraint that the Israelis have shown.

A rumour is circulating: Will the Foreign Secretary assure us that despite the fact that to avoid hitting civilian targets, 20 per cent. of our attacks are being aborted, there will be no loosening of the excellent precision bombing that is a yardstick of the battle plan? Does he agree that, while many in the House have not, as we have, accepted the necessity of hostilities, in these circumstances those people should also recognise that, even had there been no hostilities, at some not too distant time, those Scud missiles would have landed in Israel in any event? That is a fact.

Mr. Hurd: The hon. Gentleman makes a shrewd point. As regards his first question, I certainly say—my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Defence is sitting beside me—that there is no question of the operation being lossened. It is tightly controlled. As my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister said yesterday, instructions are given to minimise the civilian causalties wherever possible, and the targets that our forces have been instructed to attack are, without exception, military targets or targets of strategic importance.

Sir Norman Fowler (Sutton Coldfield): The attack on Israel is an unwelcome development which the whole country will totally deplore, but is it not clear that, however difficult, restraint from Israel is not only in the international interest but in the national interest of Israel?

Mr. Hurd: I am grateful to my right hon. Friend. I shall add a piece of information that the House may have already had from other sources—it appeared that Israel was not the only country to be attacked by Scud missiles last night. Apparently, there was also an attempted but frustrated missile attack on Dhahran in Saudi Arabia.

Mr. Greville Janner (Leicester, West): Does the Foreign Secretary not accept that, while the Israelis will listen with respect to the views that he and others have expressed

[Mr. Greville Janner]

about restraint, it is for their Government, as the democratically elected Government of the country, to take such steps as they regard as necessary to protect their citizens? In recognising that is an anguished decision, does he not see that it is far easier to urge restraint from here than to accept it after a citizen, his family and friends—innocent civilians—have been bombed, and when restraint may be taken by Saddam Hussein as an indication of something else?

Mr. Hurd: Yes, I think that I recognised that fully in the answer that I gave, as we have in everything that we have said to the Israelis who have a difficult decision. Their pressures and anxieties are immediate and strong. The account that I was given by Mr. Levi of the anxieties and fears of the night, when people felt that they might well be under chemical attack, are perfectly understandable. We must understand that as the background against which the Israelis have to take their decision.

Mr. Cyril D. Townsend (Bexleyheath): May I congratulate my right hon. Friend on his wise and extremely appropriate statement on this new and dangerous development? Will he confirm that five Arab countries are supporting the coalition with military means, and that the vast majority of the 22 Arab countries support the coalition? Does he agree that the allies have at their disposal all the weapons required to deal with the problem?

Mr. Hurd: My hon. Friend is right on his first point. In relation to his second point, it will come as a surprise to no one that the allied commanders are well aware of that particular problem and are anxious to deal with it.

Dr. David Owen (Plymouth, Devonport): I am sure that the Foreign Secretary's well-judged statement has the support of everyone in the House, and I do not wish to add to it. However, will he consider how we counter Saddam Hussein's propaganda, and in particular how we use every possible mechanism to show the world that this is still essentially an inter-Arab conflict?

Mr. Hurd: I quite agree with the right hon. Gentleman, and we have spent a lot of time on that. As he said, it is essentially for Arabs to put their point of view forward, as it comes convincingly from them. That is why the Egyptian Government and all our friends in the coalition have done a great deal—we have done our best to help them do a great deal—to make that point. The idea that Saddam Hussein is accepted as a spokesman or champion for the Arab world does not stand up to examination.

Mr. John Marshall (Hendon, South): Does my right hon. Friend accept that we are asking the people of Israel to exercise self-restraint on a scale that no other democracy in the world would be willing to exercise? Will my right hon. Friend guarantee that he will show understanding for the people of Israel in whatever decision they take, because they have been attacked for no good reason? The fact that there was no loss of life was due to the intervention of the Almighty and not to the deeds of Saddam Hussein. Those missiles were sent to kill rather than simply to maim and injure.

Mr. Hurd: My hon. Friend is right on the last point. In what I have said to the House and in what I have said in private, I have tried to show the understanding that he seeks.

Mr. Nigel Spearing (Newham, South): Does the Foreign Secretary agree that the successful prosecution of a just war requires conduct so far as possible that is conducive to obtaining a just peace? Since the preamble to the United Nations charter allows the use of force only when peace and security have been broken, is it not therefore wise to remember that the peace in that whole area was uneasy and that security was tenuous for many? Because of that, will he charge all his colleagues and everyone concerned in this unfortunate affair that the successful prosecution of the war is as important as the successful prosecution by the United Nations in a new era of those underlying causes and incidents of which we are all aware?

Mr. Hurd: Certainly the area has become much more unstable since the aggression on 2 August. Our aim is to reverse that aggression as the United Nations has authorised and required. We must then go on—in that the hon. Gentleman is right—to try to work again for answers to the different problems in the middle east on the basis that the hon. Gentleman describes.

Rev. Ian Paisley (Antrim, North): While I agree with the Foreign Secretary's statement and the opinion expressed in the House calling on Israel to exercise restraint, would it not be well for the Secretary of State to assure the House and to assure Israel publicly that the allied forces will do everything in their power to seek out those missile sites and deal with them, so that such an incident will not recur?

Mr. Hurd: I have already answered that question indirectly. The allied nations engaged in the military action against Iraq are well aware of that particular problem and are anxious to deal with it.

Rev. Martin Smyth (Belfast, South): Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the media and the world at large should contrast the difference between the precision bombing against military targets by the international force and the indiscriminate attack on civilian targets by Saddam Hussein? While I welcome the statement, and as I come from a Province in which we know what it takes to try to exercise restraint in the face of terrorism, we urge Israel to depend on the international forces at this time to defeat Saddam.

Mr. Hurd: If I may say so, the hon. Gentleman has both points exactly right.

Mr. Matthew Carrington (Fulham): Does not my right hon. Friend agree that it is vital for the prosecution of the war and for the negotiations for peace that Israel shows great restraint in retaliation on this matter? Does he also agree that it is important that, in the face of future provocations that may well occur from the Iraqis, Israel should remember that it is important that any retaliation to which it may resort is in proportion to the attack from Iraq?

Mr. Hurd: Both my hon. Friend's points are well taken.

Mr. Joseph Ashton (Bassetlaw): Has the right hon. Gentleman seen the unfortunate reports in today's *Daily*

The Gulf

3.30 pm

The Prime Minister (Mr. John Major): With permission, Mr. Speaker, I shall make a statement on the start of hostilities in the Gulf in the small hours of this morning.

Aircraft of the multinational force began attacks on military targets in Iraq from around midnight Greenwich mean time. Several hundred aircraft were involved in the action, including a substantial number of RAF aircraft. The action was taken under the authority of United Nations Security Council resolution 678 which authorises use of all necessary means, including force, after 15 January to bring about Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait.

The action was taken after extensive consultation with the principal Governments represented in the multinational force, and following direct discussions between President Bush and myself over a period of weeks. It was taken only after exhaustive diplomatic efforts through the UN, the European Community, Arab Governments and others to persuade Saddam Hussein to withdraw peacefully.

The action is continuing. Attacks have been directed at Iraq's military capability, in particular airfields, aircraft, missile sites, nuclear and chemical facilities and other military targets. Reports so far received suggest that they have been successful. Allied aircraft losses have been low. I regret to inform the House that one RAF Tornado from later raids is reported missing.

The instructions issued to our pilots and those of other forces are to avoid causing civilian casualties so far as possible.

Our aims are clear and limited. They are those set out in the United Nations Security Council resolutions: to get Iraq out of Kuwait—all of Kuwait; to restore the legitimate Government: to re-establish peace and security in the area; and to uphold the authority of the United Nations.

As I explained in the debate in the House of Commons on Tuesday, it is only with the greatest reluctance that we have come to the point of using force as authorised by the Security Council. We did so only after all peaceful means had failed and Saddam Hussein's intransigence left us no other course. We have no quarrel with the people of Iraq. We hope very much for a speedy end to hostilities. That will come about when Saddam Hussein withdraws totally and unconditionally from Kuwait. Our military action will continue until he comes to his senses and does so.

Most of all, our thoughts go to the men and women of our forces, and their families who wait anxiously at home. [HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."] They have our wholehearted support and our prayers for a safe return home.

Mr. Neil Kinnock (Islwyn): I am grateful to the Prime Minister for his statement.

As the House and the country consider the current conditions in the Gulf region, does the Prime Minister agree that it is relevant and fair to remind ourselves that the first act of warfare which caused the Gulf crisis was taken by Saddam Hussein on 2 August when he invaded Kuwait?

For the reasons that I gave on Tuesday, I had hoped that the combined pressures of blockade, sanctions and military readiness could be employed longer to have maximum effect.

Our forces naturally have our complete support and I join the Prime Minister in his thoughts for the families of the men and women facing danger in the Gulf and in his desire that their loved ones come safe home.

Will the Prime Minister confirm that the war aims of the allied forces in the Gulf are related directly to achieving the fulfilment of the United Nations purposes of upholding and implementing resolution 660 and of restoring international peace and security in the area? Will he take this opportunity to make it clear that the forces pursuing those purposes of the United Nations are guided by the dual aims of maximising the disabling of Iraqi military strength while minimising any harm to civilians?

I recognise that the conflict is but hours old, but will the Prime Minister, even at this stage, reaffirm that after the conclusion of the conflict prominence must be given to proceeding as quickly as possible to international activities through the United Nations to resolve the wider problems of justice, peace and stability throughout the region?

I welcome the fact that the Government are making provision for an early debate. Once again, just in the act of doing that we are demonstrating the superiority of democracy over any form of dictatorship.

The Prime Minister: I share the views expressed by the right hon. Gentleman.

I entirely agree with the right hon. Gentleman's first point. It was the invasion of Kuwait on 2 August that commenced the hostilities. As the House knows, that was conducted without cause and, after the invasion had taken place, repression was conducted without mercy. The aggression sas Saddam Hussein's, not ours.

I share the complete support for the forces that the right hon. Gentleman expressed. I can confirm that our aims in the conflict are to uphold the United Nations resolutions —those and no other are the aims for which the British and other forces are fighting in the Gulf.

I also confirm that the instructions that have been given to all the allied pilots are to minimise civilian casualties wherever that is possible, and the targets that they have been instructed to attack are, without exception, military targets or targets of strategic importance.

Finally, the right hon. Gentleman asked for our aims and policy at the conclusion of the conflict. I confirm that we will wish to return, as we have in the past, to the question of a peace conference to deal with the wider problems of Arab-Israel.

Mr. Michael Jopling (Westmorland and Lonsdale): Does the Prime Minister agree that in the days and weeks ahead, when internal communications in Iraq are likely to be seriously impaired, the work of the BBC's world service is likely to achieve unparalleled importance? Will he check today to ensure that that service is given every opportunity to speak the truth to the people of Iraq?

The Prime Minister: That action is in hand.

Mr. Paddy Ashdown (Yeovil): May I say how reassuring it was that the Prime Minister laid out so clearly in his statement the limited aims of the operation?

We cannot, of course, rejoice in any loss of life on whatever side, but will the Prime Minister pass on our

hon. Friend seek to reassure them in their anxiety that the courage and superb professionalism of all our troops will contribute to a swift and satisfactory outcome to this conflict, which many of us had hoped would never happen?

The Prime Minister: I have no doubt that those qualities will contribute to a successful outcome. However, we should be under no illusions about the scale and potential might of the Iraqi forces, and while I am confident about the success I cannot yet be confident about the speed of that success, and I think that we should prepare ourselves for that fact.

File a original in Arch.

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

18th January 1991

Madam,

I very much appreciated the trouble Your Royal Highness took to write to me and I am grateful for your most generous remarks.

No one commits men and women to battle lightly or hurriedly. I thought long and hard about it but I do believe in the need to do so on this occasion and on the justice of the cause.

In my broadcast I wanted to explain why it was necessary to resort to war. I do hope I managed to get the message across — particularly to the families of the forces in the Gulf.

Could I express my thanks to Your Royal

Highness for the part you have played in sustaining the spirits of the families of our troops. Your visit to Germany before Christmas was deeply appreciated — perhaps more than you know.

I am sure that right will prevail in the Gulf. But before it does there may be dark moments and we must prepare ourselves for them. But if this happens I know I can count on you to bring comfort + support to the families of our troops.

I have the honour to remain

Madam

Your Royal Highness's

Obedient Servant

John Major

KENSINGTON PALACE

January 17th 1991.

Dear Prime Ministers,

Forgive me for writing like this out of the blue, but having just listened to You on the evening news tonight I feel deeply moved by what You said to the Nation that I wanted to write.

Your message touched me

care of us all & knowing
what the last twenty-four
hours must have been
like for our Prime Minister, I
thought it was a very
special thing to do to make
the time to speak to us.

I so wanted you to
know how much it means
to us as we enter into
the unknown with the Gulf
war & this comes with my
warmest thanks & admiratio

from. Diana.

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PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
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MIPT: MESSAGE TO THE PRIME MINISTER FROM PRESIDENT VASSILIOU DATED 17 JANUARY 1991

FOLLOWING IS TEXT:

DEAR PRIME MINISTER

ALLIED FORCES HAVE UNDERTAKEN THIS MORNING AN EFFORT IN ORDER TO SECURE COMPLIANCE WITH UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS REGARDING THE IRAQI INVASION OF KUWAIT AND TO RESTORE THE SOVEREIGNTY, INDEPENDENCE AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF KUWAIT.

CYPRUS REITERATES ITS SUPPORT FOR THESE RESOLUTIONS AND EXPRESSES ITS SOLIDARITY TO THE BRITISH AND OTHER ALLIED FORCES NOW FIGHTING IN THE GULF.

WE HOPE THAT THE ALLIED EFFORT WILL SOON COME TO A SUCCESSFUL END, WITH THE MINIMUM LOSS OF HUMAN LIVES.

THE DETERMINATION SHOWN BY THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT ALL ALONG THE GULF CRISIS IN UPHOLDING INTERNATIONAL LAW AND UNITED NATIONS PRINCIPLES AND RESOLUTIONS IS INSTRUMENTAL IN ESTABLISHING A NEW ERA, IN WHICH FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES WILL BE UPHELD, SO AS TO SECURE REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY. CYPRUS HAS REASONS TO LOOK FORWARD WITH MUCH AND RENEWED HOPE FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS PERTAINING TO THE CYPRUS PROBLEM.

PLEASE ACCEPT, DEAR PRIME MINISTER, MY MOST SINCERE WISHES FOR THE SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME OF THE ALLIED EFFORT.

YOURS

GEORGE VASSILIOU.

TEXT ENDS.

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THE PRESIDENT

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31/1

Nicosia, 17th January, 1991.

Dear Prime Minister,

Allied Forces have undertaken this morning an effort in order to secure compliance with United Nations resolutions regarding the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and to restore the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Kuwait.

Cyprus reiterates its support for these resolutions and expresses its solidarity to the British and other allied forces now fighting in the Gulf.

We hope that the allied effort will soon come to a successful end, with the minimum loss of human lives.

The determination shown by the British Government all along the Gulf crisis in upholding international law and United Nations principles and resolutions is instrumental in establishing a new era, in which fundamental principles will be upheld, so as to secure regional and international peace and security. Cyprus has reasons to look forward with much and renewed hope for the implementation of the resolutions of the United Nations pertaining to the Cyprus problem.

Please accept, dear Prime Minister, my most sincere wishes for the successful outcome of the allied effort.

Yours,
George Vassiliou

(George Vassiliou)

The Rt. Honourable
John Major,
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,
10, Downing Street,
London.

cc/c

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

17 January 1991

CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Charles,

Kuwait : Reconstruction

— meeting record on FOR POL pm's trip to Gulf Dec 1990.

At his meeting with the Amir of Kuwait on 7 January the Prime Minister said that we were looking forward to participation in Kuwait's reconstruction phase once the legitimate government was restored. The Amir confirmed that his government were looking at the options. They would need a lot of help. The Prime Minister proposed that Mr Michael Weston should discuss details with Kuwaiti Ministers. The Crown Prince later told the Prime Minister that the Council of Ministers had already convened a ministerial committee to discuss plans and a team had gone to Washington.

Although Mr Blackley in Jedda has recently had assurances from the Kuwaiti Minister of State for Municipal Affairs that we and the US will be Kuwait's principal suppliers (Jedda telno 015), we are not convinced that the Kuwaitis will honour their promises. Indeed, there is convincing evidence that we risk being frozen out at the initial stage of reconstruction and, because of the appointment of US project managers, of longer term opportunities as well. At a meeting in the DTI on 10 January leading British companies complained bitterly about American penetration of the Kuwait Emergency Relief Programme (KERP), blatant US efforts to elbow us out of the market place and the Government's failure to take action. Despite assurances from Shaikh Sa'ad to the Prime Minister that they were talking to the Crown Agents, KERP have now told them that their procurement services are <u>not</u> required in the initial emergency programme. There is strong evidence of US pressure. GEC/Plessey have also lost a major contract for emergency communications for which they were at least level pegging with the US company Motorola. The Embassy in Washington confirm this skullduggery and Mr Weston's recent meeting with the Kuwaitis in Ta'if was a wash-out. Furthermore, the US Treasury have authorised the release of US$500m from blocked Kuwaiti funds on condition that it should be spent on contracts placed with US persons.

/At the second

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

At the second of two meetings in the DTI (with FCO representation) on 11 January, key British companies, including Biwater, GEC, Balfour Beatty and Trafalgar House, have established with the DTI's help a task force to produce by 21 January British supply and product packages to be put to Kuwait as part of cooperation with major US project management corporations (which UK industry cannot realistically hope to unseat). Our bids need to be specific if we are to prevail upon the Kuwaitis to instruct the major US project managers (such as Bechtel) to allocate a reasonable share of future business to the UK. We should be seeking to enhance our pre-invasion market share of 10% significantly. The US had 20% pre-invasion. We think they are likely to double that. We should seek at least similar treatment.

We and the DTI agree that we must try to ensure the Americans do not sew up everything for themselves. The Prime Minister raised our concern over this with Secretary Baker on 13 January. The Foreign Secretary believes that it would be most helpful if the Prime Minister would, in addition, following up his discussion with the Amir with a message proposing the outlines of a package for Mr Weston in Ta'if and our Embassy in Washington to follow up urgently. The Foreign Secretary would summon either the Kuwaiti Ambassador or, if available, a sufficiently senior Kuwaiti Ambassador, to deliver the message in person.

I enclose a draft for the Prime Minister's consideration.

The Foreign Secretary has also considered whether the Prime Minister should write to President Bush. He has concluded that Mr Major should not. Instead, the Foreign Secretary will pursue Anglo/US co-operation in the reconstruction of Kuwait with Mr Baker. He will not, however, do so immediately.

I am copying this letter to Martin Stanley (Department of Trade and Industry), John Gieve (HM Treasury), Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence), John Neilson (Department of Energy), Suma Chakrabarti (Overseas Development Administration) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,

(S I Gass)
Private Secretary

Sir Charles Powell KCMG
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

Fine as amended.
4/11

DRAFT MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO THE AMIR OF KUWAIT

As you know from my letter to you of 9 January I was very pleased so soon after my appointment as Prime Minister to have the opportunity to talk to you in Ta'if. I welcomed the opportunity to convey to you our continuing firm commitment to the liberation of Kuwait and the restoration of legitimate government. We will not flinch from what needs to be done.

At our meeting I pledged Britain's help with the reconstruction of Kuwait. Our companies, who have been very active in the past in Kuwait and are represented all over the Gulf, are ready to participate in reconstruction both in the immediate emergency relief and in the longer term rebuilding of Kuwait's infrastructure. We have now formed a joint Government/private sector task force to identify how best we can help you. I know that this will be welcome to you and that you will wish to instruct members of your Government, particularly those immediately concerned with procurement, to respond very positively to this initiative. The opening of a procurement office in London which would work with major US based project managers would be a valuable first step which I strongly recommend. This would match the action your Government has taken in Washington. In addition, a general procurement contract issued to the Crown Agents, who have unique, unbiased and varied purchasing experience for overseas governments would be of considerable value in your reconstruction efforts. I trust you will use their services.

I realise that competing claims may complicate the decisions which your people in Washington are already trying to take. However the United Kingdom will be making great sacrifices for the liberation of Kuwait which I know that you and your Government will wish to recognise. The British people would expect nothing less.

Our people will be in touch with yours very soon about how best to follow up this request. One basis might be to agree on guidelines for procurement business based on recent OECD market shares of Kuwaiti imports before the invasion. As the reconstruction programme is likely to double the US share of some 20 per cent, we trust that you would wish to ensure that Britain (with some 10 per cent) received at least similar treatment.

In short, ~~we wish to help but~~ But we need the active guidance and cooperation of your Government (particularly in the instruction of US project managers) if we are to do so quickly and effectively. I hope very much ~~[illegible]~~, in the light of our excellent discussion in Taif, that you will feel able to help.

The British people are ~~being asked to make~~ making great ~~sacrifices~~ sacrifices for the ~~liberation of~~ liberation of Kuwait, we do so willingly ~~because of the~~ in the cause of justice & international law. But this also will be here full part in the constructive task of ~~[illegible]~~ participating in the positive work of reconstruction once Iraq has been ~~rejected~~ ejected & the legitimate ~~[illegible]~~ government restored.



LE PRÉSIDENT DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE

Paris, le 17 janvier 1991

SUBJECT

cc MASTER

OPS.

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T 198/91

Monsieur le Premier Ministre,

J'ai été surpris par vos réactions et celles de membres de votre gouvernement, ainsi que par la campagne médiatique hostile à la France, à propos du dernier plan de paix français conçu pour éviter la guerre tout en sommant l'Irak d'évacuer le Koweit, en application des résolutions du Conseil de Sécurité.

Je dois vous dire que j'ai vivement ressenti ces critiques injustifiées. L'objet de notre proposition était de ne négliger aucune chance, fût-elle minime, de sauver la paix avant l'expiration du délai fixé par les Nations Unies. La grande majorité des pays de la Communauté qui l'ont soutenue publiquement, de même que les pays Non-Alignés, la plupart des pays arabes et de très nombreuses nations dans le monde, ont compris le sens de cet ultime appel.

Il était conforme à ce que j'avais déclaré aux Nations Unies le 24 septembre. Il tenait compte de la position des Européens et ne remettait pas en cause la date du 15 janvier.

Je veux croire que ces campagnes n'altèreront pas en profondeur les relations entre nos deux pays. Peut-être le malentendu est-il venu du fait que je ne vous ai pas informé de ce plan lors de votre visite à Paris. Je tiens à ce que vous sachiez qu'à l'heure où nous nous sommes quittés je n'avais pas encore déterminé la forme de notre initiative. Le climat amical qui s'est instauré entre nous lors de votre visite - dont j'ai, pour ma part, gardé le meilleur souvenir - me permet de l'espérer.

Je vous prie d'agréer, Monsieur le Premier Ministre, l'expression de mes sentiments les meilleurs – et cordiaux

François Mitterrand

François MITTERRAND

Monsieur John MAJOR
Premier Ministre de Grande-Bretagne



cable (1)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Context 4/17.1

17 January 1991

Prime Minister

Agree to send the attached reply to Gorbachev's message?

CDS (7/1)

Dear Charles,

Soviet Union: The Gulf

In your letter of 17 January, you asked for a draft reply to President Gorbachev's message. I enclose a draft telegram to our Ambassador at Moscow. (Transmission by the hot line would be an option, but would dramatise the message. As Gorbachev chose not to use this channel, we recommend replying through our Embassy.)

The draft reply refers to a public statement by President Gorbachev. The Soviet Embassy have provided us with a text in Russian transcribed from Soviet television. Gorbachev said that "the tragic turn of events was provoked by Iraq's refusal to fulfil the demands of the international community and withdraw its troops from Kuwait". From the time of Iraq's aggression, the Soviet Union had done everything it could to promote a peaceful settlement, and had made energetic efforts up to the last moment. Gorbachev then described the action he had taken during the night, in terms similar to his message to the Prime Minister. He mentioned that he had sent messages to a number of countries, including the UK, France, Germany, Italy, India, and the heads of the majority of Arab states, appealing for joint efforts to localise the conflict.

Gorbachev's public statement and messages to Heads of Government seem to be largely for effect. Soviet cooperation with the United States over the Gulf has been strongly criticised by hard-liners in the Supreme Soviet, the army and sections of the press. Gorbachev appears to want to assure them that he has done everything possible to achieve a peaceful settlement. But he has not claimed to find any grounds for thinking that Saddam Hussain will now change his attitude, and it is welcome that Gorbachev explicitly blamed Iraq's aggression and refusal to withdraw from Kuwait.

Yours ever,
Christopher Prentice

(C N R Prentice)
Private Secretary

Sir Charles Powell KCMG
10 Downing Street

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FM FCO
TO DESKBY NEXT CONTACT MOSCOW
TELNO
OF 171235Z JANUARY 91
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, PARIS, BONN, ROME, RIYADH, AMMAN
INFO IMMEDIATE CAIRO
INFO PRIORITY NEW DELHI, PEKING

THE GULF: MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT GORBACHEV

1. The Prime Minister has received, via the Soviet Embassy, the message in MIFT from President Gorbachev. Gorbachev has reportedly sent messages also to the French, German, Chinese, Italian, Indian, and certain Arab leaders.

2. Grateful if you could deliver urgently the following reply:

Dear President Gorbachev

Thank you for your message of 17 January. I have also ~~received an account of~~ seen your statement about the beginning of hostilities in the Gulf.

I welcome your ~~clear~~ explicit public ~~statement~~ recognition that the latest events resulted from Iraq's refusal to comply with the demands of the international community by withdrawing its forces from Kuwait. We, like you, have done all that we can by peaceful means to induce Saddam Hussein to comply with Security Council Resolutions on Kuwait. He has unfortunately at no stage indicated willingness to do so. The report of the United

L55AAL SOVIET R M J LYNE 270 2417

CONFIDENTIAL DESKBY

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Nations Secretary General on his visit to Baghdad left no room for doubt about Saddam Hussein's refusal to act in accordance with these Resolutions, and no grounds for further delay in enforcing them.

I agree with you that all appropriate steps should be taken to minimise the risk of wider consequences. As I said in public on 17 January we hope to complete this operation as quickly as possible by expelling Iraq's forces from Kuwaiti territory and restoring the legitimate government there, as the United Nations Security Council requires.

I also agree that it would be useful for us to remain in close touch. Close cooperation between our representatives in the United Nations Security Council has played ~~a vital~~ an important part in the handling of this crisis since Iraq's act of aggression in August.

Ends Yours sincerely,
John Major

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IRAQ/KUWAIT

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OUT TELEGRAM

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FM FCO
TO DESKBY NEXT CONTACT MOSCOW
TELNO
OF 171300Z JANUARY 91
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INFO PRIORITY NEW DELHI, PEKING

MIPT: THE GULF: MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT GORBACHEV

1. Following is text of message from President Gorbachev to the Prime Minister:

Begins

Dear Prime Minister

Having learnt of an imminent US military action in the Persian Gulf one hour prior to its beginning we urgently contacted the American leadership and asked it to postpone this action for a day or two in order to enable us to undertake a last attempt in convincing S. Hussain - through a direct contact - in the absolute necessity of his beginning to withdraw from Kuwait.

Unfortunately, as we were speaking to Washington the military operation had already started. In this connection the President of the USSR has sent an urgent appeal to S. Hussain suggesting that he declares in a speedy and decisive manner the withdrawal of troops. We appealed to his common sense and the

Catchword

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Authorised for Initials Date/time
Despatch by

Number reference Telegram number Processed by

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necessity to be guided by the supreme interests of his people and other peoples, so that this only saving step should be taken.

I believe that our concern for preventing the escalation of the conflict in the Persian Gulf, which still threatens with unpredictable consequences, demands that you, on your part, also take immediate measures of influencing the Iraqi leadership.

I am prepared to maintain a permanent contact with you in the interests of a joint search for ways of ending the spread of military operations in Iraq and beyond.

Time is not waiting.

M Gorbachev

Ends

HURD

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MAIN

IRAQ/KUWAIT

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MIDDLE EAST: Situation PT38.

OUT TELEGRAM

SUBJECT

cc MASTER QPS.

Classification	Caveat	Precedence
CONFIDENTIAL		DESKBY

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PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T 19/91

FM FCO
TO DESKBY NEXT CONTACT MOSCOW
TELNO
OF 171235Z JANUARY 91
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, PARIS, BONN, ROME, RIYADH, AMMAN
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Ends Yours sincerely,
John Major

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MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB
Telephone 071-21 82111/3

MO 6/17/15/1J

17th January 1991

Prime Minister
My General de la Billière is prepared to accept half or less. It would be difficult for you to stand out for the whole. Agree? CDP 17/1

Content 17.1

Dear Charles,

You wrote to Simon Webb on 9th January to record the Prime Minister's sympathy following his recent visit to the Gulf, for the proposal that a special allowance should be paid to Service personnel serving in arduous conditions in the desert.

We did consider the introduction of a special allowance, on a Gulf-wide basis, shortly before 7 Armoured Brigade were due to take up station in the desert, but ruled it out. We tend not to favour special allowances (other than cost of living allowances) for serving in particular theatres, mainly on the grounds that Service personnel receive the X-factor in their pay (currently an addition of 10.5% to basic pay for men, and 9.5% for women) throughout their careers. This recognises their liability to occasional tours of duty which are particularly difficult or dangerous. A special allowance for difficult tours would weaken the case for the X-factor, and would run counter to the general principle that Service personnel receive the same pay wherever they serve. This helps to protect personnel from sudden fluctuations in their pay packets and reduces the scope for invidious comparisons. We did of course announce steps to ensure that no one was worse off as a result of posting to the Gulf.

The proposal about which the Prime Minister was told during his visit is a refined version of the earlier Gulf-wide proposal, designed to compensate only those troops serving in the desert for the arduous conditions they face there. The proposal is for a special payment of £4 a day, as a one-off extension of an existing form of additional pay of 45p a day for work in unpleasant conditions. (This payment applies only in closely defined circumstances, which currently do not apply to troops serving in the desert).

We have now carefully considered the detailed proposal put forward by the Joint Force Commander. We continue to believe that a

Sir Charles Powell KCMG
10 Downing Street

special payment of the kind proposed runs counter to the rationale for the X-factor, could be a basis for invidious comparisons and could set an unfortunate precedent for the future. We also believe that the proposed allowance would, in effect, constitute a new form of additional pay, which would require the agreement of both the Treasury and the Armed Forces Pay Review Body. An approach to the Review Body would be particularly awkward at this juncture, as they are known to be opposed to introducing additional pay for particular locations; and they will shortly be producing their annual report on Service pay which includes, this year, a full review of the X-factor.

We do of course recognise the implications for morale of this view. The Commander is not pressing for a new allowance or allowances to be effective from 15th January. We propose, therefore, to continue payment of the £3.40 a day allowance to supplement fluid intake, at least until water supplies to troops in the desert have improved to standards acceptable to the local Commander. At the same time, we will be examining closely the scope for extending, exceptionally, the application of the payment for work in unpleasant conditions, taking into account the special factors of service in the desert. The pay award for the Services is likely to be announced in early February, and the nature of the award will also be an important element in determining the approach necessary to reach further decisions.

We believe General de la Billiere will be content with the approach we intend to take. I should be grateful to know if the Prime Minister is content.

Yours sincerely

pp (MISS J R BINSTEAD)
Private Secretary

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL London SW1A 2AH

17 January 1991

Dear Charles,

Iraqi Embassy in London

On 13 January we told the Iraqi Ambassador to reduce his staff at the Embassy to a maximum of four, by 15 January (although the families of the officials leaving were given until 20 January to leave). Subsequently we heard that three members of the Iraqi Embassy staff were seriously ill; one of these has asked for asylum and the other two have been allowed to stay in London until doctors say they are fit enough to travel. The question now arises about whether we should go further and tell the remaining four that they should leave. This would be possible without a formal break in diplomatic relations with Iraq.

When the Foreign Secretary talked to US Secretary of State, Mr Baker, about the Iraqi Embassies in Washington and London on 7 January, Mr Baker said he was planning to let the Iraqis keep two or three of their officials at their Embassy in Washington. His thinking, as we understood it, was that two or three Iraqi diplomats (who had not been associated with any nefarious activity or suspicion of involvement with terrorism) could be useful at a later stage in the war with Iraq if a ceasefire had to be discussed with the Iraqis and the Americans needed a line of communication to Saddam Hussein's government in Baghdad. The Foreign Secretary's inclination is to take the same line as the Americans and to let the Iraqis leave up to four people here as long as we are confident that they remain "clean". Obviously this decision would be reviewed daily.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (MOD), Colin Walters (Home Office), Juliet Wheldon (Attorney General's Office), John Neilson (Dept. of Energy) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,

(R H T Gozney)
Private Secretary

Sir Charles Powell KCMG
10 Downing Street

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SIC

OUR TELNO 158: IRAQ/KUWAIT
SUMMARY
1. THE WHITE HOUSE CAUTIOUSLY PLEASED WITH THE INITIAL PHASE BUT SEE A LONG WAY TO GO YET. A PLEA LAST NIGHT BY GORBACHEV FOR A STOP TO THE ATTACK DISMISSED.
DETAIL
2. WE HAVE SPOKEN TO THE WHITE HOUSE (CHARLES) ABOUT THE MOOD FOLLOWING LAST NIGHT'S STRIKES. IT SEEMS TO BE QUOTE SO FAR SO GOOD UNQUOTE. IT IS A LONG WAY FROM THE OPTIMISM BEING GENERATED BY THE MEDIA TO THE EFFECT THAT THE WAR IS VIRTUALLY OVER.
3. THE WHITE HOUSE AND PENTAGON ARE STILL STUDYING THE DAMAGE ASSESSMENTS OF LAST NIGHT'S RAIDS. ON BALANCE, THE ATTACKS HAD GONE VIRTUALLY EXACTLY AS PLANNED, WITH FAR LOWER CASUALTIES THAN EXPECTED. BUT NOT ALL THE KEY IRAQI TARGETS, FOR THIS FIRST STRIKE HAD BEEN HIT.
FOR EXAMPLE, THE DAMAGE TO THE REPUBLICAN GUARDS HAD BEEN MINIMAL. ALSO, SADDAM'S ABILITY TO COMMUNICATE WITH THE OUTSIDE WORLD VIA RADIO AND TELEVISION HAD NOT BEEN TAKEN OUT. IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT TO DO SO, SO AS TO COUNTER HIS PROPAGANDA - NOT LEAST BECAUSE CNN HAS NOW BEEN STOPPED FROM BROADCASTING OUT OF IRAQ. UNLESS SADDAM'S CAPABILITY TO DO SO WERE DESTROYED, HE WAS BOUND TO TRY TO STIR UP SENTIMENT IN THE REGION WITH GROSS DISTORTIONS OF THE IMPACT OF ALLIED ATTACKS ON THE IRAQI CIVILIAN POPULATION. (CNN ARE, HOWEVER, REPORTING THAT AS OF 1900Z BAGHDAD TV HAD ABRUPTLY STOPPED BROADCASTING.)
3. THE WHITE HOUSE CONFIRMED, AS CHENEY MADE PUBLIC THIS MORNING, THAT - IN THE LIGHT OF THE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT - HEAVY AIR ASSAULTS WOULD CONTINUE. UNLESS THE IRAQIS CRACKED, GROUND FORCES WOULD PROBABLY HAVE TO ENGAGE - PERHAPS BY THE WEEKEND. CASUALTIES THEN MIGHT BE SIGNIFICANT. SO FAR THE US PUBLIC SEEMED TO THINK THAT THE WAR COULD BE WON WITH MINIMAL LOSSES:

REPORTS OF SERIOUS CASUALTIES COULD HAVE A DISTURBING IMPACT. THEY WOULD ADD FURTHER FUEL TO TODAY'S ANTI-WAR DEMONSTRATIONS. THE WHITE HOUSE ARE PARTICULARLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE LARGE NUMBERS OUT ON THE STREETS IN CALIFORNIA.

4. THE WHITE HOUSE REMAIN CONCERNED ABOUT SADDAM'S ABILITY TO RETALIATE. IT SEEMS THAT MANY OF HIS FIGHTERS WERE SCRAMBLED LAST NIGHT BUT FLEW NORTH RATHER THAN ENGAGE THE ALLIED FORCES. THEY PRESUMABLY LIVE TO FIGHT ANOTHER DAY. ALTHOUGH IRAQ'S MISSILE CAPABILITY HAD BEEN HIT, SADDAM RETAINED HIS MOBILE LAUNCHERS. A CBW RESPONSE COULD NOT THEREFORE - AT LEAST AT THIS STAGE - BE RULED OUT. A CONCERN HAD TO BE THAT IRAQ'S MINIMAL RESPONSE LAST NIGHT WAS A DELIBERATE PLOY - PERHAPS TO LULL THE ALLIES INTO A FALSE SENSE OF SECURITY. THAT SAID, THE TACTICAL SURPRISE HAD BEEN COMPLETE, THE JAMMING OF IRAQI RADAR EFFECTIVE, AND THE ALLIED ATTACK OVERWHELMING.

5. A CONCERN AT THE WHITE HOUSE LAST NIGHT HAD BEEN THAT SADDAM WOULD GIVE UP BEFORE THE ALLIED FORCES HAD DESTROYED HIS CBW AND NUCLEAR CAPABILITY. THE DESTRUCTION OF THESE FACILITIES IS NOW IN HAND SO THE RISK OF HIM BEING LEFT WITH HIS NON-CONVENTIONAL ARSENAL INTACT IS FAST DISAPPEARING. THE WHITE HOUSE, HOWEVER, STILL THINK THAT SADDAM COULD THROW IN THE TOWEL AT ANY MOMENT. (YOU HAD DISCUSSIONS AT ALCONBURY WITH THE AMERICANS ON HOW SUCH AN EVENTUALITY SHOULD BE HANDLED.) AN ALTERNATIVE SCENARIO IS THAT THE IRAQI TROOPS IN KUWAIT WOULD CRUMBLE UNDER THE WEIGHT OF THE ALLIED ATTACK WHICH WOULD ALLOW THE COALITION TO FREE KUWAIT AND THEN OFFER A CEASEFIRE. BUT ANOTHER CONCERN AT THE WHITE HOUSE IN THE LIGHT OF THE INTRANSIGENT RHETORIC FROM BAGHDAD IS THAT THE OFFER OF SUCH A CEASEFIRE WOULD BE REFUSED, EVEN AFTER THE IRAQIS HAD BEEN DRIVEN OUT OF KUWAIT.

6. CHARLES SAID THAT DURING THE NIGHT OF 16 JANUARY GORBACHEV HAD CONTACTED THE SAUDIS TO PLEA THAT THE ALLIED ATTACKS BE STOPPED SO AS TO GIVE THE IRAQIS AN OPPORTUNITY TO SURRENDER. PRINCE BANDAR HAD RELAYED THIS PLEA TO THE WHITE HOUSE IN THE EARLY HOURS OF THIS MORNING BUT IT WAS REJECTED BY BOTH THE SAUDIS AND THE AMERICANS.

ACLAND

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23(a-d)

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB
Telephone 071-21 82111/3

MO 6/17/15/1

17th January 1991

Dear Charles

REPORT FROM MIDDLE EAST

Since the timetable for OPD(G) on Friday is limited, the Defence Secretary's colleagues might find it useful to see the attached report from Commanders on Operations today in the Gulf.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries of OPD(G).

Yours sincerely

pp (S WEBB)
Private Secretary

Sir Charles Powell KCMG
No 10 Downing Street

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CDS 2066/2/1

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17 Jan 91

PS/Secretary of State

THE VIEW FROM RIYADH

1. The Joint Commander telephoned CDS this evening to report on the views from the Gulf of General Schwarzkopf and British Commanders. In overall terms General Schwarzkopf felt that the air plan was going extremely well and that the day had been successful. He was, however, concerned by some of the claims which had been made by Pentagon spokesmen on CNN about overall effectiveness eg "the Iraqi air force has been destroyed" etc and had represented this through the highest channels. In terms of overall effectiveness the air plan is considered to have been about 60% successful based on in-theatre first look battle damage assessments. In detail:-

a. USN Tomahawks had been very effective indeed; attacks against CBW storage facilities had been highly successful. The number one BW target - Salman Pak - had been destroyed and at other sites a total of 3 tanks had been breached. It was held that the risk from contamination was slight as the attacks had been carried out in winds of 4 knots or less.

b. Attacks against communications systems had been successful forcing the Iraqis to resort to uncovered systems.

c. Attacks against the air defence system had destroyed the Western Sector Operations Centre and 3 others were no longer working. The Tallil site was still operating but would be targeted tonight.

d. Effective jamming of Ground Control Intercept radars had effectively kept Iraqi fighters out of the action and furthermore when they had been scrambled they had remained airborne for a very short period resorting to "barrage firing" (ie energising their radar briefly, firing their missiles at long range and immediately switching off the radar; under these conditions the missiles tend to adopt a ballistic trajectory).

e. In aerial combat there were confirmed kills of 3 Mirage and 6 Fulcrum. The fighters which were still active seemed to be remaining north of 32° North.

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f. Ground attack aircraft had remained in their Hardened Aircraft Shelters (HAS). No aircraft had attacked Saudi territory.

g. Attacks against power stations seem to have had limited success and some stations seemed to be recovering.

h. Attacks against airfields were deemed to have been very successful but these airfields and the power stations above will be re-visited tonight.

i. Air defence in the forward areas of Kuwait had been much lighter than expected and as a result close air support missions by Fighter Ground Attack aircraft and attack helicopters against forward defensive positions had started earlier than originally planned. In the words of Gen Schwarzkopf and the pilots this had been a "Turkey Shoot". 4 UK Jaguars had carried out a successful pre-planned mission against an Iraqi command post and barracks in SW Kuwait; 6 of the 8 bombs had been seen to hit the target.

j. Suppression missions against Surface to Air Missile (SAM) 6, on the other hand had been aborted and thus some attacks against the Republican Guard Forces by B52s had been broken off. They will be repeated tonight.

k. Against Surface to Surface Missile (SSM) fixed sites there had been some success although cloud cover had prevented full analysis. However, there appeared to be considerable damage to the main sites in Western Iraq (H2 and H3). It is the view in Riyadh that the Iraqis will deploy their mobile launchers tonight and they expect some SCUD firings overnight or early tomorrow morning.

l. General Schwarzkopf had an unconfirmed report that some Iraqi Mirage F1s had deployed to Jordan. He reported that the US administration has warned King Hussein that he will be held personally responsible if these aircraft mount attacks on Allied forces from his territory.

m. The performance of the F117As (Stealth Fighters) had been something of a curate's egg. They had carried out some good precision attacks but had missed the Iraqi leadership bunkers; their overall success rate is held currently to be 55%. However, Schwarzkopf is confident that he knows the whereabouts of Saddam Hussein and these aircraft will be targeted against him tonight.

n. The biggest threat to Allied aircraft today had been from AAA (Anti Aircraft Artillery) but our attrition rate to date was low at something less than 0.4% (vice a predicted 4-5%) namely 1 UK, 1 Kuwaiti and 1 US aircraft.

2. Overnight intentions. Tornado GR1s will be flying all night; there will be 44 sorties of 2 groups of 8 and 7 groups of 4 aircraft. Daytime use to toss 1,000lb bombs at airfields will be discontinued.

a. Our GR1As have not so far been deployed but may be tasked overnight.

b. After intensive flying by US A10s ("Tank Busters") on the Kuwaiti border today, they will be used against the second line of defence tomorrow if the SAM 6 sites can be taken out.

3. Missing Tornado GR1. There is now less optimism about the missing crew of the GR1 shot down today by AAA after an attack on an Iraqi airfield. The crew reported a hit and an engine fire but no parachutes were seen - the aircraft was at the rear of its group - the PLB (Personal Locator Beacon) transmitted for some time but having stopped was not been heard again. It is standard procedure for the crew to transmit on the PLB for a short burst every hour. Unless it is detected again it is not planned to mount a Search and Rescue (SAR) mission tonight.

4. Finally, Gen Schwarzkopf dismissed earlier unconfirmed reports claiming that tens of thousands of unarmed Iraqis were fleeing into Saudi Arabia and also that there had been a tank battle between Iraqi and Egyptian forces.

5. After a successful day in which many objectives had been achieved there remained a question over the unexplained lack of Iraqi activity/reaction. However, UK forces were in good heart and buoyant spirits.

D G LITTLEJOHNS
Cdre
PSO/CDS
MB6173 83353MB

22(a)

Ref. AO91/148

PRIME MINISTER

cc Sir Percy Cradock
Mr Appleyard

OPD(G)5: 18 January

Item 1: Current military situation

This will depend very much on the overnight air campaign. Mr Appleyard will let you have an update before OPD(G) in the morning and you will also have the JIC assessment.

2. You might invite the Defence Secretary and the CDS to report on the air campaign and in particular any assessment yet of the results of the air offensive. This evening the main points of interest are the present fate of the missing Tornado aircrew, future Tornado and Jaguar sorties, and whether any Iraqi missiles were fired or offensive sorties flown.

3. President Bush referred in his speech to the objective of eliminating Iraq's CW capability but made no mention of attacks on BW installations. There are nevertheless unconfirmed reports that the main Iraqi BW plant at Salman Pak was attacked and damaged but no reports so far of civilian casualties. The Defence Secretary may have a clearer picture of US action against CW and BW installations against the background of your discussions with Mr Baker.

4. There is a point for consideration on the follow-up to your discussion with Mr Baker on punitive action. The FCO have obtained from Mr Baker an assurance that the US are no longer thinking of attacks on Tikrit other than normal military targets,

but US statements have referred to severe retaliation if Iraq uses CW. We do not yet have a comprehensive assurance that the US will consult us before undertaking such action going outside the agreed statement of objectives. If you wish to press for consultation, the best way of doing this might be to mention it in one of your telephone conversations with the President.

Item 2: Current international situation

5. You will want to invite the Foreign Secretary to update colleagues on current diplomatic moves. There have been Ministerial meetings in the WEU and the EC today, during which the UK role will have been to steady the weaker brethren and to prevent Mr Poos, the Germans and others from rushing in with peace proposals. Further discussions have been continuing at the United Nations and, as you know, the Russians have been making desultory attempts to seek a last-minute deal, including through President Gorbachev's message to you.

6. I suggest that you might ask Sir Percy Cradock to report on what is known so far about any terrorist action in support of the Iraqis. You may also want to ask the Foreign Secretary to update the Committee on Iraqi expulsions.

7. I understand that the Defence Secretary wants to suggest that we press for further action on burden-sharing assistance from other countries to meet our costs, on which the Foreign Secretary is being briefed to comment.

Item 3: Media handling

8. You might invite the Energy Secretary to report on the broader picture and your Press Secretary on the day's hot stories.

9. Your press statement and appearance in the House went well and the Defence Secretary and the Chief of the Defence Staff held a useful press conference yesterday. The main problem is getting the media balance right between euphoria and reversion to the

other end of the spectrum. The mixture of prudent comment by the key Ministers so far seems to have struck the right note but constant vigilance will be needed to keep the press on the central track.

10. You might ask the Energy Secretary whether more needs to be done by way of weekend briefing for backbenchers and Ministerial colleagues, especially those who are likely to appear on the main television programmes.

Weekend Meetings ? chapters – Back people ?

11. You and your colleagues will be keeping in touch with developments over the weekend and plans will need to respond to events. But you will want to consider whether OPD(G) should plan to meet on Saturday or Sunday. Otherwise the next meeting will be at 10.00 am on Monday.

I will be in over the week-end & can help you briefed. I suggest you plan on no meetings, but we can always call one if we in an urgent need.

C.D. 17/1

P.E.R.B.

ROBIN BUTLER

17 January 1991



Minister

thank you. 17.1

Re Gulf: Sitrep at 0330

I briefed you on the Iraqi attack on Israel with 7 SCUD missiles. It is now confirmed that all were conventional (not CW). Casualties seem remarkably light – the latest report, 1 dead & 7 slightly injured. The question of Israeli retaliation remains open: the Americans are trying to dissuade them: and it is now daylight in the area.

Our action is:

– your statement which has been widely carried.

– instructions to our Ambassador in Israel to express sympathy & urge restraint.

– I have spoken to the Israeli Minister to express our sympathy & put the case for restraint – our Ambassadors in Arab nations are urging Arab governments to maintain solidarity as members of the international coalition.

There also seems to have been a single SCUD launched at Dhahran, which was intercepted by Patriot missiles. This is not confirmed at the time I write – now confirmed.

The Turkish government has decided to allow the Americans to use bases in Turkey for attacks on Iraq.

THIS IS A COPY. THE ORIGINAL IS RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3 (4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT

Yours.

SECRET AND PERSONAL

21-(a-b)

PRIME MINISTER

THE GULF WAR: DAY ONE

Here is an unvarnished view of the first day, culled from a number of sources.

Most people's early impressions were derived from CNN. It is now clear they gave a very exaggerated view of the early results of the air offensive. It has been a good first 24 hours but not great. The overall effectiveness of the air action has been about 60 per cent (this is Air Vice Marshal Wratten's estimate).

There are a number of bright spots. The Iraqis have not been able to fire off any missiles yet. The Americans have done well against fixed missile sites, with most damaged or destroyed. But they have not found, let alone been able to deal with, the mobile ones. The chances must still be that the Iraqis will loose some missiles off, possibly against Israel. Israeli euphoria looks premature.

The Americans have had a lot of success with their Tomahawk Cruise missiles, of which they have fired nearly one hundred from ships in the Gulf. They have also been able to jam Iraq's air defence system which has rendered even those Iraqi fighters which managed to get airborne ineffective. Attacks against airfields have been quite successful, although there are so many of them that at least a number are still useable. There will need to be a further round of attacks tonight.

Overall, Iraq's air defence has not proved very effective. They have only brought down three aircraft (one British, one American and one Kuwaiti) out of 1100 sorties. They tend to loose off their anti-aircraft missiles in barrages, which is wasteful.

SECRET AND PERSONAL

SECRET AND PERSONAL

D.

The Americans have had some success against BW and CW sites. They have attacked Salman Pak, and they have split one storage tank and damaged three others. The atmospheric conditions were ideal and they do not think there has been any collateral damage to civilians.

There are some less good bits of news:

- the Americans have not yet succeeded in disconnecting the leadership in Baghdad from the military machine by wiping out communications. They are going to have another go tonight. (They apparently think they know where Saddam Hussain is, and are intending to go after him).

- they have not made any significant impact on the Republican Guard: an attempt to attack them ran into very heavy resistance from Sam 6 missiles and the Americans backed off.

- the Iraqis still have a large number of aircraft locked away in hardened shelters or moved to the north. They are conserving their assets and could still regroup.

- more worryingly, there are reports (unconfirmed) that Iraqi F1 aircraft have deployed into Jordan. If this is true, it risks a major bust-up with the Israelis. We may need to send a message to King Hussein.

I also attach a report from our military commanders in the Gulf.

C D P

C. D. POWELL
17 January 1991

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SECRET AND PERSONAL

20(a-b)

Jp 01274

SIR CHARLES POWELL

c Sir Robin Butler

CDS 17/1

Iraq - A Radiological Weapon?

Iraq publicly claimed on 14 January to have a secret weapon capable of inflicting tens of thousands casualties before allied troops could reach Iraqi defences. The Iraqi Defence Ministry newspaper asserted that "Iraq's arsenal contains surprises which will astonish our enemies and fascinate our friends."

2. There has been media speculation that Iraq possesses a crude "dirty" atomic bomb; and that it would be feasible for Iraq to produce a functioning radiological weapon. We do not believe Iraq possesses a nuclear explosive device of any sort.

3. Iraq has, however, a number of radioactive sources obtained commercially for use in industrial structural testing, medical scanners etc. These include highly radioactive Cobalt 60. It is not inconceivable that in recent months Iraq might have supplemented its commercial sources by using its research reactor to produce irradiated material. It also has irradiated reactor fuel. All of these materials would remain active for periods of years. The threat from them is mainly gamma radiation. They are readily identifiable by radiation monitoring instruments.

4. Anyone handling or remaining within a few metres of these materials could receive a lethal dose. But beyond some tens of metres the threat is not severe. Normally, these sources are kept behind heavy protective shielding and the assembly and delivery of a radiological weapon made using them would be extremely difficult. But the Iraqis

are quite capable of putting their personnel at risk in order to do so.

5. Cobalt is a dense material and after detonation of a missile warhead or bomb (assuming the Iraqis could engineer an air-burst capability) the fragments would quickly fall to the ground and would not be widely dispersed by the wind. Moreover, once dispersed by the explosion either as pellets or fine particles the lethality would be much reduced (although if ingested the effects would be markedly enhanced). Even in the worst case, where a radiological device was exploded over a city, it would not cause widespread radiation sickness. Any detonation would be a conventional explosion and not nuclear, either in appearance or effect.

6. The Iraqis are skilled at propaganda and their claims may be just that. Militarily a radiological device of this type would be of little value. Claims that they had exploded a nuclear device could be discounted by the lack of evidence of a mushroom cloud or other characteristics of a nuclear explosion, and by the evidence of persistent gamma radiation characteristic of Cobalt 60 and irradiated materials.

PERCY CRADOCK

17 January 1991

Restricted

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

17 January 1991

Dear Tim,

Possible Motion for Debate on the Gulf

I agreed that we would circulate a draft motion for the Debate on Monday in case Ministers decided to go for a motion of substance.

The Foreign Secretary has suggested two possibilities which, in order of preference, are:

- This House expresses its full support for the actions of British forces in the Gulf region, as authorised by UN SCR 678;
- This House fully supports British forces in the Gulf, and their contribution to securing UN objectives there.

I am copying this letter to Dominic Morris (No 10), Murdo MacLean (Government Chief Whip's Office), John Neilson (Department of Energy), Simon Webb (MOD), Juliet Wheldon (Attorney General's Office) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,

S L Gass

(S L Gass)
Private Secretary

Tim Sutton Esq
PS/Lord President of the Council

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1 of 13

SECRET

Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food
Whitehall Place, London SW1A 2HH

From the Minister

19

John Redwood Esq MP
Department of Trade and Industry
1-19 Victoria Street
LONDON
SW1H 0ET

17 January 1991

Dear Minister

INSURANCE AGAINST DAMAGE BY IRAQI TERRORISTS

Thank you for copying me your letter of 16 January to Ken Baker. My Department would have an interest in this subject in the event of terrorist activity resulting in contamination of foodstuffs.

Without prejudice to any new Government scheme which may be worked up, you may like to know that I already have relevant powers under the Minister of Food (Financial Powers Act) 1949, should the need arise. This is the basis on which ex gratia payments were made to farmers affected by Government restrictions in the aftermath of the Chernobyl accident in 1986. However our general line in relation to losses resulting from Government intervention on food safety grounds has been that we expect the food industry or farmers to take out appropriate insurance cover at their own expense. I would therefore support the approach you are considering making to the insurance industry in the present exceptional circumstances.

I am copying this letter to recipients of yours.

Yours sincerely

JOHN GUMMER

[Approved by the Minister and signed in his absence]

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OUR TELNO 148: IRAQ/KUWAIT: WASHINGTON SITREP
SUMMARY
1. RELIEF THAT THE WAITING IS OVER AND GREAT HOPES OF A QUICK VICTORY, WHICH ADMINISTRATION ARE TRYING TO PLAY DOWN.
DETAIL
2. MOST OF THE US, LIKE MUCH OF THE WORLD, SPENT THE NIGHT OF 16 JANUARY GLUED TO SATURATION COVERAGE BY CNN AND OTHER NETWORKS OF THE DRAMATIC ALLIED AIR ATTACK ON BAGHDAD AND OTHER TARGETS. LIVE REPORTING ON CNN OF THE FIRST STRIKE ON BAGHDAD BROKE IN WASHINGTON AT 1835 EST AND THE SPEED AND ACCURACY OF THE COVERAGE APPEARED TO TAKE THE ADMINISTRATION BY SURPRISE. AFTER HURRIED CONSULTATIONS IN THE OVAL OFFICE THE WHITE HOUSE SPOKESMAN MADE A BRIEF STATEMENT AT 1900, CONFIRMING THAT THE LIBERATION OF KUWAIT HAD BEGUN.
3. THE PRESIDENT ADDRESSED THE NATION AT 2100 EST (SEE MIPT). IT WAS NOT ONE OF HIS BEST PERFORMANCES BUT THE REAL GEORGE BUSH CAME THROUGH: AND MOST AMERICANS SEEM TO FEEL THAT HE SAID THE RIGHT THINGS AND THAT HIS DECISION TO ACT WAS JUSTIFIED. THE PRESIDENT HAS STRONGLY EMPHASISED THAT THE US STRIKE WAS DIRECTED AT MILITARY AND NOT CIVILIAN TARGETS: IRAQI AIRBASES, MISSILE SITES AND NUCLEAR AND CHEMICAL FACILITIES (GENERAL POWELL LATER CONFIRMED THAT SOME US AIR STRIKES HAD BEEN ABORTED WHERE TARGETS HAD NOT BEEN CLEARLY IDENTIFIED, IN AN EFFORT TO AVOID CIVILIAN CASUALTIES).
4. THE REACTION IN WASHINGTON AND ACROSS THE COUNTRY WAS ONE OF RELIEF THAT THE WAITING WAS OVER AND SATISFACTION THAT THE STRIKES SEEMED TO BE GOING SO WELL. THIS BELIEF WAS FUELLED BY EARLY UNOFFICIAL PENTAGON REPORTS OF MASSIVE DESTRUCTION OF IRAQI MLLITARY
FACILITIES, INCLUDING CLAIMS THAT THE MISSILE THREAT TO ISRAEL HAD BEEN REMOVED AND THAT THE REPUBLICAN GUARD HAD BEEN DECIMATED. BY MIDNIGHT HERE THERE WAS A STRONG SUGGESTION IN THE MEDIA THAT THE WAR WAS AS GOOD AS OVER.

5. THE ADMINISTRATION HAVE TRIED TO COUNTER THIS WITH A MORE CAUTIOUS REACTION, NO FULL DAMAGE ASSESSMENT YET HAVING BEEN POSSIBLE. THE PRESIDENT, WHILE EXPRESSING SATISFACTION AT EARLY REPORTS, WARNED IN AN IMPROMPTU NEWS CONFERENCE AT 0500 EST ON 17 JANUARY AND AGAIN AT 0900 AGAINST QUOTE UNWARRANTED OPTIMISM UNQUOTE AND CHENEY REINFORCED THE MESSAGE THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO BE CAUTIOUS AT THIS STAGE.

6. POLLS ON 17 JANUARY DEMONSTRATE A STRONG INCREASE IN PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR THE PRESIDENT, WITH UP TO 80 PER CENT IN SOME POLLS. MEMBERS OF CONGRESS HAVE ALSO EXPRESSED STRONG SUPPORT FOR US FORCES IN THE FIELD, ALTHOUGH THERE HAS BEEN SOME CRITICISM FROM PREDICTABLE QUARTERS, WITH RADICAL DEMOCRATIC CONGRESSMEN DECLARING THE ATTACK QUOTE AN INESTIMABLE TRAGEDY UNQUOTE. BUT THE SENATE SEEM LIKELY TO PASS A RESOLUTION ON 17 JANUARY IN SUPPORT OF THE ADMINISTRATION. THERE HAS ALSO BEEN A SURGE OF STREET PROTESTS IN WASHINGTON, NEW YORK, CHICAGO AND OTHER MAJOR CITIES, WITH SOME VIOLENCE REPORTED. BUT THIS REMAINS FOR THE MOMENT A MINORITY REACTION.

7. IN A PENTAGON BRIEFING EARLY ON 17 JANUARY GENERAL POWELL CONFIRMED THAT TACTICAL SURPRISE HAD BEEN ACHIEVED, BUT SAID THAT US FORCES REMAINED ALERT FOR POSSIBLE IRAQI COUNTER ATTACKS. ALLIED AIR STRIKES HAD BEEN 80 PER CENT EFFECTIVE, WITH LIGHT CASUALTIES (THE LOSS OF THE US HORNET AND THE BRITISH TORNADO ARE PROMINENTLY REPORTED). CHENEY SAID DAMAGE AND POSSIBLE RETARGETTING WAS NOW BEING ASSESSED. ASKED ABOUT THE LIKELY DURATION OF OPERATIONS, CHENEY WARNED THAT THEY COULD STILL GO ON FOR SOME TIME: THEIR OBJECTIVES REMAINED ENFORCEMENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS AND THE EVICTION OF SADDAM HUSSEIN FROM KUWAIT.

8. SECURITY IN WASHINGTON REMAINS VERY TIGHT, WITH AN ARMED GUARD ROUND EMBASSIES AS WELL AS FEDERAL BUILDINGS, AIRPORTS AND PUBLIC MONUMENTS.

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GULF WAR: ARAB/ISRAEL

SUMMARY

1. LEVY SENDS MESSAGE OF APPRECIATION AND THANKS FOR BRITISH PERFORMANCE IN GULF. THREAT TO ISRAEL MUCH REDUCED BUT REMAINS. PLENTY OF GOODWILL BUT NO GIVE ON TALKING TO PALESTINIANS.

DETAIL

2. I WAS SUMMONED BY THE FOREIGN MINISTER ON 17 JANUARY TO RECEIVE AN ORAL MESSAGE OF APPRECIATION FROM THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE AND LEVY PERSONALLY FOR BRITAIN'S CONDUCT IN THE GULF WAR, WHICH LEVY DESCRIBED AS AN EXAMPLE TO OTHER COUNTRIES. SOME, HE SAID, HAD SHOWN WEAKNESS OR VACILLATED IN THE FACE OF A DICTATOR DETERMINED TO TRAMPLE LIBERTY UNDERFOOT. BRITAIN BY CONTRAST HAD BEEN FAITHFUL TO THE PRINCIPLES OF LIBERTY AND CIVILISATION. LEVY SPOKE PARTICULARLY WARMLY OF YOU (''MY FRIEND'') AND OF THE PRIME MINISTER, WHOM HE DESCRIBED AS IN THE GREAT TRADITION OF CHURCHILL AND THATCHER WHEN FACED BY DIFFICULT TIMES.

3. LEVY SAID THAT ISRAEL, AS A COUNTRY WHICH STOOD FIRM ON THE VALUES OF LIBERTY AND NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY, HAD WATCHED WITH PRIDE HOW THOSE QUALITIES HAD BEEN MANIFESTED IN THE ACTIONS OF THE BRITISH TORNADO PILOTS. ISRAELI HEARTS WERE WITH THEM. ISRAEL HOPED THAT THE IRAQI PEOPLE WOULD SOON UNDERSTAND THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN HAD LED THEM TO CATASTROPHE IN HIS DETERMINATION TO TURN THE CALENDAR SEVERAL GENERATIONS BACK TO THE DAYS OF HATRED. THE WORLD WOULD NOW SEE THAT SADDAM'S WAY LED NOT TO CONSTRUCTION BUT TO DESTRUCTION AND THAT THE AGGRESSOR MUST INEVITABLY FAIL. LEVY LIKENED THE BEHAVIOUR OF BRITISH FORCES TO THE SONS OF LIGHT OPPOSING THE SONS OF DARKNESS.

4. ISRAEL HAD NO INTEREST IN DESTABILISING JORDAN, BUT ON THE CONTRARY WISHED TO SEE STABILITY THROUGH THE ELIMINATION OF THE DESTRUCTIVE FUNDAMENTALIST INFLUENCE. PEACE ON THE LONG ISRAEL/JORDAN BORDER WAS IMPORTANT. SIMILARLY WITH SYRIA, WHERE ISRAEL WOULD DO NOTHING TO PROVOKE INSTABILITY, BUT WISHED FOR GRADUAL MOVEMENT

TOWARDS PEACE AND MUTUAL PROSPERITY: HERE TOO EVERYBODY SHOULD UNDERSTAND THAT AGGRESSION WOULD BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE.

5. LEVY CONCLUDED WITH FURTHER ELOQUENT EXPRESSIONS OF APPRECIATION OF BRITAIN'S ROLE IN THE STRUGGLE FOR THE SACRED VALUES OF FREEDOM, PROVIDING A LESSON FOR THE FUTURE OF THE WORLD.

6. I UNDERTOOK TO CONVEY HIS WORDS IN FULL AND SAID THAT I WAS SURE THAT YOU AND THE PRIME MINISTER WOULD BE GRATEFUL, ALTHOUGH THE MILITARY OPERATION IN IRAQ/KUWAIT WAS BY NO MEANS OVER YET. I ADDED THAT YOU WOULD NO DOUBT WISH ME TO SAY THAT ONCE THIS PHASE WAS COMPLETED, IT WOULD BE VERY IMPORTANT TO BUILD ON ITS SUCCESS AND WORK URGENTLY FOR A NEW STRUCTURE OF PEACE BETWEEN THE STATES AND PEOPLES OF THE MIDDLE EAST AS A WHOLE. I MADE IT PLAIN THAT I WAS REFERRING PARTICULARLY TO ISRAEL AND THE PALESTINIANS.

7. LEVY LAUNCHED AGAIN INTO A EULOGY OF PEACE AS THE BREATH OF LIFE FOR ALL ISRAELIS AND A CONDEMNATION OF DICTATORS AND EXTREMISTS. BUT NEGOTIATIONS COULD TAKE PLACE ONLY BETWEEN STATES, NOT PEOPLES. JORDAN HAD THROWN THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM BACK TO ISRAEL: LET THE JORDANIANS NOW BRING THE PALESTINIANS BACK WITH THEM INTO NEGOTIATIONS WITH ISRAEL, SINCE THE PROBLEM AFFECTED BOTH GOVERNMENTS.

8. ON THE WAY OUT I ASKED HADASS (DEPUTY DIRECTOR-GENERAL FOR EUROPE) WHETHER ISRAEL REALLY NOW THOUGHT THAT THE IMMEDIATE THREAT FROM IRAQ HAD DISAPPEARED. HE SAID THAT THE THREAT OF AN AIR INCURSION HAD CERTAINLY GONE, AND IMPLIED THAT ISRAEL HAD ALMOST NO WORRIES NOW ABOUT FIXED MISSILE SITES IN IRAQ. BUT THERE WERE STILL PROBABLY SOME MOBILE LAUNCHERS, AND ONE OR TWO MISSILES COULD STILL GET THROUGH. DURING THE DAY ARENS AND OTHERS HAVE BEEN STRESSING THAT PRECAUTIONARY ADVICE TO THE POPULATION (MY TELNO 33 PARA 3, NOT TO ALL) REMAINS IN PLACE.

COMMENT

9. CURRENT ISRAELI ENTHUSIASM FOR THE BRITISH PERFORMANCE IN THE GULF, BEFORE AND AFTER THE START OF HOSTILITIES, IS VERY MARKED - IN THE MFA FROM LEVY XOWN TO THE GATEKEEPER, AND GENERALLY OUTSIDE.

10. IT WILL BE WORTH TRYING TO CASH THIS FUND OF GOODWILL IN THE FORM OF BETTER ISRAELI PERFORMANCE ON ARAB/ISRAEL, IN DUE COURSE. LEVY'S REMARKS ON DIALOGUE WITH THE PALESTINIANS WERE NOT ENCOURAGING, BUT OTHERS IN THE GOVERNMENT ARE LESS BLINKERED ON THIS.

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MOSCOW TELNO 121: IRAQ/KUWAIT: GORBACHEV STATEMENT

SUMMARY

1. GORBACHEV PLACES RESPONSIBILITY FOR OUTBREAK OF WAR FIRMLY ONTO IRAQ. HE DID ALL HE COULD TO PREVENT SUCH A TRAGIC DEVELOPMENT, INCLUDING AN ELVENTH HOUR APPEAL TO SADDAM. EMERGENCY COMMITTEE SET UP, INCLUDING GORBACHEV, BESSMERTNYKH, PRIMAKOV, YAZOV AND KRYVHKOV. SOVIET EMBASSY IN BAGHDAD TO REMAIN OPEN.

DETAIL

2. THE FIRST OFFICIAL COMMENT ON THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES CAME JUST AFTER MIDDAY (0930Z), WHEN PRESIDENT GORBACHEV GAVE A SHORT TELEVISED ADDRESS TO THE NATION. THIS WAS FOLLOWED BY A PRESS CONFERENCE HELD AT 1000Z CONDUCTED BY HIS SPOKESMAN IGNATENKO AND DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER BELONOGOV.

GORBACHEV'S ADDRESS

3. SPEAKING CALMLY BUT SOMBERLY, GORBACHEV ANNOUNCED THAT MILITARY ACTION HAD STARTED EARLY THAT MORNING WHEN THE INTERNATIONAL FORCE, LED BY AMERICAN TROOPS, HAD ATTACKED IRAQI MILITARY AND INDUSTRIAL TARGETS. THIS WAS THE TRAGIC OUTCOME OF THE REFUSAL OF THE IRAQI LEADERSHIP TO LISTEN TO THE DEMANDS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. FROM THE BEGINNING, THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP HAD DONE ITS UTMOST TO BRING ABOUT A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION: AND UP TO THE LAST MINUTE, THEY HAD TRIED TO PERSUADE IRAQ TO WITHDRAW ITS TROOPS. GORBACHEV HAD BEEN INFORMED OF THE DECISION ABOUT AN HOUR BEFORE THE ATTACK WAS LAUNCHED: HE HAD IMMEDIATELY CONTACTED BUSH TO APPEAL FOR A FINAL EFFORT BE MADE TO PERSUADE THE IRAQI LEADERSHIP TO SEE SENSE BEFORE FORCE WAS USED.

4. HE HAD THEN INSTRUCTED THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN BAGHDAD TO PASS A MESSAGE TO SADDAM INFORMING HIM OF THE IMMENENT ACTION AND UNDERLINING THAT IT WOULD BE IN THE INTERESTS OF ALL IF HE WITHDREW HIS FORCES FROM KUWAIT. MESSAGES WERE ALSO SENT VIA SOVIET EMBASSIES TO THE LEADERS OF FRANCE, CHINA, UK, ITALY, INDIA, GERMANY AND MANY

ARAB COUNTRIES URGING THEM TO DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO ENSURE THAT THE CONFLICT REMAINED LOCALISED. SO FAR THERE WERE NO SOVIET CASUALTIES. GORBACHEV REPEATED THAT THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP HAD DONE ALL IT COULD TO AVOID THIS OUTCOME, AND UNDERTOOK TO CONTINUE TO WORK TOGETHER WITH OTHER COUNTRIES, IN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE UN, FOR THE CESSATION OF THE CONFLICT.

5. IGNATENKO ANNOUNCED THAT A GULF EMERGENCY COMMITTEE HAD BEEN SET UP AND HAD BEEN MEETING SINCE THE EARLY MORNING. IT CONSISTED OF THE PRESIDENT, THE VICE-PRESIDENT YANAEV, FOREIGN MINISTER BESSMERNYKH, TOGETHER WITH YAZOV, PRIMAKOV, FALIN, KRYUCHKOV AND OTHERS. HE GAVE NO FURTHER DETAILS.

6. BELONOGOV THE MADE A SHORT STATEMENT. HE REPEATED GORBACHEV'S ASSERTIONS THAT THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP HAD DONE EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO PREVENT THE OUTBREAK OF WAR AND RAN THROUGH THE VARIOUS CONTACTS AND APPEALS THAT HAD BEEN MADE TO IRAQ TO BOW TO THE JUST DEMANDS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. HE ADDED THAT THE USSR VALUED VERY HIGHLY THE COOPERATION IT HAD RECEIVED FROM THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE UNSC. FRANCE IN PARTICULAR HAD CONTRIBUTED CONSTRUCTIVELY TOWARDS THE UNSG'S STATEMENT. THE NEED NOW WAS TO STOP HOSTILITIES SPREADING. HE NOTED WITH SATISFACTION THAT THE TURKISH AND IRANIAN LEADERSHIPS HAD CONFIRMED THAT, AS LONG AS THERE WAS NO PROVOCATION, THEY WOULD NOT JOIN THE CONFLICT. THE SAME HE HOPED WOULD APPLY TO ISRAEL.

7. BELONOGOV THEN ANSWERED QUESTIONS. HE WAS ASKED:-

(A) WHY SOVIET FORCES WERE ON ALERT. HE REPLIED THAT THEY WENT ONTO ALERT ONLY AFTER HOSTILITIES STARTED. THE CONFLICT WAS NEAR SOVIET BORDERS AND THE TRHEAT OF THE USE OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS WAS ENOUGH TO PROMPT THIS MOVE. IT WAS NOT IN RESPONSE TO ANY PARTICULAR PROBLEM IN THE CENTRAL ASIAN REPUBLICS.(B) WHEN GORBACHEV WAS TOLD OF US PLANS. HE SAID THAT BAKER RANG BESSMERTNYKH ABOUT AN HOUR BEFORE THE ATTACK WAS LAUNCHED. AFTER A SHORT PAUSE, GORBACHEV RANG BUSH BACK TO ASK FOR ACTION TO BE DELAYED PENDING A LAST APPEAL TO SADDAM. HE WAS TOLD THAT IT WAS TOO LATE TO HALT MATTERS.

(C) WHETHER THE SOVIET UNION WAS SATISFIED WITH THE NOTICE IT RECEIVED OF US INTENTIONS. HE REPLIED THAT THE USSR APPRECIATED HAVING BEEN TOLD BEFOREHAND. OF COURSE MORE TIME WOULD AHVE BEEN BETTER. THEY HAD ASKED FOR MORE TIME BUT IT HAD BEEN REFUSED.

(D) WHETHER THE SOVIET MESSAGE TO SADDAM WARNED HIM OF THE IMPENDING

ATTACK. HE SAID THE SOVIET UNION HAD NO MORAL RIGHT TO WARN HIM - AND THAT WAS WHY GORBACHEV HAD SPOKEN TO BUSH, TO OBTAIN PERMISSION TO CONTACT SADDAM. THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR WAS NOT ABLE TO CARRY OUT HIS INSTRUCTIONS. A GENUINE ATTEPT TO REACH SADDAM HAD HOWEVER BEEN MADE.

(E) WHAT PLANS THERE WERE TO EVACUATE THE SOVIET EMBASSY. HE SAID THERE WERE NONE. ALL SOVIET DIPLOMATS WERE APPARENTLY SAFE.

(F) WHAT WOULD BE SUFFICIENT TO STOP WAR NOW. HE SAID THAT WAS UP TO THOSE WHO WERE FIGHTING TO ANSWER. FOR THE SOVIET UNION, THE PROMISE TO IMPLEMENT ALL UNSCRS WOULD BE ENOUGH.

(G) WHETHER THERE WERE PLANS TO COMMIT SOVIET TROOPS. HE SAID THERE WERE NONE.

BRAITHWAITE

YYYY

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GULF WAR: INITIAL ISRAELI REACTION

SUMMARY

1. CONTROLLED EUPHORIA IN ISRAEL AT APPARENT RESULTS OF FIRST STRIKES BY ALLIED FORCES ON IRAQ/KUWAIT. POPULATION ADVISED TO KEEP HEADS DOWN.

DETAIL

2. ACCORDING TO THE MEDIA, THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT WERE INFORMED OF THE ALLIED ATTACK ABOUT AN HOUR IN ADVANCE. THEY WERE EVIDENTLY KEPT AWARE OF PROGRESS AND AN IDF BRIGADIER SAID ON LOCAL TV AT 0200Z THAT HE KNEW THAT H2 AND H3 HAD BEEN HIT AND THAT THE MISSILE THREAT TO ISRAEL WAS THEREFORE DRAMATICALLY REDUCED. GOVERNMENT SPOKESMEN DURING THE NIGHT, INCLUDING ARENS AND NETANYAHU, TOOK THE LINE THAT IT WAS TOO EARLY TO BE SURE OF RESULTS AND THAT HOSTILITIES COULD STILL BE PROTRACTED: ISRAEL WAS NOT INVOLVED BUT WAS WATCHING CLOSELY: THE IDF WERE READY FOR ANY CONTINGENCY. BUT, ACCORDING TO ARENS, ''IT WAS A GOOD MORNING.''

3. NO STATE OF EMERGENCY HAS BEEN DECLARED, BUT SHORTLY AFTER THE NEWS OF THE ATTACK BROKE ISRAELIS WERE ADVISED TO OPEN THEIR GAS-MASK PACKS AND KEEP THEM HANDY, TO LISTEN FOR RADIO/TV MESSAGES, NOT TO LEAVE THEIR HOMES, BUT NOT TO PUT ON GAS-MASKS OR CONFINE THEMSELVES TO SEALED ROOMS. WORKERS IN ''ESSENTIAL INDUSTRIES'' HOWEVER WERE TOLD TO REPORT FOR DUTY. SENIOR IDF OFFICERS WERE ORDERED TO REPORT FOR IMMEDIATE BRIEFING. THIS MORNING TEL AVIV IS ALMOST DESERTED.

4. THE IDF ARE PROVIDING A TWO-MAN GUARD OUTSIDE THE EMBASSY APPARENTLY IN RESPONSE TO AN INCIDENT OUTSIDE THE US CONSULATE-GENERAL IN JERUSALEM AND SOME OTHER INITIAL SIGNS OF UNREST IN EAST JERUSALEM.

COMMENT

5. DESPITE THE CAREFUL PUBLIC LINE OF GOVERNMENT SPOKESMENHTHERE IS WIDESPREAD AND PROFOUND RELIEF THAT ISRAEL HAS NOT SO FAR BEEN INVOLVED IN HOSTILITIES, COMBINED WITH APPREHENSION THAT IRAQ COULD

STILL CONCEIVABLY FIND A WAY OF STRIKING AT ISRAEL. LOOKING AHEAD, ISRAELIS WILL BE AWARE FROM THE CONTINUOUS DIET OF TV AND RADIO COMMENTARY TO WHICH THEY WERE TREATED OVERNIGHT (INCLUDING LARGE CHUNKS FROM US AND BRITISH MEDIA) THAT THEIR POLITICAL PROBLEMS HAVE BY NO MEANS GONE AWAY. ONE COMMENT BY PATRICK SEABE ON THE BBC, THAT THE APPARENT HUMILIATION OF IRAQ BY OVERWHELMING WESTERN FORCE COULD PROVOKE A STRONGER ANTI-WESTERN MOOD AMONG ARABS FOR THE FUTURE, WILL HAVE STRUCK HOME HERE.

ELLIOTT

YYYY

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TOP SECRET

Copy No. 4 of 4 copies
Page 1 of 2 pages

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10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

(8 (a-b)

From the Private Secretary

17 January 1991

Dear Simon,

THE GULF

You may find it useful to have a note on a few points about the military situation which I discussed with General Scowcroft tonight.

General Scowcroft said that overall he was reasonably content with the first 24 hours, although the damage done to Iraq was not as great as he had hoped. But the pilots were gaining confidence. Tonight would be much like last night, with attacks on targets which had not been properly covered in the first round, and action extended to new targets as well.

On a number of particular points:

- Scowcroft said that there had been an air attack on Iraq's main nuclear installation but it had not gone very well. He thought there would be another try tonight;

- attacks against the Republican Guard had met with extremely limited success. There had been such a heavy screen of anti-aircraft missiles that the American aircraft had backed off. They would be trying again tonight, in the hope that the Iraqis had exhausted much of their stock of Sam missiles;

- the Americans remained worried about Iraq's mobile missiles. But they had not despaired of finding and destroying them. They had an imagery aircraft in the air over Iraq all the time, together with four F15Es on constant patrol. If the mobile launchers emerged, they should be able to find them and destroy them, given that the missiles needed two hours to fuel. He agreed that the Israelis were being far too optimistic in believing that the missile threat to them had been lifted;

- American attacks tonight would also be concentrating on communications links between the central authorities and the military commands. In response to my question whether the Americans would be going after Saddam Hussein himself tonight, Scowcroft said that they might do so. But there was an argument for leaving him alone for a while yet. If he was eliminated, the Iraqis might quit before the Americans had

inflicted sufficient damage on Iraq's military power and assets. They did not want Iraq to collapse and give up too soon;

- I asked Scowcroft about the report that some Iraqi military aircraft had gone to Jordan. He knew nothing of this.

I am copying this letter to Richard Gozney (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and to Sir Robin Butler.

b

Yours sincerely,

(C. D. POWELL)

Simon Webb, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence.

TOP SECRET

18(A-B).

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

17/1

16 January 1991

Dear Simon,

THE GULF

You may find it useful to have a note on a few points about the military situation which I discussed with General Scowcroft tonight.

General Scowcroft said that overall he was reasonably content with the first 24 hours, although the damage done to Iraq was not as great as he had hoped. But the pilots were gaining confidence. Tonight would be much like last night, with attacks on targets which had not been properly covered in the first round, and action extended to new targets as well.

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TOP SECRET

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I am copying this letter to Richard Gozney (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and to Sir Robin Butler.

Yours sincerely,

(C. D. POWELL)

Simon Webb, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence.

MEETING RECORD
cc MASTER

SECRET AND PERSONAL

KW

17(A-B)

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

17 January 1991

PRIME MINISTER'S CONVERSATION WITH PRESIDENT BUSH: THE GULF

President Bush telephoned the Prime Minister at 12.15 this afternoon and they spoke for about ten minutes.

The President said that he had listened to the Prime Minister's remarks on television earlier in the day and was currently watching the Defence Secretary's press conference. He was pleased that we shared the same upbeat and generally optimistic assessment that the US was making of the night's events. It sounded as though things were going well. He agreed in particular with the Prime Minister's remarks about the need for sensitivity in targeting. He felt our respective air forces had been relatively successful in that. The President added that the Americans had lost one F18 aircraft, destroyed by a SAM missile.

The Prime Minister said that he was very much of the same mind as the President. The initial action had gone as well as we could have hoped and the President deserved congratulations. We had lost one Tornado. President Bush interjected that his military people were saying there was reason to hope the pilots were alive. The President went on that Saddam Hussein had come out with a 9-page blast about infidels, dogs and so on. It had been the darnedest diatribe. The Americans had targeted several of his command posts in the early raids, but there were reports that he was out and about. The Prime Minister suggested that Saddam Hussein was better employed composing diatribes than launching retaliation.

President Bush said he understood that reports of Iraqi attacks on an oil refinery in Saudi Arabia were exaggerated. It was in fact only a storage tank. There were unconfirmed reports that a number of Iraqis were crossing the border and surrendering. There would inevitably be a variety of wild

B

rumours. It was important that he and the Prime Minister should keep in close touch and call each other on the secure line at any time, as should General Scowcroft and I.

I am copying this letter to Richard Gozney (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

CHARLES POWELL

Simon Webb Esq
Ministry of Defence

MEETING RECORD
cc MASTER.

file: MEM
bcc PC

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

17 January 1991

Dear Richard

THE GULF: GERMANY

Chancellor Kohl telephoned the Prime Minister out of the blue this afternoon to ask about the situation in the Gulf. The Prime Minister gave him a briefing on standard lines, correcting a tendency by Kohl to make rather over-optimistic observations of the destruction of the Iraqi missiles and airforce: Kohl expressed profound gratitude and said he would like a further word tomorrow which we are trying to arrange.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence).

Yours ever,

CHARLES POWELL

Richard Gozney, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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Mr Rowell CDS 17j;
The Prime Minister will
wish to see

14

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DRAFT

OP GRANBY -BATTLE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT

1. Analysis by the US intelligence community in Washington D.C. of radar imagery of Iraq taken by a US reconaissance satellite shortly after midnight local time Iraq, (0015GMT), and again at early and mid- morning ,(0530/0712GMT), reported on attacks made by US aircraft on 3 missile complexes in Western Iraq, Salman Pak CBW facility, and in Baghdad, the Baath Party Headquarters, 4 Presidential residences and bunkers, 2 Air Defence Headquarters and 2 Primary International Telephone exchanges. The quality of the radar imagery precluded detailed analysis and the reports simply referred to damage having been inflicted at most locations, varying from heavy to slight.

2. Analysis by the US of optical, daylight only, reconnaissance satellite imagery acquired of targets in Iraq attacked by US aircraft covering, Baghdad multi-purpose telephone exchange, CW storage facilities at Taqaddum and H3 airfield and Taji tactical SSM facility, reported heavy to moderate damage at the telephone exchange and H3 CW munitions store. The other 2 targets were cloud covered on imagery. The optical imagery provides, for the most part, high quality definition but is weather dependent.

3. Overall, BDA giving the effects of air attacks will only become more clear as better quality optical imagery is available. Limited intelligence still remains available as to the overall effects of Allied air attacks. There is as yet no reporting available on the airfields attacked by UK aircraft, Taqaddum, Tallil, Shaibah, Mudaysis and Al Assad.

For PM to use in the House.

4.[Information available to HM Government reveals that as a result of substantial and sustained Allied air attacks on Iraq, starting around midnight local time last night, substantial damage has been inflicted to a number of important communications, command and control facilities, missile sites and airfields in Iraq, including considerable damage to a range of important military and government command centres in Baghdad.]

SECRET US/UK/CAN/AUS EYES ONLY

cc/c

13

CDN 17/i

FOREIGN SECRETARY

GULF CRISIS:
IMMIGRATION CONTROL ON IRAQI NATIONALS

In view of today's developments in the Gulf I think that we should now further tighten our immigration control on Iraqi nationals who may seek to enter the United Kingdom or who are already here.

2. As you know we have already taken a number of general measures, such as refusing applications to come here from Iraqi students and businessmen and withdrawing the transit visa waiver. More specifically, we have acted to expel 95 Iraqis from the United Kingdom, mainly on security grounds. Good intelligence and the use of my personal powers against any individuals whom we think may be a threat to the United Kingdom remains our best defence against terrorism. A general restriction on the admission of Iraqis would support this, but its main value would be in reassuring the public that the Government was taking firm action.

3. I should like to introduce the following measures:

(a) a requirement that Iraqis who remain "airside" while transiting the United Kingdom should have visas. We do not normally attempt to impose a visa requirement on such passengers as they are not seeking to enter the United Kingdom. But this would be a loophole which would allow Iraqis to arrive here without visas. I believe present circumstances justify its closure. In view of the disruption to air travel from the Middle East it is unlikely to inconvenience many genuine passengers;

(b) a change in the Immigration Rules providing for Iraqi nationals to be refused visas, entry or extensions of stay here. This would be effective in preventing new admissions of Iraqis. The availability of rights of appeal means that it could not lead to the early departure of Iraqis who are already in the country on a temporary basis. Nevertheless it would be helpful in removing the obligation we would

otherwise be under in some cases to give Iraqis permission to stay longer. Although such a Rules change would authorise refusal in any Iraqi case I would not propose to operate it inflexibly. We would exercise discretion outside the Rules in compassionate cases, for example to allow an Iraqi married with a British family here to return or remain. A Rules change has to be paid before Parliament but can take immediate effect;

(c) an order under the Immigration Act 1971 imposing a requirement to register with police on all Iraqi nationals * temporarily in the United Kingdom who are not already subject to such a requirement. This would need to be well publicised and it would in practice only be effective if it was observed voluntarily. It would be quite helpful in improving our information on Iraqis already here temporarily. It would not involve any Parliamentary procedure.

4. I do not at this stage think it necessary to go further than these measures. But it is possible that as the crisis develops we will need to take more severe action. The draft Emergency Powers (Iraq and Kuwait) Bill includes the new powers which would then be required.

5. We need to consider the implications of immigration action against Iraqis in the wider context of the handling of the crisis as a whole and I should be grateful for colleagues' views on what I propose. But if we are to act we must do so quickly. I should like to make and announce these changes tomorrow, 18 January, and to meet this timetable I should be grateful for comments by mid-day tomorrow.

I am copying this minute to the Prime Minister, other members of OPD(G), the Secretary of State for Transport and Sir Robin Butler.

KM

* 'Temporarily' means Iraqis admitted for 6 months or less.

17 January 1991

SECRET

SECRET AND PERSONAL

12.

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

17 January 1991

THE GULF: ISRAEL

Following the news of the Iraqi attack on Israel with SCUD missiles in the very early hours of this morning, I spoke at about 0115 hours to General Scowcroft. At that stage the only firm information which we both had was that seven missiles had impacted in Israel, although the precise locations were not certain. They seemed to be in the neighbourhood of Tel Aviv and Haifa. General Scowcroft had confirmation that at least four of the missiles were conventional: the other three were thought to be so as well (although a subsequent report suggests that one of them may have CW). There were not any casualty figures yet available. I asked what action the Americans were taking. General Scowcroft said that the President was trying to get hold of Mr. Shamir and urge him to hold off from retaliation, at least for now. The Americans were sending airplanes into the area where the SCUDS had been launched to try to destroy any remaining launchers. General Scowcroft added that realistically we had to expect the Israeli's to retaliate, although the nature of that retaliation would depend on whether the Iraqis had used CW and the extent of casualties. They might be persuaded to attack only military targets in Iraq. But it was more likely that they would bomb Baghdad, although they would need to avoid clashes with American aircraft operating in the area. I asked whether the Americans expected the retaliation to be limited to conventional weapons. General Scowcroft said that Secretary Cheney had been speaking to the Israeli Defence Minister who had mentioned only conventional weapons. I asked about the effect of retaliation on the Arab members of the multinational force. General Scowcroft thought that they would accept Israel's right to retaliate since it had been attacked.

After talking to the Prime Minister, I authorised the No. 10 Press Office to put out a statement saying that he was appalled by this unprovoked and unforgivable attack on Israel, about which we were consulting with the American and Israeli Governments.

I am copying this letter to Richard Gozney (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and to Sir Robin Butler.

(C. D. POWELL)

Miss Jane Binstead,
Ministry of Defence.

dti

the department for Enterprise

The Rt. Hon. Peter Lilley MP
Secretary of State for Trade and Industry

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Department of Trade and Industry

1-19 Victoria Street
London SW1H 0ET

Enquiries
071-215 5000

Telex 8811074/5 DTHQ G
Fax 071-222 2629

The Rt Hon Douglas Hurd MP
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Downing Street
LONDON
SW1A 2AL

Direct line 071-215 5623
Our ref PE1132
Your ref
Date 17 January 1991

Dear Secretary of State

ANTI TANK MISSILES FOR JORDAN

Thank you for your minute of 10 January. I have no difficulties with you suggestion - ie to delay the licensing decision for a while longer. It is inconceivable that we could despatch these weapons while we are at war. There have been no recent approaches from the supplier. It is probable that the company appreciate the delicacy of the situation.

I am copying this minute to the Prime Minister, the Defence Secretary and to Sir Robin Butler.

(Approved by the Secretary of State
and signed in his absence.)

MIDDLE EAST: DX: PT 38



From: The Private Secretary

CONFIDENTIAL

Home Office
Queen Anne's Gate
London SW1H 9AT

17 January 1991

C90171

Dear Caroline

OPERATION TAPPER

Further to my letter of 15 January about Operation WOODSHED, you will wish to know that a deployment of troops at Gatwick airport, for deterrent purposes due to the situation in the Gulf, commences at 0600 am on 18 January. This deployment will initially be for 24 hours, but will be reviewed in the light of developments.

Operation TAPPER is similar to Operation WOODSHED at Heathrow and provides for troops to support police officers maintaining the security of the airport perimeter and manning checkpoints. No inconvenience should be caused to the travelling public.

The Department of Transport, Ministry of Defence and Foreign and Commonwealth Office have been consulted about the deployment and have raised no objections.

Yours sincerely

Paul Pugh

PAUL PUGH

Miss Caroline Slocock
10 Downing Street
London SW1

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

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C/Soviet
Original of message with COP

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

17 January 1991

SOVIET UNION: THE GULF

I enclose a copy of a message to the Prime Minister from President Gorbachev, delivered to us this morning, saying that the Soviet Union had tried to get the Americans to postpone military action for a day or two to leave room for further efforts by the Soviet Union to persuade Iraq to withdraw. General Scowcroft told me during the night that the Americans had received a similar approach and had treated it with some scorn. Nevertheless, the Prime Minister will want to reply and I should be grateful for a draft as soon as possible.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

CHARLES POWELL

Richard Gozney Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL

Seen by PM
CDS
17/1

The Rt.Hon. Mr.John Major, MP
Prime Minister

Dear Prime Minister,

Having learnt of an immenent US military action in the Persian Gulf one hour prior to its beginning we urgently contacted the American leadership and asked it to postpone this action for a day or two in order to enable us to undertake a last attempt in convincing S.Hussain - through a direct contact - in the absolute necessity of his beginning to withdraw from Kuwait.

Unfortunately, as we were speaking to Washington the military operation had already started. In this connection the President of the USSR has sent an urgent appeal to S.Hussain suggesting that he declares in a speedy and decisive manner the withdrawal of troops. We appealed to his common sence and the necessity to be guided by the supreme interests of his people and other peoples, so that this only saving step should be taken.

I believe that our concern for preventing the escalation of the conflict in the Persian Gulf, which still threatens with unpredictable consequences, demands that You, on Your part, also take immediate measures of influencing the Iraqi leadership.

I am prepared to maintain a permanent contact with You in the interests of a joint search for ways of ending the spread of military operations in Iraq and beyond.

Time is not waiting.

M.Gorbachev

Moscow, Kremlin
17 January, 1991

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T20191

SUBJECT cc MASTER
OPS

Узнав примерно за час о готовящейся военной акции США в зоне Персидского залива, мы срочно связались с американским руководством и попросили его отложить эту акцию на сутки-двое для того, чтобы дать нам возможность предпринять последнюю попытку убедить через прямой контакт С.Хусейна в абсолютной необходимости для него начать вывод своих войск из Кувейта.

К сожалению, когда мы были в контакте с Вашингтоном, военная акция уже началась. В этой связи Президент СССР направил экстренное обращение С.Хусейну, предложив ему самым срочным и решительным образом заявить о выводе войск. Мы обратились к его здравому смыслу и необходимости руководствоваться высшими интересами своего народа и других народов, чтобы предпринять этот единственно спасительный шаг.

Считаю, что наша забота о предотвращении эскалации конфликта в зоне Персидского залива, который по-прежнему грозит непредсказуемыми последствиями, требует, чтобы и с Вашей стороны были предприняты незамедлительные меры по воздействию на иракское руководство. Разумеется, мы все должны быть заинтересованы в срочной локализации конфликта, недопущения его опасной эскалации.

Я готов поддерживать постоянный контакт с Вами в интересах совместного поиска путей прекращения разрастания военных действий в Ираке и за его пределами.

Время не ждет.

FROM JAMES LEE FOR COI RADIO TECHNICAL SERVICES

GULF CRISIS - OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES

TRANSCRIPT OF STATEMENT BY
THE PRIME MINISTER, MR. JOHN MAJOR,
IN LONDON
ON THURSDAY, 17 JANUARY 1991

PRIME MINISTER:

I thought you might care to know the information that I have thus far. As you almost certainly will know, Allied forces attacked military targets in Iraq and Baghdad last night.

The operation began just before midnight our time and is a very large and continuing operation. The attack was carried out by a four-nation force - United States forces, British forces, Saudi Arabian forces and Kuwaiti forces - and it was, of course, carried out under the authority of United Nation Resolution 678.

Early indications are that it has been a very successful operation. I have just received an initial report this morning from the Secretary of State for Defence, Tom King, and from the Chief of the Defence Staff. I am pleased to tell you that at the present time I am not yet aware of any British casualties. We will provide further information on the detailed success of the operation at a later stage when that is available.

Tom King will hold a press conference later on this morning and I shall myself of course be making a Statement to the House of Commons this afternoon.

I know that everybody would share my feelings at the moment that our principal thoughts and prayers are with the troops who have been carrying out this operation and with their families who must be so concerned about the matter at home. Immense trouble has been taken of course to ensure that it is military targets that are the target of this attack and an enormous amount of effort and care has gone into ensuring that there are the minimum possible number of civilian casualties.

If I may, I will take what questions you may have and answer them insofar as I am yet able.

-----ooo-----

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

QUESTION:

Prime Minister, may I ask you first of all would you consider a pause to allow for negotiations to take place?

PRIME MINISTER:

No. This is an ongoing operation. If Saddam Hussein were prepared to start withdrawing from Kuwait, then that is a separate matter but for the moment this is an ongoing operation. I am not prepared to risk the potential lives of British forces - and I am sure the other commanders feel the same - by a pause that would allow Saddam Hussein to regroup his forces and perhaps launch a substantial attack. I do not think that would be right and I think the security of our forces must be a matter to which we will give overriding concern.

QUESTION:

Prime Minister, can you tell us a little bit about your conversation with President Bush before this began? What was the sort of mood of the discussion that you had with him and what the format that you agreed, the context in which you would all work?

PRIME MINISTER:

No-one enters into an operation of this scale or of this nature lightly. I have had a considerable number of conversations

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PRIME MINISTER:

No-one enters into an operation of this scale or of this nature lightly. I have had a considerable number of conversations

with President Bush about the possibility of us needing to use force at the end of the deadline over a considerable period of time.

The final decision that we would use force if Iraq did not remove themselves from Kuwait was taken very shortly after the conclusion of the House of Commons debate on Tuesday.

QUESTION:

Prime Minister, do you honestly believe that you have used force as a last resort and that there was no other way of getting Saddam Hussein out?

PRIME MINISTER:

Yes. That has been our position for a long time.

Of course, the United Nations Resolution was set some time ago with a particular deadline so that there was no doubt that in international law there was a proper authority to use force after the expiry of the deadline on the 15th. I do not think Saddam Hussein could have been in any doubt at all from what has been said over recent weeks that at the expiry of that there was authority to use force and that we would find it necessary to do so to expel him from Kuwait. I am myself satisfied that that was necessary and I hope this will be a speedy and successful operation.

QUESTION:

Prime Minister, do you have any assessment at this stage of how long military action might have to continue?

PRIME MINISTER:

No. There can be no assessment of that at this stage. We have some preliminary assessments of the damage that has been done but we will need a considerable degree of extra information before we can be precisely clear about that.

QUESTION (INAUDIBLE)

PRIME MINISTER:

Thus far, the assessments are that a considerable amount of damage has been done but they are very preliminary assessments and we will have a good deal more information later.

QUESTION:

When did you first hear about the attack?

PRIME MINISTER:

I, of course, have known about the timing of the attack, as I said a few moments ago, from consultations I had with President Bush at the conclusion of the House of Commons debate on Tuesday. I therefore was aware of the time the attack would take place.

QUESTION:

How have you spent the night and what are your feelings now that war has started?

PRIME MINISTER:

No-one wanted this conflict. No-one can be pleased about the fact that this conflict has been necessary and I regret that as much as anyone. I have been up throughout the night; we have had an open line to the White House and there has been very considerable consultation throughout the night.

I hope now that it is clear to Iraq that the scale of the Allied operation is such that they cannot win. I hope that Saddam Hussein will now make a very swift decision that he must do what he has been invited to do by the world community for a long time - that he should get out of Kuwait and enable this matter to end swiftly and decisively. I hope that he will do that.

QUESTION:

Prime Minister, could the war be over in a matter of days?

PRIME MINISTER:

I cannot forecast that. We will prosecute this war until it comes to a successful conclusion. There is no doubt at all what the world community wants: it wants Saddam Hussein to leave Kuwait and Kuwait to return to its rightful government. When that matter is concluded, the war will end but there should be no doubt about our determination to prosecute it to that end. International will is very strong; international law is quite clear; and it has been made absolutely clear by the Allies over recent weeks that that is our determination and our intention - it remains so.

I will now leave you if I may but I will report to the House of Commons this afternoon.

(END OF TRANSCRIPT)

I will now leave you if I may but I will report to the House of Commons this afternoon.

(END OF TRANSCRIPT)

11

SECRET UK EYES A

PRIME MINISTER

OPD(G): 17 January: Overnight Developments

copied to Sir Robin Butler
Sir Percy Cradock

Military campaign

The Defence Secretary and Chief of the Defence Staff can brief you on the latest assessment of the first night attacks of the allied offensive. As of now (0600) the picture is still incomplete since we do not have a read-out of the US analysis.

Operations began at 2236Z last night. UK, US, Saudi and Kuwaiti aircraft launched attacks on targets in Iraq and Kuwait. The US Navy launched Tomahawk Cruise missiles. There were confused reports of possible Iraqi missile releases but none so far confirmed either against allied bases or Israel. Iraqi defensive air activity appears to have been pretty modest.

On the UK side 22 Tornado GR1s from Tabuk and Muharraq with tanker support took part in the first strikes which in their case * covered Iraqi airfields. The attacks included the use of Alarm defence suppression missiles. There are no reports so far of any British or allied losses or casualties.

While we will not have a damage assessment until much later in the day, British aircraft fulfilled their mission.

It is possible that the Iraqis will launch daytime missile or aircraft counterattacks since we always knew that their night-time capability was limited.

International reactions

For obvious reasons there have been few substantive reactions so far. President Bush addressed the nation as the attacks began. The Kuwaiti Ambassador at the United Nations has welcomed the allied action while, predictably, Fidel Castro has denounced it. The UN Secretary General said that he was sad hostilities had begun. Soviet, Iranian and Syrian comment has been (selectively) factual.

Saddam Hussain is reported to intend to make a TV broadcast at 0838 Baghdad time but CNN say that they cannot get their pictures out. So it is not clear if the TV station is still operating.

L V Appleyard

L V Appleyard
SECRET UK EYES A

* MoD are checking whether further Tornado GR1s also took part in the attacks. More details later.

10a-f

THE GULF CONFLICT

BRIEFING FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE - 06.00Z, 17 JANUARY 1990

Contains

1. Classified sitrep

2. Unclassified material for public use by Ministers

Distribution attached

Sec(O)(C)

b

OPERATION GRANBY - BRIEFING FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

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SEC(O)(C) OVERNIGHT BRIEF, 17 JANUARY 1991

Summary

- Operation DESERT STORM began at 2336Z on 16 January. US, UK, Saudi and Kuwaiti aircraft launched attacks on targets in Iraq and Kuwait. The US Navy also lauched Tomahawk cruise missile attacks. First official confirmation at 2359Z. Believed that attack took place some 20 minutes earlier than expected. Current pause in air operations.

Political

- US Defence Secretary Cheney referred to attacks involving hundreds of US and Allied aircraft striking military targets, including Iraqi nuclear and chemical warfare facilities. Initial indications were that these attacks had been successful.

- President Bush said that 'we are determined to knock out Saddam Hussein's nuclear bomb potential. We will also destroy his chemical weapons facilities. Much of Saddam's artillery and tanks will be destroyed.'

- Luxembourg called for meeting of EC Foreign Ministers to follow WEU Ministerial in Paris.

Operations

- Details of operation and success are still sketchy. Media reports carry very optimistic reports of the success of the mission, with the Republican Guard "decimated" and destruction of almost all Iraqi airbases. Fixed and mobile SCUD sites, particularly those in Western Iraq reported to have been destroyed.

- UK aircraft involved in the first wave of attacks were: 10 Tornado GR1 from Tabuk, of which 2 carried ALARM and 8 carried JP 233. 2 aircraft returned with unserviceabilities; 12 Tornado GR1 from Muharraq, of which 8 carried JP 233 and 3 carried 8 1000lb bombs, 1 returned unserviceable; 4 Tornado GR1s from Dhahran one of which returned unserviceable; 6 VC10K tankers. Awaiting reports on 4 GR1 from Muharraq, but all other aircraft have returned safely.

- Aircraft from Muharraq report successful missions with JP 233 against airfields at Tallil and Shaibah.

- 2 Tornado GR1 from Tabuk launched successful ALARM attack (4 out of 6 succesfully fired, no indication of hits) against Al Asad airfield.

- 6 Tornado GR1 from Tabuk launched successful JP 233 attack (5 out of 6 aircraft reported hits) on Taquddum airfield.

- 3 Tornado GR1 fro Dhahran launched successful attack on Mudaysis airfield. Were illuminated by Flogger, Fulcrum and Mirage F1 during attack without interception.

- Currently, no reports of direct RN military involvement.

- CNN report senior Saudi Air Force officer quoted as stating that 150 Saudi aircraft involved.

Allied Losses/Casualties

- No reports to date of Allied casualties or aircraft losses.

Iraqi Operations

- No reliable reports of any Iraqi retaliatory measures. Media reports suggest very little resistance from missiles, aircraft or ground forces.

Media reports and coverage

- Media coverage began with live coverage from Baghdad on CNN as the first wave of bombing began.

- CNN stories picked up by UK TV and radio, with live coverage of President Bush's address.

Other issues

- Advice to merchant shipping that hostilities had broken out was issued at midnight.

- British Airways Boeing 747 chartered to Al Jubayl left before hostilities commenced, landing in Cairo at 23.40. Now on way back to UK.

Sec(O)(C)
Produced at 05.40Z

OPENING COMMENTS

Prepared 0540 17 Jan

- Sombre day but also day of hope. Aim to liberate Kuwait, uphold international law and assert authority of UN.

- Confident that the men and women of all our forces will play full part.

- Massive initial multinational air operation (involving US, Saudi, Kuwaiti and UK aircraft).

- Early reports encouraging. RAF Tornados and tanker aircraft significant contribution - [all returned safely].

- Allied navies, including RN, at readiness in Gulf and continue to enforce embargo. Ground forces continue to prepare for their own tasks. UK 1st Armoured Division complete in theatre.

- Perhaps Saddam and his people now understand we have the means - and the will - to eject him.

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY

Hundreds of sorties by aircraft of the multinational force were flown last night in the start of military operations to liberate Kuwait. UK Tornado and tanker aircraft were involved in the first wave of the allied air attack. Aircraft were armed with airfield denial weapons. Initial reports indicate that these attacks on Iraqi airfield targets were successful. [All aircraft returned safely].

DEFENSIVE POINTS TO MAKE

Why targets in Iraq?

Targets attacked in Iraq are sites which could pose an immediate threat to allied forces - airbases, missile sites and chemical weapon facilities - and facilities supporting Iraq's occupation of Kuwait.

Why chemical/nuclear facilities targeted?

We know he has chemical weapons. We have seen he has no compunction in using them. For some time he has been seeking to develop nuclear weapons. In carrying out operations, allied forces could take no chances by leaving such facilities intact to continue and perhaps complete their work.

Civilian casualties?

No information at present, but targets were facilities which either posed a threat to allied forces or were supporting Iraq's occupation of Kuwait. Operations were planned to reduce possibility of civilian casualties. If any civilian casualties have been caused, this is of course regrettable, but these were in no way indiscriminate attacks.

Dear Minister

Gulf: Situation at 0500

Still awaiting a proper read-out & assessment. But clearly the operation has gone well, indeed very well. Confirmed that ALL UK TORNADOS RETURNED SAFELY and no Iraqi retaliation as yet.

C D P.

Prime Minister

The Gulf: Situation at 02.45

I have kept in touch with General Schwarzkopf during the night. The Americans cannot yet make a proper assessment of the results of the airstrikes. But their impression is that everything is going very well. Despite some false alarms, there has been as yet NO retaliation or air resistance from Iraq. The situation on US casualties is described as 'encouraging'. The targets have been located throughout Iraq & Kuwait. The focus has been on destroying Saddam Hussein's offensive capabilities.

I have no information at this stage about our own forces.

I attach the text of the

Brighton, TV statement - it was so-so.

I also attached a slightly amended version of your statement. The TV has been repeating through the night but you will update between 0700 - 0900.

Opposition spokesmen have been on TV during the night, but presumably to a very small audience. David Howell has also appeared.

I am going to take a couple of hours kip & will be around again at about 5.30.

C.D.P

(2)

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB
Telephone 071-21 82111/3

9B(a)

MO 6/17/15/1S

16th January 1991

Thank you.
Prime Minister
Here are the details
which you requested
CDP
17/1

Dear Charles

NOTES ON EQUIPMENT

As requested at this morning's meeting, I attach some notes on the main aircraft and their weapons deployed in the Gulf. We have concentrated on the UK but given a brief summary of the main US systems too.

You might like an up to date copy of the UK forces table which gives the numbers of equipments.

Let me know if you would like something similar for the other services.

Yours sincerely
Stephen Webb

(S WEBB)
Private Secretary

Sir Charles Powell KCMG
10 Downing Street

DAO 01/10/2

16 Jan 91

BRIEF FOR S of S

BRIEF GUIDE TO CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS

JP 233

1. Specialist airfield denial weapon containing 2 types of sub-munition (SM); a cratering SM to make holes in runways and taxiways and an area denial mine to prevent the craters from being repaired. Carried exclusively by Tornado GR1. Each Tornado carries 2 JP 233 weapon dispensers which, together, will deliver 60 cratering SMs and over 400 mines. JP 233 is the only specialist anti-airfield weapons system in service in the Gulf and is probably the most effective in the world.

BL 755 CLUSTER BOMB

2. The BL 755 cluster bomb contains 147 bomblets each with a dual purpose anti-armour anti-personnel warhead. It is effective against tanks, armoured vehicles, soft-skinned vehicles and troops. It can be delivered from both the Jaguar and the Tornado GR1 from low-level attacks. Normally delivered in sticks of 4 or 8 weapons.

1000 LB GENERAL PURPOSE BOMBS

3. The 1000 lb bomb can be delivered from both the Jaguar and the Tornado GR1. It can be delivered from high level as a free-fall bomb which is capable of penetrating the hardest targets, or from very low-level using a parachute retarder system. It can be set to explode after it has penetrated hard targets, on contact with the surface or in an airburst mode. Airburst is particularly effective against soft targets such as troops in the open.

LASER GUIDED-BOMB

4. The laser-guided bomb is a 1000 lb general purpose bomb that can be delivered with pinpoint accuracy against high value targets. Once the bomb leaves the delivery aircraft, it homes onto a the target which is illuminated by a laser designator. The laser designator can be carried on an aircraft or operated by our own infantry when targets are in close proximity to our own troops. The laser guided bomb can be delivered from both the Jaguar and the Tornado GR1.

A T HUDSON
Wg Cdr
Air Off 9
MB4257 6856MB

SIDEWINDER AIM 9L



Carried by Tornado, Phantom and Hawk, the Sidewinder is an all-aspect air-to-air missile which uses infra-red homing and has a dog-fighting capability. It homes on to the heat emitted by a hostile aircraft's engines, and can operate independently of the aircraft's radar.

Capability: air-to-air combat, autonomous direction finding.
Length: 2.83m (9ft 3in)





SKY FLASH

Sky Flash is an advanced medium range radar-guided air-to-air missile based on the Sparrow, but with improved guidance and fusing systems. Designed to operate in severe electronic counter-measure conditions, it is now the RAF's major air defence weapon. It is in service with Phantom and Tornado F3 interceptor.

Capability: all weather high/low altitude attack.
Length: 3.7m (12ft 2in)





ALARM

The Alarm (Air Launched Anti-Radar Missile) is designed to destroy ground-based air defence radars and surface-to-air missile radars, to provide support to attack aircraft needing to penetrate ground air defences. One unique feature is the optional capability to loiter over a target area for several minutes while continuing to search for targets.

Capability: direct autonomous attack.
Length: 4.2m (13ft 9in)



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

TORNADO GR1

Designed as a multi-role aircraft, the Tornado GR1 is used for strike, attack and reconnaissance and, with the F3 fighter variant, is the most numerous combat aircraft in the RAF's front-line inventory. Smaller in size than the Phantom, Tornado has a crew of two. It has variable sweep wings and the GR1 can be identified from the air defence version by the shorter nose and, usually, by the external stores carried under the fuselage and wings. Wing span (spread) 14m (46ft); length 16.7m (54ft 10in).

COMBAT

TORNADO F3

A long-range air defence fighter, the Tornado F3 has replaced the Lightning and some of the Phantoms in the RAF's interceptor force. Orders for 165 have been placed to equip nine squadrons. The Tornado F3, armed with four semi-recessed Skyflash, four Sidewinder missiles and a single 27mm cannon, has about 80 per cent commonality with the Tornado GR1. The main difference is the extended fuselage which is most noticeable in the longer nose containing the interceptor radar.
Wing span (swept) 8.6m (28ft 3in); length 18m (59ft).





JAGUAR

Twin-engined tactical attack and reconnaissance aircraft designated GR1 in single-seat form and T2 for the two-seat trainer version. Weapons carried externally under wings and fuselage. Dedicated recce aircraft carry a large system pod under the centre fuselage. Additional armament comprises two 30mm cannon and Sidewinder AAMs. GR1 identified by laser nose and prominent fin fairing. All Jaguars have two ventral fins under rear fuselage. Also flown by the French Air Force. Wing span 8.5m (28ft). Length 17m (55ft).







NIMROD

MARITIME PATROL

Long-range, four-turbofan powered maritime patrol aircraft. Latest MR2P configuration includes wingtip pods, tailplane finlets, flight refuelling probe above cockpit and ventral fin under rear fuselage. Long weapons bay accommodates most stores but single hardpoint under each wing can carry Harpoon or Sidewinder missiles. Nimrod R2 electronics aircraft identified by the short tailcone. Wing span 35m (114ft 10in); length 40m (131ft).

- General Dynamics F-111

Role - All weather ground attack/Strategic attack

Speed - Mach 2.5 Range 4100 miles

Armament - AGM - 69A
SRAM Air to Surface Missile
Conventional Bombs

US - McDonnell Douglas F-15 Eagle

Role - Air Superiority Fighter

Speed - Mach 2.5

Armament - AMRAAM/Aim 7
Aim 9 Sidewinder

US - F-16 General Dynamics Fighting Falcon

Role - Fighter

Speed - Mach 2.05

Weapons - Short Range Air-to-Air Missiles/Aim 9

US - B-52 Stratofortress

Role - Strategic Bomber

Speed - 595 mph Range 7,500 miles

Armament - Conventional/Nuclear Bombs
Air Launched Cruise Missiles
Air-to-Surface short range attack missiles

US - A-10 - Thunderbolt

Role - Close air support (Tank Busting)

Speed - 439 mph Range 288 miles

Armament - 30mm Anti tank gun
free fall/guided bombs
Combined effect munitions
AGM-65 Maverick
Aim 9 Sidewinder

US - F-117

Role - Stealth Fighter



SECRET

OPERATION GRANBY - UK FORCES COMMITTED AS AT 160700Z JAN 91

CLASSIFIED FIGURES	
(a) In theatre	35237
(b) Outside theatre	665
Total UK Forces committed	35902

PUBLIC FIGURES	
(a) In theatre	About 33000
(b) Outside theatre	About 2000
Total UK Forces committed	About 35000

ROYAL NAVY

DD/FF in theatre		MCMVs in theatre		RFAs in theatre			LSLs in theatre		
Ship	Personnel	Ship	Personnel	Ship	RFA	RN	Ship	RFA	RN
HMS CARDIFF	293	HMS ATHERSTONE	46	RFA FORT GRANGE	158	52	SIR GALAHAD	56	53
HMS LONDON	307	HMS CATTISTOCK	43	RFA DILIGENCE	41	80	SIR PERCIVALE	55	6
HMS BRAZEN	249	HMS HURWORTH	56	RFA ORANGELEAF	58	5	SIR TRISTRAM	49	1
HMS GLOUCESTER	288	HMS HERALD (Cmnd ship)	135	RFA RESOURCE	159	5	SIR BEDIVERE	54	1
Ashore(inc. FSU)	209	HMS DULVERTON	48	RFA ARGUS (PCRS)	85	294			
12 x SEA KING	346	HMS LEDBURY	51	ZUIDERKRUIS *		48			
	Total RN personnel in theatre		2616	* – a Dutch ship, supporting UK vessels and operating RN Sea Kings from RFA OLNA					
	Total RFA personnel in theatre		715						

Armilla Roulement Vessels (not included in totals)	Ship	Personnel	Destination	ETA	Replacing/by

Ships taken up from trade	72
Other LSLs in use	0

ARMY

1st (British) Armoured Division – in theatre

Divisional Troops		7th Armoured Brigade		4th Brigade	
Personnel	Total	Personnel	Total	Personnel	Total
Divisional HQ	918	Fighting Echelon	4212	Fighting Echelon	4182
Fighting Echelon	4933	2nd Line Support		2nd Line Support	
2nd Line Support	4475	3rd Line Support		(Support elements of	
3rd Line Support	5445			4 Brigade included in	
Battle Casualty Repls	164			Divisional Troops totals)	
Total Divisional Troops	15935	Total 7th Armd Bde	4212	Total 4th Brigade	4182

Equipment	Tot *	Fgt Str
M109 155mm SP gun		
M110 Howitzer	1	1
Striker	9	8
AVLB,AVRE,CET	52	42
MLRS/Rapier	35	34
Lynx helicopters	22	18
Gazelle helicopters	22	18
Scimitar	39	29

Equipment	Tot *	Fgt Str
Challenger MBT	156	117
Warrior AIFV	164	101
Scorpion	22	17
Scimitar	26	20
M109 155mm SP gun	30	24
Javelin	36	36
AVLB, AVRE, CET	24	24
Striker	5	4

Equipment	Tot *	Fgt Str
Challenger MBT	65	59
Warrior AIFV	147	147
Scorpion	9	8
Scimitar	35	28
Striker	5	4
M109 155mm SP gun	24	24
AVLB, AVRE, CET	25	25
Javelin	36	36

Total other Army support personnel in theatre (signals, medical, engineers, Javelin dets (Armilla), miscellaneous) 3096

Total 1(BR) Armd Div in theatre 24329

Total Army personnel in theatre 27425

* – total no of equipment in theatre, inc Welt

1 (BR) Armd Div – outside theatre

Personnel	ETA/Loc	Total
Divisional Troops		
4th Bde		
Fd Hosp Pers		
BCRs		

Equipment	ETA/Loc	Total
Warrior AIFV		12
Striker		1
M109 155mm SP gun		12
M110 Howitzer		12
RAPIER		10
Lynx helicopters		2
Gazelle helicopters		1
Sigs/Int dets	Cyprus	0

Tot 1 Div pers o/s theatre 0

Tot Army pers o/s theatre 0

ROYAL AIR FORCE

In Theatre

Unit	Loc	Pers	Unit	Loc	Pers
18 x TORNADO F3	Dhahran		10 x TORNADO GR1	Tabuk	
12 X TORNADO GR1	Dhahran	1094	4 x TORNADO GR1 (ALARM)	Tabuk	565
4 X TORNADO GR1A	Dhahran		HQ 3 Wg RAF Regt	Tabuk	
HQ 4 Wg + LAS	Dhahran		3 x NIMROD MR2	Seeb	154
12 x JAGUAR GR1	Muharraq		8 X VC10 TANKER	Riyadh	
13 x TORNADO GR1	Muharraq	1234	3 x C130	Riyadh	374
6 x Victor	Muharraq		1 x TRISTAR	Riyadh	
RAF Regt (RAPIER/LAS)	Muharraq		1 x HS125	Riyadh	
19 x Puma			Jaguar support	Thumrait	7
8 x Chinook	Al Jubayl	908	Miscellaneous	All locations	145
Total RAF personnel in theatre		4481			

Outside Theatre

Unit	ETA/Loc	Personnel
4 x F4 Phantom + sup	Cyprus	
1 x RAF Regt LAS	Cyprus	561
HQBF Cyprus	Cyprus	4
2 x Tornado GR1A	16 JAN	100
RAF Regt		65
Tot RAF pers o/s theatre		665

Total US forces in theatre 422041 as at 160700Z Jan 91

Total Reservists employed on Regular duty	1120
Total personnel in HQBFME	326

Tot Reservists deployed to theat	135
Tot medical personnel in theatre	4146
Total female personnel in theatre	774

SECRET

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB
Telephone 071-21 82111/3

MO 9S

16th January 1991

Dear Charles,

PRINCE OF WALES' VISIT TO THE GULF

Thank you for your letter of 14th January.

The Defence Secretary was generally content with your reply. You might want to look at the wording on Options for Change in the light of my letter to you of earlier today on the Future Army Force Structure. As you will see the Defence Secretary has reluctantly concluded that we shall have to postpone implementation of some Regimental restructuring until Operation Granby has advanced further, so it would not be quite true that we should be clarifying the position of individual Regiments as soon as possible. While it is certainly the intention that we should keep redundancies to the absolute minimum you should be aware of earlier estimates that up to 10,000 army redundancies will be needed to meet our PES commitments. You might consider amending to:

"..beyond: we will keep redundancies as low as we can. Discussions on individual regiments will not be undertaken while Operation Granby is underway."

The Defence Secretary is likely to be advised against the proposal for a hard-lying allowance, but has yet to consider it.

Yours sincerely,

Temporarily Retained Simon Webb

(S WEBB)
Private Secretary

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Sir Charles Powell KCMG
No 10 Downing Street

①

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

TOP SECRET

9A (a-b)

16 January 1991

Prime Minister

The Americans tell us on military channels that they are confident of dealing safely with Salman Pak, & that the President has given the go-ahead

CDP 16/i

Dear Charles,

Gulf Crisis : Defence Issues

At OPD(G) on 14 January it was agreed that the FCO would follow up the Prime Minister's warning to Mr Baker at Alconbury on 13 January about the potential dangers of the US over-reacting to Iraqi use of CW/BW weapons during hostilities in the Gulf.

The PUS raised this with Ambassador Catto today since the latter had been present during the Prime Minister's discussion with Mr Baker. The PUS stressed the importance of keeping any US reply on very restricted channels. He then went over fully the points which the Prime Minister had made to Mr Baker and asked the Ambassador if he could let us know where matters now stood following Mr Baker's return to Washington.

Later in the day, Mr Catto returned to the PUS having spoken personally to Mr Baker. Mr Catto said that Mr Baker had asked Kimmitt (Assistant Secretary, State Department) to find out the position on a response to an Iraqi CW/BW attack. The latter had obtained from Mr Cheney and General Powell assurances that in any US response religious sites would be taken into account, and that although Tikrit airfield and associated bunkers were on the military target list there were no plans for blanket bombing of Tikrit.

Mr Baker had also added that as far as the BW target at Salman Pak was concerned no decisions had been taken. Perhaps this question could be folowed up on military channels. If the Prime Minister was still concerned Mr Baker suggested that he might give the President a ring. Mr Baker concluded by telling Mr Catto that he had been present on two occasions when this issue had been discussed with the President. On both occasions Mr Baker had referred to the Prime Minister's concerns.

These subjects are on the agenda of OPD(G) tomorrow, 17 January, when the question of any further follow up action will no doubt be discussed.

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/I am

TOP SECRET

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I am sending copies of this letter to Simon Webb (MOD) and Colin Pipe (Attorney General's Office).

Yours ever

Richard Gozney

(R H T Gozney)
Private Secretary

Sir Charles Powell KCMG
10 Downing Street

TOP SECRET

The National Archives

DEPARTMENT/SERIES PREM 19 PIECE/ITEM 3443/3 (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract details: US report dated 16 January 1991	
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Use the card for one piece or for each extract removed from a different place within a piece.

Enter the department and series,
eg. HO 405, J 82.

Enter the piece and item references, .
eg. 28, 1079, 84/1, 107/3

Enter extract details if it is an extract rather than a whole piece.
This should be an indication of what the extract is,
eg. Folio 28, Indictment 840079, E107, Letter dated 22/11/1995.
Do not enter details of why the extract is sensitive.

If closed under the FOI Act, enter the FOI exemption numbers applying to the closure, eg. 27(1), 40(2).

Sign and date next to the reason why the record is not available to the public ie. Closed under FOI exemption; Retained under section 3(4) of the Public Records Act 1958; Temporarily retained; Missing at transfer or Number not used.

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB
Telephone 071-21 82111/3

MO 6/17/15/1S

16th January 1991

Dear Charles,

THE GULF: CANADA

Thank you for your letter of today's date about the Canadian decision to send a field hospital to assist our forces in the Gulf. You asked for a draft message of thanks for the Prime Minister to send to Mr Mulroney; I attach a draft that the Prime Minister may care to send.

Yours sincerely,

Bryan Wells

(B H WELLS)
Private Secretary

Sir Charles Powell KCMG
No 10 Downing Street

DRAFT MESSAGE FROM PRIME MINISTER TO MR MULRONEY

I was delighted to hear that your Government has ~~now taken the firm decision~~ decided to send a Canadian field hospital with over 500 personnel to Saudi Arabia, in support of our forces in the Gulf. I know that our military staffs are already working urgently on the details.

Your generous contribution is particularly welcome in view of the close and longstanding relationship between our armed forces, as well as providing a welcome and very visible demonstration of Canada's commitment to the multinational forces. ~~Even at this late stage, we can only hope that Saddam Hussein will come to his senses in the face of unshakeable allied solidarity.~~ We are truly grateful to you & the people of Canada.

CH.

The National Archives

DEPARTMENT/SERIES PREM 19 PIECE/ITEM 3443/1 (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract details: Letter from the Prime Minister to the Queen dated 16 January 1991	X
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9a-b

Ref. A091/137

PRIME MINISTER

cc Sir Percy Cradock
Mr Appleyard

OPD(G): 17 January

Item 1: Current international situation

You might invite the Foreign Secretary to give a brief summary of where we stand on the diplomatic front. This is likely to include an assessment of the outcome of the Security Council consultations, which led to the Secretary General making a statement on his own authority, and the British and French roles. Other practical issues to cover would be reduction of the Iraqi Embassy, further expulsions of Iraqis from the UK, evacuation planning, and the US response to your discussion with Mr Baker on punitive action. On the latter, the FCO have obtained from Mr Baker an assurance that the US are no longer thinking of attacks on Tikrit other than normal military targets. We do not however yet have a comprehensive assurance that the US will consult us before undertaking other forms of punitive action going outside the agreed statement of objectives. If you wish to press this, you might do so in your next telephone conversation with the President.

Item 2: Current military situation

2. You might invite the Defence Secretary to brief on outstanding military issues. He may want to confirm the readiness state of British ground, air and naval forces as conflict approaches. An agreement has been signed with the Saudi Government confirming host nation support for our forces stationed there. The Defence Secretary wants to press for further action on burden-sharing assistance from other countries

SECRET

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to meet our costs, on which the Foreign Secretary is being briefed to comment. I understand that the Chief of the Defence Staff has received assurances from General Powell that the President has looked personally at the scientific advice that, provided attacks on BW storage take place in light winds and bright light, the risk of collateral damage is very small indeed and has authorised their inclusion in the list of US targets on this basis. Our own commanders have been instructed that they should seek specific authorisation from London if British aircraft were to be used for this purpose. This seems a satisfactory conclusion. The Defence Secretary may also mention B52 deployment from Diego Garcia on which the Americans have said that they would undertake the required joint consultation through the No 10/White House link.

3. Sir Percy Cradock will want to report that the Iraqis may have a radiological bomb. This is not a nuclear weapon and is not believed by the experts to be militarily effective but, since its purpose is to disperse radio-active material, it could cause alarm and even be confused, in the hubbub of war, with a nuclear weapon.

Item 3: Media Handling

4. You might invite the Energy Secretary to report on the broader picture and your Press Secretary to update on day-to-day briefing.

Temporarily retained

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Louisa Phippard

pp ROBIN BUTLER

(Approved by Sir Robin and signed in his absence)

16 January 1991

President's Speech final draft

JUST TWO HOURS AGO, ALLIED AIR FORCES BEGAN AN ATTACK ON MILITARY TARGETS IN IRAQ AND KUWAIT. THESE ATTACKS CONTINUE AS I SPEAK. GROUND FORCES ARE NOT ENGAGED.

THIS CONFLICT STARTED AUGUST 2ND WHEN THE DICTATOR OF IRAQ INVADED A SMALL AND HELPLESS NEIGHBOR. KUWAIT -- A MEMBER OF THE ARAB LEAGUE AND A MEMBER OF THE UNITED NATIONS -- WAS CRUSHED. ITS PEOPLE BRUTALIZED. FIVE MONTHS AGO, SADDAM HUSSEIN STARTED THIS CRUEL WAR AGAINST KUWAIT. TONIGHT, THE BATTLE HAS BEEN JOINED.

THIS MILITARY ACTION, TAKEN IN ACCORD WITH UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS -- AND WITH THE CONSENT OF THE U.S. CONGRESS -- FOLLOWS MONTHS OF CONSTANT AND VIRTUALLY ENDLESS DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY ON THE PART OF THE UNITED NATIONS, THE UNITED STATES AND MANY, MANY OTHER COUNTRIES. ARAB LEADERS SOUGHT WHAT BECAME KNOWN AS AN ARAB SOLUTION -- ONLY TO CONCLUDE THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN WAS UNWILLING TO LEAVE KUWAIT. OTHERS TRAVELLED TO BAGHDAD IN A VARIETY OF EFFORTS TO RESTORE PEACE AND JUSTICE. OUR SECRETARY OF STATE, JAMES BAKER, HELD A HISTORIC MEETING IN GENEVA -- ONLY TO BE TOTALLY REBUFFED. THIS PAST WEEKEND, IN A LAST DITCH EFFORT, THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS WENT TO THE MIDDLE EAST, WITH PEACE IN HIS HEART -- HIS SECOND SUCH MISSION. HE CAME BACK FROM BAGHDAD WITH NO PROGRESS AT ALL IN GETTING SADDAM HUSSEIN TO WITHDRAW FROM KUWAIT.

NOW THE 28 COUNTRIES WITH FORCES IN THE GULF AREA -- HAVING EXHAUSTED ALL REASONABLE EFFORTS TO REACH A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION -- HAVE NO CHOICE BUT TO DRIVE SADDAM FROM KUWAIT BY FORCE. // WE WILL NOT FAIL.

AS I REPORT TO YOU, AIR ATTACKS ARE UNDERWAY AGAINST MILITARY TARGETS IN IRAQ. WE ARE DETERMINED TO KNOCK OUT SADDAM HUSSEIN'S NUCLEAR BOMB POTENTIAL. WE WILL ALSO DESTROY HIS CHEMICAL WEAPONS FACILITIES. MUCH OF SADDAM'S ARTILLERY AND TANKS WILL BE DESTROYED. OUR OPERATIONS ARE DESIGNED TO BEST PROTECT THE LIVES OF ALL THE COALITION FORCES BY TARGETING SADDAM'S VAST MILITARY ARSENAL. Initial reports from General Schwarzkopf are that our operations are proceeding according to plan.

OUR OBJECTIVES ARE CLEAR. SADDAM HUSSEIN'S FORCES WILL LEAVE KUWAIT. THE LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT OF KUWAIT WILL BE RESTORED TO ITS RIGHTFUL PLACE, AND KUWAIT WILL ONCE AGAIN BE FREE. // IRAQ WILL EVENTUALLY COMPLY WITH ALL RELEVANT UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS. AND THEN, WHEN PEACE IS RESTORED, IT IS OUR HOPE THAT IRAQ WILL LIVE AS A PEACEFUL AND COOPERATIVE MEMBER OF THE FAMILY OF NATIONS, THUS, ENHANCING THE SECURITY AND STABILITY OF THE GULF.

SOME MAY ASK, WHY ACT NOW? WHY NOT WAIT. THE ANSWER IS CLEAR: THE WORLD COULD WAIT NO LONGER. SANCTIONS -- THOUGH HAVING SOME EFFECT --SHOWED NO SIGNS OF ACCOMPLISHING THEIR OBJECTIVE. SANCTIONS WERE TRIED FOR WELL OVER 5 MONTHS, AND WE AND OUR ALLIES CONCLUDED THAT SANCTIONS ALONE WOULD NOT FORCE SADDAM FROM KUWAIT.

WHILE THE WORLD WAITED, SADDAM HUSSEIN SYSTEMATICALLY RAPED, PILLAGED AND PLUNDERED A TINY NATION, NO THREAT TO HIS OWN. HE SUBJECTED THE PEOPLE OF KUWAIT TO UNSPEAKABLE ATROCITIES -- AND AMONG THOSE MAIMED AND MURDERED -- INNOCENT CHILDREN.

WHILE THE WORLD WAITED, SADDAM SOUGHT TO ADD TO THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS ARSENAL HE NOW POSSESSES AN INFINITELY MORE DANGEROUS WEAPON OF MASS DESTRUCTION -- A NUCLEAR WEAPON.

WHILE THE WORLD WAITED -- WHILE THE WORLD TALKED PEACE AND WITHDRAWAL -- SADDAM HUSSEIN DUG IN, AND MOVED MASSIVE FORCES INTO KUWAIT.

WHILE THE WORLD WAITED -- WHILE SADDAM STALLED -- MORE DAMAGE WAS BEING DONE TO THE FRAGILE ECONOMIES OF THE THIRD WORLD, THE EMERGING DEMOCRACIES OF EASTERN EUROPE -- TO THE ENTIRE WORLD, INCLUDING OUR OWN ECONOMY.

THE UNITED STATES, TOGETHER WITH THE UNITED NATIONS, EXHAUSTED EVERY MEANS AT OUR DISPOSAL TO BRING THIS CRISIS TO A PEACEFUL END. HOWEVER, SADDAM CLEARLY FELT THAT BY STALLING AND THREATENING AND DEFYING THE UNITED NATIONS HE COULD WEAKEN THE FORCES ARRAYED AGAINST HIM.

WHILE THE WORLD WAITED, SADDAM HUSSEIN MET EVERY OVERTURE OF PEACE -- WITH OPEN CONTEMPT. //

WHILE THE WORLD WAITED -- WHILE THE WORLD PRAYED FOR PEACE -- SADDAM PREPARED FOR WAR. //

I HAD HOPED THAT WHEN THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS, IN HISTORIC DEBATE, TOOK ITS RESOLUTE ACTION, SADDAM WOULD REALIZE HE COULD NOT PREVAIL AND WOULD MOVE OUT OF KUWAIT IN ACCORD WITH THE UNITED NATION RESOLUTIONS. HE DID NOT DO THAT. INSTEAD, HE REMAINED INTRANSIGENT -- CERTAIN THAT TIME WAS ON HIS SIDE.

SADDAM WAS WARNED OVER AND OVER AGAIN TO COMPLY WITH THE WILL OF THE UNITED NATIONS. LEAVE KUWAIT -- OR BE DRIVEN OUT. SADDAM HAS ARROGANTLY REJECTED ALL WARNINGS. INSTEAD HE TRIED TO MAKE THIS A DISPUTE BETWEEN IRAQ AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

WELL, HE FAILED. // TONIGHT, 28 NATIONS -- COUNTRIES FROM FIVE CONTINENTS: EUROPE AND ASIA, AFRICA AND THE ARAB LEAGUE --HAVE FORCES IN THE GULF AREA STANDING SHOULDER TO SHOULDER AGAINST SADDAM HUSSEIN. THESE COUNTRIES HAD HOPED THE USE OF FORCE COULD BE AVOIDED. REGRETTABLY, WE NOW BELIEVE THAT ONLY FORCE WILL MAKE HIM LEAVE.

PRIOR TO ORDERING OUR FORCES INTO BATTLE, I INSTRUCTED OUR MILITARY COMMANDERS TO TAKE EVERY NECESSARY STEP TO PREVAIL AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE -- AND WITH THE GREATEST DEGREE OF PROTECTION POSSIBLE FOR AMERICAN AND ALLIED SERVICEMEN AND WOMEN. I HAVE TOLD THE AMERICAN PEOPLE BEFORE THAT THIS WILL NOT BE ANOTHER VIET NAM. AND I REPEAT THIS HERE TONIGHT. OUR TROOPS WILL HAVE THE BEST POSSIBLE SUPPORT IN THE ENTIRE WORLD, AND THEY WILL NOT BE ASKED TO FIGHT WITH ONE HAND TIED BEHIND THEIR BACK.

I AM HOPEFUL THAT THIS FIGHTING WILL NOT GO ON FOR LONG -- AND THAT CASUALTIES WILL BE HELD TO AN ABSOLUTE MINIMUM. //

THIS IS AN HISTORIC MOMENT. WE HAVE, IN THIS PAST YEAR, MADE GREAT PROGRESS IN ENDING THE LONG ERA OF CONFLICT AND COLD WAR. WE HAVE BEFORE US THE OPPORTUNITY TO FORGE, FOR OURSELVES AND FOR FUTURE GENERATIONS, A NEW WORLD ORDER -- A WORLD WHERE THE RULE OF LAW , NOT THE LAW OF THE JUNGLE, GOVERNS THE CONDUCT OF NATIONS.

WHEN WE ARE SUCCESSFUL, AND WE WILL BE, WE HAVE A REAL CHANCE AT THIS NEW WORLD ORDER -- AN ORDER IN WHICH A CREDIBLE UNITED NATIONS CAN USE ITS PEACE-KEEPING ROLE TO FULFILL THE PROMISE AND VISION OF THE U.N.'S FOUNDERS.

WE HAVE NO ARGUMENT WITH THE PEOPLE OF IRAQ -- INDEED, FOR THE INNOCENTS CAUGHT IN THIS CONFLICT, I PRAY FOR THEIR SAFETY. // OUR GOAL IS NOT THE CONQUEST OF IRAQ -- IT IS THE LIBERATION OF KUWAIT. IT IS MY HOPE THAT SOMEHOW THE IRAQI PEOPLE CAN, EVEN NOW, CONVINCE THEIR DICTATOR THAT HE MUST LAY DOWN HIS ARMS, LEAVE KUWAIT, AND LET IRAQ ITSELF REJOIN THE FAMILY OF PEACE-LOVING NATIONS.

THOMAS PAINE WROTE MANY YEARS AGO: "THESE ARE THE TIMES THAT TRY MEN'S SOULS . . . ." THOSE WELL-KNOWN WORDS ARE SO VERY TRUE TODAY . . . BUT EVEN AS PLANES OF THE MULTI-NATIONAL FORCES ATTACK IRAQ, I PREFER TO THINK OF PEACE, NOT WAR. I AM CONVINCED NOT ONLY THAT WE WILL PREVAIL -- BUT THAT, OUT OF THE HORROR OF COMBAT, WILL COME THE RECOGNITION THAT NO NATION CAN STAND AGAINST A WORLD UNITED. // NO NATION WILL BE PERMITTED TO BRUTALLY ASSAULT ITS NEIGHBOR. //

NO PRESIDENT CAN EASILY COMMIT OUR SONS AND DAUGHTERS TO WAR. THEY ARE THE NATION'S FINEST. OURS IS AN ALL VOLUNTEER FORCE --MAGNIFICENTLY TRAINED AND HIGHLY MOTIVATED. THE TROOPS KNOW WHY THEY ARE THERE. LISTEN TO WHAT THEY SAY, FOR THEY HAVE SAID IT BETTER THAN ANY PRESIDENT OR PRIME MINISTER EVER COULD:

LISTEN TO "HOLLYWOOD" HUDDLESTON, MARINE LANCE CORPORAL. HE SAYS, "LET'S FREE THESE PEOPLE SO WE CAN GO HOME AND BE FREE AGAIN." HE'S RIGHT. THE TERRIBLE CRIMES AND TORTURES COMMITTED BY SADDAM'S HENCHMEN AGAINST THE INNOCENT PEOPLE OF KUWAIT ARE AN AFFRONT TO MANKIND AND A CHALLENGE TO THE FREEDOM OF ALL.

LISTEN TO ONE OF OUR GREAT OFFICERS OUT THERE, MARINE LIEUTENANT GENERAL WALTER BOOMER. HE SAID, "THERE ARE THINGS WORTH FIGHTING FOR. A WORLD IN WHICH BRUTALITY AND LAWLESSNESS ARE ALLOWED TO GO UNCHECKED ISN'T THE KIND OF WORLD WE'RE GOING TO WANT TO LIVE IN."

LISTEN TO MASTER SERGEANT J.P. KENDALL OF THE 82ND AIRBORNE: "WE'RE HERE FOR MORE THAN JUST THE PRICE OF A GALLON OF GAS. WHAT WE'RE DOING IS GOING TO CHART THE FUTURE OF THE WORLD FOR THE NEXT HUNDRED YEARS. IT'S BETTER TO DEAL WITH THIS GUY NOW THAN FIVE YEARS FROM NOW."

AND FINALLY, WE ALL SHOULD SIT UP AND LISTEN TO JACKIE JONES, AN ARMY LIEUTENANT, WHEN SHE SAYS, "IF WE LET HIM GET AWAY WITH THIS, WHO KNOW'S WHAT'S GOING TO BE NEXT?"

I HAVE CALLED UPON "HOLLYWOOD" AND WALTER AND J.P. AND JACKIE AND ALL THEIR COURAGEOUS COMRADES IN ARMS TO DO WHAT MUST BE DONE. TONIGHT, AMERICA AND THE WORLD ARE DEEPLY GRATEFUL TO THEM AND TO THEIR FAMILIES. LET ME SAY TO EVERYONE LISTENING OR WATCHING TONIGHT: WHEN THE TROOPS WE'VE SENT IN FINISH THEIR WORK, I AM DETERMINED TO BRING THEM HOME -- AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

TONIGHT, AS OUR FORCES FIGHT, THEY ARE IN OUR PRAYERS. MAY GOD BLESS EACH AND EVERY ONE OF THEM, AND THE COALITION FORCES AT OUR SIDE IN THE GULF -- AND MAY HE CONTINUE TO BLESS OUR NATION, THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

# # #

SECRET

8a-e

PRIME MINISTER

THE GULF: STATEMENT TO THE MEDIA

In the event of a conflict in the Gulf, you will be expected to make an early appearance before the media in Downing Street or in No 12. I attach a draft of a possible statement which you might make, which would be finalised at a meeting of OPD(G) shortly beforehand.

CDP.

CHARLES POWELL
16 January 1991

SECRET

a:\media

DRAFT STATEMENT FOR THE PRIME MINISTER

As you will by now know, aircraft of the multinational force attacked military targets in Iraq during the night. The action was taken under the authority of United Nations Security Council Resolution 678, which authorises use of all necessary means to bring about Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait.

The action was launched at [ ] hours this morning, Saudi time, following discussions between President Bush and myself, and consultation with King Fahd of Saudi Arabia. Some [ ] aircraft were involved in the action, of which more than thirty were British, mostly Tornados. The reports which we have so far received indicate that the action was successful and has inflicted serious damage on Iraq's military capability. The instructions issued to the pilots are to do everything possible to avoid any civilian casualties. But the spread of military facilities throughout Iraq is so extensive that some damage to surrounding areas is almost bound to have occurred and of course we regret that.

Aircraft losses have been very slight. I am glad to say that all RAF aircraft returned safely/I regret to say that [ ] RAF Tornados have not so far been accounted for.

The air campaign will continue at this intensity until Saddam Hussein comes to his senses and withdraws Iraqi forces from Kuwait, in accordance with the many resolutions passed by the United Nations Security Council.

I explained in the debate in the House of Commons on Tuesday, it is only with the greatest reluctance that we have resorted to the use of force. But Saddam Hussein's intransigence has left us no other course. We naturally hope for a speedy end to the conflict: all that is required is for Saddam Hussein to withdraw. We shall persevere until he does so.

I shall of course be making a statement to the House this afternoon. The Secretary of State for Defence will be giving a fuller press briefing on the military operations later this morning.

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GULF CRISIS: FRENCH PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT AND PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE

SUMMARY

1. MITTERRAND DECLARES THAT USE OF FORCE AGAINST IRAQ TO ENFORCE UN RESOLUTIONS IS NOW 'LEGITIMATE'. ROCARD CONFIRMS AGREEMENT TO PLACE FRENCH TROOPS UNDER US COMMAND. PARLIAMENT VOTES IN SUPPORT OF THE PRESIDENT AND GOVERNMENT BY A LARGE MAJORITY. COMMUNISTS, EXTREME RIGHT AND A FEW OPPOSITION PARLIAMENTARIANS VOTE AGAINST, AS DO SOME OF CHEVENEMENT'S SUPPORTERS.

DETAIL

2. THE FRENCH NATIONAL ASSEMBLY AND SENATE MET IN SPECIAL SESSION THIS MORNING TO HEAR A MESSAGE TO THEM FROM PRESIDENT MITTERRAND (TEXT IN MY TELNO 52). THE PRESIDENT ANNOUNCED THAT, NO RESPONSE HAVING BEEN GIVEN BY IRAQ BY THE UN'S DEADLINE, 'THE RECOURSE TO ARMED FORCE TO COMPEL IRAQ TO EVACUATE KUWAIT IS HENCEFORTH LEGITIMATE'.

3. ROCARD THEN READ OUT TO A PACKED NATIONAL ASSEMBLY A 15 MINUTE POLICY STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION. HE BASED HIS DEFENCE ON THE NEED TO ENSURE RESPECT FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW: 'WHEN SOMEONE MAKES AN ARMED ATTACK AND TAKES HOSTAGES, ONE DOES NOT ASK WHETHER OR NOT THE VICTIM WAS A NICE PERSON, OR POINT OUT THAT OTHER CRIMES HAVE GONE UNPUNISHED. ONE DOES EVERYTHING TO ARREST THE CULPRITS, BY FORCE IF NEED BE. LET THE SAME PRINCIPLE APPLY AT THE INTERNATIONAL LEVEL'. FINALLY, HE ASKED DEPUTIES TO VOTE ON 'WHETHER, GIVEN THE NECESSITY TO APPLY THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS ON THE EVACUATION OF KUWAIT, FRANCE IS JUSTIFIED IN TAKING PART IN THEIR APPLICATION BY ALL THE MEANS ENVISAGED BY THE UN, INCLUDING MILITARY MEANS SHOULD ALL OTHER SOLUTIONS PROVE IMPOSSIBLE'. DUMAS ADDRESSED THE SENATE IN SIMILAR TERMS.

4. IN THE DEBATE WHICH FOLLOWED, MOST SPEAKERS ECHOED ROCARD'S SUPPORT FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW, ALTHOUGH SEVERAL POINTED OUT THAT IT

SHOULD ALSO APPLY IN THE LEBANON AND IN LITHUANIA. SPEAKING FOR THE GAULLISTS, CHIRAC SAID THAT HIS SUPPORT WOULD BE TEMPERED BY VIGILANCE OVER HOW FRENCH FORCES WOULD BE DEPLOYED ALONGSIDE THE AMERICANS: 'HOW WILL YOU ENSURE THAT OUR TROOPS ARE NOT AUTOMATICALLY DRAWN INTO DECISIONS TAKEN WITHOUT CONSULTING US?' IN REPLY, ROCARD CONFIRMED THAT FRENCH TROOPS WOULD COME UNDER A UNIFIED US COMMAND 'BUT FOR SPECIFIED, PRE-NEGOTIATED MISSIONS WITHIN A SET TIMESCALE'. THESE MISSIONS WERE 'THE LIBERATION OF KUWAIT, THE USE OF FORCE TO ACHIEVE THAT, AND THE UNDERSTANDING THAT FOR KUWAIT TO BE LIBERATED IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO DESTROY MILITARY SITES IN IRAQ'. ROCARD ALSO SAID THAT NO FRENCH NATIONAL SERVICEMEN WOULD BE DEPLOYED, EVEN IF THEY VOLUNTEERED FOR SERVICE IN THE GULF.

5. THE COMMUNIST AND FRONT NATIONAL SPOKESMEN BOTH ACCUSED THE GOVERNMENT OF 'SENDING FRENCH SOLDIERS TO DEFEND AMERICAN OIL COMPANIES' AND ARGUED THAT, THE AMERICANS HAVING REJECTED THE LATEST FRENCH UN INITIATIVE, THE LOGICAL MOVE WOULD HAVE BEEN TO WITHDRAW FRENCH MILITARY SUPPORT FOR THE US AND CONTINUE TO SEEK A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT. THE FRONT NATIONAL DEPUTY ADDED THAT FRANCE SHOULD 'TACKLE THE MUSLIMS IN HER OWN SUBURBS BEFORE PLAYING GENDARMES IN THE GULF'.

6. IN HIS WINDING-UP SPEECH, ROCARD REJECTED THE SUGGESTION THAT THE FRENCH INITIATIVE HAD FAILED BECAUSE OF US INTRANSIGENCE, POINTING OUT THAT IT WAS THE LACK OF ANY IRAQI RESPONSE WHICH HAD DEPRIVED IT OF ALL PERTINENCE. FRANCE WAS NOT ACTING ON BEHALF OF ANY OTHER COUNTRY BUT IN DEFENCE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND OF HER OWN WIDER INTERESTS, INCLUDING HER ROLE WITHIN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND HER ACCESS TO OIL SUPPLIES. HE CALLED UPON FRANCE'S ARAB FRIENDS TO REALISE THAT SUPPORT FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW OFFERED THE BEST HOPE FOR THEM TOO AND FOR THE SOLUTION OF ALL THE PROBLEMS OF THE MIDDLE EAST.

7. THE DEBATE WAS FOLLOWED BY A VOTE. THE GOVERNMENT'S MOTION WAS CARRIED BY 523 VOTES IN FAVOUR, 43 AGAINST AND 2 ABSTENTIONS.

8. ROCARD WAS NEVER IN DOUBT OF ACHIEVING A HEALTHY MAJORITY. ALL THREE MAIN OPPOSITION GROUPS (GAULLISTS, GISCARDIENS AND CENTRISTS) UNDERTOOK TO VOTE IN SUPPORT, ALTHOUGH A FEW INDIVIDUAL CENTRISTS AND GAULLISTS LET IT BE KNOWN THAT THEY WOULD VOTE AGAINST. AS EXPECTED, THE COMMUNISTS (26 DEPUTIES) AND THE EXTREME RIGHT FRONT NATIONAL (1 DEPUTY) ALSO VOTED AGAINST. MORE SERIOUSLY FOR THE GOVERNMENT, SO DID A HANDFUL OF THE 22 SOCIALIST DEPUTIES WHO

SUPPORT THE DEFENCE MINISTER, CHEVENEMENT. THIS EVENING THE PRESIDENT OF THE UDF GROUP IN PARLIAMENT CALLED ON CHEVENEMENT TO RESIGN. CHEVENEMENT HIMSELF WAS PRESENT ON THE GOVERNMENT BENCHES THROUGHOUT THE DEBATE BUT HAS NOT YET COMMENTED ON THE VOTE. THIS EPISODE CASTS FURTHER LIGHT ON THE INTERNAL DIFFICULTIES WHICH MITTERRAND HAS FACED IN BRINGING HIS TEAM UP TO THE STARTING POST. PETIT (DIPLOMATIC COUNSELLOR, MATIGNON) HAS JUST TOLD ME THAT THE SENATE VOTE IS EXPECTED TO PRODUCE A SIMILAR MAJORITY. HE WENT ON TO VOLUNTEER THAT MANY OF THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT'S ACTIVITIES SINCE THE CRISIS STARTED HAD BEEN DETERMINED BY THE NEED EVENTUALLY TO SECURE PARLIAMENTARY APPROVAL. THAT, FINALLY HAD DECIDED THE LATEST LAST-MINUTE INITIATIVE DESIGNED TO SATISFY THOSE ESPECIALLY ON THE LEFT OF THE SOCIALIST PARTY WHO INSISTED NOT ONLY THAT THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE SEEN TO GO THE LAST MILE BUT THAT IT SHOULD DO SO IN A WAY SPECIFICALLY DISPLAYING FRENCH INDEPENDENCE. I COMMENTED THAT THERE WAS NEVERTHELESS A PRICE TO PAY, WHICH SHOULD NOT BE UNDERESTIMATED, HOWEVER SUCCESSFULLY THE PARLIAMENTARY EXIGENCIES HAD BEEN SURMOUNTED IN FRANCE ITSELF.

FERGUSSON

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MR LS SMITH BANK ENGLAND
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EMERGENCY UNIT
RESIDENT CLERK

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JC
SH
GO
AT

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

16 January 1991

Dear Shirley,

As we agreed this morning, given the daily possibility of a 1000 am Committee meeting during the Gulf crisis, the Prime Minister's regular 0945 meeting with the Party Chairman and Chief Whip will be brought forward to 0900 on Monday 21 January.

If it were not too inconvenient for the Chairman and Chief Whip, I suggest we might consider a 0900 start for this meeting on Mondays throughout January, and possibly February, to try to ensure no clash with any meetings on the Gulf. Please let me know if you have any difficulty with this.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Robina Finlay in the Chief Whip's Office.

Yours sincerely,
Sandra

SANDRA PHILLIPS

Miss Shirley Oxenbury OBE

7a-b

Prime Minister

SECRETARY OF STATE

MO 6/17/15/1

16/1

PRIME MINISTER

BIOLOGICAL WARFARE

General Powell rang the Chief of the Defence Staff yesterday evening to discuss the US Government's view of targetting Iraqi BW facilities should there be a need for offensive operations in the Gulf. As a result of the Prime Minister's recent discussions with Mr Baker the latter had ordered extensive and intensive examination of the dangers of bacteriological contamination as a result of an air attack. He had particularly asked the several investigating teams to look at Salman Pak. The US Government had concluded that they could be very confident that the type of attack planned would be very successful and would not lead to a release of contamination. It was however acknowledged that in unfavourable weather conditions ie overcast and windy, there was a 1% probability of release with catastrophic results. President Bush, Mr Baker, Mr Cheney, Gen Powell and Gen Schwarzkopf had concluded that this element of risk is acceptable and the President has agreed that BW facilities may be targetted. The US view was that they wished to destroy these Iraqi capabilities before they were used. Gen Powell also opined that it was better that the Iraqis should suffer rather than Allied Forces.

2. Although it is helpful that the US have considered the matter so thoroughly, we have not moved forward much on the substantive issue.

3. At present RAF aircraft are not included in planned attacks on the BW storage facilities (because they would better be used against other targets such as airfields where we have special capabilities). Once we transfer tactical control to the US

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SECRETARY OF STATE

commanders, however, they could decide later to change plans and include the RAF in a raid.

4. I have discussed the technical issues with my leading advisers (including the Director of Porton Down). They thought there was a good chance that there would not be a large plume of BW material and that even this would cover only a few kilometres when it eventually came to ground level again. There was, however, a continued difference of view over the best time and weather conditions for attack.

5. My overall view is there is no need to make too much of this with the Americans. There is a slight divergence of technical judgement (affecting only one of the many targets in air attack plans). We must support them in general and share responsibility too. Nonetheless in view of the uncertainty I have left in place a restriction that UK forces should not participate in a raid against a BW storage facility without specific Ministerial consent.

6. I am sending a copy of this minute to Douglas Hurd and Sir Robin Butler.

Ministry of Defence T K
16 January 1991

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

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CDP 17/1

PRIME MINISTER

Notification Procedures

You asked the Cabinet Office to prepare a short note on the notification procedures for use of the military option. This is attached. It has been cleared with the FCO and MoD.

2. I understand that your office are making arrangements to inform The Queen in a secure way.

3. I am sending copies of this minute (Personal) to the Foreign Secretary and Defence Secretary.

Mike Stuart

ROBIN BUTLER

Approved by Sir Robin Butler and signed in his absence.

16 January 1991

TOP SECRET

NOTIFICATION PROCEDURES

1. President Bush will contact the Prime Minister by secure telephone to agree the timing.

2. The Prime Minister will notify the Foreign Secretary and Defence Secretary personally without the use of intermediaries. Communication will be face-to-face or, if that is not feasible, by secure telephone. The Chief of the Defence Staff may also be involved at this stage.

3. Unless CDS has already been involved the Defence Secretary will notify the Chief of the Defence Staff personally without the use of intermediaries. Communication will be face-to-face or, if that is not feasible, by secure telephone. This will be supplemented by a written authorisation, pre-drafted but with the details completed by the Defence Secretary at the time, passed directly from the Defence Secretary to CDS by hand.

4. CDS will notify the Joint Commander personally by secure telephone, supplemented by a written authorisation (as above) passed directly by secure facsimile or if time permits by hand.

5. The Joint Commander will notify BFCME personally by secure telephone, supplemented by a written authorisation (as above) passed directly by secure facsimile.

6. BFCME will inform his commanders and staff to the extent that, and when, they need to know, and will keep in touch with General Schwarzkopf as required. BFCME will not involve HM Ambassador Riyadh or his staff in any way, since our obligation to consult the Saudi Government has already been fulfilled.

The National Archives

DEPARTMENT/SERIES PREM 19 PIECE/ITEM 3443 (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract details: Letter from Wilkinson to Turnbull dated 16 January 1991	
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Use black or blue pen to complete form.

Use the card for one piece or for each extract removed from a different place within a piece.

Enter the department and series,
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dti

the department for Enterprise

4a-b

SECRET

The Rt Hon Kenneth Baker MP
Home Secretary
Home Office
50 Queen Anne's Gate
LONDON SW1

CRS 16/1

Department of Trade and Industry

1-19 Victoria Street
London SW1H 0ET

Enquiries
071-215 5000

Telex 8811074/5 DTHQ G
Fax 071-222 2629

Direct line 071 215 4417
Our ref JF3 CANDY
Your ref
Date 16 January 1991

Dear Ken,

INSURANCE AGAINST DAMAGE BY IRAQI TERRORISTS

At present insurance contracts do not cover war risks in the UK. If and when hostilities with Iraq start, even if there is no formal declaration of war, existing insruance policies would not therefore provide cover for any damage caused by an Iraqi terrorist attack in the UK. Once this becomes clear we shall be asked whether the Government does cover or intends to cover any war risks in the UK. Damage to property in the Second World War was covered by the Government's own scheme. There are no powers at present for the Government to insure or reinsure war risks on property and life in the UK. We shall need to respond quickly.

In my view, for industry and commerce the problem is a commercial one. The insurance companies and Lloyd's will need to decide the terms of providing war cover. An oil rig operator in the North Sea has to pay now aditional premiums for coverage against Iraqi terrorism, and there is no reason why industry and commerce on shore should not do the same. If you and colleagues agree therefore, Lloyd's and the BIA might be asked to make clear to industry and commerce that war risk coverage will need to be purchased.

The issue relating to private individuals presents more difficult problems. We ought not to expect substantial risk to life and property from Iraqi terrorist attacks and on that basis we ought to try and persuade the insurance industry to continue to cover the risks.

But if they are not prepared to do so (and their attitude could well be affected by the unpredictability of the risk), we would need to consider urgently what action the Government is prepared to take; for example by extending

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the Criminal Injuries Compensation scheme or by introducing a new Government scheme which would have to be worked up; and whether provisions for either purpose should be contained in the Emergency Powers Bill.

I would be grateful for an early response from you and colleagues on our general approach to this problem and whether we should urgently consult the insurance industry on the lines indicated above.

I am copying this letter to the Prime Minister, Norman Lamont, Douglas Hurd, Tom King, Michael Heseltine, John Gummer, Malcolm Rifkind, John Wakeham, Ian Lang, David Hunt, Peter Brook and Robin Butler.

Yours ever

JOHN REDWOOD

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

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SIR CHARLES POWELL

c Sir Robin Butler

CW/BW Threat

attached

The minutes of OPD(G) yesterday record a statement by the Home Secretary on the nature of the CW/BW threat in the UK. I did not comment at the time since we had a heavy agenda, but you should be aware that Mr Baker's statement did not accord entirely with the JIC's latest assessment of 29 November 1990 (JIC(90)(N) 64). In particular it tended to discount the threat outdoors, whereas our assessment pointed out that in thickly populated areas outdoors there could be heavy fatality. In fact CDE have recently issued a paper showing how easily contamination outdoors could be effected.

PERCY CRADOCK

16 January 1991

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GULF CRISIS: ISRAELI INVOLVEMENT

1. AMERICAN DCM PARRIS SAID AT NATO LUNCH TODAY (16 JANUARY)

(A) THE ISRAELIS HAD GIVEN THE AMERICANS ASSURANCES (WHICH THE AMERICANS ACCEPTED) THAT THEY WOULD NOT LAUNCH A PRE-EMPTIVE STRIKE AGAINST IRAQ.
(B) THE ISRAELIS HAD NOT GIVEN THE AMERICANS ANY ASSURANCES THAT THEY WOULD NOT RESPOND TO AN IRAQI ATTACK. THE AMERICANS HAD EXPLORED THIS SUBJECT WITH THE ISRAELIS KNOWING IT WAS A HARD THING TO EXPECT OF ANY NATION. IN PARRIS' VIEW, MUCH DEPENDED ON THE SCALE/ACCURACY OF THE ATTACK: THE ISRAELIS MIGHT BE ABLE TO IGNORE A MISSILE WHICH FELL IN THE SEA, BUT A SUCCESSFUL CW ATTACK IN THE TEL AVIV RUSH HOUR WOULD LEAVE THE ISRAELIS NO CHOICE BUT TO RESPOND STRONGLY.
(C) THE AMERICANS WANTED ISRAEL TO STAY OUT OF THE CONFLICT. PARRIS ASSUMED THAT THE IRAQI FIXED AND MOBILE MISSILE SITES THREATENING ISRAEL WERE A HIGH PRIORITY US TARGET IE. FOR THE FIRST STRIKE. SUCH A STRIKE SHOULD SUBSTANTIALLY REDUCE THE THREAT TO ISRAEL. IF THE IRAQIS SUBSEQUENTLY TOOK OTHER MOBILE LAUNCHERS OUT OF HIDING, THERE WAS A FAIR CHANCE THESE WOULD BE SPOTTED BEFORE THE MISSILES WERE LAUNCHED.
(D) THE AMERICAN WERE ''AWARE OF ISRAELI CONCERNS'' ABOUT THE INEVITABLE NEED TO CO-ORDINATE MILITARY ACTIVITY IF THE ISRAELIS RESPONDED TO AN IRAQI ATTACK EG. SO THAT ANY US RADIO JAMMING DID NOT AFFECT AN ISRAELI AIR STRIKE.
(E) IF SADDAM HUSSEIN ATTACKED ISRAEL, HE PROBABLY WOULD USE CW. HIS GOAL WAS TO IMPRESS THE ARAB WORLD: A CW STRIKE KILLING A LARGE NUMBER OF CIVILIANS WAS AS IF NOT MORE EFFECTIVE THAN AN ACCURATE STRIKE ON MILITARY TARGETS. HE ESTIMATED THE PROBABILITY OF SUCH AN IRAQI ATTACK AT MORE THAN 50%.

ELLIOTT

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EMERGENCY UNIT
RESIDENT CLERK

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

Cd. you please return to me after action.
C.D.P.

Prime Minister

Re Gulf

I think you should write in your own hand to the Queen, & we should send the letter up to Sandringham this morning.

I attach a draft which I hope is legible, together with paper & an envelope. You might mark the envelope: "Top Secret & Strictly Personal. To be opened only by Her Majesty The Queen".
C.D.P.

 subject cc master

NOTE FOR THE RECORD

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH THE LEADER OF THE OPPOSITION: THE GULF

The Prime Minister had a further meeting this afternoon with the Leader of the Opposition about the situation in the Gulf.

The Prime Minister began by telling Mr. Kinnock about the Canadians' decision to provide a field hospital which would shortly be announced, and the conclusion of an agreement with Saudi Arabia to meet the in-country costs of our military presence. He also thanked Mr. Kinnock for his help in persuading the Australian Government to provide additional medical support in the Gulf.

The Prime Minister then gave an account of his visit to the Gulf, He had found Arab Governments generally hawkish, and believing that the military option would have to be used. They were deeply disillusioned with Saddam Hussein and fearful about the prospects of having to live with an Iraq governed by him. The Prime Minister described also the impressive scale of the American and other multi-national forces assembled in the Gulf, and referred to the good performance being achieved by our Challenger tanks and Tornado aircraft.

The Prime Minister gave Mr. Kinnock an account of his conversation with the UN Secretary-General on 14 January and his meeting with President Mitterrand later that day. He did not think that President Mitterrand had intended to deceive him about the French initiative. In any event he had no intention of making an issue of it. He thought the French initiative owed a lot to difficulties with public opinion in France and a rather cynical attempt to position France to benefit commercially in Iraq once the present crisis was over. But he nonetheless expected French forces to be involved in the event of a conflict. Mr. Kinnock shared the Prime Minister's assessment of French motives and said he was absolutely right not to make an issue of the failure to consult more fully about the French initiative.

The Prime Minister said that the British community in the area seemed in reasonably good heart. We were working on plans for their evacuation in the event that they were directly threatened by a conflict.

In reply to a question from Mr. Kinnock, the Prime Minister said there was no sign of any movement on the part of Iraqi forces, either to withdraw or to launch a pre-emptive attack. He feared they might nonetheless attack Israel, and it was probably too much to expect the Israelis to show restraint in that situation.

The Prime Minister also referred to the problems being experienced with Jordan.

In reply to further questions from Mr. Kinnock about the sort of campaign which would be conducted by the multinational force in the event of a conflict, the Prime Minister said that we expected it to begin with a heavy and substantive air bombardment of military targets in Iraq and Kuwait, with particular efforts made to minimise any civilian casualties and avoid places of special religious significance.

The Prime Minister said that there was no intention on the part of the Americans or ourselves to use either nuclear or chemical weapons.

Mr. Kinnock said that he had one particular piece of advice to offer and that was not to allow a pause in the bombing after only a day or so, which might only give Saddam Hussein hope that he could stave off defeat and gain world sympathy. To be blunt, the best time to kick someone was when they were down. If there was any flexibility over the timing of the launch of an attack, it would be best conducted at a weekend, because there would then be time for people to reflect before reacting in Parliament.

Mr. Kinnock accepted that it was not possible to predict the nature of a ground campagin at this stage, but expressed interest in further briefings on this aspect at a later stage.

Mr. Kinnock asked about measures to prevent Iraqi-inspired terrorism on this country and against British targets overseas. The Prime Minister informed him of the steps taken in regard to the Iraqi Embassy and the Iraqi community here, as well as the measures to improve aviation security.

The Prime Minister said that, in the event of a conflict, he would naturally make a Statement to the House. He wondered how long an interval Mr. Kinnock thought there should be between that and any further debate. Mr. Kinnock thought that in practical terms it would be difficult to have an interval of more than 24 or, at most, 48 hours. At all costs, we should avoid a Saturday morning debate.

In response to a question from the Prime Minister, Mr. Kinnock said that it would be very helpful if the Home Secretary could brief Mr. Hattersley and the Secretary of State for Health brief Mr. Cook. I have subsequently been in touch with both offices.

It was agreed between the Prime Minister and Mr. Kinnock that nothing would be volunteered about the fact of their meeting. But if news of it leaked, they will each simply confirm that a brief meeting had taken place.

e D.P.

CHARLES POWELL
16 JANUARY 1991

c:\wpdocs\foreign\Kinnock.MRM

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

Prime Minister

MEETING WITH MR. HEATH

I assume that you do not want any briefing. It will presumably be mostly about the Cyprus, but also range more widely including Europe. I imagine you will prefer to see him on your own, as

you did ~~Ar.~~ Lord Callaghan.

C.D.P.

16/i

SECRET AND PERSONAL

Subject cc master



c: OPD

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

SIR ROBIN BUTLER

OPD(G): MEMBERSHIP

The Prime Minister had a talk with the Foreign Secretary this morning about the membership of OPD(G) in the event of a conflict in the Gulf. He reached the firm conclusion that he would not wish to enlarge the committee or change its membership in any way, and the Foreign Secretary agreed with this. The Foreign Secretary will explain the situation to Sir Patrick Wright.

Charles Powell

16 January 1991

SECRET AND PERSONAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FILE EM.

bc PC

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

16 January 1991

Dear Simon,

THE GULF: CANADA

Mr Spector, the Canadian Prime Minister's Chief of Staff, telephoned me this morning to say that the decision had now been firmly taken to send a field hospital to assist our forces in the Gulf, as discussed between Mr Mulroney and the Prime Minister. The announcement would be made at about 5.00 pm UK time. I said that I knew the Prime Minister would be very pleased, and extremely grateful to Mr Mulroney for this generous assistance. I was sure he would want to write personally to say so.

It would be very helpful to have a draft message from the Prime Minister to Mr Mulroney.

I am copying this letter to Richard Gozney (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and to Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

Yours Sincerely

E. McAdden

pp CHARLES POWELL

Simon Webb Esq
Ministry of Defence

CONFIDENTIAL

K

Rt Hon Paddy Ashdown MP

HOUSE OF COMMONS
LONDON SW1A 0AA

CAB

21/1

Rt Hon John Major MP
Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
LONDON
SW1

Our ref :- AJL//Middle East/
Date :- 16 January 1991

Dear Prime Minister,

I am grateful to you and the Foreign Secretary for setting out yesterday the limits of the British Government's war aims in the Gulf, and for your clear statements which have ruled out the use of British nuclear weapons.

I am writing to you today to urge that the Government is just as clear about its peace aims. A just war should be followed by a just peace.

As I said yesterday, the conduct of any war will rightly lie with the nations who have committed forces to the area. I hope you will agree, however, that the responsibility for preparing for peace should now rest squarely with the United Nations.

Liberal Democrats believe that the Security Council would now be well advised to pass a resolution, stating that they intend to convene a Middle East Peace Conference before the end of the year. I believe that this would have two particular advantages for us. First, it would provide real assurance to those in the Middle East who will fear that they are about to be subject to Western interference and occupation. And second, by talking now about the peace, we will also help ourselves in the conduct of any war. We would blunt Saddam Hussein's capacity to play the Palestine card, and earn the respect of those other Arab states who have shown such courage by participating in the international coalition.

I hope that you will be able to give these proposals your consideration and outline for me the Government's policy in relation to any peace settlement which would follow a war, if one has to be fought. In particular, does the Government accept that such a peace conference should be carried out under the auspices and authority of the UN?

Yours

Paddy Ashdown