

JM

Confidential filing

MIDDLE

EAST

UK Policy towards the confid

Part 1: May 1979

Part 39: ²⁰January 1991

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
21-1-91 23-1-91 26-1-91  Put ends 		CAB ONE					
PREM 19 / 3444							

PART 39 ends:-

CDP to ^{fco} ~~11100~~ 25-1-91

PART 40 begins:-

washington Tel 259 26-1-91



CDP

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

25 January 1991

✓

Prime Minister

CDP
2571

THE GULF

I talked with General Scowcroft this evening, covering a number of issues.

✓ 11 I asked about the reports of Iraqi aircraft flying to Iran and possibly taking refuge there. General Scowcroft said that the overhead photography showed these were all civil aircraft except for one AWACS 'plane. The Americans were continuing to watch them closely: and if the AWACS 'plane showed signs of returning to Iraq, they would try to intercept and destroy it. They had let the Iranians know that they were watching them closely. There had been reports that Saddam Hussain might be contemplating sending a large part of the Iraqi fighter force to take refuge in Iran. This seemed unlikely. But if it happened, the Americans would insist that they be impounded. The Iranians were behaving even more oddly than usual at present. We would need to keep a careful eye on them. I mentioned our information that Iraqi civil aircraft were being dispersed to several locations outside Iraq. We were intending to check to see if any of the aircraft were of Kuwaiti origin, in which case they could be impounded. General Scowcroft thought this an excellent idea.

On the subject of the Israelis, General Scowcroft said that they were not absolutely committed to continue restraint but he thought they were in line for the time being. The Americans had made clear that they would not de-conflict, to allow the Israelis into Iraqi airspace. The Israelis were firmly committed to consult before taking any action. General Scowcroft's information was that Patriot had performed well in tonight's action against the Iraqi SCUDS fired at Israel.

General Scowcroft thought the overall campaign was going well and we ought soon to start to see clear evidence of the cumulative effect of the allied bombing, in particular on Saddam Hussain's ability to manage his forces. But the launching of seven SCUDS simultaneously against Israel showed that we still had some distance to go and were up against a resourceful opponent.

✓ General Scowcroft and I agreed it would be useful for the President and the Prime Minister to speak over the weekend. The late afternoon of Sunday seemed likely to be the most convenient time.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence)
and to Sir Robin Butler.

(CHARLES POWELL)

Richard Gozney, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.



cc PC
cc bad-up
✓

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PM/91/006

Covered
of 28th

PRIME MINISTER

Operation Granby : Burdensharing

minutes attached

1. Colleagues last discussed this subject in detail at our meeting on 14 September. We later agreed at OPD(G) on 18 January on the need for a review of where we now stand on sharing the burden of Operation Granby, with a view to identifying those countries which should be approached for further contributions to our costs.
2. The burden which the UK is carrying on behalf of the international community as a whole is substantial. It is impossible to say what the Gulf conflict will cost us; that depends on how the fighting goes. But we can identify at least four factors bearing on the defence budget:
 - (a) the cost of our forces' preparation, deployment and presence. On latest assessments, the extra cost of all this would, by the end of March, be over £800m;
 - (b) the cost of operations. We cannot say how much equipment, ammunition and supplies will be used/lost; The replacement cost of the first four days is put at around £110m;
 - (c) the "aftermath" cost. There will be a wide range of subsequent costs like movement homeward and pensions;

/(d)

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(d) the indirect cost, ie the impact of the war on the proposals in "options for change". This is of course for the Ministry of Defence.

To put a figure now on these four factors would be wholly artificial. But it is hard to see how they could total much less than £3b, and they might easily turn out much more.

3. In terms of direct support, we have been promised only \$110 million (by Japan and Germany) apart from what we are receiving (mainly from Saudi Arabia) under Host Nation Support arrangements. This compares unfavourably with the support being given to the US: for example, we believe that the US have requested \$6 billion from the FRG alone. The Treasury have calculated that in very broad terms, up to the outbreak of hostilities, the Americans had been able to cover about two thirds of their extra costs and we only one third. Since the start of fighting has pushed costs higher, our recovery rate has of course fallen. I believe that our objective should be to cover at least half our costs, ie £1.5 billion, and that we should make a further approach to other countries.

4. This exercise needs careful targeting. I do not believe it is worth wasting our fire on those who will undoubtedly turn us down (European neutrals such as Austria and Switzerland are an example). In addition, deciding how much we might reasonably ask for from each country is not easy because:

/(a)



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(a) some countries have benefited from the Gulf crisis through higher oil prices, while others have suffered;

(b) some countries are making significant military contributions and others none, while some countries have given significant economic assistance to the hardest hit;

(c) some countries will benefit much more directly from the liberation of Kuwait than others.

5. But I am clear that so far as those countries are concerned which we know have contributed to the Americans (indicated by an asterisk in the list below), we should ask for at least 8% of what the Americans have had or will be receiving in the future. This would reflect our relative deployed manpower. In relation to the rest, there is bound to be a degree of arbitrariness. But for all apart from the Gulf states, the following figures (which could be further refined) are based on some calculations by our Economic Advisers. They take estimated expenditure before hostilities as a base line, work out the approximate extra contributions required to bring performance (as a percentage of GDP) up to UK level, and then ask for 8% of the extra contribution. Some allowance is also made for the factors explained above.

6. On this basis, I think we might aim for contributions of the following order from the following countries (although we are checking with the Governor and High Commissioners in the territories marked †):

/(a)



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(a) <u>Gulf States</u>		f m
* Kuwait		310
* Saudi Arabia		160
* UAE		310
Qatar		30
Oman		30
Bahrain (Host Nation Support only)		—
TOTAL		840
(b) <u>European Countries</u>		
Belgium		30
* Germany (DM60m already paid)		220
Netherlands		37.5
Norway		15
TOTAL		302.5
(d) <u>Other Countries</u>		
† Australia		30
Brunei		15
† Hong Kong		15
* Japan		400
† Malaysia		10
† New Zealand		7.5
Singapore		7.5
* South Korea		25
TOTAL		510.0
OVERALL TOTAL		1652.5

This leaves a margin of over £100m to take account of the fact that in practice some countries will be very reluctant.



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7. The arguments we put to each country should be tailored to their circumstances. Annex A sets out the position on burden-sharing up to 31 December. Annex B discusses in more detail the situation of individual countries. Annex C shows which countries have been the principal gainers and losers from the Gulf crisis.
8. I have already sent a message on this subject to the Foreign Minister of Japan, and you have written to Chancellor Kohl. We are also writing separately recommending a message to the Amir of Kuwait. I would propose that you should also send messages to the King of Saudi Arabia and to the other Gulf states, while I should send messages to all the other countries listed above. Where relevant, these messages should of course also cover the question of Host Nation Support.
9. I am copying this minute and attachments to OPD(G) colleagues and to the Chancellor of the Exchequer.

DH.

(DOUGLAS HURD)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
25 January 1991

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BURDEN-SHARING TABLE 1	Military (US\$m)	Economic (US\$m)	Refugees (US\$m)	TOTAL (US\$m)	GDP (US\$bn)	% of GDP (%)
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THOSE PARTICIPATING IN MILITARY EFFORT

USA	51000	66	10.0	51076	5166	0.99
UK	4000(a)	113	22.5	4136	831	0.50
France	1676	320	17.7	2014	948	0.21
Canada	1045	65	18.0	1128	546	0.21
Italy	320	252	10.6	583	864	0.07
Spain	142	72	12.8	227	376	0.06
Australia	138	0	0.8	139	283	0.05
Netherlands	46	94	7.6	148	225	0.07
Denmark	13	42	6.2	61	105	0.06
Belgium	18	59	4.9	82	151	0.05
Norway	24	5	20.0	49	93	0.05
Greece	2	9	0.9	11.9	54	0.02
Portugal	2	8	0.7	11	37	0.03

GULF STATES

Saudi Arabia	3000	4351(2363)	155	7506	87	8.63
Kuwait	2500	3263(1603)	0	5763	26	22.17
UAE	1000	1263(850)	0	2263	24	9.43
Oman	-	200	-	-	-	-

(a) This figure is confidential. The only information being used in public is that the full operating costs in 1990-91 will be "in excess of £1 billion."

BURDEN-SHARING TABLE 2	Military (US\$M)	Economic (US\$M)	Refugees (US\$M)	TOTAL (US\$M)	GDP (US\$bn)	% of GDP (%)
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THOSE NOT PARTICIPATING IN MILITARY EFFORT

Japan	12000	2022(272)	22.0	4044	2812	0.14
FRG	1083	1069(120)	26.6	2179	1200	0.18
Korea	120	102	0	222	150	0.15
Austria	0	10	1.0	11	127	0.01
Switzerland	0	100(a)	9.0	109	174	0.06
Sweden	0	76	22.0	98	190	0.05
Taiwan	0	30	0.0	30	-	-
Ireland	0	12	1.0	13	33	0.04
Iceland	0	1	2.0	3	5	0.06
Finland	0	0	11.4	11	115	0.01
New Zealand	0	0	1.6	2	41	0.00
Luxembourg	0	5	0.1	5	6.6	0.08

(a) subject to parliamentary approval (expected in Spring 1991).

ANNEX B

COUNTRIES TO BE APPROACHED

A. DIRECT FINANCIAL SUPPORT

1. Japan. As a major importer of Gulf oil, Japan is a leading beneficiary of the allied action in the Gulf. Their inability to contribute militarily to the allied effort puts the Japanese under considerable moral pressure to help us financially. Of their total commitment to date of US \$2 billion, we have received US \$50 million; we believe this falls far short of what we might expect under the rule of thumb described above. The Japanese announced on 23 January that they will be offering a further \$9 billion to support the military effort. The Chancellor has recently spoken to Mr Hashimoto, the Finance Minister. I have sent a message to the Japanese Foreign Minister to ask for a further contribution.
2. Germany. I have already recommended separately that you should write to Chancellor Kohl to seek financial assistance, to follow up his earlier contribution of equipment to the value of about DM60 million. The Chancellor has mentioned our need for additional support to Finance Minister Waigel and I shall talk to Herr Genscher on 30 January.
3. We have not previously approached the Kuwaiti government for financial support, on the grounds that to do so might prejudice our chances of obtaining a substantial share of reconstruction contracts once hostilities are over. But I believe the time has come to make a direct approach to the al-Sabah for a contribution to our military costs, as well as re-stating our claim to a fair share of

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re-construction work. This would best be done by means of a message from you to the Amir, which I will be recommending separately.

4. Nor have we yet approached Saudi Arabia, which is of course a very special case. But we understand that the Americans have had a financial contribution from the Saudis, and we might therefore reasonably ask them for something.
5. Apart from Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, the other Gulf States are the most obvious beneficiaries of the action we are now taking. To date, their financial assistance to UK costs has been insignificant. In particular, Oman and Qatar have made no contributions to military expenditures, (we are pressing them for more host nation support - see below). Both should be pressed hard to contribute financially. The UAE has committed \$1 billion to the US. Sheikh Zayed told me on 13 January that the UAE would be "proud and happy" also to contribute to our costs. We should be quick to take up this offer using the "8% rule" above.
6. Other EC Countries. Most of our EC partners have contributed forces to the multi-national effort in some capacity or other. But apart from France and to a lesser extent Italy, none is participating directly in hostilities to the extent that they face the losses of men and material that our forces can expect. Belgium should be approached for a further financial contribution as a priority: our Embassy have reported that the Belgians already feel guilty for letting us down over our request for ammunition. The Netherlands could also be asked to do more.

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7. Of the newly industrialised economies, we should try approaching Singapore and South Korea. The latter will be a major beneficiary of a restoration of stability to the Gulf. The Korean contribution to date has been reasonably generous (we understand they have given the Americans US\$120 million in direct support for military activities). The question of a contribution from Hong Kong has already been discussed informally with the Governor. The issue is highly sensitive locally. Nevertheless, in the light of the outbreak of hostilities, we are asking the Governor whether a formal approach to the Hong Kong authorities would be successful.
8. Oil producing countries have benefited greatly over the past six months from the rise in oil prices. Unfortunately, most non-Gulf oil producers (eg Venezuela, Mexico, Nigeria, Indonesia) are also major debtors, who cannot reasonably be asked to help. But Norway should be asked to do more, despite being a modest contributor to the multinational force. Malaysia has had a windfall due to higher oil prices since August and a request for assistance would be reasonable although the Malaysians will have political difficulties in acceding to the request. Brunei should be pressed for a contribution.
9. Australia is contributing to the military effort. But Mr Hawke has personally been keen to emphasise Anglo/Australian solidarity. We are consulting our High Commission for advice on whether a request for financial support would be productive. The same goes for New Zealand.

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B. HOST NATION SUPPORT (HNS)

10. We should continue to press for satisfactory agreements with Bahrain (where I raised the issue with Sheikh Khalifa on 11 January) and Oman (which has even attempted to charge us for fuel supplies). We have a HNS agreement with Saudi Arabia and are pursuing the possibility of a Saudi waiver of certain payments due to them in connection with the UK's purchase of AWACS; the MOD will no doubt continue to bring possibilities of this sort to our attention. We should also give thought now to the question of what HNS-type support we might obtain from Kuwait following Iraq's expulsion.

24 January 1991

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ANNEX C

PRINCIPAL GAINERS


	GAINS, AUG-DEC 1990	
	\$ billion	% of GDP at annual rate
Canada	0.3	0.1
Norway	3.3	8.5
Bahrain	0.1	5.5
Iran	4.2	5.0
Oman	1.2	37.6
Qatar	0.7	39.7
Saudi Arabia	14.5	38.4
UAE	4.3	35.5
USSR	5.8	1.5
Brunei	0.3	20.2
(Brunei with gas)	0.6	40.4
Malaysia	0.8	5.0

Note: Gains by Brunei with gas assume earnings from gas exports rose in line with posted Middle East LPG prices. No allowance is made for extra gas earnings by other producers.

PRINCIPAL LOSERS

LOSSES, AUG-DEC 1990

	\$ billion	% of GDP at annual rate
Austria	0.4	0.8
Belgium/Lux	1.0	1.4
Denmark	0.2	0.5
Finland	0.4	0.9
France	3.4	0.8
Germany (West)	4.6	0.9
Greece	0.5	2.2
Ireland	0.2	1.5
Italy	3.6	1.0
Netherlands	0.6	0.6
Portugal	0.4	2.3
Spain	2.0	1.4
Sweden	0.5	0.7
Switzerland	0.6	0.7
UK	0.2	0.0
USA	14.4	0.7
Hong Kong	0.3	1.4
Japan	9.5	0.8
South Korea	1.7	2.1
Taiwan	0.9	2.3
Australia	0.3	0.3
New Zealand	0.1	0.6





10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

25 January 1991

The Prime Minister is getting a large number of letters from the wives, mothers and fiancées of our forces in the Gulf, and is replying to a good number of them personally.

One thing I have noticed is the number who complain about the postal service. The two most frequent complaints are the time which it takes for letters from members of our forces to get through: and the cost of sending parcels. The latter is often accompanied by the suggestion that we ought to provide free post for parcels intended for individual members of the forces.

The Prime Minister would be grateful if Defence Ministers could look into both these points and let him have any comments which he could make in reply.

CHARLES POWELL

Simon Webb Esq
Ministry of Defence



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

Telephone 071- 21 82111/3

MO 6/17/15/1D

25 January 1991

✓
Charles/ what can we do about the oil clock

Presly we have some experience of these?

Dear Charles, what is it about? what advice do our
oil co's have?

REPORT FROM RIYADH

The Defence Secretary's colleagues might find it useful to see the attached report from Commanders on Operations today in the Gulf.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries to members of OPD(G) and to Sir Robin Butler.

Yours sincerely,

Janet Binstead

(MISS J R BINSTEAD)
Private Secretary

Sir Charles Powell KCMG
No 10 Downing Street

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25 Jan 91

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THE VIEW FROM RIYADH 251900Z JAN 91


1. Gen Schwarzkopf reported that his main concern during the last 20 hours had been the oil spillage from the Mina al Almadi mooring buoy (10 miles south of Kuwait City). It would appear that the Iraqis are pumping oil into the Gulf. Gen Schwarzkopf was investigating ways of stopping the flow, however, the poor weather was unlikely to allow any operation to be mounted before 27 Jan. The Saudi view was that the oil slick would drift toward the Iranian coastline and that the feared pollution of Saudi desalination plants would not occur.

2. Air operations continue to seek out and destroy SCUD launchers. Adverse weather again impacted on allied air operations although some 140 strikes were made against the Hamurabi RGFC positions. Battle damage assessment is however unlikely to be available for at least 3 days due to the weather.

3. UK air operations overnight are set out below:

- | | | |
|--------------------|---------|--------------|
| a. <u>Tabuk</u> | 8 x GR1 | 8 x 1000 lbs |
| | 4 x GR1 | Alarm |
| b. <u>Muharrag</u> | 8 x GR1 | 8 x 1000 lbs |
| c. <u>Dhahran</u> | 8 x GR1 | 8 x 1000 lbs |

No Jaguar sorties planned. 2 x GR1a on 3 hr Standby.



A J STABLES
Gp Capt
DPSO/CDS
MB6173 82116MB

1 of 1

F/TSI/22

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SIC

MY TWO IPTS: IRAQ/KUWAIT: SECURITY COUNCIL: COMMENT

1. SO FAR, SO NOT TOO BAD. WE WERE ASSISTED BY A SKILFULL AND STOLID PERFORMANCE ON THE PART OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL. THERE WAS VERY LITTLE OVERT SUPPORT FOR THE CALLING OF A FORMAL COUNCIL MEETING. FOUR OF THE FIVE PERMANENT MEMBERS EXPRESSED THEIR CLEAR OPPOSITION TO THE IDEA (ALTHOUGH AS AGREED BEFOREHAND WE DID NOT GO TOO FAR INTO THE SUBSTANCE OF THE ARGUMENTS, IN PART TO AVOID PUTTING OUR CHINESE COLLEAGUE ON THE SPOT). THERE WAS A FAIRLY WIDESPREAD UNDERSTANDING THAT THOSE CALLING FOR A FORMAL COUNCIL MEETING WERE BASICALLY WORKING FOR IRAQI ENDS, AND PURSUING SOME OR ALL OF THE FOLLOWING NOT PARTICULARLY LAUDIBLE OBJECTIVES:

A) TO MOUNT A LARGE-SCALE PUBLIC DEBATE IN WHICH NUMEROUS COUNTRIES CAN BE BROUGHT IN TO CRITICISE THE ALLIANCE AS THE PERPETRATORS OF AGGRESSION AGAINST IRAQ:

B) TO PEDDLE VARIOUS UNACCEPTABLE FORMS OF PAUSE/CEASEFIRE:

C) EVENTUALLY TO SEE THESE IDEAS TAKE THE FORM OF A RESOLUTION WHICH WILL HAVE TO BE VETOED:

D) TO COPE WITH PRESSURES FROM THEIR OWN PUBLIC OPINION.

2. BUT THE HARD FACT IS THAT THOSE DEMANDING A FORMAL MEETING HAVE THE RULES OF PROCEDURE AND THE CHARTER ON THEIR SIDE. SOME MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL WHO DO NOT SHARE THE OBJECTIVES SET OUT ABOVE ARE CLEARLY QUEASY ABOUT ANYTHING MORE THAN A LIMITED DELAY IN HOLDING A MEETING, AND ESPECIALLY ABOUT THE PROSPECT OF INDULGING IN THE PROCEDURAL VOTING PRACTICES OF THE SORT USED LATE LAST YEAR ON THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. INDIA, ECUADOR AND AUSTRIA LOOK PARTICULARLY

WOBBLY AND THE ZIMBABWEANS, ALTHOUGH TOTALLY SILENT, ARE LIKELY TO BE IN THAT CATEGORY TOO. CHINA'S SILENCE TODAY WAS HELPFUL, BUT LI HAD PREVIOUSLY MADE IT CLEAR IN THE FIVE THAT HE COULD NOT ACTIVELY OPPOSE A DEBATE. WE ARE THEREFORE IN FOR A PERIOD OF INTENSE AND DIFFICULT MANOEUVRING.

3. THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL MAY STILL BE ABLE TO PRODUCE ONE OR TWO TRICKS OUT OF HIS HAT. I ENCOURAGED HIM IN PARTICULAR TO THINK THROUGH THE POSSIBILITY OF HIS FORMALLY ASKING THE MAGHREB COUNTRIES TO PURSUE THEIR CONTACTS WITH THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT BEFORE COMING TO THE COUNCIL MEETING, SO THAT THE COUNCIL WOULD HAVE SOME IDEA WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS A PROSPECT OF A POSITIVE IRAQI REACTION. GIVING THE MAGHREB COUNTRIES THIS ROLE (WHICH WOULD OF COURSE BE HIGHLY UNWELCOME TO THEM) MIGHT BE A USEFUL DIVERSIONARY TACTIC, ESPECIALLY SINCE ALL MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL EXCEPT CUBA AND YEMEN REGARD THE MAGHREB PLAN FOR AN UNCONDITIONAL PAUSE AS FLAWED GIVEN THE LACK OF ANY CONTACT WITH IRAQ.

4. THE AUSTRIAN IDEA OF A CLOSED MEETING OF THE COUNCIL COULD BE A FALLBACK WITH CERTAIN ATTRACTIONS, ALBEIT FEWER THAN THE STRATEGY OF JUST CONTINUING TO PLAY MATTERS LONG. IT WOULD (AT LEAST PARTIALLY) DEPRIVE THOSE PRESSING FOR A CEASEFIRE OF THE OXYGEN OF PUBLICITY. MOREOVER IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE IN THE CONTEXT OF A PRIVATE MEETING TO LIMIT PROCEEDINGS TO THOSE NON-MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL WHO HAD ACTUALLY ASKED FOR THE DEBATE. ON THE OTHER HAND FOR PRECISELY THESE REASONS THE IDEA WOULD BE BITTERLY OPPOSED BY CUBA AND YEMEN AMID CRIES ABOUT CENSORSHIP AND THE THREAT TO DEMOCRACY. MOREOVER A SPURIOUS SENSE OF MYSTERY WOULD SURROUND THE OCCASION WHICH WE MIGHT COME TO REGRET. ON BALANCE HOWEVER I AM INCLINED TO THINK THAT WE SHOULD SEE THE DEVICE AS A USEFUL FALLBACK, EVEN THOUGH WE SHOULD NOT DEPLOY IT AT THIS STAGE.

5. IN BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS ON 25 JANUARY, SUBJECT TO MY PRIOR DISCUSSIONS WITH PARTNERS ESPECIALLY THE UNITED STATES, I PROPOSE TO CONTINUE TO TAKE A LINE OF FIRM OPPOSITION TO A COUNCIL MEETING. IN BRIEFING THE PRESS AFTER OUR CONSULTATIONS HOWEVER I DECLINED TO COMMENT ON THE IDEA OF AN OFFICIAL MEETING, CONCENTRATING INSTEAD ON THE WEAKNESSES OF THE MAGHREB IDEA FOR A PAUSE. MY THOUGHT WAS THAT IF NOT TOO FAR DOWN THE LINE WE WOULD HAVE TO ACQUIESCE IN A FORMAL MEETING OF THE COUNCIL, IT WOULD BE BETTER FOR THIS NOT TO LOOK TOO MUCH LIKE A PUBLIC DEFEAT.

HANNAY

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SUMMARY

1. PRESIDENT CONTENT WITH PROGRESS OF OPERATIONS.
ADMINISTRATION CONTINUE TO PREPARE PUBLIC FOR LENGTHY WAR.

DETAIL

2. THE MAIN FEATURE ON 24 JANUARY HAS BEEN A CONTINUING ADMINISTRATION EFFORT TO PREPARE THE PUBLIC FOR A LENGTHY CONFLICT. WITH THE COUNTRY VACILLATING BETWEEN OPTIMISM AND PESSIMISM, THE PRESIDENT STRUCK A CONFIDENT AND RESOLUTE NOTE IN A DINNER SPEECH ON 23 JANUARY. HE SAID THAT DESERT STORM WAS RIGHT ON SCHEDULE AND THE US WOULD STAY THE COURSE AND SUCCEED. BUT HE EMPHASISED THAT THERE COULD BE NO PAUSE IN THE WAR WITH IRAQ AND WARNED THAT THERE WOULD BE PROBLEMS, SETBACKS AND SACRIFICES. THE PRESIDENT ALSO TOLD REPUBLICAN CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS ON 24 JANUARY THAT THE WAR COULD TAKE MONTHS. THE WHITE HOUSE SPOKESMAN TODAY TALKED ABOUT THE NEED IN TERMS OF PUBLIC PSYCHOLOGY FOR THE COUNTRY TO GET BACK ON AN EVEN KEEL. THE PRESIDENT'S DISCUSSION WITH THE REPUBLICAN LEADERSHIP HAD FOCUSED ON HIS UPCOMING STATE OF THE UNION MESSAGE AND A LEGISLATIVE AGENDA FOR THE NEW CONGRESSIONAL SESSION, WITH THE WHITE HOUSE EMPHASISING THAT DESPITE THE WAR THE BUSINESS OF GOVERNMENT CONTINUED AS USUAL.

3. THE MEDIA EXAMINED ON 24 JANUARY ASSERTIONS BY CHENEY AND POWELL AT THEIR BRIEFING YESTERDAY (TUE) THAT THERE WOULD BE NO ALLIED GROUND ASSAULT UNTIL IRAQI GROUND FORCES HAD BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WEAKENED BY BOMBING. FRUSTRATION PERSISTS THAT SO LITTLE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT HAS BEEN MADE PUBLIC. THE WASHINGTON POST REPORTED THAT ONLY 25 OF 800 REPUBLICAN GUARD TANKS HAD BEEN DESTROYED IN RECENT BOMBING (IT IS NOT

CLEAR WHETHER THESE FIGURES ARE BASED ON OFFICIAL BRIEFINGS). SUCH REPORTS REINFORCE A PUBLIC SENSE THAT THERE WILL BE NO QUICK VICTORY.

4. OUR CONTACTS AT THE WHITE HOUSE TOLD US TODAY THAT THE PRESIDENT WAS CONTENT WITH THE PROGRESS OF OPERATIONS WHICH CONTINUED PRETTY MUCH ON SCHEDULE. THE MILITARY BRIEFING WHICH HE WAS GETTING FROM CHENEY AND POWELL MADE CLEAR THAT THINGS WERE GOING VERY MUCH AS PLANNED. THE BIGGEST SURPRISE WAS THE CONTINUED LOW LEVEL OF ALLIED LOSSES - LESS EVEN THAN ONE MIGHT HAVE EXPECTED IN A PEACE TIME EXERCISE OF THIS SIZE.

5. THERE HAD BEEN WIDE COVERAGE AND MUCH SYMPATHY FOR RAF TORNADO LOSSES, WHICH ARE ATTRIBUTED TO A COMBINATION OF THE RAF'S LOW-LEVEL FLYING STYLE AND THEIR EXTREMELY HAZARDOUS MISSIONS. SENATOR WALLOP TELEPHONED ME TODAY TO SAY HOW MUCH HE ADMIRERD THE SKILL AND BRAVERY OF THE BRITISH PILOTS. THE WHITE HOUSE HAVE MADE THE SAME POINTS TO US.

ACLAND

YYYY

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MR COULDEN

MR JAY

MR GERMAN (LEGAL ADVISER)

MR HED

MR HAD

MR HAD

AUS (C) MODUK

OK - correct. But a positive presentation please. Don't use compare with U.S. costs (perhaps worse?). What of parcel delivery - a complaint in letter? Can any thing be said about that?

(1)

26.1



MANAGEMENT IN CONFIDENCE

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

Telephone 071 21 8211/3

Time Private

MO 6/17/15/1S

I put your points to 25 January 1991
the telephone secretary. He is minded to
stick to his proposal for subsidised
calls. He points out

Dear Charles, rather than free calls. He points out
that more & more of our forces are
in areas where they
cannot telephone

TELEPHONE CALLS FROM THE GULF

We have investigated what provision is made for US Forces in the Gulf to telephone home.

There is no subsidy on the US welfare telephone service. Interestingly, calls from the Gulf to Germany on the US system are routed via the States, since there is no direct link, unlike our own system. These calls are charged at an expensive rate, deliberately pitched to discourage users and thus reduce congestion. There is no free service provided. There was a one week trial of such a service earlier in the deployment, but it was found that this produced unacceptable congestion on the lines and it was discontinued.

In comparative terms, the cost of a three minute call is:-

	US		UK
To US	£4.12	To UK	£4.00 (£2 with concession)
To Germany	£9.60	To Germany	£4.00 (£2 with concession)

Secretary of State is conscious that we wish to avoid difficult comparisons being made with facilities provided for troops deployed in unpleasant conditions elsewhere, eg on roulement tours in Northern Ireland, and also with US forces in the Gulf. Furthermore, many of our front line troops will very shortly not have access to telephone facilities. The problem of congestion on the system is a very real one, as the US experience showed. He is therefore minded to go for levying a subsidised charge. He does not intend to make any announcement on this before the beginning of next week.

Yours sincerely *Janet Binstead*

(MISS J R BINSTED)
Private Secretary

Sir Charles Powell KCMG
No 10 Downing Street

MANAGEMENT IN CONFIDENCE

emphasis
need for
a
positive
presentation?

C.D. 257



SECRET

31 (A-B)

Spoke de la Billere.

- (1) *Patrolled*
- (2) *Condition of Iraq's. Morale, losses, etc.*
- (3) *Age of Saddam war aircraft. State of war to within.*

PRIME MINISTER

THE GULF

You are thinking of telephoning a number of Heads of Government and others over the weekend about the Gulf crisis. You may find it helpful to have a summary of points to cover.

President Bush

- Compliment on speech to Veterans and thank for quoting from you. *Good to reference to war etc; gone down well here.*
- Look forward to seeing Dan Quayle on Thursday.
- Assessment of the campaign to date.
- Israeli reactions and how to go on restraining them. *I chemical weapons. I*
- The growing problems with Arab public opinion.
- The indications of some Iranian collusion with Iraq. *Planes. (backed up)*
- Financial contributions to the cost of the war and the need to share them equitably.

*① I
②
③
⑤
⑥*

Two's. 1 or 2 outlets. Babylon: Agreement of oil stock: bombing pumping ship: pictures? damage - ANMCO specialists.

Prime Minister Mulroney

- Welcome first combat mission (on Thursday last) by Canadian aircraft (CF18).
- Gratitude for field hospital.
- Assessment of campaign so far.
- Discouragement of any activity in the UN Security Council.

Training 1/11 7 only to our charge.

Prime Minister Bolger

- Gratitude for medical assistance for the Gulf.
- Congratulations on firm line taken in Parliamentary debate.
- Your assessment of the campaign.

SECRET

Prime Minister Shamir

- Sympathy for Israeli losses in SCUD attacks.
- Welcome for the restraint hitherto shown by Israel.
- Understanding of the difficulty of maintaining it in future.
- But vital importance of not, because of undermining the coalition against Iraq.
- Assessment of the campaign so far.

President Mubarak

- Compliment on his very firm speech to the Egyptian National Assembly.
- Ask how he assesses position in the Arab world generally and reports of support in some countries for Iraq.
- Ask advice on how we can counter this.
- Assessment of the campaign so far.

General de la Billiere

[NB line may not be secure]

- Compliment on press briefing. *Weather? More? Bill's weather - more?*
- Progress on deployment of ground forces to area of concentration. *Change of view on nature of land battle? Colours with delay?*
- State of morale, particularly among Tornado squadrons. *Losses. Present activities. Bureaucracy.*
- Any practical problems with conditions of the Forces e.g. allowances, telephone calls etc.
- Ask whether equipment and ammunition is all now arriving. *Said must slow work?*


C. D. POWELL

25 January 1991

c:\foreign\calls (kk)

1. Saddam - a target?
2. " " " " - ship?
3. Stick. " " Planes.

SAFETY H.
 Strike will ever be wished. *x-infract. Allied. Mission.*

DEPARTMENT/SERIES <i>PREM 19</i> PIECE/ITEM <i>3444</i> (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract details: <i>Minute from Cradock to Powell dated 25 January 1991</i>	
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RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	<i>25/1/18</i> <i>M. Lewis</i>
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DOCUMENT PUT IN PLACE (TNA USE ONLY)	

Instructions for completion of Dummy Card

Use black or blue pen to complete form.

Use the card for one piece or for each extract removed from a different place within a piece.

Enter the department and series,

eg. HO 405, J 82.

Enter the piece and item references, .

eg. 28, 1079, 84/1, 107/3

Enter extract details if it is an extract rather than a whole piece.


This should be an indication of what the extract is,

eg. Folio 28, Indictment 840079, E107, Letter dated 22/11/1995.

Do not enter details of why the extract is sensitive.

If closed under the FOI Act, enter the FOI exemption numbers applying to the closure, eg. 27(1), 40(2).

Sign and date next to the reason why the record is not available to the public ie. Closed under FOI exemption; Retained under section 3(4) of the Public Records Act 1958; Temporarily retained; Missing at transfer or Number not used.

DEPARTMENT/SERIES <i>REM 17</i> PIECE/ITEM <i>3444</i> (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract details: <i>Telegram 150 dated 25 January 1991</i>	
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eg. HO 405, J 82.

Enter the piece and item references, .
eg. 28, 1079, 84/1, 107/3

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eg. Folio 28, Indictment 840079, E107, Letter dated 22/11/1995.
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SECRET

28(A-8)

*if they ask we must respond.
I couldn't imagine saying No. 4 26.1*

PRIME MINISTER

DEPLOYMENT OF USAF B52 AIRCRAFT TO RAF FAIRFORD

I attach a letter warning us of a request which we may receive from the United States for the deployment of up to thirteen B52 bombers to RAF Fairford, from where they would fly bombing missions against Iraq. This is very much a sounding-out operation at Air Force level and there is no sign yet of it being followed up on the political net.

There are a number of points to make:

- the deployment can only be made in consultation with us under various agreements dating back to President Truman's time: and we have a right to be consulted before the aircraft are used to mount offensive operations.
- deployment of the B52s would, undoubtedly, arouse the ire of the peace movement and perhaps others, who associate B52s with nuclear war, Dr Strangelove, etc.
- that could be increased if they were to be used to attack civilian targets or were involuntarily to cause damage to civilian targets.
- it would be something of a departure for us to launch offensive operations against Iraq directly from the territory of the United Kingdom.
- we are already making a pretty substantial contribution to the war effort and it is a bit much to ask us to take on this as well.

In short, there are reasons why we might prefer a request not to be made: and we do have the right to refuse to accept the B52s or to constrain their use. But if the Americans really need to do this, we should surely think hard before refusing. We are in this war together. We are visibly the United States' closest

SECRET

8
SECRET

- 2 -

ally. Presumably, the request would only be made because they cannot squeeze any more B52s into Diego Garcia, Saudi Arabia or Egypt, and do not regard other countries as sufficiently dependable. The B52s would add significantly to overall US air power and thus to the ability to strike the Iraqis hard and end the war sooner. We do not want to be classified with other Europeans as wimps.

I think the right course is to say nothing back to the Americans on the Air Force net, and simply wait and see whether a request comes through from the White House or not. I would expect to get notice from Brent Scowcroft before it was put in formally.

C.D.P.

C. D. POWELL

25 January 1991

A:\FOREIGN\DEPLOYME (DAS)

SECRET

12511



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

RESTRICTED

25 January 1991

Dear Charles,

CD 27/11

The Gulf : Telephone Calls

You asked earlier today for the telephone numbers on which several Heads of State or Government could best be found this weekend. I enclose details. Our posts will be glad to be involved in setting up these calls if you wish.

If the Prime Minister favours the idea in Christopher Prentice's letter of 24 January, he may like to use his call to the Canadian Foreign Minister to invite Brian and Mila Mulroney to pay a Guest of Government visit to this country in November.

[Signature]
[Signature]
(S L Gass)
Private Secretary

Sir Charles Powell KCMG
10 Downing Street

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President Mubarak

Direct Line not available.

Private Secretary, Colonel Abdul Wafa: Cairo

British Embassy Cairo

(IDD for Cairo 010 202)

King Hussein

Direct Line Amman

Chief of Court Amman

Palace Administration Office Amman

British Embassy (Duty Officer) Amman

(IDD for Amman 010 9626)

Mr Shamir

Direct Line Jerusalem

Press Officer, Avi Posner Jerusalem

(Will know Mr Shamir's whereabouts
if not at home)

Tel Aviv contact numbers Tel Aviv

British Embassy (Deputy Head of
Mission) Tel Aviv

Embassy Duty Officer Tel Aviv

(IDD for Jerusalem 010 9722)

(IDD for Tel Aviv 010 9723)

Mr Bolger

(No 10 Duty Clerk will be advised
of Mr Bolger's telephone number)
High Commission

(IDD for Wellington 010 644)

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OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT

Mr Mulroney

Prime Minister's office switchboard
High Commission (Contact Mr Scrafton)
(IDD for Ottawa 0101 613)

Ottawa

Ottawa

Temporarily Retained

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OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT

PRIME MINISTER

MEETING OF OPD(G)

You have a meeting of OPD(G) in the morning. It is basically a reporting session: substantive papers on burden-sharing and the end-game of the conflict will be taken on Tuesday (when the Chancellor can attend for the burden-sharing discussion).

The main items of interest tomorrow are:

- the oil slick. Michael Heseltine will attend for this item (only), and you will want to take it at the beginning of the meeting. Your particular concern is that Britain should be seen to be active in helping to stop the spread of the slick, given our experience in this area. You will want to establish what help we have offered, whether the advice of the oil companies have been sought and so on. Frankly, we have not shone so far.
- Iraqi aircraft in Iran. The President seemed a bit under-informed on this. Our emerging consensus is that Saddam Hussein is prudently conserving his assets (for the next war?), knowing that his air force is a write-off if it takes on the Americans. But there are more sinister explanations possible, and we need to be very watchful (although why the Iranians would want to help the Iraqis beats me). The time could come when we would want to sabotage these aircraft to stop the Iraqis getting them back: but the last thing we want is to drag Iran into the war, so its not something for now. Its enough that they are literally hors de combat.
- progress in the campaign. You will want to probe for more information on the President's comments about the greater degree of success in identifying SCUD sites: and how we assess the progress of the strikes against the Republican Guards and their logistics.

Caution: all those present will have received my note of your talk with General de la Billiere but NOT that with President Bush.

C D.P

Charles Powell

25 January 1991

c: OPDG (MJ)



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

25 January 1991

CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Charles

Kuwait: Burdensharing

Richard Gozney wrote to you yesterday with the text of a message from the Prime Minister to the Amir of Kuwait on a Kuwaiti contribution to our military effort. Our burdensharing experts have belatedly asked for an amendment, to reflect the sum which we think should be sought from the Kuwaitis, as set out in the Foreign Secretary's minute of today's date to the Prime Minister.

Accordingly, the second paragraph would finish as follows:

71 You have, I believe, made such a gesture to the United States. We would not, of course, seek assistance on the same scale. But a contribution of, say, £300 million would be a great help to us and would demonstrate our joint cooperation and solidarity in the great venture which we have embarked upon.

I am copying this letter to John Gieve (Treasury), Simon Webb (MOD) and Sue Bishop (TI).

*Yours ever,
S. L. Gass*

(S L Gass)
Private Secretary

Sir Charles Powell KCMG
10 Downing Street

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FILE
DA
PC

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

25 January 1991

GERMAN CONTRIBUTION TO BURDEN SHARING IN THE GULF

I have seen Bonn telegram number 81 about the German contribution to burden sharing in the Gulf. Provided FCO and Treasury Ministers are content, I think the Prime Minister would agree to the proposed amendment to his message. That would leave the precise amount to be sought from the Germans open until there has been a discussion in OPD(G) on 29 January.

I am copying this letter to John Gieve (HM Treasury).

CHARLES POWELL

Simon Gass, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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Ga

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MDHIAN 0640

CONFIDENTIAL
FM BONN
TO DESKBY 251130Z FCO
TELNO 81
OF 251025Z JANUARY 91
INFO IMMEDIATE POLAD HIGH WYCOMBE

Mr. Powell, No 10
We spoke.
[Signature]

SIC
DCCUK PASS TO POLAD HIGH WYCOMBE

YOUR TELNO 26:
GERMAN CONTRIBUTION TO BURDEN SHARING IN THE GULF

1. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT HAS RECENTLY GIVEN A NUMBER OF INDICATIONS THAT IT IS WILLING TO INCREASE SUBSTANTIALLY ITS FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTION TO ALLIED OPERATIONS AGAINST IRAQ. THE AMERICANS (MY TELNO 75) ARE EVIDENTLY GOING FOR A VERY BIG SUM. I THINK THAT THE FIGURE OF DM50 MILLION PER MONTH IN YOUR TUR MAY WELL BE LOWER THAN WE CAN GET. SO AS NOT TO CLOSE OFF THE POSSIBILITY OF GETTING MORE, I SUGGEST THAT THE PENULTIMATE SENTENCE OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE SHOULD READ: 'BUT I HOPE YOU WILL BE WILLING FOR GERMANY TO MAKE A SUBSTANTIAL FURTHER CONTRIBUTION, PROPORTIONATE TO BRITAIN'S SHARE OF THE COSTS OF LIBERATING KUWAIT'.

2. I WOULD PROPOSE TO DELIVER THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE TO HARTMANN, KOHL'S DIPLOMATIC ADVISER. WHEN WE KNOW THE SIZE OF THE LATEST AMERICAN BID FOR GERMAN MONEY, YOU COULD GIVE ME INSTRUCTIONS ON THE MONTHLY FIGURE TO PROPOSE TO HARTMANN IN A SUBSEQUENT MEETING.

3. ON A LESSER POINT, THE GERMANS HAVE A BAD CONSCIENCE ABOUT EUROPE'S LACK OF UNITY IN RESPONDING TO SADDAM HUSSEIN'S AGGRESSION. THE FINAL SENTENCE OF THE DRAFT MESSAGE WOULD, I SUGGEST, BE MORE TELLING IF IT REFERRED TO 'A CLEAR DEMONSTRATION OF EUROPE'S UNITY' INSTEAD OF 'YET ANOTHER CLEAR DEMONSTRATION'.

4. PLEASE ADVANCE TO POWELL, NO 10

MALLABY

YYYY

PAGE 1
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Rina Alwiler
copy

OUR TELNO 237: IRAQ/KUWAIT: WASHINGTON SITREP

SUMMARY

1. MOUNTING CONCERN OVER GULF OIL SPILL. US PUBLIC OPINION REMAINS FIRMLY SUPPORTIVE OF WAR EFFORT.

DETAIL

I 2. THE BREAKING STORY ON 25 JANUARY IS THE IRAQI-INITIATED OIL SPILL OFF KUWAIT. THE WHITE HOUSE HAVE DENOUNCED THIS AS A DELIBERATE ACT OF ENVIRONMENTAL TERRORISM, POTENTIALLY SEVERAL TIMES BIGGER THAN THE EXXON VALDEZ DISASTER. THE ADMINISTRATION ARE URGENTLY CONSIDERING WHAT TO DO ABOUT THE SPILL, BUT THE PRESIDENT HAS PUBLICLY SAID THAT IT WOULD HAVE NO IMPACT ON MILITARY OPERATIONS.

3. FOLLOWING THE FURTHER SCUD ATTACK ON ISRAEL EARLIER TODAY, THE WHITE HOUSE SAID THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD AGAIN CONDEMNED IT AND ISSUED A FURTHER CALL FOR ISRAELI RESTRAINT. THE PRESIDENT HAD BEEN IN VIRTUALLY CONSTANT CONTACT WITH SHAMIR AND HAD EXPRESSED HIS ADMIRATION FOR ISRAELI FORTITUDE. ADDITIONAL PATRIOT BATTERIES WOULD NOW BE DEPLOYED TO ISRAEL. THE PENTAGON DID NOT SAY HOW MANY, BUT THE MEDIA HAVE MENTIONED 12.

4. THE SENATE PASSED A UNANIMOUS RESOLUTION (ALREADY PASSED BY THE HOUSE ON 23 JANUARY) CALLING ON IRAQ TO ABIDE BY THE PROVISIONS OF THE GENEVA CONVENTION REQUIRING HUMANE TREATMENT OF PWS. THE SENATE ALSO UNANIMOUSLY CONDEMNED IRAQ'S SCUD MISSILE ATTACKS ON ISRAEL. SENATOR BIDEN (CHAIRMAN OF THE

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SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE) HAS PROPOSED LEGISLATION TO FILL GAPS IN CURRENT US ANTI-TERRORISM LAWS. THE BILL WOULD MAKE A WIDE RANGE OF TERRORIST ACTS FEDERAL CRIMES, FROM FINANCING TERRORIST GROUPS TO MURDERS INTENDED TO FORCE US WITHDRAWAL FROM THE GULF. IT WOULD ALSO PROVIDE FOR THE DEATH PENALTY FOR TERRORIST MURDERS WITHIN THE US OR OF US CITIZENS ABROAD.

5. WIDESPREAD COMMENT CONTINUES IN THE MEDIA TO THE EFFECT THAT THE WAR HAD ABRUPTLY HALTED MOMENTUM TOWARDS POLITICAL UNITY IN EUROPE WHILE REVIVING THE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE US AND UK. GERMANY IN PARTICULAR IS SINGLED OUT AS HAVING LOST ITS FIGHTING SPIRIT AND FOR ITS HESITATION OVER A NATO RESPONSE IN THE EVENT OF AN IRAQI ATTACK ON TURKEY. BUT REPORTING ALSO FOCUSES ON WIDER POLICY DIVISIONS WITHIN THE EC AND THE GENERAL POLITICAL INSIGNIFICANCE OF EUROPE IN THE CONTEXT OF THE GULF. ANNOUNCEMENTS OF MAJOR INCREASES IN FINANCIAL SUPPORT BY GERMANY AND JAPAN HAVE HOWEVER TAKEN SOME OF THE HEAT OUT OF THE BURDEN-SHARING DEBATE, AT LEAST FOR THE TIME BEING, ALTHOUGH THE VIEW PERSISTS THAT THEY ARE BOTH GETTING OFF CHEAPLY.

6. A WALL STREET/NBC NEWS POLL ON 25 JANUARY INDICATED THAT AMERICANS STILL STRONGLY SUPPORT THE WAR EVEN THOUGH THEY RECOGNISED THE RISKS AND HAZARDS AHEAD. NINETY-ONE PER CENT THOUGHT IRAQ SHOULD BE FORCED TO WITHDRAW FROM KUWAIT: 87 PER CENT AGREED IRAQ'S OFFENSIVE MILITARY CAPABILITY SHOULD BE DESTROYED: AND 73 PER CENT WANTED TO SEE SADDAM HUSSEIN CAPTURED OR KILLED. FIFTY-SIX PER CENT WERE PREPARED TO ACCEPT THOUSANDS OF AMERICAN CASUALTIES TO ACHIEVE US WAR AIMS. POLLSTERS CONCLUDED THAT AMERICANS WERE UNITED AND CONFIDENT ABOUT THE WAR EFFORT AND PREPARED TO SEE WAR AIMS TAKEN BEYOND THE STRICT LIMITS IN UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS. SIXTY-TWO PER CENT OF THOSE POLLED SAID THEY HAD GAINED RESPECT FOR BRITAIN AND 65 PER CENT HAD GAINED RESPECT FOR ISRAEL.

7. A RETIRED US AIRFORCE OFFICER (MAJOR GENERAL PERRY SMITH) CRITICISED RAF TACTICS IN THE GULF WAR ON A CNN PROGRAMME ON 25 JANUARY. SHORTLY AFTERWARDS, THE EMBASSY SWITCHBOARD WAS JAMMED WITH CALLS SUPPORTING THE BRITISH ROLE IN THE WAR AND THE RAF IN PARTICULAR.

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SIC

*Rina Alinder**cm*

OUR TELNO 237: IRAQ/KUWAIT: WASHINGTON SITREP

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DETAIL

I 2. THE BREAKING STORY ON 25 JANUARY IS THE IRAQI-INITIATED OIL SPILL OFF KUWAIT. THE WHITE HOUSE HAVE DENOUNCED THIS AS A DELIBERATE ACT OF ENVIRONMENTAL TERRORISM, POTENTIALLY SEVERAL TIMES BIGGER THAN THE EXXON VALDEZ DISASTER. THE ADMINISTRATION ARE URGENTLY CONSIDERING WHAT TO DO ABOUT THE SPILL, BUT THE PRESIDENT HAS PUBLICLY SAID THAT IT WOULD HAVE NO IMPACT ON MILITARY OPERATIONS.

3. FOLLOWING THE FURTHER SCUD ATTACK ON ISRAEL EARLIER TODAY, THE WHITE HOUSE SAID THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD AGAIN CONDEMNED IT AND ISSUED A FURTHER CALL FOR ISRAELI RESTRAINT. THE PRESIDENT HAD BEEN IN VIRTUALLY CONSTANT CONTACT WITH SHAMIR AND HAD EXPRESSED HIS ADMIRATION FOR ISRAELI FORTITUDE. ADDITIONAL PATRIOT BATTERIES WOULD NOW BE DEPLOYED TO ISRAEL. THE PENTAGON DID NOT SAY HOW MANY, BUT THE MEDIA HAVE MENTIONED 12.

4. THE SENATE PASSED A UNANIMOUS RESOLUTION (ALREADY PASSED BY THE HOUSE ON 23 JANUARY) CALLING ON IRAQ TO ABIDE BY THE PROVISIONS OF THE GENEVA CONVENTION REQUIRING HUMANE TREATMENT OF PWS. THE SENATE ALSO UNANIMOUSLY CONDEMNED IRAQ'S SCUD MISSILE ATTACKS ON ISRAEL. SENATOR BIDEN (CHAIRMAN OF THE

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SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE) HAS PROPOSED LEGISLATION TO FILL GAPS IN CURRENT US ANTI-TERRORISM LAWS. THE BILL WOULD MAKE A WIDE RANGE OF TERRORIST ACTS FEDERAL CRIMES, FROM FINANCING TERRORIST GROUPS TO MURDERS INTENDED TO FORCE US WITHDRAWAL FROM THE GULF. IT WOULD ALSO PROVIDE FOR THE DEATH PENALTY FOR TERRORIST MURDERS WITHIN THE US OR OF US CITIZENS ABROAD.

5. WIDESPREAD COMMENT CONTINUES IN THE MEDIA TO THE EFFECT THAT THE WAR HAD ABRUPTLY HALTED MOMENTUM TOWARDS POLITICAL UNITY IN EUROPE WHILE REVIVING THE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE US AND UK. GERMANY IN PARTICULAR IS SINGLED OUT AS HAVING LOST ITS FIGHTING SPIRIT AND FOR ITS HESITATION OVER A NATO RESPONSE IN THE EVENT OF AN IRAQI ATTACK ON TURKEY. BUT REPORTING ALSO FOCUSES ON WIDER POLICY DIVISIONS WITHIN THE EC AND THE GENERAL POLITICAL INSIGNIFICANCE OF EUROPE IN THE CONTEXT OF THE GULF. ANNOUNCEMENTS OF MAJOR INCREASES IN FINANCIAL SUPPORT BY GERMANY AND JAPAN HAVE HOWEVER TAKEN SOME OF THE HEAT OUT OF THE BURDEN-SHARING DEBATE, AT LEAST FOR THE TIME BEING, ALTHOUGH THE VIEW PERSISTS THAT THEY ARE BOTH GETTING OFF CHEAPLY.

6. A WALL STREET/NBC NEWS POLL ON 25 JANUARY INDICATED THAT AMERICANS STILL STRONGLY SUPPORT THE WAR EVEN THOUGH THEY RECOGNISED THE RISKS AND HAZARDS AHEAD. NINETY-ONE PER CENT THOUGHT IRAQ SHOULD BE FORCED TO WITHDRAW FROM KUWAIT: 87 PER CENT AGREED IRAQ'S OFFENSIVE MILITARY CAPABILITY SHOULD BE DESTROYED: AND 73 PER CENT WANTED TO SEE SADDAM HUSSEIN CAPTURED OR KILLED. FIFTY-SIX PER CENT WERE PREPARED TO ACCEPT THOUSANDS OF AMERICAN CASUALTIES TO ACHIEVE US WAR AIMS. POLLSTERS CONCLUDED THAT AMERICANS WERE UNITED AND CONFIDENT ABOUT THE WAR EFFORT AND PREPARED TO SEE WAR AIMS TAKEN BEYOND THE STRICT LIMITS IN UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS. SIXTY-TWO PER CENT OF THOSE POLLED SAID THEY HAD GAINED RESPECT FOR BRITAIN AND 65 PER CENT HAD GAINED RESPECT FOR ISRAEL.

7. A RETIRED US AIRFORCE OFFICER (MAJOR GENERAL PERRY SMITH) CRITICISED RAF TACTICS IN THE GULF WAR ON A CNN PROGRAMME ON 25 JANUARY. SHORTLY AFTERWARDS, THE EMBASSY SWITCHBOARD WAS JAMMED WITH CALLS SUPPORTING THE BRITISH ROLE IN THE WAR AND THE RAF IN PARTICULAR.

ACLAND

(C)

PRIME MINISTERBURDENSARING IN THE GULF

I attach the Foreign Secretary's submission on burdensharing in the Gulf. Very briefly, he estimates that our extra costs are likely to be of the order of £3 billion: that we should try to recover at least half that amount by seeking contributions from others: that we should approach a list of eighteen countries for such contributions: and that where the countries concerned are already contributing to the cost of US forces, we should seek 8 per cent of what the Americans are getting (reflecting the relative scale of our Forces in the Gulf).

You will want to consider a number of points

- How realistic is the figure for our extra costs?
Inevitably, it is a bit of a seat-of-the-pants estimate. We should surely not regard it as the last word, which means that when we approach other countries we should make clear that we are seeking contributions based on our current estimate of the total extra costs we are incurring.
- Is recovery of half those additional costs a reasonable goal? There may be pressure to aim higher: Treasury calculations suggest that, up to the outbreak of hostilities, the Americans had managed to recover two-thirds of their extra costs (and we only one-third). The Treasury may argue for setting a higher target. My own view is that we should be looking to get half: but we might need to ask for more initially in order to arrive at that.
- Is the list of countries to be approached right? Here I have reservations. There are eighteen countries on the list: but only five of them - Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Germany and Japan-would be expected to contribute 85 per cent of that total. I wonder whether it is worth going through the aggravation of pursuing the other thirteen for contributions. It will certainly grate, and

thanks - I wouldn't
approach Australia etc
- embarrassing + non-productive

SECRET

- 2 -

some of them will refuse, so we shall not get much benefit. It might be better to load a bit more still on to the five big contributors. That said, I do not see why we should let Belgium, Netherlands, Norway and South Korea off the hook. But I really doubt whether we should pursue countries like Australia, Malaysia and so on.

The idea is to discuss the paper at a meeting of OPD(G) with the Chancellor present on Tuesday. But you may like to reflect on these points.

C.D.P.

C. D. POWELL

25 January 1991

A:\FOREIGN\BURDEN (DAS)

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10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

25 January 1991

THE GULF: TELEPHONE CALLS

The Prime Minister is contemplating making a number of telephone calls over the next few days in connection with the Gulf crisis. Would it be possible to establish on what telephone numbers it would be best to call the following (including on a Sunday afternoon):

- President Mubarak
- King Hussein
- Mr Shamir
- Mr Mulroney
- Mr Bolger

But I would be grateful if the information could be obtained without giving the impression that a call is necessarily imminent. In the event the Prime Minister does decide to go ahead, I may need to enlist the help of our Embassies to make the calls in some cases.

CHARLES POWELL

R H T Gozney Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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TO PRIORITY MODUK

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AND TO PRIORITY FCO

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FCO FOR EMERGENCY UNIT AND NENAD FROM DA

SUMMARY. IDF BRIEFING OF THE ATTACHE CORPS OUTLINES ISRAEL'S MILITARY PREPARADNESS TO RETALIATE IF ORDERED, REVIEWS THEIR PERCEPTION OF THE COURSE OF THE WAR, THE POSSIBILITY OF CW SSMS TO FOLLOW, AND THE IMPORTANCE OF THE MEDIA AND THE FUTILITY OF CENSORSHIP.

1. BRIGADIER GENERAL ZE'EV LIVNEH, ASSISTANT DEPUTY CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF, OPENED THE BRIEFING WITH A STATEMENT THAT ISRAEL WAS NOT PART OF THE WAR, (WHICH WAS AN UNUSUAL AND DIFFICULT POSITION FOR THEM) BUT SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE CRISIS HAD BEEN PREPARING ITSELF FOR ANY EVENTUALITY, WITH PARTICULAR EMPHASIS ON INTELLIGENCE ACQUISITION, THE STATE OF ALERT OF THE ISRAELI AIR FORCE (IAF) AND CIVIL DEFENCE. AFTER A BRIEF RESUME OF THE RECENT SCUD MISSILE ATTACKS AND THE QUESTION OF RETALIATION HE STATED THAT SO FAR ISRAEL HAD NOT RESPONDED, BUT ALL OPTIONS WERE PREPARED AND THE IDF WOULD EXECUTE SHOULD THE GOVERNMENT DECIDE A RESPONSE WAS REQUIRED. IN REPLY TO A QUESTION ON THE IRAQI USE OF CW OR BW HE SAID THAT THIS WOULD EVOKE A VERY SERIOUS RESPONSE.

2. THE SECOND BRIEFER, COLONEL JACQUES REINICH, INTELLIGENCE CORPS, SUMMARISED ISRAEL'S PERCEPTION OF HOW THE WAR WAS GOING AND HOW SADDAM MIGHT PLAY THE FUTURE. IRAQI RESOLVE WAS NOT WEAKENING AS THE BATTLE IS BEING CONDUCTED AS ANTICIPATED. ONCE THE (STRATEGIC) AIR ATTACKS WERE OVER THE IRAQIS WOULD EXPECT TO FIGHT WELL AGAINST THE ALLIED GROUND OFFENSIVE. THEY WOULD FIGHT FOR AS LONG AS POSSIBLE WITH THE AIM OF BRINGING THE US TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE AFTER INFLECTING THOUSANDS OF CASUALTIES. IN THE MAIN THE IRAQI AIR FORCE WAS STILL INTACT AND EVERY ATTEMPT WOULD BE MADE TO CONSERVE IT. THE AD SYSTEM WAS ALSO NOT TOO DOWNGRADED AND IRAQI C3 WAS SURVIVING. HE

BELIEVED SSM ATTACKS WOULD CONTINUE WITH A STRONG POSSIBILITY OF CW WARHEADS BEING USED LATER ON AGAINST ISRAEL. IN ANSWER TO THE QUESTION OF WHY NO CW HAD BEEN USED TO DATE HE REPLIED THAT FOR THE PRESENT THE IRAQIS WERE NOT SURE OF THE RESPONSE, BUT FOR NOW WOULD USE HE TO STIR THINGS UP AND GENERATE SUPPORT IN THE ARAB WORLD. ASKED IF AN AIR ATTACK BY SU24S WAS POSSIBLE HE REPLIED THEORETICALLY, BUT THAT THE IAF COULD DEAL WITH IT. HE CONCLUDED BY REMINDING HIS AUDIENCE OF THE TERRORIST THREAT AGAINST THE ALLIED COALITION AND ISRAELI ASSETS ABROAD BY THE PLO AND IN PARTICULAR THE ANO. THE PALESTINIANS IN THE OTS, HOWEVER, WERE TERRIFIED OF AN IDF REACTION AND WERE KEEPING LOW THUS FAR.

3. BRIGADIER GENERAL NACHMAN SHAI, THE IDF SPOKESMAN CONCLUDED THE BRIEFING WITH A VEY SHREWD ASSESSMENT OF THE ROLE BEING PLAYED BY THE ELECTRONIC MEDIA, WITH ITS 24 HOUR COVERAGE OF THE WAR WORLDWIDE, AND OF THE FUTILITY OF TRYING TO SUPPRESS INFORMATION IN SPITE OF ATTEMPTS AT CENSORSHIP. HE FORECAST (PERHAPS INCORRECTLY KNOWING BRITISH GUIDELINES) THAT THE SAME COVERAGE NOW FOCUSING ON THE SCUD WAR OF THE CITIES WOULD SOON BE ON THE GROUND BATTLEFIELD. HE FIRMLY BELIEVED IN THE NEED FOR CONSTANT BRIEFING OF THE NOW 900 STRONG PRESS ARMADA IN ISRAEL, (I WISH HE FELT THE SAME ABOUT THE ATTACHE CORPS) AND STRESSED THE IMPERATIVE TO BE FIRST WITH THE NEWS. HE ALSO OUTLINED THE ISRAELI PR STRATEGY OF HAVING AT LEAST ONE OR TWO SENIOR POLITICAL OR MILITARY FIGURES ON THE MEDIA DAILY TO REASSURE THE CIVILIAN POPULATION.

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PS TO PRIME MINISTER
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MY 2 IPTS: CALL ON NEW SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER: THE GULF

SUMMARY

1. I REFERRED TO THE EXCHANGES BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND GORBACHEV AND SAID THERE WAS CLEARLY AGREEMENT BETWEEN US ON POLICY. SADDAM'S ACTIONS HAD MADE WAR INEVITABLE. FOR OBVIOUS MILITARY AND POLITICAL REASONS, WE DID NOT WISH TO SEE A PAUSE IN THE MILITARY ACTION. WE WERE KEEPING IRAQI CASUALTIES TO A MINIMUM AND DOING ALL WE COULD TO PREVENT THE WAR WIDENING.

2. BESSMERTNYKH AGREED OUR BASIC POSITIONS WERE SIMILAR. SADDAM HAD SPURNED ALL PEACE EFFORTS INCLUDING ONE MADE BY THE SOVIETS AFTER THE WAR HAD BEGUN. PRESSURE MUST BE SUSTAINED TO GET IRAQ OUT OF KUWAIT. HOWEVER BESSMERTNYKH EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT THE RISK OF THE WAR SPREADING: AND ABOUT THE INTENSITY OF ALLIED OPERATIONS. WE MUST NOT INFLECT TOO HIGH A PRICE ON IRAQ. I SAID IT WAS NOT OUR INTENTION TO DESTROY IRAQ WHICH WOULD HAVE AN IMPORTANT POST-WAR ROLE IN THE REGION. WE AGREED TO KEEP IN TOUCH WHILE THE WAR WAS IN PROGRESS AND OVER POST-WAR DEVELOPMENTS.

DETAIL

3. I SAID THERE WAS CLEAR AGREEMENT BETWEEN US ON POLICY TOWARDS THE GULF. THERE HAD RECENTLY BEEN IMPORTANT EXCHANGES BETWEEN MR MAJOR AND PRESIDENT GORBACHEV. THE COOPERATION AMONG THE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL BORE SPECTACULAR WITNESS TO THE CHANGE THAT HAD TAKEN PLACE IN THE INTERNATIONAL LANDSCAPE SINCE GORBACHEV HAD COME TO POWER.

4. I SAID THAT SADDAM SPURNED A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THE CRISIS. WAR WAS THE INEVITABLE CONSEQUENCE OF THAT REFUSAL. WE WOULD NOT WISH THERE TO BE ANY PAUSE IN MILITARY ACTION AS SOME NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES WERE NOW ADVOCATING. THIS WOULD ONLY ALLOW SADDAM TO RECOVER HIS MILITARY BALANCE, AND INCREASE THE NUMBER OF CASUALTIES IF THERE WERE A GROUND ATTACK. GENERALLY: WE WERE PLEASED WITH THE SOLIDARITY OF THE COALITION: WE WERE HOPING TO KEEP IRAQI CASUALTIES

TO A MINIMUM AS WELL AS OUR OWN: AND WE WERE DOING ALL WE COULD TO PREVENT THE WAR WIDENING, IN PARTICULAR BY URGING RESTRAINT ON ISRAEL.

5. BESSMERTNYKH AGREED THAT OUR BASIC POSITIONS WERE THE SAME. SADDAM'S STUBBORNNESS HAD PREVENTED A PEACEFUL SOLUTION. THIS WAS VERY REGRETTABLE. THE SOVIET UNION HAD DONE ALL IT COULD TO AVERT A MILITARY CONFLICT. EVEN AFTER IT HAD STARTED, THEY HAD APPROACHED SADDAM WITH THE PROPOSAL THAT IF HE WOULD LET THEM HAVE A DECLARATION OF INTENT TO LEAVE KUWAIT, THEY WOULD INTERVENE WITH OTHER MEMBERS OF THE COALITION AND PRESS FOR A SUSPENSION OF HOSTILITIES. HE HAD REFUSED THIS OFFER LIKE ALL THE OTHERS.

6. IN BESSMERTNYKH'S VIEW THE FIRST PHASE OF THE WAR WAS OVER. SADDAM HAD BEEN SEVERELY PUNISHED. IT WOULD TAKE YEARS FOR IRAQ TO REBUILD ITS MILITARY CAPABILITY. THE PRESSURE MUST BE SUSTAINED IN ORDER TO GET SADDAM OUT OF KUWAIT BUT THERE WERE TWO POINTS WHICH GAVE BESSMERTNYKH PARTICULAR CAUSE FOR CONCERN:
(I) EVERYTHING POSSIBLE MUST BE DONE TO PREVENT THE CONFLICT SPREADING. WE MUST DO ALL WE COULD TO RESTRAIN THE ISRAELIS. IF THEY ENTERED THE WAR, THE CONSEQUENCES WOULD BE ENTIRELY UNPREDICTABLE:

(II) THE INTENSITY OF THE WAR AGAINST IRAQ SEEMED TO BE INCREASING. THE SOVIET UNION DID NOT WANT TO SEE THE INFRASTRUCTURE AND THE PEOPLE OF THE COUNTRY DESTROYED. NO UNSCR PROVIDED FOR THAT. THE COALITION MUST STICK STRICTLY TO THE TERMS OF THE UNSCR'S. HE URGED US TO AVOID INFLECTING TOO HIGH A PRICE ON THE IRAQI POPULATION.

7. I SAID IT WAS NOT OUR INTENTION TO DESTROY IRAQ, WHICH WOULD HAVE AN IMPORTANT ROLE TO PLAY IN THE REGION ONCE THE WAR WAS OVER. I REPEATED THAT WE WERE ALSO DOING ALL WE COULD TO PREVENT A WIDENING OF THE WAR. I SAID WE WOULD LIKE TO KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH THE SOVIETS ABOUT POST-WAR ARRANGEMENTS IN THE REGION. BESSMERTNYKH REPLIED THAT HE TOO WANTED TO KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH, BOTH WHILE THE WAR WAS IN PROGRESS, AND ABOUT THE POST-WAR SETTLEMENT. THE LATTER WOULD BE VERY IMPORTANT, AND VERY DIFFICULT TO GET RIGHT IF THERE WERE TO BE STABILITY IN THE REGION.

COMMENT

8. BESSMERTNYKH'S CONCERNS ABOUT THE WAR WIDENING, AND THE INTENSITY OF THE ALLIED WAR EFFORT, ARE BOTH THEMES THAT HAVE EMERGED IN SOVIET COMMENTARIES IN RECENT DAYS. THERE WAS HOWEVER NO SUGGESTION HERE THAT SOVIET SUPPORT FOR THE COALITION MIGHT BE PUT UNDER STRAIN IF THERE WAS A GROUND ATTACK AGAINST IRAQ. (THIS WAS SOMETHING THAT GORBACHEV

SEEMED VAGELY TO HINT AT IN SOIME OBSCURE REMARKS HE MADE EARLIER THIS WEEK.) BESSMERTNYKH WAS INSTEAD AT PAINS TO STRESS SOVIET SOLIDARITY, AND THE WISH TO DISCUSS HOW BEST TO CONSTRUCT A STABLE POST-WAR SETTLEMENT.

BRAITHWAITE

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Prime Minister

24 January 1991

Yes. Good.

*An encouraging
report.*

CDL

24/1

25A (a-c)

Dear Charles,

REPORT FROM RIYADH

The Defence Secretary's colleagues might find it useful to see the attached report from Commanders on Operations today in the Gulf.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries to members of OPD(G) and to Sir Robin Butler.

Yours sincerely

Janet Binstead

(MISS J R BINSTead)
Private Secretary

Sir Charles Powell KCMG
No 10 Downing Street

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PS/Secretary of State

THE VIEW FROM RIYADH AND WASHINGTON 241800Z JAN 91

1. Gen Schwarzkopf reported a welcome shift in the weather pattern today which although resulting in heavy cloud cover over Baghdad had left the skies clear in the KTO. He had been able to mount a "huge number of sorties" against the Medinah/Minawrah RGFC Division. Furthermore, US Marine Corps aircraft had been very active against ground forces in South East Kuwait and battle damage assessment showed that they had been very effective. A10s had mounted many sorties against troops along the Kuwait/Saudi and Saudi/Iraq borders with the assistance of UK Jaguars. Recce missions (not yet analysed) had flown against the RGFC Division which had been bombed extensively yesterday although it is always difficult to determine battle damage against divisions which are well dug in. "We could well have hurt them much more than we realise".
2. Maritime forces had had a good day. 2 Iraqi minelayers/minesweepers had been captured (Royal Navy LYNX armed with Sea Skua missiles were involved but were asked not to fire as USN Commanders wished the ships to remain intact) along with 47 survivors who were now prisoners of war. 11 other survivors had swum to a nearby island and had continued to fire at the helicopters circling overhead. As a result the helicopters had attacked and the Island of Qaruh has now been captured by the Allies. This is the first part of Kuwait to be recovered. Iraqi speedboats had also been busy spraying mines at high speed in the waters off Kuwait. In the maritime air engagement, of which you will have heard, Gen Schwarzkopf stated that 5 MIRAGE Fls had approached Basra from the North West but on detection by the AWACs aircraft 3 had turned tail. The remaining 2 had gone supersonic over the Gulf but had been shot down by Saudi F15s.
3. Probably in a bid to slow the rate of defections from Kuwait, Iraqi Army personnel had replaced the police in the border posts between Kuwait and Saudi whose troops are already deployed in their border posts opposite. The SCUD hunt continues and there is strong intelligence of 4 launchers North of Kuwait in an area controlled by the RGFC. These launchers, which may be the ones which fire regularly into Saudi Arabia, are thought to be hidden in mountain caves except when in use and are thus difficult to pinpoint. Recce missions are being mounted to locate them. Other successes today include the destruction of one Adnan (AWACs), 3 Badger bombers and all but one of the Iraqi Electronic Warfare aircraft. The remaining Adnan and EW aircraft are thought to be in Tehran. The US Administration is pursuing this urgently through the Swiss. Allied Air Forces have failed so far to destroy the TV link facility at Basra; they will be returning to it overnight.

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
4. Air activity tonight will comprise a repeat of today plus F117A sorties against key bridges in the Iraqi logistic chain. These bridges are made of very tough reinforced concrete and are proving difficult to destroy. UK bomber raids will be mounted for interdiction against barracks, ammunition dumps and radar sites. In detail:

- a. Tabuk. 8 GRIs.
- b. Muharraq. 8 GRIs.
- c. Dhahran. 8 GRIs.

Each aircraft will carry 8 x 1000lb bombs. There will be the usual Tornado F3 CAPs, tanker support and 3 GRIs are on standby for tasking as required.

5. Finally, there is little news of the Tornado crew missing from last night.

6. Earlier Gen Powell had telephoned. CDS reported how well the General's Press Conference had been received in the UK yesterday and also passed his thanks for including, in his briefing, an example of the UK bombing effort. Gen Powell in turn expressed his grateful thanks for our forthcoming deployment of Buccaneers. They discussed today's switch to attacks against shipping and agreed that this represented less of a change in the Iraqi strategic approach than an unsuccessful probe to look for weaknesses. Powell also commented that there would be a continuing need to divert air effort for SCUD hunting as his stocks of PATRIOT missiles were not unlimited. He also said that the US Administration had the solid support of the 2 Israelis who mattered most and that they had assured the US that Israel would not "go over the top" in retaliation. He confirmed that the State Department was pursuing with vigour the Iraqi Air Force deployments to Iran.



D G LITTLEJOHNS
Cdre
PSO/CDS
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25(a-c)



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

SECRET AND PERSONAL

24 January 1991

For Charles.

*CDP
25/1*

Iraq/Kuwait : Overseas Information Campaign

I wrote on 19 December with a progress report. This letter brings the situation up to date.

Since the New Year and up to the outbreak of hostilities we focussed increasingly on the theme that sanctions were not producing the desired effect; that the illegal and brutal occupation of Kuwait was becoming more entrenched; and that delay in bringing about complete Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait would be dangerous. Progressively we made it clear that the use of force had become the only option if Saddam Hussein was not to benefit from his aggression, with all the loss of authority that would imply for the United Nations, and long term damage to international security.

Since the start of hostilities, we have been stressing that the aims of the military operation are those of the Security Council Resolutions, specifically the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait and the restoration of the legitimate Kuwaiti government. We are also pointing out that air attacks are being carefully targeted to ensure the minimum possible civilian casualties, and to avoid as far as possible damage to the Iraqi holy places and the major archaeological sites. The involvement of Saudi and Kuwaiti air forces in the bombardment has been stressed. And we remind our audiences that the multinational coalition includes the forces of 30 countries, almost half of them Muslim.

The Foreign Secretary has given two interviews to CNN since the start of hostilities. Mr Hogg briefed London-based representatives of the overseas Muslim press on 18 January. The same day he met representatives of the Muslim community to explain the Government's approach, and further such meetings are planned. The text of all major Ministerial speeches in Parliament and elsewhere and of selected press briefings by Ministers is being sent to our posts by fast electronic means. Posts are making extensive use of this material in briefing

/the press

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the press and others. We are also placing Ministerial statements and articles with foreign radio stations broadcasting to the Gulf area from Qatar, Bahrain, Cairo, Nicosia, and Beirut, as well as with the Arabic Service of Radio Monte Carlo, one of the most popular international stations in the area. These stations are audible to varying degrees in Iraq and Kuwait. In addition, the Iraqi opposition station Radio Free Iraq continues broadcasting to Iraq from transmitters in Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia, although it is subject to heavy jamming.

We were successful in placing our own television material about brutality of the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait with local stations up to the outbreak of war; and last week we placed with foreign TV correspondents in London a film they had requested on the British contribution to the multinational force, and the reasons for hostilities.

Appearances by Ministers, and other comment on the Gulf crisis shown on BBC television and ITN are often replayed on foreign channels as a result of commercial deals arranged by Visnews and World Television News.

BBC World Service broadcasts in Arabic to the Middle East were extended from 10½ to 14 hours a day from 17 January. Excerpts from Arabic Service broadcasts are being carried by Greater London Radio for one hour a day for the benefit of Arabic speakers in the London area. The BBC know that we are monitoring carefully the tone and content of their material.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (MOD), John Neilson (c/o Mr Colin Ambrose, Security Controller, Room 112, Department of Energy), and to Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

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
(S. A. Gass)

Private Secretary

Sir Charles Powell KCMG
10 Downing Street

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From: Lieutenant Colonel J R Durance
Military Assistant to Minister of State for the
Armed Forces



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Telephone 071 21 82216 (Direct Dialling)
071 21 89000 (Switchboard)

D/MIN(AF)/AH/5/3/30A

24 January 1991

Dear Sir Charles

As requested I enclose a copy of the MOD internal submission on welfare telephone calls in the Gulf.

The MOD plan is for Defence Ministers to release details of the system on Saturday 26 January. It is suggested that the reply to Mr Kinnock should be coordinated with the release and a draft reply will be forwarded shortly in order to achieve this.

Yours sincerely
John Durance

Sir Charles Powell
Private Secretary to the Prime Minister
No 10 Downing Street

D/PL(SPP)11/30/3
23 January 1990

MA/Minister(AF)

Copy to:

APS/S of S	Sec(O) (C)
PS/US of S(AF)	Head of NPC
MA/DCDS (P&P)	Head of AG Sec 2
PS/DUS (PL)	Head of AMP(F&S)
DGNPS	CA/HQSTC
DGPS (A)	DIT(Pol)
DGPS (RAF)	IT(Fin)2
AUS (PL)	Press Office
CPR	D Pers

OP GRANBY: CONCESSIONARY RATES FOR WELFARE TELEPHONE CALLS

1. Head of PL(SPP)'s minute D/PL(SPP)11/30/3(4308) of 13 December set out details of the welfare telephone service established by both Mercury and BT in the Gulf. The minute explained that the current charges for both systems already included a degree of subsidy allowed by the telephone companies, and it discussed the case for introducing further concessions. It concluded that there was a case for further concessions, but that we should explore, in the first instance, the scope for securing Saudi agreement to their funding the costs of concessions through Host Nation Support arrangements. It is now clear that the Saudis are not prepared to accept this for inclusion under HNS. We therefore need to consider the case for a MOD-funded subsidy.

2. The earlier minute from Head of PL(SPP) set out the arrangements for concessionary telephone charges in other Service locations overseas. The most favourable arrangements are in Namibia, where personnel are allowed a 3 minute call each week at half the normal price; and Northern Ireland, where personnel are able to purchase £10 phone cards for £5, subject to a limit of 2 a month. On grounds of equity, notwithstanding the differences between these deployments, we believe that concession arrangements for the Gulf should not be more generous than those elsewhere.

3. Using the Northern Ireland example as a parallel, therefore, we propose that personnel serving in the Gulf should be allowed a discount amounting to £10 a month on the cost of welfare telephone calls. In practical terms, this would mean that those personnel using the Mercury phone card service, for which £4 cards are currently being sold to give about a 3 minute call (depending on whether cheap or peak time rates apply at the time of the call), should be allowed to buy upto 5 cards a months at a subsidised rate of £2. This arrangement can be implemented through administrative means locally, and the discount system can be fairly easily controlled.

Service men will get

*3 x 3 minute calls (at cheap rate)
each month at half price*

4. Users of the British Telecom "Desert Direct" service, which operates on the basis of reverse charges, would be entitled to reclaim from their Service pay office a rebate of upto £10 a month, on production of copies of telephone bills either in theatre or at their parent unit. Calls made through the Desert Direct service would be separately itemised on quarterly telephone bills.


5. There would be no dual claimants: pay offices will allow the concession on either the Mercury phone cards or the BT bills, but not both. The full cost to MOD can only be estimated at this stage, through a fairly crude calculation. The number of personnel in theatre currently stands at 36,200 and, with a £10 a month discount per head, the monthly cost of MOD would be a maximum of £362,000. Not everyone, of course, will use their full entitlement, for a variety of reasons, and the actual cost is likely to be a degree or two lower. We will continue to press the Saudi Government for inclusion of welfare telephone concessions under HNS, and any success here will be used to replace MOD-funded subsidy arrangements. In the meantime, the Vote Manager has agreed that this liability can be accepted as a charge to the telecoms Vote in support of Op Granby.

Summary

6. HQBFME have made a strong case for concessionary charges on welfare telephone calls, principally on morale grounds, but also in order to bring the arrangements for troops serving in the Gulf into line in broad terms with concessions available in other active overseas theatres. The Saudis have proved reluctant, thus far, to agree to meet the costs of telephone concessions under HNS. A MOD-funded subsidy is therefore considered necessary.

8. There are a number of precedents for arrangements of this type. Northern Ireland represents the most generous example of these, and we believe that a subsidy equivalent to that available in Northern Ireland would be appropriate for Service personnel in the Gulf. A proposal has been formulated, therefore, with HQBFME and JHQ's endorsement, for a £10 a month subsidy to be made from MOD funds for welfare telephone calls. Different arrangements would be required to manage this subsidy, in view of the differences between the operation of the Mercury and BT welfare telephone services, but this does not present insuperable problems. MOD would face a maximum liability of £362,000 a month to fund this subsidy, and the Vote Manager has accepted this as a charge to the telecoms budget in support of Op Granby.

9. Minister(AF) is invited to agree the introduction of a subsidy on these lines.



D A MURTAGH
PL(SPP)B
MB8154 87705MB

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T28/91



SUBJECT
"MASTER
OPS."

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

24 January 1991

Dear Helmut,

As we have discussed, the preliminary stages of the multinational operation to recover Kuwait have continued. Our own forces have played a major part in these operations. I am sure you will appreciate the burden that this has already imposed and the greater costs that we must expect in the coming weeks. We are under no illusions as to the formidable task we face in subduing a force of such size, experience and technical sophistication; the excellent work of the air forces is not yet complete and there will remain a difficult and dangerous period of ground warfare.

When we were deploying out initial ground forces, you generously offered a package of practical assistance which met a number of important short term requirements. Since then, we have been grateful for your Government's prompt response to our more detailed requests for assistance.

The onset of hostilities has substantially increased our costs, which will now have to cover lost equipment and the use of large quantities of ammunition. At the opening of the special debate in the Bundestag on 14 January you spoke of German solidarity with the multinational effort and said that Germany would continue to contribute to international

burdensharing. These words are most welcome, and prompt me to ask if you would be prepared to consider further financial assistance. I appreciate the heavy claims on the Federal budget imposed by the unification of Germany which is in all our interests. I also applaud your efforts to reduce your budget deficit. But a German contribution of DM50 million per month to our costs, with effect from 1 January, would be a great help to us. It would also provide yet another clear demonstration of Europe's unity in responding to Saddam Hussain's aggression.

Yours Sincerely,
John Major

SE Herrn Dr. Helmut Kohl, MdB

KINNOCK MP

31/1



KW

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

a | 24 January 1991

I attach a copy of a letter the Prime Minister has received from Neil Kinnock MP.

I should be grateful for very early advice and a draft Prime Ministerial reply.

CHARLES POWELL

Simon Webb Esq
Ministry of Defence

CCDP
1988



HOUSE OF COMMONS
LONDON SW1A 0AA

The Office of the
Leader of The Opposition

24 January 1991

Dear Prime Minister,

I was grateful for your answer to my question this afternoon which made it clear that the Government is working to improve communications home for our Forces stationed in the Gulf.

In view of the speed with which events are moving, can I urge the Government to reach a decision as quickly as possible? Nobody can be in any doubt that a free phone call home every week - when their duties permit - would be completely justified and of great benefit to our servicemen and women and to their families.

Yours sincerely
Neil Arncliffe

Rt Hon John Major MP
10 Downing Street
London SW1



Simon Webb

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

CD

From the Private Secretary

*Can we pass the Rubik?
Is it unavoidable?
f251.*

24 January 1991

See Richard.

THE GULF

I had a conversation as usual this evening with General Scowcroft. I found him more optimistic about being able to restrain the Israelis. He said there had been a "nasty exchange during the night", but he thought the problem was now taken care of. He hoped to confirm this by tomorrow. It was going to cost the Americans, but it was worth it. This was, of course, predicated on nothing worse happening, e.g., a CW attack.

We agreed that reports from the theatre today were encouraging. I asked whether he foresaw any serious problems over the supply of Patriot missiles. He thought they were holding up pretty well. I mentioned the plea from Bahrain for an extra battery. Scowcroft said the Dutch might be in a position to help, although they did not have the latest missiles.

We had a very similar exchange to that between the CDS and General Powell on the subject of Iraqi aircraft in Iran. He hoped to be able to tell me more tomorrow.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence) and to Sir Robin Butler.

*Your sincerely,
C.D. Powell*

C.D. POWELL

Richard Gozney, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

E. R.
PRIME MINISTER

✓ Weefer.
What did Mr. King say?
f. 261
(1)
CONCESSIONARY TELEPHONE CALLS FOR FORCES IN THE GULF

Mr Kinnock asked today for a free phone call home each week for our forces in the Gulf. He has subsequently written to confirm this request. You said that we were looking into possible schemes.

I attach a note which MOD Ministers have approved. As you will see, it proposes a concessionary scheme, which would give servicemen 5 x 3 minute calls home a month at half price.

The MOD reasoning is that the scheme should not be more generous than the most generous currently in existence, which apply in Namibia and Northern Ireland. In both cases, servicemen get a fixed number of calls a month at half-price.

In the Gulf the discount would work out at £10 per head a month, and would cost the taxpayer £362,000 a month. Efforts to persuade the Saudis to meet this cost have so far failed.

The MOD case seems to me well-founded, and to preserve the principle of parity of treatment with servicemen in other hard-lying posts. The alternative would be to go the whole way and give 5 x 3 minute calls a month free, which would double the cost to £720,000 a month. That is expensive: and the principle that people should pay something for their calls seems sound.

Agree MOD scheme?

or

Prefer MOD to think again and go for free calls?

C.P.?
CHARLES POWELL

24 January 1991

c\foreign\gulf (kw)

Leave 6.30.

①

PRIME MINISTER

THE GULF: TELEPHONE CALLS

You may like to think of telephoning a few Heads of Government over the weekend about the Gulf situation.

5-5.30 Obviously President Bush is the most important. You might telephone him on Sunday, assuming he does not call you before. The evening would be best when you would be back at No 10 with the secure phone.

I don't think either Kohl^x or Mitterrand^x much like being disturbed at the weekend. But you might give Brian Mulroney a call and possibly Jim Bolger in New Zealand.

3/5-45 ✓ Others worth considering are Mr Shamir (if Israel is still showing restraint), President Mubarak, King Hussein and General de la Billiere. 9:15

Post 8pm ✓ It would be best to try to book some of these in advance: and it would help to know what time you are thinking of returning to London on Sunday evening. (You could do Bush, Bolger and Mulroney quite late on Sunday: but, because of the time difference, you would need to do Mubarak, Shamir and de la Billiere earlier in the afternoon, perhaps from your home).

Could you please:

- a. tick those whom you would like to telephone.
- b. indicate roughly what time you are thinking of returning to No 10.

C.D.P.
CHARLES POWELL24 January 1991

c\foreign\phone (kw)



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FCS/91/019

CHIEF SECRETARY

COM 24/i

Aid for Refugees

- will request if required*
1. In my minute of 18 January about my claim on the Reserve for the Diplomatic Wing, I mentioned the possible need for new money for the ICRC and other bodies.
 2. Now that hostilities have begun, I want to have the facility to offer very quickly £10 million (divided equally between the Aid and Diplomatic Wings) in response to two appeals: one by the Interantional Committee of the Red Cross, the other by the humanitarian agencies (UN High Commissioner for Refugees, UN disaster Relief Organisations and the International Organisation for Migration). We would need to make a substantial initial contribution out of the £10 million; the subsequent amounts to be deployed would depend upon the flow of refugees and development in theatre.
 3. There are 1.7 million foreign workers still trapped in Iraq and Kuwait. The humanitarian agencies expect up to 1 million to flee the zone of conflict (as opposed to 850,000 during the first phase in August/September when there were no hostilities). It is obviously difficult to estimate how bad the problem may become. But large numbers of people might be stranded, in winter, in the desert without basic facilities. The media would be there in force. Failure to have made adequate preparation would not be understood and the agencies therefore need to be able to respond quickly. The

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consolidated action plan prepared by UNDRO on behalf of all the agencies plans for assistance to an initial 400,000 refugees fleeing to Jordan, Syria, Iran and Turkey. The eventual numbers and hence the costs could be much higher.

4. UNDRO acting on behalf of the UN High Commisison for Refugees and the International Organisation for Migration has asked for an initial \$175 million (compared to \$60 million for the first phase in August/September). So far UNDRO has received confirmed pledges of \$60 million in rspnse to their appeal, of which Japan has contributed \$38 million. We would be giving £5 million.

5. The ICRC initial appeal for 18 January is for S.Fr 141 million (roughly £58 million). This would cover all their humanitarian assistance whether for refugees or sick or wounded, civilians or POWs. Since we no longer ~~man~~ our Embassy in Baghdad, the ICRC will be acting for us in Iraq as a protecting power seeking to ensure correct treatment for the captured British airmen and future POWs, and also for a British engineer in Iraqi custody. The response to their appeal so far has been limited, even though they have committed two thirds of the identified resources of the Red Cross movement as a whole. They have asked for immediate cash donations.

6. We propose to offer the ICRC £5 million (£5 million is equal to our annual contribution to the ICRC). We have made a series of representations to the ICRC to look after our captured airmen and also to provide medical support for the sick and wounded in the theatre. They will be setting up medical units of up to 1,000 beds. Separately, the ICRC will, like UNDRO, be making a major contribuiton on the humanitarian front to look after

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displaced persons, and indeed help the civilian population of Kuwait once they have access.

7. The picture is more complicated than in August and September, when the aid wing made a contribution of £11 million bilaterally and through the EC. Transport costs have risen dramatically because of war risks insurance etc. The agencies are prepared with a sensible action plan but will need money up front in order to be able to respond fast.

8. Neither wing of the FCO has the resources from which these contributions could be met this year. I outlined the Diplomatic Wing's position in my minute of 18 January. The ODA has responded to the extent possible from within existing country allocations to the intense pressure facing most developing countries as a result of the Gulf crisis. The separate allocation for global disaster relief is now almost exhausted. We announced on 15 January a contribution from this budget of \$1 million to the initial UNDRO appeal to prepare for the flow of Gulf refugees. The ODA now has some £1.5 million left, which I believe we need to reserve to meet unforeseen natural disasters between now and 31 March. Since the beginning of December ODA have provided \$9 million for the relief of famine in Africa, including £2 million Lynda Chalker expects to need to announce in Ethiopia later this month, from within existing resources.

9. The aid programme is fully allocated and we expect to spend the cash limit. While we shall look carefully at our spending forecasts for the final quarter it is therefore unlikely that ODA could find any significant savings towards the cost of contributions to these appeals this year. For these reasons I should be

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grateful for your agreement that £10 million should be made available from the Central Contingency Reserve.

10. I am copying this minute to members of OPD(G) and to Sir Robin Butler.

DH

(DOUGLAS HURD)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

24 January 1991

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10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

A message to
Chancellor Kohl, about
additional financial
help for British
Jewes. The sum —
\$50m a month — is
calculated at 10% of
what they are giving
the Americans.
Agree to sign
C. Dr.



THE LEGAL SECRETARIAT TO THE LAW OFFICERS
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S CHAMBERS
9 BUCKINGHAM GATE
LONDON SW1E 6JP

General enquiries 071-828 7155
Direct line 071-828 1386

CONFIDENTIAL

Richard Gozney, Esq.,
Private Secretary to the Secretary of State for
Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
King Charles Street
London
SW1

24 January 1991

Dear Richard

INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY OF IRAQIS

attached
As agreed at OPD(G), the Attorney General yesterday evening telephoned Dick Thornburgh, the US Attorney General, to discuss the above subject.

The Attorney said that we had been outraged by Iraqi actions in respect both of prisoners of war and the occupation of Kuwait. There had been flagrant breaches of the Geneva Conventions. There had, he knew, been similar outrage in the United States. It was our view, expressed publicly by the Prime Minister, that Iraqis who had perpetrated such deeds should bear individual responsibility. We had noted that President Bush had said the same. This was, however, a difficult subject and there was a need for the members of the Alliance to keep in step, since there was a down-side to each of the available options. Mr. Thornburgh expressed his agreement with this. The Attorney General said the Foreign Secretary would shortly be in contact with Secretary Baker.

The Attorney continued that we would go on referring to the individual responsibility of Iraqis in respect of grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, but would not be drawn into speculating how or where any prosecutions might take place. Every option should be kept open for the present.

Mr. Thornburgh agreed that it was important to keep in close contact. The Justice Department had not made any public comment on the subject. This had been left to the State Department who were in the lead. They had been co-ordinating a position with the FCO and the British Embassy in Washington. Mr. Thornburgh said that the Americans exactly shared the Attorney's analysis. They also shared the sense of outrage and would stress the individual responsibility of Iraqis. But the Americans would



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avoid particularity at this stage. All options should be kept open.

The Attorney said that we proposed to set in hand arrangements to ensure the collection of evidence. Mr.Thornburgh said the US Defence Department was undertaking the same exercise.

The Attorney added that, if Saddam Hussein himself were to meet a nasty end before the war were over, we would not weep for him. If he should offer to withdraw from Kuwait in circumstances which saved us lives, we would not be minded to make his surrender to justice a condition for accepting the offer. Nor would we wish to oppose a settlement which involved his going into exile, provided the terms were acceptable in all other respects. Our thinking was that we should not seem to elevate the criminal trial of Saddam to the position of one of our war objectives. Mr.Thornburgh said the question of the prosecution of Saddam would have to be judged having regard to all the circumstances at the time. This was a matter which would be discussed between the Foreign Secretary and Jim Baker and the State Department. Mr.Thornburgh accepted that political considerations could override the normal principles which he and the Attorney General might apply as prosecutors.

I am copying this letter to Sir Charles Powell, Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence), John Neilson (Department of Energy) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely
Jeremy Hill

P J O HILL



cc: Ross
cc: BP
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB
Telephone 071-21 82111/3

SECRETARY OF STATE

MO 6/17/15/1J

C8024/1

24 January 1991

Copies to : PS/No 10

Press Office, No 10

PS/Lord President

PS/Chancellor of Exchequer

PS/Chief Secretary

PS/Chief Whip

Law Martin

During Defence Questions on Tuesday, I promised to write to you to explain in greater detail the position on the costs of our operations in the Gulf.

When British Forces were first deployed in August, the full daily operating cost was £1M. Successive increments to our commitment, for example the deployment of 7 Armoured Brigade and 4 Mechanised Brigade, have increased this daily cost to about £3.6M. In addition to these costs, there has been a great deal of expenditure of a non-recurring nature on equipment, deployment etc which currently stands at some £650M.

As at 16th January, the full cost of the commitment stood at about £1bn and some of these costs, for example Service pay, are already covered in Defence Estimates. Of the cost not so covered, £480M was recently approved by the House in a Winter Supplementary Estimate. A further sum will be requested from Parliament in a Spring Supplementary Estimate to be presented on 12th February.

A significant amount of weapons and ammunition have been used during the past week's operations, and we have regrettably lost some Tornado aircraft. The estimated value of the aircraft, weapons and ammunition is well over £100M.

Martin O'Neill Esq MP





SECRETARY OF STATE

I am sure you will appreciate that it is impossible to forecast accurately the future costs of the operation as there are so many uncertainties, not least the intensity and duration of the war. I hope, however, that this information will be helpful.

I am copying this letter to Menzies Campbell, and placing a copy in the Library of the House.

2 m

1 m King
Tom King



SECRET

238(A-8)
ceft



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

Telephone 071- 21 82111/3

MO 6/17/15/1S

24 January 1991

Dear Charles,

DEPLOYMENT OF USAF B52 AIRCRAFT TO RAF FAIRFORD

I am writing to alert you to the possibility that the US Government may shortly make a formal request to deploy up to 13 B52 aircraft to RAF Fairford for a significant period during hostilities in the Gulf, and to fly missions direct from RAF Fairford in support of Operation DESERT STORM.

Officials here have been asked by HQ Third US Air Force (HQ 3AF) for guidance on how the UK Government might react to any such request, by what route such a request should formally be made, and what government-to-government agreements might exist to facilitate it.

We have drawn attention to the Churchill-Truman understanding (that the use by US forces of UK bases in an emergency is a matter for joint decision). We have stressed that any formal request to deploy B52 aircraft to the UK for the purposes described above would have to come from the White House to No 10. Also relevant is the 1982 US/UK Agreement on the deployment of B52 aircraft to UK bases in peacetime and TTW/war. This includes a number of restrictions, including a ceiling on the number of B52s normally permitted to deploy to the UK at any one time (seven for peacetime exercise purposes), and the stipulation that the aircraft will be drawn from those not converted to carry air-launched cruise missiles (ALCM), and will have only a conventional capability. Any change of B52 model requires the concurrence of the UK Government. The Agreement also states that use of RAF Fairford in an emergency will be a matter for joint decision by the two Governments in the light of circumstances prevailing at the time - a reference back to the Churchill-Truman understanding.

Sir Charles Powell KCMG
No 10 Downing Street

SECRET



HQ 3AF have advised that any B52s deployed to RAF Fairford would almost certainly be ALCM-capable, simply because the USAF have no non-ALCM-capable B52Ds left in service, and their non-ALCM-capable B52G aircraft are already in the Gulf.

MOD officials have asked for the military rationale for this possible request, but HQ 3AF have no details of the operational missions that B52 aircraft would fly from RAF Fairford, nor the targets they would attack. We have explained that any formal request would need to be very specific in this regard.

HQ 3AF have also been advised that such a request would require very careful political consideration. To conduct US offensive operations direct from the UK would mark a major change in the conduct of the war in the Gulf, and the involvement of aircraft as politically sensitive as B52s would add to the difficulties. But we have left it to the US authorities to decide whether to make the formal request, at the appropriate level.

I am copying this letter to Simon Gass (FCO) and to Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely

(MISS J R BINSTEAD)
Private Secretary

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MS
c. German
file

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

24 January 1991

GULF CRISIS: GERMAN CONTRIBUTION TO BURDEN SHARING

Thank you for your letter of 22 January covering a draft letter to Chancellor Kohl from the Prime Minister asking for a further German contribution to the cost of our forces in the Gulf. The Prime Minister has signed the letter, including the amendments suggested by the Treasury. I enclose it and would be grateful if you could arrange for its delivery as soon as possible.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to John Gieve (HM Treasury) and Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence).

Charles Powell

Simon Gass, Esq.
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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RW

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FM FCO
TO FLASH UKMIS NEW YORK
TELNO 77
OF 242045Z JANUARY 91
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, PARIS, POLAD HIGH WYCOMBE

SIC

SECRETARY OF STATE'S CONVERSATION WITH UN SECRETARY GENERAL

SUMMARY

1. SECRETARY-GENERAL GIVES ACCOUNT OF PEACE INITIATIVES IN THE UN. PREPARING TO APPOINT NEW SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE ON MIDDLE EAST. AGREES TO BE IN TOUCH WITH ANY THOUGHTS ABOUT THE WAY AHEAD IN THE MIDDLE EAST AFTER THE CRISIS.

DETAIL

2. THE SECRETARY OF STATE TELEPHONED PEREZ DE CUELLAR THIS AFTERNOON. PEREZ DE CUELLAR SOUNDED PLEASED TO HAVE BEEN TELEPHONED AND WAS QUITE CHATTY. THE SECRETARY OF STATE BEGAN BY THANKING AND CONGRATULATING HIM FOR HIS EFFORTS OVER THE LAST FEW WEEKS - HE HAD NOT BEEN IN AN EASY POSITION.

3. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL SAID THAT THE MAGHREB COUNTRIES WERE TRYING TO FLOAT A PEACE INITIATIVE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND THERE WOULD BE CONSULTATIONS THAT AFTERNOON. IT WAS NOT CLEAR TO HIM WHAT THE MAGHREBIS WANTED TO DO, ALTHOUGH HE AGREED WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE THAT THEY WERE PROBABLY MOTIVATED BY THEIR DOMESTIC OPINION. AS FAR AS THE SECRETARY GENERAL WAS CONCERNED, THE LIMITS OF ACCEPTABILITY OF AN INITIATIVE WERE SET BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ADDED THAT THE INDIANS HAD BEEN THINKING OF SOME INITIATIVE, BUT HE THOUGHT IT HAD NOW FALLEN AWAY. HE ADDED THAT YOU WERE VERY VIGILANT.

4. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT HE HAD JUST RETURNED FROM TALKS IN PARIS WITH DUMAS. THEY HAD TRIED TO BEGIN THINKING AHEAD TO AFTER THE CRISIS AND HOW, UNDER UN AUSPICES, WE COULD MAKE SOME MOVE FORWARD ON ARAB/ISRAEL. THE LUNCH FOR THE FIVE PERMANENT MEMBERS WHICH THE SECRETARY GENERAL HAD HOSTED IN SEPTEMBER HAD MADE A LITTLE PROGRESS AND THAT CONVERSATION WOULD

HAVE TO BE RESUMED. IF THE SECRETARY GENERAL HAD ANY THOUGHTS ON THE WAY AHEAD IN THE NEXT FEW WEEKS, THEY WOULD BE VERY WELCOME.

5. THE SECRETARY- GENERALLA SIAD THAT HE INTENDED TO APPOINT A NEW SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR THE MIDDLE EAST. THAT WOULD BE A GOOD INDICATION OF A COLLECTIVE WISH TO MOVE AHEAD ON ARAB/ISRAEL. HIS IDEA WAS TO MAKE THE APPOINTMENT IN FEBRUARY, BUT FIRST HE HAD TO FIND THE RIGHT MAN. IT WAS NOT EASY TO FIND SOMEBODY WHO WAS TOTALLY IMPARTIAL AND ACCEPTABLE TO EVERYONE. THEY WOULD ALSO NEED TO HAVE PERSONAL STANDING. HE THOUGHT THAT SOMEONE FROM ONE OF THE NEUTRAL COUNTRIES MIGHT BE THE THING. DID THE SECRETARY OF STATE HAVE ANY IDEAS? THE SECRETARY OF STATE AGREED TO PONDER. HE THOUGHT THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL WAS VERY WISE TO REACTIVATE THE OFFICE.

6. THE SECRETARY GENERAL CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT HE WOULD BE IN TOUCH BY TELEPHONE WITH ANY THOUGHTS ON THE WAY FORWARD AFTER THE CRISIS.

HURD

YYYY

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ADDITIONAL 36

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FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

MY TWO IPTS: SECRETARY OF STATE'S MEETING WITH DUMAS, PARIS,
24 JANUARY: POST-WAR HANDLING OF GULF SECURITY AND ARAB/ISRAEL
SUMMARY

1. The main focus of the meeting. Secretary of State seeks consultations with French and outlines UK ideas - preliminary analysis not a plan. Parallel activity required on Gulf security, Arms Control and Arab/Israel. Mix of security guarantees and CSBMs required. International conference not an immediate option. Difficulty of Palestinian representation. Aim to engage Permanent Five. US/UK/France consultations first.
2. Dumas receptive in principle and agrees broad agenda. Much common ground. Aims French idea for super-conference, encompassing sub-conferences on each major issue.

DETAIL

3. The Secretary of State said that he wanted to begin an exchange with Dumas about post-war planning. He came with some

		preliminary	
ROUTED TO	DATE	ORIGINATOR	TELEPHONE NO
RG5ALD	P OFFICE	C N R PRENTICE	2069
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YF86

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IMMEDIATE

preliminary analysis, not a plan. It was important that France and the UK consult closely. He had not yet explained his ideas to others. He had wanted first to feel his way through the issues with Dumas.

4. The immediate problem was bringing the war to an end with victory. We could not predict the precise circumstances (whether or not Saddam Hussain would remain, for instance). We needed therefore to retain maximum flexibility and not say or do things now which would bind us. We should not now say, for instance, either that the precise moment of Iraqi withdrawal would bring a clear end to the military campaign or that we would not rest until Saddam Hussain was a prisoner or there was a sympathetic government in Baghdad. However the end came, we would need to be able to consult quickly with the French about the immediate security issues.

4. Looking to the future, the Secretary of State said that no coherent ideas were coming from the Arab side. There were two core issues. First, Gulf security. The six Gulf countries had attempted regional cooperation in the Gulf Cooperation Council but this had failed to protect one of their members from invasion. They now talked in nostalgic terms of reverting to previous patterns of reliance on the West, but this would not do. They would need to do more themselves and to bring in others, particularly Egypt.

5. Second, there was Arab/Israel. France had long emphasised that there could be no security in the region without an Arab/Israel settlement. There had been some positive developments, notably the change in policy of the Soviet Union which at least for the moment was holding. It was now possible to imagine the Permanent Five taking on a new role. There had also been negative developments. Israel would be even less willing than before to make concessions. The PLO had backed the wrong side and alienated some of the key Arabs, let alone Israel

or the United States. There was much talk of an international conference but we would not want one which convened only to fail immediately.

6. In conclusion, the Secretary of State said that Gulf security and Arab/Israel were linked but there needed to be action on each in parallel. It would be for France and the UK to steer and guide the discussions among the Twelve on these problems.

7. In reply, Dumas thanked the Secretary of State for raising these issues, and particularly for posing them in this way. He welcomed the prospect of a common endeavour with the UK. The immediate picture contained too many unknowns to construct any clear plan. In the war, French Jaguars had that day bombed Iraq for the first time. The public would react to this as some new departure but in reality it had been long planned. He had no prognosis about the precise end of the war. But it would leave an acute crisis in the region, with public opinion enflamed.

8. Dumas agreed on the problems waiting for solution at the end of the war: the need for arms control, a security regime and a solution on Arab/Israel. Arms control would have to be linked to restraint by suppliers (he commented that he personally had long opposed French arms sales policy to Iraq).

9. On Arab/Israel, Dumas said there had been a false debate about linkage. Of course there was a link. The Palestinian problem was a poison in the region's bloodstream. Neither the Arabs nor Israel were really intent on a settlement. The impetus had to come from outside. But he recognised that an international conference was not an easy option. The French had therefore considered whether some other negotiating technique was available. Given the range of issues needing solution, they had conceived of a super-conference (or congress) as an umbrella under which individual conferences might be convened to tackle each problem. This would be complex and might last for years.

But it would be a means to bring people into contact with each other who otherwise could not meet (eg the restrictions on Knesset members meeting members of the PLO and Arab fears of contacts with Israelis). Such a congress would require long serious preparation.

10. Dumas hoped that the UK might support such an approach. The UK and France needed to take a greater role. The Soviet Union had completely changed its attitude but in reality Moscow was no longer in a position to impose its views in the region. This created a partial void. There was a risk that the United States might feel that they could manage the whole process alone.

11. The Secretary of State said that we had not thought in terms of a super conference, and would need to consider it. Would such a congress function under UN auspices? Dumas said the UN Secretary-General could not be excluded from having a role. The French were not obsessed by the UN but it remained the most practical forum.

12. Dumas half-seriously criticised the other members of the Five. The Chinese were inscrutable and indifferent. The Soviet Union had fallen into complicity with Secretary Baker, and Baker himself had been almost hostile.

13. The Secretary of State said that we had thought of treating Gulf security separately, at least in the first stages. There were two potential approaches. First, military guarantees. Bahrain (wrongly) saw these as the whole answer - the GCC re-organised like the WEU, with Western involvement. Second, CSCE-type CSBMs (conciliation mechanisms, rules for human rights etc). In the Middle East both approaches would eventually be needed. Israel in particular would need guarantees, if she were ever to be persuaded to withdraw from the Occupied Territories. Control of armaments in the region was another objective. To limit arms sales would require cooperation by the Soviet Union,

Western governments and Israel herself. Persuasion of Israel had to be through the US.

14. On Arab/Israel, Palestinian representation remained the core issue. Israel tended to see only an Israel/Arab problem and wanted to exclude the Palestinians. Should our approach be to try to persuade the PLO to make themselves more acceptable or to look for other Palestinians? Baker had tried hard on this. Someone would need to try again. Did it need to be Baker or could others tackle it?

15. Dumas did not answer directly. He criticised past US and Israeli ideas for negotiations which excluded not only the Palestinians but also France and the UK. Shamir had picked minute holes in all the US ideas on Palestinian representation. The Palestinians had come to the end of the concessions they could be expected to offer. The US undoubtedly had to be the principal channel to the Israelis. At an international conference there could not immediately be a PLO representative but there would have to be some Palestinians.

16. The Secretary of State agreed. For success, the US would need to be willing to use its powers of persuasion on Shamir. But after the war Israel might well have earned huge public credit and be strengthened in resisting proposals for progress on Arab/Israel. It was not possible to discuss this now with Secretary Baker. But at some stage the three of them should get together, drawing in their Soviet and perhaps Chinese colleagues only at a later stage.

17. Dumas agreed that sometime the moment would come. He wondered whether there might not be some hope of Israeli flexibility after their direct experience of war. After the destruction of Iraq's military potential there was also no credible Arab menace to Israel left: the threat from Syria was negligible and Libya too distant.



10 DOWNING STREET

✓ Thank.
We spoke about
OPD(G).

Prime Minister

1. I hope you are
feeling better.

2. I am cancelling
OPD(G) : but wait
to hear about Cabinet,
Questions & 1922.

3. I am afraid
we lost another
Tornado last night

C.D.P.

24/1/91



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

CONFIDENTIAL

24 January 1991

*Content - I hate
the necessity of these messages
Dear Charles, 26/1.*

*Prime Minister
Agree to these
two messages?*

Kuwait: Burdensharing

Thank you for your letter of 19 January about the need to get the Kuwaiti Government to contribute financially to the British military effort in the Gulf. I have also seen John Gieve's letter to you of 18 January.

We have not so far pressed the Kuwaitis for a contribution in support of Operation Granby. For obvious reasons they are not in a position to provide host nation support. Our initial view was that we would do better to focus on obtaining a substantial share for British industry of reconstruction contracts after the liberation of Kuwait. In my letter of 11 January, I set out the Foreign Secretary's views on how we might pursue this. We should maintain the effort, to which industry and parliament attach importance. However, an approach to the Amir by no means rules out seeking financial help for our military effort, which would be a bird in the hand. The Foreign Secretary therefore agrees that the Kuwaitis should now be asked to contribute to the costs of Operation Granby.

We agree with you that it would be best to separate the two approaches (which will need to be handled differently at the Kuwaiti end). I therefore enclose two draft messages for the Prime Minister's consideration. The Foreign Secretary would aim to deliver the reconstruction message to a Kuwaiti Minister in London. Failing that, it will be given to the Government-in-exile in Ta'if by Mr Blackley. British industry are keen that the point should be registered soon. The contribution message (which is likely to be the more cashable of the two) might be taken to Ta'if by Mr Weston when he takes up station there at the beginning of February. He should aim to deliver it in person to the Amir.

I am copying this letter to John Gieve (HM Treasury), Simon Webb (MOD) and Sue Bishop (DTI).

Yours ever,

Richard Sney
(R H T Gozney)
Private Secretary

Sir Charles Powell
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

DRAFT MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER
TO THE AMIR OF KUWAIT

At our meeting in Ta'if on 7 January I pledged Britain's help with ^{the} reconstruction of Kuwait. Our companies, which have been very active in the past in Kuwait and are represented all over the Gulf, are ready to participate in reconstruction both in the immediate emergency relief and in the longer term rebuilding of Kuwait's infrastructure. We have now formed a joint government/private sector task force to identify how best we can help you. I know that this will be welcome to you and hope that you will wish to instruct members of your government, particularly those immediately concerned with procurement, to respond positively to this initiative. The opening of a procurement office in London would be a valuable first step. This would match the action your government has taken in Washington. In addition, a general procurement contract issued to the Crown Agents, who have unique, unbiased and varied purchasing experience for overseas governments would be of considerable value in your reconstruction efforts. I trust you will use their services.

A (British representatives will be in touch with your Ministers and officials very soon about how best to follow up this request. One basis might be to agree on guidelines for procurement business based on recent OECD market shares of Kuwaiti imports before the invasion. As the reconstruction programme is likely to double the US share of some 20%, we trust that you would wish to ensure that Britain (with some 10%) received at least similar treatment. We wish to help but need the active guidance and cooperation of your government, particularly in the instruction of US project managers, if we are to do so quickly and effectively.

B) We in the UK are also committed to helping Kuwait to rebuild and develop its defence forces. On January 14, the Head of our Defence Export Services Organisation again visited Ta'if to assure your Foreign Minister and Defence Minister of our determination to assist with your short term defence equipment requirements; and to

convey our intent to play a substantially larger part in fulfilling your future defence equipment needs. In this respect, I trust that you will approve the acquisition of Active Skyflash to exploit the capability of your new F-18 aircraft.

I look forward to receiving Your Highness's views on these matters.

DRAFT MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER
TO THE AMIR OF KUWAIT

As you know from my letter to you of 9 January, I was very glad so soon after my appointment as Prime Minister to have the opportunity to talk to you in Ta'if. I welcomed the opportunity to renew our firm commitment to the liberation of Kuwait and the restoration of its legitimate government. Now, after the refusal of Iraq to comply with the UN Security Council deadline, military action to ^{compel} force her to withdraw from Kuwait has begun.

Shirley
The United Kingdom will be making great sacrifices for the liberation of Kuwait, which I know that you and your government will wish to recognise. The British people would expect nothing less. The despatch to the Gulf of a large contingent of British forces (second in size among Western countries only to the United States contingent) has ^{been} of course been costly: certainly over one billion pounds. ^{action, committed} The commencement of hostilities will now mean a major increase in costs. In the first four days of hostilities alone, losses of aircraft and consumption of ammunition have amounted to over £100 million. This will place a heavy burden on the people of the United Kingdom. It would be a profound gesture if your Government were to make a financial contribution to meeting these costs. *Shirley*
[You have, I believe, made such a gesture to the United States. A similar one to us would demonstrate our joint cooperation and solidarity in the great venture which we have embarked upon. *Shirley*
X You may wish to assist us with an amount which would reflect the fact that British military manpower in the Gulf is some 8% of that of the United States.]

With military operations underway, the day of liberation is surely no longer far off. We shall be making to Your Highness's government proposals for a Status of Forces Agreement, which will cover such host nation support as you are able to provide, when our forces enter Kuwait. Kuwaiti and British forces are acting together. We will not flinch from what needs to be done.

CONFIDENTIAL
FM WASHINGTON
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 230
OF 240150Z JANUARY 91
INFO IMMEDIATE TEL AVIV, RIYADH, ACTOR

OUR TELNO 191: IRAQI ATTACKS ON ISRAEL

1. WE SPOKE AGAIN TO THE NSC (WELCH) ON 23 JANUARY.
2. WELCH CONFIRMED THAT THE PRESIDENT SPOKE TO SHAMIR LATE YESTERDAY (22 JANUARY) TO EXPRESS OUTRAGE AND OFFER CONDOLENCES FOLLOWING THE SCUD ATTACK, AND AGAIN TO URGE ISRAEL NOT TO RETALIATE. WELCH SAID THAT THERE HAD BEEN SOME CONCERN IN THE WHITE HOUSE LAST NIGHT THAT THE ISRAELIS MIGHT THIS TIME FEEL OBLIGED TO RESPOND. BUT WITH THE ISRAELI CABINET MEETING HAVING REACHED NO DECISION, THE CHANCES OF EARLY RETALIATION HAD RECEDED. HE THOUGHT THAT THE LATEST (INTERCEPTED) SCUD ATTACK THIS EVENING SHOULD NOT CAUSE THE ISRAELIS TO REVISE THEIR POLICY, BUT HE REPEATED THAT THERE WERE NO CAST-IRON GUARANTEES.
3. WELCH SAID THAT THE ADMINISTRATION WERE LOOKING FOR WAYS TO INCREASE ISRAELI CONFIDENCE. ONE POSSIBILITY WAS BROADER AND DEEPER BRIEFINGS BY THE US ON ALLIED EFFORTS TO DEAL WITH THE SCUD THREAT, AND A DIRECT REQUEST FOR ISRAELI IDEAS ON WHAT ELSE THE COALITION MIGHT DO TO REMOVE THE THREAT. WELCH CONFIRMED THAT THIS WOULD NOT (NOT) INVOLVE BRINGING THE ISRAELIS IN ON OPERATIONAL PLANNING: HE DESCRIBED IT AS A QUOTE CONSULTATIVE ROLE UNQUOTE.
4. MEANWHILE, KIMMITT TOLD A MEETING OF NATO AMBASSADORS TODAY THAT THE ISRAELIS WERE TAKING THE PUBLIC LINE THAT THEY WOULD HAVE TO RETALIATE FOR IRAQI ATTACKS IN DUE COURSE, BUT NOT YET. KIMMITT NOTED THAT THEY HAD BEEN RESTRAINED. NOTHING SAID BY THE ISRAELI LEADERSHIP, INCLUDING BY ARENS, IMPLIED THAT RETALIATION WAS IMMINENT. THE ISRAELIS OBVIOUSLY HAD TO TAKE CARE, IN ENGINEERING ANY RESPONSE, NOT TO RUN INTO ALLIED FORCES TAKING OFFENSIVE ACTION.
5. KIMMITT ADDED THAT THE AMERICANS STILL BELIEVED THAT ISRAELI RETALIATION WOULD HAVE SOME IMPACT ON THE COALITION. BUT THE FACT THAT THE IRAQIS HAD NOW ATTACKED ISRAEL THREE (NOW FOUR) TIMES WOULD DIMINISH IT. REACTIONS WOULD BE LESS UNFAVOURABLE TOO, IF, AS HE ASSUMED, ANY ISRAELI ACTIONS WERE FOCUSSED RATHER THAN GENERAL. HE NOTED HOWEVER THERE WERE NUMEROUS IMPONDERABLES FOR THE

ISRAELIS TO WEIGH. ISRAEL HAD ALWAYS BEFORE PREFERRED TO ACT WHEN SHE WAS IN FULL CONTROL OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES.

ACLAND

YYYY

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IRAQ/KUWAIT SECRET

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HD/SCD

MR BERMAN (LEGAL ADVISERS)

PS/NO 10 DOWNING ST

SIR P CRADOCK, 10 DOWNING ST

PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE

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MR REEVES CAB OFFICE (VIA H29)

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2



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

Telephone 071- 21 82111/3

MO 6/17/15/1D

23 January 1991

Prime Minister

CDP
24/1

Dear Charles,

OPERATION GRANBY: CASUALTY NOTIFICATION

In the House of Commons on 22 January both the Defence Secretary and the Prime Minister made clear their hope that the media would avoid harassing the families of servicemen reported missing or killed in the Gulf. Both said that names would not be released without the consent of their families.

There are practical arguments in favour of releasing names and in the past it has been the practice to do so without seeking family consent. This ensures not only that the nominated 'next of kin' (who may not be a member of the immediate family) is informed but that other relations and friends receive early notification; it relieves the worry felt by relatives and friends of other servicemen; it eliminates the problems which might arise if the next of kin of servicemen killed in the same incident take different decisions; and it relieves next of kin of a difficult decision at a time of personal stress. In practice, moreover, names are likely to become public sooner or later and in an uncontrolled way even if they are not officially released.

Against this background the Defence Secretary has decided that the best approach would be to tell next of kin that the names will be released (after a short interval (probably six hours or overnight) to allow them to begin to come to terms with their loss) unless they did not wish this to be done. At the same time the reasons for releasing the names, particularly the point that they are likely to become public anyway, will be explained.

Yours sincerely

Janet Binstead

(MISS J R BINSTead)
Private Secretary

Sir Charles Powell KCMG
No 10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL



Jp 01285

SIR CHARLES POWELL

c Sir Robin Butler

R. A. A.
COP
24/1Gulf Hostilities: Non-Terrorist Reaction in Arab and Muslim Countries

There have been demonstrations and rallies in several Middle Eastern and North African countries. Most of these events have been small and have passed off peacefully. In some cases, the demonstrations have been anti-Western rather than pro-Iraqi. There has been some damage to the property of Western and Arab countries in the coalition.

2. In Sudan, the demonstrations seem to have been encouraged by the Government; but there have been no attempts to attack Western Embassies or other interests, or Western citizens. There have been daily demonstrations in Algeria, both in the capital and the provinces, as all political parties try to exploit anti-war feeling for their own political ends. The largest demonstration, organised by the FIS (the main Islamic party), was attended by over 100,000 people. Police protection has been generally effective, although there has been some damage to Western and Kuwaiti property and some attacks on foreigners. In Libya, demonstrators have called for both the cessation of Allied attacks on Iraq and self-determination for the Kuwaitis. These slogans were presumably officially inspired, as they reflect Qadhafi's ambiguous position on the crisis. There has been one report of damage (to Egyptair offices).

3. The Occupied Territories have been kept under strict curfew by the Israeli authorities. There have been reports of a spontaneous demonstration of support for SCUD attacks on Israel by Palestinians in Gaza; but the security forces have been quick to deal with any incidents, which have in any case been minor.



4. In Jordan there is increasing pro-Iraqi sentiment and evidence of anti-Western Islamic fervour. The Jordanian Foreign and Finance Ministers have told our Ambassador of their concern about unrest and have linked this with Jordan's urgent need for economic aid now that trade with Iraq is cut and the border with Saudi Arabia closed. Our Jordanian contacts have spoken of a perceptible increase in popular feeling that the King is not doing enough for Iraq.
5. Saudi Arabia and the other Arab Gulf states have been quiet. Here the population is overwhelmingly supportive of the Allied action, although there have been reports of a few isolated incidents involving Palestinians, as well as the arrest of a few young Islamic zealots in Saudi Arabia.
6. The other Arab coalition states have also remained quiet. In Egypt some opposition groups and intellectuals have been vociferously critical of Mubarak's policy. But there have been no reports of demonstrations or disturbances in Egypt, even in the potential trouble spots of the university campuses and fundamentalist mosques. Damascus, where the security presence has been strengthened, is reported to be calm. (We have no reports of the situation in other parts of Syria.) In Morocco, there is widespread hostility to the Allied action among political parties and the public, although King Hassan may have gone some way to defusing tension by announcing in a speech that the expression of dissenting views would be allowed, within limits set by him. But the current calm may be fragile: in one incident, two French citizens were stabbed to death by a Moroccan, following an argument over the Gulf.
7. There have been demonstrations in several countries with large Muslim communities outside the Middle East and North Africa. These have generally been small and peaceful. In Bangladesh, there has been at least one anti-



Saddam demonstration. In Nigeria, there have been no demonstrations or disturbances since the outbreak of hostilities; but the authorities remain concerned about the possibility of disorder, especially in Kaduna.

8. The situation in Pakistan gives ground for particular concern, as opposition parties, religious parties in the Government coalition, part of the armed forces, and a majority of the public, are opposed to Government support for the Allies. The Prime Minister has called for an immediate end to hostilities. There have been threats to British companies. Anti-US demonstrations have taken place in all major cities. These have, however, been well controlled by the authorities. And there is no indication of wavering in Government support for the deployment of troops to Saudi Arabia.

Outlook

9. The reaction of Arabs and other Muslims to hostilities has been subdued so far. But Iraq has issued calls for them to rise up in protest. And this Friday's prayers may provide a rallying point for hitherto unfocused feelings. The situation is likely to deteriorate if hostilities are prolonged; and certainly would do so, were Israel to retaliate for Iraqi attacks.

PERCY CRADOCK

23 January 1991

OUT TELEGRAM

SUBJECT CC MASTER
OP

Classification CONFIDENTIAL		Caveat		Precedence DESKBY	
ZCZC		1 ZCZC			
TC		2 CONFIDENTIAL			
CAVEAT		3			
FM		4 FM FCO			
TO		5 TO DESKBY NEXT CONTACT MOSCOW			
TELNO		6 TELNO			
OF		7 OF 231000Z JANUARY 1991			
AND TO		8			
		9 INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, PARIS, BONN, UKDEL NATO, RIYADH			
		10 INFO PRIORITY TEL AVIV, CAIRO, ACTOR			
		11			
		12 THE GULF: MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT GORBACHEV			
		13			
		14 1. Gorbachev's further message on the Gulf was delivered to			
		15 No.10 Downing Street on 18 January. Text in MIFT.			
		16 2. Grateful if you could convey the following reply from the			
		17 Prime Minister:			
		18 Begins			
		19 Dear President Gorbachev			
		20 Thank you for your further message on the Gulf, which I received			
		21 on 18 January.			
		22 I entirely share your concern about Iraq's missile attacks			
		23 against Israel. Iraq has no conceivable justification for these			
		24 indiscriminate attacks against civilian targets. We have			
		25 encouraged Israel to exercise restraint and avoid retaliation,			
///		26 and so far that has been the case. But Israel has the right to			
//		27 self-defence: and I have to say that in the event of further			
/		28 attack - and reports of one have just come in - it would be very			
		29 hard indeed to hold Israel back. Iraq's motives are			
YYYY		Catchword: /transparent			
MAIN		File number FF2AAD	Dept SOVIET	Drafted by (Block capitals) R H N JOY	Telephone no 270-2413
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CONFIDENTIAL

Precedence
DESKBY

transparent: a wish to draw Israel into the conflict and distract attention from the real issue of its own invasion of Kuwait. I hope that you will continue to do everything in your power to dissuade Iraq from pursuing these attacks, and indeed all attacks on its neighbours: and to bring home to Saddam Hussain that he BEGIN UNDERLINE must END UNDERLINE withdraw all his forces from Kuwait if there is to be a ceasefire.

Yours sincerely

John Major

Ends

HURD

YYYY

MAIN

IRAQ/KUWAIT

NNNN



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

23 January 1991

Dear Charles,

Message from the President of Cyprus

/ I enclose a letter from President Vassiliou of
Cyprus expressing his support for our and other allied
/ forces' action in the Gulf and his best wishes for a
successful outcome. I enclose a draft reply from the
Prime Minister, which we would ask the High Commission
to deliver if you wished.

Yours ever,

Christopher Prentice

(C N R Prentice)
Private Secretary


Sir Charles Powell KCMG
10 Downing Street

DRAFT LETTER FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT
VASSILIOU OF CYPRUS

Thank you for your kind message of support for British and other allied forces' efforts in the Gulf in support of the UN Security Council resolutions on the Iraqi invasion and occupation of Kuwait. I look forward with you to a successful outcome with the minimum loss of life.

Like you I also hope that upholding UN resolutions will strengthen the authority of the United Nations in dealing with the ~~tragic~~ situation in Cyprus. The UN has, and will continue to have, our active support ^{for} this ~~endeavour~~. ^{for}

OK





With Compliments

Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany

London



Mit besten Empfehlungen

Botschaft der Bundesrepublik Deutschland

London

Klaus Klaiter

Statement by Federal Chancellor Dr Helmut Kohl
to the press on war in the Gulf (Jan 23, 1991)

I

The news of a renewed Iraqi missiles attack on residential areas in Israel has been received by us Germans with deep anger and dismay. This brutal act of terror has taken its toll of dead and many injured. We mourn and suffer with them, our feelings are with their families.

This latest missiles attack is the third time Iraq has tried to provoke Israel into getting involved in the military conflict in the Gulf. It is a clear aggression against Israel's integrity and right of existence for the safeguard of which we Germans feel a particular responsibility. In these difficult times our total solidarity is with Israel.

That is why, in preparation of the first cabinet meeting of the new Federal Government, last week-end I was agreed with the members of government concerned to set a signal of German-Israeli solidarity.

Today we decided that Foreign Minister Genscher and Minister Spranger will go to Israel on behalf of the Federal Government as soon as possible. They will do so also as representatives of their parties and will be accompanied by Secretary General Rühle.

This morning I invited SPD-Chairman Vogel to send along a representative of the SPD.

Herr Dr Vogel told me that he himself intends to go to Israel, together with Herr Koschnik, for talks with Mr Peres' Labour-Party.

I expressly welcomed this intention.

Federal Minister Genscher will convey my personal message to the Prime Minister of the state of Israel.

On this occasion, the Federal Government will grant to the Israeli Government immediate humanitarian aid amounting to 250 million Deutschmarks.

II

President Saddam Hussein of Iraq, who alone is responsible for the war in the Gulf, is stubbornly refusing to withdraw, in accordance with the clear will of the community of nations, his troops from Kuwait.

It is in his hands alone to stop the military conflict immediately by finally abiding by the United Nations' resolutions.

Sadly there has been no indication so far that the aggressor Saddam Hussein is prepared to yield.

The barbaric parading of obviously maltreated allied prisoners of war in the media and the instigation of world-wide terror cannot

be seen but as evidence of Saddam Hussein's intention to escalate the war and preparedness to break elementary rules of international law in the process.

In this struggle of the community of nations to restore peace and to implement international law we stand in solidarity with our partners and allies. Their armed forces bear the brunt. Our American, British, French and Italian friends should know: We side with them and will continue to do so.

III

Let me add a word on the demonstrations presently being staged in Germany.

I can well understand if people, driven by their concern for peace, take to the streets and demonstrate. But I have no understanding whatsoever for such actions turning against the United States who on behalf of the United Nations is defending international law in the Gulf.

The aggressor is Saddam Hussein: He attacked a defenceless neighbour and keeps brutally oppressing it to the present day. He is attacking Israel with missiles. We mourn for all victims of this terrible war, but - I repeat it -: the responsibility for this war lies with Saddam Hussein alone.

Demonstrations against such brutal violation of international law are called for - and whoever is demonstrating today must let themselves be asked where they were on 2nd August, the day Kuwait was assaulted.

The allies from the five continents, first of all the United States, are carrying out a task set by the community of nations. They fight a unscrupulous dictator so that all of us - including the Germans - shall be able to live in a more peaceful world tomorrow. They make sacrifices and in this hour I in particular think of the soldiers and their families.

I am dismayed at some demonstrators' moral indifference, the gross perversion of facts and the intentional whipping up of emotions.

I deem it a blatant perversion when some people proclaim their so-called "love of peace" by committing acts of violence. There is no justification for this kind of excess. I condemn it most emphatically.

Peace can prosper permanent and secure only on the basis of law and justice.

We all wish for this war - and the suffering of the people involved- to be terminated as soon as possible.

The Federal Government, together with its partners and allies, will continue to do everything in its power to contribute to this aim.



Der Bundeskanzler
der Bundesrepublik Deutschland

7 L Pol

Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung

23. Januar 1991

Nr. 26/91

Es gilt das gesprochene Wort.

E r k l ä r u n g

von

Bundeskanzler Dr. Helmut Kohl

vor der Presse

in Bonn am 23. Januar 1991

I.

Die Nachricht von dem erneuten Raketenangriff des Irak auf Wohngebiete in Israel erfüllt uns Deutsche mit tiefer Empörung. Dieser brutale Akt des Terrors hat Tote und viele Verletzte gefordert. Ihnen gelten unsere Trauer und unsere Anteilnahme, ihren Angehörigen unser Mitgefühl.

Dieser jüngste Raketenangriff ist der dritte Versuch des Irak, Israel zu provozieren, um es in die militärischen Auseinandersetzungen am Golf hineinzuziehen. Es ist ein klarer Anschlag auf die Unversehrtheit und auf das Lebensrecht Israels, für das wir Deutsche eine besondere Verantwortung haben. Unsere ganze Solidarität in diesen schweren Tagen gilt Israel.

Am vergangenen Wochenende habe ich daher bei der Vorbereitung der ersten Kabinettsitzung der neuen Bundesregierung mit den zuständigen Regierungsmitgliedern vereinbart, ein Zeichen der Solidarität zwischen Deutschland und Israel zu setzen.

Heute haben wir beschlossen, daß die Bundesminister Genscher und Spranger im Auftrag der Bundesregierung so bald wie möglich nach Israel reisen. Sie tun dies zugleich als Vertreter ihrer Parteien und werden von Generalsekretär Rühle begleitet.

Ich habe heute früh den SPD-Vorsitzenden Vogel eingeladen, daß sich ein Repräsentant der SPD an dieser Reise beteiligt.

Herr Dr. Vogel hat mir bei dieser Gelegenheit mitgeteilt, daß er selber die Absicht hat, zusammen mit Herrn Koschnick zu Gesprächen mit der Arbeiterpartei nach Israel zu fahren.

Ich habe dieses Vorhaben ausdrücklich begrüßt.

Bundesminister Genscher wird dem Ministerpräsidenten des Staates Israel eine persönliche Botschaft von mir überreichen.

Die Bundesregierung wird bei dieser Gelegenheit der Regierung Israels eine humanitäre Soforthilfe in Höhe von 250 Millionen DM zur Verfügung stellen.

- 2 -

II.

Der Präsident des Irak, Saddam Hussein, der allein den Krieg am Golf zu verantworten hat, weigert sich hartnäckig, gemäß dem eindeutigen Willen der Völkergemeinschaft seine Truppen aus Kuwait zurückzuziehen.

Er hat es allein in der Hand, die militärischen Auseinandersetzungen sofort zu beenden, indem er die Resolutionen der Vereinten Nationen endlich befolgt.

Leider gibt es bis zur Stunde keinen Hinweis darauf, daß der Aggressor Saddam Hussein zum Einlenken bereit ist.

Die barbarische Vorführung offensichtlich mißhandelter alliierter Kriegsgefangener vor den Medien und die Aufforderung zu weltweitem Terror können nur als Zeichen verstanden werden, daß Saddam Hussein den Krieg eskalieren will und nicht davor zurückschreckt, dabei elementare Regeln des Völkerrechts zu brechen.

In diesem Kampf der Völkergemeinschaft um die Wiederherstellung des Friedens und um die Durchsetzung des Völkerrechts stehen wir solidarisch zu unseren Partnern und Verbündeten. Ihre Streitkräfte tragen die Hauptlast. Unsere amerikanischen, britischen, französischen und italienischen Freunde sollen wissen: Wir stehen zu Ihnen und werden das auch künftig tun.

III.

Lassen Sie mich ein Wort zu den Demonstrationen sagen, die gegenwärtig in Deutschland stattfinden:

Ich kann gut verstehen, wenn Menschen aus Sorge um den Frieden auf die Straße gehen und demonstrieren. Ich habe aber überhaupt kein Verständnis dafür, wenn sich solche Aktionen gegen die Vereinigten Staaten wenden, die am Golf im Auftrag der Vereinten Nationen das Völkerrecht verteidigen.

Der Aggressor ist Saddam Hussein: Er hat ein wehrloses Nachbarland überfallen und hält es bis zum heutigen Tag auf grausame Weise unterdrückt. Er greift mit Raketen Israel an. Wir trauern um alle Opfer dieses schrecklichen Krieges, aber - ich wiederhole es -: Die Verantwortung für diesen Krieg trägt allein Saddam Hussein.

Demonstrationen gegen solche brutale Vergewaltigungen des Völkerrechts sind angebracht - und wer heute demonstriert, muß sich fragen lassen, wo er am 2. August, am Tag des Überfalls auf Kuwait, war.

Die Verbündeten aus allen Kontinenten, allen voran die Vereinigten Staaten, erfüllen einen Auftrag der Völkergemeinschaft. Sie kämpfen gegen einen skrupellosen Diktator, damit wir alle - auch wir Deutschen - morgen in einer friedlicheren Welt leben können. Sie bringen Opfer und ich denke in dieser Stunde besonders an die Soldaten und ihre Angehörigen.

Bei manchen Demonstranten bestürzen mich die moralische Gleichgültigkeit, die krasse Verdrehung der Tatsachen und das bewußte Aufpeitschen von Emotionen.

Für eine regelrechte Perversion halte ich es, wenn einige ihre angebliche "Friedensliebe" mit Gewalttaten bekunden. Für solche Ausschreitungen kann es keine Rechtfertigung geben. Ich verurteile sie mit aller Entschiedenheit.

Friede kann dauerhaft und verläßlich nur auf dem Boden von Recht und Gerechtigkeit gedeihen.

Wir alle wünschen uns, daß dieser Krieg - und damit auch die Leiden der hiervon betroffenen Menschen - so schnell wie möglich beendet wird.

Die Bundesregierung wird weiterhin - zusammen mit ihren Partnern und Verbündeten - alles tun, um dazu ihren Beitrag zu leisten.

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AND TO DESKBY 232350Z CABINET OFFICE

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SIC

OUR TELNO 206: IRAQ/KUWAIT: WASHINGTON SITREP

SUMMARY

1. SLIGHT DISAPPOINTMENT THAT - DESPITE OBVIOUS SUCCESSES - THE ALLIED BOMBING CAMPAIGN AGAINST IRAQ DOES NOT APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN AS SUCCESSFUL AS EARLY PENTAGON COMMENTS SUGGESTED.

DETAIL

2. THE MAIN STORY ON 23 JANUARY HAS BEEN THAT - WITH BETTER WEATHER IN THE GULF - MORE DETAILED ASSESSMENTS OF THE IMPACT OF ALLIED BOMBING HAS PROVED POSSIBLE. THE SENSE IS THAT, WHILE THE ALLIED ATTACKS HAVE HAD SIGNIFICANT SUCCESSES, EARLIER PENTAGON CLAIMS THAT ALLIED STRIKES WERE AROUND 80 PER CENT EFFECTIVE WERE OVERBLOWN.

3. CHENEY TOLD THE PRESS TODAY (23 JANUARY) THAT, WHILE THE ALLIED BOMBING MISSIONS WERE GOING WELL, IRAQ STILL RETAINED A SIGNIFICANT MILITARY CAPABILITY. HE REPEATED THAT, ALTHOUGH SADDAM MIGHT HAVE MORE SURPRISES IN STORE, THEY WOULD NOT CHANGE THE BASIC COURSE OF THE CONFLICT: AND SADDAM WOULD BE DEFEATED. BUT THE OVERALL IMPRESSION WHICH CHENEY LEFT WAS THAT A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME WAS STILL SOME WAY AWAY.

4. GENERAL POWELL CONFIRMED TODAY THAT CONSIDERABLE DAMAGE HAD BEEN INFLICTED ON IRAQI CBW PRODUCTION FACILITIES, BUT HE ADMITTED THAT IRAQ STILL RETAINED A CHEMICAL WEAPONS STOCKPILE. HE ALSO ADMITTED THAT THE COALITION WERE NOW SWITCHING AIR POWER FROM ATTACKS ON IRAQI AIR FIELDS TO STRIKES AGAINST THE REPUBLICAN GUARDS. MANY SEE THIS AS TACIT ADMISSION THAT THE ALLIED FORCES CANNOT HOPE TO KEEP IRAQI AIR FIELDS OUT OF ACTION FOR LONG (GIVEN THE SPEED WITH WHICH THE IRAQIS SEEM ABLE TO PATCH THEM UP) AND THAT THE ALLIED EFFORT IS BETTER SPENT ELSEWHERE.

5. THERE IS AN INCREASINGLY WIDESPREAD PUBLIC PERCEPTION THAT

SADDAM HUSSEIN IS PLAYING A WAITING GAME, HUSBANDING HIS STRENGTH IN PREPARATION FOR THE GROUND BATTLE, WITH THE INTENTION OF INFLICTING SUFFICIENT CASUALTIES TO GIVE THE US AND ITS ALLIES PAUSE. THERE IS ALSO SPECULATION IN THE MEDIA THAT US WAR AIMS MAY BE CHANGING, IN THE LIGHT OF THE USE OF SCUDS AGAINST CIVILIANS AND SADDAM'S PUBLIC ABUSE OF PRISONERS OF WAR. COMMENTATORS ARGUE THAT, WHILE THE LIMITED PUBLIC GOAL OF FORCING IRAQI WITHDRAWAL FROM KUWAIT HAD BEEN NECESSARY AT THE TIME OF ASSEMBLING THE COALITION, THE OVERTHROW OF SADDAM AND THE DESTRUCTION OF HIS MILITARY CAPABILITIES WERE NOW LEGITIMATE OBJECTIVES. BUT KIMMITT AT A BRIEFING OF NATO AMBASSADORS TODAY CONTINUED TO STRESS THAT THE US HAD NO HIDDEN OBJECTIVES. PARAMETERS WERE DEFINED BY THE UNSCRS, ALTHOUGH HE WOULD NOT DEAL WITH THE QUESTION OF WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF SADDAM HUSSEIN REFUSED TO SURRENDER EVEN IF DRIVEN OUT OF KUWAIT. THIS POSSIBILITY WOULD AUTOMATICALLY EXTEND COALITION OBJECTIVES.

6. INTENSE CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN THE ADMINISTRATION AND THE ISRAELIS CONTINUE FOLLOWING RECENT SCUD ATTACKS. AFTER EARLY FEARS THAT THE STRIKE ON 22 JANUARY SEEMED BOUND TO PROVOKE AN ISRAELI RESPONSE, THE VIEW HERE IS THAT THE ISRAELIS ARE AGAIN LIKELY TO STAY THEIR HAND. MEANWHILE THE MEDIA CONTINUE TO RUN STORIES TO THE EFFECT THAT ISRAEL WILL PRESS THE ADMINISTRATION FOR SOME DOLLARS 13 BILLION ADDITIONAL AID (PARA 6 OF TUR) IN RETURN FOR THEIR CONTINUED RESTRAINT. THE STATE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN ADMITTED ON 23 JANUARY THAT THE ISRAELI FINANCE MINISTER HAD DISCUSSED ISRAELI AID REQUIREMENTS WITH EAGLEBURGER IN TEL AVIV. SHE ADDED THAT EAGLEBURGER HAD MADE NO COMMITMENT AND THAT STATE HAD NOT YET RECEIVED A FULL REPORT OF HIS MEETING. KIMMITT TOLD NATO AMBASSADORS THAT THE STORIES OF THIS KIND OF TRADE OFF WERE INACCURATE, AND THAT THERE WERE NO FIRM DEALS WITH THE ISRAELIS.

7. THE DEBATE ON ALLIED BURDENSARING CONTINUES (PARA 5 OF OUR TELNO 148). THE WHITE HOUSE CONFIRMED THAT THE PRESIDENT SPOKE TO CHANCELLOR KOHL ON 22 JANUARY TO DISCUSS THE GULF AND RAISED BURDENSARING. BUSH DID NOT MAKE A SPECIFIC REQUEST, BUT EMPHASISED THAT BURDENSARING WAS IMPORTANT.

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AMMAN TELNO 91: US/JORDAN: ARMITAGE VISIT

SUMMARY

1. ARMITAGE UNDERLINES TO KING HUSSEIN THAT THE PRESIDENT HAS NOT GIVEN UP ON JORDAN, AND URGES MILITARY RESTRAINT. CORDIAL DISCUSSIONS BUT NO BREAKTHROUGHS.

DETAIL

2. ARMITAGE ARRIVED BACK IN WASHINGTON LATE YESTERDAY (22 JANUARY). HE IS DUE TO DEBRIEF KIMMITT TODAY AND THE PRESIDENT TOMORROW. WE HAVE OBTAINED AN INITIAL READOUT FROM STATE.

3. STATE SAID THAT ARMITAGE HAD CARRIED TWO MESSAGES. THE FIRST WAS THAT THE PRESIDENT MEANT WHAT HE SAID ABOUT JORDAN IN HIS 18 JANUARY PRESS CONFERENCE. HE WAS NOT GOING TO WRITE OFF JORDAN. HE HAD A LONG-STANDING RELATIONSHIP WITH KING HUSSEIN. HE RECOGNISED THAT THE KING WAS IN A DIFFICULT POSITION. DIFFERENCES HAD OPENED UP BETWEEN THE US AND JORDAN OVER THE GULF CRISIS BUT HE WANTED TO GET THE RELATIONSHIP BACK ON TRACK. HE BELIEVED THAT JORDAN HAD AN IMPORTANT ROLE TO PLAY IN THE REGION.

4. STATE SAID THAT THE KING AND HIS ADVISERS HAD INITIALLY BEEN SUSPICIOUS THAT ARMITAGE HAD COME EITHER TO BERATE THE JORDANIANS FOR THEIR PERFORMANCE DURING THE GULF CRISIS OR TO PROPOSE A SPECIFIC DEAL ON US SUPPORT FOR JORDAN IN RETURN FOR AN ASSIGNED JORDANIAN ROLE ON THE GULF AND THE ARAB/ISRAEL PEACE PROCESS. WHEN THEY SAW THAT THIS WAS NOT THE CASE, THE EXCHANGES WERE FRIENDLY AND RELAXED.

5. ARMITAGE'S SECOND POINT WAS TO URGE JORDAN NOT TO GET INVOLVED IN THE MILITARY CONFLICT. HE POINTED OUT THAT THE ADMINISTRATION WERE WORKING HARD TO KEEP ISRAEL OUT. THE MILITARY SUPPORT GIVEN TO ISRAEL IN THE LAST FEW DAYS (PATRIOT BATTERIES, NAVAL PRESENCE IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN) WAS DESIGNED TO HELP IN THIS. IT WAS IN JORDAN'S INTEREST AS MUCH AS ISRAEL'S TO STAY OUT. THE JORDANIAN RESPONSE HAD BEEN THAT IF ISRAELI (OR ANY OTHER) AIRCRAFT TRIED TO OVERFLY JORDAN THEY WOULD HAVE TO RESPOND. THE SAME WENT FOR A LAND INCURSION.

THEY DID NOT, HOWEVER, HAVE THE CAPABILITY TO RESPOND TO A MISSILE OVERFLIGHT.

6. STATE SAID THAT ARMITAGE HAD NOT CARRIED ANY OFFER OF ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE (NOR, SO FAR AS THEY WERE AWARE, HAD THE JORDANIANS MADE A SPECIFIC REQUEST). NOR HAD HE OFFERED ANY GUARANTEES ON MILITARY ASSISTANCE IF THE REGIME CAME UNDER THREAT.

COMMENT

7. OUR IMPRESSION IS THAT THE PRESIDENT FIRMLY BELIEVES THAT KING HUSSEIN SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO GO UNDER AND, IN EXTREMIS, THE ADMINISTRATION WILL DO WHAT THEY CAN TO AVOID THIS HAPPENING. BUT THE ADMINISTRATION SEEM TO THINK THAT WE ARE STILL SOME WAY FROM THAT POINT. MEANWHILE, IN THE LIGHT OF JORDANS EQUIVOCAL (OR WORSE) POSITION ON THE GULF CRISIS (AND PARTICULARLY THE CONTINUING VESTIGES OF JORDANIAN/IRAQI MILITARY COOPERATION), THE ADMINISTRATION CONTINUES TO HOLD BACK ON FURTHER DIRECT SUPPORT.

8. WE SHALL TRY TO OBTAIN A FURTHER READOUT ONCE ARMITAGE HAS DEBRIEFED THE PRESIDENT.

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PAGE 2

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Prime Minister



One or two

charts & diagrams

which you may

find of interest.


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SCUD LAUNCHES AGAINST ISRAEL - 17/18 JAN 91



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
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
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


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
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


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
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
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
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
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10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

23 January 1991

THE GULF: NEW ZEALAND HELP

Thank you for your letter of 23 January enclosing a message from the Prime Minister to the New Zealand Prime Minister. This has crossed with the letter from the New Zealand Prime Minister which I sent you. Before despatching the message, are there any additional points arising from Mr Bolger's letter which ought to be taken into account?

Charles Powell

Simon Gass Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

ack



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

23 January 1991

Dear Charles,

The Gulf : New Zealand Help

The New Zealand Cabinet decided on 21 January to send additional medical units, comprising 20 people, to the multinational force in the Gulf. The units will be attached to the British forces there. This decision has been presented in New Zealand as a direct response to a British request. The New Zealand Prime Minister, Mr Bolger, has taken the lead in handling the matter.

Our High Commissioner in Wellington, David Moss, has recommended that the Prime Minister send a message to Mr Bolger to thank him for this additional commitment. This would go down well in New Zealand and would help to encourage Mr Bolger's Government to make a more positive commitment to collective security than the last New Zealand Government. We support Mr Moss's recommendation. I enclose a draft text for a message from the Prime Minister.

Yours ever,
S L Gass

(S L Gass)
Private Secretary

Sir Charles Powell KCMG
10 Downing Street

DRAFT MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO THE NEW ZEALAND
PRIME MINISTER

QUOTE

I was very glad to hear of your Government's decision to send an additional twenty military medical personnel to serve with the British forces in the Gulf. Your people will find a warm welcome from the British forces in the field and we will make sure they receive all necessary support and back-up in the Gulf. Thank you very much for this new contribution which shows the importance which New Zealand places on upholding the authority of the United Nations.

UNQUOTE



23(a-c)

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Telephone 071- 21 82111/3

MO 6/17/15/1D

23 January 1991

Dear Charles,

REPORT FROM RIYADH

The Defence Secretary's colleagues might find it useful to see the attached report from Commanders on Operations today in the Gulf.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries to members of OPD(G) and to Sir Robin Butler.

Yours sincerely

Janet Binstead

(MISS J R BINSTead)
Private Secretary

Sir Charles Powell KCMG
No 10 Downing Street

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HAS = Hardened Aircraft Structures
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THE VIEW FROM RIYADH 231730Z JAN 91


1. As highlighted in earlier reports Commanders in theatre have been reviewing the weight and emphasis of the air campaign in light of the way the Iraqi Air Force has reacted so far. Gen Horner is developing a strategy to target HAS on those Iraqi airfields to which intelligence reveals that the Air Force has decamped. This requires the use of precision guided munitions, ie in the case of the UK, laser guided bombs. Gen Horner has made it clear to AVM Wratten that he would welcome the addition of a UK capability to carry out this type of precision task stating that it would make a significant contribution to his plan. Our laser designation capability would also be used against other key targets in the land campaign.

2. The weather over Iraq and Kuwait has been much better today and battle Damage assessment reports should therefore be more timely and comprehensive. Steady progress has been made against the aim of causing attrition to ground force logistics. UK Jaguars have been in action with F-16's against ammunition dumps and also provided support for surface search aircraft as the USN continued its clearance of oil platforms in the Northern Gulf. Much more air power has been brought to bear on ground forces in the KTO particularly by A10s and F16s using smart weapons. F117A, by night, and F111, by day, have continued the policy of HAS destruction. There has been no sign of Iraqi air force activity except for reports of at least 8 combat capable aircraft and 2 further transport aircraft flying towards Iran. The intelligence community is looking into this. French Jaguars ran into serious AAA while carrying out attacks in the KTO; no losses have been reported but one pilot returned with a serious head wound. You will have seen that a US F16 was damaged over Kuwait but the pilot ejected safely over the Gulf and was picked up within the hour. In theatre there is no feel for how the Israelis will behave after last night's SCUD attack.

3. UK air operations overnight are set out below. They will be supported by the usual Tornado F3 CAP and Tankers. Tornado GR1s will be targeted against airfields and Army Barracks.

- a. Tabuk. One group of 8 and one of 3 GR1s. The former will link up with.....
- b. Dhahran. 8 GR1s. There will also be 2 GR1A recce flights.
- c. Muharrag. 1 raid of 8 GR1s.

4. The assessment of Commanders in theatre is that if Saddam Hussein is unable to restore his degraded command and control systems within the next two to three weeks and finds, therefore, that his fighting capability is seriously undermined he may resort to the use of Chemical Weapons against Israel/Saudi Arabia or to worldwide terrorist operations.



D G LITTLEJOHNS
Cdre
PSO/CDS
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POINTS FOR OPD(G)

- Israeli retaliation
- Cheney/Powell briefings: disparities in US/UK presentation?
- Loss of Tornado
- Baby milk factory
- Alleged presence of Soviet Advisers
- Financial assistance: Japan/Germany
- Involvement of German firms in supplying chemicals
- Royal Yacht Britannia
- Insurance premiums for servicemen

cc R/Up



Ref. AO91/193

PRIME MINISTER

cc Sir Percy Cradock
Mr Appleyard

OPD(G): 24 January

Item 1: Current military situation

You may wish to invite the Chief of the Defence Staff to report on the progress of the air campaign in the light of the discussions between theatre commanders on a change of tactics.

2. The Defence Secretary will be circulating later this evening a minute recommending the deployment of a small number of aircraft with a laser designation capability, probably Buccaneers. The purpose is to illuminate specific targets which Tornados or Jaguars can attack using laser guided bombs. This will significantly enhance the RAF's precision bombing capability and will be welcomed by the US Commander. The aircraft will require modification so that they will not be available for some days. You may wish to approve the deployment.

3. The Defence Secretary may also mention the repatriation of bodies. The established policy is for fatal casualties to be buried temporarily in-theatre for subsequent full burial there or repatriation. It will be impossible in practice and undesirable in presentational terms to repatriate a significant number of casualties (if they occur). However, a sergeant has been killed in a road accident and on this occasion his body will be repatriated but will not mean that the overall policy will be changed. The Defence Secretary intends to mention this issue in case it is taken up in the House or in the press.

Item 2: Current international situation

4. You might ask the Foreign Secretary, who will be leaving after Cabinet for Paris, to report. By then of course it should be clear whether there will be Israeli retaliation, though



further Iraqi missile attacks could have taken place during the night. It may also be clearer whether there will be informal consultations in the UN Security Council which is scheduled for later tomorrow.

5. Mr Hogg is seeing the ICRC today to talk about British POWs. You might ask the Foreign Secretary whether there has been any progress in securing access to them.

Item 3: Media handling

6. You might invite the Energy Secretary to report on the broad picture and also on arrangements for Ministerial and backbencher representation on weekend programmes.

7. You might then invite Mr O'Donnell to report on day-to-day issues and to say whether the change of tone and emphasis agreed at OPD(G) earlier today has been reflected in reporting in tomorrow's coverage. You might ask him how he sees the message for the weekend press. It will be important to strike the right note of prudent confidence.


Weekend meetings

8. You may wish to indicate whether you envisage any meetings at the weekend (no OPD(G) on Friday) in the normal course of events, unless there are major developments.

Sonia Phippard

PP ROBIN BUTLER

23 January 1991



Further investigation is being conducted in the area of the above mentioned activities. It is requested that you continue to keep the Bureau advised of any developments in this matter.

The Bureau is also interested in any information you may have regarding the activities of the above mentioned individuals in the area of the above mentioned activities.

The Bureau is also interested in any information you may have regarding the activities of the above mentioned individuals in the area of the above mentioned activities.


The Bureau is also interested in any information you may have regarding the activities of the above mentioned individuals in the area of the above mentioned activities.

The Bureau is also interested in any information you may have regarding the activities of the above mentioned individuals in the area of the above mentioned activities.

Very truly yours,
John Edgar Hoover

cc: [illegible]

100-100000-1000

DEPARTMENT/SERIES <i>PREM 19</i> PIECE/ITEM <i>3444</i> (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract details: <i>minute and attachments from Craddock to Powell dated 23 January 1991</i>	
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Use black or blue pen to complete form.

Use the card for one piece or for each extract removed from a different place within a piece.

Enter the department and series,
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10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

23 January 1991

THE GULF

I had a further talk with General Scowcroft this evening, mostly about the likelihood of Israeli retaliation for last night's SCUD attacks. General Scowcroft said that the Administration were still locked into a back and forth discussion with the Israelis. The Israelis had come out of their Cabinet discussion with a pretty hard line, but the Americans had been just as tough in reply. The issue remained unresolved. He did not think the Israelis would dare act without American approval, because the risk of clashes with Allied aircraft was too great. In response to my question whether the Israeli plan was still as he had described it to me, General Scowcroft said that the plan was the same, but the Israelis now intended to continue the action for three days. The Americans were arguing that this was far too dangerous for the coalition, and more than it could stand. They intended to go on taking a very hard line with the Israelis. I asked if there was anything which we could do in support. General Scowcroft was grateful, but thought it would be difficult since we were not supposed to know about the Israeli plan. We could rely on the Americans to go on taking a very firm line.

On the wider progress of the campaign, General Scowcroft said he could really add nothing to the briefing given by Secretary Cheney and General Powell. Everything was on course. The problems were not with the campaign but with the media, who were swinging wildly to and fro in their judgment of what was happening.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence) and to Sir Robin Butler.

CHARLES POWELL

R H T Gozney Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

23 January 1991

Dear Richard,

BURDEN SHARING

The Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary had a brief word this evening about burden sharing in the context of the Gulf conflict and agreed that we must make a systematic effort to get more money from those wealthier countries who were not contributing forces to any significant extent. The Prime Minister said that he would sign the message to Chancellor Kohl tonight. The Foreign Secretary will bring forward early proposals for approaches to Japan, Kuwait and possibly other Governments.

I am copying this letter to John Gieve (HM Treasury), Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence) and to Sir Robin Butler.

Charles Powell

Richard Gozney Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

23 January 1991

Sir Charles

Message From President Kaunda of Zambia

(on ph. 37.)

/ President Kaunda sent a message to the Prime Minister
/ following his return from Baghdad on 12 January. I
enclose a copy of the telegram containing the text of
this message together with a draft reply.

*Yours ever,
S. L. Gass*

(S L Gass)
Private Secretary

Sir Charles Powell KCMG
10 Downing Street

HB Dr Kenneth Kaunda
Republic of Zaire

FROM : Prime Minister

TO: President Kaunda

To Jhr
a

I am most grateful to you for sharing your thoughts with me following your visit to Baghdad.

Events have since moved on. The decision to take military action to expel Saddam Hussein from Kuwait is the sad result of Iraq's repeated and uncompromising refusal to comply with the resolutions of the UN Security Council.

During the 5½ months since the Iraqi invasion we have used every possible means to persuade Iraq to meet the requirements set out by the Security Council. But Saddam Hussein at no stage gave any indication that he was prepared to reverse his aggression and leave Kuwait in peace: not to the US Secretary of State, not to the Twelve members of the European Community, not to the Secretary General of the United Nations and not, as I understand your message, to you.

In these circumstances we have concluded that the use of force is both justified and necessary. Failure to reverse the aggression would have prolonged the tragic suffering of the people of Kuwait and the destruction of their country. It would have meant that no small country could again feel safe from aggression from a larger, hostile neighbour. It would also have challenged the authority of the United Nations.

In taking this action we and our allies have taken care to ensure that every effort is made to avoid casualties amongst the civilian population of Iraq. I am sure you will share my hope that we shall be successful in securing the full and early implementation of the wishes of the international community as set out in UN Security Council Resolutions, and that we shall soon see the full and unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait.



10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

23 January 1991

I enclose a copy of a letter to the Prime Minister from the New Zealand Prime Minister about the Gulf. It would be helpful to have a draft reply.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence).

Charles Powell

Simon Gass Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

KW

20
PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL NO. T27191

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PRIME MINISTER

SUBJECT
CC MASTER
OPS.

SPC

(2)

Richard

23 January 1991

*I have
commissioned a
short ref.*

The Rt Hon John Major MP
Prime Minister and First Lord of the Treasury
10 Downing Street
LONDON SW1

1
Thatcher
23/1

Dear John

On 22 January I called the New Zealand Parliament together for a special sitting to debate the Gulf war. The Governor General opened the session with an address recalling the history of the last few months and calling on Parliament to join in support for the United Nations in its handling of the situation, for the multinational force operating under the auspices of the United Nations, and for the efforts made by New Zealand to give effect to the resolutions of the United Nations.

I am glad that this call met with broad bi-partisan support in Parliament. Many members from both the main parties spoke of the need for New Zealand to contribute to the multinational force in the Gulf area. This broad support reflects popular opinion in New Zealand. A number of Members paid particular tribute to countries such as Britain which are shouldering the major burden of carrying out the U.N. resolutions.

As you know, the role of New Zealand is a modest one designed to provide, to the greatest extent possible, assistance in areas of need. I am pleased that we were able to respond to your Government's request to supplement our army medical team, already in the Gulf, with another group of services medical personnel. I was delighted to hear this morning of the very positive reaction of the Commons to Tom King's announcement that our people will be attached to British units.

It is clear that Saddam Hussein will not easily be persuaded from the path he has chosen to follow. We are

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PARLIAMENT BUILDINGS, WELLINGTON, NEW ZEALAND.

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most disturbed at his repeated attempts to bring Israel into the war - resisted with commendable strength by the Israelis for the moment - and the appalling treatment he is meting out to prisoners of war. I would like you to know that the people of New Zealand share the outrage you must feel at the pictures that have been broadcast of British and other allied POWs. Like that of the British people, however, our resolve is strengthened rather than weakened by such callous and illegal actions.

Saint Augustine said around 1600 years ago that "the purpose of all war is peace". We pray that a just peace without oppression will not be long coming in the Gulf so that your people, and ours, can return safely to their home countries.

With kindest regards,

Yours sincerely,

Jim Bolger

Prime Minister

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1

**SPEECH FROM THE THRONE
SPECIAL SESSION OF PARLIAMENT
TUESDAY, 22 JANUARY 1991**

HONOURABLE MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
it is a privilege for me to exercise the prerogative of Her Majesty the Queen
and open this 2nd session of the 43rd Parliament.

It is the first time I have exercised Her Majesty's prerogative, and I am
deeply conscious of the fact that Parliament has been summoned to discuss a
matter of grave concern to the people of New Zealand.

Parliament is not summoned to discuss every outbreak of hostilities in the
world.

The circumstances, in this instance, are exceptional. The hostilities are of
worldwide significance.

Today, a multinational force is in action with the full authority of the United
Nations.

The Government of New Zealand has committed units of the nation's defence
forces to support the effort to secure compliance with the resolutions of the
United Nations.

Under these circumstances, it is appropriate that the New Zealand Parliament
should convene to discuss these grave issues.

2

HONOURABLE MEMBERS, I should like to recall events leading to and following the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, and the decisions which have been taken by the previous and present Governments of New Zealand in regard to this act of aggression.

Prior to the invasion, the President of Iraq, Saddam Hussein, laid claim to two Kuwaiti islands and the Kuwaiti section of an oil field that spreads beneath the border between the nations of Iraq and Kuwait.

The President of Iraq had criticised Kuwait's oil production and pricing policies.

Discussions on these points had begun between Iraq and Kuwait.

President Saddam Hussein had given undertakings to other Arab leaders that he would not invade Kuwait.

Despite these undertakings and without prior warning, on the 2nd of August, Iraqi troops launched a full-scale attack.

The small defence forces of Kuwait were quickly overrun.

Claiming a popular revolutionary movement had arisen in Kuwait, the President of Iraq installed a new government.

This lasted but few days, before President Saddam Hussein proclaimed Kuwait to be Iraq's 19th province, and annexed the country completely.

3

The violations of human rights in Kuwait which accompanied these events have been fully reported by Amnesty International.

HONOURABLE MEMBERS, there have been many wars since 1945, but this is the first time since 1945 that one country has attempted to extinguish entirely the existence of another independent country, another member of the United Nations.

The international community has been united in a manner that is without precedent in its condemnation and rejection of Iraq's aggression against Kuwait.

Since the 2nd of August, there have been 12 United Nations Security Council resolutions expressing that condemnation and rejection.

Iraq did not heed the Security Council's initial call to withdraw from Kuwait.

The Council imposed mandatory, comprehensive economic and trade sanctions against Iraq.

Those sanctions have been almost universally enforced.

There is no evidence that they have had any effect on the attitude of the President of Iraq, or were going to do so in the foreseeable future.

On the 29th of November, the Security Council passed Resolution 678 which authorised the use of "all necessary means" to compel Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait if it had not done so by the 15th of January.

4

Thus, Iraq was given six weeks' notice to comply with the call to withdraw, which had been issued by the United Nations four months earlier.

President Saddam Hussein paid no heed to the diplomatic efforts of other nations - including many Arab states - to achieve Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait before the deadline set by the Security Council.

His envoy refused to accept a letter from President Bush of the United States.

The leader of Iraq was not moved by the direct, personal approach of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who flew to Baghdad to meet him, or by the Secretary-General's final appeal just a few hours before the deadline.

The deadline has passed, and, consequently, a multinational force has moved to enforce the will of the United Nations.

HONOURABLE MEMBERS, such action is clearly envisaged under Chapter 7 of the United Nations Charter.

The Security Council has the power and the responsibility to "decide what measures should be taken to maintain or restore international peace and security".

It may decide on peaceful measures - as it did with the imposition of sanctions on Iraq.

5

When the Security Council considers such measures "have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be deemed necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security".

The Security Council was therefore fully empowered to pass Resolution 665, which authorised the use of force to uphold the economic and trade sanctions it imposed on Iraq.

The Council was similarly empowered to pass Resolution 678, authorising the use of "all necessary means" to compel Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait, and calling upon all member states of the United Nations to support actions taken by countries with forces in the region in pursuit of its resolutions.

Twenty-eight members of the United Nations have heeded this call and contributed to the multinational force now operating in the Gulf zone.

HONOURABLE MEMBERS, New Zealand was a founding member of the United Nations.

One of its main objectives was to ensure that the organisation would effectively protect small countries, like New Zealand, against aggression.

This is what Sir Carl Berendsen, New Zealand's first Permanent Representative at the United Nations, said at the first session of the General Assembly in 1946:

6

"We wish to see established an effective system of collective security under which all contract that aggression against one is aggression against all, and will be met and defeated as such.

"We believe that nothing short of this can in the long run be permanently effective - an agreement by all the right-thinking peoples of the world that lawless force will always be met and defeated by lawful force ..."

That the United Nations has operated on this occasion in the way its founders intended, and that so many member nations have been prepared to contribute to the effort that is now required to achieve the object of its resolutions, is one of the positive aspects of the otherwise tragic situation that Parliament has been summoned to consider.

HONOURABLE MEMBERS, I now turn to the decisions made in regard to this situation by the previous and present Governments of New Zealand since August the 2nd.

The Government in office on that day immediately and repeatedly condemned Iraq's act of aggression and called for the complete withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait.

When the Security Council called for the imposition of sanctions on Iraq, the government imposed them, as quickly as legal procedures permitted.

New Zealand commercial and financial organisations willingly complied with the sanctions.

7

Indeed, they did so before the necessary regulations were implemented, and they have done so at some cost to themselves.

The Government quickly decided to make available humanitarian assistance for the hundreds of thousands of refugees displaced as a result of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait.

An appeal was received from the Egyptian Red Crescent for milk powder to help feed the Egyptian workers who had been forced to flee from their jobs in Kuwait and return to their own country.

An RNZAF Hercules delivered a load of milk powder to Cairo in response to that request.

The main need of refugees was for onward transport from Jordan to their home countries.

The Government assigned the same Hercules aircraft to carry out three refugee flights from Jordan to Pakistan and the Philippines.

An RNZAF Boeing 727, already in Europe, was diverted from its tasks by the Government to make 11 flights, carrying refugees from Jordan to Pakistan, India, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and the Philippines.

At the same time, the Government announced its willingness to send a civilian medical team to Saudi Arabia, under the auspices of the International Committee of the Red Cross, if this was acceptable.

Saudi Arabia welcomed the offer, but it was not taken up at that time by the International Committee of the Red Cross.

Since the onset of the crisis, the previous and present Governments have given frequent consideration to the possibility of further New Zealand contributions, in particular military contributions.

The previous Government announced, at an early stage of the crisis, its willingness to make an appropriate contribution to any operations organised under United Nations auspices.

On the 29th of November, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 678, in which it authorised the use of "all necessary means" to compel Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait, and requested "all states to provide appropriate support for the actions" of countries contributing to the multinational forces in the Gulf area.

The text of this resolution was sent officially by the Secretary-General to the present Government of New Zealand, as it was to other governments.

On the 3rd of December, the Government announced its intention to make available two RNZAF Hercules transport aircraft and a New Zealand Army medical team to support the multinational force in the Gulf area.

The Government believes the provision of these military support services is an appropriate response to the situation, and to the United Nations' call for assistance.

9

They have been warmly welcomed by the countries in which they are located - Saudi Arabia and Bahrain - and by the countries providing the forces with whom they will work most closely - the United Kingdom and the United States.

The Government recently received an additional request from the Government of the United Kingdom for more medical personnel.

After carefully considering the circumstances in the area, and the availability of military medical personnel in New Zealand, the Government decided to accede to this request.

About 20 medical personnel, from all three armed services, will be made available to work with British units in the Gulf area.

Further details will be announced by the Government when they are confirmed.

HONOURABLE MEMBERS, New Zealand has a long and honourable tradition of contributing to peace keeping forces.

It is a tradition that has been upheld by successive Governments, and will be upheld by the present Government.

The Government is aware that some New Zealanders believe that this country should contribute only to a peace keeping force.

10

Ministers of the Government understand that point of view, but they also recognise that there is no peace to keep, until peace has been made.

Therefore, they have decided that New Zealand should play a modest but honourable part in the effort to make peace, and to support the resolutions of the United Nations which seek to end an act of aggression by Iraq and restore the integrity of the small state of Kuwait.

HONOURABLE MEMBERS, New Zealand has shouldered its share of the burden of sanctions on Iraq.

New Zealand has made a real contribution to the welfare of refugees displaced by the conflict, and will make a real contribution to the care of those who suffer injury in the hostilities that are now under way.

New Zealand has moved to support each call and resolution of the United Nations in regard to the current crisis in the Gulf.

I am sure that all New Zealanders will extend their heartfelt sympathy to those who have suffered and will suffer in the war.

I am equally certain that all New Zealanders share the hope that the hostilities can be brought to a swift end with minimum loss of life, and that a just and lasting peace can be secured.

Today, the Ministers of the Government are inviting Honourable Members to join in support for the United Nations in its handling of this situation, for the multinational force that is operating under the auspices of the United Nations, and for the efforts that have been made by New Zealand to give effect to the resolutions of the United Nations.

11

HONOURABLE MEMBERS, Parliament has been summoned today to consider this single matter at this session.

It is the intention of the Government to continue with the legislation that was before the House at the time it adjourned, when the House comes back into session after the 19th of February.

I therefore commend this issue to you, and pray that divine guidance will attend your considerations.

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the department for Enterprise
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Lord Hesketh
Minister of State

The Rt Hon Douglas Hurd
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Whitehall
London
SW1A 2AH

Department of
Trade and Industry

1-19 Victoria Street
London SW1H 0ET

Enquiries
071-215 5000

Telex 8811074/5 DTHQ G
Fax 071-222 2629

Direct line 071 215 4301

Our ref AM10

Your ref

Date 23 January 1991

Dear Douglas.

I thought I should write to you to record the conclusions I have reached in respect of the postal and telecommunications services between the UK and Iraq.

Having taken account of advice, I believe at present that the balance of interest lies in us not using our statutory powers to direct the relevant bodies to suspend these services in the interests of national security. The advice from the Home Office that the risk to UK interests of all sorts is "minimal" and that they would not therefore press for suspension on national security grounds has been particularly helpful in reaching this conclusion.

You will be aware of course that in fact there are at present considerable practical difficulties in maintaining these services.

I shall continue to keep the situation under review in case a change in this policy becomes advisable. I am sure that Kenneth Baker to whom I am copying this letter will ensure that I am kept informed of any relevant developments.


I am copying this letter also to the Prime Minister, Tom King, John Wakeham and Sir Robin Butler.

Yours etc.
Alex Hurd

LORD HESEKTH

the
Enterprise
initiative





I thought I should write to you to record the conclusion I have reached in respect of the postal and telecommunications services provided in the UK and Iraq.

As I have taken account of advice, I believe at present that the balance of relevant law is as not under our statutory power to provide the relevant bodies to manage these services in the interests of national security. The advice from the Home Office is that the risk to the interests of all sorts is "serious" and that they would not therefore grant for suspension of national security provisions has been particularly helpful in reaching this conclusion.

I will be aware of courses that in fact there are at present considerable practical difficulties in maintaining these services.

I shall continue to keep the situation under review in case a change in this policy becomes necessary. I am sure that I shall be able to keep you informed of any relevant developments.

I am copying this letter also to the Prime Minister, Tom King, Lord Hailsham and Sir Robin Butler.



the department for Enterprise

Ent. Copy No (2) of 12

cc/206-g

The Rt. Hon. Peter Lilley MP
Secretary of State for Trade and Industry

SECRET

The Rt Hon David Mellor QC MP
Chief Secretary
HM Treasury
Parliament Street
LONDON
SW1P 3AG

Department of
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London SW1H 0ET

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071-215 5000

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Direct line
Our ref
Your ref
Date

071-215 5621
PE1265

23 January 1991

231

Dear Chief Secretary,

INSURANCE AGAINST DAMAGE BY IRAQI TERRORISTS

Following my letter of 16 January addressed to Kenneth Baker, officials met representatives of the industry on 18 January. It is clear that it will be very difficult, if not impossible, to persuade the industry to continue to carry the risks of damage from Iraqi terrorist and their supporters, and if they did they would seek substantial increases in premiums and much of industry would remain uninsured against these risks. The insurance industry lacks capacity to take on these risks and cannot lay them off through reinsurance either. The private individual is left facing financial ruin if his insurance company invokes the war exclusion clause to avoid its liabilities.

There is already growing concern about these war risk clauses and comment in the Press. They are so widely drawn that there is plenty of room for insurance companies to invoke them in the event of terrorist action by Iraqis or their supporters while hostilities continue. We cannot change existing contract provisions by legislation. Inaction also does not seem to be a realistic option because this does not tackle existing concern in a complex area. The attached paper by my officials sets out the issues and options in more detail.

In my view, work should start immediately on drawing up a scheme. I believe we should err on the side of wide coverage and not try to draw distinctions which will be difficult to defend. I therefore favour including all

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business and commercial risks in the UK and on the continental shelf and personal property risks irrespective of whether insurance for non-war risk has been taken out. However I am not inclined to include personal injury for which there exists already the Criminal Injuries Scheme, nor life insurance where war risk cover has been widely available.

I believe we should announce that we are considering the problem but this will need careful handling to avoid causing alarm.

I am copying this letter to the Prime Minister, Douglas Hurd, Kenneth Baker, Tom King, Michael Heseltine, John Wakeham, John Gummer, Ian Lang, David Hunt, Peter Brook, Patrick Mayhew and Sir Robin Butler.

Yours sincerely

P. Bennett

(Approved by the Secretary of State
and signed in his absence.)

SECRET



SECRET

GULF CRISIS: THE INSURANCE POSITION

Note by Insurance Division: Department of Trade & Industry

Issue

- 1
 - i) What action should the Government take in respect of damage in Great Britain in relation to terrorism arising from present hostilities with 'Iraq'?
 - ii) Should the Government discuss with the insurance industry the outline of a scheme to pay compensation in respect of such losses?
 - iii) What should be the public line? Should the Government announce, if pressed, that the Department is having talks with the industry on war risk exclusion clauses?

Background

2 Non-life insurance policies in respect of assets within the UK and fixed assets on the North Sea oil and gas fields contain war risk exclusion clauses. Personal accident policies may also contain these clauses. However with the exception of a few policies issued in the last few months, it is extremely unlikely that UK life and pension policies have a war risk exclusion clause and therefore any valid claim would be met in full.

3 War risk exclusion clauses are very widely drawn. They exclude any loss or liability directly or indirectly caused by or arising from or contributed to by hostilities (whether war is declared or not). The Department's legal advisers consider that terrorist activities in support of Iraq, whether or not conducted by Iraqis, may well be held as war risks while the present state of hostilities persist. But, at the end of hostilities (a stage which will need definition), any such further terrorist activities should be treated as criminal damage in the same way as other terrorist actions and valid claims would be paid.

4 Most insurance companies have signed up to a voluntary agreement, dating from 1937 but renewed since, whereby they do not underwrite war risks in relation to assets in the UK. During the Second World War the Government ran its own insurance scheme to provide compensation against war damage. The industry might be persuaded to be flexible about this agreement and provide for industry and commerce some cover against terrorists motivated by the Iraq war but the capacity for cover would be limited and expensive. Only large companies who felt especially vulnerable would be likely to

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seek cover and most of industry and commerce and all private individuals would remain uncovered. To judge from discussions so far, the industry will not provide more cover or undertake to be sympathetic to any claims. They regard war risks of fixed assets as highly unpredictable for which they could not arrange reinsurance. As the regulator of insurance companies, the Department of Trade and Industry would also have reservations on solvency grounds about some insurers taking on such risks for which they have not established reserves.

The case against Government action

5 The case against Government intervention appears to be as follows.

a) The risk of appearing to recognise that some terrorist action is an act of war. It is policy to represent all terrorist action as criminal. It may well be difficult to distinguish between terrorist activities in support of Iraq and other terrorist acts;

b) Appearing to suggest that substantial terrorist action is expected;

c) Intervention could not be equitably limited to the insured and would amount to a new form of compensation scheme. It would not be possible to devise a scheme for a short war which might have a chance of being self financing;

d) Difficulties of drawing boundaries for compensation. World War 2 experience was that a wide measure of discretion was necessary;

e) Any new scheme for property would appear more generous and speedy than the Criminal Injury Compensation Scheme.

6 The case for Government intervention is that :

a) Only Governments can take on war risks. In the event of terrorist incidents linked to Iraq, there could be very strong public pressure for the Government to act.

b) If business and individuals fear financial ruin from terrorists actions, this enhances their effect.

c) It would be undesirable on solvency grounds to put pressure on insurers to provide cover for such risks for which they have not reserved.

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Options for Government action and recommendations

Business risks

7 Insurance cover is not likely to be readily available even if the insurance industry is willing to modify its present agreement not to cover war risks. The scale of catastrophe even from a single incident could be so great in financial terms (eg a power station of oil rig) that the capacity (both direct insurance and reinsurance) is just not available. Thus while some businesses might be able to obtain cover (Lloyd's may offer a limited amount) the majority of industry and commerce could not get cover.

8 Unless the Government is prepared to say that losses should stand where they fall the Government should therefore in principle cover business war risks within the UK while hostilities continue. In the longer term, there may be a case for encouraging the industry to look again at its agreement.

Should compensation be restricted to insured?

9 Providing compensation to the uninsured complicates administration and might provide opportunity for fraud. There is no record of the insured assets and their value before the act of terrorism. On the other hand, it would be difficult to argue that compensation is not being provided for "war risks" damage because someone had not taken out insurance when cover for war risks is not available. This applies to both business and personal risks. The Northern Ireland scheme for compensation against IRA attack does not distinguish between insured and uninsured assets. The Second World War insurance scheme for private chattels also similarly made no distinction.

10 Thus, we do not think a distinction can be drawn between insured and uninsured risks for either the business or commercial sectors.

Risks to be covered

11 This will need to be considered but in principle we suggest it should cover all risks subject to war risks exclusion with the exception of life and personal injury (see below). In addition to property damage this will include legal liability, expense and consequential loss. It is recommended that loss arising from cancellation of holidays is not covered.

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SECRET

Life and Injury risks

12 The Criminal Injury Compensation scheme is available to cover personal injuries. In the event of death, most life insurance policies do not contain war risks exclusions and so will pay out. The main lacuna is the uninsured as the Criminal Injuries scheme does not compensate for loss of earnings in the event of death (it does on injury). However the argument is different from that on property damage (para 9) as cover is available if people choose. Neither were life risks covered in the Second War. It is therefore recommended that the Government should not cover life risks.

The Options

13 i) Announce no scheme, on the grounds that to do so will encourage the belief that terrorist action is likely. The downside is that this would leave the Government exposed should an Iraqi terrorist outrage occur.

ii) Work up a scheme. This will need to be discussed with the insurance industry and these discussions will become public. If Minister elect for this option and accept the broad coverage of the scheme outlined above, the most economical administration as regards insured risks might be as follows:

a) The insurance company should inform the Department of Trade and Industry of what would have payable under their policy but for the war risk exclusion clause. The Department would pay the policyholder but would reserve the right to sue the insurance company if in the Department's view the war risk exclusion clause had been unreasonably invoked in the individual case. The insurance company would make available to the Department all relevant documentation including the loss adjusters report.

b) As regards uninsured risks, the Department would need to hire loss adjusters to act on its behalf if the insurance industry could not suggest a way of helping.

Statutory powers

14 The Department does not have any statutory powers to pay compensation to policyholders and uninsured. Though express statutory powers are not strictly necessary to take on such contingent liabilities in respect of a short term and temporary situation, provided a statement is made to Parliament, if an Emergency Powers Bill is brought before the House it desirable to take provision for any scheme.

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SECRET

Cost

15 No estimate of cost can be made. The Department has no provision and does not consider this a matter which should fall to DTI.

Timing

16 Brokers have reported that commercial and industrial clients are already enquiring about war risk cover for assets within the UK. Some private individuals who feel vulnerable because of Gulf or religious beliefs have also apparently enquired. There is also Press interest. Pressure is therefore likely to grow for the Government to say how it is going to deal with these problems.

17 What is said depends on which option (para 13) Ministers choose. If Ministers decide on ii) an announcement is preferable (knowledge of discussions with the industry will leak) but such an announcement would build expectations that the Government would meet any losses due to Iraqi terrorists

Issues for Decision

18 Ministers need to decide:

1 Should any scheme be drawn up to compensate for results of Iraqi terrorist activity (para 13)?

2 if so, should it cover all business and commercial risks where the insurance claim fails only because of the war risk exclusion clause (para 7)?

3 Should it cover all property, both business and personal, whether uninsured or not (para 9)?


4 Should life and personal injury be excluded as recommended relying on the Criminal Injuries scheme for the latter (para 12)?

5 Should powers be taken in the Emergency Powers Bill (para 14) ?

6 What announcement should be made.

Insurance Division
Department of Trade and Industry
Jan 21 1991

SECRET



1. The purpose of this report is to provide information on the progress of the work done during the period from 1 July to 31 July 1951.

2. The work done during the period from 1 July to 31 July 1951 has been directed towards the completion of the project on the development of a new type of engine. The work has been carried out in accordance with the programme of work approved by the Committee on 1 July 1951.

3. The work done during the period from 1 July to 31 July 1951 has been directed towards the completion of the project on the development of a new type of engine. The work has been carried out in accordance with the programme of work approved by the Committee on 1 July 1951.

4. The work done during the period from 1 July to 31 July 1951 has been directed towards the completion of the project on the development of a new type of engine. The work has been carried out in accordance with the programme of work approved by the Committee on 1 July 1951.

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10. The work done during the period from 1 July to 31 July 1951 has been directed towards the completion of the project on the development of a new type of engine. The work has been carried out in accordance with the programme of work approved by the Committee on 1 July 1951.

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12. The work done during the period from 1 July to 31 July 1951 has been directed towards the completion of the project on the development of a new type of engine. The work has been carried out in accordance with the programme of work approved by the Committee on 1 July 1951.



SECRET - UK EYES A

(9 (a-b))

B.0718

PRIME MINISTER

cc Sir Robin Butler
Sir Percy Cradock

OPD(G): 23 January: Overnight action points

Iraqi missile attacks on Israel

You will wish to cover, perhaps under Item 2, the latest Israeli missile attack on Israel in which 3 elderly ladies were killed (according to the press, one from injuries and two by heart attacks) and a further 98 were injured, some seriously including a baby. Two Patriot missiles were reported to have been launched but failed to intercept. The Israeli Cabinet is meeting to consider their response. ✓

2. You may wish to report on your statement and the contacts overnight between Sir Charles Powell and General Scowcroft. The Foreign Secretary can report on the representations made by our Ambassador in Tel Aviv to urge continuing restraint. Initial comments by Israeli spokesmen have been guarded but the press has reported increasing public pressure to react. US press reports claim that Israel has been asking for \$3bn in war damage and \$10bn for the resettlement of Soviet Jews. President Bush has sent a Special Representative, Mr Richard Armitage, to Jordan for talks with King Hussein. ✓

3. You may wish to confirm with the Foreign Secretary the broad lines of our public line if the Israelis mount a retaliatory attack. The terms will of course depend on the scope and targeting of the attack. X



SECRET - UK EYES A

UN Security Council

4. The Foreign Secretary may report on plans for the UN Security Council to hold informal consultations tomorrow. Although the consultations are intended to provide an opportunity to hear reports under UNSCR 678, there are dangers of a wider and divisive debate which could be damaging for the coalition. Sir David Hannay has suggested low-key lobbying in capitals against an early collective discussion.

L V Appleyard
L V Appleyard

Cabinet Office
23 January 1991

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CONFIDENTIAL

FM CAIRO

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 78

OF 231013Z JANUARY 91

INFO IMMEDIATE RIYADH, DAMASCUS, WASHINGTON, TEL AVIV

INFO IMMEDIATE PARIS, AMMAN, UKMIS NEW YORK, MOSCOW

INFO IMMEDIATE CABINET OFFICE, MODUK, ACTOR, POLAD HIGH WYCOMBE

ADVANCE COPY

MY TELNO 71: GULF WAR: EGYPTIAN REACTIONS

SUMMARY

1. MUBARAK REJECTS IDEA OF CEASEFIRE. HIS RESOLVE IS FIRM. VOCIFEROUS BUT LIMITED CRITICISM FROM OPPOSITION GROUPS.

DETAIL

2. AT A PRESS CONFERENCE ON 22 JANUARY, MUBARAK REJECTED ANY IDEA OF A CEASEFIRE. A CEASEFIRE WHILE IRAQI TROOPS WERE STILL IN KUWAIT WOULD BE A VIOLATION OF THE UNSCRS. EGYPTIAN TROOPS HAD BEEN SENT TO THE GULF IN RESPONSE TO A REQUEST FROM SAUDI ARABIA AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH EGYPT'S OBLIGATIONS UNDER ARAB SUMMIT RESOLUTIONS AND 1950 ARAB DEFENCE PACT. HE REJECTED OPPOSITION CALLS FOR EGYPTIAN TROOP WITHDRAWALS. EGYPT COULD NOT ACCEPT THE OCCUPATION OF LAND BY FORCE. IF AN ARAB STATE COULD OCCUPY LAND BY FORCE, ISRAEL WOULD EXPECT TO DO LIKEWISE.

3. MUBARAK DISMISSED THE IRAQI MISSILE ATTACKS ON ISRAEL AS POLITICAL. THE IRAQI OBJECTIVE WAS TO WIDEN THE CONFLICT. IRAQI ATTACKS ON SAUDI ARABIA SHOWED THAT SADDAM MADE NO DISTINCTION BETWEEN MUSLIM AND JEWISH LAND.

4. ON 23 JANUARY, THE EDITOR IN CHIEF OF AL AHAM ECHOED MUBARAK'S REMARKS ABOUT A POSSIBLE CEASEFIRE. TWO DAYS EARLIER, AL AHAM (MY TELNO 71) HAD HINTED THAT A CEASEFIRE MIGHT BE POSSIBLE IN CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES. (IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THIS EARLIER ARTICLE HAD BEEN MISINTERPRETED AND MUBARAK THAT HAD HAD TO PUT THE RECORD STRAIGHT.)

5. SOME OF THE LOW CIRCULATION OPPOSITION NEWSPAPERS EXPRESSING LEFT WING, PAN ARAB AND EXTREMIST ISLAMIC VIEWS HAVE BEGUN TO ATTACK MUBARAK'S POLICY VERY STRONGLY. MOREOVER ALTHOUGH SOME

OPPOSITION LEADERS, AS MENTIONED IN PREVIOUS REPORTS, SUPPORT THE GOVERNMENT'S GULF POLICY, OTHERS ARE OPENLY CRITICAL. A FULL PAGE ADVERTISEMENT IN THE OPPOSITION PAPER AL SHAAB ON 22 JANUARY LISTED SELF-STYLED REPRESENTATIVES OF PROFESSIONAL SYNDICATES VOICING SUCH DISQUIET (THOUGH THE COUNCILS OF SOME OF THE SYNDICATES SUBSEQUENTLY REJECTED THIS). ALL THIS IS IN A SENSE NOTHING NEW. FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE GULF CRISIS, EXTREME OPPOSITION ELEMENTS AND EVEN LARGE SECTIONS OF THE INTELLECTUAL 'CHATTERING CLASSES' HAVE BEEN CRITICAL OF MUBARAK'S STAND.

6. IT IS DIFFICULT TO SAY WHAT EFFECT SUCH ARGUMENTS ARE HAVING AT A MORE POPULAR LEVEL. MUBARAK'S STRATEGY FROM THE OUTSET HAS BEEN LARGELY TO IGNORE THE GROUPS MENTIONED IN PARAGRAPH 5 ABOVE AND TO BASE HIS SUPPORT ON SOLID MIDDLE, LOWER MIDDLE CLASS AND MASS ELEMENTS WHOSE GUT INSTINCTS HAVE BEEN TO SUPPORT THEIR PRESIDENT AND TO OPPOSE IRAQI AGGRESSION, PARTICULARLY AS EGYPTIAN WORKERS HAVE SUFFERED AT IRAQI HANDS. (A FURTHER WAVE OF EXPELLED EGYPTIAN WORKERS IS CURRENTLY RETURNING TO EGYPT DIRECT OR VIA JORDAN.) AS TIME GOES ON IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE EGYPTIAN PUBLIC AS A WHOLE MAY WELL BECOME INCREASINGLY DISTURBED AT THE PROSPECT OF IRAQIS BEING KILLED BY NON ARABS, BY WESTERN ATTEMPTS TO DESTROY THE MOST POWERFUL ARAB ARMY AND AT A LATER STAGE IN THE WAR BY ARABS FIGHTING ARABS. NATURALLY THERE MUST ALSO BE SOME SNEAKING SATISFACTION THAT ISRAEL HAS BEEN ATTACKED. NEVERTHELESS I BELIEVE THAT MOST EGYPTIANS ARE STILL SOLIDLY BEHIND THE PRESIDENT.

7. SIMILARLY THERE IS NO SIGN THAT MUBARAK HIMSELF IS WAVERING OR THAT ANY SHIFT IN PUBLIC OPINION WILL INFLUENCE HIS HANDLING OF THE CRISIS. HE WILL MAKE A MAJOR SPEECH TOMORROW, 24 JANUARY. THE GOVERNMENT HAVE ANNOUNCED THAT SCHOOL AND STUDENT HOLIDAYS WILL BE EXTENDED BY A WEEK AND THAT LEAGUE FOOTBALL MATCHES WILL BE CANCELLED. THESE HOWEVER ARE SENSIBLE PRECAUTIONS TO PREVENT CROWDS GATHERING AND REDUCE THE SCOPE FOR DEMONSTRATIONS. I DO NOT BELIEVE THEY INDICATE THAT THE GOVERNMENT IS LOSING ITS NERVE.

ADAMS

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MR WICKS HMT

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FILE KK

bc PC

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

23 January 1991

GULF CRISIS: SOVIET UNION

Thank you for your letter of 22 January covering a draft reply to President Gorbachev's further message about the Gulf crisis. I enclose a revised version which should be delivered as soon as possible.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence) and to Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

(C. D. POWELL)

Simon Gass, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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FM FCO

TO DESKBY NEXT CONTACT MOSCOW

TELNO

OF 211110Z JANUARY 91

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, PARIS, BONN, UKDEL NATO, RIYADH

INFO PRIORITY TEL AVIV, CAIRO, ACTOR

THE GULF: MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT GORBACHEV

1. Gorbachev's further message on the Gulf was delivered to No.10 Downing Street on 18 January. Text in MIFT.
2. Grateful if you could convey the following reply from the Prime Minister:
Begins

Dear President Gorbachev

Thank you for your further message on the Gulf, which I received on 18 January.

I entirely share your concern about Iraq's missile attacks against Israel. Iraq had no conceivable justification for these indiscriminate attacks against civilian targets. We have encouraged Israel to exercise restraint and avoid retaliation, and so far that has been the case. But Israel has the right to self-defence: and I have to say that in the event of further attack - and reports of one have just come in - it would be very hard indeed to hold Israel back. Iraq's motives are transparent: a wish to draw Israel into the conflict and distract attention from the real issue of its own invasion of Kuwait. I hope that you will continue to do everything in your power to dissuade Iraq from pursuing these attacks, and indeed all attacks on its neighbours: and to bring home to Saddam Hussain that he must withdraw all his forces from Kuwait if there is to be a cease-fire.

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- 2 -

Yours sincerely
John Major

Ends

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TO DESKBY 231030Z FCO

TELNO 59

OF 230950Z JANUARY 91

INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK, RIYADH, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK,
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS GENEVA, BONN, PARIS, MOSCOW

GULF CRISIS: FURTHER JAPANESE CONTRIBUTIONS

SUMMARY

MAJOR JAPANESE ASSISTANCE PACKAGE INCLUDING NINE BILLION DOLLARS
FOR THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE

DETAIL

2. PRIME MINISTER KAIFU IS EXPECTED TO ANNOUNCE AT A PRESS
CONFERENCE LATER THIS EVENING (1230Z) A PACKAGE OF MEASURES AS
FOLLOWS:

A) NINE BILLION DOLLARS TO COVER EXPENSES INCURRED BY THE
MULTINATIONAL FORCES

B) ONE BILLION DOLLARS IN FURTHER ASSISTANCE TO THE FRONT LINE
STATES

C) 'POSITIVE CONSIDERATION' TO SENDING (PROBABLY FIVE) C130 SDF
AIRCRAFT TO AIRLIFT REFUGEES FROM AMMAN AND DAMASCUS TO CAIRO

D) SUBSEQUENT AIRLIFT (BY COMMERCIAL AIRLINES) OF REFUGEES FROM
CAIRO TO THEIR HOME COUNTRIES.

3. WE WILL FAX THE TEXT OF THE STATEMENT AS SOON AS IT BECOMES
AVAILABLE. COUNTRIES PARTICIPATING IN THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE
(IE INCLUDING THE UK) WILL BE NOTIFIED ALSO THROUGH DIPLOMATIC
CHANNELS.

4. WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE ANNOUNCEMENT WILL CONTAIN NO REFERENCE
TO HOW THE RESOURCES ARE TO BE FOUND. CURRENT EXPECTATION IS THAT
THE GOVERNMENT WILL NEED TO ISSUE SHORT-TERM BONDS AND SUBSEQUENTLY
RAISE OIL AND TOBACCO (AND POSSIBLY OTHER) TAXES. BOTH THESE STEPS
WILL REQUIRE LEGISLATION. A SUPPLEMENTARY BUDGET WILL BE PUT BEFORE
THE DIET WHEN IT RECONVENES ON 25 JANUARY: THE TIMESCALE FOR

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MDHIAN 0

APPROVAL IS NOT YET CLEAR.

5. YOUR MESSAGE TO NAKAYAMA HAS BEEN PASSED TO THE PRIME MINISTERS OFFICE AND TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER IN MOSCOW. LIKE PREVIOUS JAPANESE CONTRIBUTIONS NO ALLOCATION OF THE NINE BILLION DOLLARS WILL BE PUBLISHED IN ADVANCE. OFFICIALS WILL HOWEVER BE NEGOTIATING ON THIS POINT IN PARALLEL WITH DIET CONSIDERATION.

WHITEHEAD

YYYY

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PAGE 2

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO
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✓
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OF 230416Z JANUARY 1991
AND TO IMMEDIATE CABINET OFFICE
INFO PRIORITY MIDDLE EAST POSTS, WASHINGTON, NEW DELHI, MODUK
INFO PRIORITY ACTOR

YOUR TELNO 30 (NOT TO ALL): PRIME MINISTER'S LETTER TO SULTAN
QABOOS

SUMMARY

1. LETTER DELIVERED. SULTAN RECEPTIVE TO IDEAS ON FUTURE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS, ABOUT WHICH GCC MINISTERS ARE ABOUT TO MEET. SULTAN UNCERTAIN ABOUT COMMENTING ON HOSTILITIES BUT FIRMLY AGAINST PEACE INITIATIVES INVOLVING A CEASEFIRE.

DETAIL

2. I SAW THE SULTAN IN AUDIENCE ON 22 JANUARY TO DELIVER THE PRIME MINISTER'S LETTER (TUR). I WAS THE FIRST IN A LONG QUEUE INCLUDING THE MINISTERS OF INTERIOR, INFORMATION, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND PALACE AFFAIRS, PRESIDENT OF THE TENDERS BOARD AND MY SOVIET COLLEAGUE. MY TIME WAS UNUSUALLY LIMITED AND I WAS UNABLE TO COMPLETE MY LONG AGENDA.

3. IN HANDING OVER THE PRIME MINISTER'S LETTER I DREW THE SULTAN'S ATTENTION TO THE REMARKS ABOUT KEEPING IN CLOSE TOUCH ABOUT LONGER-TERM SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS IN THE REGION. I GAVE HIM A COPY OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S STATEMENT TO THE HOUSE ON THE GULF ON 21 JANUARY, SIDE-LINING THE PASSAGE ON FUTURE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS. I ALSO GAVE HIM A COPY OF THE NON-PAPER IN YOUR TELNO 769 TO RIYADH. I ENQUIRED WHETHER HIS THINKING HAD ADVANCED ON THE SUBJECT.

4. THE SULTAN SAID THAT EVERYONE WAS TOO PREOCCUPIED AT PRESENT WITH THE CRISIS TO GIVE MUCH SERIOUS THOUGHT TO THE SUBJECT, BUT THAT BY COINCIDENCE HE WAS RECEIVING LATER THE MINISTERS OF INFORMATION AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS BEFORE THEY SET OFF FOR A MEETING WITH THEIR GCC COLLEAGUES SOMEWHERE, HE JOKED, OUT OF MISSILE RANGE. THEIR PRIME OBJECTIVE WAS TO DISCUSS THE SITUATION IN THE GULF BUT YOUSUF BIN ALAWI WOULD ALSO BE TAKING SOUNDINGS ON FUTURE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS. HE WOULD THEREFORE PASS TO ALAWI OUR PAPERS ON THE SUBJECT AND WOULD WELCOME ANY FURTHER IDEAS WE MIGHT HAVE.

5. I ASKED WHETHER THE GCC MINISTERS WERE INTENDING TO ISSUE A STATEMENT ON THE WAR OR, INDEED, WHETHER HE HIMSELF INTENDED TO MAKE ONE. HE SAID HE DID NOT KNOW, THOUGH HE ADMITTED THAT IT HAD BEEN SUGGESTED THAT HE SHOULD MAKE A STATEMENT (PRESUMABLY HE MEANT BY MY US COLLEAGUE). HE ASKED WHAT I THOUGHT AND WHAT HE SHOULD SAY. I DREW ATTENTION TO RECENT STATEMENTS BY OTHER GCC STATES AND SAID WE WOULD WELCOME A GENERALLY SUPPORTIVE STATEMENT OF THE ALLIED ACTIONS TO DEMONSTRATE THE SOLIDARITY OF THE ALLIANCE AGAINST IRAQ. HE PROMISED HE WOULD THINK ABOUT IT.

6. I ASKED WHETHER HE THOUGHT SADDAM HUSSEIN WOULD CRACK UNDER THE PRESENT PRESSURE. HE SAID HE DID NOT THINK SO. HE WAS IMPERVIOUS TO THE SUFFERING OF HIS PEOPLE. HE WOULD ONLY BE CONCERNED IF HIS ELITE REPUBLICAN GUARDS WERE BATTERED. I SAID THEY WERE NOW A TARGET. I ASKED WHAT HE THOUGHT SADDAM HUSSEIN HOPED TO GAIN FROM HIS PRESENT TACTICS, SINCE HE STOOD NO CHANCE OF WINNING. HE SAID THAT HE STILL ENTERTAINED HOPES OF CRACKING WESTERN SOLIDARITY BY ENCOURAGING PUBLIC OPINION HOSTILE TO THE WAR. I TOOK THIS OPPORTUNITY TO DECRY THE INDIAN PEACE INITIATIVE, DRAWING ON THE POINTS IN YOUR TELNO 61 TO UKMIS NEW YORK. HE AGREED EMPHATICALLY THAT SUCH AN INITIATIVE PLAYED STRAIGHT INTO SADDAM HUSSEIN'S HANDS AND SAID THERE MUST BE NO PAUSE OR HE WOULD CLAIM IT AS A VICTORY.

7. I MENTIONED BRIEFLY THE ARSON ATTACK (MY TELNO 60 - NOT TO ALL), OF WHICH HE WAS UNAWARE, AND THANKED HIM FOR THE RAPID RESPONSE OF THE POLICE AND THE EXTRA SECURITY MEASURES THEY WERE TAKING. (I HAD SIMILARLY INFORMED THE MINISTERS IN THE WAITING-ROOM, WHO WERE ALSO UNAWARE OF THE INCIDENT.) HE SAID IT SOUNDED LIKE THE WORK OF SOME HOT-HEAD: THERE WERE SUCH PEOPLE ABOUT WHO WERE ONLY TOO READY TO BE TAKEN IN BY IRAQI PROPAGANDA. (YOUSUF ALAWI MADE THE SAME POINT AND CRITICISED THE BBC FOR GIVING CURRENCY TO BAGHDAD'S PROPAGANDA WHICH WOULD OTHERWISE GO UNHEARD. HE THOUGHT THEY CARRIED OBJECTIVITY TOO FAR.)

8. PLEASE SEE MIFT (NOT TO ALL).

CLARK

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HD/NENAD

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SUBJECT CC MASTER
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PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No: T26/1A20

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SIC

YOUR TELSNOS 188 AND 189: MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER
1. THE PRIME MINISTER AGREES THAT IT WOULD BE APPROPRIATE FOR
HIM TO SEND A MESSAGE TO KING FAHD ABOUT IRAQI MISSILE ATTACKS
ON SAUDI ARABIA. WE ARE GRATEFUL TO YOU FOR YOUR SUGGESTED
DRAFT. PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING FINAL VERSION OF THE TEXT:


BEGINS

WE HAVE WATCHED AGHAST ON TELEVISION THE IRAQI SCUD MISSILE
ATTACKS ON DHAHRAN AND RIYADH. THEY MUST HAVE BEEN A MOST
UNPLEASANT AND UNNERVING EXPERIENCE AND I SEND YOU AND THE PEOPLE
OF THE TWO CITIES MY SYMPATHY. THE USE OF SUCH INDISCRIMINATE
WEAPONS OF DESTRUCTION AGAINST CIVILIAN TARGETS ILLUSTRATES
ALL TOO WELL THE NATURE OF THE REGIME IN BAGHDAD. I AM RELIEVED
THAT THE PATRIOT ANTI-MISSILE DEFENCE SYSTEM HAS SHOWN ITSELF SO
EFFECTIVE, AND NO LIVES HAVE BEEN LOST. WE SHALL CONTINUE OUR
EFFORTS TO DISCOVER AND DESTROY THE SCUD LAUNCHERS.

I ALSO WANTED TO TELL YOU ABOUT OUR EFFORTS TO ENCOURAGE THE
ISRAELI GOVERNMENT TO SHOW RESTRAINT IN THE FACE OF THE MISSILE
ATTACKS WHICH THEY HAVE ALSO ENDURED FROM IRAQ. PRINCE SAUD
RAISED THIS WITH OUR AMBASSADOR ON 19 JANUARY. I WROTE TO PRIME
MINISTER SHAMIR THE SAME DAY URGING HIM TO AVOID RETALIATORY
ACTION IF AT ALL POSSIBLE. SADDAM'S PURPOSE IN ATTACKING ISRAEL
IS CLEARLY TO WIDEN THE CONFLICT AND DIVERT ATTENTION FROM
KUWAIT. ISRAEL HAS SO FAR HELD BACK DESPITE THE EXTREME
PROVOCATION, HELPED BY THE DELIVERY OF US PATRIOT MISSILE
SYSTEMS. I HOPE THAT THIS RESTRAINT WILL BE SUSTAINED. BUT
FURTHER SUCCESSFUL ATTACKS WHICH CAUSED SIGNIFICANT CASUALTIES
WOULD INEVITABLY INCREASE THE PRESSURE ON THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT
TO TAKE SOME ACTION. WE HAVE ALL BEEN IMPRESSED BY THE ROBUST
RESPONSE ON OUR ARAB FRIENDS TO IRAQ'S CYNICAL PLOY. I AM SURE
THAT, WHATEVER HAPPENS, OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS WILL NOT BE DIVERTED
FROM OUR COMMON PURPOSE OF CARRYING THE CAMPAIGN TO LIBERATE
KUWAIT TO A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION.

I HAVE BEEN VERY PLEASED TO HEAR FROM LT GEN DE LA BILLIERE
HOW WELL THE ROYAL SAUDI AIR FORCE AND THE ROYAL AIR FORCE ARE
COOPERATING IN CONDUCTING OPERATIONS SINCE HOSTILITIES BEGAN.
THE AL YAMAMAH PROJECT IS DEMONSTRATING ITS EFFECTIVENESS MORE
CLEARLY THAN EVER.

WITH SINCERE GOOD WISHES.



RESTRICTED
FM RIYADH
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELNO 195
OF 221955Z JANUARY 1991

MESSAGE FROM CROWN PRINCE TO PM

1. WE HAVE RECEIVED A MANUSCRIPT LETTER FROM CROWN PRINCE ADBULLAH TO MR MAJOR DATED 21 JANUARY IN REPLY TO THE PRIME MINISTER'S LETTER OF 9 JANUARY. OUR UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION IS AS FOLLOWS. FCO PLEASE PASS TO PS/NO 10. ORIGINAL FOLLOWS BY BAG.

TEXT BEGINS

GREETINGS,

I WAS VERY PLEASED TO RECEIVE YOUR LETTER OF 9 JANUARY. THANK YOU FOR THE GENEROUS SENTIMENTS EXPRESSED THEREIN WHICH I MUCH APPRECIATE. I REAFFIRM THE GREAT PLEASURE WHICH YOUR VISIT GAVE US. IT ENABLED US TO TALK AND EXCHANGE VIEWS IN DEPTH IN A WAY WHICH VERY MUCH SERVED THE INTERESTS OF OUR TWO PEOPLES AND COUNTRIES.

OUR PLEASURE WAS INCREASED BY THE FACT THAT YOU EXPRESSED A DESIRE TO REPEAT YOUR VISIT IN FUTURE. WE WOULD GREATLY WELCOME THIS AND HOPE THAT WE SHALL SEE YOU AGAIN SHORTLY IN HAPPIER CIRCUMSTANCES.

FINALLY I THANK YOU FOR YOUR INVITATION TO ME TO VISIT LONDON. I HOPE THAT I WILL BE ABLE TO MAKE SUCH A VISIT IN THE NEAR FUTURE. I FULLY RECOGNISE THAT OUR MEETINGS, WHETHER HERE OR IN LONDON, ARE VERY BENEFICIAL AND STRENGTHEN THE RELATIONSHIP AND CONSTRUCTIVE COOPERATION EXISTING BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES.

PLEASE ACCEPT MY HIGHEST REGARDS

SIGNED

ABDULLAH BIN ABDULAZIZ AL SAUD
TEXT ENDS

MUNRO

YYYY

DISTRIBUTION

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MAIN

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NO DISTRIBUTION

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PS/NO 10

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1. WE HAVE RECEIVED A MANUSCRIPT LETTER FROM CROWN PRINCE
ABDULLAH TO HIS MAJESTY DATED 21 JANUARY IN REPLY TO THE PRIME
MINISTER'S LETTER OF 9 JANUARY. OUR UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION IS AS
FOLLOWS. FOR PLEASE PASS TO PRIMO YD. ORIGINAL FOLLOWS BY BAR.

TEXT BEGINS

GREETINGS,

I WAS VERY PLEASED TO RECEIVE YOUR LETTER OF 9 JANUARY. THANK YOU
FOR THE GENEROUS SENTIMENTS EXPRESSED THEREIN WHICH I MUCH
APPRECIATE. I REAFFIRM THE GREAT PLEASURE WHICH YOUR VISIT HAVE
GIVEN US. IT ENABLED US TO TALK AND EXCHANGE VIEWS IN DEPTH IN A WAY
WHICH VERY MUCH SERVED THE INTERESTS OF OUR TWO PEOPLES AND
COUNTRIES.

OUR PLEASURE WAS INCREASED BY THE FACT THAT YOU EXPRESSED A DESIRE
TO REPEAT YOUR VISIT IN FUTURE. WE WOULD GREATLY WELCOME THIS AND
HOPE THAT WE SHALL SEE YOU AGAIN SOON IN HARMONIOUS CIRCUMSTANCES.

FINALLY I THANK YOU FOR YOUR INVITATION TO ME TO VISIT LONDON. I
HOPE THAT I WILL BE ABLE TO MAKE SUCH A VISIT IN THE NEAR FUTURE.
I FULLY RECOGNISE THAT OUR MEETINGS, WHETHER HERE OR IN LONDON, ARE
VERY BENEFICIAL AND STRENGTHEN THE RELATIONSHIP AND CONSTRUCTIVE
COOPERATION EXISTING BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES.

PLEASE ACCEPT MY HIGHEST REGARDS

SIGNED

ABDULLAH BIN ABDULLAH AL SAUD

TEXT ENDS

NNNN

ASHDOWN MP
29/1



FILE
DA

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

Ack 22 January 1991

I enclose a copy of a letter which the Prime Minister has received from the Rt. Hon. Paddy Ashdown M.P. *on 24/1*

I should be grateful if you would provide a draft reply for the Prime Minister's signature, to reach this office by 29 January.

DOMINIC MORRIS

Simon Gass, Esq.
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

✓

cc/c
(2)

~~under 1/2/17~~
**THIS IS A COPY. THE ORIGINAL IS
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3 (4)
OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT**

Treasury Chambers, Parliament Street, SW1P 3AG
07-270 3000

22 January 1991

Sir Charles Powell
Private Secretary to the
Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
LONDON
SW1A 2AA

Jim Rinker

*We shall have to
work hard on the
Japanese.*

*CGP 23/1**Dear Charles***BURDEN SHARING**

In the margins of the G7 meeting on Monday, the Chancellor spoke to Mr Hashimoto. He said that the UK was most grateful to Japan for its contribution towards the cost of our military contribution in the Gulf. However, with the onset of war, these costs were now escalating sharply. It appeared that the contributions we had received were substantially lower as a proportion of our costs than were the contributions to the US. That put the British Government in a difficult position. He hoped that the Japanese would be able to make a further contribution.

Mr Hashimoto said that the Japanese government had already announced two contributions of \$1 billion each towards the Gulf peace. On the first occasion they had not received any request for aid from the UK but they had allocated part of the second tranche to the UK. The Japanese Government had made up its mind to provide additional funds but had not yet decided the amount. The allocation of funds would be for the Gulf Co-operation Council, but his own opinion was that the UK should get a share.

CONFIDENTIAL



It would be advisable for the UK's Foreign Office to approach Japan's and take the matter up with them. However, he would pass on the Chancellor's views to his colleagues.

I am sending copies of this to Richard Gozney, Simon Webb, and Sonia Phippard.

V...

Jst.

JOHN GIEVE

Principal Private Secretary



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL London SW1A 2AH

22 January 1991

Dear Charles,

Gulf Crisis : German Contribution to Burdensharing

Chancellor Kohl wrote to Mrs Thatcher on 13 November to offer equipment to the value of DM60 million for our forces in the Gulf, and airlift support within the NATO area. The MOD say that we have probably now received assistance worth more than this amount. *Pathar P 33*

Sir Christopher Mallaby reports that Mr Baker recently asked Chancellor Kohl, in person, for \$335 million per month in cash for a year. This would be on top of German support for the American effort of \$1 billion in cash and kind to the end of 1990. Christopher Mallaby suggests that it is now time for us to make a parallel request.

Since our manpower in the Gulf is about 8% of the size of committed US forces, we would be justified in looking for burdensharing support in this proportion at least; this would work out at further financial assistance of DM50 million per month.

In view of the level at which both the new American request and our own original request were handled, we think that the most effective course would be for the Prime Minister to send a message to Chancellor Kohl. I enclose a draft (which you will now presumably use as a speaking note instead).

This letter has been seen by Mr Hogg but not, in the time available, by the Foreign Secretary. I am copying it to Simon Webb (MOD) and John Gieve (HM Treasury).

Yours ever,
S L Gass
(S L Gass)

Private Secretary

Sir Charles Powell KCMG
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

A type W
ph. minute
e

His Excellency Herr Helmut Kohl
Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany

As we have discussed
Since we spoke last week, the preliminary stages of the multinational operation to recover Kuwait have continued.)

Our own forces have played a major part in these operations. I am sure you will appreciate the burden that this has already imposed and the greater costs that we must expect in the coming weeks. We are under no illusions as to the formidable task we face in subduing a force of such size, experience and technical sophistication; the excellent work of the air forces is not yet complete and there will remain a difficult and dangerous period of ground warfare.

When we were deploying our initial ground forces, you generously offered a package of practical assistance which met a number of important short term requirements. Since then, we have been grateful for your Government's prompt response to our more detailed requests for assistance.

The onset of hostilities has substantially increased our costs, which now have to cover lost equipment and the use of large quantities of ammunition. At the opening of the special debate in the Bundestag on 14 January you spoke of German solidarity with the multinational effort and said that Germany would continue to contribute to international burdensharing. These words are most welcome, and prompt me to ask if you would be prepared to

consider further financial assistance. I appreciate that the unification of Germany continues to impose heavy claims on the Federal budget, but a German contribution of DM50 million per month to our costs, with effect from 1 January, would be a great help to us. It would also provide yet another clear demonstration of Europe's unity in responding to Saddam Hussain's aggression.

MIDDLE EAST:

Situation R39

consider further financial assistance. I appreciate that
the utilization of currency continues to impose heavy
strain on the Federal budget, but a certain contribution
of \$250 million per year to the cause, with which I
thoroughly agree, would be a great help to us. It would also
provide yet another clear demonstration of Europe's unity
in responding to Saddam Hussein's aggression.

FOREIGN SECRETARY

attached
You copied to me your minute to the Prime Minister of today's date and the paper enclosed on the subject of individual responsibility of Iraqis.

I agree that this is a difficult subject which should be addressed with considerable caution. I consider that it is primarily a matter of policy to determine whether to pursue individuals for grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions or other war crimes.

This policy will have to take into account, on the one hand, the difficulties involved in implementation and, on the other hand, popular demand that those responsible for horrible crimes should be brought to justice.

I agree that we should continue to refer to the individual responsibility of Iraqis in respect of grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions. It is, however, difficult and rather dangerous at this stage to go much beyond this, by suggesting how and where any prosecution might be pursued.

Of the options formulated in the paper, I regard the possibility of prosecuting under the Royal Warrant as much the least attractive. We surely would not wish to establish, unilaterally, ad hoc military tribunals to meet our purpose. Of the other options, establishing international jurisdiction would be a complex business. Moreover, Nuremberg/Tokyo are not altogether happy precedents. To many they derived substantially from the notion that the end justified the means.

Under the Geneva Conventions the Contracting Parties have

undertaken to establish the necessary jurisdiction in their own countries to prosecute for grave breaches. It might be difficult to persuade a new Iraqi regime, or Kuwait, or another Arab State to assume the burden of prosecuting Iraqi war criminals. And Western countries might not only face difficulties in bringing the accused persons within their jurisdiction but also attract hostility in the Muslim world for their pains. Nonetheless, prosecuting for offences under this established body of international law might still form the most practicable way forward.

We ought to discuss these tricky problems, as you suggest, with our allies, ultimately presenting a common front but in the meantime not publicly ruling out any option.

I also agree with the remaining points made in your minute.

I am copying this minute to the Prime Minister, the Secretary of State for Defence, the Secretary of State for Energy, the Chief of the Defence Staff and Sir Robin Butler.

PX
22 Jan '91



...to be made a new trial ...
...to secure the ...
...the ...
...hostility in the ...
...prosecution ...
...international law ...
...forward.

...the ...
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I also agree with the remaining points made in your ...
...I am ...
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...the ...

18

PRIME MINISTER

OPD(G): 23 JANUARY

We have a meeting of OPD(G) tomorrow. The main items are reports on the current military and international situation. There were two specific aspects you wanted to raise:

- Should we now shut the Iraqi Embassy altogether, because of the evidence that they are likely to be involved in terrorism? We would want to get rid of both the diplomatic staff and the locally engaged staff. There is a strong case for this. We have ways of contacting the Iraqis if we need to do so.
- Ought we not to be getting on with a proper study of the security arrangements for the Gulf region after the end of the conflict? Decisions will be called for rapidly when that happens. It might be a good idea to get our thoughts into the Americans early, and send a team across to discuss them.

The other main item on the agenda is a paper on the individual responsibility of the Iraqis for mistreatment of prisoners and for other war crimes. There is a paper by the Foreign Secretary which sets out some of the problems. In effect, it recommends that we defer a decision on whether to go for the full panoply of war crimes trials until the end of the conflict: but should continue to emphasise the individual responsibility of Iraqis in respect of breaches of the Geneva Convention, and set up an arrangement to collect and collate evidence of such breaches.

C.D.P.

C. D. POWELL

22 January 1991

A:\FOREIGN\OPD(G) (DAS)

E.R.

CCB/KR



Ref. AO91/184

PRIME MINISTER

(7)ca

cc Sir Percy Cradock
Mr Appleyard

OPD(G): 23 JanuaryItem 1: Current military situation

You might invite the Chief of the Defence Staff to bring you up-to-date on the air campaign over the past two days. I understand that the theatre commanders are reviewing their tactics in the light of Iraq's holding back its assets. The CDS will be able to tell you about this.

2. You might also ask what are the latest battle damage assessments (especially on CBW sites, Scud launchers and the Republican Guard) and if the improvement in the weather is giving us a better picture.

Item 2: Current international situation

3. You might invite the Foreign Secretary to report. The problems in NATO have still not been solved. The NATO Secretary General, Mr Woerner, had a discouraging reception in Bonn when he tried to sort out the simmering dispute on the German reaction to any recourse by Turkey to Article 5 of the NATO Treaty if she was attacked by Iraq. The FCO is consulting the Embassy in Ankara about the best contribution we can make to defusing this issue.

4. Apart from intermittent rumblings in the margins of the Security Council, and continuing Arab efforts to drum up a compromise plan, there have been few signs of diplomatic



6
activity. The Foreign Secretary may want to give his latest assessment of Israel's attitude. Mr Cheeseman, the missing journalist, has contacted his parents in Australia but may be under duress.

5. The Foreign Secretary is travelling to Paris on Thursday afternoon for talks with M. Dumas on the Gulf, an Arab-Israel settlement and the Soviet Union/Baltic States. You might ask him for his assessment of the French strategy.

6. I understand that you may want to ask whether the balance of advantage lies in closing the Iraqi Embassy in London entirely in view of residual risk of its contributing to terrorism. The Foreign Secretary is likely to point to the advantages of having an Iraqi representation to deal with in London, as illustrated by the public action we have been able to take on behalf of POWs.

Item 3: Individual responsibility of Iraqis

7. You might invite the Foreign Secretary to introduce his paper which was prepared at short notice to deal with the growing public anger over Iraqi treatment of POWs and other violations of the Geneva Conventions. The main points for discussion are the need to maintain our position of principle that Iraqis will be held responsible for their actions; whether the MOD should collect evidence on or around the battlefield; whether we should discuss with the Americans at a Ministerial level the need to avoid appearing to gun for Saddam personally (the Americans have been careful on this so far); and whether we should brief Opposition leaders on our approach to this issue. The Attorney General should be invited to comment on the legal aspects of the paper.

8. You may wish to conclude the discussion of the paper by endorsing the general conclusions of the paper and agreeing that we should concert a public line on personal responsibility with



the US Administration at Ministerial level as soon as possible. C

Item 4: Media handling

9. You might invite the Energy Secretary to report. At his Media Handling Group meeting yesterday he discussed the need to strike a balance in public perceptions of the campaign between initial euphoria and exaggerated pessimism. The Defence Secretary will want to explain how MOD are ringing the changes in their press conferences by putting up a variety of spokesmen in London and in the theatre.

10. You might ask Mr O'Donnell for his report on the day-to-day questions. It would be useful to check how Iraqi treatment of POWs is influencing media opinion. We will need to keep a close eye on how the press deals with this issue.

Aime Hawkins

p.p. ROBIN BUTLER

22 January 1991



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

22 January 1991

Context / 22.1

Ria Nivir

I have agreed to
re-write the message.Agree to
Dud?

Dear Charles,

Gulf Crisis: Soviet Union

Thank you for your letters of 18 and 19 January.
I enclose a draft telegram to Moscow incorporating a
reply to President Gorbachev's further message, enclosed
with your letter of 18 January.

CAN
24.1

As you will probably have seen from Moscow telno 140,
Gorbachev has publicised his bout of renewed diplomatic
activity, evidently with an eye to both domestic and
Arab opinion.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to
Simon Webb (MOD) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,
S L Gass

(S L Gass)
Private Secretary

Sir Charles Powell KCMG
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY

ZCZC

CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO

TO DESKBY NEXT CONTACT MOSCOW

TELNO

OF 211120Z JANUARY 91

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, PARIS, BONN, UKDEL NATO, RIYADH

INFO PRIORITY TEL AVIV, CAIRO, ACTOR

MIPT: THE GULF: MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT GORBACHEV

1. Following is the text of Gorbachev's message to the Prime Minister:

Begins

Dear Prime Minister

It is with concern and alarm that we received the news of Iraq having delivered last night a series of missile strikes on the territory of Israel, clearly striving to make the situation in the Middle East and the Gulf even more acute.

From the very beginning of the Kuwait crisis we have constantly and persistently warned about the danger of this type of plans, and stressed that their execution would be a reckless and unjustifiable action which would only aggravate the position of Iraq and create the risk of a new upsurge of Arab-Israel confrontation.

As a matter of urgency we called on Israel, Arab leaders to show restraint and not to succumb to emotions. I believe that relevant approaches undertaken on your part would contribute to

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DESKBY

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prevent a possible escalation of the conflict.

M Gorbachev

Ends

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MAIN

IRAQ/KUWAIT

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MIDDLE EAST: 8th Apr 38



SECRET/DEDIP

16.

SECRET

DEDIP

F.M AMMAN

TO DESKBY 221500Z FCO

TELNO 091

OF 221400Z JANUARY 91

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, RIYADH, TEL AVIV

US/JORDANIAN RELATIONS

SUMMARY

1. PRESIDENT BUSH SENDS A SPECIAL ENVOY TO AMMAN WITH A MESSAGE OF GENERAL SUPPORT. CORDIAL BUT APPARENTLY NON-SPECIFIC DISCUSSIONS.

DETAIL

2. MY US COLLEAGUE HAS TOLD ME (EMPHASISING THE SENSITIVITY OF THE SUBJECT) THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD SENT A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE, RICHARD ARMITAGE, TO AMMAN ON 21 JANUARY. ARMITAGE HAD HAD A LONG SESSION WITH THE KING AND HIS CLOSE ADVISERS.

3. HARRISON REPORTED THAT ARMITAGE HAD DELIVERED A GENERAL MESSAGE OF SUPPORT FROM THE PRESIDENT. THIS DID NOT MAKE ANY SPECIFIC PROMISES OTHER THAN THAT HE WAS CONSCIOUS OF THE NEED TO HELP JORDAN AND WOULD BE ANXIOUS TO DISCUSS JORDAN'S FUTURE ROLE, BOTH REGIONALLY AND AS REGARDS THE PEACE PROCESS, AS SOON AS THE WAR WAS OVER.

4. DURING THESE DISCUSSIONS ARMITAGE HAD MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE JORDANIAN IDEAS OF A CEASE-FIRE OR QUOTE PEACE PAUSE UNQUOTE (WHICH HAVE BULKED LARGE IN THE JORDANIAN MEDIA OVER THE PAST TWO DAYS) WERE A NON-STARTER. THE KING APPEARED TO ACCEPT THIS. DISCUSSIONS HAD BEEN DIFFICULT TO START WITH BUT THE TALKS HAD CONCLUDED ON A CORDIAL NOTE. HARRISON COMMENTED THAT ARMITAGE HAD CREDIT HERE FROM HIS FORMER ACTIVITIES IN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, WHEN HE DID MUCH TO ORGANISE SUPPORT FOR JORDAN. HE HAS MORE RECENTLY BEEN INVOLVED IN SENSITIVE NEGOTIATIONS OVER THE WAHDA DAM.

SECRET/DEDIP

(1)

COMMENT/

SECRET/SECRET

COMMENT

5. IT IS INTERESTING AND ENCOURAGING THAT THE PRESIDENT SHOULD HAVE SENT ARMITAGE AT THIS PARTICULAR TIME: THIS DESPITE SOME VERY NEGATIVE SIGNALS FROM JORDAN OF LATE (FOR EXAMPLE, THE GOVERNMENT'S STATEMENT ON THE WAR: MY TELNO 066). THE VISIT FOLLOWS BUSH'S POSITIVE COMMENTS ABOUT JORDAN AT A PRESS CONFERENCE ON 18 JANUARY, WHICH WERE PROMINENTLY COVERED HERE. I HOPE THAT, WITHOUT COMPROMISING THE SOURCE OF THIS INFORMATION, WE CAN IN DUE COURSE FIND OUT MORE ABOUT AMERICAN THINKING. SEEN FROM HERE IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WE TOO SHOULD BE INVOLVED IN ANY DISCUSSION OF JORDAN'S SITUATION.

6. ALTHOUGH HARRISON DID NOT MENTION IT, I IMAGINE THAT ARMITAGE WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY HAVE DISCUSSED IRAQI SCUD ATTACKS ON ISRAEL AND US EFFORTS TO DETER ISRAELI RETALIATION (WHICH REMAINS A MAJOR PREOCCUPATION HERE).

REEVE

IRAQ/KUWAIT SECRET
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PS/MR HOGG
PS/MR LENNOX-BOYD
MR P J WESTON
MR FAIRWEATHER
MR BROOMFIELD
MISS SPENCER
MR GOULDEN
MR GORE-BOOTH
MR BERMAN
MR SLATER

PS/NO 10 DOWNING ST
SIR P CRADOCK 10 DOWNING ST
CHIEF OF ASSESSMENTS STAFF
MR REEVES CAB OFFICE
MR APPELYARD CAB OFFICE
MR D GOWAN CAB OFFICE
PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE
HD/SEC (O) (C) MODUK
MR J HILL LAW OFFICERS
(ATTORNEY GENERAL'S DEPT)

SECRET/SECRET

(2)

ADVANCE COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

FM UKMIS NEW YORK

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 125

OF 220040Z JANUARY 91

INFO IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, MIDDLE EAST POSTS, WASHINGTON, MOSCOW
INFO IMMEDIATE PARIS, PEKING, VALLETTA, ABIDJAN, HAVANA, BUCHAREST
INFO IMMEDIATE KINSHASA, VIENNA, BRUSSELS, QUITO, HARARE, MODUK
INFO IMMEDIATE JHQ HIGH WYCOMBE, CABINET OFFICE, ACTOR

SIC

MY TELNO 123: IRAQ/KUWAIT: DEVELOPMENTS AT THE UNITED NATIONS

SUMMARY

1. AMBASSADORS OF THE FIVE DISCUSS THE STATE OF PLAY. CONTINUED AGREEMENT THAT DISCUSSION OF THE GULF IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL SHOULD BE AVOIDED. UNWILLINGNESS TO ENTERTAIN ANY UNCONDITIONAL PAUSE IN HOSTILITIES.

DETAIL

2. AMBASSADORS OF THE FIVE PERMANENT MEMBERS MET ON 21 JANUARY AT THE REQUEST OF MY U S COLLEAGUE, TO EXCHANGE NOTES ON THE LATEST DEVELOPMENTS AT THE UNITED NATIONS OVER THE GULF CRISIS.

3. PICKERING (UNITED STATES) SAID HE HAD SPOKEN EARLIER IN THE DAY TO THE (ZAIREAN) PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. IN THEIR REVIEW OF THE STATE OF PLAY THEY HAD TOUCHED ON:

A) THE SOVIET INITIATIVE FOR A PAUSE IN HOSTILITIES (MY TELNO 112). (PICKERING HAD REPORTED SEPARATELY TO ME THAT THE AMERICANS HAD TOLD THE RUSSIANS THEY COULD NOT SUPPORT GORBACHEV'S INITIATIVE: THERE COULD ONLY BE A PAUSE IN THE FIGHTING IF IRAQ HAD CLEARLY DEMONSTRATED THAT IT WAS IMPLEMENTING A COMMITMENT TO WITHDRAW FROM KUWAIT):

B) THE PRESIDENT'S CONTACTS WITH THE IRAQ PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE. BAGBENI HAD TAKEN IT UPON HIMSELF TO CONVEY THE SENSE OF THE SOVIET PROPOSAL TO THE IRAQI. THE LATTER HAD SAID HE WOULD CONVEY IT TO HIS GOVERNMENT AND GIVE BAGHDAD'S REACTIONS, BUT SEEMED UNCERTAIN WHETHER HE WOULD BE ABLE TO MAKE CONTACT:

C) BAGBENI'S DISCUSSION WITH THE INDIANS, WHO SEEMED TO BE MOVING CLOSER TO THE TERMS OF THE SOVIET INITIATIVE.

BAGBENI HAD ALSO BEEN IN TOUCH WITH THE ALGERIANS, WHO HAD NOTHING NEW TO SAY ABOUT THEIR OWN PEACE INITIATIVE.

4. PICKERING SAID HE HAD TOLD BAGBENI THAT RECENT DEVELOPMENTS MADE IT ALL THE MORE CERTAIN THAT ANY DISCUSSION OF THE GULF CRISIS IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL WOULD BE EXTREMELY UNTIDY. THE VARIOUS PROPOSALS FOR A CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES WERE HIGHLY POLITICAL IN THEIR MOTIVATION AND DIVISIVE IN THEIR EFFECT. FOR HIS PART HE WOULD FEEL BOUND TO BRING UP BOTH THE UNPROVOKED IRAQI ATTACKS ON ISRAEL AND IRAQI TREATMENT OF U S PRISONERS OF WAR. BAGBENI HAD SAID HE WAS HIMSELF THINKING OF INTRODUCING A COUNCIL RESOLUTION ON POWS. PICKERING HAD WARNED HIM THAT THIS MIGHT SPARK OFF A BROADER DEBATE: IT WOULD BE UNWISE TO ENTER INTO SUCH A DISCUSSION WITHOUT BEING CERTAIN HOW TO COME OUT OF IT.

5. PICKERING ALSO NOTED THE PRESIDENT'S INTENTION TO HOLD INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS OF SECURITY COUNCIL MEMBERS ON LIBERIA ON 22 JANUARY. HE HAD SOME DOUBTS WHETHER IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO RESTRICT ANY SUCH DISCUSSION TO THE SUBJECT ON THE AGENDA. FINALLY PICKERING (AND LATER OUR FRENCH COLLEAGUE AND I) BRIEFED PARTNERS ON OUR ACTION TO REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL: SEE MY TELNO 124.

6. I SAID THAT I HAD CONVEYED HMG'S FORMAL RESPONSE TO THE INDIAN PEACE INITIATIVE (MY TELNO 123). WE WERE LESS CERTAIN THAT INDIAN THINKING WAS MOVING IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION (NEW DELHI TELNO 108). I SHARED SOME OF PICKERING'S DOUBTS ABOUT AN EARLY DISCUSSION ON LIBERIA IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

7. BLANC (FRANCE) SAID HE HAD TOLD THE INDIAN PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE THAT FRANCE COULD NOT AGREE TO ANY PAUSE IN HOSTILITIES UNLESS IRAQ WAS COMPLYING WITH SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS. SCHEER HAD BEEN SENT TO ALGIERS (PARIS TELNO 74) TO EXPLAIN THAT POSITION TO THE ALGERIANS.

8. VORONTSOV (SOVIET UNION) SAID HIS INFORMATION FROM DELHI WAS THAT THE INDIAN POSITION WAS INDEED NOW CLOSER TO THAT OF THE SOVIET UNION. BUT HE FEARED A GROUND-SWELL AMONG THE NON-ALIGNED, LED BY THE ALGERIANS, TO PRESS FOR AN UNCONDITIONAL PAUSE IN HOSTILITIES. IT WAS ENCOURAGING THAT YUGOSLAVIA (WITH ITS INFLUENCE AMONG THE NON-ALIGNED) WAS OPPOSED TO AN UNCONDITIONAL PAUSE. WHERE SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION WAS CONCERNED, HE FEARED THAT THE CUBANS OR YEMENIS WOULD TAKE ADVANTAGE OF DISCUSSION ON LIBERIA TO RAISE SOME INITIATIVE ON THE GULF. IT MIGHT BE PREFERABLE IF THAT COUNCIL

DISCUSSION COULD BE DELAYED, PERHAPS BECAUSE A DELEGATION HAD DIFFICULTIES WITH THE TEXT OF THE PROPOSED PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT. HIS DELEGATION DID IN FACT HAVE QUESTIONS TO RAISE ON THE TEXT, AND COULD USE THIS AS A PRETEXT FOR DELAY. PICKERING AND I SAID WE WERE ATTRACTED BY THAT SUGGESTION, AND IT WAS AGREED THAT VORONTSOV WOULD CONTACT THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL ACCORDINGLY.

HANNAY

YYYY

DISTRIBUTION

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ADVANCE

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IRAQ/KUWAIT

PS⁽²⁾

PS/MR HOGG

PS/MR LENNOX-BOYD

PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE

PS/PUS

MR FAIRWEATHER

MR BROOMFIELD

MR SLATER

MR GORE-BOOTH

MR GOULDEN

MR JAY

MR BERMAN (LEGAL ADVISERS)

HD/MED

HD/AMD

HD/CONSULAR D

HD/ECD(E)

HD/NAD

HD/NEWS D

HD/NENAD

HD/SECPOL D

HD/SED

HD/UND⁽²⁾CHIEF OF ASSESSMENT STAFF
(CABINET OFFICE)

MR PRIDDLE, DEPT OF ENERGY

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MR W D REEVES CABINET OFFICE

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INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON, EC POSTS, UKDEL NATO

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MY TELNO 56: GERMAN VIEWS ON THE GULF WAR

SUMMARY

1. PUBLIC OPINION BECOMING MORE SYMPATHETIC TO THE MULTINATIONAL COALITION. GOVERNMENT UNCOMFORTABLE: ESPECIALLY WORRIED ABOUT RELATIONSHIP WITH THE US. DEFENSIVENESS MAY MAKE IT MORE RECEPTIVE TO A UK REQUEST FOR FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTION TO WAR COSTS.

DETAIL

2. THE GOVERNMENT CONTINUES TO BE ATTACKED IN THE GERMAN PRESS (AND SUBJECTED TO MORE CRITICAL EXAMINATION THAN HITHERTO BY THE ELECTRONIC MEDIA) FOR FAILING TO SHOW SUFFICIENT LEADERSHIP, PRACTICAL SUPPORT OR POLITICAL SOLIDARITY OVER THE GULF WAR. MASS CIRCULATION BILD IS CALLING FOR A PROPER STATEMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT'S POSITION. PEACE DEMONSTRATIONS CONTINUE (AND A BIG ONE IS PLANNED FOR NEXT WEEKEND IN BONN) BUT A TELEPHONE POLL LAST WEEKEND SHOWED GERMAN OPINION MOVING IN SUPPORT OF ARMED INTERVENTION AGAINST IRAQ (80% OF THOSE QUESTIONED) AND AGAINST THE DEMONSTRATORS. CDU GENERAL SECRETARY RUEHE AND PARLIAMENTARY PARTY CHAIRMAN DREGGER HAVE COMMENTED TO ME THAT THE GOVERNMENT COULD DO MORE TO ENCOURAGE THIS TREND.

3. THE GOVERNMENT HAS MADE A FEW MOVES TO PALLIATE THE CONSEQUENCES OF ITS POLICY. THEY ARE ESPECIALLY WORRIED ABOUT THE EFFECTS ON RELATIONS WITH THE AMERICANS. GENSCHER HAS WARNED AGAINST THE ANTI-AMERICAN UNDERTONES OF THE DEMONSTRATIONS AND KOHL HAS BEGUN TO TALK ABOUT THE FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTION THAT THE FRG WILL NEED TO MAKE TO A POST WAR MARSHALL PLAN. WAIGEL HAS ADMITTED IN PUBLIC THAT GERMANY WILL CONTRIBUTE MORE TO THE COSTS OF THE WAR.

COMMENT

4. THE GOVERNMENT IS INCREASINGLY UNCOMFORTABLE AND EMBARRASSED ABOUT DUCKING THE HARD ISSUES. THEIR GENERAL DEFENSIVENESS SHOULD INCREASE THEIR DESIRE NOT TO APPEAR UNHELPFUL TOWARDS THE UK OVER

A FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTION TO THE COSTS OF THE WAR.

MALLABY

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AND TO DESKBY 222350Z CABINET OFFICE

INFO IMMEDIATE MIDDLE EAST POSTS, UKMIS NEW YORK

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SUMMARY

1. GROWING AWARENESS THAT THINGS WILL TAKE LONGER THAN ORIGINALLY THOUGHT.

DETAIL

2. OFFICIAL COMMENT ON 22 JANUARY CONTINUES TO EMPHASISE THE LONG HAUL. THERE IS A SENSE THAT THE AIR CAMPAIGN, ALTHOUGH GOING WELL, IS BEHIND SCHEDULE BECAUSE OF THE WEATHER. THERE IS ALSO CONTINUED FRUSTRATION OVER THE LACK OF ACCURATE BOMB DAMAGE ASSESSMENT. OTHER FACTORS HAVE ADDED TO A SLIGHTLY MORE DOWN-BEAT MOOD: US ACKNOWLEDGEMENT THAT THEY HAVE NOT YET CRIPPLED IRAQI MILITARY COMMAND AND CONTROL NETWORKS: THE ADMISSION THAT THE BULK OF THE IRAQI AIRFORCE REMAINS INTACT: CHENEY'S COMMENT THAT THE LENGTH OF THE WAR COULD BE WEEKS OR MONTHS: AND HIS ASSESSMENT THAT IRAQ STILL HAD HUNDREDS OF SCUDS. SUGGESTIONS IN RECENT DAYS THAT THESE POSED NO SERIOUS THREAT - BECAUSE OF THEIR INACCURACY AND THE PATRIOT'S ABILITY TO INTERCEPT THEM - TOOK A DENT WITH THE ATTACK ON TEL AVIV THIS EVENING.

3. POLLS REFLECT THE MORE SOMBRE MOOD. THERE IS STILL BROAD SUPPORT FOR THE WAR EFFORT (75 PERCENT) AND THE PRESIDENT'S APPROVAL RATING REMAINS AT RECORD LEVELS (82 PERCENT) BUT OPTIMISM HAS WANED, WITH THE GREAT MAJORITY EXPECTING THE CONFLICT TO LAST FOR WEEKS IF NOT MONTHS. 65 PERCENT ALSO THINK THAT THE FINAL US OBJECTIVE SHOULD BE TO GET RID OF SADDAM HUSSEIN.

4. THE IRAQI PARADING OF ALLIED PRISONERS ON TV CONTINUES TO CAUSE UPSET AND ANGER. THE ISSUE HAS AROUSED INTENSE INTEREST ON THE HILL, AND CONGRESSMEN ARE INCREASINGLY FOCUSING ON THE

QUESTION OF WAR CRIMES. THE WHITE HOUSE SPOKESMAN SAID AGAIN TODAY THAT SADDAM WOULD BE HELD ACCOUNTABLE FOR HIS TREATMENT OF PWS. HE ADDED, THAT, WHILE NO FINAL DECISIONS HAD BEEN MADE, WAR CRIMES WOULD BE ONE APPROACH.

5. THE WHITE HOUSE HAVE CONFIRMED THAT THE PRESIDENT SENT RICHARD ARMITAGE (ASSISTANT SECRETARY AT THE DOD UNDER REAGAN) TO JORDON FOR TALKS WITH KING HUSSEIN AND SENIOR JORDANIAN OFFICIALS. HE CARRIED NO SPECIFIC OFFER OF ASSISTANCE, BUT WAS SENT TO DISCUSS WITH KING HUSSEIN PERSONALLY THE CURRENT SITUATION, INCLUDING THE PROBLEM OF REFUGEES. ARMITAGE IS DUE BACK IN WASHINGTON ON 22 JANUARY.

6. THE US PRESS REPORTED TODAY THAT ISRAEL HAD ASKED WASHINGTON FOR DOLLARS 3 BILLION IN WAR DAMAGE ASSISTANCE, AND SUGGESTED THAT A FURTHER US DOLLARS 10 BILLION WOULD BE REQUIRED TO SETTLE SOVIET JEWS. THE STATE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN WAS ASKED ABOUT THESE REPORTS. SHE SAID THAT SHE WAS UNAWARE OF ANY DIRECT REQUEST TO STATE. BUT THE FEELING THAT ISRAEL WILL WANT A PRICE FOR ITS RESTRAINT IS GROWING. ON THE OTHER HAND, NEWS OF THE SCUD STRIKE ON TEL AVIV HAS LED MANY TO BELIEVE THAT CONTINUED ISRAELI RESTRAINT WILL NOW BE MUCH HARDER, ALTHOUGH THE ADMINISTRATION CONTINUES TO URGE IT.

7. THERE IS CONSIDERABLE SYMPATHY FOR BRITISH LOSSES IN THE US MEDIA WITH GENERAL ACCEPTANCE THAT THEY ARE THE RESULT PARTLY OF BAD LUCK AND PARTLY OF THE TOUGHER TARGETS WHICH OUR TORNADOS ARE HITTING.

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MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

Telephone 071- 21 8211/3

MO 6/17/15/1S

22 January 1991

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R. Webb
CR
 22/1

Dear Charles,

CALL TO SECRETARY CHENEY

The Defence Secretary had a brief discussion with Secretary Cheney this afternoon mainly about our current line to the media on the success of the air campaign.

Mr Cheney said that, with slight differences in emphasis, he thought that the reports in the US of the British and US statements were comparable. He did not think that any special action was needed to align what we are saying beyond existing arrangements for keeping in touch.

Mr Cheney said he expected that the US targeting would shortly include some of the ground stations that were transmitting video pictures out of Iraq, so these should disappear from TV screens. Asked about civilian casualties Mr Cheney said that he had little hard information but it was assessed that damage to water supplies and electricity stations was causing significant discomfort to the Iraqi population.


Because General Schwarzkopf has been holding a conference today there will be no "view from Riyadh" this evening.

I am copying this to Richard Gozney (FCO) and to Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely

for *Janet Winstanley*
 (S WEBB)
 Private Secretary (AOD)

Sir Charles Powell KCMG
 No 10 Downing Street

DEPARTMENT/SERIES <i>PREM 19</i> PIECE/ITEM <i>3444</i> (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
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PRIME MINISTER

OPD(G): 23 JANUARY

We have a meeting of OPD(G) tomorrow. The main items are reports on the current military and international situation. There were two specific aspects you wanted to raise:

- Should we now shut the Iraqi Embassy altogether, because of the evidence that they are likely to be involved in terrorism? We would want to get rid of both the diplomatic staff and the locally engaged staff. There is a strong case for this. We have ways of contacting the Iraqis if we need to do so.
- Ought we not to be getting on with a proper study of the security arrangements for the Gulf region after the end of the conflict? Decisions will be called for rapidly when that happens. It might be a good idea to get our thoughts into the Americans early, and send a team across to discuss them.

The other main item on the agenda is a paper on the individual responsibility of the Iraqis for mistreatment of prisoners and for other war crimes. There is a paper by the Foreign Secretary which sets out some of the problems. In effect, it recommends that we defer a decision on whether to go for the full panoply of war crimes trials until the end of the conflict: but should continue to emphasise the individual responsibility of Iraqis in respect of breaches of the Geneva Convention, and set up an arrangement to collect and collate evidence of such breaches.

C. D. POWELL

22 January 1991

A:\FOREIGN\OPD(G) (DAS)

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10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

22 January 1991

GULF CRISIS: MESSAGE TO KING FAHD

Thank you for your letter of 22 January proposing a message from the Prime Minister to King Fahd about the Iraqi missile attacks on civilian targets in Saudi Arabia. I enclose a revised message and would be grateful if you would arrange for its delivery as soon as possible.

CHARLES POWELL

Simon Gass Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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TO DESKBY

Z RIYADH

TELNO

OF

Z JAN 91

YOUR TEL NOS 188 AND 189: MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER

1. The Prime Minister agrees that it would be appropriate for him to send a message about Iraqi missile attacks on Saudi Arabia. We are grateful to you for your suggested draft. Please deliver the following final version of the text:

BEGINS

We have watched aghast on television the Iraqi SCUD missile attacks on Dhahran and Riyadh. They must have been a most unpleasant and unnerving experience and I send you and the people of the two cities my sympathy. The use of such indiscriminate weapons of destruction against civilian targets illustrates all too well the nature of the regime in Baghdad. I am relieved that the Patriot anti-missile defence system has shown itself so effective, and no lives have been lost. We shall continue our efforts to discover and destroy the SCUD launchers.

I also wanted to tell you about our efforts to encourage the Israeli government to show restraint in the face of the missile attacks which they have also endured from Iraq. Prince Saud raised this with our Ambassador on 19 January. I wrote to Prime Minister Shamir the same day urging him to avoid retaliatory action if at all possible. Saddam's purpose in attacking Israel is clearly to widen the conflict and divert attention from Kuwait. Israel has so far held back despite the extreme provocation, helped by the delivery of US Patriot missile systems. I hope that this restraint will be sustained. But further successful attacks which caused significant casualties would inevitably increase the pressure on the Israeli government to take some action. We have all been impressed by the robust response of our Arab friends to Iraq's cynical ploy. I am sure that, whatever happens, our two governments will not be diverted

from our common purpose of carrying the campaign to liberate Kuwait to a successful conclusion.

I have been very pleased to hear from Lt Gen de La Billiere how well the Royal Saudi Air Force and the Royal Air Force are cooperating in conducting operations since hostilities began. The Al Yamamah project is demonstrating its effectiveness more clearly than ever.

With sincere good wishes. John Major

ENDS

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IRAQ/KUWAIT (EU)

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

22 January 1991

Dear Charles,

Gulf Crisis: Message to King Fahd

You will have seen that in Riyadh telnos 188 and 189 Sir Alan Munro has suggested that the Prime Minister should send a message to King Fahd about the Iraqi missile attacks on civilian targets in Saudi Arabia. The Foreign Secretary agrees that it would be helpful to show King Fahd that we sympathise with the Saudis over these attacks and that our concern is not confined to Israel alone. I enclose a draft.

Yours ever,
S. L. Gass

(S. L. Gass)
Private Secretary

Sir Charles Powell KCMG
10 Downing Street

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We have watched aghar
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YOUR TELNOS 188 AND 189: MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER

1. The Prime Minister agrees that it would be appropriate for him to send a message about Iraqi missile attacks on Saudi Arabia. We are grateful to you for your suggested draft. Please deliver the following final version of the text:
BEGINS

I have been deeply distressed to see the Iraqi ^{SCUD} missile attacks on Dhahran and Riyadh. The use of such indiscriminate weapons of destruction against civilian targets ^{all too well} illustrates the nature of the regime in Baghdad. I am relieved that the ^{has been} anti-missile defence system in place has been so effective, and no lives have been lost. But I know how troubling it must be for your people to live under this threat. Our thoughts are with you at this very difficult time.

I wanted also to let you know of the efforts we have made with the Israeli government to encourage them to show restraint in the face of the missile threat from Iraq. Prince Saud raised this with our Ambassador on 19 January. I wrote that day to Prime Minister Shamir warning of the risks attached to retaliatory action. Clearly Saddam's purpose in attacking Israel is the cynical one of widening the conflict and diverting

They must have been a most unpleasant experience. I had you people of the two cities of my sympathy.

Catchword: attention

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despite the attention from Kuwait. Israel has so far *held back* ~~exercised~~ restraint ~~under~~ extreme provocation, helped by the delivery of US patriot missile systems. I hope that this restraint will be sustained *although* despite the pressures which the Israeli government faces. Whatever happens, I know our two governments will not be diverted from our common purpose, ~~which we discussed together in Riyadh~~, of carrying the campaign to liberate Kuwait to a successful conclusion.

May I add that I have been very pleased to hear from Lt Gen de La Billiere of the ~~close cooperation~~ *has well the* existing between the Royal Saudi Air Force and the Royal Air Force in operations since hostilities began. The Al Yamamah project is ~~now~~ *clearly* clearly demonstrating its effectiveness. *more clearly than ever.*

With sincere good wishes. John Major.

ENDS

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
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PRIME MINISTER

GULF CRISIS: INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY OF IRAQIS

1. The appearance on Iraqi TV of British prisoners of war who may have been maltreated, and reports that Prisoners of War will be sent away to strategic sites as human shields, have focussed public attention on war crimes. This can be expected to assume still greater importance as the weeks go by and particularly after the land battle (which may lead to more of our people falling into Iraqi hands) gets under way. The re-introduction of the War Crimes Bill into the House of Commons in March/April will also sharpen public interest in the issue.

2. Both the Security Council and British Ministers have referred at various times since the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait to the liability of Iraq in respect of grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (the instruments under which war criminals would be pursued), and in particular to the personal responsibility of individuals who commit such grave breaches or order their commission. The enclosed paper considers the mechanisms and procedures by which we might hold the Iraqis to this responsibility after the occupation of Kuwait has been brought to an end.

3. This is a difficult area and we need to proceed with some care. We would shed no tears were Saddam Hussein, as the discredited leader of a defeated country, to disappear after the war is over. If he were to offer to withdraw from

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Kuwait in circumstances which saved us lives and treasure, we should not want to make his surrender to justice a condition for the acceptance of that offer. Neither, I imagine, would we wish to oppose a settlement which involved his going in to exile provided the agreement was acceptable in all other respects.

4. On the other hand we should not rule out the possibility of deciding to proceed against him or other individual Iraqis at some stage. There would be strong pressures for us to do so if for example there had been atrocities against British Prisoners of War.

5. I hope that we could reach agreement in OPD(G) on the following points:

- a. we should continue to refer to the individual responsibility of Iraqis in respect of grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions. You confirmed this again yesterday, 21 January. We can do no less if we are to convince the British public and an increasingly anxious Parliament and press that we are doing all we can to prevent maltreatment of our PWs. But we should try to avoid elevating the downfall and possible trial of Saddam Hussein to one of our objectives once the war is over.
- b. An arrangement should be set up (presumably by the MOD) to collect and collate evidence of Iraqi breaches which becomes available on or around the battlefield. I am not suggesting that large resources should be devoted to this purpose, nor would I wish it to be assumed that, because a mechanism existed, we would necessarily expect



proceedings to be taken after the war, but (a) above will carry no conviction unless some such arrangement is put in place;

c. we should raise the matter with the Americans at a political level to keep in line. I will also mention to M. Dumas in Paris on Thursday. Political pressures may make it difficult for Kuwait or Saudi Arabia to prosecute Iraqis.

d. We might consider briefing Opposition leaders on our approach to this problem.

6. I am copying this minute to the Secretary of State for Defence, the Secretary of State for Energy, the Attorney General, the Chief of the Defence Staff and Sir Robin Butler.

DH

(DOUGLAS HURD)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
22 January 1990

INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY OF IRAQIS

1. SCRs 670 and 674 recall the liability of Iraq in respect of grave breaches of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, and in particular the personal responsibility of individuals who commit them or order their commission. These provisions repeat, in legally more precise terms, earlier statements by British Ministers and the Foreign Ministers of the Twelve. The purpose of this paper is to consider, without prejudice to policy decisions as to Allied objectives in resolving the Gulf crisis, the mechanisms and procedures by which illegal acts by Iraqis or Iraqi agents might be pursued after the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait has been brought to an end.

2. The paper covers in order: offences, geographical scope, potential defendants, timing, machinery and evidence, before offering some policy conclusions.

A. Offences

3. Ministerial statements have been based on the concept of "grave breaches" in the Fourth Geneva Convention. The same is true of the Security Council Resolutions. The list of grave breaches set out in Article 147 is comprehensive (see Annex). The key elements of these are defined with a degree of precision in the substantive Articles of the Convention. With the onset of armed conflict between the UK and Iraq, the First, Second and Third Conventions have also come into operation. Each has an exactly equivalent system of "grave breaches" (see Annex). Taken together, they provide a wide coverage, with the additional advantage of being linked to a system of penal jurisdiction (see Section E below).

4. The Nuremberg and Tokyo Charters of 1945 gave the International Military Tribunals jurisdiction to try three categories of crimes. Of these, 'War Crimes' corresponds broadly to the "grave breaches" discussed above. 'Crimes against the Peace', on the other hand, covered the planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression; whereas 'Crimes against Humanity' was designed to deal

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with inhumane acts against civilian populations, including before the War (and thus covered Nazi racial persecution). To adopt, for present purposes, the Nuremberg/Tokyo categories is liable therefore to raise tendentious extraneous questions. It would be better to continue to invoke, as we have done until now, the Geneva Conventions, as universally-accepted standards of conduct to which Iraq itself expressly assented in acceding to all four Conventions in 1956.

B. Geographical Scope

5. With the Iraqi invasion in August, the Geneva Conventions came into operation as between Iraq and Kuwait. The better argument is that that state of armed conflict between Iraq and Kuwait continues, and with it therefore the applicability of the Conventions. But in any case the Fourth Convention applies in virtue of the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait, and SCRs 670 and 674 declare this. Once the Conventions are in operation, they enure for the benefit of all persons protected by them, regardless of nationality. They therefore cover British citizens in Kuwait and British citizens compulsorily transferred from Kuwait to Iraq. The only question not free from doubt is whether they cover the few remaining British citizens in Iraq as "protected persons" (conferring a special degree of protection). Our interpretation of the relevant provision is that they do; the ICRC takes a similar view.

6. With the onset of armed hostilities, all four Conventions have unquestionably come into operation as between the UK and Iraq. The geographical scope of the Conventions is that of the hostilities themselves.

C. Potential Defendants

7. The Geneva Conventions are inter-State treaties; therefore they bind primarily the State. Iraq would be legally responsible internationally for breaches committed by persons for whose conduct it is answerable. The Geneva Conventions are however special, in that duties are imposed directly on a wide range of persons who take part in warfare or are responsible for military or civil policy or

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its execution. Such persons bear direct criminal responsibility, separate from the general legal responsibility of the State, and cannot plead 'superior orders' as a defence. There is no difference according to whether the persons concerned are Iraqi nationals or foreigners acting at Iraqi behest in Iraq or Kuwait. The Conventions expressly require each High Contracting Party to legislate so as to reflect this position (see Annex).

8. The wartime and post-war arrangements of the Second World War divided the treatment of alleged war criminals into two. The primary rule was that the accused was returned to the place of the crime to stand trial there under a rehabilitated system of local law. The overwhelming majority of war crimes trials, numerically, was handled this way. The explicit intention was to satisfy local demands for justice and, on a practical level, to ease the problems of procedure and evidence. The Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals, on the other hand, were reserved expressly for a limited number of major war criminals "whose offences have no particular geographical location". This category of defendants was tried not for the direct consequences of their own actions but in essence for policies which they ordered or approved.

9. The Nuremberg/Tokyo precedent is not therefore a good one for present purposes. There is not likely to be one category of local offences and another of offences 'with no particular geographical location'. The Geneva Convention rules provide a means for dealing with all cases, and already incorporate the notion of an increasing degree of legal responsibility as one moves higher up the chain of command. A more difficult question will be, in the event that large numbers of grave breaches are uncovered, whether or not to exercise selectivity in pursuing potential defendants. A limited selection of major defendants may well serve to set a salutary example but would raise serious questions of fairness; selection itself is also notoriously difficult. Conversely, a comprehensive pursuit of all war crimes and occupation crimes might well be a major undertaking, lasting a long time, and having potentially adverse impact therefor on establishing a post-conflict settlement. Without total Iraqi surrender and occupation, it is not clear which Iraqis and Iraqi

agents would be physically in Allied hands on the liberation of Kuwait.

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10. The timing of prosecutions will depend on two factors: accused persons being physically in the hands of governments intending to submit them to prosecution, and the general Allied policy as to the relationship between trials for grave breaches and other aspects of the management and resolution on the Gulf crisis. The first of these factors of itself suggests that action would follow only after Iraqi expulsion from Kuwait had been achieved, i.e. as part of the post-conflict arrangements. If Iraqis or Iraqi agents accused of grave breaches fall into British and Allied hands while the military action is still in train, it would be normal to retain the accused as prisoners for subsequent release or trial, especially if the armed hostilities were of short duration. There would be a wider range of options for dealing with them after hostilities had ceased, and the evidence might be more accessible.

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Both of these are expressly provided for in Article 146 and corresponding Articles (see Annex). They would not however preclude a third theoretical option (even if not expressly provided for as, for example, in the Genocide Convention), namely:

- (c) trial before a special international tribunal.

As between the above:

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(a) would require no further legislative action; the legal basis is already provided by the Geneva Conventions Act 1957. Trial would be before the ordinary criminal courts; prosecutions would require the DPP's consent. It would however be a major and costly undertaking; defendants would have to be transported to the UK, as would witnesses (for both prosecution and defence) and physical evidence. An alternative might be trial by Military Courts under the old Royal Warrant of 1945. But this could only be abroad and only if the UK were construed as being "at war" with Iraq.

(b) might be particularly suited for transfer of defendants either to the State of their own nationality or the State where their crimes were committed, who ought, in accordance with their obligations under Article 146 etc, to have an equivalent jurisdiction to try them under their own law. It would not be possible however to extradite from the UK under the Geneva Conventions Act 1957 as it stands, but might be possible by way of ad hoc extradition under the new powers in the Extradition Act 1989. It might alternatively be possible for prisoners held in theatre to be transferred informally to another belligerent without extradition formalities.

(c) would require a new treaty setting up a new tribunal and laying down its powers and procedure, though the definition of offences could simply borrow that of "grave breaches" under the Geneva Conventions. No existing international or regional tribunal has personal criminal jurisdiction or powers to pronounce or carry out sentences. It has been suggested that a tribunal might be established by decision of the United Nations, but there would be limits on the powers that could be conferred on it except by treaty. Either way it would probably be necessary to back new arrangements with fresh legislation (depending on the powers to be conferred on the tribunal, where it would sit, who should have custody of the accused pending and during trial, and where and by whom its sentences were to be executed).

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F. Evidence

12. It should be borne in mind that prosecutions would only be possible if evidence was available to raise a sufficient likelihood of conviction, and in a form that was admissible before the trial court under its normal rules. In the case of a new international tribunal, its rules of evidence would have to be laid down specifically. In addition to the question of evidence, the usual procedural safeguards to ensure a fair trial would apply or would have to be provided, including facilities for the defence and provision for different languages and for interpretation, so as to meet the requirements of the ECHR.

13. The most fruitful sources of evidence are those British subjects who were held against their will in Iraq or were in hiding in Kuwait after the Iraqi invasion; or (in the current hostilities) members of the British Armed Forces on the spot or other eye-witnesses. A certain amount of information has been gathered as a by-product of intelligence interviews carried out by the MoD with returning British civilians, but this has not been collated and it scarcely seems worthwhile as matters stand to undertake this. Arrangements for the present hostilities are under consideration in the MoD. Information collected and collated from British sources would not necessarily have to be used in British prosecutions, but could be made available to other states on request, or furnished to the UN.

14. The gathering of evidence and background information, even if limited to British sources, would be a sizeable task for which the necessary resources would have to be provided. Departmental responsibility would also have to be identified, since the subject does not fall within the normal responsibilities of any government department. An effective allocation of resources would be eased by prior policy decisions on the scale and ultimate purpose of the exercise.

15. The United Nations might well set up a clearing-house for

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evidence and documentation, as after the Second World War. This would be a natural development of SCR 674.

General

16. In general, it would be highly desirable, not to say essential, for the UK's approach to be compatible with that taken by other Allies, notably as regards A, C, D and E above. Consultations with the Americans show that, with some differences of emphasis, thinking is proceeding on very similar lines.

Conclusions

17. From the political point of view, the following conclusions suggest themselves:

(a) the Nuremberg procedure would not be appropriate for dealing with Iraqis unless perhaps large-scale atrocities ensued between now and the resolution of the crisis, leading to powerful public pressure for international action. Any proposal to set up an international tribunal would have to confront the issue of the death penalty, or, alternatively, the willingness of individual governments to hold defeated Iraqi leaders as prisoners for lengthy periods of time;

(b) even if the Saddam Hussein regime is toppled, it is hard to envisage a successor Iraqi Government willing to pursue large-scale prosecutions of its own nationals for excesses committed during the crisis. Consequently, the only individuals against whom the international community might in practice be able to move would be those who fell into allied hands as POWs or, perhaps years later, turned up in the UK or another friendly State in the normal course of international travel;

(c) the restored Government of Kuwait might come under pressure to punish individuals who had committed excesses during the occupation of Kuwait; whether the Kuwaitis would have any interest in bringing

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Iraqis to trial would depend on their political priorities at the time, including the need to establish a viable relationship with Baghdad. Similar considerations would apply with varying degrees of force to Saudi Arabia and the other Arab States of the Gulf;

(d) there are some political (as well as practical) arguments against bringing individual Iraqis to trial in British courts. To do so would complicate British relations with the Arab world after the crisis and increase the possibilities of British interests being a particular target for Arab terrorism. Similar considerations are likely to weigh with other Western allies, although there may be greater public pressure in the USA for unilateral legal action. The picture would change if atrocities were committed against Allied forces in the field or PoWs, in which event HMG and Allied Governments would have to balance the conflicting pressures. Publicly, we should maintain the deterrent value of Ministerial statements and the UN resolutions by not ruling out any options, but conversely we should not saddle ourselves with any commitment to pursue the Iraqi leadership.

ANNEX

GENEVA CONVENTIONS 1949: PROVISIONS FOR THE REPRESSION OF GRAVE BREACHES

Fourth Convention

Article 146

The High Contracting Parties undertake to enact any legislation necessary to provide effective penal sanctions for persons committing, or ordering to be committed, any of the grave breaches of the present Convention defined in the following Article.

Each High Contracting Party shall be under the obligation to search for persons alleged to have committed, or to have ordered to be committed, such grave breaches, and shall bring such persons, regardless of their nationality, before its own courts. It may also, if it prefers, and in accordance with the provisions of its own legislation, hand such persons over for trial to another High Contracting Party concerned, provided such High Contracting Party has made out a prima facie case,

Each High Contracting Party shall take measures necessary for the suppression of all acts contrary to the provisions of the present Convention other than the grave breaches defined in the following Article.

In all circumstances, the accused persons shall benefit by safeguards of proper trial and defence, which shall not be less favourable than those provided by Article 105 and those following of the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of 12th August, 1949.

Article 147

Grave breaches to which the preceding Article relates shall be those involving any of the following acts, if committed against persons or property protected by the present Convention: wilful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments, wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health, unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement of a protected person, compelling a protected person to serve in the forces of a hostile Power, or wilfully depriving a protected person of the rights of fair and regular trial prescribed in the present Convention, taking of hostages and extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully

nd wantonly.

(Identical provisions appear in the

First Convention : Articles 49 and 50

Second Convention : Articles 50 and 51

Third Convention : Articles 129 and 130)

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PM/91/005

PRIME MINISTER

Seen by COP.

GULF CRISIS: INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY OF IRAQIS

1. The appearance on Iraqi TV of British prisoners of war who may have been maltreated, and reports that Prisoners of War will be sent away to strategic sites as human shields, have focussed public attention on war crimes. This can be expected to assume still greater importance as the weeks go by and particularly after the land battle (which may lead to more of our people falling into Iraqi hands) gets under way. The re-introduction of the War Crimes Bill into the House of Commons in March/April will also sharpen public interest in the issue.

2. Both the Security Council and British Ministers have referred at various times since the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait to the liability of Iraq in respect of grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (the instruments under which war criminals would be pursued), and in particular to the personal responsibility of individuals who commit such grave breaches or order their commission. The enclosed paper considers the mechanisms and procedures by which we might hold the Iraqis to this responsibility after the occupation of Kuwait has been brought to an end.

3. This is a difficult area and we need to proceed with some care. We would shed no tears were Saddam Hussein, as the discredited leader of a defeated country, to disappear after the war is over. If he were to offer to withdraw from

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Kuwait in circumstances which saved us lives and treasure, we should not want to make his surrender to justice a condition for the acceptance of that offer. Neither, I imagine, would we wish to oppose a settlement which involved his going in to exile provided the agreement was acceptable in all other respects.

4. On the other hand we should not rule out the possibility of deciding to proceed against him or other individual Iraqis at some stage. There would be strong pressures for us to do so if for example there had been atrocities against British Prisoners of War.

5. I hope that we could reach agreement in OPD(G) on the following points:

- a. we should continue to refer to the individual responsibility of Iraqis in respect of grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions. You confirmed this again yesterday, 21 January. We can do no less if we are to convince the British public and an increasingly anxious Parliament and press that we are doing all we can to prevent maltreatment of our PWs. But we should try to avoid elevating the downfall and possible trial of Saddam Hussein to one of our objectives once the war is over.
- b. An arrangement should be set up (presumably by the MOD) to collect and collate evidence of Iraqi breaches which becomes available on or around the battlefield. I am not suggesting that large resources should be devoted to this purpose, nor would I wish it to be assumed that, because a mechanism existed, we would necessarily expect



proceedings to be taken after the war, but (a) above will carry no conviction unless some such arrangement is put in place;

- c. we should raise the matter with the Americans at a political level to keep in line. I will also mention to M. Dumas in Paris on Thursday. Political pressures may make it difficult for Kuwait or Saudi Arabia to prosecute Iraqis.
- d. We might consider briefing Opposition leaders on our approach to this problem.

6. I am copying this minute to the Secretary of State for Defence, the Secretary of State for Energy, the Attorney General, the Chief of the Defence Staff and Sir Robin Butler.

DH

(DOUGLAS HURD)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
22 January 1990

INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY OF IRAQIS

1. SCRs 670 and 674 recall the liability of Iraq in respect of grave breaches of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, and in particular the personal responsibility of individuals who commit them or order their commission. These provisions repeat, in legally more precise terms, earlier statements by British Ministers and the Foreign Ministers of the Twelve. The purpose of this paper is to consider, without prejudice to policy decisions as to Allied objectives in resolving the Gulf crisis, the mechanisms and procedures by which illegal acts by Iraqis or Iraqi agents might be pursued after the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait has been brought to an end.

2. The paper covers in order: offences, geographical scope, potential defendants, timing, machinery and evidence, before offering some policy conclusions.

A. Offences

3. Ministerial statements have been based on the concept of "grave breaches" in the Fourth Geneva Convention. The same is true of the Security Council Resolutions. The list of grave breaches set out in Article 147 is comprehensive (see Annex). The key elements of these are defined with a degree of precision in the substantive Articles of the Convention. With the onset of armed conflict between the UK and Iraq, the First, Second and Third Conventions have also come into operation. Each has an exactly equivalent system of "grave breaches" (see Annex). Taken together, they provide a wide coverage, with the additional advantage of being linked to a system of penal jurisdiction (see Section E below).

4. The Nuremberg and Tokyo Charters of 1945 gave the International Military Tribunals jurisdiction to try three categories of crimes. Of these, 'War Crimes' corresponds broadly to the "grave breaches" discussed above. 'Crimes against the Peace', on the other hand, covered the planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression; whereas 'Crimes against Humanity' was designed to deal

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with inhumane acts against civilian populations, including before the War (and thus covered Nazi racial persecution). To adopt, for present purposes, the Nuremberg/Tokyo categories is liable therefore to raise tendentious extraneous questions. It would be better to continue to invoke, as we have done until now, the Geneva Conventions, as universally-accepted standards of conduct to which Iraq itself expressly assented in acceding to all four Conventions in 1956.

B. Geographical Scope

5. With the Iraqi invasion in August, the Geneva Conventions came into operation as between Iraq and Kuwait. The better argument is that that state of armed conflict between Iraq and Kuwait continues, and with it therefore the applicability of the Conventions. But in any case the Fourth Convention applies in virtue of the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait, and SCRs 670 and 674 declare this. Once the Conventions are in operation, they enure for the benefit of all persons protected by them, regardless of nationality. They therefore cover British citizens in Kuwait and British citizens compulsorily transferred from Kuwait to Iraq. The only question not free from doubt is whether they cover the few remaining British citizens in Iraq as "protected persons" (conferring a special degree of protection). Our interpretation of the relevant provision is that they do; the ICRC takes a similar view.

6. With the onset of armed hostilities, all four Conventions have unquestionably come into operation as between the UK and Iraq. The geographical scope of the Conventions is that of the hostilities themselves.

C. Potential Defendants

7. The Geneva Conventions are inter-State treaties; therefore they bind primarily the State. Iraq would be legally responsible internationally for breaches committed by persons for whose conduct it is answerable. The Geneva Conventions are however special, in that duties are imposed directly on a wide range of persons who take part in warfare or are responsible for military or civil policy or

its execution. Such persons bear direct criminal responsibility, separate from the general legal responsibility of the State, and cannot plead 'superior orders' as a defence. There is no difference according to whether the persons concerned are Iraqi nationals or foreigners acting at Iraqi behest in Iraq or Kuwait. The Conventions expressly require each High Contracting Party to legislate so as to reflect this position (see Annex).

8. The wartime and post-war arrangements of the Second World War divided the treatment of alleged war criminals into two. The primary rule was that the accused was returned to the place of the crime to stand trial there under a rehabilitated system of local law. The overwhelming majority of war crimes trials, numerically, was handled this way. The explicit intention was to satisfy local demands for justice and, on a practical level, to ease the problems of procedure and evidence. The Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals, on the other hand, were reserved expressly for a limited number of major war criminals "whose offences have no particular geographical location". This category of defendants was tried not for the direct consequences of their own actions but in essence for policies which they ordered or approved.

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First Convention : Articles 49 and 50

Second Convention : Articles 50 and 51

Third Convention : Articles 129 and 130)

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10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

SUBJECT CC MASTER

From the Private Secretary

22 January 1991

THE GULF: PRIME MINISTER'S CONVERSATION WITH CHANCELLOR KOHL

Chancellor Kohl telephoned again this morning about the situation in the Gulf and asked for the Prime Minister's assessment. The Prime Minister said that we had made a fairly good beginning. But it was increasingly apparent that the scale of the Iraqi war machine was such that it would be a lengthy job. We were also hampered at present by bad weather, which restricted sorties and made it difficult to get the satellite pictures necessary to make a proper assessment of battle damage. The Iraqis were carefully conserving their assets, such as aircraft, and many of their airfields were still operational. The air campaign was likely to last for at least another fortnight, and quite a number of targets already attacked would have to be visited again. Meanwhile we were moving up our ground forces to positions nearer the border. We had lost a number of Tornado aircraft, mainly because they were carrying out particularly hazardous missions against heavily defended targets.

The Prime Minister continued that we were particularly worried by the Iraqi attacks on Israel and the danger that Israel would retaliate. We had gone to a lot of effort to dissuade them. Chancellor Kohl asked if the Prime Minister expected such restraint to continue in the event of further Iraqi attacks. The Prime Minister said he thought this doubtful, above all if the Iraqis were to use CW. The success of the Patriot missile in intercepting SCUDS was a great help in encouraging restraint. Chancellor Kohl observed that, if Israel were to enter the conflict, there would be unpredictable consequences. The Prime Minister reiterated that this was the reason we had gone to immense trouble to persuade Israel to stay out. But the Israeli Government was under a lot of pressure.

Chancellor Kohl asked how the Prime Minister assessed the chances that Saddam Hussein would attack Turkey. The Prime Minister said he thought they were fairly low. Iraq might fire a few SCUD missiles, but the Iraqis were sufficiently occupied elsewhere. Their principal concerns were to defend their ground forces, to draw in Israel and to frighten Saudi Arabia. Chancellor Kohl said he could not foresee what would happen if Turkey was attacked. It was a very important question for Germany because an attack might activate Paragraph 5 of the NATO Treaty. He was aware that a lot of people in the United Kingdom

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- 2 -

and the United States were criticising his position. But he had always been a reliable partner and kept his word, and he would not change now. Unfortunately he had to cope with a ridiculous trend in German public opinion, reminiscent of the situation in 1983 over the decision to deploy Pershing. It had actually been simpler then, because the matter concerned German territory and there had been a considerable body of the media on the Government's side. This time public opinion was being strongly influenced against any German involvement. His main difficulty was that the Socialists had built up a massive front. You would never find a German Socialist making a speech like Mr. Kinnock's in the debate yesterday. There was going to be a great battle in Germany and he had to box clever. But he knew his duty. He was very anxious to tell the Prime Minister this, since he was no doubt hearing something very different from the media. The Prime Minister said he absolutely understood the difficulties which Chancellor Kohl faced and was grateful for the frank account of the Chancellor's position which he accepted fully. Chancellor Kohl said he would telephone again in a few days' time.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence) and to Sir Robin Butler (Cabinet Office).

CHARLES D POWELL

Richard Gozney, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

Prime Minister ✓

News in Brief:

— 6 Scuds landed overnight:

5 of them against Saudi Arabia: 1
against Qatar. Two shot down: three
wildly off course

— Another Tornado lost. Exploded
after dropping its weapon load. Virtually
no hope for crew, 1 par.

C.D.P.
12/1

PRIME MINISTER

THE GULF

Your comments on the attached letter:

- I am sure you are right that it is mostly a PLO ploy. I told Brent Scowcroft about it when we were talking late last night. He said that the casualty estimate for Baghdad was completely out of the ball park. He did not discount that Saddam Hussain might begin using CW, but said that we still had no real evidence that he was capable of fitting CW warheads to his SCUD missiles.
- There was indeed a reference in the overnight military briefing to the possibility of Iraqi use of CW against Israel last night or today. The source is not specified, but it may well be the same information as that available to Bassam Abu Sharif.

CHARLES POWELL

22 January 1991

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AND TO IMMEDIATE MODUK

SIC A2G

IRAQ/KUWAIT : HIGH-LEVEL FRENCH MILITARY VISIT TO UK

SUMMARY

1. LANXADE SUGGESTS EARLY SHORT VISIT BY FRENCH MILITARY REPRESENTATIVE TO LONDON. I HAVE CONFIRMED CDS' AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE AND AWAIT FIRM PROPOSAL FROM THE ELYSEE.

DETAIL

2. LANXADE (MITTERRAND'S MILITARY ADVISER) TELEPHONED ME AT 1030 TODAY TO PROFFER HIS WARMEST THANKS FOR THE ARRANGEMENTS MADE DURING HIS VISIT TO LONDON ON 7/8 JANUARY. HE REFERRED TO THE LUNCH ON 14 JANUARY BETWEEN MITTERRAND AND THE PRIME MINISTER, THE TELEPHONIC EXCHANGE BETWEEN THEM ON 18 JANUARY AND THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE REACTING TO OUR IRRITATION WITH THE LAST MINUTE FRENCH INITIATIVE (ON WHICH, INCIDENTALLY, HIS ADVICE HAD NOT BEEN HEEDDED). HE HOPED THAT WE AND THE ELYSEE WOULD NOW DRAW A LINE UNDER THAT EPISODE (I CONCURRED WHOLEHEARTEDLY).

3. AGAINST THAT BACKGROUND, LANXADE SAID THAT OUR FORCES WERE NOW OPERATING ALONGSIDE EACH OTHER IN THE GULF, AND WE NEEDED TO CONCENTRATE ON BUILDING UP THE HABIT OF WORKING TOGETHER. THE CONFLICT WAS ALREADY PROVIDING USEFUL EXPERIENCES WHICH WE COULD SHARE, FOR INSTANCE IN THE USE OF JAGUARS FOR THE ATTACKS ON KUWAIT. HE SUGGESTED THAT THERE SHOULD BE VERY EARLY CONTACT AT CDS/VCDS LEVEL, FOCUSING ON THE AIR ARM, WHICH MIGHT BE DEVELOPED INTO OTHER SECTORS, AS THE WAR WIDENED. IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES (THOUGH THIS WAS A SUBSIDIARY ASPECT) HE THOUGHT THAT IT WOULD BE NO BAD THING IF THE PRESS WERE TO LEARN THAT SUCH EXCHANGES WERE TAKING PLACE.

4. I REPORTED THIS PROPOSAL TO HEAD OF WED AND, FOLLOWING DIRECT CONTACT BETWEEN MY DA AND MOD, TO VCDS. MOTTRAM SUBSEQUENTLY TELEPHONED ME AT 1400Z TO SAY THAT IN PRINCIPLE CDS/VCDS WOULD BE READY TO SEE AN APPROPRIATE FRENCH MILITARY REPRESENTATIVE. I AWAIT

IN INDICATION FROM LANXADE OF PRECISELY WHO MIGHT BE CHOSEN (A LOGICAL CHOICE MIGHT BE SCHMIDT'S SOUS-CHEF OPERATIONS, GENERAL GUIGNON). MY DA WILL BE READY TO ACCOMPANY.

COMMENT

5. A SHORT VISIT (WELL INSIDE HALF A DAY SHOULD FIT THE BILL. I APPRECIATE THAT, IN OPERATIONAL TERMS, THERE IS PROBABLY LITTLE IN THIS FOR US. BUT MITTERRAND CLEARLY ATTACHES IMPORTANCE TO FRANCE BEING SEEN TO BE OPERATING CLOSELY WITH ITS COALITION PARTNERS - AND IT IS IN OUR WIDER POLITICAL INTEREST TO BUILD ON LANXADE'S VISIT IN THIS WAY. NOW THAT MITTERRAND HAS AGAINST CRACKED THE WHIP OVER CHEVENEMENT (MY TELNO 74) I SEE MUCH ADVANTAGE IN LETTING THE PRESS KNOW THAT CONTACTS OF THIS KIND ARE PART OF OUR NORMAL WORKING TOGETHER.

FERGUSSON

YYYY

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TELNO 199

OF 212315Z JANUARY 91

AND TO DESKBY 212330Z CABINET OFFICE

INFO PRIORITY MIDDLE EAST POSTS, UKMIS NEW YORK, ANKARA, PARIS

INFO PRIORITY MOSCOW, MODUK, ACTOR

OUR TELNO 192: IRAQ/KUWAIT: WASHINGTON SITREP
SUMMARY

1. ADMINISTRATION WILL HOLD IRAQ ACCOUNTABLE FOR MISTREATMENT OF PWS. CONCERN ABOUT LACK OF PRECISE BOMB DAMAGE ASSESSMENTS. CONTINUING COVERAGE OF US/ISRAELI DIALOGUE OVER RETALIATION. FURTHER WIDE COVERAGE OF BRITISH ROLE.

DETAIL

2. THE MAIN NEW STORY ON 21 JANUARY HAS BEEN THE MISTREATMENT OF ALLIED PRISONERS OF WAR (PWS). THE INTERVIEWS WITH CAPTURED ALLIED AIRMEN ON IRAQI TELEVISION AND THE THREAT THAT THEY WOULD BE USED AS HUMAN SHIELDS HAS BEEN CARRIED PROMINENTLY. KIMMITT CALLED IN THE IRAQI CHARGE TO PROTEST (TEXT BY FAX TO EMERGENCY UNIT, FCO). THE PRESIDENT HAS RESPONDED ANGRILY THAT THE BRUTAL PARADING OF ALLIED PILOTS WAS IN DIRECT VIOLATION OF EVERY CONVENTION THAT PROTECTS PRISONERS. HE SAID IT WOULD NOT AFFECT DECISIONS ON THE PROSECUTION OF THE WAR: RATHER, IT WOULD OUTRAGE THE US AND ITS COALITION PARTNERS. HE SAID SADDAM HUSSEIN WOULD BE HELD ACCOUNTABLE. CHENEY ECHOED THIS, NOTING THAT SUCH BREACHES OF THE GENEVA CONVENTION CONSTITUTED WAR CRIMES.

3. THE US MEDIA ARE PRESSING THE ADMINISTRATION HARD ON BOMB DAMAGE ASSESSMENTS. (WE HAVE REPORTED ON OTHER CHANNELS - JICTELS 11 AND 14 - THE LATEST ASSESSMENTS). THE ADMINISTRATION HAVE ADMITTED THAT BAD WEATHER CONTINUES TO HAMPER COLLECTION OF INTELLIGENCE ON BOMB DAMAGE. THE PENTAGON ADMITTED ON 21 JANUARY TO FRUSTRATION OVER ITS INABILITY TO FORM A CLEAR ASSESSMENT. THE RESULT HAS ADDED TO THE GROWING SENSE IN WASHINGTON THAT - AFTER AN IMPRESSIVE START - DESERT STORM IS INDEED SETTLING DOWN FOR THE HARD SLOG, AS THE PRESIDENT WARNED EARLY ON BUT WHICH MANY FOUND HARD TO ACCEPT GIVEN THE EARLY SUCCESSES.

4. ONE ISSUE OF CONCERN AT THE NSC IS THE POSSIBILITY OF IRAQI RETALIATION AGAINST TURKEY FOLLOWING THE TURKISH DECISION TO ALLOW THE US AIRFORCE TO OPERATE AGAINST IRAQ FROM TURKEY. AN IRAQI ATTACK IS NOT AS YET THOUGHT PROBABLE OR EVEN LIKELY. BUT

THE TURKISH ROLE HAS RECEIVED WIDE PUBLICITY HERE, AND PRUDENT CONTINGENCY PLANNING IS THOUGHT TO BE IN ORDER.

5. THE POSSIBLE INVOLVEMENT OF ISRAEL CONTINUES TO BE A CAUSE FOR CONCERN. THE WHITE HOUSE TOLD US ON 21 JANUARY THAT EAGLEBURGER'S LATEST VISIT HAD NOT ADDED SUBSTANTIALLY TO ISRAELI ASSURANCES ON NON-RETALIATION. BARRING FURTHER ATTACKS LEADING TO HEAVY CASUALTIES, THE WHITE HOUSE THINK THAT THE ISRAELIS WILL CONTINUE TO SHOW RESTRAINT. THEY TELL US THAT THE PATRIOT BATTERIES FOR BOTH TEL AVIV AND HAIFA ARE FULLY OPERATIONAL. THE US MEDIA HAVE NOTED THAT THE PRESIDENT AND BAKER HAVE HAD ALMOST AS MUCH CONTACT WITH SHAMIR IN THE LAST 3 DAYS AS IN THE PREVIOUS 2 YEARS.

6. ANTI-WAR PROTESTS CONTINUE, AS DO DEMONSTRATIONS IN SUPPORT OF DESERT STORM. ONE SUCH DEMONSTRATION, ORGANISED BY THE JEWISH COMMUNITY RELATIONS COUNCIL, ATTRACTED MORE THAN 10,000 PEOPLE OUTSIDE THE UN IN NEW YORK ON 20 JANUARY.

7. THE BRITISH CONTRIBUTION CONTINUES TO BE WIDELY REPORTED. PUBLIC RADIO STATIONS IN THE WASHINGTON AREA (AND ELSEWHERE IN THE COUNTRY) ARE SUPPLEMENTING THEIR REGULAR NEWS COVERAGE WITH SOME 3 HOURS PER DAY OF DIRECT BROADCASTS FROM THE BBC - BOTH THE WORLD SERVICE AND OTHER BBC CURRENT AFFAIRS PROGRAMMES WHICH ARE BEING RUN IN FULL. THE PRIME MINISTER'S STATEMENTS AND MR KING'S PRESS CONFERENCES ARE GIVEN REGULAR COVERAGE. WE HAVE RECEIVED NEARLY 80 TELEPHONE CALLS IN THE LAST 3 DAYS FROM ORDINARY AMERICANS EXPRESSING THEIR GRATITUDE FOR BRITISH SUPPORT. US CORRESPONDENTS IN LONDON HAVE REPORTED PEACE MARCHES IN THE UK, BUT UNDERLINED THAT BRITISH PUBLIC OPINION IS OVERWHELMINGLY SUPPORTIVE OF MILITARY ACTION.

ACLAND

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(2)

cy/c

✓ *Tim Austin*
CDB
21/1

FCS/91/013CHIEF SECRETARY TO THE TREASURYGulf Evacuation

1. We have made contingency plans for the possible evacuation of British nationals from war risk countries. The numbers involved could be large. We estimate that in Bahrain there are about 3,900, in Qatar 2,900 and in the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia 5,300. In the Central Province of Saudi Arabia there are a further 5,400, mostly in Riyadh.

2. On the outbreak of hostilities we issued advice to those in war risk areas to stay in their homes. But should the situation deteriorate we might need to advise them to travel by road to a safer part of the Peninsula (we expect that air space close to the fighting will be closed to civilian aircraft), from which we would try to organise their evacuation by air. We estimate that the cost could be between £9 million and £16 million, £2 million of which would be spent locally on transport, temporary accommodation and administration, and the remainder on aircraft hire and operation costs. The figure could be very much higher if we had to indemnify carriers in respect of aircraft.



3. The FCO has no funds for such an operation. I hope you will agree that if these areas need to be evacuated, the cost should be met in full from the contingency Reserve. It is important to have the assurance now, so that planning can go ahead. I understand that our officials are already in touch about the arrangements for any evacuation.

4. These numbers do not include those in Israel (3,600), Jordan (700) and Yemen (250), all of whom could require evacuation. If things go extremely badly we may need to consider evacuating those in the United Arab Emirates - a further 13,300. A requirement to evacuate all these could double the estimated cost although I do not think this at all likely.

5. Evacuation would almost certainly take place against a background of panic and chaos throughout the region. Roads would be blocked, and there would be serious congestion at frontiers. There would probably be casualties amongst the British community. All this would be dramatically reported by the news media. I do not believe that in these circumstances it would be acceptable to insist on evacuees signing undertakings to repay (UTRs) before they embarked on the flights we had organised. We agreed that we would not seek UTRs for the earlier evacuations from Kuwait and Iraq, and I hope you will accept that we should not do so in this case either.



6. If we dispense with UTRs we shall still need to decide whether to seek repayment from individuals or, as we agreed for those who were evacuated from Iraq and Kuwait, from employers or, for foreign nationals, from other governments. Announcing that we would seek reimbursement from individuals would effectively present the same problems as a decision to seek UTRs.

Restricting ourselves to employers and other governments would be ineffective. It would be difficult to secure reimbursement from those who are self-employed.

Reimbursement from the many UK nationals who work for foreign companies or governments would be unlikely. In either case, without UTRs we would stand little chance of recovering more than a very small proportion of our costs since we would have no powers to enforce payment. It is already clear that it will be much more difficult than we expected to recover any worthwhile proportion of costs from employers for the evacuations from Kuwait and Iraq.

7. If we tried to recover costs, there would also be damaging comparison with other Western governments, most of whom have already decided not to try to recover evacuation costs (and the rest have told us they will almost certainly do the same). Some, including France and Spain, have already begun evacuation at public expense. In the case of foreign nationals we already face difficult decisions over whether to seek reimbursement from those governments who evacuated many British nationals from Iraq and Kuwait without charge. They could seek to charge us in return, to our net cost.



8. I therefore hope you can agree that we should neither seek UTRs, nor seek to recover costs.

9. I am copying this letter to members of OPD(G).

DH

(DOUGLAS HURD)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
21 January 1991



(DROPPED 10/12)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

11 January 1961

SECRET



Foreign &
Commonwealth
Office

London SW1A 2AH

John Redwood MP
Minister of State
Department of Trade and Industry
1-19 Victoria Street
LONDON
SW1

From The Minister of State

21 January 1991

CDN
m₁

Dear John

INSURANCE AGAINST DAMAGE BY IRAQI TERRORISTS

- file in CD

Douglas Hurd was grateful to you for sending him a copy of your letter of 16 January to Kenneth Baker.


I am sure you are right that this is an issue on which the Government should have a prepared response. The terms of that response is more a matter for home Departments than it is for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office but your proposed approach to the problem seems sensible. I agree that early consultation with the insurance industry over the provision of cover to both commercial/industry customers and private individuals would be an appropriate first step. I suspect that if Iraq suffers a humiliating defeat, the risk of terrorist outrages is likely to be higher for several months and the insurance industry will be reluctant to continue to cover the risks. If commercial insurance proves to be unavailable, then we shall need to consider a government scheme of some kind: there is likely to be strong public reaction against the government if assistance is not forthcoming.

I am copying this letter to the addressees of yours.

Yours

Douglas Hurd

SECRET



SECRET

cc 10



Northern Ireland Office
Stormont Castle
Belfast BT4 3ST

John Redwood Esq MP
Minister of State for Corporate Affairs
Department for Trade and Industry
1-19 Victoria Street
LONDON SW1

21 January 1991

Dear John,

INSURANCE AGAINST DAMAGE BY IRAQI TERRORISTS

Cam

Thank you for sending me a copy of your letter of 16 January to Kenneth Baker. I am sure it is right to seek to persuade the insurance industry to carry the risks as far as possible.

map

In Northern Ireland we have had schemes for providing compensation for criminal damage to property from public funds for many years and the responsibility was taken on fully by central government in the early 1970's, when the burden became too great for local government. Insurance companies have generally excluded cover for damage caused by public order and civil commotion in the Province since 1977 and our compensation arrangements have therefore become a critical factor in sustaining business confidence and combating terrorism. The scheme is statutory and is administered directly by the NIO alongside the Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme. Each year we receive some five thousand claims and pay out about £20m.

Our scheme covers damage caused by terrorism and we should therefore not require special arrangements for damage caused by Iraqi terrorists or their agents (providing, of course, they were terrorist and not members of the Iraqi armed forces).

I understand that both DTI and Home Office officials have been in touch with mine and have obtained details of our arrangements. We have many years of experience in administering the scheme and if we can be of any further help we shall of course be happy to oblige.

I am copying this letter to recipients of yours.

Z
Pmc

MIDDLE EAST

Situation #138



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MY TELNO 42: IRAQI ATTACKS ON ISRAEL

SUMMARY

1. NO ISRAELI/US DEAL ON NON-RETALIATION, BUT SHAMIR SAYS NO GAME OF PING-PONG EITHER. CONTINUING THREAT ACKNOWLEDGED BUT SLOW REOWRN TO NORMAL WORKING, APART FROM SCHOOLS.

DETAIL

2. I CALLED ON HADASS (MFA) ON 20 JANUARY TO DELIVER YOUR MESSAGE TO LEVY (YOUR TELNO 36), LEVY HIMSELF BEING CLOSETED WITH EAGLEBURGER. HADASS SAID THAT THE DECISION ON RETALIATION WAS FINELY BALANCED. ISRAEL WAS VERY CONSCIOUS OF THE ARGUMENTS AGAINST, BEING PUT BY WESTERN POWERS: HE READ OUT TO ME THE SUBSTANCE OF A CONVERSATION THAT DAY BETWEEN LEVY AND POOS FOR THE EC, AND DESCRIBED (SOMEWHAT CYNICALLY) A SIMILAR EXCHANGE BETWEEN PRESIDENT HERZOG AND MITTERRAND. BUT FOR SOME OF THE ARAB WORLD, ISRAELI RESTRAINT WAS A SIGN OF WEAKNESS NOT STRENGTH. MANY PALESTINIANS WERE CROWING OVER SADDAM'S ABILITY TO DO DAMAGE TO ISRAEL. HADASS MENTIONED ('BETWEEN US') THAT IT WAS ONLY BY CHANCE THAT A THIRD SALVO OF MISSILES HAD FAILED TO HIT ISRAEL IN THE EVENING OF 19 JANUARY: THE FALSE ALARM AT 2200 (PARA 2 OF MY TUR) HAD IN FACT BEEN GENUINE, BUT RAPIDLY ABORTED BECAUSE THE MISSILES LAUNCHED HAD FALLEN BACK INTO IRAQ. A FURTHER SUCCESSFUL ATTACK COULD VERY WELL TIP THE BALANCE TO RETALIATION. AND CASUALTIES FROM A CW ATTACK WOULD BE QUITE A DIFFERENT THING.

3. SPEAKING ON TELEVISION LATER ON 20 JANUARY, SHAMIR SAID THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO DEAL WITH THE US BASED ON PROVISION OF PATRIOT MISSILES. ISRAEL HAD THE RIGHT TO RETALIATE, BUT WOULD DO SO ONLY IN A WISE AND EFFECTIVE MANNER. THIS WAS NOT A GAME OF PING-PONG. HE SPOKE AT SOME LENGTH OF THE IMPORTANCE OF COOPERATION WITH THE US AND OTHER ALLIES, AND THE NEED FOR ISRAELIS TO FACE THE SITUATION RESOLUTELY. RETURN TO NORMAL WORKING PATTERNS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE WAS IMPORTANT FOR THE NATIONAL ECONOMY: HE QUOTED THE EXAMPLE OF BRITAIN UNDER THE BLITZ. (HADASS HAD EARLIER TOLD ME THAT THIS ANALOGY IS NOW VERY POPULAR AMONG ISRAELI MINISTERS.)

4. THIS MORNING (21 JANUARY) THE IDF HAVE ANNOUNCED THAT NORMAL WORKING IS TO BE RESUMED IN ALL AREAS EXCEPT GREATER HAIFA AND GREATER TEL AVIV, EXCEPT THAT SCHOOLS AND HIGHER EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS WILL REMAIN CLOSED. (HADASS HAD SAID THAT THERE WAS NO DISPOSITION IN THE CABINET TO PUT AT RISK THE MILLION AND A QUARTER ISRAELI YOUNG: THERE WILL IN PRACTICE BE CONSEQUENCES FOR MANY WORKING MOTHERS.) GAS-MASKS HOWEVER WILL BE CARRIED AT ALL TIMES. THE IDF CHIEF OF STAFF HAS SAID THAT THE RISK OF IRAQI MISSILE ATTACK CONTINUES AND COULD EVEN INTENSIFY AS SADDAM GROWS MORE DESPERATE.

ELLIOTT

YYYY

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10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

21 January 1991

THE GULF

There are one or two points worth recording from the talk I had with General Scowcroft this morning:

- The Israelis have calmed down quite a bit and no longer seem to be intending early retaliation. They have been mightily impressed by the performance of the Patriot missile against the SCUDs in Saudi Arabia last night. (Scowcroft mused on the cost/exchange ratio of Patriot: each missile costs \$1.5 million, all to prevent SCUDs from making a hole in the sand!)

- He confirmed what CDS told us this morning, namely that the Americans were now targeting individual aircraft shelters with smart weapons carried by F117As. They intended to pursue a systematic destruction of the shelters.

- He said the Administration had no clear idea how many SCUD launchers the Iraqis had. If you believed some of the claims about the success of sorties against them, you arrived at a figure in excess of the highest estimates for Iraqi holdings.

- He understood that the weather over the area was now clearing which should make it possible to get better pictures of battle damage (although there were likely to be sand storms).

- He had misunderstood the briefing he received yesterday, in saying nine US aircraft had been shot down. It was of course a cumulative total of nine.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence) and to Sir Robin Butler.

CHARLES POWELL

Richard Gozney Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

KW
c/scowcroft
CCPC
9

cc/PC
8PM/91/004R. H. HurdPRIME MINISTER

✓

CAN
24/10/91

-file with KSP

Biological Warfare


1. The Defence Secretary's minute of 16 January reported on our latest exchanges with the Americans about the risk of contamination following attacks on BW facilities and concluded that we should continue to ensure that any British participation in such attacks required specific ministerial consent. This approach seems to me to be both consistent with our international legal obligations and in line with common sense, given that the role of attacking these facilities has in practice already been taken by the US Air Force.

2. I am copying this minute to the Defence Secretary and to Sir Robin Butler.

DH.

(DOUGLAS HURD)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
21 January 1991



Covering TOP SECRET US/UK EYES
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7a-c



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

Telephone 071- 21 82111/3

MO 6/17/15/1D

21 January 1991

✓

Fin Hunter

abs
21/1

Dear Charles,

REPORT FROM RIYADH

The Defence Secretary's colleagues might find it useful to see the attached report from Commanders on Operations today in the Gulf.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries to members of OPD(G) and to Sir Robin Butler.

Yours sincerely

Janet R Binstead

(MISS J R BINSTead)
Private Secretary

Sir Charles Powell KCMG
No 10 Downing Street

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PS/Secretary of State

6/17/15/1

THE VIEW FROM RIYADH AND WASHINGTON 211800Z JAN 91

1. The weather today in the Kuwait Theatre of Operations has been very bad and as a result there have been no sorties by either UK or French Jaguars. B52's have continued high level bombing of the RGFC but with no verifiable results, although there is some intelligence to suggest that the effectiveness of units is being degraded. There have been Allied successes against mobile SCUD launchers in SouthEast Iraq; reports range from 1 to 9 launchers destroyed, but these are all based on initial debriefings. Understandably there is considerable confidence in the performance of the PATRIOT missile system. An earlier report today of excessive expenditure of ammunition at Riyadh (40 missiles were launched when 20 should have sufficed) have been explained by the fact that the incoming SCUDs were breaking up and the PATRIOT system fired at the debris. The first downed airman (US) has been rescued from Iraq by a Search and Rescue (SAR) mission.

2. Commanders are satisfied with progress of the air campaign acknowledging that it has been affected adversely by not only the weather but also by the diversion of 25% of the air effort to SCUD hunting. Some battle damage assessment is now available. The Iraqis have suffered extensive damage to their Command and Control systems, in particular, Saddam Hussein's ability to communicate with his people via television and radio. The US will be revisiting targets in the Baghdad area tonight to sever this capability. 3 of the 4 biological weapon storage bunkers at Salman Pak have been breached, many chemical weapon storage facilities have been badly damaged and it is claimed in theatre that all nuclear reactors at Tuwaitha have been destroyed. There is, at last, some prospect of an improvement in the weather; clear skies are expected tomorrow over Baghdad and Central Iraq but not the KTO. The reverse is expected on 23rd followed by good conditions in Iraq and Kuwait from 24th Jan onwards. To "pulverize" and demoralise Gen Schwarzkopf intends to hit each Iraqi division in the KTO sequentially with the full weight of his air power as soon as weather conditions allow.

3. CDS enquired about Allied/Israeli relations following the deployment of PATRIOT systems to Israel. There are single batteries at Tel Aviv and Haifa which, although able to cope with a light raid, will not be robust enough against large numbers of incoming missiles. There is some intelligence (dubious) that the Iraqis plan to employ chemical weapons in an airstrike against Israel tonight or tomorrow morning. To counter this possibility, and for political reasons, the US have deployed AWACs aircraft and fighters to Western Iraq.

cover

4. UK flying overnight, weather permitting, will involve the following (departure airfields unknown):

a. 44 Tornado GR1s all with 1000lb bombs against airfields and airfield defences. 16 of these are airborne at the time of writing.

b. 6 Jaguars at first light.


c. 16 Tornado F3s on Combat Air Patrol (CAP) supported by 2 Tankers.

d. 2 Nimrod Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA) on surveillance.

5. Earlier CDS had spoken to BFCME who reported that the recent major diversion of air effort to the West against targets which were politically rather than strategically important had setback the overall air campaign plan by 1½-2 days. This was by no means critical noting the mid-Feb US forces' readiness date. He was very pleased with progress on the relocation of 1st Armoured Division; there were no major problems and the plan was running to time. Gen de la Billiere also said that he was drawing up plans to provide, at short notice, a force which would include FCO representatives, to reoccupy the British Embassy in Kuwait should there be a sudden change in the situation. He felt that it was important for presentational reasons to get in there quickly if the opportunity arose.

6. CDS also spoke to Gen Powell who reported that some US logistic ships would not approach Saudi ports. Crew concern stemmed from dire threats of floating mines broadcast on CNN. Ships' masters on the other hand have taken a more pragmatic view but to avoid any further delays the US is giving serious consideration to providing warship escorts. To date UK logistics have not been noticeably affected but the MOD and the Pentagon are in close touch on the matter.

7. CDS raised the question of the whereabouts of the Iraqi Air Force and, recalling Saddam Hussein's tactics in the Iran/Iraq war, wondered whether he was husbanding his resources to wait for the allies to exhaust their weapon stocks or whether the reason was just degraded C2. They agreed that a combination of the two was most likely and General Powell pointed out that the allies were well stocked. He repeated Gen Schwarzkopf's view of yesterday that the Iraqi Air Force might well be forced to appear to defend the RGFC once a proper weight of attack could be brought to bear.



D G LITTLEJOHNS
Cdre
PSO/CDS
MB6173 83353MB

CONFIDENTIAL



10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

PM

(2)

Don't know

21 January 1991 *COO*

*Charles!
Souds bogus - a
PCO ploy. Just speak wely to Saddam !!*

THE GULF

Peter Palumbo telephoned me this evening to say that he had been telephoned from Tunis by Bassam Abu Sharif of the PLO, who was an old friend of his wife. Bassam Abu Sharif had said that he was appalled at what was about to happen in the Gulf crisis. There had been 12,000 casualties in Baghdad so far, but the Iraqis were not releasing the figures for fear of the effect on national morale. Meanwhile, Saddam Hussain's military capability was virtually untouched and he was going to start using CW from tomorrow. There were going to be a million dead soon. It could all be so simply resolved; someone just had to speak nicely to Saddam Hussain. Bassam Abu Sharif said that he was trying to get an appointment with the Foreign Secretary but his message was so urgent that he had chosen this means to pass it on. I said I was rather sceptical of some of these claims which did not correspond with our own, but I would certainly pass on his message.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

CHARLES POWELL

Richard Gozney, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

*Haven't we heard this
from elsewhere?
Is that the work of
man who says it
spoken to wely!*

ADVANCE COPY

RESTRICTED

FM PARIS

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 74

OF 211641Z JANUARY 91

INFO IMMEDIATE EC POSTS, WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, UKDEL NATO, MODUK
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INFO IMMEDIATE TEL AVIV, UKMIS NEW YORK, DAMASCUS, ALGIERS
INFO IMMEDIATE AMMAN, RIYADH, HMCBS IN FRANCE

SIC 19M

GULF : FRENCH PRESIDENTIAL PRESS BRIEFING

SUMMARY

1. MITTERRAND MAKES CLEAR THAT FRENCH FORCES DO HAVE CLEARANCE TO OPERATE IN IRAQ. ALSO DENIES THAT FRANCE HAS SUPPLIED IRAQ WITH ANY MISSILES CAPABLE OF HITTING ISRAEL. WEEKEND OPINION POLLS SHOW FRENCH OPINION SWINGING BEHIND THE ALLIED OFFENSIVE. NEW OPPOSITION ATTACKS ON CHEVENEMENT.

DETAIL

2. MITTERRAND GAVE A SHORT, UNEXPECTED INTERVIEW ON FRENCH TV ON SUNDAY NIGHT (20 JANUARY), HIS FIRST TELEVISION APPEARANCE SINCE THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES IN THE GULF. IN REPLY TO QUESTIONS HE MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS :

(I) FRANCE WAS FULLY BEHIND AND INVOLVED IN THE ALLIED EFFORT IN THE GULF. TO SUGGEST THAT THEIRS WAS A 'PART-TIME' EFFORT TRADUCED THE BRAVERY OF THE FRENCH PILOTS. SO FAR THERE HAD BEEN DAYLIGHT STRIKES BY FRENCH JAGUARS AGAINST TARGETS IN KUWAIT. THIS WAS ACCORDING TO THE ALLIED PLAN. 'WE HAVE NOT RULED OUT IF NEED BE GOING INTO IRAQ.....THE PLANS ARE ALREADY MADE.....THERE WILL BE LAND OPERATIONS AND YOU WILL SEE THEN HOW WE HAVE DECIDED TO DO OUR DUTY'. WHEN THE DEFENCE MINISTER SAID LAST WEEK THAT FRANCE'S MISSION WAS IN KUWAIT 'HE WAS NOT DISAGREEING WITH MY ACCOUNT' - BUT SIMPLY REFERRING ONLY TO THE FIRST, AERIAL, PHASE OF THE FIGHTING. (COMMENT: IN FACT CHEVENEMENT HAD SAID THAT THE LIMITS ON FRENCH ACTION ARE IN PART POLITICALLY MOTIVATED).

(II) THE MUSLIM COMMUNITY IN FRANCE SHOULD UNDERSTAND THAT THIS WAS NOT A WAR AGAINST ISLAM. 'FRANCE IS THERE TO HELP OUT AN ARAB STATE WHICH HAS BEEN ATTACKED AND OCCUPIED BY ANOTHER ARAB STATE...FRANCE IS DOING NOTHING AGAINST ISLAM'.

(III) MITTERRAND SAID THAT HE WAS 'INDIGNANT' ABOUT THE IRAQI 'PROVOCATION' OF ATTACKING ISRAEL. HE COMMENDED ISRAEL'S RESTRAINT.

HE DENIED THAT FRANCE HAD SOLD TO IRAQ BALLISTIC MISSILES CAPABLE OF REACHING ISRAELI TERRITORY, CONTRARY TO WHAT 'CERTAIN ISRAELI OFFICIALS' WERE SAYING. MOREOVER, SINCE THE DESTRUCTION OF THE IRAQI NUCLEAR PLANT AT TAMOUZ (IN 1981 - THE YEAR OF MITTERRAND'S ELECTION) 'I HAVE ALWAYS REFUSED TO SELL IRAQ ANY KIND OF EQUIPMENT WHICH COULD BE USED TO RECONSTRUCT HER NUCLEAR CAPABILITY'. MITTERRAND ADDED THAT HE HAD NEVER MET SADDAM HUSSEIN. (IV) PEACE EFFORTS : MITTERRAND SAID THAT THE MOST OBVIOUS AND MOST URGENTLY REQUIRED PEACE MOVE WAS FOR SADDAM TO WITHDRAW FROM KUWAIT.

(V) IN ANSWER TO A QUESTION HE SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THE WAR WOULD LAST WEEKS NOT MONTHS.

COMMENT

3. MITTERRAND'S PRESS BRIEFING CAME AT A TIME WHEN POLLS ARE SHOWING THAT FRENCH OPINION HAS SWUNG SHARPLY IN FAVOUR OF THE ALLIED CAUSE. WHEREAS A POLL PUBLISHED IN 'LE FIGARO' AS RECENTLY AS 11 JANUARY SHOWED THAT 79 PER CENT OF FRENCH PEOPLE THOUGHT THAT 'NO CAUSE, HOWEVER JUST, IS WORTH A WAR', TWO POLLS PUBLISHED ON 19 JANUARY SHOWED THAT 67 PER CENT OF FRENCH PEOPLE APPROVED OF THE ALLIED ATTACK ON IRAQ: 69 PER CENT THOUGHT THAT FRANCE WAS RIGHT TO PARTICIPATE: AND 72 PER CENT APPROVED OF MITTERRAND'S POSITION.

4. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND MITTERRAND WAS RESPONDING TO RECENT CRITICISM OF FRENCH POLICY FROM THREE QUARTERS. FIRST FROM RIGHT-WING OPPOSITION LEADERS WHO, BUOYED UP BY OPINION POLLS SHOWING EVEN STRONGER APPROVAL ON THE RIGHT (81 PER CENT) FOR ALLIED ACTION AGAINST IRAQ, LAST WEEKEND REDOUBLED THEIR ATTACKS ON THE DEFENCE MINISTER. IN A RADIO INTERVIEW ON SUNDAY NIGHT GISCARD D'ESTAING SEVERELY CRITICISED CHEVENEMENT'S STATEMENTS OF 17 JANUARY (PARIS TEL 171727Z JANUARY, TO MODUK (NOT TO ALL) TO THE EFFECT THAT THE FRENCH FOR THE PRESENT ENVISAGED OPERATIONS ONLY ON KUWAITI TERRITORY, CALLING THEM 'A DOUBLE ERROR OF JUDGEMENT, BOTH MILITARY AND POLITICAL, IN THE MILITARY FIELD THERE IS NO ROOM FOR AFTERTHOUGHTS AND AMBIGUITIES'. STATEMENTS MADE BY CHEVENEMENT ON TV FROM THE GULF AREA OVER THE WEEKEND AGAIN IMPLIED THAT FRANCE WAS LIMITING HER ACTIONS FOR POLITICAL REASONS, AND NECESSITATED THIS CLARIFICATION BY MITTERRAND.

5. FROM THE START OF THE GULF CRISIS MITTERRAND HAS TAKEN THE VIEW THAT IT WOULD BE MORE DAMAGING TO LET CHEVENEMENT GO THAN TO KEEP HIM IN GOVERNMENT, WHERE THERE ARE RESTRAINTS ON HOW MUCH HE CAN SAY. A CHEVENEMENT OUTSIDE THE GOVERNMENT WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY TRY TO RIDE ON THE, AS YET, MINORITY WAVE OF ANTI-WAR FEELING. IF

THINGS WENT BADLY IN THE GULF, HE MIGHT TRY TO SET UP WITH OTHERS ON THE LEFT (COMMUNISTS, GREENS) A NEW ANTI-MITTERRAND COALITION. SUCH A SPLIT WOULD DAMAGE MITTERRAND, AFFECT THE CONDUCT OF THE FRENCH FORCES IN THE WAR AND HAVE LONGER TERM CONSEQUENCES EG FOR THE 1993 LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS.

6. MITTERRAND HIMSELF HAS NEVER SUGGESTED THAT FRANCE WOULD BE OTHER THAN ENGAGED IN THE WAR TO THE EXTENT NECESSARY TO ASSURE THE LIBERATION OF KUWAIT (IE INCLUDING EVENTUALLY ACTION WITHIN IRAQ ITSELF). AT OUR PRIVATE LUNCH TODAY, THIS WAS CONFIRMED VERY CLEARLY TO ME BY LANXADE (ELYSEE) WHO IS, OF COURSE, FULLY INFORMED OF THE PRESIDENT'S ATTITUDES AS REGARDS FRENCH PARTICIPATION IN FUTURE OPERATIONS. THE INCOHERENCE IN PRESENTATION OF FRENCH POLICY DERIVES FROM CHEVENEMENT, AND MAY WELL BE REPEATED IF HE OPENS HIS MOUTH TOO WIDE AGAIN, AS IS ALL TOO LIKELY.

7. SECOND, MITTERRAND WAS ANXIOUS TO COUNTER THE ACCUSATION MADE ON FRENCH TV LAST WEEKEND BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE OF THE ISRAELI KNESSET THAT 'FRANCE IS LARGELY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE IRAQI'S CAPACITY TO FIRE BALLISTIC MISSILES AGAINST ISRAEL AND FOR HAVING SUPPLIED IRAQ WITH NON-CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS'. DUFOURCQ (POLITICAL DIRECTOR) HAS TOLD US THAT MITTERRAND'S TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH HERZOG CONSISTED OF (1) SYMPATHY AND CONDEMNATION OF IRAQI ATTACKS, (2) URGING NO RETALIATION, AND (3) COMPLAINTS ABOUT SUCH ACCUSATIONS. DUFOURCQ SAID HE FEARED AN ANTI-ISRAELI BACKLASH IN FRANCE. LANXADE COMMENTED TO ME THAT, WHATEVER WEAPONS AND TECHNOLOGY HAD COME FROM FRANCE IN THE PAST, THE MOST RECENT PROBLEM LAY WITH THE IRRESPONSIBILITY AND SELF-INTEREST OF GERMAN FIRMS.

8. THE PRESIDENT'S THIRD AIM WAS TO PREVENT THE VIRULENT ATTACKS ON FRANCE'S GULF POLICY BY ARABS IN THE MAGHREB COUNTRIES FROM SPREADING TO FRANCE'S LARGE MUSLIM ARAB COMMUNITY. SATURDAY'S 'LIBERATION' GAVE GRAPHIC ACCOUNTS OF MASSIVE DEMONSTRATIONS IN ALGERIA DURING WHICH CROWDS CHANTED 'BUSH, MITTERRAND ASSASSINS QUERY'. INTERVIEWS WITH INDIVIDUAL FRENCH MUSLIMS SHOWED EUPHORIA IN SOME QUARTERS ABOUT THE IRAQI MISSILE ATTACKS ON ISRAEL, ALTHOUGH MOST ARAB COMMUNITY LEADERS IN FRANCE HAVE SO FAR AVOIDED PUBLIC COMMENT. LANXADE TOLD ME THAT THERE WAS GROWING EVIDENCE OF TENSION IN THE MUSLIM COMMUNITY AND OF SMALL ARMS PURCHASE ON AN INCREASING SCALE WHICH THE GOVERNMENT WAS DETERMINED TO CONTROL: INDEED, NEW PROVISIONS FOR LIMITING WEAPONS SALES HAVE BEEN ANNOUNCED. LANXADE ALSO TOLD ME THAT SCHEER (QUAI SECRETARY GENERAL) HAS JUST BEEN DESPATCHED ON AN UNPUBLISHED MISSION

TO ALGIERS.

FERGUSSON

YYYY

DISTRIBUTION

42

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MR BERMAN (LEGAL ADVISERS)

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HD/NENAD

HD/SECPOL D

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CHIEF OF ASSESSMENT STAFF

(CABINET OFFICE)

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MR APPLEYARD CABINET OFFICE

MR W D REEVES CABINET OFFICE

SIR C CURWEN CABINET OFFICE

MR CHARLTON CABINET OFFICE

PS/NUMBER 10 DOWNING ST

SIR P CRADOCK, 10 DOWNING ST

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
MR LS SMITH BANK ENGLAND

MR WICKS HMT

EMERGENCY UNIT

RESIDENT CLERK

NNNN





cc PC. 18/13

2 MARSHAM STREET
LONDON SW1P 3EB
071-276 3000

My ref:
Your ref:

6

SECRET

Mr J Redwood
Minister of State
Department of Trade and Industry
Victoria Street
LONDON
SW1

CD 24/1

21 January 1991

Dear Minister,

INSURANCE AGAINST DAMAGE BY IRAQI TERRORISTS

Recd A38

Thank you for copying to me your letter of 16 January to Kenneth Baker. These are possible concerns in two areas of my responsibilities. In both, I fully agree that the first recourse should be to the commercial insurance market.

Local government commonly carries some of its own liabilities, and insures commercially for the remainder. A confidential sounding suggests that, unless we were to be formally at war, most local authorities are adequately covered. The point was gone into by local authority insurers during an earlier period of concern about terrorism.

In the event of a major and unanticipatable event outside their control forcing major additional expenditure on the authority, we could operate the "Bellwin" arrangements as we do for extreme weather conditions.

In passing, you may wish to note that if there is a need to make payments to private individuals, etc local government has sufficient powers (Section 138, Local Government Act 1972) to act in cases of emergency and disaster.

The other major area is the water industry. Although we would normally expect the industry to insure against such risks, there are possible if unlikely contingencies in which very major liabilities might fall upon water undertakings. It may be that these are not commercially insurable.


Copies go to those to whom you copied you letter.

Yours sincerely
M Heaseltine

MICHAEL HESELTINE

Approved by the Secretary of State
and signed in his absence

2
MURDOCK EAST.
SIL #39





CABINET OFFICE

70 Whitehall London SW1A 2AS Telephone ~~01 270 0120~~ 071 270 0050

CONFIDENTIAL

T01329

21 January 1991

Miss Jane Binstead
Ministry of Defence
Room 6165
Main Building
Whitehall SW1

en

Dof

OPD(G)(MH)

I am writing to confirm my telephone call just now. At ODP(G)(MH) this morning there was discussion of questions concerning allied POWs in Iraq which may come from the media, and indeed are already coming, against the background that some of the POWs have made anti-war statements under duress, and that the Iraqis have threatened to move them to strategic sites. The questions are:

- What advice does the RAF give to its pilots regarding the possibility of capture and being put under duress (taking account of the fact that there is some historical experience of this)?
- Is this advice the same as that given by the US forces?
- Will the allies be altering their bombing plan to avoid the strategic sites where the POWs may be held?

These are questions both of substance and of response to media questioning, and it is the latter of course that is OPD(G)(MH)'s responsibility.

2. My request to you, from Ministers at the meeting, was:

- a. for a definitive line to take for the Prime Minister's use in the Debate this afternoon (which is obviously very urgent);

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- b. that the Minister who attends the OPD(G)(MH) meeting tomorrow should come briefed to speak on the response that should be given to these lines of questioning from the media. I think Ministers would wish to be reassured that the Americans and ourselves were taking the same line.

*You
Bill*

W D REEVES

Copies to: ✓ Sir Charles Powell, No 10
A T O'Donnell Esq, No 10
J Neilson Esq, DEN

CONFIDENTIAL

Baghdad radio this morning broadcast a new threat: that Allied prisoners would be interned at strategic sites in Iraq. This is grave and disturbing news. My HF the Minister of State has already protested in the strongest terms to the Iraqi Ambassador who had been summoned to the Foreign Office for this morning. He reminded the Ambassador that those who order or commit grave breaches are personally answerable for their conduct. He also assured him that we would scrupulously honour our obligations under the *Geneva* Conventions.

This practice is expressly forbidden by the Geneva Convention. We are appealing to the ICRC to do all they can to bring home to the Iraqis that any such practice must be stopped. We shall hold the Iraqis directly responsible for the safety of our prisoners.



SECRET - UK EYES A

B.0715

PRIME MINISTER

cc Sir Robin Butler
Sir Percy Cradock

OPD(G): 21 January: Overnight action points

Prisoners of War

1. You might ask the Defence Secretary under Item 1 to report on what is known of the fate of the two British airmen shown on Iraqi television. They are Fl. Lt. Peters and Fl. Lt. Nichol who were the crew of the first Tornado to be lost in action. Their families apparently recognised their voices though they were understandably under great strain. According to the transcript available to MOD, Fl. Lt. Peters did not comment on the war itself (limiting himself to his name, rank, duties) while Fl. Lt. Nichol was more circumspect and deliberately ambiguous than some of the others.

2. The Defence Secretary may also report that we have two Iraqi POWs in the UK in the shape of two members of the Iraqi Embassy who failed to leave and who are members of the Iraqi Armed Forces. They are being kept here under the normal Geneva Convention rules.

3. You might ask the Foreign Secretary about action taken with the Iraqi Government to demand that the British airmen be treated in accordance with the Geneva Convention. Action was taken on Saturday with the Iraqi Embassy to secure an assurance that all British POWs would be treated in accordance with the Convention. The US Government has

SECRET - UK EYES A

B



SECRET - UK EYES A

protested after the showing of their POWs on TV (which prima facie looks like a breach) and you may want to ask the Foreign Secretary to take parallel action with the Iraqi Embassy here. It would be helpful for you to be able to say that this had been done in the House of Commons this afternoon.

Missing British journalist

4. The Foreign Secretary may report that Bruce Cheeseman, a British passport holder normally resident in South Korea as a stringer for the Daily Telegraph and South China Morning Post, has disappeared in Baghdad. He was last seen on 17 January. His parents who live in Australia have been informed.

L V Appleyard

L V Appleyard

Cabinet Office
21 January 1991

SECRET - UK EYES A

Jp 01279

SIR CHARLES POWELL

c Sir Robin Butler

Covered
in OPX(E) Copy No 1 of 5 copies

C 07246

THIS IS A COPY. THE ORIGINAL IS
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3 (4)
OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACTIraq: Battle Damage Assessment

I attach the second informal battle damage assessment produced by the Assessments Staff with the help of the Ministry of Defence. It summarises our knowledge up to 7.00 pm (GMT) last night. It is subject to the same reservations as its predecessor. It is still difficult to produce a good assessment. The main reasons are the poor weather and the slowness with which information is being passed from headquarters in Saudi Arabia to both Washington and London. I understand from the CIA that there is frustration, not only in the American intelligence community, but in the White House as well, about the thinness of battle damage assessments.

2. The attachment shows that the air campaign is going well, though not miraculously. There is a long way to go. So far, there have been some 7,000 sorties. We are having success in grinding down Iraqi air defences, particularly command and control. We have had an impact on BW and on nuclear sites, a significant impact on airfields and on Baghdad targets.

3. On the other hand, bad weather has prevented some attacks and much effort has had to be redirected to the location and destruction of mobile missiles. The Iraqis still have considerable missile capacity; they have lost none of their ground attack aircraft; they have plenty of CW available, plus BW, we must assume being reserved for later use, perhaps in the land battle. The Iraqi army remains largely undamaged.





4. Our assessment of Saddam's strategy remains that he will try to sit out the present phase of the attack in the hope that he can last until the ground fighting. Then he will hope to bloody the Allies sufficiently to cause problems with Western public opinion. This is not an entirely bad strategy from our point of view: the worst scenario now would be if he withdrew from Kuwait while his forces still mounted a serious threat, either agreeing to make peace and living to fight another day, or refusing to make peace, inviting a land campaign and possible occupation in Iraq itself.

le

PERCY CRADOCK

21 January 1991

DEPARTMENT/SERIES <i>Premia</i> PIECE/ITEM <i>3444</i> (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
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Use the card for one piece or for each extract removed from a different place within a piece.

Enter the department and series,
eg. HO 405, J 82.

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file
SUBJECT CC MASTER

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

21 January 1991

Dear R. And,

PRIME MINISTER'S TALK WITH THE AUSTRALIAN PRIME MINISTER

The Australian Prime Minister telephoned the Prime Minister this morning about the situation in the Gulf. Mr. Hawke said that once again our two countries were fighting alongside each other against a common enemy as so often in the past. He had thought it was time to have a bit of a yarn. There was great admiration in Australia for the way in which the Gulf conflict was being handled in the United Kingdom. People shared our sense of sadness at the loss of aircraft and aircrew.

The Prime Minister said that he had meant to telephone Mr. Hawke himself. He was grateful for the expression of sympathy. We had feared that the losses might have been greater in the early stages. Much of Iraq's airpower was still untouched. Overall there was a long way to go.

Mr. Hawke said there remained a great uncertainty over whether Iraq would use CW and BW. They seemed to have the technical means to do so. The Prime Minister said that we pondered this daily. The Americans were attacking Iraqi CW establishments on a daily basis. But we did not know how much of Iraq's chemical and biological capacity was in usable weapons form and when they might bring it out. It was possible they were being kept for a later stage in the campaign.

Mr. Hawke said that restraint on the part of the Israelis would be critical, despite the provocation they had suffered. Their longer term interest would surely best be served by not retaliating for the Iraqi missile attacks. The Prime Minister said that we shared this view and had pressed the Israelis hard. The United States had sent Patriot missiles and operators which should provide some additional assurance, particularly after their success against SCUD missiles fired at Saudi Arabia the previous evening.

Mr. Hawke said that a parliamentary debate on the Gulf was in progress in Australia. The position was cast-iron solid. The Liberal and National party supported the government's decisions. There was a fringe group in the Senate which was exercising the luxury of opposition. The vast majority of Australians understood the necessity to stop Iraq and supported the decision to send Australian ships. The Prime Minister said that we were very grateful for Australian support. We were always very happy to know that, when there was trouble, Australia was with us.


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Mr. Hawke asked whether Britain had any line into Iraq which would enable us to judge Saddam Hussain's thinking and get through to him that he should comply with SCR 678. The Prime Minister said that we saw no current possibility that Iraq would agree to withdraw: there was not the slightest indication that Saddam Hussain was re-thinking his position. His strategy seemed to be to absorb early attacks and fight on. But he was probably shaken by the scale of the allied assault and the damage being done. Mr. Hawke emphasised that his question did not reflect any vacillation on Australia's part. The war could only end on the basis of complete Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait. It was probably wishful thinking to expect Saddam Hussain to change. But if we heard anything suggesting that he would, it would be interesting to know.

Mr. Hawke continued that Australia had the same position as Britain against linkage. But once we defeated Saddam Hussain, we would all need to address the wider issues of the Middle East, which were the cause of potential conflict in the future. The Prime Minister confirmed that we would return to that once the Gulf conflict was out of the way.

The Prime Minister and Mr. Hawke agreed to stay in touch.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'C. D. Powell', with a stylized, cursive script.

(C. D. POWELL)

Richard Gozney, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.



*Caught / low level /
High defended target
Prime Minister*

*2. Need more Tornados
2. OK for assessment*

Ref. AO91/155

PRIME MINISTER

cc Sir Percy Cradock
Mr Appleyard

CDR.

containing / lead

OPD(G): 21 JANUARY

Item 1: Current military situation

You might invite the Defence Secretary and the Chief of the Defence Staff to bring you up to date on the air campaign. As you know, there has been a third Tornado loss on Saturday evening. So far British forces have lost 3 out of the 11 total air losses within the coalition. Jaguars and Tornados have kept up their regular series of sorties over the weekend, mainly directed as planned against enemy airfields.

X

2. More widely you might ask the Chief of the Defence Staff for an indication of the extent to which the allies have achieved what they expected in the initial air attack. It would be useful to know how General Schwarzkopf and our Joint Commander now see the nature and timing of subsequent phases. In that context the Defence Secretary might say a word about preparations for the land campaign as the First Armoured Division moves to its concentration point. There are reports that one element of Iraqi VII Corps stated that so many of its assets were destroyed in the air campaign that it could no longer function.

Speech. X

3. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office think it very important to counter Saddam Hussein's propaganda that the Allied action is damaging the holy sites. The agreed statement of objectives makes it clear that such sites should be avoided. You might invited the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary to say something



about this. Your speech in Parliament is an obvious opportunity for dealing authoritatively with the point.

Item 2: Current international situation

4. You might report on the contacts over the weekend with the US and Israeli Governments which have led the Israelis so far to exercise commendable restraint over Iraqi missile attacks on Israel. You might then invite the Foreign Secretary to report on the representations made by the FCO and Embassies to the same purpose and the reactions of the Arab coalition partners. Finally, you might ask the Chief of the Defence Staff to bring you up to date on the hunt for Iraqi mobile Scud launchers and the probability that the Iraqis could launch further conventional or chemical strikes against Israel. If Israel retaliates, have your colleagues a view on the least damaging form of retaliation? The least damaging Israeli action might be a purely Israeli attack (ie without allied involvement) directly related to the missile sites in Western Iraq; and the later it takes place, the better.

5. You might ask the Foreign Secretary for his assessment of the position of British communities/Embassies in Muslim countries as the conflict gathers pace. There have been demonstrations in a number of countries and the Jordanian Parliament is reported to have adopted a motion for action against Western interests. The Foreign Secretary might also report on any terrorist threats overseas. Sir Percy Cradock might comment on intelligence about terrorist threats generally.

6. You might ask the Foreign Secretary to report on problems in NATO with the Germans hinting at pulling out of the Allied Mobile Force (Air), under which German, Italian and Belgian fighters were deployed to Turkey, if the US continues to use Turkish airbases against Iraq. Although the dispute currently seems



containable, if it hits the press in a big way, we could have a bitter Alliance quarrel with the German attitude under much criticism.

Item 3: Media Handling

7. You might invite the Energy Secretary to report on the broader picture including preparations for the Parliamentary debate, especially briefing of backbenchers. He is also looking at whether more needs to be done to find stories for correspondents with the First Armoured Division. You may wish to consider whether more needs to be done to counter the peace movement, not least by pointing out the consequences for this country if Saddam Hussain had been allowed to go on developing missiles and nuclear weapons which, as the missile strikes on Israel have shown, could then have been used against us.

8. A particular issue is whether, given the Parliamentary debate today, we could do without an MOD press conference. It seems to me that there would be some advantage in establishing that such a press conference does not take place automatically every day.

9. You might then invite your Press Secretary to report on day-to-day stories. The press is now beginning to allege that US briefing is more comprehensive and helpful than British briefing which is said to be unattributable for the more interesting snippets. Mr O'Donnell is looking into this. Altogether, however, the press handling seems to be going very well.

10. A point which the press were picking at over the weekend was the one which you mentioned at the end of Friday's meeting, ie whether, in view of Saddam Hussein's crimes, we should continue to take the line that it is not part of our objectives to remove



him. We have to stick to the UN Resolutions which do not include the removal of Saddam Hussein but, since the point may well come up in the debate, you may want to ask the FCO to suggest a line to take.

R.R.B.

ROBIN BUTLER

20 January 1991

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PERSONAL

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MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB
Telephone 071 21 82111/3

MO 6/17/15/1D

20th January 1991

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Dear Charles,

REPORT FROM RIYADH

The Defence Secretary's colleagues might find it useful to see the attached report from Commanders on Operations today in the Gulf.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries to members of OPD(G) and to Sir Robin Butler.

Yours sincerely,
Simon Webb

(S WEBB)
PS/S of S

Sir Charles Powell KCMG
No 10 Downing Street

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THE VIEW FROM RIYADH AND WASHINGTON 201745Z JAN 91

1. This has been a frustrating day for the allied Air Forces particularly in the Kuwait theatre of operations (KTO) due to very poor weather which is now unlikely to clear until 22 January. Thereafter it should be possible to bring the full weight of air power on to troops, battle fighting equipment, ammunition, storage and logistic supply. If the Iraqis have been husbanding their air resources, heavy and precision strikes against their main fighting forces may well bring out the Air Force in greater numbers. Medium and high level radar control bombing against the RGFC and Western Iraq has continued today - of note there were some 300 A-10 sorties against SCUD sites in Western Iraq today. There has been little flying by UK bombers, except for a raid by 8 Jaguars which was forced to turn back from the target and divert to Dhahran. They have since returned to Muharraaq. Minimal battle damage assessment has been possible.

2. There will be 44 sorties by UK Tornado GR1s and continuing Tornado F3 combat air patrols tonight both supported by tankers. Main GR1 targets will be airfields and airfield defences. In detail:

- a. Tabuk. 2 raids each of 10 GR1s with escorting fighters.
- b. Muharraaq. 8 GR1s escorted by 2 F14s and 2 EF111s (jamming aircraft).
- c. Dhahran. 8 GR1 plus a further 8 GR1 from Muharraaq.
- d. The GR1As have not been tasked as the weather in their area of interest precludes proper reconnaissance.

3. Commanders in theatre are reviewing the conduct of the air effort. There is evidence that much of the Iraqi Air Force has moved to airfields in the North and to investigate this F117As have been targeting individual hardened aircraft shelters (HAS) at Tallil to generate signs of aircraft debris post-attack.

4. CDS noted that as we now seem to have gained air superiority we have moved into phase 3 of the original attack plan earlier than expected - a heavy concentration in the KTO was not planned until 8 days into the air campaign. He noted also, in line with earlier remarks about the possibility of the Iraqi Air Force being drawn out in the next few days, that they have suffered but little attrition.

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
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5. In conclusion some frustration but morale remains good and, in particular, at Muharraaq which has now lost 3 Tornados, crews are if anything even more resolute.

6. CDS and Gen Powell spoke earlier about the progress of the campaign to date. On the question of Israel and possible retaliation against SCUD attacks Gen Powell said that the US administration had found the Prime Minister's support very helpful indeed. Powell felt that Western Iraq was now much more firmly under control after diversion of considerable air effort for mainly political reasons resulting in rather easier relations with the Israelis. Recent air strikes in the West had achieved 24 hits many of which were followed by secondary explosions which indicated that the targets could well have been SCUDs.

7. Baghdad would continue to be worked very hard by allied Air Forces for one or two more days following which targeting would switch to supply lines, roads and bridges to chip away at Iraqi logistics. Powell confirmed that, weather permitting, the weight of emphasis would shift to the KTO. Although Iraqi command and control has been degraded the "Spinal Cord" of the system has not yet been severed, and therefore Saddam Hussein is still able to exercise some direction. CDS and Gen Powell agreed that there was still a great number of AAA and highly capable SAM systems to be dealt with. On PR the Pentagon is being very careful in handling public opinion which currently shows 86% of the population in favour of the President's handling of the crisis, but all are very conscious of the impact of a growing list of casualties not backed up by tangible gains. CDS and the General reaffirmed their acknowledgement, reached before hostilities started, that there was a danger of increasing public and political pressure for results but Powell confirmed that he fully supported Gen Schwarzkopf's stance on not starting land operations until ready. They were also in concert on the need to avoid casualty figures and losses being treated in sporting event terms.

8. CDS said that he had directed his staff to do more longer term thinking on possible military outcomes and contingencies. In particular he mentioned his concern about the possibility of the Iraqis leaving Kuwait but neither declaring nor suing for peace. Gen Powell agreed that this would be a very difficult problem and suggested that officials from both sides of the Atlantic should meet for discussions. Finally on media matters CDS asked if Gen Powell would intercede on our behalf for release to the media of some overhead photography which showed the damage caused by UK JP233s at Tallil airfield. The General agreed to take this forward.



D G LITTLEJOHNS
Cdre
PSO/CDS
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PRIME MINISTER

I have been speaking to Brent Scowcroft. He is sure the President will be happy to have a word today. We have tentatively agreed on 1745. He will let me know only if that does not suit the President.

I think the subjects suggest themselves:

- Israel
- the progress of the air campaign and *Republican Guards*
- how to react to possible peace initiatives.

You might also ask him how he assesses the true effectiveness of the air campaign so far: it is very hard to judge without access to satellite photography.

Brent tells me that they are still having considerable difficulty with the Israelis in holding them off from retaliation, but are succeeding so far. The price has been diverting a very large proportion of air strikes to the western desert to try to destroy SCUD missile sites, when the aircraft could be better used elsewhere. American military commanders are getting a bit testy about this.

He also told me that they had a very costly night in the air campaign, losing 9 aircraft. Cheney's explanation is that the "kids are getting careless: they are over-confident and going in too low". You will want to commiserate with the President on this.

Suzy

(C. D. POWELL)

20 January 1991

RP

Me for

PRIME MINISTER

IRAQ/KUWAIT: FOREIGN SECRETARY'S COMMENTS

I gather from Gus, that the press are trying to make something of the Foreign Secretary's remarks during "On The Record" today about whether or not allied forces would simply stop at the border between Kuwait and Iraq or would enter Iraq to attack Iraqi forces.

In practice it is not a very meaningful question, since we know that, if there is a ground campaign, allied forces would enter Iraq before they would enter Kuwait. But we can't say that. And no doubt some Opposition Members will try to make a meal of it in the House tomorrow. If so, I suggest the attached line, which might be discussed in OPD(G) tomorrow. I also attach the transcript of the Foreign Secretary's remarks and the text of SCR 678.

C.D.P.

C. D. POWELL

20 January 1991

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I dispute the interpretation which the RHG/Hon Member is trying to put on my RHFs remarks. Our aim is to see the Security Council Resolutions implemented in full: Iraq has to withdraw from Kuwait totally and unconditionally and the legitimate government has to be restored. The Resolution also authorises us to use the necessary means to restore international peace and security in the area. Surely it is a matter of common sense that, if Saddam Hussein's forces were sitting just across the border from Kuwait, firing their artillery and their missiles and threatening to occupy it once again, the objectives of the Security Council Resolutions would not be fulfilled. Kuwait's independence would still be at risk: and there would not be peace and security. In those circumstances, we would not just do nothing, we would deal with the continuing threat to Kuwait. But of course we do not have a policy of occupying any part of Iraq or trying to change its government, only of freeing Kuwait.



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all*

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

Subject c Master

From the Private Secretary

20 January 1991

THE GULF: PRIME MINISTER'S CONVERSATION WITH PRESIDENT BUSH

The Prime Minister had a conversation this afternoon with President Bush about developments in the Gulf. I had a short talk with General Scowcroft immediately beforehand. The two main points to emerge from the latter were that the Israelis were still pressing hard for retaliatory action, even though the Americans had diverted a great deal of air activity to the western Iraqi desert at the expense of higher priority tasks: and that the Americans had had heavy aircraft losses last night. The figure given by General Scowcroft was nine aircraft, which I took to be new losses. But I may have misunderstood and it could be the cumulative total. Scowcroft said the explanation given by Cheney was that the "kids are getting careless and going in too low".

When the Prime Minister spoke to the President he began by saying how sorry he was to hear of the American losses. The President said that we had been pretty lucky so far and the pilots were getting over-confident. He continued that he was impressed to read about the extent of public support in Britain for the Government's line on the conflict in the Gulf. There had been some sizeable anti-war demonstrations in the United States. The Prime Minister said there had been some demonstrations here, but nothing to cause any difficulty. He thought that the Iraqi attack on Israel had reinforced public opinion.

The Prime Minister continued that he thought the President had handled the Israelis very skilfully. It was a bonus that they had not retaliated so far and every day gained was an advantage. The arrival of the Patriot missiles should help hold them back for longer. If we could find the remaining SCUD launchers and get rid of them, that would reinforce the case for the Israelis keeping out. The President said that he remained very worried about Israel's intentions. He had the impression from his conversation with Mr. Shamir that Israel actively wanted to get into the war. They had now drawn up new plans for retaliation which were even more ambitious than the previous ones (he did not specify what they were: I will try to find out more from Scowcroft). The Prime Minister said that we had been trying to influence the Israelis and would continue to do so, although we did not carry nearly as much weight with them as the Americans.

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The Prime Minister asked whether the President expected us to be faced with embarrassing peace initiatives. The President said that he had no specific news, although President Mitterrand had put in for a telephone call. He was a bit fearful that might presage some new initiative. He did not think there was any case at all for halting the air campaign. The Prime Minister said he agreed. Whatever proposal was put to us, we should not stop. The air campaign must be doing huge damage to Iraq. We should carry on and not be blown off course. The President said he very much agreed with this.

This account is somewhat briefer than normal: we had a technology failure which prevented me hearing all the President's end of the conversation.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence) and Sir Robin Butler.

C. D. POWELL

Richard Gozney, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

PART 38 ends:-

PART 39 begins:-

CDP to fco Meeting Record
20.1.91