

PART 40 ends:-

CDP to MOD 31-1-91

PART 41 begins:-

MOD to CDP 1-2-91

TUNISIAN EMBASSY

REPUBLIQUE TUNISIENNE

PRIME MINISTER'S

29 PRINCES GATE

LONDON SW7

PERSONAL MESSAGE

TEL: 01-584 8117

SERIAL NO. 7368191

LE PRESIDENT

(Non-Official Translation)

Subject cc Mauter
OPS

Carthage, 31 January 1991

Mister Prime Minister,

Our attachment to the principles and objectives of the United Nations Organisation, the aim of which is to promote peace and security in the world, and our satisfaction at the signs of international detente and its promises for the future, have prompted us to convey to you our thoughts on the Gulf crisis, which is a source of great concern for us all, and to consult with you on the most appropriate means to restore and guarantee stability in the Middle East and the rest of the world.

The war that is raging now in the region and the trail of ruin and devastation left by sophisticated means of destruction and other weapons, the use of which we have reason to fear, are bound to take a turn for the worse; which would have the most disastrous consequences for all concerned.

Persuaded that you share our conviction that disaster is not inevitable as well as our aspiration to put an end to this tragedy, we, in Tunisia, are determined, while it is still time, to work in favour of a cessation of hostilities, and to avoid further loss of life and material resources for all parties involved in the conflict.

I would like to stress that the call for an end to hostilities and for another chance to seek a peaceful solution is not meant to impede the implementation or modify the terms of Security Council

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- 2 -

resolutions in so far that the objective remains the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait and the restoration of the sovereignty of this country, in conformity with international legality which binds us all.

Since the beginning of the crisis, we have spared no effort to reach this objective. On the basis of these very principles we have presented our proposals to President Saddam Hussein and we deem that these proposals will have a better chance to succeed if supported by the Security Council.

Tunisia which continues its quest for a peaceful solution to this conflict in cooperation with the states of the Arab Maghreb Union, calls upon your country, as a permanent member of the Security Council, to support the Maghrebi initiative, thereby contributing to the achievement of the noble objective of peace.

In these difficult times, the relations of friendship and consideration which exist between us allow us to be confident that our call for peace will meet the interest and support of Your Excellency, enabling us to observe international legality, preserve peace and guarantee security and stability.

With my highest consideration, I remain,

Yours sincerely,

ZINE EL ABIDINE BEN ALI

وإن تونس التي ما انفكت تسعى بالتعاون مع دول اتحاد المغرب العربي للتوصل إلى حلّ هذا النزاع بالطرق السلمية تناشد بلكم بوصفه عضواً بمجلس الأمن، تيسير المبادرة المغاربية التي تقدّمت بها دول اتحادنا إلى مجلس الأمن، إسهاماً منكم في تحقيق هذا الهدف النبيل.

وإنّ علاقات الصداقة والتقدير القائمة بيننا تجعلنا واثقين في أن يجد هذا المسعى دعمكم ومساندتكم، في هذه الساعات الحرجة، بما يحقق احترام الشرعية الدولية ويصون السلم ويضمن الأمن والاستقرار .

وتفضلوا، سيادة الرئيس، بقبول فائق مشاعر المودة والتقدير.

زين العابدين بن علي

حرّر بقصر الجمهورية بقرطاج في 15 رجب 1411 هـ

موافق لـ 31 جانفي 1991 م

معالي السيد جون ميجر

الوزير الأوّل للمملكة المتحدة

لبريطانيا العظمى وإيرلندا الشمالية

لندن



الجمهورية التونسية الرئيس

معالي السيد الوزير الأول،

إن تعلقنا بمبادئ الأمم المتحدة وأهدافها الرامية إلى نشر الأمن والسلام في العالم، واستبشارنا بما ظهر من بوادر الانفراج الدولي وما فتحة من آفاق، منذ نهاية العقد الماضي، يحملنا على مخاطبتكم في موضوع أزمة الخليج التي نعتقد أنها تشكل مصدر انشغالنا جميعا في هذه الآونة، وتبادل الرأي والتشاور معكم حول أنجع سبل حلها وأسرعها بما يعيد إلى المنطقة استقرارها ويضمن استتباب السلم فيها وفي العالم .

وإن الحرب الدائرة اليوم في هذه المنطقة، وما تخلفه من دمار وتخریب، نظرا إلى الوسائل المتطورة المستخدمة فيها، والوسائل الأخرى التي تتخوف من استعمالها، مرشحة للإنتزلاق نحو كارثة تكون عواقبها وخيمة على الجميع .

وإننا إذ نعتقد أنكم مثلنا، لا تقبلون بحتمية الدمار، وتشاركوننا التطلع إلى وضع حد لهذه المأساة، حريصون على العمل من أجل توقيف القتال مادام الأمر ممكنا، من أجل إنقاذ ما يمكن إنقاذه من أرواح بشرية ومقدرات مادية لجميع الأطراف.

وإن الدعوة إلى إيقاف القتال، وفسح المجال من جديد للبحث عن حل سلمي لهذه الأزمة لا تهدف إلى تعطيل قرارات مجلس الأمن أو تغيير مضمونها مادامت متعلقة بذات الأهداف المتمثلة في انسحاب القوات العراقية من الكويت وإعادة السيادة إلى هذا البلد، تطبيقا للشرعية الدولية والتزاما بها .

ولقد آلينا على أنفسنا، منذ اندلاع هذه الأزمة، بذل كل الجهود والمساعدات لتحقيق هذه الغاية، وعرضنا مقترحاتنا على الرئيس صدام حسين، انطلاقا من نفس الأسس والأهداف. وإننا نعتقد أن حظوظ نجاح هذه المبادرات ستكون أوفر إذا ما لقيت دعم مجلس الأمن.

EMBASSY
OF
THE STATE OF KUWAIT
46 QUEEN'S GATE
LONDON S.W.7

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

RECEIVED

T364191

سفارة دولة الكويت

لندن

SUBJECT

Unofficial Translation

cc: MAF
OPS

CDM

b/L

The Right Honourable John Major
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom

Dear Mr. Prime Minister,

It was kind of you to remember, as we remember with pleasure, our meeting in Taif on the 6th of January 1991. You may also recall my praise of the friendship and the ties that bind Kuwait and Britain. I said then, and I repeat it now that Britain is one of Kuwait's oldest and most loyal friend and that is a fact you have proved on more than one occasion, whenever Kuwait was endangered.

The sacrifices offered and the costs incurred by the British people in order to help a friend in his hour of need were not absent from our thoughts then, just as it is the case now. Indeed, this matter was the subject of serious discussion and consideration by our government to find the best venues for cooperation with our friends to defray the cost of their burden. Your Excellency's message came at the right time.

We highly value the honourable and principled stance taken by Britain towards the liberation of Kuwait, and its stand by right and justice from the outset of the crisis. We also highly appreciate your readiness to participate in the rebuilding of Kuwait after its liberation, God willing.

EMBASSY
OF
THE STATE OF KUWAIT
46 QUEEN'S GATE
LONDON S.W.7



سفارة دولة الكويت
لندن

(2)

The Government of Kuwait will discuss these matters with its British counterpart at the nearest possible opportunity .

I remain confident that victory is imminent, and that liberation will be achieved very soon.

With my best wishes and highest consideration.

Jaber Al-Ahmed Al-Sabah
Emir of Kuwait

16th Rajab 1411
31st January 1991

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ



٢١ يناير ١٩٩١م

صاحب الفخامة جون ميجور

رئيس وزراء المملكة المتحدة

لقد كان جميلا منكم أن تتذكروا بعبادة كما نتذكر نحن لقاءنا في الطائف في السادس من يناير الحالي ، ولعلكم تتذكرون أيضا اشادتنا بالصدقة والروابط التي تربط بين الكويت وبريطانيا ووصفنا لكم بأنكم من أقدم وأوفى أصدقاء بلادنا كما برهنتم على ذلك في أكثر من مناسبة تحاط بها الكويت بالخطر . ولم يغيب عن أذهاننا آنذاك كما هي الحال الآن ماقدمته بريطانيا من تضحيات وما تكبدته من نفقات لمساعدة صديق في وقت الضيق ، وبالفعل كان هذا الأمر مدار نقاش وبحث جاد لدى حكومتنا لاختيار السبيل الأمثل للتعاون مع أصدقائنا فيما يتحملون من أعباء ، ولقد جاءت رسالتكم في الوقت المناسب ومن قبيل توارد الخواطر ليس إلا .

لقد كنا ولا تزال نشمن تسمينا عاليا موقف بريطانيا المبدئي والمشرف من تحرير الكويت ووقوفها الى جانب الحق والعدل منذ بداية الأزمة ، كما نقدر لها تمام التقدير استعدادها للمساهمة في البناء بعد التحرير ان شاء الله ، ولهذا فان الحكومة الكويتية ستبحث هذه المواضع مع الجانب البريطاني في أقرب وقت ممكن .

وانني لعلني ثقة بأن النصر بات وشيكا ، وأن التحرير سيتحقق بأقرب فرصة ان شاء الله .

مع عميق التقدير وأطيب التمنيات .

جابر الأحمد الصباح

أمير الكويت

SECRET AND PERSONAL

33 CDP



10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

31 January 1991

THE GULF

I had a further, very brief, conversation with General Scowcroft tonight. We both agreed there was not very much to report.

We talked about the reports of the massing of Iraqi forces just over the Saudi border. General Scowcroft said he did not really know what to make of these. It was hard to understand why Saddam Hussein should be so dumb: once his forces came out of their defensive positions onto the highways and open spaces, they were bound to get decimated. I said that it struck me as slightly odd that we had not yet received reports of allied air strikes against the Iraqi forces reported to be massing. General Scowcroft wondered whether they really were doing so: a lot of the information came from PoW reports. But either way, he was at a loss to explain it.

I am copying this letter to Richard Gozney (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

CHARLES POWELL

Simon Webb, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence

SECRET AND PERSONAL

UNCLASSIFIED

afe



Treasury Chambers, Parliament Street, SW1P 3AG

The Hon Timothy Sainsbury MP
Minister of State
Department of Trade and Industry
1 - 19 Victoria Street
London
SW1

CMM
12.

31 January 1991

New Lm.

IRAQ: PREMIUM REFUNDS

- attached

Thank you for your letter of 27 December.


2. I understand the legal position is clearly that exporters have no entitlement to refund of premium. From the moment an exporter signed a contract under a line of credit ECGD was on risk and the exporter certain of being paid for goods shipped - and a premium of 10 per cent was a most modest charge for ECGD carrying such a risk on Iraq. It is quite clear that it was the exporter who was at risk if shipment was thwarted. Exporters who did not wish to take this risk had the option of taking our separate cover with ECGD against pre-shipment risks. Exporters who took out such cover - paying the appropriate premium - have been fully protected against recent events.

3. Like Norman Lamont I am prepared to agree that ECGD should offer ex-gratia premium refunds of 75 per cent to exporters who have made no loan drawings. This is consistent with past ECGD practice. However, the arguments are firmly against giving policy holders on Iraq further special treatment. As Norman Lamont pointed out earlier, these include the enormous losses which ECGD faces on Iraq, the breach of normal insurance principles, the likely knock-on effects elsewhere on ECGD's business, and the undermining of our policy of not paying compensation for losses arising out of sanctions.

UNCLASSIFIED

4. We have taken legal advice about the risk of judicial review and are not confident that this should not alter our approach. These issues are questions of commercial relations between the various parties on a contractual matter and do not appear to raise questions of public law. Even if they did the risk of a legal challenge to current policy seems remote as the legal position is clear and no policy holder can have had a legitimate expectation that ECGD's approach to ex gratia payments for Iraq would have been more generous than normal arrangements.

5. I am copying this letter to the Prime Minister, Douglas Hurd, Tom King and to Sir Robin Butler.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'David Mellor', written in a cursive style.

DAVID MELLOR



MIDDLE EAST: Slt Pt 240

SECRET



32#(a-b) cclg
QUEEN ANNE'S GATE LONDON SW1H 9AT

31 January 1991

Mr Peter

*ear
1/2*

INSURANCE AGAINST DAMAGE BY IRAQI TERRORISTS

1
Thank you for sending me a copy of your letter of 23 January. *Har.*

My general reaction is that we should not rush into state compensation arrangements based on a concept of "war damage" which suits the insurance industry, but not us, and which does not fit present circumstances. My concern is that your proposals could draw us into an enduring commitment, possibly not confined to Iraqi-inspired terrorism. I agree that we must be ready to respond to developments, but not without regard to the long-term implications of any commitments we give now.

I have a particular concern that we should not give too alarming a view of the threat short-term, or too sanguine a view of it long-term. I should therefore be grateful if your officials would liaise closely with mine over how we present our assessment of the threat in any discussions which are, or which are likely to become, public.

Our assessment is that the overall risk of terrorist damage to property is not - certainly not yet - substantially heightened by events in the Gulf, given the subsisting risk of Irish terrorism. The threat from Irish terrorism remains more real. If Gulf-related terrorism does occur in the United Kingdom, there is no indication that any damage caused would be on anything like the scale that justified the special arrangements to deal with damage caused by enemy action in 1939/45. There are also likely to be serious practical difficulties in ring-fencing any scheme for Government support - while it may be relatively simple to identify terrorist acts that have a Middle East element, it would probably be very difficult to isolate, certainly for public identification, those incidents cause by Iraqi Government-inspired terrorists, as opposed to those caused by, say opportunist Palestinian groups.

And "The end of hostilities", however that is to be defined, is unlikely to see the end of any terrorist campaign that the Iraqis do succeed in mounting: the prospect must be that we shall remain vulnerable for many years to terrorist actions which may be claimed as a response to our military action in the Gulf. If insurance companies do disclaim responsibility while hostilities continue I see no reason why they should refrain from disclaiming it for any later incident plausibly attributable to the Gulf conflict.

The Rt Hon Peter Lilley, MP.
Secretary of State for Trade & Industry
Department of Trade & Industry
1-19 Victoria Street
LONDON, S.W.1.

SECRET

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2.

And I see political difficulties in denying compensation to an uninsured person for an apparently Gulf-related incident occurring after some deadline; or for an act of, for instance, Irish terrorism, while Iraqi terrorism is covered. These political difficulties will be compounded because in practical terms it may be difficult to establish terrorist motives convincingly. It is also conceivable that different terrorist groups might collaborate.

Terrorism in this country alas seems likely to be with us for some years. The conflict in Iraq does not create a radically new situation as regards terrorism here. If we respond by expanding Government's responsibilities for the consequences of terrorism, any such commitment could have implications beyond that conflict and terrorism associated with it.

The issue is really whether Government should get further into the insurance business as regards terrorism. If there were terrorist outrages here connected with the Gulf the Government would have to pick up a bill as regards injuries under the criminal injuries compensation scheme. Whether that could be absorbed under existing provision would depend on the scale of the claims. There is no special financial provision. It would not be feasible for the Government to opt out of its general commitment to cover injuries from crime by way of an exception as regards either terrorist crime or terrorist crime associated with armed conflict. But to add to the uncertain implications of that commitment a further dimension of commitment as regards property seems very questionable.

My Department's experience of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board suggests that the political attractions of appearing helpful and sympathetic can lead to costs which are difficult to predict and impossible to control. Targeting a Government scheme so that those who benefit in practice are only or predominantly those sufferers whom the Government wants to help, and not those who find opportunities to manipulate the rules of the system, is more difficult for Government than for insurance companies. Peter Brooke may wish to comment in the light of his experience of the wider compensation arrangements in Northern Ireland.

On present information it is difficult to see that the risks of terrorism in the UK are so different from the risks of other kinds of major tragedy which are difficult to predict that the insurance industry is incapable of dealing with the problem if it wishes to do so. To the extent that it cannot, any major tragedy caused by terrorism is likely in practice to call for a charitable response with a fund to assist the victim being established. It would then be open to Government to make a contribution to such a fund.

If the taxpayer is to bear losses, I see no case for confining compensation to those who thought they were privately insured. On the other hand there might be a case for meeting claims which are excluded as "war damage", but offsetting the cost by a percentage levy on the classes of insurance covered -straightforward enough to administer, I should have thought. Either way, benefits and costs should fall on the same group of people.

SECRET

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SECRET

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But I should prefer, if we can - while the extent and duration of any Iraqi-inspired terrorism here is so uncertain - to take the position that insurers have not hitherto tried to disown responsibility for terrorist damage - rightly, because terrorism is crime. This position would maintain pressure upon the insurance industry, and would avoid giving the impression that we expected something comparable with "war damage" as generally understood. (I accept that we cannot exclude the possibility of occasional high-value losses).

If you do proceed on your original lines, I see much advantage in private delivery of state compensation, building on present insurance arrangements. Experience of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board makes me doubt whether a public board is likely to be effective or economical in administering a scheme.

I agree that we should make no change to the Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme, for which I am jointly responsible with Ian Lang. It will cover injuries and death which arise from a crime of violence. You have noted the possible awkwardness of Government's paying large sums for damage to property, while bereaved families would receive only the statutory sum for fatal accidents - presently £3500, which James Mackay is raising to £7500 for deaths from 1 April.

I am sending copies of this letter to those who received yours, and to James Mackay.

Ian Lang
Amint

SECRET

MIDDLE EAST SU- PT39



Quayle (Tempest)



File

326-c)KK

meeting record

CC MASTER

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

31 January 1991

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH VICE PRESIDENT QUAYLE: THE GULF

Much of the Prime Minister's talk with Vice President Quayle this afternoon was about the Gulf.

The Prime Minister began by referring to our decision to accept the stationing of B52s at RAF Fairford. We had been very happy to agree to this. Vice President Quayle said it was characteristic of the UK to be so willing. The United States greatly appreciated the sustained support which it had received from Britain.

The Prime Minister said that the air campaign against Iraq was going well. There seemed to be some indications that the Iraqis were intending to cross the Saudi border in some strength in the next day or so, to try to provoke the multinational force into starting a ground campaign. The Vice President agreed that the Iraqis were trying to precipitate a ground war, with the intention of inflicting casualties. The Americans had in fact suffered double-digit casualties on each of the last two days: 11 marines yesterday, and a C130 shot down today.

The Prime Minister said that we assessed Iraq was likely to start to use CW quite soon. This might be against forces in Saudi Arabia or against Israel or both. The Vice President said the United States regarded it as certain that CW would be used by Iraq. They would go for an overwhelming conventional response.

The Vice President referred to the transfer of Iraqi aircraft to Iran. This might indicate that the Allied attacks on aircraft shelters were proving very accurate. He wondered how we saw Saddam Hussain's motives for moving the aircraft. The Prime Minister said we thought his main purpose was to husband his air force. The move seemed to have been agreed with Iran some time ago. We thought it unlikely that the Iranians would let the aircraft go, at least until the end of the conflict.

SECRET

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The Vice President asked whether public opinion in the United Kingdom thought that elimination of Saddam Hussain should be one of our war aims. The Prime Minister said it could not be an overt aim, although none of us would shed any tears if he were to be removed. The Vice President said the feeling was growing in the United States that Saddam Hussain must be removed.

The Prime Minister stressed the need to start thinking now about what would follow the conflict in the Gulf. We had to reckon with the possibility that Saddam Hussain might still be there and a powerful political figure, with a significant part of his war machine untouched. It was very important to inflict the maximum possible damage on his forces and military infrastructure before there was any question of a ceasefire. The Vice President said that the Administration was wrestling with this problem. There would have to be post-war security arrangements and this might involve an American presence for a time, although he did not think the Saudis would want Western forces to remain for long.

The Vice President asked whether the Prime Minister thought the Israelis would continue to exercise restraint. The Prime Minister thought they would do so for the time being. They were deriving considerable benefit from it in terms of international approval. But they would retaliate eventually. The Vice President agreed with this view. The real problem would arise if Saddam Hussain used CW against the Israelis. At worst, and if there were thousands of casualties, the Israel response could even be nuclear.

The Vice President asked whether the Prime Minister was satisfied with information we were receiving from Washington about the conduct of the military campaign, in particular overhead photography. He knew the President was keen for the Prime Minister to be as fully informed as possible. The Prime Minister said he would find it quite useful to see rather more satellite photography. The Vice President said that he would raise this on his return to Washington.

The Vice President said that burden-sharing was a very sensitive issue politically in Washington. That would continue after the end of the conflict and could have repercussions for NATO. Opinion in the United States was becoming very critical of Germany, particularly because of its reported role in providing CW precursors and other material to Iraq. The Prime Minister said that he had just sent the President a message about our concerns on burden-sharing. We might need help from the United States in persuading some countries like Japan to contribute to our costs.

The Vice President said there was evidence that Muslim opinion was becoming steadily more vocal in support of Saddam Hussain, not just in the Middle East, but in the Far East as well. This was a worrying development.

SECRET

SECRET

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence), John Neilson (Department of Energy) and to Sir Robin Butler.

(C. D. POWELL)

Richard Gozney, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SECRET

ccpc



Treasury Chambers, Parliament Street, SW1P 3AG

The Rt Hon Douglas Hurd CBE MP
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
Foreign & Commonwealth Office
King Charles Street
London
SW1A 2AH

31 January 1991

CBE/12

GULF EVACUATION

Thank you for your minute of 21 January. I have delayed replying to this in order to allow time for my officials to seek clarification of the cost estimates included in your minute.

2. I note the contingent need for emergency evacuation arrangements should the situation require it. I note also that the costs could be of the order you mention and might give rise to a claim on the Reserve. Our officials are continuing to discuss these estimates. Should an evacuation prove necessary, I would be grateful if your officials kept in close touch with mine about the operation. You will, I am sure, take all reasonable measures within the Government's control to limit the costs as well as to make the operation an effective one. I should, for example, expect you to rely on the Department of Transport's emergency insurance scheme to provide hull insurance for the carriers. I am sure that you will also have borne in mind the scope for taking advantage of any available capacity on military flights to assist civilians to leave the area, both before and during any emergency.

3. I am perplexed by what you say about UTRs and cost recovery, and would invite you to reconsider it. I find it difficult to see how your proposals in this case can be reconciled with practice in other recent situations such as:


- the evacuation of hostages from Iraq and Kuwait last Autumn;
- the provision of chemical warfare protection equipment to British and other nationals;
- evacuations from other locations, such as Liberia.


4. I find it difficult also to reconcile your proposals with the fact that some British citizens would have left the area at their own expense, often at great personal inconvenience and employing considerable ingenuity, and that some may hold valid tickets to travel from the area.

5. I should like to suggest that you adopt an approach to UTRs and cost recovery which is consistent with that agreed for the evacuation of hostages last Autumn. It was agreed then that UTRs might not invariably be requested if circumstances made this extremely difficult, but that they should be sought in cases where an employing company could reasonably be expected to bear the costs of evacuating its employees. You should in any event subsequently seek repayment from those evacuated (and have in the FCO a special unit to undertake this task,) whether or not an employer has been identified in a particular case. Any financial provision made for evacuation costs should be based on assumptions about the rate of recovery, and about the timing of recovery which our officials would discuss in the light of events. I hope that you agree with this approach.

6. I am copying this letter to Malcolm Rifkind and to Members of OPD(G).

DAVID MELLOR







FROM: STEPHEN BOWDEN

DATE: 31 JANUARY 1991

SIR CHARLES POWELL

cc SIMON CASS (FCO)

BURDEN SHARING: MESSAGE TO RULER OF UAE

The Chief Secretary would like to suggest that the Prime Minister write to Sheikh Zayed along the lines of the attached draft, which he believes would strike the right note with him ahead of the Chief Secretary's meeting.

Step L Bowden

ASSISTANT PRIVATE
SECRETARY



MINISTER OF STATE FOR
THE ARMED FORCES

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

Telephone 071 21 82216 (Direct Dialling)
071 21 89000 (Switchboard)

D/MIN(AF)/AH/5/3/30A

31st January 1991

Dear Colleague

ON

As you may know, many Gulf Support Groups have been set up throughout the UK by the mothers, families and friends of personnel serving in the Gulf, and by others who wish to help. These Groups aim to provide comfort and support to our Gulf personnel over and above the welfare services available from the Armed Forces. They are writing supportive letters to our troops and sending gifts from their local communities.

I believe these activities are worthwhile and should be encouraged. If there is a Group in your constituency, I am sure they would welcome your interest and support. If you do not have a local Group, perhaps you would consider setting one up or encouraging someone else to do so. If you wish to be put in touch with a Group in your area or to find out if one exists, the Welfare Help Desk here in the MOD will be able to assist. You can contact them on 071 430 6243. They are also able to deal with any queries raised by Gulf Support Groups.

I hope you will be able to help.

Yours sincerely
Archie Hamilton

ARCHIE HAMILTON

31(a-h)

covering SECRET

D/Sec(O)(C)/2/30/1/1

can
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THE GULF CONFLICT

BRIEFING FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE - SITREP No. 43

SITUATION AS AT 2000Z, 31 JANUARY 1991

Contains

1. Classified sitrep
2. Unclassified material for use by Ministers.

Distribution attached

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covering SECRET

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SEC(O)(C) EVENING BRIEF, 31 JANUARY 1991

Summary

Khafji battle over at 1100Z; about 160 Iraqi PWs captured and 14 armoured vehicles destroyed. Iraqi deployments could indicate possible larger-scale attacks tonight. One SCUD fired at Israel at approx 1600Z: apparently fell on West Bank, with no casualties reported.

General Situation

- Iraqi attack at Khafji of limited military significance, and probably had political aim of demonstrating Iraqi ability to advance into Saudi territory and achieve a "victory". The other attacks may have been probes or diversionary. Greater political impact could be achieved by action at divisional (rather than local) level.

Political

- ICRC say that Iraq continues to ignore her responsibilities towards PW. The ICRC have yet to be notified of the capture of a single PW.
- Jordan has protested at aerial attacks on Jordanian oil tankers, inside Iraq, leading to the deaths of 9 civilians. On the days in question RAF aircraft were not operating over Eastern Jordan where the attacks took place. FCO are consulting Washington.
- Foreign Secretary's party in Bonn report German agreement to give DM800m (£275m) to UK to assist with UK cost of DESERT STORM, as well as other officially "unspecified" (understood to be ammunition) materiel assistance.
- The German Cabinet has approved the sending of additional air defence assets (Hawk and Roland) to Turkey for the defence of the AMF(A). The Cabinet also agreed to the provision of military assistance to Israel (have offered PATRIOT, FUCHS NBC recce vehicles and spares for Soviet tanks and Phantom aircraft).
- Secretary of State announced in Parliament this afternoon that B52s would be based in UK and carry out operations against Iraq.

UK Operations

Air Operations

- 10 Tornado GR1s from Tabuk, armed with 1000lb bombs, successfully attacked a possible SSM test site at Rufah Fuwad. Numerous and massive secondary explosions were seen.

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- 8 Tornado GR1s from Muharraq, armed with 1000lb bombs, attacked Al Jahara Commando Camp and SAM support site. Seven attacks reported as successful. All aircraft returned safely.
- 7 Tornado GR1s from Dhahran, armed with 1000lb bombs, successfully attacked Shaibah SAM support area facility. All aircraft returned safely.
- 5 GR1A recce sorties were undertaken. There was one air abort, but the other 4 provided good imagery.
- 8 Jaguars from Muharraq successfully attacked an ammunition storage and logistics site in Kuwait with 1000lb bombs and CBU87 cluster bombs; 1 Jaguar was forced to dispense chaff and manoeuvre following lock-on by friendly (possibly French) fighter radar.
- 2 Jaguars destroyed a ZSU23-4 anti-aircraft tank with IBL755 cluster bombs (used for the first time) 40nm south of Kuwait City this morning.
- 5 Jaguars from Muharraq attacked Ras al Qualayah SILKWORM site in Kuwait; 4 aircraft reported hits in target area, while 5th aircraft trialled a recce pod (which failed).
- 11 Tornado GR1s from Takuk with 1000lb bombs successfully attacked Wadi al Khirr EW site this evening.
- Further 28 Tornado GR1 attack sorties and 2 Tornado GR1A recce sorties planned for tonight.
- RAF combat sorties as at 311900Z:

since 311000Z

	since 311000Z	total
Tornado GR1	0	432
Tornado GR1A	0	30
Jaguar	9	185
Tornado F3	8	295
Buccaneer	0	0
Nimrod	0	30
AAR (Victor, VC10K, Tristar)	5	192
	24	1164
- Coalition forces have flown over 30,000 sorties to date, of which about 1,600 by the RAF (including non-combat sorties).

Navy Operations

- It is now confirmed that, on the morning of 30 Jan, Lynx helicopters from BRAZEN, CARDIFF and GLOUCESTER severely damaged two minelayers and two Exocet armed patrol boats with SEA SKUA missiles.

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- GLOUCESTER's Lynx engaged a TNC45 Fast Attack Craft in the Northern Gulf with SEA SKUA at this morning: two missiles fired, one hit causing severe damage; subsequently sunk by USN AG. An ITN cameraman was on board the Lynx.
- MANCHESTER is now in the Gulf.

Army Operations

- 1(BR) Armd Div now over 85% complete in the concentration area; due to complete today.
- A LCpl Croft RCT has been seriously burned (non-combat). NOK have been informed.

Allied Operations

- One USAF AC130 lost near Khaffji; one further Allied aircraft reported lost off Bubiyan Island. Neither yet confirmed publicly by US, though former has been picked up by the media.
- Yesterday the French Air Force flew two raids against the Republican Guard. The first of 7 Jaguar plus 4 Mirage, the second of 8 Jaguar plus 2 Mirage.
- Media report Pentagon statement that US forces have handed over 36 Iraqi PW to Saudi Arabia - the first such transfer.
- Kuwaiti A4s yesterday attacked FROG facilities and a SILKWORM site in Kuwait. RSAF F5s attacked command and control facilities, a SSM site and aircraft shelters at H3 airfield. Italian Tornados attacked RGFC formations. Bahraini F5s attacked a possible division command post in Kuwait. Canadian F18s continued their defensive counter-air role.
- CENTCOM announced this afternoon that 28 Iraqi aircraft have been shot down and at least 25 destroyed on the ground.
- US forces landing on Kuwaiti island of al Maradina (where Iraqi forces reported to have surrendered) found island unoccupied.
- CINCENTCOM reports that all fixed SCUD sites have been destroyed.
- Commander of Italian naval forces in Gulf transferred at his own request following his allegedly anti-war remarks in an interview with an Italian magazine.

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Iraqi activity

- Summary of Khafji battle: Iraqi company plus (with 5 T55 tanks and 16 BTR60 APCs) engaged yesterday by Saudi and Qatari troops; all T55s destroyed but BTR60s infiltrated into Khafji (where there were two 6-man USMC reconnaissance groups). Prince Khalid took personal command of Allied counter-attack, which started at 310600Z; 1 BTR60 destroyed, remainder escaped north where 8 were destroyed by USMC Harriers. An Iraqi counterattack was blocked, with 2 tanks destroyed. Battle over at 1100Z. Losses: Saudi (1 dead, 2 injured); USMC (12 missing); Iraq (7 tanks and 9 BTR60s destroyed, about 160 men captured, dead NYK).
- US losses in other actions yesterday were 11 Marines killed, 2 wounded and 3 LAVs destroyed.
- Intelligence reports of ARCENT/MARCENT concern about massing of Iraqi armoured units in Khafji area, and in tri-border area; their view (which CENTCOM is playing down) is that there may be a Div/Bde strength attack tonight.
- There have been a total of 166 Iraqi military defections since 17 Jan.
- DIS assess that Iraqi aircraft have continued to fly to Iran (probably 4 unidentified transport aircraft yesterday). (Though CENTCOM this afternoon announced that no Iraqi aircraft had left for Iran yesterday.)
- Iraq was pumping oil into the Gulf from her offshore terminal at Mina al-Bakr; but surface air patrol reported this morning that this pumping had stopped.

Logistics

- The final consignment of oil slick control equipment arrived at Al Jubayl last night.

Media reports and coverage

- Media reporting focussing on the fighting around Al Khafji (where involvement of RAF Jaguars reported) and naval activity in the Northern Persian Gulf. Speculation that land attack may be to relieve tension/ raise morale/test reaction/provoke ground offensive.
- German agreement to give £275 million to UK to assist with cost of Desert Storm also reported.
- Reports that the US is blanketing Iraqi troops with 5 million leaflets telling them how to surrender.

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- Unconfirmed media reports tonight of up to 1,000 Iraqi military vehicles advancing through Kuwait towards the Saudi border.

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UNCLASSIFIED LINES TO TAKE

20.00 GMT, 31 Jan 1991

- Small scale Iraqi incursion into Saudi Arabia repelled by Saudi and Qatari troops, with successful retaking of Khafji. Indications are that Iraqi forces suffered heavy losses, with light Allied losses. Some 160 Iraqis taken as prisoners of war.
- Agreement for limited numbers of B52s to be temporarily based at RAF Fairford to undertake missions with conventional munitions against Iraqi military or strategic targets which are supporting the continuing Iraqi occupation of Kuwait. RAF Fairford is an established forward operating base for B52s.
- Understand that pumping of oil from Mina al-Bakr has now been stopped.

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THE GULF CONFLICT - BRIEFING FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

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
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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL AND PERSONAL London SW1A 2AH

31 January 1991

✓
Dear Charles,

True about
CDS 3/1

Foreign Secretary's talk with Chancellor Kohl,
30 January: Burdensharing

I recorded in telegrams the Foreign Secretary's discussions about burdensharing with Chancellor Kohl in Bonn last night (FCO telnos 47 and 48 to Bonn).

I did not include an aside which the Chancellor made to the effect that if the war went on (for rather longer than he expected), then it would be open to the British Government to go back to the Germans to talk about a further contribution to British costs. The Foreign Secretary believes that we should be careful to make no public reference to this remark.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (MOD), John Gieve (Treasury) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).


Yours ever,

Richard Eny

(R H T Gozney)
Private Secretary

Sir Charles Powell
10 Downing Street

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MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

Telephone 071-21 82111/3

MO 6/17/15/1S

31st January 1991

en

Mr Richard,

GULF STATEMENT

I attach a copy of the text which the Defence Secretary proposes to use for his Statement in the House this afternoon.

I am sending a copy of this to Sir Charles Powell (No 10), John Neilson (Energy), Juliet Wheldon (Law Officers) as well as to Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office)

Lu

Sm.

(S WEBB)
PS/S of S

Richard Gozney Esq
PS/Foreign and Commonwealth Office
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STATEMENT BY THE RT HON TOM KING MP
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE
31ST JANUARY 1991

With permission Mr Speaker, I would like to make a Statement on the Gulf and various matters arising.

The allied campaign to liberate Kuwait was launched two weeks ago. The initial aim has been to establish air supremacy and then sufficiently to reduce the military capability of the Iraqis armed forces so that the liberation of Kuwait would be successfully achieved with the minimum of casualties to our forces.

During this first period over 30,000 allied sorties have been flown against what was initially substantial air defences. From these 30,000 sorties 19 aircraft have not returned of which 5 were British. The House knows of these most regrettable losses in the first week, but will be pleased to note that none have been lost in the past week. That pleasure is combined with the deepest admiration for the skill and courage of our aircrews and of all the allies at the way they have sustained this vital air campaign. The initial denial to the Iraqis of the use of their airfields, in which the Tornados played such a critical part, the progressive suppression of their ground air defences, the shooting down of their aircraft seeking combat, have enabled air supremacy to be achieved so that hardened aircraft shelters and other military and strategic targets can be progressively attacked. This supremacy has been underlined by the sudden departure of some 100 Iraqi aircraft to Iran.

The achievements of the air campaign so far include the destruction of all nuclear reactor capacity, about half of their Biological and Chemical production, military fuel and ammunition stores, a number of airfields out of action, major damage to Command and Control facilities, loss of centralised control of air defences, progressive reduction of Scud launch capability, and 22 bridges hit to inhibit re-supply of Iraqi forces in Kuwait.

However substantial as these achievements are, I must warn the House that so vast is the Iraqi military capacity that it is likely to be some time yet before it will be sufficiently reduced to proceed with the liberation of Kuwait.

In this connection, we have received a request from the US Government for a limited number of B52s to be temporarily based at RAF Fairford to undertake missions with conventional munitions against Iraqi military or strategic targets which are supporting the continuing Iraqi occupation of Kuwait. RAF Fairford is an established forward operating base for B52s and the Government has readily agreed to their request.

At sea, while the allied navies have been much involved since August in enforcing the embargo, it is only in the last few days that there has been any significant action against Iraqi Navy. In these engagements in which RN Lynx helicopters and RAF Jaguars have played an important role, 10 Iraqi patrol boats and minesweepers has been sunk and up to a further 25 damaged. A number of these vessels had an Exocet capability. These naval encounters have frustrated what may have been an amphibious attack designed to coincide with this land attack at Khafji, which occurred yesterday.

In respect of the 1st Armoured Division the continuing delivery of

supplies is further enhancing its battle ready capability.

The House will be aware that we are now starting to hold a number of Iraqi POWs. I wish to affirm again that they will be held in strict conformity with the requirements of the Geneva Convention. That is our absolute commitment, and we insist on those requirements being observed by the Government of Iraq as well. To parade captured aircrew on television is in total breach of the Convention as would be any detention of them at strategic sites. I regret to inform the House that the ICRC has still not even been informed of the names of any prisoners, let alone being granted the access to which they are entitled. This inhuman treatment of the prisoners is causing great distress, and the thoughts of us all are with their families as is our admiration for their courage and steadfastness as such a difficult time. I confirm that we are making the strongest representations to the ICRC and the Iraqi authorities for these our concerns to be met.

- I turn now to our strengths in the Gulf. At the start of operations we had committed some 35,000 men to the Gulf. We have been strengthening units already deployed. three additional battalions are being deployed to fulfill our obligations to Prisoners of War. With the extra half squadron of Buccaneers I announced on 25th January, the total of UK personnel now committed will rise to about 42,000.
- The full operating costs in 1990/91 now over £1.25 billion, excluding the cost of any replacement of loss of equipment and of munitions used. The daily operating cost has risen to over £4 million which so far would total nearly £200 million.
- In connection with these costs, I very much welcome the announcement by the German Government of further DM800M contribution to our costs. We are very hopeful of other contributions from our friends and allies in support of our efforts in support of the United Nations.
- Turning now to matters of particular interest to our forces and their families, there have been complaints over difficulties in the availability at Post Offices of the very popular airletter, the bluey, and steps have been taken which I hope have dealt with this problem.
- Some hon Members have told me of Service families being charged normal interantional airmail rates for sending parcels to the Gulf. From tomorrow, I am pleased to announce that the Post Office are suspending the use of normal airmail rates for any parcels sent to BFPO addresses. All will be charged at the UK inland parcel rate. This clear instruction should end any confusion about our policy at Post Office counters.

- The telephone service we installed with the help of British Telecom and Mercury has been very popular but it is obviously somewhat expensive. We are therefore proposing to subsidise calls for all service personnel from the Gulf on a basis similar to that for forces in Northern Ireland. The value of this will be up to £10 a month affecting for example, 3 minute calls at half price. I have to say to the House that many of our forces are not actually in early reach of a telephone kiosk at present, but their entitlements under this scheme will be accumulated for later use.



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What a bunch!

FROM BLACKLEY.

FCO TELNOS 47-51 TO JEDDA: UK/KUWAIT: BURDEN-SHARING AND
RECONSTRUCTION.

SUMMARY

1. ACTION TAKEN WITH KUWAITI DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER/FOREIGN MINISTER AT 310900Z. NO SUBSTANTIVE REACTION. RESISTANCE TO VISIT TO TAIF BY MINISTERIAL/INDUSTRY TEAM.

DETAIL

2. GIVEN THE IMPORTANCE OF THE MESSAGES I SOUGHT A MEETING WITH SHAIKH SABAH AND FINALLY GOT IT AT 310900Z IN JEDDA. IN HANDING OVER THE TEXTS I MADE THE POINTS IN TURS AND LEFT MY SPEAKING NOTE WITH THE MINISTER'S PRIVATE SECRETARY.

3. SHAIKH SABAH MADE NO SUBSTANTIVE COMMENT ON BURDEN-SHARING BEYOND THE USUAL TRIBUTES TO OUR RELATIONSHIP BUT HIS SMILE FADED AT THE MENTION OF A FINANCIAL GESTURE FOR BRITAIN. HE DID NOT READ THE TEXT BUT WAS AWARE OF ITS CONTENTS SINCE FACSIMILE MESSAGES HAD BEEN RECEIVED IN TAIF ON 30 JANUARY FROM THE KUWAITI EMBASSY IN LONDON.

4. ON RECONSTRUCTION SHAIKH SABAH PICKED UP THE SUGGESTION THAT A HIGH POWERED MINISTERIAL/INDUSTRY TEAM SHOULD VISIT TAIF SOON TO DISCUSS THE NEXT STEPS. HE SAID THE GOK WERE BUSY AT PRESENT WITH THE EMERGENCY PROGRAMME FOR THE FIRST THREE MONTHS AFTER LIBERATION. SUCH A TEAM SHOULD COME LATER. I POINTED OUT THAT A SECOND TEAM COULD COME LATER, THAT WE WERE KEENLY INTERESTED IN THE EMERGENCY PHASE, AND ARGUED THE PRESENTATIONAL CASE FOR AN EARLY VISIT TO TAIF. SHAIKH SABAH DID NOT BUDGE, AND ADVISED US TO CONCENTRATE ON INDUSTRY/TECHNICAL CONTACTS WITH SHAHEEN'S COMMITTEE WHICH IS ABOUT TO MOVE TO DAMMAM, LEAVING MINISTERIAL INVOLVEMENT UNTIL LATER. (COMMENT. ONE WAY TO SQUARE THE CIRCLE WOULD BE FOR A HIGH-POWERED INDUSTRIAL DELEGATION, LED BY WHICHEVER ASSOCIATION CHAIRMAN IS ACCEPTABLE TO THE PARTICIPANTS, TO VISIT THE SHAHEEN

COMMITTEE IN DAMMAM ONCE THEY ARE PROPERLY INSTALLED. IF BY THAT TIME SOME SECTORAL MINISTERS HAVE ALSO RELOCATED TO DAMMAM, SO MUCH THE BETTER.)

5. SHAIKH SABAH SAID THE AMIR WAS IMPATIENT TO RECEIVE THE SIGNED ORIGINALS OF MR. MAJOR'S LETTERS TO WHICH HE WOULD REPLY. I SAID THESE HAD BEEN GIVEN TO SHAIKH KHALID AL AHMAD IN LONDON TO DELIVER TO THE AMIR.

COMMENT

6. SHAIKH SABAH, WHO CHAIRS THE MINISTERIAL COMMITTEE ON RECONSTRUCTION, HAS SPENT THE PAST FEW DAYS IN JEDDA FOR MEETINGS OF THE HIGHER CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE. HE SEEMED IMPATIENT TO GET BACK TO TAIF TO DISCUSS INTER ALIA MR. MAJOR'S MESSAGES WITH THE AMIR.

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WASHINGTON TELNO 300: IRAQ-KUWAIT BURDEN SHARING: KOREAN
CONTRIBUTION

1. THE KOREAN FOREIGN MINISTER FORMALLY ANNOUNCED ON 30 JANUARY THE ADDITIONAL CONTRIBUTION OF US DOLLARS 280 MILLION MENTIONED IN TUR.
2. FOREIGN MINISTER LEE SAID IT WOULD COMPRISE APPROX US DOLLARS 170 MILLION WORTH OF MILITARY SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT (INCLUDING COMBAT FATIGUES AND BARBED WIRE) AND US DOLLARS 110 MILLION IN CASH AND TRANSPORTATION SERVICES. HE SAID THE MINISTRY HAD DECIDED IN PRINCIPLE TO SEND FIVE C-130 MILITARY TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT TO HELP FERRY MATERIALS AND PERSONNEL IN SAUDI ARABIA. DETAILS WILL BE WORKED OUT BETWEEN THE KOREAN AND US GOVERNMENTS. THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY IS EXPECTED TO APPROVE THIS ADDITIONAL PACKAGE IN THE NEXT COUPLE OF DAYS.
3. IN AN INTERVIEW WITH KOREA'S YONHAP NEWS AGENCY ON 29 JANUARY US AMBASSADOR TO KOREA DONALD GREGG SAID THE US GOVERNMENT HAD NOT ASKED FOR COMBAT TROOPS TO BE SENT FROM KOREA NOR DID HE HAVE ANY INDICATION THAT THIS WAS A POSSIBILITY. HE DID SAY THERE MIGHT BE ANOTHER REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE OF SOME KIND BUT HOPED THAT KOREA WOULD, BY WHATEVER CONTRIBUTION IT MADE, BE ACTING AS A FRIEND OF THE UNITED STATES AND AS A STRONG MEMBER OF THE ASSOCIATION OF FREE NATIONS. US EMBASSY POLITICAL COUNSELLOR TOLD US ON 30 JANUARY THAT EXTRA ASSISTANCE HAD BEEN DISCUSSED "VERY INFORMALLY" WITH THE KOREANS, THE MESSAGE BEING THAT THEY MIGHT LIKE TO TAKE THE INITIATIVE AND COME UP WITH SOMETHING. THE US EMBASSY TELL US THEY ARE VERY HAPPY WITH THIS SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENT.

4. A KOREAN GOVERNMENT SPOKESMAN SAID ON 30 JANUARY THAT THE DECISION WAS REACHED WITHOUT A REQUEST FROM WASHINGTON. IT WAS REACHED IN THE LIGHT OF KOREA'S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE US, AS WELL AS WITH OTHER ALLIES FROM THE TIME OF THE KOREAN WAR. PROSPECTS FOR KOREA'S PARTICIPATION IN POST-WAR REHABILITATION PROJECTS IN THE GULF WERE ALSO A FACTOR.

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FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

MIPT : SECRETARY OF STATE'S TALKS WITH CHANCELLOR KOHL: BONN, 30
JANUARY

THE GULF AND ARAB/ISRAEL

BURDENSARING

1. THE CHANCELLOR SAID HE HAD JUST BEEN TOLD OF A UK REQUEST FOR AMMUNITION. THE GERMANS WOULD LOOK AT THIS REQUEST AND HELP AS BEST THEY COULD IN ADDITION TO PROVIDING THE HELP HE WAS ABOUT TO COVER. HE HAD RECEIVED THE PRIME MINISTER'S LETTER. HE KNEW WHAT THE UK WAS DOING AND WISHED TO PAY TRIBUTE TO THE UK EFFORT. HE SUFFERED FROM, AND REGRETTED, THE FACT THAT GERMANY HAD AN UNFORTUNATE PROVISION IN HER CONSTITUTION. WHEN IT HAD BEEN WRITTEN PEOPLE HAD NOT THOUGHT AHEAD TO THE EVENTUALITY OF SOMETHING LIKE THE GULF CRISIS. (IT WOULD HAVE BEEN POSSIBLE IN, SAY, 1975 OR 1976, WHEN SCHMIDT'S POSITION AS CHANCELLOR HAD BEEN STRONG AND WITH KOHL AS LEADER OF THE OPPOSITION, TO HAVE CHANGED THE CONSTITUTION. BUT NO ONE HAD SEEN THE NEED AT THAT TIME.) IN 1991 KOHL COULD NOT BE SURE OF A TWO THIRDS MAJORITY IN THE BUNDESTAG TO PUT THROUGH THE NECESSARY MEASURES. THE TREND IN THE SPD WAS SERIOUS AND ALARMED HIM. IT HAD BECOME WORSE SINCE THE DECEMBER ELECTION. ONE THIRD OF THE SPD MEMBERS WERE OF THE LEFT OR FAR LEFT AND 10 DAYS EARLIER HAD SUPPORTED A MOTION FROM THE PDS AND GREENS WHICH HAD INSINUATED THAT THE AMERICANS WERE TO BLAME FOR THE GULF WAR. VOGEL WAS NOT IN CONTROL OF HIS PARTY.

2. KOHL HOPED THE SECRETARY OF STATE COULD EXPLAIN TO THOSE IN BRITAIN WHO WROTE SILLY THINGS ABOUT HIM THAT HE WAS STILL THE SAME CHANCELLOR WHO HAD SEEN THROUGH THE NATO DOUBLE DECISION ON INF. BUT HE REALISED THAT GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY MIGHT BE GIVING A MISERABLE IMPRESSION AND WHY OUTSIDERS SAID THAT THE COUNTRY SHOULD DO MORE.

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3. THE GERMANS IN THE OLD FRG WERE AFFLUENT. WITH BRITISH AND UNITED STATES' SOLDIERS GOING TO THE GULF, THE CHANCELLOR WANTED TO MAKE IT CLEAR TO THE GERMAN PEOPLE THAT FREEDOM WAS NOT WITHOUT COST. THE CHANCELLOR SAID THAT THE GERMANS WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO THE UK ABOUT 10 PERCENT OF WHAT THEY WERE GIVING TO THE AMERICANS. HE COULD ADD, IN CONFIDENCE, THAT THEY WOULD SUPPLY THE AMMUNITION WE HAD REQUESTED (ALTHOUGH THEY WOULD NOT WISH TO ADMIT PUBLICLY THE NATURE OF THIS EXTRA HELP). HE PROPOSED TO CONTRIBUTE DM800 MILLION. HE WAS KEEN THAT THE SECRETARY OF STATE SHOULD GIVE HIM A FRANK REACTION TO THIS OFFER.

4. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT THIS CONTRIBUTION WOULD BE VERY GOOD. HE APPRECIATED VERY MUCH WHAT THE CHANCELLOR HAD SAID. HE AGREED THAT STUPID THINGS WERE WRITTEN IN THE NEWSPAPERS. BUT WHEN A COUNTRY WAS AT WAR THE TEMPERATURE ROSE. THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT KNEW THAT THE CHANCELLOR HAD INHERITED A CONSTITUTION WHICH HE WISHED TO CHANGE. SOME OF THOSE IN BRITAIN COMPLAINING ABOUT THE LACK OF GERMAN TROOPS IN THE GULF WOULD BE THE FIRST TO COMPLAIN IF SIGNIFICANT NUMBERS WERE SENT THERE. THE PRIME MINISTER HAD NOT/NOT FOUND IT EASY TO WRITE THE LETTER TO THE CHANCELLOR ABOUT BURDENSARING BUT HAD FELT THAT IT WAS UNAVOIDABLE GIVEN THE DEBATE IN BRITAIN AND THE AMERICANS' REQUEST. BUT HE HAD ASKED THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO SAY THAT THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF OUR SEEKING TO BARGAIN OVER FIGURES. IN RESPONSE TO THE CONTRIBUTION OF DM800 MILLION AND THE DECISION ON AMMUNITION WE WOULD CERTAINLY SAY THAT THIS WAS GREATLY APPRECIATED. THE CHANCELLOR AGREED THAT HERR GENSCHER AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE SHOULD ANNOUNCE LATER IN THE EVENING THE FINANCIAL HELP AND THE GERMAN DECISION ON (UNSPECIFIED) MILITARY MATERIAL.

IRAQI AIR FORCE

5. KOHL ASKED FOR THE BRITISH ASSESSMENT OF THE FLIGHT OF IRAQI PLANES TO IRAN. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT WE WERE NOT SURE BUT THOUGHT THEIR MOVEMENT WAS PART OF A PLAN BY SADDAM HUSSAIN TO FIND A SAFE PLACE FOR HIS AIRCRAFT. THIS SUGGESTED THAT SADDAM HUSSAIN WAS BANKING ON SURVIVING THE WAR. IT WAS BAD NEWS FOR HIS TROOPS, LEAVING THEM WITHOUT AIR COVER.

6. THE CHANCELLOR ASKED IF THE UK BELIEVED THAT IRAN WOULD STAY NEUTRAL. THE SECRETARY OF STATE BELIEVED THAT SHE WOULD BECAUSE

IT WAS NOT IN HER INTEREST TO TAKE SIDES. A CAVEAT WAS THE DANGER OF RAFSANJANI LOSING CONTROL, TO THE RADICALS.

ARAB/ISRAEL

7. KOHL ASKED WHAT SHOULD BE DONE ABOUT THE PALESTINIANS AFTER THE WAR.

8. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT SOME HAD BEGUN TO THINK OF A REPLACEMENT FOR ARAFAT. PERSONALLY HE WAS PESSIMISTIC BECAUSE THE PALESTINIANS WERE SO DIVIDED. HE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT SYRIA, SAUDI ARABIA OR JORDAN WOULD SIGN PEACE TREATIES WITH ISRAEL UNLESS SOMETHING WAS PROVIDED FOR THE PALESTINIANS. BUT THE ISRAELI LIKUD GOVERNMENT WERE RECONCILED TO PERMANENT OCCUPATION OF THE WEST BANK. THE FRENCH TALKED OF A HUGE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE. BUT THE SECRETARY OF STATE COULD SEE THAT SUCH A CONFERENCE MIGHT END IN DISASTER. THE CHANCELLOR SAID THE RESULT OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE WOULD HAVE TO BE DECIDED IN ADVANCE OF ITS TAKING PLACE. ONCE THE WAR WAS OVER HE THOUGHT THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD HAVE AS STRONG A POSITION IN THE MIDDLE EAST AS EVER BEFORE. (THE SECRETARY OF STATE THOUGHT THAT THIS WOULD NOT LAST.) KOHL SAID THAT THE AMERICANS WOULD BE IN A POSITION TO INSIST ON SOMETHING FOR THE PALESTINIANS FROM SHAMIR. HE FOUND THAT BUSH AND BAKER, UNLIKE THEIR PREDECESSORS, DID NOT SHOW UNCRITICAL SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL. IN DOMESTIC AMERICAN TERMS, MANY JEWISH GROUPS HAD SUPPORTED DUKAKIS, AND BAKER REMEMBERED THIS. AFTER THE WAR GERMANY AND THE UK MIGHT NEED TO LEAD THE UNITED STATES IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION. THE SECRETARY OF STATE AGREED THAT BUSH AND BAKER HAD A CLEAR PICTURE OF THE POSSIBILITIES. THE LIKUD GOVERNMENT IRRITATED THEM AND THEY WERE ADAMANT THAT THEY HAD STRUCK NO BARGAIN WITH THE ISRAELIS OVER THE WEST BANK DURING THE GULF WAR. HE AGREED THAT BRITAIN AND GERMANY SHOULD CONCERT OVER WHAT THEY WERE SAYING TO THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION.

9. THE CHANCELLOR THOUGHT THAT IF THERE WAS NO MOVEMENT ON PALESTINE AFTER THE WAR THIS WOULD BE CATASTROPHIC FOR KING HUSSEIN AND FOR MUBARAK.

10. SEE MIFTS (NOT TO ALL)

HURD

YYYY

DISTRIBUTION

118

MAIN

109

LIMITED
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PLANNERS
EMERGENCY UNIT (PASSED)
NENAD
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PS/MRS CHALKER
PS/MR HOGG
PS/MR GAREL-JONES
PS/LORD CAITHNESS
MR WESTON
MR FAIRWEATHER
MR BROOMFIELD
MR BAYNE
MR GREENSTOCK
MR SLATER
MR GORE-BOOTH
MR GOULDEN
MR JAY
MR MILES
MISS SPENCER

ADDITIONAL

9

~~PS/NO 10~~
PS/DEFENCE SECRETARY
PS/CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER

SIR P CRADDOCK
SIR R BUTLER
MR APPLEYARD

NNNN

The Gulf

3.30 pm

The Secretary of State for Defence (Mr. Tom King): With permission, Mr. Speaker, I should like to make a statement on the Gulf conflict and various matters arising therefrom.

The allied campaign to liberate Kuwait was launched two weeks ago. The initial aim was to establish air supremacy and then sufficiently to reduce the military capability of the Iraqis' armed forces, so that the liberation of Kuwait will be successfully achieved with the minimum of casualties to our forces.

During this first period more than 30,000 allied sorties have been flown against what were initially substantial air defences. From those 30,000 sorties, 19 aircraft have not returned—of which five were British. The House knows of those most regrettable losses in the first week, but will be pleased to note that no British aircraft have been lost in the past week. That pleasure is combined with the deepest admiration for the skill and courage of our aircrews and of all the allies at the way in which they have sustained the vital air campaign. The initial denial to the Iraqis of the use of their airfields, in which the Tornados played such a critical part, the progressive suppression of their ground air defences, in which the Jaguars have been very active, and the shooting down of their aircraft seeking combat, have enabled air supremacy to be achieved, so that hardened aircraft shelters and other military and strategic targets can be progressively attacked. That supremacy has been underlined by the sudden departure of about 100 Iraqi aircraft to Iran.

The achievements of the air campaign so far include the destruction of all nuclear reactor capacity and of about half Iraq's biological and chemical production; substantial damage to military fuel and ammunition stores; the putting out of action of a number of airfields; major damage to command and control facilities; the loss of centralised control of air defences; the progressive reduction of Scud launch capability; and the hitting of 22 bridges to inhibit the resupply of Iraqi forces in Kuwait.

However, substantial as those achievements are, I must warn the House that so vast is the Iraqi military capacity that it is likely to be some time yet before it will be sufficiently reduced for the allies to proceed with the liberation of Kuwait.

In that connection, we have received a request from the United States Government for a limited number of B52s to be temporarily based at RAF Fairford, to undertake missions with conventional munitions against Iraqi military or strategic targets that are supporting the continuing Iraqi occupation of Kuwait. RAF Fairford is an established forward-operating base for B52s, and the Government have readily agreed to the request.

At sea, while the allied navies have been much involved since August in enforcing the embargo, it is only in the last few days that there has been any significant action against the Iraqi navy. In those engagements, in which Royal Navy Lynx helicopters and RAF Jaguars played an important role, 10 Iraqi patrol boats and minesweepers were sunk, and up to a further 25 damaged. A number of those vessels had an Exocet capability. Those naval encounters frustrated what may have been an amphibious attack designed to coincide with the land attack at Khafji that occurred yesterday.

In respect of the 1st Armoured Division, the continuing delivery of supplies is further enhancing its battle-ready capability.

The House will be aware that we are now starting to hold a number of Iraqi prisoners of war. I reaffirm that they will be held in strict conformity with the requirements of the Geneva convention. That is our absolute commitment and we insist on those requirements being observed by the Government of Iraq as well. The parade of captured aircrew on television is in total breach of the convention—as would be any detention of them at strategic sites. I regret to inform the House that the International Committee of the Red Cross has still not even been informed of the names of any prisoners, let alone been granted the access to which it is entitled. That inhuman treatment of the prisoners is causing great distress and the thoughts of us all are with their families—as is our admiration for their courage and steadfastness at such a difficult time. I confirm that we are making the strongest representations to the Red Cross and the Iraqi authorities for our concerns to be met.

I refer next to our strengths in the Gulf. At the start of operations, we committed some 35,000 service men and women. We have since strengthened some units already deployed. Three additional battalions are being deployed to fulfil our obligations to any prisoners of war. With the extra Buccaneers that I announced on 25 January, total United Kingdom personnel now committed will rise to about 42,000.

The full operating costs in 1990-91 now total more than £1.25 billion, excluding the cost of any replacement of lost equipment and of munitions used, which so far totals nearly £200 million. The daily operating cost has risen to more than £4 million.

In connection with those costs, I very much welcome the announcement by the German Government of a contribution of a further 800 million deutschmarks to our costs. We are very hopeful of other contributions from our friends and allies in support of our efforts in support of the United Nations.

As to matters of particular interest to our forces and their families, there have been complaints over difficulties in the availability at post offices of the very popular air letter—the bluey—and steps have been taken that I hope have dealt with their problem.

Some hon. Members told me of service families being charged normal international airmail rates for sending parcels to the Gulf. I am pleased to announce that, from tomorrow, the Post Office is suspending the use of normal airmail rates for any parcels sent to BFPO addresses in the Gulf. All will be charged at the normal United Kingdom inland parcel rate. That clear instruction should end any confusion at post office counters.

The telephone service that we installed with the help of British Telecom and Mercury has been very popular, but it is obviously somewhat expensive. We therefore propose to subsidise calls for all service personnel from the Gulf, on a basis similar to that for forces in Northern Ireland. The value of that subsidy will be up to £10 a month—affecting, for example, five three-minute calls at half price. Many of our forces are not in early reach of a telephone kiosk at the moment, but their entitlement under that scheme will be accumulated for later use.

The House can be proud of the way in which the armed forces are contributing to the multinational effort. They have made an excellent start and, thankfully, losses have

more difficult, but as I have said to the House on a number of occasions in recent weeks, we shall certainly be looking to see whether we can bring that peace forward as soon as the conflict is over.

Mr. Molyneux: Does the Prime Minister share my admiration for the prompt response of senior members of the Commonwealth to the invasion of Kuwait? Does he share my hope that those ties with the Commonwealth will endure long after various temporary entanglements have disappeared?

The Prime Minister: I most certainly do, without qualification.

Q7. Mr. Thorne: To ask the Prime Minister if he will list his official engagements for Thursday 31 January.

The Prime Minister: I refer my hon. Friend to the reply that I gave some moments ago.

Mr. Thorne: As justice delayed is justice denied, will my right hon. Friend, in his usual caring fashion, be kind enough to examine the efficiency of the courts and whether or not it is right that people, particularly from abroad, should be obliged to wait so long for their trial? I am thinking in particular of Mrs. Dina Le Tarle, the American wife of a surgeon, aged 29, who has been prosecuted for her actions while responding to muggers on the underground. She has now been waiting three months for her trial—

Mr. Speaker: Order. If the case is sub judice, the hon. Gentleman should bear that in mind.

The Prime Minister: I understand the general point that my hon. Friend makes. The Government are concerned to reduce to a minimum delay in all criminal cases.

Mr. Michael J. Martin: The Prime Minister will know that many of the soldiers who are serving well in the Gulf are in the Army because they could not get jobs in civvy street, and when the Gulf war is over there will be soldiers who, unfortunately, will be unfit for Army service. Can the right hon. Gentleman guarantee them jobs in Glasgow and the north of England?

The Prime Minister: The early part of the hon. Gentleman's remarks will be widely resented by many of our forces in the Gulf. I heard from him no talk of employment during the 40 successive months when unemployment was falling.

Q8. Mr. Page: To ask the Prime Minister if he will list his official engagements for Thursday 31 January.

The Prime Minister: I refer the hon. Gentleman to the reply that I gave some moments ago.

Mr. Page: My right hon. Friend is hearing from those who wish to see extensions to the sanction period in respect of the Gulf, calls to bring about a ceasefire. For the benefit of the House, will my right hon. Friend surmise why those people are trying to put our troops in extra danger by giving Saddam Hussein the breathing space to develop a nuclear weapon?

The Prime Minister: I agree with my hon. Friend. He makes a valid point. We are not interested in a pause or a ceasefire, which would simply enable Iraq to regroup, resupply its forces and place our troops in greater peril. The conflict over Kuwait will be concluded only when all the provisions of Security Council resolution 678 have been met.

been few. However, there is some way to go yet, and there may be setbacks and at times unwelcome news. None the less I have no doubt of the determination of the House and the country to give our forces the support that they need to bring their task to a successful conclusion.

Mr. Martin O'Neill (Clackmannan): I thank the Secretary of State for his statement and I think that the whole House would want to join in his tribute to the courage and skill which has been displayed by our airmen during the past two weeks, and to join him in noting that there have been no casualties and no losses to the air force during the past week. We also join him in deploring the Iraqi authorities' failure to intimate to the International Committee of the Red Cross the identity of prisoners and those people whom it is alleged have been detained at militarily sensitive locations.

We also note what the Secretary of State said about basing B52s at Fairford. Perhaps he could tell us why Britain was chosen and which, if any, other European countries have agreed to participate. We also note from his statement that the United States has not employed the normal "neither confirm nor deny" formula in respect of nuclear devices and that no nuclear air-launched cruise missiles will be carried by these aeroplanes. Will he also confirm that the aircraft will be based at Fairford only for the duration of the conflict?

We join the Secretary of State in expressing our appreciation for the German donation to the war effort. Which other countries have been approached for contributions?

We note the attempt to resolve the problem of telephone calls, but how does that facility compare with that afforded by AT and T to United States troops in the Gulf?

In his statement the Secretary of State mentioned the town of Khafji. Will he tell us more about the circumstances surrounding the liberation of that town, the casualties involved and what prisoners have been taken? Could he enlighten the House as to what military use the town of Khafji would have been to the Iraqis and whether he has any inkling of the idea behind the attack? Will he also give us some information about the latest developments regarding polluting of the Gulf by the Iraqis releasing oil? What is happening there?

Can the Secretary of State give any information to the House about reporters' access to troops, because journalists in Scotland have made a number of complaints about their inability to gain access to the Scottish regiments, which account for some 40 per cent. of the troops in the Gulf?

Mr. King: I thank the hon. Member for his general welcome and the support that he gave on behalf of his right hon. and hon. Friends.

I certainly confirm that the application in respect of the B52s is temporary, and that we have an absolute assurance that they will use only conventional munitions when operating from that base, which is important. Other countries will be assisting with the successful deployment of B52s in various ways and one other country will be involved in basing, but I think that it will shortly be making its own announcement and the hon. Member will forgive me if I do not anticipate it.

The contribution from Germany is certainly very much appreciated. I would rather not say which other countries

have imposed on the west bank and Gaza and the recent arrest of Sari Hussein. May I ask him to raise these matters with his Israeli counterpart and to say whether the Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office has been able to find out whether Her Majesty's Government have spare gas masks that could be given to the Israeli Government for use by the Palestinians?

Mr. King: I have not met my Israeli opposite number, as the hon. Gentleman puts it, but I shall certainly ensure that his comments are conveyed to my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary because I understand the strength of feeling about these issues.

Sir Bernard Braine (Castle Point): As the Father of the House, may I put to my right hon. Friend a simple request: to convey to the pilots and air crews in the Gulf our great admiration of their courage, steadfastness and professional skill?

Mr. King: I am most grateful to my right hon. Friend, who occupies his position with such dignity. I shall certainly ensure that the message is conveyed.

Mr. John Cartwright (Woolwich): Yesterday we saw Iraqi tanks apparently pretending to surrender in order to mount an attack. Oil has deliberately been pumped into the waters of the Gulf. We have seen missile attacks on Israeli cities and the misuse of allied prisoners of war. Does not all that demonstrate that Saddam Hussein has no intention of fighting this war under any sort of Marquess of Queensberry rules? Has that lesson now been learnt by the allied military commanders and will they plan accordingly?

Mr. King: I am sure that the hon. Gentleman is not suggesting in any way that we should walk away from the standards and codes of practice and behaviour that he would expect us to follow and we have no intention of doing so. The matters that he has rightly drawn to the attention of the House confirm what so many of us feel so strongly: that this cause, now embarked on, has to be seen through and that everything that has happened since shows what a very evil and monstrous military regime exists in Iraq.

Ms. Clare Short (Birmingham, Ladywood): Does the right hon. Gentleman believe that the part of the UN resolution that authorises the current action and calls for the restoration of peace and security in the region also authorises, if necessary, the invasion of Iraq in order to destroy Saddam Hussein and his war machine?

Mr. King: The issue of resolution 678 is one which, I am glad to say, is now being seriously addressed by a lot of people. I put it most simply: there is no point in seeking to achieve the liberation of Kuwait if Kuwait cannot stay liberated. The answering of that question deserves—not in slogans, nor by attempting to accuse some people of bellicosity or aggression—very serious consideration. That is precisely why, in its good sense, the United Nations put that point in the resolution. How it is going to be achieved—whether by economic sanctions or by military action—will depend on how the situation develops. But let there be no doubt that it would betray—as I have said on another occasion—all those who are prepared to risk their lives in this conflict if we settled for some halfway solution, only to have to return to the problem in a year's time.



10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

SRW

cc FCO
GB
Press

THE PRIME MINISTER

31 January 1991

Dear Paddy,

Thank you for your letter of 16 January about the need to prepare for peace in the Gulf.

Since you wrote, military action has begun against Iraq. The objectives have not changed since I set them out in the House on 15 January. We must now see the military campaign through in order to ensure that Saddam Hussain leaves Kuwait. I do not see a case for further Security Council action at present: indeed I believe that Saddam Hussain's "ability to play the Palestine card" - to quote from your letter - has been blunted by his callous attacks on Israel.

I agree that once the present crisis is resolved we shall need to work out arrangements for the long-term security to the Gulf region. That is primarily a matter for the Arab governments themselves, and we have urged them to give attention now to the arrangements which will be needed. We are ready to play our part if asked to do so - as I have made clear in the House - although I see no circumstances in which we would station ground forces permanently in the area.

Iraq's invasion of Kuwait has set back attempts to find a durable Middle East peace. But once this crisis is over, renewed efforts will be needed to resolve the Arab/Israel and other longstanding disputes in the region.

At the appropriate time a properly prepared conference under UN auspices could make an important contribution to the


KW

conduct of negotiations on the Arab/Israel problem. But it needs willing participants if it is to get anywhere. I see no scope for setting a date for such a conference before it is clear that the right conditions exist: that must include some assurance that the key countries will attend, an assurance which we do not yet have.

*I'd come + talk at any time if you wish
to: I will be happy to see you.*

*Yours Sincerely,
John H.*

The Rt. Hon. Paddy Ashdown, M.P.

DEPARTMENT/SERIES <i>PREM 19</i>	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM <i>3445</i> (one piece/item number)	
Extract details: <i>message from Prime Minister to US President</i> <i>dated 31 January 1991</i>	
CLOSED UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
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DOCUMENT PUT IN PLACE (TNA USE ONLY)	

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Use black or blue pen to complete form.

Use the card for one piece or for each extract removed from a different place within a piece.

Enter the department and series,
eg. HO 405, J 82.

Enter the piece and item references, .
eg. 28, 1079, 84/1, 107/3

Enter extract details if it is an extract rather than a whole piece.
This should be an indication of what the extract is,
eg. Folio 28, Indictment 840079, E107, Letter dated 22/11/1995.
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If closed under the FOI Act, enter the FOI exemption numbers applying to the closure, eg. 27(1), 40(2).

Sign and date next to the reason why the record is not available to the public ie. Closed under FOI exemption; Retained under section 3(4) of the Public Records Act 1958; Temporarily retained; Missing at transfer or Number not used.

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- 2 -

endorse our efforts. The Japanese in particular need reassurance that our respective bids for help from them are coordinated.

Our military forces in the Gulf represent about 8 per cent of yours in manpower terms. In our search for financial contributions we are therefore aiming for a figure about 8 per cent of your own. The German contribution just announced meets that target.

Perhaps we could have a word about this when we next speak on the telephone.

Warm regards

John

COR.

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10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

file SH

cc: GB

press office

THE PRIME MINISTER

31 January 1991

Dear Paddy,

I should let you know that, in the course of his statement on the Gulf this afternoon, Tom King will inform the House that the Government have agreed to an American request to station a small number of B52 bombers at RAF Fairford. They would fly missions from there against Iraq. We have received firm assurances from the Americans that the B52s in question will be used only for conventional operations. I would add that one other European country - it has requested no publicity - has already given the Americans a similar facility.

*Yours faithfully,
John H.*

The Right Honourable Paddy Ashdown, M.P.

OTS



10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

File
JD

cc G.B.
MOD
PRESS

THE PRIME MINISTER

31 January 1991

For Neil

Thank you for your letter of 24 January, about welfare telephone calls for the forces in the Gulf. We have been giving this very careful consideration.

We have now decided to introduce a concession on telephone calls equivalent to £10 a month for all Service personnel in the Gulf. Tom King will be announcing the introduction of this scheme today. This would effectively give them five three minute calls a month at half price, and this is similar to the scheme already available to troops in Northern Ireland. The military themselves feel that it would be best to keep in step with the terms available to our forces in difficult postings elsewhere.

The introduction of the welfare telephone service, installed with the enthusiastic co-operation of both Mercury and British Telecom, has already provided a great boost to morale both in the Gulf and amongst Service families and friends at home. I am sure these new concessions will be equally well received.

*Yours sincerely,
John H.*

The Rt. Hon. Neil Kinnock, M.P.

EA

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FILE 810
arc

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

SUBJECT CC MASTER.

31 January 1991

See Record.

THE GULF: PRIME MINISTER'S CONVERSATION WITH CHANCELLOR KOHL

The Prime Minister spoke on the telephone this morning to Chancellor Kohl.

Chancellor Kohl said that he and the Foreign Secretary had talked at length yesterday. They had come up with a good result on burden sharing. The Prime Minister said that his first task was to thank Chancellor Kohl most warmly for the German government's most generous contribution to the costs of our forces. He would be making our gratitude clear in the House of Commons in this afternoon. The Foreign Secretary had given him an account of his talk with the Chancellor. There were a number of points which he would like to follow through personally. Perhaps they could find a date in the near future when he could come over to Bonn for a private talk. Chancellor Kohl thought this an excellent idea: the meeting should take place as soon as possible. The Prime Minister might come over one morning for a talk followed by lunch. The smaller the delegation the better. The Prime Minister said that he intended to come just with me. We would be in touch to discuss dates.

Chancellor Kohl said that he had a couple of points to ask the Prime Minister about the situation in the Gulf. He wondered first how the Prime Minister assessed the transfer of Iraqi war planes to Iran. The Prime Minister said we did not believe they were defectors, but had gone according to a pre-determined plan. Saddam Hussain's purpose appeared to be to husband his resources, so that he still had a substantial airforce after the conflict was over. He had done something similar in the early stages of the Iran/Iraq war. Chancellor Kohl commented that this meant Saddam Hussain assumed he would survive, which did not quite fit with his statements about all-out war to the finish.


Chancellor Kohl asked whether the Prime Minister had reliable information on the real extent of the damage being done to Iraq by the Allied bombardment. The Prime Minister said we were confident that substantial damage had been done to Iraq's air defences, communications, NBC establishments and other strategic targets. The weight of the attack was now against the enemy's supply lines and logistics. But Iraq's war machine was so enormous that there was still quite a long way to go. We did not believe we had yet succeeded in inflicting major damage on

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the Republican Guards. Chancellor Kohl observed that this would have consequences for the ground campaign. The Prime Minister said that the present ground fighting was largely a side show. But there were some indications that a larger battle was in the offing. The indications were that Iraq was likely to use CW quite soon. Chancellor Kohl commented that this would be a very bad development.

The conversation ended with the Chancellor promising to ring again soon.

I am copying this letter to John Gieve (HM Treasury), Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence), John Neilson (Department of Energy) and Sir Robin Butler.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'C. D. Powell', with a stylized flourish above it.

(C. D. POWELL)

Richard Gozney, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.



SECRET

FILE SLH
c/c 80

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

31 January 1991

Dear Sir,

THE GULF: STATIONING OF B52s AT RAF FAIRFORD

Following this morning's discussion in OPD(G), I sent a message to General Scowcroft telling him that the Defence Secretary would be informing Parliament this afternoon of the American request to station B52s at RAF Fairford and of the Government's decision to agree. I sought confirmation that we could quote publicly the assurance that the B52s would be used to support only conventional operations while at RAF Fairford. I sought confirmation that we could confirm that another European country (unspecified) was providing a similar facility.

I have subsequently heard back from General Powell that there is no objection to our making the statement today or to our quoting the assurance. But he would very much prefer us not to point the finger at Spain, since the Spanish were still trying to play down their assistance. A formulation on the lines of: "This effort is being supported by several other European nations" would be better. I passed this last point on to you by telephone and you said the Defence Secretary would take it into account.

I am copying this letter to Richard Gozney (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and to Sir Robin Butler.

C. D. POWELL

Simon Webb, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence

SECRET

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file

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

31 January 1991

GULF CRISIS: FINANCIAL BURDEN SHARING

Thank you for your letter of 30 January enclosing a draft message from the Prime Minister to President Bush about burden sharing. I enclose a revised version which I have sent on the direct line to the White House.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence), John Gieve (HM Treasury) and Sonia Phippard).

(C. D. POWELL)

Richard Gozney, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME-MINISTER

cc GB

press office

copy flashed to
Simon Webb (MO)

31 January 1991

For Neil

I should let you know that, in the course of his statement on the Gulf this afternoon, Tom King will inform the House that the Government have agreed to an American request to station a small number of B52 bombers at RAF Fairford. They would fly missions from there against Iraq. We have received firm assurances from the Americans that the B52s in question will be used only for conventional operations. I would add that one other European country - it has requested no publicity - has already given the Americans a similar facility.

*Yours faithfully
John M.*

The Right Honourable Neil Kinnock, M.P.

QTS



30

SECRET - UK EYES A

B.0721

PRIME MINISTER

cc Sir Robin Butler
Sir Percy Cradock

OPD(G): 31 January: Overnight Action PointsItem 3: Current international situation

The Foreign Secretary will report on his discussions in Bonn. He obtained a pledge of £275m. (DM.800m.) which, subject to confirmation, appears to be around 10% of the additional contribution of \$5.5bn. to the US Government recently announced by the German Government.


2. There are renewed signs of pressure for a UN Security Council debate. The Maghreb countries are complaining about breaches of procedure in not having a debate, the French expect to receive instructions to accept an open session provided it is immediately suspended sine die, and the Iraqi Ambassador has called publicly for a debate though he has not made a formal application. On the other hand, the Iraqi cross-border incursions into Saudi Arabia may inhibit the Maghreb countries from pressing for an early debate.

L V Appleyard
L V Appleyard

Cabinet Office
31 January 1991

SECRET - UK EYES A

A The National Archives

DEPARTMENT/SERIES <i>REM 19</i>	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM <i>3445</i> (one piece/item number)	
Extract details: <i>Letter from Powell to Gozney dated 31 January 1991</i>	
CLOSED UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	<i>24/1/18</i> <i>M. Williams</i>
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Use the card for one piece or for each extract removed from a different place within a piece.

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eg. HO 405, J 82.

Enter the piece and item references, .
eg. 28, 1079, 84/1, 107/3

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Sign and date next to the reason why the record is not available to the public ie. Closed under FOI exemption; Retained under section 3(4) of the Public Records Act 1958; Temporarily retained; Missing at transfer or Number not used.

28

DEAR BRENT,
THANK YOU FOR YOUR MESSAGE ABOUT THE STATIONING OF EIGHT B52S AT
RAF FAIRFORD. THE PRIME MINISTER HAS CONSIDERED THIS WITH HIS
SENIOR COLLEAGUES. WE SHALL HAVE SOME TROUBLE WITH THE ANTI-WAR
LOBBY AND FAIRFORD IS LIKELY TO BECOME A FOCUS FOR DEMONSTRATIONS.
BUT HE READILY AGREES TO THE REQUEST, SUBJECT TO THE FOLLOWING
POINTS:

- WE NEED TO BE ABLE TO QUOTE PUBLICLY THE ASSURANCE IN YOUR MESSAGE THAT THE B52S WILL BE USED ONLY TO SUPPORT CONVENTIONAL OPERATIONS WHILE AT RAF FAIRFORD. IS THAT ALL RIGHT?

IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO HAVE A RESPONSE BY TELEPHONE.

CHARLES

[illegible]

14-00000

279 311106Z Jan 91

SECRET

Flash

PLEASE PASS FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO GENERAL BRENT SCOWCROFT FROM
CHARLES POWELL, NO 10 DOWNING STREET

Dear Brent

Thank you for your message about the stationing of eight B52s at
RAF Fairford. The Prime Minister has considered this with his
senior colleagues. We shall have some trouble with the anti-war
lobby and Fairford is likely to become a focus for
demonstrations. But he readily agrees to the request, subject to
the following points:

- The Defence Secretary has to make a Statement to Parliament
this afternoon (1030 EST) on the progress of the Gulf
campaign. We feel that it would be right for him to inform
Parliament of your request and our decision to agree. Are
you content with an announcement today?
- we need to be able to quote publicly the assurance in your
message that the B52s will be used only to support
conventional operations while at RAF Fairford. Is that all
right?
- We note that Spain has, in your words, quietly agreed to
the use of Maron AB. We suppose this means they prefer no
public mention of it. Can we confirm if necessary that
another European country (unspecified) is providing a
similar facility?

It would be helpful to have a response by telephone.

Warm regards

Charles

CPD

A:\FOREIGN\FAIRFORD (DAS)

SECRET

file 27

~~SECRET~~



DC PC

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

31 January

From the Private Secretary

Dear Sir,

B52s at Fairford

I attach the formal request
from the White House to
Britain of B52s at Fairford.
This will need to be discussed

at this morning's OPS(E).

I am copying this note &
enclosure to Richard Gortney (FA),
John Wilson (Aeros), & Sir Robin
Butler. Yours truly



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

30 January 1991

CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Charles,

Prime Minister's Meeting with Vice President Quayle,
31 January 1991: Gulf Issues

The Prime Minister has agreed to see Vice-President Quayle at 5.15 on 31 January. The meeting will be preceded by one with the Foreign Secretary and the Defence Secretary.

The major issue for the Prime Minister's talks with Vice-President Quayle will be the situation in the Gulf two weeks after the outbreak of hostilities. This letter covers the main Gulf political issues which the Prime Minister may wish to raise.

We are encouraged by the alliance's unity of purpose two weeks into hostilities. Despite the variety of motives within the alliance, it is standing up well to the strain imposed by the decision to take military action. We can best ensure that this continues by keeping other coalition members closely informed of our thinking and regularly encouraging their continued commitment. Iraq's tactics will be to make every effort to wedge-drive, particularly by playing upon issues calculated to rouse Arab opinion. We need to be aware of this and to take swift action to counteract Iraqi propaganda.

It remains important for the cohesion of the alliance that Israel should avoid retaliating against Iraq. Like the US we have done all we can to discourage this; and it is a considerable plus to the Alliance that Israel has seen where its longer term interests lie. Patience may of course snap - and will no doubt do so if Saddam escalates to a chemical weapons attack. It is important that any actions taken by the Israeli Air Force are carefully chosen and that the scope (in nature and time) of response is proportionate.

Other difficulties are also becoming apparent. Turkey is very sensitive to the question of support from other NATO

/members

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CONFIDENTIAL

members if Iraq were to attack her. The Americans have been trying to dissuade Turkey from invoking the NATO Treaty without good cause, and to encourage Germany to play its part in any NATO response if this were to become necessary. We have added our support. The German position has firmed up in recent days: Genscher has confirmed in public that Turkey's assistance to the international coalition was legitimate: and that Germany would fulfil its responsibilities in NATO. But the Germans have been carefully unspecific about what action they would take in the event of an attack on Turkey. Follow-up to any attack would therefore need careful handling, to ensure that Turkey received the assistance and protection it needed and, at the same time, that the unity of NATO was maintained.

The US and Britain have both condemned Iraq's ill-treatment of POWs and its clear breach of its commitment under the Geneva Conventions. We should be scrupulous in ensuring our treatment of Iraqi POWs is beyond reproach. The ICRC recently visited Iraqi POWs (and civilian detainees) in Britain and we are acting on the few minor points they raised with us. It is also important that we should continue to make clear publicly that individual Iraqis will be held responsible for war crimes, of which we shall record evidence. (But we should avoid specifying means or naming names: hostilities may well end in a way which makes it difficult for us to ensure punishment for war crimes.)

At the United Nations, we have been successful in containing pressure among the Non-Aligned for the Security Council to meet to consider the terms of a possible ceasefire. Under the Council's Rule of Procedure we cannot put off responding to a call for a formal meeting indefinitely. Informal consultations continue on 31 January: hostile international reaction to an Iraqi message to the UN Secretary-General, accusing him of personal responsibility for the deaths of Iraqis, has probably bought us more time - into the Zimbabwean Presidency of the Council on 1 February.

The Prime Minister will also wish to raise with the Vice-President two questions on which better American understanding of our position would be helpful. First is the question of burden-sharing. The Prime Minister might say that like the Americans, we have been facing difficulties in meeting the costs of our contribution to the effort against Iraq, and like them we are seeking contributions from a number of countries. We hope that it might be possible to achieve greater co-ordination of our effort in this direction. We have drafted a message from the Prime Minister to President Bush on the subject.

/We are also

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
We are also concerned that Britain's contribution should be acknowledged in the Kuwaiti process of national reconstruction. The Prime Minister may wish to emphasise that we would wish to work with the Americans on this. Our aim is to make sure that those who have made the major contribution to the effort to liberate Kuwait should also benefit from the considerable task of rebuilding the infrastructure of a modern state. This is a subject we have raised with the Americans before.

The Prime Minister may also wish to mention the shape of post-crisis security arrangements in the Gulf: initial discussions suggest that American thinking is very close to our own. Although there will probably be a role for UN peacekeeping forces in the short term, lasting security will inevitably have to be based on greater security cooperation amongst the Arab states themselves, particularly those in the Gulf, perhaps with Egyptian and/or Syrian involvement and backed up by the West, especially the US. But the Gulf states seem reluctant to face the realities of this issue and show little sign of willingness to resolve their own internal quarrels. Their ideas do not seem to go beyond a wish for Western underpinning of their security. It is probable that there will have to be some kind of continuing Western involvement, but it is important that the impetus for this should come from the Gulf states themselves. They need to develop a coherent idea of what form their own security structures should take. It is likely we will have to press hard on this if we are to see any real progress.

The Prime Minister will wish to congratulate the Americans on their successful action to interdict the massive Iraqi oil pollution of the Gulf from Kuwait's terminal. We are sending help in cleaning up. But the Iraqis are now pumping oil into Gulf from their own terminal.

The Prime Minister may wish to conclude with an expression of sympathy for American losses in the conflict so far.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries at the Treasury and the Ministry of Defence.


(S. L. Gass)
Private Secretary

Sir Charles Powell KCMG
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL





Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

30 January 1991

✓
Dear Charles,

etc
(2)
Prime Minister

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Gulf Conflict : Turkey *Plot*

Thank you for your letter of 27 January about the Prime Minister's concern that the Turks might seek some territorial advantage from a weakened and defeated Iraq.


Since the end of the First World War and the establishment of the boundaries of present day Iraq, the Turks have maintained that they were unjustly deprived of the former Vilayet of Mosul (now part of Northern Iraq). But there is no evidence to support the contention that one reason behind President Ozal's robust response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait might have been the hope of obtaining some territorial gains. Traditionally the Turkish establishment has not sought to challenge the border arrangements, which are part of Ataturk's legacy, nor to pursue irredentist claims; and Ozal has had difficulty over some aspects of his Gulf policy with both the Turkish military and some sectors of public opinion. Our assessment is that it is unlikely he would seek territorial gains unless it became clear that others, eg Syria and Iran, were profiting from a large-scale dismemberment of Iraq in the aftermath of hostilities. (It is worth remembering that any realignment of borders would strengthen calls for the establishment of an Independent Kurdish State in what are now parts of Turkey, Iran and Iraq).

Nevertheless, the Foreign Secretary agrees that it is right to emphasise publicly that we would expect the present crisis to be settled on the basis of existing territorial boundaries. He and the Prime Minister have already made it clear that the Allies are not seeking the

/dismemberment



dismemberment of Iraq. The Foreign Secretary took the opportunity of his interview on Newsnight on 29 January to restate this in the clearest terms (I enclose the relevant extract).

Yours ever,


(S L Gass)
Private Secretary

Sir Charles Powell KCMG
10 Downing Street

INTERVIEWER:

In order to make him legally accountable we would have to capture him of course?

FOREIGN SECRETARY:

Yes, and we do not know how that will be possible or if it will be possible. That is why it is not sensible now to lay down exactly how we will be able to implement the UN resolutions, we are keeping within those resolutions, it is not our job to cut up Iraq or to alter its borders or to say who is going to govern it.

INTERVIEWER:

I am not asking you how, but is it an aim to put him on trial?

FOREIGN SECRETARY:

It is not an aim specifically to put him on trial, we have never said that. He is accountable and we will have to decide when we have achieved victory how that accountability is to be exercised, not just on him, our main aim now in talking about individual responsibility is to bring that home to the people who obey his commands.

INTERVIEWER:

Do we guarantee the borders of Iraq after the war?

FOREIGN SECRETARY - INT - NEWSNIGHT - 29 JANUARY 1991

- 5 -

FOREIGN SECRETARY:

Yes, we have said clearly and so have our Arab allies and so has everybody that there is no intention of dismembering Iraq.

INTERVIEWER:

You have been quoted as describing the response of the Europeans to the crisis in the Gulf as "patchy", where is it most patchy?

FOREIGN SECRETARY:

Patchy is patchy, it means it is uneven. We have the French who are fighting in the desert, we have the Italians, we have the Dutch who have sent aircraft and ships, we have the Germans whose constitution prevents them from doing that and that is why we believe, and they believe, that they have got to make a substantial contribution in money. And so across the field there are different kinds of performance.

INTERVIEWER:

The Germans have said that they will make another substantial monetary contribution today although it is not quite clear whether any of that is going to go to Britain. What are you going to tell Mr Genscher when you see him tomorrow?

FOREIGN SECRETARY:

I have got quite a lot to talk to him about, about other things besides the Gulf. But certainly I will be ramming home the point that since Germany cannot send troops to the Gulf but since

MIDDLE EAST. *Atlanta* R40



A The National Archives

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25/A-C

PRIME MINISTER

OPD(G): THE GULF

We resume meetings of OPD(G) tomorrow morning, with two main papers on the agenda:

- how to end the fighting; and
- policy towards Iraq after the conflict.

No final decisions are required at this stage: the purpose of the papers is to provide guidance for officials who will be travelling to Washington to discuss these issues with the Americans shortly.

Another issue which may come up is the American request - which seems to be imminent - to station B52 bombers at Fairford and to conduct missions against Iraq from there. On the military front, we shall need to assess the direction, scale and consequences of a possible Iraqi ground attack overnight.

How to end the fighting

I think we have to reconcile ourselves to a messy situation. I very much doubt the Iraqis will formally surrender or even agree a ceasefire. They would regard that as humiliation, whereas Saddam Hussein wants a success. It seems to me that he wants two things: first, something which he can present as a military victory, either by capturing Saudi territory or inflicting significant damage on Israel. Second and behind the smokescreen which this will provide, a spurious reason to withdraw from Kuwait. He will say that he has stood up to the Americans and the Israelis and lived to tell the tale. Now he must conserve Iraq's military strength for the coming battle with Israel. He will want in particular to preserve his Republican Guard just as he is preserving his air force. In a way, both sides will be able to claim they won. He will have survived, be a hero in the Arab world and live to fight another day. We will have got him out of Kuwait and reduced his military strength.

This is going to be a hard situation with which to deal. There will not be a clean-cut end to the war. We probably shan't be

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in direct communication with the Iraqis. They may leave their forces in Kuwait simply to look after themselves, either to fight or to surrender, while they concentrate on salvaging the Republican Guard. The difficulty for us will be to impose any constraints and conditions affecting the future size of Iraqi forces and their nuclear, chemical and biological capability. Indeed, the prospects of that seem to me very slim. At best we can hope to keep up sanctions against supply of military and NBC equipment from outside for a while. Equally, I doubt we would be able to negotiate a buffer zone round Kuwait, although we might achieve it de facto by continuing attacks on departing Iraqi forces until they were a reasonable distance away.

All this suggests that we have got to be very flexible in our approach and ready to cope with several possible eventualities. If we tie ourselves down in advance to a single procedure for ending the fighting, we are all too likely to find ourselves out-flanked by events. Above all, we should not give up the option of continuing to inflict damage on Saddam Hussein as he withdraws from Kuwait, and as long as he continues to pose a threat to it.

Policy towards Iraq

This paper deals with the negotiations between Iraq and Kuwait which will need to follow an end to the conflict (as provided for in Resolution 660), and the linked question of compensation and war crimes. It does not go into the question of wider security arrangements, which will in practice be an essential part of policy towards Iraq. Indeed they are, if anything, the most important: Arab governments are unlikely to display much backbone in dealing with a post-war Iraq unless they are confident there will be continuing security arrangements involving the West to protect them.

That apart, the conclusions of the paper seem quite sound:

- we would seek agreement among the principal arms exporting countries not to sell weapons to Iraq (though not a formal embargo);

SECRET

- 3 -

- impose the tightest possible controls on export of nuclear, biological and chemical materials;
- seek a supporting role for Kuwait's allies in future negotiations with Iraq, and keep oil sanctions in force until those negotiations are satisfactorily concluded;
- and defer any decision on how to obtain financial compensation for Kuwait and to bring to justice those responsible for war crimes, until we can judge what the actual situation at the end of the war is.

Basing of B52s

You are aware of the background to this likely request from the Americans. It will be politically controversial here and provide a focus for protest by anti-war groups. On the other hand the Spaniards (and, I believe, the Italians) have been permitting American B52s to fly direct on missions against Iraq from their airfields for some time. We cannot be less robust than they are. There is no possibility in this country of keeping it quiet. We should plan on announcing a decision at the appropriate moment. Were the request to come tonight, one possibility would be to announce it in the Defence Secretary's statement to the House tomorrow.

Military situation

Much will depend on developments overnight.

C.D.P.

C. D. POWELL

30 January 1991

A:\foreign\opdg (pmm)

SECRET



Ref. AO91/248

PRIME MINISTER

cc Sir Percy Cradock
Mr Appleyard

OPD(G): 31 January

*off. military ext. work.**Two papers for disc. w - ? either?
Gold - prob. outflow / defining / diff.
No early sol...
(basically on round)*Item 1: The end of the conflict

You might invite the Foreign Secretary to introduce the two papers together. The first deals with bringing the fighting to an end and the second with our policy towards Iraq in the immediate aftermath of a conflict. The third paper in the series (Middle East - winning the peace), dealing with the longer term issue of maintaining stability and security in the region, will be circulated by the Foreign Secretary next week. The aim, as you know, is to hold a further round of the UK/US talks in the next week to co-ordinate our approach with the US Government on the more pressing issues covered in the first two papers. The Foreign Secretary will be looking for a second-reading discussion of the broad approach.

2. It is conceivable that the current Iraqi ground offensives are a prelude to withdrawal. This gives these issues extra urgency. The main question arising from the paper is whether a ceasefire would be acceptable without a surrender of all Iraqi forces in Kuwait (paragraph 5 of the paper). The joint Baker/Bessmertnykh statement may make a surrender more difficult to insist upon if Saddam Hussein gives an unequivocal undertaking to withdraw. You might ask the Foreign Secretary and the Attorney General about the chances of being able successfully to insist that all Iraq's CBW, nuclear and missile facilities,

*Don't know
never
surrender?*



B

plus existing stocks, be destroyed as a condition of cease-fire. We would need coalition support to achieve this.

3. An aspect not covered in the paper, but which you might like to mention, is the Israeli factor. The Iraqis might attack Israel after a cease-fire in Kuwait, or the Israelis might treat the prospect of a cease-fire as the occasion for their already threatened retaliation. The main burden would fall on the Americans to continue to keep Israel under control.

4. On UN involvement (paragraph 6), the key questions are whether we should go for a satisfactory Resolution from the outset, to forestall worse versions, and if so, what action would we need to take to prepare the ground. You might ask the Chief of the Defence Staff whether he is content with the ceasefire procedures set out in paragraph 7 and colleagues to confirm that they are happy with the policy of not declaring Iraqi leaders in advance to be war criminals (paragraph 8) since we may have to do business with them.

5. On POWs (paragraph 9), you might confirm that arranging a swift exchange takes priority over screening. One point not covered in the paper is the possibility that some POWs, if Saddam is still in power, will ask for political asylum: we will not want a repetition of the Cossacks problem after WW2 but we will need a response which takes them off our hands (eg by asking Gulf States or other Arab coalition partners to take them). You might conclude the discussion of the first paper by approving the broad thrust as a basis for consultation with the US Government, subject to points raised in discussion.

6. On the second paper, you might begin by accepting that much depends on whether Saddam is still in power and if not, on the complexion of the new regime. You might then seek confirmation that the definitions of British interests (paragraph 4) and



X on to ask the Foreign Secretary whether he accepts that containment is likely to be the most we can expect in dealing with Iraq. If so, then we should strive for the broadest and toughest arms embargo and non-proliferation regime. These will not be easy to achieve given the Israeli factor and the arms replacement exercise which will be needed in the rest of the area. You might ask the Attorney General to comment on the approach on compensation and personal responsibility (paragraphs 13-16) and the Energy Secretary on the prospects for maintaining an oil embargo to retain leverage over Iraq (paragraphs 17-20).

7. You might conclude the discussion of the second paper by approving the main conclusions, subject to points made in discussion, as a basis for coordination with the US Government and by commissioning the further work proposed in paragraph 22. You might then invite UK officials to report to OPD(G) after the next round of UK/US talks on the two papers.

Item 2: Current military situation

8. You might invite the Chief of the Defence Staff to give a brief report on allied and Iraqi air, land and naval operations, including the Iraqi border incursions. There is evidence that the Iraqis may be planning more substantial local offensives both in the East and in the West, possibly accompanied by chemical attacks. The aim may be to draw us into a premature ground battle or to establish some easy victories as a face-saving prelude to a demand for a cease-fire or withdrawal.

9. The Defence Secretary is likely to raise the initial US soundings on the deployment of B52 aircraft to Fairford together with 5 USAF tankers. We have not yet had a formal approach which is likely to come on the White House/No 10 net. Clearly it would be difficult to refuse the request, especially as the Spanish Government has allowed Spanish bases to be used. MoD are asking



the Pentagon for a more detailed indication of the role of the aircraft. While the deployment might provide an unwelcome focal point for anti-war demonstrations and terrorist incident, acceptance of any US request would be timely in the burdensharing context.

Item 3: Current international situation

10. You might invite the Foreign Secretary to report on his meetings in Bonn, especially on the burdensharing aspects. The Defence Secretary will mention his own contacts with Dr Stoltenberg. The Foreign Secretary is planning to visit Saudi Arabia for discussions with the Saudi and Kuwaiti Governments on 6-8 or 9-11 February. The Chief Secretary is planning to visit UAE on 1-2 or 2-3 February. You have now sent a message to King Fahd and have a draft message to President Bush. The German Government has announced an additional contribution of \$5.5 bn. towards US military costs for the first three months of 1991. The South Korean Government is reported to be pledging another \$280m. (\$500m. in all).

11. In the context of burdensharing, you might invite the Energy Secretary to say a word about current discussions in the Media Handling Group on opportunities for British industry in the reconstruction of Kuwait, on which you have sent a message to the Emir. You may think it would be helpful for the Trade and Industry Secretary to be invited to prepare a brief note for OPD(G) on the substance and for him to be present when the paper is taken at a later meeting. The Americans seem set to scoop the pool and there could be a good deal of criticism if we are thought not to have been vigorous enough on behalf of our own companies.

Item 4: Media handling

12. You might invite the Energy Secretary to report on the broader picture and Mr O'Donnell to cover the day-to-day points.



Issues of interest include the allies' war aims (again), the timing of the land campaign (again), and Saddam Hussain's intentions over unconventional weapons.

R.R.B.

ROBIN BUTLER

30 January 1991



CONTROL

11

SECRET



Jp 01297

PRIME MINISTER

23(A-C)
oil embargoes to be lifted only after
sales. Iraq / Kuwait negotiations - - - -
✓

OPD(G): 31 January

How to End the Fighting

Policy Towards Iraq After the Conflict

These are useful papers and their main lines are right.

How to End the Fighting

2. It might help if we set out some criteria by which to judge arrangements. I would suggest that what we want out of a ceasefire ideally is:

- a. Maximum Allied control of the situation.
- b. Maximum disabling of Iraqi forces.
- c. Maximum impairment of Saddam's chances of survival.

It is also clear from the analysis that if the land battle has begun we shall be in a better position to control the situation than if the ceasefire comes earlier.

3. On the various scenarios, I find the first, demanding Iraqi surrender if Saddam proposes a ceasefire (paragraph 2a.), rather unreal. World opinion would insist on acceptance of the ceasefire. What would matter would be the terms we attached to acceptance, ie the speed with which the Iraqis would have to evacuate various zones in Kuwait (paragraph 2b.). We had discussions with the Americans on this before hostilities began and I thought we had reached agreement. Apparently this is not entirely true. The urgency of tying this up is underlined by



Secretary Baker's latest announcement that all that is wanted from Saddam is clear evidence of willingness to withdraw plus certain concrete steps. Unless we rapidly agree with the Americans a tight evacuation timetable, we shall risk slipping into a Mitterrand/Gorbachev-type situation, where all that is wanted from Saddam is a declaration of a change of heart.

4. We need to focus on the scenario in paragraph 2d., ie orderly Iraqi withdrawal without ceasefire; this still appears, to me at least, the most likely. It also poses the hardest question in terms of Allied response. If Saddam withdraws, remains hostile and his forces remain within close range of Kuwait, do we say they pose an imminent threat? The paper comes near to giving two different answers. We are first told that hostilities will continue if we are imminently threatened, then, a little later, that if Iraqi forces remain on their side of the frontier but do not actually engage our forces we should fall back upon UN sanctions. This will all have to be decided in the light of the circumstances at the time, as we have agreed; but we do have, under Security Council Resolution 678, justification for continued military action in order to restore international peace and security and we should not hesitate to interpret this liberally, subject to the need to avoid getting drawn into an endless campaign inside Iraq.

5. On withdrawal after a ground engagement (paragraph 5), our chances of imposing our wishes would be higher in this situation than if we were simply relying on air attacks. Nevertheless, I wonder whether we would in fact be able to refuse a ceasefire until all Iraqi forces in Kuwait had surrendered. I also agree it is worth trying for an agreement that all Iraq's remaining CBW, nuclear and missile facilities be destroyed, but I am not sure how we would be able to enforce this in the short time available.

Policy Towards Iraq After the Conflict


6. As I see it there are two main requirements:

a. Separating security questions relating to Iraq/Kuwait from those relating to the region as a whole. There will be a strong temptation to say that nothing can be settled until all is settled - proliferation in the region, Arab/Israel, etc etc. They are certainly interlinked. But if we are to make any progress, Iraq and Kuwait will have to be hived off. Our justification is the war and the fact that, while others have worrying weapons, Iraq has actually used them.

b. Keeping some hold on Iraq in peacetime conditions. We have few levers, essentially the need for Security Council agreement to the lifting of sanctions, the Security Council requirement on compensation and the Security Council requirement for Iraq/Kuwait negotiations. I was at first very suspicious of the last, because of the risks that Kuwait would give away what we had been fighting for. But on reflection it seems it could prove a useful instrument, provided we can create a negotiating framework which controls Kuwait. If we then link the lifting of the oil embargo with Security Council approval for the outcome of the negotiations, a long-drawn negotiation would justify continuing control on Iraqi oil exports. This will be a powerful economic weapon, which will in turn restrain Iraqi imports of military-related material. And before the embargo is lifted we shall need arrangements to divert some of the revenues to compensation. An embargo on arms and NBC material will have to be open-ended, though it is bound to grow increasingly leaky as time goes on.

30 January 1991

PERCY CRADOCK



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SECRETARY OF STATE

MO 6/17/15/1D

PRIME MINISTER

THE GULF: DEPLOYMENT OF USAF B52S TO UK *attached*

I have seen the record of Charles Powell's discussion this afternoon with General Scowcroft; and noted that a request to base eight B52 aircraft at RAF Fairford for operations over Iraq is likely to be sent overnight.

2. In the final analysis we would obviously wish to support the Americans, if there is no alternative. But clearly it will pose significant problems for public attitudes. The B52 with its association with less precise bombing is the more controversial element in the US bombing campaign. The sight of these massive aircraft fully laden with bombs taking off from the middle of Gloucestershire on their missions to Iraq will bring the Gulf conflict very much closer to home, and provide a sharp focus for opponents.

3. I have therefore been considering what alternative there might be. Only Fairford and Maron in Spain have the necessary facilities. The Spanish have already accepted basing twelve B52s at Maron but I understand that with supporting KC10 tankers it is currently full-up. We might consider trying to persuade the Spanish to accept eight more B52s. The KC10s could then deploy elsewhere in Spain or, at a pinch, to Fairford where they have been based before and should not present the same problems at B52s.

4. If we do decide that we want to proceed with B52s in the UK we should have to make clear to the US that our agreement was on the basis:

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SECRETARY OF STATE

a) the aircraft would carry conventional weapons only (they are known to be capable of delivering nuclear-tipped cruise missiles);

b) targeting will be in accordance with the principles set out in the paper on strategic and military objectives agreed between UK and US officials. (The final version of which was sent to Dick Cheney on 14th January).

These conditions would ensure that the operations of the B52s are in line with current guidelines and that a separate decision would be required if it were intended to widen the scope of their operations.

5. I would then see advantage in including reference to this matter in the Parliamentary Statement which I plan to make tomorrow, along the following lines:

"We have agreed to a request from the United States Government to deploy a number of B52 aircraft temporarily to the United Kingdom to undertake conventional bombing operations against targets which provide support to Iraqi military operations or the occupation of Kuwait"

6. These are my initial thoughts and I am still seeking clearer information both on the military need and also on the alternative possibilities there could be. We need to be properly satisfied on these points before we embark on a course that would give a fillip to those anti-war protesters who cannot currently find a focus and worry a wider range of opinion too.

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SECRETARY OF STATE

7. I am sending copies of this minute to members of OPD(G) and suggest that it might be discussed at tomorrow.

SWK

Ministry of Defence
30th January 1991

(T K)

(Approved by the
Defence Secretary and
signed in his absence)



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MO 6/17/15/1D

30 January 1991

✓
Prime Minister

COP
30/1

Dear Charles

REPORT FROM RIYADH

The Defence Secretary's colleagues might find it useful to see the attached report from Commanders on Operations today in the Gulf.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries to members of OPD(G) and to Sir Robin Butler.

Yours sincerely,

Janet Binstead

(MISS J R BINSTEAD)
Private Secretary

Sir Charles Powell KCMG
No 10 Downing Street

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CDS 2066/2/1

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30 Jan 91

PS/Secretary of State

THE VIEW FROM WASHINGTON AND RIYADH 301800Z JAN 91

1. This afternoon CDS had a wide ranging discussion with General Powell on the situation in the Gulf. Powell was confident that the Iraqi aircraft now in Iran did not pose a threat. In his view each represented one less aircraft/pilot/HAS to shoot down/take out. He was confident that there were no munitions and no support facilities for these aircraft in Iran and furthermore, as they were dispersed over several airfields, they could not group for any dastardly purpose without being detected. In response to a question from CDS, Gen Powell had no intelligence to suggest whether the aircraft had gone to Iran with or without the blessing of Saddam Hussein.

2. Gen Powell stated that as a result of gaining air supremacy he was pleased that Allied forces were now able to concentrate on interdicting Iraqi lines of communication, logistic supply, railways, bridges, roads, ammunition and fuel. Furthermore, we had obviously made heavy in-roads into Iraq's command and control as there was increasing use of back-up communications. However, he remains concerned, as does CDS, that insufficient BDA is available to assist air planning to maximise the effect of bombing. He was having to rely too much on post mission debriefing of aircrew. Powell said that he had spoken to Gen Schwarzkopf today about his concerns over BDA and had asked him to talk about it during his evening press conference. BDA available, particularly against static facilities, artillery and mechanised positions does show that attacks are having a considerable impact. Referring to the land skirmishes in the last 24 hours he admitted that the US had lost more men than they should have done.

3. Gen Powell confirmed, as he has done in every telephone call, that he is under no political pressure to commit ground forces before the softening up process has been completed. CDS said that the same applied in London. CDS rehearsed his fears that Saddam Hussein might, after withstanding the air and maritime power of the coalition forces, feel that he is in a position to make some sort of symbolic gesture on land and then propose a cease-fire to "snatch victory from the jaws of defeat". He could thus become the surviving hero of the Muslim world with a reasonably intact air force, his RGFC and the remnants of his navy. He could claim that he had withstood the might of the USA and point to the fact that no coalition soldiers had set a foot in Iraq whereas his land forces had been into Saudi Arabia. Gen Powell agreed that this was indeed a danger and said quite firmly that now hostilities had begun he was not much interested in a cease-fire.

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1 of 3
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he did not want to have to return to the area to deal with Saddam Hussein again in a few years time. Interestingly he said that the recent talk of cease-fire in Washington had been a State Department initiative which had not been cleared by the Administration. The talk of cease fire had been "stamped on".

4. CDS questioned the likely US response to the use of CW by the Iraqis. Gen Powell would prefer a political response rather than a diversion of the air campaign at political direction to, for instance, attack the Iraqi infrastructure; he wanted to concentrate on winning the war. In any case he did not think that Saddam Hussein would be deterred either politically or militarily from using CW.

5. CDS raised the question of the safety of the religious sites at Karbala and Najaf. He reported that there was a view that damage to the sites, important to all Muslims including the Iranians, could affect the neutrality of the latter. He felt however, that any positive moves open to us such as, releasing photographs or statements to show that the shrines remained intact could backfire, indeed it might give Saddam Hussein ideas. He could so easily pile up rubble around them or, worse still, attack them himself. We should take comfort from the fact that had the Allies damaged them then pictures would have appeared on CNN. Gen Powell agreed saying that the US examined the sites daily and kept their aircraft well clear. Furthermore, he was taking positive steps to warn the media of the possible options open to Saddam Hussein to embarrass the Allies. CDS took note.

6. Finally, CDS raised the question of a possible deployment of eight B52s and supporting tankers to the UK. Gen Powell was unsighted on the detail, but said that the Pentagon had examined several possible deployment airfields not only in UK but in Italy, Greece and Southern France. However, the package of support required for these large aircraft made the other countries unsuitable. CDS noted Gen Powell's comments but suggested that any form of approach on this subject should be made at White House/No 10 level with a well argued case for why the UK was the only possible choice.

"

7. Later CDS spoke to the Joint Commander who is now in Riyadh. Having debriefed him on his conversation with Gen Powell - the Joint Commander will not see Gen Schwarzkopf until tomorrow - they discussed the progress of the air campaign. The Joint Commander reported that Gen Horner remains confident that within about two weeks he will have achieved the necessary reduction in effectiveness of the RGFC and other ground forces. Gen Horner acknowledged that BDA alone is unlikely to give a true indication of the impact of continued bombing in the early days. He does expect however, to see eventually a sudden indication that the bombing has taken its toll; the Joint Commander agreed with this view. He said that the Allies were keeping up the pace of attacks and re-attacks as necessary on strategic targets in Iraq and he reported that last night aircraft had found a mobile launcher in south east Iraq on the point of firing. While attacking this the air crew had noticed six other launchers and claimed to have hit them all.

2 of 3

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
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8. Commanders in theatre are also considering possible end game tactics for Saddam Hussein and they have confirmed Gen Powell's earlier comments that there is no pressure for early action on the land. In a short discussion on shrines CDS pointed out that it would be useful to have conventional (GR1a) photographs of these shrines in our back pockets. The Joint Commander agreed and said that he would discuss this with AVM Wratten without detriment to the overall air campaign or to the safety of an aircrew. Finally, on the question of the B52s, CDS said he would be grateful for any additional input from the Joint Commander before OPD(G) tomorrow on how important these additional eight aircraft were to the operational plan.

9. Joint Commander said that he would telephone again tomorrow by which time he would have had the opportunity to discuss progress of the war with Gen Schwarzkopf and his senior advisers who have spent most of the day in preparation for the press conference. For information I attach at Annex the current deployment of American B52s and the overnight tasking of UK aircraft



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Annex:

A. B52 Operations.

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ANNEX A TO
CDS 2066/2/1
DATED 30 JAN 91

1. The following airfields are being used by the USA for B52 operations in support of Desert Storm:

- a. Diego Garcia 20 x B52 Airfield at full capacity
- b. Jeddah 20 x B52 Airfield at full capacity
- c. Maron (Spain) 12 x B52 See paragraph 2.

2. In theory there is capacity for a further 16-20 B52s at Maron. However, KC10 tankers are also stationed at Maron and use up the spare capacity. An increase in B52s would be contingent on moving the KC10's. The latter might move to Saragossa or perhaps the UK could offer to house them as an alternative to B52s. Either option would require approval of the Spanish Government.

3. Tasking for UK aircraft tonight is as follows. Each Tornado GR1 will carry 8 x 1000 lb bombs and will be supported by the usual CAP and tankers.

- a. Tabuk 10 x GR1s each with 8 x 1000 lb bombs
- b. Dharhan 10 x GR1s each with 8 x 1000 lb bombs
2 x GR1a recce
- c. Muharrag 8 x GR1s At first light 8 x Jaguar
each with 4 x 1000 lb bombs

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MODUK FOR SEC(O)(C), HM TREASURY FOR FELGETT

MY TELNO 82: FURTHER JAPANESE CONTRIBUTION TO UK GULF COSTS

SUMMARY

X 1. CONSIDERABLE JAPANESE IRRITATION AT US ATTEMPT TO CLAIM FULL DOLLARS 9 BILLION. US AMBASSADOR SAYS THAT DEBATE IN WASHINGTON ON THIS WAS HIJACKED BY POLITICIANS AND US TREASURY. JAPANESE ARE TAKING THIS UP WITH WASHINGTON TODAY BUT VERY HIGH LEVEL ASSIST BY US WOULD BE WELCOME. X

DETAIL

2. I TELEPHONED HYODO, DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE EUROPEAN AFFAIRS BUREAU IN THE MFA, THIS MORNING TO PURSUE THE CONVERSATION REPORTED IN MY TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE. WHILE HE HAD NO FURTHER SPECIFIC DEVELOPMENTS TO REPORT SINCE THEN, OPINION INSIDE THE JAPANESE BUREAUCRACY HAS CLEARLY HARDENED AGAINST THIS AMERICAN MOVE: HYODO DESCRIBED IT AS "OUTRAGEOUS AND VERY DISTURBING". HE ALSO SAID THAT THIS SUBJECT WAS NOW A "HOT ISSUE" AND WAS BEING TAKEN UP URGENTLY IN WASHINGTON. THE NORTH AMERICAN AFFAIRS BUREAU HAD BEEN THROWN INTO SOMETHING OF A PANIC AND IT WAS FOR THIS REASON THAT AMBASSADOR KITAMURA IN LONDON HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED FORMALLY THAT HE COULD SAY NOTHING POSITIVE ABOUT A JAPANESE COMMITMENT TO FURTHER FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE FOR THE UK DURING HIS MEETING WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE (WHICH I BELIEVE TOOK PLACE YESTERDAY).

3. US AMBASSADOR ARMACOST TOLD ME AT LUCH TODAY THAT THE BACKGROUND TO THE BAKER STATEMENT WAS THAT THE BUREAUCRATIC DEBATE IN WASHINGTON HAD PROVED SOMEWHAT INCONCLUSIVE AND THAT THE MATTER HAD THEN BEEN "HIJACKED BY POLITICIANS AND THE US TREASURY". HE WENT ON TO SUGGEST THAT THIS HAD BEEN DONE IN ORDER TO PREVENT THE JAPANESE FROM WRIGGLING OFF THE HOOK OR SURROUNDING THEIR FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTION WITH INNUMERABLE CONDITIONS.

PAGE 1
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I FIND THIS LATTER PART OF HIS EXPLANATION UNCONVINCING. THE FIRST TRANCHE OF THE JAPANESE FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTION LAST YEAR PRODUCED NO SUCH WRIGGLING OR CONDITIONS THAT WERE IMPOSSIBLE TO MEET AND THE DOLLARS 9 BILLION WAS ALREADY A CLEAR UNDERTAKING HERE. AT ANOTHER POINT IN OUR CONVERSATION ARMACOST COMMENTED IN SYMPATHETIC VEIN (PLEASE PROTECT) THAT THE SHARE WHICH WE HAD RECEIVED LAST YEAR WAS ROUGHLY 5 PERCENT OF THE FINAL DOLLARS 1 BILLION, THE CLEAR IMPLICATION BEING THAT AT THIS END THE AMERICANS WOULD SEE NO DIFFICULTY IN US OBTAINING SOMETHING OF THE ORDER OF DOLLARS 450 MILLION THIS TIME. (I THINK THIS MAY BE ON THE OPTIMISTIC SIDE FOR THE FINAL OUTTURN, ALTHOUGH WE HAVE CLEARLY PUT ON RECORD WITH THE MFA THAT AN 8% SHARE WOULD IN OUR VIEW BE MORE APPROPRIATE). I TOLD ARMACOST THAT THIS WAS A MATTER ON WHICH I WAS SURE BRITISH MINISTERS FELT STRONGLY AND THAT WE WOULD WISH TO TAKE UP URGENTLY.

4. IT WAS CLEAR FROM MY CONVERSATION WITH HYODO THAT HE WELCOMED MY INTENTION TO DISCUSS THE MATTER WITH ARMACOST AND THAT THE JAPANESE WOULD STRONGLY WELCOME OUR INTERVENTION AT A HIGH LEVEL IN WASHINGTON. I DREW HYODO'S ATTENTION TO THE ARTICLE IN TODAY'S EDITION OF THE FINANCIAL TIMES WHICH REFERRED TO OUR OSTENSIBLE PLANS FOR AND OFFENSIVE ON BURDEN-SHARING AND THE PROSPECT OF A MINISTERIAL VISIT HERE AS PART OF A SERIES TO A NUMBER OF COUNTRIES WHICH WOULD INCLUDE THE GULF STATES AND LARGER EC COUNTRIES. I SAID THAT I HAD HAD NO OFFICIAL CONFIRMATION ON THIS BUT IT WAS CLEAR FROM HYODO'S RESPONSE THAT HE HOPED THE ISSUE OF A FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTION FOR US COULD BE RE-OPENED IN WASHINGTON "IT IS JAPANESE GOVERNMENT AND NOT AMERICAN MONEY" AND THAT IT COULD THEN REVERT TO A RATIONAL DISCUSSION INSIDE THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT. MY OWN VIEW IS THAT A MINISTERIAL VISIT ON THIS SUBJECT BEFORE WE HAVE SQUARED THE AMERICANS WOULD LEAD TO A PUBLIC ROW WITH THE AMERICANS, EMBARRASSMENT FOR THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT, AND PROBABLY LITTLE RESULT. WE SHALL BE IN QUITE A DIFFERENT BALL GAME IF WE CAN PERSUADE AMERICAN POLITICIANS THAT THE MATTER SHOULD BE REOPENED AND DISCUSSED RATIONALLY.

5. ON FINAL POINT: IT IS JUST POSSIBLE THAT IN DISCUSSION WITH THE AMERICANS THEY MIGHT SUGGEST THAT PRESSURE ON THE JAPANESE COULD PRODUCE A FURTHER FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTION OVER AND ABOVE THE DOLLARS 9 BILLION. WE SHOULD NOT FALL FOR THIS. THERE IS IN MY VIEW NO POSSIBILITY AT ALL THAT THE JAPANESE WILL PRODUCE ADDITIONAL MONEY FOR THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE. THE ONLY PROSPECT IS OF UP TO DOLLARS 1 BILLION WHICH WOULD CLEARLY BE EAR-MARKED FOR

NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES SUCH AS TURKEY OR EGYPT AND WOULD IN NO WAY BE TRANSFERABLE.

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R. Austin

Thank you

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SIR CHARLES POWELL

c Sir Robin Butler

Possible Iraqi Offensive

I have received a briefing from Major General Foley on the latest DIS assessment of the threat to Allied forces in Saudi Arabia. A number of indications suggest that Iraq may soon launch an offensive into Saudi Arabia:

- Imagery shows that the 1st and 5th mechanised divisions are moving forward from the positions in the second echelon, with the 14th infantry division moving from their position on the coast to strengthen the front line of defence.
- An Iraqi POW claims that the Iraqis are also planning to launch a major offensive further to the west - on both the east and the west of Wadi Batin, which marks the western frontier between Iraq and Kuwait. The attack is said to be planned to begin at 2100 hours local time tonight (ie 1800 GMT). We now have some signs that Iraqi divisions are on the move. There are indications that 1 Republican Guard division may be involved; and tentative signs that a CW attack may be under preparation.

2. We do not know the basis for the POW's claim, but if Saddam does launch such an offensive - across several points of the front line - it could be a major affair, involving up to 90,000 men and 1,300 tanks (albeit mainly old T-55s) and other armoured vehicles.

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3. Saddam is already claiming that the small-scale Iraqi attacks mounted over the past 36 hours were "victories", though it was his forces that took virtually all the casualties before they swiftly retreated. A large-scale offensive would probably be aimed at mauling the Arab forces that still are the first line of defence along much of the frontier zone. Saddam would also hope to have a chance to bloody the nose of the Americans and ourselves and possibly capture a good number of Allied soldiers for propaganda and future bargaining.

4. If this is indeed Saddam's aim he might try to muster a sizeable part of his air force to distract the Allies, even if they cannot provide effective air cover. We would not expect to get signs of any such action until much nearer the moment of attack.

5. In an assessment prepared yesterday and now being issued we judged that Saddam was soon likely to raise the stakes, either by a CW attack on Israel or by attacks into Saudi Arabia, so that he could embroil Israel in the conflict or cause a significant number of Allied casualties and claim to have won a substantial victory. This, we argued, could make it easier for him to try to end hostilities if he decided that the price of continued conflict was higher than he was willing pay (eg the destruction of his Republican Guard divisions).

6. We do not know whether Saddam will attack on the scale, or at the time maintained above. But this is a high-risk operation for Saddam, even if the weather gives his forces some protection. The Allied Commander is prepared - not in terms of fixed defences, but those of air power.


PERCY CRADOCK

30 January 1991



1. It is the policy of the United States to support the efforts of the United Nations to bring about a just and lasting peace in the Korean peninsula. The United States will continue to support the efforts of the United Nations to bring about a just and lasting peace in the Korean peninsula.

2. It is the policy of the United States to support the efforts of the United Nations to bring about a just and lasting peace in the Korean peninsula. The United States will continue to support the efforts of the United Nations to bring about a just and lasting peace in the Korean peninsula.

3. It is the policy of the United States to support the efforts of the United Nations to bring about a just and lasting peace in the Korean peninsula. The United States will continue to support the efforts of the United Nations to bring about a just and lasting peace in the Korean peninsula.

②
Prime Minister
CBO
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BUSH VOWS COALITION EFFORT IN GULF WILL SUCCEED

(Text: State of the Union address)

Washington - President Bush pledged January 29 that the allied coalition's effort in the Persian Gulf region "will succeed," declaring that Iraqi President Saddam Hussein's aggression "will not stand."

In his State of the Union address, Bush said Saddam Hussein's "unprovoked invasion" of Kuwait "violated everything the community of nations holds dear. The world has said this aggression would not stand - and it will not stand."

Bush said he was heartened that the United States is not being asked to bear alone the financial burden of the struggle to free Kuwait from Iraqi occupation.

"Last year, our friends and allies provided the bulk of the economic costs of Desert Shield, and having now received commitments of over 40,000 million dollars for the first three months of 1991, I am confident they will do no less as we move through Desert Storm," Bush said.

The president's address focused on developments in the Persian Gulf, but he also discussed U.S.-Soviet ties, trade relations, the U.S. economy and other domestic issues, including civil rights, anti-crime measures and health care.

Following is the text of the president's address:

Mr. President, Mr. Speaker, members of the United States Congress. I come to this House of the people, to speak to you and all Americans, certain that we stand at a defining hour.

Halfway around the world, we are engaged in a great struggle in the skies and on the seas and sands. We know why we're there. We are Americans: part of something larger than ourselves.

For two centuries, we've done the hard work of freedom. And tonight, we lead the world in facing down a threat to decency and humanity.

What is at stake is more than one small country; it is a big idea: a new world order - where diverse nations are drawn together in common cause, to achieve the universal aspirations of mankind: peace and security, freedom, and the rule of law. Such is a world worthy of our struggle and worthy of our children's future.

The community of nations has resolutely gathered to condemn and repel lawless aggression. Saddam Hussein's unprovoked invasion - his ruthless, systematic rape of a peaceful neighbor - violated everything the community of nations holds dear. The world has said this aggression would not stand - and it will not stand.

Together, we have resisted the trap of appeasement, cynicism, and isolation that gives temptation to tyrants. The world has answered Saddam's invasion with 12 U.N. resolutions, starting with a demand for Iraq's immediate and unconditional withdrawal - and backed up by forces from 28 countries of six continents. With few exceptions, the world now stands as one.

The end of the Cold War has been a victory for all humanity. A year and a half ago, in Germany, I said our goal was a Europe whole and free. Tonight, Germany is united. Europe has become whole and free -- and America's leadership was instrumental in making it possible.

Our relationship with the Soviet Union is important, not only to us, but to the world. That relationship has helped to shape these and other historic changes. But like many other nations, we have been deeply concerned by the violence in the Baltics, and we have communicated that concern to the Soviet leadership.

The principle that has guided us is simple: our objective is to help the Baltic peoples achieve their aspirations, not to punish the Soviet Union. In our recent discussions with the Soviet leadership, we have been given representations, which, if fulfilled, would result in the withdrawal of some Soviet forces, a reopening of dialogue with the Republics, and a move away from violence.

We will watch carefully as the situation develops. And we will maintain our contact with the Soviet leadership to encourage continued commitment to democratization and reform.

If it is possible, I want to continue to build a lasting basis for U.S.-Soviet cooperation, for a more peaceful future for all mankind.

The triumph of democratic ideas in Eastern Europe and Latin America -- and the continuing struggle for freedom elsewhere around the world -- all confirm the wisdom of our nation's founders.

Tonight, we work to achieve another victory -- a victory over tyranny, and savage aggression.

We in this union enter the last decade of the 20th century thankful for our blessings, steadfast in our purpose, aware of our difficulties, and responsive to our duties at home and around the world.

For two centuries, America has served the world as an inspiring example of freedom and democracy. For generations, America has led the struggle to preserve and extend the blessings of liberty. And today, in a rapidly changing world, American leadership is indispensable. Americans know that leadership brings burdens and requires sacrifice.

But we also know why the hopes of humanity turn to us.

We are Americans: We have a unique responsibility to do the hard work of freedom. And when we do -- freedom works.

The conviction and courage we see in the Persian Gulf today is simply the American character in action. The indomitable spirit that is contributing to this victory for world peace and justice is the same spirit that gives us the power and the potential to meet our toughest challenges at home.

We are resolute and resourceful. If we can selflessly confront evil for the sake of good in a land so far away, then surely we can make this land all that it should be.

If anyone tells you America's best days are behind her, they're looking the wrong way.

Tonight, I come before this House, and the American people, with an appeal for renewal. This is not merely a call for new government initiatives, it is a call for new initiative in government, in our communities, and from every American – to prepare for the next American century.

America has always led by example. So who among us will set this example? Which of our citizens will lead us in this next American century? Everyone who steps forward today, to get one addict off drugs. To convince one troubled teenager not to give up on life...to comfort one AIDS patient...to help one hungry child.

We have within our reach the promise of a renewed America. We can find meaning and reward by serving some purpose higher than ourselves – a shining purpose, the illumination of a thousand points of light. It is expressed by all who know the irresistible force of a child's hand, of a friend who stands by you and stays there – a volunteer's generous gesture, an idea that is simply right.

The problems before us may be different, but the key to solving them remains the same: it is the individual – the individual who steps forward. And the state of our union is the union of each of us, one to the other: the sum of our friendships, marriages, families, and communities.

We all have something to give. So if you know how to read, find someone who can't. If you've got a hammer, find a nail. If you're not hungry, not lonely, not in trouble – seek out someone who is.

Join the community of conscience. Do the hard work of freedom. That will define the state of our union.

Since the birth of our nation, "We the people" has been the source of our strength. What government can do alone is limited – but the potential of the American people knows no limits.

We are a nation of rock-solid realism and clear-eyed idealism. We are Americans: We are the nation that believes in the future. We are the nation that can shape the future.

And we've begun to do just that -- by strengthening the power and choice of individuals and families.

Together, these last two years, we've put dollars for child care directly in the hands of parents, instead of bureaucracies. Unshackled the potential of Americans with disabilities. Applied the creativity of the marketplace in the service of the environment, for clean air. And made homeownership possible for more Americans.

The strength of a democracy is not in bureaucracy. It is in the people and their communities. In everything we do, let us unleash the potential of our most precious resource – our citizens. We must return to families, communities, counties, cities, states, and institutions of every kind the power to chart their own destiny, and the freedom and opportunity provided by strong economic growth. That's what America is all about.

I know, tonight, in some regions of our country, people are in genuine economic distress. I hear them.

Earlier this month, Kathy Blackwell of Massachusetts wrote me about what can happen when the economy slows down, saying "My heart is aching, and I think that you should know - your people out here are hurting badly."

I understand. And I'm not unrealistic about the future. But there are reasons to be optimistic about our economy.

First, we don't have to fight double-digit inflation. Second, most industries won't have to make big cuts in production, because they don't have big inventories piled up. And third, our exports are running solid and strong. In fact, American businesses are exporting at a record rate.

So let's put these times in perspective. Together, since 1981, we've created almost 20 million jobs, cut inflation in half, and cut interest rates in half.

Yes, the largest peacetime economic expansion in history has been temporarily interrupted. But our economy is still over twice as large as our closest competitor.

We will get this recession behind us, and return to growth - soon. We will get on our way to a new record of expansion and achieve the competitive strength that will carry us into the next American century.

We should focus our efforts today on encouraging economic growth, investing in the future, and giving power and opportunity to the individual.

We must begin with control of federal spending. That's why I'm submitting a budget that holds the growth in spending to less than the rate of inflation. And that's why, amid all the sound and fury of last year's budget debate, we put into law new, enforceable spending caps - so that future spending debates will mean a battle of ideas, not a bidding war.

Though controversial, the budget agreement finally put the federal government on a pay-as-you-go plan - and cut the growth of debt by nearly 500,000 million dollars. And that frees funds for saving and job-creating investment.

Now, let's do more. My budget again includes tax-free family savings accounts; penalty-free withdrawals from IRA's for first-time home-buyers; and, to increase jobs and growth, a reduced tax for long-term capital gains.

I know there are differences among us about the impact and the effects of a capital gains incentive. So tonight, I am asking the congressional leaders and the Federal Reserve to cooperate with us in a study - led by Chairman Alan Greenspan - to sort out our technical differences so that we can avoid a return to unproductive partisan bickering.

But just as our efforts will bring economic growth now, and in the future, they must also be matched by long-term investments for the next American century.

That requires a forward-looking plan of action - and that's exactly what we will be sending to the Congress. We have prepared a detailed series of proposals that include:

- A budget that promotes investment in America's future - in children, education, infrastructure, space, and high technology.

- Legislation to achieve excellence in education - building on the partnership forged with the 50 governors at the education summit - enabling parents to choose their children's schools - and helping to make America No. 1 in math and science.

- A blueprint for a new national highway system - a critical investment in our transportation infrastructure.

- A research and development agenda that includes record levels of federal investment and a permanent tax credit to strengthen private R and D and create jobs.

- A comprehensive national energy strategy that calls for energy conservation and efficiency, increased development, and greater use of alternative fuels.

- A banking reform plan to bring America's financial system into the 21st century - so that our banks remain safe and secure and can continue to make job-creating loans for our factories, businesses and home-buyers. I do think there has been too much pessimism. Sound banks should be making more sound loans, now - and interest rates should be lower, now.

In addition to these proposals, we must recognize that our economic strength depends upon being competitive in world markets. We must continue to expand America's exports. A successful Uruguay Round of world trade negotiations will create more real jobs and more real growth - for all nations. You and I know that if the playing field is level, America's workers and farmers can out-work and out-produce anyone, anytime, anywhere.

And with a Mexican Free Trade Agreement, and our Enterprise for the Americas Initiative, we can help our partners strengthen their economies and move toward a free trade zone throughout this entire hemisphere.

The budget also includes a plan of action right here at home to put more power and opportunity in the hands of the individual. That means new incentives to create jobs in our inner cities, by encouraging investment through enterprise zones. It also means tenant control and ownership of public housing. Freedom and the power to choose should not be the privilege of wealth. They are the birthright of every American.

Civil rights are also crucial to protecting equal opportunity. Every one of us has a responsibility to speak out against racism, bigotry, and hate. We will continue our vigorous enforcement of existing statutes, and I will once again press the Congress to strengthen the laws against employment discrimination without resorting to the use of unfair preferences.

We're determined to protect another fundamental civil right - freedom from crime and the fear that stalks our cities. The attorney general will soon convene a crime summit of our nation's law enforcement officials. And to help us support them, we need tough crime control legislation, and we need it now.

As we fight crime, we will fully implement our National Strategy for Combatting Drug Abuse. Recent data show we are making progress, but much remains to be done. We will not rest until the day of the dealer is over, forever.

Good health care is every American's right and every American's responsibility. So we are proposing an aggressive program of new prevention initiatives - for infants, for children, for

adults, and for the elderly - to promote a healthier America and to help keep costs from spiralling.

It's time to give people more choice in government, by reviving the ideal of the citizen politician who comes not to stay, but to serve. One of the reasons there is so much support for term limitations is that the American people are increasingly concerned about big-money influence in politics. We must look beyond the next election, to the next generation. The time has come to put the national interest above the special interest - and totally eliminate Political Action Committees.

That would truly put more competition in elections, and more power in the hands of individuals. And where power cannot be put directly in the hands of the individual, it should be moved closer to the people - away from Washington.

The federal government too often treats government programs as if they are of Washington, by Washington, and for Washington. Once established, federal programs seem to become immortal.

It's time for a more dynamic program life cycle: Some programs should increase. Some should decrease. Some should be terminated. And some should be consolidated and turned over to the states.

My budget includes a list of programs for potential turnover totalling more than 20,000 million dollars. Working with Congress and the Governors, I propose we select at least 15,000 million dollars in such programs and turn them over to the states in a single consolidated grant - fully funded - for flexible management by the states.

The value of this turn-over approach is straightforward. It allows the federal government to reduce overhead. It allows states to manage more flexibly and more efficiently. It moves power and decision-making closer to the people. And it reinforces a theme of this administration: appreciation and encouragement of the innovative power of "States as Laboratories."

This nation was founded by leaders who understood that power belongs in the hands of people. They planned for the future. And so must we - here and around the world.

As Americans, we know there are times when we must step forward and accept our responsibility to lead the world away from the dark chaos of dictators, toward the brighter promise of a better day.

Almost 50 years ago we began a long struggle against aggressive totalitarianism. Now we face another defining hour for America and the world.

There is no one more devoted, more committed to the hard work of freedom, than every soldier and sailor, every marine, airman, and coastguardsman - every man and woman now serving in the Persian Gulf.

Each of them has volunteered to provide for this nation's defense -- and now they bravely struggle, to earn for America, for the world, and for future generations, a just and lasting peace.

Our commitment to them must be the equal of their commitment to their country. They are truly America's finest.

The war in the Gulf is not a war we wanted. We worked hard to avoid war. For more than five months we, along with the Arab League, the European Community, and the United Nations, tried every diplomatic avenue. U.N. Secretary General Perez de Cuellar; Presidents Gorbachev, Mitterand, Ozal, Mubarak, and Bendjedid; Kings Fahd and Hassan; Prime Ministers Major and Andreotti -- just to name a few -- all worked for a solution. But time and again, Saddam Hussein flatly rejected the path of diplomacy and peace.

The world well knows how this conflict began and when: It began on August 2, when Saddam invaded and sacked a small, defenseless neighbor. And I am certain of how it will end. So that peace can prevail, we will prevail.

Tonight, I'm pleased to report that we are on course. Iraq's capacity to sustain war is being destroyed. Our investment, our training, our planning -- all are paying off. Time will not be Saddam's salvation.

Our purpose in the Persian Gulf remains constant: to drive Iraq out of Kuwait, to restore Kuwait's legitimate government, and to ensure the stability and security of this critical region.

Let me make clear what I mean by the region's stability and security. We do not seek the destruction of Iraq, its culture, or its people. Rather, we seek an Iraq that uses its great resources, not to destroy, not to serve the ambitions of a tyrant, but to build a better life for itself and its neighbors. We seek a Persian Gulf where conflict is no longer the rule, where the strong are neither tempted nor able to intimidate the weak.

Most Americans know instinctively why we are in the Gulf. They know we had to stop Saddam now, not later. They know this brutal dictator will do anything; will use any weapon; will commit any outrage, no matter how many innocents must suffer.

They know we must make sure that control of the world's oil resources does not fall into his hands, only to finance further aggression. They know that we need to build a new, enduring peace -- based not on arms races and confrontation, but on shared principles and the rule of law.

And we all realize that our responsibility to be the catalyst for peace in the region does not end with the successful conclusion of this war.

Democracy brings the undeniable value of thoughtful dissent -- and we have heard some dissenting voices here at home -- some reckless, most responsible. But the fact that all voices have the right to speak out is one of the reasons we've been united in purpose and principle for 200 years.

Our progress in this great struggle is the result of years of vigilance, and a steadfast commitment to a strong defense. Now, with remarkable technological advances like the Patriot missile, we can defend against ballistic missile attacks aimed at innocent civilians.

Looking forward, I have directed that the SDI program be refocused on providing protection from limited ballistic missile strikes -- whatever their source. Let us pursue an SDI program that can deal with any future threat to the United States, to our forces overseas, and to our friends and allies.

10

The quality of American technology, thanks to the American worker, has enabled us to successfully deal with difficult military conditions and help minimize loss of life. We have given our men and women the very best. And they deserve it.

We all have a special place in our hearts for the families of our men and women serving in the Gulf. They are represented here tonight by Mrs. Norman Schwarzkopf. We are very grateful to General Schwarzkopf and to all those serving with him. And to the families, let me say our forces in the Gulf will not stay there one day longer than is necessary to complete their mission.

The courage and success of the RAF pilots - of the Kuwaiti, Saudi, French, the Canadians, Italians, the pilots of Qatar and Bahrain - all are proof that for the first time since World War II, the international community is united. The leadership of the United Nations, once only a hoped-for ideal, is now confirming its founders' vision.

I am heartened that we are not being asked to bear alone the financial burden of this struggle. Last year, our friends and allies provided the bulk of the economic costs of Desert Shield, and having now received commitments of over 40,000 million dollars for the first three months of 1991, I am confident they will do no less as we move through Desert Storm.

But the world has to wonder what the dictator of Iraq is thinking. If he thinks that by targeting innocent civilians in Israel and Saudi Arabia, that he will gain advantage - he is dead wrong. If he thinks that he will advance his cause through tragic and despicable environmental terrorism - he is dead wrong. And if he thinks that by abusing the coalition POWs, he will benefit - he is dead wrong.

We will succeed in the Gulf. And when we do, the world community will have sent an enduring warning to any dictator or despot, present or future, who contemplates outlaw aggression.

The world can therefore seize this opportunity to fulfill the long-held promise of a new world order - where brutality will go unrewarded, and aggression will meet collective resistance.

Yes, the United States bears a major share of leadership in this effort. Among the nations of the world, only the United States of America has had both the moral standing, and the means to back it up. We are the only nation on this earth that could assemble the forces of peace.

This is the burden of leadership - and the strength that has made America the beacon of freedom in a searching world.

This nation has never found glory in war. Our people have never wanted to abandon the blessings of home and work, for distant lands and deadly conflict. If we fight in anger, it is only because we have to fight at all. And all of us yearn for a world where we will never have to fight again.

Each of us will measure, within ourselves, the value of this great struggle. Any cost in lives is beyond our power to measure. But the cost of closing our eyes to aggression is beyond mankind's power to imagine.

This we do know: Our cause is just. Our cause is moral. Our cause is right.

11

Let future generations understand the burden and the blessings of freedom. Let them say, we stood where duty required us to stand.

Let them know that together, we affirmed America, and the world, as a community of conscience.

The winds of change are with us now. The forces of freedom are united. We move toward the next century, more confident than ever that we have the will at home and abroad to do what must be done — the hard work of freedom.

May God bless the United States of America.



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LETTER FROM KING FAHD TO PRIME MINISTER

1. WE HAVE RECEIVED THE FOLLOWING REPLY TO THE PRIME MINISTER'S LETTER TO KING FAHD ON 9 JANUARY. ARABIC ORIGINAL FOLLOWS BY BAG. FCO PLEASE PASS TO NO 10.

TEXT BEGINS

GREETINGS,

I RECEIVED YOUR KIND LETTER FOLLOWING YOUR VISIT TO THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA AND GREATLY APPRECIATED YOUR COMMENTS ABOUT THE VISIT. I WAS DELIGHTED TO MEET AND DISCUSS MATTERS WITH YOU AT THIS TIME, WHEN WE ARE WORKING TOGETHER TO ACHIEVE PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE GULF REGION, A RETURN TO LEGALITY IN KUWAIT AND AN END TO AGGRESSION, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE WILL OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.

AT THIS TIME, WHEN WE ARE ACTING TO LIBERATE KUWAIT FROM THE AGGRESSION OF THE IRAQI REGIME IN IMPLEMENTATION OF INTERNATIONAL RESOLUTIONS, LET US HOPE THAT WE WILL ACHIEVE OUR HUMANITARIAN AIMS AND EMERGE WITH PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE REGION ENHANCED, NOW AND FOR THE FUTURE.

I VERY MUCH APPRECIATE THE REAFFIRMATION OF YOUR EXCELLENCY'S COMMITMENT AND THAT OF YOUR GOVERNMENT TO THE YAMAMAH PROJECT, AND TO WORKING TO COMPLETE PHASE TWO OF THE PROGRAMME RAPIDLY. I CAN CONFIRM OUR HOPE FOR FUTURE SOLID COOPERATION BETWEEN OUR TWO FRIENDLY COUNTRIES IN MANY VITAL AREAS IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF BOTH OUR COUNTRIES.

I HOPE TO STAY IN CONTACT WITH YOUR EXCELLENCY ON THESE IMPORTANT MATTERS OF MUTUAL INTEREST. PERMIT ME TO WISH YOUR EXCELLENCY HEALTH AND HAPPINESS AND PROSPERITY FOR THE BRITISH PEOPLE.

PLEASE ACCEPT MY BEST WISHES.

PAGE 1
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SIGNED
CUSTODIAN OF THE TWO HOLY MOSQUES
FAHD BIN ABDULAZIZ AL SAUD
KING OF SAUDI ARABIA

RIYAD, 27 JANUARY 1991

TEXTS ENDS.

MUNRO

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH (2)

30 January 1991

R. Munro

Jean Charles,

Go
30/1Gulf Security

The Foreign Secretary was anxious that you, and through you the Prime Minister, should see Alan Munro's telno 271 about what we say on the subject of objectives of the war. I enclose / a copy.

Yours ever,
Richard S.
(R H T Gozney)
Private Secretary

Sir Charles Powell
10 Downing Street

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PERSNAL FOR BROOMFIELD, FAIRWEATHER, GORE-BOOTH

YOUR TELNO 62 TO PARIS AND WASHINGTON TELNO 264 TO YOU: HANDLING
OF GULF SECURITY

SUMMARY

1. IMPORTANT FOR SAUDI CONFIDENCE IN US AS AN ALLY THAT WE DO NOT
APPEAR TO BE EXTENDING WAR OBJECTIVES BEYOND THE LETTER OF SCRS OR
PROCLAIMING REVANCHISME AGAINST IRAQ OR SADDAM HUSSEIN. AS
REPORTED ON BBC, DEFENCE SECRETARY'S RADIO INTERVIEW ON 27 JANUARY
APPEARS TO STRADDLE THE PRESENT FRONTIERS OF OUR POLICY. PRIME
MINISTER'S DEFINITION OF WAR AIMS IN HIS 17 JANUARY BROADCAST BEST
SUITS OUR PURPOSES HERE, AT LEAST PUBLICLY. REFERENCE IN SCR 678
PARAGRAPH 2 TO RESTORATION OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY IN
THE REGION TO BE KEPT UP OUR SLEEVE. SAUDI RELUCTANCE TO
CONTEMPLATE AN IRAQ DEMILITARISED OR DISMEMBERED.

DETAIL

2. FOR THE SAKE OF OUR PRESENT COOPERATION WITH THE SAUDIS (AND
PERHAPS KUWAITIS TOO), AS WELL AS OUR INTEREST IN RETAINING
INFLUENCE IN THE EVOLUTION OF A POST-WAR REGIONAL SETTLEMENT, I
STRONGLY SUPPORT THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S POINT TO DUMAS (FIRST
TUR) THAT WE NEED TO RETAIN FLEXIBILITY AND KEEP OPTIONS OPEN.
REMARKS BY KIMMITT AND GATES (IN SECOND TUR) SUGGESTS AMERICANS
ALSO INTEND TO TREAD CAREFULLY. AT SOME POINT, PERHAPS NOT TOO FAR
OFF, WE SHALL WANT TO DISCUSS WITH PRINCE SAUD AND THE KING HOW
FAR HOSTILITIES SHOULD BE CARRIED, AND WHETHER IN THE EVENT OF AN
IRAQI WITHDRAWAL FROM KUWAIT, UN SPONSORED MEASURES, EG SELECTIVE
SANCTIONS, SHOULD BE MAINTAINED IN ORDER TO CUT IRAQ'S MILITARY
CAPABILITY DOWN TO A SIZE CONSISTENT WITH A REBALANCING OF SECURITY
IN THE GULF COCKPIT. FOR THE PRESENT HOWEVER (AS SAUD HAS MADE
CLEAR TO MYSELF AND MORE RECENTLY TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE) THE
SAUDIS ARE DISINCLINED TO FOCUS ON THIS ASPECT. WE BELIEVE HOWEVER
(FROM OTHER CHANNELS ON WHICH I HAVE COMMENTED SEPARATELY) THAT
THEY ARE STARTING TO LOOK AT THE REGIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF

See

A DEFEATED IRAQ.

3. AS I HAVE COMMENTED ON OTHER CHANNELS THE SAUDI PREFERENCE IS TO SEE IRAQ'S MILITARY CAPABILITIES ONLY PARTLY DISMANTLED, THOUGH THEY WOULD WISH ITS CBW AND NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES TO BE ELIMINATED. KING FAHD INDICATED THIS TO THE PRIME MINISTER THIS MONTH: THE DEPUTY DEFENCE MINISTER TOLD MR HAMILTON IN DECEMBER THAT HE WOULD NOT WISH TO SEE IRAQ'S STANDING ARMY REDUCED BY MORE THAN HALF: AND THE EC TROIKA WERE TOLD LAST WEEK BY DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER MANSOURI THAT SAUDI ARABIA WISHED TO AVOID IRAQ'S DISMEMBERMENT (BY WHICH I SUSPECT HE MEANT DEMILITARISATION AND POSSIBLE PARTITION) AS SOME LEVEL OF IRAQI MILITARY CAPABILITY WAS DESIRABLE TO HELP DISCOURAGE RECIDIVIST IRANIAN MILITARISM, SEEN AS A MORE ENDURING BOGEY THAN IRAQ. PEOPLE HERE SEE A MILITARY VACUUM IN IRAQ, INVOLVING SOME KIND OF FOREIGN OCCUPATION, AS DESTABILISING. THERE IS IN THE BACK OF MINDS CONCERN LEST AN IRAQ, WEAKENED TO THE POINT OF BEING UNABLE TO DEFEND HERSELF WOULD BE AT RISK AS IN THE EARLY 1920S, FROM PREDATORY NEIGHBOURS (IRAN: TURKEY IN RELATION TO MOSUL: OR EVEN SYRIA). BY WAY OF EXAMPLE MASKERI (ASSISTANT SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE GCC) EXPRESSED ACUTE CONCERN TO US THIS MORNING ABOUT TURKISH INTENTIONS, AND THE POSSIBILITY THAT TURKISH REVANCHISME (CF TREATY OF SEVRES 1923) MIGHT BRING IRAN INTO IRAQ. ADMITTEDLY HE IS AN OMANI, BUT HIS VIEWS ARE HEARD AMONG SAUDI CONTACTS. BOTH MASKERI AND OTHER MEMBERS OF THE SECRETARIAT STAFF VOLUNTEERED THAT MR KING'S REMARKS HAD WORRIED THEM, AS A RE-DEFINITION OF BRITAIN'S WAR AIMS.

4. IT FOLLOWS THAT PUBLIC EXPRESSIONS FROM OURSELVES WHICH SUGGEST THE EXTENSION OF WAR OBJECTIVES BEYOND THOSE DEFINED IN THE SCRS, AND AS ENUNCIATED BY THE PRIME MINISTER IN HIS PUBLIC BROADCAST ON 17 JANUARY TOGETHER WITH HIS ASSURANCES OVER IRAQ'S INTEGRITY, ARE LIKELY TO AROUSE CONCERN HERE. IN PRACTICE, AS KING FAHD HAS MADE PLAIN TO US, THE SAUDIS HAVE NO DOUBT THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN NEEDS TO BE REMOVED FROM POWER AND IRAQ'S CAPACITY TO THREATEN HER NEIGHBOURS, INCLUDING WITH CBW, REMOVED. THEY BELIEVE THAT THE CURRENT CAMPAIGN OF TARGETING MAJOR MILITARY FACILITIES AND THE HUMILIATION WHICH BEING CHASED OUT OF KUWAIT WOULD INFLICT ON SADDAM, WOULD IN PRACTICE DO THE TRICK. BUT FOR THE SAKE OF RE-ESTABLISHING QUICKLY A TOLERABLE MILITARY BALANCE WITHIN THE GULF AREA, THE SAUDIS, AND I SUSPECT THEIR GCC PARTNERS, WILL PREFER US TO REFRAIN FROM EXPRESSIONS OF VINDICTIVENESS, OR POINTING TO THE MILITARY EMASCULATION OF IRAQ. THE REFERENCE IN SCR 678 (PARAGRAPH 2) TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL AUTHORISING ACTION TO RESTORE INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE AREA, AFFORDS A USEFUL

PLATFORM FOR ACTION, WHETHER POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, OR MILITARY, WHICH WE AND OUR ALLIES MAY SUBSEQUENTLY SEE FIT TO APPLY TO ENSURE THAT IRAQ, POST-WITHDRAWAL, DOES NOT REMAIN A THREAT. BUT, IN SAUDI EYES AT LEAST, THIS DOES NOT AMOUNT TO DISMANTLING ITS ENTIRE MILITARY APPARATUS. BUT EVEN IF SADDAM SURVIVES, THEY WOULD I SUSPECT PREFER HIM TO RETAIN A LIMITED MILITARY CAPACITY TO FEND OFF PREDATORS. I BELIEVE SAUDI ARABIA AND OTHER GCC STATES ARE REALLY LOOKING TO A SUCCESSOR REGIME IN BAGHDAD WITH WHICH THEY COULD GET ON TO TERMS AND WHICH WOULD RETAIN THE STRENGTH TO SERVE AS AN ELEMENT OF SECURITY IN THE REGION RATHER THAN A VOID. THIS WOULD ALSO REDUCE THE NEED FOR EXTERNAL, AND PARTICULARLY WESTERN, MILITARY FORCES REMAINING IN STRENGTH IN SAUDI ARABIA OR KUWAIT FOR ANY LENGTHY PERIOD POST HOSTILITIES.

5. THERE IS TYPICAL WOOLINESS AND WISHFUL THINKING IN ALL THIS. BUT IT DOES MEAN THAT THE SAUDIS WILL ATTACH PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE TO OUR CONTINUING TO SHOW FLEXIBILITY OVER WAR OBJECTIVES AND HOW THESE ARE TO BE ATTAINED. THE SAME I BELIEVE GOES FOR OPINION ELSEWHERE IN THE ISLAMIC WORLD, WHERE SUPPORT FOR THE ALLIANCE HAS ITS PRECARIOUS SIDE. THE SCRS SHOULD THUS CONTINUE TO PROVIDE THE BEDROCK OF OUR PUBLIC POSITION. IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO HAVE YOUR CLARIFICATION THAT THIS IS SO, FOR MY CONTACTS WITH SAUD AND OTHER PERSONALITIES HERE. IT WOULD ALSO BE HELPFUL TO KNOW HOW YOUR THINKING ON THE STAGES TOWARDS ESTABLISHING THE REGIONAL PEACE (ON WHICH WE HAVE CORRESPONDED) ARE DEVELOPING.

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
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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

30 January 1991

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Prime Minister

I have rewritten the message. Agree to send

Gulf crisis: Financial burdensharing *minutes if not included on the*

Following discussion in OPD(G) on 30 January, it was *has-line?*
agreed that the Prime Minister should write to President Bush
setting out our concern to recover more of our costs in the *CDP*
Gulf.

If the Americans continue on their present course, there is a risk that their demands will exhaust the main sources of funding. Rivadh telno 272 (copy enclosed) reports increasing Saudi discontent with the financial demands placed upon them; our Embassy in Tokyo have reported similar signs from the Japanese.

I enclose a draft message from the Prime Minister to President Bush. As agreed at OPD(G), this could be reinforced by a telephone message to the President.

I am copying this letter to John Gieve (Treasury), Simon Webb (MOD) and Sonia Philpard (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,

R. H. T. Goznev

(R H T Goznev)
Private Secretary

Sir Charles Powell
10 Downing Street

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Translation

POLICY STATEMENT

by

Herr Helmut Kohl

Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany

in the German Bundestag

on 30 January 1991

(Excerpts)

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Translation of advance text

I am delivering this policy statement at a time when many people throughout the world are greatly concerned - about the war in the Gulf and about the occurrences in the Baltic region. Who could better understand this concern than we Germans, who - due to the crimes of the Nazi dictatorship - had to directly experience the horrors and suffering of war? Against this historical background we are all the more grateful for having been able last year to recover common freedom for all Germans. This imposes a special duty on us.

The last few years were a period of hope and great optimism. Long-cherished dreams became reality, and our attention was focused above all on the opportunities promised by the changes on our continent and in other parts of the world. In shaping the future we want to make responsible use of our common freedom. This means taking account not only of our own nation's well-being. What applies to each individual's life and to government action is this: freedom and responsibility are inextricably interlinked. In view of the current global developments, it would be a disastrous mistake if we were to ignore the new threats to peace and freedom. Resignation and evasion of responsibility would be equally dangerous.

The military confrontation in the Gulf is now in its third week. Hardly ever before had the international community taken similar political efforts to avert an armed conflict. They all foundered on Iraq's categorical refusal to comply with the resolutions of the United Nations, in other words the will of the international community, and to reverse the forcible annexation of Kuwait.

Iraq's dictator Saddam Hussein alone is responsible for this war, which he started on 2 August 1990 by his brutal attack on Kuwait. It is in his power to end the war immediately. He must immediately and completely withdraw from Kuwait. Yet there is no sign of Saddam Hussein being willing to give way. On the contrary, the barbaric presentation of clearly maltreated allied prisoners-of-war in the media, the call for worldwide acts of terrorism, the deliberate pollution of the Gulf with oil and the recent threat to use nuclear, biological and chemical weapons indicate Saddam Hussein's clear intention to escalate the war. At the same time he is trying to spread it to countries that are not involved.

The attacks by Iraqi missiles serve but one purpose: Israel is to be drawn into the military confrontation in the Gulf. This is an attack on Israel's integrity and right to existence. Let me assure Israel that it has our full solidarity in these difficult times. We shall demonstrate this solidarity not least by assisting Israel in its distress through supplies of material and equipment so that it can protect its territory and population. We are thus acting in accordance with the special responsibility that all Federal Governments have displayed vis-à-vis Israel since the inception of the Federal Republic of Germany.

We are also linked in solidarity with the armed forces of the 28 countries struggling for the implementation of the United Nations resolutions, for the liberation of Kuwait. The allies from all continents, headed by the United States, are performing a mission for the international community. They are fighting against an unscrupulous dictator so that all of us, including us Germans, can tomorrow live in a more peaceful world. They are making sacrifices - and at this juncture I particularly think of the soldiers and their relatives.

Here I wish to recall that the United States in particular defended peace and freedom in Germany for forty years. The United States made a substantial contribution towards enabling us Germans to achieve our unity in freedom. It is thus all the more despicable to hear during the last few weeks a vociferous minority trying to blame the United States, instead of Iraq, for causing this conflict.

Let me assure our American and European allies of this: We stand solidly beside them in this struggle of the international community to assert international law and restore peace. In their difficult task they will continue to receive every possible support from us. This includes continued participation in the financial burdens. My Government therefore decided yesterday to make available to the Government of the United States of America a sum of \$ 5.5 billion for the first three months of this year.

At the same time I would like to stress this once more: The Federal Republic of Germany will live up to its commitments both within the United Nations and in the Alliance. The Alliance can rely on our solidarity. This applies to

Turkey, as to all other members. We shall without delay send units of the Roland and Hawk defence systems to Turkey. The deployment of the systems serves to protect Turkey as our Nato partner and especially the German, Belgian and Italian air force formations transferred there.

Our responsibility also includes that we do everything in our power to prevent illegal arms exports. These are criminal acts by some profiteers for which there must be no lenience. We shall therefore take further steps to make the export controls even more stringent and to ensure that any violation receives the severe penalty it deserves. In this connection I reject any sweeping condemnation of German industry. But the industrial leaders must also help to outlaw those involved in illegal arms transactions. Anyone who displays such criminal conduct deserves to be outlawed by all of society.

We all hope that this war and hence the suffering of the population and all people affected in the region end as soon as possible. I appreciate the fear that some in our country have in view of the developments in the Gulf. Yet there must not be peace at any price. Peace can only flourish lastingly and effectively on the basis of freedom, law and justice.

Once this conflict has ended, we must devote ourselves even more than hitherto to the other problems of the region. New, constructive efforts are needed to achieve a lasting peaceful order in the Middle East, too. Our aim above all is to reconcile the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination with the right to existence and security of all states in the region, including Israel. In the Middle East, too, it must prove possible to overcome the differences and develop stable security structures so that the region can achieve just and enduring peace.

The stabilization of the conditions there also calls for intensified efforts aimed at promoting economic development and overcoming social differences. In due course we shall - initially with our partners in the European Community - discuss the possibility of a comprehensive development plan for the Middle East. First of all, however, we need a comprehensive solution to all political questions. All this brooks no delay, or else there will be the risk of the Middle East plunging from one crisis into the next.

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The Federal Republic of Germany is willing to contribute to the creation of a peaceful order and to the development of the region. Through the recovery of our full sovereignty, we Germans have acquired not only more freedom of action, but also increased responsibility. Our partners throughout the world concur in this view. They expect the united Germany to live up to its new role. This does not mean national single-handedness or hankering after power. There is only one place for us in the world: in the community of free nations! This calls for reason and circumspection - and above all firm adherence to the great goals that we have set ourselves. We are at the beginning of a long and possibly arduous path.

- We want to unite Germany in every respect: intellectually, culturally, economically and socially.
- We want to participate in building a just and lasting peaceful order for Europe which unites all nations of our hitherto divided continent in common freedom.
- We want to participate in creating a global peaceful order based on the rule of law, on respect for human rights and the right to self-determination of all nations as well as the common will to preserve Creation entrusted to humankind.

We are grateful for the fact that we Germans have together been able to follow this path to the future since 3 October 1990. An inestimable advance, as everyone can clearly see, is the fact that it proved possible to achieve German reunification before the present conflicts came to a head. The national tasks ahead of us are difficult enough. I well understand the anxieties of the people in the new Länder - they are worried about their jobs, the future of their children and families and the serious state of the environment.

There are now pressing economic, social and ecological problems that have to be solved, but they are certainly not the only ones. It will take a lot longer to remove the non-material damage caused by the period of Communist dictatorship. Here I have in mind above all the grave legacy in intellectual life

and in the minds of people caused by more than four decades of Communist dictatorship.

Achieving in free self-determination the unity and freedom of Germany - this mission defined in our Constitution of 1949 has been completed in a constitutional sense. The aim now is to shape this unity: We want to secure equal opportunities for all people throughout Germany. At the same time we must make every effort to tackle the second major task imposed on us by our Constitution: to create a united Europe. Our Constitution calls upon us "to serve the peace of the world as an equal partner in a united Europe". It is a fact that we serve world peace most effectively by vigorously promoting the political unification of Europe. Neither the united Germany nor the merging Europe can afford to be indifferent to the problems accumulating in other regions of the world. Those problems affect us directly. By jointly helping to solve them, we not only perform a moral duty but also act in our own enlightened self-interest.

Europe is merging on the basis of the values shaped by Christianity and the Enlightenment. Complacent Eurocentrism is now less justified in the West than at any time before: During the last few days and weeks it has become more evident than ever how closely our destiny is linked to developments in our vicinity: to the East of our continent and, for instance, in the Middle East.

Germany and Europe will only flourish if they do not isolate themselves culturally or economically, but remain willing to learn from others and do not try to avoid peaceful competition. National self-centredness would be not least a sign of great ingratitude towards the partners and friends who protected our freedom over decades and strongly assisted us with our reunification. Here I would particularly like to mention the United States of America, France and the United Kingdom. But I also expressly pay tribute to the contribution made by President Gorbachev to German unity. On the road to German unity many placed great faith in us. Preserving this faith, strengthening it and showing that we are worthy of it - this will always be the precept of our policies.

6

V

Germany is our fatherland, Europe our future. The nucleus of and basis for Europe's integration are to us the European Community, which we aim to develop into a European union.

On the road to a united Europe France and Germany must continue to be the driving force. The friendship between our two nations is vital to us Germans. President Mitterrand and I have shown our determination to proceed jointly by launching two initiatives of fundamental significance for political union.

Of outstanding importance to us are our friendly relations with Great Britain, whose contribution towards European integration we cannot dispense with.

In recent years the European Community has enhanced its attractiveness, due largely to

- the Single European Act, which entered into force on 1 July 1987, and
- the fundamental reforms carried out under the German presidency of the first half of 1988.

During the radical transformation of the last two years the European Community has shown itself to be an anchor of economic and political stability for the whole of Europe. This has benefited all members, not least us Germans. The Community's international standing too has improved. It has become a model for cooperation among other regions and states.

But we must not content ourselves with the results achieved so far because the time of change is not yet over and new challenges will present themselves. We need a united and strong Europe. This has become more palpably clear in recent weeks than ever before. Time is running short. The Federal Government will therefore make every effort to achieve European union before the next election for the European Parliament in the spring of 1994.

To attain this goal, we need to make a broad approach.

First, we aim to complete the single European market with 340 million inhabitants by 31 December 1992. That will mark the end of the first major phase on the road to European Union. Two thirds of the programme for completing the internal market have already been carried out. But we cannot, and will not, relax our efforts. I am confident that we shall be able to make all the necessary decisions in the time left.

Second, our goal is a Europe without frontiers. We advocate further progress in the abolition of border controls and will also use our presidency to this effect under the Schengen Agreement.

The removal of all frontier controls will present new challenges in terms of internal security, however. We therefore urgently require a common policy in the crucial areas of police and judicial activity. Priority should be given to

- a common European asylum and immigration policy, and
- the establishment of a European centre to combat the drug mafia as well as organized international crime and terrorism.

At the intergovernmental conference on political union we will urge that these central aspects be incorporated in the Community Treaties.

In order to solve the problems connected with the flows of refugees and migrants within and to Europe, we shall have to take joint action to remove the causes in the countries of origin. That is the purpose of the refugee concept which the Federal Government introduced last year.

In this context we have to realize that we cannot take in all those who want to come to our country. The Federal Republic of Germany is not an immigration country. However, we will encourage the integration of those living in our country. To this end we introduced a new Aliens Act which came into force at the end of last year. It gives foreigners living in our country more clarity and security. The integration of foreign residents should be seen as an opportunity for ourselves to enrich our own lives. We owe a lot to them.

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Third, we do not want a centralistic Europe but a Europe of diversity. Europe thrives on the cultural wealth and the abundance of national and regional traditions. This, together with the spiritual unity inherent in its basic values, is the inexhaustible source of its strength which we aim to preserve.

We want to establish a sensible balance between the powers of the Community and its members: federalism, subsidiarity and respect for regional interests are fundamental principles underlying Europe's future structure.

The individual citizen must be more acutely and directly aware that the Community represents his Europe. A new element of such a people's Europe could be a "European citizenship" built on national citizenship. The question of granting citizens of the European Community the right to participate in local government elections should also be examined in this context.

Fourth, we would like the European Parliament to have far greater powers. Europe's electorate will be loathe to elect another European Parliament in the spring of 1994 unless we make up this shortage of democracy.

In particular, the European Parliament must be involved in the election of the President and members of the Commission. It must also have greater powers with regard to the budget, legislation, and external relations. In future elections for the European Parliament greater importance must be attached to the principle of electoral equality.

Fifth, a common foreign and security policy must be developed which in the longer term will also embrace common European defence.

This will require a greater commitment on the part of us Germans too.

The members of the Community need an effective set of foreign policy instruments to make it more capable of meeting its responsibilities and presenting its interests around the world. In the field of security policy we aim to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance, which has proved its worth. President Mitterrand and I have suggested that the inter-governmental conference on political union consider how Western European

Union might be strengthened and ultimately incorporated in the European union.

Sixth, we aim to achieve a European economic and monetary union. At the end of October 1990 the European Council gave the intergovernmental conference clear guidelines which concur with our own basic views. Our aim is a common European currency which is no less stable than the Deutschmark. The necessary institutional framework for this is an independent European Central Bank, which would eventually be responsible for monetary policy and, like the Deutsche Bundesbank, would have the primary responsibility of maintaining monetary stability.

This requires of all concerned - not at a later date but now in advance of such institution - greater and lasting progress in terms of converging economic policies.

Seventh, we aim to create a social union. The Community's charter of fundamental social rights must be put into effect. We also aim to improve the possibilities for workers to play their part in such a social Europe.

Eighth, to us Germans it is crucial that the two intergovernmental conferences should be running parallel. There are cogent substantive and political reasons for the link between them. However important the completion of economic and monetary union, it would remain mere patchwork unless political union were established simultaneously. These two undertakings are, in our opinion, inseparable.

Our primary objective all along has been the political unification of Europe. But we also realize that the European Community is not the whole of Europe. The Community must, in principle, be open to other European countries. This does not mean that it can take in all of them immediately. But neither does it mean that we are in any way trying to shut ourselves off from our European neighbours.

This applies first and foremost to the members of EFTA, some of whom are already thinking in terms of Community membership. But our neighbours in Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe too need the European perspec-

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tive. The new democracies have always emphasized that the pursuit of freedom also meant their "return home to Europe". To them especially the Community has long since been a model for economic success, prosperity and social security.

We therefore strongly urge the Community to continue to do everything possible to support the process of reform in Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe. The proposed association agreements are an important means of doing so. At the same time, those countries who meet the requirements must also be given the option of joining the community at a later date.

In this way the Community will become the focal point of a free Europe, a United States of Europe.

We must thoroughly intensify cooperation with our Mediterranean neighbours. Their stability is in our own true interest. The united Germany does not want a return to the Europe of yesterday. Old rivalries and nationalism must not be revived. We want a new Europe which does not remove national identities, a Europe in which there is no more antagonism, in which no nation stands in the shadow of any other, but a Europe in which we can together work for a future in peace, freedom, prosperity and security.

This new Europe cannot and will not isolate itself. It will in particular maintain the closest possible links with the democracies of North America. After all, transatlantic partnership is not based on mutual enemy images but on common vital interests and fundamental values - and not least on historical human, cultural and political ties.

America's and Canada's role and responsibility in and for Europe remain vital to peace and security on our continent - and to the united Germany at its centre.

We initiated the transatlantic declarations between the members of the European Community and the United States and Canada in order to endorse these fundamental concepts - as an element of continuity at a time of fundamental change. Friendship and partnership with the United States are vital to the united Germany as well.

As always, the North Atlantic Alliance forms an indispensable security link between Europe and North America. True, the political transformation in Europe has reduced the confrontation between East and West and the security situation on the continent has noticeably improved despite the remaining risks. Nevertheless, this has not rendered the Alliance, to which especially we Germans owe so much, in any way superfluous. It cannot be repeated often enough: It was due not least to the Alliance that the transformation in Europe became at all possible. The Alliance has also drawn the necessary conclusions from that transformation. In the summit declaration of July 1990, for instance, we laid the tracks for a comprehensive review of the Alliance's strategy and structure. Since then the new concept has been a subject of intensive work in which the Federal Government is playing an important part. Its main elements are:

First, a political framework which will continue to ensure Europe's security and stability and which places greater emphasis on controlled force reductions, confidence-building measures, active crisis containment and conflict prevention, and the peaceful settlement of disputes.

Second, a new strategy which is based to a lesser extent on nuclear weapons and fundamentally changes the old strategy of forward defence.

Third, a structure based on smaller, more mobile forces, though still with a strictly defensive posture.

Another possibility is to create multinational units, that is to say units made up of forces from different member countries. That would at the same time enhance the Alliance's cohesion.

In this context the presence of North American forces in Western Europe will continue to be the indispensable guarantee of transatlantic linkage.

In the Common Declaration of the 22 adopted in November 1990, the members of Nato and the Warsaw Pact extended to one another the hand of friendship and cooperation. We did so in the hope and conviction that the conflicts of the past are over once and for all.

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This cannot mean that we renounce our ability to defend peace and freedom against threats from outside. This remains the mission of the Bundeswehr - side by side with our American and European allies.

In a democracy an assured defence capability depends not least on the civic responsibility of every individual. That is why we want those who have joined the Bundeswehr from the new federal states to feel that they, too, are "citizens in uniform". That is why we strictly adhere to compulsory military service. This ensures full integration of the armed forces with the rest of society. It is also an important sign evoking the trust of others.

On the other hand, we must keep the public aware that protecting freedom and democracy is every individual's concern, and that burdens, too, have to be put up with for the sake of peace and freedom. We are grateful to our servicemen for it is they especially who are carrying this burden for all of us.

The Bundeswehr is to be thoroughly reorganized in response to the new security situation in Europe. Its mission will still be a defensive one. We will reduce the number of formations and units, but they will continue to be well trained and equipped for their tasks. The reduction and restructuring of the Bundeswehr is also bound to result in changes of location. In making the necessary decisions we shall, wherever possible, take account of the structural situation of the federal states and municipalities concerned.

The aim which I set out in my first policy statement in October 1982 - establishing peace with fewer weapons - remains a cornerstone of the foreign and security policy of the united Germany. This principle must be defended by all participants in the CSCE process. And everyone must realize that any attempts to circumvent existing agreements will delay that process.

My Government will continue to seek progress on arms control and disarmament in spite of a more difficult environment.

The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, which was signed in Paris, laid the foundations for a new security structure covering the whole of Europe. This Treaty must be ratified and implemented in both spirit and letter very soon. We played a decisive part in the negotiations. Following our promise to reduce the united Germany's forces to 370,000, we expect our partners in the continuing negotiations to follow with measures to limit their forces to maximum national strengths.

We also want to give the Vienna negotiations on confidence- and security-building measures a fresh impulse, particularly as regards confidence building between neighbouring states.

We remain committed to ensuring the earliest possible start to negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union on short-range nuclear systems. The changed security situation on our continent now permits the removal from the whole of Europe of land-based short-range nuclear missiles as well as nuclear artillery ammunition.

We are looking to the Geneva negotiations on START and chemical weapons, as well as to the ban on nuclear testing, to provide the long-overdue breakthrough. The continuation of the summit diplomacy between the United States and the Soviet Union is of key importance in this connection.

Our prime objective remains a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe based on respect for human rights, liberal democracy and social market economy. The Charter for a New Europe, signed by the CSCE heads of state and government in Paris in November last year, sets clear standards to this end. At the same time it opens new avenues and creates new pan-European institutions. But neither documents nor bureaucratic institutions are themselves enough to guarantee actual progress. We will therefore continue to ensure that we breathe life into and put into practice all that is laid down in the Charter of Paris.

The first meeting of CSCE foreign ministers, to be held in Berlin in June 1991, assumes great significance in this light. For it is there that the course will be set for the next CSCE summit in Helsinki in 1992.

We also want to smooth the way for the constitution of a CSCE parliamentary assembly. We will in addition seek new impulses for pan-European legal development and market-economy cooperation, transboundary environmental protection and cultural exchange.

The comprehensive protection of national minorities is a special task and obligation incumbent upon the united Germany. We will express our firm commitment to it within the CSCE organs, but also in the Council of Europe, which pointed the way at a very early date with the 1950 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.

This concerns not least of all our fellow countrymen in Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe. We want them not to view emigration to the Federal Republic as their only hope, but to see again a secure future for themselves and their children in their own country. This involves the protection of their legal status, the opportunity to cultivate their own language, culture and traditions, and the improvement of their living conditions. The Federal Government will regulate these matters in, for example, bilateral agreements with the countries concerned. However, we will continue to admit and offer a home to those Germans who see no future for themselves or their children in their own country.

There must be no turning back on the way to a greater Europe of peace and freedom, a Europe growing together against a background of political, economic and social stability.

The recent events in the Baltic were a severe setback. I have strongly urged President Gorbachev to stop any further use of force.

In the German Bundestag we emphatically urged all political groupings in the Soviet Union

- to guarantee the Baltic peoples' right to self-determination, freedom of expression and the restoration of legality,
- to seek a solution to the problems through exclusively peaceful means,

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- to exercise as much restraint as possible, and
- to resume political dialogue immediately.

At the same time we expressed our deep conviction that

- the future belongs only to democracy, human rights and the rule of law, and that
- only on these principles can a just and lasting peaceful order be established in Europe.

United Germany attaches fundamental importance to its relations with the Soviet Union. This is reflected in the forward-looking agreements which President Gorbachev and I reached in the Caucasus.

With the new German-Soviet treaties concluded since 1988, with the Treaty on Good-Neighbourliness, Partnership and Cooperation as the centrepiece, we have laid a solid foundation, not least for the reconciliation of the German people with the peoples of the Soviet Union.

We will continue as before to support the Soviet Union in its reforms, particularly in consolidating democracy, guaranteeing human rights and the rule of law, and in switching to the social market economy. We do not confine ourselves to rhetoric, as this winter's unprecedented readiness to help by individual citizens' has shown.

We will meet our obligations under the treaty and facilitate the reintegration of the Soviet forces and their families, who are to leave Germany by 1994 at the latest.

As before, we will support the reformist states of Central and South-Eastern Europe, too, in their difficult task of introducing the social market economy. Where necessary we will increase joint Western aid.

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We are and always will be grateful to Hungary for opening its borders to thousands of our countrymen in the summer of 1989, thus giving us crucial help on the path towards unity.

The united Germany intends to comprehensively codify its relationship with the Republic of Poland in a Treaty on Good-Neighbourliness and Cooperation based on Partnership.

This year we are seeking to conclude with Czechoslovakia, too, a wide-ranging treaty which will close a sorry chapter and point the way to a future of good-neighbourly relations.

We want to involve our expellees in this work of reconciliation. They have played a decisive part in building up our liberal society. Forty years ago, in the Stuttgart Charter, they renounced the use of force and opened the door to greater unity within Europe. They deserve our thanks and our solidarity. The Federal Government will always be a fair and sympathetic partner in talks with them and their organizations.

The scope and difficulty of the tasks facing us in our country and in Europe must not narrow our vision. The united Germany must remain open to the world.

Our share of responsibility in the world has increased. At the beginning of this new legislative term, Willy Brandt said: "Were it to forget global problems - starvation, the spread of poverty, the destruction of the environment - to concentrate on domestic cares, Germany would burden itself with a sense of guilt." I fully agree with him. These and other global challenges, such as excessive indebtedness and the population explosion, require increased international cooperation.

We want the resources and energies released by the end of the East-West conflict to be channelled for the benefit of the people in Asia, Africa and Latin America.

The change can be felt in these parts of the world too. In a number of countries a new, liberal thinking is becoming ever more established - in

politics, business and society. We will take this hopeful development into account in our cooperation with these countries.

We attach particular value to our relations with Asia, the most densely populated and fastest-growing part of the world. We want to expand our economic, political and cultural cooperation with Japan. I am gratified to note that trade with India and investment there has increased dramatically over the past few years. The People's Republic of China plays a responsible and stabilizing role in international politics. It is our hope that this, the country with the world's largest population, will renew its endeavours towards domestic reform and towards opening up to the rest of the world.

Within the framework of our long-standing close partnership we will continue to help the countries of Africa to relieve, and if possible permanently overcome, their growing economic difficulties, famine and epidemics, and their refugee problems.

By the same token the Federal Government, together with its European partners, will continue to encourage the Republic of South Africa as it seeks to implement its difficult programme of domestic reform and to secure peace. It appeals to all with political responsibility to abolish apartheid once and for all and to complete the process of internal and external reconciliation.

Through dialogue, cooperation and the opening-up of our markets - both bilaterally and within the EC - we hope to help stabilize democracy and the market economy system in Latin America.

Promoting dialogue and achieving a balance between North and South will remain the major challenges in the 90s. We will face up to our responsibility for the people in the Third World. Specifically, the united Germany will continue to increase its development aid. However, our help can be successful only if the crucial basic conditions exist in the receiving countries:

- respect for human rights and human dignity,
- forms of government based on democracy and the rule of law, and

- economic development instead of the stockpiling of military potential.

Simultaneously, conditions must be such as to enable entrepreneurial initiative to develop as the engine of economic growth.

The Federal Government will examine new ways of harnessing unexploited productive energies via private-sector structures, for example credit and advisory services. This is in line with our principle of giving help for self-help.

The indebtedness of many developing countries is still one of the most pressing problems facing us today. Within the responsible international bodies, we will seek to elaborate strategies to overcome it. Further, returns from capital aid will be used primarily for environmental protection and for the promotion of the private sector in the Third World.

We the industrialized countries - and particularly the Federal Republic, the world's second-largest exporter - have a special obligation to guarantee a free system of international trade, and it is in our fundamental interest to do so. We in the European Community will therefore do everything in our power over the coming weeks to bring the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations to a successful conclusion. Not least in the present international economic situation, we need clear and binding rules for all involved in world trade.

The 90s will be the decade of global environmental protection. We know that protecting the earth's atmosphere and avoiding damage to the climate must be a joint effort between industrialized and developing countries throughout the world. We are prepared staunchly to support the developing countries in their endeavours to develop without harming the environment. This includes the coupling of debt relief with specific environmental protection measures.

The protection of the tropical rain forests will be the main focus in this regard. The international endeavours already initiated, with the considerable involvement of the Federal Government, must now be further developed and implemented consistently. The recommendations made by the commission of enquiry of the German Bundestag will provide important guidelines.

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The responsible shaping of the future between East and West, North and South, is not only the task and responsibility of government but an obligation on all citizens. I should like to take this opportunity to thank the churches, social and humanitarian organizations for their commitment.

At the start of this statement I mentioned the new increased responsibility now devolving on us Germans. We will have to face up to this responsibility, whether we like it or not. To date we have been particularly active and successful in our commitment to economic stability in the world. This alone will no longer be enough. Now we will also be expected to be more closely involved in the solution of international issues, first and foremost by our partners and allies. Common interests also mean common duties. Germany must therefore be ready to join in concrete steps to ensure peace and stability in the world.

The United Nations plays an increasingly important role in maintaining peace. United Germany is rightly expected to intensify its efforts in this sphere. In order to do so we want to clarify the possibilities open to us under the constitution. The Federal Government will seek talks on this matter with the political groups in the Bundestag.

Meeting this new responsibility calls for the rejection of some of our cosy thought-patterns of the past and the courage to face the future.

With the unification of our fatherland Germany has entered a new epoch. After almost two hundred years the struggle over Germany's political shape, its internal order and its place in Europe, has reached a happy end. For the first time in Germany's history, unity, freedom and peaceful accord with our European neighbours are inextricably linked. Let us be grateful for this.

The whole of Germany now has a chance to find its internal equilibrium, its identity. This means that what is natural in other nations can now also develop in Germany: active patriotism - a patriotism with a European perspective, committed to freedom.

It is now important for united Germany to accept its role in the family of nations, with all the ensuing rights and responsibilities. This is rightly

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expected of us - and we must fulfil that expectation. There is no comfortable niche in international politics for us Germans, and we must not shirk our responsibility. We want to make our contribution to a world of peace, freedom and justice.

This is our vision: a new order for Europe and for the world, based on the nations' right to self-determination, the inviolability of human dignity and respect for human rights.

The way will be difficult, and, as we now know, full of risks and dangers. But it is a way worth taking for the benefit of the people in Germany and in Europe, conscious of our responsibility for peace in the world.

GERMAN ENGAGEMENT IN CONTEXT OF THE GULF CONFLICT

29 Jan 91

A. MILITARY CONTRIBUTIONS	B. FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTIONS	C. OTHER CONTRIBUTIONS
1. Naval Forces in the Mediterranean and adjacent seas: - 2700 sailors - 19 ships, incl. frigates, destroyers and minesweepers - 3 maritime patrol aircraft - cost by end of last year: 51 Mio f 2. Allied Mobile Force (Air) - 300 airmen - 18 aircraft Alpha Jet in Turkey - cost up to now: 10 Mio f - cost per day: 200.000 f 3. Extra allocation of training, training facilities and times - incl. low-level flying - in Germany for forces ear-marked for the Gulf.	1. Military aid for Allies in cash and performance in kind (vehicles ammunition, etc) a. US 575 Mio f b. Turkey 528 Mio f c. GB 20 Mio f d. France 1 Mio f 1.124 Mio f 2. Economic aid for front line states (Egypt, Jordan, Turkey): 568 Mio f 3. Emergency aid for Israel: 86 Mio f 4. Aid on loan basis: a. US 23 Mio f b. GB 45 Mio f c. IT 9 Mio f 77 Mio f Total: (A+B) 1.916 Mio f	1. Provision of medical facilities and support (field hospital with a capacity of 1.000 beds for US, German physicians for GB military hospital in Germany, etc. / the British Government does not intend to bring casualties to Germany but directly to UK. 2. Support of GB and US forces' families in Germany in the framework of "Project Friendship". 3. Support of the deployment and resupply of allied forces from Germany to the Gulf area (road, railways, air, sea).

Today the Federal German Government announced

- a further financial support to the United States for the first 3 months of this year totalling 2.8 billion f,
- to send air defence units equipped with HAWK and ROLAND missiles to Turkey for the defence of the AMF Air Base, and
- its willingness, in accordance to a request from Israel, to send equipment and material in order to protect her territory and population.

OPINION POLL IN GERMANY (19 JAN 1991):

Q:	"Is the allied military action against IRAQ justified?"	Yes	81,4 %
		No	10,0 %
		Do not know	8,6 %
Q:	"What is your position to the so-called peace demonstrations in Germany?"		
		against	85,2 %
		in favour	14,8 %

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SECRET AND PERSONAL



10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

30 January 1991

✓
Dear Simon,

Prime Minister

CDP

30/1

THE GULF

General Scowcroft telephoned me this afternoon on the secure line. We covered a number of issues.

✓ General Scowcroft said that he wanted to stress, in the light of some of the interpretations being put on the US/Soviet Communique, that there was absolutely no change in the United States' position on a ceasefire. There could be no ceasefire until Saddam Hussain got out of Kuwait. He must actually be on his way out. Speaking very frankly, the White House felt that the phraseology used in the US/Soviet Communique left something to be desired: not to put too fine a point on it, Bessmertnykh had taken the State Department to the cleaners.

I said that we had reacted very calmly to the US/Soviet Communique, dismissing any talk of a new initiative and taking the line that it simply restated the agreed position. I then read General Scowcroft the answer which the Prime Minister had given on this point in his interview with The Times this morning (copy enclosed). General Scowcroft said that he was very grateful for this and for the way we had reacted. He subsequently rang back to say that he had told the President, who was personally most appreciative of the Prime Minister's response.

General Scowcroft went on to say that the US was hoping to deploy eight B52 aircraft to RAF Fairford, from where they would conduct bombing operations over Iraq. He understood there had been some informal contacts about this on the military net. The Administration had originally hoped to add the aircraft to those already in Spain, but the Spaniards had refused to take any more. The President would be very grateful if the Prime Minister felt able to agree to have them in the United Kingdom. I said that it would be helpful to have a formal request from the President in the form of a short message, which might be sent overnight. I was sure that the Prime Minister would want to be helpful, although the anti-war movement would kick up a fuss and there might be some problems in Parliament. General Scowcroft said that he would arrange for a message to come as soon as possible.


SECRET AND PERSONAL

I asked General Scowcroft whether the Americans were receiving intelligence of an imminent and substantial attack by Iraqi ground forces across the Saudi border. We had some quite strong indications that something of the sort was imminent. There was overhead intelligence of movement of armour in South Eastern Kuwait: and there was a POW interrogation report of much more substantial movements further west, with a major incursion planned for tonight. General Scowcroft said that he was not aware of anything on this scale. He knew of the POW interrogation report, to the effect that the action currently taking place on the Kuwait/Saudi border was only a feint. Some Iraqi forces had actually crossed the border moving west in the course of today and had then tried to go back on their tracks, got lost and run up against their own defences. The Americans currently had them pinned down there. I said that the reports reaching us suggested something more substantial. General Scowcroft said that he would check and come back to me if there was something significant to report.

He subsequently telephoned again to say that the Americans had the same information and there was a debate going on between the intelligence community and the military about its significance. He was not sure how it would be resolved. Meanwhile he had just been given an intercept which indicated Iraqi preparations for a CW attack further west. When I queried what this last reference meant, he said it seemed to be where the Kuwait border started to turn north, in the area where there had been some action the previous night.

I told General Scowcroft that I had reported what he had told me about American intentions for retaliation in the event of an Iraqi CW attack. It would be very helpful to know in addition what the Americans would say publicly about their intentions in the immediate aftermath of such an attack. We would obviously need to coordinate our press line very closely. General Scowcroft said rather distractedly that he did not think anyone had got round to sorting out press guidance yet, but he would put it in hand and let me have something.

I am copying this letter to Richard Gozney (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and to Sir Robin Butler.

Yours sincerely,


(CHARLES POWELL)

Simon Webb, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence.

TRANSCRIPT A - PM - INT - THE TIMES - 30 JANUARY 1991

- 1 -

FROM EGMG FOR COI RADIO TECHNICAL SERVICES

TRANSCRIPT OF INTERVIEW

GIVEN BY THE PRIME MINISTER, MR JOHN MAJOR,

IN LONDON,

ON WEDNESDAY, 30 JANUARY 1991

INTERVIEWER: ROBIN OAKLEY, THE TIMES

=====

INTERVIEWER:

Prime Minister, do you seriously see any prospect of a ceasefire following the American/Soviet initiative?

PRIME MINISTER:

There is no reason to suppose there is going to be one, and what the Americans and the Soviets essentially did yesterday was reformulate precisely the conditions that underpin the Security Council resolutions. There was nothing fresh in it, it was the position that there has been since the beginning. So there is not, to that extent, a fresh initiative backing away from the present situation at all, the situation is as it was. it is a reaffirmation of the Security Council resolutions.

INTERVIEWER:

But is it an attempt to give Saddam Hussein the chance to present it as something new?

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OUR TELNO 285: IRAQ/KUWAIT: WASHINGTON SITREP

SUMMARY

1. REACTIONS TO THE STATE OF THE UNION ADDRESS. AN UPBEAT BRIEFING BY GENERAL SCHWARZKOPF ON THE PROGRESS OF THE CAMPAIGN.

DETAIL

2. THE PRESS LEAD TODAY (30 JANUARY) WITH THE STATE OF THE UNION ADDRESS (MY TELNO 297). THEY GIVE THE PRESIDENT HIGH MARKS. ALTHOUGH NOTING THAT THE MOST SPONTANEOUS AND PROLONGED APPLAUSE WAS RESERVED FOR HIS TRIBUTE TO THE DEVOTION AND COMMITMENT OF US TROOPS IN THE GULF, THE WASHINGTON POST THOUGHT THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD COME ACROSS AS A TRUE WAR PRESIDENT, CAPABLE OF RALLYING GOVERNMENT AND COUNTRY IN THE PROSECUTION OF A MAJOR WAR. OVERALL, CONGRESS LISTENED WITH PARTICULAR ATTENTION AND RESPONDED WITH GENUINE EMOTION TO THE GULF ELEMENTS OF THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH. THE UNPRECEDENTED SECURITY AROUND THE CAPITOL AND THE NATIONAL TELEVISION AUDIENCE ADDED TO THE SINGULARITY AND GRAVITY OF THE OCCASION.

3. IN THE DEMOCRATIC RESPONSE, SENATE MAJORITY LEADER MITCHELL SUPPORTED THE PRESIDENT'S PERSIAN GULF POLICIES, BUT ADDED A NOTE OF DOMESTIC CRITICISM. WHILE ACKNOWLEDGING THAT THERE WAS A CRISIS ABROAD IN THE GULF, MITCHELL SAID THAT THERE WAS ALSO A DOMESTIC CRISIS AND A NEED FOR THE US TO PUT ITS HOUSE IN ORDER.

4. INTENSE PRESS INTEREST CONTINUES IN THE FLIGHT OF IRAQI AIRCRAFT TO IRAN. THERE IS UNCERTAINTY OVER WHETHER SADDAM IS CONTROLLING THE EXODUS. MOST BELIEVE THAT HE AGREED TO THE STRATEGY, PARTICULARLY AFTER THE ALLIES FOUND IT EASIER THAN EXPECTED TO DESTROY HARDENED IRAQI AIRCRAFT SHELTERS

PAGE 1
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WITH 2000 POUND BOMBS. A PENTAGON OFFICIAL HAS SAID THAT IT WOULD BE IRRESPONSIBLE TO CLAIM FOR CERTAIN THAT US SUCCESS AGAINST HARDENED SHELTERS WAS THE REASON THE CROSS-BORDER FLIGHT BEGAN, BUT THAT WAS THE UNMISTAKABLE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS.

5. AN UPBEAT BRIEFING BY GENERAL SCHWARZKOPF FROM SAUDI ARABIA ON 30 JANUARY, INCLUDING FOOTAGE OF SUCCESSFUL US BOMB STRIKES ON IRAQI AIRFIELDS AND HARDENED SHELTERS AND THE MOST DETAILED BOMB DAMAGE ASSESSMENTS TO DATE, HAS BEEN WIDELY AIRED ON CNN AND OTHER NETWORKS. HIS EMPHASIS ON THE INTENSITY OF ALLIED BOMBING MISSIONS AGAINST REPUBLICAN GUARD AND FRONT-LINE TROOPS IN KUWAIT AND SUCCESSFUL ALLIED INTERDICTION EFFORTS AGAINST IRAQI RE-SUPPLY CONVOYS AND INFRASTRUCTURE HAVE BOOSTED CONFIDENCE WITHIN THE PENTAGON AND THE ADMINISTRATION GENERALLY. BUT BOTH SCHWARZKOPF AND ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS CONTINUE TO STRESS THAT THE WAR IS STILL SOME WAY FROM BEING WON.

6. THE IRAQI ARMoured INCURSION INTO SAUDI ARABIA ON 29/30 JANUARY IS ALSO WIDELY REPORTED AS THE MAJOR LAND BATTLE OF THE WAR SO FAR. MOST COMMENTATORS HAVE SEEN IT AS EVIDENCE OF GROWING IRAQI DESPERATION. THERE HAS SO FAR BEEN SURPRISINGLY LITTLE MEDIA OR PUBLIC REACTION TO US MARINE CASUALTIES (12 KILLED, 2 WOUNDED), WHICH EFFECTIVELY DOUBLES US COMBAT LOSSES.

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2. Second oil flow from al-Bakr? How much? *R31/19A*
2. 1st oil shift?

Prime Minister

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FM WHITE HOUSE
TO CABINET OFFICE
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S E C R E T VIA CABINET CHANNELS
QQQQ

PLEASE DELIVER IMMEDIATELY AT OPENING OF BUSINESS

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
THE WHITE HOUSE

TO: CHARLES POWELL
£10 DOWNING STREET

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR CHARLES:

WE HAVE EXHAUSTED AVAILABLE RAMP SPACE TO LOCATE B-52S IN SAUDI ARABIA AND NOW NEED ADDITIONAL BASING AS CLOSE AS POSSIBLE TO SUPPORT ON-GOING DESERT STORM OPERATIONS. SPAIN HAS QUIETLY AGREED TO OUR USE OF MORON AB BUT WE ARE NOW AT CAPACITY THERE AS WELL. AS A RESULT, WE WOULD GREATLY APPRECIATE YOUR PERMISSION TO DEPLOY EIGHT B-52S AT RAF FAIRFORD.

SINCE WE HAVE ALREADY DEPLOYED OUR ENTIRE INVENTORY OF CONVENTIONAL-ONLY B-52S TO SUPPORT DESERT STORM, THE EIGHT IDENTIFIED FOR RAF FAIRFORD ARE NUCLEAR ALCM CAPABLE. HOWEVER, WE PROVIDE ASSURANCES TO THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT THAT THESE EIGHT B-52S WILL BE USED ONLY TO SUPPORT CONVENTIONAL OPERATIONS WHILE AT RAF FAIRFORD. FURTHER, WE HAVE NO INTENTION OF DEPLOYING ANY ALCM WEAPONS= ALCM ROTARY LAUNCHERS, ALCM PYLONS OR ALCM SUPPORT EQUIPMENT WITH THESE AIRCRAFT.

WE WOULD BE MOST GRATEFUL FOR YOUR ENDORSEMENT OF THIS REQUEST.

WARM REGARDS,

BRENT

END TEXT

DECL: OADR
£0115

This is the
formal request for
the stationing of
the B52s. Also

attached a letter from
the Defense Secretary who
is highly anxious. But
a refusal would be
taken very badly.
JANUARY 30, 1991

To discuss at OPR(6)

It's
morning

CDP

2/1/

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TO DESKBY 302359Z FCO

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OF 302359Z JANUARY 1991

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SIC I9M

IRAQ/KUWAIT

SUMMARY

1. INITIAL SAUDI CONCERN ABOUT US-SOVIET STATEMENT, OFFSET BY ASSUMPTION THAT SADDAM WILL NOT RESPOND. US AMBASSADOR CLAIMS SOME OF DAMAGE DONE IN SHIA TOWNS IN IRAQ MAY HAVE BEEN THE RESULT OF DELIBERATE SHELLING BY REPUBLICAN GUARD. DISCUSSION OF OIL SPILLAGE.

DETAIL

2. THE US AMBASSADOR BRIEFED EUROPEAN AMBASSADORS TODAY, 30 JANUARY. FREEMAN SAID THE AIR CAMPAIGN WAS GOING WELL. THE US HAD BEEN SURPRISED BY THE MOVE OF IRAQI AIR FORCE AIRCRAFT TO IRAN. THE IRANIANS HAD ASSURED THE SAUDIS AND OTHER GCC COUNTRIES, AS WELL AS THE US AND UK, THAT THE IRAQI AIRCRAFT WOULD BE HELD IN IRAN. FREEMAN SAID HE WOULD BE SURPRISED IF THE IRAQIS EVER GOT THE AIRCRAFT BACK. THE IRANIANS WERE LIKELY TO REGARD THEM AS WAR REPARATIONS.

3. FREEMAN SAID THAT HE HAD CALLED ON PRINCE SAUD THIS MORNING TO DELIVER A COPY OF THE STATEMENT ISSUED BY THE US AND SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTERS IN WASHINGTON. SAUD HAD EXPRESSED CONCERN. FREEMAN HAD EXPLAINED THAT IT REPRESENTED NO CHANGE IN THE US POSITION. HE HAD LAID STRESS ON THE REQUIREMENT THAT IRAQ MUST PROVIDE CONCRETE EVIDENCE OF ITS INTENTION TO WITHDRAW COMPLETELY BEFORE A CEASEFIRE COULD BE AGREED. FREEMAN CLAIMED THAT THIS SATISFIED SAUD (COMMENT: OUR OWN CONTACTS WITH SENIOR MFA OFFICIALS DURING THE DAY SUGGEST THAT THE SAUDIS WERE SURPRISED BY THE STATEMENT. THEY WOULD BE LESS THAN HAPPY WITH AN OUTCOME WHICH LEFT SADDAM BLOODIED BUT UNBOWED. THEY TOOK COMFORT FROM THE FACT THAT IRAQ WAS MOST UNLIKELY TO RESPOND TO THE US-SOVIET STATEMENT.)

4. THE ITALIAN HAD A REPORT THAT THE IRANIANS WERE TRYING TO MANIPULATE OPINION IN IRAQ, USING INTER ALIA THE SHIA CLERIC HAKIM, WITH THE ULTIMATE AIM OF ESTABLISHING A SHIA GOVERNMENT. FREEMAN SAID THAT THERE WAS CONCERN AMONG SENIOR SAUDIS THAT THE FALL OF SADDAM, WHICH THEY OTHERWISE HOPED FOR, MIGHT LEAD INDIRECTLY TO A SHIA REGIME (CONVERSELY, WE HAVE SOME EVIDENCE THAT SHIA IN THE EASTERN PROVINCE OF SAUDI ARABIA ARE HOPING FOR SUCH AN OUTCOME WHICH MIGHT STRENGTHEN THEIR HAND). FREEMAN CLAIMED THERE WAS INFORMATION TO SUGGEST THAT MOST OF THE DAMAGE IN SHIA TOWNS MIGHT BE A RESULT OF DELIBERATE SHELLING BY THE REPUBLICAN GUARD WITH THE INTENTION OF INFLAMING SHIA OPINION AGAINST THE ALLIES AND RALLYING THEM TO SADDAM.

5. ON THE OIL SLICK, FREEMAN SAID THAT THE AMERICANS BELIEVED THAT THE IRAQIS MAY HAVE BEGUN PUMPING OIL INTO THE GULF AGAIN, THIS TIME FROM MINA AL BAKR OFF THE IRAQI COAST. AMBASSADORS COMPARED NOTES ON ASSISTANCE OFFERED BY THEIR GOVERNMENTS SO FAR. THE FRENCHMAN BETRAYED A CERTAIN IRRITATION AT THE MEDIA ATTENTION DEVOTED TO THE SOUTHAMPTON CENTRE OF WHICH, HE POINTED OUT, ELF WAS A MEMBER. THE FRENCH, GERMAN AND AMERICAN SAID THAT THE MINISTRY OF PETROLEUM WERE EVALUATING THE OFFERS OF ASSISTANCE THEY HAD RECEIVED. THE AMERICAN SAID THAT THE CROWN PRINCE AND PRINCE SAUD IN PARTICULAR WERE DEEPLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE DAMAGE DONE TO THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT. THEY ACCEPTED THAT COUNTERING IT COULD NOT BE SAUDI ARABIA'S TOP PRIORITY BUT PRINCE SAUD (WHO IS THE MAIN ROYAL SPONSOR OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR WILDLIFE CONSERVATION) WAS DEVOTING TIME TO COORDINATION OF INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS IN THIS AREA THROUGH THE COMMISSION.

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
30 January 1991

Dear Charles,

Operation Granby: Burdensharing

Following the discussion yesterday in OPD(G), I enclose a draft message from the Prime Minister to Sheikh Zayed of the UAE. The Foreign Secretary believes that this would be a useful curtain-raiser for Mr Mellor's proposed visit.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (MOD), John Gieve (HM Treasury) and (since there was no time for the drafts to be seen by the Chief Secretary) also to Jeremy Haywood (HM Treasury).

Yours ever

(S L Cass)
Private Secretary

Sir Charles Powell KCMG
10 Downing Street

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Shaikh Zayed Bin Sultan
Al Nahyan GCMG GCB

Please type
for PM's
signature

DRAFT MESSAGE FROM PRIME MINISTER TO SHEIKH ZAYED (UAE)

Since Douglas Hurd's call on you on 13 January, open hostilities against Iraq have begun. The task of liberating Kuwait was never likely to be easy, but we will press on until the job is completed in the knowledge that our cause is just and right.

The people of Britain will not flinch from what has to be done. There is a clear public perception in this country that Saddam Hussain cannot be allowed to profit from his aggression. His attempt to use missiles as a terror weapon, his unacceptable treatment of prisoners of war and his wanton destruction of the environment simply strengthen our national determination.

As you know, the United Kingdom has provided the second largest overseas force to the coalition. We have not sought substantial commitments from our friends and allies before now. But the financial burden is increasing and the press here have reported on the generosity of your country, among others, to the Americans. The initial deployment of our forces cost us about £1 billion. With the outbreak of hostilities, expenditure is rising rapidly: in the first ten days of fighting alone, losses of aircraft and consumption of ammunition and other supplies amounted to a replacement value of well over £160 million. The final costs to the UK are impossible to forecast at this stage, but we expect them to be at least £3 billion.

I was much encouraged that when Douglas Hurd called on you, you expressed your willingness to help with this and I am therefore writing in the hope that you will feel able to make a contribution to our costs. Our forces deployed in the Gulf are about 8% of the size of those of the United States. On the basis of what I understand to be your contribution to US costs, a sum of some £300 million for Britain would be proportionate. It would provide another practical demonstration of international solidarity in the face of the aggression of Saddam Hussain.

I add you my warm regards.

Sent to Marko
Stanley
OTI

R301, R10 ✓

See Cade-



Mary Duke.

With Compliments

The wife enclosed with an
angry letter from a solicitor
in heads! I hope it's
not true. Please can you
advise me how long to persist?
The OTI have not been
following.


HOUSE OF COMMONS
LONDON, SW1A 0AA

See all
Jenell

I got it from my
assistant who spoke to
the DTI (Mike Cowan)
that he was told that
it "could be used in
factories which make
chemical weapons, to
detect leaks - so is not
purely defensive". Amazing
nonsense!!

Technology) and "Win32" within the company, the 32-bit version will provide many of OS/2's 32-bit capabilities under MS-Dos. Sources say it will provide preemptive multi-tasking.

The company is making changes to the way Dos Interrupt 21h operates, so it will support multiple execution threads and add direct support for the High Performance File System (HPFS), named pipes and mail slots.



Windows 3.0: soon a platform for OS/2

Additions to the 16-bit version will include improved graphics in Windows' Graphics Device Interface (GDI) calls with Bezier curves; a transform layer to support rotation and shearing;

grouping of graphics primitives for area fills; and support for dithered fills.

Microsoft is also actively considering support for fractional character widths; half-tones;

Microsoft admits Portable OS/2 will only appeal to a small core of high end users but said it will "win over the competition because it runs Windows applications natively".

Analysts believe Microsoft's long term reliance on Windows continues to strain its relationship with IBM. "There is a lingering problem between IBM and Microsoft," said Mark Ryland, who is chairing the Windows-

continued on page 3

Pentagon shops in Leeds for gas warning

AMERICAN forces will use British handheld computers to warn of chemical attack in the Gulf — but government restrictions prevent the potentially life-saving device from being exported to Israel.

The ZENBC chemical hazard-prediction computers are made by Leeds-based Zengrange, which is exporting an undisclosed number of the devices.

The company's military sales manager, John Gatehouse, said: "We are not allowed to sell to the Israelis.

We did not get an export licence — we've just given up."

A spokeswoman for the Department of Trade & Industry (DTI) said she would not discuss individual export licence applications, but added: "There are requirements which all countries [seeking] certain sensitive technologies — particularly in defence — must meet."

The ZENBC stores troop locations and meteorological data. If a chemical attack occurs, users can predict the

direction the fumes will move. This advanced warning system can give troops in the danger zone enough time to take preventative action.

The Pentagon was forced to go shopping in Leeds because Zengrange is the only company in the world to offer this type of specialist equipment.

"The US Marines should have them within days," said Desmond Longfield, who handles military systems development at Zengrange. "They are sending someone to collect

the first batch by hand."

The ZENBC is already in service with UK land forces in the Gulf. But the Ministry of Defence (MoD) was initially slow to pick up on its benefits (*PC Business World*, 4 September 1990).

Longfield blamed the delay on unwieldy bureaucracy within the MoD, but added that the US Department of Defense was probably still more inflexible. "Their low-level civil servants are even worse than ours," he said.

By Jane Lewis

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GULF CRISIS: PLO

SUMMARY

1. PLO INTEREST CAPTURED BY YOUR STATEMENTS ON POST-WAR DIPLOMACY. NO APPARENT HEAD OF STEAM FOR THEIR CEASEFIRE INITIATIVE. STILL SWALLOWING IRAQI PROPOGANDA.

DETAIL

2. I CALLED ON BASSAM ABU SHARIF. MUCH OF THE DISCUSSION WAS FAMILIAR TO BOTH SIDES. I DREW ON YOUR TELNO 24 TO VIENNA. HE LISTENED BUT REMAINED CAPTURED BY IRAQI PROPOGANDA. HE DID NOT EXPECT SADDAM HUSSEIN TO WIN BUT HE WAS QUITE SURE HE WOULD NOT LOSE: SADDAM WAS MORE POPULAR THAN EVER IN ARAB EYES AND EVEN IF KILLED WOULD REMAIN A FORCE TO BE RECKONED WITH. IN DISCUSSING RECENT EVENTS (ON THE BATTLEFIELD, RESIGNATION OF CHEVENEMENT ETC) IT WAS AS IF WE WERE STUDYING THE SAME SCENES BUT THROUGH DIFFERENT ENDS OF THE TELESCOPE.

CEASEFIRE MOVES

3. WHEN I ARRIVED HE WAS ON THE PHONE TO THE INDIAN PRIME MINISTER AND CLAIMED THE LATTER WAS PRESSING THE PLO HARD TO SHOW ACTIVITY IN ORDER TO HELP THE INDIANS WITH THEIR PUBLIC OPINION: THEY AGREED TO EXCHANGE EMISSARIES.

4. HE SAID ARAFAT'S VISIT TO RABAT (WHICH HE HAD JOINED) HAD BEEN QUOTE UNPRODUCTIVE UNQUOTE. THE TALK WITH KING HASSAN WAS CORDIAL BUT PRODUCED NO AGREEMENT ON THE FUTURE. THE YUGOSLAVS WERE ALSO BUSY.

5. BUT HE WAS MOST INTERESTED IN SOVIET DIPLOMACY. HE SAID THE VISIT OF ABU MAAZEN (MAHMOUD ABBAS) HAD GONE BETTER THAN EXPECTED. THEY KNEW ARAB PROBLEMS WERE NOT TOP OF THE SOVIET AGENDA BUT THE TALKS HAD BEEN THOROUGH AND THEY WERE EXCHANGING MESSAGES DAILY. HE

PAGE 1
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BELIEVED THE SOVIETS WERE KEEN TO LIMIT THE WAR AND WERE ALARMED BY REACTIONS IN THE SOUTHERN REPUBLICS.

6. THE FRENCH WERE ALSO CHASING THE PLO. HAKEM BELAWI HAD FLOWN SECRETLY TO PARIS THE NIGHT BEFORE AND THE ELYSEE HAD SENT AN URGENT MESSAGE TO ARFAT SEEKING HIS VIEWS ON THE POST-WAR SITUATION AND MODALITIES OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ARAB-ISRAEL. (BAS WONDERED WHETHER THIS WAS A RESULT OF BRITISH PRESSURE - SEE PARA 9 BELOW).

7. NEVERTHELESS, HIS EXPECTATIONS FROM THE ABOVE WERE NOT HIGH. HE DID NOT PRETEND THERE WAS A POWERFUL DRIVE TO STOP THE WAR AND WAS DISMISSIVE OF MAGHREB EFFORTS. HE SAID THE PLO WERE SENDING MESSAGES TO BAGHDAD BUT HAD RECEIVED NOTHING POSITIVE BACK. THE IRAQIS WERE ADAMANT THEY WOULD NOT WITHDRAW FROM KUWAIT WITHOUT CONCESSIONS FROM PRESIDENT BUSH. (THE IRAQIS WOULD DEAL ONLY WITH WASHINGTON, NOT THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE COALITION.)

8. IN GENERAL HE WAS APOCALYPTIC ABOUT THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE WAR - BUT NO MORE THAN USUAL. HIS MOOD THROUGHOUT WAS CALM AND POSITIVE.

ARAB-ISRAEL

9. I SUCCEEDED, NOT WITHOUT DIFFICULTY, IN DIRECTING HIS ATTENTION TO PALESTINIAN PROBLEMS AND REPEATED OUR ADVICE THAT THE PLO WOULD BE WELL ADVISED TO LEAVE THE GULF TO SORT ITSELF OUT AND CONCENTRATE ON THEIR OWN POST-WAR POSITION. HE SAID YOUR RECENT STATEMENTS HAD BEEN FOLLOWED WITH INTEREST: INDEED YOU WERE QUOTE THE ONLY PERSON MAKING SENSE THESE DAYS UNQUOTE. HE WISHED SIMILAR SIGNALS WOULD COME FROM WASHINGTON AND FEARED THE ISRAELIS WERE BLOCKING OFF FUTURE OPENINGS. HE SAID HE HAD AIMED TO RESPOND POSITIVELY IN RECENT PRESS INTERVIEWS.

10. HE HOPED HMG HAD RECOGNISED THE PLO'S EFFORTS TO PRESERVE THEIR LONGER TERM INTERESTS. HAD WE NOTICED, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT THE YEMENI PRESIDENT'S RECENT COMMENTARY ON THE WAR HAD NOT EVEN MENTIONED THE PLO.

11. HE SPOKE ANGRILY OF SADDAM'S HIJACKING OF THE PALESTINIAN CAUSE. THE PLO WERE AWARE OF THE HARM THIS DID BUT BLAMED HIS POPULAR SUCCESS ON OUR REFUSAL OF LINKAGE. HE COULD ACCEPT - INTELLECTUALLY - THE ARGUMENT THAT THE SOONER SADDAM WAS DEALT WITH THE BETTER FOR PALESTINIANS BUT THE MOOD AMONG THEIR RANK AND FILE WAS SULLEN AND BITTER. MORE STATEMENTS DEVELOPING YOUR THINKING

WOULD HAVE A POSITIVE IMPACT.

TERRORISM

12. HE WAS FIRM ON PLO'S OPPOSITION TO TERRORISM AND SAID A MAJOR EFFORT WAS UNDER WAY TO PREEMPT IRAQI AND ISRAELI EFFORTS TO BLACKEN THEIR NAME. FURTHER POINTS IN THIS CONTEXT ARE BEING REPORTED SEPARATELY.

DAY

DISTRIBUTION 43

ADVANCE 43

IRAQ/KUWAIT

PS 2

PS/MR HOGG

PS/MR LENNOX-BOYD

PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE

PS/PUS

MR FAIRWEATHER

MR BROOMFIELD

MR SLATER

~~MR GORE-BOOTH~~

MR GOULDEN

MR JAY

MR BERMAN (LEGAL ADVISERS)

HD/MED

HD/AMD

HD/CONSULAR D

HD/ECD(E)

HD/NAD

HD/NEWS D

HD/NENAD

HD/SECPOL D

HD/SED

HD/UND 2

CHIEF OF ASSESSMENT STAFF

MR PRIDDLE, DEPT OF ENERGY

MR APPLEYARD CABINET OFFICE

MR W D REEVES CABINET OFFICE

SIR C CURWEN CABINET OFFICE

MR CHARLTON CABINET OFFICE

MR GOWAN, CABINET OFFICE

PS/NUMBER 10 DOWNING ST

SIR P CRADOCK, 10 DOWNING ST

CABINET OFFICE DIO

SIR ROBIN BUTLER, CAB OFFICE

LT COL CRONIN CAB OFFICE

MR SHAPLAND CAB OFFICE

AUS (C) MODUK

HD/SEC (O) (C) MODUK

MR LS SMITH BANK ENGLAND 2

MR WICKS HMT

~~EMERGENCY UNIT~~

RESIDENT CLERK

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL



KW
c/foreign/rabbi

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

30 January 1991

SUBJECT CC MASTER

THE GULF: JEWISH COMMUNITY

The Prime Minister saw the Chief Rabbi and Mr Greville Janner MP this afternoon, at their request, to discuss the Gulf crisis.

The Chief Rabbi said that he would shortly be visiting Israel and wondered whether there was any particular message which the Prime Minister would wish him to convey. The Prime Minister said that he should say how much Israel's restraint in the face of Iraq's SCUD missile attacks was admired and appreciated in this country. We hoped that it would be maintained. The Chief Rabbi said that he was also intending to stress the need for a debate in Israel on the future security of the region as a whole. It was important that Israelis should start to think about the situation after the present conflict. The Prime Minister said this would also be a very helpful message. We could not go back to the status quo ante. All sorts of questions would arise, depending on the precise outcome of the conflict, for instance the need for a balance between Iran and Iraq, the wish of the Gulf States for some sort of security arrangements backed by western guarantees, and the necessity of some movement on the Palestinian issue. The Chief Rabbi said that he accepted these points with one qualification. The phrase "peace conference" had a very unhappy resonance in Israel. People associated it with Versailles and Munich and saw it as a means by which a lot of not at all well-disposed countries would try to impose a settlement on Israel. It would be better to talk simply about peace negotiations. The Prime Minister pointed out that the concept of a peace conference was firmly established and it could not be eliminated from the international glossary. But he understood the sensitivity.

Mr Janner asked the Prime Minister to investigate reports that a British company trying to export computer equipment to Israel which could be of help in detecting a CW attack had been refused a license. The Prime Minister said that he knew nothing of this but would ask the Trade and Industry Secretary to inform him of any problem in the course of 31 January. I should be grateful if DTI could follow this up.

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- 2 -

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence), Martin Stanley (Department of trade and Industry) and to Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

CHARLES POWELL

Simon Gass Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth office

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19a-k
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB
Telephone 071- 21 82111/3

MO 6/17/15/1S

304 January 1991

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Dear Charles,

GULF UPDATE

As we discussed I attach a copy of our internal morning SITREP in the absence of a "View from Riyadh".

Yours sincerely

Sue Webb

(S WEBB)
Private Secretary

Sir Charles Powell KCMG
No 10 Downing Street

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SEC(O)(C) MORNING BRIEF, 30 JANUARY 1991

Summary

First significant offensive action by Iraqi ground forces: 5 separate incursions/raids, not pressed home. British forces not involved. No SCUD attacks overnight. No further exodus of Iraqi aircraft overnight; assessed total just over 100. RN helicopters hit Iraqi vessels with Sea Skuas. Joint US/USSR statement on possible suspension of hostilities if Iraqi commitment to withdraw described by media as window of opportunity for peace.

General Situation

- Significant Iraqi ground incursions overnight and minor naval actions yesterday could be aimed at probing Allied strengths and bolstering Iraqi morale.
- But Iraqi ground forces remain primarily in a defensive posture. Allied air offensive continues as planned, with emphasis of attack shifting turning to Iraqi ground forces and logistic sites.

Political

- Following talks between Mr Baker and the new Soviet Foreign Minister the US and USSR issued joint statement that Allies would agree to suspend hostilities if there was an unequivocal commitment by Iraq to withdraw from Iraq and immediate concrete steps to do so. Also that will work jointly to resolve Arab-Israeli differences.
- Any hint that this amounts to change in US policy negated by Mr Bush's Union Address in which he reiterated US resolve to achieve aims (drive Iraq out of Kuwait, restore to legitimate Government, and achieve peace and stability in region).
- Germany yesterday announced a contribution of \$5.5bn towards US military costs in the first 3 months of 1991; provision of defence equipment to Israel (details to be resolved); and immediate deployment of ROLAND air defence missile units to Turkey. Possible offer to UK today.
- The US is using Maron airbase (near Seville) in Spain to mount B52 attacks on Iraq. Spanish approval was given on the basis that there would be no publicity, but it was subsequently revealed by Turkish President Ozal in an interview with a Spanish newspaper (though not yet picked up by other media).
- Pressure for a formal UN Security Council meeting, proposed by the Maghreb countries supported by Cuba and Yemen, have been thwarted for the time being.

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- The Commander of the Royal Jordanian Air Force confirmed to HMA Amman that any Allied aircrew downed over Jordan would be treated as if they were his own men. He also complained about alleged Israeli incursions into Jordanian airspace.
- Low level attacks by indigenous anti-Western terrorist groups in Greece and Turkey are likely to continue against targets associated with coalition countries.

UK Operations

Air Operations

- 10 Tornado GR1s from Tabuk with 1000lb bombs and 2 GR1s with ALARM successfully attacked Al Taqaddum airfield.
- 8 Tornado GR1s from Muharraq with 1000lb bombs successfully attacked oil storage/refining facilities at Ad Dinawayah; "single massive explosion with secondary fires" reported, after very accurate delivery.
- 1 Tornado GR1A from Dhahran carried out a linesearch mission. 2 further GR1As tasked with linescan missions: 1 air aborted, 1 carried out as planned.
- 8 Tornado GR1s with 1000lb bombs from Dhahran attacked Ubaydah bin al Jarrah airfield; initial results indicate 7 hits and 1 possible.
- RAF sorties as at 300100Z:

	last 24 hrs	total
Tornado GR1	20	396
Tornado GR1A	1	22
Jaguar	17	151
Tornado F3	10	259
Buccaneer	0	0
Nimrod	2	28
AAR (Victor, VC10K, Tristar)	16	170
	66	1026

Navy Operations

- Yesterday afternoon Lynx helicopters from BRAZEN and GLOUCESTER detected and engaged 17 small (15/20 ft) Iraqi patrol boats near the Mina Saud Point; 2 SEA SKUA missiles were fired, giving 1 near-miss and 1 malfunction. The craft were then engaged by Allied (including RAF) aircraft: 4 boats sunk, and 12 beached or disabled. A further patrol boat was destroyed later by a SEA SKUA from CARDIFF's Lynx.
- At 300512Z Cardiff's Lynx hit an Iraqi vessel, probably a mine layer, with a Sea Skua. The vessel is dead in the water.

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Army Operations

- 1 (BR) Armd Div continues move to KEYES concentration area; now estimated 75% complete, with completion scheduled for tomorrow. Wet weather and congestion on the main supply route is not slowing UK movements.
- The first 2 (of 11) FUCHS NBC recce vehicles and 2 HUMMEL armoured jamming vehicles supplied by the Germans will be airlifted to the Gulf today by USAF C5; 2 more HUMMELs and supporting vehicles will depart on 2 Feb.
- The BFME Islander liaison aircraft will leave UK today; deployment time around 3-5 days.

Allied Operations

- 2 USN A6s attacked 4 Iraqi vessels last night south of the Paylacka Islands; 3 sunk and possibly another hit. The A6s later attacked a Polnochny-class amphibious ship and an FPB: Polnochny was damaged and FPB sunk. A further FPB was attacked later and totally disabled.
- US air forces are operating a barrier Combat Air Patrol to the NE, E and SE of Baghdad.
- Two French attack missions were flown yesterday morning, each comprising 6 Jaguars, 2 Mirage F1s and 2 Mirage 2000s. Target was an RGFC mechanised battalion.
- The French assess (as reported to DA Paris) that the Iraqis have lost 150 tanks and 360 artillery pieces.
- US announced yesterday that 27 Iraqi aircraft had been shot down, and 23 destroyed on the ground (excluding next item).
- CENTCOM BDA reports for 28 Jan indicate that 6-8 Iraqi Su22 aircraft destroyed on the ground at Kirkuk, and 3-4 transport aircraft destroyed at Mosul.
- Report of a large explosion yesterday evening at ammunition dump west of Kuwait, following B52 attack.

Iraqi activity

- 5 Iraqi land incursions/raids took place overnight (see attached map):
 - a. At 1925Z MARCENT reported 50 enemy tanks crossing Kuwait/Saudi border at (1); subsequently engaged by USMC Task Force - 13 tanks destroyed (by TOW missiles and aircraft); remainder moved north of border except for 15 tanks, which were engaged by AC130 aircraft. Air missions called on withdrawing vehicles. MARCENT losses total 2

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2

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LAVs. Renewed attack at (1) by up to 40 armoured vehicles (opposed by LAVs and aircraft) reported at 0530Z.

b. At 2000Z MARCENT reported dismounted infantry crossing border at (2); enemy subsequently withdrew.

c. At 2105Z, 15 T55 tanks and 10 MTLB APCs reported crossing Khafji area (3); Saudi National Guard engaged enemy, then withdrew south and lost contact. Enemy then engaged by Cobra helicopters prior to planned Saudi mopping-up operation.

d. At 2310Z, 4 tanks reported crossing the border at (4); engaged by US 1st Armd Cav Regt and SOCCENT, and withdrew north-east.

e. At 0215Z, USMC reported an Iraqi battalion on the outskirts of Khafji (5). Enemy artillery was deployed forward onto Saudi territory but forced back. JHQ believes 5 further Iraqi battalions were ready to exploit any success. US aircraft (AC130, A10 and Cobra) cleared Iraqi penetration from Khafji by 0530Z.

- Several of the 150 Iraqi soldiers defecting to Saudi Arabia between 17-27 Jan were apparently clutching Allied invitations to surrender.

Logistics

- The 2nd consignment of oil slick control equipment left UK yesterday evening; remaining equipment will be moved by MOD-chartered Belfast today.
- The main body of 29 Dutch medics to be attached to 205 Gen Hosp is planned to arrive on 3/4 Feb. 20 New Zealand medics for attachment to RAF Hosp Muharraq should arrive at Riyadh on 2 Feb.
- There are 674 tonnes of Priority 1 air freight in UK and Germany awaiting movement to the Gulf.
- The 28,000 tonne-capacity Norwegian ship DELORES has been chartered to carry water to the Gulf; loading at Teesport is imminent. Negotiations to charter a 2nd Norwegian ship are underway.

Media reports and coverage

- Joint US/USSR statement following Baker/Bessmertnykh described by press as 'window of opportunity' for peace.
- Some media coverage this morning of RN attacks on Iraqi patrol boats.

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
- Speculation that Air Force defections to Iran were caused by attempts to suppress a coup within the Air Force.
- Some coverage of oil slick.

Other Issues

- The US forces are constructing 2 PW camps in theatre for completion by 15 Feb, each with capacity for 48,000 PWs.
- Preparations may be underway for an Israeli missile test launch.

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BORDER INCURSIONS



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OPERATION GRANBY - UK FORCES COMMITTED AS AT 300500ZJAN91

CLASSIFIED FIGURES

(a) In theatre	40686
(b) Outside theatre	1550
Total UK Forces committed	42236

PUBLIC FIGURES

(a) In theatre	About 38000
(b) Outside theatre	About 2000
Total UK Forces committed	About 40000

ROYAL NAVY

DD/FF in theatre		MCMs in theatre		RFAs in theatre			LSIs in theatre		
Ship	Personnel	Ship	Personnel	Ship	RFA	RN	Ship	RFA	RN
HMS CARDIFF	298	HMS ATHERSTONE	48	RFA FORT GRANGE	162	47	SIR GALAHAD	51	89
HMS LONDON	306	HMS CATTISTOCK	44	RFA DILIGENCE	43	82	(including FSU-02)		
HMS BRAZEN	248	HMS HURWORTH	49	RFA ORANGELEAF	58		SIR PERCIVALE	57	1
HMS GLOUCESTER	286	HMS LEDBURY	48	RFA RESOURCE	126	1	SIR TRISTRAM	51	3
HMS MANCHESTER	293	HMS DULVERTON	48	RFA OLNA	95	5	SIR BEDIVERE	54	1
Ashore	169	HMS HERALD	140	RFA ARGUS (PCRS)	87	295			
12 x SEA KING	392								
Total RN personnel in theatre		2893							
Total RFA personnel in theatre		784							

Armilla Roulement

Vessels not included in totals

Ship	Personnel	Destination	ETA	Replacing
HMS EXETER	291	Gulf	5 Feb 91	HMS GLOUCESTER
HMS BRAVE	285	Gulf	5 Feb 91	HMS LONDON
HMS BRILLIANT	255	Gulf	11 Feb 91	HMS BRAZEN
RFA BAYLEAF	57	Gulf	12 Feb 91	RFA ORANGELEAF

Ships taken up from trade 17

Other LSIs in use 0

ARMY

1st (British) Armoured Division - in theatre						Outside theatre		
Divisional Troops		7th Armoured Brigade		4th Brigade		Personnel	ETA/Loc	Total
Personnel	Total	Personnel	Total	Personnel	Total			
Divisional HQ	957	Fighting Echelon	4135	Fighting Echelon	4196	1(BR) Arm Div		
Fighting Echelon	5015	2nd Line Support		2nd Line Support		Battle Casualty		
2nd Line Support	5459	3rd Line Support		(Support elements of 4 Brigades included in Divisional Troops totals)		Replacements (BCRs)		104
3rd Line Support	4437					PM Guard Force		464
Battle Casualty Reple	1748							
Total Divisional Troops	17616	Total 7th Arm Div	4135	Total 4th Brigade	4196	Equipment	ETA/Loc	Total
Equipment Total		Equipment Total		Equipment Total				
Tot *	Fgt Str	Tot *	Fgt Str	Tot *	Fgt Str	1(BR) Arm Div		
M109 155mm SP gun	12	Challenger MBT	162	Challenger MBT	59	M109 155mm SP g.		3
M110 Howitzer	13	Warrior AIFV	164	Warrior AIFV	159	Lynx helicopters		1
MRS	13	M109 155mm SP gun	30	M109 155mm SP gun	24	Bozelle helicopters		1
Rapier	32	Javelin	58	Javelin	36	Scorpion/Scimitar		3
Lynx helicopters	23					Challenger/Warrior		16
Gazelle helicopters	23					Striker		2
Total other Army support personnel in theatre				5298		Engineer Egipts.		7
Total 1(BR) Arm Div in theatre		25947				Tot 1 Div pers o/s theatre		
Total Army personnel in theatre		31245				Tot Army pers o/s theatre		

* - total no of equipment in theatre, inc MMR

ROYAL AIR FORCE

In Theatre						Outside Theatre		
Unit	Loc	Pers	Unit	Loc	Pers	Unit	ETA/Loc	Personnel
18 x TORNADO F3	Dhahran	1187	7 x TORNADO GR1	Tabuk	588	5 x F4 Phantom		
12 x TORNADO GR1	Dhahran		8 x TORNADO GR1 (ALARM)	Tabuk		+airhead support		
6 x TORNADO GR1A	Dhahran		NO 6 Wg RAF Regt	Tabuk		1 x RAF Regt LAS	Cyprus	982
HQ 4 Wg + LAS	Dhahran		19 x Puma	FFL Udayli	1189	HQBF Cyprus		
12 x JAGUAR GR1	Muharrag	1415	10 x Chinook	FFL Udayli				
13 x TORNADO GR1	Muharrag		9 x VC10 TANKER	Riyadh				
7 x Victor	Muharrag		6 x C-130	Riyadh				
RAF Regt (RAPIER/LAS)	Muharrag		1 x TRISTAR 1 x HS125	Riyadh				
4 x Buccaneer	Muharrag	182	Jaguar support	Thumrait	4			
3 x Nimrod MR2	Seeb		Miscellaneous	All locations	839			
Total RAF personnel in theatre		5764				Tot RAF pers o/s theatre		

Total US forces in theatre 492785

as 300500Z Jan 91

Total Reservists employed on Regular duty 1491

Total personnel in HQBFME 431

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Tot Reservists deployed to theat 1147

Tot medical personnel in theatre 4524

Total female personnel in theatre 1191

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OPERATION GRANBY - CASUALTY REPORT

Report Number : 14 Situation as at : 300400Z JAN 91

TOTAL NUMBER OF CASUALTIES, SINCE THE COMMENCEMENT OF HOSTILITIES

Total number confirmed dead	2
Total number confirmed wounded (very seriously ill/seriously ill)	1
Total number of confirmed casualties	3

Total number currently missing	10
--------------------------------	----

Total strength in theatre at commencement of hostilities	35684
--	-------

Total number died of wounds	0
-----------------------------	---

TOTAL CASUALTIES BY SERVICE

RN/RM			Army			RAF			Civilians (inc RFA)		
	Men	Women		Men	Women		Men	Women		Men	Women
Dead	0	0	Dead	2	0	Dead	0	0	Dead	0	0
Wounded	0	0	Wounded	0	0	Wounded	1	0	Wounded	0	0
Total RN casualties	0	0	Total Army casualties	2	0	Total RAF casualties	1	0	Total civ casualties	0	0
Total RN missing	0	0	Total Army missing	0	0	Total RAF missing	10	0	Total civ missing	0	0

Total strength in theatre at commencement of hostilities

RN/RM			Army			RAF			Civilians (inc RFA)		
Total	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women
2510	2440	70	27651	27058	593	4799	4688	111	724	724	0

CASUALTIES CONFIRMED SINCE REPORT No. 13 (SINCE290400ZJAN91)

Number confirmed dead	0
Number confirmed wounded (very seriously ill/seriously ill)	0
Number of confirmed casualties, of all types	0

Number reported missing since last report	0
Number previously missing, now confirmed dead	0
Number previously missing, now confirmed wounded	0
Number previously missing, now confirmed safe and well	0

Number previously reported wounded, but now dead	0
--	---

CASUALTIES BY SERVICE

RN/RM			Army			RAF			Civilians (inc RFA)		
	Men	Women		Men	Women		Men	Women		Men	Women
Dead	0	0	Dead	0	0	Dead	0	0	Dead	0	0
Wounded	0	0	Wounded	0	0	Wounded	0	0	Wounded	0	0
RN casualties	0	0	Army casualties	0	0	RAF casualties	0	0	Civilian casualties	0	0
RN missing	0	0	Army missing	0	0	RAF missing	0	0	Civilians missing	0	0

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POINTS TO MAKE: 30 JANUARY

- Increased Iraqi ground activity overnight along Iraq/Kuwait border with Saudi Arabia. Not clear what is aim of these incursions.
- Possibly intended to draw coalition forces into premature land battle. Allies will begin land battle when appropriate and on own terms.
- Allied air campaign continues on track to destroy Iraqi capability to sustain war.
- RAF flown over 1,000 sorties, including attacks on fuel storage facilities. Total overall allied air sorties number over 32,000.
- Aim of multinational forces has not changed. Iraq must leave Kuwait so that legitimate government can be restored. Long term stability of region also always been fundamental aim, as stated in SCR 678.
- Very pleased that Iraqi oil spillage into Gulf now stopped, thanks to coalition action. Wholly irresponsible for Saddam Hussein to imply that such pollution of environment is justified. No military gain to Iraq.
- Totally condemn any action by Saddam Hussein to use

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
prisoners of war as human shield. Clear breach of Geneva Convention. Have formally reminded Iraq of responsibility towards prisoners of war.

- Ridiculous for Saddam Hussein to suggest that UK in breach of Geneva Convention. UK fully honouring Geneva Convention commitments; ICRC have confirmed they are satisfied with arrangements. Hope that Iraq will treat coalition prisoners of war in same way as UK treating Iraqi prisoners of war in UK.

- Some 100 aircraft now flown to Iran. Possible attempt by Saddam Hussein to implicate Iran. Welcome Iran firm assurance that aircraft will be impounded for duration of hostilities.

(Defensive use)

- [If asked about Saddam Hussein's statement that might use nuclear, chemical or biological warheads on SCUD missiles]. Nothing new in this threat. Have made clear would take very grave view of use of such weapons. Not prepared to speculate on what allied response might be.



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10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

30 January 1991

THE GULF: MESSAGE TO KING HASSAN

Thank you for your letter of 29 January proposing a message from the Prime Minister to King Hassan.

The Prime Minister has agreed to sign this and I enclose the letter. You will see that I have added the suggestion that the Prime Minister would be happy to receive General Kadiri. This is the mode in which the King has preferred to operate in the past.

I should be grateful if you could arrange for delivery of the message as soon as possible.

(C. D. POWELL)

Simon Gass, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

30 January 1991

See Simon,

IRAQ/KUWAIT: BURDEN-SHARING MESSAGE FROM
THE PRIME MINISTER TO KING FAHD

Thank you for your letter of 29 January covering a draft message from the Prime Minister to King Fahd requesting a substantial contribution to our Gulf costs.

The Prime Minister does not relish sending a message of this sort but is resigned to the necessity. I enclose a slightly amended version and should be grateful if it could be despatched as soon as possible.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to John Gieve (HM Treasury), Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

(C. D. POWELL)

Simon Gass, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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Handwritten mark

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PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No T35/90

DRAFT MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO KING FAHD

*subject cc master
ops.*

I was most grateful for your kind response to my letter of 9 January, which I have just received.

Since we met, Saddam Hussain's continuing refusal to withdraw from Kuwait has obliged us to open hostilities against Iraq. This task was never likely to be easy, but it has begun as successfully as we could have hoped. Our forces and yours, together with the others in the coalition, will press on until the task is completed in the knowledge that our cause is just. I take this opportunity to congratulate you on the performance of the Royal Saudi Air Force. We were all inspired by the accounts of the recent success of your young pilots.

There is strong support in the United Kingdom for the coalition. Saddam Hussain's use of missiles as a terror weapon against Saudi Arabia, his unacceptable treatment of prisoners of war and his wanton destruction of the environment simply strengthen our determination. We are proud to be in the front line of the battle for the defence of your country and the liberation of Kuwait.

The United Kingdom is providing the second largest Western force in the Gulf. The financial burden of this is increasing. The initial cost of deployment of our forces was substantial, and with the outbreak of hostilities expenditure is again rising rapidly. In the first week of fighting alone our losses of aircraft and consumption of ammunition and other supplies have been well over £100 million. The final costs to the UK are impossible to forecast at this stage, but we expect them to be at least £3 billion. That will involve us in considerable sacrifices.

Your help to us under the host Nation Agreement is very welcome indeed. But it would be a most generous gesture if Saudi Arabia was able to make in addition a financial contribution towards meeting our very large costs. I understand that you have agreed

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to make such a contribution in the case of the United States. A contribution to Britain's costs proportionate to the scale of military presence in the Gulf - some 8 per cent of the United States manpower - would be greatly appreciated and would underline the unity and resolve of our two countries in the great venture upon which we have embarked. I would ask you in friendship to give consideration to this.

I send you my warmest greetings.

JOHN MAJOR



10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

30 January 1991

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T34/91
Subject cc master
ops.

Your Majesty,

I know that my predecessor greatly valued the close links which she had established and enjoyed with Your Majesty. I thought it would be useful, after the first days of hostilities in the Gulf, if we were to exchange views on the present situation and on how it may develop.

First, I should like to convey to Your Majesty my country's deep appreciation of the role Morocco has played throughout the present crisis. You were among the first to condemn the invasion of Kuwait and you sent troops to Saudi Arabia and elsewhere in the Gulf to deter further aggression. You have been steadfast in upholding international law and in underlining the need for Iraq to comply with Security Council Resolutions by withdrawing from Kuwait.

Like Britain, Morocco sought a peaceful solution. Now that hostilities have been forced on us I am conscious of the difficulties encountered by a number of states, including Morocco, which have upheld the rule of international law but whose peoples are troubled by watching a fellow Arab State enduring the consequences of conflict. In the face of these difficulties, Your Majesty continues to show great firmness of purpose. The participation of troops from Morocco, and twelve other Islamic nations, is a vital contribution to the coalition now ranged against Saddam Hussein's army of occupation.

Your Majesty will know that operations by coalition forces have been directed solely at those installations which constitute or support Iraq's armed forces and which sustain the illegal occupation of Kuwait. These actions are taken in support of the aims set out in the Security Council Resolutions: to get Iraq out of Kuwait, to restore the legitimate government, to re-establish peace and security in the area, and to uphold the authority of the United Nations. We do not seek the destruction, occupation or dismemberment of Iraq and have no quarrel with its people. Our forces have been ordered to keep civilian casualties to a minimum and to try to avoid damage to all sites of religious and cultural significance.

After the war, new arrangements for security in the region must be set in place. A determined effort must be made to resolve the Palestine question. It will be time for new thinking. Britain will play a full part. It would be helpful to have Your Majesty's views, in the light of your immense experience of the region.

I should be very happy to receive General Kadiri as an emissary from Your Majesty as I know my predecessor did on more than one occasion.

*Your Sincerely
John Major*

His Majesty King Hassan II

CONFIDENTIAL



He Am
all

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

30 January 1991

Dear Jeremy,

VISIT TO THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

Thank you for your letter of 29 January about the Chief Secretary's visit to the United Arab Emirates as part of the Government's efforts to seek contributions to the military costs incurred by the UK as a result of the Gulf conflict. You record that the Chief Secretary sees advantage in combining the trip to the United Arab Emirates with similar visits to Qatar and Bahrain. I have discussed this with the Prime Minister this morning. He is clear that the decision of OPD(G) was to limit approaches for contributions to five main contributors at this stage: Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Germany and Japan. He does not, therefore, think it would be right for the Chief Secretary to go to Bahrain or Qatar (or indeed Muscat) to discuss burdensharing. But there would of course be no objection to a brief goodwill visit to Qatar and Bahrain.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries to members of OPD(G) and to Sir Robin Butler.

Yours sincerely,

C. D. POWELL

Jeremy Heywood, Esq.,
Chief Secretary's Office,
H.M. Treasury.

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COVERING SECRET

MR APPELYARD, CABINET OFFICE

OPD(G): Papers by the FCO

The Foreign Secretary has commissioned three papers for circulation to OPD(G) colleagues:

- Iraq/Kuwait: how to end the fighting
- Gulf crisis: policy towards Iraq after the conflict
- Middle East: winning the peace.

The Foreign Secretary approved the first two papers, subject to a number of amendments, last night. These amendments have now been incorporated into the texts. I attach clean copies. The Foreign Secretary would be grateful if they could be circulated to OPD(G) members by the Secretaries of the Committee. Officials are travelling to Washington towards the end of the week to talk to the Americans about the two subjects covered by the papers. The Foreign Secretary is asking officials to use the papers as the basis for their discussions, pointing out to United States' officials that the papers have not been cleared inter-ministerially in London.

The third paper will follow, probably after the weekend of 2/3 February.

I am copying this minute to the Private Secretaries of other members of OPD(G).

RICHARD GOZNEY

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

29 January 1991

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188(A-G) 20

Mr Charles Powell

Time Minister

You may like
to see these
two papers, which
will serve as a basis
for discussion

discussions
in Washington.

CAD

29/1

IRAQ/KUWAIT: HOW TO END THE FIGHTING

1. Allied objectives in launching military action under UNSCR 678 are to liberate Kuwait and to restore peace and security in the area. This could happen in several ways. But the main variables are:

- (a) whether Iraqi forces leave Kuwait with or without a ground engagement;
- (b) whether they leave with or without a ceasefire.

Iraqi withdrawal before any ground engagement

2. The picture is likely to be messy, but there are four broad possibilities:

- a) Orderly Iraqi withdrawal under surrender: if Saddam Hussain proposes a ceasefire, we could make this conditional on the surrender of all Iraqi forces in Kuwait. The advantages of this course are that it would be harder for Saddam Hussain to prevaricate and resume hostilities; it would force him to leave his equipment in Kuwait; and he would clearly appear to his own people as a defeated leader thus lessening the risk of an Iraqi resurgence based on a distorted account of Iraq's defeat (cf. Germany in 1918). The disadvantages of demanding surrender are that Saddam Hussain might well reject this demand; that the coalition might thus appear to world opinion to be spurning a chance to end hostilities on the basis of a ceasefire; and that in the event of surrender we (basically the Americans) would face immense practical problems in disarming, registering, feeding and giving medical treatment to over 200,000 Iraqi soldiers (as we would be obliged to do under the Geneva Conventions). Conceivably we could after surrender, disarm, and then send them home at once - though this could probably be done only in the case of the fit and healthy.

b) Orderly Iraqi withdrawal under ceasefire: The alternative to demanding a surrender would be to agree to a ceasefire in return for Iraq's acceptance of tough conditions. We would for example insist that Iraqi withdrawal be completed within two weeks, with intermediate conditions, such as the removal of all aircraft and helicopters within 24 hours, after which Kuwait's airspace would be reserved for the allies. We would not want to get into negotiation about a ceasefire: until we were convinced that the Iraqis were on the point of withdrawing (evidence might include, for example, orders broadcast to Iraqi forces in the theatre) hostilities would continue uninterrupted. If our conditions were not observed, we would be free to resume hostilities. Provided Saddam Hussain accepted our conditions and gave evidence of implementing them, it would not be politically feasible for us to continue the air attack.

c) Disorderly Iraqi withdrawal without ceasefire: Iraqi forces may collapse under the pressure of bombardment and flee either back towards Iraq or through our lines. This may well happen in places, but is unlikely to involve all Iraqi troops in Kuwait. The Republican Guard deployed in northern Kuwait may for example stand their ground and prevent others leaving. Since there would be no ceasefire we would continue action against resisting Iraqi forces, while accepting the surrender of the rest.

d) Orderly Iraqi withdrawal without ceasefire: Saddam Hussein may try to pull out of Kuwait but decline to discuss a ceasefire or accept our terms, leading to a state of no peace, no war. Until withdrawal from Kuwait was complete, we would continue to attack Iraqi forces by air throughout the theatre, following up on the ground as they withdrew. Some Iraqi forces in Kuwait have poor mobility and may be unable to withdraw. They may therefore surrender in small groups.

3. In cases (c) and (d) we would need to consider whether to engage the retreating Iraqis on the ground. There would be political obstacles to mounting flanking action on the ground inside

Iraqi territory when the Iraqis were already leaving Kuwait. The Kuwaitis and other allies would be unlikely to support this. Once Iraqi forces had left Kuwait further military action could be justified under SCR 678 only if we could show that this was necessary "to restore international peace or security". This would depend on whether Iraqi forces continued to pose an imminent threat to Kuwait or our forces in the theatre. We should assume that we would not cross the Iraq/Kuwait border or continue hostilities once Iraqi forces had left Kuwait unless allied forces were being attacked or immediately threatened by Iraqi forces from inside Iraq (in which case hostilities would continue). If, however, Iraqi forces simply remained on the Iraqi side of the frontier (but did not actually engage our forces), our response would be to maintain the full UN sanctions regime. We would do this by pointing to the damage done to Kuwait, the refusal of Iraq to cease hostilities and its clear threatening posture to get agreement. On the ground we could consider the combination of a reducing allied presence (but with some prepositioned equipment and rapid reinforcement capabilities etc), an increasing Arab defence screen, and a UN observer force, to build confidence in Kuwait. Iraq, with its economy shattered, should not be able to resist this pressure indefinitely.

4. We would also need to decide whether to try to establish a buffer zone between Iraq and Kuwait. There could be advantages in terms of security and early warning. But if we tried to do this without Iraqi agreement, the need to occupy Iraqi territory might divide the coalition and strengthen suspicions about our war objectives. On balance, it may be preferable simply to reinforce the Kuwaiti frontier and interpose UN observers.

Iraqi Withdrawal after Ground Engagement

5. It is more likely that ground action will commence before Iraqi forces withdraw. At any point before completion of the ground campaign, Iraqi forces may surrender. By the conclusion of the land phase some allied forces may well have entered southern Iraq, thus encircling Iraqi forces. If they have been cut off, the Iraqis will only be able to withdraw in a supervised process after surrender.

We would not agree to a ceasefire until:

- all Iraqi forces in Kuwait had surrendered;
- all Iraqi air and ground forces inside Iraq had ceased hostilities.

It is for consideration whether we should exploit this advantage in order to insist that all Iraq's remaining CBW, nuclear and missile facilities (and existing stocks/weapons) be destroyed. There might be more chance of achieving a dismantling of CBW facilities if Iraq had used such weapons in hostilities. We would not, however, be able to keep forces in southern Iraq for more than a limited period (say 2-3 months). We should also consider the possibility of agreeing, at a second stage, on the creation of a buffer zone by the withdrawal of all Iraqi forces to at least 20 km from the Kuwaiti and Saudi borders.

United Nations Involvement

6. Under both ceasefire scenarios (paragraph 2(b) and 5) the question will arise whether the Security Council should become involved. If our conditions are accepted by Iraq, we would have an interest in codifying them in a SC Resolution. If there is no agreement between us and Iraq, we will face very strong pressure from Yemen etc for an unsatisfactory ceasefire resolution. Our line should be that the details of a ceasefire are a matter for the military commanders on the spot. But it will be difficult for us to continue hostilities for long on the basis of vetoing other resolutions. Moreover, we would need the cooperation of the Security Council at that time in sustaining some sanctions after Iraqi withdrawal. We should therefore consider taking the initiative in the Security Council with a resolution containing our conditions for a ceasefire.

Ceasefire Procedure

7. A ceasefire would probably have to be agreed with Iraqi field commanders (perhaps by radio) either following consultation with

their authorities or on their own initiative. There could be problems of communications between Iraqi forces in Kuwait and Baghdad, and between Baghdad and Western capitals.

Dealing with the Iraqi regime

8. There are a number of other questions on which we will need to have taken decisions prior to any discussions with the Iraqis on a cease-fire. We shall, for example, need to be prepared to deal with whatever Iraqi regime is in power in Baghdad. We should try to avoid declaring in advance that the leaders are war criminals, and people with whom we are not prepared to have contact.

Prisoners of War

9. In the context of a cease-fire, we shall want to arrange through the ICRC for the most rapid possible exchange of POWs. This may mean that we will not be able to screen Iraqi POWs at any length to ascertain their personal responsibility for breaches of the Geneva Convention. (In any case, if we were to attempt to prosecute Iraqi POWs, there would be an obvious risk of Iraqi attempts to prosecute Allied POWs). To ensure that the POW exchange goes without difficulty, it would be advantageous to have in allied hands a very considerable number more Iraqi POWs than the Iraqi authorities have allied POWs.

Recovery of military equipment

10. The recovery of any allied equipment left in Kuwait will be a matter for discussion with the Kuwaiti authorities. Iraqi equipment left in Kuwait will be a matter principally for the Allies to decide on, or thereafter for the Kuwaiti authorities, or else for the Iraq-Kuwait negotiations envisaged in SCR 660.

Conclusions

11. The conclusions are:

- a) When Iraqi forces "surrender" or sue for ceasefire, we should

impose conditions which ensure a rapid Iraqi withdrawal and oblige Iraq to leave equipment behind.

- b) If substantial Iraqi forces are cut off in Kuwait and southern Iraq, and Iraq has used CBW weapons in the war, there may be an opportunity to insist on the dismantling of Iraq's remaining NBC and missile forces and facilities.
- c) We should not assume that Western forces inside Iraq will be able to remain there for more than a short period (say 2-3 months); nor that we will be able to push from Kuwait into Iraq unless Iraqi forces continue to attack from their own soil.
- d) Iraqi forces may well surrender or withdraw in penny packets as they become separated from their political or military authorities. Wherever possible, we should encourage surrender (and the handover of equipment) rather than a ceasefire or orderly withdrawal. But in that case, the burden of handling Prisoners of War (POWs) will be heavy.
- e) We should recognise that a rapid exchange of POWs may mean that we are not able to screen Iraqi POWs to ascertain personal responsibility for breaches of the Geneva Convention.
- f) We should try to avoid declaring in advance that the leaders of Iraq are people with whom we are not prepared to deal.

GULF CRISIS: POLICY TOWARDS IRAQ AFTER THE CONFLICT

1. This paper considers our policy towards Iraq following a military victory over Iraqi forces in Kuwait. It assumes that Iraqi nuclear and chemical facilities, together with its offensive missile capability, are badly damaged and that Iraq has lost some 50% of its conventional arms. Iraqi troops are assumed to have withdrawn from Kuwait leaving their equipment behind or to have surrendered. (The assumption on Iraqi conventional losses may however be optimistic.)
2. The most significant variable is whether or not Saddam Hussein remains in power. If he does, animosity will pervade the region. Saddam, who may still be a popular hero, will resist the imposition of terms and remain a threat to the Gulf states. We will want to drive a hard bargain so as to weaken him further and increase the chance of his removal.
3. If he is replaced at the end of the war much will depend on the nature of the new regime. If it is emollient, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia will seek to mend fences, and will not want to impose terms which begin a new spiral of hostility.

British Interests

4. We have two vital long-term interests in the Gulf:
 - secure, diverse and reliable supplies of Gulf oil for world markets; and
 - to prevent further proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. These in time could represent a direct threat to Europe as well as being a destabilising factor in the Middle East.

Policy Objectives

5. The first of these vital interests implies that our principal policy objective must be to preserve, strengthen and protect the pro-Western status quo in the Arabian Peninsula. To achieve this we shall need to:

- a) improve the defence of the GCC states;
- b) prevent Iraq rebuilding her conventional military power to the point where she again threatens regional stability;
- c) seek an approximate balance of military force among the powerful states of the region - Iraq, Iran and probably Syria;
- d) uphold existing borders: the political collapse and dismemberment of Iraq would generate enormous instability. Undermining existing borders would also raise a threat to the independence of the Gulf states.

6. The second interest requires policies to prevent the escalation of missile, BW, CW and above all military nuclear programmes throughout the Middle East region. As a result of the war we have an opportunity to deal with Iraq but many countries in the region are likely to step up their efforts to acquire these weapons after the war.

7. Both of these interests will be addressed in more detail in a later paper. Our policy towards Iraq is one element.

Containing Iraq while Keeping a Balance

8. Even if seriously weakened and under new management Iraq will continue to be a potential threat to our interests. It will remain the only northern Arab State with the population and resources to become a dominant military force; it is likely to continue to pursue regional pre-eminence. Iran, on the other hand, is potentially even

more powerful, with a population of over 40 million and substantial oil revenues. Syria, without comparable oil resources, deprived of access to cheap Soviet weaponry, and heavily dependent on Saudi money, is less of a threat to the status quo in the Peninsula.

9. If Iraq lost 50% of her conventional weapons in this war she would still have some 2500 tanks and 350 military aircraft. The comparative figures are 500 tanks and 185 aircraft for Iran, and 1000 tanks and 390 aircraft for the GCC. Further growth of Iraq's military power must be controlled, either by agreement or by containment.

10. Agreement would entail Iraq's acceptance of a regime of intrusive verification. It would be very difficult for any Iraqi government to do that unless Israel and Iran did so too - inconceivable in present circumstances. It is just possible that with a new government Iraq might accept unilateral arrangements in the moment of defeat; but these would not last.

11. Containment is a more plausible approach:

a) The best method of placing restraint on Iraqi conventional military capability will be to maintain a complete embargo on arms, defence equipment, and related technology. A UN embargo would impose substantial costs and delays on an Iraqi attempt to re-arm. The measure would be justified by the use Iraq has already made of its arsenal. But there will be resistance at the United Nations to continuing an embargo indefinitely, especially if Iraq has a new government. For the medium/long term we will probably have to rely on cooperation among the key suppliers, including the Soviet Union, China, Germany and France.

b) We shall certainly want to maintain the tightest possible controls on supply of nuclear, biological and chemical materials to Iraq. There should be widespread support for this. If there is the slightest opportunity to do so, we should bid for a

special regime to monitor Iraq's nuclear facilities with comparable verification arrangements for biological and chemical weapons. This might arise if there is a new government keen to regain respectability. If it subsequently reneged the world would have a clear signal. But we should not count on achieving such arrangements. Our main hope should therefore rest on tightening existing supplier regimes.

12. Embargos of this sort on Iraq should if possible be matched by measures to moderate conventional arms supplies to others in order to preserve regional balance. The difficulties are self-evident, especially when we will be trying to build up the armed forces of the GCC countries.

Iraq/Kuwait, the UN and Sanctions

13. After the fighting ends there will be three remaining requirements from UN resolutions:

- a negotiation between Iraq and Kuwait on outstanding disputes;
- payment of compensation to Kuwait and to third parties, including British companies and individuals;
- holding responsible individual Iraqis who have committed grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions.

14. Our first objective here is to secure an Iraq/Kuwait settlement which lasts. It needs to be perceived as fair on both sides but to provide adequate compensation for Kuwait and in no way reward Iraqi aggression. There can be no question of Kuwait making territorial concessions, but we should not rule out an agreement on Iraqi access to the Gulf or on oil extraction from the shared Rumaila field.

15. It will not be simple to agree and ensure payment of adequate compensation for Kuwait. If Saddam is in power we should drive a hard bargain, keeping full sanctions on until he agrees. But the

Kuwaitis may be inclined to go more softly on a new Iraqi regime. We should aim to have third party compensation included in the talks, but may also have to resort to bilateral legal action for this (see para 19).

16. Despite media attention to the fate of Saddam Hussein, holding individual Iraqi officers responsible is the least important of these three objectives. We shall have to decide at the time what to do about Saddam in the unlikely event that he become available for trial. Trial in the Kuwaiti courts of individual Iraqi officers and soldiers who have committed grave breaches may be possible if they have fallen into allied hands and evidence is available. However the Kuwaitis are unlikely to pursue this, and we shall seek a rapid exchange of POWs in order to recover our own men. Action against Iraqis is likely to endanger them. In the end, we may have to abandon this aspect of the Security Council resolutions.

Conduct of Negotiations

17. We need to consider (a) the most appropriate format for the negotiations between Iraq and Kuwait, and (b) what leverage we can exert over an Iraq which may be embittered and hostile.

18. Format: Some form of international involvement will be required. Kuwait needs support in order to ensure that the fruits of Allied success are not given away. Some of the issues involve states other than Kuwait. It would be reasonable for the Kuwaitis' main allies (the Americans, the Saudis and ourselves, possibly the Egyptians and the French) to participate as members of a team led by Kuwait, completing the fulfilment of UN resolutions. Any agreement between Iraq and Kuwait should be subject to the approval of the Security Council, which controls the lifting of sanctions.

19. Leverage: International leverage over Iraq will rest in control over the lifting of sanctions. Once Iraq has withdrawn, there will be pressure to relax them. It will be essential to retain control over this process, but undesirable to have to veto. We should

therefore immediately table a draft resolution relaxing the present sanctions regime but:

- retaining an open-ended embargo on arms and NBC related material;
- maintaining the oil embargo until the Security Council has approved the outcome of negotiations between Iraq and Kuwait.

The oil embargo is both the most effective economic sanction against Iraq and the most easily enforceable given a continuing naval blockade and Saudi and Turkish cooperation.

20. It also makes sense to retain a full oil embargo if we are to use Iraqi oil as the means to obtain compensation. We should investigate the possibility of establishing in the Iraq/Kuwait settlement a Trust Fund into which a tax would be paid on Iraq's oil exports once the oil embargo was lifted. Designation of a proportion of this revenue for third countries (including Britain) might increase international support for the idea. But there may be legal difficulties in establishing and administering such a fund.

Conclusions

21. The principle elements of our immediate post-war strategy in the Gulf should be:

- a) a settlement negotiated between Iraq and a team of allies led by Kuwait, with the results endorsed by the Security Council;
- b) the maintenance of the oil embargo to give leverage during negotiations on that settlement;
- c) the indefinite maintenance of an embargo on arms and NBC-related material for Iraq backed by a stronger supplier constraint regime;

- d) enhanced defensive arrangements for the GCC states.


Recommendations

22. a) We should discuss the approach in this paper, first with the United States and then with others who will be directly involved, notably the Saudis, Kuwaitis and Turks.

b) More detailed work should be set in hand on:

- The nature of tighter supplier constraints on arms and NBC items.
- The immediate military arrangements to follow withdrawal, including UN involvement.
- Gulf security arrangements.
- A new draft resolution building down from the present sanctions regime following Iraqi withdrawal.
- Means of securing compensation out of Iraqi current revenues, including the possibility of a trust fund and the taxation or hypothecation of Iraqi oil revenue.

Policy Planning Staff
January 1991



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OUR TELNO 274: IRAQ/KUWAIT: WASHINGTON SITREP

SUMMARY

1. PRESIDENT'S POPULARITY AT RECORD HIGH ON EVE OF STATE OF UNION ADDRESS. IRAQI AIRCRAFT IN IRAN AND BAGHDAD'S TREATMENT OF PWS REMAIN CONCERNS.

DETAIL

2. THE PRESIDENT'S STATE OF THE UNION ADDRESS (TO BE DELIVERED IN CONGRESS LATER TONIGHT) HAS BEEN THE MAIN FOCUS OF WHITE HOUSE ENERGIES ON 29 JANUARY. THE WHITE HOUSE SPOKESMAN SAID THAT THE SPEECH WOULD REVIEW THE STATUS OF THE GULF CONFLICT, AS WELL AS THE PRINCIPLES AND OBJECTIVES THAT HAVE GUIDED US POLICY. THE PRESIDENT GOES INTO THE SPEECH WITH HIS POPULARITY AT THE HIGHEST POINT OF HIS PRESIDENCY. DESPITE MAJOR PUBLIC RESERVATIONS ABOUT HIS HANDLING OF THE ECONOMY AND DOMESTIC ISSUES (ONLY 45 PER CENT APPROVED OF HIS PERFORMANCE IN THIS AREA), HIS CONDUCT OF THE WAR HAS GENERATED BROAD AND SUSTAINED SUPPORT ACROSS VIRTUALLY ALL DEMOGRAPHIC AND POLITICAL GROUPS (79 PER CENT, UP FROM 63 PER CENT IN DECEMBER 1990).

3. THE FLIGHT OF IRAQI PLANES TO IRAN REMAINS A MAJOR ISSUE OF PRESS INTEREST, RAISING QUESTIONS OF BOTH ALLIED ABILITY TO PREVENT THEIR RETURN AND ABOUT IRAN'S INTENTIONS AND AVOWED NEUTRALITY. WHILE THE PENTAGON HAVE ASSERTED THEIR ABILITY TO DESTROY ANY RETURNING AIRCRAFT, SOME WONDER WHY THE AIRCRAFT WERE NOT DESTROYED ON THEIR WAY OUT. THE PRESS HAVE ALSO REPORTED CONCERN AMONG PENTAGON OFFICIALS THAT IRAQ HAS SUCCEEDED IN PREVENTING THE DESTRUCTION OF IMPORTANT ELEMENTS OF ITS AIRFORCE, WHICH HAD IMPLICATIONS BOTH FOR THE COURSE OF THE WAR AND FOR POST-WAR REGIONAL STABILITY. THE

STATE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN SAID ON 29 JANUARY THAT THE US HAD RECEIVED ADDITIONAL ASSURANCES WITHIN THE LAST 24 HOURS THAT IRAN WOULD DETAIN ALL IRAQI MILITARY AND CIVILIAN AIRCRAFT UNTIL THE END OF HOSTILITIES.

4. IN THE WAKE OF THE FURTHER SCUD ATTACK ON TEL AVIV ON 28 JANUARY, THE PRESS SPECULATE WIDELY ABOUT ISRAEL'S ABILITY TO REMAIN PASSIVE UNDER THE CUMULATIVE STRAIN OF ALMOST NIGHTLY MISSILE ATTACKS. SEVERAL PAPERS, WHILE QUOTING SHAMIR'S DECLARATION THAT ISRAEL WOULD NOT LAUNCH MILITARY ACTION WITHOUT US CONSENT AND COORDINATION, REPORT THAT THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT ARE PRESSING WASHINGTON TO ALLOW ISRAELI FORCES TO CARRY OUT AN UNSPECIFIED BUT ALREADY PLANNED OPERATION AGAINST IRAQ TO STOP, OR DETER, FUTURE SCUD ATTACKS. AN ISRAELI MILITARY OFFICIAL IS QUOTED AS QUESTIONING WHETHER US TACTICS AGAINST MOBILE LAUNCHERS - TRYING TO USE PRECISION BOMBS FROM ALTITUDE - WERE MISPLACED. HE SUGGESTED THAT BRITISH ATTACKS AT LOWER ALTITUDES SEEMED TO HAVE HAD MORE SUCCESS AGAINST THE LAUNCHERS. THE ISRAELIS ARE WIDELY THOUGHT TO HAVE PLANS FOR A COMMANDO STYLE ATTACK.

5. THE PENTAGON HAS CHANGED THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE 7 US PILOTS CAPTURED BY THE IRAQIS FROM QUOTE MISSING IN ACTION UNQUOTE TO QUOTE PRISONER OF WAR UNQUOTE, ALTHOUGH THE US HAVE NOT BEEN OFFICIALLY INFORMED OF THEIR DETENTION BY IRAQ AS CALLED FOR UNDER THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS. STATE'S SPOKESMAN SAID THAT THEY HAD SUMMONED THE IRAQI CHARGE ON 29 JANUARY TO REINFORCE THEIR CONCERNS ABOUT IRAQI TREATMENT OF PWS. STATE ALSO REMINDED IRAQ OF THEIR OBLIGATIONS CONCERNING ANY AMERICAN REMAINS AND INFORMED THEM AGAIN THAT THE RED CROSS SHOULD HAVE ACCESS TO PWS.

6. FOLLOWING HIS MEETING WITH SECRETARY BAKER ON 28 JANUARY, LUXEMBOURG FOREIGN SECRETARY POOS SAID THAT HE HAD REMINDED BAKER OF THE SOLIDARITY BETWEEN ALL MEMBERS OF THE ANTI-IRAQ COALITION. THE EC HAD PROVIDED DOLLARS 2 BILLION IN AID TO THE FRONT LINE STATES AND 75 PER CENT OF OPERATIONS IN THE GULF TO ENFORCE THE UN EMBARGO WERE BEING UNDERTAKEN BY EUROPEAN NAVAL VESSELS. THE EC WOULD ALSO CONTINUE TO DISCUSS WITH THE US THE POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND SECURITY ASPECTS OF THE GULF AFTER THE CRISIS. NEVERTHELESS, PRESS CRITICISM OF EC INEFFECTUALITY CONTINUES, WITH GERMANY IN PARTICULAR SINGLED OUT AS QUOTE SHOWING TIMIDITY IN A TIME OF CRISIS UNQUOTE. THE LATEST GERMAN GOVERNMENT CONTRIBUTION OF DOLLARS

5.5 BILLION FOR THE FIRST 3 MONTHS OF 1991 MAY HELP TO COUNTER THIS CRITICISM, BUT GERMANY'S IMAGE HERE HAS NONETHELESS SUFFERED CONSIDERABLY.

ACLAND

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MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

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Telephone 071-21 82111/3

MO 6/17/15/1D

29 January 1991

Dear Simon

CALL TO GERMAN DEFENCE MINISTER

My Secretary of State spoke this afternoon by telephone with Dr Stoltenberg, the German Minister of Defence. The call was at our initiative, to take the opportunity to re-establish contact following Dr Stoltenberg's confirmation in post, and do some lobbying on burdensharing.

Dr Stoltenberg began by telling Secretary of State of the decision to deploy Roland and Hawk together with some 600 soldiers to the airbases in South Eastern Turkey where the German and Belgian elements of the AMF(Air) is based. Speaking privately he said that the attacks on Israel had changed attitudes in Germany considerably, and that "even the Social Democrats" were now ready for steps to be taken to help to protect Israel. In answer to a question from my Secretary of State about Patriot, Dr Stoltenberg said that the problem was that their six Patriot batteries did not have such advanced software as the US version; moreover the associated equipments such as radar and communications were German and were not therefore compatible with the US equipment deployed in Israel. Whereas the US had deployed their own troops with the Patriot batteries it was not likely to be politically acceptable to the Israelis for German troops to deploy to Israeli soil, for very understandable reasons. He commented that working relationships between his ministry and the Israeli equivalent were very good and had been so for a number of years. He believed that they would find ways of providing significant assistance for Israel eg deployment of radar, perhaps Hawk, and biological and chemical protection assistance.

My Secretary of State referred to the assistance we have already received from the Germans with supply of ammunition, spares, Fuchs and Hummel vehicles. Dr Stoltenberg referred to the announcement today of an additional \$5.5 billion assistance for the US. He added that when the Foreign Secretary visited he expected there would "be a discussion". My Secretary of State took the

Simon Gass Esq
Private Secretary to the Foreign Secretary

SECRET

SECRET



opportunity to encourage Dr Stoltenberg to persuade his colleagues to consider favourably our request for help, quoting 8% of the US figure. Dr Stoltenberg commented that we would find that the Federal Chancellor was prepared to have a discussion about a general contribution.

Dr Stoltenberg then asked Secretary of State for his assessment of the situation. In reply he referred to the Allies now having achieved virtual air supremacy, continuing raids against hardened air shelters, artillery dumps etc. He felt that the air campaign would need to continue for some while yet. The Allies believed that they had damaged significantly Saddam's biological and chemical stores, but believed that much of his capability in this respect had already been distributed. There was concern that "something new" would now be tried, since the Scuds had not achieved a great deal, and the oil slick was hopefully going to be contained. We did not believe that he had the capability to produce a nuclear bomb, but might well produce a conventional bomb including radioactive material within it.


Concluding Dr Stoltenberg said that he believed the German Government position was now a strong one with the Chancellor due to make a strong speech in the Bundestag tomorrow. Public opinion was developing well, with the last three opinion polls showing increasing support for the Allies' decision to go to war - the last poll he said had showed support of upwards of 70%.

I am copying this letter to Charles Powell (No 10), Tancred Tarkowski and Jeremy Hayward (Treasury) and John Neilson (Energy), and to Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely,

(MISS J R BINSTED)
Private Secretary

SECRET





10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

Prime Minister

Some mis-understanding,
I didn't obey for
with EST; he
acted + I obviously wasn't
retaining a good turnover of

Gully

The Chief Secretary's office rang this
evening. The Chief Secretary says that
you told him this evening that he
could go to Qatar & Bahrain as
well as UAE to seek contributions
to the cost of our forces. But on
checking with the Cabinet Office, they
were told that the conclusions of
OPD (E) this morning were ~~be~~ limited
approaches to five countries. Please



10 DOWNING STREET

included UAE ~~but~~ not Qatar &

Bahrain.

The Cabinet Office are of course
right: that was the conclusion of ODD(G) &
has been minuted. We would be
no hindrance to Mr. Rafter visiting
Qatar & Bahrain, but not to other
contributions.

Should we:

- stick to the conclusions of
ODD(G), as described above; or
- re-open the issue at Thursday's
ODD(G)?

COP
29/1



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

29 January 1991


29

Dear Dominic,

The Gulf : Letter from Paddy Ashdown MP

Thank you for your letter of 22 January enclosing a copy of a letter, dated 16 January, from the Rt Hon Paddy Ashdown MP to the Prime Minister.

/ I enclose a draft reply for the Prime Minister's signature.

Yours ever,

(S L Gass)
Private Secretary

Dominic Morris Esq
10 Downing Street



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

CONFIDENTIAL

29 January 1991

Dear Charles,

Prime Minister
Agree another
letter?
begging
CD

Iraq/Kuwait : Burdensharing : Proposed Message
from the Prime Minister to King Fahd

Ministers agreed at OPD(G) on 29 January that the Prime Minister should send a message to King Fahd of Saudi Arabia requesting a substantial contribution to our Gulf costs. I enclose the draft of such a message.

Yours ever
[Signature]

(S L Gass)
Private Secretary

29/1

Yes, But

it's not
phased
process?

Sir Charles Powell KCMG
10 Downing Street

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Treasury Chambers, Parliament Street, SWIP 3AG

Sir Charles Powell
Private Secretary
10 Downing Street
London
SW1

29 January 1991

Dear Charles

VISIT TO THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

I understand that the Chief Secretary was asked at today's meeting of OPD(G) to visit the United Arab Emirates (UAE) as part of the Government's effort to seek contributions to the military costs incurred by the UK as a result of the Gulf conflict.

2. The Chief Secretary sees advantage in combining a trip to the UAE with similar visits to Qatar and Bahrain.

3. The Chief Secretary recognises that OPD(G) decided that Qatar and Bahrain should not be approached at this stage. However, given the logistical difficulties in making a trip to the region, and the proximity of these countries to the UAE, the Chief Secretary believes that, subject to the Prime Minister's views (and any comments other members of OPD(G) might have), it would make sense for him to take this opportunity to discuss burdensharing and host-nation support (as appropriate) with the Governments of Bahrain and Qatar.

4. I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries to members of OPD(G) and to Sir Robin Butler.

Yours sincerely

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'Jeremy Heywood', written over a horizontal line.

JEREMY HEYWOOD
Private Secretary



Handwritten text, possibly a date or reference number, located below the embossed seal.



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MDADAN 6049

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TO DESKBY 291500Z FCO

TELNO 118

OF 290922Z JANUARY 91

INFO IMMEDIATE CAIRO, TEL AVIV, RIYADH, DAMASCUS, JERUSLAM

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, ACTOR,

INFO IMMEDIATE ISLAMABAD, ANKARA, TEHRAN

MIPT (NOT TO ALL)

AUDIENCE WITH KING HUSSEIN: CONTACTS OVER CEASE-FIRE

SUMMARY

1. KING DESCRIBES RECENT CONTACTS OVER PROPOSED CEASE-FIRE. RESIGNED TO FAILURE OF THIS INITIATIVE. REVEALS RECENT VISIT TO BAGHDAD BY HIS PRIME MINISTER.

DETAIL

2. I ASKED THE KING ABOUT THE OUTCOME OF HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH VARIOUS VISITORS, INCLUDING ORTEGA AND THE PRIME MINISTER OF PAKISTAN.

3. THE KING SAID THAT ORTEGA WAS ONE OF A GROUP OF NON-ALIGNED AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL REPRESENTATIVES WITH WHOM HE HAD HAD LONG DISCUSSIONS ABOUT WAYS OF PROMOTING A PEACE SETTLEMENT, BUT THESE HAD TAKEN PLACE PRIOR TO THE OUTBREAK OF WAR. ORTEGA AND RAJIV GHANDI HAD PUT TOGETHER A PEACE PACKAGE WHICH, HE CLAIMED, THEY HAD CLEARED WITH SADDAM AND HAD BEEN INTENDING TO PUT FORWARD WITH HIS TACIT APPROVAL. HOWEVER, THIS EXERCISE HAD BEEN OVERTAKEN BY EVENTS.

4. AS TO THE VISIT OF NAWAF SHARIF, HE WAS DISMISSIVE OF HIS EFFORTS (AS THE CROWN PRINCE HAD BEEN: MY TELNO 111). HIS MAIN IDEA SEEMED TO BE THE CONVENING OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE ORGANISATION WHICH, IN THE KING'S JUDGEMENT, WAS A NON-STARTER. IT HAD FAILED TO ACHIEVE ANYTHING DURING THE IRAQ/IRAN WAR AND THERE WAS NO REASON TO SUPPOSE THAT IT WOULD DO ANY BETTER NOW. THE WHOLE EXERCISE SEEMED TO BE MERE WINDOW DRESSING.

5. THE KING SAID THAT HE HAD RELUCTANTLY CONCLUDED THAT NOW

WAS NOT THE RIGHT MOMENT TO PRESS FOR A CEASE-FIRE. HE KNEW VERY WELL WHAT THE REACTION OF AT LEAST 3 OF THE 5 PERMANENT MEMBERS WOULD BE TO SUCH A PROPOSAL. I CONFIRMED THAT, IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY INDICATION THAT SADDAM INTENDED TO WITHDRAW FROM KUWAIT, WE WOULD CERTAINLY OPPOSE A CEASE-FIRE.

6. I ASKED WHETHER THE KING HAD HAD ANY RECENT CONTACTS WITH THE IRAQIS. HE TOLD ME IN CONFIDENCE THAT THE PRIME MINISTER HAD VISITED BAGHDAD RECENTLY (I THINK IT MUST HAVE BEEN ABOUT A WEEK AGO, THOUGH THE VISIT HAS NOT BEEN MENTIONED HERE IN THE MEDIA). THE JOURNEY BY ROAD HAD BEEN HAZARDOUS. BADRAN HAD NOT SEEN SADDAM HIMSELF BUT HAD TALKED TO TAREQ AZIZ AMONGST OTHERS. THE IRAQIS HAD SAID THAT THEY WOULD NOT HAVE USED SCUDS AGAINST ISRAEL IF THE AMERICANS HAD NOT CLAIMED THAT IRAQ'S OFFENSIVE CAPABILITY AGAINST ISRAEL HAD ALREADY BEEN WIPED OUT (COMMENT: THE KING PASSED ON THIS COMMENT WITH EVERY APPEARANCE OF BELIEVING IT).

7. BADRAN HAD ALSO BEEN TOLD THAT IRAQ WOULD NOT USE CW AGAINST ISRAEL UNLESS ISRAEL ITSELF WERE TO DO SO: NOR WOULD IRAQ USE CW AGAINST THE COALITION FORCES UNLESS THERE WAS SOME SIGNIFICANT CHANGE QUOTE IN THE ARAB NATIONAL SITUATION UNQUOTE. THE KING WAS UNABLE TO EXPLAIN WHAT THIS PHRASE MEANT: I SUPPOSE IT MAY MEAN UNLESS IRAQ WERE FACING DEFEAT OR PERHAPS UNLESS THE ARAB ELEMENT IN THE COALITION DEFECTED FOLLOWING THE INVOLVEMENT OF ISRAEL IN HOSTILITIES.

8. BADRAN HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED BY THE KING TO URGE THE IRAQIS NOT TO ESCALATE THE CONFLICT. BADRAN HAD REPORTED THAT ORDINARY IRAQIS QUOTE WERE NOT BEING LOOKED AFTER UNQUOTE IN THE SENSE THAT THEY WERE NOW LACKING MOST OF THE ESSENTIAL SERVICES. THE KING ADDED THAT HE WOULD BE PREPARED TO GO TO BAGHDAD HIMSELF AT SOME STAGE IF THAT WOULD HELP TO END THE WAR. I SAID MERELY THAT THE TIME OF SUCH A VISIT WOULD PRESUMABLY REQUIRE VERY CAREFUL THOUGHT.

9. I ENQUIRED FINALLY ABOUT CONTACTS WITH IRAN. THE JORDANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER HAS JUST RETURNED FROM A VISIT TO TEHRAN. THE KING SAID THAT THIS HAD BEEN USEFUL IN LAYING THE FOUNDATIONS FOR A REVIVED BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP WHICH HAD BEEN DORMANT FOR A DECADE. DURING THE DISCUSSION BOTH COUNTRIES HAD EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT TURKEY'S INTENTIONS AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE REGION IF TURKEY WERE TO ATTACK IRAQ. ALTHOUGH THE KING DID NOT MENTION IT, TODAY'S NEWSPAPERS REPORT THAT JORDAN HAS

BACKED AN IRANIAN 5-POINT PLAN, WHICH APPARENTLY CALLS FOR A SIMULTANEOUS WITHDRAWAL OF IRAQI AND ALLIED FORCES AND DEPLOYMENT OF AN ISLAMIC PEACE-KEEPING FORCE (AS WELL AS A CESSATION OF JEWISH IMMIGRATION TO ISRAEL).

COMMENT

10. THE KING WAS CLEARLY RESIGNED TO THE FACT THAT NONE OF THESE CONTACTS WAS LIKELY TO LEAD TO ANY BREAKTHROUGH. THE FACT THAT BADRAN'S VISIT TO IRAQ WAS NOT PUBLICLY DISCLOSED MUST IN PART BE EXPLAINED BY JORDAN'S DESIRE NOT TO AROUSE EXPECTATIONS ON THIS SCORE. NO DOUBT OTHER IMPORTANT POINTS AFFECTING JORDAN'S RELATIONS WITH IRAQ WERE ALSO COVERED DURING THIS VISIT. I CANNOT IMAGINE THAT BADRAN WOULD HAVE BRAVED THE HAZARDS OF THE ROAD JOURNEY TO BAGHDAD UNLESS THERE HAD BEEN MORE TO DISCUSS THAN THE POINTS RETAILED TO ME BY THE KING.

11. SEE MIFT.

REEVE

YYYY

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MR SLATER

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MR GOULDEN

MR JAY

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MR WICKS HMT

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TELNO 097

OF 291443Z JANUARY 91

INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK, CABINET OFFICE, TEL AVIV, ANKARA, WASHINGTON
INFO PRIORITY UKDEL NATO, ACTOR

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MY TELNO 96 (NOT TO ALL): BURDEN SHARING IN THE GULF AND GERMAN
MILITARY AID TO ISRAEL AND TURKEY

SUMMARY

1. GERMANY ANNOUNCES ADDITIONAL FINANCIAL HELP TO THE US,
PROVISION OF DEFENCE EQUIPMENT TO ISRAEL, AND IMMEDIATE DEPLOYMENT
OF BUNDESWEHR ROLAND UNITS TO TURKEY.

DETAIL

2. SINCE THE CONVERSATION WITH HARTMANN REPORTED IN TUR, THE
FEDERAL PRESS SPOKESMAN HAS ANNOUNCED OTHER DECISIONS REACHED THIS
MORNING BY THE CABINET. MAIN POINTS AS FOLLOWS:

(A) AS A MARK OF SOLIDARITY WITH THE US, IN THE FIRST THREE MONTHS
OF 1991 GERMANY WILL PAY DOLLARS 5.5 BILLION (ABOUT DM8.25
BILLION) TOWARDS US COSTS IN THE WAR.

(B) IN ACCORDANCE WITH ISRAELI WISHES, GERMANY WILL SUPPLY
EQUIPMENT FOR THE DEFENCE OF THE TERRITORY AND POPULATION OF
ISRAEL. THERE WILL BE FURTHER BILATERAL DISCUSSION ON THE
DETAILS.

(C) BUNDESWEHR UNITS WITH ROLAND AIR DEFENCE MISSILE SYSTEMS WILL
BE DEPLOYED AT ONCE TO TURKEY, TO PROTECT GERMANY'S NATO PARTNER
BUT ALSO ESPECIALLY THE GERMAN, BELGIAN AND ITALIAN AIR FORCE
UNITS AT ERHAC AND DIYARBAKIR. (ACCORDING TO RADIO REPORTS, THIS
DEPLOYMENT WILL INCLUDE 580 BUNDESWEHR PERSONNEL).

COMMENT

3. THESE RAPID DECISIONS - INCLUDING THE IMMEDIATE ANNOUNCEMENT
ON AIR DEFENCE SYSTEMS FOR TURKEY BEFORE ANY IRAQI ATTACK - SHOW
HOW KEEN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IS TO GET GERMANY OUT OF THE
INTERNATIONAL DOGHOUSE.

4. THE SUM ANNOUNCED FOR THE US FALLS JUST SHORT OF THE DOLLARS
6 BILLION WHICH THE AMERICANS ASKED FOR (MY TELNO 89). THE

FEDERAL SPOKESMAN DID NOT REFER TO ASSISTANCE TO THE UK. IT SEEMS THAT KOHL MAY BE HOLDING THIS BACK FOR DISCUSSION WITH YOU TOMORROW.

5. FMOD HAVE CLARIFIED THAT GERMANY STANDS READY TO SUPPLY TO ISRAEL PATRIOT SYSTEMS TO BE OPERATED BY ISRAELIS AND HAWK MISSILES FOR EXISTING ISRAELI SYSTEMS. THE SUPPLIES TO ISRAEL WILL ALSO INCLUDE FUCHS CW DETECTION VEHICLES AND EQUIPMENT FOR PROTECTION AGAINST CHEMICAL ATTACK. TO AVOID INTERFERENCE WITH SUPPLIES TO THE UK, FMOD ENVISAGE MOVING TO ISRAEL FUCHS VEHICLES DEPLOYED IN OPERATIONAL UNITS OF THE BUNDESWEHR.

MALLABY

YYYY

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FOLLOWING FOR FAIRWEATHER ✓

OUR TELNO 262 : BURDENSARING

1. DURING THE COURSE OF OTHER BUSINESS ON 28 JANUARY, WE RAISED BURDENSARING WITH BURNS (DEPUTY DIRECTOR, POLICY PLANNING STAFF, STATE). AS YOU KNOW, THE POLICY PLANNERS ARE CLOSE TO BAKER. BURNS TOLD US THAT HE HAD DONE A CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT OF WORK ON THIS ISSUE FOR BAKER.

2. WE TOLD BURNS THAT THERE WAS SOME CONCERN IN LONDON THAT - WITH THE LATEST SERIES OF PLEDGES TO THE US BY THE KUWAITIS, JAPANESE, SAUDIS AND GERMANS - THE AMOUNT LEFT FOR THE UK MIGHT NOT BE ENOUGH. BURNS FULLY UNDERSTOOD OUR CONCERNS. HE VOLUNTEERED THAT THIS WAS SOMETHING THAT THE SECRETARY OF STATE SHOULD RAISE WITH BAKER ONCE WE WERE CLEARER ABOUT WHAT THE DONORS WOULD IN FACT BE PREPARED TO MAKE AVAILABLE TO US. HE SAID THAT THE KUWAITIS IN PARTICULAR HAD DEEP POCKETS AND WE SHOULD NOT HESITATE ABOUT PRESSING THEM HARD. HE ALSO THOUGHT WE SHOULD BE READY TO PRESS OUR EUROPEAN PARTNERS, ALTHOUGH OBVIOUSLY THE FRENCH WERE IN A SEPARATE CATEGORY. BUT IN THE EVENT THAT WE FOUND OURSELVES SHORT, BURNS SAID THAT HE THOUGHT BAKER WOULD WANT TO DO WHAT HE COULD TO HELP. HE SAID THAT BAKER HAD DEVELOPED CONSIDERABLE RESPECT AND ADMIRATION FOR THE BRITISH MILITARY CONTRIBUTION IN THE GULF. HE WOULD UNDERSTAND THAT SUCH A CONTRIBUTION DID NOT COME ON THE CHEAP, AND WOULD NOT WANT US TO BE LEFT OUT OF POCKET. BURNS ADDED THAT THERE WAS NO POINT IN RAISING THIS ISSUE AT A LOWER LEVEL: TO DO SO WOULD ONLY ENCOURAGE A QUOTE BUREAUCRATIC UNQUOTE RESPONSE.

ACLAND

YYYY

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PAGE 1
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MR BERMAN (LEGAL ADVISERS)

PS/NO 10 DOWNING ST

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CHIEF OF ASS STAFF CAB OFFICE

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NNNN

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PAGE 2
SECRET



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

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29 January 1991

Dear Charles,

The Gulf : Morocco : Message to King Hassan

The Foreign Secretary is concerned that King Hassan's position on the Gulf crisis is becoming increasingly exposed. He agrees with the recommendation from HM Ambassador (Rabat telnos 52 and 53) that a message from the Prime Minister would help to steady the King at a difficult time.

Morocco has not been immune to the wave of popular support across the Maghreb for Saddam Hussein. The King is struggling as perhaps never before and is increasingly isolated in the face of popular opposition to the attack on Iraqi targets by coalition forces. In addition to the internal pressures, the King feels abandoned by the French and undermined by the American decision to pull out dependants and non-essential staff from Morocco. He has already felt obliged to go along with the Maghreb initiative in New York to work for a ceasefire despite the presence of Moroccan forces in the coalition against Iraq. The Ambassador believes that there is a real risk that he will give in to domestic pressure to withdraw his forces from the Gulf, despite the loss of Saudi support and money which this would entail.

This looks the right time to pursue the regular correspondence with a message of reassurance to the King, to bolster his resolve to see matters through. I enclose a draft which is based on HM Ambassador's suggestions.

Powever
S L Gass
(S L Gass)
Private Secretary

Sir Charles Powell KCMG
10 Downing Street

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166162
MDADAN 5949

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INFO IMMEDIATE CABINET OFFICE, POLAD HIGH WYCOMBE, ACTOR

SIC

PART ONE OF TWO

MY TELNO 165 : IRAQ/KUWAIT : SECURITY COUNCIL

SUMMARY

1. PRESSURE FOR FORMAL COUNCIL MEETING THWARTED, AT LEAST FOR THE TIME BEING. POWERFUL ZIMBABWEAN STATEMENT IN INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS. PRESIDENT WILL CONTINUE BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS ON THE TIMING OF FORMAL MEETING. FURTHER INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS TO TAKE PLACE ON 31 JANUARY.

DETAIL

2. BEFORE THE INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS OF MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL SCHEDULED FOR THE AFTERNOON OF 28 JANUARY AMBASSADORS OF THE FIVE PERMANENT MEMBERS MET BRIEFLY TO EXCHANGE NOTES. PICKERING (UNITED STATES) SAID HIS INSTRUCTIONS WERE STILL TO AVOID ANY FORMAL MEETING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON THE GULF CRISIS, ALTHOUGH PEOPLE IN WASHINGTON HAD INFORMALLY EXPRESSED A PREFERENCE FOR A PRIVATE RATHER THAN AN OPEN MEETING IF ONE HAD TO BE HELD. IF THIS DID COME ABOUT, THE FORMAT WOULD HAVE TO BE CAREFULLY ARRANGED IN ADVANCE. IN THE PAST THERE HAS BEEN A TENDENCY TO RESTRICT ATTENDANCE TO A LIMITED NUMBER OF PARTIES WITH A DIRECT INTEREST (IE IN THIS CASE THE MAGHREB AND GCC COUNTRIES, KUWAIT AND IRAQ). THE MEETING SHOULD INVOLVE THE EXPLORATION OF POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS TO THE CRISIS. WE WOULD HAVE TO CONSIDER HOW TO DEAL WITH SUCH NEW DEVELOPMENTS AS IRAQ'S ATTACK ON THE SECRETARY-GENERAL (MY TELNO 167), THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR AND IRAQI DUMPING OF OIL IN THE GULF. THE OUTCOME SHOULD BE ONE WHICH REITERATED VERY CLEARLY THE VIEWS OF

THE COUNCIL AS EXPRESSED OVER THE PAST FIVE MONTHS.

3. VORONTSOV (SOVIET UNION) SAID HIS GOVERNMENT COULD LIVE WITH A PRIVATE MEETING BUT WOULD PREFER NO MEETING AT ALL. THERE WAS NO CALL FOR ONE: THE SITUATION HAD NOT CHANGED AND ABOVE ALL THE POSITION OF IRAQ HAD NOT CHANGED. THE AGENDA AND DISCUSSION SHOULD RETAIN THE FOCUS ON OCCUPIED KUWAIT AND THE NEED TO LIBERATE IT. BLANC (FRANCE) AGREED THAT IT WOULD BE BETTER TO HAVE NO MEETING AT ALL. HE DID NOT YET HAVE INSTRUCTIONS ON A PRIVATE MEETING, BUT WOULD PROBABLY BE ABLE TO ACCEPT IT.

4. I SAID WE STILL HAD TO BE CONVINCED THAT THERE WAS A SERIOUS CASE FOR A FORMAL MEETING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. IT WOULD SERVE NO USEFUL PURPOSE, AND ITS EFFECTS WOULD BE UNWELCOME ONES. IF WE HAD TO HAVE A MEETING, A FORMAL PUBLIC SESSION WOULD BE THE WORST SOLUTION. IT WOULD GIVE A PLATFORM TO COUNTRIES WHO FELT THE NEED TO ASSUAGE THEIR OWN PUBLIC OPINIONS. IT WOULD SHOW UP DIFFERENCES OF VIEW AMONG THE UN MEMBERSHIP. IT WOULD BE LIKELY TO LEAD A DRAFT RESOLUTION WHICH SIMPLY COULD NOT BE ADOPTED. I DID NOT YET HAVE INSTRUCTIONS ON A PRIVATE MEETING, BUT I BELIEVE IT COULD BE PRESENTED AS THE MOST APPROPRIATE FORMAT FOR DEBATE IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES.

5. WHEN COUNCIL MEMBERS MET IN INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS, BLANC, PICKERING AND I GAVE BRIEF ACCOUNTS OF OUR MILITARY ACTIVITIES. BLANC SAID THE FRENCH AIRFORCE HAD ATTACKED SITES IN KUWAIT : ADDITIONAL LOGISTIC SUPPORT HAD BEEN MADE AVAILABLE TO THE FRENCH LAND FORCES. I SAID I HAD JUST CIRCULATED A FURTHER REPORT IN THE SERIES UNDER SCR 678 (YOUR TELNO 84): THIS DESCRIBED THE MAIN TARGETS WE HAD ATTACKED RECENTLY AND EXPLAINED THEY WERE LINKED TO SUSTAINING THE IRAQI OCCUPATION OF KUWAIT. IT ALSO DEALT WITH CONTACTS WITH THE ICRC OVER POWS. PICKERING SAID OVER 20,000 AIR SORTIES HAD NOW BEEN FLOWN: THESE HAD FOCUSED EXCLUSIVELY ON MILITARY TARGETS WHICH WERE IMPORTANT FOR MAINTAINING THE IRAQI FORCES IN KUWAIT. SOME IRAQI CIVILIAN AND MILITARY AIRCRAFT HAD GONE TO IRAN. THE IRAQIS HAD DELIBERATELY PUMPED OIL INTO THE GULF. AMERICAN F111 AIRCRAFT HAD ATTACKED TWO MANIFOLDS IN THE IRAQI PIPELINE SYSTEM TO TRY AND CUT OFF THE FLOW OF OIL: THE RESULTS OF THIS WERE NOT YET KNOWN. THE UNITED STATES WAS ALSO CONCERNED ABOUT THE TREATMENT OF THE POWS.

6. THE (ZAIREAN) COUNCIL PRESIDENT (BAGBENI) THEN TURNED TO THE REQUESTS FOR AN OFFICIAL COUNCIL MEETING (NOW INCLUDING ONE FROM CUBA). THOSE WHO HAD REQUESTED A MEETING HAD TOLD HIM THEY WANTED A

DEBATE AT WHICH CONSTRUCTIVE IDEAS COULD BE PRESENTED. THEY HAD MENTIONED THE IDEA OF A TEMPORARY CEASEFIRE BUT SAID THAT THEY HAD NO DRAFT RESOLUTION, APPEAL OR PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT PREPARED. THE MAGHREB COUNTRIES HAD SAID THEY WOULD INSIST ON AN OPEN OFFICIAL MEETING SO THAT ALL COULD EXPRESS THEIR VIEWS. THE GCC STATES HAD TOLD HIM THAT IT WAS INADMISSIBLE THAT COUNCIL MEMBERS, WHOSE TASK WAS TO IMPLEMENT THE COUNCIL'S RESOLUTIONS, SHOULD WANT AN OPEN MEETING AT WHICH DOUBT COULD BE CAST ON THOSE RESOLUTIONS. THEY HOPED THAT IF THE PRINCIPLE OF A MEETING WAS ACCEPTED, NO DATE WOULD BE FIXED, GIVEN THE CURRENT CIRCUMSTANCES.

7. AL ASHTAL (YEMEN) SAID THAT HE HAD COME TO THE INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT THERE WOULD BE A FORMAL MEETING IMMEDIATELY AFTERWARDS.

HANNAY

YYYY

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MR FAIRWEATHER	SIR C CURWEN CABINET OFFICE
MR BROOMFIELD	MR CHARLTON CABINET OFFICE
MR SLATER	MR GOWAN, CABINET OFFICE
MR GORE-BOOTH	PS/NUMBER 10 DOWNING ST
MR GOULDEN	SIR P CRADOCK, 10 DOWNING ST
MR JAY	CABINET OFFICE DIO
MR BERMAN (LEGAL ADVISERS)	SIR ROBIN BUTLER, CAB OFFICE
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HD/AMD	MR SHAPLAND CAB OFFICE
HD/CONSULAR D	AUS (C) MODUK
HD/ECD(E)	HD/SEC (O) (C) MODUK
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SIC

PART TWO OF TWO

8. MUMBENGEGWI (ZIMBABWE) SAID THAT WHILE HE ACCEPTED THAT A COUNCIL MEETING SHOULD BE HELD IF A MEMBER REQUESTED ONE, TIMING WAS IMPORTANT. IT WAS IMPLIED IN THE RULES OF PROCEDURE THAT IF A MEETING WAS HELD IT WAS CONSIDERED LIKELY TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THE COUNCIL'S OBJECTIVES. IN THE CASE OF IRAQ/KUWAIT THESE WERE TO ASSIST A SMALL STATE AND TO ENSURE ITS SOVEREIGNTY AND ITS INDEPENDENCE WERE PROTECTED. THIS COULD ONLY BE ACHIEVED THROUGH THE WITHDRAWAL OF IRAQ FROM KUWAIT. COUNCIL MEMBERS HAD TO WEIGH WHAT WAS LIKELY TO EMERGE FROM A MEETING AND WHETHER IT WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO THAT OBJECTIVE. IF BY MEETING THE COUNCIL WOULD CREATE THE IMPRESSION (EVEN IF UNINTENDED) THAT IT DID NOT WHOLEHEARTEDLY CONDEMN THE INVASION AND OCCUPATION OF KUWAIT, THIS WOULD BE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE.

9. MUMBENGEGWI SAID THAT WHEN THE COUNCIL WAS UNLIKELY TO COME UP WITH A POSITIVE DECISION, A MEETING SHOULD BE AVOIDED IF POSSIBLE. AT PRESENT IT WAS DIFFICULT TO RESOLVE THE GULF ISSUE WITHOUT SOME INDICATION FROM IRAQ THAT IT WAS IN A POSITION TO BE MORE COOPERATIVE TOWARDS THE COUNCIL. IT WOULD BE PRUDENT TO ALLOW MORE TIME FOR QUIET DIPLOMACY TO ELICIT SUCH AN INDICATION FROM IRAQ. THUS WHEN THE COUNCIL MET IT WOULD NOT JUST BE A FORUM FOR DEBATE, BUT FOR WORKING OUT THE MODALITIES OF TOTAL IRAQI WITHDRAWAL FROM KUWAIT.

10. GHAREKHAN (INDIA) SAID HIS POSITION WAS UNCHANGED.

11. AL-ASHTAL (YEMEN) SAID THAT IF A MEMBER REQUESTED A COUNCIL MEETING IT DID NOT MEAN THAT SPECIFIC MEASURES WERE NECESSARILY PLANNED: NOR COULD CONDITIONS BE IMPOSED ON THE MEMBER BEFORE THE

COUNCIL MET. THE COUNCIL HAD MET SCORES OF TIMES ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND LEBANON EVEN THOUGH ITS RESOLUTIONS ON THESE SUBJECTS HAD NOT BEEN IMPLEMENTED. THE LOGIC OF MUMBENGEGWI'S ARGUMENT WAS THAT THE COUNCIL SHOULD ONLY MEET ON LEBANON IF ISRAEL WITHDREW FROM THE SOUTH OF THAT COUNTRY. WHY WERE THERE DOUBLE STANDARDS? IF IT WAS DECIDED THE COUNCIL SHOULD NOT MEET OFFICIALLY, THIS WOULD BE UNPRECEDENTED: YEMEN WOULD ANNOUNCE THAT THE COUNCIL HAD STOPPED WORKING AND WAS DEADLOCKED.

12. I SAID MUMBENGEGWI HAD NOT MENTIONED IMPOSING CONDITIONS BEFORE A COUNCIL MEETING. BUT HE HAD ADDRESSED THE SUBJECT MATTER. NO-ONE REQUESTING A FORMAL MEETING, HAD SAID WHAT IT SHOULD DO. THE COUNCIL WAS NOT A DEBATING SOCIETY. I DID NOT UNDERSTAND HOW A PUBLIC DEBATE, WHICH WOULD PRESUMABLY ENABLE PEOPLE TO MAKE LENGTHY AND PREJUDICIAL STATEMENTS DIRECTED TO THOSE OUTSIDE THE COUNCIL, WOULD HELP THE COUNCIL TO MAKE PROGRESS. MUMBENGEGWI HAD SAID THAT THERE WOULD BE NO SOLUTION UNTIL THERE WAS A CHANGE OF POLICY BY IRAQ. THE LETTER FROM TARIQ AZIZ TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL CIRCULATED EARLIER IN THE DAY DEMONSTRATED THAT THERE WAS NO CHANGE IN IRAQ'S POLICY. PICKERING SUPPORTED WHAT MUMBENGEGWI AND I HAD SAID. HE DID NOT WANT TO SEE THE COUNCIL TAKE STEPS FROM WHICH SADDAM HUSSEIN COULD DRAW STRENGTH.

13. NOTERDAEME (BELGIUM) SAID THE COUNCIL MUST ANSWER PRACTICAL QUESTIONS: WHY SHOULD IT MEET AND TO DO WHAT? WOULD THIS CONTRIBUTE TO A SOLUTION? FROM THE CONTENTS OF TARIQ AZIZ'S LETTER, IT WAS CLEAR THAT POLICY IN BAGHDAD HAD NOT CHANGED. IF COUNCIL MEMBERS WISH TO ACT RESPONSIBLY, THEY SHOULD CONTINUE BILATERAL AND INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS. ALARCON (CUBA) SAID THE COUNCIL COULD DECIDE NOTHING IN INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS. NO-ONE COULD FORCE COUNCIL MEMBERS TO ATTEND A FORMAL MEETING: BY THE SAME TOKEN NO-ONE COULD FORCE HIS DELEGATION TO ATTEND INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS.

14. WHEN THE PRESIDENT ATTEMPTED TO SUM-UP AT THIS POINT, AL-ASHTAL INTERVENED AGAIN. A RAGING WAR WAS TAKING PLACE THAT MIGHT SPREAD TO OTHER AREAS. A SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION HAD GIVEN THE LEADERSHIP OF OPERATIONS TO FORCES OUTSIDE THE COMMAND OF THE COUNCIL AND OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF ARTICLE 42 OF THE CHARTER. YEMEN HAD REQUESTED A FORMAL MEETING TO CALL FOR A CEASEFIRE TO EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITY OF A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. DID SCR 678 MEAN THAT ALL POSSIBILITY OF CONSIDERING A PEACEFUL SOLUTION HAD BEEN FORECLOSED? IRAQ SHOULD FULFILL THE COUNCIL'S RESOLUTIONS AND WITHDRAW FROM KUWAIT AND RESTORE ITS

LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT. BUT WHAT WAS HAPPENING NOW WENT BEYOND THE MANDATE OF SCR 678. AN ATTEMPT WAS BEING MADE TO CHANGE THE BALANCE OF POWER IN THE REGION TO ELIMINATE ANY ARAB POWER THAT COULD STAND UP TO ISRAEL. FOLLOWING THE DESTRUCTION OF IRAQI INDUSTRIAL AND MILITARY POWER, ISRAEL WOULD NEVER ACCEPT A PEACE SETTLEMENT. YEMEN WOULD CONTINUE TO CALL FOR PEACE OUTSIDE THE COUNCIL. THE SECURITY COUNCIL, BY OPERATING IN SECRECY, WAS DISENGAGING ITSELF FROM THE WIDER UN MEMBERSHIP.

15. VORONTSOV SPOKE IN SUPPORT OF THE COUNCIL PRESIDENT CONTINUING BILATERAL AND INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS. IF THERE WERE SIGNALS FROM BAGHDAD THAT IRAQ WAS WILLING TO WITHDRAW ITS TROOPS FROM KUWAIT, THERE WOULD BE GOOD GROUNDS FOR A PRODUCTIVE SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING. BUT THERE WERE NO SUCH SIGNALS. ALL THE SOVIET UNION'S APPEALS HAD BEEN IGNORED OR REBUFFED.

16. IT WAS AGREED THAT THE PRESIDENT WOULD CONTINUE BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS ON THE TIMING OF A FORMAL MEETING: COUNCIL MEMBERS WOULD MEET AGAIN IN INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS ON THE AFTERNOON OF 31 JANUARY TO HEAR FURTHER REPORTS FROM THE THREE COUNCIL MEMBERS PARTICIPATING IN MILITARY OPERATIONS.

COMMENT

17. THIS WAS A REMARKABLY SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME, DUE LARGELY TO THE UNEXPECTEDLY ELOQUENT AND EFFECTIVE INTERVENTION BY THE ZIMBABWEAN PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE (VIRTUALLY THE FIRST TIME HE HAS OPENED HIM MOUTH SINCE 1 JANUARY) AND TO THE EFFECT OF THE INTEMPERATE LETTER FROM TARIQ AZIZ TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL. THESE TWO EVENTS, AND THE UNWISE EXPLANATIONS BY AL-ASHTAL OF THE PURPOSE OF A COUNCIL MEETING, SMOTHERED DOUBTS AMONG THOSE WHO HAD PREVIOUSLY QUESTIONED THE PROPRIETY OF NOT HOLDING A MEETING. THE ISSUE OF WHETHER THERE SHOULD BE A PRIVATE OR OPEN MEETING HARDLY AROSE AND REMAINS TO BE FOUGHT OVER ON ANOTHER DAY.

18. BESIDES THE CUBAN PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE'S THREAT TO ABSENT HIMSELF FROM INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS - WHICH WOULD BE A SOURCE OF GENERAL REJOICING IF HE CARRIED IT OUT - THERE WERE HINTS IN AL-ASHTAL'S STATEMENT OF THE POSSIBILITY OF RESUMED EFFORTS TO MOBILISE THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. HE REFERRED TO THE COUNCIL BEING DEADLOCKED WHICH IS THE CODEWORD FOR INITIATING THE 'UNITING FOR PEACE' PROCEDURE. IT WOULD PROBABLY BE AS WELL TO TOUCH BASE WITH THE PRESIDENT OF THE ASSEMBLY (DE MARCO) BEFORE TOO LONG TO ENSURE THAT HE IS STILL ON SIDE.

19. THE ISSUES OF WHETHER TO HOLD A PRIVATE OR OPEN MEETING AND THE NEED TO HAVE UP OUR SLEEVE A TOUGH RESOLUTION TO FORESTALL A PEACE INITIATIVE (YOUR TELNO 168 TO WASHINGTON AND WASHINGTON TELNO 267) REMAIN TOPICAL. BUT THEY HAVE, AS WE AND THE AMERICANS WISHED, BEEN PUT OFF FOR THE TIME BEING. I SEE NO NEED TO REVERT TO THE AMERICANS ON THE FIRST ISSUE, SINCE PICKERING MADE IT CLEAR IN THE FIVE THAT THERE IS A PREFERENCE IN WASHINGTON FOR A PRIVATE RATHER THAN AN OPEN MEETING IF ONE HAS TO BE HELD. ON THE QUESTION OF A BACK-POCKET RESOLUTION WE AND THE AMERICANS DO NEED TO COME TO A CONFIDENTIAL UNDERSTANDING ON A TEXT AND TO BE READY TO USE IT PRE-EMPTIVELY. ONE POSSIBLE DIRECTION IN WHICH YEMEN, CUBA AND THE MAGHREB MAY HEAD, AFTER THE BATTERING THEY HAVE TAKEN OVER THE USE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL IS A PUBLIC PLATFORM FOR PURPOSELESS DEBATE, IS TO DRAFT A RESOLUTION AND TABLE IT. I HOPE THEREFORE THAT WE CAN PURSUE OUR CONTACTS WITH THE AMERICANS ON THIS POINT.

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PRIME MINISTER

c.c. Mr. Turnbull

LEADER OF THE OPPOSITION

I spoke to Mr. Kinnock's office this morning to say that you would be very willing to offer him a further briefing on the Gulf if he so wished. They were grateful and promised to get back in touch.

They added that in due course there were a number of other issues Mr. Kinnock would like to discuss on Privy Council terms, in particular the Speaker, the House of Lords (I think nominations), and a particular honours matter. In general they were not urgent matters and could wait until after the present crisis. Mr. Kinnock would be writing to you shortly about one of them.

C DP

CHARLES D POWELL

29 January 1991

tmw a:kinnock

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US ATTACKS ON IRAQI NUCLEAR FACILITIES

1. SAMORE IN AMBASSADOR KENNEDY'S NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION OFFICE TOLD US ON 28 JANUARY THAT FOLLOWING THE RAIDS AGAINST IRAQ'S TWO OPERATING NUCLEAR RESEARCH REACTORS THE FUEL IS ASSUMED TO NOW BE BURIED UNDER TONS OF RUBBLE. THERE ARE NO SIGNS OF RADIOLOGICAL LEAKS OR FIRES AT EITHER SITE. NOR HAVE THE AMERICANS SEEN ANY ACTIVITY AT THE SITES SINCE THE BOMBING. WE WERE ALSO TOLD THAT THE USAF HAVE BEEN BOMBING A NUMBER OF THE NUCLEAR LABORATORIES AT TUWAITHA.
2. IN RESPONSE TO ENQUIRIES STATE JUSTIFY US ACTIONS BY SAYING THAT IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES IT WAS IMPORTANT TO DENY IRAQ THE OPTION OF DIVERTING HER NUCLEAR MATERIAL FOR USE IN A WEAPONS PROGRAMME. ON THE POSSIBILITY OF CONTAMINATION, THE LINE THEY ARE TAKING IS QUOTE WE ARE NOT AWARE OF ANY REPORTS THAT RADIATION HAS BEEN RELEASED. GIVEN THE SMALL SIZE OF THESE REACTORS, ANY RADIOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES FROM BOMB DAMAGE WOULD BE LIMITED AND LOCAL. IT WOULD NOT POSE A SERIOUS HEALTH RISK TO IRAQ'S CIVILIAN POPULATION OR TO ANY OTHER COUNTRY UNQUOTE. STATE BELIEVE THAT THE IAEA IN VIENNA ARE TAKING A SIMILAR LINE ON POSSIBLE CONTAMINATION.
3. THE AMERICANS EXPECT THE IRAQIS TO RAISE THE ISSUE AT THE UN OR OTHER FORA AVAILABLE TO THEM. THE MOST LIKELY IS THE IAEA BOARD OF GOVERNORS MEETING IN VIENNA IN LATE FEBRUARY. BEFORE THAT GATHERING THE AMERICANS HOPE TO DISCUSS TACTICS WITH THEIR FRIENDS AND ALLIES (INCLUDING UK) IN THE HOPE THAT A COLLECTIVE REBUTTAL OF ANY IRAQI CHARGES WILL END THE MATTER SWIFTLY. A PAPER IS CURRENTLY UNDER PREPARATION. IN THE MEANTIME THE AMERICANS WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR ADVANCE WARNING OF ANY INFORMATION WE MAY PICK UP ON THE IRAQIS MAY BE PLANNING TO SPRING AT THE IAEA, UN OR CD (THEY HAVE HEARD NOTHING SO FAR).

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MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

Telephone 071-21 82111/3

MO 6/17/15/1J

28th January 1991

Dear Charles,

As requested in your letters of 24th and 28th January, I attach a draft reply for the Prime Minister to send to Mr Kinnock on the question of concessionary telephone calls. We plan to announce the new scheme during a press conference tomorrow morning. I therefore suggest that the reply to Mr Kinnock should arrive in his office sometime during tomorrow morning. *10p*
Appt 39.

In your letter of 25th January, you also raised the question of the cost of sending parcels and delays in the postal service.

Concessionary parcel rates under the Post Office Economy Service already exist for all BFPO addresses. Under this service, parcels are carried at UK inland parcel rates, instead of the normal civil international airmail postage rates. The transit time for parcels sent to the Gulf, which are carried by RAF aircraft, is between 5 and 10 days. The complaints about the cost of the parcel service could well stem from the stories we have been hearing that some service families have been charged normal airmail rates by the Post Office. This is happening despite reminders being sent out to staff at Post Offices. I am glad to say, however, that from 1st February, the Post Office are formally suspending the use of normal airmail rates for any parcels sent to BFPO addresses. They will all be charged at the concessionary rate. This policy change should ensure that there is no further confusion at Post Office counters. Mr King or Mr Hamilton will be reminding people of this concessionary service during tomorrow's press conference.

Finally, in your letter of 25th January, you also raised the time it takes for letters from members of our forces to get through to the UK. We believe the problem here is the perceived delay from the date of letters and the actual date of receipt by the addressees. Trials show that mail picked up from the Gulf is taking on 4-5 days to deliver. The point that has to be borne in mind is that a letter from, say, a soldier in the front line could take up

Sir Charles Powell KCMG
10 Downing Street



to 2 days to get from his unit to the RAF aircraft. So complaints could be based on a minimum turn-round time of about 2 weeks for an exchange of correspondence. Relatives and friends of servicemen are probably accustomed to a shorter exchange time, which possibly explains the source of the complaints. I can assure you, however, that the system is working smoothly. A total of some 600 bags of mail are being moved every day to and from the Gulf and there is no backlog in the system.

Yours age,
Bill Clark

PP (MISS J R BINSTAD)
Private Secretary

DRAFT REPLY FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO THE LEADER OF THE OPPOSITION

Thank you for your letter of 24th January, calling for concessionary charges to be introduced for the welfare telephone service established in the Gulf. We have, of course, been giving this very careful consideration.

We have now decided to introduce a concession on telephone calls equivalent to £10 a month for all Service personnel in the Gulf. Tom King will be announcing the introduction of this scheme today. This is similar to the scheme already available to troops in Northern Ireland.

We looked at ¹⁶your proposal for a free call home every week carefully, together with other possible options. Arrangements on the lines of your proposal might have been seen to provide a greater benefit to those personnel serving in the rear areas than to the troops now based in the desert. Troops in the desert necessarily have less regular access to the welfare telephone service because of the nature of training and operations near the front line. The concessionary arrangements which are now to be introduced should be seen to provide a flexible system of equal benefit to all Service personnel in the Gulf.

The introduction of the welfare telephone service, installed with the enthusiastic co-operation of both Mercury and British Telecom, has already provided a great boost to morale both in the Gulf and amongst service families and friends at home. I am sure these new concessions will be equally well received.

~~I am grateful for your support.~~

MIDDLE EAST! Sit Pt 40.

Thank you for your letter of 14th January, calling for concessionary charges to be introduced for the welfare telephone service established in the Gulf. We have, of course, been giving this very careful consideration.

We have now decided to introduce a concession on telephone calls equivalent to £15 a month for all Service personnel in the Gulf. Your King will be announcing the introduction of this scheme today. This is similar to the scheme already available to troops in Northern Ireland.

~~We looked at your proposal for a free call home every week carefully, together with other possible options. Arrangements on the lines of your proposal might have been seen to provide a greater benefit to those personnel serving in the rear areas than to the troops now based in the desert. Troops in the desert necessarily have less regular access to the welfare telephone service because of the nature of training and operations near the front line. The concessionary arrangements which are now to be introduced should be seen to provide a flexible system of equal benefits to all Service personnel in the Gulf.~~

The introduction of the welfare telephone service, installed with the enthusiastic co-operation of both Mercury and British Telecom, has already provided a great boost to morale both in the Gulf and amongst service families and friends at home. I am sure these new concessions will be equally well received.

I am grateful for your support

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Subject cc master

NOTE FOR THE RECORD

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH THE LEADER OF THE
LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY .

The Prime Minister saw Mr. Paddy Ashdown M.P. this evening, at his own request. The meeting was on Privy Council terms.

The Prime Minister briefed Mr. Ashdown on developments in the conflict in the Gulf.

Mr. Ashdown raised two concerns:

- the dangers which would arise from any attempt to extend the multinational force's war aims. The Prime Minister explained that our aims remained those set out in the UN Security Council resolutions. That had also been reaffirmed by President Bush earlier in the day. Saddam Hussein's removal was not one of those aims, although we would certainly not regret his departure. But one could not foresee the precise circumstances under which the conflict might end: if Iraq withdrew from Kuwait but remained a clear threat to its security from just over the border, then Kuwait would not have been truly liberated and we might have to continue to fight Iraq on its own territory. But that could only be judged at the time. There was no question of our driving on Baghdad or occupying Iraqi territory. Indeed we had entered the conflict to preserve Kuwait's borders, and we did not wish to see any change in Iraq's borders. Mr. Ashdown said that he was reassured by the Prime Minister's comments: it would be useful if he could make the last point publicly.
- his hope that the Government would not get locked into a dispute with other EC countries about their performance in the Gulf War. He accepted that several of them had fallen short of what could have been expected. But it would be counter-productive to engage in a slanging match or call in question the commitment to ever closer cooperation on

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foreign policy. The Prime Minister said that there was justified disillusion in the United Kingdom with the performance of some of the European allies. But senior Ministers had been careful to avoid attacking our European partners. He regretted any departure from that.

Mr. Ashdown said that he was likely to raise in Questions on 29 January the robust contribution of the Arab allies to give the Prime Minister an opportunity to praise them.

C.D.

C.D. POWELL

28 January 1991

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SECRET - UK EYES A

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PRIME MINISTER

cc Sir Robin Butler
Sir Percy Cradock

OPD(G): 29 January: Overnight Action Points

Item 1: Burdensharing

The Foreign Secretary has circulated a revised paper dated 28 January which updates the figures and slightly alters the advice (paragraph 8) but does not represent a significant departure from the basic line taken in his earlier minute of 25 January.

2. Paragraph 2 of Sir Robin Butler's brief suggests that we might concert our position with the US Government through a message followed by a word on the telephone from you to President Bush. A useful piece of supplementary action might be for you to raise burdensharing with Vice-President Quayle later in the week.

Item 2: Current military situation

3. You might ask the Defence Secretary to comment on reports from Baghdad that POWs have been injured in "allied bombing of civilian sites". This may be a bluff but if the POWs have been injured while placed at strategic sites this would be a clear breach of the Geneva Conventions. An even more sinister explanation might be that they had been badly maltreated.

SECRET - UK EYES A



SECRET - UK EYES A

Item 3: Current international situation

4. Reports overnight suggest that the pressure for a Security Council debate may be easing. Informal consultations took place yesterday evening during which only the Cubans and Yemenis called for a debate. The other members were either opposed or chary and the Zaire representative, as President, was helpfully dismissive. The Zimbabwe representative, who takes over as President on 1 February, argued forcefully that a debate would be a waste of time. The next move will be informal consultations on Thursday with enthusiasm for a formal meeting waning. The Iraqis scored an own goal against their supporters when Tariq Aziz sent an abusive letter to the Secretary General which went down badly.

L V Appleyard

L V Appleyard

Cabinet Office
29 January 1991

SECRET - UK EYES A

SECRET

PRIME MINISTER

OPD(G): THE GULF

There is a further meeting of OPD(G) tomorrow morning to discuss developments in the Gulf.

The main item is burdensharing. The Foreign Secretary has produced a revised paper on this, which you will want to see. It increases considerably the sums we ought to seek from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Japan, to reflect a pro rata proportion of what the Americans are obtaining. It still recommends that we should approach quite a long list of countries. It suggests that you should write to a number of Gulf rulers. The Foreign Secretary proposes to go to see King Fahd and the Amir of Kuwait. You will also want to ask the Chancellor to report on his discussions in the margins of ECOFIN.

My view remains that you should concentrate on a small number of potential high-payers: Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Japan and Germany plus one or two Europeans - Belgium, Norway, the Netherlands - just to make them feel bad. You have already sent messages to Chancellor Kohl and the Emir of Kuwait. One of the main purposes of the meeting should be to consider the tactics for extracting significant amounts from the countries in question. A particular point for decision is whether we should approach the Americans at this stage and ask for their help, or even to be cut in on what they have already obtained: or should we leave that until we have made efforts direct with the countries concerned but without result. At the end of the discussion, you will want to agree a form of words which you could use at Questions.

That apart, we have the usual discussion on the current military and international situation. You will want to be brought up to date with the continuing removal of Iraqi aircraft to Iran, and with efforts to clear the oil slick in the Gulf. You might also want to report to the meeting the results of my talk with General Scowcroft about how the Americans would retaliate for the use of CW by Iraq. (My note is in the folder.) On the UN aspects the Americans are very firmly opposed to conceding a formal Security Council meeting (see telegram).

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I am advised that it would be better not to raise closure of the
Iraqi Embassy tomorrow.

C.D.P

C. D. POWELL

28 January 1991

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PRIME MINISTER

cc Sir Percy Cradock
Mr Appleyard

OPD(G): 29 JanuaryItem 1: Burdensharing

You might invite the Foreign Secretary to introduce his minute of 24 January and his updating note this evening. You might then invite the Chancellor of the Exchequer to outline the public expenditure background to the exercise, and the Defence Secretary to report on the MoD estimates of the total cost of the UK war effort.

2. You might then suggest that an essential component of the exercise should be to concert a position with the United States. So far the US Government has focussed on maximising its own share. Given the preponderant political power of the United States there is a risk that we will be squeezed out. There are indications that an approach at the top political level will be needed to secure US agreement. Soundings we have taken with American officials indicate that President Bush is likely to respond well to a personal approach from you on the basis that we are seeking a co-operative approach and pointing out the serious political risks to the Atlantic Alliance and the war effort if this tricky issue is not managed between us. You could explain that we were looking for a fair share commensurate with our contribution to the war effort: ie 8 per cent of the US total. We envisage a written message from you to the President followed by a word on the telephone. The mechanics for co-operating could then be followed up at official level.



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3. You might then consider whether personal contacts with donor Governments at Ministerial level will be needed. In that context you might look at the approach to major potential donors individually.

4. On Germany, you have sent a personal message to Chancellor Kohl and the Foreign Secretary will be seeing Herr Genscher and perhaps Chancellor Kohl in Bonn on Wednesday. The Americans have asked the Germans for \$6bn. Your message to Chancellor Kohl requested a substantial level of assistance and when the message was handed over it was made clear that we had in mind 8 per cent of the US figure. You may wish to consider telephoning Chancellor Kohl later this week to follow up, depending on the outcome of the Foreign Secretary's meetings in Bonn.

5. On Japan, the Foreign Secretary has sent a message to his opposite number asking for a share of the \$9bn which the Japanese Government stated that it would devote to the war effort, though there have been problems in securing Diet approval. The Chancellor approached the Japanese Finance Minister in the margins of the G7 meeting. Again we have suggested that 8 per cent of the US figure would be right. You may wish to consider follow-up, perhaps by asking the Chancellor to visit Tokyo for that purpose combined with other business.

6. On Kuwait, you have sent a message to the Amir earlier today. The Kuwaitis are notoriously tight-fisted but they have pledged \$13.5bn towards US war costs for the first three months of 1991 on top of the earlier figure of \$2.5bn, making \$16bn in total. They have told us that this is exclusively for the United States. It will not be easy to obtain our share. We understand that the Foreign Secretary is planning to visit Taif.



7. On Saudi Arabia, we have already obtained an agreement on host nation support but no pledge on additional funding. The FCO is considering a message to King Fahd, which could be combined with follow-up by the Foreign Secretary on the same trip as his visit to Taif. The Foreign Secretary is also thinking of going to UAE.

8. On the rest of Europe, the Belgians are feeling suitably guilty and appear to be expecting a request for finance. You might ask the Foreign Secretary which other countries would be serious candidates for providing assistance: e.g. Norway, Netherlands. Outside Europe, other candidates might be Brunei, Bahrain and Oman.

9. The Chancellor may suggest that a monitoring group be set up to supervise the follow-up to this exercise at junior Ministerial or senior official level or a combination of both. I believe that this would be a useful step, though I think it would be better done at official level reporting to OPD(G) since only approaches by Senior Ministers are likely to be successful in extracting the money. I propose to ask Mr Reeves of the Cabinet Office to convene a group with FCO, MOD and Treasury and to be responsible for liaising with the Americans (since the National Security Council is co-ordinating the US effort).

Item 2: Current military situation

10. You might invite the Chief of the Defence Staff to report on the military campaign. He expects to report briefly on this occasion. You may want Sir Percy Cradock to bring the Committee up to date on the flight of Iraqi aircraft to Iran, which by the morning may be higher in number than England's second innings score in Adelaide.

11. A difficult point has arisen over a report in today's New York Times that US forces have authority to use CS gas for riot



control, rescuing hostages or controlling prisoners of war. You may be asked about the UK's attitude and whether there are circumstances in which we would also use CS gas. The Defence Secretary will be able to advise on this. We would like Ministerial authority for counselling the US to play this very carefully.

Item 3: Current international situation

12. You might invite the Foreign Secretary to report on the continuing pressure for a Security Council debate. The Security Council will have had informal consultations late tonight London time which may throw light on the way ahead. As instructed by OPD(G) yesterday, the FCO have instructed the Embassy in Washington to concert a line with the US Government. We may thus have a clearer picture of US policy and the New York angle by OPD(G) tomorrow.

✓ 13. For reasons which will have been reported to you, I suggest you do not ask the Foreign Secretary to report his conclusions at this meeting on the Iraqi Embassy in London.

Item 4: Media handling

14. You might invite the Energy Secretary to report on the broader picture and your Press Secretary to raise immediate issues. The main need this evening appears to be to get across the message that we are not widening our strategic objectives and that the action being taken against Iraq is militarily necessary for expelling Iraq from Kuwait with minimum casualties.

F.R.B.

ROBIN BUTLER

28 January 1991

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 271

OF 282335Z JANUARY 91

INFO IMMEDIATE RIYADH, JEDDA, MODUK, TREASURY, CABINET OFFICE, ACTOR

SIC

MODUK FOR SEC(0)(C), POLAD HIGH WYCOMBE, HQBFME (FOR ABBOT)
TREASURY FOR PS/CHANCELLOR

JEDDA FOR BLACKLEY

RIYADH TELNO 272: IRAQ/KUWAIT: BURDEN-SHARING

SUMMARY

1. FURTHER PLEDGE, FROM SAUDI ARABIA, OF DOLLARS 13.5 BILLION (BRINGING US TOTAL PLEDGES FOR THIS YEAR TO DOLLARS 36 BILLION). DETAILS APPARENTLY STILL UP IN THE AIR. ADMINISTRATION NOW ESTIMATE COST FOR FY91 TO BE BETWEEN DOLLARS 60 BILLION WITH CONTRIBUTIONS OF DOLLARS 45 BILLION ANTICIPATED. BUT ACTUAL CASH CONTINUES TO TRICKLE RATHER THAN POUR IN.

DETAIL

2. FOLLOWING THE KUWAITI ANNOUNCEMENT OF A CONTRIBUTION OF DOLLARS 13.5 BILLION TO OPERATION DESERT STORM ON 25 JANUARY, BAKER ANNOUNCED ON 26 JANUARY THAT SAUDI ARABIA WOULD BE MATCHING THE KUWAITI OFFER, THEREBY BRINGING CONTRIBUTIONS SO FAR TOWARDS US COSTS FOR THE FIRST THREE MONTHS OF 1991 TO DOLLARS 36 BILLION (KUWAIT 13.5 BILLION, SAUDI ARABIA 13.5 BILLION, JAPAN 9 BILLION). THIS ASSESSMENT WAS UPDATED BY THE WHITE HOUSE SPOKESMAN ON 28 JANUARY WHO, IN DRAWING ATTENTION TO A WALL STREET JOURNAL ARTICLE OF THE SAME DATE QUOTING DARMAN (OMB), CONFIRMED THAT THE ADMINISTRATION WAS NOW WORKING ON THE ASSUMPTION OF A SHORT FALL OF DOLLARS 15 BILLION BETWEEN COSTS (DOLLARS 60 BILLION) AND ANTICIPATED CONTRIBUTIONS (DOLLARS 45 BILLION).

3. WE HAVE DISCUSSED THE LATEST SAUDI PLEDGE WITH ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS. THEY TOO HAVE TOLD US THAT THE DETAILS OF THE ARRANGEMENT HAVE NOT BEEN FINALISED AND THAT THEY MIGHT REMAIN UNRESOLVED FOR SOME TIME YET, GIVEN THE STRONG POSSIBILITY THAT HOST NATION SUPPORT WOULD CONSTITUTE A SIGNIFICANT PROPORTION OF THE EVENTUAL SAUDI CONTRIBUTION. THESE SAME OFFICIALS WENT ON TO CONFIRM (TOKYO TELNO 71)

THAT THE ADMINISTRATION ARE CONTINUING TO PRESS THE JAPANESE FOR THE FULL DOLLARS 9 BILLION FOR US COSTS, WHICH THE ADMINISTRATION IS NOW INCLUDING IN ALL OF ITS ESTIMATES OF ANTICIPATED REVENUES. BUT WHILE FURTHER SUBVENTIONS ARE EXPECTED FRC BOTH THE GERMANS AND THE UAE, THE PROBLEM OF EXTRACTING THE FULL POUND OF FLESH REFERRED TO IN TUR IS BECOMING INCREASINGLY EVIDENT. OUR CONTACTS IN THE PENTAGON HAVE TOLD US IN CONFIDENCE (PLEASE PROTECT) THAT THE NEXT PROGRESS REPORT TO CONGRESS HAD BEEN DELAYED UNTIL MID-FEBRUARY BECAUSE ONLY DOLLARS 438 MILLION (IN CASH FROM THE JAPANESE) HAS BEEN ADDED TO THE DEFENCE CO-OPERATION ACCOUNT SINCE THE LAST DOD REPORT TO CONGRESS EARLY THIS MONTH (WHICH WAS FAXED TO EMERGENCY UNIT).

COMMENT

4. DESPITE THESE LATEST PLEDGES THE ADMINISTRATION THEY HAVE NOT, AS YET, CONVINCED SOME OF THEIR CONGRESSIONAL CRITICS WHO ARE PUBLICLY VOICING THEIR SUSPICIONS THAT THE US IS BEING FOBBED OFF (QUOTE THE CHECK IS IN THE MAIL UNQUOTE). NONETHELESS, THE FACT THAT THE ADMINISTRATION APPEARS ON COURSE TO COVER 75 TO 80 PER CENT OF ITS COSTS FOR BOTH 1990 AND 1991 MEANS THAT SOME OF THE HEAT HAS GONE OUT OF THE BURDEN-SHARING DEBATE HERE (GERMANY EXCEPTED) AND MAY WELL REMAIN SO UNLESS IT BECOMES CLEAR THAT PLEDGES ARE NOT BEING FULFILLED. INSTEAD CONGRESS APPEARS TO BE TURNING ITS ATTENTION TO ADMINISTRATION COST ESTIMATES WITH THE GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE (GAO) ALREADY HAVING PASSED TO THE ADMINISTRATION A TWO PAGE LISTING OF THE COMPONENTS OF THE OPERATION THAT IT INTENDS TO AUDIT IN THE COMING WEEKS.

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MR PRIDDLE, DEPT OF ENERGY


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SIC I9M

OUR TELNO 261: IRAQ/KUWAIT: WASHINGTON SITREP
SUMMARY

1. PRESIDENT RESTATES WAR AIMS AND SAYS DESTRUCTION OF IRAQ IS NOT ONE OF THEM. CONTINUING COVERAGE OF OIL SLICK AND IRAQI AIRCRAFT IN IRAN. DETAIL
2. IN A SPEECH TO RELIGIOUS BROADCASTERS TODAY 28 JANUARY, THE PRESIDENT REITERATED US OBJECTIVES IN FAMILIAR TERMS: IRAQ'S IMMEDIATE AND COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL FROM KUWAIT, RESTORATION OF KUWAIT'S LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT AND THE SECURITY AND STABILITY OF THE GULF. THE DESTRUCTION OF IRAQ WAS NOT AN OBJECTIVE. US FORCES WOULD LEAVE AS SOON AS THEIR MISSION WAS OVER. THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT, DESPITE SADDAM HUSSEIN'S EFFORTS TO PRESENT IT OTHERWISE, THE GULF WAR WAS NOT ABOUT RELIGION BUT RATHER ABOUT THAT WHICH RELIGION EMBODIES: GOOD VERSUS EVIL, RIGHT VERSUS WRONG. IT WAS A JUST WAR, FOUGHT UNDER THE LEGITIMATE AUTHORITY OF THE UN RESOLUTIONS.
3. THE PRESIDENT ALSO STRESSED THAT THE ADMINISTRATION AS WELL AS THE UN, THE ARAB LEAGUE AND THE EC - HAD MADE EVERY EFFORT TO RESOLVE THE CRISIS WITHOUT WAR. SADDAM HUSSEIN'S REJECTION OF THESE OVERTURES HAD MADE WAR INEVITABLE. HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT THE US'S GRAVEST OBLIGATION WAS TO CONDUCT WAR IN PROPORTION TO THE THREAT, ACTING REASONABLY, HUMANELY AND KEEPING CASUALTIES TO A MINIMUM. HE CONCLUDED THAT, ONCE THE WAR WAS OVER, THE US, ITS CREDIBILITY AND RELIABILITY RESTORED, WOULD HAVE A KEY LEADERSHIP ROLE IN HELPING TO BRING PEACE TO THE REST OF THE MIDDLE EAST.
4. THERE IS NO MAJOR NEW GULF-RELATED STORY TODAY. THE LIKELY EFFECTS OF THE OIL SLICK - AS WELL AS SPECULATION AS TO IRAQI MOTIVES IN RELEASING IT - CONTINUES TO BE GIVEN WIDE COVERAGE. THERE IS ALSO WIDESPREAD INTEREST IN IRAQI AIRCRAFT IN IRAN, BUT THE ADMINISTRATION ARE AVOIDING

PAGE 1
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SPECULATION ON IRANIAN MOTIVES OR INTENTIONS. (OUR JICTEL 21 GIVES THEIR BEST GUESS.) THE WHITE HOUSE SPOKESMAN SAID THE ADMINISTRATION HAD BEEN ASSURED THAT IRAN INTENDED TO BE NEUTRAL AND KEEP THE AIRCRAFT UNTIL THE WAR WAS OVER.

5. PRO AND ANTI-WAR DEMONSTRATIONS CONTINUE TO RECEIVE COVERAGE. AN ANTI-WAR MARCH IN WASHINGTON ON 26 JANUARY WAS ATTENDED BY 75,000 (ACCORDING TO THE POLICE). THIS WAS THREE TIMES AS LARGE AS THAT HELD LAST WEEKEND BUT MORE MODERATE IN TONE. THE WASHINGTON POST REPORTED THAT THOSE IT INTERVIEWED WERE HIGHLY CRITICAL OF IRAQ. THE WHITE HOUSE DESCRIBED THE PROTESTS AS QUOTE ENTIRELY APPROPRIATE UNQUOTE AND THE PRESS COVERAGE AS QUOTE FINE UNQUOTE.


6. A PARTISAN ELEMENT HAS CREPT INTO US DOMESTIC DEBATE ON THE GULF WAR, FOLLOWING NEWLY-APPOINTED REPUBLICAN NATIONAL CHAIRMAN YEUTTER'S COMMENT THAT THE GULF WAR WOULD BE A MAJOR POLITICAL ISSUE IN 1992 AND THAT DEMOCRATS WOULD FIND THEY HAD CHOSEN THE WRONG SIDE. HOUSE SPEAKER FOLEY AND DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN BROWN HAVE CRITICISED YEUTTER'S REMARKS SENATOR KERREY HAS NOTED THAT YEUTTER'S SUGGESTION THAT DEMOCRATS HAD MADE UP THEIR MINDS ON THE GULF ISSUE ACCORDING TO SOME POLITICAL CALCULUS QUOTE SAYS MORE ABOUT HIS APPROACH TO FOREIGN POLICY THAN OURS UNQUOTE.

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL London SW1A 2AH

28 January 1991

Dear Charles,

Gulf: Messages from President Mitterrand and M. Dumas

Thank you for your letter of 19 January. As he had agreed with the Prime Minister on 23 January, the Foreign Secretary raised President Mitterrand's letter to the Prime Minister with Dumas privately before their meeting in Paris on 24 January. The Foreign Secretary had that morning himself received a letter from Dumas on the same theme. I enclose a copy and an English translation.

The Foreign Secretary noted to Dumas that we had received these two stiff letters about the events on 14 January. One had only arrived that morning. He had discussed with the Prime Minister the points raised by President Mitterrand. The Prime Minister did feel that the President might have shared more freely at their lunch his ideas about final diplomatic action before expiry of the UN deadline, even if at that time President Mitterrand had reached no decisions. The question facing us now was whether we should reply to these letters, as we well could, or whether to draw a line. The Prime Minister had asked him to draw Dumas' attention to the efforts he and the Foreign Secretary had made to play down this issue, both in the House of Commons and with the media.

In reply, Dumas took the line that at President Mitterrand's lunch the French ideas for action in New York had only been in Dumas' own head. He had conceived of the plan that morning after watching the UN Secretary-General's interviews but had had no time to talk to President Mitterrand. The President himself had referred to the possibility of further action in New York only because he, the President, had had some ideas of his own. But the eventual French plan had not matured until later, and Dumas had telephoned the Foreign Secretary in London with the details as soon as he could.

After short further discussion, the Foreign Secretary and Dumas agreed to let the issue rest, and that there would be no replies to either letter.

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The Foreign Secretary commented finally to Dumas that this episode was all the more regrettable because the Prime Minister had felt that his lunch with the President had been a good one. Dumas agreed that it had been excellent.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (MOD) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

*Yours ever,
Christopher Prentice.*

(C N R Prentice)
Private Secretary

Sir Charles Powell KCMG
10 Downing Street

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
23rd January, 1991

Dear Secretary of State,

I have just received through the
diplomatic bag a letter addressed to you by
Monsieur Roland Dumas, Ministre d'Etat,
Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.

I enclose it herewith.

Yours sincerely



Bernard DORIN

The Rt. Hon. Douglas Hurd, CBE, MP
Secretary of State
for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Whitehall
London S.W.1.

(for urgent
translation)

- Mr. Symonds, WED

Republique Française

Le Ministre d'Etat
Ministre des Affaires Etrangères

[Delivered by French Embassy
at 0930 on 24 Jan.]

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Mr. Wether
21 JAN 1951
Mr. G. G. G. G.
Mr. J. J.
Mr. G. G. G. G.

Heads E. Unit

News
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Monsieur le Ministre, Cher Collègue,

cheu Douglas
Special Advisers
C. G. G. G.
24/1

Je ne peux que m'étonner de l'incompréhension manifestée par votre Gouvernement à l'égard de la dernière tentative faite par la France, le 14 janvier, pour convaincre l'Irak d'éviter la guerre.

Les critiques formulées publiquement à Londres et dans les colonnes de la presse parisienne, contre notre initiative, me paraissent particulièrement malvenues, compte tenu de la parfaite conformité de cette proposition avec les résolutions du Conseil de Sécurité des Nations Unies et avec les positions constantes exprimées par les Douze sur la solution des problèmes de la région. Je vous ai, au demeurant, longuement exposé au téléphone, le 14 janvier, les raisons de notre initiative, dont votre pays a été le premier avisé.

Vos premières réactions ne m'avaient pas laissé augurer un comportement aussi négatif de la part de votre Gouvernement et je regrette que le raidissement de la position des Etats-Unis, puis de la Grande-Bretagne, ait empêché le Conseil de Sécurité d'examiner avec la gravité et la sérénité

Monsieur Douglas HURD
Secretary of State for Foreign
and Commonwealth Affairs


qu'exigaient les circonstances, la dernière chance que nous proposons de donner à la paix. La contre-proposition britannique, dont vous ne m'aviez pas informé lors de nos conversations m'a, je dois vous le dire, fort surpris dans ce contexte.

Enfin, notre engagement militaire aux côtés des Nations qui ont décidé d'agir ensemble pour la libération du Koweït, ne devrait autoriser aucune critique sur la détermination de la France.

J'espère que ces malentendus successifs n'altéreront en rien les relations excellentes qui existent entre nous, comme entre nos deux pays, et que les circonstances présentes ne peuvent que renforcer.

Je vous prie de croire, Monsieur le Ministre, cher Collègue, en l'expression de mes sentiments les meilleurs.

Yours



Roland DUMAS

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LETTER OF 21 JANUARY FROM THE FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER TO
SECRETARY OF STATE

TRANSLATION

I cannot but be astonished by the lack of understanding shown by your government regarding the last attempt which France made on 14 January to convince Iraq to avoid war.

The criticisms of our initiative which were formulated publicly in London and in the columns of the Paris press seem to me particularly unwelcome, given that this proposal was in complete conformity with the UN Security Council Resolutions and with the constant positions expressed by the Twelve regarding the resolution of the problems of the region. Moreover, I explained to you at length on the telephone on 14 January the reasons for our initiative, of which your country was the first to be informed.

Your first reactions did not lead me to expect such a negative reaction on the part of your government, and I regret that the hardening of the US position, and then of the British position, prevented the Security Council from examining this last chance which we proposed to give for peace with the seriousness and serenity which the circumstances required. I must tell you that the British counter-proposal, about which you did not inform me during our conversations, greatly surprised me in this context.

Finally, our military commitment alongside the nations which decided to act together for the liberation of Kuwait ought not to permit any criticism of French determination.


I hope that these successive misunderstandings will have no adverse effect on the excellent relations which exist between us, as between our two countries, and which present circumstances can only strengthen.

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CCP

PM/91/008PRIME MINISTEROperation Granby : Burdensharing

1. As a consequence of recent events, I am circulating a revised version of my paper of 25 January, taking account of the new figures and offering further advice on tactics.

✓ 2. The burden which the UK is carrying on behalf of the international community as a whole is substantial. It is impossible to say what the Gulf conflict will cost us; that depends on how the fighting goes. But we can identify at least three factors bearing on the defence budget.

- (a) the cost of our forces' preparation, deployment and presence. On latest assessments, the extra cost of all this would, by the end of March, be well over £1 bn;
- (b) the cost of operations. We cannot say how much equipment, ammunition and supplies will be used/lost; the replacement cost of the first ten days is put at around £160m;
- (c) the "aftermath" cost. There will be a wide range of subsequent costs like movement homeward and pensions.

To put a figure now on these factors would be wholly artificial. But it is hard to see how they could total much less than £3bn, and they might easily turn out much higher.

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3. In terms of direct support, we have been given only \$110 million (by Japan and Germany) apart from what we are receiving (mainly from Saudi Arabia) under host nation support arrangements. This now compares very unfavourably with the support pledged or already being given to the US: for example, we believe that the US have requested \$6 billion from the FRG alone. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait have each pledged \$13.5 bn to the US in the last few days. The Treasury have calculated that in very broad terms, up to the outbreak of hostilities, the Americans (who are being very hard-nosed) had already been able to cover about two thirds of their extra costs and we only one third. Since the start of fighting has pushed costs higher, our recovery rate has of course fallen. I believe that our objective should be to cover at least half of our projected costs, ie. £1.5 billion, and that we should make a further approach to other countries.

4. This exercise needs careful targeting. I do not believe it is worth wasting our fire on those who will undoubtedly turn us down (European neutrals such as Austria and Switzerland are an example). We will, however, consult posts in Europe to ensure that we do not overlook any likely prospects. In addition, deciding how much we might reasonably ask for from each country is not easy because:

- (a) some countries have benefited from the Gulf crisis through higher oil prices, while others have suffered;
- (b) some countries are making significant military contributions and others none, while some countries have given significant economic assistance to the hardest hit, but little or no military contribution;



- (c) some countries will benefit much more directly from the liberation of Kuwait than others.

5. But I am clear that so far as those countries are concerned which we know have contributed to the Americans (indicated by an asterisk in the list below), we should ask for at least 8% of what the Americans have had or will be receiving in the future. This would reflect our relative deployed manpower. In relation to the rest, there is bound to be a degree of arbitrariness. But for all apart from the Gulf states, the following figures (which could be further refined) are based on some calculations by our Economic Advisers. They take estimated expenditure before hostilities as a base line, work out the approximate extra contributions required to bring performance (as a percentage of GDP) up to UK level, and then ask for 8% of the extra contribution. Some allowance is also made for the factors explained above.

6. On this basis, I think we might aim for contributions of the following order from the following countries (although we are checking with the Governor and High Commissioners in the territories marked †):

(a) <u>Gulf States</u>	f m
* Kuwait	660 <i>24</i>
* Saudi Arabia	560 <i>24</i>
* UAE	300 <i>EST.</i>
Qatar	30
Oman	30
Bahrain (host nation support only)	
TOTAL	1,580

/(b)

(b) European Countries

Belgium	30
* Germany (DM60m worth of equipment already received)	250
Netherlands	37.5
Norway	15
TOTAL	332.5

(c) Other countries

† Australia	30
Brunei	15
† Hong Kong	15
* Japan (\$50m already received)	400
† Malaysia	10
† New Zealand	7.5
Singapore	7.5
* South Korea	25
TOTAL	510.0

OVERALL TOTAL 2422.5

This leaves a substantial margin over the target figure of £1.5bn, to take account of the fact that in practice some countries will be very reluctant to pay up. The figure for the UAE is higher than would be justified by the 8% rule, to take account of the possibility that the Americans will soon extract a much increased pledge from them.

7. The arguments we put to each country should be tailored to their circumstances. Annex A discusses in more detail the situation of individual countries. Annex B shows which countries have been the principal gainers and losers from the Gulf crisis.

/8.

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8. The Chancellor and I have already sent messages on this subject to the Finance and Foreign Ministers of Japan, and it is for consideration whether a Minister (possibly a Treasury Minister) should visit Tokyo to follow up. You have written to Chancellor Kohl. You may feel it would be useful to speak to him as well; I will be seeing Genscher on 30 January. You are also writing to the Amir of Kuwait and I would propose that you should also send messages to the King of Saudi Arabia and to the rulers of the other Gulf states listed. To reinforce our efforts in the Gulf, I am considering an early visit to Saudi Arabia to see the Amir and King Fahd. I propose to send messages to all the other countries listed above. Where relevant, these messages should of course also cover the question of host nation support.

✓ 9. One of the keys to solving this problem is to get American agreement to co-operate with us. I therefore also recommend a message from you to President Bush.

10. I am copying this minute and attachments to OPD(G) colleagues and to the Chancellor of the Exchequer.

DA.

(DOUGLAS HURD)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
28 January 1991

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DH.

(DOUGLAS HURD)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
28 January 1991

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ANNEX A

COUNTRIES TO BE APPROACHED

A. DIRECT FINANCIAL SUPPORT

1. Japan. As a major importer of Gulf oil, Japan is a leading beneficiary of the allied action in the Gulf. Their inability to contribute militarily to the allied effort puts the Japanese under considerable moral pressure to help us financially. Of their total commitment to date of \$2 billion, we have received \$50 million; we believe this falls far short of what we might expect under the rule of thumb described above. The Japanese announced on 23 January that they will be offering a further \$9 billion to support the military effort. The Americans are aiming to pick all of this up. The Chancellor has recently sent a message to Mr Hashimoto, the Finance Minister, to ask for a further contribution; while I have sent a message to the Japanese Foreign Minister.

2. Germany. You have written to Chancellor Kohl to seek financial assistance, to follow up his earlier contribution of equipment to the value of about DM60 million. The Chancellor has mentioned our need for additional support to Finance Minister Waigel and I shall talk to Herr Genscher on 30 January.

3. We have not previously approached the Kuwaiti government for financial support, on the grounds that to do so might prejudice our chances of obtaining a substantial share of reconstruction contracts once hostilities are over. But in view of the \$16 bn (\$13.5 bn + \$2.5 bn) now pledged to the US, I believe the time

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has come when the al-Sabah should make a contribution to our military costs. You have written to the Amir to ask for this, as well as re-stating our claim to a fair share of reconstruction work.

4. Nor have we yet approached Saudi Arabia, which is of course a very special case. But the Americans have now had a pledge of \$13.5 bn from the Saudis, and we might therefore reasonably ask them for 8% of this figure.

5. Apart from Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, the other Gulf states are the most obvious beneficiaries of the action we are not taking. To date, their financial assistance to the UK costs has been insignificant. In particular, Oman and Qatar have made no contributions to military expenditures, though we are rpressing them for more host nation support - see below. Both should be pressed hard to contribute financially. The UAE has committed \$1 billion to the US. Shaikh Zayed told me on 13 January that the UAE would be "proud and happy" also to contribute to our costs. We should also be quick to take up this offer.

6. Other EC Countries. Most of our EC partners have contributed forces to the multi-national effort in some capacity or other. But apart from France and to a lesser extent Italy, none is participating directly in hostilities to the extent that they face the losses of men and material that our forces can expect. Belgium should be approached for a further financial contribution as a priority: our Embassy have reported that the Belgians already feel guilty for letting us down over our request for ammunition.

The Netherlands could also be asked to do more. We are consulting posts about which other European countries would be worth approaching.

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7. Of the newly industrialised economies, we should try approaching Singapore and South Korea. The latter will be a major beneficiary of a restoration of stability to the Gulf. The Korean contribution to date has been reasonably generous (we understand they have given the American \$120 million in direct support of military activities). The question of a contribution from Hong Kong has already been discussed informally with the Governor. The issue is highly sensitive locally. Nevertheless, in the light of the outbreak of hostilities, we are asking the Governor whether a formal approach to the Hong Kong authorities would be successful.
8. Oil producing countries have benefited greatly over the past six months from the rise in oil prices. Unfortunately, most non-Gulf oil producers (eg Venezuela, Mexico, Nigeria, Indonesia) are also major debtors, who cannot reasonably be asked to help. But Norway should be asked to do more, despite being a modest contributor to the multinational force. Malaysia has had a windfall due to higher oil prices since August and a request for assistance would be reasonable although the Malaysians will have political difficulties in acceding to the request. Brunei should be pressed for a contribution.
9. Australia is contributing to the military effort. But Mr Hawke has personally been keen to emphasise Anglo/Australian solidarity. We are consulting our High Commission for advice on whether a request for financial support would be productive. The same goes for New Zealand.

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
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B. HOST NATION SUPPORT (HNS)

10. We should continue to press for satisfactory agreements with Bahrain (where I raised the issue with Shaikh Khalifa on 11 January) and Oman (which has even attempted to charge us for fuel supplies). We have a HNS agreement with Saudi Arabia and are pursuing the possibility of a Saudi waiver of certain payments due to them in connection with the UK's purchase of AWACS; the MOD will no doubt continue to bring possibilities of this sort to our attention. We should also give thought now to the question of what HNS-type support we might obtain from Kuwait following Iraq's expulsion.

28 January 1991

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MY TELNO 088: GERMAN CONTRIBUTION TO BURDENSARING IN THE GULF

SUMMARY

1. THE US ASKS THE GERMANS FOR DOLLARS 6 BILLION IN CASH.

DETAIL

2. THE US EMBASSY HERE HAVE TOLD US THAT THE AMERICAN REQUEST TO THE GERMANS DELIVERED TO THE CHANCELLERY YESTERDAY, 27 JANUARY, IS FOR DOLLARS 6 BILLION TO BE PAID DURING THE NEXT QUARTER IN CASH. WARD (US MINISTER) COMMENTED THAT THE US WAS NOT INTERESTED IN HELP IN KIND.

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
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INFO IMMEDIATE DEP OF TRANSPORT (FOR MARINE POLLUTION CONTROL UNIT)

SIC I9M

MY TELNO 262: RELEASE OF OIL INTO GULF

SUMMARY

1. SAUDIS RESPOND TO OUR OFFER WITH REQUEST FOR TWO EXPERTS TO ASSIST IN DEALING WITH THE OIL SLICK, ONE OF WHOM WOULD BE ATTACHED TO THE US TEAM.

DETAIL

2. THE METEOROLOGICAL AND ENVIRONMENT PROTECTION ADMINISTRATION (MEPA) RANG US THIS MORNING TO ASK WHETHER WE COULD IDENTIFY TWO EXPERTS WHO WOULD BE WILLING TO ASSIST IN THE SAUDI OPERATION TO CONTAIN AND CLEAN UP THE OIL SLICK. THIS FOLLOWS MY OFFER TO PRINCE FAHD ABDULLAH, MINISTER (INTER ALIA) FOR ENVIRONMENT.

3. MEPA WOULD LIKE ONE EXPERT TO BE ATTACHED TO THE US TEAM DUE TO ARRIVE HERE ON THE AFTERNOON OF 28 JANUARY. THE TEAM IS TO ACT IN AN ADVISORY CAPACITY TO MEPA, AND WILL WORK WITH THE INTER-AGENCY SPILL MANAGEMENT OFFICE SET UP IN DHAHARAN ON THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES. ACCORDING TO THE US EMBASSY, THE TEAM PLANS FIRST TO ASSESS THE SCALE OF THE PROBLEM, AND THEN TO ADVISE THE SAUDIS ON HOW BEST TO CLEAN UP THE SLICK. AS WELL AS EQUIPMENT EN ROUTE FROM THE OIL SPILL SERVICE CENTRE AT SOUTHAMPTON, THE US CENTCOM HAS MADE AVAILABLE EQUIPMENT.

4. THE US TEAM HAS BEEN PUT TOGETHER AS A RESULT OF A DIRECT REQUEST FROM KING FAHD TO PRESIDENT BUSH. IT IS LED BY A CAPTAIN IN THE COASTGUARD. IT CONSISTS IN ADDITION OF ANOTHER COASTGUARD CAPTAIN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM EPA, TWO FROM THE NATIONAL OCEANOGRAPHIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION (NOAA), AND ONE FROM THE ARMY CORP OF ENGINEERS. THE US EMBASSY EXPECT THAT THE TEAM WILL BE JOINED IN A FEW DAYS BY A REPRESENTATIVE FROM THE FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE, WHOSE JOB WILL BE TO ADVISE IN THE CLEANING UP OF

THE ANIMAL LIFE AFFECTED. THE CONTACT IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT WHO HAS BEEN DEALING WITH THE TEAM IS TUCKER SCULLEY, DIRECTOR OF MARINE SCIENCE AND POLAR AFFAIRS IN OES/OSP (TEL NO 647 3262).

5. MEPA WOULD LIKE A SECOND BRITISH EXPERT WITH DIRECT HANDS ON EXPERIENCE OF DEALING WITH MARINE OIL SPILLAGES. THEY THOUGHT THAT THERE MIGHT BE PEOPLE IN BP OR SHELL WITH SUCH EXPERIENCE EITHER IN THE NORTH SEA OR IN THE CASE OF SHELL, FROM THE RECENT MERSEYSIDE SPILLAGE. THE EXPERT WOULD WORK DIRECTLY TO THE HEAD OF THE OIL SPILL DEPARTMENT AT MEPA, WHOSE JOB WILL BE PHYSICALLY TO DEAL WITH THE SLICK.

6. I WELCOME PROMPT DESPATCH TO ARAMCO OF BOOMS ETC. I AM GOING TO JUBAIL ON 29 JANUARY TO DISCUSS ASSISTANCE TO ROYAL COMMISSION (EG OVER SEA WATER COOLING RECYCLING) WITH PRINCE AFT.

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SIC

YOUR TELNO 168: IRAQ/KUWAIT: SECURITY COUNCIL

SUMMARY

1. AMERICANS REMAIN STRONGLY OPPOSED TO A CLOSED SESSION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND UNCONVINCED OF THE NEED FOR A PRE-EMPTIVE RESOLUTION.

DETAIL

2. THE MINISTER TOOK ACTION ON TUR WITH BOLTON ON 28 JANUARY, AND TOOK HIM IN DETAIL THROUGH PARAS 2 AND 3. BOLTON SAID HE HAD JUST DISCUSSED POSSIBLE US TACTICS IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL WITH KIMMITT, WHO REMAINED VIGOROUSLY OPPOSED TO ANY MEETING OF THE COUNCIL (MY TELNO 249). BOLTON SAID THAT PICKERING'S INSTRUCTIONS REMAINED TO OPPOSE BOTH CLOSED OR OPEN MEETINGS OF THE COUNCIL AND IF PRESSURE FOR A MEETING PROVED INEXORABLE, TO REVERT TO WASHINGTON FOR INSTRUCTIONS.

3. BOLTON SAID THAT WASHINGTON'S POSITION, AND IN PARTICULAR THINKING ON THE SEVENTH FLOOR (BAKER'S), WAS BASED ON THEIR VIEW THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL AS AN INSTITUTION TENDED TO MOVE RAPIDLY TO WHAT THE US REGARDED AS WORST-CASE SCENARIOS. FALL-BACK POSITIONS VERY QUICKLY BECAME ACTUAL. WASHINGTON WAS CONCERNED THAT ANY MEETING WOULD LEAD TO AN OUTCOME THAT

WOULD BE DAMAGING TO US. STATE WOULD THEREFORE PREFER TO CONTINUE STONE-WALLING. ANY OTHER COURSE OF ACTION WOULD OPEN THE FLOOD-GATES. BOLTON SAID THAT HE HAD SEEN A REPORT THAT THE MAGHREB COUNTRIES HAD ALREADY REJECTED THE PROPOSAL THAT NON-MEMBER PARTICIPANTS SHOULD ATTEND A CLOSED SESSION ONE AT A TIME.

4. IN ADDITION TO THIS GENERAL OBJECTION TO A CLOSED SESSION, BOLTON SAID THAT THE US HAD TWO SPECIFIC TACTICAL OBJECTIONS: FIRST, THEY DID NOT BELIEVE THAT A SESSION COULD BE KEPT TRULY CLOSED. THERE WAS NOTHING TO STOP PARTICIPANTS SPEAKING TO THE PRESS AFTER HAVING SPOKEN TO THE COUNCIL. THIS WOULD LEAD TO QUESTIONS AS TO WHAT THE COALITION WERE TRYING TO HIDE AND WOULD PRECIPITATE DEMANDS FOR AN OPEN SESSION. SECOND, STATE DID NOT CONSIDER THAT A CLOSED SESSION COULD HOLD OFF MORE FORMAL OPEN DEBATE FOR MORE THAN A FEW DAYS. INDEED, IT COULD ACTUALLY GENERATE DEMANDS FOR AN OPEN SESSION.

5. AS ANOTHER TACTICAL CONSIDERATION, BOLTON SAID THAT THE US WERE CONFIDENT THAT WE STILL HAD A MAJORITY ON THE COUNCIL. WE THEREFORE HAD THE WHIP HAND. IF WE HELD OUR GROUND, IT WOULD FORCE THE OPPOSITION TO RECONSIDER THEIR OWN APPROACH. THERE WAS NO NEED FOR US TO COMPROMISE AT THIS STAGE. INDEED, THE MORE WE ACCOMMODATED MAGHREB DEMANDS, THE MORE INSISTENT THOSE DEMANDS WOULD BECOME. WE SHOULD NOT THEREFORE CONSIDER THE TABLING OF A PRE-EMPTIVE RESOLUTION (AND BOLTON SPECIFICALLY REQUESTED THAT WE KEEP THE IDEA OF ANY US/UK RESOLUTION VERY MUCH TO OURSELVES).

6. WOOD COMMENTED THAT THE MAJOR DIFFERENCE IN ASSESSMENT BETWEEN US TURNED ON WHETHER AND FOR HOW LONG WE COULD DELAY HOLDING A COUNCIL SESSION. WE AGREED THAT WE MUST DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO AVOID RESOLUTIONS BEING TABLED WHICH WOULD ONLY LEAD TO THE USE OF A VETO. HENCE OUR BACK-POCKET DRAFT, A COPY OF WHICH HE LEFT WITH BOLTON. BOLTON SAID THAT THE US CALCULATED THAT WE HAD AT LEAST ANOTHER WEEK BEFORE PRESSURE INCREASED. THE ZAIRIAN PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL COULD AND WOULD, HE BELIEVED, RESIST DEMANDS FOR A CLOSED SESSION UNTIL THE END OF HIS TERM. THE INCOMING ZIMBABWEAN PRESIDENCY WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY FOLLOW THE PATTERN OF INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS WITH COUNCIL MEMBERS, WHICH WOULD TAKE ANOTHER COUPLE OF DAYS. THIS WOULD PROBABLY TAKE US TO 4-5 FEBRUARY, BY WHICH TIME THE SITUATION COULD HAVE MOVED ON:

QUOTE A WEEK IN THE UN IS A YEAR UNQUOTE.

7. WOOD ASKED BOLTON TO CHECK THE POSITION AGAIN WITH KIMMITT, FOLLOWING HIS REPRESENTATIONS. KIMMITT HAD BEEN TIED UP WITH MEETINGS ALL THIS MORNING (28 JANUARY) BUT BOLTON HAS SAID THAT HE IS NOW AWARE OF OUR VIEWS BUT HAD AGAIN CONFIRMED PICKERING'S INSTRUCTIONS IN PARA 2 ABOVE. THIS IS BAKER'S VIEW TOO. THE AMERICANS HOPE THAT WE CAN AGREE TO DIG IN AND HELP MAINTAIN THE POSITION THROUGH OUR MAJORITY ON THE COUNCIL.

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THE PRIME MINISTER

28 January 1991

SUBJECT CC MASTER
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PRIME MINISTER
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T32191

Dear Mr. President,

Thank you for your kind message of support for British and other allied forces' efforts in the Gulf in support of the UN Security Council resolutions on the Iraqi invasion and occupation of Kuwait. I look forward with you to a successful outcome with the minimum loss of life.

Like you I also hope that upholding UN resolutions will strengthen the authority of the United Nations in dealing with the situation in Cyprus. The UN has, and will continue to have, our full support for this.

Yours Sincerely
John Major

His Excellency Mr George Vassiliou

SECRET



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Jp 01291

SIR CHARLES POWELL

Gulf Conflict: Turkey

Has
Your letter of 27 January to Richard Gozney.

2. I wonder whether we want to put Saddam's mind at ease about the Turks. We should certainly do our best to ensure that at the end of hostilities Iraq is not dismembered. But if Saddam currently fears dismemberment at the hands of the Turks, and others, is that to be regretted? It has in fact been a theme we have sought to foster and the Turks, by now lifting restrictions on the Kurdish tongue, have given a helping hand.

3. There is another point about border adjustments. We are committed under an early Security Council resolution to promote negotiations between Kuwait and Iraq to resolve any outstanding differences. We shall have to make very sure that these negotiations are carefully controlled so that Kuwait does not give away what we have been fighting for; but, provided we can ensure an appropriate framework, border adjustments might conceivably form part of the agenda.

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PERCY CRADOCK

28 January 1991

SECRET





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LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

28 January 1991

Dear Sir,

THE GULF

I had a talk this afternoon on the secure line with General Scowcroft about a number of current issues in the Gulf conflict, including points raised in the meeting of OPD(G) this morning.

I began by saying that the Prime Minister and I had not been entirely clear about the meaning of the President's references on the telephone yesterday to recent progress with SCUD-hunting. General Scowcroft said that the President had been conveying that the Americans were having more luck with identifying SCUD sites. They had deployed the J-Stars system to the Gulf on an experimental basis. Over the last couple of nights this had turned up indications of movement on the ground at various sites in Iraq. When the Americans had subsequently struck at these, they had detected secondary explosions, which made them think they had hit targets - possibly SCUD sites.

I then turned to possible use by the Iraqis of CW, noting Saddam Hussein's recent statement that Iraq would use weapons which were 'not conventional'. There was some speculation that, as the Allies pressed home their attack on Iraq, Saddam Hussein would indeed start to use CW. Did the Americans have any more specific information? General Scowcroft said they had nothing beyond the sort of indications which I had mentioned. They had no evidence of specific preparations for the use of CW. I recalled that we had talked in the past about how the Americans might respond to the use of CW by Iraq. Our impression had been that they would go for a heavy conventional response. General Scowcroft confirmed that the US did not envisage retaliation with CW or nuclear weapons, at least at the moment. I noted that we had discussed and agreed joint objectives for the conflict with the Americans, which set out clearly the sort of targets which would be attacked. Would an American conventional response to Iraqi use of CW be limited to the sort of targets envisaged in those agreed objectives? General Scowcroft said that they would go for targets which they would not otherwise have gone after, for instance important economic facilities - factories, bridges, dams - and sectors of Iraq's petroleum industry, which they would otherwise leave alone. I pressed him whether they would in any circumstances envisage going for purely civilian targets such as the centre of Baghdad. General Scowcroft said that he did not think so: it was not at all likely. But he repeated that they

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
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would attack targets which they would otherwise have left alone.

I said that we remained puzzled about the continued outflow of Iraqi military aircraft to Iran. Were the Americans confident of the assurances they had received from the Iranians that the aircraft would be impounded until the end of the conflict? General Scowcroft said that the assurances had come from a very high level: and they had received the same assurances in private as in public. They were not sure whether or not to trust them. The aircraft concerned were all top-line and included most of Iraq's offensive air capability. If one took account of those destroyed by the Americans, there were not many left. The Americans remained distinctly uneasy about the whole episode and would watch the situation very closely. It might be that the Iraqis had a different view than we did of what the Iranians would permit them to do with the aircraft.

I took the opportunity to ask General Scowcroft whether the Americans had decided on postponement of the US/Soviet Summit. General Scowcroft said that they had indeed decided to postpone it. They took the view that it would be inappropriate for the President to go off to Moscow in the middle of the Gulf conflict. Moreover, there were serious difficulties in the START negotiations and continuing problems over the CFE agreement. If the Soviets would not budge on CFE, the Americans would not be prepared to conclude the START agreement. I said that the Prime Minister had provisional plans to go to Moscow to meet Gorbachev for the first time on 4/5 March. Our present intention was to maintain this meeting, although our decision would be affected by what happened between now and then in the Baltics. General Scowcroft said this seemed perfectly understandable to him and not out of line with the American decision which was principally - though not exclusively - determined by the difficulty for the President of leaving the US at present.

I am copying this letter to Richard Gozney (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and Sir Robin Butler.

Yours sincerely,


C. D. POWELL

Simon Webb, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence

SECRET AND PERSONAL



10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

28 January 1991

THE GULF

General Scowcroft called me late tonight on a matter not related to the Gulf, but mentioned three other points which might be of interest:

- Saddam Hussein has given a 90 minute interview on CNN, which they intend to show in bits tomorrow. Much of it is apparently a long history of how he was compelled into the war. It has been described to the White House as "chilling".
- x - The Israeli Ambassador telephoned Scowcroft tonight to say that their ~~forces~~ ^{sources} indicated that Saddam Hussein would do something "unconventional" in the next two days.
- He could confirm the reports of a massive explosion today near Basra, which had the seismic force of a volcano. It was apparently a major ammunitions dump going up.

I am copying this letter to Richard Gozney (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and to Sir Robin Butler.

C. D. POWELL

Simon Webb, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence.

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10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

28 January 1991

GULF: BURDEN-SHARING

I enclose the two letters from the Prime Minister to the Amir of Kuwait on burden-sharing and on reconstruction. I should be grateful if you would arrange for the earliest possible delivery of the first, with the second following as soon as appropriate.

I am copying this letter and enclosures to John Gieve (HM Treasury), Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence), Sue Bishop (Department of Trade and Industry), and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

C.D. POWELL

Simon Gass, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

28 January, 1991.

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T31191

Your Highness,

As you know from my letter to you of 9 January, I was very glad to have the opportunity, so soon after my appointment as Prime Minister, to talk to you in Ta'if. I welcomed the opportunity to renew our firm commitment to the liberation of Kuwait and the restoration of its legitimate government. Now, after the refusal of Iraq to comply with the UN Security Council deadline, military action to compel her to withdraw from Kuwait has begun and indeed is making good progress.

Our Armed Forces will be making great sacrifices for the liberation of Kuwait, and the British people are prepared for this. But the despatch to the Gulf of a large contingent of British forces (second in size among Western countries only to the United States contingent) has, however, been costly: certainly over one billion pounds already committed and likely to rise very much further. The commencement of hostilities will mean a major increase in costs. In the first week of hostilities alone, losses of aircraft and consumption of ammunition have amounted to well over £100 million. This will place a heavy burden on the people of the United Kingdom. It would be a profound gesture if your government were to make a substantial financial contribution to meeting these costs, in proportion to the assistance which you have given to the United States. Our own manpower in the Gulf amounts to 8 per cent of that of the United States. I understand that Your Highness's government has so far given as promised a total of \$16 billion

to the United States. Eight per cent of this sum, expressed in sterling, would amount to approximately £660 million. Such a contribution would demonstrate our joint cooperation and solidarity in the great venture which we have embarked upon. I believe the British people will look to Kuwait for such a gesture.

With military operations under way, the day of liberation is surely no longer far off. We shall be making to Your Highness's government proposals for a Status of Forces Agreement, which will cover such host nation support as you are able to provide, when our forces enter Kuwait. Kuwaiti and British forces are acting together. We will not flinch from what needs to be done.

Yours Sincerely,
John Reid

His Highness Shaikh Jabir Al Ahmad Al Sabah GCMG



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10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME-MINISTER

28 January, 1991.

Your Highness,

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T30191

At our meeting in Ta'if on 7 January I pledged Britain's help with the reconstruction of Kuwait. Our companies, which have been very active in the past in Kuwait and are represented all over the Gulf, are ready to participate in reconstruction both in the immediate emergency relief and in the longer term rebuilding of Kuwait's infrastructure. We have now formed a joint government/private sector task force to identify how best we can help you. I know that this will be welcome to you and hope that you will wish to instruct members of your government, particularly those immediately concerned with procurement, to respond positively to this initiative. The opening of a procurement office in London would be a valuable first step. This would match the action your government has taken in Washington. In addition, a general procurement contract issued to the Crown Agents, who have unique, unbiased and varied purchasing experience for overseas governments would be of considerable value in your reconstruction efforts. As I said in Ta'if, I trust you will use their services.

British representatives will be in touch with your Ministers and officials very soon about how best to follow up this request. One basis might be to agree on guidelines for procurement business based on recent OECD market shares of Kuwaiti imports before the invasion. As the reconstruction programme is likely to double the US market share to some 40 per cent, we trust that you would wish to ensure that Britain's

share received similar treatment, which would mean an increase to a 20 per cent market share. We wish to help but need the active guidance and co-operation of your government, particularly in the instruction of US project managers, if we are to do so quickly and effectively.

We in the UK are also committed to helping Kuwait to rebuild and develop its defence forces. On 14 January, the Head of our Defence Export Services Organisation again visited Ta'if to review with your Foreign Minister and Defence Minister the help we have already given with your short term defence equipment requirements; and to convey our intent to play a substantially larger part in fulfilling your future defence equipment needs. In this respect, I trust that you will approve the acquisition of Active Skyflash to exploit the capability of your new F-18 aircraft.

I look forward to receiving Your Highness's views on these matters.

Yours faithfully,
John Nye

His Highness Shaikh Jabir Al Ahmad Al Sabah GCMG



2 MARSHAM STREET
LONDON SW1P 3EB
071-276 3000

My ref:

Your ref:

Barry Potter
10 Downing Street
LONDON
SW1A 2AA

28 January 1991

Dear Barry,

STATEMENT ON GULF OIL SLICK

I enclose a copy of the statement that my Secretary of State proposes to make this afternoon. It may be subject to some final revision.

I am copying this to the Private Secretaries of the Chief Secretary, Lord President, the Chief Whip and the Secretaries of State for Transport, Defence and Energy and to Bill Reeves in the Cabinet Office.

*Yours
Phillip*

PHILLIP WARD
Private Secretary

POLLUTION IN THE GULF

DRAFT STATEMENT BY SECRETARY OF STATE

Mr Speaker, with permission I will make a statement about the UK response to the environmental damage taking place in the Gulf.

This oil spill in the Gulf is the largest ever. It is 35 miles long by 10 miles wide, it appears to contain some 8 million barrels of oil and it is moving down the Gulf at some 15 to 20 miles per day. Words are inadequate to condemn the callousness and irresponsibility of the action of Saddam Hussain in deliberately unleashing this environmental catastrophe.

There is a threat to desalination plants and fresh water supplies; to birds and other wildlife; to fish, sea mammals and shellfish; and to local communities dependent for their livelihoods on the sea.

With our allies, the UK is playing a full part in the World's response to this abomination.

First, we must stem the flow of oil. The United States has already acted on this decisively and, we believe and hope, effectively.

Secondly, we must assess the way in which the oil may flow so that we can assess likely consequences. Action is in hand in the Gulf itself to do this. To supplement it, UK scientific resources are already being mobilised. Existing computer models at the meteorological office and Proudman Oceanographic Laboratory are being urgently adapted to help give the best possible predictions of the likely behaviour of the slick in the Gulf.

Thirdly, we need to assess possible effects on marine life. The United States is already sending experts. The Natural Environment Research Council is co-ordinating urgent work to

bring together here in the UK information that we have on marine life and effects that could be useful in the Gulf.

Fourthly, in common with other countries, the UK is taking practical steps to help to protect desalination plants and sensitive coastal areas and inlets. The airlift of an initial 70 tonnes of equipment from the stores maintained by the oil industry will go ahead today, with a further flight tomorrow. Further material will be available if needed. My right Honourable Secretary of State for Transport is looking sympathetically at requests that we have received from the Saudi Government for the loan of small numbers of skilled pollution control experts and advisers. We anticipate being able to respond later today. The Department of Transport will meet EC colleagues tomorrow to consider whether the Community should send in its standing task force of national experts on oil pollution response. We shall be urging strongly that it should do so.

For the longer term, the UK is considering now how it will be able to help with the clean-up and restoration of the habitats and human settlements affected once it is safe to do so. We are making arrangements to assess and bring together the contribution that UK bodies outside government, whether public, private or voluntary, can make.

The first responsibility for dealing with the environmental problems facing the Gulf lies with the Gulf states themselves. We do not yet know what final form the arrangements for co-ordinating their efforts will take: matters are still developing fast. But, whatever they may be, the UK stands ready to play its full and immediate part. We shall be in touch later today with Saudi Arabia and the other states most closely involved with a first indication of the help we can offer.

Meanwhile UNEP today has announced its intention to take a lead on improving environmental communications and co-ordinating technical expertise. I have been in touch with UNEP to establish what we can offer by way of expert staff or other help.



Looking to the future, OECD environment Ministers are meeting in Paris on Wednesday. I shall be calling then for all OECD members to respond to this disaster and to take action according to their experience, equipment and skills to offer help to the Gulf states likely to be affected.

Mr Speaker, on Wednesday the environment Ministers of the OECD meet in Paris. It seems important to recognise the ongoing risks of environmental calamity which arise from time to time which go way beyond national frontiers. I mean to raise with OECD colleagues the proposal that we should set up a Working Party to recommend what more effective preparations we could undertake to cope with these disasters. I have in mind that there should be a register setting out available expertise and available facilities on which affected nations could draw in times of crisis. In this context, we shall be pressing for an early conclusion to the work already in hand in the International Maritime Organisation to put into effect a full-scale international convention on preparedness and response in relation to oil pollution and to set up regional centres to pool resources.

Mr Speaker, the whole House will be appalled at the environmental damage threatening the Gulf. The Government is determined to do all it reasonably can to assist those faced with the consequences of this outrage. We also intend to inject a new urgency into consideration of the wider issues raised by environmental threats that require co-ordination above the national level.





Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food
Whitehall Place, London SW1A 2HH

From the Minister

SECRET

The Rt Hon Peter Lilley MP
Secretary of State
Department of Trade and Industry
1-19 Victoria Street
London
SW1H 0ET

EDT
207:

28 January 1991

Dear Secretary of State

INSURANCE AGAINST DAMAGE BY IRAQI TERRORISTS

Thank you for your letter of 23 January, following up John Redwood's letter of 16 January. *for 1739*

It is disappointing to learn that the insurance industry is not prepared to cover the risks of damage caused by Iraqi terrorists and their supporters. This has implications for the food industry, which could be seriously affected by terrorist action, either directly as a result of damage to plant and equipment or indirectly arising from the kind of biological or chemical contamination which would require the imposition of statutory controls necessary to safeguard public health. I therefore support your proposal to work up a scheme to cover business and personal property risks in this area and would like to be kept in touch with your further thinking.

I am copying this letter to recipients of yours.

Yours sincerely
John Gummer

JOHN GUMMER
Approved by the Minister
and signed in his absence

87/801
11

RECEIVED
FBI - NEW YORK
JAN 10 1964


TO: DIRECTOR, FBI
FROM: SAC, NEW YORK
SUBJECT: [Illegible]
RE: [Illegible]

JAN 10 1964

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

28 January 1991

CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Charles,

Iraq/Kuwait: Burdensharing: Message from
The Prime Minister to Amir of Kuwait

/ Thank you for your letter of 27 January. In the
/ light of further discussion, we are, I think, now agreed
that the message to the Amir on a financial contribution
should include a new and higher figure and should be sent
as soon as possible without waiting for OPD(G) on
29 January. I therefore now enclose a further revised
version of the message, and am also sending back to you
the re-construction message as revised by you.

I am copying this letter and enclosures to
John Gieve (HM Treasury), Simon Webb (Ministry of
Defence), Sue Bishop (Department of Trade and Industry)
and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,
S L Gass

(S L Gass)
Private Secretary

Sir Charles Powell KCMG
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

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MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO THE AMIR OF KUWAIT

As you know from my letter to you of 9 January, I was very glad to have the opportunity, so soon after my appointment as Prime Minister, to talk to you in Ta'if. I welcomed the opportunity to renew our firm commitment to the liberation of Kuwait and the restoration of its legitimate government. Now, after the refusal of Iraq to comply with the UN Security Council deadline, military action to compel her to withdraw from Kuwait has begun and indeed is making good progress.

Our Armed Forces will be making great sacrifices for the liberation of Kuwait, and the British people are prepared for this. But the despatch to the Gulf of a large contingent of British forces (second in size among Western countries only to the United States contingent) has, however, been costly: certainly over one billion pounds already committed and likely to rise very much further. The commencement of hostilities will mean a major increase in costs. In the first week of hostilities alone, losses of aircraft and consumption of ammunition have amounted to well over £100 million. This will place a heavy burden on the people of the United Kingdom. It would be a profound gesture if your government were to make a substantial financial contribution to meeting these costs, in proportion to the assistance which you have given to the United States. Our own manpower in the Gulf amounts to 8% of that of the United States. I understand that Your Highness's government has so far given as promised a total of \$16 billion to the United States. Eight per cent of this sum, expressed in sterling, would amount to approximately £660 million. Such a contribution would demonstrate our joint cooperation and solidarity in the great venture which we have embarked upon. I believe the British people will look to Kuwait for such a gesture.

With military operations underway, the day of liberation is surely no longer far off. We shall be making to Your Highness's government proposals for a Status of Forces Agreement, which will

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cover such host nation support as you are able to provide, when our forces enter kuwait. Kuwaiti and British forces are acting together. We will not flinch from what needs to be done.

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c: Kuwait (MJ)

MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO THE AMIR OF KUWAIT

At our meeting in Ta'if on 7 January I pledged Britain's help with the reconstruction of Kuwait. Our companies, which have been very active in the past in Kuwait and are represented all over the Gulf, are ready to participate in reconstruction both in the immediate emergency relief and in the longer term rebuilding of Kuwait's infrastructure. We have now formed a joint government/private sector task force to identify how best we can help you. I know that this will be welcome to you and hope that you will wish to instruct members of your government, particularly those immediately concerned with procurement, to respond positively to this initiative. The opening of a procurement office in London would be a valuable first step. This would match the action your government has taken in Washington. In addition, a general procurement contract issued to the Crown Agents, who have unique, unbiased and varied purchasing experience for overseas governments would be of considerable value in your reconstruction efforts. As I said in Ta'if, I trust you will use their services.

British representatives will be in touch with your Ministers and officials very soon about how best to follow up this request. One basis might be to agree on guidelines for procurement business based on recent OECD market shares of Kuwaiti imports before the invasion. As the reconstruction programme is likely to double the US market share to some 40 per cent, we trust that you would wish to ensure that Britain's share received similar treatment, which would mean an increase to a 20 per cent market share. We wish to help but need the active guidance and co-operation of your government, particularly in the instruction of US project managers, if we are to do so quickly and effectively.

We in the UK are also committed to helping Kuwait to rebuild and develop its defence forces. On 14 January, the Head of our Defence Export Services Organisation again visited Ta'if to review with your Foreign Minister and Defence Minister the help

we have already given with your short term defence equipment requirements; and to convey our intent to play a substantially larger part in fulfilling your future defence equipment needs. In this respect, I trust that you will approve the acquisition of Active Skyflash to exploit the capability of your new F-18 aircraft.

I look forward to receiving Your Highness's views on these matters.

MANAGEMENT IN CONFIDENCE



File

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

28 January 1991


Dear Jane,

TELEPHONE CALLS FROM THE GULF

Thank you for your letter of 25 January on the question whether we should provide free or subsidised telephone calls home for our forces in the Gulf. In the light of the points which the Defence Secretary makes, the Prime Minister agrees that we should adopt the concessionary scheme set out in the enclosure to Colonel Durance's letter of 24 January to me. But he would like the maximum effort made to give a positive presentation of this concession. We should also need an early draft reply to Mr Kinnock, putting over our decision in positive terms.

The Prime Minister has also reverted to the question of parcel deliveries to our forces in the Gulf. The case for a free or subsidised parcel service continues to be a constant theme in the letters which the Prime Minister is receiving from the families of our forces. If a concession is to be made in this area too, it would be well worth combining it with an announcement about the subsidising of telephone calls.

I am copying this letter to Colonel Durance in the Minister of State for the Armed Forces' Office.

Yours sincerely,

Charles Powell

Miss Jane Binstead
Ministry of Defence

MANAGEMENT IN CONFIDENCE



CGPC

CO 2 L07i

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Secretary of State for Defence

minutes attached

Our discussion at OPDG yesterday about arrangements for the repatriation of the bodies of fatal casualties during the Gulf conflict reminded me of the unsatisfactory situation which arose after the Falklands conflict when the Southampton Coroner had to hold an inquest in respect of each serviceman whose body was repatriated. This was made necessary because the Court of Appeal judgement in the much publicised "Helen Smith" case had effectively removed any discretion from the Coroner. The law has not since been changed.

The extent of the possible embarrassment and waste of resources are succinctly set out in a letter written by the then Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for the Armed Forces to me as Minister of State at the Home Office (copy enclosed). It is of course far from certain that it will be possible in an operation of the present size to maintain in the field the sort of records which were so important in alleviating difficulties in the Falkland cases. This argues against individual repatriations as casualties occur.

The Home Office are, I know, well aware of this point and it has been addressed in the draft regulations which are ready to be made if and when emergency legislation has been enacted. These convert the coroner's duty to hold individual inquests into a discretionary power. It is however ~~no~~ means certain that such legislation will be necessary and I do not know whether there is any other legislative vehicle which could be used.



Copies of this minute go to members of OPDG, Kenneth Baker and Sir Robin Butler.

28 Jan 91. JX7.

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COPY NO 23 OF 24



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

Telephone 01-218 2452 (Direct, Dialling)

01-218 9000 (Switchboard)

PARLIAMENTARY UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR THE ARMED FORCES

D/US of S(AF)JW/17/1/4

369/82

24 December 1982

Patrick Mayhew Esq QC MP
Minister of State
Home Office
50 Queen Anne's Gate
London
SW1

Dear Paddy,

*✓ MH
4.1.83*

You will recollect the concern shared by the Home Secretary and the Defence Secretary at the unfortunate side-effect of the Appeal Court decision in the 'Helen Smith' case, which meant that the Southampton Coroner had no option but to hold an inquest into the deaths of 64 Service personnel whose bodies were repatriated from the Falkland Islands.

The inquest was successfully concluded without incident and I am most grateful to your Department for the support and advice given to the Coroner about how to proceed in his unusual task.

I understand that the Home Secretary is considering how best to restore the position to enable Coroners to regain their discretion whether or not to hold an inquest on the deaths of persons who have died abroad from violent or unnatural cause and whose bodies are brought within the jurisdiction of a Coroner.

May I underline the need for a return to the former position. The possibility that future Inquests of a similar nature might be used for political purposes to embarrass the Government or the Armed Forces is a real one. Furthermore such proceedings serve no legal or other useful purpose since Boards of Inquest have already been held (and have been accepted in the past as wholly adequate for the purpose) and, apart from the political risk, involve Service medical officers and officers in operational units in the substantial and additional tasks in preparing and giving evidence.

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We do not take comfort from the fact that, in this case, the Inquest proceedings were concluded smoothly and efficiently. This was largely the result of the sympathetic and commonsense approach of the Coroner and the close co-operation of the many officers and Units concerned. Above all, the ability to meet the particular nature of the Coroner's requirement, and for the inquest procedure to be seen to be followed, depended almost entirely on the fact that records were compiled and maintained in the most difficult circumstances: had these records not survived the air attack on Ajax Bay in which the temporary Record Office received a direct hit, it might have been a different story.

May I therefore urge very early action to ensure that inquests on Service personnel killed in action during Campaigns abroad, whose bodies are repatriated, are not mandatory? How this is to be achieved is for consideration by officials in the first instance, and mine will be glad to join in any discussions following your Department's initiative. I do not think however that in view of the importance and political implications we should rule out early legislation, if that should be necessary.

I am sending a copy of this letter to the Law Officers, and to the Lord Chancellor's Office.

Yours ever

Jerry
Jerry Wiggin





SECRET - UK EYES A

11
Zam Amir
CAB
28/1

B.0719

PRIME MINISTER

cc Sir Robin Butler
Sir Percy Cradock

OPD(G): 28 January: Overnight Action Points

Item 1: Iraqi oil slick

The Environment Secretary will report discussions last night over plans for the British company, Oil Spill Service Centre, to despatch 220 tons of oil clearance equipment, mainly booms and skimmers, to Saudi Arabia. The first consignment of 90 tons is due to leave this afternoon. This shipment will be funded on a contingency basis by the Department of the Environment and Department of Transport with a view to recovering the cost from Aramco.

2. US F-111 aircraft carried out two strikes yesterday using precision guided munitions on the manifolds through which the Iraqis have been pumping some of the oil. Preliminary reports suggest that the outflow volume of oil has reduced, though we cannot be sure about the exact results of the strikes until we have a full damage assessment later today.

Item 3: Current international situation

3. You might ask Sir Percy Cradock to report on the terrorist threat to Western interests overseas following the rocket attack on the Athens headquarters of American Express and the attack on a Greek insurance company, in the wake of earlier terrorist incidents in Turkey.

L V Appleyard
L V Appleyard

Cabinet Office
28 January 1991

SECRET - UK EYES A

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cc PC



Treasury Chambers, Parliament Street, SW1P 3AG
071-270 3000

28 January 1991

Sir Charles Powell
Private Secretary to the
Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
LONDON
SW1A 2AA

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vaw.
CJ 28/1

De Charles

KUWAIT: BURDENSARING


The Chancellor is content with the text of the draft message to the Amir of Kuwait about a Kuwaiti contribution to our military effort, enclosed with Richard Gozney's letter of 24 January as amended in Simon Gass's letter of the 25 January. However, he understands that the Kuwaitis have just announced a further \$13.5 billion of support for the US military effort, bringing the total to \$16 billion (which would cover the bulk of US cost so far). If these reports from Washington are correct, a proportionate contribution to the UK would be £750 million, not £300 million.

He also suggests that a message should be sent forthwith; an approach to the Kuwaitis is already overdue, and we are not aware of any good reason for waiting until a date in early February to deliver it.

He has no comments on the draft message about reconstruction.

I am copying this letter to Simon Gass (FCO), Simon Webb (MOD) and Sue Bishop (DTI).

Y...
Ja.
JOHN GIEVE
Principal Private Secretary



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162244
MDHIAN 0910

CONFIDENTIAL
FM WASHINGTON
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 264

OF 271645Z JANUARY 91

AND TO IMMEDIATE PARIS, ACTOR

INFO PRIORITY MOSCOW, EC POSTS, UKMIS NEW YORK, UKDEL NATO

INFO PRIORITY GULF POSTS, AMMAN, TEL AVIV, CAIRO, ANKARA

INFO PRIORITY OTTAWA, CANBERRA, WELLINGTON, TOKYO

YOUR TELNO. 62 TO PARIS: POST WAR HANDLING OF GULF SECURITY
AND ARAB/ISRAEL

SUMMARY

1. KIMMITT AND GATES EXPECT A FAIRLY LONG HAUL AND AN UNTIDY END. NEED TO PRESERVE OUR FREEDOM OF MANOEUVRE, INCLUDING ON SADDAM HUSSEIN'S FUTURE. THE AMERICANS, TOO, HAVE BEEN WORKING ON CEASEFIRE SCENARIOS, AND A LONGER TERM SECURITY STRUCTURE, AS WELL AS ECONOMIC QUESTIONS, COPING WITH THE IMMEDIATE AFTERMATH OF WAR, AND THE POLITICAL RECONSTRUCTION OF KUWAIT. THEY AGREE IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO COMPARE NOTES.

DETAIL

2. I SAW KIMMITT AND GATES (NSC) ON 25 JANUARY. KIMMITT SAID THAT THE ADMINISTRATION HAD BEEN SERIOUS IN SAYING SINCE DAY 1 OF THE CONFLICT THAT IT MIGHT TAKE MONTHS NOT WEEKS. THERE HAD BEEN A FLURRY OF SPECULATION LAST WEEK ABOUT THE POSSIBLE POST-WAR SHAPE OF THE REGION, BUT IT WAS IN FACT DIFFICULT TO GET A REAL SENSE OF WHAT THAT MIGHT BE. SADDAM HUSSEIN HAD DISPLAYED NO FLEXIBILITY AND HAD PREPARED HIMSELF FOR BATTLE WELL. THE ADMINISTRATION'S CURRENT PRIORITY WAS INEVITABLY TO FOCUS ON THE CURRENT OPERATION AND, SO FAR AS THE STATE DEPARTMENT WAS CONCERNED, ITS DIPLOMATIC RAMIFICATIONS. HE THOUGHT THAT BOTH THE AMERICANS AND OURSELVES WERE PRETTY MUCH AT THE SAME POINT ON WHAT OUR WAR AIMS SHOULD BE AND WHAT RHETORIC SHOULD BE USED TO EXPRESS THEM. BAKER'S REPLY OF 25 JANUARY TO YOUR MESSAGE OF 24 JANUARY ABOUT INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY CONFIRMED THIS. WE HAD TO BE CAREFUL IN OUR PUBLIC REMARKS NOT TO APPEAR TO EXPAND OUR WAR AIMS. WE ALSO HAD TO AVOID ANYTHING WHICH MIGHT LIMIT OUR FUTURE FREEDOM OF ACTION.

3. KIMMITT SAID THAT THE ADMINISTRATION HAD THE IMPRESSION FROM SOME THINGS THAT THE BRITISH HAD BEEN SAYING THAT WE MIGHT BE RATHER FURTHER DOWN THE ROAD THAN THEY WERE IN MAKING THE QUESTION OF SADDAM HUSSEIN'S FUTURE ONE OF OUR EXPLICIT

PAGE 1
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OBJECTIVES. THE AMERICANS WERE NOT AT THAT POINT YET. THERE WERE RISKS IN SUGGESTING THAT HE MIGHT IN SOME WAY BE AN OBSTACLE WHICH HAD TO BE REMOVED. IT WAS IN BOTH OUR DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL INTERESTS TO STICK TO THE LETTER OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS. IF WE WENT BEYOND THOSE, WE WOULD NEED TO CONCERT CLOSELY AND CONSIDER OUR TACTICS CAREFULLY. I SAID THAT I DID NOT THINK THERE WAS A DIFFERENCE BETWEEN US HERE. IT WAS EVIDENT FOR EXAMPLE FROM OUR PAPER ON INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY (WHICH I LEFT WITH HIM, AND WHICH THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S LEGAL ADVISERS HAD SEEN IN ADVANCE) THAT WE WERE ANXIOUS NOT TO LIMIT OUR FUTURE FREEDOM OF ACTION. THE WORDING THAT WE HAD SUGGESTED FOR USE IN PUBLIC MADE IT CLEAR THAT GUILTY IRAQIS WOULD BE LIABLE TO BE CALLED TO ACCOUNT, BUT THAT WE WOULD DECIDE WHAT WE WOULD ACTUALLY DO AT A LATER STAGE WHEN THE QUESTION BECAME MORE ACTUAL. AS THE AMERICANS WOULD BE AWARE, THERE HAD BEEN AN OUTCRY IN THE UNITED KINGDOM FOLLOWING THE EXPOSURE OF PRISONERS OF WAR ON TELEVISION.

4. KIMMITT SAID THAT HE DID NOT WANT TO BELABOUR HIS POINT TOO HARD. THE AMERICANS TOO AGREED THAT WE SHOULD NOT BOX OURSELVES IN. NOR SHOULD WE GET IN THE POSITION WHERE IT MIGHT SEEM THAT ONLY THE BRITISH AND AMERICANS WERE AFTER SADDAM HUSSEIN'S HEAD. OTHER MEMBERS OF THE COALITION ALSO HAD AN INTEREST IN THE MATTER. HE THOUGHT HOWEVER THAT THE ARABS, ONCE THE FIGHTING WAS OVER, MIGHT VERY WELL GO SOFT ON US. THEY MIGHT NOT EVEN PURSUE REPARATIONS ON THE GROUNDS THAT INTER-ARAB TRUST HAD TO BE RESTORED. WE SHOULD NOT BE SURPRISED IF THERE WAS A RAPID CHANGE OF HEART ON THEIR PART.

5. I SAID THAT THIS TIED IN WITH THINKING THAT WE HAD BEEN DOING ON POSSIBLE CEASEFIRE SCENARIOS AND HOW WE SHOULD REACT TO THEM. KIMMITT SAID THAT THE AMERICANS TOO HAD BEEN WORKING ON THIS QUESTION. HE THOUGHT IN PRACTICE THAT THE END MIGHT COME IN MORE OF A MUDDLE THAN AS A CLEAN PROCESS. WE MIGHT WELL ARRIVE AT A POINT WHERE SADDAM HUSSEIN WAS NOT PREPARED TO GIVE UP, EVEN AFTER A DEFEAT. WE SHOULD NOT IN THAT EVENT WANT TO DO ANYTHING WHICH MIGHT PUT US ON THE ROAD TO TRYING TO ASSERT CONTROL IN BAGHDAD. I POINTED OUT THAT WE ALL NEEDED TO STICK TO THE LINE THAT THE UNSCRS HAD TO BE ACCEPTED, INCLUDING BY SADDAM HUSSEIN. IF HE DID NOT ACCEPT THE RESOLUTIONS, HE WOULD STILL REPRESENT A THREAT TO KUWAIT, WHICH WOULD THUS NOT BE FULLY LIBERATED. KIMMETT SAID THAT HE AGREED THAT OUR LEGAL BASIS WAS SOUND IN TAKING THIS SORT OF LINE. BUT WE MIGHT WELL FIND OURSELVES WITHOUT COALITION PARTNERS IF WE HAD TO FIGHT TO THE LAST IRAQI SOLDIER. HE DOUBTED WHETHER SADDAM HUSSEIN WOULD BREAK WHAT HE UNDERSTOOD TO BE AN ARAB TRADITION OF NEVER SURRENDERING FORMALLY. WE SHOULD NOT IN

OUR RHETORIC SUGGEST THAT IF SADDAM HUSSEIN DID NOT ACCEPT THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS EXPLICITLY AS OPPOSED TO BEING FORCED TO COMPLY WITH THEM THE IRAQI REGIME MIGHT THEN BECOME OUR TARGET. THERE WAS A STRONG POSSIBILITY THAT HE WOULD NEVER CRY UNCLE.

6. I SAID THAT IF SADDAM HUSSEIN WOULD NOT ACCEPT THE REALITY OF HIS DEFEAT, THEN THE QUESTION OF THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS WHICH WOULD APPLY ONCE THE PRESENT CRISIS WAS OVER WOULD BECOME EVEN MORE IMPORTANT. WE WERE PREPARING PAPERS ON THIS SUBJECT, TOO. THERE COULD BE NO BLUEPRINT AT THIS STAGE, BUT IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO IDENTIFY THE AREAS ON WHICH WE SHOULD BE WORKING. THAT IN ITSELF WOULD HELP TO POINT UP IDEAS FOR A WAY FORWARD. I THEN DREW ON YOUR TUR. I ADDED THAT THERE WAS A NEED FOR A PUBLIC LINE TO COUNTER MEDIA COMMENT TO THE EFFECT THAT WE HAD ENTERED A WAR WITHOUT HAVING A CLEAR IDEA OF WHAT WE WANTED TO RESULT FROM IT. THERE WERE MANY VARIABLES HERE INCLUDING, FOR EXAMPLE, WHAT MOOD THE ISRAELIS WOULD BE IN ONCE THE CRISIS WAS OVER AND WHICH PALESTINIANS WOULD BE AVAILABLE TO NEGOTIATE WITH THEM.

7. KLMMITT SAID THAT THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAD DONE A GREAT DEAL OF WORK ON THESE QUESTIONS. IN ADDITION TO PAPERS ONES COVERING THE THREE AREAS THAT I HAD MENTIONED, THEY WERE PREPARING THREE FURTHER PAPERS, AS FOLLOWS:

(A) THE ECONOMICS OF A SETTLEMENT, INCLUDING HOW BEST TO APPROACH THE HAVE/HAVE NOT PROBLEM.

(B) HOW TO TACKLE THE IMMEDIATE AFTERMATH OF CONFLICT, INCLUDING IN IRAQ. IT WAS NOT JUST A QUESTION OF WHO WOULD BE IN CHARGE IN BAGHDAD, BUT ALSO WHO WOULD ADMINISTER THE BITS WHICH MIGHT BE OCCUPIED BY THE ALLIED FORCES AND HOW QUICKLY OUR TROOPS COULD BE EXTRACTED.

(C) THE POLITICAL AS WELL AS THE ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION OF KUWAIT. THERE MIGHT FOR EXAMPLE BE PROBLEMS BETWEEN THOSE WHO HAD STAYED BEHIND AND JOINED THE RESISTANCE AND THOSE WHO MIGHT WANT TO RETURN SIMPLY TO REIMPOSE THE OLD SYSTEM UNCHANGED.

8. KIMMITT SAID THE AMERICANS WOULD WANT TO TALK OVER ALL THESE TOPICS THOROUGHLY WITH US. THEY LOOKED FORWARD TO SEEING OUR PAPERS IN DUE COURSE. THEIR OWN WERE NOT YET QUITE READY BUT HE HOPED THAT THEY SOON WOULD BE

9. MY SUBSEQUENT CONVERSATION WITH GATES COVERED SIMILAR GROUND. HE TOO SAID THAT THE CAMPAIGN WAS GOING WELL. THE ADMINISTRATION HAD HAD TO DAMP DOWN INITIAL EUPHORIA. THE WEATHER HAD INTERFERED WITH OPERATIONS AND THE US AND ALLIED EFFORTS HAD BEEN SLOWED DOWN AND DIVERTED BECAUSE OF THE SCUD

PROBLEM. BUT THE LAST TWO DAYS HAD BEEN EXTRAORDINARY. SADDAM HUSSEIN'S RESISTANCE HAD DEMONSTRATED THAT HE HAD TURNED IRAQ INTO SOMETHING OF A LATTER DAY SPARTA. BUT NOW HIS NBC CAPABILITY HAD BEEN DEALT A HEAVY BLOW, AND THE AMERICANS WERE TURNING THEIR ATTENTION TO THE REPUBLICAN GUARD. THE ADMINISTRATIONS INTEREST LAY IN BOMBING FOR A LONGER RATHER THAN SHORTER PERIOD IF THAT WOULD CUT CASUALTIES.

10. I SPOKE OF OUR INTEREST IN FORWARD PLANNING AND OUTLINED THE AREAS ON WHICH WE WERE WORKING. I SAID THAT IN THE MEANTIME WE SHOULD BE CAREFUL NOT TO BOX OURSELVES IN BY PUBLIC STATEMENTS WHICH MIGHT LATER REBOUND UPON US. GATES SAID THAT HE VERY MUCH AGREED. THERE WAS NO ADMINISTRATION COMMITMENT TO WAR CRIMES TRIALS. BUT HE THOUGHT THAT REFERENCES TO THE POSSIBILITY MIGHT EXERCISE SOME DETERRENT EFFECT IN THE MEANTIME. HIS BEST JUDGEMENT HOWEVER WAS THAT THE IRAQIS WOULD NOT SURRENDER. THE END WOULD COME, RATHER, THROUGH A DESULTORY CEASEFIRE. WE MUST NOT COMMIT OURSELVES TO ANYTHING WHICH MIGHT IMPLY THAT WE INTENDED TO OCCUPY BAGHDAD. HE THOUGHT THAT THE POSSIBILITY OF OUR HAVING LIBERATED KUWAIT WHILE SADDAM HUSSEIN YET MANAGED TO PRESERVE SIGNIFICANT MILITARY FORCES WAS REMOTE. HE SEEMED UNLIKELY TO RETREAT IN TIME FOR THAT.

11. I SAID THAT WE THOUGHT THAT IT WOULD BE WISE TO ADDRESS THE PROBLEMS OF THE FUTURE WITH OUR CLOSE ALLIES SOONER RATHER THAN LATER. I MENTIONED YOUR CONVERSATION WITH DUMAS. GATES SAID THAT A LOT OF WORK HAD BEEN DONE IN THE ADMINISTRATION ON VARIOUS CONTINGENCIES. HE AGREED THAT WE SHOULD SHARE IDEAS.

12. GATES SAID THE NSC HAD BEEN WORKING IN PARTICULAR ON HOW THE WAR MIGHT TERMINATE. THEY WERE WORKING THROUGH POSSIBLE SCENARIOS RANGING FROM THE SURRENDER OF INDIVIDUAL UNITS TO SADDAM HUSSEIN STAYING IN POWER. THERE WERE PARTICULAR DANGERS IN MERE PAUSES IN THE CONFLICT. WHEN IT CAME TO THE POINT, WE SHOULD BE READY TO PUT A RANGE OF POSSIBILITIES INTO PLACE QUICKLY, RATHER THAN WORK GRADUALLY. THE AMERICANS HAD DISCUSSED POSSIBLE SECURITY STRUCTURES FOR KUWAIT WITH THE KUWAITIS IN TAIF. THERE WAS A RANGE OF VIEWS WITHIN THE ADMINISTRATION, WITH THE NSC PERHAPS TAKING THE STRONGEST LINE ON US TROOPS BEING GOT OUT OF THE AREA AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND THE BASIC JOB OF PEACEKEEPING BEING TURNED OVER TO THE ARABS OR THE UNITED NATIONS. THESE MATTERS STILL HAD TO BE TALKED THROUGH. THE ABILITY OF THE ARABS TO FORM AN EFFECTIVE PEACEKEEPING FORCE WAS OF COURSE QUESTIONABLE, PARTICULARLY IF THERE WAS NO DURABLE CEASEFIRE IN PLACE. AN AMERICAN AND BRITISH ROLE IN SUPPORTING SUCH A FORCE WAS PROBABLY INEVITABLE, INCLUDING LOGISTICAL HELP, A NAVAL PRESENCE AND PREPOSITIONING.

13. GATES SAID THE NSC CAME OUT WITH THREE BASIC PROPOSITIONS:
(A) THE CHESS BOARD WOULD HAVE CHANGED AFTER THE CONFLICT WAS OVER. WE COULD NOT AT PRESENT SEE EXACTLY HOW, BUT THERE WOULD BE OPPORTUNITIES AS WELL AS PROBLEMS.
(B) WESTERN INFLUENCE WAS NOW AT A HIGH POINT, BUT WOULD DECLINE RAPIDLY ONCE PEACE, OR SOMETHING LIKE IT, RETURNED.
(C) WE COULD NOT DICTATE THE OUTCOME, BUT NEEDED TO COORDINATE OUR APPROACH AND TO BE READY TO ACT RAPIDLY.
14. GATES SAID, LASTLY, THAT THE ADMINISTRATION WERE NOT AT PRESENT OVER-CONCERNED ABOUT THE STATE OF OPINION IN EGYPT. THEY THOUGHT MUBARAK HAD A GOOD MEASURE OF PUBLIC SUPPORT. HE SAW NO PRESENT NEED FOR PRE-EMPTIVE ACTION BY THE AMERICANS. PAKISTAN AND THE MAGHREB REPRESENTED MORE OF A PROBLEM.
- COMMENT
15. WE SHALL OF COURSE DO WHAT WE CAN TO ENCOURAGE THE AMERICANS TO SHOW US THEIR PAPERS SOONER RATHER THAN LATER. IT WILL HELP FOR US TO GIVE THEM DETAILS OF OUR THINKING AS SOON AS WE CAN. KIMMITT AND GATES SAID THAT THEY HOPED TO CARRY OUR TALKS FURTHER BEFORE TOO LONG.
16. I AM SLIGHTLY PUZZLED THAT KIMMITT SHOULD APPARENTLY HAVE THOUGHT OF US AS GETTING A BIT OUT IN FRONT IN EXTENDING OUR WAR AIMS AND PINNING ACCOUNTABILITY ON SADDAM HUSSEIN PERSONALLY. THE PRESIDENT WOULD SEEM TO ME TO HAVE GONE QUITE FAR AT LEAST IN THE LATTER DIRECTION. BUT YOU WILL NO DOUBT WANT, NEVERTHELESS, TO CONTINUE TO BEAR THE POINT IN MIND.

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From the Private Secretary

27 January 1991

Dear Richard.

THE GULF: BURDEN-SHARING

The Prime Minister has considered the Foreign Secretary's note on burden-sharing dated 25 January. This is now to be discussed in OPD(G) on 29 January, and I have suspended the draft message to the Amir of Kuwait until after then.

Since the minute was written, both the Kuwaitis and Saudis have announced figures for financial assistance to the United States which may affect our own judgment of how much we ask them for. I should add that the Prime Minister is rather disinclined to seek contributions from some of the countries on the list in the Foreign Secretary's minute, preferring to concentrate on a few main contributors.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries to members of OPD(G), John Gieve (HM Treasury) and to Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely,

Charles Powell

Richard Gozney Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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10 DOWNING STREET
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From the Private Secretary

27 January 1991

Dear Richard.

KUWAIT: BURDEN SHARING

Thank you for your letter of 24 January covering a draft message from the Prime Minister to the Amir of Kuwait, requesting financial help for our military effort in the conflict with Iraq, together with a separate message about the reconstruction of Kuwait following the end of the conflict.

To take the message about a financial contribution first. Various amendments have subsequently been suggested, in Simon Gass' letter of 25 January and Jane Binstead's of 26 January. I have recast the message with these and other amendments in mind, and enclose a revised version. But I have left the figure blank until after discussion in OPD(G) on Tuesday 29 January. In the light of what we now know about the Kuwaiti offer to the Americans, £300 million looks paltry. In any event, it seems better to delay despatch of the message until after that meeting. Whether thereafter it would be sensible to give the message to Mr Weston to take to Ta'if I am not sure. With all the publicity about burden-sharing, it seems important to me to get our request in very speedily and before the Americans mop up all available funds.

As regards the reconstruction message, I have again had the message retyped to take account of the two points suggested in the annex to Jane Binstead's letter of 26 January. I suggest that both message be on the agenda of OPD(G) on Tuesday.

I am copying this letter and enclosures to John Gieve (HM Treasury), Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence), Sue Bishop (Department of Trade and Industry) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely,

Charles Powell

Richard Gozney Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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c: Amir (MJ)

MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO THE AMIR OF KUWAIT

As you know from my letter to you of 9 January, I was very glad to have the opportunity, so soon after my appointment as Prime Minister, to talk to you in Ta'if. I welcomed the opportunity to renew our firm commitment to the liberation of Kuwait and the restoration of its legitimate government. Now, after the refusal of Iraq to comply with the UN Security Council deadline, military action to compel her to withdraw from Kuwait has begun and indeed is making good progress.

Our Armed Forces will be making great sacrifices for the liberation of Kuwait, and the British people are prepared for this. But the despatch to the Gulf of a large contingent of British forces (second in size among Western countries only to the United States contingent) has, however, been costly: certainly over one billion pounds already committed and likely to rise very much further. The commencement of hostilities will mean a major increase in costs. In the first week of hostilities alone, losses of aircraft and consumption of ammunition have amounted to well over £100 million. This will place a heavy burden on the people of the United Kingdom. It would be a profound gesture if your Government were to make a substantial financial contribution to meeting these costs, in proportion to the assistance which you have given to the United States. This would demonstrate our joint co-operation and solidarity in the great venture which we have embarked upon. I believe the British people will look to Kuwait for such a gesture.

With military operations underway, the day of liberation is surely no longer far off. We shall be making to Your Highness's government proposals for a Status of Forces Agreement, which will cover such host nation support as you are able to provide, when our forces enter Kuwait. Kuwaiti and British forces are acting together. We will not flinch from what needs to be done.

c: Kuwait (MJ)

MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO THE AMIR OF KUWAIT

At our meeting in Ta'if on 7 January I pledged Britain's help with the reconstruction of Kuwait. Our companies, which have been very active in the past in Kuwait and are represented all over the Gulf, are ready to participate in reconstruction both in the immediate emergency relief and in the longer term rebuilding of Kuwait's infrastructure. We have now formed a joint government/private sector task force to identify how best we can help you. I know that this will be welcome to you and hope that you will wish to instruct members of your government, particularly those immediately concerned with procurement, to respond positively to this initiative. The opening of a procurement office in London would be a valuable first step. This would match the action your government has taken in Washington. In addition, a general procurement contract issued to the Crown Agents, who have unique, unbiased and varied purchasing experience for overseas governments would be of considerable value in your reconstruction efforts. As I said in Ta'if, I trust you will use their services.


British representatives will be in touch with your Ministers and officials very soon about how best to follow up this request. One basis might be to agree on guidelines for procurement business based on recent OECD market shares of Kuwaiti imports before the invasion. As the reconstruction programme is likely to double the US market share to some 40 per cent, we trust that you would wish to ensure that Britain's share received similar treatment, which would mean an increase to a 20 per cent market share. We wish to help but need the active guidance and co-operation of your government, particularly in the instruction of US project managers, if we are to do so quickly and effectively.

We in the UK are also committed to helping Kuwait to rebuild and develop its defence forces. On 14 January, the Head of our Defence Export Services Organisation again visited Ta'if to review with your Foreign Minister and Defence Minister the help

We have already given with your short term defence equipment requirements; and to convey our intent to play a substantially larger part in fulfilling your future defence equipment needs. In this respect, I trust that you will approve the acquisition of Active Skyflash to exploit the capability of your new F-18 aircraft.

I look forward to receiving Your Highness's views on these matters.

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MY TELNO 252: RELEASE OF OIL INTO GULF

SUMMARY

1. SAUDIS NO FURTHER FORWARD IN IDENTIFYING POSSIBLE ROLE FOR UK TECHNICAL EXPERTS. LACKLUSTRE PRESS CONFERENCE BY PRESIDENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL AGENCY.

DETAIL

2. ENVIRONMENT MINISTER PRINCE FAHD ABDULLAH PHONED ME ON 27 JANUARY TO SAY THAT DR AL GAIN, PRESIDENT OF THE METEOROLOGICAL AND ENVIRONMENT PROTECTION ADMINISTRATION (MEPA, A BRANCH OF THE MOD) HAD BEEN GIVEN RESPONSIBILITY FOR COORDINATING OFFERS OF ASSISTANCE IN DEALING WITH THE OIL SPILL, AND WOULD BE IN TOUCH WITH US TO SEE HOW UK EXPERTISE MIGHT BE ABLE TO HELP.

3. AL GAIN, WHO VISITED THE UK ON A COI CATEGORY I VISIT IN OCTOBER 1990, WAS IN RIYADH ON THE SAME DAY TO GIVE A PRESS CONFERENCE BEFORE FLYING ON TO EASTERN PROVINCE (MEPA IS BASED IN JEDDA). WE SPOKE TO HIM BEFOREHAND. HE SAID HE HAD NOT GOT IDENTIFIED SPECIFIC AREAS WHERE OUTSIDE HELP WOULD BE NEEDED. ONCE HE HAD VISITED THE GULF COAST, HE MIGHT HAVE A BETTER IDEA. HE WOULD THEN CONTACT US.

4. AT HIS PRESS CONFERENCE, WHICH WAS CARRIED LIVE BY CNN, AL GAIN DESCRIBED THE IRAQI ACTION AS DELIBERATE AND ABHORRENT. THE SPILL, WHICH COULD TURN OUT TO BE THE LARGEST IN HISTORY WAS NOT ONLY CONTRARY TO REGIONAL PROTOCOLS UNDER THE REGIONAL ORGANISATION OF THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT (ROPME) TO WHICH IRAQ WAS A SIGNATORY, BUT OFFENDED THE VERY ROOTS OF THE RELIGION SHARED BY ALL GULF COUNTRIES.

5. AL GAIN SAID THAT THE LATEST AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHY SHOWED THE SLICK TO BE AROUND 13 MILES LONG AND 3 MILES WIDE. IT HAD BROKEN INTO TWO PARTS, BOTH OF WHICH WERE TRAVELLING IN A SOUTHERLY DIRECTION (THIS INFORMATION CONTRASTS WITH THE LATEST MILITARY BRIEFING, WHICH RECKONS THE SLICK TO BE 50 MILES BY 5 MILES), AND

PAGE 1
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HAD NOW REACHED SAFANIYAH, THE FIRST MAJOR SAUDI OIL FIELD SOUTH OF THE BORDER WITH KUWAIT AND ABOUT 80 MILES NORTH OF JUBAIL). AL GABIN

WAS CONFIDENT, HOWEVER, THAT SAUDI ARABIA, WHICH HAD LOTS OF EXPERIENCE IN DEALING WITH OIL SPILLAGES, COULD COPE. PLANS HAD BEEN PREPARED IN ANTICIPATION OF SADDAM'S ACTION. A MULTI-AGENCY SPILL MANAGEMENT OFFICE HAD BEEN SET UP ON THE EVE OF HOSTILITIES. THE KHAFJI AND SAFANIYAH DESALINATION PLANTS (WHICH COVER ONLY THEIR LOCAL AREAS) HAD ALREADY BEEN CLOSED (IN THE CASE OF KHAFJI, BECAUSE IT HAD BECOME A GHOST TOWN). BOOMS HAD BEEN PLACED AROUND ALL MAJOR FACILITIES FURTHER DOWN THE COAST. MEPA WAS STILL ASSESSING WHAT FURTHER ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN: THE US TEAM MIGHT HAVE IDEAS. ABSORBENTS AND SKIMMERS WERE PROBABLE. BUT FOR ENVIRONMENTAL REASONS, CHEMICAL DISPERSANTS, STOCKS OF WHICH WERE HELD BY ARAMCO, WOULD BE USED ONLY AS A LAST RESORT.

6. AL GAIN ADMITTED THAT CONTAINMENT WAS THE ONLY REALISTIC OPTION IN THE SHORT TERM. CLEANING UP THE SLICK MIGHT WELL HAVE TO AWAIT THE END OF THE WAR. BUT HE STRESSED THAT NONE OF SAUDI ARABIA'S GULF COAST FACILITIES - DESALINATION PLANTS, POWER STATIONS, OIL INSTALLATIONS AND REFINERIES - WERE AT RISK. THERE WOULD BE NO CLOSURES, AND NO REDUCTION IN PRODUCTION. THE REAL THREAT WAS TO THE FRAGILE ECOLOGY OF THE GULF. A NUMBER OF SPECIES WERE NOW ENDANGERED (THE DUGONG WAS MENTIONED IN PARTICULAR). THIS WOULD BE SADDAM'S LEGACY TO FUTURE GENERATIONS.

COMMENT

7. THE PRESS CONFERENCE WAS DISAPPOINTINGLY THIN ON DETAIL, PARTLY BECAUSE AL GAIN HAD CLEARLY NOT BEEN WELL BRIEFED ON THE SLICK BEFOREHAND. BUT IT DID AT LEAST SERVE TO HIGHLIGHT THE LIKELY EXTENT OF THE ECOLOGICAL DAMAGE TO THE GULF WHICH THE SPILL SEEMS CERTAIN TO WREAK.

8. AS FAR AS OUR OFFER TO HELP IS CONCERNED, WE SHALL CONTINUE TO KEEP IN TOUCH WITH AL GAIN AND HIS OFFICIALS AND WITH THE JUBAIL ROYAL COMMISSION. BUT THE BALL IS NOW IN THEIR COURT TO COME UP WITH SPECIFIC AREAS WHERE THEY NEED HELP. AL GAIN'S STAFF TOLD US THAT THEY WERE NOT SURE THAT THE US 'SWAT' TEAM, CONSISTING OF REPRESENTATIVES FROM AGENCIES SUCH AS THE US COASTGUARD AND EPA, WERE THE RIGHT PEOPLE FOR THE JOB AT HAND. THE SAUDIS HAD ALL THE SPILL MODELLING EXPERTISE THEY NEEDED AT THE KING FAHD UNIVERSITY OF PETROLEUM AND MINERAL RESOURCE (KFUPM) IN DHAHRAN. THEY THEREFORE HAD A GOOD IDEA OF WHAT THE SPILL WOULD DO AND IN WHICH DIRECTION IT WAS LIKELY TO TRAVEL. WHAT MEPA REALLY NEEDED WAS OIL PEOPLE WITH DIRECT EXPERIENCE OF

CONTAINING AND CLEANING UP A MULTI-MILLION BARREL SPILL.

9. MEANWHILE, ON THE COMMERCIAL SIDE, THE PRESIDENT OF BECHTEL MIDDLE EAST, WHOSE COMPANY WAS MENTIONED EARLIER BY THE AMERICNAS AS POSSIBLY TAKING A LEADING ROLE IN CLEAN UP OPERATIONS HAS TOLD US THAT BECHTEL HAVE NOT (NOT) BEEN APPROACHED SUBSTANTIVELY AND WOULD NOT BE KEEN ON THE TASK. THE SHELL REPRESENTATIVE HERE HAS BRIEFED US ON THE VIEW TAKEN BY THEIR JUBAIL REFINERY MANAGEMENT. ADEQUATE SHORT-TERM MEASURES, IN THE FORM OF BOOMS, HAVE BEEN TAKEN TO PROTECT THE REFINERY. BUT THERE ARE CONCERNS OVER LONGER-TERM PROBLEMS WHICH COULD EMERGE IF THE CRUDE OIL STARTS TO CLOT INTO TAR BALLS AND FLOAT UNDER THE SURFACE. IF THAT CANNOT BE CONTAINED, THE SEA WATER COOLING CHANNELS AT JUBAIL WOULD HAVE TO BE BLOCKED. THE TEMPERATURE OF THE WATER REMAINING IN THE CHANNELS WOULD BE LOW ENOUGH TO ENABLE THE REFINERY TO KEEP RUNNING, BUT MANY OF THE PETROCHEMICAL PLANTS IN JUBAIL MIGHT HAVE TO CLOSE DOWN. SIMILARLY, IF THE MAIN DESALINATION PLANT WAS FORCED TO CLOSE BECAUSE OF INADEQUATE PROTECTION, BOTH WATER PRODUCTION AND GENERATING CAPACITY FOR JUBAIL WOULD BE HIT. INSUFFICIENT POWER MIGHT NECESSITATE CLOSING THE REFINERY, SINCE ITS OWN GENERATORS PRODUCE ONLY ENOUGH TO PERMIT A CONTROLLED SHUT DOWN.

10. WE ARE FAXING TO EMERGENCY UNIT A USEFUL FACT SHEET PRODUCED BY THE SAUDI NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR WILDLIFE CONSERVATION AND DEVELOPMENT (NCWCD) ON THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE SPILLAGE FOR THE GULF.

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YOUR TELNO 29: GERMAN CONTRIBUTION TO BURDENSARING IN THE GULF

SUMMARY

1. PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE TO KOHL DELIVERED. POINT IN TUR MADE ORALLY. HARTMANN DESCRIBES FURTHER US REQUEST FOR FINANCIAL SUPPORT AS MASSIVE, AND LIKELY TO NECESSITATE TAX INCREASES HERE. HE SAYS THAT GERMANY SHOULD PROVIDE FINANCIAL SUPPORT TO BRITAIN AS WELL AS USA, AND APPEARS TO EXPECT A COOPERATIVE RESPONSE TO OUR REQUEST.

DETAIL

2. I DELIVERED THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE, AS AMENDED, TO HARTMANN, KOHL'S DIPLOMATIC ADVISER, ON 27 JANUARY. HE SAID THAT A MESSAGE FROM BUSH TO KOHL REQUESTING QUOTE MASSIVE UNQUOTE FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR THE WAR EFFORT HAD BEEN DELIVERED THAT MORNING. I MADE THE POINTS IN TUR. HARTMANN SAID THAT IF GERMANY HELPED THE USA IT SHOULD ALSO HELP BRITAIN PROPORTIONATELY. HE WOULD INFORM KOHL IMMEDIATELY OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE.

3. HARTMANN CONTINUED THAT THE SUMS REQUESTED BY THE USA WERE TOO HIGH TO ADD TO GERMANY'S PSBR. TAX INCREASES WOULD BE NECESSARY. I SAID THAT THE COSTS OF UNIFICATION WOULD BE A BIG PART OF THE REASON FOR ANY TAX INCREASES. HARTMANN NODDED AND SAID THAT TAX INCREASES WOULD NOT QUOTE BE BLAMED ON OTHER COUNTRIES UNQUOTE.

4. HARTMANN AGREED THAT THERE WAS A STRONG CASE FOR FURTHER FINANCIAL SUPPORT BY GERMANY FOR THE COALITION'S WAR EFFORT AGAINST IRAQ. HE HOPED THAT THIS WOULD HELP TO PUT AN END TO THE WIDESPREAD CRITICISM OF GERMANY IN BRITAIN AND ELSEWHERE. I DREW ATTENTION TO THE FINAL SENTENCE OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE, WHICH SAYS THAT A PROPORTIONATE GERMAN FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTION WOULD BE A DEMONSTRATION OF EUROPEAN UNITY.

5. AT THE START OF OUR TALK, BEFORE HE READ THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE, HARTMANN ASKED WHETHER THE CRITICISM OF GERMANY IN BRITAIN WAS REALLY AS SHARP AS THE GERMAN PRESS WAS REPORTING. I SAID THAT

THERE WAS MUCH CRITICISM, NOT LEAST IN THE SUNDAY PAPERS OF 27 JANURAY. GERMANY WAS SEEN AS A COUNTRY WHICH

- HAD BENEFITTED GREATLY FROM ITS ALLIANCE WITH THE US, UK, FRANCE AND OTHERS, GETTING SECURITY AND UNIFICATION

- LIVED FROM EXPORTS AND THEREFORE WAS DEPENDENT ON STABILITY ACROSS THE WORLD

- DEPENDED (UNLIKE THE UK AND US) ON IMPORTING ALL ITS OIL

- WAS RICH

- AND DESPITE ALL THIS WAS NOT SHARING THE RISKS AND CASUALTIES OF THE WAR.

6. HARTMANN ASKED WHAT GERMANY SHOULD DO TO COUNTER THE INTERNATIONAL CRITICISM. I SAID THAT IT WOULD HELP IF THE TOP FIGURES IN GERMAN POLITICS WOULD GIVE A LEAD TO PUBLIC OPINION, BY SUPPORTING THE ALLIED COUNTER ATTACK ON IRAQ REPEATEDLY AND UNRESERVEDLY: AND ALSO ARGUING FOR GERMAN SUPPORT FOR TURKEY IF IT WAS ATTACKED BY IRAQ. KOHL HAD SUCCESSFULLY LED PUBLIC OPINION IN THE RUN-UP TO UNIFICATION BUT HE WAS SAYING RATHER LITTLE ABOUT THE GULF. I SUGGESTED SECONDLY THAT GERMANY SHOULD BE GENEROUS IN ITS FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR BRITAIN AND THE US, BEARING IN MIND PARTICULARLY THAT IT WAS NOT TAKING CASUALTIES. I ALSO ASKED WHETHER GERMANY COULD FIND OTHER MEANS OF HELPING, FOR INSTANCE IN THE MEDICAL FIELD. HARTMANN SAID THAT PROVISION OF A BUNDESWEHR HOSPITAL SHOULD BE A POSSIBILITY, THOUGH THERE WOULD BE ARGUMENTS ABOUT WHICH FEDERAL MINISTRY SHOULD PAY. I SAID THAT SUCH ARGUMENTS, THOUGH NORMAL IN GOVERNMENTS, WERE NOT IMPORTANT COMPARED WITH WHAT WAS AT STAKE IN THE GULF. HARTMANN (WHOM I KNOW WELL) TOOK MY FRANK REMARKS WITHOUT ANNOYANCE AND SAID THAT HE SAW THE NEED FOR GERMANY TO ACT TO IMPROVE ITS STANDING IN ALLIED COUNTRIES. HE SAID THAT THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT WAS ALSO ACTING TO STOP THE QUOTE DISGUSTING BEHAVIOUR UNQUOTE OF GERMAN COMPANIES IN SUPPLYING WEAPONS, EVEN ELEMENTS FOR CW, TO IRAQ.

COMMENT

7. HARTMANN GAVE ME THE IMPRESSION THAT HE THOUGHT THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT WOULD MAKE A SERIOUS EFFORT TO MEET OUR REQUEST FOR FINANCIAL SUPPORT.

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GULF CONFLICT : IRANIAN ATTITUDE

SUMMARY

1. COORDINATED STATEMENTS BY IRAN'S SPIRITUAL LEADER AND PRESIDENT TO STOP CALLS BY RADICALS FOR IRAN TO SIDE WITH IRAQ IN HOLY WAR AGAINST ISRAEL / US. THIS AND OTHER INDICATIONS SUGGEST IRAN WILL NOT ABANDON ' NEUTRALITY ' EVEN IF ISRAEL RETALIATES TO SCUD ATTACKS.

DETAIL

2. THERE HAS BEEN A FIERCE RUNNING DEBATE IN THE IRANIAN MAJLES (PARLIAMENT) AND IN THE PRESS ABOUT IRAN' S ROLE IN THE GULF CONFLICT. EXTREMISTS HAVE URGED THE GOVERNMENT TO JOIN IRAQ IN FIGHTING A JIHAD AGAINST ISRAEL AND THE AMERICANS. THE RADICALS HAVE REJOICED IN REPORTS OF SCUD ATTACKS ON CIVILIAN TARGETS IN ISRAEL.

3. IN A MAJOR STATEMENT ON 24 JANUARY, IRAN'S SPIRITUAL LEADER, KHAMENEI, CRITICISED THE BOMBING OF IRAQI CITIES BY THE US AND ITS ALLIES AND DESCRIBED PRESIDENT BUSH AS A MURDERER AND CRIMINAL FOR MASSACRING INNOCENT PEOPLE. BUT HAVING CRITICISED THE AMERICANS AND THEIR ALLIES, KHAMENEI WENT ON TO MAKE A DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE INNOCENT IRAQI PEOPLE AND THE IRAQI LEADER SHIP. HE ASKED RHETORICALLY WHETHER THE LEADER AND OTHER OFFICIALS (OF IRAQ) HAD THE RIGHT TO EXPOSE ALL THEIR HUMAN AND VITAL RESOURCES TO DESTRUCTION. THE OCCUPATION OF KUWAIT, WHICH HAD TURNED IRAQ'S OPPRESSED PEOPLE INTO THE TARGETS OF WICKED ENEMIES WAS INDEFENSIBLE. WHAT IRAQ HAD DONE WAS IN THE INTERESTS OF ISRAEL AND THE ENEMIES OF ISLAM, AND TO THE DETRIMENT OF THE IRAQIS AND OTHER MOSLEM NATIONS OF THE REGION, NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT SCUD ATTACKS MEANT THAT ISRAEL TO SOME EXTENT COULD NOW FEEL THE PRESSURE IT HAD INFLICTED ON THE INNOCENT PEOPLE OF PALESTINE.

4. KHAMENEI WARNED THAT ' CERTAIN PEOPLE ' (COMMENT : I.E. THE RADICALS INSIDE IRAN) WERE ATTEMPTING TO MISINTERPRET THE TERM NEUTRALITY WHICH DESCRIBED IRAN'S STANCE. IRAN'S POLICY WAS FULLY ISLAMIC AND REVOLUTIONARY. IN THE OPINION OF IRAN AND ALL THE REASONABLE PEOPLE (SIC), THE PARTIES INVOLVED IN THE PERSIAN GULF WAR WERE FIGHTING EACH OTHER FOR WRONG, SECULAR AND UNHOLY GOALS. THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC REJECTED BOTH THEIR POSITIONS IRAN DID NOT SEE THE CONFLICT AS ISLAM'S WAR AGAINST BLASPHEMY.

5. PRESIDENT RAFSANJANI DEVELOPED THIS THEME IN A MAJOR SPEECH AT THE FRIDAY PRAYERS THE FOLLOWING DAY. HE DESCRIBED THE CONFLICT AS ' A WAR OF OIL '. THE ALLIES WERE NOT SOLELY INTERESTED IN IRAQ'S WITHDRAWAL FROM KUWAIT : THIS OBJECTIVE DID NOT REQUIRE THE DESTRUCTION OF IRAQ'S ECONOMIC AND OTHER RESOURCES. REFERRING TO IRAQI OCCUPATION OF KUWAIT, HE SAID THAT IT WOULD COST THE REGION VERY DEAR IF ANY COUNTRY TRIED TO OCCUPY ANOTHER TINY STATE UNDER THE PRETEXT OF TERRITORIAL DISPUTES. CHALLENGING THOSE WHO CALLED FOR IRAN TO ENTER THE WAR IN SUPPORT OF IRAQ, RAFSANJANI SAID THAT THIS WOULD MERELY ENABLE SADDAM HUSSEIN TO STAY IN KUWAIT, WHICH WAS HIS REAL OBJECTIVE. IF THE CURRENT WAR HAD BEEN ONE OF ' JUSTICE AGAINST FALSEHOOD ', IRAN MIGHT HAVE ENTERED THE BATTLE. IRAN AGREED THAT THE US WAS A CENTRE OF CORRUPTION AND SHOULD BE COUNTERED. BUT IN THE CURRENT PERSIAN GULF CRISIS THE ISSUE WAS DIFFERENT AND IRAN COULD NOT COMMIT SUICIDE. THOSE IN IRAN WHO WARNED AGAINST ' WEAKENING THE IMAM'S LINE ' WERE SYMPATHISERS OF THE REVOLUTION AND HE HAD NO WISH TO ACCUSE ANYONE OF ILL INTENTION - BUT HE WISHED TO MAKE CLEAR THAT THE ONLY PEOPLE TO BENEFIT FROM THEIR REMARKS WOULD BE THE FOREIGNERS (I.E. US).

6. RAFSANJANI SAID THAT THE SUPREME NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL, ATTENDED BY ' THE COUNTRY'S MOST EFFECTIVE FORCES ', HAD TAKEN THE DECISION TO REMAIN NEUTRAL IN THE WAR. THIS DECISION SHOULD NOT BE QUESTIONED BECAUSE THIS MIGHT CREATE DOUBT AMONG THE PEOPLE AS TO WHETHER THE POLICY OF NEUTRALITY WAS CORRECT.

7. ON THE WAR WITH ISRAEL, HE NOTED THAT EVEN DURING THE IRAN / IRAQ WAR, IRAN HAD SENT A GROUP OF HEZBOLLAH FORCES TO LEBANON TO FIGHT AGAINST ISRAEL. THE IRANIAN PEOPLE SHOULD NOT BE DECEIVED. IRAN BELIEVED IN A WAR WITH ISRAEL WHICH WOULD CONTINUE UNTIL THE FULL SOVEREIGNTY OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE HAD BEEN SECURED. TO ACHIEVE THIS, THE COUNTRIES BORDERING ISRAEL WOULD NEED THE BACKING OF THE OIL RICH STATES, AND ENTER THE BATTLE TOGETHER TO WIPE OUT ISRAEL. ' GOD WILLING THIS WILL BE DONE

ONE DAY '. BUT THIS WAS NOT (NOT) THE RIGHT TIME.

COMMENT

8. THESE CAREFULLY COORDINATED SPEECHES ARE OF IMMENSE SIGNIFICANCE HERE. SINCE THE IRAQI INVASION OF KUWAIT, THE CONTINUING STRUGGLE FOR POWER INSIDE IRAN HAS BEEN REFLECTED IN ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE GULF CONFLICT. WHILE THE GOVERNMENT HAS TRIED TO BALANCE CALLS FOR IRAQ'S WITHDRAWAL FROM KUWAIT WITH A DEMAND THAT FOREIGN FORCES SHOULD WITHDRAW FROM THE REGION, RADICALS IN THE MAJLES AND THE PRESS HAVE ATTACKED THE GOVERNMENT FOR FAILING TO JOIN IRAQ IN FIGHTING A JIHAD AGAINST ISRAEL AND THE AMERICANS. NOW THAT BOTH KHAMENEI AND RAFSANJANI HAVE GIVEN THEIR SPIRITUAL AND POLITICAL SUPPORT SO UNAMBIGUOUSLY TO THE POLICY OF NEUTRALITY, THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD FIND IT MUCH EASIER TO SILENCE ANY FURTHER CRITICISM AND RESIST ANY PRESSURE TO TAKE IRAQ'S SIDE IN THE CONFLICT.

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FM TEHRAN

TO DESKBY 271100Z FCO

TELNO 82

OF 270940Z JANUARY 91

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, GULF POSTS

INFO IMMEDIATE POLAD HIGH WYCOMBE, MODUK, ACTOR

FCO TELNOS 66 AND 67 : IRAQI AIR PLANES IN IRAN

SUMMARY

1. IRANIAN NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL (SNSC) ANNOUNCES THAT ANY IRAQI OR ALLIED PLANES MAKING EMERGENCY LANDINGS IN IRAN WILL BE IMPOUNDED UNTIL THE CONFLICT ENDS. MFA VICE MINISTER SUSPECTS THAT IRAQI PLANES WERE SENT TO TRY TO DRAW IRAN INTO THE CONFLICT. IRAN DETERMINED NOT TO HELP IRAQ, AND BELIEVE THAT EVEN-HANDED APPROACH IS UNLIKELY TO AFFECT ALLIES. IRAQI PILOTS WANT TO RETURN TO BAGHDAD : IRANIANS STILL TO TAKE DECISION. I EMPHASISE IMPORTANCE OF RELEASING ANY ALLIED PILOT WHO MIGHT LAND IN IRAN, EVEN IF THIS MEANS IRAQIS ARE ALSO FREED. MFA THINK THIS LIKELY TO BE THEIR APPROACH.

DETAIL

2. AS REPORTED IN THE MEDIA (FIRST TUR), SEVEN IRAQI WAR PLANES LANDED AT AN UNSPECIFIED MILITARY AIRFIELD IN IRAN AT 0630Z 26 JANUARY. THE SNSC MET LATER THAT DAY UNDER RAFSANJANI'S CHAIRMANSHIP AND ANNOUNCED THAT, IN VIEW OF IRAN'S NEUTRALITY IN THE CONFLICT BELLIGERENT PARTIES SHOULD REFRAIN FROM USING IRANIAN AIRSPACE IN ANY WAY. IF AN AIRCRAFT FROM EITHER SIDE MADE AN EMERGENCY LANDING IN IRANIAN TERRITORY IT WOULD BE IMPOUNDED UNTIL THE END OF THE CONFLICT.

3. I CALLED ON THE MFA VICE MINISTER RESPONSIBLE FOR EUROPE AND THE AMERICAS, VAEZI, THIS MORNING 27 JANUARY TO DELIVER OUR STATEMENT ON BOMBING OF HOLY SHRINES (MIFT). HE SAID THE ARRIVAL OF THESE IRAQI WARPLANES HAD COME AS A COMPLETE SURPRISE. THEY HAD ENTERED IN A SINGLE GROUP AND HAD ASKED FOR PERMISSION

TO MAKE AN EMERGENCY LANDING, SAYING THEY DID NOT HAVE ADEQUATE FUEL TO RETURN TO BASE. THE IRANIANS HAD SENT UP FIGHTERS TO GUIDE THEM DOWN. ONE OF THE IRAQI PLANES HAD CAUGHT FIRE WHEN

LANDING , AND TWO MORE HAD HAD (UNSPECIFIED) MECHANICAL PROBLEMS.

4. VAEZI SAID THAT HE THOUGHT IT POSSIBLE THAT THE IRAQIS HAD SENT THESE AIRCRAFT IN AN ATTEMPT TO DRAW IRAN INTO THE CONFLICT. IF THIS WAS SO, THE PLAN HAD NOT WORKED. THE SNSC HAD MET AT SHORT NOTICE TO ENSURE THAT NOBODY COULD MISUNDERSTAND IRAN'S POSITION. BECAUSE OF IRAN'S DETERMINATION TO KEEP OUT OF THE CONFLICT, THE GOVERNMENT HAD HAD TO TAKE AN EVEN-HANDED APPROACH. BUT WHEREAS THE IRAQIS HAD NOWHERE ELSE TO GO IN AN EMERGENCY, THE IRANIANS DID NOT EXPECT THAT ALLIED PLANES WOULD NEED EMERGENCY FACILITIES IN IRAN.

5. I ASKED ABOUT THE IRAQI PILOTS. VAEZI SAID THAT THEY HAD ALL ASKED TO BE RETURNED TO BAGHDAD, WHICH HAD INCREASED HIS SUSPICIONS OF AN IRAQI PLOT. NO DECISION HAD YET BEEN TAKEN. I SAID THAT IF A BRITISH OR AMERICAN AIRCRAFT WERE TO LAND IN IRAN, IT WOULD CREATE A VERY BAD IMPRESSION IF THE CREW WAS TO BE DETAINED HERE. I DID NOT HAVE INSTRUCTIONS ON THIS POINT, BUT IF THE IRANIANS HAD TO TAKE AN EARLY DECISION ON THE IRAQI PILOTS I THOUGHT IT LIKELY THAT HMG'S PREFERENCE WOULD BE THAT ALLIED AIRCREW SHOULD BE RELEASED AT ONCE EVEN IF THIS MEANT THAT IRAQIS WERE RETURNED TO BAGHDAD.

I ALSO HOPED THAT WE WOULD BE GIVEN IMMEDIATE NOTIFICATION AND CONSULAR ACCESS TO ANY BRITISH SERVICEMEN. VAEZI SAID THAT WE WOULD HAVE NO PROBLEM IN THIS REGARD. HE THOUGHT IT LIKELY THAT THE GOVERNMENT WOULD DECIDE THAT ALL AIRCREW WOULD BE SENT HOME.

6. I ASKED ABOUT THE PENTAGON SPOKESMAN'S COMMENT THAT AT LEAST 24 IRAQI AIRCRAFT HAD FLOWN TO IRAN IN THE LAST FEW DAYS (FCO TEL NO 067). VAEZI SAID THAT HE HAD NEVER HEARD ANYTHING ABOUT THIS.

COMMENT

7. VAEZI OFFERED NO EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT HIS SURPRISING THEORY OF AN IRAQI PLOT LYING BEHIND THIS EMERGENCY LANDING.

8. IF THE LINE I TOOK IN PARA 5 IS INCORRECT, GRATEFUL FOR IMMEDIATE INSTRUCTIONS SO THAT I CAN GO BACK TO VAEZI.

9. THE IRANIANS REMAIN DETERMINED TO KEEP OUT OF THE CONFLICT. I WARNED VAEZI THAT THE WAY IRAN PRESENTED THEIR SO CALLED NEUTRALITY, AND ATTEMPTED TO BALANCE WITHDRAWAL FROM KUWAIT AND THE REMOVAL OF FOREIGN FORCES FROM THE REGION, WERE OPEN TO MISINTERPRETATION. HE SAID THAT IRAN HAD MADE CLEAR THEIR VIEW THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN

HAD CAUSED THE CONFLICT AND SHOULD WITHDRAW FROM KUWAIT. THIS WITHDRAWAL SHOULD PRECEDE THE DEPARTURE OF NON REGIONAL FORCES. IRAN'S ' NEUTRALITY ' EXTENDED ONLY TO MILITARY ACTIVITY. THEY HAD NO SYMPATHY FOR IRAQI POLICY, ONLY FOR THE IRAQI PEOPLE.

10. PLEASE SEE MIFT (NOT TO ALL).

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INFO IMMEDIATE JEDDA, PARIS, WASHINGTON, ACTOR, GULF POSTS

RIYADH TELNO 237 AND FCO TELNO 177 TO RIYADH: GULF CONFLICT :
ENVIRONMENTAL THREAT

SUMMARY

1. IRANIANS KEEN TO COOPERATE OVER OIL SLICK.

DETAIL

2. WHEN I CALLED THIS MORNING 27 JANUARY ON THE MFA VICE MINISTER FOR EUROPE AND THE AMERICAS VAEZI RAISED THE ISSUE OF POLLUTION WITHOUT PROMPTING FROM ME. HE SAID THAT BLACK RAIN HAD FALLEN YESTERDAY IN BUSHEHR AND THAT THE AIR POLLUTION THERE WAS NOW VERY SERIOUS. THE OIL SLICK WAS ALSO MOVING RAPIDLY TOWARDS IRAN. IT WAS ESSENTIAL TO COOPERATE IN TACKLING IT. IRAN WAS EAGER TO WORK TOGETHER WITH OTHER REGIONAL POWERS AND THE EUROPEANS.

3. I SAID THAT I WAS SURE THAT IRAN'S COOPERATION WOULD BE WELCOME. DESPITE IRAQI PROPAGANDA, MY INFORMATION WAS THAT THE IRAQIS WERE DELIBERATELY PUMPING OIL INTO THE SEA. VAEZI SAID THAT THE IRANIANS WERE IN NO DOUBT ABOUT THIS.

COMMENT

4. VAEZI CONSPICUOUSLY DID NOT REFER TO COOPERATION WITH THE AMERICANS, WHICH THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT WOULD FIND VERY DIFFICULT IN PRESENTATIONAL TERMS. NEVERTHELESS, THERE WAS NO DOUBTING HIS INTEREST IN COOPERATION - WHICH WOULD PRESUMABLY HAVE TO INVOLVE THE AMERICANS - IF SOME FACE-SAVING FORMULA CAN BE FOUND.

5. GRATEFUL FOR INSTRUCTIONS IF YOU WOULD LIKE ME TO PURSUE

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10 DOWNING STREET
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From the Private Secretary

27 January 1991

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Dee Simon

THE GULF: PRIME MINISTER'S CONVERSATION WITH
PRESIDENT BUSH

The Prime Minister and President Bush spoke on the secure line for about twenty minutes this evening about developments in the Gulf conflict.

The President was evidently well pleased with the overall progress of the campaign. Things were going well. He spoke particularly of the success of the raids against Republican Guard units and the attacks against bridges. He felt there had been considerable progress in isolating the forces in and around Kuwait from Baghdad. The President also referred to better identification of SCUD sites which should enable the allied forces to be more effective in taking them out. The Prime Minister said that we were receiving generally encouraging reports from our commanders about the campaign.

On the oil slick, the President said that he could add little to what the Prime Minister would have seen on television. He understood that the air strikes against the manifolds had been successful and that the flow of oil had been much reduced. Environmentalists in the United States were up in arms about the slick, and he was sending a team of experts out to the Gulf: but there was only a limited amount they could do. Much more information was needed. In reply to a question from the Prime Minister, the President said that there was some reluctance to publish the photographs which would clearly demonstrate that Iraq had deliberately caused the oil slick, although they might construct drawings from them. It was helpful that the Saudis and others were clearly blaming Saddam Hussein.

The President seemed relatively uninformed on the presence of Iraqi aircraft in Iran, and was inclined to the view that they were defectors. The Prime Minister explained our view that it was probably a deliberate tactic by the Iraqis to husband their

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assets. They had acted similarly during the Iran/Iraq war by sending aircraft to other Arab countries. It appeared that the pilots had asked to be sent back to Iraq, which suggested that they were not defectors. The President professed puzzlement with Iraqi tactics. Evidently the aircraft would not be available for defence, unless Iran was conspiring with Iraq to permit some lightening strike against allied forces. But that seemed unlikely and was incompatible with the assurances which the Iranians had given the Americans. He had not previously heard that the pilots had asked to be returned to Iraq. It was all a bit of a mystery.

The Prime Minister complimented the President on his success in restraining the Israelis from retaliating against Iraq for the SCUD attacks. The President said that, given Israel's history and the fact that they had been attacked, their restraint was fairly remarkable. It had not been easy to achieve. There appeared to be some divisions within the Israeli Cabinet on the subject of retaliation, with Shamir rather surprisingly more in favour of restraint than Arens and some of the others. He was irritated with claims that the United States had made some sort of side deal, for instance by promising not to press Israel about the Occupied Territories. These were entirely untrue. The Israelis were indeed demanding a great deal of money - \$13 billion - for showing restraint, claiming that they would need to step up their own defences. His view was that the multinational forces were actually diminishing Israel's post-war need for weapons by dealing with their nemesis. The performance of the Patriot missiles had been a great reassurance to public opinion in Israel, although he was worried about the inventory which was not unlimited. The Americans were looking at other ways to stop SCUD attacks, including Special Force operations against the launchers.

The President continued that the Israelis had also sought a number of additional concessions, for instance closer co-operation with CENTCOM, not all of which the Americans were able to give them. More irritatingly they had wanted to tell the United States how to run the war, implying that they could do it much better. They had produced a number of schemes for retaliation against Iraq, including sending helicopters into the western desert and leaving forces on the ground there. The Americans had firmly ruled out over-flights of Saudi Arabia and Jordan and made clear they would not de-conflict in order to enable such over-flights to happen. They had suggested that, if the Israelis felt they must take some action, they should fire Jericho missiles at military targets. That would be seen as a proportionate response. He recognised Israel's real concern about the SCUDs, and the allied forces would have to see whether they could do more to neutralise them. Generally speaking, he was well pleased with the position reached with the Israelis. The Prime Minister said that we had made clear to the Israelis that there was no action which they could take which the multinational force could not equally well carry out: it was better to leave it to the allies. We were also emphasising how much credit Israel had won internationally for its restraint.

The Prime Minister said he was grateful to the President, and to Secretary Cheney and General Powell for their generous

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
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words about the RAF. These had been very well received here, particularly by the families. The President said they had been well deserved. He was saddened by the Tornado losses: the pilots and navigators had paid a high price for their courage. The President continued that anything which underlined that the conflict was not just an American affair was helpful. He had got a great kick out of seeing the Saudi pilot shoot down two Migs.

The President concluded by commenting that it was very helpful to compare notes. He and the Prime Minister should stay in close touch.

I am copying this letter to Richard Gozney (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and to Sir Robin Butler.

Yours sincerely,


Charles Powell

Simon Webb Esq
Ministry of Defence

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SUBJECT CC MASTER

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

27 January 1991

Dear Richard,

THE GULF: PRIME MINISTER'S CONVERSATION WITH
THE NEW ZEALAND PRIME MINISTER

The Prime Minister telephoned the New Zealand Prime Minister this evening to discuss the conflict in the Gulf.

The Prime Minister began by thanking Mr. Bolger for New Zealand's medical assistance, and complimenting him on the way in which he had handled the public debate in New Zealand. It was good to have such a robust ally. Mr. Bolger said that public opinion in New Zealand was positive and strong. The overwhelming public mood was to stay with the multi-national force and the United Nations, and to maintain New Zealand's commitments. The anti-war protests were relatively small and of no great consequence. Although the Labour opposition had initially been critical, they had now moved a long way towards the Government's position.

Mr. Bolger asked for the Prime Minister's assessment of the military campaign to date. The Prime Minister said it was going pretty much as we had expected. Considerable damage had been done to Iraq's defence assets, particularly its NBC capability, its communications and its airfields. The multi-national force had achieved air superiority. The attack was now moving on to Iraq's ground forces, particularly the Republican Guard. The bombing was bound to affect their morale: and evidence from defectors suggested that Iraqi forces were not receiving much in the way of supplies. In short, the outlook was good from the point of view of an eventual ground battle. Mr. Bolger suggested that the air campaign should go on as long as necessary and the multi-national force should not rush to commit ground troops. The Prime Minister agreed there was no hurry. We would adopt the course which was least expensive in terms of lives.

The Prime Minister referred to the large number of Iraqi planes which had moved to Iran. We thought the Iraqis were probably acting in order to husband their resources. We faced a serious problem over the oil slick in the Gulf. There was no doubt that Saddam Hussein had caused this deliberately. It was environmental vandalism of the first order. Mr. Bolger said that the oil pollution was causing trouble with New Zealand opinion. The Prime Minister said that the New Zealand Government should point out firmly where the responsibility lay. It was not clear why the Iraqis had taken this step now: they may have feared an amphibious landing.

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- 2 -

Mr. Bolger enquired about the morale of our forces in the Gulf. The Prime Minister said that it was astonishingly good. We were receiving supportive letters from families as well.

Mr. Bolger noted there had been some criticism of the European contribution in the Gulf. He had the impression that the French were doing well, despite their last-minute peace initiative. The Prime Minister said there was certainly some frustration in the UK and the US with the overall European performance.

Mr. Bolger noted that opinion in New Zealand was exercised over the possibility that Iraq might explode a radiological bomb over Israel. The Prime Minister suggested that the evidence for Iraq having such a bomb was not very strong.

Mr. Bolger concluded that, so far as could be judged from New Zealand, the campaign was going well. The Prime Minister said that he did not believe Iraq could take the present degree of attrition from the air indefinitely. Our Commanders were confident that things were going our way and we would win. But it could take a while yet.

In the light of this conversation, I do not see any need for a written reply to Mr. Bolger's message. No decision has yet been reached to seek a financial contribution from the New Zealanders.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence) and Sir Robin Butler.

*gun man,
Powell*

CHARLES POWELL

Richard Gozney, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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SUBJECT CC MAST&L

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C: Foreign - Mulroney

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10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

27 January 1991

Dear Richard,

THE GULF: PRIME MINISTER'S CONVERSATION
WITH THE CANADIAN PRIME MINISTER

The Prime Minister telephoned Mr. Mulroney this evening for a talk about the Gulf situation.

The Prime Minister began by thanking Mr. Mulroney for Canada's decision to send a field hospital to the Gulf. This has been very well received in Britain. It was good to see the special links between Britain and Canada operating so well. Mr. Mulroney said Canada had been happy to do it.

The Prime Minister asked how Canadian public opinion had responded to the first combat mission in the Gulf by Canadian aircraft. Mr. Mulroney said that public opinion was supportive of a Canadian presence, but wanted it to be defensive only. But there was some sign this was now changing. The Prime Minister said that opinion in this country had been very robust and the Government had received an unprecedentedly large majority in the House of Commons in support of its Gulf policy. Mr. Mulroney noted that the Labour Party had by and large supported the Government, whereas the Socialists in Canada had been opposed to the use of force in the Gulf from the beginning.

Mr. Mulroney continued that there had been a great deal of euphoria in Canada in the early days of the conflict, which was now disappointed. People did not relish a long, hard grind. But Canada would hang on. The Prime Minister said that it would indeed take a while. The campaign was going well. But Iraq had an extensive war machine and it would take a lot of attrition to wear it down. He had spoken earlier in the day to General de la Billiere and found him very buoyant. The impact of the bombing campaign on Iraqi ground forces was beginning to show. Mr. Mulroney agreed that there was no doubt about the ultimate outcome, but wondered if the Prime Minister could put any time scale on it. The Prime Minister said there were too many uncertainties. But he felt there were quite a few weeks to go. We would be lucky to have it all over by the end of March. Our own tactics had the effect of lengthening the conflict. We were determined to avoid a premature ground battle with higher casualties. Mr. Mulroney agreed fervently that we were right in this.

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Mr. Mulroney said that he continued to be concerned lest Iraq had some surprise up its sleeve, a secret weapon or unexpected tactic. The Americans seemed to doubt this. But Iraq's success in protecting its airforce and in continuing to fire SCUDs at Israel were both setbacks for the Allies. The Prime Minister said that the scale of the Iraqi war machine was very large indeed. But he thought the danger from SCUDs was being gradually diminished, particularly by the successful performance of the Patriot missiles. The air campaign was steadily degrading Iraqi ground forces.

The Prime Minister referred to Iraq's stupidity in flooding the Gulf with oil. There was no doubt this had been done deliberately. But it would be damaging to Saddam Hussein. Mr. Mulroney said that he found the Iraqi action hard to comprehend.


Mr. Mulroney asked about Israel's attitude. The Prime Minister said that the Israeli Government appeared to see the advantage of continuing restraint, in terms of international opinion, so long as that remained practical politics in Israel. The Americans had done a good job on them.

Mr. Mulroney asked about the mood in Arab countries, in particular Egypt. The Prime Minister said that he thought President Mubarak remained robust. He hoped to talk to him in the next day or two.

Mr. Mulroney asked whether the Prime Minister had talked to Chancellor Kohl. The Prime Minister confirmed that they had been in contact. Chancellor Kohl had significant problems with public opinion, but he would come through. Mr. Mulroney said that, in his experience, Chancellor Kohl was always there at the end of the day. He was glad to see that the Prime Minister had also met President Mitterrand. The Prime Minister said there was every advantage in Britain and France being close.

In concluding, Mr. Mulroney noted wryly that the Gulf War had brought at least a small boost in the standing of the Conservatives in Canada. He would not describe it as a revival: but it was better than nothing.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence) and Sir Robin Butler.

Yours sincerely,


CHARLES POWELL

Richard Gozney, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET



10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

27 January 1991

See Jan,

DEPLOYMENT OF USAF B52 AIRCRAFT TO RAF FAIRFORD

Thank you for your letter of 24 January about the soundings made by HQ Third Air Force for guidance on how the United Kingdom would reaction to a request to deploy a number of B52 aircraft to RAF Fairford from where they would fly missions in support of Operation DESERT STORM. I have consulted the Prime Minister, who takes the view that we should accede to such a request if it is forthcoming on political channels. But he would only wish to entertain it if it were made direct from the President to him. We should do nothing to stimulate such a request or encourage the Americans to make it.

I am copying this letter to Simon Gass (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

Charles Powell

Miss Jane Binstead
Ministry of Defence

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL



10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

27 January 1991

GULF CONFLICT: TURKEY

The Prime Minister has noted the increasing tension between Turkey and Iraq as a result of Turkey's decision to allow American aircraft to fly missions against Iraq from their base at Incirlik. He is a bit concerned however at the suggestion that the Turks might eventually seek some territorial advantage from a weakened and defeated Iraq. This is, of course, only speculation: but he sees advantage in making clear that we do not envisage any border adjustments as a result of the conflict with Iraq. He wonders whether we ought to find ways to emphasise publicly that we regard boundaries of Iraq post-war as sacrosanct. I should be grateful for advice on this point. in

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence) John Neilson (Department of Energy) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

Charles Powell

Richard Gozney Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL



R. M. M. M.

Ref. A091/219

CBO
27/1

PRIME MINISTER

cc Sir Percy Cradock
Mr Appleyard

OPD(G): 28 January

Item 1: Iraqi Oil Slick

You might begin with the Iraqi oil slick on which the Environment Secretary (who has been invited for this item) and the Energy Secretary might report. The total volume released by Iraq is estimated at 8-12 million barrels. The size, at the time of drafting, is assessed at 35 miles by 10 miles though by tomorrow the size and direction of the slick may be clearer. You might ask the Environment Secretary for an assessment of the environmental implications of the spillage, especially in terms of Saudi and other Gulf States' desalination plants, and the help we are giving. (The Saudis have asked for the help of a British firm, and they may have already been flown out by the time of the meeting.) You might ask the Chief of the Defence Staff to report on the attempts being made to stem the flow by attacking the pumping stations.

Item 2: Current Military Situation

2. After the Environment Secretary has left, you might ask the Chief of the Defence Staff to report on recent allied and British operations. He will update the assessment of the effect of the action so far. You could enquire about the attacks on the Republican Guard and Scud launchers on which allied air forces have been concentrating. You might ask when the Buccaneers which have just been deployed are likely to begin operations. X

3. You might invite Sir Percy Cradock to give the intelligence assessment of the movement of Iraqi aircraft to Iran. A variety of interpretations have been advanced for the flights including diversion to husband resources, an attempt to drag Iran into the



conflict (the Iranian version) and air force defections after the reported executions of the top air force generals. The Defence Secretary may wish to comment on the military background and the Foreign Secretary on the light which this incident throws on Iranian attitudes. The Foreign Secretary will also want to report on the action which has been taken with the Iranian Government. The paramount objective must be to have the aircraft impounded for the rest of the war. You will want to note that thought is being given to the implication for Rules of Engagement in respect of these aircraft: we must clearly concert these with the Americans.

Item 3: Current international situation

4. You may want to report on your conversation with the President and what he said about US negotiations with the Israeli Government. You might then invite the Foreign Secretary to report on the growing pressure from Iraqi sympathisers to convene a formal meeting of the Security Council. The Maghreb countries appear to be at the centre of these manoeuvres which could result in a divisive debate. There are likely to be informal consultations on 28 January to hear reports on the military situation but there will probably be demands for a formal session soon after. The pro-Iraqi forces are said to be working on the text of a Resolution and there have been preliminary UK/US contacts on the text of a more acceptable Resolution if this is needed. If this pressure develops, Sir David Hannay will be working for a private, closed meeting which has the advantage of resulting in a communique and to which the pro-Iraqi representatives can be invited one by one. The important objective is not to weaken SCR 678 in any way unless there is firm evidence of Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait.

5. In this context you might invite the Foreign Secretary to say a word about the Soviet attitude under the new Foreign Minister, Mr Bessmertnykh. Their position could be crucial if the Permanent Five are to maintain their unity. The Russians

appear to be suggesting that the allies' attacks on Iraq are going beyond the action necessary to fulfil SCR 678.

6. Finally, you might ask the Foreign Secretary to update Ministers on the German attitude in the light of the NATO debate on Article 5 assistance for Turkey. The Foreign Secretary will be seeing Herr Genscher on 30 January. This could be a useful occasion in the context of burdensharing which OPD(G) will be discussing in detail on Tuesday.

7. You may also want to ask the Foreign Secretary whether he has yet reached a conclusion on closing the Iraqi Embassy.

Item 3: Media handling

8. You might invite the Energy Secretary to report on the weekend media coverage and the general direction of the press handling of the military campaign and Mr O'Donnell to report on the day-to-day coverage. The essential points which may need to be emphasised in the light of weekend comment are that the action being taken against Iraq is only what is necessary to fulfil the UN Resolutions with the minimum of casualties, that a long air campaign must be expected for that purpose and that the land campaign will begin as soon as, but not before, those conditions are fulfilled.

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OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT

27 January 1991

H.R.B.
ROBIN BUTLER

POINTS TO MAKE: 27 JANUARY 1991 0600

- Very strongly condemn Iraq's deliberate pumping of oil into the Gulf. Demonstrates complete disregard for environment of Middle East. This sort of wilful destruction necessarily indiscriminate in effect.

- Of course Iraqi claims that oil slick is result of allied action totally false.

- Seems that Iraqis have been pumping out contents of 5 large tankers - totalling perhaps some 4 million barrels of heavy crude oil - and more than another 4 million barrels from shore-based storage tanks at Mina al Mahdi. Understand resulting slick may be some 30 miles long and 8 miles wide.

- Environmental consequences appalling. Have all seen on television heavy oil beginning to wash ashore and destruction of wildlife. As oil moves further south, could be threats to Saudi desalination plants and their fresh water supplies. Will clearly take measures as necessary to ensure water supplies protected.

- Otherwise, not clear what purpose is - no significant impact on naval operations, either present or future. Perhaps just an attempt at causing economic disruption.

- The UK will want to play full part in steps to deal with problem. Have good deal of expertise in this area. Understand President Bush sending team of experts to assess the situation.

- RAF aircraft have now carried out around 800 sorties. Attacks have recently focussed in particular on Republican Guards and their supplies and lines of communication. But Allied efforts against range of targets continue - airfields, missile sites, SCUD launcher sites, command and control installations.

- More than 20,000 allied sorties now conducted, over 11,000 of which have been offensive sorties. Inevitably this sort of very high level of sustained effort will steadily degrade Iraq's military capabilities. Must be patient and stick to plan.

- Impossible to predict length of conflict. Aim is to reduce progressively Iraq's military capability to resist. Intend only to launch ground offensive when sure victory can be achieved with minimum casualties. Believe public will support need to proceed steadily and not be rushed into land operations.

- UK providing largest European contribution, but France providing ground, naval and air forces, and Italy naval and air forces. Belgium, Denmark, Norway, Netherlands and Spain all providing naval forces. Other countries, particularly Germany and Portugal, providing support for UK deployments.

- Concerned at flights of Iraqi aircraft into Iran. Both military combat and transport aircraft involved, also civilian aircraft. Significant numbers, although precise numbers not clear. Perhaps about 24 aircraft went to Iran yesterday.

- Not clear why flying to Iran, but cause for concern if Iran in any way providing assistance to Iraq.

- Both US and we have asked Iranian authorities for clarification and for assurances that any Iraqi military aircraft in Iran, or flying into Iran in future, will be held in Iran until hostilities have ended. Understand Iranians have offered that assurance to Americans. *Jim Baker has made statement to this effect.*

- Article 2(5) of UN Charter requires Member States to 'refrain from giving assistance to any state against which the UN is taking preventative or enforcement action'. Obligation on Iran therefore to seize and retain until the end of the conflict any Iraqi military equipment and supplies brought into Iran, and not to stand in way of allies taking action in accordance with Security Council Resolutions, or provide assistance to Iraq.

- Very welcome that Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Japan have now offered substantial contributions towards meeting costs of Gulf operations (Saudis and Kuwaitis about \$13.5bn and Japanese about \$9bn).

- [If asked about Rolleston camp and housing of Iraqi PW]. Decided that Rolleston Camp most suitable site to house a number of Iraqi military personnel who have been taken into military custody from the police. Confident the camp meets all the requirements of the Geneva Convention and will of course facilitate any requests by the Red Cross to see the accommodation. 35 Iraqi military personnel were moved to the camp yesterday.

SECRET



SUBJECT CUMMASTER

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

27 January 1991

See Ginn.

GULF CONFLICT

The Prime Minister had a talk on the telephone this afternoon with CBFME.

General de la Billiere said that weather conditions in the theatre were exceedingly cold and wet. But our forces were resilient and looking after themselves. Experience with the wet weather indicated that vehicles did not get bogged down in the desert: there was a good, hard base which gave them plenty of purchase.

The Prime Minister asked how the deployment of 1 Division was proceeding. General de la Billiere said it was going entirely to his satisfaction. There were no problems or delays as far as British forces were concerned. The same could not be said of US forces. There had been some hiccups, which could create a bit of a delay.

General de la Billiere confirmed that the morale of British forces was extremely good. They were ready to go and just waiting for the signal. In reply to a question from the Prime Minister, he confirmed that good morale extended to the Tornado squadrons as well. The losses they had suffered were sad for them, but had not affected their determination. Their role would continue on the lines of the last few days.

The Prime Minister complimented General de la Billiere on his press briefing and that given by Air Vice Marshal Wratten. He hoped they would continue to make regular appearances. General de la Billiere said that he intended to vary press briefings between himself and his senior commanders. He was intending to put up his Chief of Staff next, with the intention of having someone senior every two or three days. This was in addition to briefings by his appointed representative. The Prime Minister pointed out that people were much more interested in hearing General de la Billiere and his senior colleagues than in politicians or press spokesmen. The more they gave the briefings, the better. General de la Billiere said that he would put in regular appearances.

SECRET

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- 2 -

b

The Prime Minister asked whether there were any practical problems - allowances, telephone calls, parcels - affecting the morale of our forces. General de la Billiere said these issues had rather dropped into the background. Everyone had their eyes down and concentrated on the job in hand.

The Prime Minister asked about the mental and physical condition of Iraqi ground forces. General de la Billiere said his judgment could only be a subjective one: but there was growing evidence that they were very badly looked after, especially in forward positions. He thought the supply lines to the forward troops were now very poor. Prisoners-of-war were suffering from lice and open sores, and the front line troops were altogether lower grade than the Republican Guards. He was optimistic that they were unlikely to put up much of a fight. Various psyop campaigns were being planned against them. The Republican Guards were subject to very heavy bombing, which was bound to take its toll and at the very least reduce their will and capacity to fight. By wearing them down from the air, we should correct the correlation of forces, to make an offensive against the Iraqi troops feasible, even though they were heavily dug in. The Prime Minister asked why there had not been more defections from the front line forces. General de la Billiere said the number of minefields made it difficult for defectors to get into Saudi Arabia: and the presence of the Republican Guards stopped them from retreating.

The Prime Minister asked about cross-border shelling. General de la Billiere said this was limited and fairly inaccurate, although the US marines had suffered one or two casualties.

The Prime Minister asked about the Iraqi motivation in releasing oil into the Gulf. General de la Billiere hazarded that they had been expecting an amphibious attack. They had initially released the oil through the pick-up buoy, but had then got cold feet about the effect on world opinion. They had subsequently fired the whole pier in an effort to reduce the flow. The Americans had bombed two pump stations during the night. Indications were that these had now ceased pumping, thus reducing the pressure. We should therefore see the fire diminishing and the flow of oil dwindling. But there was already 10 million gallons in the sea. The main worry was that the oil might interfere with the desalination plants. Efforts were being made to prevent this. But the plants might have to be shut down. That should not affect our forces. All units were suppose to hold 30 days supply of water, and additional water could be obtained by drilling artesian wells. At worst it might be necessary to charter a water ship. The Prime Minister commented that it was essential to get over publicly the message that Saddam Hussein was responsible for this environmental disaster. We must get the photographic evidence into the public domain.

General de la Billiere commented that the scale of Saddam Hussein's military infrastructure, which was now fully revealed, was almost unbelievable. Clearly it had been built not just to deal with Iran but to enable Iraq to dominate the whole Middle

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
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- 3 -

East. This underlined how absolutely right the Prime Minister and the President had been to take the decision to act against Iraq now. The problem would have been much worse still in a few years' time. The Prime Minister commented that it was very important to get this point across to the public. He would consider how best to do so, but suggested that General de la Billiere himself should stress it at his next press conference.

Concluding, General de la Billiere said the Prime Minister could be assured that everything was on course and there were no major concerns in theatre.

I am copying this letter to Richard Gozney (Foreign and Commonwealth Office), John Neilson (Department of Energy), Juliet Wheldon (Law Officers' Department) and Sir Robin Butler.

Yours sincerely,

Charles Powell

Simon Webb Esq
Ministry of Defence.

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OUR TELNO 250: IRAQ/KUWAIT: WASHINGTON SITREP

SUMMARY

1. AMERICANS ANNOUNCE DISPATCH OF EXPERTS TO SAUDI ARABIA TO HELP CONTAIN THE OIL SLICK. MUCH INTEREST IN IRAQI AIRCRAFT IN IRAN. AMERICANS HOPE OTHERS WILL URGE IRANIS TO HOLD IRAQI AIRCRAFT UNTIL IRAQ WITHDRAWS FROM KUWAIT.

DETAIL

OIL SLICK

2. REFERRING TO THE OIL SLICK, THE PENTAGON SPOKESMAN ON 26 JANUARY SAID IRAQ WAS INTENTIONALLY CREATING THE WORST ENVIRONMENTAL DISASTER IN THE HISTORY OF THE GULF. IT WAS CONDUCTING AN ENDOTOXIMATE ENVIRONMENTAL WAR ON ITS NEIGHBOURS AS WELL AS ON THE PLANT AND ANIMAL LIFE IN THE REGION. THE FIVE TANKERS IN MINA AL AMHADI HAD A CATASTROPHE OF 120 MILLION GALLONS, BUT THERE WAS NO WAY TO BE CERTAIN HOW MUCH WAS IN STORAGE TANKERS ON SHORE. THE WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCED THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD AGREED TO DISPATCH AN INTERNATIONAL TEAM OF OIL POLLUTION AND ENVIRONMENT EXPERTS TO SAUDI ARABIA TO HELP THE SAUDIS IN THEIR EFFORTS TO CONTAIN THE OIL SLICK.
3. MACK (DAS, STATE) HAD TOLD US THAT WASHINGTON WAS CONSIDERING THE PRESENT - IRAQI TO NOT INVOLVE ENVIRONMENTAL EXPERTS FROM ARAMCO - ON WHAT NEEDED TO BE DONE. MILITARY AS WELL WOULD BE CONSIDERED BY THE EXPERTS' ADVISOR. THE PENTAGON BRIEFER STRESSED THE OIL SLICK DID NOT YET CONSTITUTE A MILITARY PROBLEM, NOT AT LEAST BECAUSE THERE WERE NO PLANS TO SAIL THROUGH IT.
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4. THE PENTAGON SPOKESMAN SAID HE BELIEVED THERE WERE

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SHRINES

6. IN RESPONSE TO SADDAM'S ACCUSATIONS, THE PENTAGON SPOKESMAN SAID THAT NO/NO RELIGIOUS SITES HAD BEEN HIT. HE REITERATED THAT THE ALLIES WERE NOT TARGETTING CIVILIANS OR RELIGIOUS SHRINES.

7. WE HAVE ASKED STATE (TASK FORCE) ABOUT THE RELEASE OF PHOTOGRAPHS (YOUR TELNO 165). THEY SAID NO/NO DECISION HAD BEEN REACHED. PENTAGON SPOKESMAN REFERRED TO - BUT DID NOT RELEASE - PHOTOGRAPHIC EVIDENCE INDICATING THAT THE SITES HAD NOT BEEN DAMAGED.

BRITISH ROLE

8. THERE CONTINUES TO BE WIDE MEDIA COVERAGE OF THE BRITISH ROLE. THE EMBASSY RECEIVED OVER 50 CALLS TODAY FROM MEMBERS OF THE PUBLIC PRAISING THE SKILL AND COURAGE OF THE RAF, AND INCLUDING SOME AMERICANS ENQUIRING HOW THEY COULD ASSIST WITH THE BRITISH FORCES.

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
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A The National Archives

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SUBJECT CC MASTER
OKS



10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

File KW

CFRO

THE PRIME MINISTER

26 January 1991

Dear Mr. President,

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T29/91

I am most grateful to you for sharing your thoughts with me following your visit to Baghdad.

Events have since moved on. The decision to take military action to expel Saddam Hussein from Kuwait is the sad result of Iraq's repeated and uncompromising refusal to comply with the resolutions of the UN Security Council.

During the 5¹/₂ months since the Iraqi invasion we have used every possible means to persuade Iraq to meet the requirements set out by the Security Council. But Saddam Hussein at no stage gave any indication that he was prepared to reverse his aggression and leave Kuwait in peace: not to the US Secretary of State, not to the Twelve members of the European Community, not to the Secretary General of the United Nations and not, as I understand your message, to you.

In these circumstances we have concluded that the use of force is both justified and necessary. Failure to reverse the aggression would have prolonged the tragic suffering of the people of Kuwait and the destruction of their country. It would have meant that no small country could again feel safe from aggression from a larger, hostile neighbour. It would also have challenged the authority of the United Nations.

M

In taking this action we and our allies have taken care to ensure that every effort is made to avoid casualties amongst the civilian population of Iraq. I am sure you will share my hope that we shall be successful in securing the full and early implementation of the wishes of the international community as set out in UN Security Council Resolutions, and that we shall soon see the full and unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait.

Yours Sincerely,
John Major

His Excellency Dr Kenneth Kaunda



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

Telephone 071-21 82111/3

MO 6/17/15/1D

26 January 1991

Dear Charles,

KUWAIT BURDENSARING

Richard Gozney sent me a copy of his letter of 24th January and supports the proposal that the Prime Minister should send two letters to the Amir of Kuwait; one to cover reconstruction and defence contracts after the liberation of Kuwait and the other to seek a contribution to our military costs.

We are broadly content with the terms of the letter but would like to see a few minor amendments to the texts. These are attached. We also wonder whether the first three sentences of the second paragraph strike the right tone. We would prefer this to read.

41 "The British Armed Forces will be making great sacrifices for the liberation of Kuwait, which I know your Government recognises. The British people appreciate this. The despatch to the Gulf ... has, however, been costly:..."

You should be aware that it is unlikely that we shall be able to afford to buy the Active Skyflash missile for UK forces.

I am sending a copy of this letter to John Gieve (HM Treasury), Richard Gozney (FCO), Sue Bishop (DTI) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely

J R Binstead

(MISS J R BINSTED)
Private Secretary

Sir Charles Powell KCMG
No 10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

DETAILED AMENDMENT TO LETTER TO AMIR OF KUWAIT

"RECONSTRUCTION" LETTER

Second Paragraph - Amend third sentence to read:

"As the reconstruction programme is likely to double the US share of some 20% (to 40%), we trust that you would wish to ensure that Britain's share of 10% received at least similar treatment (to 20%).

Third Paragraph - Amend second sentence to read:


"On January 14, to review with your Foreign Minister and Defence Minister the help we have already given with your short term defence equipment requirements;"

"CONTRIBUTION" LETTER

Second Paragraph - Amend 7 - 10 to read:

21
"pounds already committed. The commencement In the first week of hostilities alone, losses of aircraft and consumption of ammunition have amounted to well over £100 million. This "

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DEPARTMENT/SERIES <i>PREM 19</i>	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM <i>3445</i> (one piece/item number)	
Extract details: <i>Report 3/AL 1159-91 dated 26 January 1991</i>	
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Use the card for one piece or for each extract removed from a different place within a piece.

Enter the department and series,
eg. HO 405, J 82.


Enter the piece and item references, .
eg. 28, 1079, 84/1, 107/3

Enter extract details if it is an extract rather than a whole piece.
This should be an indication of what the extract is,
eg. Folio 28, Indictment 840079, E107, Letter dated 22/11/1995.
Do not enter details of why the extract is sensitive.

If closed under the FOI Act, enter the FOI exemption numbers applying to the closure, eg. 27(1), 40(2).

Sign and date next to the reason why the record is not available to the public ie. Closed under FOI exemption; Retained under section 3(4) of the Public Records Act 1958; Temporarily retained; Missing at transfer or Number not used.

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Enter the department and series,
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Sign and date next to the reason why the record is not available to the public ie. Closed under FOI exemption; Retained under section 3(4) of the Public Records Act 1958; Temporarily retained; Missing at transfer or Number not used.

POINTS TO MAKE

2000 GMT 26 JANUARY 1991

- RAF aircraft have now carried out nearly 800 sorties. Recent attacks have been against a range of military targets.
- Impossible to predict length of conflict. Aim is to reduce progressively Iraqi military's ability to resist. Intend only to launch ground offensive when sure victory can be achieved with minimum casualties.
- UK providing largest European contribution, but France providing ground, naval and air forces, and Italy naval and air forces. Belgium, Denmark, Norway, Netherlands and Spain all providing naval forces. Other countries, particularly Germany and Portugal, providing support for UK deployments.
- Decided that Rolleston Camp most suitable site to house a number of Iraqi military personnel who have been taken into military custody from the police. Confident the camp meets all the requirements of the Geneva Convention. Will, of course, facilitate any requests by the Red Cross to see the accommodation.
- The scale of Iraq's deliberate pumping of oil into the Gulf is becoming clear. The slick now extends some 30 miles by 8 miles. Quite simply, an act of environmental terrorism. No military justification. As the oil spreads further South it could threaten Saudi desalination plants.

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10 DOWNING STREET

INDON SWIA 25A

From the Private Secretary

6 January 1991

I had a talk this afternoon to Bob Gates in the White House (General Towercroft is up at Camp David with the President).

Iraqi Aircraft

Gates said that the Americans simply did not know what to make of the apparent presence of so many Iranian fighter aircraft - 21 at the last count, he said. The word "apparent" was very closely to see what happened. I am optimistic interpretation was that they were Iranian. But the number seemed very large for that, and the aircraft were simple, taking up with or without Iranian markings. The Americans had already gone in to AWACS aircraft and a good part to north of the Iraqi EW and of the fighters, and they would not be the same in respect I said we had no doubt we would learn what they learned. to make the same point in relation to Tehran earlier today seen a report about an impounding aircraft. I had not yet interest. I would let the news be turned nothing of about a B-747 that had been heard the further reports under Iranian and Iranian under Iraqi fighter escort.

Oil Spill

Gates said that the outlook on the oil spill was very gloomy. The Americans now estimated that there was 200 million tonnes in the Gulf. "Make it worse they were detecting another major spill just off the coast of Saudi Arabia, another damaged in an air crash some days ago but there had been no spillage at the time. The Americans were clear that the Iraqis had now opened the taps. The US military were at something of a loss how best to handle this. There were a number of different options, complicated by the fact that the oil emerged by gravity feed. There were conflicting assessments as to where the oil slick would move. One assessment forecast that the current would

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10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

26 January 1991

THE GULF

I had a talk this afternoon to Bob Gates in the White House (General Scowcroft is up at Camp David with the President).

Iraqi Aircraft

Gates said that the Americans simply did not know what to make of the apparent presence of so many Iraqi fighter aircraft - 21 at the last count - in Iran. They were watching very closely to see what happened to them. The optimistic interpretation was that they were all defectors. But the number seemed very large for that, and it could be they were simply taking refuge with or without Iranian permission. The Americans had already gone in to the Iranians through a third party to ask that the Iraqi EW and AWACS aircraft be impounded and would now do the same in respect of the fighters. He would keep me posted of what they learned. I said we had already sent instructions to Tehran earlier today to make the same point about impounding aircraft. I had not yet seen a report back but would let him know if I learned anything of interest. I had not at that stage heard the further reports about a B-747 flying from Tehran to Baghdad this morning, first under Iranian and subsequently under Iraqi fighter escort.)

Oil Spill

Gates said that the outlook on the oil spill was very gloomy. The Americans now estimated that there was 8-11 million tonnes in the Gulf. To make it worse they were detecting another major spill just off Jubayl Island. The tanks here had been damaged in an air raid some days ago but there had been no spillage at the time. The Americans were clear that the Iraqis had now opened the taps. The US military were at something of a loss how best to handle this. There were a number of different options, complicated by the fact that the oil emerged by gravity feed. There were conflicting assessments as to where the oil slick would move. One assessment forecast that the current would

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3(A-E)

- 2 -

move it away from the Kuwait/Saudi coast into the middle of the Gulf so that it would end up round the Qatar peninsular. Another forecast put it on the Iranian shore. I said that we were concentrating our efforts on volunteering help with trying to control the effects of the spill. Gates undertook to keep me informed of any developments on this as well.

I am copying this letter to Jane Binstead (Ministry of Defence), Sir Robin Butler, Mr Barrass (Assessment Staff) and John Neilson (Department of Energy).

Charles Powell

Richard Gozney Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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By Fax.
Faxed 26.1.91

PRIME MINISTER

THE GULF: TELEPHONE CALLS

We need to consider timing of telephone calls you may want to make tomorrow. We shall need to check whether some of the people concerned are available.

President Bush is likely to call at about 5.30 p.m. You would need to be in the Alconbury office, to take it on the secure line.

The best time to get General de la Billiere is between 1500-1545. We can connect him to your home. This will be an open line.

You could try Mr Mulroney some time between 1500-1700. We have a home number for him.

Its more of a problem to identify the best time to telephone Mr Bolger. New Zealand is twelve hours ahead. The choice would be early-ish on Sunday morning e.g. 0900 or late-ish on Sunday evening e.g. 2230.

I am not sure whether you want to try King Hussein, Mr Shamir and President Mubarak. But again the period 1600-1700 should be feasible.

Thus a possible timetable would be:

[0900	Mr Bolger]
1500	General de la Billiere
1520	Mr Mulroney
1545	Mr Shamir
1605	King Hussein
1625	President Mubarak
1730 [Alconbury]	President Bush
[2230 [No.10]	Mr Bolger]

If you could indicate that you are content with these names and times - deleting those whom you don't want - we can try to book the calls.

CDP
Charles Powell

26 January 1991

c: Telephone (MJ)

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faxed to PM 26-1-91

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SIC AAA/I9M

FOR EMERGENCY UNIT

Prime Minister
CDS.YOUR TELNO 177: RELEASE OF OIL INTO GULF

1. WE ARE CONTACTING MAIN SAUDI ELEMENTS NOW INVOLVED IN HANDLING ENVIRONMENTAL ASPECTS OF THIS OIL SPILL (PRINCE FAHD ABDULLAH THE ENVIRONMENT MINISTER, THE JUBAIL ROYAL COMMISSION AND ARAMCO) ABOUT THE ASSISTANCE AND ASSETS AVAILABLE IN UK TO CONTAIN AND COUNTER ENVIRONMENTAL THREAT. WE MAY WANT TO ASK FOR RAF HELP IN BRINGING OUT ANTI-POLLUTION EQUIPMENT FROM OIL SPILL SERVICE CENTRE. ARAMCO TELL US THEY ARE IN DIRECT CONTACT WITH THE CENTRE.

2. MEANWHILE I HAVE COMPARED NOTES WITH US AMBASSADOR WHO IS DIRECTLY INVOLVED THROUGH US JOINT COMMAND WITH HANDLING OF THIS MAJOR PROBLEM. FREEMAN TELLS ME THAT:

A) AMERICANS PROMPTED THE SAUDIS YESTERDAY TO TAKE OVER COORDINATION OF RESPONSE TO THE OIL SPILLAGE. THEY ALSO BROUGHT KUWAITI GOVERNMENT OIL ENGINEERS FAMILIAR WITH THE AL AHMADI INSTALLATION INTO THE ACT.

B) KUWAITIS INITIALLY ARGUED THAT SPILLAGE MUST COME FROM OFF SHORE LOADING BUOY WITH MAXIMUM THROUGH PUT OF 100,000 BPD.

C) US AIR RECONNAISSANCE HOWEVER NOW SHOWS THAT MULTIPLE DELIBERATE SPILLAGE IS TAKING PLACE FROM LOADED TANKERS MOORED OFF AL AHMADI AND IN PARTICULAR FROM TWO MAIN TANK FARM OUTLETS. US ESTIMATE THIS MORNING IS THAT AT LEAST SIX MILLION BARRELS HAVE ALREADY BEEN DISCHARGED (OVER APPROXIMATELY 2 DAYS). THE SLICK HAS ALREADY REACHED KHAFJI ON THE SAUDI COAST, BUT THE DESALINATION

PLANT THERE HAD ALREADY BEEN CLOSED DOWN SOME TEN DAYS AGO. b

D) US MILITARY ARE SEEKING A WAY TO STOP THIS TANK FARM FLOW BY MILITARY ACTION. KUWAITI ENGINEERS HAVE IDENTIFIED TWO MAIN MANIFOLDS ON SHORE WHICH MUST BE DESTROYED IF FLOW IS TO CEASE. (THERE ARE OF COURSE OTHER MAJOR ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS ASSOCIATED WITH SUCH MILITARY ACTION THOUGH ENGINEERS INSIST THAT OIL WOULD NOT BE DIVERTED INTO AL AHMADI TOWN: NOR COULD IT REACH THE SEA IN FREE FLOW).

E) ALTERNATIVE IS TO BLOW UP AL AHMADI MAIN CONTROL ROOM BUT KUWAITIS ARE VERY RELUCTANT AS THIS COULD TAKE TWO YEARS TO REPAIR

[Now given] F) DECISION ON WHETHER TO GO AHEAD WITH EARLY MILITARY ACTION NOW RESTS WITH KING FAHD WHO HAS BEEN RELUCTANT TO GIVE THE GO AHEAD. AMERICANS ARE PRESSING THAT THE DECISION BE TAKEN NOW GIVEN HIGH RATE OF FLOW.

G) MEANWHILE SAUDI COMMITTEE UNDER PRINCE SULTAN HAS PUT IN HAND POINT DEFENCE AT JUBAIL AND DHAHRAN USING ARAMCO'S RESOURCES. FREEMAN BELIEVES WASHINGTON ARE IN TOUCH WITH YOU ABOUT EARLY PROVISION OF ADDITIONAL ANTI-POLLUTION EQUIPMENT.

3. I DISCUSSED WITH FREEMAN IMPORTANCE OF OURSELVES AND THE SAUDIS RETAINING THE INITIATIVE IN PUBLIC PRESENTATION OF THIS AFFAIR. AMERICANS HOPE TO HAVE AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHS READY VERY SOON WHICH CAN BE USED TO DEMONSTRATE THIS IS A WILFUL ACT OF IRAQI VANDALISM. WE ALSO AGREED THE ISSUE MIGHT BE EXPLOITED TO POLITICAL EFFECT WITH THE IRANIANS.

4. GRATEFUL IF HQBFME COULD GET HOLD OF INCRIMINATING US RECON PHOTOGRAPHY IN ORDER THAT WE MAY MAKE USE OF IT.

5. SAUDI AUTHORITIES TELL US THAT BOOMS ARE ALREADY BEING PLACED AROUND THE WATER DESALINATION AND OTHER CRITICAL COASTAL INSTALLATIONS AT JUBAIL. THEY ESTIMATE THE SLICK COULD REACH JUBAIL IN AS LITTLE AS FOUR DAYS. (RIYADH DERIVES 80% OF ITS WATER FROM JUBAIL DESALINATION PLANTS). BECHTEL HAVE BEEN ENGAGED TO HELP WITH CLEANING UP THE SLICK.

MUNRO

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SIC

James Austin

GULF CONFLICT: ENVIRONMENTAL THREAT

SUMMARY

1. AMERICAN SUSPENSE LUMINATED THAT THE IRAQIS HAVE RELEASED CRUDE OIL INTO THE GULF NOW BECAUSE THEY EXPECTED AN IMMINENT US ATTACK. NO US DECISIONS YET ON WHAT SHOULD BE DONE.

DETAIL

2. WE LEARNED FROM THE NSC ON 25 JANUARY, SHORTLY BEFORE MY MEETING THAT THE IRAQIS HAD RELEASED CRUDE OIL INTO THE GULF. THE IRAQIS HAD EXPECTED AN IMMINENT US ATTACK. SHORTLY BEFORE MY MEETING, THE IRAQIS HAD EXPECTED AN IMMINENT US ATTACK. THE AMERICAN SUPPOSITION WAS THAT THE IRAQIS HAD ACTED PREMATURELY ON A FALSE INTERPRETATION OF THE SITUATION. THEY HAD EXPECTED AN IMMINENT US ATTACK. THEY HAD EXPECTED AN IMMINENT US ATTACK. AS WELL AS PUMPING OIL INTO THE GULF. THE EXTENT OF THE LEAK WAS NOT ENTIRELY CLEAR BUT WAS PROBABLY 20 TIMES OR MORE THAT CREATED BY THE EXXON VALLEE.

3. GATES SAID THAT NO DECISIONS HAD YET BEEN TAKEN BY THE AMERICANS ON WHAT BEST MIGHT NOW BE DONE. STRICTLY FROM THE MILITARY POINT OF VIEW, IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE, IN DESTROYING THE PUMPING STATION IN KUWAIT AND ONE MORE OBJECTIVE, TO STOP THE LEAK. THE MILITARY WOULD THEN BE SET ON FIRE NEAR ITS SOURCE, WHERE THE OIL WAS BEING PUMPED, USING FOR EXAMPLE NAPALM BOMBS. THERE WERE HOWEVER MANY QUESTIONS TO BE ANSWERED BEFORE TAKING THIS SORT OF ACTION, INCLUDING HOW LONG IT WOULD TAKE TO REPLACE THE PUMPING STATION. ESTIMATES VARIED FROM SIX MONTHS TO TWO YEARS. THE TRUE ANSWER HAD OBVIOUS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE RECOVERY OF KUWAIT.

4. GATES SAID THAT THE AMERICANS DID NOT BELIEVE THAT THE IRAQI ACTION WOULD HAVE ANY SIGNIFICANT MILITARY CONSEQUENCES FOR THEM. IT WOULD TAKE SOME CONSIDERABLE TIME FOR THE SLICK TO TRAVEL DOWN THE GULF. DECONTAMINATION PLANTS WOULD HAVE TO BE TURNED OFF WHEN PASSED, A PROCESS WHICH MIGHT TAKE SOME TWO WEEKS.

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GULF CONFLICT: ENVIRONMENTAL THREAT
SUMMARY

1. AMERICAN SUPPOSITION THAT THE IRAQIS HAVE RELEASED CRUDE OIL INTO THE GULF NOW BECAUSE THEY EXPECTED AN IMMINENT US ATTACK. NO US DECISIONS YET ON WHAT SHOULD BE DONE.
- DETAIL
2. WE LEARNED FROM THE NSC ON 25 JANUARY, SHORTLY BEFORE MY MEETING THAT DAY WITH GATES, THAT THE IRAQI RELEASE OF CRUDE OIL INTO THE GULF HAD BEEN ANTICIPATED BY THE AMERICANS BUT EXPECTED SHORTLY BEFORE AN ALLIED ASSAULT ON KUWAIT. THE AMERICAN SUPPOSITION WAS THAT THE IRAQIS HAD ACTED PREMATURELY ON A FALSE INTERPRETATION OF INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO THEM. THEY HAD EMPTIED ALL THREE TANKERS THAT HAD BEEN HOLED UP IN KUWAIT AS WELL AS PUMPING OIL DIRECTLY INTO THE GULF. THE EXTENT OF THE SLICK WAS NOT ENTIRELY CLEAR BUT WAS PROBABLY 20 TIMES OR MORE THAT CREATED BY THE EXXON VALDEZ.
3. GATES TOLD ME THAT NO DECISIONS HAD YET BEEN TAKEN BY THE AMERICANS AS TO WHAT BEST MIGHT NOW BE DONE. STRICTLY FROM THE MILITARY POINT OF VIEW IT OUGHT TO BE POSSIBLE, IN DESTROYING THE PUMPING STATION IN KUWAIT AND ONE MORE OBJECTIVE, TO STOP THE LEAK. THE SLICK COULD THEN BE SET ON FIRE NEAR ITS SOURCE, WHERE THE OIL WAS THICKEST, USING FOR EXAMPLE NAPALM BOMBS. THERE WERE HOWEVER OBVIOUS QUESTIONS TO BE ANSWERED BEFORE TAKING THIS SORT OF ACTION, INCLUDING HOW LONG IT WOULD TAKE TO REPLACE THE PUMPING STATION: ESTIMATES VARIED FROM SIX MONTHS TO TWO YEARS. THE TRUE ANSWER HAD OBVIOUS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE RECOVERY OF KUWAIT.
4. GATES SAID THAT THE AMERICANS DID NOT BELIEVE THAT THE IRAQI ACTION WOULD HAVE ANY SIGNIFICANT MILITARY CONSEQUENCES FOR THEM. IT WOULD TAKE SOME CONSIDERABLE TIME FOR THE SLICK TO TRAVEL DOWN THE GULF. DESALINATION PLANTS WOULD HAVE TO BE TURNED OFF WHILE IT PASSED, A PROCESS WHICH MIGHT TAKE SOME TWO WEEKS.

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