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CAB ONE

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Part 41: Feb 1991

[illegible]

PART 41 ends:-

CH. 6XCH to PM. 7.1.91

PART 42 begins:-

COP to SQ. WR McNICOU. 8.1.91

SECRET



41(A-9) *ccp*

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Treasury Chambers, Parliament Street, SW1P 3AG
071-270 3000

Prime Minister
CA 9/2

✓

PRIME MINISTER

Also?

GULF CONFLICT: FINANCIAL POSITION OF SAUDI ARABIA AND KUWAIT

In response to my minute of 1 February, you asked me to keep you in touch with developments. Since then, Treasury officials have worked with the Bank of England, the Cabinet Office and the Foreign Office to assess the ability of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait to meet their financial commitments without disrupting the markets. I conclude that they should be able to do so in the short term; but that if the conflict is prolonged, both Governments may find it much more difficult to raise the funds. They might therefore become more reluctant to contribute; or their attempts to raise funds might affect confidence in the financial markets.

Analysis

There is inevitably tremendous uncertainty over the numbers, in part because both countries release little information on their

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spending or net financial assets. But our best current estimate is shown below.

Assets and expenditure of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait

	<u>Saudi Arabia</u>	<u>\$billion</u> <u>Kuwait</u>
Usable assets at end 1990 Q2 (of which liquid assets)	65 35	75 10
Drawdown over 1990 H2 (of which crisis expenditure)	6 13	4 7
Assets at end 1990	59	71
Drawdown over 1991 Q1 (a)	20	18
Assets at end 1991 Q1	39	53

Note (a): this assumes that commitments attributed to 1991 Q1, mainly to the US are fully disbursed then. In practice, disbursement is likely to be slower.

Market Implications

The Saudis might be able to call upon assets of \$59 billion at the end of 1990. They can meet their commitments in 1991 Q1 by running down their holdings of foreign debt, their time and call deposits and by domestic borrowing. The debt markets have sufficient depth that in normal circumstances, they would be able to cope with transactions of this scale even over a short period.

The Kuwaitis also face large outlays in the first quarter of perhaps \$18 billion. They can draw on their Future Generations Fund, which has liquid assets of about \$10 billion, bond holdings of \$20 billion and equity holdings of \$40 billion. Therefore they could meet commitments in the near future from liquid assets and bond sales and avoid major recourse to borrowing or sales in the equity markets.

SECRET



In short, the main risk lies not so much in the ability of either Government to fund its short term commitments but in a misinterpretation of this activity by the markets or an overreaction to any heavy-handed efforts to raise the funds. It is clearly in those Governments' own interests to avoid this.


Secondly, the position could deteriorate markedly if hostilities continued well beyond the end of March. Then their ability to pay might be doubted and the markets would in any case become more nervous.

We will keep this position under close review but I see no case for immediate action. It should certainly not make any difference to Douglas' efforts to obtain assistance from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait this weekend. And obviously we should take great care not to let our concerns filter out into the markets.

I am copying this minute to Douglas Hurd, Robin Leigh-Pemberton and Sir Robin Butler.

[N.L.]

7 February 1991



40(A-9) ccle
(2)

Prime Minister

C. M. P.

MO 6/17/15/1

PRIME MINISTER

SECRETARY OF STATE

Thank you

for 2

BW COUNTERMEASURES

At the end of last year we agreed, following OPD(G) discussion, that we should proceed with a voluntary anthrax vaccination programme for our forces in the Gulf. We also identified the need to consider countermeasures against plague and botulinum toxin (BTx). It may be useful if I briefly update colleagues on progress made with our BW countermeasures programme.

2. On anthrax, the first 2 of the 3 doses in the vaccination programme have now been administered to the great majority of our forces in the Gulf (the exceptions are recent deployments, such as the Buccaneer force, who have received only one dose). We have been getting adequate supplies from the Public Health Laboratory Service to meet the UK forces' requirements and we have also provided, or will provide, doses to Saudi MOD, the WHO and British Aerospace. There should also be sufficient extra production over the coming weeks to satisfy the remaining 45,000 doses of an order from the Saudi MOD by early March and to start addressing other orders, including up to 500,000 more for the Saudis.

3. On plague, we have started a vaccination programme. The first of two doses has now been administered. In this case we acquired the vaccine from the US. Although licensed by the Federal Drug Agency it has not been granted a Medicines Act product licence in the UK. Both the National Institute of Biological Standards and Control (NIBSC) and the Department of Health have, however, cleared the vaccine for use. As in the case of the anthrax vaccine, the vaccination programme is voluntary, with the informed consent of





SECRETARY OF STATE

each individual being obtained prior to immunisation. The US do not acknowledge a threat from plague and do not intend to vaccinate their forces.

4. On BTx, our assessments suggest that the Iraqis are likely to possess toxin in as many as four different strains. CDS Porton Down has been producing BTx antitoxin from goat and human plasma. Between them, the goat and human antitoxins cover all strains of BTx which we believe the Iraqis may have. For their part, the US have (relatively limited) supplies of BTx vaccine which they have used to immunise some of their servicemen in the Gulf. They have also been developing antitoxin for use as post-attack treatment. We have not produced BTx vaccine, since it was estimated that it would have taken several months to produce vaccines covering all the relevant BTx strains.

5. As with the plague vaccine, the BTx antitoxin does not have a Medicines Act product licence. It has, however, been tested by NIBSC; and NIBSC, the Department of Health and Porton Down have concluded that the antitoxin is of acceptable quality for use as post-attack treatment. It is not recommended that the antitoxin be used prophylactically.

6. Our intention is to administer the antitoxin once a BW attack involving BTx had been confirmed; and limit its administration to those assessed to have been in the area likely to have been affected by the attack. We are currently holding some 20,000 doses in theatre. (There is also a small stockpile in the UK). As in the case of the two vaccination programmes, administration would need to be voluntary.



SECRET UK EYES A



SECRETARY OF STATE

7. I am copying this minute to other OPD(G) colleagues, and to Sir Robin Butler.

A handwritten signature, likely of the Secretary of State, consisting of a large 'R' followed by a smaller 'K'.

Ministry of Defence

(T K)


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February 1991



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SECRET UK EYES A





Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SWIA 2AH

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7 February 1991

Dear Charles,

CCP
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Foreign Secretary's visit to Saudi Arabia:
Prior contact with Prince Bandar

You said that Prince Bandar had contacted you the other day from Washington and offered to feed into Riyadh any points which might be helpful before the Foreign Secretary arrives there on Saturday evening, 9 February.

The Foreign Secretary was very grateful for this offer from Prince Bandar and you, and would like to take you up on it. If you can ring Prince Bandar, the following would be the points we think most need to be lodged with the Saudis in advance:

- we attach great importance to early formulation of GCC ideas on Gulf security post-crisis: hope Sultan Qaboos will complete his Doha remit rapidly;
- they will understand the domestic importance of our being supported financially, and proportionately, now Saudi Arabia has announced a large contribution to US;
- have sent message from the Prime Minister to The Custodian. How should we approach the issue? Grateful for any help you can give.

On the logistical side of the visit, we have quite a serious problem on Sunday. The BAE 146 of The Queen's Flight has to be back in UK on Sunday evening and The Custodian may keep the Foreign Secretary waiting until Sunday evening before seeing him. In this case we would be on the RAF trooper leaving in the middle of the night: not a happy thought. Alan Munro is doing all he can to try to urge the Saudis to arrange for The Custodian to receive the Foreign Secretary on Sunday morning/early afternoon. If the opportunity arises with Prince Bandar, an extra nudge from that direction would be welcome.

Yours ever,
R. H. T. Gozney

(R H T Gozney)
Private Secretary

Sir Charles Powell
10 Downing Street

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SUMMARY

1. STRONG INTEREST IN CHENEY/POWELL VISIT TO GULF. NEGATIVE REACTION TO KING HUSSEIN'S TELEVISION ADDRESS.

DETAIL

2. DEFENSE SECRETARY CHENEY AND GENERAL POWELL ARE SCHEDULED TO FLY TO SAUDI ARABIA LATER ON 7 FEBRUARY. SPECULATION CONTINUES THAT THEIR VISIT IS THE PRELUDE TO THE GROUND OFFENSIVE. BUT IN A PRIVATE BRIEFING TO CONGRESSMEN ON 6 FEBRUARY THEY SEEM TO HAVE LEFT THE STRONG IMPRESSION THAT SUCH AN OFFENSIVE WAS NOT IMMINENT. CONGRESSMEN SAID AFTER THE BRIEFING THAT CHENEY AND POWELL WERE CLEARLY NOT EAGER TO MOVE THE WAR FROM THE SKY TO THE GROUND. CHENEY AND POWELL ARE EXPECTED TO RETURN TO WASHINGTON LATE ON 10 FEBRUARY.

3. GENERAL DE LA BILLIERE'S COMMENTS ON 7 FEBRUARY THAT A GROUND WAR WAS INEVITABLE HAVE BEEN PROMINENTLY FEATURED ON CNN AND CONTRASTED WITH THE CENTCOM BRIEFING THAT A GROUND WAR WAS NOT INEVITABLE. CENTCOM'S MORE CAUTIOUS TONE IS NOT SEEN AS REFLECTING A FUNDAMENTALLY DIFFERENT ASSESSMENT SO MUCH AS ADMINISTRATION SENSITIVITY TO PUBLIC CONCERN ABOUT HEAVY CASUALTIES IN A GROUND OFFENSIVE.

4. THERE IS CONTINUED FRUSTRATION OVER BATTLE DAMAGE ASSESSMENTS. CHENEY AND POWELL TOLD CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS THAT PRECISE ASSESSMENTS WERE IMPOSSIBLE. BUT THEY THEN ADDED

THAT ACCORDING TO THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, MORE THAN 600 IRAQI TANKS HAD BEEN DESTROYED, WITH AT LEAST ONE REPUBLICAN GUARD DIVISION BELIEVED TO BE 40-50 PER CENT DISABLED. MEANWHILE, US MILITARY OFFICIALS ARE QUOTED AS SAYING THAT THERE COULD BE A LEVELLING-OFF IN THE EFFECTIVENESS OF BOMBING RAIDS ON IRAQI UNITS, AT LEAST UNTIL GROUND FIGHTING FLUSHED OUT NEW TARGETS.

5. KING HUSSEIN'S TELEVISION ADDRESS OF 6 FEBRUARY IS SEEN AS HIS MOST UNEQUIVOCAL PRO-IRAQI STATEMENT TO DATE AND A DIRECT REJECTION OF PRESIDENT BUSH'S APPEAL TO HIM FOR A PUBLIC STATEMENT OF UNDERSTANDING FOR THE US POSITION IN THE WAR. THE PRESIDENT HAS RESPONDED BY REJECTING THE KING'S CALL FOR A CEASE FIRE AND SAID THAT HE HAD MADE A MISTAKE BY ALIGNING JORDAN MORE CLOSELY WITH IRAQ.

6. WITH THE WAR ENTERING ITS FOURTH WEEK, A SUBSTANTIAL MAJORITY OF AMERICANS CONTINUE TO SUPPORT THE ADMINISTRATION. A WASHINGTON POST/ABC POLL ON 7 FEBRUARY FOUND THAT 78 PER CENT BACKED THE DECISION TO ATTACK IRAQ, UP FROM 75 PER CENT LAST WEEK. STRONG SUPPORT PERSISTS DESPITE A GROWING EXPECTATION THAT THE WAR WILL NOT BE A SHORT ONE. SECRETARY BAKER'S WARNING IN HIS TESTIMONY TO THE HOUSE (MY TELNO 385) THAT TOUGH TIMES LAY AHEAD IS WIDELY QUOTED.

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FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

MIPT : SECRETARY OF STATE'S TALK WITH FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER,
7 FEBRUARY : MIDDLE EAST OTHER ISSUES

POST GULF WAR : ARMS CONTROL

1. A BRIEF DISCUSSION ONLY. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT ARMS CONTROL IN THE MIDDLE EAST WAS DIFFICULT, NOT LEAST BECAUSE FRANCE AND THE UK HAD FILLED THE REGION WITH ARMS, FRANCE RATHER MORE SUCCESSFULLY THAN OURSELVES, AND THE SOVIET UNION AHEAD OF ALL OTHERS. BUT WE HAD AN OBLIGATION TO TACKLE THIS PROBLEM AND IT HAD TO BE DONE TOGETHER IN A GLOBAL AGREEMENT. BUT HE HAD HAD NO DISCUSSION YET WITH GOVERNMENT COLLEAGUES, PARTICULARLY THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR INDUSTRY AND EXPORTS. DUMAS AGREED. WE NEEDED TO DISCIPLINE OUR INDUSTRIES, CIVIL AND MILITARY AND THERE WOULD BE NO PROGRESS UNLESS EVERYONE PLAYED THE GAME.

CSCM

2. THE SECRETARY OF STATE ASKED WHAT THE OBJECTIVES OF THIS PROPOSAL NOW WERE. HE HAD HEARD MANY VARIANTS DESCRIBED. DUMAS AGREED THE CONCEPT HAD BECOME CONFUSED. ITS ORIGINS LAY IN MORE MODEST IDEAS, WHICH FRANCE HAD SUPPORTED SINCE 1982, FOR A CONFERENCE TO DISCUSS THE PROBLEMS OF THE MEDITERRANEAN. THERE HAD BEEN A SERIES OF CONTACTS BETWEEN SOUTHERN EC MEMBER STATES AND THE ARAB MAGHREB UNION. THEN DE MICHELIS, WHO HAD A RICH IMAGINATION, HAD BROADENED THE CONCEPT TO EMBRACE THE WHOLE REGION FROM PORTUGAL TO IRAN. SPAIN AND ITALY WERE STILL PUSHING THIS ENLARGED IDEA. FRANCE WAS GOING ALONG BUT THEY WERE SCEPTICAL ABOUT UNITING ALL THE TROUBLESOME ISSUES UNDER THIS UMBRELLA.

SCHEER'S VISIT TO IRAN

PAGE 1
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3. BOTH IN THE TETE A TETE AND OVER LUNCH, DUMAS GAVE AN ACCOUNT OF THE QUAI SECRETARY GENERAL'S VISIT TO TEHRAN. HE ASSURED THE SECRETARY OF STATE PRIVATELY THAT SCHEER HAD NOT SEEN ANY IRAQI DURING HIS TIME IN TEHRAN. SCHEER HAD HAD SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS NOT TO. SCHEER HAD NOT SEEN RAFSANJANI BUT HAD BEEN GIVEN A MESSAGE THAT RAFSANJANI WOULD WELCOME A CONTACT WITH PRESIDENT MITTERRAND. THE PRESIDENT HAD TELEPHONED RAFSANJANI ON 5 FEBRUARY. RAFSANJANI HAD SET OUT THE BASIS ON WHICH IRAN MIGHT EXPLORE A POSSIBLE CEASFIRE. THE FIRST REQUIREMENT FOR THE IRANIANS WAS A PRIVATE COMMITMENT BY SADDAM HUSSAIN THAT IRAQ WOULD WITHDRAW FROM KUWAIT. WITHOUT THAT THERE WOULD BE NO IRANIAN INITIATIVE. RAFSANJANI'S OTHER CONCERN WAS TO UNDERLINE THAT IRAN WISHED TO BE TREATED AS PART OF THE REGION AND INCLUDED IN POST-WAR ARRANGEMENTS. RAFSANJANI ALSO SAID THAT THEY HAD WARNED THE KUWAITIS AGAINST MAKING ANY POST-WAR TERRITORIAL CONCESSIONS TO IRAQ.

4. OVER LUNCH, DUMAS SAID THAT VELAYATI HAD ASSURED SCHEER THAT IRAN WOULD STAY NEUTRAL IN THE WAR AND WAS LOOKING FOR EQUILIBRIUM IN THE REGION AND NO CHANGES TO INTERNATIONAL FRONTIERS. THE SECRETARY OF STATE AGREED THAT IT WAS NECESSARY TO ENVISAGE A ROLE FOR IRAN AFTER THE WAR, THOUGH THE ARABS HAD ENGRAINED SUSPICIONS OF TEHRAN. THE SYRIAN FOREIGN MINISTER HAD ALSO PREDICTED AT THEIR MEETING ON 6 FEBRUARY IN LONDON THAT IRAN WOULD REMAIN NEUTRAL IN THE WAR, AND HAD BEEN VERY FIRM ON THE PRESERVATION OF IRAQ'S TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY.

IRAQ : INTERNAL

5. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT SHARA'A HAD NO FIRM IDEA ON WHETHER SADDAM HUSSEIN WOULD BE OVERTHROWN OR WOULD SURVIVE THE WAR. WE HAD BEGUN SOME CONTACTS WITH MEMBERS OF THE IRAQI OPPOSITION IN LONDON. WHAT ABOUT THE FRENCH? DUMAS SAID THAT THEY HAD FEW CONTACTS, MOSTLY FUNCTIONAL. THERE WERE 2 SOURCES OF OPPOSITION TO SADDAM HUSSEIN, ONE CENTRED IN DAMASCUS, AND THE OTHER IN IRAQ ITSELF, MOSTLY FROM THE SHI'A. THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND DUMAS AGREED THAT THERE WAS LITTLE CLEAR EVIDENCE OF THE STATE OF MORALE INSIDE IRAQ. DUMAS SUGGESTED THAT THE U.S. MIGHT HAVE MORE INFORMATION THAN BRITAIN OR FRANCE.

GULF WAR AIMS

6. THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR SPECULATED THAT, IF SADDAM HUSSEIN SURVIVED THE WAR, EVEN THOUGH HEAVILY DEFEATED HE MIGHT BECOME AN ARAB HERO. THIS WAS AN ARGUMENT FOR EXTENDING THE COALITION'S WAR AIMS TO INCLUDE HIS REMOVAL. BOTH THE SECRETARY

OF STATE AND DUMAS STRONGLY DISAGREED. IT WAS IMPORTANT TO MAINTAIN THE PRESENT LIMITED WAR AIMS. THE SECRETARY OF STATE NOTED THAT SECRETARY BAKER WAS EQUALLY FIRM ON THIS POINT.

JORDAN

6. DUMAS SAID HE WANTED TO RAISE JORDAN. HE WAS WORRIED THAT KING HUSSEIN WAS BECOMING MORE AND MORE ISOLATED FROM THE WEST THROUGH IDENTIFYING HIMSELF WITH IRAQI INTERESTS. THIS WAS NOT JUST A SHAME BUT CARRIED POTENTIAL STRATEGIC DANGERS, SHOULD JORDAN TIP OVER THE EDGE INTO AN OPEN ALLIANCE WITH IRAQ. HE HAD RAISED THIS WITH SECRETARY BAKER, WHO HAD SAID THE U.S. HAD TRIED TO PERSUADE THE SAUDIS TO HELP KING HUSSEIN BUT THE SAUDIS WOULD HAVE NOTHING OF IT. DUMAS WONDERED WHETHER THE TWELVE COULD PLAY A ROLE? THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID HE HAD HIMSELF BEEN TRYING FOR WEEKS, THROUGH OMAN, DIRECTLY AND IN OTHER WAYS TO CREATE A BRIDGE BETWEEN JORDAN, EGYPT AND THE GCC, BUT WITHOUT SUCCESS. KING HUSSEIN'S REMARKS SPEECH ON 6 FEBRUARY WOULD MAKE MATTERS WORSE. THERE WERE IMMINENT PROBLEMS OVER JORDAN'S AIRBUS DEBTS AND OUR COMMERCIAL CREDIT EXPOSURE. SHARA HAD SAID THAT SYRIA WOULD BE WILLING TO PROVIDE OIL TO JORDAN, BUT THIS WOULD HAVE TO BE AT COMMERCIAL PRICES. KING HUSSEIN HAD DONE HIMSELF GREAT HARM BUT WE DID NOT THINK HE HAD CONSPIRED WITH SADDAM HUSSEIN. HE HAD RATHER FOUND HIMSELF TRAPPED BY HIS PAST ACTIONS. DUMAS SAID, IN CONFIDENCE, THAT WHEN SCHEER HAD SEEN KING HUSSEIN HE HAD FOUND HIM IN A PATHETIC STATE, EVEN IN TEARS.

MAGHREB

7. THE SECRETARY OF STATE ASKED DUMAS ABOUT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MAGHREB SINCE THEY HAD MET IN PARIS. DUMAS SAID THE NEWS WAS NOT GOOD, PARTICULARLY FROM MOROCCO. THE TIDE OF PUBLIC PROTEST ABOUT THE WAR HAD RISEN STRONGLY, WITH 300,000 DEMONSTRATORS ON THE STREETS IN RABAT AND KING HASSAN BEING PERSONALLY CRITICISED. IN TUNISIA, THE GOVERNMENT WERE PLAINLY AFRAID OF STREET OPINION. PARADOXICALLY, IN LIBYA THERE WERE STREET DEMONSTRATIONS DEMANDING IRAQI WITHDRAWAL FROM KUWAIT. BUT THIS SHOWED QADHAFI'S GUILF IN TRYING TO REHABILITATE HIMSELF. THE SECRETARY OF STATE NOTED THAT THE LIBYAN-SUPPLIED SEMTEX WHICH HAD EXPLODED IN WHITEHALL THAT MORNING TOLD A DIFFERENT STORY. (DUMAS HAD EARLIER EXPRESSED HIS SYMPATHIES FOR THE BOMB ATTACK IN LONDON.) THE SECRETARY OF STATE NOTED THAT, WHEN HMA RABAT HAD CALLED ON KING HASSAN RECENTLY, THE KING HAD APPEARED CALM AND CONFIDENT OF HIS ABILITY TO HANDLE POPULAR OPINION. BUT THE WAVES OF PUBLIC PROTEST WERE RISING HIGH.

UK/FRENCH PRESS REACTIONS TO GULF CONFLICT

8. IN BRUSSELS ON 4 FEBRUARY, DUMAS HAD COMPLAINED TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE ABOUT THE TONE OF BRITISH PRESS COVERAGE OF THE FRENCH ROLE IN THE GULF. AFTER THE LUNCH ON 7 FEBRUARY, AT THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S SUGGESTION, DUMAS MET A SELECTED GROUP OF SENIOR BRITISH JOURNALISTS. OVER LUNCH, THERE WAS A BRIEF, FRIENDLY DISCUSSION OF PRESS ATTITUDES IN BOTH COUNTRIES. THE SECRETARY OF STATE ASSURED DUMAS THAT THERE WAS NO POLITICAL INFLUENCE AT PLAY IN THE CHAUVINIST HEADLINES IN THE BRITISH TABLOID PRESS. THE GERMANS WERE GETTING WORSE TREATMENT THAN THE FRENCH. IT WAS NECESSARY FOR POLITICIANS ON BOTH SIDES TO DEMONSTRATE THAT WE WERE ACTIVELY COOPERATING. THIS WOULD GIVE THE LIE TO THESE STORIES. DUMAS' PRESS ADVISER NOTED THAT THE BRITISH RADIO AND TELEVISION COVERAGE WAS LESS OF A PROBLEM.

9. SEE MY 2 IFTS.

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SIR P CRADOCK, CABINET OFFICE

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SIC I9M

SECRETARY OF STATE'S DISCUSSION WITH BFCME IN RIYADH

I 1. I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH GEN DE LA BILLIERE THE TOPICS HE WOULD LIKE TO RAISE WITH YOU WHEN YOU MEET IN RIYADH ON THE MORNING OF 10 FEBRUARY. BFCME SAYS HE WOULD FIND IT VERY HELPFUL TO RUN OVER WITH YOU THE PRELIMINARY PLANNING HE HAS DONE, TOGETHER WITH THE US COMMAND, FOR THE POSSIBLE ROLE OF BRITISH FORCES IN KUWAIT IN THE SHORTER TERM AFTERMATH OF HOSTILITIES. CURRENT PLANNING INVOLVES A PHASED BACK-LIFT OF BRITISH TROOPS FROM KUWAIT AND SAUDI ARABIA OVER SEVERAL MONTHS WITH AN ELEMENT, PERHAPS OF BRIGADE STRENGTH STAYING ON IN KUWAIT ALONGSIDE OTHER ALLIED FORCES TO HELP PROVIDE A DEFENSIVE SCREEN UNTIL ANY THREAT FROM IRAQ HAS DISAPPEARED. UNTIL THE OUTCOME OF THE WAR IS CLEAR, IT IS DIFFICULT TO SET A DURATION FOR THIS ROLE. IT IS NOT HOWEVER INTENDED TO HAVE BRITISH FORCES INVOLVED IN INTERNAL SECURITY OR LAW AND ORDER WITHIN KUWAIT. (I BELIEVE THE SAUDIS MAY BE PREPARED TO TAKE A HAND HERE). AT THE SAME TIME BFCME WOULD LIKE TO TOUCH ON THE IDEAS WHICH HE AND I HAVE DISCUSSED FOR OFFERING SMALL ELEMENTS OF HIS FORCES AS NUCLEI FOR NEW MILITARY ADVICE AND TRAINING UNITS (IN ESSENCE MILITARY MISSIONS) TO THE SAUDI ARMY AND PERHAPS AIR DEFENCE COMMAND, AND ALSO IN OTHER PARTS OF THE GULF.

2. BFCME MAY ALSO WANT TO RAISE WITH YOU OUR DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION IN KUWAIT. HE IS ANXIOUS THAT WHOEVER IS TO BE AMBASSADOR OR CHARGE SHOULD BE VISIBLE ON THE GROUND HERE VERY SOON WITH THE IDEA OF ENTERING KUWAIT CITY ON THE HEELS OF THE ALLIED FORCES TO RE-ESTABLISH OUR EMBASSY, ON WHICH THE BRITISH FORCES WOULD NEED TO DEPEND FOR POLITICAL ADVICE AND FOR THEIR FORMAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THE KUWAITI GOVERNMENT.

3. GEN DE LA BILLIERE IS ALSO CONCERNED TO ENSURE THAT HIGH

PRIORITY IS GIVEN TO BRITISH POWS NOT ONLY IN TERMS OF TREATMENT IN CAPTIVITY BUT ALSO TO THEIR EARLY RELEASE POST HOSTILITIES. I HAVE TOLD HIM OF OUR DIFFICULTIES IN SELECTING AN APPROPRIATE PROTECTING POWER TO BUTTRESS THE ICRC'S EFFORTS ON OUR BEHALF (FCO TELNO 269 TO ME).

4. WOULD THE SECRETARY OF STATE BE PREPARED TO DO A 5-10 MINUTE INTERVIEW WITH THE BRITISH FORCES BROADCASTING SERVICE IN RIYADH FOR NETWORKING TO TROOPS IN A NUMBER OF MILITARY LOCATIONS? I HAVE PUT THE SUGGESTION TO BFCME WHO WOULD WELCOME IT. WE COULD ARRANGE AN INTERVIEW EG AT MY HOUSE FOLLOWING THE MEETING WITH EMBASSY STAFF IN THE MIDDLE OF THE DAY ON 10 FEBRUARY. YOUR DETAILED PROGRAMME IS STILL BEING WORKED OUT WITH SAUDI PROTOCOL AND WILL BE GIVEN TO THE PARTY ON ARRIVAL HERE.

MUNRO

YYYY

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10 DOWNING STREET

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From the Private Secretary

7 February 1991

See Richard,

DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH IRAQ

The Diplomatic Adviser to the Spanish Prime Minister, Juan-Antonio Yanez, telephoned me tonight about Iraq's decision to break relations with a number of countries, including several EC Member States. Sr. Gonzalez thought there should be a joint response on the part of the EC countries: he did not exclude this being a joint decision to break off diplomatic relations in return. He had instructed the Spanish Foreign Minister to begin consultations with his other colleagues, and a Coreu telegram had issued to this effect. He would be very grateful for Mr. Major's support.

I said I would discuss this with the Prime Minister and the Foreign Office and get back to him tomorrow with our views.


Yan Yanez,
Charles Powell

Charles Powell

Richard Gozney, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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DEPARTMENT/SERIES <i>Prem 19</i>	Date and sign
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10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

7 February 1991

DEPLOYMENT OF ADDITIONAL DESIGNATION AIRCRAFT TO THE GULF

The Prime Minister has considered the Defence Secretary's minute of 6 February about the proposed deployment of six Buccaneers equipped with the Paveway laser target designator system to the Gulf, which was discussed in OPD(G) on 6 February. He is content with what is proposed.

I am sending a copy of this letter to the Private Secretaries to members of OPD(G), to the Chief Secretary and to Sir Robin Butler.

(C. D. POWELL)

Simon Webb, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence.

SECRET

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A: DEPLOYMENT

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10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

7 February 1991

Dear Richard,

PRIME MINISTER'S TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
KING FAHD OF SAUDI ARABIA

The Prime Minister had a talk on the telephone with King Fahd of Saudi Arabia this evening, lasting some fifty minutes. The Prime Minister spoke to the note enclosed with this letter. I will, therefore, record only the King's part of the conversation (except where the Prime Minister added one or two additional points).

The King thanked the Prime Minister for telephoning. He agreed that their talks in Saudi Arabia had been extremely constructive and useful. They had made clear to both sides what had to be done. It was essential to strike with the utmost force at military targets in Iraq and Kuwait, particularly NBC sites ('illegal weapons'). He was grateful for the Prime Minister's kind words about the performance of the Saudi armed forces. He wanted to underline the importance of striking only at military targets and not at civilian areas. We must make clear that we were not waging war against the Iraqi people: to do so, would cause great difficulties throughout the Middle East. The scale of Iraq's military machine had been a considerable surprise. We had to continue the air action until it was substantially destroyed. In particular, the communications systems had to be knocked out as well as roads, bridges and logistics. As to the land battle, it was essential not to start too soon. We should wait until the main military targets had been neutralised. We should cut off the supplies to Iraqi forces in Kuwait and isolate them from Basra and Baghdad. That would have a devastating effect on the morale of Iraqi forces. It was most important, also, to continue to destroy Iraq's fixed and mobile SCUD missile sites.

Taking up the further points in the Prime Minister's speaking note, the King said that he was very pleased to hear of our contacts with Egypt and Syria, and agreed that both countries remained resolute. It was very regrettable that King Hussein continued to take the line he did: it would not bring him any benefit from Saddam Hussein. He believed that Iran would remain neutral, although one heard different views from different Iranian leaders. But he thought that Rafsanjani was in the ascendant. Turning back to Iraq, he would be most interested in the Prime Minister's assessment of Iraq's CW and BW capacity and

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
- 2 -

how many SCUD launchers Iraq still had available. The Prime Minister said that we did not believe that Iraq had a nuclear capacity. We were dubious whether it had delivery systems for BW. But the position on CW was less happy: we simply did not know whether they could deliver it over a long distance. If they had the capacity, it was a bit surprising that they had not used it. But there was no doubt they could deliver it over shorter distances, and we must bargain with the likelihood that they would use it as part of a land battle. But our forces were well prepared and we would retaliate very severely indeed.

After the Prime Minister had deployed the remainder of his speaking note, the King replied that he wished to say to his dear friend the Prime Minister that Saudi Arabia would always stand side by side with the United Kingdom, because it regarded Britain as a friendly country in all areas. He would be delighted to see Mr Hurd the following weekend. He was very pleased that the Al Yamamah project was going so well, and Saudi Arabia wanted to develop relations in this field on a large scale in future, in order to meet its requirement for armaments. He would stress that such armaments would only ever be used defensively: Saudi Arabia threatened no one.

The King expressed his horror at the terrorist attack on No 10 earlier in the day and his relief that no one had been injured. The Prime Minister suggested that the King should keep in close touch in the immediate future. He could assure the King that Great Britain and Saudi Arabia would stand shoulder to shoulder until they had finished the task of evicting Saddam Hussein from Kuwait. The King spoke of the great personal pleasure which his talk with the Prime Minister had given him. He would not hesitate to get in touch in the weeks ahead. He looked forward to continuing their talks at greater leisure, perhaps in the United Kingdom.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence), John Neilson (Department of Energy) and to Sir Robin Butler.

Yours sincerely,


CHARLES POWELL

R H T Gozney Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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TELEPHONE CALL TO KING FAHD

- Like to thank the King once more for his hospitality during your visit there. You found your conversation with him extremely useful and illuminating on the background to the present Gulf crisis and Iraq's role in it. You look forward to an opportunity for a further discussion before too long.
- You also wanted to express your congratulations to Saudi armed forces for their success at Kahfji, as well as to the Royal Saudi Air Force on their performance in combat.
- Your view that the campaign is going very well and that great damage is being done to military and strategic targets in Iraq and occupied Kuwait. You see no hurry to embark on the ground campaign, although it may be necessary eventually. The important thing is to inflict the most extensive possible damage on his forces in Kuwait, particularly on the Republican Guard, so that an eventual land battle is neither too long nor too expensive in terms of casualties. Our own forces are ready for the land battle when it comes.
- At the same time, the international coalition is holding together remarkably well and you are grateful for Saudi Arabia's key role in that. You spoke recently to President Mubarak and found him very confident and determined: and we had the Syrian Foreign Minister here yesterday who was equally robust.
- There are some fainter-hearts both in the Arab world and the non-aligned movement. You disagree profoundly with King Hussein's speech last night. And there are signs that some non-aligned countries will try to come forward with premature and unfocussed peace initiatives. There is also some pressure in New York for a meeting of the Security Council next week. But

we are confident that these trends can be kept under control.

- You would be interested to hear the King's view about Iran and its intentions. It seems to you that Iran has every incentive to remain neutral and to hold on to the Iraqi aircraft. Their main concern seems to be to stake a claim to an important role once the conflict is over.
- We are beginning to give thought to how the conflict will end and what should follow it and are consulting very closely with the United States about that. You are sorry that the King was taken by surprise at some elements in the Foreign Secretary's recent speech. You hope that a fuller examination of the text and the Foreign Secretary's subsequent remarks will have made clear our view that it is for the Arab Governments themselves to decide what sort of long term security arrangements they want in the Gulf. You also acknowledge how extremely generous Saudi Arabia has been in its financial assistance to other countries in the region.
- You are most grateful to the King for seeing the Foreign Secretary during his forthcoming visit and it will be most helpful for you to have an account of the King's most recent thinking.
- You hope that your message about costs of our military effort will have been received in the spirit of friendship in which it was sent. Obviously we would be most grateful for any assistance Saudi Arabia felt able to provide.
- Meanwhile, you are delighted with the progress of the Al-Yamamah project and hope that we can continue to build on it.

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TELEPHONE CALL TO KING FAHD

Wanted to speak before F. Sec. answer to article 14.

- Like to thank the King once more for his hospitality during your visit there. You found your conversation with him extremely useful and illuminating on the background to the present Gulf crisis and Iraq's role in it. You look forward to an opportunity for a further discussion before too long.
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- Meanwhile, you are delighted with the progress of the Al-Yamamah project and hope that we can continue to build on it.



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

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7 February 1991

Dear Charles

As requested in your letter of 6 February I enclose a list of points for the Prime Minister to make during his planned telephone conversation with King Fahd. They have been discussed with the MOD at official level and will, if necessary, be updated tomorrow. We have established from Riyadh that the King will be available between 6-7 pm tomorrow, 7 February on his Riyadh telephone number (482 2277). We are trying to locate Mr McLaughlin with a view to asking him to interpret. We shall be in touch to confirm this as soon as possible.

I am sending a copy of this letter goes to Simon Webb at the Ministry of Defence.

Yours ever,
S L Gass
(S L Gass)
Private Secretary

Sir Charles Powell KMG
10 Downing Street

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PRIME MINISTER'S TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH KING FAHD : 7 FEBRUARY

Points to Make

- Military operations going well. Congratulations on success of Saudi forces at Khafji. Royal Saudi Air Force has also played an important and invaluable role in the air campaign. Important we should not be rushed into land battle prematurely.
- No expansion of our objectives: no destruction or dismemberment of Iraq.
- Foreign Secretary much looking forward to his visit to the Kingdom on 9-10 February. Much useful business to discuss with you and with the Government of Kuwait. Anxious to keep up the dialogue.
- Saudi/Egyptian/Syrian triangle vital both for conduct of present campaign and for aftermath of crisis.
- Meanwhile need to watch carefully activity at the UN and among the Non-Aligned. We are in touch with key members of the Security Council and governments attending the Non-Aligned Ministerial Meeting in Belgrade on 12 February. Helpful if you could take action too (know you are in touch with the Zimbabweans and others). Signs are that the Belgrade meeting should not be too damaging: Yugoslavs and Cypriots seemed disposed to be helpful and the steam seems to have gone out of the Indian "peace initiative". But others (e.g. Ghanians and Zimbabweans) could hanker after a ceasefire.
- Iranian neutrality vital. Seems assured. Mystery over Iraqi aircraft, but important point is that they should remain grounded in Iran until after the conflict.
- Douglas Hurd will also come briefed to follow-up my letter about the cost of our military effort. An increasingly difficult issue for us here, particularly in the light of new pledges of

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support given to the Americans by Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Japan and Germany. Value the host nation support you are already giving but hope you will be able to help.

- [if raised] we remain fully committed to the Al Yamamah Project and the related Offset Programme, and hope that they will continue to flourish for many years to come.

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Middle East : Sat PT41



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MIPT: KING HUSSEIN'S ADDRESS TO THE NATION

SUMMARY

1. POWERFUL RHETORIC BUT NO NEW POLICY CONTENT. DESPITE THE STRONG SUPPORT FOR IRAQ, THE SPEECH IS UNLIKELY TO SIGNAL A SIGNIFICANT SHIFT OF POLICY.

DETAIL

2. FOR ALL ITS LAMENTABLY ONE-SIDED CONTENT, THIS WAS A POWERFUL PERFORMANCE. STRIPPING AWAY THE RHETORIC, HOWEVER, I CAN SEE NO NEW POLICY CONTENT. PREDICTABLY, THERE IS NO REFERENCE TO THE CAUSE OF THE WAR, IE IRAQ'S INVASION OF KUWAIT. ONE OF THE MOST DEPRESSING FEATURES IS THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE KING HAS SWALLOWED IRAQI PROPAGANDA (INCLUDING CNN MATERIAL WHICH IS SHOWN HERE AS CENSORED BY THE IRAQIS).

3. THE SPEECH SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN PREPARED AT SHORT NOTICE. UNDOUBTEDLY, THE ATTACKS ON JORDANIAN TANKERS, THE NEW US CONSULAR ADVICE, AND THE DISTORTED MEDIA ACCOUNTS OF THE WAR HAVE ALL INCREASED FEARS THAT JORDAN MIGHT BECOME DIRECTLY INVOLVED. THE KING WILL HAVE CONVEYED SOME REASSURANCE TO ORDINARY PEOPLE ON THIS SCORE. HE MAY ALSO HAVE PRE-EMPTED CALLS BY RADICALS ESPECIALLY IN PARLIAMENT TO GIVE MORE MATERIAL SUPPORT TO IRAQ. HOWEVER, I DOUBT THAT THESE MOTIVES ALONE EXPLAIN THE STRENGTH OF HIS ATTACK ON THE ALLIED COALITION. AS I KNOW FROM MY CONVERSATIONS WITH HIM, THE VIEWS EXPRESSED ARE HIS OWN, AND DEEPLY FELT. IT IS ALSO CONCEIVABLE THAT HE IS PAVING THE WAY FOR FURTHER CONTACTS WITH SADDAM (HE RECENTLY TOLD ME THAT HE WOULD BE PREPARED TO GO TO BAGHDAD IF THAT WOULD ACHIEVE ANYTHING).

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4. THE KEY QUESTION IS WHETHER THE SPEECH CAN BE TAKEN, AS IT AT FIRST SEEMS, AS SIGNALLING A SHIFT OF POLICY FROM WHAT SENIOR JORDANIANS HAVE RECENTLY BEEN DESCRIBING AS QUOTE NEUTRALITY UNQUOTE TO ONE OF POSITIVE SUPPORT FOR IRAQ. TO MOST WESTERN OBSERVERS IT WILL CERTAINLY SEEM THAT WAY BUT FOR EG MANY RADICAL PALESTINIANS IN JORDAN THE KING WILL NOT HAVE GONE FAR ENOUGH IN SADDAM'S DIRECTION. PERSONALLY, I DOUBT THAT A SHIFT OF POLICY IS INTENDED. SANCTIONS REMAIN IN PLACE, AS THEY MUST IF WESTERN AID IS TO BE FORTHCOMING: AND WITHOUT THE LATTER, JORDAN WOULD RAPIDLY BE ON ITS KNEES. SIMILARLY, I AM NOT AWARE OF ANY NEW CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE OF SIGNIFICANT COOPERATION WITH IRAQ (AND TWO BRIGADES REMAIN DEPLOYED ON THE EASTERN FRONT). THE NEED FOR OIL FROM SYRIA WILL ALSO LIMIT THE KING'S FREEDOM OF MANOEUVRE. BUT A CONSIDERED JUDGMENT WILL HAVE TO AWAIT FURTHER DISCUSSIONS WITH SENIOR OFFICIAL AND OTHER CONTACTS. MEANWHILE, WHAT IS PROBABLY MORE CERTAIN IS THAT THE SPEECH WILL HAVE BEEN THE LAST STRAW FOR JORDAN'S ERSTWHILE GULF ARAB SUPPORTERS.

5. IT IS TOO EARLY TO JUDGE HOW THE SPEECH MIGHT AFFECT THE INTERNAL SITUATION, BUT WE WILL HAVE TO WATCH THE LOCAL MOOD CAREFULLY AND TAKE EXTRA CARE OVER OUR OWN SECURITY AND THAT OF OUR COMMUNITY. UNLIKE HIS MUCH MORE STATESMANLIKE SPEECH OF 15 JANUARY, THE KING DID NOT MAKE ANY REFERENCE TO THE NEED TO PROTECT FOREIGNERS IN JORDAN.

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MR FAIRWEATHER

MR BROOMFIELD

MR SLATER

MR GORE-BOOTH

MR GOULDEN

MR JAY

MR BERMAN (LEGAL ADVISERS)

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KING HUSSEIN'S ADDRESS TO THE NATION

SUMMARY

1. SUMMARY OF SPEECH. COMMENT IN SEPARATE TELEGRAM.

DETAIL

2. KING HUSSEIN GAVE A 25 MINUTE ADDRESS TO THE NATION ON THE EVENING OF 6 FEBRUARY. HIS DELIVERY WAS IMPRESSIVE, IN FLAWLESS CLASSICAL ARABIC, INCLUDING QUOTATIONS FROM THE QURAN. THE TONE WAS HIGHLY EMOTIONAL.

3. HE SAID THE AIM OF THE WAR WAS TO DESTROY IRAQ, A COUNTRY THAT HAD COME TO THE DEFENCE OF OTHER ARAB NATIONS IN THEIR STRUGGLES WITH ISRAEL, AND QUOTE HOW SHAMED WILL BE THE ARABS WHO LET ARAB BLOOD BE SPILT IN THIS UNJUST WAR UNQUOTE. THE UNPRECEDENTED FIREPOWER MUSTERED BY THE ALLIANCE WAS DESTROYING QUOTE MOSQUES, CHURCHES, MUSEUMS, HOSPITALS, SCHOOLS AND POWDERED MILK FACTORIES UNQUOTE. IRAQ HE SAID, IN A PASSAGE LACED WITH HISTORICAL ALLUSIONS, WAS BEING TURNED INTO QUOTE THE ARENA OF THE THIRD WORLD WAR UNQUOTE.

4. THE WAR WAS BEING WAGED FOR INTERNATIONAL LEGITIMACY IN THE NAME OF THE UNITED NATIONS, BUT WHAT LEGITIMACY WAS THERE IN THE STRONG ATTACKING THE WEAK? IT WAS NOT TRUE THAT EVERY EFFORT HAD BEEN MADE TO AVERT THE WAR, AND THE ARAB NATIONS IN THE COALITION HAD FROM THE START REJECTED DIALOGUE WITH IRAQ. THE WAR WAS NOT COMPATIBLE WITH THE AIMS OF THE UN RESOLUTIONS, AND HE COMPARED THE LACK OF PROGRESS IN ENDING OTHER OCCUPATIONS IN PALESTINE AND LEBANON. THE REAL PURPOSE OF THE WAR, HE CLAIMED, WAS TO DESTROY IRAQ AND QUOTE REARRANGE THE AREA IN A MANNER FAR MORE DANGEROUS THAN THE SYKES-PICOT AGREEMENT UNQUOTE. REFERRING

TO TALK OF A NEW WORLD ORDER, THE KING SAID THIS SHOULD BE APPLIED FAIRLY TO ALL NATIONS, AND BE BASED ON MUTUAL RESPECT AND COOPERATION.

5. HE SAID THAT THE NATURE OF THE ALLIANCE, WHICH WAS SUPPORTED BY ISRAEL, BETRAYED ITS AIM OF DESTROYING IRAQ, AND QUOTE IT BECOMES EASY TO SEE THIS WAR IS A WAR AGAINST ALL ARABS AND MUSLIMS, NOT ONLY AGAINST IRAQ UNQUOTE. WITHOUT NAMING THEM (BUT MAKING IT CLEAR HE WAS REFERRING TO EGYPT AND TURKEY), HE SCORNE THOSE MUSLIM COUNTRIES WHICH HAD RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL AND THE MUSLIM AND ARAB COUNTRIES WHICH ALLOWED THEIR TERRITORY TO BE USED AS BASES FOR THE ALLIED FORCES. QUOTE ARAB MONEY IS FINANCING THIS WAR WITH UNPRECEDENTED GENEROSITY UNKNOWN TO US AND OUR PALESTINIAN BROTHERS UNQUOTE. ISRAEL WOULD BENEFIT FROM THE CURRENT SITUATION. THERE WAS MUCH TALK OF PLANS TO CONTROL QUOTE OUR UNQUOTE RESOURCES, ABOUT FOREIGN TROOPS REMAINING ON ARAB SOIL AND ABOUT PEACE SETTLEMENTS BEING IMPOSED ON THE PALESTINIANS WHICH MIGHT DEPRIVE THEM OF THEIR RIGHTS.

6. JORDAN WAS BEING PUNISHED FOR ITS STAND, AND NOW OIL SUPPLIES WERE BEING CUT. THE COUNTRY WOULD REMAIN UNITED AND HOLD ITS POSITION THAT THE OPPORTUNITY FOR PEACE STILL EXISTED. MILLIONS OF PEOPLE IN EVERY COUNTRY WERE CALLING FOR PEACE AGAINST THE STANDS TAKEN BY THEIR LEADERS. QUOTE JUSTICE WILL BE VICTORIOUS UNQUOTE AND QUOTE OUR NATION WILL PREVAIL UNQUOTE BECAUSE QUOTE HUMANITY WILL PREVAIL AGAINST ITS ENEMIES UNQUOTE.

7. QUOTE THIS IS A CALL FROM A HASHEMITE ARAB TO ALL HONEST ARAB AND MUSLIM LEADERS UNQUOTE. THE IRAQIS SHOULD BE SAVED FROM THEIR FATE AND THE WAR SHOULD BE STOPPED. IN ABOUT THE ONLY SPECIFIC SUGGESTION IN THE SPEECH, HE SAID THE FIRST THING WAS TO WORK TO MAKE THE ALLIANCE ACCEPT A CEASE-FIRE AND THEN TO START DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES. IF THIS FAILED THE ARABS AND MUSLIMS WOULD BE DESTROYED. JORDAN WOULD STAY UNITED BUT, IF WAS FORCED TO WAR, IT WOULD FIGHT TO QUOTE GAIN ONE OF GOD'S TWO FAVOURS - VICTORY OR MARTYRDOM UNQUOTE.

8. THE KING ENDED HIS SPEECH BY HAILING THE PALESTINIANS FOR THEIR STEADFASTNESS WHILE QUOTE UNDER HOUSE ARREST UNQUOTE AND THE IRAQIS FOR THEIR COURAGE IN FACING 28 ARMIES AS QUOTE THEY DEFEND US ALL UNQUOTE. HE SENT A SPECIAL SALUTE TO THE POPE FOR HIS PRAYERS AND CALLS FOR PEACE AND TO ALL OTHERS, PARTICULARLY MOSLEMS, FROM ALL OVER THE WORLD WHO CALLED FOR PEACE. HE ALSO THANKED ALL NEWSMEN, ACADEMICS AND POLITICIANS WHO WERE SEEKING

TO SPREAD THE TRUTH.

9. FOR COMMENT, SEE MIFT.

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SIR CHARLES POWELL

c Sir Robin Butler

The Iraq Crisis: CIA's Assessment

Recent exchanges we have had with CIA have highlighted differences between General Schwarzkopf's view of the campaign and those of the Agency. CIA are distinctly more downbeat than the General.

2. CIA recognise Saddam's failures and frustrations, also the serious damage he is suffering in many sectors. But they point to his consolations. After three weeks of the air campaign his ground forces continue to show considerable resilience. Khafji demonstrated that he could still manoeuvre several divisions over an extended period. The speed at which airfields were being repaired and the rapid construction of pontoon bridges were further signs of resilience.

3. CIA argue that Saddam must be pleased that his ground forces have retained their overall combat capability. Even General Schwarzkopf accepted that most Iraqi divisions - with the exception of the 5th mechanised division - had not yet suffered serious damage. In CIA's view, damage so far to the Republican Guards had been limited: overall, they were still assessed to be "95 per cent combat capable", with their two key heavy armoured divisions - the Medina and the Hamarabi - virtually intact.

4. The rate of desertions, less than 2,000 so far, did not suggest serious morale problems. Morale had undoubtedly been hit by the allied air strikes: once Iraqi units were surrounded and cut off they would probably surrender rapidly. However, the allies could suffer considerable casualties in getting to that point. It would

TO SPREAD THE TRUTH.

9. FOR COMMENT, SEE MIFT.

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LT COL CRONIN CAB OFFICE

MR SHAPLAND CAB OFFICE

AUS (C) MODUK

HD/SEC (O) (C) MODUK

MR LS SMITH BANK ENGLAND

MR WICKS HMT

PS/CHIEF SEC TO THE TREASURY

EMERGENCY UNIT

RESIDENT CLERK

NNNN



SECRET

38a - c



R. A. Smith

COO

7/2.

Jp 01315

SIR CHARLES POWELL

c Sir Robin Butler

The Iraq Crisis: CIA's Assessment

Recent exchanges we have had with CIA have highlighted differences between General Schwarzkopf's view of the campaign and those of the Agency. CIA are distinctly more downbeat than the General.

2. CIA recognise Saddam's failures and frustrations, also the serious damage he is suffering in many sectors. But they point to his consolations. After three weeks of the air campaign his ground forces continue to show considerable resilience. Khafji demonstrated that he could still manoeuvre several divisions over an extended period. The speed at which airfields were being repaired and the rapid construction of pontoon bridges were further signs of resilience.

3. CIA argue that Saddam must be pleased that his ground forces have retained their overall combat capability. Even General Schwarzkopf accepted that most Iraqi divisions - with the exception of the 5th mechanised division - had not yet suffered serious damage. In CIA's view, damage so far to the Republican Guards had been limited: overall, they were still assessed to be "95 per cent combat capable", with their two key heavy armoured divisions - the Medina and the Hamarabi - virtually intact.

4. The rate of desertions, less than 2,000 so far, did not suggest serious morale problems. Morale had undoubtedly been hit by the allied air strikes: once Iraqi units were surrounded and cut off they would probably surrender rapidly. However, the allies could suffer considerable casualties in getting to that point. It would



b

be wrong to assume that the Iraqi army would not strongly resist an allied ground attack. CIA's assessment is that we are still a long way from inflicting such damage on the Republican Guard as to cause Saddam real concern.

5. CIA agree with us that Saddam could still seek to raise the stakes. But allied vigilance and the use of B-52s and cluster bombs against Iraqi front-line positions could make it harder or even impossible for him to launch offensives. As a result, CIA are increasingly of the view that he might decide to sit tight. The destruction of his ability to resupply his forces need not necessarily affect his strategy. Each division had sufficient supplies for six to eight days' fighting once the ground war started. In that time, Saddam would still hope to inflict sufficient casualties on the coalition to enable him to negotiate a ceasefire on his own terms.

6. It should be noted that there is much bitterness in CIA over the way in which they have been deprived of hard intelligence by General Schwarzkopf, who has kept most of the tactical intelligence within his own headquarters. (The Defense Department's own Defense Intelligence Agency is faring little better.) CIA are therefore taking the line that, in the absence of photographic intelligence, they will remain sceptical of Schwarzkopf's claims. They point out, for example, that his announcement that six mobile launchers had been destroyed in fact involved the destruction of six petrol tankers, and probably Jordanian ones at that. They also say that the latest claim of 647 Iraqi tanks destroyed has no intelligence backing.

7. We have therefore to aim off a little. But despite this caveat, and the difference about Saddam's readiness to risk more forays, we think CIA's analysis is to be taken

SECRET



seriously, particularly the warning that the Iraqi army is still able to fight hard.

le

PERCY CRADOCK

7 February 1991



Fin Rabin
Post a letter
letter

2 MARSHAM STREET
LONDON SW1P 3EB
01-212 3434

My ref:

Your ref:

CDP.
6/2

- 6 FEB 1991

De Collyer ✓

OIL SPILLS IN THE GULF

Members on all sides of the House have been shocked by the environmental damage inflicted on the waters of the Gulf by Iraq over recent days as a deliberate act of environmental terrorism. This underlines Saddam Hussein's gross irresponsibility and unscrupulousness in pursuing his own aims and reinforces our determination to curb the threat his aggressive policies represent.

It is impossible to anticipate or prevent all acts of this kind. However, what we can do is respond helpfully and promptly to requests from the sovereign Gulf States who are in the lead in dealing with the situation. The Governments of those states have been made clearly aware of the UK's readiness to do so.

You will want to be aware of what has already been done in response to requests from the Saudi Arabian and other Gulf Governments.

Existing UK computer models of the Gulf have been urgently modified to help to predict the behaviour of the oil.

The Natural Environment Research Council has prepared an urgent assessment based on information available in the UK on the local effects of the pollution on marine life, and the results have been conveyed to the co-ordinator on such matters appointed by Saudi Arabia.

90 tonnes of anti-pollution equipment have been airlifted to the Gulf from oil industry stocks held at Southampton. In response to a request from the Saudi Arabian Government, the Department of Transport has sent two oil pollution control experts to give advice on the spot, and it is urgently considering requests by the Saudi and other Gulf governments for further expertise to be made available.

The RSPCA has identified three volunteers who are being flown to Eastern Saudi Arabia at government expense to help the Saudi authorities set up a programme to treat oil contaminated birds.

THE UNITED KINGDOM
INTERNATIONAL UNION

The United Kingdom committee for the International Union for Nature Conservation (IUCN) whose secretariat is provided by the Nature Conservancy Council, had consulted its member organisations on the contribution they may be able to make to scientific assessment of effects on wildlife and related issues.

For the longer term, the Government is beginning to consider now what skills and experience the UK could contribute to an eventual clean up when immediate military danger is past. The Environment Ministers of the OECD issued communiques on 30 and 31 January condemning Iraq for its crime against the environment and endorsing the Government's suggestion for strengthening the international community's ability to respond to future environmental emergencies by establishing an international register of capabilities and expertise. In this connection we are giving urgent consideration to the United Kingdom's early ratification of the International Maritime Organisation's (IMO) International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Co-operation which was agreed in London last November. We hope that other countries will also seek to expedite their ratification procedures for this important Convention.

The United Nations Environment Programme has called a meeting of relevant UN agencies and the oil industry in Geneva this week to consider how to improve communications on the environmental situation in the Gulf and to co-ordinate international technical response. The Government has made it clear that we shall contribute to the UNEP efforts fully and promptly as soon as the nature of the needs has been clarified.

At the request of a number of Gulf states the IMO, based in London, is acting as a clearing house for requests for, or offers of anti-pollution equipment and expertise. In response to a request from the IMO's Secretary General the Department of Transport has agreed to second administrative staff to assist IMO in this work.

John
Michael

MICHAEL HESELTINE

TOP SECRET

Jp 01314

PRIME MINISTER

*Agree - we should
be in no hurry.
f 7.2*

Copy No 1 of 2 copies

*3892(A-C)
Zin Minin
You will have to
go over this with
the President in due
course.*

Gulf Crisis: Timing of the Land Campaign

C 881

Now that the air campaign is well advanced and Cheney and Powell are going out to the Gulf, the question of the timing of an Allied land attack becomes more acute.

7/2

2. As regards the practicalities, I believe the American ground forces would be ready from about 20 February. Our forces are already in a position to move.

3. On the question of the best time, as Air Chief Marshal Hine told you yesterday, Schwarzkopf is likely to require a 50 per cent reduction in Republican Guard capability before launching an attack, though the difficulty of measuring that level will make the judgment highly subjective. Both Cheney and Powell are likely to be cautious. But I am struck by Scowcroft's view, expressed to Charles more than once, that he favoured an early land attack because of the risk that Saddam might otherwise escape us by offering a ceasefire. This could be influential and, I think, dangerous.

4. It is true that we do not want Saddam or his military machine to slip through our fingers; also that, once we are engaged on land in Kuwait, we shall have a better chance of imposing our terms for an end to hostilities. There may also be political/presentational problems in a protracted bombing campaign. Moreover, the climate and, to some extent, Ramadan mean that the time at our disposal is limited.

5. On the other side, however, there are powerful considerations:



a. I think the risk of Saddam offering a ceasefire on tolerable terms in the very immediate future may be overrated. He shows no sign at all of responding to the neutral solutions at present being peddled, which would involve Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait. He will probably want to get us involved in serious land engagements in the hope of inflicting heavy casualties before deciding further steps. In other words, he probably has not yet abandoned his initial strategy, aimed at a ceasefire forced on the West by a war of attrition. Even if that is not so, he probably does not see damage to the Republican Guard as sufficiently critical to force his hand just yet. He probably still sees himself as having room for manoeuvre, which in turn gives us a little more time.

b. We also know on good authority that Saddam is dismayed by the length of the air attack; he expected a much shorter prelude to a land offensive. An earlier land attack would therefore play into his hands.

c. Whatever Saddam may think, I doubt whether we on our side can be satisfied about the degree of damage so far inflicted on the main Iraqi land forces. Battle damage is extremely hard to assess, but it seems clear that there is still a lot of life left in them. (You know my doubts about the Republican Guard.) We shall need to be very sure in, say, two weeks' time, that this is not still true.

d. The overriding consideration on our side must be to attain our objective with minimum casualties. The figures given in your talk yesterday (5-10 per cent, with 8 per cent as our figure for hospital planning) are disquieting. Moreover these are average figures. Our armoured brigade, at the sharp end, could suffer above average losses.



e. The answer given to your question yesterday "Why not prolong the air attack?" was not, I thought, entirely convincing. The law of diminishing returns may indeed apply, but our tactics would adapt to the new situation. In any case should that be the deciding factor, given the countervailing worries?

6. The balance of the argument, as I see it, favours continuing caution. Unless we are very confident indeed in two weeks' time that the Iraqi army is cracking, and, in the nature of things, we may lack really hard evidence, then it would be prudent to extend the air bombardment for another week or ten days. We should then still be in early March and there should be time to finish the job by the end of the month. The presentational problems of such an extended air campaign could be dealt with by demonstrating that most of our effort was concentrated on Iraqi forces in Kuwait and by the argument that the course we were following would keep our casualties to a minimum.

7. If you agree with the thrust of the above, it would, I think, be wise to start injecting these considerations and our preference for caution into US minds now, before their position crystallises and Bush has made up his mind. In the end, of course, the Americans will decide and we shall have to fall in with them; but we should not do so until we have gone over the ground carefully with them and we should not be led into a premature attack by arguments, such as the risk of an early ceasefire, which may not stand up to examination.


PERCY CRADOCK

6 February 1991



From: GREVILLE JANNER, Q.C., M.P.



✓ *Prime Minister*

GD 2/2/91

6/2

Dear Prime Minister -

*It was most kind of you
to receive the Chief Rabbi and myself
last week - in spite (or even because)
of the weight of women, on your
shoulders. It is thanks largely to
you that we retain such a wide
area of common ground, in the present
Gulf crisis. And the Chief and I
much appreciated your cordial, frank
and attentive welcome.*

With Best wishes,

Yours ever -

P. J. Julli

If ever you want a quick dip into
the view or concern of my Jewish
Community, on this or any other
matter, please do not hesitate
to let me know.



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

SECRET

London SW1A 2AH

6 February 1991

CDD 7/2

Dear Charles,

The Gulf: Message from General Scowcroft

Thank you for a copy of your letter of 3 February to Simon Webb. We will leave the MOD to comment on the message from General Scowcroft.

Yours ever,
Richard Smy

(R H T Gozney)
Private Secretary

Sir Charles Powell
10 Downing Street

SECRET



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MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

Telephone 071- 21 82111/3

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MO 6/17/15/1J

[Handwritten signature]
CB 6/2
44 February 1991

Dear Charles,

VIEW FROM WASHINGTON

I attach a copy of the "View From Washington" following a call from the Chief of Defence Staff to General Powell this afternoon. We have subsequently been in touch with Secretary Cheney's office and plans are now shaping up for a short visit by the Defence Secretary and the Chief of the Defence Staff to see their US counterparts early next week.

We will be in touch separately to seek the Prime Minister's formal approval.

I am sending a copy of this letter to the Private Secretaries to members of OPD(G) and to Sir Robin Butler.

Yours sincerely
John Webb.

(S WEBB)
Private Secretary

Sir Charles Powell KCMG
10 Downing Street

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CDS 2066/2/1

6 Feb 91

PS/Secretary of State


THE VIEW FROM WASHINGTON - 061530Z FEB 91

1. CDS spoke briefly to Gen Powell this afternoon on the general state of progress of the war in the Gulf. The General has briefed President Bush that weather has been a major factor in causing a delay in the air campaign of about a week to date. As he always does Gen Powell emphasised that there is no serious pressure on him or on Gen Schwarzkopf to commit ground forces before they are ready to do so. As Powell sees it, the President will not go for the ground campaign until recommended to do so by Schwarzkopf and him. The imminent visit of Cheney and Powell to the theatre in no way presages the start of a land campaign; they are going simply to get first hand reports from Gen Schwarzkopf whom they have not seen for over 6 weeks.

2. In agreeing with CDS that we need to keep the air campaign going to really soften up Iraqi ground forces, Gen Powell made the point that when the land campaign starts the air effort will intensify rather than stop. Gen Schwarzkopf does not intend to pit ground forces against strong well dug-in Iraqi resistance; he plans to make them move thereby exposing themselves to air effort. He does not believe that ipso facto the ground campaign will lead to a large number of casualties. [In an aside he said that US forces would open up Iraqi minefields by rolling a 15,000lb bomb out of the back of a C130! Two will be dropped on Iraqi forward defences tonight.]

3. CDS professed satisfaction with the conduct of the war to date, was pleased with the extent of the air effort against the Iraqi Army together with continued attacks on Iraqi infrastructure. Gen Powell concurred that we need to agree our conditions for ceasefire to ensure that Saddam Hussein will be unable to stage a repeat in a few years time.

4. CDS floated the idea that he and the Secretary of State should fly to Washington for a meeting with Mr Cheney and Gen Powell on their return from the Gulf. Gen Powell agreed that this would be a good idea and suggested that this should now be taken forward by Mr King and Mr Cheney. He also recommended that the visit should not take place immediately on their return, Sunday 10 February, but that we should wait a few days so as not to send any wrong messages to the media. CDS and Gen Powell agreed that they would speak again by telephone on Monday 11 February.


D G LITTLEJOHNS
Cdre
PSO/CDS
MB6173 83353MB

38E

PRIME MINISTERTHE GULF

702-
The Defence Secretary and David Craig are thinking of going over to Washington for the day next Wednesday to talk to Dick Cheney and Colin Powell after their return from the Gulf. I think this is sensible in presentational terms. Cheney and Powell will actually be back from the Gulf on Sunday and Scowcroft has promised to telephone me with an account of their conclusions, so we should get some quite early information. The President will also want to talk to you when he has heard from them. But it is important that we should be seen to be having consultations with the Americans before any decision on the land campaign is announced.

CDD

CHARLES POWELL
6 February 1991

c:\foreign\gulf

agree - they did go.
But why wait 17/1 Wed

→ surely Monday is
better presentationaly?
/ 6.2



CAN
7/2

CONFIDENTIAL

MESSAGE FROM CHIEF SECRETARY AT OPD(G)(B) THIS MORNING

Subject: Japanese burden-sharing contribution to UK.

Kimmit told Sir P Wright yesterday that the US was happy for the UK to have some of the \$9bn provided the US share was topped up with other Japanese funds.

2. Tokyo telno 104 (attached) reports that Nakayama has written to Baker saying that some of the \$9bn for which the Japanese Government is seeking Diet approval is intended for the UK. It will be routed through the GCC.

3. It is proposed to send John Weston to Tokyo as soon as possible to follow this up, and also to smooth the way for the GCC to play their (nominal) part in the allocation by approaching Qatar.

4. Chief Secretary and Mr Hogg feel that Nakayama's letter gives us an opening to go to the US at high level and say that, since we are in the conflict together and the UK is carrying its share of the military effort, and since the Japanese wish us to have a share of the \$9bn, the US should not stand in the way of the Japanese giving us \$720M.

5. They recommend that Sir Charles Powell put this case to General Scowcroft today, with the request that the President's reply to the Prime Minister's message of 31 January take account of Nakayama's letter.

wdr

Cabinet Office
6 February 1991

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FM TOKYO
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 104
OF 060745Z FEBRUARY 91
INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK, WASHINGTON, POLAD HIGH WYCOMBE, HM TREASURY

SIC
MODUK FOR SEC(0)C. TREASURY FOR FELLGETT

JAPAN: BURDEN-SHARING

SUMMARY

1. NAKAYAMA HAS WRITTEN TO BAKER TO SAY THAT SOME OF THE NINE BILLION DOLLARS WILL GO TO THE UK AND OTHER TROOP CONTRIBUTORS.
2. KAIFU HAS SAID IN THE DIET THAT THE MONEY WILL BE SPENT ONLY ON TRANSPORT, MEDICAL CARE, FOOD, LIVING EXPENSES AND ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS. MOOD STILL RUNNING PROGRESSIVELY IN FAVOUR OF A CONTRIBUTION TO THE UK COSTS FROM THE 9 BILLION DOLLARS, WITH 8 PER CENT BEING A FIGURE THAT HAS OBTAINED SOME CREDIBILITY (ALBEIT CONTESTED IN CERTAIN QUARTERS CLOSEST TO THE AMERICANS).

DETAIL

3. THE MFA NORTH AMERICAN BUREAU HAVE TOLD US THAT NAKAYAMA SENT A LETTER ON 5 FEBRUARY TO BAKER WHICH WAS ON THE FOLLOWING LINES:

THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT'S TOP PRIORITY AT PRESENT IS TO SECURE DIET APPROVAL OF THE NINE BILLION DOLLARS, THEY ARE TAKING THE LINE THAT THIS IS FOR THE MULTINATIONAL FORCES: IT IS IMPORTANT TO EXPLAIN TO THE DIET THAT THIS CONFLICT IS NOT JUST BETWEEN THE US AND IRAQ, BUT BETWEEN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND IRAQ,

A PREDOMINANT SHARE OF THE MONEY WILL GO TO THE US, BUT JAPAN HAS NO CHOICE BUT TO ROUTE THE MONEY THROUGH THE GCC AND TO ALLOCATE SOME OF THE MONEY FOR DISTRIBUTION BY THAT ORGANISATION,

JAPAN ALSO INTENDS TO CONTRIBUTE A CERTAIN AMOUNT TO THE UK IN RECOGNITION OF THE MILITARY EFFORT BEING MADE BY THAT COUNTRY.

4. WE HAVE THANKED THE MFA FOR THE LAST POINT IN THE LETTER, BUT THE NORTH AMERICAN BUREAU CONTINUE TO TAKE THE LINE THAT 8

PER CENT IS QUOTE OUT OF THE QUESTION UNQUOTE. WE (AND THE EUROPEAN BUREAU) CONTINUE TO ARGUE THAT IT IS THE MOST LOGICAL BASIS FOR AN ALLOCATION. HYODO MADE THIS POINT AGAIN TO ME TODAY WHEN I TELEPHONED HIM. THE NORTH AMERICAN BUREAU ARE TRYING TO DELAY A DECISION FOR SEVERAL WEEKS, APPARENTLY ON THE GROUNDS THAT IF A DECISION ON ALLOCATION IS TAKEN AND SUBSEQUENTLY LEAKED (MOST PROBABLY IN WASHINGTON), IT WOULD COMPLICATE THE DIET DEBATE. THERE MAY BE SOME FORCE IN THIS, BUT WE CONTINUE TO ARGUE FOR A SPEEDY DECISION GIVEN THE EXTENT OF PRESS AND PARLIAMENTARY INTEREST IN THE UK. WE HAVE INCIDENTALLY ASSURED THE MFA THAT A REPORT IN A JAPANESE NEWSPAPER THAT WE HAD TOLD THE DAILY EXPRESS THAT THE UK MIGHT RECEIVE 100 MILLION POUNDS FROM JAPAN IS WITHOUT FOUNDATION: WE ARE NOT TALKING TO THE PRESS ABOUT FIGURES (EVEN IF WE DID, THAT WOULD NOT BE THE FIGURE WE SHOULD USE).

5. MEANWHILE, THE UK BID AND OUR 8 PER CENT FIGURE ARE GOING THE ROUNDS HERE, INCLUDING IN JAPANESE CABINET CIRCLES. AT A SMALL DINNER PARTY LAST NIGHT, OCHI, THE ECONOMIC PLANNING MINISTER, SURPRISED BOTH US AMBASSADOR ARMACOST AND ME BY SAYING THAT THE JAPANESE POSITION (SIC) WAS THAT THE MONEY SHOULD ALL BE PAID TO THE GCC BUT THAT THE US AND UK SHOULD SHARE IT, WITH 8 PER CENT OF THE NINE BILLION GOING TO THE UK. THIS OBLIGED ARMACOST TO HINT THAT THE US MIGHT HAVE TO SETTLE FOR 91 PER CENT (WHICH IS THE PERCENTAGE THEY GOT OF THE FIRST TWO BILLION). THE QUESTION OF A POSSIBLE CONTRIBUTION TO THE UK WAS RAISED IN THE DIET ON 6 FEBRUARY. NAKAYAMA REPLIED THAT A REQUEST FROM THE UK HAD BEEN RECEIVED BUT THE ALLOCATION OF THE NINE BILLION DOLLARS WOULD BE FOR THE GCC FUND.

6. OTHERWISE, DIET QUESTIONING OF KAIFU AND HIS MINISTERS HAS BEEN GOING QUITE WELL FOR THE GOVERNMENT SO FAR. ON 5 FEBRUARY KAIFU SAID THAT THE JAPANESE WOULD ASK THE GCC FUND NOT TO ALLOCATE THE NINE BILLION FOR ANY USE OTHER THAN THE FIVE CATEGORIES IN PARA 2 ABOVE. THE STATE DEPARTMENT SPOKESPERSON HAS ALREADY INDICATED US AGREEMENT TO THIS LIMITATION, AND THE KOMEITO WELCOMED IT.

WHITEHEAD

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EMERGENCY UNIT (PASSED)
POLMIL UNIT (PASSED)

NNNN

B. R.

SECRET

38 (ac)

PRIME MINISTER

MEETING OF OPD(G) AND THE GULF

There is a further meeting of OPD(G) tomorrow morning to discuss developments in the Gulf. It will be the last meeting until next Tuesday (you are in Germany on Monday).

In addition to the normal reports, there are three items on the agenda:

- Reconstruction of Kuwait: opportunities for British industry.
- Burden-sharing.
- Ceasefire terms.

Reconstruction of Kuwait

The paper records the efforts we are making to get a fair share of contracts for British firms, based on your own talks with the Amir and Prime Minister of Kuwait, and your subsequent message. The Foreign Secretary will be following up on his visit to Taif and will take a team of business representatives with him. We are urging the Kuwaitis to set up a procurement office in London. And we plan a major trade mission to Kuwait as soon as possible after liberation. We shall need also to play on the Americans' heart strings to cut us in on the loot.

You will want the Trade and Industry Secretary to report. But there seems little action for the Committee, except to take note.

Burden-sharing

Only a draft of the Chief Secretary's paper is available at the time of dictating. This:

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- reports on his visit to the Gulf. He is optimistic that we shall get a substantial whack from the UAE, but nothing from Qatar.

- notes the Foreign Secretary's success in obtaining a contribution from Germany, and his forthcoming visit to the Saudis and Kuwaitis;

- proposes sending Mr Weston to Tokyo to stiffen the Japanese' creeping resolve to give us something.

There appear to be two issues to discuss:

- how to persuade the Americans that we must have a cut of the \$9 billion which the Japanese are making available. I discussed this with General Scowcroft today and I think it is something you will have to raise with the President, but after the Foreign Secretary returns from the Middle East. (I would not pursue the idea of a visit by the Chief Secretary to Washington).

- whether we should approach smaller countries. The feeling at the last meeting of OPD(G) was that we should not. But the Chief Secretary's paper suggests we tap South Korea for £50 million and Norway for a contribution (given that they have benefited from higher oil prices). It also recommends chasing other EC countries. Approaches have in fact already been made to Belgium, Denmark and The Netherlands, with very limited success. But there seems little point in going to the Italians since they are making a military contribution in the Gulf.

Ceasefire Terms

These are suitably draconian. They will be difficult for Iraq

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- 3 -

to accept, which is part of the purpose. I do not think they can be improved, and should be sent to the Americans as a basis for discussion.

In the more highly classified part of the discussion, after the Trade and Industry Secretary and Chief Secretary have gone, you might like to refer to the further assurances which I have received from General Scowcroft that the Americans would consult us should the question of using nuclear weapons ever arise.

C.D.P.

CHARLES POWELL
6 February 1991

c:\wpdocs\opdg.kw

SECRET

cc back up
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SECRET - UK EYES A

B.0728

PRIME MINISTER

cc Sir Robin Butler
Sir Percy Cradock

OPD(G): 7 February

Item 1: Reconstruction of Kuwait: Opportunities for
British Industry

The Trade and Industry Secretary, the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Chief Secretary, Treasury have been invited for this item. A Note by the Department of Trade and Industry has been circulated (OPD(G)(91)10).

2. You might invite the Trade and Industry Secretary to introduce the paper. In discussion you might ask him why British companies previously had such a modest share of business in Kuwait (6.4% compared with Japan 11.4%); whether there is not more the British companies can do to get alongside the Kuwaitis in exile (e.g. a small trade mission before the restoration); and how companies from other countries can live with the conditions imposed by the Kuwaitis while ours apparently cannot. You might invite the Foreign Secretary to say how he proposes to approach the issue in his discussions with the Amir. The Defence Secretary may wish to cover the (separate) arms sales angle. The Chief Secretary can comment on the part that securing reconstruction work may play in the context of burdensharing more generally. X

3. You may wish to conclude the discussion by underlining the importance of doing all we can to stimulate and help X

SECRET - UK EYES A



SECRET - UK EYES A

British industry to secure a decent share of the Kuwait reconstruction market. You might invite the Trade and Industry Secretary to report to colleagues on further progress in about four weeks' time.

Item 2: Burdensharing

4. You might ask the Chief Secretary to introduce his note (OPD(G)(91)11). You might note his success in obtaining a general commitment from Shaikh Zayed ^{and} and asking for his personal view on when this was likely in practice to be translated into money, and how much. You might then invite the Chancellor of the Exchequer to comment on the wider public expenditure background to this exercise.

5. The most important current problem is Japan, on which the Foreign Secretary may wish to add his comments. The Japanese Foreign Minister has written to Mr Baker to inform him that the \$9bn. will be shared among the coalition allies through the Gulf Co-operation Council and that some will go to the United Kingdom. The current proposal is that a senior FCO official (Mr Weston or Mr Gillmore) should travel to Tokyo to follow up Mr Nakayama's letter. Mr Mellor may also suggest that further contacts should be made with the US Administration to secure a co-operative approach (Sir Charles Powell to General Scowcroft and/or a visit to Washington by Mr Mellor). The MoD meanwhile have prepared a list of costs on the lines proposed by the Japanese.

6. Mr Mellor may also want to discuss approaches to second echelon countries. You might ask the Foreign Secretary to report on his contacts with the Belgians, Dutch and Danes after the earlier discussion in OPD(G). Mr Mellor is likely

SECRET - UK EYES A

[I would
be very
cautious
about
doing
this]

Very to
Washington:
it could

ripple the delicate
but vital relationship
with the White House.
Better to go to speak to the President.



SECRET - UK EYES A

to suggest that you should approach the Norwegian Prime Minister, Mrs Brundtland, when she visits here next week. The Foreign Secretary may argue that other Europeans should be approached (e.g. Italy and Luxembourg) on European solidarity grounds and because the Americans are likely to be less successful there.

7. You might conclude the discussion by endorsing the Chief Secretary's line with the UAE; by agreeing that a senior FCO official should travel to Japan as proposed, adding that a Ministerial visit might well be needed as well; that the Foreign Secretary should report back to OPD(G) on the results of his visit to Saudi Arabia; and that further action with major potential donor countries and any suitable second echelon countries should be reviewed in the light of the Foreign Secretary's visit. Depending on the current stage reached in the exercise, you might consider having another word with President Bush at that point.

[Chancellor, Chief Secretary, Trade & Industry Secretary to cover or other point].

Item 3: US/UK Talks - Ceasefire Terms

8. If you wish, I would be ready to introduce the Note by Officials (OPD(G)(91)12) on ceasefire terms which was commissioned at OPD(G) earlier today.

9. The terms take account of US views and the OPD(G) discussion. They are deliberately pitched high and their acceptability will depend on the situation at the time. The first two sections are intended as the basis for a document to be presented to the Iraqis. The third section on modalities is for discussion with the Americans only at this stage. You might invite the Foreign Secretary and Defence Secretary to comment on the sections dealing with POWs and

SECRET - UK EYES A



SECRET - UK EYES A

on the timescales set for withdrawal (48 hours from Kuwait City and 15 days from Kuwait). On POWs the Foreign Secretary may suggest that the precise timing figures in paragraph 2 might be omitted for the Americans, pending further discussion of the whole POW problem in OPD(G) on Tuesday. The section on equipment would mean that the Iraqis would leave Kuwait pretty well empty-handed and would give Saddam Hussain no grounds for claiming victory.

10. You might invite the Attorney General to comment on the legal aspects. (His Department was represented on the small drafting group but the Attorney General will only have seen the paper this evening.)

11. You might conclude the discussion by approving the text, subject to points made in discussion, for transmission to the US Government through our Embassy in Washington, making clear that this did not represent a final position taken by Ministers. You might ask the Embassy to keep in close touch with US thinking to ensure that UK views continue to be fed into the US drafting process well before the US team sets out for London and other capitals. You might ask the Cabinet Office to keep OPD(G) informed on progress.

Item 4: Current Military Situation

Item 5: Current International Situation

12. You might wish to take these two items quickly together. The Defence Secretary may wish to mention his meeting with his Italian opposite number. The Foreign Secretary will be meeting M. Dumas in London at the latter's request tomorrow.

SECRET - UK EYES A



SECRET - UK EYES A

Item 6: Media Handling

13. You might invite the Energy Secretary to report briefly on his continuing discussions with ITN and the BBC and the action taken over encouraging Gulf support groups to look after elderly people with relatives in the Gulf during the present cold spell. Mr O'Donnell will be able to cover day-to-day media issues.

LV Appleyard

L V Appleyard

Cabinet Office
6 February 1991

SECRET - UK EYES A

163

Hidden copies: Mr Appleyard
✓ Mr Gowan
Mr Ball

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T01378

MR R SMITH, FCO
MR R FELLGETT, HM TREASURY

cc PS/Chief Secretary
PS/Mr Hogg
Mr T J Brack, MOD

CHIEF SECRETARY'S PAPER FOR OPD(G)

I attach the draft paper prepared by the Chief Secretary's office, with some support from here. I have suggested some minor editorial changes in manuscript.

2. The Chief Secretary will not be able to read it until after his return from TCSC. Could any comments be telephoned to me by 6 pm please. Silence will be taken as assent.

3. Meanwhile, would the Chief Secretary's office please set the complete paper up on their word processor, using the topping and tailing attached.

W D Reeves

W D REEVES

Cabinet Office
6 February 1991

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OPD(G)(91) 11

COPY NO

6 February 1991

CABINET

DEFENCE AND OVERSEAS POLICY COMMITTEE

SUB-COMMITTEE ON THE GULF

BURDENSARING

Note by the Chief Secretary, Treasury

DM

HM Treasury

6 February 1991

CONFIDENTIAL

DRAFT PAPER FOR OPD(G) 7 FEBRUARY 1991Introduction

This note reports on my recent trip to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Qatar. It also summarises the preliminary conclusions OPD(G) has reached on how best to carry forward the burden-sharing effort.

Visit to UAE and Qatar

I visited the UAE and Qatar on 1 - 5 February. In the UAE I was warmly received by both Shaikh Zayed bin Sultan al Nahyan (to whom I handed over the Prime Minister's letter) and Shaikh Hamdan bin Rashid al Makhtoum (the Federal Minister of Finance).

Shaikh Zayed is clearly well-disposed to the UK. He went out of his way to make the task of requesting a large financial contribution easier than it might have been. He said that he well understood the UAE's obligations to us and made it clear that "by the Grace of God" the UAE now had the resources to help her friends, and that he would certainly not be seeking to evade the responsibilities of friendship.

I am optimistic that we shall receive a substantial sum from the UAE. It is hard to predict whether we will meet the £300 million target we have set ourselves, or when any offer will emerge. However, I pitched our request at a level (up to \$800 million) which allows some leeway for downward negotiation and H M Ambassador in Abu Dhabi will be following up my discussions within the next week.

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In Qatar the question of burden-sharing was not formally discussed. However, during the course of private discussions with the Crown Prince on regional issues, and again during a more formal exchange of views with Shaikh Abdullah (Acting Minister of Finance) the Qataris raised the subject with me.

It seems clear that neither the US nor ourselves are likely to get anything from Qatar. The Amir has refused even to provide Host Nation Support (HNS) for the US, despite the large number of aircraft they have stationed in the country.

Nevertheless one useful point did emerge from my discussions. Both my interlocutors made it clear that the Gulf Cooperative Council (GCC) has formally agreed that burden-sharing contributions should be a matter for the Big Three - Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the UAE.

The Crown Prince gave me a firm undertaking that Qatar, in its role as Chairman of the GCC, would use its best ^{CHS} ~~effects~~ to ensure that the UK's claims were not overlooked. The Qataris were clearly surprised that our discussions with Saudi Arabia and Kuwait had not progressed very far, and that we had not established any arrangement with the US for seeking joint contributions.

I believe that we should make ^h full use of Qatari good offices. This might also extend to securing their help in appropriating part of the Japanese offer of \$9 billion given Japan's insistence that this money must be formally routed through the GCC.

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Major Contributors: Progress Report

OPD(G) decided that in the first instance we should approach the five biggest potential contributors - Japan, Germany, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and UAE. I have reported on my trip to the UAE; at a meeting earlier today OPD(G)(B) assessed progress in securing contributions from the other four.

Germany

OPD(G)(B) congratulated the Foreign Secretary on his success in securing a further contribution of DM 800 million from Germany. Our Embassy in Bonn is ~~waiting~~ seeking advice on precisely when this payment will be made, although the Germans have said publicly that the money will be paid in the next three months. The Germans have also said privately that it remains open to us to ask for a further contribution in due course if hostilities prove protracted.

Japan

OPD(G)(B) welcomed the news from Tokyo today that Nakayama has now written to Secretary Baker to say that some of the \$9 billion Japanese offer will go to the UK (Tokyo Telno 104).

OPD(G)(B) takes the view that we should now seek to consolidate this progress by sending John Weston to Tokyo and through high level contacts with the US. The Group also believes that we should enlist Qatari support in securing the GCC agreement that part of the Japanese funds should go to the UK.

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Our clear objective must be to make it clear to both the Japanese and the Americans that the UK should get no less than 8 per cent of the \$9 billion currently on the table. To facilitate Japanese agreement to a payment of \$720 million towards the UK's non-military costs a list of the UK's non-military requirements has been drawn up under the guidance of OPD(G)(B) }.

Saudi Arabia and Kuwait

OPD(G)(B) } was pleased that the Foreign Secretary had been able to schedule a visit to Saudi Arabia for the 8-10 February. This trip will be crucial to the success of the burden-sharing initiative.

Relationship with the US

One more general point that has emerged in OPD(G(B))'s continuing deliberations is the importance of reaching a greater level of understanding with the US. To date President Bush has not replied to the Prime Minister's message. However, the continuing problems in securing a contribution from Japan and the ^{question of} ~~evidence of~~ Saudi/Kuwaiti ^{ability to pay} ~~financial difficulties~~ suggest to me that a sine qua non of faster progress will be to achieve a degree of cooperation

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with the Americans on the financial side which precisely mirrors the degree of cooperation we have built up on the military aspects of the Gulf crisis. Our failure to do this at the outset has been one further underlying some of the difficulties we now face.

Smaller countries

OPD(G) decided to defer action on the second tier of potential contributions until the Big Five had been approached. OPD(G(B)) has now reviewed the list of potential smaller contributors. A revised list is attached at Annex A.

At this stage there is no need to review the list in detail. But OPD(G) may wish to note one or two particular points:

- (i) OPD(G(B)) believes that South Korea should be approached for a contribution of £50 million. The Group recommends that John Weston should combine his trip to Tokyo with a mission to Seoul. South Korea has already ^{provided} ~~given~~ the Americans a contribution of \$500 million.
- (ii) OPD(G(B)) considers that Norway should be approached for a significant contribution. In the last 5 months of 1990 Norway received an extra £1.56 billion as a result of higher oil prices. OPD(G(B)) believes that it would be appropriate for the Prime Minister to raise the question of burden-sharing with the Norwegian Prime Minister when she visits next week.

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(iii) OPD(G)(B)? believes that significant contributions should be sought ~~in due course~~ from certain EC countries, particularly Belgium, Denmark, Netherlands, Luxembourg and Italy. The Group has concluded that we should seek to avoid any contribution from the EC . Not only does the EC have no competence in this area; but also, as a result of the Fontainebleau arrangements the UK would in effect have to pay for ~~45~~⁷² per cent? of any contribution it received.

OPD(G)(B)? would propose to consider further the second tier countries after the Foreign Secretary's return from Saudi Arabia.

[Conclusions]

DM

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CONCLUSIONS

1. The prospects of obtaining a substantial sum from the UAE are good.
2. We are unlikely to get anything from the Qataris, but their good offices may be useful in helping to obtain a share of the \$9bn offered by Japan.
3. Mr Weston should visit Tokyo to press for a share of the \$9bn, building on the helpful statement by Nakayama. (He should also take in South Korea during his trip). The US should be contacted at high level to persuade them not to stand in the way of our receiving \$720M (8%) out of the \$9 billion.
4. The Foreign Secretary's visit to Saudi Arabia will be crucial to the success of the burden-sharing initiative.
5. We should seek to build up a pattern of close co-operation with the US over burden-sharing since this is a sine qua non of success.
6. It would be appropriate for the Prime Minister to raise the question of burden-sharing when Mrs Brundtland visits next week.
7. In the light of the Foreign Secretary's visit to Saudi Arabia, OPD(G)(B) would wish to consider further what approaches should be made to second tier countries.

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ANNEX A

SECOND ECHELON COUNTRIES THAT MIGHT BE APPROACHED

	<u>Suggested contribution</u>
	£m
Belgium	50 (1)
Denmark	25 (2)
Netherlands	NYK (3)
Luxembourg	5
Italy	30 (4)
Norway	At least 25 (5)
Iceland	2
Finland	30
Austria	10 (6)
Brunei	30
Hong Kong	15 (7)
Singapore	10
South Korea	50
Malaysia	- (8)
Australia	- (9)
New Zealand	- (9)
Canada	- (10)
Spain	- (10)

Notes

1. 50 has been proposed to Belgians; evasive reply.
2. Already suggested to Danish Government, which has expressed willingness to help.
3. Foreign Secretary has spoken to Dutch colleague without naming an amount.

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ANNEX A

SECOND ECHELON COUNTRIES THAT MIGHT BE APPROACHED

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Italy	30 (4)
Norway	At least 25 (5)
Iceland	2
Finland	30
Austria	10 (6)
Brunei	30
Hong Kong	15 (7)
Singapore	10
South Korea	50
Malaysia	- (8)
Australia	- (9)
New Zealand	- (9)
Canada	- (10)
Spain	- (10)

Notes

1. 50 has been proposed to Belgians; evasive reply.
2. Already suggested to Danish Government, which has expressed willingness to help.
3. Foreign Secretary has spoken to Dutch colleague without naming an amount.

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4. Italy is making a military contribution, and has lost one Tornado during operations.
5. Norway gained £1.65bn from higher oil prices during last 5 months of 1990. Prime Minister seeing Mrs Brundtland on 13 February.
6. Should be considered in the light of responses from other neutrals.
7. An offer has already been volunteered, subject to the approval of the Legislative Council.
8. Malaysia gained £0.4bn from higher oil prices during last 5 months of 1990, but as a Moslem country may be unwilling to contribute.
9. As Old Commonwealth could reasonably be expected to contribute, and we are better placed to approach them than are the US.
10. For reasons of consistency (eg NATO, EC) these could be considered, but there are arguments against.

I like Tom
King's logic. Hering
failed to hit
anything unimportant.
They took a grade at
PM !!

Chris pulled one of his
underdog faces.

SECRET UK EYES A
MANAGEMENT IN CONFIDENCE



386
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

Telephone 071-21 8211/3

MO 6/17/15/1J

*I haven't seen H
letter @ X.
f6.2
Dear Charles,*

6K February 1991

*Prime Minister
CBB 6/2*

Thank you for your letter of 5th February about losses of aircraft over Iraq.

The difficulty we face is that some of the facts set out in my letter of 4th January may emerge in the media. We have already had well-informed inquiries from two newspapers on premature detonation, perhaps stemming from the damage to the second aircraft involved in the attack (which was able to return to base). They have both been persuaded to hold the story: but obviously there are risks. Against this background, the Defence Secretary felt that it would be better for the family to hear the story from us rather than second hand from the media with the added implication that the MOD were seeking to conceal the facts.

X As we have indicated in providing you with a draft response from the Prime Minister to a letter from the mother of one of the aircrew, the families have therefore been briefed along the lines set out in my letter. This may seem hard, but our experience is that the families prefer their units to be honest with them. If they get a sense of holding back (or pick up service gossip) they may well pursue the case with special vigour until satisfied. We had a bad case after the Falklands where well-meaning staff concealed that a Gazelle helicopter was accidentally shot down by a Royal Navy ship, which lead to many difficulties and Parliamentary criticism.

As far as legal liability is concerned, the aim has been to develop a line which acknowledges a range of possibilities but avoids speculation. Obviously we must not prejudice the outcome of any future possible legal action but have a responsibility to treat personnel and their families fairly too.

*Yours sincerely
Simon Webb*

(S WEBB)
Private Secretary

Sir Charles Powell KCMG
10 Downing Street

MANAGEMENT IN CONFIDENCE
SECRET UK EYES A

SECRET AND PERSONAL

Prime Minister



38A(a-b)

Prime Minister

COP

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

6 February 1991

This is useful.
Well done, Charles

f.6.2

THE GULF

General Scowcroft telephoned me this afternoon without any particular reason. He said he was grateful for my reply to the message he had sent at the weekend assessing the state of the campaign. The comments were very useful and he was discussing them with the various agencies. The President had also been appreciative of the Prime Minister's telephone call to Mitterrand and the full account we had provided of it.

General Scowcroft went on to say that the visit of Secretary Cheney and General Powell to the Gulf had now been announced. They would be back on Sunday and be able to give the President the view from the field. Obviously one of the main considerations would be the timing of a ground campaign. He would give me a full account as soon as they had been debriefed. I said the Prime Minister would be grateful for that. General Scowcroft said the President would certainly want to telephone the Prime Minister to discuss the conclusions he drew from the visit.

I said that the Prime Minister would need at some stage to have a word with the President about burden-sharing. We had had a helpful response from the Germans: and the Foreign Secretary was on his way to Saudi Arabia shortly, to discuss the prospects of Saudi and Kuwaiti contributions. But there seemed to be a problem over the Japanese, with the Americans claiming that the full \$9 billion was for them and the Japanese saying that it had to cover contributions to others as well. General Scowcroft said disgustedly that it was a typical Japanese performance. They made big announcements and when it came to the small print they tried to chisel you. He was sure the President would want to help the United Kingdom's efforts to obtain fair contributions from others, and would be ready to discuss this with the Prime Minister at the right moment. We agreed that it was probably best to wait until after the Foreign Secretary's return from the Gulf.

I said to General Scowcroft that we had been very grateful for the clear account of American thinking on retaliation in the event the Iraqis were to use chemical weapons. There was

SECRET AND PERSONAL

- 2 -
SECRET AND PERSONAL

b

still some speculation in the press about possible use of nuclear weapons. But of course we discounted this heavily in the light of his remarks to me, and were confident that the established consultation procedures would be used if ever the need arose. General Scowcroft said that, at the present juncture, he could not conceive of circumstances where a nuclear response would be necessary or appropriate. If the idea ever crossed the Americans minds, they would consult immediately. I think that is rather a satisfactory response.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence) and to Sir Robin Butler.

(C. D. POWELL)

Richard Gozney, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SECRET AND PERSONAL

NO911



CABINET OFFICE

70 Whitehall London SW1A 2AS Telephone 01-270 071-270 0071

CONFIDENTIAL

S L Gass Esq
Assistant Private Secretary to the
Secretary of State for Foreign and
Commonwealth Affairs
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
King Charles Street
London SW1A 2AH

CM 6/5

6 February 1991

Dear Simon,

VISIT BY THE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY TO EGYPT AND
SAUDI ARABIA : 8-10 FEBRUARY 1991

1. Please refer to my letter of 1 February.
2. At its meeting on 5 February, GEN 10 gave further consideration to the security aspects of the visit which the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary will be making to Egypt and Saudi Arabia on 8-10 February. Although pro-Iraqi terrorists are known to be active in Egypt and Iraq, there is no intelligence of any specific threat to the Foreign Secretary. The short duration of the visit and the absence of detailed publicity about the programme will in any case minimize the risk of a terrorist attack.
3. The Group was satisfied that the Egyptian and Saudi authorities would make very thorough security arrangements, as they have done during other recent high-level visits. The programme does not (as it stands) include any public events at which it might prove difficult to maintain an adequate level of security. One of the Foreign Secretary's Personal Protection Officers will be travelling in advance to check on arrangements at all the places which the Foreign Secretary will be visiting.
4. As I reported in my previous letter, there will be a slight risk as a result of the intermittent SCUD attacks on Riyadh. This is however largely offset by the PATRIOT defence system around the city. The party will also have NBC protective equipment.

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5. The Foreign Secretary will be travelling in an aircraft of The Queen's Flight, which would allow a change of itinerary at short notice if this proved necessary for security reasons.


6. The Group concluded that the risks attached to this visit were limited. The high level of security which the Egyptians and Saudi authorities will provide will be adequate to contain the terrorist threat. Furthermore the danger of injury from a SCUD attack is not at a level which would justify recommending against the visit to Riyadh. The Group will, however, keep the situation in Egypt and Saudi Arabia under close review. I shall offer further advice if there is any development which significantly increases the risks to the Foreign Secretary.

7. I am copying this letter to Charles Powell in No 10.

Yours truly,
David Gowan

D J GOWAN

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DEPARTMENT/SERIES <i>PREM 19</i>	Date and sign
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MO 6/17/15/1J

SECRETARY OF STATE

PRIME MINISTER

37a-c

Dir. Mun

*CBP
7/4*

✓

DEPLOYMENT OF ADDITIONAL DESIGNATION AIRCRAFT TO THE GULF

At OPD(G) this morning, we discussed the deployment of a further 6 Buccaneers equipped with the Pavespike laser target designator system to the Gulf. In the light of that discussion, I am minuting colleagues on what is envisaged and the costs involved.

2. On 24th January I announced the deployment of 6 Buccaneers to the Gulf. At that time, we decided to modify 12 Buccaneers for operations in the Gulf, to provide for long term unserviceability and losses in action.

3. The Buccaneers had, by midday today, flown some 18 operational sorties, each in support of Tornado GR1s equipped with laser guided bombs (LGBs). These missions have achieved a very high success rate - colleagues will have seen the television footage of successful LGB attacks on bridges.

4. The Joint Commander has now requested the deployment to the Gulf of the remaining six modified Buccaneers. These will allow Tornado GR1s and Jaguars to conduct missions using LGBs simultaneously from Muharraq and Dhahran at an increased rate. Our total stocks of LGBs should be adequate to support missions by 12 Buccaneers for some 2 to 3 weeks. Thereafter, operations would depend on the supply of additional LGBs from Allies.

5. 56 personnel would support deployment of a further six Buccaneers (in addition to the 125 already deployed to support the



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SECRETARY OF STATE

current six aircraft). The first three modified aircraft and their crews will be ready for deployment by 7th February and the second three on 10th February. This additional deployment would incur only small additional costs (perhaps £200K a week for personnel allowances and fuel) compared with being based in Scotland. I also propose that two further Buccaneers are modified, to be available as replacements for losses in action, at a cost of £400K.

6. Missions using LGBs can use fewer aircraft with fewer bombs and achieve a considerably higher success rate. For example, a Tornado GR1 mission against a target such as a bridge using standard 1000lb bombs might involve 10 aircraft with 8 bombs each (weapons cost £1.04 million); based on recent experience, the likelihood of success would be considerably lower than for a Buccaneer-accompanied mission involving 4 Tornado GR1s with 3 LGBs each (weapons cost £0.26 million). Since only six aircraft would be involved rather than ten, fuel and other operating costs would be less too. Increased use of LGBs would also have the useful effect of slowing the usage rate of 1000lb bombs, where we are already having to replenish in-theatre stocks (a laser guided bomb is a standard 1000lb bomb to which a laser guidance system is fixed in theatre). LGB also reduces collateral damage.

7. The further Buccaneers should be based with those already at Muharraq, to achieve the most efficient use of support facilities. We are consulting the Bahraini authorities. Since the doubling of the number of Buccaneers in theatre is unlikely to go unnoticed, I propose to announce the deployment of further aircraft at a press conference on Friday (without giving precise numbers). I would put this in the context of a wider briefing on the advantages of precision guided munitions but the difficulty of assessing damage on deployed Army targets (as opposed to bridges etc).



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SECRETARY OF STATE

8. Separately I am planning to deploy 4 Tornado aircraft fitted with a newly developed thermal imaging and laser designator (TIALD). This will provide a capability for laser designation at night and in poor visibility to complement the daytime capability of the Buccaneers. A decision was taken some months ago to accelerate development of this equipment. I will not, however, publicise its deployment initially since it is unproven and a potential surprise to the Iraqis.

9. I am sending a copy of this minute to other OPD(G) colleagues and the Chief Secretary to the Treasury, and to Sir Robin Butler.

Ministry of Defence

6 Feb February 1991

Tom King




SECRET

TV are now
saying Σ missiles / mortars

e are showing
room windows
Cabiner
sheltered

A The National Archives

DEPARTMENT/SERIES <i>REM 19</i>	Date and sign
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cc pc
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB
Telephone 071-21 82111/3

MO 14/7D

6H February 1991

0072

Dear Christopher,

VISIT OF ITALIAN MINISTER OF DEFENCE

Sr Rognoni came to London today for a short visit (arranged following an earlier suggestion by us for a telephone call to the Defence Secretary). He was accompanied by General Corcione, the Italian Chief of Defence Staff, and their Ambassador.

During a short tête à tête, Sr Rognoni said that Italians had difficulties finding out enough information about what was happening in the Gulf. It was difficult to present the Italian contribution effectively to the public. He had sent General Corcione (the CDS) to Paris, Washington and London two weeks ago, and very much welcomed the chance of a talk with Mr King. Apart from the political difficulties, the Italians needed to understand the over-all plan of campaign so that they could be comfortable about the role of the Italian Tornado aircraft under US tactical command. The Defence Secretary said that the UK faced similar problems, though on a smaller scale since our land forces contribution gave us access to a good deal of US planning. It was important for all of us that the Americans did not appear to be in complete control of the situation and that we could influence their thinking. Despite these difficulties he thought that public presentation was going quite well; and he was pleased that the WEU was playing a useful role. This week for example, two British warships would be operating under Italian tactical control.

Sr Rognoni raised the two countries mutual interests in the work of the ICRC. He said that both De Michelis and Andreotti had visited Switzerland to make representation about the Italian pilots in Iraqi hands. The Defence Secretary explained that he was meeting Dr Sommaruga later that afternoon and, at Sr Rognoni's request undertook to raise the Italians concern along with those of the UK.

Christopher Prentice
Private Secretary to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary

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Over a working lunch at which Mr Mottram and General Incisa di Camerana were also present, the Italians engaged in an extended question time about what was going on in the Gulf. The UK team's response, was as follows:

Do the Arabs have staying power?

The Defence Secretary said that the Saudi's and Quataris had fought well at Khafji; and the casualties sustained would probably strengthen their resolve. They were keen to get into Kuwait though we must understand that many of them (eg Syrians and Egyptians) would not want to go into Iraq itself. CDS commented that most Arab countries had sent their best forces forward to Saudi Arabia and he thought they would fight well. There were some difficulties about co-ordination but, by putting most Arabs under Prince Khalid, these were not likely to be significant in practice.

Bombing: Is it really damaging the Iraqis?

The Defence Secretary said that we did not really know how far the Republican Guards had been impaired. Our Commander in the Gulf had reported to him intelligence of Kuwaiti hospitals being full of RGFC casualties; and there had been similar reports from POW's of the poor conditions of Iraqi troops in Kuwait. This was all anecdotal and hard evidence was difficult to come by. CDS commented that we knew quite accurately how many bridges had been knocked out; the percentage of Petroleum and refinery and their related capacity that had been destroyed; and the number of individual tanks and ammunition stores that had been damaged. The problem was translating this into an overall assessment of capability of Iraqi forces and in particular their sustainability.

Israel

The Defence Secretary said a good deal of effort had been devoted to hunting Scuds. We had not got them all but were reasonably confident that the Iraqis could no longer launch a multiple, say 20 strong, missile attack. The US had done a good job in persuading the Israelis that they were better leaving the military task to the multi-national force rather than joining in themselves and risking the cohesion of the coalition.

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Turkey and Kurds

The Defence Secretary said that we were probably less good at answering questions here than the Italians themselves, particularly about the Turks. We were concerned that if the Iraqis ended up very weakened by the conflict, the Kurdish problem would re-emerge. The Americans had made it very clear to the Turks that none of the NATO partners would have any sympathy for Turkey taking any opportunity to nibble a piece of Iraqi territory.

Iraqi aircraft in Iran

General Corcione said that he thought that the evidence was consistent with Iraqi moving the aircraft to Iran in the hope of preserving them for the long term. The UK team agreed that this was the most probable answer, referring to Rafsanjani's complaint about the movements and reluctance to accept any more. The Iraqis might well be calculating that, after the present conflict, they would have difficulties getting anyone (including the Russians) to sell them sophisticated aircraft again.

Soviet Attitudes

The UK team said that they thought that the Soviets would continue to be helpful over the Gulf situation, if only because they needed western money. Sr Rognoni said that he had cancelled a visit to Marshall Yazov using the Gulf as an excuse, but really because the Italian Government was concerned about the situation in the Baltic States.

Concluding the visit, the Ministers agreed that it was helpful to keep in touch given our close mutual interests in the Gulf. The UK team handed to the Italians the attached list of ammunition that they might be able to help provide and referred to possible assistance with bombs and other air delivered weapons too. The visit concluded with a photocall for the UK and Italian press.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Sir Charles Powell (No 10) and to Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office), and (by secure fax) to the Defence Attaché in Rome.

Yours sincerely

Temporarily Retained

Simon Webb

(S WEBB)

Private Secretary

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
AMMUNITION REQUIREMENTS FROM ITALY

UK requires the following ammunition types and quantities from Italy:

a. 155mm HE L15 plus charges and primers	-	31,500 rounds
b. 155mm Smoke plus charges and primers	-	12,600 rounds
c. 155mm Illum. plus charges	-	6,300 rounds
d. 8" HE plus charges and primers	-	10,080 rounds
e. 155mm Bomblet M483	-	12,600 rounds
f. MLRS rockets	-	3640 rounds
g. 165mm HE (Demolition round)	-	630 rounds

Further ammunition may be required.

UK would be grateful if Italy could ship the ammunition to the Gulf as soon as possible.





SECRET - UK EYES A

B.0726

PRIME MINISTER

cc Sir Robin Butler
Sir Percy Cradock

OPD(G): 6 February: Overnight Action Points

Item 2: Current military situation

The Defence Secretary may wish to comment on President Bush's announcement yesterday that Mr Cheney and General Powell will visit Saudi Arabia later in the week to be given a first-hand report on the military situation. Their intention is presumably to be in a position to brief the President on the progress of the air campaign and the timing of the ground offensive. It is not clear whether they will be in Saudi Arabia at the same time as the Foreign Secretary.

Item 3: Current international situation

2. The Foreign Secretary may mention the visit today of the Syrian Foreign Minister, Mr Faruq Shar'a at his request. The Ministers will confirm plans for an exchange of Ambassadors shortly. There will doubtless be discussion about the allied military campaign and the role of the Iranians in promoting talk of mediation.

3. Sir Percy Cradock is expected to report on terrorism. According to media reports, two time bombs were placed overnight in Athens, one at the offices of Citibank.

L V Appleyard
L V Appleyard

Cabinet Office
6 February 1991

SECRET - UK EYES A

A The National Archives

DEPARTMENT/SERIES <i>Prem 19</i>	Date and sign
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Extract details: <i>Letter from Powell to Goss dated 6 February 1991</i>	X
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34(a-L)⁹



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

Telephone 071- 21 82111. 3

MO 6/17/5/1D

6 February 1991

COO G/L

Dear Charles,

GULF: OVERNIGHT SITREP

In the absence of a "View from Riyadh" last night I enclose this mornings Sitrep, which you may find useful.

Yours ever

(MISS J R BINSTead)
Private Secretary

Sir Charles Powell KCMG
No 10 Downing Street

Covering SECRET

6
covering SECRET

D/Sec(O)(C)/2/30/1/1

THE GULF CONFLICT

BRIEFING FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE - SITREP No. 57

SITUATION AS AT 0600Z, 6 FEBRUARY 1991

Contains

1. Classified sitrep
2. Casualty sitrep
3. Ammunition and equipment states
4. Unclassified material for use by Ministers

Distribution attached

Sec(O)(C)

covering SECRET

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SEC(O)(C) MORNING BRIEF, 6 FEBRUARY 1991

Summary

Allied air campaign continues with major emphasis on Republican Guard. Cheney and Powell to visit Gulf. More Iraqi aircraft fly to Iran.

General Situation

- Iraqi forces continue to maintain a passive posture in the face of the Allied air offensive. No apparent move to mass armour for a strike southward despite unsubstantiated French reports to the contrary.

Political

- President Bush has denied that the visit of Cheney and Powell to Saudi Arabia later this week means a decision on a ground offensive is near.
- The Belgian Foreign Minister, Eyskens, said, during a call by Mr Tristan Garel-Jones (Minister of State, FCO), that it would be easier for the Belgians to provide military equipment rather than financial assistance. They would try to meet some of our demands.
- Jordanian Foreign Minister says nine killed and 15 injured in attacks on Jordanian tankers. Public reaction has been sharp, attacks interpreted as Allied attempt to change Jordanian policy towards Iraq.
- Pakistan Prime Minister has announced 6 point peace plan. Includes immediate ceasefire on basis of Iraqi commitment to withdraw; all foreign forces to leave Gulf; linkage to UN Resolutions on Palestine and Kashmir.

UK Operations

Air Operations

- There have been no attack sorties since last brief. Missions planned for today include 16 Jaguar and 44 Tornado sorties (including 4 Alarm), plus 3 LGB/PAVESPIKE missions by 12 Tornados and 6 Buccaneers. Many of these aircraft are already airborne.
- 2 Tornado GR1a from Dhahran carried out successful line search missions. Convoy of 10 vehicles seen 45 mile NW Hafr Al Batin. Huge fireball observed at ground level near Iraqi 48 Infantry Division.

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- RAF combat sorties as at 06100Z:

	last 24 hours	total
Tornado GR1	50	658
Tornado GR1A	2	45
Jaguar	17	265
Tornado F3	16	373
Buccaneer	6	14
Nimrod	2	41
AAR (Victor, VC10K, Tristar)	<u>15</u>	<u>297</u>
	108	1693
Non-combat sorties:		<u>1011</u>
		2704

Navy Operations

- BRILLIANT and EXETER due to commence WEU patrol duties in Eastern Gulf under Italian Tacon from 060900Z. Duties will include Sea Train protection and continuation of embargo operations.

Army Operations

- No significant events overnight.

Allied Operations

- The French AirForce has now flown 444 combat sorties. 2 x Mirage 2000 deployed to Al Ahsa on 5 February, 2 x Mirage F1 to deploy by end of week.

Iraqi activity

- During yesterday as many as 30 Iraqi aircraft may have flown to Iran.
- CINCCENT report that a Iraqi fast patrol boat has been identified at Bandar, Iran. First known Iraqi naval vessel to reach safe haven in Iranian port.

Logistics

- There are currently 445 tonnes of priority 1 air freight on hand. This is within one day's airlift capacity.

Media reports and coverage

- Media concentrates on Cheney and Powell visit to Saudi Arabia; Syrians first skirmish; Iraqi planes to Iran; minesweepers role in preparing way for possible amphibious landings; 2 bombs in Athens, one at US Citicorp bank.

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Other Issues

- Saudi authorities are reported to have arrested the gunmen responsible for the shooting attack in Jedda. The gunmen were described as "residents", a term usually used to refer to foreigners working in the country.
- HMT has agreed that the service regulations should be amended to ensure that full pay and allowances remain payable when an individual is missing but death or absence without leave cannot be presumed.

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OPERATION GRANBY - CASUALTY REPORT

Report Number : 21 Situation as at : 060400Z FEB 91

TOTAL NUMBER OF CASUALTIES, SINCE THE COMMENCEMENT OF HOSTILITIES

Total number confirmed dead	5
Total number confirmed wounded (very seriously ill/seriously ill)	3
Total number of confirmed casualties	8

Total number currently missing	10
--------------------------------	----

Total strength in theatre at commencement of hostilities	35684
--	-------

Total number died of wounds	0
-----------------------------	---

TOTAL CASUALTIES BY SERVICE

RN/RM			Army			RAF			Civilians (inc RFA)		
	Men	Women		Men	Women		Men	Women		Men	Women
Dead	0	0	Dead	5	0	Dead	0	0	Dead	0	0
Wounded	0	0	Wounded	3	0	Wounded	0	0	Wounded	0	0
Total RN casualties	0	0	Total Army casualties	8	0	Total RAF casualties	0	0	Total civ casualties	0	0
Total RN missing	0	0	Total Army missing	0	0	Total RAF missing	10	0	Total civ missing	0	0

Total strength in theatre at commencement of hostilities

RN/RM			Army			RAF			Civilians (inc RFA)		
Total	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women
2510	2440	70	27651	27058	593	4799	4688	111	724	724	0

CASUALTIES CONFIRMED SINCE REPORT No. 20 SINCE 050400Z FEB 91

Number confirmed dead	1
Number confirmed wounded (very seriously ill/seriously ill)	0
Number of confirmed casualties, of all types	1

Number reported missing since last report	0
Number previously missing, now confirmed dead	0
Number previously missing, now confirmed wounded	0
Number previously missing, now confirmed safe and well	0
Number previously reported wounded, but now dead	0

CASUALTIES BY SERVICE

RN/RM			Army			RAF			Civilians (inc RFA)		
	Men	Women		Men	Women		Men	Women		Men	Women
Dead	0	0	Dead	1	0	Dead	0	0	Dead	0	0
Wounded	0	0	Wounded	0	0	Wounded	0	0	Wounded	0	0
RN casualties	0	0	Army casualties	1	0	RAF casualties	0	0	Civilian casualties	0	0
RN missing	0	0	Army missing	0	0	RAF missing	0	0	Civilians missing	0	0

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ANNEX C TO
D/ACDS(L)129/5/2
DATED 6 FEB 91

Army Equipment State (Source ASMA Tote JHQD 11 Page 7) As At: 052300Z Feb 91

Ser	Description	UE	Fit Now	% of UE (Now)	Fit in 24 Hours	% of UE (24 hrs)	WMR	Remarks
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)
1	Challenger	176	153	87%	158	90	45	All variants
2	Warrior	260	249	96%	251	97	63	
3	M109	(1)59	58	98%	59	100	6	
4	M110	12	11	92%	12	100	1	Servicing
5	MLRS	12	8	67%	8	67	3	
6	Rapier	24	22	92%	24	100	8	
7	Javelin	72	72	100%	72	100	24	1(3)
8	AVRE	(3)26	17	65%(2)	17	65	1(3)	
9	AVLB	24	21	88%	21	88	2	
10	Lynx	18	16	89%	18	100	5	6th WMR in UK
11	Gazelle	18	16	89%	18	100	5	6th WMR in UK
12	Striker	16	16	100%	16	100	4	

Notes:

(1) One M109 destroyed by a vehicle fire 4/5 Feb.

(2) As previously reported CE AVRE availability affected by spares problems. Of the 39 types of spares required 34 have now been fully identified and were despatched by air 2 Feb 91. The remaining requirement is subject to proper verification by FMA E&S MAN. Availability has increased by 6% over last 24 hours. Continuing increase anticipated as a result of spares arriving in theatre.

(3) Destruction of a Centurion AVRE by a vehicle fire 4/5 Feb.

(4) 1 Armd Div FTX is likely to reduce equipment availability for the next 24-48 hours.

C-1 of 1
SECRET

ROW 156 (DIFF/JE)

ROW 156 (DIFF/JE)

SECRET

ANNEX D TO
D/ACDS(L)129/5/2
DATED 6 FEB 91

Army Ammunition Stock (Source ALOC) As At: 052300Z Feb 91

Ser	Description	Qty Consumed Since Last Report (Rds)	Qty Remaining(1)		Remarks
			(Rds)	Days SPG	
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
1	120MM APFSDS (L23 Shot. L8 Charge		16000	21	
2	120MM JER 1 (L23 Shot. L14 Charge)		17000 (2)	23	Jer 1 charge replaces 65% of L8 charge. (4)
3	120MM JER 2 (L26 Shot)		5500 (2)	7	Jer 2 shot delivery 1000 per week to max 9000 (4)
4	120MM HESH		15536	42	
5	30MM APDS		121104	37	
6	SWINGFIRE		968	42	
7	MILAN		2736	42	
8	TOW		1275	53	Additional 265 flown out at request of JHQ from re-supply tranche
9	RAPIER		1298	42	
10	JAVELIN		2188	42	
11	MLRS ROCKETS		20676	41	MLRS Ablative Panels restrict use to 19 days (3) Further panels and paste on order. US stocks available in theatre.

D-1 of 2
SECRET

ROW 156 (ARMY)

SECRET

12	8IN HE		45954	32	
13	155MM HE L15		163211	38	
14	155MM Bomblet		73300	40	
15	81MM Mor HE		28829	42	

Notes:

1. Figs are for in-theatre stocks and floating reserves and do not include natures in transit by sea.
2. Includes receipts in theatre since last report.
3. 200 gallons paste now arrived (ex UK 1 Feb 91).
4. Still in production by RO PLC. Being flown out as received from manufacturer.
5. On MV St Lucia ETA 23 Feb.

SECRET

ANNEX F TO
 DTACDS(L) 129/5/2
 DATED 6 FEB 91

RAF Ammunition Stock (Source ASMA JHQ G2 Page 10) As At: 060200Z FEB 91

Ser	Description	Stock Consumed Last Report	Stock Remaining (Rds) (1)	Days of Effort Remaining (2)	Sorties Possible	Remarks
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)
1	JP 233		737	21.9	368	
2	1000 lb Bombs	210	4016	18.3	669/1004	) TORNADO/JAG assessed independently (3)))
3	CBU (BL755)		2166	39	361/541	
4	CBU87(USA)		425	25.6	-	
5	LGB	21	1371	)		
6	Skyflash		240	)		
7	AIM 9L		654	)		
8	AIM 9M		204	) TR (3)		
9	ALARM		11	)		Further deliveries of 20 per month for Feb, Mar and Apr.
10	27 mm		347597	30	1931	
11	30 mm		82542	34	687	
12	Rapier		423	30		
13	BOZ		1534450	30	2841	
14	PHILMAT	1105	92090	18.2	511	
15	ALE 40		7956	30	132	

Notes:

- Stocks in Cyprus are not included.
- Days of Effort Remaining (DOER). DOER is the assessment by the Air Commander in theatre of the capability that the weapons 'stock remaining' (Col (d)) represents in terms of his known and potential tasks. (Potential tasks include the retained capability to operate at higher rates than tasked to date).
- TR = Threat Related.

ROW 156 (RAF/NJL)

F-1 of 1
 SECRET

K

UNCLASSIFIED LINES TO TAKE: 0600 6 FEBRUARY

- Allied air offensive continues by night and, increasingly, by day. No indication of any immediate Iraqi intention to mount full-scale offensive. No intention of being drawn into land battle until ready.

- RAF have flown over 2,700 sorties. Of these nearly 1,700 were combat sorties.

(For defensive use)

- [If asked about pork in rations] Can confirm that pork and pork related products are supplied to our forces in the Gulf. While we try to take account of customs and sensitivities in the countries where our forces are deployed, this is not always practicable. For example, pre-packed combat rations contain pork related products. Supplies are taken from reserve stocks and there is no scope for any change in their composition.

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THE GULF CONFLICT - BRIEFING FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

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
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FILE: C/FOREIGN/SAUDI
(M204)

b2 c PC



10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

6 February 1991

SAUDI ARABIA

Prince Bandar has suggested that it would be useful if the Prime Minister were to telephone King Fahd in advance of the Foreign Secretary's visit. The Prime Minister is disposed to do this. About the only time he could manage would be between 1830-1930 tomorrow, 7 February.

I should be grateful for help on the following points:

- could our Embassy in Riyadh establish whether the King would be available to take a call at that time (and let us know the number to ring);
- assuming that is so, arrange for Mr. McLaughlin to come to No.10 to interpret;
- let us have a list of points for the Prime Minister to make.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence).

CHARLES POWELL

Richard Gozney, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL



OK to keep

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB
Telephone 071-21 82111/3

all

MO 6/17/15/15

5th February 1991

Dear Charles,

Janis
OK - keep this
letter for letter,
which explains
about the postal system
for the Gulf
on
(MOD not dealing with complaints)
2/21/2
Ap PT31

Thank you for your letter of 25th January about the postal service to our forces in the Gulf.

Mail posted by servicemen's families in the UK is delivered to the Defence Postal and Courier Service Depot in London where arrangements are made for it to be carried to BFPO addresses overseas. Air mail to the Gulf is carried by RAF or chartered aircraft. Letters are usually delivered within five days of posting but parcels take up to ten days. These times are not excessive but delivery can take longer if flights are suspended, as happened for two days at the outbreak of hostilities, or if the serviceman had deployed to a forward area.

There have been two services available for posting parcels to the Gulf. The Standard Service, to which the normal airmail charges apply, and the Economy Service. The Economy Service is a concessionary service for which the charges are the same as the UK inland parcel postage rates. Parcels sent by the Economy Service would usually be carried by surface means but, in the case of the Gulf, they are carried by the RAF or chartered aircraft which depart daily. This has made it possible to suspend the Standard Service to the Gulf from 1st February.

Although Post Office counters were advised of the service provided by the Economy Service, many people continued to use the Standard Service. Now that it has been suspended we hope there will not be so many complaints about the cost of posting parcels to the Gulf. Suggestions will, no doubt, continue to be made that parcels to the Gulf should be carried free of charge but the inland rate charged is a concessionary rate and covers the cost of delivery to the Postal and Courier Depot in London. Onward movement is arranged and paid for by the Ministry of Defence.

Sir Charles Powell KCMG
No 10 Downing Street



I attach some draft paragraphs which you may find useful to include in your replies on this matter.

Yours sincerely,

Bryan Wells

(B H WELLS)

Private Secretary

DELAYS

Forces mail for the Gulf is passed by the Post Office to the Defence Postal and Courier Service Depot in London. From there it is taken to RAF Brize Norton and flown by RAF aircraft to the Gulf. Letters are usually delivered within five days of posting and parcels take up to ten days, but delivery can take longer if flights are suspended or if the serviceman is located in a forward area.

THE COST OF SENDING PARCELS

Until recently there was a choice of two services for parcels. The first was the Standard Service (airmail) to which the Royal Mail Parcelforce International charges applied. The rate for the Gulf was £8.00 for the 0.5kg plus £2.70 for each additional 0.5kg or part thereof. This service was suspended on 1 February and the second service, the Economy Service, is the only one now in existence. Parcels sent by this service are carried at concessionary rates equivalent to the UK inland postage rates and cover the cost of delivery to the Defence Postal and Courier Services Depot in London. Parcels are carried by RAF aircraft which depart daily and the transit time between posting and delivery is at present ten days. The charges are:

Not over 1kg: £2.00	Not over 6kg: £4.00
2kg: £2.52	7kg: £4.15
3kg: £3.15	8kg: £4.30

4kg: £3.40

9kg: £4.80

5kg: £3.60

10kg: £5.00 (Maximum
weight)

FREE POST

The Forces Free Airletters are the only items of mail that may be carried free of charge. Letters, small packets and printed papers, however, may be sent by airmail at the following concessionary rates:

Letters: Not over 40 grammes - 22p. Each additional
10 grammes or part thereof 10p.

Postcards: 22p each.

Small Packets, Printed Papers and Periodicals: Not over
40 grammes - 22p. Each additional 10 grammes or part
thereof - 4p.

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MIPT: GULF CRISIS: US/JORDAN

1. TEXT OF STATE DEPT STATEMENT AS FOLLOWS:
BEGINS: COALITION MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE KUWAIT-IRAQ
THEATRE ARE NOT DESIGNED TO ENFORCE THE EMBARGO, BUT TO
IMPLEMENT UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 678.
THOUGH THESE OIL EXPORTS DO VIOLATE THE SANCTIONS, IT IS NOT
COALITION POLICY TO ATTACK CIVILIAN TRUCKS EXPORTING PETROLEUM
TO JORDAN. ON THE OTHER HAND, THESE VEHICLES ARE TRAVELING
THROUGH A WAR ZONE, AND SPECIFICALLY THROUGH AN AREA THAT HAS
BEEN THE SOURCE OF SCUD ATTACKS AGAINST NEIGHBORING STATES.
MOREOVER, WE HAVE CREDIBLE INFORMATION THAT WAR MATERIAL,
INCLUDING SOME RELATED TO SCUD MISSILES, HAS BEEN TRANSPORTED IN
CONVOY WITH CIVILIAN OIL TRUCKS. SUCH MATERIAL CONTRIBUTES TO
IRAQ'S OCCUPATION OF KUWAIT AND IS A LEGITIMATE MILITARY
TARGET. WHILE WE SEEK TO MINIMISE COLLATERAL DAMAGE IN ALL OUR
OPERATIONS, THIS IS MADE DIFFICULT BY IRAQ'S POLICY OF
CO-LOCATING MILITARY AND CIVILIAN TARGETS. ENDS

ACLAND

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SHAMIR'S SPEECH

SUMMARY

1. SHAMIR SEES SCUD ATTACKS AS EMBLEMATIC OF WIDER ARAB HOSTILITY TO ISRAEL: GIVES THE MIXTURE AS BEFORE ON RETALIATION: AND SUGGESTS TOUGH TRADITIONAL ISRAELI LINE ON POST GULF-CRISIS PEACE PROCESS.

DETAIL

2. IN HIS FIRST MAJOR SPEECH TO THE KNESSET SINCE THE OPENING OF HOSTILITIES IN THE GULF, SHAMIR ON 4 FEBRUARY SAID THAT THE SCUD ATTACKS ON ISRAEL 'HAVE CREATED A NEW POLITICAL SITUATION WHICH HAS SO FAR CONTRIBUTED TO A POSITIVE CHANGE IN ISRAEL'S INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS' AND 'A WAVE OF SYMPATHY FROM MANY COUNTRIES, NOT ONLY OUR TRADITIONAL FRIENDS'. IN THE DAYS LEADING UP TO THE ONSET OF HOSTILITIES, ISRAEL HAD ADOPTED A LOW PROFILE POLICY WHICH IT HAD HOPED TO CONTINUE. THE SCUD ATTACKS HAD REVEALED 'THE VERY ROOTS OF THE IRAQI LEADER'S INTENTIONS, AND THE INTENTIONS OF ALL THOSE WHO HAVE CHEERED HIM - TO KILL JEWS AND DESTROY THEIR STATE,' AN AIM WHICH 'SURFACES AGAIN AND AGAIN AT TIMES OF TENSION AMONG BROAD SECTORS OF THE ARAB WORLD'.

3. WHILE PRAISING THE US FOR ITS SUCCESSSES IN COMBATING THE IRAQI MISSILE THREAT, SHAMIR SAID THAT THE IDF 'BECAUSE OF ITS SPECIAL OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE' COULD MAKE AN IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION TOWARDS TOTALLY REMOVING THAT THREAT. THE TIME FOR THIS WOULD COME 'WHEN WE OURSELVES MAKE A DECISION TO THIS EFFECT IN ACCORDANCE WITH CIRCUMSTANCES'. AN 'APPROPRIATE PROCESS OF CONSULTATION WITH THE US WILL BE NECESSARY, DUE TO OBVIOUS REASONS CONNECTED WITH THE MILITARY SITUATION IN THE FIELD'.

4. SHAMIR PRAISED THE US AND UK FOR REJECTING ALL LINKAGE BETWEEN THE GULF CONFLICT AND ISRAEL-ARAB RELATIONS. HE HOPED THAT, IN THE WAKE OF THE GULF CRISIS, THE WORLD WOULD BETTER UNDERSTAND WHY ISRAEL HAD TO PURSUE ITS FOREIGN POLICY SO CAUTIOUSLY. ON THE PEACE PROCESS, HE SAID THAT THE CHANCES OF PURSUING A PEACEFUL ARRANGEMENT

'WILL ONLY INCREASE WHEN THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE ARAB COUNTRIES WILL CONSENT TO ENDING THE STATE OF WAR WITH ISRAEL'. THE MAY 1989 PEACE INITIATIVE 'WAS MEANT TO LAY THE FOUNDATIONS FOR PEACEFUL RELATIONS BETWEEN US AND THE ARAB COUNTRIES AND FOR AN ARRANGEMENT REGARDING THE STATUS OF ARABS OF ERETZ ISRAEL' (COMMENT: BEGIN'S PHRASING AT CAMP DAVID). 'THIS INITIATIVE STILL EXISTS AND APPLIES TODAY, AND WE ARE PREPARED AT ANY TIME TO RENEW EFFORTS FOR ITS REALISATION'. IT SHOULD NOW BE CLEAR TO EVERYONE THAT IDEAS LIKE AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE, 'SO STRONGLY ADVOCATED BY SADDAM HUSSEIN AND YASSER ARAFAT', WERE NOT A MEANS TO PROMOTE AN ARRANGEMENT, BUT OF ENABLING THE AGGRESSOR TO IMPOSE HIS WILL. 'ISRAEL WILL HAVE NO PART IN SUCH A CONFERENCE, AND THOSE WHO YEARN FOR PEACE AND HAVE ISRAEL'S BEST INTERESTS AT HEART WOULD DO WELL TO REMOVE THAT IDEA FROM THE AGENDA'. AS REGARDS THE PLO WHICH HAD SUPPORTED 'THE KILLER OF BAGHDAD', THE TIME HAD COME FOR THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND THE ENLIGHTENED WORLD 'TO REMOVE THIS TERROR ORGANISATION AND ITS LEADERS FROM THEIR MIDST'.

COMMENT

5. THIS WAS AN UNDISTINGUISHED BUT CONFIDENT POLICY STATEMENT, SENDING A 'NO CHANGE' MESSAGE ON THE PEACE PROCESS. SHAMIR'S PRESENTATION OF THE SCUD ATTACKS AS EMBLEMATIC OF THAT WIDER ARAB HOSTILITY TO ISRAEL WHICH ISRAELIS SEE AS THE CORE OF THE PROBLEM (RATHER THAN THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE) PICKS UP WHAT IS BECOMING A COMMON THEME HERE. THE LINKAGE AT THE CORE OF THE LIKUD INSISTENCE THAT ANY CAMP-DAVID-STYLE PROGRESS ON THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE MUST BE PARALLELED BY RESOLUTION OF THE WIDER ARAB-ISRAEL CONFLICT NOW ATTRACTS WIDER SUPPORT AMONG ISRAELIS, BECAUSE OF THE EXPERIENCES OF THE LAST FEW WEEKS.

6. WE SHALL OBTAIN FULL TEXT IN DUE COURSE AND FAX TO NENAD.

ELLIOTT

YYYY

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GULF CONFLICT:WIFE OF IRAQI PRESIDENT

SUMMARY

1. RUMOURS THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN'S WIFE IS IN SWITZERLAND. POSSIBLE BENEFITS FOR SWISS UNLIKELY TO OUTWEIGH DISADVANTAGES.

DETAIL

2. SINCE THE GULF CONFLICT BEGAN THERE HAVE BEEN RUMOURS HERE THAT MRS SADDAM HUSSEIN AND MEMBERS OF HER FAMILY ARE LIVING CLANDESTINELY IN SWITZERLAND. HOTELS IN GENEVA AND GSTAAD HAVE BEEN MENTIONED. THE MOST RECENT RUMOUR HAS HER LIVING IN A CHALET ON THE EDGE OF GSTAAD.

3. WE HAVE NO (NO) EVIDENCE TO CONFIRM OR DENY THESE STORIES, THOUGH THEY SEEM IMPLAUSIBLE. BUT WE DO NOW HAVE SOME EVIDENCE, REPORTED ON OTHER CHANNELS, THAT THE IRAQIS ARE PRESSING THE SWISS TO ALLOW HER TO COME TO SWITZERLAND BUT THAT NO (NO) DECISION HAS YET BEEN TAKEN

4. WHY SHOULD THE SWISS AGREE TO SUCH A REQUEST? THE FEDERAL COUNCIL ARE KNOWN TO WISH TO MAINTAIN AND DEVELOP TRADITIONAL SWISS NEUTRALITY BOTH FOR HUMANITARIAN REASONS AND IN THEIR OWN NATIONAL SELF-INTEREST. THEY MIGHT LOOK TO THE IRAQIS FOR SOME BILATERAL RETURN, WHETHER POLITICAL OR COMMERCIAL, TO BE HONOURED AFTER THE CONFLICT WAS OVER. IN THE SHORT TERM THEY MIGHT THEORETICALLY BE INTERESTED IN IRAQI UNDERTAKINGS TO ABSTAIN FROM DIRECT ACTS OF TERRORISM ON SWISS SOIL AND TO PREVENT SUCH ACTS BY THEIR SURROGATES.

5. BUT EVEN IF SUCH UNDERTAKINGS COULD BE RELIED UPON, THEY COULD SCARCELY BE DEFENDED PUBLICLY ONCE THEY BECAME KNOWN. AT THAT STAGE THE FEDERAL COUNCIL WOULD FACE SEVERE DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL CRITICISM. THOUGH SOME SWISS MIGHT CONDONE SUCH AN ABJECT COURSE OF ACTION THERE ARE PLENTY OF OTHERS ON BOTH LEFT AND RIGHT OF THE POLITICAL SPECTRUM WHO WOULD CRITICISE IT BITTERLY. THE SWISS WOULD ALSO BE SHARPLY AFFECTED BY INTERNATIONAL CRITICISM. ESPECIALLY GIVEN THE COLLEGIAL NATURE OF SWISS POLITICS, I DO NOT (NOT) THINK IT AT ALL LIKELY THAT THE FEDERAL COUNCIL COULD STEEL THEMSELVES TO TAKING

SUCH A DECISION AND HAVING IT CARRIED OUT WITHOUT ITS BECOMING KNOWN QUICKLY.

6. IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO KNOW IF YOU HAVE ANY EVIDENCE OF MRS SADDAM HUSSEIN'S WHEREABOUTS.

LONG

YYYY

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Jp 01311

PRIME MINISTER

OPD(G): 6 February
US/UK Talks: Ceasefire Arrangements

This paper will be the first item for OPD(G) tomorrow. I have only just received my copy and the following are immediate reactions only. I confine myself to the ceasefire problem, which is urgent and still not fully agreed. Other issues such as sanctions and regional security can be taken in slower time.

2. Timing of surrender or ceasefire - paragraph 4. The Americans are encouraging in thinking that we are unlikely to be confronted with an immediate ceasefire offer. I agree. Saddam shows no signs of accepting current ceasefire proposals, which involve withdrawal of Iraqi as well as Western forces, and will want to wait for more land fighting, or more destruction of his Republican Guard from the air, before making a fundamental move.

3. Allied response to ceasefire offer - paragraphs 6 and 7. We shall need to agree the detailed timetable we wish to lay down. But the biggest problem is Iraqi equipment. There is considerable attraction in the idea of compelling the Iraqis to abandon their equipment, thereby emphasising Saddam's humiliation, and it would be worth going for, even if it meant slower withdrawal. But we must not underestimate the pressure from international opinion. Would we in practice be able to continue attacks on the Iraqi forces once they had offered a ceasefire or begun to withdraw, even with their equipment? Difficult, but desirable.

4. POWs - paragraph 10. This is clearly a potent factor with the Americans (as with us) and also bears on the



ceasefire arrangements. The suggestion is that we could impose as a condition an agreement for immediate return of POWs, and fight on if it was not met, even if the Iraqis were withdrawing or had sought a ceasefire. But the Americans are apparently not of one mind. We also must do further thinking. POWs figure in Saddam's planning: he recognises their value as bargaining chips and wants as many as possible. Suitable terms on POWs could be of use in preventing Saddam terminating the fighting on his terms. But we must be careful they do not draw us into an open-ended campaign inside Iraq.

5. No peace, no war - paragraphs 18 and 19. A more likely scenario than requests for a ceasefire. Here, we are close: decisions will depend on the precise circumstances at the time. The crucial question will be, what presents a threat to the Allied position?
6. United Nations - paragraphs 13 and 14. The Americans envisage simply informing the UN of the terms of a ceasefire (paragraph 14). But in paragraph 19, dealing with a "no peace no war" situation, they envisage putting to the UN the terms of a ceasefire and stating that when Iraq agrees the situation could be normalised. I am not sure how these two passages are to be reconciled.
7. Israel - paragraph 16. This is reassuring.
8. NBC facilities - paragraph 9. I am trying to clarify the references to the possible use of tunnels. At the moment we on our side have no evidence that anything of this kind exists.


PERCY CRADOCK

5 April 1991



*You will contact
other place? There what channel?*

Ref. AO91/291

Why wait for info together?

PRIME MINISTER

cc Sir Percy Cradock

L V Appleyard

*POW's elements
- over paid
- not their back*

OPD(G): 6 FebruaryItem 1: UK/US Talks

You might invite Mr Appleyard to introduce the note by officials (OPD(G)(91)9) reporting the UK/US talks in Washington on Monday. The talks were important and timely. The Americans accept the need for the US and UK to come to a joint view on the main action points for a ceasefire and the immediate aftermath which they would then settle in general terms with key coalition members in advance. The exchanges on longer term issues may be helpful background for the Foreign Secretary's discussions in Riyadh and Taif.

2. On the principal action points, ceasefire procedures and concrete steps (criteria for Iraqi withdrawal) there is a broad measure of agreement. The Americans have a rolling list of high priority targets for the 24-48 hour period before a ceasefire is put in place. POWs are a very sensitive matter for the US. They share our view that rapid exchange takes precedence over screening. They took on board our concerns about TV footage of Iraqi POWs being interviewed blindfold and said that media access to POWs would be denied. You and the Secretary of State for Defence have meetings with the President of the ICRC later in the day: this is an important opportunity to put our view on POWs generally and you may like to review with the Secretary of State the main points to stress.

*Why wait?
11*

Good

[Next day]



3. The Americans evidently believe that the ceasefire proposals can be reported, but not debated, in the Security Council. They accept the advantages a UN monitoring force would provide once a ceasefire had been implemented but are sceptical about a long-term UN peacekeeping force.

4. We turned out to be very much on track over advice to the Kuwaiti Government, Gulf security, policy towards Iraq after the conflict and Iraq/Kuwait negotiations. However, US officials are harbouring some grandiose ideas about regional groupings from the Maghreb to the Western borders of Afghanistan which our side found unconvincing.

✓ 5. The US propose to send a team to London in the next two weeks to reach broad agreement on outstanding points so that they can be concerted with other key coalition countries. In preparation for that, you might invite the official team to put to OPD(G) on Thursday our ideas about the concrete steps for an Iraqi withdrawal and OPD(G) next Tuesday our proposals on other issues including treatment of POWs: we would then send these to Washington so as to influence US preparations for the next round of talks.

✓ Item 2: Current Military Situation

6. The Chief of the Defence Staff proposes to report very briefly on developments. There has been little further Iraqi activity. The CDS will mention the present situation on the oil spillage.

Item 3: Current International Situation

7. You may wish to say a word about your recent discussions with President Mitterrand, President Mubarak and Mr Hawke. The Foreign Secretary might wish to look ahead to his visit to Saudi Arabia and Egypt on 8-10 February. The Saudis took offence at press reports of a couple of extracts from his Blaby speech



concerning Britain's contribution to Gulf security arrangements and economic assistance from Gulf States to poorer Muslim countries. This seems to have blown over after the Foreign Secretary telephoned Prince Saud. You might ask what the impact on the visit may be of EC Foreign Ministers' agreement to extend assistance to Israel.

8. On burdensharing more widely, the Chief Secretary's group is also meeting on Wednesday morning, following his return from the UAE, and he is expected to put proposals to the Committee on Thursday. You may therefore wish to postpone substantive discussion of this subject until then.

11
9. The Foreign Secretary may mention Iran's continuing efforts to keep a high diplomatic profile. President Rafsanjani's statement on Monday that he would not oppose talking to the Americans in certain circumstances has been widely misreported as an offer of mediation. According to Moscow Radio, the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister is to visit Teheran shortly. Manoeuvres continue in New York for a formal Security Council meeting. The general assessment seems to be that this diplomatic activity is directed towards striking a posture for the future rather than serious pressure for a ceasefire.

10. You might invite Sir Percy Cradock to say a word about the terrorist threat in the light of the discovery of bombs at a methanol plant in Norfolk, Virginia; and the cryptic messages on Baghdad Radio to all revolutionary cells to strike against Iraq's enemies. Except for the Virginia incident, no major terrorist activity still seems to be taking place. The position on Iraq's Embassy in London has been reported to you separately.

Item 4: Media Handling

11. You might invite the Energy Secretary to report on the broader picture. The Energy Secretary has spoken to ITN at a



concerning Britain's contribution to Gulf security arrangements and economic assistance from Gulf States to poorer Muslim countries. This seems to have blown over after the Foreign Secretary telephoned Prince Saud. You might ask what the impact on the visit may be of EC Foreign Ministers' agreement to extend assistance to Israel.

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Item 4: Media Handling

11. You might invite the Energy Secretary to report on the broader picture. The Energy Secretary has spoken to ITN at a



senior level about their reporting from Baghdad, and they appear to have taken the concerns on board. A letter from Tariq Aziz to the UN Secretary General indicates that civilian casualties have been surprisingly low. Once the UN publish this letter, it would be advantageous for us to draw attention to it.

12. You might invite Mr O'Donnell to report on day-to-day issues of interest, which will include your meeting with the President of the ICRC.

R.R.B.

ROBIN BUTLER

5 February 1991

TOP SECRET

PRIME MINISTER

INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING ON THE GULF

Rear Admiral Kerr, Chief of Defence Intelligence, and Air Vice Marshal Walker, are coming to see you tomorrow with a selection of satellite photographs which show in some detail the effects of the Allied air campaign against Iraq. You will want to question them particularly on the damage done to the Republican Guards: and ask what lessons they think can be learned for the next phase of the air campaign from the early results. You might also request a fairly regular briefing of this sort, so that you are fully up to date.

C.D.P.

CHARLES POWELL

5 February 1991

c\foreign\int (kw)

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MARTING & REARD

SUBJECT MASTER



10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

5 February 1991

Dear Richard,

THE GULF

I enclose a copy of my Note for the Record of the Prime Minister's meeting today with CDS and Air Chief Marshal Sir Patrick Hine. It should be given an even more restricted distribution than usual for documents of this sort.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence) and to Sir Robin Butler.

Yours sincerely,

(C. D. POWELL)

Richard Gozney Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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NOTE FOR THE RECORD

THE GULF

The Prime Minister had a talk this morning with the Chief of the Defence Staff and Air Chief Marshal Sir Patrick Hine about the progress of the Gulf campaign and Sir Patrick Hine's recent visit to Saudi Arabia.

The general conclusion was that the campaign was going well and very much according to plan.

The Prime Minister asked when the military commanders in the Gulf expected the land campaign to start. The answer was: not before the middle of the month and quite possibly a week later than that.

The Prime Minister asked whether there was any feeling that a ground campaign might not be necessary at all. The answer was that General Schwarzkopf and Sir Patrick Hine both thought it would be necessary: General Horner, the American Air Force Commander in the Gulf, thought it would probably not be necessary. Saddam Hussain appeared to have two options: either to hang on in the hope of inflicting heavy casualties on the allies when they mounted a ground attack: or to mount a limited ground offensive himself, using CW and some of his remaining air power to inflict quite severe casualties on the allies.

The Prime Minister asked why Saddam Hussain had not used CW yet. The answer was that he was probably holding it back for a decisive land battle, or for use against allied forces once they moved to their assembly areas and were highly concentrated.

The Prime Minister asked whether much of value was being obtained from interrogation of prisoners of war. The answer was: very little so far. There was no evidence that overall Iraqi morale was cracking.

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- 2 -
TOP SECRET

The Prime Minister asked what degree of degradation of the capability of Iraqi ground forces General Schwarzkopf hoped to achieve before initiating a ground campaign. The answer was that he still aimed at a 50 per cent degradation, particularly of the Republican Guard. The present intention was to keep the focus of air attacks on them for the next 7/10 days, and then for the final three days concentrate on frontline Iraqi forces.

The Prime Minister asked about the effectiveness of air attacks against the Republican Guard. Sir Patrick Hine said that there was some evidence that the B52s were simply 'bombing the desert'. Smart weapons would probably have to be used for successful attacks against Iraqi tanks in their berms. But the Iraqis ability to sustain operations was being damaged by successful attacks against soft-skinned vehicles and logistics. Many of the Republican Guard were in shelters, sometimes at a distance from their tanks.

The Prime Minister asked about damage to bridges. The answer was that about three-quarters of the main bridges over the Tigris and Euphrates had been taken out. But the Iraqis were adept at repairing them or installing temporary bridges, and a number would have to be visited again. But there was no doubt that the volume of supplies getting through had been reduced.

The Prime Minister asked about reports that Iraq still had 70 days supply of POL. The Chief of the Defence Staff said this was a figure for the country as a whole, and not all of it could be moved to the area of operations. The key for the Iraqis was how much was actually in theatre. An increasing number of allied attacks were now being mounted against storage sites.

The Prime Minister asked about the state of preparedness of British ground forces. Sir Patrick Hine said they were ready to move at any time. They were also well positioned for counter-action against an Iraqi invasion. The American forces were, however, still waiting for some of their equipment.

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The Prime Minister asked about progress with the SCUD-hunting campaign. Was this causing a significant diversion of the allied air effort? Sir Patrick Hine thought that probably only 10/15 per cent of the air effort was now being devoted to this purpose. Iraqi SCUD launches had clearly been put under pressure. They seemed no longer able to launch salvoes of missiles, and their accuracy had deteriorated. Allied aircraft could pinpoint launch positions within 7/8 minutes of a launch.

The Prime Minister asked about the attrition rate against Iraqi tanks and artillery. CDS and Sir Patrick Hine guess-timated that it might be some 2/3 per cent per day.

In a discussion about the most effective response to Iraqi use of CW, CDS and Sir Patrick Hine were opposed to diversion of resources to attack economic targets. The response could best be concentrated on eliminating CW delivery systems, in particular artillery.

The Prime Minister asked about General Schwarzkopf's estimates of allied casualties. The answer was that, in a situation where Iraqi forces in Kuwait had been attrited by 50 per cent, allied casualties (dead and wounded) in a ground attack would generally be 5/10 per cent, although a lot higher in key engagements. This pointed to a total of 20-40,000. But if allied forces were able to engage in battle of manoeuvre, the figure would be lower. In response to the Prime Minister's question whether it would not be better to continue the air campaign, CDS pointed to the diminishing returns of bombing over a period of time.

The Prime Minister asked how long General Schwarzkopf thought a land battle would last. The answer was that - with 50 per cent attrition - about two weeks. CDS was inclined to believe it would take longer, possibly up to Easter.

In discussion of how the conflict might end, there was agreement that one option for Saddam Hussain would be to

TOP SECRET

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preserve his most important forces i.e. the Republican Guard and the air force, and claim a propaganda victory. But for this to carry any credibility he would probably need to fight a further battle on Saudi territory and inflict casualties on allied forces.

C.D.P.

C. D. POWELL

5 February 1991

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MURKIN RECORD

SUBJECT A MASTER

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10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

5 February 1991

Dear Richard,

THE GULF: NUCLEAR WEAPONS

The Foreign Secretary told the Prime Minister this evening that senior officials in the Foreign Office were slightly concerned that we had not formally reminded the Americans of their obligation to consult us if they were contemplating a resort to nuclear weapons in the Gulf conflict. Although the possibility of the use of such weapons must be very remote, it could not be absolutely ruled out if the Iraqis were to perpetrate some fearful act causing large numbers of deaths and injuries. Personally he thought the clarification of American intentions which General Scowcroft had given me provided an adequate safeguard. But he felt bound to report the views of officials. The Prime Minister said there was some risk in raising the matter with the Americans, since it would imply that we did not have full confidence in their willingness to tell us about their intentions in advance. He was satisfied that the Americans would not act without consulting us. He thought we should avoid any sort of formal approach to them. But he would consider whether he could work round to the point when he next talked to the President on the secure line.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence) and to Sir Robin Butler.

Yours sincerely,
C. D. Powell

(C. D. POWELL)

Richard Gozney, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

Telephone 071- 21 82111/3

MO 6/17/15/1S

5th February 1991

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Dear Charles,

THE GULF

Thank you for your letter of 3rd February covering a message from General Scowcroft on the progress of the military operation in the Gulf.

Overall, the US assessment is upbeat and, in one or two respects, rather more upbeat than our own. For example, the statement that "the Iraqi Air Force and air defence systems is now powerless to interfere with our operations" appears rather too dismissive of the Iraqi's remaining air defence capability. You have already raised with General Scowcroft the separate question of the amount of damage inflicted on the Republican Guard. Although, as you know, we have close contacts with the US, it would be helpful to hear a briefing from the Washington side. You might suggest that this concentrates on degradation of Iraqi land forces where there is the greatest scope for judgement of the limited evidence available. The Defence Secretary and Chief of Defence Staff would be grateful to join the Prime Minister for the briefing so that any divergences from UK assessments can be explored.


There is one other particular area where US and UK assessments differ significantly and which you might usefully raise in any response to General Scowcroft. This is the question of the shelf life of Iraqi nerve agents. The message says that "the nerve agents will deteriorate in weeks and Baghdad will have difficulty producing more or filling them into munitions", our own assessment is that the shelf life of the nerve agents should be considerably longer and will not pose any immediate problems for Saddam. This is a long-standing area of dispute between US and UK intelligence communities and has already been the subject of exchanges. The US line does, however, tend to manifest itself in expectations of early use - and, as you know, we have had several alerts from them that have not materialised.

Yours sincerely
Simon Webb

(S WEBB)
Private Secretary

Sir Charles Powell KCMG
10 Downing Street

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OUR TELNO 355: IRAQ/KUWAIT: WASHINGTON SITREP

SUMMARY

1. PRESIDENT SENDS CHENEY AND POWELL TO SAUDI ARABIA, BUT DENIES THAT THIS NECESSARILY SIGNALS AN IMMINENT GROUND OFFENSIVE. US WAR AIMS UNCHANGED.

DETAIL

2. PRESIDENT BUSH GAVE A PRESS CONFERENCE AT THE WHITE HOUSE ON 5 FEBRUARY. IN A CONFIDENT OPENING STATEMENT, HE SAID THAT THE WAR EFFORT REMAINED ON COURSE AND ON SCHEDULE. THE COALITION WAS GOING TO EXTRAORDINARY AND UNPRECEDENTED LENGTHS TO AVOID DAMAGE TO CIVILIANS AND HOLY PLACES IN IRAQ. THE US DID NOT SEEK IRAQ'S DESTRUCTION, NOR DID THEY WISH TO PUNISH THE IRAQI PEOPLE FOR THE POLICIES OF THEIR LEADERS. THEY WERE DOING EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO MINIMISE COLLATERAL DAMAGE, DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE IRAQIS WERE NOW USING CIVILIAN AREAS FOR MILITARY FUNCTIONS. THE PRESIDENT ALSO EMPHASISED THAT US GOALS HAD NOT CHANGED. THEY CONTINUED TO SEEK IRAQ'S FULL COMPLIANCE WITH SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS.

3. THE PRESIDENT ANNOUNCED THAT HE WAS SENDING DEFENSE SECRETARY CHENEY AND GENERAL POWELL (CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS) TO SAUDI ARABIA LATER THIS WEEK FOR MEETINGS WITH GENERAL SCHWARZKOPF. THE PURPOSE OF THE TRIP WOULD BE TO GET A QUOTE FIRST HAND STATUS REPORT UNQUOTE' AND THEY WOULD RETURN QUICKLY FOR FURTHER DISCUSSIONS WITH THE PRESIDENT AND SENIOR ADVISERS IN WASHINGTON.

4. GIVEN THAT CHENEY'S VISITS TO THE REGION HAVE OFTEN BEEN FOLLOWED BY DRAMATIC DEVELOPMENTS, THIS ANNOUNCEMENT HAS

PAGE 1
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GENERATED SPECULATION THAT THE VISIT IS TO DISCUSS THE IMMINENT START OF AN ALLIED GROUND ASSAULT. BOTH THE PRESIDENT AND THE PENTAGON HAVE SAID THAT IT DOES NOT/NOT SIGNAL THAT A GROUND OFFENSIVE IS IMMINENT. THE PRESIDENT LATER ADDED THAT EXTERNAL PRESSURES WOULD NOT INFLUENCE HIS DECISION ON THE TIMING OF A GROUND ASSAULT.

5. IN ANSWER TO QUESTIONS' THE PRESIDENT WOULD NOT PREDICT WHEN THE WAR WOULD END, BUT SAID AGAIN THAT IT WOULD NOT BE ANOTHER VIETNAM. HE EMPHATICALLY REJECTED CHARGES THAT THE US WAS ATTEMPTING TO DESTROY THE INFRASTRUCTURE OF DAILY LIFE IN IRAQ. HE WAS CATEGORICAL THAT NO SPECIFIC IRANIAN PEACE PROPOSAL HAD BEEN CONVEYED TO THE US. IN ANY CASE, THERE WAS NO SIGN OF IRAQI FLEXIBILITY AND THEREFORE NOTHING TO BE CONCILIATORY ABOUT. BUT THE FACT THAT IRAN WOULD LIKE TO SEE THE WAR END WAS ENCOURAGING AND IRAN ITSELF WAS ACTING IN A VERY CREDITABLE WAY (IMPOUNDING IRAQI AIRCRAFT, NOT VIOLATING SANCTIONS). HE COULD REASSURE THEM AND OTHERS THAT THE US HAD NO INTENTION OF LEAVING FORCES IN THE GULF AFTER ITS UN-MANDATED OBJECTIVES WERE ACCOMPLISHED.

6. THE PRESIDENT ATTACKED SADDAM'S BRUTALITY TOWARDS PRISONERS OF WAR (QUOTE IT JUST TURNS MY STOMACH UNQUOTE) AND WARNED THAT HE SHOULD THINK QUOTE VERY VERY CAREFULLY UNQUOTE ABOUT USING CHEMICAL WEAPONS. HE WOULD NOT BE DRAWN ON HOW THE US WOULD RESPOND TO SUCH WEAPONS BUT SAID THAT IRAQ'S USE OF THEM WOULD FURTHER TURN WORLD OPINION AGAINST SADDAM. THE PRESIDENT MADE CLEAR THAT HE WAS PREPARED TO TAKE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE VERY DIFFICULT DECISION TO COMMIT TROOPS TO GROUND COMBAT IF NECESSARY. ASKED ABOUT CONDITIONS FOR AGREEING TO A CEASE FIRE, THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT THE IRAQIS WOULD HAVE TO BEGIN A CREDIBLE, VISIBLE, TOTALLY CONVINCING WITHDRAWAL. THIS WOULD INVOLVE IMMEDIATE SUPERVISION OF WITHDRAWAL AND THE RETURN OF KUWAIT'S LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT. IF THIS HAPPENED, WITHOUT CONCESSIONS OR CONDITIONS, OTHER THINGS COULD THEN FALL INTO PLACE.

7. A TOTAL OF 6 PIPE BOMBS WERE FOUND AT THE METHANOL PLANT IN NORFOLK, VIRGINIA (PARA 2 OF TUR). THEY WERE ALL DEFUSED OR SAFELY DETONATED. THE FBI HAVE SAID THAT IT IS TOO EARLY TO TELL WHETHER THE INCIDENT WAS GULF-RELATED, BUT THIS HAD NOT BEEN RULED OUT. INR TELL US THAT THE DEVICES WERE VERY CRUDE WHICH, EVEN IF THEY HAD EXPLODED, MIGHT NOT HAVE PUNCTURED THE TANKS.

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MY TELNO 141: CHIEF SECRETARY'S VISIT TO QATAR: GULF WAR

SUMMARY

1. ADMIRATION FOR UK'S STEADFASTNESS. AWARENESS OF THE NEED TO PLAN FOR LONG TERM SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS BUT STILL NO POSITIVE ACTION.

DETAIL

2. THE CHIEF SECRETARY SPENT AN HOUR WITH THE AMIR. MR MELLOR BEGAN BY CONGRATULATING THE QATARIS ON THE PERFORMANCE OF THEIR ARMED FORCES IN THE WAR. MR MELLOR SAID THAT HIS VISIT DEMONSTRATED THE UK'S COMMITMENT TO ITS FRIENDS IN HARD TIMES AS WELL AS GOOD TIMES. THE AMIR AGREED ON THE NEED TO CONSOLIDATE ITS FRIENDSHIP AND ASKED THE CHIEF SECRETARY TO CONVEY TO THE PRIME MINISTER THAT QATAR WILL NOT FORGET OUR HELP. THOSE WHO HAD ONLY BEEN INTERESTED IN QATAR AS A MARKET FOR THEIR GOODS WOULD SUFFER IN THE FUTURE. QATAR HAD ALWAYS KNOWN THAT BRITAIN COULD BE RELIED ON IN A CRISIS. THAT WAS NOT JUST HIS VIEW BUT THAT OF THE MAN IN THE STREET AS WELL.

3. THE AMIR SAID THAT THE DECISION TO GO TO WAR WAS THE RIGHT ONE. IF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY HAD NOT TAKEN THIS STAND THE NUMBER OF CASUALTIES IN THE LONG TERM WOULD HAVE BEEN HIGHER, SINCE SADDAM HUSSEIN WOULD NOT HAVE STOPPED AT KUWAIT AND WOULD HAVE AIMED TO CONTROL THE WORLD'S OIL SUPPLY.

4. THE AMIR THOUGHT THAT THE CRISIS WOULD SOON BE OVER. THE US POLICY OF CUTTING SUPPLY LINES AND ATTACKING THE TROOPS IN AND AROUND KUWAIT WAS RIGHT AND WAS BOUND TO AFFECT THE MORALE OF IRAQI TROOPS. IN ADDITION HITTING THEIR OIL REFINING CAPABILITY WOULD LEAVE THE IRAQI MILITARY WITHOUT FUEL, WHICH WOULD FURTHER IMPEDE THEIR ABILITY TO FIGHT. HE SAW THE ATTACKS ON OIL

TRUCKS GOING TO JORDAN AS NECESSARY AS THOSE TRUCKS COULD RETURN WITH REFINED PRODUCTS FOR THE IRAQIS.

5. THE AMIR SAID THAT IF SADDAM HUSSEIN STAYED ON AFTER KUWAIT WAS LIBERATED HE WOULD STILL BE A DANGER TO THE WHOLE WORLD. HE WOULD NOT CHANGE HIS AGGRESSIVE INSTINCTS. MR MELLOR POINTED OUT THAT OUR WAR AIMS WERE LIMITED TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS AND SAID THAT THERE MIGHT NOT BE A CLEAR CUT END IF SADDAM HUSSEIN FOUGHT ON AFTER HE HAD BEEN PUSHED OUT OF KUWAIT. THE AMIR DOUBTED IF SADDAM HUSSEIN WOULD WITHDRAW. IF HE DID, PRESSURE SHOULD CONTINUE THROUGH SANCTIONS TO CONTAIN HIM AND BY WORKING INTERNALLY TO HAVE HIM REMOVED.

6. THE CHIEF SECRETARY SAID THAT THE UK WOULD BE WILLING TO LISTEN TO ANY IDEAS THE GCC HAD ON LONG TERM SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS, ALTHOUGH THERE WERE LIMITS ON WHAT WE COULD DO IN PRACTICE. THE FIRST STEP HAD TO BE FOR THE GCC TO FORMULATE THEIR OWN IDEAS. WHAT PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE ON THIS? THE AMIR SAID THAT HE HAD NOT YET SPOKEN TO SULTAN QABOOS WHO WAS CHARGED WITH PUTTING TOGETHER PROPOSALS. AS THE TASK HAD BEEN GIVEN TO THE SULTAN HE WAS NOT PREPARED TO PUT FORWARD HIS OWN IDEAS UNTIL THE SULTAN HAD PRESENTED HIS REPORT. BUT HE AGREED ON THE NEED FOR URGENCY AND WOULD RAISE THIS WITH YOUSEF AL ALAWI WHO WAS IN DOHA THAT DAY TO SAY THAT THE SULTAN'S PLAN SHOULD BE COMPLETED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. MR MELLOR AGREED. WAITING UNTIL NOVEMBER TO COMPLETE THE REPORT WAS TOO LEISURELY A PACE. THE AMIR SAID THAT IF HIS TALK WITH YOUSEF BIN ALAWI WAS NOT PRODUCTIVE HE WOULD IF NECESSARY SEND A HIGH LEVEL EMISSARY TO URGE SPEED ON SULTAN QABOOS. MEANWHILE HE WAS ANXIOUS FOR HMG'S ADVICE. THIS WOULD NOT BE REGARDED BY QATAR AS INTERFERENCE. MR MELLOR SAID THAT HE WOULD PASS THIS ON TO YOU AND THE PRIME MINISTER BUT CAUTIONED THAT IN THE END THE IDEAS FOR LONG TERM SECURITY HAD TO COME FROM WITHIN THE REGION BUT HE WAS SURE THAT WE WOULD BE WILLING TO SHARE OUR IDEAS WITH THE QATARIS. IT WAS VITAL THAT OUR FRIENDS SHOULD LEARN A LESSON FROM THE EVENTS OF THE PAST SIX MONTHS. THE AMIR SAID THAT THERE WERE VERY MANY LESSONS TO BE LEARNED.

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MIPT: IRAN/GULF CONFLICT: RAFSANJANI'S PRESS CONFERENCE

SUMMARY

1. RAFSANJANI GIVES MAJOR PRESS CONFERENCE. MAKES CLEAR IRAN'S CONTINUING NEUTRALITY, DETERMINATION TO RETAIN AIRCRAFT AND VESSELS OF BOTH SIDES UNTIL HOSTILITIES CEASE AND COMMITMENT TO TRY TO END GULF CONFLICT ON BASIS OF IRAQI WITHDRAWAL FROM KUWAIT. REFERS WITHOUT DETAIL TO PROPOSALS HE HAS SENT SADDAM HUSSEIN. BBC (AND APPARENTLY AMERICANS) SEEM TO HAVE MISUNDERSTOOD HIS COMMENTS ON TALKING TO THE US GOVERNMENT: HE HEDGED HIS BETS. PREDICTABLE COMMENTS ON REGIONAL SECURITY. MODERATE LANGUAGE THROUGHOUT.

DETAIL

2. RAFSANJANI GAVE A MAJOR PRESS CONFERENCE ON 4 FEBRUARY, FOR WHICH THE IRANIANS HAD ISSUED VISAS AT SHORT NOTICE TO A LARGE NUMBER OF FOREIGN JOURNALISTS. RAFSANJANI DID NOT MAKE AN INITIAL STATEMENT, BUT TOOK QUESTIONS FROM THE START.
3. RAFSANJANI REITERATED IRAN'S COMMITMENT TO NEUTRALITY IN THE PERSIAN GULF CONFLICT AND SAID THAT TEHRAN WAS PURSUING A PEACEFUL SOLUTION THROUGH ALL AVAILABLE DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS. IN THIS CONTEXT HE DREW ATTENTION TO NUMEROUS RECENT VISITORS TO TEHRAN.
4. DESCRIBING THE IRAQI VICE PRESIDENT'S VISIT, RAFSANJANI SAID THAT HAMMADI HAD BROUGHT A MESSAGE FROM SADDAM HUSSEIN

TO WHICH RAFSANJANI HAD REPLIED. HAMMADI'S VISIT HAD BEEN PROMPTED BY IRAN'S COMPLAINT TO IRAQ ABOUT THE DESPATCH OF WAR PLANES WITHOUT PRIOR CONSULTATION.

5. RAFSANJANI REFUSED TO CONFIRM THAT MORE THAN THIRTEEN IRAQI PLANES HAD ARRIVED HERE, BUT REPEATED THAT IRAQI PILOTS AND AIRCRAFT WOULD BE TREATED ACCORDING TO THE DECISION OF THE SUPREME NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL AND INTERNATIONAL REGULATIONS (IE RETAINED UNTIL THE END OF HOSTILITIES). HE NOTED THAT THE LANDING OF THESE AIRCRAFT HAD BEEN QUOTE OUT OF OUR CONTROL UNQUOTE. IRAN HAD TRIED TO REPEL SOME OF THE IRAQI AIRCRAFT IN THE EARLY DAYS, BUT THEY HAD BEEN TOO SHORT OF FUEL TO RETURN TO BASE IN IRAQ. THREE HAD CRASHED FOR THIS REASON. HE NOTED THAT SWITZERLAND HAD HELD ABOUT 300 PLANES DURING WORLD WAR II, AND THAT THIS HAD NEVER BEEN REGARDED AS A BREACH OF NEUTRALITY.

6. AS REGARDS HIS MESSAGE TO SADDAM HUSSEIN, RAFSANJANI SAID THAT HE HAD NOT PRESENTED ANY SPECIFIC PLAN, BUT THAT IF SADDAM HUSSEIN ACCEPTED QUOTE THE IDEA UNQUOTE MENTIONED IN THE MESSAGE, IRAN MIGHT PREPARE A PLAN ON THAT BASIS.

7. ASKED WHETHER IRAN HAD OBSERVED ANY FLEXIBILITY IN IRAQ'S STANCE DURING HAMMADI'S VISIT, RAFSANJANI SAID THAT NONE HAD BEEN EVIDENT.

8. ASKED ABOUT IRAN'S REACTION IF TURKEY ENTERED THE WAR, RAFSANJANI REPLIED THAT IRAN WOULD REMAIN NEUTRAL. TURKEY'S ATTITUDE WAS NOT SURPRISING GIVEN ITS MEMBERSHIP OF NATO. TURKEY WAS IN ANY EVENT IN PRACTICE ALREADY AT WAR BECAUSE OF THE USE OF ITS BASES AGAINST IRAQ.

9. RAFSANJANI SAID THAT NO REGIONAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS COULD BE MAINTAINED WITHOUT TAKING IRAN INTO CONSIDERATION. THE PRESENCE OF UNITED STATES FORCES WOULD NOT BRING SECURITY BUT PROMPT A REACTION BY THE PEOPLE OF THE REGION. NOR SHOULD THE REGIONAL MAP BE CHANGED: IRAN QUOTE SERIOUSLY OPPOSED UNQUOTE THIS.

10. ON THE SUBJECT OF FOOD AND MEDICINES TO IRAQ, RAFSANJANI SAID THAT THIS WOULD BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH UN RESOLUTIONS. THERE WOULD BE NO MILITARY AID.

11. ON A FUTURE IRAQI REGIME, RAFSANJANI SAID THAT THE DECISION WAS FOR THE IRAQI PEOPLE. OBSERVERS WERE CONCERNED QUOTE WHETHER IT WOULD BE THE TURN OF THE IRAQI COMBATANTS AND THEIR POLITICAL CURRENTS INSIDE IRAQ, OR IRAQI'S TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AT STAKE UNQUOTE. THE IMPORTANT THING WAS TO PRESERVE IRAQ'S TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY.

12. AT THIS POINT RAFSANJANI REPEATED THAT IRAQ SHOULD LEAVE KUWAIT, THAT FOREIGN FORCES SHOULD RETURN HOME, THAT REGIONAL BORDERS SHOULD REMAIN IN TACT, AND THAT THE PEOPLE AND GOVERNMENTS OF THE REGION SHOULD PROVIDE THEIR OWN SECURITY.

13. ASKED ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF INITIATING TALKS WITH THE AMERICANS ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF PEACE IN THE GULF, RAFSANJANI SAID THAT CONTACT WAS ALREADY POSSIBLE THROUGH THE SWISS EMBASSY. HE CONTINUED THAT QUOTE OF COURSE, IF THE ISSUE OF WAR REACHES THE STAGE OF PEACE AND IF IT BECOMES NECESSARY FOR US TO TALK TO THE AMERICANS, I THINK IT WILL BE LOGICAL. BUT NO DECISION HAS YET BEEN MADE IN THIS REGARD. THIS RESTS WITH THE LEADER AND THE SUPREME NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL UNQUOTE.

14. ASKED ABOUT MEETING SADDAM HUSSEIN, HE SAID HE SAW NO REASON TO REFUSE TO DO SO IF THERE WAS HOPE FOR THE SALVATION OF THE IRAQI NATION.

COMMENT

15. I HAVE STILL NOT SEEN AN AUTHORITATIVE TEXT OF INTERVIEW. THE ABOVE IS BASED ON PRESS REPORTING.

16. THE IMPORTANT POINTS (IN SOME HASTE TO MEET DEADLINE IN YOUR TELNO 91) SEEM TO BE:

(A) RAFSANJANI SET OUT TO MEET ANY DOUBTS ABOUT A CHANGE IN IRAN'S POSITION AS A RESULT OF RECENT CONTACTS WITH IRAQIS AND OTHERS.

(B) IN DOING SO, HE CLARIFIED THE POSITION ON THE IRAQI AIRCRAFT, INCLUDING IN THE EVENT OF WAR WITH ISRAEL.

(C) HE COMMITTED IRAN TO NEUTRALITY EVEN IF TURKEY TAKES A MORE ACTIVE ROLE.

(D) HE SUGGESTED THAT IRAQ WAS STILL SHOWING NO SIGN OF FLEXIBILITY.

(E) HIS MODERATE LANGUAGE AND LINE, AND EMPHASIS ON IRAN'S EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE PEACE BASED ON COMPLETE IRAQI WITHDRAWAL FROM KUWAIT, ARE DESIGNED TO STAKE IRAN'S CLAIM TO A PLACE ON THE TABLE DURING DISCUSSION OF MIDDLE EAST ISSUES, AND TO A ROLE IN REGIONAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS.

(F) HE SHOWED THAT IN CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES HE WAS NOT OPPOSED TO TALKING TO THE AMERICANS, BUT MADE IT CLEAR THAT KHAMENEI AND THE SNSC WOULD TAKE THIS DECISION (AND THEREFORE SHARE THE RESPONSIBILITY).

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TEHRAN TELNO 119: VISIT TO TEHRAN BY QUAI SECRETARY GENERAL

SUMMARY

1. QUAI FOUND IRAN ROBUST ON THE ESSENTIALS: THEIR NEUTRALITY, THE NON-RETURN OF IRAQI AIRCRAFT EVEN IF ISRAEL ENTERED THE WAR. A STATESMANLIKE PERFORMANCE BY VELAYATI, SEEMEDLY IN ANTICIPATION OF AN IMPORTANT IRANI ROLE IN THE POST-WAR GULF SETTLEMENT.

DETAIL

2. SIBIOUDE, WHO ACCOMPANIED SCHEER TO AMMAN, TEHRAN AND ANKARA, BRIEFED US YESTERDAY EVENING. THIS FOLLOWED CLOSELY THE VERY FULL BRIEFING WHICH THE FRENCH EMBASSY IN TEHRAN HAD GIVEN TO MR REDDAWAY RECORDED IN TUR.

3. SIBIOUDE'S PARTICULAR POINTS OF EMPHASIS WERE:

(A) CEASEFIRE: VELAYATI HAD SAID THAT THE 'KEY ELEMENT' WAS IRAQI WITHDRAWAL FROM KUWAIT. A CEASEFIRE WAS THEREFORE NOT SOMETHING FOR THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE. ALTHOUGH HE MENTIONED THE SECOND IRANI DESIDERATUM OF THE DEPARTURE OF FOREIGN FORCES FROM THE GULF, VELAYATI MADE CLEAR THAT THIS ONLY APPLIED ONCE SADDAM HAD BEEN FORCED TO CONCEDE.

(B) IRANI NEUTRALITY: BOTH VAEZI AND VELAYATI HAD BEEN INSISTENT ON THIS. THEY HAD SAID THAT IRAN HAD REFUSED TO BE 'PULLED INTO SADDAM'S GAME.'

(C) IRAQI AIRCRAFT: THE IRANIANS HAD SAID (I) THERE HAD BEEN NO PREVIOUS UNDERSTANDING THAT THE AIRCRAFT COULD COME TO IRAN (II) THE PILOTS WERE NOT DESERTERS: THEY HAD ASKED IMMEDIATELY TO RETURN TO IRAQ (III) THIS HAD BEEN REFUSED, AND THEY WERE TO BE HELD EFFECTIVELY AS POW'S UNTIL THE END OF THE WAR (IV) THE AIRCRAFT WOULD NOT BE RELEASED EVEN IF ISRAEL ENTERED THE WAR.

(D) OUTCOME AND APRES GUERRE: VELAYATI HAD SAID THAT HE WAS IN NO DOUBT THAT SADDAM WOULD BE DEFEATED, THOUGH HE DID NOT COUNT ON HIS FALL FROM OFFICE. BUT WHATEVER, HE WOULD BE GREATLY WEAKENED. A NEW START COULD THEN BE MADE ON GULF SECURITY INVOLVING INITIALLY

(THOUGH NOT RULING OUT OTHERS PARTICIPATING LATER) THE GULF LITTORAL STATES. ON FORMULAE FOR PROTECTING THE SMALL GULF STATES, SIBIOUDE SAID THAT THEY HAD HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT THE IRANIANS WERE NOT COMPLETELY RULING OUT SOME INVOLVEMENT OF WESTERN GUARANTOR FORCES.

(E) INTERNAL SITUATION IN IRAN: VAEZI HAD ADMITTED THAT THERE WERE RADICALS OPPOSED TO IRANI NEUTRALITY, BUT HAD CLAIMED THAT THEY HAD INSUFFICIENT WEIGHT TO INFLUENCE PRESENT POLICY. HOWEVER THE FRENCH SAW RAFSANJANI'S OFFER TO GO TO BAGHDAD AS IN PART AN EFFORT TO HEAD OFF DOMESTIC CRITICISM.

4. SIBIOUDE COMMENTED THAT THE QUAI DID NOT TRUST THE IRANIANS FURTHER THAN THEY COULD THROW THEM. BUT VELAYATI HAD BEEN AT PAINS TO EXPRESS HIS ARGUMENTS IN REASONABLE TONES THROUGHOUT. AND THERE WERE OBJECTIVE REASONS FOR THE IRANIANS TO PLAY A RESPONSIBLE ROLE: THEY COULD GAIN A LOT FROM THE WAR. THEY ALSO CLEARLY WANTED TO PLAY A MAJOR ROLE IN THE POST-WAR SETTLEMENT.

5. SIBIOUDE SAID THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO CONTACT BETWEEN SCHEER AND ANY OF THE IRAQIS, YEMENIS OR ALGERIANS IN TEHRAN.

6. THE ONLY POINT ON WHICH SIBIOUDE SEEMED DEFENSIVELY MONOSYLLABIC WAS FRENCH FINANCIAL RELATIONS WITH IRAN. THE DECISION OF THE ARBITRATION TRIBUNAL OF LAUSANNE THAT FRAMATONE SHOULD PAY 550 MILLION FRANCS TO IRAN MAY THEREFORE HAVE BEEN A MAJOR POINT ON THE BILATERAL AGENDA. THE OTHER POINT WAS EMBASSY CEILINGS, WHICH THE QUAI NOW CONSIDERED WERE DEFINITELY LIFTED (AND EXPECTED EARLY APPLICATIONS FOR NEW PERSONNEL TO BE GRANTED VISAS). PRESS REPORTS ALSO SPEAK OF AN OPENING UP OF SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL LINKS.

7. THERE WAS NO TIME FOR US TO BE FULLY BRIEFED ON THE VISITS TO AMMAN AND ANKARA. SIBIOUDE SAID THAT THE QUAI REGARDED IT AS IMPORTANT TO KEEP UP SOME CONTACT WITH JORDAN, THOUGH THE KING HAD SEEMED PATHETICALLY ISOLATED AND IMPOTENT. IN ANKARA, THE TURKS HAD SAID CATEGORICALLY (FOR WHAT IT WAS WORTH) THAT THEIR CLAIMS ON PRESENT IRAQI TERRITORY WOULD NOT BE PURSUED IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE WAR.

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29 (a-c)

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO BRENT SCOWCROFT FROM
CHARLES POWELL

DEAR BRENT,

Thank you very much for your message reviewing progress in the Gulf, which we found very useful. The Prime Minister would be very pleased to see a military briefing team: please let me know when they will be free to come.

You invited comments on your message. We certainly have no major disagreements with it, although the overall tone is perhaps rather more upbeat than some of our own assessments. Let me identify a number of points where our interpretation differs a bit from yours: this is not meant as a criticism, but simply because I think it is useful to compare notes in this way.

Taking first Iraq's nuclear, chemical and biological weapons capability. We certainly agree that you have had considerable and commendable success in disrupting that capability, and that is a great relief. But I think we should go further and say that our aim should be to destroy as much of it as we possibly can. Our calculations are that about half the CW production capability and two-thirds of the known agent-filling capacity have been destroyed: but a good number of storage sites remain untouched, and chemical weapons have probably been dispersed to a variety of ammunition depots. We think it likely that Iraq also dispersed its BW production and storage facilities to some extent before hostilities. On the nuclear side we have reports of the Iraqis endeavouring to salvage the highly enriched uranium from the ruins of the Russian reactor. The condition of the suspected nuclear facility at Al Qaim remains unknown. In short, we think there is still some distance to go here before our objectives are all achieved. If a ceasefire suddenly loomed it would surely be important to try to finish the job as comprehensively as possible while we still had the opportunity.

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- 2 -

One other point on nerve agents: your experts believe they will deteriorate in weeks, while our own assessment is that the shelf-life of the nerve agent should be considerably longer, and will not pose any immediate problem for Saddam Hussein. This is quite a long-standing difference between our respective intelligence communities.

I think we would both agree that Iraq's national command and control system still shows considerable resilience, despite the damage done, and the "spinal cord" may survive.

One of the key judgements is the extent of the damage inflicted on the Republican Guard. I know that this is particularly difficult to assess. Our view is that substantial damage has been inflicted on one Republican Guard Division, but the others are as yet relatively little affected (although that information may not be entirely up to date). Our airmen tell us that the tanks of the armoured divisions are very well protected, and can probably only be destroyed by smart weapons.

On logistics, although there is now disturbance in supply to the Kuwait theatre, we have to allow for considerable stock-piling of ammunition and POL from before hostilities, and their dispersal throughout the theatre.

It is of course particularly difficult to assess Iraqi morale. It may well be beginning to crack, but it does not seem yet to have become a major factor for Saddam Hussein. I think we were all struck by the good fight which the Iraqis put up at Khafji.

Finally, I personally very much agree with you that a comprehensive international conference to address all the political issues in the Middle East would be premature. This and other issues connected with the ending of the war, such as future regional security arrangements, were discussed in some detail by British and American officials in Washington yesterday.

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- 3 -

Let me say again how grateful we were for your message. Please treat the points above only as reflecting the very few areas in which our respective assessments differ.

With warm regards,

CHARLES

5 FEBRUARY 1991

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A The National Archives

DEPARTMENT/SERIES <i>PRem 19</i>	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM <i>3446</i> (one piece/item number)	
Extract details: <i>minute SP 01312 from Cradock to Powell</i> <i>dated 5 February 1991</i>	
CLOSED UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	<i>251.118</i> <i>Mr. L.</i>
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Instructions for completion of Dummy Card

Use black or blue pen to complete form.

Use the card for one piece or for each extract removed from a different place within a piece.

Enter the department and series,
eg. HO 405, J 82.

Enter the piece and item references, .
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Enter extract details if it is an extract rather than a whole piece.
This should be an indication of what the extract is,
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A The National Archives

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PIECE/ITEM (one piece/item number)	3446	
Extract details: Minute from Cradock to Powell dated 5 February 1991 - JP- 01310		
CLOSED UNDER FOI EXEMPTION		
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	25/1/18 m.b.	
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Sign and date next to the reason why the record is not available to the public ie. Closed under FOI exemption; Retained under section 3(4) of the Public Records Act 1958; Temporarily retained; Missing at transfer or Number not used.

PRIME MINISTER

OPD(G): THE GULF

There is a meeting of OPD(G) tomorrow morning to consider developments in the Gulf. The main item is to consider the report on the talks between British and American officials in Washington earlier this week on ending the conflict and on the arrangements which should follow. The report itself is in the folder, together with comments from Sir Percy Cradock. By and large there is agreement between us and the Americans on most of the items, but a need for further work on the detail.

The Americans tend to what I believe is your view, namely that there is unlikely to be an agreed ceasefire but rather a rather messy situation of no peace no war. Points on which the Americans are particularly robust (thank goodness) are:

- the need to have a priority list of targets which must be destroyed before a ceasefire can take place; ✓
- X - the importance of securing an absolute commitment to the release of PoWs before we agree to stop fighting; ✓ X
- the need to go on attacking or harassing Iraqi forces, even if they are fleeing or withdrawing from Kuwait; ✓
- the concept that Saddam Hussein must be forced to abandon much of his military equipment in Kuwait, whether or not there is an agreed ceasefire; ✓
- scepticism about a United Nations Peace Keeping Force, which the Kuwaitis are anyway unlikely to be keen on (although a UN monitoring force on the border could be useful). ✓

On all these points, I think the Americans are right to be firm and we should be no less robust.

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The Cabinet Office brief deals satisfactorily with the other issues which may be raised at the meeting. Burden-sharing is for the OPD(G) meeting the following day, where the Chief Secretary will report.

There is one further matter which may come up. I have written to MoD (a copy of the letter is in the folder) about your dissatisfaction at the lack of prompt and reliable intelligence from the theatre about what is going on in the campaign from day to day. After talking to Sir Percy, I have proposed that the Commander and his staff should send us twice-daily telegrams reporting the latest developments. The MoD are wriggling a bit about this, and saying there are difficulties: but it cannot be beyond the wit of a good intelligence officer out there to provide readable summaries to keep you abreast.

C.D.P

CHARLES POWELL
5 FEBRUARY 1991

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10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

5 February 1991

✓
Dear Robert,

THE GULF

Since General Scowcroft was testifying up on the Hill this evening, I had a brief word with Bob Gates. The main purpose was to brief him on the Prime Minister's telephone call with President Mitterrand, which I did on the basis of my letter to you earlier today. I added that President Mitterrand had not given any hint of an impending French peace initiative: but in the light of the experience of the Prime Minister's visit to Paris in January, that was not necessarily definitive. M. Dumas was coming over to London to see the Foreign Secretary on Thursday: we were not quite sure why. I also mentioned the Prime Minister's conversations with President Mubarak and Mr. Hawke.

Bob Gates said that he would pass this on to the President and to General Scowcroft. The President would be grateful to the Prime Minister for contacting Mitterrand as they had agreed.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (MoD) and to Sir Robin Butler.

Yours sincerely,

CHARLES POWELL

Richard Gozney, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

SECRET AND PERSONAL

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SUBJECT CC MASTER

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

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CC SOUTH AFRICA
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COMMONWEALTH
High Level Matters

From the Private Secretary

5 February 1991

PRIME MINISTER'S TALK WITH THE AUSTRALIAN PRIME MINISTER

The Prime Minister telephoned Mr. Hawke this morning to discuss the Gulf and South Africa.

Mr. Hawke began by saying he had made a good resolution not to talk about cricket. The Prime Minister said that he had been intending to explain that all our best cricketers were in the Gulf. He congratulated Mr. Hawke on Australia's success.

The Gulf

Turning to the Gulf, the Prime Minister said that we were content with the progress of the campaign. We were in no hurry to get into a land battle. The air campaign was wreaking heavy damage on strategic targets and on logistics and supplies. The focus was increasingly on attacks against the Republican Guards. Mr. Hawke said that it was not inconceivable that the air campaign alone would be sufficient. The Prime Minister said that a land battle would probably still be required. But in any event, the air campaign would go on for some time yet. Meanwhile, we must fend off undesirable peace initiatives.

Mr. Hawke said that the Foreign Secretary's recent speech had been a useful contribution to discussion of the post-conflict situation. The Australian Government was basically in agreement with it, particularly the point that there should be no dismemberment of Iraq. Iraq had some greedy neighbours with territorial aspirations. The Prime Minister said that we were defending Kuwait's territorial integrity, and the same principle must apply to Iraq. We were giving a great deal of thought to the post-conflict situation. At the moment it was difficult to see how it would actually end: it might not be clear cut at all.

The Prime Minister noted that the Israelis were already saying that they would not attend a peace conference, although this was no more than their traditional position. Mr. Hawke said that Israel's refusal to deal with the PLO had been given credibility by the PLO's support for Iraq. But he hoped that the experience of war in the Middle East might persuade people to look more favourably on peace negotiations.

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South Africa

Turning to South Africa, the Prime Minister asked what Mr. Hawke made of President de Klerk's recent speech. Mr. Hawke said it would be churlish to do anything other than welcome it. De Klerk had shown a lot of courage, and obviously still faced difficulties from some very antediluvian opponents. Australia had taken the lead in the Commonwealth in seeking to impose sanctions against South Africa. He now felt under a personal obligation to take a lead in dismantling them. The Australian Foreign Minister would be attending the meeting of Commonwealth Foreign Ministers on South Africa shortly, and would be putting a proposal for the phased easing of sanctions. The Australian idea was to take 'people-oriented' sanctions first, including sport, provided it was integrated in South Africa: then move on to trade sanctions: and finally to arms sales and financial sanctions. It was not unreasonable to think in terms of all these measures being unravelled in the course of the current year.

The Prime Minister said he very much agreed that President de Klerk had done enough to enable us to lift sanctions. He very much hoped there could be rapid progress in the Commonwealth, so that the CHOGM in October would not be burdened with the issue. There could then be a forward looking meeting in Harare concentrating on the future CHOGM. He had made this point strongly to the Commonwealth Secretary General. Mr. Hawke agreed that we ought to be able to get a long way with lifting sanctions before October. Privately, the ANC were expressing understanding of the need to move. The Prime Minister thought the Secretary General already understood the danger of the Commonwealth being left behind and looking silly. Mr. Hawke repeated that he felt a sense of personal obligation and of urgency about this. We must not let the Front Line States dictate our position, but try to carry them along.

Future of the Commonwealth

Mr. Hawke said that he hoped very much that the dates of 10-12 June could be agreed for the meeting of CHOGM on the future of the Commonwealth. His Parliament was sitting until 6 June, and his Biennial Party conference was on 24-28 June, and he would want to be back in Australia well before that. The Prime Minister said he did not think the dates of 10-12 June posed great problems for us: rather, it was the Malaysians who had difficulties.

I am copying this letter to John Gieve (HM Treasury), Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence), John Neilson (Department of Energy), Martin Stanley (Department of Trade and Industry) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

C.D. POWELL

Richard Gozney, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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SUBJECT CC MASTER



10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

5 February 1991

Dear Roland,

PRIME MINISTER'S TALK WITH PRESIDENT MITTERRAND

The Prime Minister had a talk on the telephone this morning with President Mitterrand about the situation in the Gulf.

The Prime Minister said that he was just making a casual call: it was a week or so since they had last spoken and he would find it useful to know how the President thought things were going in the Gulf, and where they would go in the future.

President Mitterrand said that he thought the campaign was going ahead satisfactorily. France was now ready to move to the next stage of committing ground forces. He thought that would be necessary in order to break Iraq's war machine. We would have to prepare public opinion for a difficult battle. It remained to be seen whether a great land battle would cause a total collapse of Iraq. As far as he was concerned, a ground campaign should be limited to Kuwait itself and the immediately adjoining areas of Iraq: he did not really see any point in waging war to the far corners of Iraq or of occupying any part of its territory. The Prime Minister said that he agreed with this assessment. He thought the air campaign should continue for some time yet. It was proving effective and inexpensive in terms of human life. Most importantly, it was weakening Iraq's capacity to wage war. The objective must be to make a land battle as short as possible, with casualties kept to a minimum.

The Prime Minister continued that we were nonetheless worried that Saddam Hussein might yet score a propaganda victory of the sort that he had enjoyed at Khafji. He might withdraw from Kuwait and boast that he had stood up to the United States, France and the United Kingdom, making himself a hero among the Arabs. President Mitterrand agreed this was a problem against which we must guard. It must be clear that Saddam Hussein had lost the war. Equally the peace must be very demanding on Iraq, particularly in terms of future constraints on the supply of weapons. The Prime Minister said that we certainly took the view that Iraq's boundaries should not be changed in any way. But more thought was needed on what should follow the conflict in terms of a wider Middle East settlement. President Mitterrand agreed that boundary changes must at all costs be avoided, otherwise there would be a chain reaction right throughout the region. It was not exactly a restful part of the world at the best of times.


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The Prime Minister asked whether President Mitterrand had any insight into Iran's intentions, in the light of M. Scheer's visit. Could we rely on them not to give back the Iraqi aircraft for use in the conflict? President Mitterrand said that M. Scheer had come back with the impression that the Iranians were sincere about remaining neutral in the conflict. It was anyway not in their interest to take one side or the other. They would probably try to use the aircraft to influence decisions on both sides. They were great hagglers and they would use the aircraft as bargaining counters to extract concessions from the Iraqis once the conflict was over. He could see them being very active when peace negotiations began. The Prime Minister commented that this was an interesting insight.

The Prime Minister said that he had seen the new French Ambassador the previous day and had enjoyed their discussion. He would try to see him again in future. President Mitterrand commented that the Ambassador was a man with an original cast of mind. There were two sorts of diplomats, the conformists and those who were alive: it was difficult to find many of the latter but M. Dorin was one. The Prime Minister added that we had also been very pleased to see the new French Defence Minister so soon after he took office. President Mitterrand said that he had come to the United Kingdom virtually on his first day as Defence Minister. He would be seeing him later in the day on his return from Saudi Arabia. He was confident that M. Joxe would do a good job.

President Mitterrand said he was very pleased that the Prime Minister had called and they should have another talk soon.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence), John Neilson (Department of Energy) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

Yours rich,


CHARLES D POWELL

Richard Gozney, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

SUBJECT CC MASTER

5 February 1991

PRIME MINISTER'S TALK WITH PRESIDENT MUBARAK

The Prime Minister had a talk on the telephone this morning with President Mubarak of Egypt about the situation in the Gulf.

The Prime Minister said that we were all tremendously impressed with President Mubarak's resolve, and his clear-cut and outspoken lead on Gulf issues. This commanded great admiration in Britain. President Mubarak said that the conflict with Iraq was a matter of principle for Egypt, which would not weaken. The Prime Minister continued that we were well content with the progress of the campaign. Considerable damage was being done by the bombing. President Mubarak said it was quite possible that the vigorous air campaign would on its own bring a quick end to the war. It could be over by the end of February. The Prime Minister said there was evidence that the air campaign was beginning to hurt the Republican Guard. President Mubarak said that he had sent a message to General Schwarzkopf urging him to put the main pressure on Iraqi forces in Kuwait. The Prime Minister agreed that the right way was to weaken the Iraqi forces before any land battle.

The Prime Minister asked whether President Mubarak saw any possibility that Saddam Hussain could suddenly withdraw, saying that he had stood up to the Americans and prevailed and had therefore achieved a victory. We very much wanted to avoid this situation: Saddam Hussain had to be defeated and humiliated. It was important to make sure that Saddam Hussain's military might was destroyed. President Mubarak said that once Saddam Hussain was defeated he would soon be seen off by his generals. That was why it was so important to put maximum pressure on the Republican Guard. Even if Saddam Hussain withdrew now, so much of his military machine had been destroyed that he would not survive. The Prime Minister said that he and President Mubarak were agreed that the right way was to go on with the air campaign for the time being. President Mubarak said this would then make it easier to put in ground forces. He continued to believe that the Iraqis might be forced to surrender on the basis of the air campaign alone. He repeated that he had no doubt that, once Iraq was defeated militarily, the regime would fall.

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The Prime Minister asked President Mubarak about the state of opinion in other Arab countries. President Mubarak advised the Prime Minister not to pay too much attention to it. All was well in Egypt where he had the support of the whole people, including the People's Assembly and popular institutions throughout the land.

The Prime Minister asked what assessment President Mubarak made of Iran's intentions. President Mubarak said that the Iranians and Iraqis hated each other. Whatever impression they might be trying to give publicly, they would go to great lengths to do each other down. He did not think it at all likely that Iran would let Iraq have its aircraft back, either during the conflict or indeed afterwards. They might send food and medicine but not provide any serious help.

The Prime Minister asked what President Mubarak expected Saddam Hussain to do next. He was getting steadily more boxed in. President Mubarak said that he would probably use CW on his artillery, once he saw no way out. Our forces should all take the necessary precautions.

The Prime Minister asked whether President Mubarak thought the various rather dubious peace initiatives now being floated were likely to make ground. The President said there was no need to worry about them, it was just a case of countries fishing for a role in the post-war settlement.

The Prime Minister said he was grateful to find that he and the President saw matters very similarly. They should keep in touch. The President thanked the Prime Minister very much for telephoning; he had found it most helpful.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence), John Neilson (Department of Energy) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

(C. D. POWELL)

Richard Gozney, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

5 February 1991

LOSSES OF AIRCRAFT OVER IRAQ

Thank you for your letter of 4 February about losses of aircraft over Iraq, which I have shown to the Prime Minister. He has commented that it seems a bit hard on the families to tell them that the loss of the last Tornado may have been an own goal, when we shall never know for certain. But if there are legal considerations, they must of course be given full weight.

The Prime Minister may raise this with the Defence Secretary in the margins of OPD(G) tomorrow.

I am copying this letter to Juliet Wheldon (Law Officers Department) and to Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

(CHARLES POWELL)

Simon Webb, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence.

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in South Africa
Winston

PRIME MINISTER

TELEPHONE CALL WITH BOB HAWKE

1. All our best cricketers are in the Gulf.....
2. Update on Gulf developments:
 - air campaign succeeding in destroying large number of strategic targets, as well as roads, bridges and supply chain.
 - increasing weight of effort against ground forces in Kuwait. Not easy to assess extent of damage yet.
 - no decision yet on timing of ground campaign.
 - risk of Iraqi use of CW still there.
3. Regret civilian casualties but believe number to be very small indeed: Iraq making maximum propaganda.
4. Saddam failed in all his main aims so far:
 - has not divided the multinational coalition
 - has not drawn in Israel
 - has not inflicted serious casualties on the Allies
 - has not drawn us into premature land battle
 - has not sparked off risings in Arab countries
 - and he has underestimated the effectiveness of the Allied air campaign.
5. So he faces an increasingly desperate situation. But he is not finished yet. Worst case is that he may still withdraw with some of his forces intact, claim he stood up to the worst we

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- 2 -

could do, and appear as a hero in Arab world. We must ensure he is defeated, discredited and humiliated.

6. Some stirrings of peace initiatives from Iranians and Non-Aligned. Not to be encouraged. Keep Security Council at bay.

7. Welcome Mr. Hawke's remarks on South Africa, particularly on sporting links. Need to move rapidly in Commonwealth to start to lift measures. Must not let the issue of sanctions dominate CHOGM.

C D.P.

CHARLES POWELL

5 February 1991

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PRIME MINISTER

TELEPHONE CALL WITH PRESIDENT MITTERRAND

H. Dorian

1. Refer to meeting with French Ambassador yesterday.
2. Welcome Mr Joxe's (new Defence Minister) prompt visit to UK.
3. Compliment on performance of French air force in the Gulf conflict.
4. Assessment of progress in the campaign.
5. Saddam Hussain failed in all his objectives so far: but must ensure he does not even so emerge as a hero.
6. Enquire whether visit of French emissary to Tehran produced any new insights into Iranian - or Iraqi - intentions.
7. Need to avoid attempts to impose a premature cease-fire.
8. Refer to your letter to him on how to take forward his proposals for closer contacts between his office and yours.

e.d.f

CHARLES POWELL

5 February 1991

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PRIME MINISTER

TELEPHONE CALL WITH PRESIDENT MUBARAK

1. Compliment him on Egypt's resolve.
2. Refer to his recent message to you about the IMF and the prompt action which you took. (He should have your reply.)
3. Seek his assessment of how the campaign is going. (He has said publicly that it should be over in a month.) Importance of ensuring that Saddam does not emerge from defeat as a hero.
4. Consult him on how to head off unwelcome peace initiatives.
5. Ask his assessment of state of public opinion in other Arab countries.
6. Enquire about Egyptian forces.

C.D.P.

C. D. POWELL

5 February 1991

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Covering **SECRET**

23 (A-J)



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB
Telephone 071-21 82111/3

MO 6/17/15/1S

5 February 1991

Dear Charles,

com
5/1

SITREP

In the absence of a "Report from Riyadh" last night you may find it helpful to see the enclosed copy of our morning SITREP.

Yours ever

(MISS J R BINSTEAD)
Private Secretary

Sir Charles Powell KCMG
10 Downing Street

Covering **SECRET**

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THE GULF CONFLICT

BRIEFING FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE - SITREP No. 54

SITUATION AS AT 0600Z, 5 FEBRUARY 1991

Contains

1. Classified sitrep
2. UK Forces Table
3. Casualty Sitrep
4. Equipment and ammunition states (Ministers only)
5. Unclassified material for use by Ministers

Distribution attached

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covering SECRET

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SECRET

SEC(O)(C) MORNING BRIEF, 5 FEBRUARY 1991

Summary

Little Iraqi activity. Allied air campaign continues. Reduced media coverage of Gulf issues. Possible terrorist attack at Norfolk, Virginia.

General Situation

- Little activity by Iraqi ground forces apparent in KTO or Iraq. Iraqi air and naval forces remain inactive. No indications of a full-scale Iraqi offensive.
- Allied air campaign continues to centre on SCUDs, airfields, RGFC units, CBW production and storage facilities and C3.

Political

- French Defence Minister Joxe arrived yesterday in Saudi Arabia for 2-day visit. He will see Prince Sultan (but not King Fahd) and visit French forces. DA Paris believes it likely that French troop reinforcements will be announced on Joxe's return.
- In addition to approving overflight of B52s from UK, the French government has agreed basing of US tanker aircraft at Mont de Marsan.
- UN Secretary-General reported to have condemned Allied bombing raids which killed Jordanian tanker drivers in Iraq.
- EC foreign ministers discussed Gulf burdensharing briefly over lunch yesterday. Foreign Secretary made clear that this was a bilateral matter, though all contributions would be gratefully received.
- Saudi concern over the terrorist threat is illustrated by a decision not to allow nationals of Iraq, Jordan, Yemen, Sudan and Palestine, normally resident in Saudi Arabia but currently outside, to return even if they hold valid visas.
- HMA Damascus reports that Syrian Foreign Minister wishes to visit London in near future, to discuss the Gulf situation and closer UK/Syrian relations.

UK Operations

Air Operations

- The Secretary of State has approved the deployment of 4 Tornado GR1s in the TIALD laser designator role.

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- No attack sorties flown since last brief. Missions planned for today include 16 Jaguar and 32 Tornado GR1 sorties (4 with ALARM), plus 3 laser-guided bomb/PAVESPIKE missions by 12 Tornado GR1s and 6 Buccaneers, most of which are already airborne. No night attacks are planned.
- A Tornado GR1A from Dhahran carried out a linesearch mission.
- RAF combat sorties as at 050100Z:

	last 24 hrs	total
Tornado GR1	28	598
Tornado GR1A	3	43
Jaguar	14	248
Tornado F3	10	357
Buccaneer	4	8
Nimrod	2	39
AAR (Victor, VC10K, Tristar)	15	279
	76	1572
Non-combat sorties:		925
		2497

Navy Operations

- Assessment of the ARCHANGELGRACHT incident (when the master of a Dutch merchant ship alleged that a rocket launcher was pointed in its direction - reported in 030600 Sitrep) has concluded that there is insufficient evidence of intended attack to warrant alteration of advice to merchant shipping.
- The AAW/ASUW screen, including CARDIFF and GLOUCESTER, has moved further north, adjacent to the Saudi/Kuwait border.
- BRILLIANT and BRAVE arrive at Straits of Hormuz on 5/6 Feb, to join up with the repaired EXETER.
- Sea King from ARGUS which made emergency landing in Qatar on 3 Feb has been safely recovered.

Army Operations

- NOK of Maj Kinghan (Killed in RTA) now informed. Two soldiers have been missing for 72 hours (since 3 Feb); NOK not yet informed.

Allied Operations

- US battleship MISSOURI continues naval gunfire support operations against Iraqi troop installations on the Kuwaiti coast.

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Iraqi activity

- Iraqi conscript captured by Saudis at Khafji claimed during interrogation to have been briefed that operation's primary objective was to capture Allied prisoners for propaganda purposes and gain intelligence.
- Baghdad Radio reported to have issued a series of cryptic messages yesterday night (such as "implement the programme of the last gathering"). Possibly coded messages to activate terrorists, or psyops mischief-making. DIS investigating.

Logistics

- There are 476 tonnes of Priority 1 freight in Germany and the UK awaiting movement to the Gulf, which is within one day's airlift capacity.
- 50,000 S6 respirators from MOD stocks are being sent to the Bahraini government; the first consignment was flown out yesterday.

Media reports and coverage

- Today's INDEPENDENT reports that VCDS recently summoned the German DA in London to say that Germany bore some of the blame for Tornado losses in the Gulf because of its restrictions on RAF low flying training.
- Reuters reports Saudi request for the Gulf to be declared an international disaster area because of the damage from the world's largest oil slick.
- Coverage of discovery and defusing of 6 pipe bombs on chemical storage tanks in Norfolk, Virginia. FBI investigating possible Iraq terrorist connection.
- EXPRESS predicts 10 days to land war.
- TODAY reports allied tanks have orange ID markings to reduce risk of blue on blue.

Other Issues

- Up to 70 civilian Kuwaiti volunteers are deploying from UK as interpreters in support of UK forces. They will have honorary officer status in the Kuwaiti Armed Forces in Exile and will be employed in hospitals and PW camps. Kuwaiti Embassy is organising media coverage of the move, which will be on 6/7 Feb for first 40 personnel.

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- Saudis are still investigating the incident at around midnight on 3/4 Feb when 15 shots were fired at an unmarked USAF bus in Jedda. There has been no claim of responsibility. Security forces' initial analysis is that attack was the work of an amateur, and not carefully planned.
- FCO has asked our Embassies in Riyadh and Washington to follow up with US the apparent discovery of ammunition boxes on Maradim Island marked "GHQ JORDAN ARMED FORCES".
- UAE believes that due to the country's geographical position, the main oil slick has a minimal chance of reaching the UAE coast and affecting "sensitive establishments".

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OPERATION GRANBY - UK FORCES COMMITTED AS AT - 050500Z FEB 91

CLASSIFIED FIGURES

(a) In theatre	42597
(b) Outside theatre	1128
Total UK Forces committed	43725

PUBLIC FIGURES

(a) In theatre	About 38000
(b) Outside theatre	About 2000
Total UK Forces committed	About 40000

ROYAL NAVY

DD/FF in theatre		MCMVs in theatre		RFAs in theatre			LSIs in theatre		
Ship	Personnel	Ship	Personnel	Ship	RFA	RN	Ship	RFA	RN
HMS CARDIFF	296	HMS ATHERSTONE	48	RFA FORT GRAVANCE	149	47	SIR GALAHAD	51	92
HMS LONDON	316	HMS CATTISTOCK	49	RFA DILIGENCE	41	82	(Including FSU-G2)		
HMS BRAZEN	248	HMS HURWORTH	49	RFA ORANGELEAF	57		SIR PERCIVAL	54	6
HMS GLOUCESTER	288	HMS LEDBURY	49	RFA RESOURCE	159	1	SIR TRISTRAM	49	4
Ashore	169	HMS DULVERTON	47	RFA OLHA	93	5	SIR BEDVERE	53	1
12 x SEA KING	392	HMS HERALD	140	RFA ARGUS (PCRS)	82	308	ZUDERKRUS		4

Total RN personnel in theatre 2641

Total RFA personnel in theatre 788

Armilla Roulement

Vessels (not included in totals)

Ship	Personnel	Location	ETA/Gulf	Replacing
HMS EXETER	290	Gulf	In theatre	HMS GLOUCESTER
HMS BRAVE	285	GOO	5 Feb 91	HMS LONDON
HMS BRILLIANT	254	GOO	5 Feb 91	HMS BRAZEN
HMS MANCHESTER	296	Gulf	In theatre	HMS CARDIFF
HMS HECLA	126	Red Sea	12 Feb 91	HMS HERALD
RFA BAYLEAF	58	Arabian Sea	5 Feb 91	RFA ORANGELEAF

Ships taken up from trade 14

ARMY

AKM1						Outside theatre			
1st (British) Armoured Division - in theatre						Personnel	ETA/Loc	Total	
Divisional Troops		7th Armoured Brigade		4th Brigade					
Personnel	Total	Personnel	Total	Personnel	Total	1(BR) Arm Div			
Divisional HQ	967	Fighting Echelon	4157	Fighting Echelon	4202	Battle Casualty		142	
Fighting Echelon	5067					Replacements (BCRs)			
2nd Line Support	5450								
3rd Line Support	4509								
Battle Casualty Reps	2851								
Total Divisional Troops	18844	Total 7th Arm Div	4157	Total 4th Brigade	4202	Equipment	ETA/Loc	Total	
Equipment Total		Equipment Total		Equipment Total					
Tot *	Fgt Str	Tot *	Fgt Str	Tot *	Fgt Str	1(BR) Arm Div			
M109 155mm SP gun	12	Challenger MBT	162	117	Challenger MBT	59	59	M109 155mm SP g	12
M110 Howitzer	13	Warrior AFV	164	101	Warrior AFV	159	159	Lynx helicopters	1
MURS	15	M109 155mm SP gun	30	24	M109 155mm SP gun	24	24	Gazelle helicopters	1
Rapier	32	Javelin	60	36	Javelin	36	36	Scorpion/Scimitar	3
Lynx helicopters	23							Challenger/Warrior	16
Gazelle helicopters	23							Striker	2
						6158	Engineer Eqs.	7	
Total other Army support personnel in theatre									
Total 1(BR) Arm Div in theatre			27203			Total 1 Div pers o/s theatre			142
Total Army personnel in theatre			33361			Total Army pers o/s theatre			142
						* - Total no of equipment in theatre, loc, head			

ROYAL AIR FORCE

In Theatre			Outside Theatre		
Unit	Loc	Pers	Unit	Loc	Pers
16 x TORNADO F3	Dhahran	1195	7 x TORNADO GR1	Tabuk	595
12 x TORNADO GR1	Dhahran		8 x TORNADO GR1 (ALARM)	Tabuk	
6 x TORNADO GR1A	Dhahran		HQ 6 Wg RAF Regt	Tabuk	
HQ 4 Wg + LAS	Dhahran	1451	19 x Puma	FFL Lubbayl	1200
12 x JAGUAR GR1	Muharrarq		10 x Chinook	FFL Lubbayl	
13 x TORNADO GR1	Muharrarq		9 x VC10 TANKER	Riyadh	
7 x Victor	Muharrarq	162	6 C-130	Riyadh	362
RAF Regt (RAPER/LAS)	Muharrarq		1 x TRISTAR 1 x HS125	Riyadh	
6 x Buccaneers	Muharrarq		Jaguar support	Thumail	
3 x Nimrod MR2	Seeb		Miscellaneous	All locations	828
Total RAF personnel in theatre			Total RAF pers o/s theatre		
5807			986		

Total US forces in theatre 501174
as at 050500Z Feb 91Total Reservists employed on Regular duty 1839
Total personnel in HOBEME 411

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Total Reservists deployed to theatre 1137
Total medical personnel in theatre 4870
Total female personnel in theatre 1165

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OPERATION GRANBY - CASUALTY REPORT

Report Number : 20 Situation as at : 050400Z FEB 91

TOTAL NUMBER OF CASUALTIES, SINCE THE COMMENCEMENT OF HOSTILITIES

Total number confirmed dead	4
Total number confirmed wounded (very seriously ill/seriously ill)	3
Total number of confirmed casualties	7

Total number currently missing	10
--------------------------------	----

Total strength in theatre at commencement of hostilities	35684
--	-------

Total number died of wounds	0
-----------------------------	---

TOTAL CASUALTIES BY SERVICE

RN/RM			Army			RAF			Civilians (inc RFA)		
	Men	Women		Men	Women		Men	Women		Men	Women
Dead	0	0	Dead	4	0	Dead	0	0	Dead	0	0
Wounded	0	0	Wounded	3	0	Wounded	0	0	Wounded	0	0
Total RN casualties	0	0	Total Army casualties	7	0	Total RAF casualties	0	0	Total civ casualties	0	0
Total RN missing	0	0	Total Army missing	0	0	Total RAF missing	10	0	Total civ missing	0	0

Total strength in theatre at commencement of hostilities

RN/RM			Army			RAF			Civilians (inc RFA)		
Total	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women
2510	2440	70	27651	27058	593	4799	4688	111	724	724	0

CASUALTIES CONFIRMED SINCE REPORT No. 19 SINCE 040400Z FEB 91

Number confirmed dead	1
Number confirmed wounded (very seriously ill/seriously ill)	1
Number of confirmed casualties, of all types	2

Number reported missing since last report	0
Number previously missing, now confirmed dead	0
Number previously missing, now confirmed wounded	0
Number previously missing, now confirmed safe and well	0

Number previously reported wounded, but now dead	0
--	---

CASUALTIES BY SERVICE

RN/RM			Army			RAF			Civilians (inc RFA)		
	Men	Women		Men	Women		Men	Women		Men	Women
Dead	0	0	Dead	1	0	Dead	0	0	Dead	0	0
Wounded	0	0	Wounded	1	0	Wounded	0	0	Wounded	0	0
RN casualties	0	0	Army casualties	2	0	RAF casualties	0	0	Civilian casualties	0	0
RN missing	0	0	Army missing	0	0	RAF missing	0	0	Civilians missing	0	0

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ANNEX C TO
D/ACDS(L)129/5/2
DATED 5 FEB 91

Army Equipment State (Source ASMA Tote JHQD 11 Page 7) As At: 042300Z Feb 91

Ser	Description	UE	Fit Now	% of UE (Now)	Fit in 24 Hours	% of UE (24 hrs)	WMR	Remarks
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)
1	Challenger	176	158	90%	158	90	45	All variants
2	Warrior	260	247	95%	250	96	63	
3	M109	60	59	98%	59	98	6	
4	M110	12	11	92%	12	100	1	
5	MLRS	12	10	83%	11	92	3	
6	Rapier	24	24	100%	24	100	8	
7	Javelin	72	72	100%	72	100	24	
8	AVRE	26	16	62%(1)	17	65	2	6th WMR in UK
9	AVLB	24	21	88%	21	88	2	
10	Lynx	18	14	78%	18	100	5	
11	Gazelle	18	16	89%	16	89	5	
12	Striker	16	16	100%	16	100	4	

Notes:

1. As previously reported CE AVRE availability affected by spares problems. Of the 39 types of spares required 34 have now been fully identified and were despatched by air 2 Feb 91. The remaining requirement is subject to proper verification by FMA E&S MAN. Availability has increased by 6% over last 24 hours and 6% previous 24 hours. Continuing increase anticipated as a result of spares arriving in theatre.

C-1 of 1
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ROW 156 (DIFF/JE)

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ANNEX F TO
D/ACDS(L)129/5/2
DATED 5 FEB 91

RAF Ammunition Stock (Source ASMA JHQ G2 Page 10) As At: 050130ZFEB91

Ser	Description	Stock Consumed Last Report	Stock Remaining (Rds) (1)	Days of Effort Remaining (2)	Sorties Possible	Remarks
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)
1	JP 233		737	21.9	368	
2	1000 lb Bombs	325	4236	18.3	749/1124	) TORNADO/JAG assessed independently (3)))
3	CBU (BL755)		2166	39	361/541	
4	CBU87(USA)	16	425	25.6	-	
5	LGB	20	1460	)		
6	Skyflash		240	)		
7	AIM 9L		648	)		
8	AIM 9M		204	) TR		
9	ALARM	6	11	)		Further deliveries of 20 per month for Feb, Mar and Apr.
10	27 mm		347597	30	1931	
11	30 mm	1080	82542	34	687	
12	Rapier		412	30		
13	BOZ	6060	1534450	30	2841	
14	PHILMAT	300	93195	18.2	517	
15	ALE 40		7956	30	132	

Notes:

- Stocks in Cyprus are not included.
- Days of Effort Remaining (DOER). DOER is the assessment by the Air Commander in theatre of the capability that the weapons 'stock remaining' (Col (d)) represents in terms of his known and potential tasks. (Potential tasks include the retained capability to operate at higher rates than tasked to date).
- TR = Threat Related.

F-1 of 1
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ROW 156 (RAF/NJL)

UNCLASSIFIED LINES TO TAKE: 0600 5 FEBRUARY 1991

- Allied air offensive continues by night and, increasingly, by day. No indication of any immediate Iraqi intention to mount full-scale offensive. No intention of being drawn into land battle until ready.

- Allies now conducted total of over 44,000 sorties, and RAF have flown nearly 2,500 sorties. Of these, over 1,500 were combat sorties.

(For Defensive Use)

- [If asked about low flying in Germany] Regretted recent German decision to place new restrictions on low flying. But each country must make own judgement of operational requirement. Grateful that Germany allowed some additional low flying training for Tornado pilots deploying to Gulf.

- [If asked about Kuwaiti interpreters deployed with UK forces.] Very understandable that Kuwaiti people will wish to make a contribution to liberation of their homeland. Very pleased that Kuwaiti civilians in UK will be assisting UK forces.

- [If asked about cryptic messages on Baghdad radio.] Obviously cannot rule out possibility of Iraqi terror campaign. Have been concerned about this all along. If Saddam Hussein thinks he can reduce coalition will by this means he is wrong.

- [If asked about bombs at Norfolk, Virginia]. Understand FBI are investigating possible origin of these bombs.

- [If asked whether painting orange ID panels on tanks are result of US 'own goal'] No connection. Not prepared to go into details but ID marks on equipment is sensible precaution aimed at minimizing risk of accidents on battlefield. Possibility of accidental killing of friendly forces one of the hazards of war.

- [If asked about UNSG comment on allied bombing of Jordanian lorries.] Must stress that coalition aim continues to be to avoid civilian casualties or damage. In some cases pilots have taken greater personal risks or have returned to base without dropping bombs. Targets attacked either pose a threat to multinational force or support Iraqi military occupation. [If pressed] As US have said, trucks were travelling through war zone.

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THE GULF CONFLICT - BRIEFING FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

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
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
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TO DESKBY 050900Z FCO

TELNO 357

OF 042336Z FEBRUARY 91

INFO PRIORITY RIYADH, MODUK, POLAD HIGH WYCOMBE, TOKYO

SIC 19M

YOUR TELNO 214: BURDENSARING

*Rich**I think you**may have to
speak to the**President. CDH*

1. IN THE MARGINS OF THE OFFICIALS' MEETING ON THE GULF, I HAD A WORD WITH KIMMITT ABOUT BURDENSARING. I SAID THAT THE PUS MIGHT TELEPHONE TO HIM DIRECT. THERE WAS A GREAT HEAD OF STEAM OVER THIS SUBJECT IN LONDON.
2. AS KIMMITT KNEW, WE HAD RECEIVED A CONTRIBUTION FROM GERMANY AND HOPED THAT KUWAIT AND OTHER GCC COUNTRIES WOULD ALSO HELP US. BUT THERE WAS NO CERTAINTY OF THIS. WE HAD, HOWEVER, PARTICULAR DIFFICULTIES OVER A CONTRIBUTION FROM JAPAN.
3. KIMMITT SAID THAT WHEN BAKER WAS IN LONDON BEFORE HIS RECENT TOUR, HE HAD SIGNALLED HIS INTENTION TO SEEK FUNDS AND THOUGHT THAT HE HAD GIVEN US AN OPPORTUNITY TO SUGGEST SOME COORDINATION OF THE EFFORT. THE UNITED STATES WOULD CERTAINLY SUPPORT CONTRIBUTIONS TO US FROM GCC COUNTRIES AND JAPAN ON A PROPORTIONAL BASIS. THE US BOTTOM LINE NOW, HOWEVER, WAS THAT THE UNITED STATES MUST GET THE DOLLARS 9 BILLION IN FULL FROM THE JAPANESE. THIS FIGURE HAD BEEN ANNOUNCED AND THE DOD, TREASURY AND CONGRESS WOULD NOT AGREE TO ANYTHING LESS. KIMMITT ALSO THOUGHT THAT IT WOULD BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT FOR THE JAPANESE TO PUT ANY HIGHER FIGURE INTO THE REVENUE BILL, WHICH HAD TO GET PARLIAMENTARY APPROVAL. HE SAID HOWEVER THAT THE JAPANESE STILL HAD MONEY IN THEIR CONTINGENCY RESERVE (HE THOUGHT AT LEAST DOLLARS 1.2 BILLION) AND THAT, AFTER APRIL, A NEW CONTINGENCY RESERVE WOULD BE CREATED. THE UNITED STATES WOULD NOT OBJECT IF, IN PRACTICE, SOME OF THE DOLLARS 9 BILLION (IF APPROVED IN THE REVENUE BILL LEGISLATION) WERE TO COME TO US, AND THEN THE UNITED STATES WERE TOPPED OFF FROM THE CONTINGENCY RESERVE. ALTERNATIVELY, WE MIGHT BE ABLE TO GET OUR PAYMENT DIRECT FROM THE RESERVE. BUT KIMMITT REPEATED THAT THE UNITED STATES MUST GET A TOTAL OF DOLLARS 9 BILLION AT THE END OF THE DAY.

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4. KIMMITT SAID THAT, IF WE WANTED, THE UNITED STATES WOULD BE PREPARED TO CONSIDER MAKING REPRESENTATIONS TO THE JAPANESE ON OUR BEHALF. HE AGREED THAT SOME COORDINATION WOULD BE IMPORTANT IN THE FUTURE, IF THERE WERE TO BE ANOTHER ROUND OF REQUESTS FOR FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTIONS. BUT HE WAS NOT SURE THAT A COMBINED APPROACH TO DONORS WOULD BE PRACTICAL. THIS COULD ONLY LEAD TO DISCUSSION ABOUT WHO SHOULD GET WHAT, AND IN WHAT PROPORTIONS, AND COULD BRING IN SMALLER MEMBERS OF THE COALITION TOO. KIMMITT WAS INCLINED TO THINK THAT MUTUALLY SUPPORTIVE, BUT SEPARATE, APPROACHES MIGHT BE BEST.

5. I UNDERSTAND THAT ARRANGEMENTS HAVE NOW BEEN MADE FOR THE PUS TO SPEAK TO KIMMITT AT 1330Z TOMORROW, 5 FEBRUARY.

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RIYADH TELSNOs 325 AND 337: POST-CRISIS SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS

SUMMARY

1. THE ARGUMENTS FOR UN INVOLVEMENT IN POST-CRISIS SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS IN THE GULF.

DETAIL

2. I NOTE THAT THERE IS SINGULARLY LITTLE SAUDI OR KUWAITI ENTHUSIASM FOR ANY UN INVOLVEMENT IN POST-CRISIS GULF SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS. ON BOTH SUBSTANTIVE AND TACTICAL GROUNDS THIS WOULD SEEM TO BE MISGUIDED.

3. I CAN WELL UNDERSTAND WHY NONE OF THE SMALLER GULF COUNTRIES SHOULD REGARD UN PEACE-KEEPING INVOLVEMENT AS IN ANY SENSE AN ADEQUATE SAFEGUARD ON ITS OWN AGAINST THE MILITARY AMBITIONS OF THEIR LARGER NEIGHBOURS (WHETHER IRAQ OR IRAN). THERE IS NO WAY IN WHICH THE UN IS GOING TO FIELD FORCES THAT WILL ACT AS AN EFFECTIVE DIRECT MILITARY DETERRENT TO THEIR NEIGHBOURS. MOREOVER THESE GULF COUNTRIES MAY WELL FEAR THAT WE ARE GOING TO PUSH FORWARD THE UN AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR OUR OWN UNWILLINGNESS TO MAINTAIN GROUND FORCES.

4. BUT THE IMPORTANT THING IS SURELY TO GET THEM AWAY FROM AN ALL OR NOTHING APPROACH TO A UN PEACEKEEPING INVOLVEMENT AND TO LOOK ON IT AS A COMPLEMENT TO OTHER REGIONAL OR EXTRA-REGIONAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS.

5. LOOKED AT AS A COMPLEMENT, A UN FORCE ON THE IRAQ/KUWAIT BORDER, WHETHER A FORCE OF OBSERVERS A LA UNIMOG ON BOTH SIDES OF THE BORDER OR A SOMEWHAT LARGER FORCE A LA UNIFIL PERHAPS ON THE KUWAITI SIDE ONLY WOULD SEEM TO HAVE SOME CONSIDERABLE

ADVANTAGES. BY SEPARATING THE COMBATANTS IT WILL MAKE IT EASIER FOR KUWAIT TO HAVE A FREE HAND IN WHATEVER SUBSTANTIVE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS THEY DECIDE TO BUILD UP BEHIND SUCH A FRONTIER FORCE SEMI-COLON FOR EXAMPLE USE OF ARAB OR NON-ARAB ISLAMIC MEMBERS OF THE COALITION WOULD BE LESS CONTENTIOUS. MOREOVER A UN TRIP-WIRE ON THE BORDER COULD BE A USEFUL DETERRENT TO IRAQI (OR IRANIAN) AMBITIONS SINCE TRIGGERING IT WOULD SO OBVIOUSLY FACILITATE FULL IMPOSITION OF A TRADE EMBARGO SUCH AS THAT CONTAINED IN SCR 665.

6. IN ADDITION TO THESE SUBSTANTIVE CONSIDERATIONS, THE TACTICAL ADVANTAGES AT THE UN OF THERE BEING A CLEAR UN INVOLVEMENT IN THE POST-CRISIS SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS ARE FAIRLY OBVIOUS. THE SECURITY COUNCIL, HAVING BEEN INVOLVED FROM THE WORD GO, IS NOT SIMPLY GOING TO BOW OUT OF THE OPERATION. BUT ITS INVOLVEMENT CAN EITHER BE BENIGN FROM OUR (AND THE GULF STATES') POINT OF VIEW IE BOLSTERING AND LEGITIMISING ARRANGEMENTS WE WANT TO SEE, OR MALIGN IE CUTTING ACROSS OUR EFFORTS AND PUTTING FORWARD LESS ACCEPTABLE ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO THE WHOLE PROBLEM OF REGIONAL SECURITY AND STABILITY. ALTHOUGH WE AND THE AMERICANS (AND, LESS CERTAINLY, THE FRENCH AND SOVIET UNION) CAN NO DOUBT FEND OFF THE LATTER SORT OF ACTIVITY, USING THE THREAT, OR THE ACTUAL APPLICATION, OF THE VETO, IT WILL BE MUCH BETTER IF WE CAN WORK WITH THE GRAIN.

7. IN THE LONGER TERM TOO, WHEN BROADER COLLECTIVE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS MAY COME INTO BEING, THE UN DIMENSION IS LIKELY TO REMAIN SUBSTANTIVELY AND PRESENTATIONALLY IMPORTANT. SECURITY COUNCIL BACKING WILL BOLSTER THE ACCEPTABILITY OF THE INVOLVEMENT OF NON-REGIONAL POWERS, EITHER ON THE GROUND OR THROUGH ASSURANCES OF MILITARY SUPPORT. MOREOVER IT MAY BE POSSIBLE TO UNDERPIN THE ARRANGEMENTS THEMSELVES BY A UN BACKED SYSTEM OF GUARANTEES (FOR EXAMPLE OF NON-AGGRESSION AND THE INVIOABILITY OF FRONTIERS.)

HANNAY

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February 1991

✓
Dear Charles,

REPORTS OF CIVILIAN CASUALTIES/DAMAGE

I said that I would let you have some analysis of the reporting of claims of civilian casualties and damage as a result of Allied bombing. We have not been able to carry out a comprehensive review of media reports but the very clear impression from even a cursory study is that the number of primary sources for these is very limited but that they are being heavily "recycled", partly as a result of conscious 'pooling' arrangements and also precisely because the amount of material available is so limited. The impression has perhaps been heightened because the return of a group of Western media to Baghdad has coincided with a lack of competing major news stories from the conflict. There appear to be three routes by which these stories are emerging:

- a. Official Iraqi Sources. Judging by 'claims/allegations' generally - reported on Western media, official Iraqi sources contain much invective and few specific details. Indeed, such casualty figures as have been given by Iraqi sources have been low - presumably supposed to demonstrate how ineffective the campaign has been.
- b. Western Media in Iraq. The limited number of Western media in Baghdad include CNN and ITN and two UK nationals, the Independent and the Sunday Times. Some papers are running stories filed by other Western journalists who have managed to remain - eg the Guardian is running pieces from a Spanish correspondent.

Sir Charles Powell KCMG
No 10 Downing Street



c. Reports from Neighbouring Countries. Some reports are emerging via travellers and refugees reaching neighbouring countries. The claims of attacks on Jordanian civil traffic came out this way, as did the weekend stories about damage in Basra.

The number of separate specific stories which can be clearly traced is small but each tends to be used to provide the basis of an apparently more substantial piece on casualties in general. For example, the Independent in Sunday's article about collateral damage and TV pictures of collapsed (presumably civilian) buildings around an apparently undamaged communications tower apparently came from the same Iraqi organised media trip to Diwaniya. Similarly several TV stations have shown (repeatedly) the same footage of damage in the 'outskirts of Baghdad'. By contrast, however, a few days ago we were seeing footage of how life in Baghdad is continuing 'normally'. Several recent reports have also included earlier stores in an attempt to produce an overall picture. The Iraqis have been taking the returned correspondents to the 'milk factory' (or BW facility) attacked early in the campaign.

In fact, given that the Iraqis have been choosing sites for TV crews to visit, reports from within Iraq are notable for what they do not show. There have not so far been pictures of widespread destruction or of damage to religious sites. Reporters stress that they are being shown only what the Iraqis choose to show them and, despite censorship, their doubts about Iraqi claims come through (eg references to the camouflage on the 'milk factory'). This might be best illustrated by quoting Pat Arrowsmith (part of the "Gulf Peace Team" who have just left Baghdad): 'The Iraqis had to hunt about a bit to find things to show us'.

I attach a collection of press cuttings on this subject from recent days, which generally are built from the same small groups of incidents/stories - often in identical words.

We shall now be discussing further with the US the damage assessments for these areas to check that our current public line (based on instructions to try to avoid civilian casualties) is still sustainable.

I am sending copies of this letter to Private Secretaries to members of OPD(G) and its Media Handling Group, and to Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

Yours Sincerely
Jim Webb

(S WEBB)
Private Secretary

WAR IN THE

Civilian deaths rise around the missed targets

"THIS last night was the first time they did not hit the area," said a man in Diwaniya, a city on the Euphrates, 125 miles south of Baghdad, as he surveyed the ruins of a small hotel for Egyptian workers. Allied bombers have been trying since 17 January to hit a tall pylon, which rises 150 feet over Diwaniya. In four raids they had blown the top storey off two hotels, the Yarmuk and the al-Khayam, and wrecked about 60 small shops in the neighbouring soukh (market), but without demolishing the target.

Just how many people have been killed is unclear. One officer said 35 dead, but the owner of the al-Khayam, loading surviving beds and mirrors on to a lorry, would confirm only four dead in his hotel and three dead or wounded in the street outside.

Elsewhere in Diwaniya, a depressing Iraqi provincial city sprawling across the Mesopotamian plain, Iraqi officials showed two areas which had been attacked in the first days of the war. By now green slime had formed on the surface of the water in the deep craters in a street of small houses wrecked by a bomb which, in one case, had killed a family of seven. A few hundred yards away a flour factory had been squarely hit, torn apart by the blast.

The Iraqi purpose in organising the visit to Diwaniya was to show that, contrary to allied claims, the attack on Iraq

From Patrick Cockburn in Diwaniya, Iraq



with bombs and missiles has been inaccurate and has caused heavy civilian casualties. At the second and third sites I saw in the city it was impossible to get a clear view of potential military targets, but at the first it was evident the two hotels and 60 shops had been destroyed by a series of near-misses.

The picture, going by the evidence of Baghdad and Diwaniya, is that Iraqi civilians are not facing carpet bombing of residential areas, but that the allied planes and missiles are not as accurate as they claim, and frequently hit non-military targets. Further evidence of this was a salvo of five Tomahawk cruise missiles fired on Friday which roared over Baghdad, two landing in unquestionably civilian areas.

The initial shock effect on Iraqis of the bombardment —

traumatic in the first few days — has worn off, leaving people apprehensive, but better able to estimate the risks they take. Iraqis traditionally store a lot of food, but absence of electricity means that food in freezers and fridges has to be thrown out. Petrol is rationed to 6½ gallons every 15 days and there are long queues at every filling-station. With the refineries destroyed, it is not clear where any more will come from. The dark grey cloud of smoke from Dohra refinery on the outskirts of Baghdad, first hit a week ago, can be seen more than 60 miles to the south of the capital, rising above the palm trees on the Mesopotamian plain.

It is probably in Baghdad and Basra, Iraq's second city close to the front, that the effects of the bombing are felt worst by civilians, partly because they had a higher standard of living. There were few cars or vehicles on the main expressway, indicating that people in the cities of the south have not tried to leave. The main movement of refugees has been from the richer neighbourhoods of Baghdad to the north.

Iraq yesterday made little comment on the war. However, the speaker of the national assembly, Saudeh Mehdi Saleh, told a delegation of Palestinians that the attack on Khafji had been a tactical manoeuvre, because the army wanted action, but no general offensive had been contemplated.

Dilemn



Palestinians gather in Amman to

Slicks threaten to overwhelm Saudi defences

TWO giant oil slicks in the Gulf — one the largest in history — are

From Tim Kelsey

Gulf War Briefing

Military casualties

The allies say 30 of their troops have been killed and a further 34 wounded. Eighteen of the dead are Saudi soldiers killed in this week's

S
Fo

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It was claimed yesterday that 18 Allied bombing raids had hit residential areas and the people would use everything from kitchen knives to chemical weapons to force the enemy to defeat.

At least six Tomahawk cruise missiles struck Baghdad on Friday and two crashed in residential areas, narrowly missing the abandoned U.S. Embassy. Government officials said several people were killed or wounded in those attacks. There were no air strikes on the city yesterday.

The army newspaper Al-Qaddisya said President George Bush was deluded if he imagined the bombardment would cause Iraq to capitulate.

From Bob Graham on the Iraqi-Jordan border

"The Iraqi leadership will use whatever power and weapons are at our disposal, starting from kitchen knives to weapons of mass destruction," it said.

Reality

The people meanwhile pick through the propaganda and come up with a reality far different.

I don't blame the pilots, I blame those who tell us lies," said Abdul Fatah Mohammed, who watched Allied bombers flatten his dry cleaning shop near Saddam's palace on Tuesday. "They were aiming for the

Electric City because it was a proper target. Or maybe it was Saddam Hussein's house: they were aiming for

"One time they said a plane was shot down near my home. I went to see it, but there was nothing, they were lying. And again when I heard another plane was down, I went to look. And again, they lied. So I decided to leave."

Abdul reached the border early on Friday but even there he was not free. Iraqi soldiers stripped him of his savings of \$42,000 — and all valuables.

Mohammed Sayed Ali carried the body of his best friend out of the rubble of their home. The 34-year-old Egyptian blames no one. They lived close to electrical power plants and a


post office. The Americans just missed.

Trainee doctor Taha Abed, from Yemen tended injured in the northern Iraqi city of Mosul which has a large military base. "It is strange everyone still believes that Iraq will win the war," he said. Taha has now left.

Doubt

Reporters were taken to the wrecked factory the Iraqis claim was making baby milk, but the Pentagon insists was producing chemical and biological weapons.

ITN's Brent Sadler said: "It looked and smelled like a factory plant. But the watch-tower and partly-camouflaged buildings left me with a nagging doubt."



PROPAGANDA: bombed factory which the Iraqis say made baby milk and the allies insist made weapons

TheGuardian



TheGuardian

Angry eyes of a woman, sad eyes of a child, all accusing



Eyewitness

Alfonso Rojo
in Baghdad

"This what you call Western civilisation?" From a terrace, a woman shouts down to us: she is enraged, her eyes smouldering.

"Mea culpa! Mea culpa! Westerners are guilty, including you lot."

She grinds her teeth and jabs her finger at the foreign journalists with their cam-

eras, microphones and notebooks, standing around the enormous crater the missile has just created.

"You are all guilty of killing people for oil." She isn't one of the Shi'ites of Kudmiya, permanently swathed in a chador.

There are foreign embassies in the Carrada quarter and many Christians live there.

The inhabitants used to have a lot of money. The Iraqi woman is wearing a white tracksuit with the insignia of the United Nations. She speaks good English.

"We are human beings." The hate burning her up inside makes her eyes shine like two burning coals. She stretches her throat with each shout. "This isn't a

game, these are human lives".

As she is dragged back into the house, she has enough strength and hate to turn: "Remember my eyes."

We had gone out in the morning for one of the trips organised by the Ministry of Information.

The first stop is a milk factory which, according to the Pentagon, was a camouflaged chemical factory. The second, a hospital where casualties from the bombings were being treated, and the third stop is a block of flats hit six days ago by a missile which went off-course.

In the twisted ruins of the factory we asked twenty times why the building had been covered in camouflage paint, and we taste some of

the packets to see if they are really milk powder.

At about 11 o'clock, we hear several bangs and a missile whistles past, 150 yards above the ground. The group is still scattered when another missile passes, lower in the sky, also coming from the East, and heading for the heart of Baghdad.

Another passes, then another and another, six in all. Each is followed by the staccato of anti-aircraft fire positioned along the missile's route.

If the Iraqi artillery don't hit the missile, the projectile unwaveringly finds the programmed target. What often happens if they hit the missile, is that it loses direction and crashes just anywhere with all its cargo of death.

When we arrive at Arbuk hospital, they tell us that around 11 o'clock a missile fell on the Saidia quarter and another in Karrara.

They bring a child, naked from the waist down and whimpering.

"What's your name?" The kid opens his huge eyes and wriggles like an animal caught by its leg in a trap. He has little bits of shrapnel in his left leg, a cut in his side and his feet are covered in blood.

"Ahmet Abdelada," he says in a barely audible voice.

"What happened?" "I was with my family, opposite my house, and things began to fall on us, things from the sky."

The child, frightened by

the cameras and the television lights, looks at the doctor and whispers something to him.

"He says that he doesn't know where his father and mother are," explains Dr Bogusian, who used to work in Britain. The doctor says the worst problem is that there is no electricity. He explains that since the outbreak of war, more than 200 civilians have been admitted to hospital with wounds caused by the bombs or missiles. Roughly 30 have died. He adds, without changing his tone of voice or his sad smile faltering: "War is an atrocious thing."

• Alfonso Rojo is a correspondent of the Spanish newspaper El Mundo.

1203

TheGuardian



TheGuardian

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1203

THE TIMES

Cruise missiles fray weary Baghdad nerves

From RICHARD BEESTON
IN BAGHDAD

THE first cruise missile came in low and fast, hugging the highway like a speeding white sports car travelling east into Baghdad, before disappearing above the rooftops and landing beyond the skyline with a dull thud and a puff of smoke about 10 miles away.

It was followed in the next 15 minutes by five more Tomahawks each cruising about 100 yards from the ground, their tiny fins visible for an instant as they shot past on a route mapped out by their on-board computers to guide them through the streets of Baghdad to a target south of the city.

But the high-tech war is so hard on Baghdad's nerves that the official radio is now threatening to put

captured allied pilots on trial as "war criminals". Scores of anti-aircraft batteries, whose gunners have grown accustomed to the daily cruise missile shoot, opened fire with a barrage of flack intended to clip the projectiles and throw them off course or destroy them in the air.

Yesterday, either the gunners were successful or the missile's accuracy failed, as the people of Karrada and Masbah, two prosperous residential areas in Baghdad, discovered to their cost. "Is this the civilisation of the West?" screamed a housewife in a tracksuit as foreign journalists inspected the decapitated trees and a large crater 10ft deep and three times as wide near the American embassy in Masbah.

"*Mea culpa*, all of you are responsible for attacking people for the sake

of oil. We are human beings. This is not a game, these are human lives."

The outburst, was one of the clearest signals that Baghdad's residents are beginning to foster a real hatred of the Western forces. Baghdad radio reported that 77 allied raids were carried out overnight and a commentary described the killing of civilians as "cold-blooded", recommending that allied pilots captured should be treated as war criminals not prisoners of war.

"You are equally responsible," said the woman to visiting Western journalists. "I suppose you are happy because you have a story now, but I say enough, enough civilian casualties."

After a fortnight of continuous air raids the civilian toll is beginning to mount and although the city is

returning to some form of normality the shortages of fuel and food and the absence of water and electricity is putting great pressure on those trying to survive from day to day.

At the second civilian bomb site in Karrada, next door to the Abdel Maguid Hussein hospital, an entire two-storey house was reduced to a heap of bricks. No one was at home at the time the missile struck and an inspection of the debris revealed that the only casualty was the family cat.

Visits to two nearby hospitals, organised by the Iraqi authorities, revealed that at least nine people were injured in the morning's raid and one woman killed.

Other suspected casualties, from the billowing smoke rising nearby from a strategic target censors will not allow us to reveal, were not released.

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Iraq radio says allied pilots machine-gunned civilians

By Mark Nicholson in Cairo and Reuter in Baghdad

IRAQI radio yesterday accused coalition air forces of killing "very large numbers" of civilians in the continued bombardment of Iraq and charged some pilots with machine-gunning pedestrians to death in the streets.

Iraq also repeated its call yesterday on Arabs everywhere to strike against the coalition of forces ranged against Iraq, saying: "All you have to do is take the first step."

The broadcast accused US, British, French and Italian air forces of deliberately bombing residential districts and civilian targets, and said coalition pilots should be treated as war criminals.

"In other words, they should be treated as the killers of defenceless women, children and old people, not as soldiers waging a war against other soldiers," the broadcast said.

Iraqi radio described the coalition pilots of being the "spiritual inheritors of colonialism."

The broadcast echoed the recent assurance of President Saddam Hussein by saying that Iraq was "sure of the eventual victory which God had destined for him."

It singled out King Fahd of Saudi Arabia for particular contempt, saying that Iraqis would uproot his family.

Two weeks of allied air attacks have turned life in Baghdad into a nightmare.

Every day has become a battle for life's most basic necessities. Every day brings fear of being killed or wounded by missiles or bombs.

There is no power. There is little water. There is very little petrol, so little that some motorists spend the night in front of filling stations,

wrapped in blankets against the bitter cold, to gain a place in the queue.

By the time filling stations open at 8 am, up to 400 cars are waiting their turn to buy the newly-introduced ration of 30 litres for 15 days. Petrol sales resumed this week after a nationwide halt.

"The most simple things, all the things one took for granted no longer exist," one Baghdad resident said.

Iraqi authorities this week introduced a system which provides for the two halves of the capital, bisected by the Tigris river, to take turns in getting three days supply of water.

The next three days are waterless and few Baghdadis have the containers to store enough water to last them through the week.

Perhaps the worst aspect of life under the allied bombs is fear and uncertainty. Fear of dying or being

maimed, fear of losing one's child, husband or parent.

After the opening attack of the war on January 17, a few local telephones still functioned. Wave after wave of strikes have ended all that. Now, not even ministries can communicate with each other.

US statements that the air war is being waged exclusively against military targets look different from Baghdad.

On Friday, five cruise missiles crossed Baghdad from west to east and smashed into the city.

Correspondents visited what Iraqi officials say was a baby milk factory before a missile reduced it to a tangle of twisted steel girders and flattened walls.

According to Washington, the plant was in fact producing chemical weapons. Inside the building however, split

milk powder, containers, signs such as "pasteurising line" and stationery appeared to indicate the plant was everything the Iraqis said it was.

Correspondents were taken to two residential areas which had been hit and two hospitals where the wounded had been taken.

One building destroyed in the attack was near the American Embassy. There was no indication of anything of military significance in the vicinity - or near the other destroyed houses correspondents were taken to see.

There were 11 wounded treated at two different hospitals. They included six children. One of them, aged 12, was hit by shrapnel that pierced his back and came to rest in his abdomen, according to a physician.

His young patient, he said, was on the verge of death.

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Back to basics for civilians in Baghdad

By Bernd Debusmann of Reuters in Baghdad

TWO WEEKS of allied air attacks have turned life in Baghdad into living hell. Every day has become a battle for life's most basic necessities. Every day brings fear of being killed or wounded by missiles or bombs.

There is no power. There is little water. There is very little petrol, so little that some motorists spend the night in front of filling stations, wrapped in blankets against the cold, to gain a place in the queue.

By the time filling stations open at 8 am, up to 400 cars are waiting their turn to buy the newly-introduced ration of 64 gallons for 15 days. Petrol sales resumed this week after a blanket nationwide halt.

"The most simple things, all the things one took for granted no longer exist," one Baghdad resident said. "Even shaving in the morning is almost impossible. Where do you get the water?"

Authorities this week introduced a system which provides for the two halves of the capital, bisected by the Tigris river, to take turns getting three days supply of water.

The next three days are waterless and few Baghdadis

Reports from countries in the war zone are subject to censorship by the relevant authorities

have the containers to store enough water to last them through the week.

"Old habits die hard," said another resident. "I still automatically flip the light switch when I get home. Nothing happens of course. I still turn the tap and expect water. Nothing."

But perhaps the worst aspect of life under allied bombs is fear and uncertainty. Fear of dying or being maimed, or of losing one's child, husband or parent.

After the opening attack of the war, a few local telephones still functioned and some people could exchange views.

Wave after wave of strikes have ended all that. Now not even ministries can communicate with each other.

"Bush said he had no dispute with the Iraqi people," a Baghdadis said. "It certainly looks

different from Baghdad."

So do American statements that the air war is being waged exclusively against military targets.

Yesterday, five cruise missiles — flying at an almost sedate speed and plainly visible — crossed Baghdad from west to east and smashed into the city.

The air strike began at 11 am (0800 GMT) as a group of foreign correspondents visited what Iraqi officials say was a baby milk factory before a missile reduced it to rubble.

According to Washington, the plant was producing chemical weapons. Inside the building however, spill milk powder containers, signs such as "pasteurising line" and stationery appeared to indicate the plant was everything the Iraqis said it was.

After the cruise missiles swished overhead, correspondents were taken to two residential areas which had been hit and two hospitals where the wounded had been taken.

One destroyed building was near the American Embassy. There was no indication of anything of military significance in the area, nor near other destroyed houses correspondents were taken to see.

There were 11 wounded treated at two hospitals. They included six children. One aged 12 was hit by shrapnel that pierced his back and came to rest in his abdomen, according to Dr Zaku Ghazi. He said the boy was on the verge of death.

Dr Paul Bogossian said he had treated several hundred wounded since the start of the war. About 50 had died.

Christopher Lockwood in Amman writes: Damage to civilian areas of Baghdad does not appear to be heavy. Pat Arrowsmith, the British peace campaigner, said yesterday after being evacuated to Amman from a "peace camp" on the Saudi Iraq border.

Mrs Arrowsmith and other members of the "Gulf Peace Team" saw a small number of civilian casualties and limited bomb damage to residential areas. "The Iraqis had to hunt about a bit to find things to show us," she said. "It didn't look like Portsmouth when I lived there in the Second World War."

Allied raids wreck refugees' lifeline

By Jane Arraf of Reuters in Ruweisid

THE main Gulf war escape route from Iraq has been almost cut off by allied air raids, refugees who trickled across the border into Jordan said yesterday.

Nightly bombing has badly damaged the main Amman-Baghdad highway, they said. This, and Iraqi exit restrictions, is preventing people fleeing the war from reaching Iraq's western border.

Relief officials said Baghdad was still insisting that anyone trying to leave Iraq, including those already at the frontier, must obtain exit visas in the capital. They said that up to 1,000 people, mostly Egyptians, were stranded at the Iraqi border post of Treibee.

"We went back to Baghdad twice under the bombing," said Mr Mohammad al-Bedoui, an Egyptian teacher. "The first time we went back for visas to Baghdad they told us there we didn't need them, and when we came back they sent us there again."

Mr Bedoui, 40, said his wife and three children spent 10 days at Treibee, wrapped in blankets, with no shelter from freezing rain and snow.

He and about 200 other Egyptians, crowded into the backs of lorries, arrived at the Ruweisid transit camp after waiting for days at the Iraqi border post.

The Geneva-based International Organisation for Migration said nearly 9,000 foreigners who have fled Iraq since the start of the war will have

left for their home countries by today.

But few people are now crossing at the Jordanian checkpoint.

Hundreds streamed across every day before allied bombs blew craters in the road and killed at least five civilians. Some Western diplomats say the planes may be aiming at Iraqi Scud missile sites, but Jordan maintains the attacks are deliberate.

Many drivers say they are too frightened to run the gauntlet of bombs on the road to Baghdad. But a 52-seat bus packed with Jordanians, most of them hoping to bring relatives home, waited to head for the Iraqi capital yesterday.

Mrs Fatma Naser said she had left her three grown children in Kuwait in December after 25 years there. Now she was going to bring them back.


Mr Fuad Rashid, 22, wearing Italian shoes and a Palestinian scarf, said he was going to fetch his fiancée from the Iraqi-occupied emirate.

But a veteran lorry driver, who had crossed the border the day before after dodging air raids and 20ft deep craters in the road, said: "This was my last trip."

One refugee said: "We were so afraid. They didn't care about civilians — they hit everybody."

Travellers said they switched off headlights and drove by moonlight on Thursday, hoping attacking planes would not see them.

2 FEB 1991



Saddam 'offensive now broken up'

THE scale of the Iraqi offensive along the Kuwaiti-Saudi Arabia border this week seems to have been larger than revealed so far.

Sources in London said last night that Iraqi movements other than those already known about at Khafji and elsewhere had been broken up by allied artillery fire and aircraft.

No further details were given but it does seem that a substantial number of Iraqi troops and armoured vehicles were standing by to exploit any successes by their troops along the front.

It now seems probable that the Iraqi offensive was more than a series of raids. It may have been intended to seize and hold a slice of north-eastern Saudi Arabia. One source said: "Clearly something big has gone on over the past few days."

Khafji has now been cleared by allied forces apart from some snipers and isolated pockets of resistance north of the town. The operation was described as "a clear military disaster" for Iraq by Lieutenant-General Sir Peter de la Billière, the Commander of British Forces in the Gulf.

By Will Bennett
in London

The scale of Iraqi casualties at Khafji was drastically revised down yesterday, when the British military spokesman in Riyadh said 30 had died. An earlier figure of 300 was a "typing error," he said. Between 400 and 500 Iraqi prisoners were taken.

The Iraqi troops who carried out the raid on Khafji are thought to have been a mechanised infantry battalion from the 3rd Corps based to the west of Kuwait City.

This unit, which worked closely with the Republican Guard during the invasion of Kuwait, is among the best units in the army.

An Iraqi column was said to be moving south yesterday, but there was uncertainty in London last night about what it was doing. A considerable reorganisation is going on among the occupying forces in Kuwait after their attacks into Saudi Arabia. One source said: "They are getting themselves sorted out."

Cruise missiles killing civilians in Iraqi capital

Patrick Cockburn
reports from Baghdad
on casualties of the
allied air assault

THE TOMAHAWK missile that landed on a house in the Karada district of Baghdad yesterday morning seriously wounded only one person, a 12-year-old boy called Mohammed Hussein. At the Al-Khindi hospital an hour later doctors said pieces of shrapnel had hit him in the back, entering his stomach from behind. They pulled up the blanket covering him to show the dark blood stain under the bandages, saying they would not know what organs had been destroyed until they operated. In the next bed lay an older man, his skin punctured in an earlier blast.

In Karada, a district of shops and small businesses on the other side of the Tigris, a crowd had gathered outside a house next to which the missile had landed. Picking his way through the broken glass and smashed furniture Fuad Saleh looked surprised that his wife and six children were alive. A little further down the street Hashem Jassem, an electrical engineer, showed the ruins of his kitchen, saying: "This is just bombing. There are no government buildings around here." He added that his brother, drafted into the army, had been killed on 23 January in south Kuwait. "I am proud of him."

The missile which hit Karada was one of five Tomahawks which, looking like black aerial torpedoes, had roared over Baghdad at 1,000 feet yesterday morning. A second had struck close to the American Embassy, causing a deep crater in the road close to Baghdad's largest open-air swimming pool, and decapitating a palm tree. I saw no obvious military targets in the area.

In the hour after the missiles struck casualties trickled into the hospital. The explosion near the embassy injured a man who arrived at the Yarmuk teaching hospital with one arm roughly bandaged by first aid workers and

a line of blood from a scalp wound down his forehead. A girl called Suad Ibrahim, admitted to the hospital with skull injuries, said: "I was walking in the street. All of a sudden I lost consciousness and fell down." An elderly Iraqi who brought her to the hospital, said: "I just heard the sound of thunder."

At the two sites I visited there was no sign of military facilities nearby, indicating that the Tomahawks are considerably less accurate than claimed by the allies. Casualties were limited but it appears only a matter of time before one lands beside a bread queue on or one of the petrol stations where up to 500 people gather to pick up their petrol and paraffin ration.

There was no question of the explosions being caused by anything other than Tomahawks. I saw the missiles go over, was at the sites where they exploded an hour later and, at Karada, handled a piece of a missile.

The extent of civilian casualties in Iraq is still unclear. At the Yarmuk hospital, Dr Paul Bogossian, the Edinburgh-trained chief surgeon, said between 30 and 40 had died in his hospital and another 200 were wounded.

Despite the missile attacks people in Baghdad, while still apprehensive, are less frightened than in the first days of the war. Electricity is no longer supplied but water is available in each side of city for half the week. Food is still plentiful, with fruit and vegetables on sale in the shops that have opened. But food in deep freezers is spoiling. Petrol is rationed to 30 litres a fortnight.

1 FEB 1991

THE TIMES

DAMAGE REPORT

Kurds tell
of allies' precision
bombing

By HAZHIR TELMOURIAN

Iraqi incursions may have caused surprise, some of the allied commanders, including Lieutenant-General Sir Peter de la Billière, the British forces commander, have given warnings in recent weeks that an Iraqi pre-emptive strike into Saudi Arabia could not be ruled out.

It should be remembered that the original reason for deploying so many allied troops to Saudi Arabia was to defend the kingdom against an Iraqi invasion, not to mount an offensive. Six weeks ago General Schwarzkopf's mission was still only a defensive one. So the allied forces, now adequately reinforced to launch an offensive, should be fully capable of repelling any Iraqi sorties across the border even if, as in the case of Khafji, it takes nearly three days.

If Saddam's orders to his troops, delivered in person to his operational headquarters last Saturday at Basra, were to follow a strategy of constant harassment by battalion or even divisional

strength units, General Schwarzkopf's plan surely will be to draw them as far as he can into the Saudi desert before engaging them, cutting them off from their supply line and making retreat more hazardous. The Iraqis can ill afford to use up too much ammunition during this stage of the conflict, unless their purpose is to occupy Saudi territory permanently. Yesterday, Baghdad claimed that this was not the objective.

Because of increasingly successful allied raids on ammunition dumps, the Iraqis could face serious resupply difficulties if they mount too many border raids which become bogged down in heavy crossfire. General Schwarzkopf reported on Wednesday that B52 bombers had set off a huge explosion at an Iraqi ammunition depot. About 125 storage facilities at the largest operations were destroyed. General Schwarzkopf said allied aircraft would be back.

A DETAILED account of the damage inflicted by allied bombers on the Kurdish region of northern Iraq was published yesterday in Europe by spokesmen of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, one of the two largest guerrilla organisations fighting the Iraqi army there.

It said that although there had been instances when civilian targets had been mistaken for government establishments, the allied bombing had been executed with precision and care, leaving almost no site of military significance intact.

The account could not be independently verified, but the union has proved reliable in the past. It was responsible for disclosing the news of the explosion at Iraq's rocket research establishment south of Baghdad, in August 1989, which claimed 700 lives. Its members relay news abroad by radio and telephone.

Ahmed Barmani, spokesman for the union, said about 129,000 deserters from the Iraqi army and 150,000 civilians had fled from Baghdad and elsewhere in Iraq, to seek refuge in cities throughout the Kurdistan region. He also said that there were hundreds of civilian casualties of allied air raids, and that a captured allied pilot had been executed.

Mr Barmani said he received information every two or three days from Kurdish sources in Iraq. There was no immediate means of confirming his detailed report. The union is one of five main Kurdish political parties forming the Kurdistan Front, which says it is preparing armed resistance against President Saddam Hussein.

Mr Barmani said 300 Iraqi soldiers in military convoys were killed on January 23 by allied bombing. Kirkuk, a major oil-producing city near the Iranian border, had been under allied bombing almost daily, he said, and hundreds of civilians were killed by bombs that missed their targets. But he said military bases, munitions depots, air bases and oil wells were hit by allied bombing.

Basra, a town built in northern Iraq after the 1988 chemical weapon attacks on Kurdistan, was heavily bombed on January 25, and at least 40 civilians died, he said. Mr Barmani said the pilot of an allied plane shot down over Mossul, near the Turkish border, had been executed by Iraqi secret police.

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Muzak sounds the all-clear ²⁰ as foreign hackpack returns

Alfonso Rojo listens as the rules of the reporting game are laid down to Westerners returning to a miraculously restored Baghdad hotel

IT'S 11.05 in the morning and there's a light drizzle over Baghdad. A tremendous buzzing can be heard and a cruise missile can be seen 150 yards from the al-Rashid Hotel, slowly crossing the sky.

The sirens haven't sounded and not until several seconds after the projectile hits its target and grey smoke mushroomed into the sky, can the deafening rattle of the anti-aircraft batteries be heard.

I've always thought that missiles travel at the speed of a flash of lightning, but no. The cruise is a light green colour and it moves slowly and quietly from east to west, watched by the 20 foreign journalists who have just arrived from Jordan.

The people start running like rabbits towards the hotel's underground shelter, abandoning luggage, bags, boxes of food, and dozens of bottles of mineral water.

Soon afterwards, another cruise comes by, also from the east, over the bank of the Tigris.

"Today is an ideal day for bombing and they are taking advantage of it," comments the senior official leaning against the marble wall of the hotel foyer. "Today we can't see the planes."

He explains that there is

fighting in the south around the Saudi town of Khafji. The Iraqis are proud of it.

Last night, in the half-light of the hotel hall, I came across Naji Hadizi, the general manager, and I asked him why he was so relaxed.

"Bush said that he was going to finish us off in three days," he said very proudly. "We have come to the end of the second week of the war, and we have just occupied part of Saudi Arabia."

A communique says an allied counter-offensive over Kafji has been crushed: "Innumerable corpses lie abandoned on the battlefield... prisoners have been captured, as many men as women, and they will soon be transferred to Iraqi territory."

Apart from the cruise incident and the occasional wailing of some siren in the distance, Baghdad is eerily quiet.

Yesterday, for the first time since dawn on January 17, the night passed without aerial attacks. The allied fighter-bombers must have too much work in the south.

The 67 foreign "pacifists" who had set up a "peace camp" at Arar on the Saudi frontier left Baghdad in two buses for Jordan. Four days ago they were evacuated

from Arar. On the front of one of their vehicles a placard read: "Let this peace shine." They wore Palestinian scarves and they had tears in their eyes.

Sadun al-Janabi, the head of protocol from the Ministry of Information, gathers us at 2pm in the Shereza Bar, which has become a "campaign press office".

He orders an interpreter to translate the headlines of al-Jumuriyah, one of the three newspapers still being printed in Baghdad, and he explains the "rules of the game".

"The more you co-operate with us the easier it will be for you," declares the indefatigable Mr Janabi. "Point number one, no information on damage inflicted on strategic installations can be given. Point number two, no important logistic data can be included. Point number three, you must show us your stories before sending them."

Smiling and friendly as usual, he makes clear that he has staff who speak English, French, Spanish, even Polynesian.

Afterwards he announces that each journalist will have 15 minutes on one of the three satellite telephone links which the big television

teams have brought and he announces that there will be a journey outside Baghdad in the morning.

The destination is 140 miles south of the capital, to a place where several houses have been destroyed and civilians have died.

Until three days ago, the al-Rashid Hotel had no running water, no electricity and there was a strong stench of rubbish.

Now it is impeccable. Employees worked round the clock for 48 hours. They have stuck tape on the windows and picked up all the broken fragments of glass as if they were diamonds, tidying everything to give the arriving journalists a good impression.

They have put back at the door of the hotel — the door through which a cruise missile went — the former door-mat: a six-footer dressed like Harun al-Rashid, the caliph of One Thousand and One Nights.

The food is still rationed in the restaurant, and the lights are so weak that they look like wisps of fire, but music is being played.

While the Indian and Moroccan waiters criss-cross the room in the half-light, elegantly carrying the sparse portions on trays, you can hear the type of music piped into dentists' waiting rooms.

● **Alfonso Rojo** is a correspondent of the Spanish newspaper *El Mundo*.

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EXPRESS

7 Baghdad

CRUISE missiles are continuing to pound Baghdad with pinpoint accuracy, TV newsman Brent Sadler revealed yesterday as he returned to the city.

But despite the daily bombardment life there is returning to normal and the people are still confident of victory.

The ITN reporter is the first British journalist allowed back into the Iraqi capital after being thrown out at the start of the war. He told how he watched two Tomahawk cruise missiles skim past his hotel and home in on their targets.

"We arrived here a couple of hours ago and were welcomed by the sight of two Allied cruise missiles whistling over the top of our heads at the front of our hotel and going off to some target we know not where," said Sadler.

Treacherous

"There's smoke spiralling away from me. But people around here seem pretty calm," he said in a live broadcast subject to Iraqi censorship.

Sadler said he and his crew faced a difficult 20-hour journey across the desert from the Jordanian capital Amman.

They travelled at night on roads which only hours earlier had been attacked by Allied planes.

He said protests from the Jordanian Government that several civilians had been killed in the air strikes appeared to be true.

"These protests from what I could see seem to be pretty well founded," said Sadler. "I saw four blazing fuel tankers."

"I saw huge bomb craters made by low-altitude bombing runs on those roads. There was a minibus that had nosedived into one of the road cavities and one saloon car also there."

"Inside the minibus one of the passengers was actually still asleep. I don't know how he survived it."

"It was quite an incredible sight."

Sadler, who had only been in Baghdad a matter

of hours when he made his live broadcast to ITN, said the mood of the people had not changed despite the continual bombardment.

Normal

Describing the mood, he said: "People are talking about victory, people I've spoken to in the street."

"People are very relaxed. They are going about their business as normal. They are very happy."



BRENT SADLER
reports from Baghdad

The Iraqi authorities have allowed a small number of journalists to return to Baghdad.

Until now reporter Peter Arnett from the American cable network CNN was the only newsman allowed to broadcast from the capital.

Sadler said: "The very small group of journalists that came here across the desert last night is just assembling, so it's very difficult to say what I can see around here."

EXPRESS

School ban on pupils' battle games

By GERARD GREAVES

CHILDREN have been banned from playing war games in a school playground because of the Gulf conflict.

Toy guns and mock fights are also barred in a move which parents have branded an insult.

But yesterday headmistress Christine Barry defended the ban at the 370-pupil Moreland Primary School in Islington, North London.

"We do not feel war toys or games should be allowed," she said. "War is not a good thing and the children should know."

Ms Barry, who has been backed by Labour-run Islington Council, told parents of the move in a newsletter.

Racial

"Several of our families have relatives in the war zone."

"It is important we make clear to all our children that this war is not a game or an excuse to express prejudice against racial or religious groups."

Ms Brenda Quinn, 41, whose 10-year-old son Dean attends the school, said yesterday: "It's ridiculous. War games are war games and kids will always play them."

"It's an insult to our boys in the Gulf."

● Labour-run Lambeth Council in London yesterday called for the withdrawal of foreign troops from the Gulf. It condemned "all attempts to whip up patriotic and pro-war hysteria".

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
WILEY
EXPRESS

BAGHDAD REAPS THE WHIRLWIND



This picture, said to show bomb damage in Baghdad, was released by Iraq's official news agency yesterday — with no information on when it was taken

Late



SECRET



22A(a-b)

*Reflected in my
Mk. 5/2*

Jp 01308

SIR CHARLES POWELL

at Play
The Gulf: Scowcroft's Assessment attached to your letter of
3 February to Simon Webb

You asked for comments.

2. I agree with much of the assessment, though I think it rather upbeat - an attempt to convey uplift, rather than hard facts.

3. I have reservations on the following points:

a. NBC capability. Our objectives are more than simply the disruption of Iraq's nuclear, chemical and biological weapons capability. We have to destroy. There is still a good deal to do. About half the CW production capability and two-thirds of the known agent-filling capacity have been destroyed. None of the 11 bunkers in the main storage area at the Samarra facility appears to have been hit, though no activity has been seen at Samarra since the attack. Chemical weapons have probably been dispersed to a variety of ammunition depots.

b. There are still differences between US and UK experts on the shelf life of Iraqi nerve agents: we think they will be in good condition for quite some time.

c. Equally, although there has been damage to BW storage bunkers at Salman Pak and destruction at the suspected BW facility at Abu Ghreib and at the facility at Taji, it is likely that Iraq dispersed its BW production and storage facilities before hostilities.

SECRET



d. The main nuclear research centre at Tuwaitha has suffered major damage, but we now have reports of the Iraqis endeavouring to salvage the highly enriched uranium from the ruins of the Russian reactor. The condition of the suspected nuclear facility at Al Qaim remains unknown.

e. On the national command and control system, although much damage has been done, it still shows considerable resilience and the "spinal cord" may survive. The main command bunkers appear to have suffered little damage.

f. Despite the heavy continuous attacks, we still do not see the Republican Guard as seriously hurt. One division has suffered much damage, but the others are little affected.

g. On logistics, although there is now interruption in supply to the Kuwait theatre, we have to allow for considerable collection of ammunition and POL there before hostilities and their dispersal throughout the theatre.

h. On Iraqi morale, despite some recent reports from SIGINT and POWs/defectors, we remain uncertain. Morale may be beginning to crack, but it does not seem to have yet become a major factor for Saddam. We were struck by the good fight the Iraqis put up at Khafji.


PERCY CRADOCK

4 February 1991

CONFIDENTIAL



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10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

4 February 1991

Joe Sil,

OPD(G) (MH)

Thank you for your letter dated today, with the proposal that the Prime Minister should see the new Archbishop of Canterbury to talk about the Gulf. The Prime Minister had him to dinner last week, and its fair to assume a good deal of the conversation was about the Gulf. So there is no urgency. But we will find another opportunity in due course.

I am copying this letter to the recipients of yours.

Charles Powell

W.D. Reeves, Esq.
Cabinet Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

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CABINET OFFICE

70 Whitehall London SW1A 2AS Telephone ~~01-270~~ 071 270 0050

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T01369

4 February 1991

Sir Charles Powell KCMG
10 Downing Street

Dear Charles

OPD(G)(MH)


At OPD(G)(MH) this morning the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster commented that the Church leaders in Britain had on the whole been supportive of Government policy in the Gulf. They had met senior Ministers at the outset of hostilities, and he saw advantage in repeating this from time to time as the campaign progressed. This suggestion was generally endorsed. It was further suggested that the Archbishop of Canterbury - designate, who is apparently away in Australia, might be invited for a talk with the Prime Minister on his return. Mr Wakeham asked me to pass this suggestion to you.

Yours sincerely
W D Reeves

W D REEVES

Copies to:	A T O'Donnell Esq,	No 10
	Richard Gozney Esq,	FCO
	John Neilson Esq,	DEn
	R T Canniff Esq.	Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster's Office

CONFIDENTIAL



SECRET UK EYES A
MANAGEMENT IN CONFIDENCE

22(A-B)



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

Telephone 071-21 82111/3

MO 6/17/15/1J

Prime Minister

4H February 1991

*I agree but as it seems a bit hard
on the families to tell
them it may have been an
own goal. I think we shall
never know for certain.*

LOSSES OF AIRCRAFT OVER IRAQ

C 00 4/2.

The Prime Minister should be aware of circumstantial evidence emerging that the possible cause of the loss of one of the five aircraft over Iraq was premature detonation of one of its bombs.

The loss of an RAF aircraft is always of concern and normally the subject of a detailed Board of Inquiry. Every effort is being made to investigate the losses of Tornados in combat, although in the absence of recoverable wreckage and crew interviews, it is unlikely that the cause of individual losses will ever be known for certain. Since most of the missions were at night, little evidence is available from other members of the formations concerned.

That said, each of the losses to date has been examined. From the information available, enemy action is assessed as the most likely cause for the loss of three Tornado aircraft carrying out sorties using 1000 lb bombs. A fourth aircraft was seen to crash shortly after delivering JP 233 at low level over a heavily defended airfield.

The last Tornado lost on 24th January had, however, delivered 1000 lb bombs from level flight at medium altitude (about 20,000 ft). Very heavy surface to air missile (SAM) and Anti Aircraft Artillery (AAA) activity was experienced before weapon delivery. The bombs were fuzed to burst in the air at a pre-set height above the ground. This is achieved by arming after a pre-set period of time and detonating when proximity to ground is detected. Analysis suggests that the fuze arming time set was such that they armed while close enough to the aircraft to inflict damage if detonated. Such premature detonation could have been caused by another bomb or the presence of AAA, SAMs or chaff near the weapons. The spacing selected for this attack could have put the bombs close enough to cause bomb-to-bomb interference. Thus, while the aircraft could

Sir Charles Powell KCMG
10 Downing Street

MANAGEMENT IN CONFIDENCE
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MANAGEMENT IN CONFIDENCE



have been lost to enemy action, another technically possible cause is that it was hit by debris from its own weapons prematurely detonating. This analysis is further supported by damage to the second aircraft in the attack consistent with premature detonation of its own weapons, but which was able to return to base.

There is no reason to suspect that technical failure was a factor in other losses. A variety of weapon delivery types, heights and profiles were being flown. In the case of the last loss it now seems quite possible that premature detonation was the cause, but we will never know for sure. Whilst some risk of premature detonation with high explosive weapons cannot be eliminated entirely, changes are being made to both weapon settings and delivery profiles to minimise the chances of this occurring in future attacks.

Given the lack of hard facts, the Defence Secretary does not believe that it would be helpful to make a statement about the possibility that premature detonation had occurred. In response to media enquiries (and some interest has already been shown), we have discouraged publication under the current "Guidance to Editors" and we intend to continue to do this. If pressed, we would stress that these aircraft were lost over enemy territory in attacks on heavily defended targets, explaining that it was not possible to ascertain the cause of any individual loss with certainty and that we were not prepared to speculate on the range of possibilities in the absence of hard facts.

Finally, the Defence Secretary has also considered the position of the families concerned. While not going into detail, he believes that it would be sensible to inform those concerned in the last case of the range of possibilities, against the chance of speculation in the media, and this is being done. Questions of legal liability may be involved.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Juliet Wheldon (Attorney General's Office), and to Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely
Simon Webb

(S WEBB)
Private Secretary

MANAGEMENT IN CONFIDENCE
SECRET UK EYES A

PRIME MINISTER

MEETING WITH AIR CHIEF MARSHAL SIR PATRICK HINE

Air Chief Marshal Sir Patrick Hine is coming to see you tomorrow morning, to brief you on his visit to Saudi Arabia last week and discussions with General Schwarzkopf. He will be accompanied by CDS.

Particular points to cover are:

- X - his impressions of the overall progress of the campaign and the damage being caused.
- X - General Schwarzkopf's plans for the land campaign: when will it begin?
 - is the air campaign doing sufficient damage to the Republican Guard and other Iraqi ground forces to produce the 50 per cent degradation of their capabilities, which General de la Billiere told you was necessary in order to launch an attack.
 - the state of preparedness and logistic position of our own forces.
 - his assessment of the likelihood of use by Iraq of CW and BW: the circumstances under which it might be used: and the likely effects.
- X - his view of how the end might come. A formal cease-fire? A sudden Iraqi collapse?
- X - his judgment of the proportion of Iraq's military might we can reasonably expect to destroy/neutralise.
- X - his insight into American expectations of losses in a land battle.

SECRET

- 2 -

- our need for prompt and reliable intelligence on a daily basis on the fighting in the Gulf. At present we are often behind the media. We have asked for twice daily telegrams from the theatre, for your benefit.

You are to have a separate briefing on the following day from Admiral Kerr on satellite photography.

C.D.P.

C. D. POWELL

4 February 1991

A:\foreign\hine (pmm)

P.S. Perry Crabtree
has now also done
a note, much of
which overlaps. I
have underlined the
additional points.

SECRET

SECRET



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R. Hinton
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4/1.

Jp 01307

PRIME MINISTER

Meeting with Air Chief Marshal Hine

You are seeing Air Chief Marshal Hine tomorrow at 11.00 am. You will want to pick his brains on the conduct of the campaign. The following are among the questions you may wish to put.

- X (a) How is the present air campaign going? What does he see as its main objectives?
- X (b) Will it by itself cause Saddam to give up/seek a ceasefire/withdraw?
- ↗ (c) What are the main pressure-points we should be going for? The Republican Guard? Other objectives?
- X (d) So far, we have been struck by the fact that, despite very heavy continuous bombing, the Republican Guard still seems surprisingly intact. The Tawakalna mechanised division has been hardest hit, perhaps losing as many as 138 of its 222 tanks and several guns. But the two remaining RGFC armoured divisions are thought still to be fully effective; and the three RGFC infantry divisions are thought to be little affected. If this is the result after 16 days of continuous attack, are we going to be able to pulverise the Republican Guard as we would wish within the remaining two to three weeks available?
- (e) What are the particular problems we face in attacking the Republican Guard - dispersal over a wide area? Quantities of anti-aircraft guns and SAMs? The protection of the tanks in revetments?



b

(f) How are we proposing to deal with their anti-aircraft defences? When are we likely to be able to shift from very high-level bombing to attacks by A10s (tank busters)? Are we going over the Republican Guard divisions one by one in the way General Schwarzkopf promised? Which ones have been gone over?

(g) The Commander, in recent interviews, has put great weight on logistics, on destruction of bridges and on cutting off supplies of ammunition and petrol, oils and lubricants (POL) to the Kuwait theatre. But, according to one US assessment, POL for some 70 days' combat is still available to the Iraqi forces in the theatre and, although many bridges are now down, we must assume that large amounts of ammunition and POL have been dispersed to areas scattered throughout the Kuwait theatre. Moreover, we now hear that the Iraqis are busy repairing bridges. How does he see the logistics factor operating? Will it not in any case operate more slowly than direct attacks on the Republican Guard?

(h) If the campaign goes well, Saddam may decide to end hostilities within a relatively short period. If we are pressed for time, what are the most urgent tasks we should try to complete in the air campaign? Are there, for example, essential tasks to be done still in completing the destruction of his NBC capability, or should we concentrate entirely now upon his land forces in Kuwait?

(i) Is there anything more that can be done by way of air attack against Scuds? Could we keep patrols circling the small areas from which Scuds have been launched?

SECRET



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(j) How does he see the remaining 350 combat-effective aircraft in Iraq? Will Saddam put them into the air again and if so how?

h

PERCY CRADOCK

4 February 1991

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OUR TELNO 350: IRAQ/KUWAIT: WASHINGTON SITREP

SUMMARY

1. BOMBS DEFUSED NEAR US NAVAL BASE. CHENEY PLEASD WITH US WAR EFFORT.

DETAIL

2. THE BREAKING STORY ON 4 FEBRUARY IS OF ⁶ PIPE BOMBS WITH SOPHISTICATED TIMING DEVICES DISCOVERED AT A METHANOL PLANT IN NORFOLK, VIRGINIA. THE BOMBS WERE PLACED ON TANKS CONTAINING OVER ONE MILLION GALLONS OF METHANOL, WHICH LOCAL POLICE SAID COULD HAVE CAUSED A DEVASTATING EXPLOSION. BOTH BOMBS HAVE BEEN SAFELY DEFUSED. THE TANK FARM IS CLOSE TO THE LARGEST US NAVAL BASE. NO ONE HAS SO FAR CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY AND LOCAL POLICE HAVE NOT RULED OUT THE POSSIBILITY OF GULF-RELATED TERRORIST ACTION.

3. IN A PRESS BRIEFING ON 4 FEBRUARY, DEFENSE SECRETARY CHENEY DESCRIBED THE ALLIED WAR EFFORT AS VERY SUCCESSFUL. HE WAS PLEASD WITH PROGRESS AND CONFIDENT THAT THE OUTCOME WOULD BE THE EXPULSION OF IRAQ FROM KUWAIT. HE SAID THAT ONE BOMBING SORTIE HAD BEEN FLOWN FOR EVERY MINUTE OF OPERATION DESERT STORM.

4. IN REVIEWING THE BATTLE FOR KHAFJI, THE MEDIA REPORT THAT IRAQI GROUND TROOPS FOUGHT WITH TENACITY. IN CONTRAST TO THE AVOIDANCE OF COMBAT BY THE IRAQI AIRFORCE AND ITS SUBSEQUENT FLIGHT TO IRAN, AND THE SWIFT DESTRUCTION OF THE IRAQI NAVY, COMMENTATORS NOTE THAT DESPITE SERIOUS LOSSES THE IRAQIS IN KHAFJI BEHAVED MORE LIKE AN ARMY SPOILING FOR A FIGHT THAN RUNNING FROM ONE. IT WAS CLEAR THAT ALLIED BOMBING WAS HAVING AN IMPACT, BUT IT DID NOT SEEM YET TO HAVE COMPLETELY DEMORALISED THE IRAQI ARMY. THE MORALE OF THE REPUBLICAN GUARD WAS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT. THE PRESS REPORT

PAGE 1
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ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS AS SAYING THAT EARLY ASSESSMENTS INDICATE THAT NO MORE THAN 15 PER CENT OF THE GUARDS' DUG-IN TANKS AND OTHER WEAPONS HAD BEEN DESTROYED. THIS WAS WELL SHORT OF THE 50 PER CENT DESTRUCTION THAT THE MILITARY HOPED EVENTUALLY TO SEE FROM THE BOMBING.

5. THE MEDIA ALSO REPORT ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS AS INSISTING THAT THEY WOULD NOT BE RUSHED INTO A GROUND WAR. THE PACE OF THE ALLIED CAMPAIGN WOULD NOT BE DICTATED BY THE CALENDAR, BUT ONLY BY THE PROGRESS OF TARGET DESTRUCTION. BUT THE MEDIA NOTE THAT ARAB NATIONS IN THE COALITION WERE PRESSURING THE WHITE HOUSE TO FINISH THE WAR BEFORE RAMADAN IN MID-MARCH. TO DO THAT, THE ALLIED GROUND ASSAULT WOULD HAVE TO BEGIN BY LATE FEBRUARY. THE MILITARY ARE REPORTED TO BE OPTIMISTIC THAT THE REPUBLICAN GUARD WILL HAVE BEEN SERIOUSLY WEAKENED BEFORE THEN.

6. IN TERMS OF DAMAGE ASSESSMENT, THE PENTAGON HAVE SHARPLY INCREASED THEIR COUNT (FROM 31 TO 99) OF THE NUMBER OF IRAQI WAR PLANES THEY CLAIM TO HAVE DESTROYED ON THE GROUND. THE NUMBER MAY RISE TO 140 AFTER FURTHER STUDY OF RUBBLE FROM BLASTED AIRCRAFT SHELTERS.

7. ASKED ABOUT THE IRANIAN OFFER TO MEDIATE BETWEEN IRAQ AND THE US, STATE'S SPOKESMAN SAID THAT THEY HAD NOT HAD DIRECT CONTACT WITH TEHERAN, NOR HAD ANY SPECIFIC PROPOSAL BEEN CONVEYED TO WASHINGTON THROUGH THIRD PARTIES. BUT THE ONLY MEDIATION THAT WOULD BE APPROPRIATE WOULD BE FOR THOSE WHO COMMUNICATED WITH SADDAM TO CONVINCE HIM TO COMPLY WITH THE 12 UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS ON KUWAIT.

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ADVANCE

44

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NNNN

SECRET AND PERSONAL



10 DOWNING STREET
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From the Private Secretary

4 February 1991

THE GULF

General Scowcroft and I had our customary brief chat this evening on the secure line.

I recalled that the President had told the Prime Minister last night that he was returning to Washington for a meeting with Baker, Cheney, Powell and Scowcroft himself, at which they would be considering among other things when to start the land battle. I was curious to know how the meeting had gone. General Scowcroft said that it had been a bit of a non-event. He had set aside an hour for the meeting but in fact they had only needed 25 minutes. Most of the time was spent ploughing familiar ground. The only concrete result was a decision that Cheney would go out to Saudi Arabia, probably at the end of this week to gather impressions from the field commanders and talk to General Schwarzkopf. Scowcroft added that the general feeling at the meeting was of no great hurry about starting the land battle. Personally, he was getting increasingly nervous about waiting too long. More and more people were busying themselves with devising ceasefire initiatives, and the risk was there that Saddam Hussain might accept one of them. That would enable him to withdraw, saying that he had taken the most that the Americans could throw at him and survived, making himself a hero in the Arab world. That would be a bad outcome: and the land battle still provided the best means of destroying or at least reducing his remaining forces. I recalled that I told him yesterday that our assessment of the damage inflicted on the Republican Guards was considerably less optimistic than the American calculation. Our view remained that we should only start the land battle when Iraqi forces in Kuwait had been degraded by 50 per cent or so, in order to minimise our own casualties. General Scowcroft said this was one of the factors Cheney would have to assess. But he repeated that he remained uneasy about waiting too long.

I told General Scowcroft that we were getting to see more pictures on television of damage to civilian areas in Iraq, put out by Iraqi TV. I thought this was going to cause us increasing trouble as the days went by. General Scowcroft said that he had been talking to the UN Secretary General that morning, and Perez de Cuellar had told him that he was getting an increasing number of complaints from UN members about civilian damage and casualties. The fact was there were practically none:

SECRET AND PERSONAL

the numbers were insignificant measured against the amount of bombing which had taken place. We had to find a way to get this into better perspective. I said that General Schwarzkopf was saying that quite a lot of the damage was probably caused by Iraqi SAM missiles falling back to earth. General Scowcroft thought this probably was a factor.

I referred to reports that President Rafsanjani was now offering to mediate between the US and Iraq. Had the Administration heard from the Iranians? General Scowcroft said there had been a few feelers but nothing they could focus on. Quite a lot of the peace initiatives going the rounds were self-promotion. The Iranians probably thought the war would not last long and wanted to be sure they were in on the peace negotiations.


General Scowcroft said the President had instructed yesterday that someone should come over from Washington to show the Prime Minister more of the satellite photography, but Colin Powell had said that we had all the photographs already. I said that arrangements were being made for the Prime Minister to receive a full photographic briefing on Wednesday. I would let him know if there seemed to be any particular gaps in our coverage.

I am copying this letter to Richard Gozney (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and to Sir Robin Butler.

CHARLES POWELL

Simon Webb, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence.

A The National Archives

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TO DESKBY 041200Z FCO
TELNO 225
OF 041130Z FEBRUARY 91
AND TO DESKBY 041200Z RIYADH

FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

RIYADH TELNO 344: SAUDI REACTION TO BLABY SPEECH

1. IN RESPONSE TO TUR (FOR WHICH SECRETARY OF STATE WAS GRATEFUL), THE SECRETARY OF STATE TELEPHONED PRINCE SAUD AT HOME FROM BRUSSELS AT 2330 (BRUSSELS TIME) ON 3 FEBRUARY.
2. THE SECRETARY OF STATE TOLD SAUD HE HAD RECEIVED A FULL REPORT OF HIS CONVERSATION WITH HMA RIYADH. HE WAS SORRY THAT HIS REMARKS AT BLABY HAD CAUSED DIFFICULTIES. HE UNDERSTOOD THERE WERE TWO PARTICULAR POINTS OF CONCERN TO KING FAHD AND PRINCE SAUD. BY CHANCE BEFORE HEARING OF THIS, HE HAD SPOKEN FURTHER ON BOTH POINTS ON A WIDE RANGING BBC RADIO INTERVIEW AT MID-DAY ON 3 FEBRUARY. A TRANSCRIPT OF THE INTERVIEW WAS ON ITS WAY TO RIYADH AND WOULD BE AVAILABLE THROUGH THE AMBASSADOR.
3. ON THE FIRST POINT, FUTURE REGIONAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS, THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID HE HAD REPEATED AT BLABY THE LINE THE PRIME MINISTER HAD USED EARLIER IN THE WEEK IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS. WHEN ASKED BY THE BBC TO CLARIFY THIS, HE HAD EMPHASISED THAT FUTURE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS WERE FOR THE GCC TO DECIDE, AND THAT ANY HELP OR CONTRIBUTION FROM FRIENDS, INCLUDING BRITAIN, WOULD HAVE TO BE AT THE EXPLICIT REQUEST OF THE GULF COUNTRIES THEMSELVES. HE HAD SAID IN TERMS THAT SUCH ARRANGEMENTS COULD NOT BE DEvised, LET ALONE IMPOSED, FROM OUTSIDE.
4. HE HAD BEEN ASKED FURTHER AT MID-DAY WHO SHOULD BE IN THE LEAD, IF NOT THE WEST. HE HAD REPLIED THAT THIS WAS FOR THE GCC, AND THAT WITHIN THE GCC THE LEADERSHIP FELL NATURALLY TO SAUDI ARABIA: KING FAHD AND PRINCE SAUD HAD ALREADY SHOWN EXPERIENCED LEADERSHIP. HIS REMARKS, THEREFORE, BOTH AT BLABY AND IN THE INTERVIEW, HAD BEEN DESIGNED TO EMPHASISE THAT THE INITIATIVE ON THESE ISSUES HAD TO COME FROM THE REGION. THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF US LEAVING TROOPS IN THE AREA LONG-TERM. THAT WAS AN OLD STORY. IF THERE WAS A NEED FOR AIRCRAFT, SHIP VISITS, PREPOSITIONING ETC, WE WOULD BE WILLING TO RESPOND, BUT ONLY IF ASKED.
5. THE SECRETARY OF STATE THEN TURNED TO THE SECOND POINT, SAUDI FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE IN THE REGION (PARA 2 OF TUR). HE SAID THAT HE HAD NOT TOUCHED ON THIS AS A NEW POINT OR A NOVEL IDEA. IN THE

BBC INTERVIEW HE HAD EMPHASISED THAT SAUDI ARABIA AND OTHER GULF STATES ALREADY SHARE THEIR RESOURCES. HIS REMARKS REFLECTED CONFIDENCE THAT THESE POLICIES WOULD BE CONTINUED AND STRENGTHENED.

6. IN CONCLUSION, THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID HE HOPED HE HAD NOW CLARIFIED BOTH POINTS IN THE WAY SAUD HAD SUGGESTED TO HMA RIYADH. THROUGHOUT THE CRISIS, HE AND PRINCE SAUD HAD WORKED TOGETHER WITH IDENTICAL PURPOSE AND VIEWS. HE WAS ANXIOUS THAT THIS SHOULD CONTINUE. HE HOPED, THEREFORE, THAT PLANNING FOR HIS VISIT TO THE KINGDOM NEXT WEEK COULD CONTINUE. THE VISIT PROMISED TO BE IMPORTANT ON MANY GROUNDS. HE UNDERSTOOD THE SENSITIVITIES WITHIN THE KINGDOM AND HAD TRIED TO MEET THEM. PUBLIC OPINION IN THE UK ALSO NEEDED CAREFUL HANDLING: THERE WAS NATURAL INTEREST IN LOOKING AHEAD TO ARRANGEMENTS AFTER THE WAR WAS OVER.

7. IN RESPONSE, PRINCE SAUD AGREED THAT THE VISIT WAS IMPORTANT AND HOPED THAT IT WOULD BE MAINTAINED. HE WOULD REPORT TO KING FAHD THE FOLLOWING MORNING WHAT THE SECRETARY OF STATE HAD SAID. THERE WAS NO QUESTION ON THE SAUDI PART OF QUESTIONING OUR MOTIVES. BUT EACH SIDE HAD TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE OTHER'S PUBLIC OPINION AS WELL AS THEIR OWN. THE SECRETARY OF STATE AGREED.

8. COMMENT. PRINCE SAUD WAS FRIENDLY THROUGHOUT. HE DID NOT REPEAT THE COMPLAINTS IN TUR AND DID NOT PRESS FOR ANY MORE TO BE SAID IN PUBLIC TO CORRECT THE RECORD (THE SECRETARY OF STATE DID SAY HOWEVER THAT HE MIGHT HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY ON 4 FEBRUARY TO CLARIFY THESE POINTS FURTHER). SAUD GAVE EVERY IMPRESSION OF WANTING THE VISIT TO GO AHEAD.

9. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SPOKE IMMEDIATELY AFTERWARDS TO HMA RIYADH TO GIVE AN ACCOUNT OF HIS CONVERSATION WITH SAUD.

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FROM PS/CHIEF SECRETARY

CHIEF SECRETARY'S VISIT TO UAE

SUMMARY

1. CHIEF SECRETARY ASKS UNITED ARAB EMIRATES (UAE) FOR A
CONTRIBUTION TO UK MILITARY COSTS OF UP TO 800 MILLION DOLLARS.
INDICATIONS RECEIVED THAT UAE GOVERNMENT MAY HAVE SET ASIDE 2
BILLION DOLLARS TO MEET REQUESTS FOR ASSISTANCE FROM COUNTRIES
OTHER THAN THE US.

DETAIL

2. THE CHIEF SECRETARY MADE SEPARATE CALLS ON 3 FEBRUARY ON
SHAIKH ZAYED (PRESIDENT OF UAE) AND SHAIKH HAMDAN (UAE MINISTER
OF FINANCE).

3. SHAIKH ZAYED RECEIVED THE CHIEF SECRETARY WITH WARMTH, NOTING
THAT THE PRESENT CONFLICT PROVIDED AN IMPORTANT DEMONSTRATION OF
THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY'S RESOLVE TO STAND UP TO DICTATORS IN
THE CAUSE OF JUSTICE. THE BRINGING TOGETHER OF THE INTERNATIONAL
COALITION AGAINST SADDAM HUSSEIN HAD BEEN A SIGNIFICANT, INDEED
AN HISTORIC, ACHIEVEMENT, AND THE UK HAD PROVIDED AN IMPORTANT
LEADERSHIP ROLE.

4. THE CHIEF SECRETARY HANDED OVER THE PRIME MINISTER'S LETTER
TO SHAIKH ZAYED. THE CHIEF SECRETARY DREW ATTENTION TO THE LONG
TIES OF FRIENDSHIP THAT UNITED THE UK WITH THE COUNTRIES OF THE

GULF REGION.

5. SHAIKH ZAYED AGREED THAT THE UAE'S FRIENDSHIP WITH THE UK WAS SPECIAL AND PRIVILEGED. IT WAS A FRIENDSHIP BASED ON LOYALTY, WHICH HAD DEVELOPED OVER MANY YEARS - EVEN AT TIMES WHEN THE UAE HAD NOT BEEN IN A POSITION TO RECIPROCATATE FULLY THE SUPPORT BRITAIN HAD BEEN ABLE TO PROVIDE. THIS WOULD NEVER BE FORGOTTEN. AND NOW, BY THE GRACE OF GOD, THAT HIS COUNTRY WAS ABLE TO SHOW ITS SUPPORT THE UAE WOULD NOT BE INDIFFERENT TO BRITAIN'S NEEDS. HE FELT A DUTY AND AN OBLIGATION TO PROVIDE MONEY, MEN OR WHATEVER WAS REQUIRED.

6. SHAIKH ZAYED SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN GREATLY DISTURBED BY MR HEATH'S COMMENT THAT THE BRITISH FORCES IN THE GULF WERE LITTLE MORE THAN 'MERCENARIES'. THIS HAD BEEN A SHAMEFUL AND DISHONOURABLE THING TO SAY AND WAS, OF COURSE, QUITE UNTRUE. THE CHIEF SECRETARY AGREED AND EXPRESSED THANKS FOR SHAIKH ZAYED'S WORDS.

7. THE CHIEF SECRETARY THEN EXPLAINED THAT THE UK HAD HOPED FERVENTLY THAT HOSTILITIES IN THE GULF COULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED. NEVERTHELESS, NOW THAT THEY HAD STARTED, THE UK WOULD FIGHT FOR HOWEVER LONG WAS NEEDED TO GET SADDAM HUSSEIN OUT OF KUWAIT.

8. INEVITABLY, THE MILITARY CAMPAIGN WAS PROVING TO BE EXPENSIVE - IN TERMS OF BOTH LIVES AND MONEY. ALREADY THE UK'S MILITARY CONTRIBUTION HAD COST ROUGHLY 3 BILLION US DOLLARS AND THE COSTS WERE ESCALATING RAPIDLY. WE HAD ORIGINALLY HOPED TO BE ABLE TO AVOID ASKING OUR FRIENDS AND ALLIES TO MAKE A CONTRIBUTION TO THESE COSTS. BUT RELUCTANTLY WE HAD NOW DECIDED WE WOULD NEED TO SEEK ASSISTANCE - SPEAKING FRANKLY THE COSTS WERE BECOMING QUITE A BURDEN.

9. IF SHAIKH ZAYED WERE ABLE TO MAKE A CONTRIBUTION TO THE UK'S MILITARY COSTS WE WOULD BE DEEPLY GRATEFUL. THE SIZE OF ANY CONTRIBUTION WOULD, OF COURSE, BE A MATTER FOR SHAIKH ZAYED'S JUDGMENT. HOWEVER, LOOKING AT THE COSTS WE HAD HAD TO MEET SO FAR AND GIVEN THE PROSPECT OF FURTHER EXPENDITURE IN DUE COURSE, A SUM OF UP TO 800 MILLION US DOLLARS WOULD BE A VERY WELCOME CONTRIBUTION.

10. SHAIKH ZAYED SAID THAT HE WAS GRATEFUL FOR THE CHIEF SECRETARY'S FRANKNESS - THIS WAS A SIGN OF TRUE FRIENDSHIP. HE HOPED THE CHIEF SECRETARY WOULD FIND THAT THE UAE WOULD DO

EVERYTHING ITS FRIENDS WANTED - THE CHIEF SECRETARY WOULD FIND HIM TOTALLY SUPPORTIVE. SHAIKH ZAYED SAID THAT HIS PEOPLE WOULD DISCUSS THE DETAILS WITH HM AMBASSADOR. CONCLUDING, SHAIKH ZAYED ASKED THE CHIEF SECRETARY TO CONVEY HIS GREETINGS TO THE PRIME MINISTER.

11. IN A SUBSEQUENT CALL ON SHAIKH HAMDAN, THE CHIEF SECRETARY RAISED THE ISSUE OF HARBOUR CHARGES AND FUEL PAYMENTS FOR BRITISH SHIPS IN JEBEL ALI PORT. THE CHIEF SECRETARY EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT THESE CHARGES MIGHT BE MET BY THE DUBAI GOVERNMENT. HAMDAN SAID THAT HE WOULD BRING THIS ISSUE TO THE ATTENTION OF SHAIKH MAKTOUM.

COMMENT

12. THE CHIEF SECRETARY'S REQUEST FOR A CONTRIBUTION CLEARLY CAME AS NO SURPRISE TO SHAIKH ZAYED. HE RECEIVED THE CHIEF SECRETARY WITH WARMTH AND SPOKE GENEROUSLY OF THE UK'S IMPORTANCE WITHIN THE US-LED COALITION AND OF THE UAE'S WILLINGNESS TO PROVIDE SUPPORT FOR THE UK.

13. WHILE SOME CONTRIBUTION TO UK COSTS SEEMS LIKELY, ITS PRECISE SIZE WILL BE DETERMINED ONLY AFTER DETAILED NEGOTIATION WITH THE SHAIKH'S STAFF.

14. HM AMBASSADOR HAS HEARD FROM THE AMERICANS IN ABU DHABI THAT THEY DO NOT EXPECT TO RECEIVE ALL THE MONEY THEY HAVE ASKED FOR (IE A FURTHER 7.5 BILLION US DOLLARS FOR 1991 (Q1)). HM AMBASSADOR WAS TOLD BY THE AMERICANS THAT THE UAE HAD SET ASIDE 2 BILLION US DOLLARS TO MEET NON-US REQUESTS FOR ASSISTANCE (INCLUDING SUPPORT FOR EGYPT). THE CHIEF SECRETARY'S REQUEST FOR 'UP TO 800 MILLION US DOLLARS' LEAVES ROOM FOR SOME NEGOTIATION, CONSISTENT WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF SECURING A TOTAL CONTRIBUTION OF 300 MILLION POUNDS.

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MODUK FOR SEC(0)C. HM TREASURY FOR FELLGETT

YOUR TELNOS 79 TO ME AND 222 TO WASHINGTON

SUMMARY

1. JAPANESE HAVE ARRANGED PUBLICLY TO ANNOUNCE THAT UK BENEFITTED BY DOLLARS 50 MILLION FROM THE FIRST TRANCHE OF ASSISTANCE TO THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE (ALTHOUGH THERE MAY HAVE BEEN A LAST MINUTE TECHNICAL HITCH). LIST OF THE WAY IN WHICH THIS WAS SPENT HANDED OVER BY US TODAY. THE MOOD HERE, PUBLICLY AND PRIVATELY, IS ALMOST UNIVERSALLY IN FAVOUR OF THE SECOND TRANCHE OF DOLLARS 9 BILLION BEING GIVEN TO THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE AND FOR LOGISTICS NOT WEAPONS SYSTEMS.

DETAIL

2. I CALLED ON HYODO, DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE EUROPEAN AFFAIRS BUREAU IN THE MFA, THIS AFTERNOON TO HAND OVER A LIST BASED ON THAT CONTAINED IN MODUK U/N TELEGRAM OF 31 JANUARY ITEMIZING HOW THE DOLLARS 50 MILLION WHICH WE HAD RECEIVED FROM THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT AT THE END OF LAST YEAR HAD BEEN SPENT. HYODO SAID THAT THIS WOULD BE HELPFUL AND ADDED THAT A QUESTION HAD BEEN PLANTED IN THE DIET TO ELICIT DETAILS OF HOW THE FIRST TRANCHE TOTALLING DOLLARS 2 BILLION HAD BEEN DIVIDED UP AMONG MEMBER COUNTRIES OF THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE. I SAID THAT WE HOPED TO LET HIM HAVE DETAILED ESTIMATES OF OUR EXPENDITURE ON LOGISTICS IN ORDER TO JUSTIFY OUR CLAIM ON A PROPORTION OF THE SECOND TRANCHE. HYODO SAID THAT THAT WOULD BE MOST HELPFUL.

3. I CONFIRMED THAT WE HAD BEEN IN TOUCH WITH THE AMERICANS AT VERY HIGH LEVELS IN ORDER TO ENSURE THAT OUR OWN ADDED BURDENS AS A RESULT OF ACTION IN THE GULF WERE ALLEVIATED IN AN APPROPRIATE AND BROADLY PROPORTIONATE MANNER, WHILE ALSO SEEKING TO AVOID ANY PUBLIC ROW OVER THE ISSUE. BUT I EMPHASISED THAT THERE WAS A LIMIT TO

WHAT WE COULD OR SHOULD BY SAYING TO THE AMERICANS ON THIS SINCE WE WERE TALKING ABOUT JAPANESE RATHER THAN AMERICAN OR BRITISH MONEY. WE WERE THEREFORE READY TO CONTINUE TO SUPPORT THE JAPANESE IN ANY WAY THAT MIGHT BE HELPFUL BUT THE LEAD HAD TO BE TAKEN BY THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT. WERE THERE FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS? AND HAD THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT REALLY SAID THAT AT ANY TIME THAT ALL DOLLARS 9 BILLION WOULD BE EARMARKED FOR THE UNITED STATES?

4. HYODO SAID THAT HE WAS GRATEFUL FOR OUR EFFORTS. THE JAPANESE WERE CONTINUING TO DISCUSS THIS MATTER ACTIVELY (WHETHER ONLY AMONG THEMSELVES OR WITH THE AMERICANS ALSO WAS NOT ENTIRELY CLEAR). THERE HAD BEEN NO FURTHER SPECIFIC DEVELOPMENTS TO REPORT BUT THE MOOD HERE WAS VIRTUALLY UNANIMOUS THAT THE MONEY WAS FOR THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE AND SHOULD BE SPENT ON LOGISTIC ITEMS RATHER THAN WEAPONS SYSTEMS. THERE WAS PERHAPS A POTENTIAL POLITICAL PROBLEM IN THE UNITED STATES IF BAKER HAD TO GO BACK ON HIS CLAIM THAT THE FULL DOLLARS 9 BILLION WAS FOR THE AMERICANS BUT FOR ITS PART THE JAPANESE BUREAUCRACY'S (PRIMARILY MFA) INTENTION WAS TO WORK OUT A SUITABLE DIVISION OF THAT SUM AND TO PRESENT IT TO THE PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE FOR APPROVAL WHICH AT THAT STAGE HE THOUGHT SHOULD CAUSE NO PROBLEM. BUT HE DID NOT WANT JAPANESE MINISTERS TO BE BROUGHT INTO THE DEBATE AT AN EARLIER STAGE (HE DID NOT SPELL IT OUT BUT IT WAS EVIDENT THAT HE WAS CONCERNED THAT JAPANESE MINISTERS MIGHT FLINCH UNDER AMERICAN PRESSURE).

5. I STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT WE SHOULD IN NO WAY ENTERTAIN THE DE ICES FLOATED BY BAKER IN YOUR TELEPHONE CALL, BASICALLY DESIGNED TO SUGGEST THAT WE MIGHT BETWEEN US FINESSE THE TIMING OF VARIOUS TRANCHES OF JAPANESE FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE. AS YOU SAID, IT IS VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE TO IMAGINE THE JAPANESE COMING UP WITH MORE MONEY FOR THE GULF OPERATIONS (AS OPPOSED PERHAPS TO FINANCE FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND REFUGEE ASSISTANCE AFTER THE END OF THE FIGHTING). GIVEN THE DIFFICULTY WHICH THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT STILL HAVE TO FACE IN OBTAINING DIET APPROVAL FOR FUNDING THE PRESENT DOLLARS 9 BILLION, IT IS HARD TO BELIEVE THAT THE AMERICANS GENUINLY THINK OTHERWISE.

6. I REMAINS TO BE SEEN HOW BAKER'S POLITICAL PROBLEM (WHICH SEEMS TO BE SUBSTANTIALLY IF NOT ENTIRELY OF HIS OWN MAKING) CAN BE DEFUSED. AT THIS END WE SHALL CONTINUE TO KEEP IN DAILY TOUCH WITH THE MFA WHILE EMPHASISING TO OTHERS THE PROPORTION OF OUR EFFORT IN THE GULF WITHOUT TOUCHING ON SPECIFIC FINANCIAL DETAILS

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AS SUGGESTED IN MY TELNO 95 OUR SINGLE MOST HELPFUL MOVE IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS IS LIKELY TO BE THE COMPILATION AND SUBMISSION TO THE JAPANESE OF AN ITEMIZED LIST SUPPORTING OUR BID FOR ABOUT 8 PER CENT OF THE DOLLARS 9 BILLION.

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OUR TELNO 341: IRAQ/KUWAIT: WASHINGTON SITREP

SUMMARY

1. CHENEY DISCUSSES US WAR AIMS AND WARNS OF CONTINUING IRAQI CW THREAT. PRAISE FOR UK EFFORT FROM VICE PRESIDENTI.

DETAIL

2. DEFENCE SECRETARY CHENEY GAVE TWO TELEVISION INTERVIEWS OVER THE WEEKEND. ASKED WHETHER US WAR AIMS WERE EXPANDING, HE SAID THE PRIMARY OBJECTIVE WAS TO GET IRAQI FORCES OUT OF KUWAIT, AND THE SECOND WAS TO ELIMINATE SADDAM'S OFFENSIVE MILITARY CAPABILITIES: QUOTE THAT IS THE KEY, IF WE ARE GOING TO RESTORE STABILITY AND SECURITY IN THE REGION UNQUOTE. HE ADDED THAT THE US HAD NO DESIGNS ON BAGHDAD OR WISH TO INFLECT UNNECESSARY DAMAGE ON THE IRAQI NATION. ASKED WHAT THE US WOULD DO IF SADDAM WITHDREW ACROSS THE KUWAITI BORDER BUT MAINTAINED AN AGGRESSIVE POSTURE, HE SAID THAT IRAQI CAPABILITY HAD ALREADY BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCED, BUT THE US MIGHT WANT TO MAINTAIN SANCTIONS TO DENY THEM THE ABILITY TO REBUILD.

3. CHENEY DESCRIBED THE IRAQI AIRFORCE AS TOTALLY INEFFECTIVE AND THE NAVY AS PRETTY WELL NEUTRALISED. HE SAID THAT, ALTHOUGH THE AIR CAMPAIGN WAS MAKING SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS AGAINST IRAQI GROUND FORCES, THERE WAS STILL A NEED TO BE CAUTIOUS. IRAQ STILL HAD SCUD CAPABILITY AND, IT HAD TO BE ASSUMED, A CHEMICAL CAPABILITY TIED TO THE SCUDS.

4. CHAIRMAN OF THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE, ASPIN, SAID TODAY (3 FEBRUARY) THAT HE THOUGHT THE ADMINISTRATION WERE UNDER SOME PRESSURE TO GET THE WAR OVER WITH BUT SHOULD RESIST THE TEMPTATION TO MOVE TOO QUICKLY TO A GROUND OFFENSIVE. (MEDIA COMMENTATORS HAVE ECHOED THE THEME WITH ONE ARGUING THAT THE TIME TO MOVE TO THE GROUND OFFENSIVE WAS WHEN FURTHER AIRSTRIKES WERE DOING NO MORE THAN MAKING THE RUBBLE BOUNCE.) ASPIN ALSO ARGUED THAT THE REMOVAL OF SADDAM HUSSEIN WAS STARTING TO BECOME A WAR

OBJECTIVE. HE THOUGHT THIS COULD TURN OUT TO BE A COSTLY ERROR.
5. ASKED IN AN INTERVIEW ON 2 FEBRUARY ABOUT THE ALLIED CONTRIBUTION TO THE WAR EFFORT, VICE PRESIDENT QUAYLE SAID THAT THE UK HAD BEEN QUOTE VERY FORTHCOMING, VERY SUPPORTIVE UNQUOTE. AFTER MENTIONING THE CONTRIBUTION OF OTHER COUNTRIES, QUAYLE RETURNED TO HIS THEME SAYING QUOTE THE BRITISH HAVE BEEN MAGNIFICENT UNQUOTE.

6. THE MAIN NEWS STORIES HERE ON 3 FEBRUARY HAVE BEEN THE ADMISSION BY THE US MILITARY THAT THE DEATHS OF SEVEN MARINES WHO IN THEIR ARMoured VEHICLE NEAR KHAFJI LAST WEEK HAD BEEN CAUSED BY FRIENDLY FIRE, AND THE LOSS OF A B52 BOMBER IN THE INDIAN OCEAN YESTERDAY.

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MR W D REEVES CABINET OFFICE
SIR C CURWEN CABINET OFFICE
MR CHARLTON CABINET OFFICE
MR GOWAN, CABINET OFFICE
PS/NUMBER 10 DOWNING ST
SIR P CRADOCK, 10 DOWNING ST
CABINET OFFICE DIO
SIR ROBIN BUTLER, CAB OFFICE
LT COL CRONIN CAB OFFICE
MR SHAPLAND CAB OFFICE
AUS (C) MODUK
HD/SEC (O) (C) MODUK
MR LS SMITH BANK ENGLAND (2)
MR WICKS HMT
PS/CHIEF SEC TO THE TREASURY
~~EMERGENCY UNIT~~
RESIDENT CLERK



P. a. 4 1/2

Charles
Mon 22 April
at 1500?



S 4 1/2

10 DOWNING STREET

London

Can we find
one here for

QALS ZAWAWI,

the Prime Minister

of Oman, in the

week of 22

April.

C. D.

CONFIDENTIAL

12
c/c

PRIME MINISTER

QAIS ZAWAWI

Air Marshal Sir Erik Bennett telephoned early this morning on his return from Muscat, to say that the Sultan wanted to send Qais Zawawi (the acting Prime Minister, whom you sat next to at the Sultan's dinner) to London in the last week of April. The purpose would be to compare notes on strategic thinking about post-conflict regional security, and discuss bilateral relations. The Sultan wanted the proposed visit to be known only to you at this stage: although later he would hope that arrangements could be made for Qais Zawawi to see the Foreign Secretary and others.

I imagine that you will want to agree to this. It is not an easy week - State visit of President Walesa and likely visit of President de Klerk. But I am sure we could find an hour for Qais Zawawi (though probably not a meal: it might anyway be more appropriate for the Foreign Secretary to do that).

Bennett also told me that the Sultan was aware of 'your' unhappiness over the award of the airport contract to PANAM rather than International Aeradio (IAL). He had therefore instructed that the training part of the contract go to IAC.

(C. D. POWELL)

4 February 1991

c:\wpdocs\foreign\Qais (srw)

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET AND PERSONAL



10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

4 February 1991

IRAQ: INTELLIGENCE ON OPERATIONS

The Prime Minister has on several occasions expressed surprise at the paucity of prompt, reliable information on the fighting in the Gulf. We depend either on the letters which come in some evenings, recounting conversations with General Schwarzkopf or CBFME: or on what CDS is able to tell us the following day at meetings of the War Cabinet (on days when such meetings are held). The result is that we are actually sometimes behind the media in our knowledge of what is happening on the ground: the events of last Friday are a case in point.

The Prime Minister would like to remedy this, and I think the best way would be to have a regular reporting telegram once or twice a day from our Commander and his staff in the field, giving their best understanding of what is going on. The purpose is not to interfere with operations or with the arrangements for publicity. It is simply to ensure that we get early and accurate intelligence from the theatre for the Prime Minister's private information. I understand there are adequate staff to produce such information: indeed we were originally given an assurance that it would be forthcoming.

Unless your Secretary of State sees great objection, I should be grateful if this procedure could be introduced with immediate effect.

CHARLES POWELL

Simon Webb Esq
Ministry of Defence

SECRET AND PERSONAL

File 18 EAM
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bc PC

Royal Embassy of
Saudi Arabia
London

مملكة العربية السعودية



Subject to MASTER
OPS

مملكة العربية السعودية
بشأن

The Right Honourable John Major, MP.,
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom.

MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T40A/91

Cordial Greetings.

I greatly appreciate your letter dated 22nd January 1991, in which you expressed sympathy with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, regarding the Iraqi missile attacks to which the two cities of Dhahran and Riyadh were subjected. As you have stated such an aimless and haphazard act against civilian targets reflects the true nature of the aggressor and demonstrates his irresponsible behaviour. We praise Allah that these attacks did not lead to any appreciable damage and we are confident that right will eventually triumph and that the attack will not achieve its objectives.

With reference to what you have stated, Prime Minister, about the attack on Israel and what the Iraqi regime was aiming to achieve by such an attack, it was merely to extend the area of the war. There is no doubt that such an aim was very obvious judging by its conduct and actions which were meant to draw away the attention from the regime's occupation of Kuwait and therefore it is of the utmost importance to be aware of this fact.

I would like to reiterate with what you have stated regarding the co-operation between the Air Forces of our two friendly Countries and to emphasise that we look, with very hopeful hearts, to the establishment of peace, security and stability in the region, and the restoration of the legitimate Government of Kuwait in accordance with the Resolutions adopted by the international community.

In conclusion I wish you, Prime Minister, continuous good health and happiness as well as lasting well-being and prosperity for the people of the United Kingdom.

Please accept my good wishes and highest consideration.

Your Friend,
Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques,

Fahd bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud,
King of Saudi Arabia.

Riyadh - 20 Rajab 1411H
Corresponding to 4th February, 1991.

copy attached



دولة السيد/ جون ميجر

رئيس وزراء المملكة المتحدة

تحية طيبة وبعد،

فاقدر كثيرا ماتضمنته رسالة دولتكم بتاريخ ٢٢ يناير ١٩٩١ من التعاطف مع المملكة العربية السعودية تجاه ماتعرضت له مدينتي الظهران والرياض من هجوم عراقي بالصواريخ. وكما ذكرتم فان هذا الفعل العشوائي ضد أهداف مدنية يعكس طبيعة المعتدي ويدل على تصرفه غير المسؤول ونحمد الله ان هذا الهجوم لم يسفر عن اضرار تذكر ونثق بان الحق سيعلو في النهاية وان الاعتداء لن يحقق أهدافه. وبالنسبة لما ذكره دولتكم عن الهجوم على اسرائيل وأن هدف النظام العراقي منه توسيع رقعة الحرب فلاشك ان هذا الهدف واضح من تصرفاته التي يقصد منها صرف النظر عن احتلال الكويت وان التنبه لهذا يظل في غاية الأهمية.

هذا وانوه بما اشترتم اليه عن التعاون القائم بين القوات الجوية في بلدينا الصديقين وأؤكد اننا نتطلع بقلوب مفعمة بالأمل الى احلال السلام والامن والاستقرار في المنطقة وعودة الشرعية لدولة الكويت وفقا للقرارات التي أصدرها المجتمع الدولي. وفي الختام اتمنى لدولتكم دوام الصحة والسعادة ولشعب المملكة المتحدة ودوام الرخاء والازدهار. وتقبلو تحياتي وتقديري،،،

صديقكم

خادم الحرمين الشريفين

خادم الحرمين الشريفين

فهد بن عبدالعزيز آل سعود

ملك المملكة العربية السعودية

الرياض في ٢٠ رجب ١٤١١هـ
الموافق ٤ فبراير ١٩٩١م

⑤

ADDRESS BY THE PRIME MINISTER, MR. YITZHAK SHAMIR TO THE JIA MISSION

ON SUNDAY 3 FEBRUARY, 1991 AT 4 P.M.

AT THE KNESSET

Mr. Chairman, Dear Friends,

I am very pleased to welcome you to Yerushalayim, the eternal capital of our State, and the heart and soul of the entire Jewish people. For centuries, this city and this land have overcome wars, occupation and attacks by dictators and tyrants. And so it is today. You may be sure that, as always, our strength and our spirit will prevail over the evil designs of the tyrant in Baghdad. We have returned to Yerushalayim and to Eretz Israel, and will never be separated from this land again.

We are getting much praise for our policy of restraint. In fact, we don't have a policy of restraint; nor do we have a policy of retaliation. They are not principles. Our policy is the defence of our country and population. Our policy is to provide maximum security for our people. If, today, we exercise restraint, it does not necessarily mean that we shall do so tomorrow. We shall always use the appropriate means to achieve our goal of security, as we did, for example, in 1981, to deprive this evil man of the nuclear capability. Now, the whole world remembers our action with gratitude.

We are not alone in the struggle against Iraq and, therefore, we have to take account of the circumstances and the timing of anything we do, and coordinate any plans we have with our friend and ally, the United States of America. We admire the leadership of President Bush; We appreciate the role

✓ Prime Minister
Re Israeli
Ambassador wanted
you no
see X
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of Prime Minister Major and the contribution of the British forces - especially the R.A.F. - in the present conflict. But, let me stress - we don't want a single U.S., British or Allied soldier to shed his blood for us. We are, as always, perfectly capable of defending ourselves. All we say to the United States is what Churchill said at the beginning of the War: "Give us the tools and we will do the job."

For the people of Israel this is an unusual war. We have not mobilised our army nor called up our reserves. This time the real front is our civilian population. They are the fighters; they are in the forefront of the struggle. The army, of course, is not passive. They are active as always, and doing what they have to do. But the main burden is on the civilian population. We are proud of their behaviour and of their courage as, I am sure, you are, too.

You have seen - and even experienced - the effect of the war on our Home Front. You have met the people - the men, the women, the children who behave in an exemplary manner as they carry out the orders of the military and civilian authorities. I would like to say to you, in particular, that the fortitude of the British people at the time of the Blitz serves as an example for us.

Your visit is an encouragement. It shows that we are not alone, and that the entire Jewish people and many, many friends are with us in this period of test and challenge.

I hope that the international community will learn some lessons from what is happening now. For example, they must re-think their approach to the

so-called "moderate" Arab leaders. Not long ago Saddam Hussein was defined by statesmen and media, especially in Europe, as a "moderate" leader. King Hussein has also gained the reputation of a moderate, but he identifies with Saddam Hussein even today.

And the PLO was not long ago regarded as an important partner in any peace process. Now the world is learning the real essence of this organization. After a few phrases by Saddam Hussein about his intention to burn half of Israel they dropped all their moderate pretences and their so-called renunciation of terrorism. They are the most devoted partisans of Saddam Hussein. They should have no place in any process that is aimed at achieving coexistence and peace. They are the opposite of both.

Already, some political factors are looking beyond the war to a future political settlement in the Middle East, and the assumption is made that Israel will be pressured to satisfy certain Arab demands. Therefore, let me say right now, we need no pressure, we need no encouragement. We are still the only people in this region who hate war and are ready, and anxious, to negotiate peace. We are yet to see the first Arab government, apart from Egypt, that will show willingness to end the state of war with Israel and talk peace with us.

My friends, the remarkable character of our people is demonstrated by the fact that in the midst of this crisis; in the days and nights when the missiles are falling upon our country, we have not, for a moment, forgotten or stopped the great Aliyah from the Soviet Union, Ethiopia and other countries. We are full of admiration for the olim who are not deterred by the bombs, nor frightened by the emergency. Where else in the world can you

see immigrants arriving by plane, singing and dancing and then, receiving their papers together with their gas masks? They tell us how proud they are to be with the people of Israel in these difficult days and our people embrace them and go out of their way to welcome them and help them set up a new life in their new homeland.

It is our principal duty to absorb this Aliyah even in these most difficult circumstances. But we cannot do it alone. This is a time for the Jewish people throughout the world to mobilise all its capacities, resources and strength to fulfil this duty. In all the 42 years of Statehood we have not faced such a challenge and such an opportunity. We are targets in a cruel war, and have suffered casualties and extensive damage that needs to be repaired at once. At the same time, we are proceeding with the biggest Aliyah in the history of our country! The figure for the month of January was 15,000 immigrants, which is bigger than the total Aliyah from all over the world in each year from 1984 to 1989!

This is an extraordinary hour for the Jewish people, and we are lucky to be part of it. I call upon you to double and treble your efforts - and even more - for the great common cause that unites us in spirit.

My friends, in spite of present concerns and anguish, we believe completely in the bright future of our people. After this crisis we shall enter a period of great progress for Am Israel and Eretz Israel. As our enemies are destroyed, or weakened, we pray to the Almighty that we shall see the dawn of a long, long period, in which there will be "no more war", and the people of Israel will enjoy true and lasting peace. SHALOM!



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SIR CHARLES POWELL

Iraq: Intelligence on Operations

We need to improve the supply of intelligence from the field to London.

2. The Prime Minister has remarked several times on the paucity of reliable information on the fighting. I have had to fall back on the fact that the military commanders in Saudi Arabia are holding the information very tightly and that others, including the intelligence communities in Washington and London, are being starved. Before hostilities we on our side were assured this would not be so.

3. We had a striking example on Friday. The media were all day full of reports of intense bombing of Iraqi troop movements behind the front. JIC had nothing, nor had MOD. Since I was seeing the Prime Minister, I made contact with CIA in Washington, only to find that they were in a similar predicament. It now appears, a day later, that a large number of sorties were flown against Iraqi troop movements, much as the media claimed, though they exaggerated. The media and public were better informed than the Prime Minister.

4. This is not good enough. If we do not get better and quicker intelligence our assessments will be outdated and inaccurate and Ministers will be misled. It is not sufficient to rely on an occasional letter from CDS, based on a telephone talk with Air Marshal Hine.

5. The situation would be vastly improved if the Prime Minister were to request a regular reporting telegram ^{once or} twice a day from our commander and his staff in the field, giving




their best understanding of what is going on. This should go to MOD but be copied direct to the Cabinet Office and to No 10.

6. We should of course explain to General de la Billière that this is in no way an attempt to interfere with operations or with arrangements for publicity. What we want is simply early and accurate intelligence from the theatre for the Prime Minister's private information.

le

PERCY CRADOCK

3 February 1991



MEETING RECORDED

SECRET AND PERSONAL

SUBJECT MATTER



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CDP

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

3 February 1991

Dear Richard,

THE GULF: PRIME MINISTER'S TALK WITH PRESIDENT BUSH

President Bush telephoned the Prime Minister this evening for a general round-up on the Gulf.

The President said that he had no specific agenda. He thought things were going reasonably well. He was just on his way back to Washington for a meeting with Cheney, Baker, Powell and Scowcroft to review progress. He had spoken yesterday to King Fahd, President Mubarak and the Amir of Qatar: they had all seemed reasonably relaxed and not fussing about a premature ceasefire. He had been a bit worried that the joint statement agreed by Baker and Bessmertnykh might have started a few hares.

The Prime Minister said that we too were quite content with the way things were going. We had succeeded in damping down speculation about the Baker/Bessmertnykh statement quickly, and it was not an issue. Public opinion in the United Kingdom was resolute and prepared for the conflict to last longer than some had initially thought. The case for completing the air campaign before starting ground action was well taken. The effects of the massive bombing were clearly building up and that was becoming increasingly clear to public opinion. Beyond that, we were turning our minds to how the conflict might end and to post-conflict security arrangements.

The President said that the American military experts were now telling him that the land battle would not be particularly bloody or prolonged. If we needed a land assault at all, it would be relatively quick. They reached this view after assessing the damage done by bombing to the Republican Guards and other forces and from the evidence of prisoner interviews. He agreed with the Prime Minister there was no need to rush into a land battle. He would be discussing the timing of it with his principal advisors this evening and would let the Prime Minister know any conclusion they reached. He was not sure that the American ground forces were yet fully ready, although they should be very soon. More generally, public opinion in the United States was resolute and he did not sense any restlessness or desire to hurry things up.

The President continued that he had talked to the Pakistani Prime Minister yesterday and had found him concerned about what

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
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the American reaction would be if Saddam Hussein offered to withdraw from Kuwait on condition that all foreign forces withdrew from the area. He had replied that Saddam Hussein was in no position to set conditions. The Prime Minister said that we had some concern about a scenario under which Saddam Hussein decided to withdraw with some of his forces still intact and declare a victory. He would say that he had stood up to the United States, bloodied its nose and was now preparing for the battle with Israel. It was important that he should be seen to lose and be humiliated, so that he had no credibility left. It would be most unfortunate if he emerged from the conflict with any sort of prestige. We must do everything to keep up pressure on his forces and destroy them as comprehensively as possible before the conflict ended. The President said that General Scowcroft and I had discussed this scenario, very much on the lines described by the Prime Minister, and he himself had no difficulty with it. President Mubarak took the view that it was impossible for Saddam Hussein to withdraw. One of the advantages of a land battle would be that it would destroy an even higher proportion of Saddam Hussein's forces. We needed to think through the end-game. We did not want Saddam Hussein to be another Nasser. It would be much simpler all round if his own people took him out. The President concluded that he and the Prime Minister would need to discuss these matters further in a few days' time.

The President said that he had not recently talked to President Mitterrand. There was some concern in Washington about the fact that the French had sent an envoy to Iran. The Prime Minister said that the French had assured us that he was not engaged in talks with the Iraqis. It might be easier if he were to ring President Mitterrand. The President said that he would welcome this.

The Prime Minister said that he had been sorry to hear about the loss of a B52 in the Indian Ocean. The President said that he wanted to thank the Prime Minister for the very quick and helpful response to his request to accept the stationing of some B52s in the United Kingdom. All in all things were going pretty well and he was glad that Britain and the United States were in there together.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence) and to Sir Robin Butler.

Yours sincerely,

C. D. POWELL

Richard Gozney, Esq.
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

SECRET AND PERSONAL

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FM RIYADH

TO FLASH FCO

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AND TO FLASH UKREP BRUSSELS (FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY)

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
COI RETRACT 21 TO ABIDJAN AND TELECON AMBASSADOR/NIXON: YOUR SPEECH ON REGIONAL SECURITY

1. I AM AFRAID A SUDDEN STORM HAS BLOW UP WHICH HAS IMPLICATIONS FOR YOUR VISIT HERE. PRINCE SAUD HAS JUST CALLED ME ROUND TO HIS HOUSE TO SAY THAT CERTAIN PASSAGES IN YOUR SPEECH AT BLABY HAVE SERIOUSLY UPSET THE KING. THERE WERE TWO POINTS AT ISSUE. FIRST THE KING WAS DISTURBED TO SEE US PUBLICLY AIRING IDEAS ON HOW BRITAIN MIGHT CONTRIBUTE TO GULF SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS, INCLUDING POSSIBLE MILITARY SUPPORT, WITHOUT HAVING COMPARED IDEAS PRIVATELY WITH THE SAUDIS. SUCH ISSUES HAD BEEN EXPECTED TO BE DISCUSSED DURING YOUR VISIT HERE. THEY WERE STILL VERY SENSITIVE TO A MIDDLE EASTERN AUDIENCE AND NEEDED TO BE DEALT WITH PRIVATELY. ALL SORTS OF UNHELPFUL INFERENCES WERE NOW BEING DRAWN BOTH WITHIN SAUDI ARABIA AND ELSEWHERE OVER WHAT WE MIGHT HAVE IN MIND, INCLUDING THE SENSITIVE ISSUE OF AN ONGOING MILITARY PRESENCE. THESE ISSUES STILL HAD ECHOES FOR ARABS AND THEIR PUBLIC DISCUSSION PLAYED INTO SADDAM'S HANDS.

2. THE SECOND POINT WHICH HAD GIVEN OFFENCE INVOLVED THE STATEMENT THAT THE GULF STATES MIGHT HAVE IN THE CONTEXT OF SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS A ROLE IN PROVIDING ECONOMIC HELP FOR THEIR LESS WELL ENDOWED MUSLIM PARTNERS WITH THE OBJECT OF GREATER EQUALITY. THIS COMMENT GAVE CREDENCE TO SADDAM'S ARGUMENTS ABOUT 'HAVES' AND 'HAVE NOTS' AND HIS POPULIST ALLEGATIONS OF GULF STATES MEANNESS. IN PRACTICE SAUDI ARABIA HAD A LONG RECORD OF GENEROSITY AND WOULD CONTINUE IN THIS WAY. THE STATEMENT WITH ITS IMPLICATION THAT GREATER EFFORT WAS NEEDED HERE WAS UNJUST, AND DID NOT HELP OUR COMMON PURPOSE.

3. SAUD WENT ON TO ASK YOU TO TAKE A VERY EARLY OPPORTUNITY TO CLARIFY THE REMARKS IN YOUR SPEECH ON THESE TWO ASPECTS, TO PUT IT BEYOND ANY DOUBT PUBLICLY THAT WE SAW IT AS THE PREROGATIVE OF THE REGIONAL STATES TO DECIDE HOW THEY COULD BEST TOGETHER WORK OUT THEIR FUTURE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS, AND ALSO THAT THE RECORD OF BENEFICENCE OF SAUDI ARABIA AND HER PARTNERS WAS WELL ESTABLISHED

PAGE 1
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FLASH

FLASH

AND APPRECIATED. UNLESS THIS COULD BE DONE HE WARNED THAT THE TIMING OF YOUR VISIT HERE MIGHT BE CALLED IN QUESTION, GIVEN THE SPECULATION AND COMMENT ON THESE TWO POINTS WHICH THE SPEECH WITH ITS ATTENDANT PUBLICITY HAD AROUSED.

4. I SOUGHT TO PUT YOUR COMMENTS IN THEIR PROPER PERSPECTIVE. SAUD SHOULD RECOGNISE THAT YOU WERE OPERATING IN AN ENVIRONMENT IN WHICH OPTIONS FOR GULF SECURITY WERE MATTERS OF PUBLIC COMMENT AND INTEREST. I TOOK HIM THROUGH THE PASSAGES IN QUESTION POINTING OUT THAT THEIR THRUST HAD BEEN TO FEND OFF SUGGESTIONS THAT WE SOUGHT SOME LATTER DAY IMPERIALIST ROLE OR A MILITARY PRESENCE. IT WAS CLEAR THAT WE LOOKED FOR A LEAD FROM SAUDI ARABIA AND HER NEIGHBOURS. YOUR SPEECH AIMED TO PLAY DOWN SPECULATION. I KNEW IT WOULD BE A MATTER OF MUCH REGRET TO YOU TO SEE IT MISINTERPRETED OR CAUSING OFFENCE. WE WERE IN THIS VENTURE TOGETHER AND NO MISUNDERSTANDING MUST COME BETWEEN US. ON THE ECONOMIC REDISTRIBUTION POINT SAUDI ARABIA'S GENEROUS RECORD IN ASSISTANCE TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES PARTICULARLY IN THE ISLAMIC WORLD WAS WELL KNOWN TO US ALL. THIS GENEROSITY CONTINUED. IT HAD NOT BEEN YOUR INTENTION TO SUGGEST IN ANY WAY IT WAS A NEW FEATURE.

5. SAUD ASKED ME TO ASSURE YOU THAT HE IN NO WAY QUESTIONED THE THINKING BEHIND YOUR SPEECH. WE WERE VERY CLOSE AT THIS TIME, AS THE PRESENCE OF SO MANY BRITISH FORCES HERE AMPLY DEMONSTRATED. BUT THE FACT WAS THAT THESE PARTICULAR PASSAGES IN THE SPEECH WERE CAUSING DAMAGING COMMENT. HE ASKED THAT IN SUCH PUBLIC STATEMENTS WE TAKE INTO ACCOUNT ARAB SUSCEPTIBILITIES AND OTHER HISTORICAL BACKGROUND, AS WELL AS OUR OWN PUBLIC CONSTITUENCY. UNLESS THE RECORD COULD QUICKLY BE PUT STRAIGHT AN EARLY VISIT BY YOU WHICH WOULD CLEARLY INVOLVE DISCUSSION OF THESE IMPORTANT ISSUES COULD FEED AWKWARD COMMENT. I ASKED THAT HE PERMIT YOU TO JUDGE HOW THE TWO POINTS OF CONCERN HE HAD RAISED COULD BEST BE HANDLED IN ORDER TO ALLAY CONCERN AND COMMENT. WE OBVIOUSLY NEEDED TO BE CAREFUL THAT ANY ACTION WE TOOK DID NOT SIMPLY COMPOUND CONTROVERSY. SAUD ACCEPTED THIS BUT PRESSED THAT SOME EARLY MOVE BE MADE TO PUT THE RECORD STRAIGHT. IN PARTICULAR HE NEEDED URGENTLY TO KNOW HOW YOU THOUGHT THESE TWO POINTS COULD BEST BE TACKLED. HE ASKED FOR A REPLY BEFORE TOMORROW'S COUNCIL OF MINISTERS' MEETING AT WHICH THE KING WOULD ASK HIM ABOUT THE ISSUE.

COMMENT

6. IT IS VERY TIRESOME THAT YOUR SPEECH WITH ITS CLARIFICATION OF OUR POSITION ACROSS THE BOARD SHOULD HAVE PRODUCED THIS ADVERSE REACTION. BUT, AS WE ARE ALSO BEING TOLD BY OTHER SAUDI CONTACTS,

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THE PASSAGES IN QUESTION DO TOUCH ON DORMANT POST IMPERIAL SENSITIVITIES AND ARE SEEN AS PROVIDING AMMUNITION WHICH SADDAM WILL EXPLOIT. SAUDI ARABIA, AND KING FAHD IN PARTICULAR, REMAINS (UNLIKE SOME GCC PARTNERS) ULTRA SENSITIVE OVER ANY PUBLIC REFERENCE TO THE POSSIBILITY OF A WESTERN MILITARY PRESENCE. THE CRISIS HAS NOT CHANGED THIS. IN ITS OTHER PARTS SAUD TOLD ME HE HAD NO DIFFICULTY WITH THE SPEECH.

7. THIS MAY LOOK LIKE A STORM IN A TEA CUP, BUT IT LOOKS SERIOUS, AND COULD PREJUDICE THE TIMING OF YOUR VISIT. I HOPE YOU CAN LET ME HAVE A MESSAGE WHICH I CAN GIVE TO SAUD BEFORE 0800Z TOMORROW MORNING (4 FEBRUARY) GIVING NOT ONLY REASSURANCE AS TO OUR APPROACH OVER GULF SECURITY, BUT ALSO AN INDICATION OF HOW WE CAN PUT THE RECORD STRAIGHT ON THE TWO POINTS OF CONCERN AND WHAT EARLY OPPORTUNITY EG IN BRUSSELS THIS EVENING OR TOMORROW YOU MAY HAVE FOR MAKING THIS CLEAR. UNLESS WE CAN CLEAR THIS CLOUD AWAY I FEAR WE SHALL NOT BE ABLE TO GET AHEAD WITH THE PLANNING FOR YOUR VISIT. I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THIS SHARP REACTION REPRESENTS A TACTICAL REACTION TO OUR BID FOR AN ADDITIONAL BURDEN-SHARING CONTRIBUTION. THERE IS A REAL SENSITIVITY HERE. FOR US IT WOULD BE A GREAT PITY, INCLUDING IN THE BURDEN SHARING CONTEXT IF WE WERE TO LOSE YOUR VISIT AT THIS POINT.

MUNRO

YYYY

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MR BERMAN (LEGAL ADVISERS)
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SIR P CRADOCK, 10 DOWNING ST
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CHIEF OF ASS STAFF CAB OFFICE
MR REEVES CAB OFFICE (VIA H29)

PAGE 3
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MR APLEYARD CAB OFFICE (H29)
MR D GOWAN CAB OFFICE (H29)
HD/SEC (O) (C) MODUK
RESIDENT CLERK

NNNN

FLASH

ELASH



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

Telephone 01-218 2111/3 (Direct Dialling)

01-218 9000 (Switchboard)

MO 6/17/15/1D

3rd February 1991

Dear Charles,

REPORT FROM RIYADH

The Defence Secretary's colleagues might find it useful to see the attached report from Commanders on Operations today in the Gulf.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries to members of OPD(G) and to Sir Robin Butler.

Yours sincerely,

Bryan Wells

(B H WELLS)
Private Secretary

Sir Charles Powell KCMG
No 10 Downing Street

CDS 2066/2/1

3 Feb 91

PS/Secretary of State

THE VIEW FROM RIYADH - 31800Z FEB 91

1. CDS and the Joint Commander spoke briefly this evening following the latter's discussion with Commanders in theatre. The most encouraging news was the success of Buccaneers since they began offensive operations yesterday. You will have seen the effects of their bombing on the road bridge at As Samawah which crosses the Euphrates some 120 miles South East of Baghdad. Today the aircraft attacked a railway bridge at the same location and 6 bombs on one end of the bridge had "dropped it". Noting the success of laser guided bombing there will be a switch in Tornado deployment to 2 waves from each detachment by day to operate with the Buccaneers or to conduct dive bombing attacks.
2. Gen Schwarzkopf remains pleased with the progress of the air campaign which continues to cause damage to Iraqi ground forces. Evidence that the attacks are affecting the RGFC divisions has been reinforced by the fact that they are now trying to bury their equipment under more sand. In Gen Schwarzkopf's view Saddam Hussein probably thinks that the Allied Forces will mount a ground offensive soon. However when he sees that that is not the case Schwarzkopf expects another attempt to mount a large scale offensive. Commanders still expect the use of chemical warfare soon in the knowledge that chemical weapons have been deployed to the KTO. Recent attacks against convoys are clearly causing a rethink by the Iraqis and future movements are likely to be in much smaller groupings. Iraqi Commanders' complaints about lack of air support have led to the forward deployment of SA6 and the new SA16 surface to air missiles. Of note the A10 lost yesterday was hit by a SA16. Gen Schwarzkopf expressed his concern that some of his aircrew had become careless of late and this had probably contributed to the loss of the AC130 gun ship which had remained over the KTO after daybreak when it should operate over enemy positions only by night. Finally there are some indications of movement of heavy armour forward in the Wadi Batin from where a future attack could be launched. Allied forces, which include 1st Armoured Division, are better prepared to meet such an attack than were the forces around Khafji.
3. CDS and the Joint Commander rehearsed the possible options now open to Saddam Hussein for "headline grabbing" noting that his Navy is much depleted and that he has husbanded the more effective components of his Air Force. These options included the possibility of suicide attacks, terrorism, attacks against Turkey, Syria and the Suez Canal. In extremis he might even resort to the use of the RGFC in the front line rather than keep them in reserve.

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
4. UK Tornado bomber employment during the next 24 hours, noting the change of tasking as in paragraph 1, will be as follows. They will be supported by the usual F3 CAP and Tankers:

a. Night - 3rd Feb.

- (1) Dhahran. 1 GR1A (recce mission).
- (2) Tabuk. 4 GR1 (1000lb bombs) supported by 2 GR1 (ALARM).
- (3) Muharrag. 8 GR1 (1000lb bombs).

b. Day - 4 Feb

- (1) Dhahran. 8 GR1 (1000lb bombs)
- (2) Tabuk. 2 x 4 GR1 (1000lb bombs) supported by 2 GR1 (ALARM)
- (3) Muharrag. 2 waves of 4 GR1 each with 2 Buccaneer (LGB/PAVESPIKE).



D G LITTLEJOHNS
Cdre
PSO/CDS
MB6173 83353MB



10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

Some important
papers here, which you
will want to read
in full before OPD(E).

You should see
in particular the
telegram from Riyadh
regarding Mr KING
FAMD is under by the
Foreign Secretary.

speech. I understand
that the Foreign
Secretary, who is in
Brussels, intends to
send a conciliatory
message to ~~King~~
the Prince of
Jordan.

But we may need
a soothing reply
call from you to
King Fahd.
C.D.P.

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Ref.A091/269

PRIME MINISTER

cc Sir Percy Cradock
Mr AppleyardOPD(G) : 4 FebruaryItem 1: Current Military Situation

1. You might invite the Chief of the Defence Staff to report on recent developments. He proposes to give a brief overview, as last Monday, on the state of the sea, land and air campaigns and the progress they are making in achieving the objectives. He is also going to survey Saddam Hussein's present options. Sir Percy Cradock might comment on our assessment of Iraqi intentions behind the battle for Khafji, and whether it was intended to be part of a larger scale invasion. You may also like to mention the assessment sent by General Scowcroft yesterday evening, which will have been circulated to participants. If anything, it is a bit more upbeat than our own but this may be because it is a version of a general briefing circulated to all allies. You will also want to report on the conversation which I understand that you will be having later this evening with President Bush.

2. Officials are currently in Washington discussing policy on the ending and longer-term aftermath of hostilities. A paper on the talks will be tabled for discussion on Wednesday.

Item 2: Current International Situation

3. You might open by saying a word about your own meeting with Vice President Quayle. The Vice President shed little new



light on US thinking, but noted the pressure for an early ground attack, and in the longer term for an international conference. You might invite Mr Hogg to give an account of the Foreign Secretary's telephone conversation with Mr Baker on Friday.

4. You might invite Mr Hogg to report briefly on the United Nations, where we have bought more time, although the new Presidency (Zimbabwe) will not be able to hold off pressure for a formal Security Council meeting indefinitely. He might also cover the recent Iraqi, Algerian, Yemeni and French contacts with Iran. These do not seem to have amounted to any sort of initiative, and the Iranians are reported to have given a firm response to Saddam's message. The French deny that Scheer met the Iraqis in Tehran and the Foreign Office are inclined to believe that their presence was coincidental. The Foreign Minister of the non-aligned movement (NAM) will meet in Belgrade on 11-12 February. Prince Saud has asked for our help in lobbying to see off possible NAM ceasefire proposals. Mr Hogg may mention under this heading briefings given to Commonwealth Governments and attempts to stiffen the Yugoslavs. The Syrian Foreign Minister has asked to come to London to see the Foreign Secretary before 10 February, but his purpose is so far unclear.

5. Apart from a brief report on progress, further discussion of broadsiding might await the Chief Secretary's return from the Gulf and the next meeting of his Sub-Committee on Wednesday, after which he will be reporting back to OPD(G). The Foreign Secretary's visit to Cairo and Saudi Arabia is now becoming firmer for 8 - 10 February.

6. On ICRC, the President of the International Committee (Mr Sommaruga) visits London this week. He made a statement on 1 February which tended to equate Iraq and the allies without highlighting Iraqi violations. You might invite Mr Hogg and the



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Defence Secretary to give their preliminary views on the line that should be taken with him.

X 7. Mr Hogg will also report on the oil slicks. The first slick seems to have settled north of Manifah, 5-10 miles from the coast. The British equipment has arrived and is being installed. The EC has made a formal offer of help. The Saudis are concerned about a second slick heading south from Mina al Bakr. You might invite the Defence Secretary to check that the prevention of the flow by military means is receiving a sufficiently high priority.

8. It would again be premature to discuss closure of the Iraqi Embassy, especially in the absence of the Foreign Secretary, since Mr Hogg is not aware of the all considerations. If anyone raises the issue, I suggest you head it off until a later meeting.

Item 3: Media Handling

9. You might invite the Energy Secretary to report on the broader picture and Mr O'Donnell to cover matters of day-to-day media handling. Now that journalists have returned to Baghdad we may need to counter reports of the effect of the campaign on civilian life in Baghdad, especially when there may not be much new about the allies' operations in the next week or so. It is worth noting, however that the BBC are stopping their continuous television coverage, allegedly on grounds of cost, until the war moves into a new phase. Backbenchers have been provided with material on the US/Soviet statement, POWs and Iran as well as general updates on the international effort. Current media attention is focusing increasingly on war aims, ceasefires and longer-term security arrangements.

R.R.B.

ROBIN BUTLER

3 February 1991



SECRET AND PERSONAL



10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

3 February 1991

GULF BURDEN SHARING: SAUDI ARABIA AND KUWAIT

Thank you for your letter of 1 February about endeavours by Saudi Arabia and Kuwait to raise funds to cover their burden sharing commitments. The Prime Minister has commented that this could be difficult and might mean that we get a dusty response from Kuwait. He would like to be kept informed.


I am copying this letter to Richard Gozney (Foreign and Commonwealth Office), Paul Tucker (Bank of England) and to Sir Robin Butler.

CHARLES POWELL

John Gieve Esq
HM Treasury

SECRET AND PERSONAL

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clforeign/gulf
DO NOT PUT ON
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NO COPY TO PC

DEPARTMENT/SERIES <i>REM 19</i> PIECE/ITEM <i>3446</i> (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract details: <i>Telegram 001 dated 3 February 1991</i>	
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Use black or blue pen to complete form.

Use the card for one piece or for each extract removed from a different place within a piece.

Enter the department and series,
eg. HO 405, J 82.

Enter the piece and item references, .
eg. 28, 1079, 84/1, 107/3

Enter extract details if it is an extract rather than a whole piece.
This should be an indication of what the extract is,
eg. Folio 28, Indictment 840079, E107, Letter dated 22/11/1995.
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MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB
Telephone 01-218 2111/3

MO 6/17/15/1

3rd February 1991

Dear Charles,

When we spoke earlier this afternoon I said I would send you a copy of our internal SITREP on the day's events in the Gulf. This is attached.

Yours sincerely,

Bryan Wells

(B H WELLS)
Private Secretary

Sir Charles Powell KCMG
10 Downing Street

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SEC(O)(C) EVENING BRIEF, 3 FEBRUARY 1991

Summary

- Air campaign continues (including another successful Buccaneer mission). No further Iraqi incursions. US announces loss of B52 over Indian Ocean, and confirms 7 US deaths from "friendly fire".

*[These were the
marines, two days ago]*

General Situation

- Allied air campaign continues as planned, with particular emphasis on Iraqi ground forces, SCUD locations, and hardened aircraft shelters. 1,622 allied sorties planned for today. No significant activity by enemy ground forces across the front. Further Iraqi incursions into Saudi Arabia remain possible.

Political

- Iranian President Rafsanjani has said the only solution to the conflict is Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait and withdrawal of all foreign forces from the region.
- European Community has made a formal approach to Saudis offering assistance to combat Gulf oil spill.
- US Ambassador in London reported to have called the Iranians "practised if not talented liars" during TV interview today, and cast doubt on Tehran's assurance that it would detain Iraqi aircraft.
- Reuters reports that new French Defence Minister Joxe is to leave Paris for Saudi Arabia tomorrow. Polls of the French people apparently show 75% backing for the conflict and rising support for President Mitterand.

UK Operations

Air Operations

- 7 Tornado GR1s from Muharraq armed with 1000lb bombs attacked the An Nassiriyah petrol production storage facility. Secondary fires were observed.
- 12 Tornado GR1s from Tabuk armed with 1000lb bombs attacked the Kirkuk Haifa petrol storage site. All aircraft released their weapons. Secondary fires were observed.
- 8 Tornado GR1s from Dhahran armed with 1000lb bombs attacked Qalat Salih airfield. All aircraft released their weapons.

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- 2 missions of 4 Jaguars each (from Muharraq) successfully attacked separate Silkworm sites in Kuwait with 1000lb bombs.
- 8 Tornado GR1s from Dhahran were tasked to attack a rail junction NW of Tallil airfield; 3 reported hits, 1 missed, 1 air-aborted and 3 experienced hung ordnance.
- 4 Tornado GR1s and 3 Buccaneers from Muharraq successfully attacked Muftar Wadam railway bridge with laser guided bombs; railway and last span of bridge reported probably destroyed.
- RAF combat sorties as at 031600Z:

	since 030100Z	total
Tornado GR1	21	541
Tornado GR1A	0	38
Jaguar	17	233
Tornado F3	9	332
Buccaneer	3	5
Nimrod	1	35
AAR (Victor, VC10K, Tristar)	11	235
	62	1419
Non-combat sorties as at 030400Z		820
		2239

Navy Operations

- JHQ reports that control of the Northern Gulf has been achieved.
- A Dutch merchant ship, the ARCHANGELGRACHT, carrying equipment for UK forces in the Gulf, reported that while transitting the Straits of Hormuz yesterday morning a large open speed boat had made three passes at a distance of about 150-200m and aimed what seemed to be a rocket launcher in its direction. Vessel has now arrived at Jubayl. A review of chartered ship safety is underway.
- One Sea King from FORT GRANGE has made a controlled emergency landing in NW Qatar. All on board reported safe. SAR helicopters launched to investigate.

Army Operations

- The two missing RCT soldiers have been found unhurt. It appears that they failed to report correctly on reaching Al Jubayl and were "misplaced" rather than missing. Investigation underway.

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Allied Operations

- JHQ confirms that one B52 crashed in sea 15 miles NW of Diego Garcia at 2145Z yesterday, while returning from mission. Aircraft earlier reported having to shut down an engine. 3 crew rescued, 3 still missing. US announced loss of B52 "over Indian Ocean" this afternoon, probably due to mechanical failure.
- US confirmed this afternoon that one USMC LAV had been destroyed by a US MAVERICK missile, and 7 Marines killed.
- USMC Cobra attack helicopter lost early this morning just south of Saudi/Kuwait border; both crew killed.
- A US convoy in Saudi Arabia apparently hit by cluster bombs. One US Marine killed, 2 wounded. Bombs probably US. Americans have launched investigation.
- Another Iraqi OSA II missile boat has been badly damaged by USN A6 aircraft at Mina al Ahmadi.
- Kuwaiti A4s and Bahraini F5s yesterday continued to attack artillery positions in the KTO. RSAF fighters attacked H3 airfield, aircraft in the open at Tallil and Tagaddum, and a command post in the KTO. Italian Tornados attacked RGFC elements. French aircraft mounted 3 raids (26 aircraft) against ammunition depots in Iraq and Kuwait. Canadian F18s continued to fly defensive CAPs.
- CENTCOM announced this afternoon that between 68-140 Iraqi aircraft were believed destroyed in their hardened shelters.
- The first 4 (of 8) B52s are scheduled to arrive at RAF Fairford between 2030-2100 tomorrow.

Iraqi activity

- One SCUD fired at Riyadh. PATRIOT intercepted but 29 slightly hurt by falling debris and flying glass. Two SCUDs, 5 hours apart, fired at Tel Aviv; both fell in West Bank, and no casualties or serious damage reported.
- About 100+ vehicles were spotted hiding amongst trees in woods near Basra. A B52 raid was directed over it where the effect was described as similar to "turning on the lights in a room filled with cockroaches".
- Following media reports yesterday of captured ammunition boxes on Um al Maradim Island marked "GHQ JORDAN ARMED FORCE, DIR OF PLNG & ORG, AMMAN JORDAN", ESC reports no information on Jordanian supply of military equipment to Iraq apart from some medical stores last November.

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Logistics

- There are 480 tonnes of Priority 1 air freight in the UK and Germany representing less than one day's airlift capacity.
- All the equipment (220 tonnes) from the Oil Spill Service Centre in Southampton has now arrived in the Gulf. Due to a change in wind direction the first slick is not expected to reach Jubayl until 6 February. Protective booms are in place.


Media reports and coverage

- NOP poll in Sunday Times: 86% support for Gulf War, same as last week; support for Government handling 89% up from 86% last week.
- Sunday Times front page: Saddam Hussein has given front line commanders the go ahead to use CW; quotes a Pentagon source saying "no longer a question of if, but when".
- Up to 20,000 at anti-war rally yesterday in Hyde Park.
- NBC television report an Iranian official as saying that Iraqi pilots who had flown to Iran were not acting on orders from Saddam Hussein.

Other Items

- Pro-Iraqi terrorist attacks in Larnaca, Beirut and Lima; three injured in all.
- A second oil slick appears to be emanating from Mina al Bakr and heading south. New slick (5 x 1nm) sighted east of Ardeshir oilfield, midway between Iraq and Iran in Northern Gulf.

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PRIME MINISTER



THE GULF

You asked three questions on papers over the weekend:

- Why will Saddam Hussein use CW? Two reasons, I think. First battlefield use to soften up the allied forces ahead of an advance into Saudi Arabia. The Iraqis used this technique in the Iran/Iraq war. It won't have much military effect since we are prepared for it. But it will cause alarm. A second possible scenario is use to cause panic among civilians in Israel and Saudi Arabia.

- Can he deliver CW on SCUDs? This is dealt with in today's JIC assessment which I sent down to Chequers. We don't know: we doubt he has the airburst technology to make CW on SCUDs fully effective. But they could be quite nasty even without that.

- Does he have a crude nuclear weapon? The JIC and CIA have been into this at length. The view is that he does not: but he may have a radiological bomb, that is a normal high explosive bomb encased by dirty radioactive scraps. Not very effective except for causing panic. But it could be misinterpreted as a real nuclear weapon, leading to Israeli nuclear retaliation. What is doubtful is his ability to deliver it, given the assessed difficulty of getting his aircraft through to Israel.

C.D.P.

CHARLES POWELL

3 February 1991

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S. Africa. - cc/c/w,
host R. 52. (Fairford).
Dan. Quayle.
officials on military conflict
port conflict Security.
bureau P. A. N. ?

PRIME MINISTER

THE GULF

Baron: may w/ down + down a victory. The hope
hope he is seen as helping. Must be on limited man.

Worried: reparations / oil embargo 'til K long. rep. OK. // U.A. also for
citizens.

I attach a copy of a message which I have received this evening from Brent Scowcroft about the progress of the military campaign. It is generally upbeat. I think it conveys a fair picture, with the qualification that it may be a bit optimistic about the damage being done to the Republican Guard and about the solidity of the international coalition. There are one or two worrying indications that the Non Aligned Movement are beginning to get involved in an unhelpful way, which may undermine the resolve of some of the Arab members of the Coalition.

You will see that Brent offers to send a military briefing team to brief you on the progress of the campaign. There are some risks that this will be seen a bit sniffily in the MOD, as indicating that they are not briefing you properly. But I plan to accept it nonetheless, since I think it is important that you have the fullest possible information. (Incidentally I have arranged for Air Chief Marshal Sir Patrick Hine to come on Tuesday morning to brief you about his visit to Saudi Arabia: and Rear Admiral Kerr, the Chief of Defence Intelligence, to come later that same morning with some of the aerial pictures).

C. 22

CHARLES POWELL

3 February 1991

c:\foreign\scowcroft (kw)

latent.
Prof. long. work.

Prof. for bombing campaign.
Footnote under control.

When do we?
Land battle?
How end?
What security?

Fighting ammunition eff. U.S. app.

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10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

3 February 1991

THE GULF

General Scowcroft rang me this evening, more for a general chat than anything else.

I thanked him for his message (a copy of which I have sent you separately) and said that personally I agreed pretty much with the assessment in it. Our experts were rather less upbeat about the amount of damage inflicted on the Republican Guard. And I was a bit concerned about growing diplomatic activity among the Non-Aligned, which might lead to unhelpful action in the United Nations. General Scowcroft said that he would talk further to Pentagon experts about the damage to the Republican Guard. He agreed about the risks of activity by the NAM and OIC. The President had telephoned the Prime Minister of Pakistan yesterday, to stiffen him up. He had in fact been quite resilient and said he could handle the pressure he was getting.

I reminded General Scowcroft that we were sending a team of officials over for talks in Washington tomorrow about the ending of the conflict and post-conflict security arrangements. There had been some suggestions that a gap was opening up between us and the Americans, with the United Kingdom taking a rather harder line on war aims. I did not think that was really the case, but we certainly took the view that physical withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait would not necessarily be the end of the story, if they continued to pose an active threat to Kuwait. In some circumstances, it might be necessary to go on attacking them to reduce their military capability. General Scowcroft said that he very much agreed with this and had been jotting down some thoughts for the President. He himself took the view that, when the Iraqis left Kuwait, they must be required to leave all their weapons and equipment behind, thus further diminishing Iraq's military strength. I said that I rather doubted there would be a clear cut end to the conflict, with a formal ceasefire agreement: it was more likely to be a rather messy situation without there necessarily being any formal contact between the Iraqis and the Allies. General Scowcroft agreed this might well be the case: but even then it would remain important to do everything possible to reduce the Iraqi armed forces before the conflict ended.

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General Scowcroft added there was still some discussion in Washington of changing the war aims to include the downfall of Saddam Hussein but he did not think this was really feasible. We would have to rely on a lucky hit, or on the Iraqis themselves removing him.

We agreed that it would be useful for the Prime Minister and the President to have a talk later this evening.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence) and to Sir Robin Butler.

CHARLES POWELL

Richard Gozney Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

SECRET AND PERSONAL

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10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

3 February 1991

THE GULF

I enclose a copy of a message which I have received from Brent Scowcroft about the progress of the military campaign in the Gulf. You will note that he says that he would welcome comments and I should be grateful if recipients of this letter would let me know any points they would like to see made in reply. He also offers a visit from a military briefing team to brief the Prime Minister, and I propose to accept this.

The arrangements for discussing "war termination" and post-war arrangements, mentioned in the last paragraph of the letter are of course already in hand. You will note that the Americans remain strongly opposed to the quick convening of an international conference.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Richard Gozney (Foreign and Commonwealth Office), and to Sir Robin Butler.

CHARLES POWELL

Simon Webb Esq
Ministry of Defence

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PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO CHARLES POWELL FROM
BRENT SCOWCROFT AT OPENING OF BUSINESS.

DEAR CHARLES:

AS WE GO THROUGH THE THIRD WEEK OF WAR, I THOUGHT I MIGHT STEP BACK AND OFFER YOU A GENERAL OVERVIEW OF PROGRESS IN THE GULF. I WOULD WELCOME YOUR COMMENTS. WE ARE THINKING ABOUT PUTTING TOGETHER A MILITARY BRIEFING TEAM THAT MIGHT COME BY LONDON IN THE NEAR FUTURE AND SHARE AN EVEN MORE DETAILED PICTURE WITH THE PRIME MINISTER, SUPPLEMENTING THE INFORMATION WE ARE ALREADY SHARING DAY BY DAY.

THE MILITARY PICTURE IS QUITE PROMISING. THE FIRST PHASE OF OUR AIR CAMPAIGN IS ESSENTIALLY COMPLETE. THE IRAQI AIR FORCE AND AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM IS NOW POWERLESS TO INTERFERE WITH OUR OPERATIONS. WE BELIEVE THE FLIGHT OF SOME OF THEIR AIRCRAFT TO IRAN IS SYMPTOMATIC OF A DESPERATE JUDGMENT THAT THIS WAS THE ONLY WAY TO HAVE EVEN A CHANCE OF PRESERVING SOME OF THEIR BETTER AIRCRAFT FOR THE FUTURE. WE HAVE NOTED THE ASSURANCES FROM TEHRAN ABOUT THESE AIRCRAFT. WE DOUBT THEY WILL BE REEMPLOYED IN THE WAR AGAINST US. WE HAVE SEEN NO SIGNS OF PREPARATION FOR SUCH USE AND IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO PREPARE AND MAINTAIN THE AIRCRAFT FOR SUCH OPERATIONS WHILE THEY REMAIN IN IRAN. THE IRANIANS WILL DISPOSE OF THESE AIRCRAFT IN ACCORDANCE WITH IRANS INTERESTS. IF THEY ARE USED AGAINST US, WE WILL BE READY TO DEAL WITH THAT.

OTHER OBJECTIVES IN THE INITIAL PORTION OF THE AIR CAMPAIGN INCLUDED THE DISRUPTION OF IRAQS NUCLEAR, CHEMICAL, AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CAPABILITY AND DEGRADATION OF ITS NATIONAL COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM. THOSE OBJECTIVES HAVE BEEN ACHIEVED. WHERE PARTICULAR FACILITIES SUFFERED ONLY PARTIAL DAMAGE, WE ARE NOW FOLLOWING UP TO FINISH THE JOB. NATIONAL COMMAND AND CONTROL, ALONG WITH COMMAND AND CONTROL IN KUWAIT, CONTINUES TO BE HIT (19 OF 20 NATIONAL COMMAND FACILITIES HAVE BEEN ATTACKED) AND CONTINUES TO DETERIORATE.

IRAQ RETAINS SUBSTANTIAL STOCKS OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS. ALTHOUGH SOME, SUCH AS MUSTARD GAS, MAY POSE A THREAT FOR SOME TIME TO COME, THE NERVE AGENTS WILL DETERIORATE IN WEEKS AND BAGHDAD WILL HAVE DIFFICULTY PRODUCING MORE OR FILLING THEM INTO MUNITIONS. IRAQS DEFENSE INDUSTRIES, ELECTRICAL POWER GENERATION, AND PETROCHEMICAL PLANTS HAVE ALL SUFFERED SEVERE DAMAGE AS WELL.

WE HAVE ALREADY BEGUN THE SECOND PHASE OF THE CAMPAIGN: THE ISOLATION AND DESTRUCTION OF IRAQS FORCES IN KUWAIT. I SHOULD NOTE HERE THAT, ALTHOUGH WE CONTINUE TO GIVE ATTENTION TO THE SCUD THREAT (PERHAPS 150-200 SORTIES A DAY), THIS EFFORT HAS ALREADY PAID OFF IN REDUCED NUMBERS OF MISSILE ATTACKS AND IS NOT AN UNDUE BURDEN ON THE OVERALL CAMPAIGN. THERE IS ABUNDANT EVIDENCE THAT WE HAVE DISRUPTED IRAQS ABILITY TO SUPPLY ITS FORCES IN KUWAIT AND THAT THE BOMBING IS TAKING AN INCREASING TOLL ON THE FORCES THEMSELVES. IT ALSO APPEARS THAT OVER 75

OF THE IRAQI NAVY HAS BEEN SUNK OR DISABLED, AND SURVIVING CRAFT ARE INTERESTED ONLY IN THEIR OWN SURVIVAL. AS YOU KNOW, YOUR FORCES HAVE MADE AN ESPECIALLY LARGE CONTRIBUTION TO THIS NAVAL EFFORT.

RECENT IRAQI OFFENSIVE PROBES INTO SAUDI ARABIA, ALONG WITH ATTEMPTS TO REPOSITION THEIR FORCES -- POSSIBLY FOR FURTHER OFFENSIVE ACTION -- HAVE OFFERED NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR OUR AIRPOWER. WE BELIEVE OUR STRIKES MAY ALREADY HAVE BROKEN UP AT LEAST ONE ATTACK BY III CORPS AND HAVE CAUSED HEAVY LOSSES TO IRAQI UNITS. THE REPUBLICAN GUARDS ARE BEING HIT DAY AND NIGHT. ALTHOUGH THERE IS SADNESS HERE ABOUT ANY LOSS OF OUR SOLDIERS AND AIRMEN, IRAQS APPARENT EFFORT TO EMBROIL US IN COSTLY GROUND BATTLES IS PROVING COSTLY ONLY FOR BAGHDAD. THERE ARE SIGNS OF MORALE PROBLEMS IN THE IRAQI UNITS -- ONE INFANTRY DIVISION IS REPORTING THAT THOUSANDS OF ITS TROOPS HAVE DISAPPEARED FROM THE RANKS.

WE CERTAINLY DO NOT FEEL COMPLACENT. THERE MAY WELL BE ADDITIONAL MISSILE ATTACKS OR OFFENSIVE SALLIES. THE THREAT OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS USE IS QUITE HIGH, ALTHOUGH I BELIEVE WE ARE PREPARED TO MEET IT. THE AIR CAMPAIGN WILL CONTINUE. WE WILL NOT BE DRAWN INTO LAUNCHING ANY GROUND CAMPAIGN BEFORE WE ARE READY, OR BEFORE SUCH ACTION IS NECESSARY TO ACHIEVE OUR GOALS. RECENT AIR ATTACKS HAVE SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCED IRAQS ABILITY TO LAUNCH ATTACKS THAT WOULD REQUIRE A SUBSTANTIAL COUNTER-OFFENSIVE BY THE MULTINATIONAL FORCES.

POLITICALLY THE COALITION REMAINS SOLID. OUR POSITION ON WHAT SADDAM MUST DO TO END THE WAR IS UNCHANGED. ALTHOUGH WE ARE ALREADY WORKING ON THE RANGE OF ISSUES INVOLVED IN WAR TERMINATION AND POSTWAR ARRANGEMENTS, AND WILL WANT TO DISCUSS THESE QUESTIONS IN GREATER DETAIL WITH YOU SOON, THERE HAS BEEN SOME DISCUSSION ABOUT QUICK CONVENING OF A COMPREHENSIVE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE TO ADDRESS ALL OF THE POLITICAL ISSUES IN THE MIDDLE EAST. AS YOU MIGHT GUESS, WE THINK SUCH PLANS ARE PREMATURE.

I LOOK FORWARD TO SPEAKING AGAIN WITH YOU SOON.

SINCERELY,

BRENT SCOWCROFT

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PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO CHARLES POWELL FROM
BRENT SCOWCROFT AT OPENING OF BUSINESS.

DEAR CHARLES:

AS WE GO THROUGH THE THIRD WEEK OF WAR, I THOUGHT I MIGHT STEP BACK AND OFFER YOU A GENERAL OVERVIEW OF PROGRESS IN THE GULF. I WOULD WELCOME YOUR COMMENTS. WE ARE THINKING ABOUT PUTTING TOGETHER A MILITARY BRIEFING TEAM THAT MIGHT COME BY LONDON IN THE NEAR FUTURE AND SHARE AN EVEN MORE DETAILED PICTURE WITH THE PRIME MINISTER. SUPPLEMENTING THE INFORMATION WE ARE ALREADY SHARING DAY BY DAY.

THE MILITARY PICTURE IS QUITE PROMISING. THE FIRST PHASE OF OUR AIR CAMPAIGN IS ESSENTIALLY COMPLETE. THE IRAQI AIR FORCE AND AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM IS NOW POWERLESS TO INTERFERE WITH OUR OPERATIONS. WE BELIEVE THE FLIGHT OF SOME OF THEIR AIRCRAFT TO IRAN IS SYMPTOMATIC

OF A DESPERATE JUDGMENT THAT THIS WAS THE ONLY WAY TO HAVE EVEN A CHANCE OF PRESERVING SOME OF THEIR BETTER AIRCRAFT FOR THE FUTURE. WE HAVE NOTED THE ASSURANCES FROM TEHRAN ABOUT THESE AIRCRAFT. WE DOUBT THEY WILL BE REEMPLOYED IN THE WAR AGAINST US. WE HAVE SEEN NO SIGNS OF PREPARATION FOR SUCH USE AND IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO PREPARE AND MAINTAIN THE AIRCRAFT FOR SUCH OPERATIONS WHILE THEY REMAIN IN IRAN. THE IRANIANS WILL DISPOSE OF THESE AIRCRAFT IN ACCORDANCE WITH IRAN'S INTERESTS. IF THEY ARE USED AGAINST US, WE WILL BE READY TO DEAL WITH THAT.

OTHER OBJECTIVES IN THE INITIAL PORTION OF THE AIR CAMPAIGN INCLUDED THE DISRUPTION OF IRAQ'S NUCLEAR, CHEMICAL, AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CAPABILITY AND DEGRADATION OF ITS NATIONAL COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM. THOSE OBJECTIVES HAVE BEEN ACHIEVED. WHERE PARTICULAR FACILITIES SUFFERED ONLY PARTIAL DAMAGE, WE ARE NOW FOLLOWING UP TO FINISH THE JOB. NATIONAL COMMAND AND CONTROL, ALONG WITH COMMAND AND CONTROL IN KUWAIT, CONTINUES TO BE HIT (13 OF 20 NATIONAL COMMAND FACILITIES HAVE BEEN ATTACKED) AND CONTINUES TO DETERIORATE.

IRAQ RETAINS SUBSTANTIAL STOCKS OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS. ALTHOUGH SOME, SUCH AS MUSTARD GAS, MAY POSE A THREAT FOR SOME TIME TO COME, THE NERVE AGENTS WILL DETERIORATE IN WEEKS AND BAGHDAD WILL HAVE DIFFICULTY PRODUCING MORE OR FILLING THEM INTO MUNITIONS. IRAQ'S DEFENSE INDUSTRIES, ELECTRICAL POWER GENERATION, AND PETROCHEMICAL PLANTS HAVE ALL SUFFERED SEVERE DAMAGE AS WELL.

WE HAVE ALREADY BEGUN THE SECOND PHASE OF THE CAMPAIGN: THE ISOLATION AND DESTRUCTION OF IRAQ'S FORCES IN KUWAIT. I SHOULD NOTE HERE THAT, ALTHOUGH WE CONTINUE TO GIVE ATTENTION TO THE SCUD THREAT (PERHAPS 150-200 SORTIES A DAY), THIS EFFORT HAS ALREADY PAID OFF IN REDUCED NUMBERS OF MISSILE ATTACKS AND IS NOT AN UNDUE BURDEN ON THE OVERALL CAMPAIGN. THERE IS ABUNDANT EVIDENCE THAT WE HAVE DISRUPTED IRAQ'S ABILITY TO SUPPLY ITS FORCES IN KUWAIT AND THAT THE BOMBING IS TAKING AN INCREASING TOLL ON THE FORCES THEMSELVES. IT ALSO APPEARS THAT OVER 75

OF THE IRAQI NAVY HAS BEEN SUNK OR DISABLED, AND SURVIVING CRAFT ARE INTERESTED ONLY IN THEIR OWN SURVIVAL. AS YOU KNOW, YOUR FORCES HAVE MADE AN ESPECIALLY LARGE CONTRIBUTION TO

AND DESTRUCTION OF IRAQI FORCES IN KUWAIT. I SHOULD NOTE HERE THAT, ALTHOUGH WE CONTINUE TO GIVE ATTENTION TO THE SCUD THREAT (PERHAPS 150-200 SORTIES A DAY), THIS EFFORT HAS ALREADY PAID OFF IN REDUCED NUMBERS OF MISSILE ATTACKS AND IS NOT AN UNDUE BURDEN ON THE OVERALL CAMPAIGN. THERE IS ABUNDANT EVIDENCE THAT WE HAVE DISRUPTED IRAQ'S ABILITY TO SUPPLY ITS FORCES IN KUWAIT AND THAT THE BOMBING IS TAKING AN INCREASING TOLL ON THE FORCES THEMSELVES. IT ALSO APPEARS THAT OVER 75

OF THE IRAQI NAVY HAS BEEN SUNK OR DISABLED, AND SURVIVING CRAFT ARE INTERESTED ONLY IN THEIR OWN SURVIVAL. AS YOU KNOW, YOUR FORCES HAVE MADE AN ESPECIALLY LARGE CONTRIBUTION TO THIS NAVAL EFFORT.

RECENT IRAQI OFFENSIVE PROBES INTO SAUDI ARABIA, ALONG WITH ATTEMPTS TO REPOSITION THEIR FORCES -- POSSIBLY FOR FURTHER OFFENSIVE ACTION -- HAVE OFFERED NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR OUR AIRPOWER. WE BELIEVE OUR STRIKES MAY ALREADY HAVE BROKEN UP AT LEAST ONE ATTACK BY III CORPS AND HAVE CAUSED HEAVY LOSSES TO IRAQI UNITS. THE REPUBLICAN GUARDS ARE BEING HIT DAY AND NIGHT. ALTHOUGH THERE IS SADNESS HERE ABOUT ANY LOSS OF OUR SOLDIERS AND AIRMEN, IRAQ'S APPARENT EFFORT TO EMBROIL US IN COSTLY GROUND BATTLES IS PROVING COSTLY ONLY FOR BAGHDAD. THERE ARE SIGNS OF MORALE PROBLEMS IN THE IRAQI UNITS -- ONE INFANTRY DIVISION IS REPORTING THAT THOUSANDS OF ITS TROOPS HAVE DISAPPEARED FROM THE RANKS.

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I LOOK FORWARD TO SPEAKING AGAIN WITH YOU SOON.

SINCERELY,

BRENT SCOWCROFT

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SANDRA PHILLIPS

cc Sir Percy Cradock

Could you please confirm with the MOD that Air Chief Marshal Hine should come to see the Prime Minister on Tuesday at 1100-1145: and Rear Admiral Kerr from 1145-1215.

CAP

CHARLES POWELL

3 February 1991

c:\foreign\diary (kw)

Charles


Percy TON
Meeting with ACM Hine confirmed
for Tuesday 5 Feb 1100-1145.

Admiral Kerr will now come
on Wednesday 6 Feb at 1100-1145.
(Both times with Sir Percy Cradock).

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cc: Sir Percy Cradock

A The National Archives

DEPARTMENT/SERIES <i>PR 19</i>	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM <i>3446</i> (one piece/item number)	
Extract details: <i>minute and attachment from Al Pass to Callan dated 2 February 1991</i>	
CLOSED UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	<i>24/1/18</i> <i>M. W.</i>
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Use black or blue pen to complete form.

Use the card for one piece or for each extract removed from a different place within a piece.

Enter the department and series,
eg. HO 405, J 82.

Enter the piece and item references, .
eg. 28, 1079, 84/1, 107/3

Enter extract details if it is an extract rather than a whole piece.
This should be an indication of what the extract is,
eg. Folio 28, Indictment 840079, E107, Letter dated 22/11/1995.
Do not enter details of why the extract is sensitive.

If closed under the FOI Act, enter the FOI exemption numbers applying to the closure, eg. 27(1), 40(2).

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INFO PRIORITY BELGRADE

SIC 19M

CALL ON PRINCE SAUD

SUMMARY

1. SAUD WILL TRANSMIT THE PRIME MINISTER'S LETTER ON FINANCE TO KING FAHD. WIDE RANGING DISCUSSION OF MILITARY SITUATION. DIPLOMATIC MANOEUVRES OVER THE COMING WEEKS ESPECIALLY IN NAM AND OIC: REQUEST FOR HELP IN LOBBYING. FUTURE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS EXTENDING BEYOND ARAB STATES OF REGION. RELATIONS WITH IRAN AND OIL SPILL. SAUD IN RELAXED FORM AND LOOKING FORWARD TO YOUR VISIT. PLEASED WITH PERFORMANCE OF SAUDI TROOPS IN DRIVING IRAQIS OUT OF KHAFJI.

DETAIL

2. PRINCE SAUD ASKED ME TO CALL THIS MORNING, PRIMARILY TO TAKE DELIVERY OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S LETTER TO KING FAHD ON A FURTHER SAUDI FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTION TO OUR WAR COSTS. DEPUTY MINISTER THUNAYAN WAS PRESENT. SAUD SAID HE WOULD PASS THIS TO THE KING BUT MADE NO FURTHER COMMENT BEYOND SAYING THAT THEY WOULD EXPECT TO DISCUSS THE SUBJECT WITH YOU ON YOUR VISIT ON 9 FEBRUARY (WHICH SAUD WELCOMED). (COMMENT: I REGARD SAUD AS A USEFUL RECIPIENT OF OUR MESSAGE. AMERICANS TELL US HE WAS CLOSELY INVOLVED WITH BAKER IN RECENT DISCUSSIONS OVER THE ADDITIONAL SUMS PLEDGED TO DEFRAY US MILITARY COSTS, ON WHICH WE ARE TOLD THE AMERICANS STILL HAVE NOTHING IN WRITING.)

3. WE DISCUSSED ARRANGEMENTS FOR YOUR VISIT AND ITS AGENDA, ON WHICH I AM TELEGRAPHING SEPARATELY. THIS LED INTO A USEFUL TOUR D'HORIZON, THE MAIN POINTS OF WHICH I RECORD BELOW AS THEY MAY HAVE RELEVANCE FOR YOUR DISCUSSIONS HERE.

PAGE 1
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4. THE WAR. I CONGRATULATED SAUD ON THE SUCCESSFUL LEAD GIVEN BY SAUDI FORCES IN DRIVING THE IRAQIS OUT OF KHAFJI. WE AGREED THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN'S OPTIONS WERE NARROWING. HIS TACTICS SO FAR HAD SOUGHT TO INVOLVE ISRAEL: TO SOW PANIC IN SAUDI ARABIA THROUGH CONVENTIONAL SCUD ATTACKS: TO DISRUPT SAUDI INFRASTRUCTURE THROUGH THE OIL SLICK: TO PRODUCE RIFTS IN THE COALITION AND A WAVE OF INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT, WHILE WEATHERING OUT ALLIED AIR ASSAULT: WERE ALL PROVING TO BE MISCALCULATIONS. HENCE HIS INTEREST IN TRYING TO DRAW US INTO A PREMATURE LAND BATTLE WHICH HE HOPED WOULD BE ON IRAQI TERMS. SAUD THOUGHT SADDAM MIGHT NOW EMBARK ON THE USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN THE BATTLE GROUND OR FURTHER AFIELD. I DREW HIS ATTENTION TO THE ALLIES HIGH DEGREE OF TRAINING IN CBW.

5. SAUD COMMENTED THAT THE MAJOR FIS DEMONSTRATION IN ALGIERS HAD BEEN SMALLER THAN EXPECTED AND HAD FOCUSED ON INTERNAL DISCONTENT RATHER THAN THE GULF. KHAFJI HAD SHOWN THAT THE DISPARATE ELEMENTS IN THE MILITARY ALLIANCE COULD OPERATE WELL TOGETHER. SAUD SAID THE COALITION LOOKED IN GOOD SHAPE, OUR MILITARY RESOLVE MUST NOT FLAG. WE COULD EXPECT SIMILAR IRAQI ATTEMPTS TO DRAW US INTO A FIGHT. HE TOOK MY POINT THAT WE SHOULD CONCENTRATE ON GETTING THE PUBLIC MESSAGE ACROSS THAT KHAFJI REPRESENTED A MILITARY DISASTER FOR IRAQ. WE AGREED THAT THE FACT THAT THE FIRST LAND CONTACT HAD OCCURRED BETWEEN ARAB FORCES WAS IMPORTANT PRESENTATIONALLY. I URGED SAUD TO GIVE INTERNATIONAL PUBLICITY TO THE INTERESTING FILM FOOTAGE WHICH SHOWED THE IRAQI PRISONERS CAPTURED BY THE SAUDIS RELAXED AND IN CONSIDERATE CUSTODY. WE NEEDED TO PUT SADDAM OFF-SIDE HERE. (WE ARE DRAWING THIS FILM TO THE ATTENTION OF BRITISH CORRESPONDENTS).

6. WAR OBJECTIVES. I POINTED OUT OUR CARE IN DEFINING OUR POSITION AGAINST A BACKGROUND OF GROWING PUBLIC PRESSURE. SAUD APPEARED TO HAVE NO DIFFICULTY WITH WHERE WE STOOD. HE REPEATEDLY MADE THE POINT THAT THERE COULD BE NO CEASE-FIRE WITHOUT WITHDRAWAL. ANY IRAQI UNDERTAKING TO WITHDRAW HAD TO BE ACCOMPANIED BY CLEAR EARNEST OF INTENT.

7. DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY: SAUD COMMENTED THAT WE MEANWHILE HAD TO COOPERATE TO DOUSE A NUMBER OF FIRES ON THE MULTI-NATIONAL DIPLOMATIC FRONT. SO FAR THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAD BEEN SATISFACTORY. HE HAD TAKEN MY POINT ABOUT THE NEED TO CULTIVATE ZIMBABWE AS FEBRUARY'S COUNCIL PRESIDENT, AND CONTACTS WERE IN HAND. THE KUWAITIS WERE TAKING A LEAD HERE. HE WAS MORE CONCERNED HOWEVER OVER DEVELOPMENTS IN THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT AND

Organization of Islamic Conference

THE OIC, WHERE HE WOULD LIKE OUR HELP. HAVING GOT NO WHERE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL, THE INDIANS AND ALGERIANS WERE NOW WORKING UP AN EXERCISE WITHIN THE NAM INVOLVING A CONFERENCE OF THE 15 MOST ACTIVE COUNTRIES TO CALL FOR A CEASE-FIRE. THE SAUDI AMBASSADOR IN NEW DELHI HAD BEEN TOLD BY THE INDIAN DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER OF A 5 POINT INDIAN PLAN INVOLVING A STATEMENT ON WITHDRAWAL, CEASE-FIRE, INTRODUCTION OF A UN PEACE-KEEPING FORCE, WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN TROOPS AND A CONFERENCE TO COVER ALL REGIONAL ISSUES (FOR WHICH THE AGENDA WOULD BE IMPRACTICABLY BROAD.) THE EGYPTIANS AND YUGOSLAVS (SAUD SAID THE LATTER WERE NOW BEING MORE HELPFUL OVER KUWAIT) HAD FORTUNATELY TAKEN THE INITIATIVE IN DRAFTING A NAM STATEMENT WHICH WOULD INSIST ON PRIOR IRAQI WITHDRAWAL AND OBSERVANCE OF SCRS. BUT THE NAM GROUP OF 15 (ALGERIA, GHANA, ZAMBIA, ZIMBABWE, INDIA, IRAN, CUBA, AFGHANISTAN, CYPRUS, YUGOSLAVIA, INDONESIA, NIGERIA, SRI LANKA, VENEZUELA, EGYPT) CONTAINED SOME UNRELIABLE NUMBERS. COULD WE INTERCEDE WITH SOME OF THE COMMONWEALTH ONES, AT LEAST TO EXPLAIN THE COALITION'S POSITION AND OUR ENGAGEMENT IN IT? IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT THE INDIAN IDEAS WERE NOT CARRIED. THE SAUDIS WERE DOING THEIR OWN LOBBYING AND THE EGYPTIANS WORKING HARD. HE HOPED IN PARTICULAR WE COULD SPEAK WITH THE CYPRIOTS, ZIMBABWEANS, INDIANS, ZAMBIANS, GHANAIANS AND NIGERIANS. IN ZAMBIA'S CASE SAUD HELD THAT KAUNDA'S EARLIER ATTACHMENT TO SADDAM WAS WANING. HE CLAIMED THAT THE NAM BUREAU IN NEW YORK WAS NOT INVOLVED IN THIS EXERCISE WHICH WAS AN AD HOC AFFAIR. I SAID THIS WAS THE FIRST I HAD HEARD OF THIS NAM INITIATIVE. WE HAD HOWEVER BEEN TAKING CARE TO PUT OUR POSITION TO THE INDIANS. I WOULD SEE WHETHER WE COULD HELP WITH SOME OF THE OTHERS HE HAD MENTIONED, WITHOUT MAKING OUR INTERCESSION TOO OBVIOUS IN A NAM CONTEXT. SAUD THOUGHT THE INDIANS HOPED TO CALL A SPECIAL NAM MEETING SOON: WE HAVE NOW SEEN REPORTS THAT THE MEETING MAY BE HELD IN BELGRADE, 11-12 FEBRUARY.

8. OIC: SAUD SEEMED LESS CONCERNED AT ACTIVITY TO BRING OIC INTO A CEASE-FIRE EXERCISE. THE INITIAL IRANIAN APPEAL HAD (AS WE KNOW FROM THE SECRETARIAT IN JEDDA) FAILED TO ACHIEVE TWO THIRDS SUPPORT AMONG MEMBERS (ONLY 8 SUPPORTERS, ACCORDING TO SAUD). THE IRANIANS WERE NOW MAKING ANOTHER ATTEMPT, AT ALGERIAN AND JORDANIAN REQUEST, FOLLOWING RECENT MEETINGS IN TEHRAN, BUT HE DOUBTED THEIR HEART WAS IN IT. MORE OMINOUS WAS A SLIDE IN PAKISTANI THINKING TOWARDS AN OIC MEETING. SAUD WONDERED WHETHER WE COULD HELP IN ISLAMABAD. THE PRIME MINISTER WAS CLEARLY UNDER HEAVY PRESSURE FROM THE MILITARY WHOSE LEADERSHIP WAS PERVERSELY SHOWING FAVOUR TO SADDAM. THIS STEMMED FROM INTERNAL POLITICS AS WELL AS PIQUE AT THE CUTTING OFF OF US AID. HE WAS TALKING TO THE AMERICANS ABOUT THE LATTER.

SAUD BRUSHED ASIDE MY SUGGESTION THERE MIGHT BE AN AFGHAN DIMENSION TO THE ATTITUDE OF THE PAKISTANI MILITARY. I SAID WE WERE DOING OUR BIT WITH THE PAKISTANI GOVERNMENT BUT SAUD ASKED THAT WE CONCENTRATE ON THE MILITARY TOO. WE MIGHT USE THE ARGUMENT WHICH, HE ASSURED ME, NOW HAD SAUDI ENDORSEMENT, THAT IF THEY PLAYED THEIR CARDS RIGHT IN THIS CRISIS AND SAW IRAQ OUT OF KUWAIT THEN PAKISTAN COULD EXPECT TO BE INVITED TO PLAY AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN THE REGION IN FUTURE. SAUDI ARABIA WAS SENDING AN EMISSARY TO PAKISTAN TO EXPLAIN THIS.

9. FUTURE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS: PRESSED ON THIS, SAUD INSISTED SAUDI THINKING NOW INCORPORATED A ROLE FOR NON-ARAB REGIONAL POWERS SUCH AS PAKISTAN, IRAN AND TURKEY IN A FUTURE SECURITY STRUCTURE. FEARS OF TURKISH EXPANSIONISM WERE GROUNDLESS. SUCH HISTORICAL ISSUES CONTINUED TO DOG POLITICS: WEREN'T WE STILL TRYING TO COME TO TERMS WITH THE NORMAN CONQUEST? THE ARABS OF THE REGION HAD TO THINK BEYOND THEIR OWN BORDERS. THIS HAD BEEN AGREED IN THE GCC AND ALSO WITH EGYPT AND SYRIA. I SAID THIS TALK MADE SENSE AND I WAS SURE YOU WOULD BE INTERESTED TO CARRY IT FURTHER ON YOUR VISIT. WE WERE LOOKING TO SAUDI ARABIA AND OTHER COUNTRIES OF THE AREA TO GIVE A LEAD BEFORE CONSIDERING WHAT CONTRIBUTION WE COULD MAKE. HOW ABOUT THE INTERIM STAGE WHEN A MILITARY GUARD MIGHT NEED TO BE MOUNTED VIS A VIS IRAQ? SAUD SAID EMPHATICALLY THAT THIS STAGE SHOULD INCORPORATE THE PRESENT CONTRIBUTORS TO THE COALITION. IF DESIRABLE THESE COULD BE REMOULDED INTO A MORE SPECIFIC UN PEACE-KEEPING FORCE THOUGH HE SHOWED NO ENTHUSIASM FOR THIS (THIS IS CONSISTENT WITH HIS EARLIER REMARKS AS WELL AS THOSE OF THE KUWAITIS HERE).

10. IRAN: SAUD ASKED HOW WE VIEWED IRAN'S POSITION AND HER RESPONSE TO THE TRANSFER OF IRAQI AIRCRAFT. I GAVE HIM THE GIST OF WHAT VAEZI HAD TOLD US AND MENTIONED KING FAHD'S APPARENT PUBLIC OPENING TOWARDS IRAN IN REMARKS AT HIS PRESS CONFERENCE WITH MUBARAKON 30 JANUARY. SAUD CONFIRMED THIS WAS SO. THEY HOPED THE IRANIANS WOULD HOLD ON TO THE AIRCRAFT, PERHAPS INDEFINITELY. THE IRANIANS HAD TOLD THE QATARIS AND OMANIS THERE WAS NO PRIOR DEAL OVER THE AIRCRAFT AND THAT THEY SAW IRAQI OCCUPATION OF KUWAIT AS THE CAUSE OF THE PRESENCE OF FOREIGN TROOPS. THEY HAD ADDED THAT THEY DID NOT INTEND EVER TO RETURN IRAQI AIR ASSETS. I RAISED IRAN'S INTEREST IN COOPERATION WITH OURSELVES AND WITH THE SAUDIS OVER THE OIL SLICK. SAUD RESPONDED POSITIVELY SAYING THAT THEY WERE FOLLOWING UP OUR SUGGESTION OF TECHNICAL COOPERATION WITH IRAN THROUGH ROPME THOUGH THIS ALSO PRESENTED THE PROBLEM OF IRAQI MEMBERSHIP. THEY SAW MERIT IN SEEING HOW THEY COULD COOPERATE WITH

IRAN OVER THE ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE. I GAVE SAUD A NOTE OF BRITISH HELP TO DATE INCLUDING ON THE WILDLIFE SIDE AS HE RUNS THE NATIONAL WILDLIFE COMMISSION. HE EXPRESSED GRATITUDE FOR OUR PROMPT HELP AND AFFIRMED THEY WERE NOW IN TOUCH WITH THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION OVER EC HELP ON THE OIL SPILL.

COMMENT

11. THIS WIDE RANGING DISCUSSION AFFORDED A USEFUL CURTAIN RAISER FOR YOUR TALKS ON 9 FEBRUARY, TO WHICH SAUD EVIDENTLY LOOKS FORWARD. HE REGARDS THE NAM INITIATIVE AS UNHELPFUL. I HOPE WE CAN HAVE A WORD WITH SOME OF THE COUNTRIES MENTIONED. THIS MAY ALSO COME UP IN YOUR TALKS IN CAIRO. AS FOR OUR FINANCIAL BID, THERE IS GROWING CONCERN AS TO WHAT THE SAUDIS ARE GOING TO USE FOR MONEY GIVEN NEW COMMITMENTS AS A RESULT OF THE CRISIS. WE MUST SEE HOW THEY RESPOND.

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PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE
PS/PUS
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MR BROOMFIELD
MR SLATER
MR GORE-BOOTH
MR GOULDEN
MR JAY
MR BERMAN (LEGAL ADVISERS)
HD/MED
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CHIEF OF ASSESSMENT STAFF
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SIR C CURWEN CABINET OFFICE
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MR GOWAN, CABINET OFFICE
PS/NUMBER 10 DOWNING ST
SIR P CRADOCK, 10 DOWNING ST
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TELNO 333

OF 021330Z FEBRUARY 1991

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See by my
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PARA 3 OF MY TELNO 288 (NOT TO ALL): SAUDI OIL PRODUCTION SUMMARY

1. PRODUCTION LEVELS CONTINUE TO FLUCTUATE, BUT EXPORTS APPEAR TO HAVE STEADIED. CONSUMPTION OF REFINED PRODUCTS MANAGEABLE.

DETAIL

2. PETROLEUM MINISTRY OFFICIALS HAVE TOLD US THAT ARAMCO WERE ABLE TO REOPEN THE OFF-SHORE NORTHERN OIL FIELDS LAST NIGHT (1 FEBRUARY), THANKS TO CONCLUSION OF THE BATTLE IN KHAJJI. THE OIL INSTALLATIONS IN THAT TOWN, MOREOVER, DID NOT APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN DAMAGED BY THE FIGHTING (BUT JAPANESE PRODUCTION IN THE SO CALLED NEUTRAL ZONE WILL REMAIN CLOSED FOR THE TIME BEING).

3. OUR SOURCES ADMIT THAT OIL PRODUCTION SINCE WAR BEGAN HAS BEEN HIGHLY VOLATILE. DECISIONS ARE TAKEN ON A DAILY BASIS, ACCORDING TO AVAILABILITY OF TANKERS AND STORAGE FACILITIES. ON THE FORMER, A SHUTTLE SERVICE FROM RASTANURA TO FUJAIRAH IS SAID BY LOCAL OIL REPRESENTATIVES TO HAVE RESUMED OPERATING ON 31 JANUARY. PETROLEUM MINISTRY SOURCES, HOWEVER, PLAY THIS DOWN, AND CLAIM THAT TANKERS ARE STILL PREPARED TO MAKE THE JOURNEY UP THE GULF. THEY ALSO MAINTAIN THAT EXPORTS HAVE HELD STEADY OVER THE PAST WEEK, AT AROUND 8 MILLION BPD (THIS BEARS OUT WHAT THE CHAIRMAN OF ARAMCO TOLD ME ON 29 JANUARY).

4. AS FOR STOCKS, MOST SAUDI CRUDE AND PRODUCT IS BEING STORED OUTSIDE THE KINGDOM; FUJAIRAH REMAINS A FAVOURITE DESTINATION. ARAMCO IS ALSO PULLING OUT ALL STOPS TO MAXIMISE CAPACITY OF THE EAST WEST PIPE LINE LINKING THE OIL FIELDS WITH YANBU. ALTHOUGH CAPACITY IS TAKEN TO BE 3.2 MILLION BPD, THERE IS SAID TO BE SCOPE TO INCREASE THIS TO AS MUCH AS 5 MILLION BPD, DEPENDING ON THE VISCOSITY OF THE CRUDE.

5. DOMESTIC CONSUMPTION OF REFINED PRODUCTS APPEARS TO BE MORE MANAGEABLE THAN EXPECTED. FIGURES FOR THE FIRST 14 DAYS OF THE WAR REVEAL THAT CONSUMPTION OF JET FUEL HAS AVERAGED 250,000 BPD (CONSIDERABLY LESS THAN THE 550,000 BPD FIGURE WHICH THE AMERICANS AND PETROLEUM MINISTRY HAD PLANNED ON). PRODUCTION OF JET FUEL IS RUNNING AT AROUND 200,000 BPD. BUT WITH STOCKS OF SOME 12 MILLION BARRELS, THE SAUDIS FEEL COMFORTABLE. AL NAIMY OF ARAMCO TOLD ME

PAGE 1
RESTRICTED

THEY HAD BEEN ABLE TO SECURE EXTRA STOCK FROM ABROAD WITHOUT DIFFICULTY.

6. THE POSITION FOR DIESEL FUEL IS EVEN MORE REASSURING. CONSUMPTION IS 330,000 BPD, NO DIFFERENT FROM PEACE TIME (INCREASED MILITARY USE APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN CANCELLED OUT BY REDUCED CIVILIAN DEMAND). PRODUCTION IS RUNNING AT 450,000 BPD, AND STOCKS HELD ARE CURRENTLY 16 MILLION BARRELS.

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Good!!

GULF CRISIS: US/ISRAEL

SUMMARY

1. ADMINISTRATION STILL CONFIDENT THAT ISRAELIS WILL REFRAIN FROM RETALIATION FOR TIME BEING.
DETAIL

2. WE HAVE SPOKEN TO STATE (KURTZER) AND NSC (WELCH) ABOUT WHERE THE VARIOUS RECENT SCUD ATTACKS HAVE LEFT US/ISRAELI UNDERSTANDINGS ON ISRAEL'S INVOLVEMENT IN THE GULF CRISIS.

3. KURTZER, WHO ACCOMPANIED DEPUTY SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER ON HIS TWO MISSIONS TO ISRAEL, SAID THAT THE ISRAELIS HAD BEEN PRE-DISPOSED NOT TO RESPOND TO IRAQI SCUD ATTACKS. THEY HAD NO WISH TO GIVE SADDAM HUSSEIN THE VICTORY OF DRAWING ISRAEL INTO THE WAR: THEY WERE ANXIOUS NOT TO WIDEN THE CONFLICT: AND THEY WERE AWARE THAT, GOOD AS THE ISRAELI AIRFORCE IS, THERE WAS NOT MUCH IT COULD DO ABOUT REMOVING THE SCUD THREAT THAT COALITION AIRFORCES WERE NOT ALREADY DOING.

4. KURTZER THOUGHT THAT THE QUESTION NOW WAS WHETHER THE ISRAELIS COULD BE HELD IN THIS FRAME OF MIND. THE PATRIOT BATTERIES HAD BEEN HELPFUL IN PROVIDING PHYSICAL REASSURANCE. THE OTHER PART OF THE EQUATION WAS CONVINCING THE ISRAELIS THAT THE COALITION WAS CONTINUING TO MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO ELIMINATE THE SCUD THREAT. TO THIS END, THE ADMINISTRATION WERE BRIEFING THE ISRAELIS ON ALLIED ATTACKS AND INVITING ISRAELI SUGGESTIONS ON HOW TO LOCATE AND DESTROY THE SCUDS (SOME OF WHICH CENTCOM HAD ADOPTED).

5. KURTZER AND WELCH THOUGHT THAT, ALTHOUGH ISRAELIS CONTINUED TO SPEAK PUBLICLY ABOUT RETALIATION, THIS WAS LARGELY TO DEFLECT ANY DOMESTIC CRITICISM OF GOVERNMENT INACTION AND DID NOT SIGNAL IMMINENT INTENT. (INDEED,

PAGE 1
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KURTZER SAID THAT EAGLEBURGER AND SHAMIR HAD REACHED AN UNDERSTANDING ON THIS: THE ISRAELIS WOULD SAY WHAT THEY FELT THEY NEEDED FOR POLITICAL PURPOSES AND WASHINGTON WOULD NOT REACT.) THEY DID NOT, HOWEVER, RULE OUT AN ISRAELI ACT OF RETALIATION AT SOME LATER STAGE AND, IN PARTICULAR, THOUGHT THAT IF ISRAEL WERE STILL BEING HIT BY SCUDS, SAY IN A MONTH'S TIME, THE ISRAELIS MIGHT FEEL OBLIGED TO RECONSIDER THEIR POLICY. OTHERWISE, SHORT OF AN UNLUCKY HIT WITH HIGH CASUALTIES OR A CW STRIKE, THEY WERE CONFIDENT THAT THE ISRAELIS WOULD STAY OUT.

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OUR TELNO 324: IRAQ/KUWAIT: WASHINGTON SITREP

SUMMARY

1. FULL COVERAGE OF FIRST LAND BATTLE, INCLUDING US CASUALTIES, AS WELL AS CIVILIAN CASUALTIES IN BAGHDAD.

DETAIL

2. THE PRESS TODAY (1 FEBRUARY) GIVES WIDE COVERAGE TO THE FIRST SERIOUS LAND ENGAGEMENT OF THE WAR - INCLUDING THE ELEVEN MARINES KILLED IN ACTION - AND THE HEAVY US BOMBING OF IRAQI FORCE CONCENTRATIONS IN KUWAIT. THE FIRST SIGNIFICANT CASUALTIES AMONG US FORCES HAVE PROMPTED SOME COMMENT ON WHETHER THE AMERICAN PUBLIC ARE PREPARED FOR WHAT MAY BE TO COME. ASPIN, CHAIRMAN OF THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE, SAID THAT THE MINIMAL LOSSES IN THE AIR WAR HAD GIVEN RISE TO UNREALISTIC EXPECTATIONS. THERE IS GROWING MEDIA SPECULATION AS TO WHETHER THE MARINE CASUALTIES AT KHAFJI WERE CAUSED BY ENEMY OR FRIENDLY FIRE. THE PENTAGON HAVE SAID THEY ARE CONDUCTING AN INVESTIGATION.

3. THE TELEVISION NETWORKS HAVE BEEN CARRYING PICTURES OF CRUISE MISSILES HITTING BAGHDAD, CIVILIAN CASUALTIES AND DAMAGE TO RESIDENTIAL AREAS. THIS IS CAUSING SOME IRRITATION WITHIN THE ADMINISTRATION, WHICH ATTACHED IMPORTANCE TO KNOCKING OUT BAGHDAD'S TV TOWER AND THUS DENYING SADDAM HUSSEIN A PROPAGANDA OUTLET. THE NETWORKS ARE NOW SEEN TO BE DOING THE JOB FOR HIM.

4. THERE IS COVERAGE OF BRITAIN'S DECISION TO ALLOW B-52S TO OPERATE FROM FAIRFORD (PARALLELS ARE DRAWN WITH THE AGREEMENT TO PERMIT UK-BASED FB-111 TO BOMB TARGETS IN LIBYA IN 1986) AND THE STORY HAS FINALLY SURFACED HERE THAT B-52S HAVE BEEN OPERATING OUT OF SPAIN.

5. THE PRESIDENT SPOKE TO MARINES AND THEIR FAMILIES WHEN HE VISITED CHERRY POINT MARINE AVIATION STATION IN NORTH CAROLINA. HE MADE NO NEW POINTS IN WHAT WAS LARGELY A MORALE BOOSTING EXERCISE. BUT HE REPEATED THAT OPERATION DESERT STORM WAS ON SCHEDULE AND THAT IRAQ'S CAPACITY TO WAGE WAR WAS BEING SYSTEMATICALLY DESTROYED: QUOTE OUR INVESTMENT, OUR TRAINING AND OUR PLANNING ARE PAYING OFF UNQUOTE.

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FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

SECRETARY OF STATE'S TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH MR BAKER,
1 FEBRUARY

1. THE SECRETARY OF STATE TELEPHONED BAKER ON 1 FEBRUARY. THEY
TALKED FOR JUST OVER 30 MINUTES ABOUT:

- ARAB REACTION TO THE GULF CONFLICT
- COALITION AIMS
- GULF SECURITY AFTER THE CONFLICT
- SHIA SHRINES
- BURDENSARING
- ARAB/ISRAEL

GULF CONFLICT: ARAB REACTION

2. BAKER SAID HE DID NOT DETECT ANY SUBSTANTIAL WEAKNESSES IN
THE COALITION. OPPOSITION TO THE COALITION IN SOME ARAB
COUNTRIES WAS GROWING, BUT STILL LESS THAN HAD BEEN EXPECTED.
THE SECRETARY OF STATE AGREED. HE HAD BEEN UNHAPPY ABOUT THE
RECENT JORDANIAN COMPLAINT FOLLOWING AN ATTACK ON THEIR
NATIONALS. BAKER WAS SYMPATHETIC. IT WAS NECESSARY TO TRY TO
AVOID A REPETITION.

COALITION AIMS OF THE GULF CONFLICT

3. BAKER REMAINED CONCERNED ABOUT THE DANGER OF FALLING INTO
THE TRAP OF BROADENING THE WAR AIMS, ALTHOUGH NEITHER THE UNITED
STATES NOR THE UK HAD DONE SO YET. BUT WHEN THE IRAQIS
DISPLAYED PRISONERS OF WAR, OR IF THEY USED CW, THE EMOTIONAL
REACTION COULD PUSH GOVERNMENTS IN THE WRONG DIRECTION. MANY
PEOPLE IN THE US THOUGHT THAT THE COALITION SHOULD AIM TO KILL
SADDAM HUSSEIN OR TO PROMISE TO TRY HIM FOR WAR CRIMES. AN
EXTENSION OF THE WAR AIMS IN THIS WAY COULD MEAN SNATCHING
DEFEAT FROM THE JAWS OF VICTORY. IT COULD ALSO INVOLVE THE
COALITION IN TAKING WIDE RESPONSIBILITIES FOR IRAQ SUCH AS
PROTECTING IRAQ FROM POSSIBLE SYRIAN OR TURKISH ATTEMPTS TO
POACH IRAQI TERRITORY. CONTINUED VIGILANCE WAS NEEDED. THE
SECRETARY OF STATE STRONGLY AGREED. IT WAS A LONG WAY TO
BAGHDAD AND EVEN FURTHER TO GET HOME AGAIN. THE TWO GOVERNMENT
HAD TO KEEP THEIR OPTIONS OPEN ALTHOUGH THIS WAS DIFFICULT,
ESPECIALLY WHEN THEIR OWN SUPPORTERS WERE PRESSING THEM TO
BROADEN THE AIMS.

GULF SECURITY POST-CONFLICT

4. BAKER SAID THAT IN HIS RECENT MEETINGS IN WASHINGTON WITH
POOS, VAN DEN BROEK, SAMARAS AND BESSMERTNYKH, ALL HAD WANTED TO
TALK ABOUT POST-CONFLICT ARRANGEMENTS. THIS WAS TIMELY,
ESPECIALLY AS HE WOULD BE TESTIFYING TO CONGRESS THE FOLLOWING
WEEK WHEN QUESTIONS ABOUT POST-CONFLICT ARRANGEMENTS WOULD BE
ASKED.

5. IN ANSWER TO BAKER'S QUESTION THE SECRETARY OF STATE

R/
He is a peace Nolo
(We have seen how that
you get telegram on
may, I know it is not
immediately, we're coming
back

R/
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CONFIRMED THAT THE EUROPEANS WOULD BE DISCUSSING GULF SECURITY AMONG THE TWELVE, ON 19 FEBRUARY. BUT THE SUBJECT WAS ARISING AT THE TIME, IN BILATERAL AND OTHER CONTACTS. UK OFFICIALS WERE TRAVELLING TO WASHINGTON ON 3 FEBRUARY TO TALK TO THEIR AMERICAN COUNTERPARTS. THE SECRETARY OF STATE HAD TALKED AT SOME LENGTH ABOUT POST-CONFLICT ARRANGEMENTS TO THE VICE PRESIDENT ON 31 JANUARY. THE ISSUE TURNED ON HOW MUCH THE UNITED STATES WAS PREPARED TO DO AFTER THE WAR.

6. BAKER DID NOT THINK THERE WOULD BE ANY DISINCLINATION TO DO WHAT WAS REQUIRED, ALTHOUGH THE PRESIDENT WAS SERIOUS WHEN HE SAID HE WANTED THE UNITED STATES' TROOPS HOME AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. BAKER CONFIRMED THAT THERE WAS A DIFFERENCE BETWEEN CONTINUED TROOP DEPLOYMENTS AND AIR FORCE/NAVAL DEPLOYMENTS. THE AMERICANS MIGHT HAVE TO THINK UP SOME NEW ARRANGEMENTS COVERING, FOR EXAMPLE, THE PRE-POSITIONING OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT.

SHIA SHRINES

7. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT WE WERE WORRIED ABOUT IRAQI PROPAGANDA WHICH CLAIMED THAT THE COALITION HAD ATTACKED SHIA SHRINES. BAKER SAID THAT THE AMERICANS HAD TAKEN SOME DEFENSIVE MEASURES. THERE WAS NOT A GREAT DEAL MORE THEY COULD DO. THEY TOO WERE WORRIED ABOUT THE EFFECT OF IRAQI PROPAGANDA, ESPECIALLY IN IRAN.

BURDENSARING

8. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WERE UNDER MUCH PRESSURE ON BURDENSARING, ESPECIALLY NOW THAT THE AMERICANS HAD BLAZED THE TRAIL. AT THE SAME TIME WE REALISED THAT THE UK WAS THE JUNIOR PARTNER. HE WANTED TO COORDINATE WITH THE U.S.

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10. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THAT THE CHANCES OF SQUEEZING ANY FURTHER MONEY OUT OF THE JAPANESE WERE SLIGHT. WE WOULD BE TALKING OF ONLY 8 PERCENT OF THE MONEY GIVEN TO THE UNITED STATES, AS BAKER HAD ACKNOWLEDGED, ALTHOUGH HE COULD SEE THE AMERICANS' POLITICAL DIFFICULTY.

11. BAKER WONDERED IF THE JAPANESE COULD CONTRIBUTE TO THE UK EFFORT ON A SIX-MONTHLY BASIS RATHER THAN THE THREE-MONTHLY BASIS ON WHICH THEY WERE HELPING THE AMERICANS. IN OTHER WORDS COULD THE JAPANESE NOT SAY THAT THEY WOULD GIVE THE UK 8 PERCENT OF WHAT THEY GAVE THE UNITED STATES OVER THE FIRST HALF OF 1991 (RATHER THAN THE FIRST QUARTER OF THE YEAR). THEY COULD LOOK AT A FIGURE IN, SAY, APRIL. THE SECRETARY OF STATE THOUGHT THIS WOULD NOT WORK BECAUSE IT WOULD MEAN THE JAPANESE FINDING FRESH MONEY, WHICH HE THOUGHT WOULD BE DIFFICULT. BAKER SAID THAT THE JAPANESE MIGHT NEED TO FIND SUCH FRESH MONEY IN ANY CASE BECAUSE THE AMERICANS WOULD BE GOING BACK TO THEM FOR THE SECOND QUARTER OF THE YEAR. EVEN IF THE CONFLICT WERE OVER, THERE WOULD STILL BE SOME DEPLOYMENTS OF US FORCES TO BE PAID FOR.

12. BAKER THOUGHT THAT HE AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE MIGHT HAVE TO TALK AGAIN ABOUT THIS ISSUE. HE SUGGESTED RATHER VAGUELY THAT FOR THE SAKE OF JUST US\$720 MILLION PERHAPS THE AMERICANS COULD IN SOME WAY POSTPONE RECEIPT OF PART OF THEIR MONEY FROM THE JAPANESE. THE MOST IMPORTANT THING WAS TO HOLD THE JAPANESE TO THEIR INITIAL COMMITMENT TO LEAD THE PACK IN PROVIDING CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE UNITED STATES' EFFORT. HE WOULD CONTINUE

TO WORK ON THE PROBLEM.

ARAB/ISRAEL

13. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THE ISRAELIS CONTINUED TO DO BY SHOWING RESTRAINT. BAKER SAID THE AMERICANS WOULD SUPPORT ANY EFFORT TO TREAT THEM AS A FRONT-LINE STATE. THEY HAD SUFFERED WAR DAMAGE AND INCURRED EXPENSE AS A RESULT.

14. BAKER SAID THAT ARAB/ISRAEL WOULD BE ONE OF THE POST-CONFLICT ISSUES BUT HE DID NOT SEE A ROLE FOR THE PERMANENT FIVE. THE ISSUE NEEDED TO BE TACKLED PRAGMATICALLY. HE WANTED TO FLAG THIS POINT WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE. HE KNEW THAT DUMAS WOULD PROBABLY PRESS FOR EARLY INTERNATIONAL ACTION. BESSMERTNYKH CERTAINLY WOULD. THE SECRETARY OF STATE AGREED. THE FRENCH WERE THINKING OF A HUGE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE. THIS WOULD NOT WORK (BAKER AGREED). BUT THE PROBLEM NEEDED ATTENTION AND MAY HAVE BEEN MADE MORE DIFFICULT BY THE GULF CONFLICT. BAKER DOUBTED THIS. HE SAW A LITTLE MORE FLEXIBILITY IN THE ARABS' POSITION.

15. THE SECRETARY OF STATE ASKED HOW, IF ACTION BY THE PERMANENT FIVE OR AN EARLY INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE WAS NOT

FAVoured, WORK SHOULD BE GOT UNDERWAY. PRESUMABLY BAKER WOULD NOT BE IN A POSITION TO SAY THAT HE WAS GOING TO PICK UP AGAIN ON THE 'BAKER PLAN'.

16. BAKER THOUGHT THAT ALL PARTIES COULD SAY THEY WERE GOING TO DO MORE TO MOVE THE ARAB/ISRAEL PEACE PROCESS FORWARD: EACH WOULD WORK ON THE PROBLEM TO THE EXTENT THAT HE COULD CONTRIBUTE. BAKER ADDED THAT THERE WERE SOME POTENTIALLY HELPFUL NEW ELEMENTS. THE SYRIANS, FOR EXAMPLE, NO LONGER LOOKED TO THE SOVIET UNION AS THEIR PROTECTOR. THEY WANTED TO GET ALONGSIDE THE UNITED STATES. BUT THERE WOULD BE A NEED FOR QUIET DIPLOMACY, NOT SOME HIGHLY PUBLICISED CONFERENCE.

17. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT AFTER THE CONFLICT THERE WOULD BE GREAT EXPECTATIONS OF ACTIVITY ON ARAB/ISRAEL. CRITICISM WOULD BE GREAT IF THE FORCES WENT HOME AND NOTHING WAS SEEN TO BE HAPPENING. BAKER SAID HE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT ANY SCHEME HAD A CHANCE OF WORKING UNLESS IT HAD BEEN WORKED OUT IN ADVANCE WITH THE KEY PLAYERS. ISRAEL HAD TO BE BROUGHT ALONG. THE ISRAELIS WOULD NOT CONSIDER SITTING DOWN WITH ONLY THE PALESTINIANS. THEY WOULD WANT TO GO BACK TO ONE OF THE ORIGINAL ELEMENTS OF THE LEVY PLAN, WHICH REFERRED TO ARAB GOVERNMENTS (THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAW NO DIFFICULTY WITH THAT). BAKER SAID THAT IF TOO MANY PEOPLE WERE 'DOODLING ABOUT' WITH THE PROBLEM, THERE WOULD BE NO PROGRESS. THE ISRAELIS WERE VERY SUSPICIOUS OF THE EUROPEANS, SEEING THE FRENCH AND SOME OTHERS AS TOTALLY ARABIST. THE ISRAELIS' SUSPICION OF THE UNITED NATIONS WAS TOTAL.

18. THE SECRETARY OF STATE REPEATED THAT IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE TO LEAVE THE ISSUE TO QUIET DIPLOMACY ALONE. A FORMULA WOULD BE NEEDED, PERHAPS ALONG THE LINES OF THAT TO WHICH BAKER HAD REFERRED (PARA 16 ABOVE).

19. THE TALK FINISHED BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND BAKER AGREEING THAT THEY SHOULD GET TOGETHER BEFORE TOO LONG, PERHAPS IN BERMUDA. BAKER SUGGESTED LATE FEBRUARY/EARLY MARCH.

20. THE SECRETARY OF STATE ALSO SAID THAT THE APPOINTMENT OF RAY SEITZ WAS VERY GOOD NEWS AND WARMLY WELCOMED IN LONDON.

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Fax 071-270 5456

The Rt Hon Douglas Hurd CBE MP
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
Foreign & Commonwealth Office
King Charles Street
London
SW1A 2AH

/ February 1991

Dear Secretary of State,

AID FOR REFUGEES

Thank you for your minute of 24 January.

2. I recognise the important role of the ICRC and of the other relief agencies in the potentially difficult situation which may arise if significant numbers of foreign workers decide to leave Iraq and Kuwait while hostilities continue. I acknowledge also of course the part which we look to these agencies to play in protecting our own interests in Iraq.

3. The £10 million which you seek to enable you to respond to the Agencies' appeals would represent a very generous response to the ICRC and the UNDRO compared with other countries' responses so far to the appeals, and considering our other commitments in the conflict. I do not dissent from your judgement that some contribution by the UK is appropriate, but, in view of the meagre offers made by countries contributing less than we are to the overall costs of the conflict, I propose that initially we should offer rather lower sums than you suggest. I would of course be prepared to look sympathetically at whether further contributions to these appeals are required, in the light of developments and contributions made by others, within the overall envelope of £10 million you proposed.

4. As the initial contribution to the ICRC appeal I propose £2.5 million, for which I am prepared to agree to a claim on the Reserve. For the UNDRO appeal I propose that any initial contribution should come from within the sum which remains out of ODA's provision for disaster relief this year.

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5. I have replied separately to your minute of 21 January about contingency plans for the possible evacuation of British nationals from war risk countries.

6. I am copying this letter to members of OPD(G) and to Sir Robin Butler.

yours sincerely

Stephen Boulton

DAVID MELLOR

*[Approved by the Chief Secretary
and signed in his absence]*



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Prime Minister

CAB

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Treasury Chambers, Parliament Street, SW1P 3AG

071-270 3000

there is the difficult - night mean
a duty reference from Kuwait.
Pl. kept me informed 2.2

Sir Charles Powell KCMG
PS/Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
London SW1

1 February 1991

Dear Charles

GULF BURDEN SHARING: SAUDI ARABIA AND KUWAIT

You and copy recipients will want to be aware of certain developments which appear to relate to Saudi Arabian and Kuwaiti endeavours to raise funds to cover their commitments towards allied military and other expenditure.

The Saudis have already committed some \$13½ billion to the US in relation to their military expenditure. Kuwait has made similar commitments of some \$16 billion. Each country has also made considerable commitments to the front-line states: \$4.5 billion in the case of Saudi Arabia, and \$3.3 billion in the case of Kuwait. We are of course seeking further contributions towards our own expenditure, and the two countries have almost certainly made further commitments.

Against this background, you will want to be aware that we have learnt that the Saudis have approached the US bank Morgan Guaranty to raise a loan of some \$7 billion to meet commitments to the United States. These are probably (but not certainly) commitments arising from the pledge to some of the military costs of the US arising from the crisis. Morgan Guaranty have in turn approached ten banks, in the United States, Germany, Japan, France and the UK. The loan being sought would be in two parts, with \$3.6 billion sought immediately. The first part is unsecured; the second will be secured. Each bank's initial participation has been set at around \$350 million. The UK banks concerned are



Barclays, NatWest, and Midland. The banks are expected to respond to Morgan Guaranty today; we understand that the UK banks will decline the offer to participate, on commercial grounds, while the other banks will accept the offer.

We have less firm information about Kuwait. We understand, however, that the Kuwait Investment Office (KIO) may be instructed to liquidate up to \$12 billion of assets to meet Kuwait's expenditure. If this were carried out too quickly or clumsily it could have adverse effects on the markets. It is obviously important that we do everything to maintain orderly financial markets during the war.


The Treasury - in cooperation with the Bank, FCO, and Cabinet Office - will be as a matter of urgency undertaking further work on the extent and distribution of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait's assets. It seems clear, however, that both countries are facing a cash squeeze arising from their commitments. We see no reason to reconsider our strategy towards burden sharing, or more particularly alter our claims under the exercise. But we shall need to continue to monitor the position carefully, and will report any further developments.

I need not emphasise how important it is that none of this information should get into the markets. I should be grateful, therefore, if knowledge could be restricted to the recipients of this minute and your principals.

I am copying this minute to Richard Gozney, and to Paul Tucker and Sir Robin Butler.

V. J. S.
JOHN GIEVE

A The National Archives

DEPARTMENT/SERIES <i>PREM 19</i>	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM <i>3446</i> (one piece/item number)	
Extract details: <i>minute and attached report from Cranlock to Powell</i> <i>dated 1 February 1991</i>	
CLOSED UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	<i>24/1/18</i> <i>Ni Wln.</i>
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	
MISSING AT TRANSFER	
NUMBER NOT USED	
MISSING (TNA USE ONLY)	
DOCUMENT PUT IN PLACE (TNA USE ONLY)	

Instructions for completion of Dummy Card

Use black or blue pen to complete form.

Use the card for one piece or for each extract removed from a different place within a piece.

Enter the department and series,
eg. HO 405, J 82.

Enter the piece and item references, .
eg. 28, 1079, 84/1, 107/3

Enter extract details if it is an extract rather than a whole piece.


This should be an indication of what the extract is,
eg. Folio 28, Indictment 840079, E107, Letter dated 22/11/1995.

Do not enter details of why the extract is sensitive.

If closed under the FOI Act, enter the FOI exemption numbers applying to the closure, eg. 27(1), 40(2).

Sign and date next to the reason why the record is not available to the public ie. Closed under FOI exemption; Retained under section 3(4) of the Public Records Act 1958; Temporarily retained; Missing at transfer or Number not used.

A The National Archives

DEPARTMENT/SERIES <i>PREM 19</i>	Date and sign
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P.A.
Sp'z



10 DOWNING STREET

Charles

Meeting with Neil
Kinnoch fixed for

Tuesday 5 Feb
at 1630 in HqC.

Sip

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T39191

subject cc master
cc ops



10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

*He has
ask*

THE PRIME MINISTER

1 February 1991

Your Highness,

I am most grateful to you for receiving my close colleague, David Mellor, the Chief Secretary to the Treasury. I have asked him to make this visit because he is a particular friend to your country.


The United Kingdom and the United Arab Emirates are facing difficult and dangerous times. The bonds of friendship which tie our two countries and two peoples together have never been so close or so necessary. The people of Britain will not flinch from what has to be done. Saddam Hussein cannot be allowed to succeed in his aggression against Kuwait, or to put at risk the security and prosperity of the Gulf. We are determined to restore freedom to Kuwait and peace to the region.

We in Britain are not fair weather friends. We have provided the second largest overseas force to the international coalition. The financial burden is heavy and increasing. The initial deployment of our forces cost us about £1 billion. In the first ten days of fighting alone, losses of aircraft and consumption of ammunition and other supplies was well over £160 million. The final costs to the UK are impossible to forecast at this stage, but we expect them to be at least £3 billion.

The burden of war is heavy as well as sad. We welcome the generosity which your country has shown to our American allies.

It would be a great help to us if you felt able to make a generous financial contribution to our military effort. I know you will listen with great care to what David Mellor has to say.

I send you my warm regards.

Yours Sincerely,
John Nye


His Highness Shaikh Zayed Bin Sultan Al Nahyan GCMG GCB



10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

1 February 1991

CHIEF SECRETARY'S VISIT TO THE UAE

I enclose a revised version of the Prime Minister's message to Shaikh Zayed which takes in some of the elements from the Chief Secretary's own draft. As you will see, the Prime Minister has signed it and it can now be handed over.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Simon Gass (Foreign and Commonwealth Office), Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence), John Gieve (H.M. Treasury) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

C. D. POWELL

Jeremy Heywood, Esq.,
Chief Secretary's Office,
H.M. Treasury.

SLUG

BBC C IRAQ-RADIO-PILOTS-:

FROM

ARRIVED

STATUS TIME

MONR

Fri Feb 1 11:52

2:58

IRAQI RADIO SAYS ALLIED PILOTS "WAR CRIMINALS", KILLED MANY CIVILIANS
IRAQI RADIO SAID TODAY THAT ALLIED PILOTS HAD KILLED A "VERY LARGE
NUMBER" OF IRAQI CIVILIANS, INCLUDING PEDESTRIANS WHO HAD BEEN
MACHINE-GUNNED IN THE STREET, AND THEY SHOULD BE TREATED AS WAR
CRIMINALS NOT SERVICEMEN.

A COMMENTARY ON THE RADIO DESCRIBED U.S., BRITISH, FRENCH AND ITALIAN
PILOTS AS THE DESCENDANTS OF THOSE WHO HAD COMMITTED "THE MOST
DESPICABLE CRIMES AGAINST THE NATIONS OF THE WORLD NOT SO LONG AGO"
AND "THE SPIRITUAL INHERITORS OF COLONIALISM".

"THUS, IT SHOULD NOT BE AMAZING WHEN THEY NOW DISPLAY THEIR SKILL
AGAINST RESIDENTIAL DISTRICTS AND CIVILIAN TARGETS AND WHEN THEY
STRIVE TO BOMBARD THESE TARGETS AND TO KILL DEFENCELESS CIVILIANS AND
WORKERS. THIS IS WHAT THEIR FOREFATHERS DID WHEN THEY HAD AN ABSOLUTE
SUPREMACY OVER PEOPLE", THE RADIO SAID.

"WE WELL KNOW THE HISTORY OF THE COUNTRIES OF THOSE PILOTS... THROUGH
THEIR NEW CRIMES, THESE COUNTRIES INSIST ON REMINDING US OF THEIR
PAST...

"GEORGE BUSH, JOHN MAJOR, AND FRANCOIS MITTERRAND ARE ONLY DUPLICATES
OF OTHER FACES KNOWN BY THE ARABS BY DIFFERENT NAMES: HARRY TRUMAN,
ANTHONY EDEN, GUY MOLLET, AND OTHER FANATIC COLONIALISTS AND
DEFENDERS OF ZIONISM...

"THE CRIMES OF THE U.S., BRITISH, FRENCH, AND ITALIAN PILOTS SHOULD
BE VIEWED AS WAR CRIMES WHICH VIOLATE THE LAWS AND FOUNDATIONS OF
WAR, PARTICULARLY THE LAWS AND CONVENTIONS WHICH CALL FOR
SAFEGUARDING CIVILIANS AT TIMES OF WAR.

"THOSE PILOTS HAVE DELIBERATELY BOMBARDED PURELY RESIDENTIAL
DISTRICTS AND CIVILIAN INSTALLATIONS WHICH HAVE NOTHING TO DO WITH
THE WAR EFFORT. THEY HAVE KILLED VERY LARGE NUMBERS OF WOMEN,
CHILDREN, AND OLD PEOPLE IN EXTREME COLD BLOOD.

"MOREOVER, SOME OF THESE PILOTS WERE NOT SATISFIED WITH FIRING THE
MISSILES OF THEIR AIRCRAFT ON RESIDENTIAL DISTRICTS, BUT, IN A
DISPLAY OF THEIR RANCOUR AND HATRED, WENT FURTHER TO USE THEIR
AIRCRAFT'S MACHINE GUNS TO KILL PEDESTRIANS IN STREETS AND ALLEYS.
"THE BEHAVIOUR OF THOSE PILOTS IS VERY FAR AWAY FROM THE HONOUR AND
MORALITIES OF THE MILITARY CODE. IT IS THE BEHAVIOUR OF ORDINARY
CRIMINALS LIKE THAT SEEN IN AMERICAN AND EUROPEAN FILMS. THEREFORE,
THEY SHOULD BE DEALT WITH ON THIS BASIS. IN OTHER WORDS, THEY SHOULD
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OUR PEOPLE'S DETERMINATION AND RESOLVE TO GO ALONG THE PATH OF
JUSTICE UNTIL A CLEAR VICTORY IS ACHIEVED. THOSE SHOULD KNOW THAT
OUR PEOPLE CONSIDER THEM LIKE THEIR PILOTS: THAT IS, DIRECTLY
RESPONSIBLE FOR THESE CRIMES.

THEY SHOULD KNOW THAT THEY WILL NOT BE PARDONED BUT THAT WILL BE
PUNISHED PERSONALLY AND THAT EVERY ONE OF THEM WILL RECEIVE THE
PUNISHMENT HE DESERVES...

TRAITOR FAHD, IN PARTICULAR, SHOULD KNOW THAT THE IRAQIS WILL NOT BE
ONLY AFTER HIM BUT WILL CHASE EVERY MEMBER OF HIS FAMILY UNTIL THE
LAST ROOT OF THIS EVIL JEWISH FAMILY PLAGUING THE ARAB LAND AND HOLY
PLACES IS UPROOTED", THE RADIO SAID.

BC MON CS/SL

141010291

/J1747 CVON2292 11:43 01 FEB 91

SLOG

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FROM

ARRIVED

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BC MON CS/SL

141010291

VID747 CVON2292 11:43 01 FEB 91

NO906



CABINET OFFICE

70 Whitehall London SW1A 2AS Telephone 01-270

071-270 0071

SECRET

S L Gass Esq
Assistant Private Secretary to
the Secretary of State for
Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
King Charles Street
London SW1A 2AA

1 February 1991

D. Simon.

CDH 412

VISIT BY THE CHIEF SECRETARY TO THE UAE AND QATAR: 1-5
FEBRUARY

1. GEN 10 met this morning to consider the security aspects of the visit which the Chief Secretary will be making to the UAE and Qatar on 1-5 February. You will wish to know that the Group was satisfied with the arrangements for the visit.

2. The Group looked closely at the threat to the Chief Secretary and at the security arrangements that are being made. The level of threat to British interests in the Middle East has increased as a result of the Gulf hostilities, and the Security Service is aware of reports of planning for possible terrorist operations in the UAE and Qatar. There is, however, no intelligence of any specific threat to the Chief Secretary.

3. Despite the concern about terrorist activity, the Group was satisfied that an exceptionally high level of security would be arranged both in the UAE and in Qatar for the visit. Close protection will be provided by the security authorities in Abu Dhabi and by a combination of the Ambassador's Royal Military Police team and the local police in Doha. The programme does not involve any public engagements in poorly secured premises. Moreover the fact that the visit is taking place at short notice will reduce

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the risk of terrorist attack. The Group did not consider that there would be any significant risk to the Chief Secretary during his brief stop-over in Muscat on the return journey.

4. The Group therefore concluded that the security precautions which will be in place can be expected to provide an adequate level of protection against the possible terrorist threat.

The Foreign and Commonwealth's visit to Saudi Arabia and Egypt

5. The Group also gave preliminary consideration to the security aspects of the visit which the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary will be making to the Gulf and to Cairo later this month. There will be a slight risk as a result of SCUD attacks on Riyadh, but this is very largely offset by the PATRIOT defence system around the city. The Group noted that the party will be supplied with NBC protective equipment.

6. The Saudi security authorities demonstrated an exceptionally high degree of efficiency during the recent visits by the Prince of Wales and the Prime Minister. The Group was confident that an equally thorough package of security measures would be put in place for the visit by the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary. One of the Foreign Secretary's Personal Protection Officers will in any case be travelling in advance to check on arrangements at all the places where the Foreign Secretary will be visiting.

7. Overall, the Group was satisfied that in general the security arrangements for this visit would be commensurate with the threat. We nevertheless plan to look at the arrangements in more detail at the Group's next meeting on 5 February.

8. I am copying this letter to Charles Powell at No 10.

*Yours ever,
David Gowan*

D J GOWAN

SECRET

1 (a-j)



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB
Telephone 071- 21 82111/3

MO 6/17/15/1D

1⁵⁷ February 1991

COO
1/2.

Dear Charles,

GULF UPDATE

I attach a copy of our internal morning SITREP in the absence of a "View from Riyadh".

Yours ever

Ru Ambler-Edwards

(S J AMBLER-EDWARDS) (MISS)
Private Secretary

Sir Charles Powell KCMG
No 10 Downing Street

SECRET

covering SECRET

D/Sec(O)(C)/2/30/1/1

THE GULF CONFLICT

BRIEFING FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE - SITREP No. 44

SITUATION AS AT 0600Z, 1 FEBRUARY 1991

Contains

1. Classified sitrep
2. Casualty sitrep
3. Equipment and ammunition states (Ministers only)
4. Unclassified material for use by Ministers

Distribution attached

Sec(O)(C)

covering SECRET

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SEC(O)(C) MORNING BRIEF, 1 FEBRUARY 1991

Summary

- Iraqi forces gather on Kuwait/Saudi border.

General Situation

- Air campaign continues with particular emphasis on Iraqi ground forces gathering near the Kuwait/Saudi border.
- Allied Forces have regained control of Khafji, although sporadic fighting goes on.
- DIS assess further incursions are likely.

Political

- Maghreb countries continue to press for formal meeting of Security Council. Informal discussions continue with aim of avoiding a formal meeting to discuss the Gulf which could only expose rifts.
- HMA Madrid reports that in event of Iraqi attack on Turkey, Spain would be in full agreement that the mechanisms of Article 5 should be activated and Spain would fulfil its obligations. But would be preferable for support to be provided only by those NATO members already participating in multinational force.

UK Operations

Air Operations

- 8 Tornado GR1s from Muharraq successfully attacked Saibah airfield with 1000lb bombs from medium level. AAA and single SAM in target area posed no threats. Many small fires noted in the target area with explosions to the north. All aircraft returned safely.
- 1 Tornado GR1a successfully completed a recce mission in which a possible SAM battery was located.
- 1 Tornado GR1a from Dhahran flew recce mission and obtained interpretable information covering 120nm strip of enemy territory.
- 8 Tornado GR1s from Dhahran armed with 1000lb bombs attacked Ar Ramadi petroleum production and storage facility. 7 claim hits, 1 had bombs hang up. Massive explosions observed and resultant fires still visible at 80 nm. All aircraft returned safely.

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- RAF combat sorties as at 010100Z:

	Last 24 hrs	total
Tornado GR1	28	460
Tornado GR1A	2	32
Jaguar	17	185
Tornado F3	14	297
Buccaneer	0	0
Nimrod	2	30
AAR (Victor, VC10K, Tristar)	<u>16</u>	<u>198</u>
	79	1201

Navy Operations

- GLOUCESTER and CARDIFF continue AAW and ASUW operations with Allied ships in the northern Gulf. MANCHESTER passed through Strait of Hormuz last night and will join the multi national MCMV group later this evening.

Army Operations

- 1(BR) Armd Div will be complete in Keyes today with the arrival of the final elements of logistic support. Up-
armouring continues and the FFMA now has 100% of stocks.
- An RE Lt Col has Died on Active Service in RTA. NOK have not yet been informed.

Allied Operations

- French Air Force flew two missions against units of the Republican Guard yesterday. They intend to deploy two more Mirage F1s next week.

Iraqi activity

- US intelligence sources say that the CO of one of the landing craft sunk by allied forces on 30 January revealed he had received hand carried message to leave Umm Qasr and head for Iranian port of Bandar Khomeini.
- No more Iraqi aircraft have moved into Iran overnight, but Iran still claims to be holding only "about a dozen".
- Israel refusing to comment on possibility of Patriot response to yesterday's SCUD attack.
- Battle at Khafji forced Aramco to close its three off shore northern Gulf oil fields. Production has fallen by 15%, but Aramco are having no difficulty since they still hold considerable stocks in storage.

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Logistics

- As at 31 January 42,664 tonnes of freight has been moved to the Gulf by air. Only 638 tonnes of priority freight remains to be flown out.

Media reports and coverage

- Newspapers concentrate on: re-taking of Khafji; B52s flying from Fairford; large troop movements in southern Kuwait; female US Marine captured by Iraqis; phone and mail concessions; "cut" in RAF meal allowance; and increase in service pay.
- Meetings yesterday in Tehran between representatives from France, Yemen, Algeria and Iraq described as possible 'peace conference'. France say had no contact with Iraqis.
- Breakfast TV reporting US AC130 lost behind enemy lines and the fact that 11 USMC may have been killed by their own side.

Other Items

- Poll in Los Angeles Times shows that half of all Americans are addicted to watching the Gulf war on television and 21% have trouble concentrating on their jobs.

CONFIDENTIAL

OPERATION GRANBY - CASUALTY REPORT

Report Number : 16 Situation as at : 010400Z FEB 91

TOTAL NUMBER OF CASUALTIES, SINCE THE COMMENCEMENT OF HOSTILITIES

Total number confirmed dead	3
Total number confirmed wounded (very seriously ill/seriously ill)	1
Total number of confirmed casualties	4

Total number currently missing	10
--------------------------------	----

Total strength in theatre at commencement of hostilities	35684
--	-------

Total number died of wounds	0
-----------------------------	---

TOTAL CASUALTIES BY SERVICE

RN/RM			Army			RAF			Civilians (inc RFA)		
	Men	Women		Men	Women		Men	Women		Men	Women
Dead	0	0	Dead	3	0	Dead	0	0	Dead	0	0
Wounded	0	0	Wounded	1	0	Wounded	0	0	Wounded	0	0
Total RN casualties	0		Total Army casualties	4		Total RAF casualties	0		Total civ casualties	0	
Total RN missing	0		Total Army missing	0		Total RAF missing	10		Total civ missing	0	

Total strength in theatre at commencement of hostilities

RN/RM			Army			RAF			Civilians (inc RFA)		
Total	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women
2510	2440	70	27651	27058	593	4799	4688	111	724	724	0

CASUALTIES CONFIRMED SINCE REPORT No. 15 (SINCE 310400Z JAN 91)

Number confirmed dead	1
Number confirmed wounded (very seriously ill/seriously ill)	0
Number of confirmed casualties, of all types	1

Number reported missing since last report	0
Number previously missing, now confirmed dead	0
Number previously missing, now confirmed wounded	0
Number previously missing, now confirmed safe and well	0

Number previously reported wounded, but now dead	0
--	---

CASUALTIES BY SERVICE

RN/RM			Army			RAF			Civilians (inc RFA)		
	Men	Women		Men	Women		Men	Women		Men	Women
Dead	0	0	Dead	1	0	Dead	0	0	Dead	0	0
Wounded	0	0	Wounded	0	0	Wounded	0	0	Wounded	0	0
RN casualties	0		Army casualties	1		RAF casualties	0		Civilian casualties	0	
RN missing	0		Army missing	0		RAF missing	0		Civilians missing	0	

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ANNEX F TO
D/ACDS(L)129/5/2
DATED 01 FEB 91

RAF Ammunition Stock (Source ASMA JHQ G2 Page 10) As At: 010330ZFEB91

Ser	Description	Stock Consumed Last Report	Stock Remaining (Rds) (1)	Days of Effort Remaining (2)	Sorties Possible	Remarks
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)
1	JP 233		737	21.9	368	
2	1000 lb Bombs	161	4556 (3)	19.4	772/1155	) OG 126 OFFLOADED MV) SINGLE GRACHT) TORNADO/JAG assessed independently
3	CBU (BL755)	8	2166	39	362/543	
4	CBU87(USA)	8	-	-	-	
5	LGB	0	1476	)		) CBU's used on 31 Jan Ex -) USAF stocks (Qty 8)
6	Skyflash		240	)		
7	AIM 9L		649	)		
8	AIM 9M		204	)		
9	ALARM	-	23	)		
10	27 mm		347597	30	1931	Misfires (8) not included. Delivery of 8 by the end Jan, then 20 per month for Feb, Mar and Apr
11	30 mm		83622	34	696	
12	Rapier		423	30		

Notes:

1. Stocks in Cyprus are not included.

2. Days of Effort Remaining (DOER). DOER is the assessment by the Air Commander in theatre of the capability that the weapons 'stock remaining' (Col (d)) represents in terms of his known and potential tasks. (Potential tasks include the retained capability to operate at higher rates than tasked to date).

3. 1000 lb Bomb stocks will increase by 1979 delivered ex-Cyprus due in theatre ½ Feb and 1597 ex-RAFG/UK due Yanbu 8 Feb and Al Jubayl 15 Feb.

F-1 of 1
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ROW 156 (RAF/NJL)

SECRET

ANNEX E TO
ACDS(L) 129/5/2
DATED 1 FEB 91

RAF Equipment State (Source ASMA Tote JHQ G1 Pages 3-37) As At: 010126Z Feb 91

Ser	Description	Originally In Theatre	Losses	Total Now in Theatre	Service- able	Unserviceable		Remarks
						Available within 24 Hrs	Available 24 Hrs +	
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)
1	TORNADO F3	18	-	18	14	3	1	Col h Wing Tip damage. Under investigation.
2	PHANTOM F4	5	-	5	3	-	2	Due serviceable 021600Z and 021000Z.
3	TORNADO GR1/GR1A	45	6	46	41	5	-	
4	NIMROD	3	-	4	2	2	-	
5	BUCCANEER	0	-	6	6	-	-	Nimrods at Akrotiri not included.
6	VICTOR	6	-	7	7	-	-	
7	JAGUAR GR1	12	-	12	11	1	-	
8	VC10K	8	-	9	8	1	-	
9	TRISTAR K1	1	-	1	1	-	-	
10	HERCULES	9	-	9	9	0	-	
11	PUMA	19	-	19	15	4	-	
12	CHINOOK	10	-	11	10	1	-	
13	SEAKING	12	-	12	7	3	2	Col (h) aircraft to be flight tested.

E-1 of 1
SECRET

ROW 156 (RAF1/NJL)

UNCLASSIFIED LINES TO TAKE

0600 GMT, 1 FEB 1991

- Saudi led forces have re-gained control of Khafji although sporadic fighting continues. At least 160 Iraqis taken as prisoners of war.
- Allied air campaign continues. RAF flew some 80 sorties in last 24 hours making total of just over 1200.
- (If asked about "cut" in RAF meal allowance) These are compensatory allowances and are liable to change as circumstances change. They are not an integral part of pay. When reason for compensation disappears, when for example 3 meals a day are provided rather than only 2, the allowance ceases.

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
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