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PT42: 8 February 1991

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
12-2-94							
14-2-91							
15-2-94							
 PART ENDS  PREM 19/3447							

PART 42 ends:-

Riyadh tcho 465 16/2/91

PART 43 begins:-

Moscow tcho 283 17/2/91

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. 747 d/91



SUBJECT: *Master*
OPS

نائب رئيس مجلس الوزراء
رئيس دولة الإمارات العربية المتحدة

16th February, 1991.

Unofficial Translation

His Excellency Mr. John Major,
British Prime Minister,
10 Downing Street,
London SW1A 2AA.

FCO
Tram
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Cdr. d/91

CDP
22/2

Excellency,

Copy att.

I have received with great appreciation your letter delivered by your friend David Mellor, the Chief Secretary to the Treasury, who conveyed to us sentiments of friendship and affection that truly reflect the privileged relations that have linked our two countries and our two peoples over a long period of time. We were extremely happy to have the opportunity thus proffered to exchange our view-points over recent developments and to continue our personal contacts that contribute to the consolidation of the bonds of friendship between our two countries.

As I mentioned to your special envoy, the Government and people of the United Arab Emirates greatly appreciate the firm policy conducted by Her Majesty's Government in this present crisis in the Gulf, a crisis that was caused by Iraq's flagrant aggression against Kuwait and its posing of a serious threat to the stability and security of the whole region. Your firm stand with us during those critical moments, and your substantial and effective contribution to the international effort aimed at implementing the relevant Security Council resolutions on this question, constitute yet another new stance of friendship and support that joins a distinguished record of policies based on honourable positions

contd/....

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ



الشيخ زايد بن سلطان آل نهيان
رئيس دولة الإمارات العربية المتحدة

= 2 =

adopted by Her Majesty's Government towards us. Our people will always remember this with due recognition and gratitude.

We of course recognise the enormous sacrifices being made by the British public in these critical circumstances in its stand on the side of Justice and Righteousness which is aimed at implementing the resolutions of the Security Council in a way that would liberate Kuwait and bring peace and stability to the region. As I mentioned to your envoy we are genuinely gratified with the chance being offered us to respond to your letter and to participate with all resources and men at our disposal to share the burden of this war with you and with our allies in the International Community until we achieve our common goals. We consider such a participation as the least we could do in order to express the extent of our gratitude and our appreciation for the significant role you are undertaking in this international effort, and to reaffirm our deep interest in developing the bonds of friendship and special understanding that tie us to Britain, relations that we wish to see continuously grow and prosper.

I avail myself of this opportunity to send to you my sincerest expressions of friendship and esteem.

Zayed Bin Sultan Al Nahyan,
President of UAE.

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ



نائب رئيس مجلس الوزراء
رئيس دولة الإمارات العربية المتحدة

فخامة جـون ميجر
رئيس الوزراء البريطاني - لندن .
تحية طيبة وبعد ،

لقد استلمنا مع بالغ التقدير رسالتكم بيد صديقنا السيد ديفيد ميلور وزير الخزانة الذي حمل إلينا مشاعر صداقة ومودة تعكس بصدق طبيعة العلاقات المميزة التي تربط بلدينا وشعبينا عبر سنوات طويلة . ولقد سعدنا كثيرا بهذه الفرصة التي أتاحت لنا لتبادل وجهات النظر في آخر تطورات الوضع ولاستمرار الاتصالات الشخصية بيننا للعمل على تقوية أواصر المودة بين بلدينا .

وكما ذكرنا لمبعوثكم الخاص فان دولة الامارات العربية المتحدة حكومة وشعبا تكن لحكومة صاحبة الجلالة كل تقدير لسياساتها الحازمة في هذه الازمة الراهنة التي تمر بها منطقة الخليج نتيجة العدوان العراقي الفاشم على دولة الكويت الشقيقة وتهديده لامن واستقرار المنطقة . ان وقوفكم معنا في هذه الظروف المصيرية للمساهمة بشكل فاعل في تنفيذ مقررات مجلس الامن المتعلقة بهذه القضية يشكل مواقف دعم وصداقة جديدة تضاف الى رصيد حافل من المواقف المشرفة لحكومة صاحبة الجلالة معنا سيذكرها شعبنا لكم دائما بكل عرفان وامتنان .

واننا ندرك بطبيعة الحال حجم التضحيات الكبيرة التي يتكبدها الشعب البريطاني في هذه الظروف الصعبة من أجل الوقوف مع العدالة والحق تنفيذاً لمقررات مجلس الامن الدولي بشكل يضمن اعادة الحرية للكويت ويحقق السلام والامن للمنطقة . وكما ذكرنا لمبعوثكم فاننا سعداء حقاً بفرصة التجاوب مع ماورد في رسالتكم وذلك بالمشاركة في حدود امكانياتنا بكل مانستطيعه من رجال وموارد في تحمل اعباء هذه الحرب معكم ومع اشقائنا وحلفائنا في المجتمع الدولي الى أن نحقق اهدافنا المشتركة . واننا نعتبر مساهمتنا هذه أقل مايمكن أن نفعله للتعبير عن مدى شكرنا وتقديرنا للدور

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ



زايد بن سلطان آل نهيان
رئيس دولة الإمارات العربية المتحدة

الكبير الذي تضطلعون به في هذا الجهد الدولي ولتأكيد عميق اهتمامنا بتطوير أواصر الصداقة والتفاهم الخاصة مع بريطانيا وهي علاقات نريد لها دوام النمو والازدهار .

وننتهز هذه الفرصة لكي نبعث اليكم بأصدق مشاعر المودة والاحترام .

وتفضلوا ، فخامتكم ، بقبول أسمى آيات اعتبارنا وتقديرنا ...

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رئيس دولة الإمارات العربية المتحدة




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FM RIYADH

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 465

OF 161422Z FEBRUARY 91

INFO IMMEDIATE PARIS, WASHINGTON, MODUK, POLAD HIGH WYCOMBE

INFO IMMEDIATE HQBFME, GULF POSTS

SIC 19M

VISIT OF FRENCH PRIME MINISTER AND DEFENCE MINISTER

1. THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR GAVE ME AN ACCOUNT THIS AFTERNOON OF HIS PRIME MINISTER'S MEETINGS WITH THE KING AND PRINCE SULTAN ON 14 FEBRUARY. ROCARD'S PURPOSE HAD LARGELY BEEN FENCE MENDING, FOLLOWING EARLIER SAUDI SUSPICION OF CHEVENMENT AND FRENCH POLICY GENERALLY. AS IT WAS THEIR FIRST MEETING, THE KING HAD GIVEN ROCARD A LENGTHY HISTORICAL ACCOUNT OF HIS RELATIONS WITH SADDAM ETC. AS WITH YOU A WEEK AGO, HE SAID THAT THE ALLIES ULTIMATE - IF UNSPOKEN - OBJECTIVE SHOULD BE THE REMOVAL OF SADDAM. HE DWELT AT LENGTH ON SADDAM'S BRUTALITY. THE FRENCH HAD NOT (NOT) ASKED FOR FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE. THE DEPUTY HEAD OF MISSION IN THE FRENCH EMBASSY HAD PREVIOUSLY SUGGESTED TO US THAT ROCARD HOPED TO GET ACROSS THE MESSAGE THAT FRANCE SHOULD BE REWARDED FOR ITS ASSISTANCE WITH CONTRACTS.

MUNRO

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SIC
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TREASURY FOR FELLGETT

GULF BURDENSARING : JAPANESE CONTRIBUTION

SUMMARY

X 1. POLITICAL DEALS DONE BETWEEN JAPANESE GOVERNMENT AND CENTREIST KOMEITO WHICH VIRTUALLY ENSURE THE PASSAGE OF THE DOLLARS 9 BILLION PACKAGE THROUGH THE DIET IN THE NEXT FOUR OR FIVE WEEKS. KURIYAMA (PUS IN THE MFA) REASSURES ME THAT WE SHOULD RECEIVE A REASONABLE SHARE OF THIS FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE. I TOLD HIM THAT THE JAPANESE RESPONSE TO OUR REQUEST WOULD CARRY AN IMPORTANT POLITICAL MESSAGE, PARTICULARLY IN THE EARLY DAYS OF A NEW ADMINISTRATION IN THE UK. IN THE MEANTIME FURTHER ATTENTION TO THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR IN LONDON, WHO HAS BEEN CHAMPIONING OUR CAUSE EFFECTIVELY, WOULD PRODUCE WORTHWHILE DIVIDENDS.

Y 2. KURIYAMA (PUS EQUIVALENT IN MFA) SOUGHT ME OUT LAST NIGHT AT A PARTY TO SEND OFF PROFESSOR OGATA, THE NEWLY APPOINTED UNHCR, TO SAY THAT THE FINAL STAGES IN THE POLITICAL DEAL WERE JUST BEING COMPLETED AND IT WAS NOW VIRTUALLY CERTAIN THAT THE THREE BILLS DEALING WITH THE DOLLARS 9 BILLION JAPANESE GULF PACKAGE WOULD PASS THROUGH THE DIET IN THE NEXT FEW WEEKS. AS SOON AS THEY HAD DONE SO, IF NOT BEFORE, HE WOULD BE IN TOUCH TO TALK ABOUT THE WAY IN WHICH HIS SECOND TRANCHE OF JAPANESE FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE WOULD BE APPOINTED. HE DID NOT MENTION ANY FIGURES BUT HIS APPROACH WAS CLEARLY DESIGNED TO REASSURE US THAT THE UK PORTION WOULD BE A REASONABLE ONE.

3. I THANKED HIM FOR THIS INFORMATION AND ADDED THAT, AS HE WOULD BE AWARE, THE JAPANESE CONTRIBUTION WOULD CARRY WITH IT AN IMPORTANT POLITICAL MESSAGE. I HAD BEEN REPRESENTING YOUR STRONGLY HELD VIEWS IN DISCUSSIONS IN RECENT WEEKS BUT WESTON'S VISIT IN THE PAST TWO DAYS HAD BEEN DESIGNED TO UNDERLINE THE CLOSE PERSONAL INTEREST WHICH BOTH YOU AND THE PRIME MINISTER HAD IN THIS

PAGE 1
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MATTER. I HOPED THAT THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT RECOGNIZE THE HIGH POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE WHICH THEIR DECISION ON THE CONTRIBUTION TO OUR GULF COSTS WOULD HAVE IN THESE EARLY DAYS OF A NEW ADMINISTRATION IN THE UNITED KINGDOM.

4. KURIYAMA VERY FIRMLY TOOK THIS POINT AND UNDERTOOK TO BE IN TOUCH SOON.

2) 5. I HAVE BEEN STRUCK IN THE PAST WEEK BY THE NUMBER OF FAVOURABLE REFERENCES WHICH HAVE BEEN MADE BY JAPANESE TO THE REPORTS REACHING TOKYO FROM AMBASSADOR KITAMURA IN LONDON. THESE SEEM TO HAVE MADE A NOTICABLE IMPACT ON JAPANESE THINKING WHICH IS DISTINCTLY FAVOURABLE TO OUR INTERESTS OVER THIS MATTER. I WOULD THEREFORE BE VERY HELPFUL FOR HIM TO CONTINUE TO BE TAKEN INTO OUR CONFIDENCE OVER THE GULF IN THE NEXT FEW WEEKS. I DO NOT KNOW WHETHER HE HAS YET ASKED TO SEE OR ALREADY BEEN SEEN BY THE PRIME MINISTER, BUT I THINK THIS WOULD MAKE A PARTICULARLY FAVOURABLE IMPACT ON HIM.

WHITEHEAD

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SIC I9M

MIPT: IRAQ/KUWAIT: SECURITY COUNCIL: COMMENT

1. THIS WAS ANOTHER REASONABLY SATISFACTORY DAY IN THE COUNCIL. WE HEARD A NUMBER OF GOOD, FIRM STATEMENTS FROM MEMBERS OF THE MILITARY ALLIANCE AND FROM THEIR SUPPORTERS (NOTABLY JAPAN AND GERMANY). THE TWO LEAST SATISFACTORY CONTRIBUTIONS WERE FROM MALAYSIA AND IRAN. ALTHOUGH THESE WERE BOTH STRONGLY CRITICAL OF THE ALLIANCE (AND THERE WERE ALSO ECHOES OF MALAYSIA'S EARLIER HOBBY HORSES ABOUT THE WORKINGS OF THE COUNCIL) BOTH ALSO CLEARLY CALLED FOR AN UNCONDITIONAL IRAQI WITHDRAWAL FROM KUWAIT.

2. IT IS AT PRESENT DIFFICULT TO SAY HOW PROCEEDINGS WILL DEVELOP. ALTHOUGH WE, THE AMERICANS AND THE RUSSIANS URGED THE PRESIDENT TO SUSPEND PROCEEDINGS UNTIL 18 FEBRUARY, THE PRIVATE MEETING OF THE COUNCIL WILL RESUME ON THE MORNING OF 16 FEBRUARY AND CANNOT FAIL TO EXHAUST THE PRESENT LIST OF SPEAKERS. THIS WILL LEAVE THE QUESTION OF WHAT TO DO WITH THE THREE CUBAN DRAFT RESOLUTIONS. THE SUPPORT OF YEMEN FOR THE TEXTS IS OF COURSE ASSURED. BEYOND THAT THERE WERE SOME SUSPICIOUS PRE-ECHOES OF THE DRAFTS IN THE INDIAN STATEMENT, AND I WOULD EXPECT INDIA AND PROBABLY ECUADOR TO BE TEMPTED INTO GIVING THEIR SUPPORT. BUT IT IS DIFFICULT TO SEE A WIDER BODY OF SUPPORT DEVELOPING IN THE COUNCIL.

3. HOWEVER WE CERTAINLY CANNOT AFFORD TO BE COMPLACENT. SOME LOBBYING IN CAPITALS, INCLUDING DELHI AND QUITO (BUT NOT HAVANA OR SAN'A), WOULD SEEM BOTH NECESSARY AND WORTHWHILE. WE NEED TO MUSTER AS MUCH SUPPORT AS WE CAN FOR OUR RUBBISHING OF THE CUBAN TEXTS, THUS FORCING THE PRESIDENT BACK INTO A FURTHER LENGTHY PROCESS OF BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS WITH COUNCIL MEMBERS. THIS

SHOULD COINCIDE WITH HIS NATURAL INCLINATION TO STRING THINGS OUT.

4. CLEARLY THE ONLY REALLY DANGEROUS ONE OF THE THREE DRAFTS IS THAT ON THE BOMBING OF IRAQI CITIES. TO THE EXTENT THAT (WITHOUT CONSTRAINING OUR MILITARY FREEDOM OF ACTION) I CAN SAY SOMETHING SLIGHTLY MORE EXTENSIVE THAN I WAS INSTRUCTED TO SAY IN THE DEBATE ON 14 FEBRUARY ABOUT OUR SWITCHING THE FOCUS OF BOMBING TO MILITARY TARGETS IN KUWAIT, THIS WOULD OBVIOUSLY STRENGTHEN MY HAND IN THE DEBATE HERE. WE ARE FAXING TO UND AND THE EMERGENCY UNIT THE TEXT OF POINTS ON WHICH I PROPOSE TO DRAW IN MAKING A FURTHER STATEMENT IN THE COUNCIL EITHER ON 16 FEBRUARY OR (IF PROCEEDINGS CAN BE DRAWN OUT THAT LONG) AT THE BEGINNING OF NEXT WEEK. I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL TO RECEIVE DESKBY 161500Z YOUR GUIDANCE ON THESE AND ANY OTHER POINTS WHICH I SHOULD MAKE.

HANNAY

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SIC
CORRECTED VERSION
OUR TELNO 461: IRAQ/KUWAIT: WASHINGTON SITREP

SUMMARY

1. IRAQI PROPOSAL DOMINATES NEWS, BUT NOW WIDELY SEEN AS HOLLOW. ADMINISTRATION IRRITATION WITH INITIAL MEDIA REPORTING OF PROPOSAL. PUBLIC SUPPORT UNAFFECTED BY ALLIED BOMBING OF BUNKER. STRONG SPECULATION THAT GROUND ATTACK IMMINENT.

DETAIL

2. THE IRAQI WITHDRAWAL PROPOSAL, AND US AND COALITION REACTIONS TO IT (INCLUDING A LIVE DOORSTEP INTERVIEW WITH THE PRIME MINISTER ON CNN) DOMINATE THE NEWS ON 15 FEBRUARY. THIS HAS SWEEPED THE ALLIED BOMBING OF THE BUNKER IN BAGHDAD FROM THE HEADLINES.
3. IN A SPEECH AT THE PATRIOT MISSILE FACTORY IN ANDOVER, MASSACHUSETTS, PRESIDENT BUSH REITERATED HIS EARLIER REACTION (OUR TELNO 466) TO THE IRAQI OFFER: A CRUEL HOAX, FULL OF UNACCEPTABLE OLD AND NEW CONDITIONS. US AND COALITION FORCES WOULD CONTINUE TO PURSUE THEIR OBJECTIVE OF COMPLETE FULFILMENT OF ALL UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS, AND WOULD PREVAIL.
4. THE ADMINISTRATION HAVE BEEN GREATLY IRRITATED BY THE US MEDIA'S HANDLING OF THE IRAQI ANNOUNCEMENT. INITIAL COVERAGE ALL BUT IGNORED THE CONDITIONS AND SUGGESTED THAT THE ANNOUNCEMENT MEANT PEACE. INTERVIEWS WITH THE FORCES IN THEATRE WERE SHOWN, SUGGESTING AN EARLY RETURN OF THE TROOPS. BUT WITH THE PRESIDENT'S TOUGH REACTION, AND SUBSEQUENT OFFICIAL COMMENT, THE HOLLOWNESS OF THE IRAQI PROPOSAL IS NOW WIDELY RECOGNISED. BUT IRRITATION WITH THE MEDIA, ALREADY REAL FOLLOWING THEIR EARLIER HANDLING OF THE BUNKER ISSUE, REMAINS.
5. ON THE BUNKER, OVERNIGHT PRESS COMMENT CONFIRMS THAT THE ADMINISTRATION HAVE HARDENED THEIR LINE AND ARE CLOSING THE

BOOKS ON THE ATTACK WITHOUT FURTHER INVESTIGATION. THE WHITE HOUSE SPOKESMAN IS QUOTED AS SAYING THAT THE DATA AND THE INFORMATION HAD NOT CHANGED, NOR HAD US CONCLUSIONS. THERE WOULD BE NO REVIEW, NO CHANGE IN PROCEDURES, NO CHANGE IN POLICY, NO CHANGE IN TARGET SELECTION AT ALL: QUOTE THE ISSUE IS SETTLED... AND WE WILL CONTINUE TO PROSECUTE THE WAR UNQUOTE.

6. THE BOMBING OF THE BUNKER DOES NOT SEEM TO HAVE HAD ANY SIGNIFICANT IMPACT ON PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR THE WAR. IN SPOT POLLS TAKEN AFTER THE BOMBING, THE OVERWHELMING MAJORITY OF THOSE QUESTIONED SAW IT AS THE SORT OF ACCIDENT WHICH IS PART OF THE FORTUNES OF WAR, AND FELT THAT THE BLAME LAY LARGELY WITH SADDAM FOR PUTTING CIVILIANS IN HARM'S WAY. THERE IS STILL A STRONG PERCEPTION THAT COALITION FORCES ARE ONLY ATTACKING MILITARY TARGETS AND ARE BEING SCRUPULOUS IN THEIR EFFORTS TO AVOID CIVILIAN CASUALTIES. DESPITE THE DEATHS IN THE BUNKER, 78 PER CENT SUPPORTED A CONTINUATION OF THE AIR CAMPAIGN. MEANWHILE, CNN HAVE THEMSELVES ADMITTED THAT ONLY HALF OF THEIR VIEWERS APPROVE OF PETER ARNETT'S BROADCASTING FROM IRAQ. ON THE DAY OF THE BOMBING, A CNN SPOKESMAN SAID THEY RECEIVED 1500 CALLS ABOUT THE COVERAGE, THREE-QUARTERS OF WHICH WERE NEGATIVE.

7. SPECULATION ABOUT THE IMMINENT START OF THE GROUND WAR IS STRONG. THERE IS WIDESPREAD MEDIA COMMENT TO THE EFFECT THAT THE GROWING DESTRUCTION OF IRAQI ARMOUR AND ARTILLERY IN KUWAIT MEANS THAT MANY UNITS HAVE BEGUN TO DISINTEGRATE AND ARE VULNERABLE TO AN ALLIED GROUND OFFENSIVE. PENTAGON FIGURES OF 1300 TANKS, 1100 ARTILLERY PIECES AND 800 ARMoured VEHICLES DESTROYED ARE PROMINENTLY QUOTED AND ARE SAID TO REPRESENT ROUGHLY 30 PER CENT OF IRAQIS ARMOUR, 35 PER CENT OF THEIR ARTILLERY AND 27 PER CENT OF OTHER ARMoured VEHICLES. MILITARY OFFICIALS ARE REPORTED AS BELIEVING THAT THESE NUMBERS ACTUALLY UNDERSTATE THE TRUE DESTRUCTION.

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16 February 1991

Dear Charles,

True Private

*An encouraging report: but
note expected bad
weather at the week-end*

*CAP
16/2*

REPORT FROM RIYADH

The Defence Secretary's colleagues might find it useful to see the attached report from Commanders on operations in the Gulf.

I am coping this letter to the Private Secretaries to members of OPD(G) and to Sir Robin Butler.

Yours ever,

Janet Binstead

(MISS J R BINSTEAD)
Private Secretary

Sir Charles Powell KCMG
No 10 Downing Street

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THE VIEW FROM RIYADH 161000Z HRS FEB 91

1. CDS had an extended discussion with the Joint Commander who is in Riyadh at 0700 hrs this morning. The Joint Commander said that he had spoken to Gen Schwarzkopf about the apparent differences between DIA, DIS assessments and those available in theatre to CENTCOM. Schwarzkopf confirmed (as we suspected) that he also had considerable other information from his SIGINT and HUMINT sources which convinces him of the Iraqi Forces in the KTO are in much poorer shape than we can establish from overhead alone. For example, reports of shortages of fuel, food and water in many divisions, and a complete disruption of all communications between Baghdad and the KTO last night including a fibre-optic cable. Communications between Baghdad and Basra are reduced by 85%. Schwarzkopf reported that the reason so many vehicles were captured at Khafji was because they ran out of fuel or were short of coolant. RGFC Generals were becoming increasingly worried about the damage being inflicted on them. Schwarzkopf continued to maintain the pressure on the RGFC. Over 160 sorties were being mounted with precision guided weapons against them today. Overall, Schwarzkopf was now very confident that the Iraqi ground forces were being severely mauled. A number of cross-border raids were going to be mounted during the next few days over most of the Allied patch some of which could go quite deep (there were some last night by 1 US Cavalry, and 101 US Airborne). These could be described as recesses in depth and strength designed to keep the Iraqis off balance and guessing about the main ground offensive. They had also last night attacked a pumping station leaking oil into the main trenches and tried to set fire to the oil, but the Joint Commander had no information on the success of this activity. Attacks on lines of communication had continued and some 10 concrete bridges had been destroyed in the last 24 hours. JStars (Airborne Targeting Radar) had been successfully used and several vehicle convoys have been struck.

2. Schwarzkopf was convinced that the bunker at Al Amerieh in Baghdad was an intelligence centre which was functioning at the time of the attack on a lower floor. The second bomb had struck in there. He had evidence before and after the attack to support his assessment that the attack had been successful against the intelligence function. It was 7 1/2 hours before the media had been allowed into the bunker after the attack. Schwarzkopf also showed the Joint Commander photographic evidence of a large number of examples of Iraqi units sheltering near shrines, schools, hospitals and cemeteries. Although the Geneva Convention would allow these to be attacked as legitimate military targets, Schwarzkopf would not allow them to be struck. He was now personally examining and authorising the attack of every single

1 OF 3

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target in Baghdad. He is well alive to the important sensitivities following the bunker attack. As the Joint Commander indicated in today's press interview, Schwarzkopf intends to bring these points out in his next media interview, less intelligence material that the United States has decided is still too sensitive to release.

3. Two other points of interest. Gen Downey US Commander was there with BFCME in the latter's host quarters which would allow very good liaison towards any activity. The Joint Commander had also learnt that the Syrians would now participate in the projected ground force operations.

4. Some details follow on yesterday's operations which continued uninterrupted by the "cruel hoax" from Baghdad yesterday.

5. The SCUD attack was launched from the Al Amarah area at 2301Z and impacted South of Al Jubayl in Saudi Arabia which may have been the intended target. No PATRIOT were fired and there have been no reports of damage or casualties. The Iraqi forces retain their defensive posture in Kuwait with little or no change to deployment in the last 24 hours.

6. A naval incident occurred yesterday afternoon in the North of the Gulf (South East of Bubiyan Island) in which the Lynx of HMS MANCHESTER hit an armed salvage vessel with a Sea Skua missile. Following a secondary explosion the ship was left dead in the water. The SPASIIAC class ship had 10 x 20mm AA guns and was an ideal mine laying vessel. Further attacks were launched during the night by the Lynx of HMS MANCHESTER and GLOUCESTER against a POLNOCHNY LSM which was believed hit.

7. HMS HECLA, a converted survey ship, has arrived in the Gulf and is heading for the Bahrain area as a MCM support vessel. The MCM clearance is due to start today. A UK EOD team was in action for the first time yesterday from Sir Galahad dealing with a mine to the North of Feridoon Oilfield (45 miles East of Khafji).

8. With good visibility yesterday, Jaguars paid particular attention to attacking Iraqi artillery positions with cluster bombs and 251 Artillery Battalion had a particularly bad day. Several F1 122mm Self Propelled guns (range 15 km) were destroyed in their positions (which are carefully revetted and well dispersed for protection). At least 5 x D20 towed artillery pieces (range 17 km) were destroyed or damaged by the Jaguars. The main targets though were the Iraqi multi barrelled rocket launcher systems against which some success was reported, including devastating one area and setting fire to a command post.

9. 1(BR) Armd Div should now be complete in AREA RAY. They are on NBC warning MEDIUM.

10. A total of 44 offensive sorties were flown yesterday with 15 supporting PAVESPIKE/TIALD sorties and 8 Recce sorties. GRIs were described in yesterday afternoon's Press briefing in Riyadh as 'remodelling' Iraqi airfields. Rather than attacking runways they are now concentrating on attacking hardened aircraft shelters

2 OF 3

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(HAS), command and control bunkers and support facilities. With the aid of laser designators the tote for Thursday was 19 direct hits against HAS and one against a command centre. At least 11 more HAS were hit yesterday; one bomb of which was described as "entering through the front door". As evidenced by the GR1 loss, the Iraqi surface to air missile systems are still capable of a considerable threat against Allied aircraft. There is evidence that SA-6 AD assets have been deployed for the first time to improve air defence in the Southern KTO.

11. Reports in theatre indicate that the RGFC are forming 'Iraqi Morale Squads' to police military lines throughout the KTO and stiffen the resolve of troops in non RGFC units.

12. Allied operations included a cross border aerial recce by 101st US Airborne Division and elements of XVIII Corps established ambush sites along the Iraqi border. 1 x USN A-6E crashed on recovering to its carrier but the crew were saved. An F16 crashed during its approach to AL DHAFRA through mechanical failure and two A-10s failed to return to base. Initial reports indicate that they were lost to SAM and AAA fire 60 miles NW of Kuwait City. USS America joined the other 3 Carriers and ground forces continue aggressive patrolling and sporadic ordnance exchange cross border.

13. The weather forecast is not good for the weekend with cloud and occasional rain spreading from the West to cover all but central Dhahran. UK air activity today will include standard Tornado F3 CAP and tankers plus the following attack missions:

- a. Dhahran. 12 x GR1 with LGB.
- b. Muharrraq. 12 x GR1 with LGB
16 x Jaguar
12 x Buccaneer with PAVESPIKE.
- c. Tabuk. 8 x GR1 with LGB
4 x GR1 with TIALD


T J MINTER
Lt Col
MA/CDS
MB6173 82117MB

3 OF 3

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MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB
Telephone 071-21 82111/3

MO 6/17/15/1D

16 February 1991

CDP162.

Dear Charles,

GULF REPORT

I attach a copy of the morning report prepared for MOD Ministers on operations in the Gulf.

Yours,

Janet Binstead

(MISS J R BINSTead)
Private Secretary

Covering SECRET

6

covering SECRET

D/Sec(O)(C)/2/30/1/1

THE GULF CONFLICT

BRIEFING FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE - SITREP No. 84

SITUATION AS AT 0800Z, 16 FEBRUARY 1991

Contains

1. Classified sitrep
2. Casualty sitrep
3. Ammunition and equipment states (Ministers only)

This sitrep does not contain nay unclassified material for use by Ministers

Distribution attached

Sec(O)(C)

covering SECRET

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SEC(O)(C) MORNING BRIEF, 16 FEBRUARY 1991

Summary

- SCUD attack on Saudia Arabia. Some moves on diplomatic front.

General Situation

- Allied air campaign continues. No significant land or sea engagements.
- Iraqi forces in KTO retain their defensive posture with little or no change to deployments over last 24 hours.

Political

- Iran has announced at the UN that a high level delegation will be visiting Baghdad in the next few days carrying a personal message to Saddam Hussein from President Rafsanjani. The aim is to try to end the war, but Iran admits that it does not expect a great breakthrough.
- Iraqi Foreign Minister, Tariq Aziz, will be in Moscow over the weekend.

UK Operations

Air Operations

- 6 Tornado GR1s from Tabuk (including 2 TIALD equipped aircraft) attacked Mudaysis airfield (1 on attached map). 3 aircraft reported hits on 3 HAS. All recovered safely.
- 4 Tornado GR1As flew missions this morning. 1 aircraft was recalled. 1 located what appears to be a bridge under construction in An Najif area. Not much other significant activity was noted.
- RAF combat sorties as at 160100Z:

	last 24 hours	total
Tornado GR1	42	1076
Tornado GR1A	6	88
Jaguar	18	431
Tornado F3	14	513
Buccaneer	12	90
Nimrod MR	2	61
AAR (Victor, VC10K, Tristar)	<u>19</u>	<u>492</u>
	113	2751
Non-combat sorties (as at 150100Z):		<u>1624</u>
		4375

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Navy Operations

- Overnight, Lynx helicopters from GLOUCESTER and MANCHESTER engaged an Iraqi vessel believed to be a POLNOCHNY amphibious craft. A total of 4 SEA SKUAS were fired at the vessel and explosions were observed by MANCHESTER's Lynx. The target was reported to be dead in the water. During engagement GLOUCESTER's Lynx successfully avoided a missile fired at her.

Army Operations

- No significant developments overnight.

Allied Operations

- US MCM helicopters commenced mine clearance operations about 50nm east south east of Kuwait City at about 0515Z this morning. UK and US MCMVs are making final preparations for night operations.
- French Jaguars attacked Iraqi artillery and ammunition dumps in northern Kuwait and artillery positions near the Kuwait/Saudi border yesterday.

Iraqi activity

- Iraq launched a SCUD attack aimed at Al Jubayl in Saudi Arabia last night. Full details not available, but preliminary reports are that it landed harmlessly south of the town. ITN erroneously reporting that Patriot missile intercepted SCUD and deflected it into the Gulf.

Logistics

- ETA of MV HANSA LINK which is carrying the Romanian Field Hospital has slipped to 26 Feb 91 as the ship is only making 11 knots due to engine problems.

Media reports and coverage

- ITN report that UN are making preparations for a UN peacekeeping force to move into the Gulf area.
- Newspapers dominated by Iraq's "offer" to withdraw and Allied rejection.

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General Staff Map Room, (JN) 8 115 01 (C) Edition 8 (30) 18, November 1997. 1:1,000,000

Produced under the direction of Captain General of Military Survey, Ministry of Defence, United Kingdom 1990

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OPERATION GRANBY - CASUALTY REPORT

Report Number : 31 Situation as at : 160400ZFEB91

TOTAL NUMBER OF CASUALTIES, SINCE THE COMMENCEMENT OF HOSTILITIES

Total number confirmed dead	7
Total number confirmed wounded (very seriously ill/seriously ill)	2
Total number of confirmed casualties	9

Total number currently missing	12
--------------------------------	----

Total strength in theatre at commencement of hostilities	35684
--	-------

Total number died of wounds	0
-----------------------------	---

TOTAL CASUALTIES BY SERVICE

RN/RM			Army			RAF			Civilians (inc RFA)		
	Men	Women		Men	Women		Men	Women		Men	Women
Dead	0	0	Dead	6	0	Dead	0	0	Dead	1	0
Wounded	0	0	Wounded	2	0	Wounded	0	0	Wounded	0	0
Total RN casualties	0		Total Army casualties	8		Total RAF casualties	0		Total civ casualties	1	
Total RN missing	0		Total Army missing	0		Total RAF missing	12		Total civ missing	0	

Total strength in theatre at commencement of hostilities

RN/RM			Army			RAF			Civilians (inc RFA)		
Total	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women
2510	2440	70	27651	27058	593	4799	4688	111	724	724	0

CASUALTIES CONFIRMED SINCE REPORT No. 30 (SINCE 150400ZFEB91)

Number confirmed dead	0
Number confirmed wounded (very seriously ill/seriously ill)	0
Number of confirmed casualties, of all types	0

Number reported missing since last report	0
Number previously missing, now confirmed dead	0
Number previously missing, now confirmed wounded	0
Number previously missing, now confirmed safe and well	0

Number previously reported wounded, but now dead	0
--	---

CASUALTIES BY SERVICE

RN/RM			Army			RAF			Civilians (inc RFA)		
	Men	Women		Men	Women		Men	Women		Men	Women
Dead	0	0	Dead	0	0	Dead	0	0	Dead	0	0
Wounded	0	0	Wounded	0	0	Wounded	0	0	Wounded	0	0
RN casualties	0		Army casualties	0		RAF casualties	0		Civilian casualties	0	
RN missing	0		Army missing	0		RAF missing	2		Civilians missing	0	

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ANNEX C TO
D/ACDS(L)129/5/2
DATED 16 FEB 91

Army Equipment State (Source ASMA Tote JHQD 11 Page 17) As At: 152300Z Feb 91

Ser	Description	UE	Fit Now	% of UE (Now)	Fit in 24 Hours	% of UE (24 hrs)	WMR	Remarks
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)
1	Challenger	176	146(1)	83%	151	86	45	
2	Warrior	260	246	95%	248	95	63	All variants
3	M109	60	56	93%	58	97	4	
4	M110	12	11	92%	12	100	1	
5	MLRS	12	11	92%	11	92	3	
6	Rapier	24	20	83%	22	92	8	Post FTX Repair
7	Javelin	72	72	100%	72	100	24	
8	AVRE	25	20	80%	21	84	1	
9	AVLB	24	22	92%	22	92	2	
10	Lynx	20	18	90%	20	100	3	6th WMR in UK(2)
11	Gazelle	18	16	88%	16	88	5	6th WMR in UK(2)
12	Striker	16	16	100%	16	100	4	

Notes:

- (1) Due to installation of armoured charge bins.
- (2) Ongoing trials of desert mods.

C-1 of 1
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ROW 156 (DIFF/JE)

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ANNEX D TO
 D/ACDS(L)129/5/2
 DATED 16 FEB 91

Army Ammunition Stock (Source ALOC) As At: 152300Z Feb 91

Ser	Description	Qty Consumed Since Last Report (Rds)	Qty Remaining(1)		Remarks
			(Rds)	Days SPG	
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
1	120MM APFSDS (L23 Shot. L8 Charge)		16000	21	
2	120MM JER 1 (L23 Shot. L14 Charge)		21000	28	Jer 1 charge replaces 65% of L8 charge. (2)
3	120MM JER 2 (L26 Shot)		6000	8	Jer 2 shot delivery 1000 per week to max 9000 (2)
4	120MM HESH		15536	42	
5	30MM APDS		124804	38	Up to 137000(2)
6	SWINGFIRE		2021	42+	
7	MILAN		5736	42+	
8	TOW		2995	42+	
9	RAPIER		1298	42	
10	JAVELIN		2188	42	
11	MLRS ROCKETS		21840	42	MLRS Ablative Panels restrict use to 25 days. (3) US stocks available in theatre.

D-1 of 2
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ROW 156 (ARMY)

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12	8IN HE		62010	42	
13	155MM HE L15		192468	42	
14	155MM Bomblet		76462	42	
15	81MM Mor HE		62879	42	

Notes:

1. Figs are for in-theatre stocks and floating reserves.
2. Still in production by RO PLC. Being flown out as received from manufacturer.
3. 21 Neoprene Panels expected RTM to Gulf ex UK wef 16 Feb 91. 15 Metal Panels RTM UK 28 Feb 91. Further 27 Metal Panels due RTM UK by 15 Mar 91. 2 x 200 gals of Ablative paste in theatre, further 2 x 200 gals (last consignment) awaiting air move from UK. All ex USA.

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ANNEX E TO
ACDS(L) 129/5/2
DATED 16 FEB 91

RAF Equipment State (Source ASMA Tote JHQ G1 Pages 3-37) As At: 160200Z Feb 91

Ser	Description	Originally In Theatre	Losses	Total Now in Theatre	Service- able	Unserviceable		Remarks
						Available within 24 Hrs	Available 24 Hrs +	
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)
1	TORNADO F3	18	-	18	17	1	-	Nimrods at Akrotiri not included.
2	TORNADO GR1/GR1A	45	7	49	39	9	1	
3	NIMROD	3	-	3	2	-	-	
4	BUCCANEER	0	-	12	12	-	-	
5	VICTOR	6	-	7	7	-	-	
6	JAGUAR GR1	12	-	12	12	-	-	
7	VC10K	8	-	9	9	-	-	
8	TRISTAR K1	1	-	1	1	-	-	
9	HERCULES	9	-	7	6	1	-	
10	PUMA	19	-	19	17	1	1	
11	CHINOOK	10	-	12*	6	2	3	* 1 detached
12	SEAKING	12	-	12	10	2	-	

E-1 of 1
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ROW 156 (RAF1/NJL)

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ANNEX F TO
D/ACDS(L)129/5/2
DATED 16 FEB 91

RAF Ammunition Stock (Source ASMA JHQ G2 Page 12) As At: 160400ZFEB91

Ser	Description	Stock Consumed Last Report	Stock Remaining (Rds) (1)	Days of Effort Remaining (2)	Sorties Possible	Remarks
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)
1	JP 233		737	26.3	368	
2	1000 lb Bombs	62	4539	26.3	756/1134	) 6230 in transit) TORNADO/JAG assessed independently (4))
3	CBU (BL755)		2166	41.6	361/541	2500 in transit
4	CBU87(USA)	30	263	16.4	-	
5	LGB (KIT)	54	1081	10.0		328 in transit
6	Skyflash		240	)		
7	AIM 9L		725	)		
8	AIM 9M		155	) TR (3)		
9	ALARM	0	2	)		(6 in transit plus (Further deliveries of (20 per month for (Feb, Mar and Apr.
10	27 mm	1042	440303	43.4	1446	90720 in transit
11	30 mm	62	80620	32.9	671	
12	Rapier		423	30		

Notes:

- Stocks in Cyprus are not included.
- Days of Effort Remaining (DOER). DOER is the assessment by the Air Commander in theatre of the capability that the weapons 'stock remaining' (Col (d)) represents in terms of his known and potential tasks. (Potential tasks include the retained capability to operate at higher rates than tasked to date).
- TR = Threat Related.
- Staged arrivals 12 Feb - 8 Mar. MV Jens Monk unloading 603 at Bahrain.

ROW 156 (RAF/NJL)

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THE GULF CONFLICT - BRIEFING FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

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OF 160001Z FEBRUARY 91
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SIC

IRAQ/KUWAIT: ALLIED BOMBING OF IRAQ.

1. DURING THE COURSE OF OTHER BUSINESS, WE ASKED COVEY (DAS, NEA, STATE) ABOUT WHAT, IF ANYTHING, THE AMERICANS WERE THINKING OF DOING TO COUNTER SUGGESTIONS, EG FROM THE RUSSIANS AND THE SPANIARDS, THAT THE COALITION AIR STRIKES AGAINST IRAQ WERE EXCEEDING THE UN MANDATE.
2. COVEY SAID THAT STATE WERE WORKING HARD ON THIS ISSUE. THEIR THINKING AT PRESENT WAS THAT THE ADMINISTRATION SHOULD DESPATCH TEAMS TO THE VARIOUS COALITION PARTNERS AND TO OTHERS KEY COUNTRIES TO GIVE A FULL BRIEFING ON THE REASONS FOR, AND THE EFFECTS OF ALLIED BOMBING OF IRAQ.
COVEY SAID THAT THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL HAD RECENTLY BEEN GIVEN SUCH A BRIEFING. PEREZ DE CUELLAR'S SUPPORT HAD NEVER BEEN IN DOUBT BUT THE ADMINISTRATION FELT THAT HE WOULD WELCOME REASSURANCE. WHEN HE HAD SEEN THE SATELLITE PHOTOGRAPHY WHICH SHOWED THE PRECISION WITH WHICH TARGETS HAD BEEN ATTACKED, HE HAD BEEN IMPRESSED. LT GEN KELLY, WHO HAD BEEN PART OF THE BRIEFING TEAM, HAD BEEN ABLE TO CONVINCE THE SECRETARY GENERAL THAT THE OBJECTIVE OF US BOMBING WAS SOLELY TO DESTROY THE MILITARY FACILITIES WHICH SUPPORTED THE IRAQI FORCES IN THEATRE. THE AMERICANS HAD BEEN READY TO ADMIT MISTAKES, AND PEREZ DE CUELLAR HAD BEEN SHOWN PHOTOGRAPHS OF COLLATERAL CIVILIAN DAMAGE. BUT IT HAD BEEN CLEAR THAT SUCH DAMAGE WAS NOT ONLY ACCIDENTAL BUT ALSO EXTREMELY LIMITED. HE HAD CLEARLY GOT THE MAIN MESSAGE - WHICH WAS THAT MILITARY OBJECTIVES ONLY WERE BEING TARGETTED.
3. THE AIM OF THE PROPOSED BRIEFINGS OF THE COALITION AND OTHER KEY COUNTRIES WOULD BE TO PUT ACROSS THE SAME MESSAGE AND THEREBY PROVIDE REASSURANCE. THE MAIN PROBLEM TO BE RESOLVED BEFORE SUCH BRIEFINGS COULD BE UNDERTAKEN WAS WHETHER SATELLITE PHOTOGRAPHY COULD BE USED. THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY HAD THEIR NORMAL RESERVATIONS: STATE WERE DETERMINED THAT IMAGERY WOULD HAVE TO BE

USED, AND WERE CONFIDENT THAT A DECISION TO DO SO WOULD BE TAKEN.

4. WE ENCOURAGED STATE TO GET ON WITH THESE IDEAS WHICH WOULD NO DOUBT SERVE A USEFUL PURPOSE.

ACLAND

YYYY

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
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NNNN



SECRET



3 to the Prime
c/c

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

16 February 1991

See Robert.

THE GULF: BURDENSARING

I enclose a copy of President Bush's reply to the Prime Minister's message of 31 January about burdensharing. We may need to take this further, with another message from the Prime Minister. But it might be worth waiting for the Japanese to reach decisions before doing so.

I am copying this letter and its enclosure to John Gieve (H.M. Treasury), Jeremy Heywood (Chief Secretary's Office), Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence), John Neilson (Department of Energy) and to Sir Robin Butler.

Your mine,
C. D. Powell

C. D. POWELL

Richard Gozney, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SECRET

Spare

POSSIBLE IRAQI WITHDRAWAL FROM KUWAIT

Line which will be used by the Foreign Secretary as he is doorstepped in his constituency at lunchtime, 15/2/91

So far all we have is an account of a reported decision. If Iraq were now to withdraw decisively and irreversibly from Kuwait and comply fully with the UN Security Council Resolutions, without conditions, that be good news for the world. We cannot be clear yet whether that is the position. We shall need to see early evidence of withdrawal.

cc: PS/No 10

PS/Defence Secretary



Prime Minister

② *cs/c*

The ECO misunderstood:

*Israel was attacked
by Jordan, although
after the war
with Egypt had
started.*

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

15 February 1991

1572

Dear Charles,

The Gulf Crisis: Comparisons with the 1967 War

The Foreign Secretary noticed that during Questions on 31 January, the Prime Minister said that the situation in the Gulf differed from that in the Occupied Territories because "in 1967 it was Israel that was attacked."

It is certainly true that Egypt was guilty of severely provoking Israel in May 1967 by closing the Straits of Tiran at the end of the Red Sea, and thus interfering with access to the Israeli port of Eilat, and of demanding the withdrawal of the UN Emergency Force from Egypt. But Israel actually made the first military strike by pre-emptively taking out the Egyptian airforce, most of which was destroyed on the ground. It was only later this that Jordan entered the war, in which she lost the West Bank and East Jerusalem (and Egypt lost Gaza, and Syria the Golan).

The Foreign Secretary has therefore been taking the line that the two situations are different because the 1967 war followed a period of intense Arab hostility to Israel which threatened Israel's existence.

The 1973 (Yom Kippur) war did begin with an Egyptian attack on Israel but resulted in no change in the status of the Occupied Territories.


The Foreign Secretary asked us to mention this to you because the pro-Arab lobby in the House picked him up on the same point when he said much the same as the Prime Minister!

Yours ever,
S. L. Gass
(S. L. Gass)
Private Secretary

Sir Charles Powell
10 Downing Street

London, 2/11/22

My dear Mr. [illegible]



t2308rlnsw

y hush-aas sked 02-15 0261

h-aas

REMARKS OF PRESIDENT BUSH
TO THE AMERICAN ACADEMY FOR ADVANCEMENT OF SCIENCE

450 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BUILDING

FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 15, 1991

.STX

PRESIDENT BUSH: Good morning. Please be seated. (Applause.) Please be seated. Thank you. Thank you very much. Thank you, and please forgive me for keeping you waiting.

First let me pay my respects to Secretary Watkins and to Dr. Bromley and to NASA's very able administrator Admiral Truly.

Before talking about the subject at hand I do want to make a few comments on the statement that came out of Baghdad early this morning.

When I first heard that I statement I must say I was happy that Saddam Hussein had seemed to realize that he must now withdraw unconditionally from Kuwait in keeping with the relevant United Nations resolutions. Regrettably, the Iraq statement now appears to be a cruel hoax dashing the hopes of the people in Iraq and, indeed, around the world. It seems that there was an immediate celebratory atmosphere in Baghdad after this statement

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CONTINUED ON PAGE 2-1

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and this reflects, I think, the Iraqi people's desire to see the war end, a war the people of Iraq never sought. Not only was the Iraq statement full of unacceptable old conditions, but Saddam Hussein has added several new conditions. And we've been in touch with members of the coalition, and they recognize that there is nothing new here, with the possible exception of recognizing for the first time that Iraq must leave Kuwait.

Now let me state once again they must withdraw without condition, there must be full implementation of all the Security Council resolutions, and there will be no linkage to other problems in the area, and the legitimate rulers of Kuwait must be returned to Kuwait. Until a massive withdrawal begins, with those Iraqi troops visibly leaving Kuwait, the coalition forces acting under United Nations resolution 678, will continue their efforts to force compliance with all the resolutions of the United Nations.

But there's another way for the bloodshed to stop, and that is for the Iraqi military and the Iraqi people to take matters into their own hands to force Saddam Hussein the dictator to step aside and to comply with the United Nations resolutions and then rejoin the family of peace-loving nations. We have no argument with the people of Iraq. Our differences are with Iraq's brutal dictator.

And the war -- but we just sound you all -- is going on anyway. We sound you all to want to see the war ended soon and with a limited loss of life, and it can if Saddam Hussein would comply unconditionally with these UN resolutions and do now what he should have done long, long ago.

So I'm sorry that after analysis and reading the statements out of Baghdad in their entirety,

-END-

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ATTENTION MR CROWIN

Baghdad, 13 February, INA: The Revolution Command Council has

announced Iraq's decision to deal with UNSC resolution number 660 for

the year 1990 with the aim of reaching an honourable and acceptable

solution, including the withdrawal. The RCC decision said that this

readiness is the first step needed to be implemented as an

undertaking on the part of Iraq in the issue of withdrawal, linked

with a full and comprehensive ceasefire on land, air and sea and that

the UNSC resolves to abolish all the resolutions issued by it.

④ from the start, and all its consequences, and the abolishing of all
the resolutions and measures, and the measures concerning the boycott
and the embargo and all the negative measures taken by some of the
states against Iraq individually and collectively before August 2nd,
which were the real cause so that matters return to their normal
nature, as though all this has not happened and without this bringing
Iraq any negative effects for any reason.

***** END OF DOCUMENT *****

15 FEB '91 12:19

FROM BBC MON SWB

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⑤ of the crisis in the Gulf. These troops and [military] equipment must
be withdrawn over a period not exceeding one month from the date of
the cease-fire.

MORE

***** END OF DOCUMENT *****

(4)

The Revolutionary Command Council indicated that the first step requested from the Iraqi side regarding the issue of withdrawal should also be linked to Israel's withdrawal from Palestine and the Arab territories it is occupying in the Golan and Lebanon in implementation of the Security Council resolutions and the UN. In case it [MN Israel] refuses to do so, then, the Security Council should implement against Israel the same resolutions it had taken against Iraq, in addition to guaranteeing, in any political solution, all Iraq's historical rights on land and in the sea in their entirety.

of a genuine democratic exercise and not on the basis of the concessions which have been [words garbled] on the basis that the national and Islamic forces would participate in a basic form in the political arrangement on which agreement will be reached."

9 The RCC statement called on the states which took part and financed the aggression to undertake to rebuild what the aggression had destroyed in Iraq and this is in accordance with the best specifications of all activities and projects and the installations which had been a target of the aggression and at their own expense

15 FEB '91 12:21

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without Iraq bearing any financial cost.

***** END OF DOCUMENT *****

(10) The statement demanded the cancellation of all Iraqi debts and those of the region's states which were harmed by the aggression, which did not take part in it directly or indirectly, to the Gulf states and foreign states which participated in the aggression, and the establishment of relations between the rich and the poor states in the region and in the world based on justice and fairness, in a way that puts the rich countries before clear obligations in order to achieve development in the poor countries and the removal of their economic suffering, on the basis that the poor have a right in the moneys of the rich, and putting an end to the double standards method.

(16)

(6)

E.R.

SECRET AND PERSONAL

p. a.

Sp ¹⁹/₂PRIME MINISTERBRIEFING OF OPPOSITION LEADERS

You may feel it would be a good idea to offer Mr Kinnock and Mr Ashdown further briefings on Privy Council terms on Wednesday or Thursday next week, in the light of developments and expected developments in the Gulf. Would you like me to fix these?

Charles Powell
15 February 1991

c: Briefing (MJ)

Charles Perkins.
 Oh.


Ashdown - Tuesday
 19 Feb

at 1535
 (for 10-15 mins
 as Mr Ashdown
 has another
 engagement)

Kinnock - Wednesday
 20 Feb
 at 1515

(for up to 45
 mins. Mr K
 is sitting
 Bulgarian
 President at
 1600).

SECRET AND PERSONALS ¹⁸/₂

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MY TELNOS 353 AND 354 AND PARIS TELNO 150: VISIT OF FRENCH FOREIGN
MINISTER TO MOSCOW

SUMMARY

1. MORE DETAILS OF THE VISIT, PROVIDED BY THE FRENCH EMBASSY:
GORBACHEV STRAINED AND DEFENSIVE, ACCORDING TO OFFICIALS.
BESSMERTNYKH CHARMING BUT LACKING AUTHORITY. THE CALL ON PAVLOV CLOSE
TO A FIASCO.

2. MOSCOW CONSIDERING A REQUEST TO ACT AS PROTECTING POWER FOR FRENCH
IN IRAQ.

DETAIL

3. WE HAVE BEEN GIVEN SOME ADDITIONAL INFORMATION BY THE FRENCH
EMBASSY IN CONFIDENCE ABOUT THIS VISIT:

(I) GORBACHEV: DESPITE DUMAS' UPBEAT ASSESSMENT, HIS ACCOMPANYING
OFFICIALS THOUGHT GORBACHEV SEEMED STRAINED AND DEFENSIVE. HE GAVE
THE IMPRESSION OF BEING UNDER GREAT PRESSURE. WHEN DISCUSSING THE
BALTIC CRISIS, HE HAD CLAIMED THAT YAZOV HAD RESISTED PRESSURE IN THE
USSR SUPREME SOVIET TO SEND TROOPS TO RIGA IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE
SHOOTINGS:

(II) BESSMERTNYKH: HE HAD BEEN CHARMING BUT SEEMED TO HAVE LITTLE
AUTHORITY AS FAR AS POLICY WAS CONCERNED EG THE GULF SEMI COLON

(III) PAVLOV: THE CALL HAD BEEN CLOSE TO A FIASCO. PAVLOV HAD BEGUN
BY SAYING HE HAD ONCE BEEN TO PARIS AND HAD ENJOYED THE NIGHTLIFE.
DUMAS HAD REPLIED THAT HE HAD COME TO HAVE A SERIOUS CONVERSATION:
WHAT WAS HAPPENING TO THE SOVIET BALANCE OF PAYMENTS ? PAVLOV HAD
THEN SPOKEN INCOHERENTLY ABOUT THE SOVIET ECONOMY. DUMAS HAD CUT
SHORT THE CALL AFTER 30 MINUTES.

4. DUMAS APPARENTLY RAISED THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE SOVIET UNION
MIGHT ACT AS THE PROTECTING POWER, OF FRENCH INTERESTS FOLLOWING THE
BREAK IN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN PARIS AND BAGHDAD. THIS WAS NOW
UNDER ACTIVE CONSIDERATION IN MOSCOW.

BRAITHWAITE

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SIC I9M

YOUR TEL NO 120: IRAQ/KUWAIT: IRAQI CEASEFIRE OFFER:
SECURITY COUNCIL

SUMMARY

1. DISCUSSION OF IRAQI INITIATIVE IN INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS.
PRIVATE FORMAL COUNCIL MEETING TO BE FOLLOWED BY FURTHER INFORMAL
CONSULTATIONS TO CONSIDER COMMUNICATION FROM IRAQ TO THE COUNCIL
PRESIDENT.

DETAIL

2. BEFORE INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS OF THE WHOLE WERE HELD AT THE
END OF THE MORNING, I TOOK MY TURN IN CALLING ON THE
(ZIMBABWEAN) PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL. I GAVE MUMBENGEGWI MY
PRELIMINARY REACTIONS TO THE IRAQI STATEMENT, LAYING EMPHASIS ON
THE UNNEGOTIABLE CONDITIONS WHICH IT CONTAINED. HE SAID HE HAD
ALREADY RECEIVED A COPY OF THE STATEMENT FROM THE IRAQI DEPUTY
PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE. I SUGGESTED THAT WHAT THE COUNCIL
NEEDED WAS A MORE CONSIDERED STATEMENT BY THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT
CLARIFYING WHAT THE STATEMENT MEANT.

3. WHEN MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL MET IN INFORMAL
CONSULTATIONS MUMBENGEGWI SAID THAT HE HAD RECEIVED A DOCUMENT IN
ARABIC FROM THE DEPUTY PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ THAT
MORNING. IT WAS BEING TRANSLATED INTO THE OFFICIAL LANGUAGES
AND HE WOULD CIRCULATE IT TO COUNCIL MEMBERS IN THE AFTERNOON.

4. GHAREKHAN (INDIA) SAID THE COUNCIL MUST TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION
THE SIGNIFICANT AND POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT THAT HAD TAKEN PLACE. AL
ASHTAL (YEMEN) SAID THE IRAQI REVOLUTIONARY COMMAND COUNCIL
STATEMENT REPRESENTED AN IMPORTANT TURN IN THE DIRECTION OF A

PEACEFUL SOLUTION. THE YEMENI PRESIDENTIAL COUNCIL HAD ISSUED A STATEMENT THAT MORNING WELCOMING THE IRAQI POSITION ON DEALING WITH THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, ESPECIALLY SCR 660 AND WITH THE QUESTION OF WITHDRAWAL FROM KUWAIT. SOME REACTIONS TO THE IRAQI STATEMENT MIGHT REFLECT NEGATIVELY ON THE SECURITY COUNCIL. YESTERDAY VORONTSOV HAD ASKED THE IRAQI PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE WHEN IRAQ WOULD WITHDRAW. TODAY THE HIGHEST AUTHORITY IN IRAQ HAD ISSUED A STATEMENT DEALING WITH WITHDRAWAL FOR THE FIRST TIME. THIS MEANT IRAQ WAS NO LONGER STICKING TO ITS POSITION THAT KUWAIT WAS PART OF IRAQ. THE COUNCIL SHOULD INITIATE A PEACE PROCESS LEADING TO IRAQI WITHDRAWAL FROM KUWAIT.

5. PICKERING (UNITED STATES) SAID THE COUNCIL SHOULD PROCEED WITH ITS PRIVATE FORMAL MEETING IN THE AFTERNOON. BUT HE WOULD LIKE TO DISCUSS THE TRANSLATION OF THE TEXT GIVEN BY THE IRAQIS TO THE PRESIDENT IN INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS. THE IRAQI STATEMENT REPRESENTED THE FIRST ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF THE NOTION OF WITHDRAWAL BY IRAQ SINCE 4 AUGUST. BUT HE REMAINED SCEPTICAL: IN PARTICULAR OVER THE DEMAND THAT THE COUNCIL SHOULD ABOLISH ALL ITS RESOLUTIONS OTHER THAN SCR 660: THESE INCLUDED SCR 662 DECLARING THE ANNEXATION OF KUWAIT NULL AND VOID. LINKAGES IN THE IRAQI STATEMENT AROUSED CONCERN AND THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE OF ANY JUSTIFICATION FOR A CALL FOR A CEASEFIRE.

6. I SAID IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO KNOW WHETHER THE DOCUMENT HANDED OVER BY THE IRAQI DEPUTY PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE WAS A FORMAL COMMUNICATION OF POLICY FROM IRAQ OR MERELY A COURTESY. THE REFERENCE TO WITHDRAWAL IN THE IRAQI STATEMENT WAS TO BE WELCOMED, BUT THAT WAS WHERE THE WELCOME ENDED. THE REST OF IT WAS INCONSISTENT BECAUSE IT TRIED TO IMPOSE CONDITIONS AND SCR 660 STIPULATED THAT WITHDRAWAL HAD TO BE UNCONDITIONAL. IF THERE WAS INDEED A COMMITMENT TO WITHDRAWAL, IT WOULD HAVE TO BECOME CONCRETE. IN THE FORMAL MEETING PERHAPS THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ WOULD ANSWER THE QUESTIONS THAT VORONTSOV AND I HAD PUT TO HIM ON WITHDRAWAL. I SUPPORTED PICKERING'S REQUEST FOR INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS ONCE WE HAD A TRANSLATION OF THE IRAQI DOCUMENT.

7. VORONTSOV SAID THAT IN A FIRST REACTION FROM MOSCOW GORBACHEV'S PRESS SPOKESMAN HAD STATED 'THE POSITIVE NEWS FROM IRAQ HAS BEEN RECEIVED WITH SATISFACTION AND HOPE IN MOSCOW. WE LOOK FORWARD TO THE VISIT OF PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSSEIN'S REPRESENTATIVE'. VORONTSOV ADDED THAT MUCH NEEDED TO BE CLARIFIED IN WHAT WAS A CONTRADICTORY STATEMENT. THERE WOULD BE

SERIOUS DISCUSSION IN MOSCOW WITH TARIQ AZIZ TO OBTAIN CLARIFICATION WHICH HE WOULD THEN PASS ON TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

8. LI (CHINA) SAID IT WAS WORTHWHILE TO SEE THE TERM 'WITHDRAWAL' FOR THE FIRST TIME IN THE IRAQI STATEMENT. BUT THERE WERE SOME QUESTIONS AND DOUBTS OVER OTHER PARTS OF THE STATEMENT WHICH REQUIRED CLARIFICATION.

9. ALARCON (CUBA) SAID IT WOULD BE GOOD IF COUNCIL MEMBERS HAD TIME TO READ THE IRAQI TEXT MORE CAREFULLY. THE STATEMENT WAS OF THE UTMOST IMPORTANCE BUT AT THE SAME TIME HE UNDERSTOOD THE QUESTIONS AND DOUBTS. BUT THE COUNCIL SHOULD WELCOME THE FACT THAT THE IRAQI LEADERSHIP HAD RECOGNISED SCR 660 FOR THE FIRST TIME. THE IRAQI TEXT SHOULD BE CIRCULATED TO ALL MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS, NOT JUST MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

10. BAGBENI (ZAIRE) AGREED THIS WAS THE FIRST TIME THE COUNCIL HAD RECEIVED FROM BAGHDAD A DECLARATION ACCEPTING SCR 660. IT MUST BE CONSIDERED SERIOUSLY.

11. IT WAS AGREED THAT THE PRIVATE FORMAL MEETING OF THE COUNCIL WOULD GO AHEAD AS PLANNED IN THE AFTERNOON. THE PRESIDENT WOULD CIRCULATE THE IRAQI TEXT TO COUNCIL MEMBERS AS SOON AS IT WAS AVAILABLE AND, IF THE IRAQIS AGREED, TO OTHER MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS. THE PRESIDENT WOULD SUSPEND THE FORMAL MEETING AT ABOUT 2330Z AND HOLD FURTHER INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS ON THE IRAQI TEXT.

COMMENT

11. DISCUSSION THUS FOLLOWED LARGELY PREDICTABLE LINES, ALTHOUGH CUBA WAS A LITTLE LESS UNRESERVED THAN YEMEN IN WELCOMING THE IRAQI STATEMENT. IT IS CLEAR THAT AL ASHTAL'S MIND IS ALREADY MOVING TOWARDS A COUNCIL CALL FOR A CEASEFIRE; BUT IT IS TOO EARLY TO SAY HOW MUCH SUPPORT THIS MIGHT ATTRACT OR WHAT CHANCE IT HAS OF ACQUIRING A CRITICAL MASS. THERE WAS A HELPFUL DISPOSITION IN THE COUNCIL TO WAIT AND SEE THE FULL TEXT OF THE IRAQI STATEMENT. SOME WILL ALSO WISH TO SEE THE OUTCOME OF FORTHCOMING DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS, NOTABLY THE VISIT OF TARIQ AZIZ TO MOSCOW.

12. IN AN EARLIER DISCUSSION WITH PICKERING WE HAD AGREED THAT THE PRESENT CUBA/YEMEN DRAFT RESOLUTIONS WERE

LARGELY OVERTAKEN, ALTHOUGH THEY COULD STILL BE ADAPTED TO NEW CIRCUMSTANCES. WE ALSO AGREED THAT IN THE NEW SITUATION THE IDEA OF OUR PRE-EMPTIVELY TABLING A RESOLUTION OF OUR OWN WAS NO LONGER APPROPRIATE, AND DID NOT AT PRESENT NEED TO BE PURSUED. THE DRAFT WE HAD EARLIER DISCUSSED WAS NOW THE WRONG SORT OF TEXT AND WOULD CREATE THE WRONG IMPRESSION.

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

15 February 1991

Dear Charles,

Iraq/Kuwait: UAE Contribution to Burdensharing

The Foreign Secretary suggests that the Prime Minister might thank Shaikh Zayed for the UAE's offer of US\$500 million immediately and a commitment to discuss a further US\$300 million or more at a later date. I enclose a draft letter.

I understand that the Chief Secretary intends to write personally to Shaikh Zayed after any message from the Prime Minister has been sent.

I am copying this letter to John Gieve (HM Treasury), Jeremy Haywood (PS/Chief Secretary) and Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence).

Yours ever
S L Gass

(S L Gass)
Private Secretary

Sir Charles Powell
10 Downing Street

President

FROM : Prime Minister

TO : His Highness Shaikh Zayed Bin Sultan Al Nahyan GCMG, GCB

David Mellor had told me of his visit to the United Arab Emirates on 2-3 February. He spoke with great warmth about his call on you and the exceptional courtesy with which he was received.

I have now heard of your generous response to our suggestion about help towards meeting the financial burden of the conflict. On behalf of the British Government and people, I thank you most sincerely. When we decided to help our friends in the Gulf deal with Iraqi aggression we did so because of the principle at stake. But as you know, costs are now considerable and rising, and the generous contribution you have made is greatly appreciated. I am also grateful to you for agreeing to consider a further contribution at a later date, depending on military and financial developments. Once again the ties of friendship that so closely bind our two countries have proved effective in dealing with the problems we face.

I send you my best wishes for the testing period of the next few weeks. I am confident that it will not be long before legitimacy is restored to Kuwait and peace returned to the whole Gulf region.

Z

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GULF BURDENSARING: JAPAN: WESTON'S VISIT

SUMMARY

1. JAPANESE OFFICIALS ASSURE WESTON THAT UK WILL RECEIVE PART OF NINE BILLION DOLLARS BUT CANNOT YET SAY HOW MUCH. THEY BELIEVE THAT US ADMINISTRATION NOW UNDERSTAND THAT NOT ALL THE MONEY IS FOR THE US. JAPANESE ARE RECEPTIVE TO UK ARGUMENTS AND REALISE THAT THE SIZE OF CONTRIBUTION WE RECEIVE WILL BE SEEN AS A POLITICAL MESSAGE. WESTON STRESSES IMPORTANCE OF THIS ISSUE FOR THE UK AND PRESSES FOR 8 PER CENT.

DETAIL

2. DURING TALKS ON 14 FEBRUARY WITH OWADA, THE MFA POLITICAL DIRECTOR, WESTON SAID THAT HE HAD COME TO JAPAN WITH SENIOR MINISTERIAL INSTRUCTIONS TO SAY HOW SERIOUSLY THE ISSUE OF BURDEN-SHARING WAS BEING TAKEN BY HMG. WE WELCOMED THE CLEAR DECLARATION BY NAKAYAMA IN HIS SPEECH OF 25 JANUARY THAT JAPAN RECOGNISED THE 'VITAL IMPORTANCE OF SOLIDARITY' WITH THE INTERNATIONAL EFFORT IN THE GULF. THE UK WAS MAKING THE SECOND LARGEST MILITARY EFFORT AMONG THE WESTERN POWERS WITH SOME 45,000 TROOPS - ABOUT 8 - 10 PER CENT OF THE AMERICAN EFFORT. THIS MEANT A SIGNIFICANT UNFORESEEN FINANCIAL BURDEN, AND WE RECOGNISED THAT THE BRITISH TAXPAYER WOULD HAVE TO BEAR A PART OF THAT. BUT WE ALSO FELT IT NATURAL TO LOOK TO FRIENDS, ESPECIALLY THOSE WITH MAJOR DIRECT STAKES IN THE GULF, TO HELP US WITH THESE COSTS. SO FAR WE HAD INCURRED OR WERE COMMITTED TO ABOUT 1.5 BILLION POUNDS OF EXTRA EXPENDITURE ON DEPLOYMENT TO AND RETURN FROM THE GULF, NEW EQUIPMENT AND EQUIPMENT MODIFICATIONS, REPLACEMENT OF LOST EQUIPMENT AND OTHER ITEMS. THE GROUND CAMPAIGN WAS NOT YET JOINED. WE ASSESSED THAT

PAGE 1
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Prime Minister
You are seeing the
Japanese Ambassador
on Monday, & will
be able to give him
an extra push
CDP
15/2

THE TOTAL ADDITIONAL COST WOULD BE NOT LESS THAN 3 BILLION POUNDS. THE EMBASSY HAD HANDED OVER A BREAKDOWN OF SOME OF THESE COSTS. WE HAD NOTED THE JAPANESE POSITION ON NON-WARLIKE COSTS. WE WERE GRATEFUL FOR THE 50 MILLION DOLLAR CONTRIBUTION ALREADY RECEIVED.

3. WE UNDERSTOOD THAT NAKAYAMA HAD MADE IT CLEAR TO BAKER IN THE CONTEXT OF THE NINE BILLION DOLLAR PACKAGE THAT THIS MONEY WAS INTENDED FOR OTHER TROOP CONTRIBUTORS AS WELL AS THE US, AND THAT THE US ADMINISTRATION DID NOT DISPUTE THIS. THE POINT WAS CONFIRMED BY BAKER'S CHOICE OF WORDS ON 6 FEBRUARY IN TESTIMONY TO CONGRESS. IF ONE APPLIED THE SAME RATIO AS THAT BETWEEN US AND UK MANPOWER DEPLOYED, A FIGURE OF 720 MILLION DOLLARS FOR THE UK WAS INDICATED. THIS 8 PER CENT RATIO HAD IN FACT BEEN ACCEPTED BY GERMANY AND KUWAIT IN DECIDING THE DIVISION OF THEIR OWN FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTIONS.

4. WESTON ALSO UNDERLINED THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS ISSUE FOR OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS. THERE WAS GREAT PUBLIC AND PARLIAMENTARY INTEREST IN BURDEN-SHARING. GIVEN MRS THATCHER'S PLEDGE AS PRIME MINISTER TO MAKE THE 1990S A DECADE OF UNPRECEDENTED PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN BRITAIN AND JAPAN AND THE IMPORTANCE OF OUR POLITICAL AND INVESTMENT RELATIONSHIP, A JAPANESE CONTRIBUTION TO OUR GULF COSTS OF THE ORDER HE HAD INDICATED WOULD BE A POWERFUL DEMONSTRATION OF THE PRACTICAL SOLIDARITY OF OUR RELATIONSHIP, AND WOULD DO MUCH TO THE OVERALL ATMOSPHERE IN A YEAR WHICH WOULD SEE OTHER IMPORTANT BILATERAL EVENTS IN THE UK INCLUDING A VISIT BY THE CROWN PRINCE.

5. OWADA SAID THAT ON THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP HE FULLY AGREED WITH WESTON. HE DESCRIBED JAPAN'S CONTRIBUTION TO THE GULF CRISIS:

- A) MAJOR FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE MILITARY COSTS,
- B) AID FOR THE FRONT-LINE COUNTRIES. THIS CAME TO 2 BILLION DOLLARS SO FAR FOR JORDAN, EGYPT AND TURKEY, BUT THERE WAS LIKELY TO BE MORE, POSSIBLY FOR OTHER COUNTRIES AS WELL.
- C) HUMANITARIAN AID THROUGH ICRC, IOM, UNDRP ETC. THIS ALREADY TOTALLED NEARLY 100 MILLION DOLLARS.

TAKEN TOGETHER, THIS SHOWED JAPAN'S DETERMINATION TO RESPOND AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE WITHIN ITS CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS.

6. TURNING TO THE 9 BILLION DOLLARS, OWADA SAID THAT ALTHOUGH THE GOVERNMENT HAD DECIDED ON THIS LARGE CONTRIBUTION IT HAD NOT YET OBTAINED PARLIAMENTARY APPROVAL. HE REHEARSED THE NEED FOR KOMEITO TO GIVE ITS SUPPORT TO THE PACKAGE IN THE UPPER HOUSE AND DESCRIBED THE PROSPECTS FOR THAT AS STILL TOTALLY UNCLEAR. WESTON SAID THAT FROM DISCUSSION WITH TWO SENIOR POLITICIANS THAT MORNING HE HAD RECEIVED A MODERATELY OPTIMISTIC IMPRESSION. BUT OWADA REMAINED CAUTIOUS: IT WAS STILL NOT CLEAR FOR EXAMPLE WHETHER THE LDP WOULD AGREE TO THE CUTS IN DEFENCE SPENDING DEMANDED BY KOMEITO AS A CONDITION OF APPROVING THE PACKAGE.

7. OWADA SAID THAT THE NINE BILLION WAS INTENDED FOR THE MULTINATIONAL FORCES, NOT JUST THE AMERICANS. SINCE THE AMERICANS SEEMED TO HAVE MISUNDERSTOOD, AND BAKER HAD LAID CLAIM TO THE WHOLE SUM, NAKAYAMA HAD WRITTEN TO CORRECT ANY SUCH MISUNDERSTANDING. HE AGREED THAT SUBSEQUENT STATEMENTS BY BAKER AND BRADY SEEMED TO IMPLY ACCEPTANCE OF THE POSITION. BAKER HAD SENT NO REPLY, NOR DID THE JAPANESE EXPECT ONE. BUT THE US PUBLIC AND CONGRESS WOULD CERTAINLY EXPECT TO GET MOST OF THE NINE BILLION. OWADA EXPRESSED GREAT SYMPATHY WITH THE BRITISH CASE. THE UK WOULD CERTAINLY BE A RECIPIENT COUNTRY, BUT HE COULD NOT COMMENT ON THE EXACT FIGURES. NOMINALLY THESE WOULD BE DECIDED BY THE JAPANESE TOGETHER WITH THE GCC, IN PRACTICE THE JAPANESE HAD NOT YET LOOKED AT THE MATTER INTERNALLY. BUT HE COULD SAY THAT THE BULK OF THE MONEY WOULD GO TO THE US, SOME TO THE UK AND SOME TO NON-OIL PRODUCING ISLAMIC TROOP CONTRIBUTORS.

8. WESTON REPEATED THAT 8 PER CENT SEEMED TO US APPROPRIATE AND HAD ALREADY BEEN APPLIED BY TWO OTHER COUNTRIES. OWADA WOULD NOT BE DRAWN. AT ONE POINT HE SEEMED TO IMPLY THAT THE 50 MILLION DOLLARS LAST TIME ROUND MIGHT HAVE ESTABLISHED A PRECEDENT FOR 5 PER CENT, BUT HE STUDIOUSLY AVOIDED COMMITMENT TO THAT OR 8 PER CENT OR ANY OTHER FIGURE BECAUSE THE INTERNAL DISCUSSION HAD NOT YET REACHED THAT POINT. ASKED ABOUT THE TIMING OF A DECISION, HE SAID IT WOULD PROBABLY NOT BE BEFORE THE DIET HAD APPROVED THE NINE BILLION, IE MID TO LATE MARCH, BUT THE INTERNAL PROCESS WOULD BEGIN BEFORE THEN.

9. ON 15 FEBRUARY, WESTON SPOKE ON SIMILAR LINES TO KAWASHIMA, DEPUTY DIRECTOR GENERAL FOR NORTH AMERICAN AFFAIRS (THE DG HAD BEEN CALLED TO THE DIET). KAWASHIMA GENERALLY TOOK A SIMILAR LINE TO OWADA. HE EXPRESSED UNDERSTANDING FOR THE UK'S CASE AND SAID THAT THE UK WOULD BE A RECIPIENT. THE JAPANESE HAD CLARIFIED THE POSITION TO THE US. IT WAS NOT YET CLEAR WHAT THE

SAUDI'S WOULD REQUEST FOR THEIR ISLAMIC FRIENDS. IT WAS NOT YET POSSIBLE TO COMMENT ON THE FIGURES, BUT HE WARNED THAT IN HIS BUREAU'S VIEW A PRO RATA ALLOCATION TO THE UK MIGHT BE DIFFICULT. HE STRESSED HOWEVER THAT THE IMPORTANCE OF THE UK INTEREST WAS WELL UNDERSTOOD AND ACCEPTED.

COMMENT

10. WESTON'S VISIT HAS BEEN MOST USEFUL IN ADDING AN EXTRA DIMENSION DIRECT FROM LONDON TO OUR CONTACTS WITH OFFICIALS HERE. THE JAPANESE OFFICIALS HE MET WENT AS FAR IN OUR DIRECTION AS THEY CAN AT THE PRESENT STAGE. IT IS HOWEVER CLEAR THAT THERE WILL BE SOME RESISTANCE, PARTICULARLY FROM NORTH AMERICAN BUREAU, TO STRICT PROPORTIONALITY. A FINAL DISCUSSION ON ALLOCATION MAY NOT BE FORTHCOMING FOR A FEW WEEKS YET BECAUSE OF THE CONCENTRATION AT PRESENT ON SECURING DIET APPROVAL FOR THE WHOLE PACKAGE. WE SHALL CONTINUE OUR CLOSE CONTACTS WITH THE MFA AND OUR PROFILE-RAISING CAMPAIGN WITH OPINION-FORMERS AND WILL IN DUE COURSE ADVISE ON WHETHER MORE DIRECT ACTION FROM LONDON WOULD BE USEFUL. IN THE MEANTIME, IT IS CLEAR THAT REPORTS FROM THE JAPANESE EMBASSY IN LONDON HAVE BEEN HAVING A USEFUL EFFECT, AND IT WILL BE WORTH CONTINUING TO GIVE ATTENTION TO KITAMURA AND HIS STAFF.

CCN PARA 10 WA SECURING DIET APPROVAL ETC

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SIC

MIPT: IRAQ/KUWAIT: SECURITY COUNCIL: COMMENT

1 SO FAR THE DEBATE IS GOING QUITE WELL FOR US. THE IDEA OF A QUESTION AND ANSWER FORMAT DID NOT SURVIVE UNSCATHED, BUT THE QUESTIONS WHICH PICKERING AND I WERE ABLE TO ASK SHOULD ENABLE SOME OF THE ALLIES TO RESPOND ON HELPFUL LINES (FOR EXAMPLE KUWAIT ON ITS READINESS TO NEGOTIATE FOLLOWING AN IRAQI WITHDRAWAL). THE QUESTIONS ADDRESSED TO IRAQ BY VORONTSOV AND MYSELF ARE LIKELY TO REMAIN UNANSWERED: BUT THEY HAVE SERVED THEIR PURPOSE OF POINTING UP IRAQ'S UNWILLINGNESS TO LIVE UP TO ITS OBLIGATIONS UNDER COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS.

2 THE SELF-DENYING ORDINANCE OF THE CUBANS AND YEMENIS, COMBINED WITH THE DISAPPEARANCE OF THE MAGHREB COUNTRIES, HAS RESULTED IN A VERY FIRM TONE TO THE DEBATE SO FAR, WITH THE PRESSURE CONTINUOUSLY DIRECTED AGAINST IRAQ. WE ARE IN FOR ONE OR TWO LESS SATISFACTORY CONTRIBUTIONS: FOR EXAMPLE THE IRANIAN STATEMENT, OF WHICH WE HAVE PROCURED AN ADVANCE COPY, IS STRONGLY CRITICAL OF THE UNITED STATES AND ITS ALLIES WHILE CONTINUING TO CALL FOR IRAQ'S WITHDRAWAL FROM KUWAIT. BUT OVERALL THE BALANCE WILL BE STRONGLY IN OUR FAVOUR.

3 OF THE STATEMENTS WE HAVE HEARD SO FAR THE SOVIET CONTRIBUTION WAS COMMENDABLY FIRM. DESPITE YESTERDAY'S EVENTS IN BAGHDAD VORONTSOV DID NOT DEPART ONE IOTA FROM THE LINE TAKEN BY GORBACHEV THAT EVENTS 'COULD CREATE A DANGER' OF EXCEEDING THE LIMITS OF SCR 678. CHINA ADOPTED A LOW PROFILE. THE BELGIANS WERE COMMENDABLY STALWART: THE AUSTRIANS A GOOD DEAL LESS SO, WITH MUCH TRAILING OF POSSIBLE INITIATIVES FROM MOCK.

4 A POTENTIALLY OMINOUS DEVELOPMENT DURING THE DAY WAS THE EMERGENCE OF A CUBAN/YEMENI TEXT OF TWO DRAFT COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS. THE FIRST WOULD EXPRESS THE COUNCIL'S DETERMINATION TO PUT A HALT TO HOSTILITIES IN THE GULF AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, AND DECIDE TO ESTABLISH AN AD HOC COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE SECURITY COUNCIL TO EXAMINE THE SITUATION AND POSSIBLE FORMULAS FOR HALTING ARMED ACTION. THE SECOND, LINKED TO THE FIRST, WOULD EXPRESS DEEP CONCERN ABOUT THE LOSS OF LIFE AND DESTRUCTION OF PROPERTY PROVOKED BY BOMBINGS OF IRAQI CITIES, DEMAND THAT ALL SUCH BOMBINGS BE HALTED AND REQUEST THE COMMITTEE JUST CREATED TO EXAMINE POSSIBLE FORMULAS FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. (TEXTS BY FAX TO EMERGENCY UNIT AND UND.) THE CUBANS AND YEMENIS ARE SO FAR KEEPING THESE DRAFTS CLOSE TO THEIR CHESTS: WE BELIEVE THEY HAVE NOT YET GONE BEYOND SOUNDING OUT THE INDIANS AND ECUADOREANS (BOTH OF WHOM ARE BEING NOTABLY CAGEY WITH US). WE PROCURED THE TEXTS AT AN EARLY STAGE AND PASSED COPIES TO THE AMERICANS, FRENCH AND RUSSIANS. THE FACT THAT THE CUBANS AND YEMENIS ARE COOKING SOMETHING UP HAS ALSO SEEPED TO THE PRESS (BUT NOT YET THE TEXTS).

5 IT SHOULD BECOME CLEAR DURING THE COURSE OF 15 FEBRUARY, PARTICULARLY IF THE LIST OF SPEAKERS IN THE DEBATE LOOKS LIKE BEING EXHAUSTED, WHETHER THE CUBANS AND YEMENIS ARE ON A FAST TIME TRACK OR A SLOW ONE. EVENTS COULD MOVE VERY QUICKLY: THE TEXTS APPEAR TO BE COMPLETE, AND COULD BE SUBMITTED AT ANY TIME AS CUBAN/YEMENI DRAFTS, EVEN WITHOUT ANY OTHER SUPPORT. THE MOMENT AT WHICH WE MIGHT HAVE TO PRE-EMPT, IF WE ARE NOT OURSELVES TO BE PRE-EMPTED, OVER RESOLUTION TEXTS LOOKS A GOOD DEAL CLOSER. IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WE AND THE AMERICANS SHOULD ADDRESS OURSELVES AGAIN TO THE QUESTION RATHER URGENTLY.

HANNAY

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Ref. A091/366

SIR CHARLES POWELL

cc Sir Percy Cradock
Mr Appleyard

Statement from Iraqi News Agency

Following the statement from the Iraqi News Agency, the JIC are producing an immediate assessment. In parallel with that, I have held a meeting of OPD(G)(O) which considered the line which Ministers should be recommended to take.

2. It is clear that the Iraqi statement does not constitute grounds for a settlement. Although it refers to the possibility of withdrawal for the first time, this is linked to a large number of conditions which are clearly unacceptable and, in many cases, directly incompatible with Security Council resolutions.
3. In these circumstances, Ministers need to steer between two pitfalls - one is to appear completely impervious to any sign of Iraqi concession and the other is to dignify the present statement by appearing in any way to regard it as an important development or a serious basis for ending the hostilities.
- 4. In the light of those considerations, I attach a suggested list of points to make which the FCO are clearing with the Foreign Secretary. Subject to his approval, the points are suggested as a basis for Ministerial reactions and for use by press officers. It is suggested that you might convey it to General Scowcroft as the points which we propose to make, and in parallel the FCO will be sending it to the State Department and using it as a basis of guidance for posts. The Foreign Office similarly propose to pass it to the other coalition allies.

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Other action which is being taken is a telegram of instructions to the UK Ambassador at the UN to take the same line if the Security Council debate continues over the weekend.

5. There are reports that the EC Troika (Luxembourg, Italy, Netherlands), which is on its way to Moscow, may meet Tariq Aziz there. The Foreign Secretary is having these reports investigated. The Troika has no mandate for such a meeting beyond the one which they had towards the end of last year when it was proposed that they meet Tariq Aziz to urge on the Iraqis' withdrawal from Kuwait and compliance with the UN resolutions.

6. I am copying this minute to members of OPD(G).

R.R.B.

ROBIN BUTLER

15 February 1991

SECRET

Response to Iraqi Announcement

1. Disappointed that the first reports which talked of withdrawal not borne out by the long list of conditions which followed. Now clear that the announcement by the Revolutionary Command Council does not commit Iraq to unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait as required by the United Nations Security Council in Resolution 660, or to the implementation of the other 11 Resolutions passed by the Security Council since the invasion of Kuwait.

2. Instead it lays down nine conditions before Iraq would be ready to negotiate:

- link with Israeli withdrawal from the Occupied Territories.
- withdrawal of coalition troops from the Middle East within one month.
- removal of military equipment recently supplied to Israel.
- end of military bases in the Middle East and any form of foreign military presence.
- demands for a "democratic" Kuwait.
- reparations for the destruction of Iraq.
- cancellation of all Iraqi debt and transfers from rich to poor states in the region and the world.
- repeal of UNSCRs and the end of all sanctions.
- guarantee of Iraq's historic rights in their entirety.

3. It is preposterous for an aggressor to seek to set conditions for remedying its misdeeds.

4. What the world needs is an unequivocal commitment by Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait. When the Iraqi Government are ready to do this, they should say so unambiguously and match their words with action by beginning their withdrawal from Kuwait.

5. On this basis hostilities could end very quickly.

Supplementaries

6. Coalition in danger of missing opportunity?

No. On the contrary, the Iraqis are missing an opportunity. Their announcement is no more than a ploy to divert attention from their refusal to comply with the requirements of the Security Council Resolutions.

7. Does the war have to go on?

No. Saddam Hussein could stop hostilities any day by announcing his intention to withdraw and providing decisive and irreversible evidence that he is withdrawing. On the basis of this announcement there is no case for a change in the policies adopted by the Security Council and being implemented by the coalition. The responsibility for the continuation of the war rests solely on the Government of Iraq.

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REMARKS OF PRESIDENT BUSH
TO THE AMERICAN ACADEMY FOR ADVANCEMENT OF SCIENCE

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FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 15, 1991

PRESIDENT BUSH: Good morning. Please be seated. (Applause.) Please be seated. Thank you. Thank you very much. Thank you, and please forgive me for keeping you waiting.

First let me pay my respects to Secretary Watkins and to Dr. Bromley and to NASA's very able administrator Admiral Truly.

Before talking about the subject at hand I do want to make a few comments on the statement that came out of Baghdad early this morning.

When I first heard that I statement I must say I was happy that Saddam Hussein had seemed to realize that he must now withdraw unconditionally from Kuwait in keeping with the relevant United Nations resolutions. Regrettably, the Iraq statement now appears to be a cruel hoax dashing the hopes of the people in Iraq and, indeed, around the world. It seems that there was an immediate celebratory atmosphere in Baghdad after this statement

.RTX

CONTINUED ON PAGE 2-1

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and this reflects, I think, the Iraqi peoples' desire to see the war end, a war the people of Iraq never sought. Not only was the Iraq statement full of unacceptable old conditions, but Saddam Hussein has added several new conditions. And we've been in touch with members of the coalition, and they recognize that there is nothing new here, with the possible exception of recognizing for the first time that Iraq must leave Kuwait.

Now let me state once again they must withdraw without condition, there must be full implementation of all the Security Council resolutions, and there will be no linkage to other problems in the area, and the legitimate rulers of Kuwait must be returned to Kuwait. Until a massive withdrawal begins, with those Iraqi troops visibly leaving Kuwait, the coalition forces acting under United Nations resolution 678, will continue their efforts to force compliance with all the resolutions of the United Nations.

But there's another way for the bloodshed to stop, and that is for the Iraqi military and the Iraqi people to take matters into their own hands to force Saddam Hussein the dictator to step aside and to comply with the United Nations resolutions and then rejoin the family of peace-loving nations. We have no argument with the people of Iraq. Our differences are with Iraq's brutal dictator.

And the war -- let me just assure you all -- is going on schedule. Of course all of us want to see the war ended soon and with a limited loss of life, and it can if Saddam Hussein would comply unconditionally with these UN resolutions and do now what he should have done long, long ago.

So I'm sorry that after analysis and reading the statements out of Baghdad in their entirety,

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CONTINUED ON PAGE 3-1

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So far all we have is an account of a reported decision. If Iraq were now to withdraw decisively and irreversibly from Kuwait, and comply fully with United Nations Resolutions without conditions, that would be good news for the world. We cannot be clear that is yet the position. We shall need to see early evidence of withdrawal.

E. R.

In view of the large number of conditions being attached to the original announcement, we are extremely sceptical whether this represents any advance at all.

TE R.

In view of the large number of conditions being attached to the original announcement, we are extremely sceptical whether this represents any advance at all.


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News Department
Date: 15 February 1991
cc: PS/No 10
Mr O'Donnell, No 10
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Mr Gore-Booth
Emergency Unit
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Private Secretary

IRAQI STATEMENT

1. The White House Spokesman made the following statement at 0830 hours local today:

"We have not yet examined a full official text of the RCC's statement. But it clearly contains conditions for Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait. The UN Security Council Resolutions are clear in their insistence that the withdrawal be complete and unconditional. Promises alone are not sufficient. There must be not only agreement to comply with the Resolutions but also immediate and concrete action on the ground."


R F Cornish

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YOUR TELNO 120 TO UKMIS NEW YORK : IRAQI CEASE-FIRE PROPOSAL

1. AFTER HIS TALKS WITH CHANCELLOR KOHL IN PARIS ON 15 FEBRUARY, PRESIDENT MITTERRAND SPOKE TO THE PRESS ABOUT IRAQ'S CEASE-FIRE PROPOSAL. HE SAID THAT SCR 660 'CALLED FOR THE IMMEDIATE AND UNCONDITIONAL WITHDRAWAL OF IRAQI FORCES FROM KUWAIT' THE IRAQI PROPOSAL WAS 'UNACCEPTABLE SINCE IT DID NOT COMPLY WITH THESE REQUIREMENTS AND ADDED NEW CONDITIONS'.

2. CHANCELLOR KOHL IS REPORTED AS SAYING THAT THE IRAQI PROPOSAL DID NOT FULFIL THE CONDITIONS FIXED BY THE UN AND DID NOT CONSTITUTE A CHANGE IN THE IRAQI POSITION.

3. THE MINISTER SPOKE TO MOREL (ELYSEE) AND LECLERCQ (QUAI) SUGGESTING THAT THE FRENCH WERE WELL PLACED AT DUMAS'S TALKS WITH DE MICHELIS IN PARIS THIS EVENING TO REIN IN ANY ITALIAN DISPOSITION FOR THE TROIKA TO SEEK A MEETING WITH TARIQ AZIZ IN MOSCOW ON 16 FEBRUARY. IF A MEETING WAS FORCED ON THE TROIKA, THEY SHOULD STICK TO A FIRM LINE ON THE NEED FOR COMPLETE AND UNCONDITIONAL COMPLIANCE WITH THE UNSCR RESOLUTIONS. LECLERCQ AGREED THAT IT WOULD GIVE THE WRONG SIGNAL TO ASK FOR A MEETING. MOREL COMMENTED THAT DE MICHALIS'S INITIAL PUBLIC RESPONSE TO THE IRAQI PROPOSAL HAD BEEN UNDULY EUPHORIC.

FERGUSSON

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
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
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J Alan Thomas
Head of Defence Export Services



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15 February 91

Dear Charles

I enclose a suggested extra paragraph for the PM's letter to Sheikh Zayed. The APC decision is imminent and Warrior is up against Russian competition thought to be highly favoured, due to price. The Blackhawk's have been postponed but the Abu Dhabi's profess them to be a "key ingredient". Each deal is worth £400m.

I plan to be in the Gulf from 9-13 March; but will, of course, re-shuffle as necessary to fix a convenient date.

With thanks, as ever

Yours

Alan

DRAFT LETTER FROM PRIME MINISTER TO SHAIKH ZAYED

ADDITIONAL PARAGRAPH 3

Might I also say that I welcome your active interest in two important defence equipment programmes with the UK, Warrior armoured personnel carriers and helicopters. I believe this equipment would make a significant contribution to the strengthening of your armed forces and to our defence co-operation.

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MY TELNO 375: THE GULF: SOVIET MOVES

SUMMARY

1. PRIMAKOV SAID BY KUWAITIS TO HAVE REPORTED SOME SIGNS OF FLEXIBILITY FROM SADDAM HUSSEIN. HENCE RETURN VISIT TO MOSCOW BY TARIQ AZIZ. RUSSINS DENY TANGIBLE RESULTS FROM PRIMAKOV'S MISSION SO FAR, BUT FURTHER INDICATIONS OF SOVIET THINKING ON POSSIBLE BASIS FOR CEASEFIRE.
2. NO/NO SIGNS THAT UNDER INFLUENCE OF BUNKER BOMBING SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTRY INCLINED TO DEPART FROM PRESENT POSITION THAT OPERATIONS REMAIN WITHIN SCOPE OF UN RESOLUTIONS.

DETAIL

3. AL DUAIJ (THE KUWAITI AMBASSADOR IN MOSCOW) BRIEFED US ON HIS FOREIGN MINISTER'S DISCUSSIONS IN MOSCOW ON 14 FEBRUARY. ACCORDING TO GORBACHEV, PRIMAKOV HAD REPORTED THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN HAD STARTED TO REALISE THAT THE COALITION COULD NOT BE WEAKENED. PRIMAKOV HAD BEEN STRUCK BY THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN SADDAM HUSSEIN DURING HIS RECENT VISIT AND LAST TIME HE HAD SEEN HIM. HE APPEARED TO HAVE LOST 15 KILOS AND WAS PALE AND DISTURBED (SIC). SADDAM HUSSEIN "DID NOT REFUSE THE IDEA OF WITHDRAWAL FROM KUWAIT." THIS WAS WHY IT HAD BEEN SUGGESTED THAT TARIQ AZIZ SHOULD VISIT MOSCOW ON 17 FEBRUARY. AL-DUAIJ ADDED, HOWEVER, THAT IN HIS VIEW IT WAS MOST UNLIKELY THAT TARIQ AZIZ WOULD BRING PROPOSALS WITH HIM. SADDAM HUSSEIN WOULD HIMSELF WANT TO TAKE THE CREDIT FOR ANY SHIFT IN THE IRAQI POSITION.
4. BOTH GORBACHEV AND BESSMERTNYKH HAD BEEN ROBUST IN THEIR DISCUSSIONS WITH SABAH. THE SOVIET UNION WAS FIRMLY COMMITTED TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS. THEY WERE, HOWEVER, CONCERNED AT THE POSSIBILITY OF MILITARY OPERATIONS GETTING OUT OF CONTROL SEMICLN HENCE SOVIET DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY. BESSMERTNYKH

SAID THAT VORONTSOV HAD FIRM INSTRUCTIONS THAT THERE COULD BE NO QUESTION OF A CEASEFIRE UNTIL SADDAM HUSSEIN HAD DECLARED HIS INTENTION OF WITHDRAWING FROM KUWAIT AND HAD THEN IMPLEMENTED THIS UNDERTAKING. BESSMERTNYKH HAD ADDED THAT PRIMAKOV HAD REFUSED TO MEET ARAFAT DURING HIS RECENT VISIT TO BAGHDAD.

5. IN A SEPARATE DISCUSSION, LAVROV (HEAD OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS DEPT IN THE MFA) EMPHASISED TO LOGAN THAT SOVIET OFFICIAL STATEMENTS DREW ATTENTION ONLY TO THE RISK OF ALLIED MILITARY ACTIVITY GOING BEYOND THE TERMS OF UN RESOLUTIONS. A LEGAL STUDY, RECENTLY COMPLETED BY MFA LAWYERS, SHOWED THAT ALLIED TACTICS DID NOT VIOLATE THE TERMS OF UN RESOLUTIONS SINCE IT WAS ADMISSABLE TO ATTACK TARGETS WHICH WERE CRUCIAL TO THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR EVEN IF THEY WERE NOT ACTUALLY MILITARY. THE SOVIET AUTHORITIES WERE OPEN-MINDED ABOUT THE BOMBING OF THE BUNKER SEMICLN THERE WERE CONFLICTING VERSIONS FROM EACH SIDE. LAVROV REFERRED TO THE EPISODE AS 'THE ACCIDENT' FOR THE REST OF THE DISCUSSION. AS FOR PRIMAKOV'S ACTIVITIES, LAVROV SAID THAT NOTHING HAD YET BEEN ACHIEVED. PRIMAKOV WAS A MAN WHOM SADDAM HUSSEIN KNEW AND TRUSTED. THAT WAS WHY THE SOVIET UNION REGARDED HIS CONTINUED ACTIVITY AS USEFUL. IN THE SOVIET VIEW, THE BASIS FOR A CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES LAY IN A PROGRAMME SUCH AS THAT DESCRIBED IN PARA 4 OF MOSCOW TUR. BUT NOTHING CONCRETE HAD YET BEEN ACHIEVED BY PRIMAKOV. 'YOU KNOW AS MUCH AS WE DO' LAVROV SAID.

6. LAVROV SAID THAT MEANWHILE THE SOVIET AUTHORITIES WERE ANXIOUS THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL SHOULD BE SEEN TO UNDERTAKE A POSITIVE ROLE EVEN IF IT COULD NOT STOP THE CONFLICT. IT WAS IN THE INTERESTS OF ALL THAT ITS CREDIT AS AN INSTRUMENT OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION DID NOT SUFFER, FOR EXAMPLE FROM SADDAM HUSSEIN'S ATTACKS ON THE SECRETARY GENERAL. ONE POSSIBILITY MIGHT BE FOR THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL TO MAKE A STATEMENT IN CONNECTION WITH THE WHO AND UNICEF REPORTS ON THE SITUATION OR ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS. ANOTHER POSSIBLE AREA OF SECURITY COUNCIL INVOLVEMENT WAS IN CONNECTION WITH THE OIL SPILLAGES ON WHICH IMO HAD ALREADY INTERVENED. THE SECURITY COUNCIL COULD FOR EXAMPLE DELIVER A VIEW ON THE BASIS OF A 1977 UN DECISION (LAVROV COULD NOT REMEMBER THE PRECISE REFERENCE) ON THE INADMISSABILITY ON ACTIVITIES HOSTILE TO THE ENVIRONMENT.

7. FINALLY, LAVROV WAS CONCERNED THAT AT THE MEETING OF THE IAEA BOARD MEETING NEXT MONTH THE IRAQIS MIGHT RAISE THE ISSUE OF ATTACKS ON THEIR NUCLEAR INSTALLATIONS, SOME OF WHICH AT LEAST OPERATED UNDER THE IAEA REGIME.

COMMENT

8. AL-DUAIJ ATTENDED SABAH'S MEETING WITH GORBACHEV AND BESSMERTNYKH. HIS ACCOUNT OF PRIMAKOV'S IMPRESSIONS (WHICH WERE DESCRIBED IN VERY SIMILAR TERMS BY THE TWO RUSSIANS) SEEM CONVINCING. ALTHOUGH LAVROV SAID THAT NO PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE BETWEEN PRIMAKOV AND THE IRAQIS, IT LOOKS SIGNIFICANT THAT HIS MENTION OF A POSSIBLE CEASEFIRE PROGRAMME WAS ON SIMILAR TERMS AS THAT DESCRIBED TO THE AMERICANS.

BRAITHWAITE

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INFO DESKBY 151600Z LUXEMBOURG

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YOUR TELNO 51 TO LUXEMBOURG AND TELECON JENKINS/GREENSTOCK
TROIKA MEETING WITH TARIQ AZIZ

1. I SPOKE TO VAN WALSUM AND SAID THAT WE UNDERSTOOD THAT THE LUXEMBOURGERS WERE ISSUING A COREU ASKING FOR PARTNERS VIEWS ON A MEETING IN MOSCOW BETWEEN THE TROIKA AND TARIQ AZIZ. WE WOULD BE REPLYING THAT WE BELIEVED THE PRESIDENCY SHOULD NOT (REPEAT NOT) INITIATE A MEETING WITH HIM BUT THAT IF THE IRAQIS TOOK THE INITIATIVE, OR THE RUSSIANS AS HOSTS DID SO, A MEETING WITH TARIQ AZIZ SHOULD BE USED TO MAKE ONE OR TWO BASIC POINTS.
2. IT NOW SEEMED CLEAR THAT THE IRAQI STATEMENT WAS SO HEDGED WITH CONDITIONS AS TO MAKE THE OFFER OF WITHDRAWAL UNACCEPTABLE. THIS BEING SO THE TROIKA SHOULD INSIST WITH TARIQ AZIZ ON THE FULFILLMENT OF ALL THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS. WE SHOULD ALSO SEEK CLARIFICATION FROM THE IRAQIS OVER THE FATE OF ALLIED PRISONERS OF WAR.
3. VAN WALSUM RESPONDED THAT THE DUTCH COULD SUPPORT OUR POSITION BOTH ON THE CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH ANY MEETING WITH TARIQ AZIZ COULD TAKE PLACE, AND THE SUBSTANCE OF THE MESSAGE TO BE CONVEYED TO THE IRAQIS. HE ADDED THAT THE DUTCH WOULD HAVE FOUND IT DIFFICULT TO HAVE REFUSED TO SEE TARIQ AZIZ UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES, BUT HE AGREED THAT THE TROIKA NEED NOT TAKE THE INITIATIVE FOR A MEETING.
4. PLEASE ADVANCE TO GREENSTOCK.

JENKINS

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SIC I9M

MY TELS NOS 278/280: IRAQ/KUWAIT: SECURITY COUNCIL

SUMMARY

1. MEETING OF THE FIVE TO DISCUSS IRAQI OFFER TO 'DEAL WITH' SCR 660. AGREEMENT THAT CONDITIONS ARE UNACCEPTABLE AND THAT COUNCIL PRESIDENT SHOULD BE URGED TO GET THE IRAQI PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE TO MAKE A CLEAR STATEMENT OF HIS GOVERNMENT'S POSITION. COUNCIL PRESIDENT HOLDING BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS AND INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS DURING THE MORNING OF 15 FEBRUARY. PRIVATE FORMAL COUNCIL MEETING POSTPONED UNTIL THE AFTERNOON.

DETAIL

2. FOLLOWING THE ANNOUNCEMENT FROM BAGHDAD OF IRAQ'S READINESS TO 'DEAL WITH' SCR 660 WITH THE AIM OF REACHING A SOLUTION INCLUDING WITHDRAWAL, THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL CANCELLED THE PRIVATE FORMAL MEETING OF THE COUNCIL ARRANGED FOR THE MORNING OF 15 FEBRUARY. INSTEAD HE BEGAN A SERIES OF BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS, INCLUDING IRAQ, KUWAIT, AND THE FIVE PERMANENT MEMBERS. INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS OF THE WHOLE HAVE BEEN SCHEDULED FOR LATE IN THE MORNING.

3. EARLIER IN THE MORNING AMBASSADORS OF THE FIVE PERMANENT MEMBERS MET TO TAKE STOCK OF THE NEW SITUATION. WE HAD ONLY LIMITED INFORMATION ON THE IRAQI OFFER AND THE POSITIONS OF OUR OWN GOVERNMENTS: BUT OUR DISCUSSION REACHED A NUMBER OF PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS:

(A) THE REFERENCE IN THE IRAQI STATEMENT TO SCR 660 AND

WITHDRAWAL REPRESENTED A NEW ELEMENT, EVEN IF IT WAS HEDGED ABOUT WITH TOTALLY UNACCEPTABLE CONDITIONALITY. THERE WAS OF COURSE A FUNDAMENTAL CONTRADICTION BETWEEN THE STIPULATION IN SCR 660 THAT IRAQI WITHDRAWAL SHOULD BE IMMEDIATE AND UNCONDITIONAL AND THE LINKAGE CONTAINED IN THE TEXT:

- (B) THE BEST FIRST STEP IN NEW YORK WOULD BE TO URGE THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL TO ASK THE IRAQI PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE TO SEEK A CLEAR STATEMENT OF HIS GOVERNMENT'S POSITION, TO BE CONVEYED TO THE COUNCIL OR AT LEAST TO THE PRESIDENT.

IN THE MEANTIME WE SHOULD NOT TAKE THE INITIATIVE IN PROPOSING A POSTPONEMENT OF THE FORMAL COUNCIL MEETING UNDER WAY, BUT IN PRACTICE THE LIST OF SPEAKERS WOULD DWINDLE TO NEXT TO NOTHING AS MISSIONS AND GOVERNMENTS SOUGHT TO ASSESS THE NEW SITUATION:

- (C) THERE WAS NO IMMEDIATE CALL FOR COUNCIL ACTION. THE EMPHASIS HAD TO BE ON THE CLARIFICATION OF THE IRAQI POSITION, NOTABLY THROUGH THE DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS IN MOSCOW AND ELSEWHERE SCHEDULED FOR THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE:
- (D) BUT THIS WOULD PROBABLY NOT DETER CERTAIN COUNCIL MEMBERS (IN PARTICULAR CUBA AND YEMEN) FROM PUTTING FORWARD PROPOSALS FOR AN IMMEDIATE CEASEFIRE OR PAUSE IN HOSTILITIES. THESE WOULD HAVE TO BE RESISTED. LI (CHINA) HELPFULLY COMMENTED THAT THE CONDITIONS CONTAINED IN THE IRAQI STATEMENT WERE TOO HARSH TO JUSTIFY ANY CALL FOR AN IMMEDIATE CEASEFIRE.

4. WE AGREED TO REMAIN CLOSELY IN TOUCH AS EVENTS UNFOLDED IN NEW YORK AND ELSEWHERE DURING THE DAY.

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
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OUR TELNO 450: IRAQ/KUWAIT: WASHINGTON SITREP

SUMMARY

1. NEWS AND DEBATE DOMINATED BY COALITION BOMBING OF BUNKER. ADMINISTRATION MAINTAIN UNIFIED LINE, BUT BATTLING POWERFUL IMAGES FROM BAGHDAD.

DETAIL

2. THE STORY OF THE DAY (14 FEBRUARY) CONTINUES TO BE THE ALLIED BOMBING OF THE BUNKER IN BAGHDAD. THE ADMINISTRATION HAVE BEEN PUT ON THE DEFENSIVE BY WHAT COMMENTATORS DESCRIBE AS THE MOST TROUBLING CONTROVERSY OF THE WAR.

3. NONETHELESS, THE WHITE HOUSE SPOKESMAN HAS MADE CLEAR THAT COALITION BOMBING WOULD CONTINUE, AS WOULD ATTACKS ON COMMAND AND CONTROL CENTRES. THE US WERE NOT DELIBERATELY TARGETTING CIVILIANS BUT THE RISK OF CIVILIAN CASUALTIES WOULD REMAIN. COALITION OBJECTIVES WERE VALID AND THE US WOULD NOT SHRINK QUOTE ONE IOTA UNQUOTE FROM RESPONSIBILITY FOR ENFORCING UN RESOLUTIONS: QUOTE THE WAR GOES ON UNQUOTE. FITZWATER ALSO MADE CLEAR THAT ANY DECISION ON THE START OF A GROUND WAR WOULD NOT BE AFFECTED BY POLITICAL FALL-OUT FROM THIS INCIDENT BUT WOULD BE BASED ON MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS.

4. FITZWATER'S STATEMENTS FORM PART OF A CAREFULLY ORCHESTRATED US RESPONSE. STATE DEPARTMENT, PENTAGON AND CENTCOM SPOKESMEN ALL CONTINUE TO TAKE THE LINE THAT THE SHELTER HAD BEEN UPGRADED, CAMOUFLAGED, AND HARDENED FOR MILITARY PURPOSES, WHICH MADE IT A LEGITIMATE TARGET. RESPONSIBILITY FOR CIVILIAN CASUALTIES RESTED WITH SADDAM HUSSEIN. THIS IS ALL IN MARKED CONTRAST TO THE ADMINISTRATION'S INITIAL, HESITANT RESPONSE TO THE INCIDENT WHICH VAGUELY PROMISED AN INVESTIGATION. BUT THE PRESS CONTINUE TO REPORT THE NAGGING FEAR, ACKNOWLEDGED PRIVATELY BY A SMALL NUMBER OF OFFICIALS, OF A PARTIAL FAILURE OF

PAGE 1
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INTELLIGENCE: THAT THE BUILDING SERVED TWO FUNCTIONS AND THAT THE ALLIES HAD FAILED TO DISCERN IT.

5. ALL ANALYSTS AGREE THAT THE GRIM PICTURES FROM BAGHDAD HAVE DISPELLED FOR AMERICANS THE IMAGE OF AN ANTISEPTIC WAR AND CREATED A DILEMMA FOR THE ADMINISTRATION. THE AIR CAMPAIGN COULD AVOID COSTLY GROUND CASUALTIES BUT RAN THE RISK THAT THE BOMBARDMENT ITSELF WOULD BECOME THE ISSUE, DISTRACTING ATTENTION FROM THE LIBERATION OF KUWAIT.

6. US PUBLIC REACTION IS STILL DIFFICULT TO JUDGE. ANTI-WAR GROUPS HAVE REACTED STRONGLY, BUT PROFESSIONAL POLLSTERS HAVE PREDICTED THAT THE PUBLIC ARE LIKELY TO SUSPEND JUDGEMENT FOR 2 OR 3 DAYS UNTIL THE SITUATION HAS BEEN CLARIFIED AS FAR AS POSSIBLE. MOST EXPECT PUBLIC OPINION TO HOLD UP AS LONG AS PEOPLE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT THE MILITARY ARE MAKING A CONSCIENTIOUS EFFORT TO MINIMISE CIVILIAN CASUALTIES. BUT THE PENTAGON SEE THE DANGER OF A CREDIBILITY GAP DEVELOPING BETWEEN THE MILITARY AND MEDIA/PUBLIC OPINION AS IN VIETNAM. FOR THEIR PART THE MEDIA SEEM TO BE EQUALLY AWARE THAT THE IMAGES FROM BAGHDAD PROVIDE A PROPAGANDA WINDFALL FOR SADDAM WHICH HE IS CYNICALLY PREPARED TO EXPLOIT.

7. THE PENTAGON HAVE RAISED THEIR DAMAGE ASSESSMENT TO 1300 IRAQI TANKS, OVER 800 ARMoured VEHICLES AND 800 ARTILLERY PIECES DESTROYED. CNN HAVE QUOTED SIR P DE BILLIERE AS SAYING THAT A TENTATIVE DATE FOR THE STATE OF THE GROUND CAMPAIGN HAD NOW BEEN AGREED, BUT LT GEN KELLY OF THE JOINT CHIEF SAID THAT HE WAS NOT AWARE THAT ANY DATE HAD BEEN FIXED.

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

14 February 1991

Sir Charles

Letter from President Ben Ali of Tunisia
to the Prime Minister

/ The Tunisian President has written to the Prime Minister (and Heads of Government of the other members of the Security Council) seeking support for the Maghreb initiative in New York. Mrs Thatcher sent Mr Ben Ali a pretty fierce reply to an earlier message which also implied concessions to Saddam Hussain. I
/ enclose a draft reply for the Prime Minister's signature.

copy attached

Answer,
S L Gass

(S L Gass)
Private Secretary

Sir Charles Powell
10 Downing Street

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BSP ①

FROM : The Prime Minister
TO : President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali *KK*
Tunis

Thank you for your letter of 31 January about your efforts to bring about a peaceful end to the present hostilities in the Gulf.

I am glad ~~to note~~ that you remain committed to achieving Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait and the restoration of its legitimate government. The coalition forces fighting in the Gulf, under the authorisation of Security Council Resolution 678, seek to achieve exactly those aims. This reflects the will of the whole international community as expressed in successive Resolutions of the UN Security Council.

I understand and share your wish to see an early end to the fighting. But the responsibility for prolonging it lies with Saddam Hussain. He can choose peace by announcing his acceptance of the relevant Security Council Resolutions and by beginning a swift and total withdrawal of his forces from Kuwait. I hope that you will use your influence with Baghdad to bring this about. But unless and until the Iraqis withdraw, the coalition forces will continue their operations to ensure that Kuwait is once again a free and sovereign nation. We aim to achieve this objective as quickly as possible and with the minimum of casualties.

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JHQ HIGH WYCOMBE (FOR POLAD), HQBFME

MY TELNO 130: GULF CRISIS: ICRC: ALLIED POWS

SUMMARY

1. I PRESS SOMMARUGA AGAIN ON ICRC ACCESS TO ALLIED POWS. HE IS
FLYING TO AMMAN TO SEE KING HUSSEIN.

DETAIL

2. BEFORE HE LEFT FOR PARIS EARLIER THIS WEEK PRESIDENT SOMMARUGA
CALLED ME TO EXPRESS THANKS FOR HIS EXCELLENT PROGRAMME IN LONDON.
HE HAD BEEN TOLD BY MINISTERS IN NO UNCERTAIN TERMS OF THEIR
OVERRIDING CONCERN FOR NEWS OF BRITISH PRISONERS OF WAR. I
TELEPHONED HIM AGAIN THIS EVENING ON HIS RETURN FROM PARIS TO SEE
WHETHER THERE WAS ANY PROGRESS AND PARTICULARLY WHETHER HE HAD ANY
REPLY TO HIS LETTER TO SADDAM HUSSEIN. SOMMARUGA SAID NO. HE HAD
BEEN MILDLY OPTIMISTIC ABOUT ACCESS TO ALLIED POWS AT THE TIME OF
HIS LONDON VISIT BUT NOW A WEEK HAD PASSED AND STILL NO MOVEMENT.
THEY WERE CERTAINLY NOT GIVING UP TRYING, ON THIS OR THEIR OTHER
OBLIGATIONS. HOWEVER INFURIOATING THE LACK OF PROGRESS MUST SEEM TO
THOSE WHO HAD POWS AS THEIR FIRST CONCERN, THE ICRC RECKONED FROM
THEIR EXPERIENCE WITH IRAQIS OVER THE WAR YEARS THAT CONTACT ON ONE
ISSUE HELPED INCH FORWARD ON OTHERS. SOMMARUGA WOULD NEVER HAVE GOT
7 1/2 HOURS WITH TARIQ AZIZ DURING HIS VISIT TO BAGHDAD LAST YEAR IF
THEY HAD NOT DONE BUSINESS BEFORE ON IRAN/IRAQ PRISONER EXCHANGES.

3. MEANWHILE THEY CONTINUED TO LOOK FOR INDIRECT LEVERAGE. SOMMARUGA
HIMSELF WAS ABOUT TO FLY TO AMMAN TO TRY TO GET KING HUSSEIN TO USE
HIS INFLUENCE TO ALLOW THE ICRC TO EXERCISE ITS FUNCTIONS INCLUDING
VISITS TO POWS. HE REMINDED ME ALSO OF THEIR EFFORTS TO USE THE
SOVIET UNION AND THE PRESIDENT OF THE ALGERIAN RED CRESCENT (TUR).
HE REMINDED ME THAT GNAEDINGER, THE ICRC DELEGATE-GENERAL FOR THE
MIDDLE EAST., WAS NOW IN BAGHDAD DOING HIS BEST TO ENLARGE THE

DELEGATION'S FREEDOM OF MANOEUVRE. I STRESSED THAT EVEN INDIRECT NEWS OF BRITISH POWS' WHEREABOUTS WOULD BE OF THE UTMOST VALUE TO US.

4. FINALLY, I TOLD SOMMARUGA THAT HE COULD EXPECT ME TO CONTINUE BADGERING HIM ON THIS ISSUE AT FREQUENT INTERVALS. HE SAID THAT HE WAS PERFECTLY HAPPY TO KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH. I HAVE INDEED FOUND HIM ACCESSIBLE.

MORLAND

MOD PASS TO JHQ HIGH WYCOMBE (FOR POLAD), HQBFME
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MR W D REEVES CABINET OFFICE
SIR C CURWEN CABINET OFFICE
MR CHARLTON CABINET OFFICE
MR GOWAN, CABINET OFFICE
PS/NUMBER 10 DOWNING ST
SIR P CRADOCK, 10 DOWNING ST
CABINET OFFICE DIO
SIR ROBIN BUTLER, CAB OFFICE
LT COL CRONIN CAB OFFICE
MR SHAPLAND CAB OFFICE
AUS (C) MODUK
HD/SEC (O) (C) MODUK
MR LS SMITH BANK ENGLAND
MR WICKS HMT
PS/CHIEF SEC TO THE TREASURY
EMERGENCY UNIT(PASSED)
RESIDENT CLERK

NNNN



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PERSONAL

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

Telephone 071- 21 82111/3

31a-c

MO 6/17/15/1D

14 February 1991

CD 16/2

Dear Charles,

REPORT FROM RIYADH

The Defence Secretary's colleagues might find it useful to see the attached report from Commanders on operations in the Gulf.

I am coping this letter to the Private Secretaries to members of OPD(G) and to Sir Robin Butler.

Yours aw,

Janet Binstead

(MISS J R BINSTAD)
Private Secretary

Sir Charles Powell KCMG
No 10 Downing Street

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
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CDS 2066/2/4

14 Feb 91

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THE VIEW FROM RIYADH 141930Z FEB 90



The
Countdown
Vessels

1. A busy day in theatre for UK forces. 1st Armd Div has been moving North West into a concentration area and exercising en route. The MCMs which were to clear an area for the battleships, as reported yesterday, have been held south of 28° North in view of the continued threat to them by Silkworm surface-to-surface missiles, fired from mobile launchers. Jaguars were tasked today against Silkworm and artillery sites using cluster bombs in an attempt to minimise this threat.

2. Gen Horner has commissioned a consolidated review of BDA in theatre to make sure that commanders can be confident of claimed Iraqi losses. He clearly feels there are too many variations of the figures which are being bandied about and he has not been able, in all instances, to reconcile claimed results with assessments.

3. It is hoped shortly to be able to obtain drawings of the structure of the bunker destroyed yesterday which resulted in "civilian" casualties. These may add to our confidence that it was rather more than an air-raid shelter. DGMST should be in a position to report during the course of tomorrow.

4. Allied air attacks have continued very much as yesterday with the predominant weight on the KTO. There is little, at this stage, to add on the loss of the Tornado GR1 this morning during an attack on the El-Taggadum airfield, except that next-of-kin have been informed. An accompanying US EF111 saw a possible SA3 hit the aircraft which subsequently crashed some 20 miles south of the target. There were no calls from the stricken aircraft, no parachutes were seen and there have been no confirmed reports of intercepts of the personal locator beacons (PLB). The lost GR1 was part of a package of 8 Tornados and 4 Buccaneers, plus supporting aircraft, attacking HAS's and it is possible that the SAM was fired optically. As a consequence the size of formations has been reviewed and it is likely that only 4 Tornados vice 8 will fly in future raids. You will be aware of the loss of a Saudi F5 yesterday and the loss of a US EF111 over Saudi Arabia. It is reported that a Saudi F15 was also lost today.

Electronic
Warfare
Unit

6. There has been no further comment on a possible Iraqi land attack in the near future although it is worth noting that bad weather and poor visibility is forecast over the weekend. The Allies are likely to mount further probes against Iraqi front line forces in Kuwait in the next few days. As a final snippet there will be an attempt, probably tomorrow when the wind is forecast to be from the south-west, to set fire to some of the flame trenches along the Kuwait/Saudi Arabia border.

1 OF 2

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
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7. The Joint Commander leaves for Riyadh tonight and will return to the UK on Monday afternoon. Inter alia he will discuss BDA, the air and land campaigns with Gens Schwarzkopf and De La Billiere and, communications allowing, he will be in regular contact with CDS.

8. UK air activity in the next 24 hours will include standard Tornado F3 CAP and tankers plus the following attack and recce missions:

- a. Dhahran. 3 x GR1A's
4 x GR1's
8 x GR1's
- b. Muharraq. 8 x GR1's
4 x GR1's
12 x Buccaneer with PAVESPIKE
4 x 4 Jaguar
2 x Jaguar Recce
- c. Tabuk. 10 x 3 GR1's



D G LITTLEJOHNS
Cdre
PSO/CDS
MB6173 83353MB

2 OF 2


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UK/US EYES ONLY

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NO USE BY OTHERS



2 MARSHAM STREET
LONDON SW1P 3EB
071-276 3000

My ref

Your ref

The Rt Hon David Mellor QC MP
Chief Secretary to the Treasury
Parliament Street
London
SW1P 3AG

C 100
1572

14 FEB 1991

ENVIRONMENT ASSISTANCE IN THE GULF


I was encouraged by your helpful response to my intervention in Cabinet this morning about our policy towards providing environmental aid to the Gulf.

The aid that we have so far given was set out in my "Dear Colleagues" letter of 6 February. So far it has consisted mainly of expert advice, and such costs as there have been to the UK have been slight.

The pollution is now entering a new phase where the immediate need is less for expertise and more for urgent supplies of booms and other capital equipment for fighting the slick. Japan, Canada, France, the US and the Netherlands have already made substantial support available to the Gulf states free of charge.

Bahrain has now asked the UK urgently for booms, which it says that it is not well placed to finance for itself. Bahrain is not of course a poor country, but it does face special challenges because it is an island with a correspondingly long coastline to defend, and because of the range and value of its threatened wildlife habitats.

Dtp has 3km of booms which it could make available. The costs would be; first, about £4m; and, secondly, a period during which contingent protection for our own coasts was reduced while replacements were procured. However, our present policy dictates that we are able to make the offer only on condition that the full costs of the booms and their transport are recovered from the Bahrainis. And whether or not the Treasury make this a special case, there would as things stand be no obvious source for the PES cover, and we should in effect have to pass the hat round Whitehall.



I believe that this situation is unacceptable for a number of reasons.

First, it precludes fast decisions and action on requests from the Gulf states. It was the speed and promptness of our responses to requests for experts that put us in an international lead in the early days of the response to the crisis.

Secondly, it risks giving us the worst possible public profile in relation to environmental considerations in the Gulf. Our present policy, which must become widely known as time goes on, would be seen with some justice by both home and international opinion as miserly and lacking in due concern. There will be no convincing public response to those who contrast our preparedness to find billions for military action while refusing comparatively minute sums for combatting environmental damage of international significance.


Thirdly, and more immediately, our policy gives us a poor profile, especially in relation to the Gulf states, which threatens damage to future political relations. A policy of requiring the pound of flesh will, again with justification, appear callous behaviour on the part of an ally, particularly when the Gulf states and others are already committed to contributing a far larger sum to our war costs.

Fourthly, our current policy is not in the UK's long-term commercial interests in the region. The countries which have provided equipment free will no doubt expect to get a degree of long-term commercial preference in return.

I therefore propose that we set aside from the resources earmarked for the war a relatively minor sum - perhaps £5 million initially up to the end of next financial year - for responding to requests from the Gulf states for short and medium-term aid with the oil pollution and its environmental consequences; and that the Bahraini booms should be agreed as the first call on it. We would then consider - on merits, but sympathetically - further requests from the Gulf states for

- oil pollution control equipment;
- further expert advice both on oil pollution control and on assessing and countering immediate impact on wildlife; and
- scientific and other help in assessing the longer-term impact on the ecology of the Gulf and in developing strategies for dealing with it.


Clear criteria would of course need to be agreed between officials, and I emphasise that I am not proposing that we should forgo reimbursement where it would be practical and politic. But establishing a modest fund of this kind would give us the same ability to respond flexibly and positively to developing needs as the Know-How Fund has given us in relation to Eastern Europe.



I should be grateful for a very early response to these proposals. We need to act quickly as the Bahraini request is urgent and we need if at all possible to respond to it very early next week.


I am copying this letter to the Prime Minister and to Norman Lamont, Douglas Hurd, John Wakeham, Chris Patten, Malcolm Rifkind, Peter Lilley, Tom King and Sir Robin Butler.

Yours in

A handwritten signature in dark ink, consisting of several vertical strokes followed by a horizontal flourish.

MICHAEL HESELTINE





Covering SECRET

30a-g *etc*



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

Telephone 071-21 82111/3

MO 6/17/15/1D

14 February 1991

ODD 14/2

Dear Charles,

GULF REPORT

I attach a copy of the midday report prepared for MOD Ministers on operations in the Gulf.

Yours

Janet Binstead

(MISS J R BINSTAD)
Private Secretary

Sir C Powell KCMG
No 10 Downing Street

Covering SECRET

b

covering SECRET

D/Sec(O)(C)/2/30/1/1

THE GULF CONFLICT

BRIEFING FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE - SITREP No. 79

SITUATION AS AT 1300Z, 14 FEBRUARY 1991

Contains

1. Classified sitrep
2. Unclassified material for use by Ministers

Distribution attached

Sec(O)(C)

covering SECRET

SECRET

SEC(O)(C) MIDDAY BRIEF, 14 FEBRUARY 1991

Summary

- A further Tornado has been lost (NOK not yet informed). SCUD attacks on Saudi Arabia.

General Situation

- Allied air campaign continues. No significant activity at sea or on land.

Political

- The UN Security Council last night passed the UK's motion to go into closed session from today for its discussions on the Gulf, on the grounds that an open session would be used for Iraqi propaganda; voting was 9 in favour, 2 against (Yemen and Cuba) and 4 abstentions (China, Ecuador, India and Zimbabwe).
- US Defence Secretary Cheney is reported to have said that the US might want to increase its naval presence in the Gulf after the conflict is over.
- Kuwait's Information Minister has claimed that Iraqi troops have shot dead over 100 Kuwaitis in the past 3 days.

UK Operations

Air Operations

- 8 Tornado GR1s and 4 Buccaneers from Muharraq attacked Al Taqaddum airfield (see 1 on the attached map). 7 aircraft hit their targets and 1 GR1 was seen to be hit by a 2 visually guided SA2/SA3 missiles. Aircraft was hit over target and was seen to gradually descend, trailing smoke. Aircraft impacted 20 nm NE of target. No parachutes were seen. No other details yet available. NOK not yet informed.
- 4 Tornado GR1s and 2 Tornado GR1 TIALD aircraft from Tabuk attacked H2 airfield (2). 3 HAS hit, 2 with doors blown off and on fire. A third was seen to be emitting smoke.
- 4 Tornado GR1s from Dhahran and 2 Buccaneers from Muharraq attacked Al Jarrah airfield (3) this morning. 3 HAS targets successfully hit. No other BDA available.
- 8 Jaguars from Muharraq attacked artillery site in SE Kuwait (4). All bombs seen to impact on targets and some secondary explosions were observed.

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- RAF combat sorties as at 141300Z:

	since 140100Z	total
Tornado GR1	18	1020
Tornado GR1A	0	79
Jaguar	8	403
Tornado F3	4	493
Buccaneer	6	74
Nimrod	0	57
AAR (Victor, VC10K, Tristar)	13	463
	49	2589

Non-combat sorties (as at 140100Z): 1513
4102

Navy Operations

- No significant developments since 0600Z sitrep.

Army Operations

- No significant developments since 0600Z sitrep.

Allied Operations

- Yesterday Italian Tornados flew missions against Republican Guard targets. Saudi, Kuwaiti, French and Bahraini fighters continued to attack KTO targets. Canadian fighters continued to fly CAPs.
- Today the RAF will attack airfields and a bridge in Iraq and artillery positions in Kuwait. Kuwaiti Skyhawks and Mirages will attack an early warning site and KTO tank positions. The Bahraini Air Force will also attack an early warning site. Italian and French fighters will attack the Republican Guard while French Jaguars will attack an Iraqi airfield. Qatari fighters will fly KTO battlefield preparation missions. Canadian CF-18 fighters will fly defensive CAPs.
- USS America transits Strait of Hormuz today to increase the number of the US carriers in the Gulf to 4.
- The UAE Air Force carried out its first 4 sorties of the conflict on 12 Feb.

Iraqi activity

- 2 SCUD missiles were fired at Saudi Arabia this morning. BBC report that one of the missiles landed in the northern town of Hafr al Batin and that the other landed in the military city of King Khalid. There are no reports of any

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casualties. The SCUDs were launched from an area just to the north of Baghdad which had not been used before. Attack does represent a change in targetting by the Iraqis who had previously concentrated on Riyadh and Dhahran.

Logistics

- The Swedish 360-bed field hospital became fully operational on 12 Feb, situated just outside Riyadh.

Media reports and coverage

- Media reports on the Gulf continue to be dominated by yesterday's attack on the command and control bunker in Baghdad. Still a great deal of confusion over numbers. Ceefax report Iraqi officials estimate 500 dead, but also Iraqi military communique giving figure at 64.

SECRET



General Staff Map Section, OSGB 11182 (CAD) Edition 8 OSGB, November 1990 4.4/91

Produced under the direction of Director General of Military Survey, Ministry of Defence, United Kingdom 1990

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UNCLASSIFIED LINES TO TAKE - 13.00Z, 14 FEBRUARY 1991


Loss of Tornado - defensive, only if raised

For use ONLY after NOK have been informed

- Regret to report that a sixth Tornado has failed to return from a mission against a military target in Iraq. The families have been informed that the crew are missing

(Defensive, for use ONLY if raised before NOK have been informed)

- Can confirm that a Tornado has failed to return from a mission over Iraq. Do not want to comment further, as we have not yet been able to inform the family of one of the crew.



SECRET AND PERSONAL

SUBJECT CC MASTER



29A-B TW
R. GULF
cc PC

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

14 February 1991

Dear Sir,

THE GULF

President Bush telephoned the Prime Minister at lunch time today about the Gulf conflict.

The President began by enquiring about public reaction in the United Kingdom to the destruction of the bunker in Baghdad yesterday in which a number of civilians had been killed. The Prime Minister said that the press had been very even-handed in their treatment of the incident. Television coverage had initially leaned heavily towards accepting Iraqi propaganda at face value. But, following large numbers of telephone calls from furious listeners, the later bulletins had been more balanced. The Prime Minister continued that the worry was the propaganda which Saddam Hussein would make of the incident. But Ministers here were taking a very robust line, pointing out that the responsibility lay with Saddam Hussein for deliberately exposing his people to danger. We were reiterating that it was not our policy to attack civilians, but only legitimate military targets.

The President said that public opinion in the United States was very similar: it was holding well. He thought that the briefers in Riyadh had done a good job. Statements from elsewhere in the Alliance, including Egypt, had been pretty good. He was confident that the United States was on firm ground in its assessment of the use to which the bunker was being put. He was still worried by the disposition of television to swallow Iraqi propaganda, with reporters failing to show the barbed wire and camouflage and making no effort to enquire about the use to which the lower storey of the bunker was being put. The President added that he was very pleased with the United Kingdom's response. The role of the UK at home and in the field was terribly important to public opinion in the United States.

The Prime Minister said that it would be very important to try to avoid any similar incidents in future, even at the risk of holding back from attacking one or two potential targets. It would be difficult for public opinion to take a similar event in the run-up to the ground campaign. The President said this was a fair point. He understood that no attacks were planned in Baghdad for tonight. The emphasis would be increasingly on Iraqi forces in and around Kuwait. The New York Times were running a

SECRET AND PERSONAL


B

story that the Al Rashid Hotel was being used as a communications centre for the Iraqi military: this was quite helpful because it demonstrated that the United States was exercising restraint in attacking military targets where there was a probability of causing civilian casualties. He would talk again to Secretary Cheney and General Powell. But his understanding was that their approach was to avoid any repetition of an attack of the sort which had taken place yesterday and which had given Saddam Hussein a propaganda advantage.

The President continued that he had received a letter from Gorbachev overnight, talking about the forthcoming visit to Moscow of Tariq Aziz, and urging that the United States should not initiate a ground campaign while he was there. He was a bit worried that the Soviet Union or some other Government might issue a last-minute appeal for a ceasefire or a halt to hostilities to give negotiations another chance. We would have to resist that very firmly. The Prime Minister said he very much agreed that there could be no stepping back now, unless Saddam Hussein actually withdrew from Kuwait.

The Prime Minister thanked the President for receiving the Defence Secretary and CDS. They had found their discussions very worthwhile. The President said that the Defence Secretary had spoken in very helpful terms to representatives from the Oval Office.

I am copying this letter to Richard Gozney (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and to Sir Robin Butler.

Yours sincerely,


(C. D. POWELL)

Simon Webb, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence.

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PERSONAL

File M



Copy 4 of 4 copies

28(A-B)

Page 1 of 2 pages

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

14 February 1991

Dear Secretary of State,

THE GULF

I have written separately about the Prime Minister's talk on the secure line with President Bush at lunchtime. For an even more restricted circle, I should add that the President told the Prime Minister that he had last night received a firm recommendation from General Schwarzkopf, endorsed by General Powell, concerning the start of the ground campaign. The chosen time would be 0400 local time in Saudi Arabia on Thursday 21 February. But there would be a window of 2/3 days beyond that to take account of any problems with the weather. General Schwarzkopf had assured him that he was content with the state of readiness of his forces, including the Egyptians whom he had just visited: they would have a role in the very early stage of the campaign. The President continued that he had not yet told anyone else about the date, although he assumed that General Schwarzkopf would be in touch with the Commander of the British Forces. Personally he wished it could be sooner rather than later. But on balance he was ready to accept General Schwarzkopf's recommendations. He was satisfied that casualties would be manageable, and believed the land battle would be quick. He would welcome the Prime Minister's view. The Prime Minister said that this would cause us no problems: we were perfectly happy with the proposed date, which was within the timescale we already had in mind. It would not be right to second guess our military Commanders on this.

The President said that he had not yet informed President Mitterrand of this, but thought he would have to do so soon. Nor had he spoken to our Arab Allies. He was very anxious to preserve secrecy for as long as possible, because lives were at stake. But he feared there was bound to be some leakage: movement of forces and supplies would be massive, three times that required for the Normandy landings in 1944. Some speculation was inevitable. The Americans were considering to what extent they could be masked by strategic deception and would welcome any thoughts on this. The Prime Minister observed that, given the scale of the movements, it was probably not realistic to think of concealment.

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
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2 - PERSONAL

Page 2 of 2 pages

B

The Prime Minister wishes this letter to be seen only by you, CDS, the Foreign Secretary and Sir Robin Butler to whom I am copying this letter.

Yours sincerely,


C. D. POWELL

The Secretary of State for Defence

TOP SECRET

PERSONAL

SECRET

27 (A-B)

Seen by PM

CDP
14h

PRIME MINISTER

TELEPHONE CALL WITH PRESIDENT BUSH

I spoke to General Scowcroft this morning. The President will telephone you at 1255. Scowcroft says there is no particular subject: the President just suggested he might give you a call. But inevitably the bunker attack is very much at the forefront of everyone's minds.

I asked Scowcroft whether the United States would be able to display publicly any of the evidence which they have for the military use of this building. He said that he did not think they could produce anything further: it was not their policy to publish photographs or details of signals intelligence. But they were "very comfortable" with the evidence and were not going to be shaken. I said that we were being supportive. Incidentally, CNN report that the Iraqis have now scaled down their own estimate of casualties from an initial 1,000 via 500 and then 400 to 94. [But now back up to 500].

I took the opportunity to mention the delay in setting a date for a further round of talks with officials. Scowcroft knew nothing of this, but said he would investigate and come back to me.

In the light of this, I think the points you ought to make to the President are:

- You were very grateful to him for seeing Tom King and David Craig. They have reported fully on their discussions and we are clearly very much of one mind.
- Yesterday's incident in Baghdad was clearly unfortunate in terms of the propaganda which Saddam Hussein can make out of it. The more detail the Americans can give of their evidence that the bunker was being used for military purposes the better. We are taking the line that the responsibility lies with Saddam Hussein who is deliberately exposing his people to danger and

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- 2 -

destruction. We are also confirming that it is not our policy to target civilians, and that the bunker was attacked on the basis of an assessment that it was a legitimate military target.

- It will be helpful in this respect that the weight of allied bombing is shifting increasingly to attacks on Iraqi forces in Kuwait itself.
- Meanwhile, we secured our aim of having the Security Council session held in private. It seems likely that we can contain the discussion itself without too much difficulty.
- You might mention the loss of a ^{Tornado} ~~Harrier~~, and the new departure in Iraqi use of SCUD missiles.

C.D.P.

Charles Powell

14 February 1991

↳ Haha H1 Pativ.
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w. P. H. H. H.
No us 7th. H. H. H.
Owe 1st. H. H. H.

c: Telephone (MJ)

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Copy No. 1 of 2

PRIME MINISTER

14 February 1991

BOMBING OF THE BAGHDAD BUNKER

There are, I suggest, two points you will want to include in your conversation with the President:

- (a) we are sure that the Administration have evidence pointing to the military use of this bunker. We hope that they can be as flexible as possible in this case in the rules governing release of such information. If something could be provided at once it would have a powerful effect on public opinion.
- (b) we should think carefully about the cost/benefit balance of targeting similar sites, given the risks for international opinion and our need in any event now to concentrate our attacks on the Kuwait theatre.


PERCY CRADOCK

SECRET

SECRET AND PERSONAL



10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

14 February 1991

Dear Sir,

THE GULF

I spoke to General Scowcroft after OPD(G) this morning to confirm arrangements for the President to talk to the Prime Minister at lunchtime. I took the opportunity to say that I hope the Americans would deploy publicly as much as possible of the evidence they had for military use of the bunker in Baghdad. General Scowcroft said that he was not sure that it was the sort of evidence which could be made public: the Americans observed strict constraints on this. But they were "very comfortable" with the evidence and were going to stand very firmly by it.

I also mentioned that we seemed to be having some difficulty in fixing a date for the next round of talks between officials and were being steered towards the end of the month. If at all possible, we would like to have further discussions before that. General Scowcroft, who seemed only just aware that there were to be further talks, said he knew of no reason for delay. He would look into it and come back to me.

I am copying this letter to Richard Gozney (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and Sir Robin Butler.

Your sincerely
C. D. Powell

C. D. POWELL

Simon Webb, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence

SECRET AND PERSONAL



10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

Material for

OPD(G) at

0930.

The President would
like to telephone
you at 12:50.

C.D.P.
14/2



SECRET - UK EYES A

B.0731

PRIME MINISTERcc Sir Robin Butler
Sir Percy Cradock

COB

15/2

OPD(G): 14 February: Overnight Action PointsItem 3: Current International Situation

The Security Council agreed, at UK initiative, to convene in closed session. The proposal received the necessary nine votes, including the Soviet Union, with only the hard core of Yemen and Cuba voting against and with four abstentions (China, India, Zimbabwe and Ecuador). The meeting will begin today and the list of speakers suggests that the balance of the debate should be reasonably acceptable. Sir David Hannay will speak early, almost certainly today. The proceedings were accompanied by denunciations of the allied air attack on the Baghdad bunker by Iraq's supporters. Altogether, as good an outcome as could have been expected.

2. Soviet diplomacy continues to focus on high profile peacemaking. Despite some upbeat Soviet briefing it does not look as though Primakov's mission indicated any change in Iraqi attitudes. The Kuwaiti Foreign Minister is in Moscow now and will be followed by Tariq Aziz who arrives on Sunday. Deputy Foreign Minister Belonogov told the US Ambassador that his visit to Ankara and Tehran had been designed to dissuade the Iranians and Turks from any territorial ambitions against Iraq and to secure assurances that they opposed any widening of the conflict. All this diffuse activity contrasts with Vorontsov's robust line at the UN.

L V Appleyard
L V AppleyardCabinet Office
14 February 1991SECRET - UK EYES A

CONFIDENTIAL



Treasury Chambers, Parliament Street SW1P 3AG

071-270 3000

Fax 071-270 3436

The Hon Dominic Asquith
Private Secretary to the Minister of State
Foreign & Commonwealth Office
King Charles Street
London
SW1

13 February 1991

CDD
14/2

Dear Dominic,

GULF BURDENSARING: PROFITING FROM THE WAR?

There was some discussion at OPD(G)(B) on 12 February of how the Government should handle any accusation that it was profiting from the war, because contributions promised to date broadly match the additional costs to which the UK is committed so far. *minutes attached*

2. The Chief Secretary does not feel that this is a difficult accusation to handle. The eventual cost of hostilities will undoubtedly exceed the contributions pledged so far. But it will be important to make this clear publicly to maintain pressure on the Saudi Arabians, the Japanese and others to contribute properly to the UK military effort.

3. I attach a note on the issue we have prepared, with the line Treasury Ministers are taking as necessary in the Autumn Statement debate today. If your Minister or others have any comments, I should be glad to know of them quickly.

4. I am copying this letter and enclosure to Private Secretaries to members of OPD(G) and OPD(G)(MH), and to Sir Robin Butler and Bill Reeves (Cabinet Office).

Yours etc,

JEREMY HEYWOOD
Private Secretary

CONFIDENTIAL

PROFITING FROM THE WAR?

1. Contributions promised to date amount to some £1.4 billion. This covers Saudi and other Host Nation Support, assistance in kind and the Japanese £24 million all promised by mid January. And in addition, it covers recent pledges from Germany (£275 million), Kuwait (£660 million), UAE (£250 million) and some smaller sums. This is about as large as (or larger than) any of the figures previously quoted for the cost to MOD, because those were confined primarily to costs falling in 1990-91.

2. If further significant assistance is secured, there is a good chance that the total value of contributions from other countries will be £2 billion or more. To deflect any possible criticism that the UK is expecting more in contributions than the costs we will incur we need to be able to say that the costs are likely to be significantly more than £2 billion. Otherwise there could be criticism about the British government's motives ("mercenaries"), and a risk that other countries who should contribute will not feel they need to do so.

3. Such criticism would not be justified. The MOD's best estimate is that costs, additional to those they would otherwise incur, could be about £3 billion, although no estimate can be precise at this stage. We had not previously felt it appropriate, or necessary, to use this figure publicly because it would invite questions on the military scenarios assumed. However it has been mentioned in confidence to other Governments and hence appeared in the Press. The Chief Secretary and the Chancellor, after consultation with other Departments at official level, have therefore referred to the figure for the record.

CONFIDENTIAL

4. To deal with any criticism the following line to take is therefore suggested:

"There is no question of the UK receiving more in contributions from other countries than we are spending on the costs of the military deployment and operations, and their consequences. A daily comparison of costs incurred to date with contributions promised will be misleading. But it is impossible to estimate with any precision what the eventual cost of hostilities will be. It is clear, however, that the eventual cost to the UK will very likely exceed by a substantial margin the value of contributions we have been promised".

5. More detailed points for use if necessary are:

(a) even in the most favourable circumstances of which one could conceive - an end to hostilities tomorrow and the virtual disbandment of the Iraqi military machine the day after - military costs to which the UK is already committed amounts to some £1½ billion. [Detailed list attached, for use if pressed];

(b) allowing for a continuation of the air campaign and the fact that a land campaign is likely to be necessary, eventual costs are likely to be very much higher. It is impossible to be precise when there are so many uncertainties about the length and nature of hostilities and their aftermath. We will no doubt see costs of much more than £1½ billion, though these could be spread over several years depending on the pace of replacement;

(c) [if asked for a figure]. Cannot be precise. But as the Chief Secretary said in response to a question at the Treasury Select Committee on 6 February, and the Chancellor confirmed in the House on 13 February, £3 billion is as good as any other estimate;

CONFIDENTIAL

(d) [if pressed to justify £3 billion]. This is an indication rather than a precise estimate, because there are so many uncertainties. But for a number of reasons I believe it is the best indication we can give at this stage: for example, United States costs are generally estimated to be in the region \$60-70 billion - President Bush recently mentioned a figure of \$66 billion - and the UK contribution to the multi-national forces in the Gulf is approximately a twelfth of the size of that of the United States;

HM Treasury
13 February 1991



23
CDP10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

13 February 1991

Dear Sir,

THE GULF

I had a short round up with General Scowcroft this evening on a number of points.

I briefed him on the Prime Minister's conversation with the UN Secretary General. General Scowcroft said the President would be very grateful to the Prime Minister for following up on this.

General Scowcroft said the Americans were not worried about the Security Council discussion. They believe they have 9 votes to hold it in private, and that the Chairman intended to close off discussions by 6pm New York time.

We talked about the attack on the bunker/shelter in Baghdad. General Scowcroft said that all the evidence he had seen indicated that the building was being used as a military command and control centre. He believed the Administration's evidence was really very strong and was making an impact on public opinion in the United States. They were not getting too much trouble on this.

I mentioned the intelligence reports about the possibility that the Iraqis might launch a divisional strength attack from SE Kuwait in the next 72 hours. He had seen the reports but said they had not been highlighted, which indicated that the military were not taking them too seriously.

I mentioned some interesting reports we had seen in the last day or two which indicated the whereabouts of some important targets. General Scowcroft confirmed that he had also seen these.

General Scowcroft spoke warmly of the visit of the Defence Secretary and CDS, which had been very successful.

I am copying this letter to Richard Gozney (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and Sir Robin Butler.

CHARLES POWELL

Simon Webb, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence

RESTRICTED

042233
MDADAN 8376

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OUR TELNO 437: IRAQ/KUWAIT: WASHINGTON SITREP

SUMMARY

1. SUCCESSFUL VISIT BY MR KING. ADMINISTRATION DESCRIBE ALLEGED IRAQI BOMB SHELTER AS A COMMAND AND CONTROL BUNKER. REITERATE THAT COALITION FORCES NOT DELIBERATELY TARGETING CIVILIANS.

DETAIL

2. MR KING'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON ON 12 FEBRUARY, AND HIS CALL ON PRESIDENT BUSH, HAVE RECEIVED FULL COVERAGE IN THE US MEDIA. MR KING WANTED TO OBTAIN A US ASSESSMENT OF THE MILITARY SITUATION FOLLOWING CHENEY AND POWELL'S RETURN FROM THE GULF AND TO SEND A CLEAR PUBLIC SIGNAL THAT THE UK WAS FULLY INVOLVED AT THIS IMPORTANT PHASE OF THE WAR. TWO HOURS WITH CHENEY AND POWELL FULFILLED THE FIRST OBJECTIVE. THE ADMINISTRATION WENT OUT OF THE WAY TO PROVIDE PUBLIC PLATFORMS - AT THE PENTAGON AND IN THE OVAL OFFICE - FOR ACHIEVING THE SECOND. THE VISIT CONFIRMED THAT THERE ARE NO GAPS BETWEEN BRITISH AND AMERICAN ASSESSMENTS OF THE MILITARY SITUATION OR OF THEIR THINKING ON THE PROSPECTS AND TIMING OF A GROUND ASSAULT. MR KING'S VISIT WAS IN NO WAY ECLIPSED BY THAT OF HIS FRENCH COUNTERPART, RATHER THE REVERSE.

3. THE MAJOR STORY IN WASHINGTON ON 13 FEBRUARY IS THE BOMBING OF WHAT THE IRAQIS ALLEGE WAS A CIVILIAN SHELTER IN BAGHDAD. THE STORY IS CLEARLY CAUSING CONCERN TO THE ADMINISTRATION. BUT THE WHITE HOUSE SPOKESMAN ISSUED AN UNCOMPROMISING STATEMENT TO THE EFFECT THAT THE TARGET WAS IN FACT A MILITARY COMMAND AND CONTROL CENTRE IN BAGHDAD. THE BUNKER WAS A WELL-DOCUMENTED AND LEGITIMATE MILITARY TARGET, WHICH FED INSTRUCTIONS TO THE IRAQI WAR MACHINE. THE US HAD NOT AND WOULD NOT TARGET CIVILIAN CENTRES: LOSS OF INNOCENT CIVILIAN LIFE WAS TRAGIC. THE US DID NOT KNOW WHY CIVILIANS

WERE THERE, BUT SADDAM HUSSEIN HAD SHOWN A CONTINUING WILLINGNESS TO SACRIFICE LIVES FOR HIS WAR AIMS EG THE USE OF WESTERN HOSTAGES AND PWS AS HUMAN SHIELDS, THE EXECUTION SQUADS, AND IRAQI SCUD ATTACKS AGAINST CIVILIANS.

4. SOVIET ENVOY PRIMAKOV'S MISSION TO BAGHDAD AND BAGHDAD RADIO'S ANNOUNCEMENT THAT IRAQ WAS PREPARED TO COOPERATE WITH THE SOVIET UNION IN FINDING A PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THE REGION'S PROBLEMS HAS BEEN PROMINENTLY REPORTED. THE WHITE HOUSE HAS REACTED CAUTIOUSLY, SAYING IT WAS PREMATURE TO MAKE A JUDGEMENT BUT THE DECIDING FACTOR WOULD BE IRAQI WITHDRAWAL FROM KUWAIT AND COMPLIANCE WITH UN RESOLUTIONS. THE PRESS GENERALLY AGREED THAT THE IRAQI STATEMENT AMOUNTS TO NOTHING NEW AND NOTE THAT US OFFICIALS ARE SUSPICIOUS OF THE PRIMAKOV INITIATIVE BECAUSE OF HIS LONG-STANDING RELATIONSHIP WITH SADDAM.

5. FOLLOWING ARENS' RECENT VISIT, STATE'S SPOKESMAN SAID ON 12 FEBRUARY THAT BAKER WAS CONSIDERING INCREASED US AID TO ISRAEL AND ASKING WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES TO CONTRIBUTE TO ISRAEL'S DEFENCE COSTS. SHE SAID THAT THE ADMINISTRATION NOW CONSIDERED ISRAEL QUOTE A FRONT-LINE STATE UNQUOTE, IN THE SAME CATEGORY AS EGYPT, TURKEY AND JORDAN, WHICH HAD ALL RECEIVED BILLIONS OF DOLLARS IN COMPENSATION FOR WAR-RELATED LOSSES.

6. A CNN/GALLUP POLL RELEASED ON 13 FEBRUARY SHOWS THE PRESIDENT'S APPROVAL RATING STILL AT AN IMPRESSIVE 79 PER CENT (DOWN SLIGHTLY FROM A HIGH OF 83 PER CENT). 76 PER CENT OF THE PUBLIC APPROVED OF THE US PRESENCE IN THE GULF AND 75 PER CENT THOUGHT THE ALLIED FORCES WERE MAKING PROGRESS. 62 PER CENT CONSIDERED THAT THE WAR SHOULD CONTINUE UNTIL IRAQ'S WAR-MAKING CAPACITY WAS DESTROYED.

7. THE DEBATE OVER POLITICAL STRUCTURES IN POST-WAR KUWAIT (JEDDA TELNO 72) HAS LARGELY FADED HERE AND WITH IT CRITICISM AT THE PROSPECT OF US FORCES RESTORING A MONARCHY. BUT THE KUWAITI PLANNING MINISTER IN A RADIO INTERVIEW WAS UNABLE TO MAKE A PERSUASIVE CASE FOR THE ANNOUNCEMENT THAT MARTIAL LAW WOULD BE IMPOSED IN KUWAIT BY A RESTORED KUWAITI GOVERNMENT. IF NOT CAREFULLY HANDLED, THIS ISSUE COULD REVIVE CRITICISM HERE OF THE AL SABAH.

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INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, PARIS, BONN, UKDEL NATO, RIYADH

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SIC I9M

TELECON BROWNE/STAGG: IRAQ/KUWAIT: PRIMAKOV'S MISSION TO BAGHDAD

SUMMARY

1. MFA CLAIM PRIMAKOV'S TALKS HAVE QUOTE GIVEN RISE TO CERTAIN HOPES UNQUOTE. AZIZ TO VISIT MOSCOW 17-18 FEBRUARY. MFA DENIES LINKAGE BETWEEN THIS AND KUWAITI FOREIGN MINISTER'S VISIT 14-16 FEBRUARY.

DETAIL

2. THE PRESIDENTIAL SPOKESMAN ANNOUNCED THIS AFTERNOON THAT PRIMAKOV HAD CONCLUDED HIS VISIT TO BAGHDAD AND WAS EXPECTED TO RETURN TO MOSCOW LATER TODAY (13 FEBRUARY). JUDGING FROM HIS PRELIMINARY REPORT, HIS CONTACT WITH SADDAM HUSSEIN HAD QUOTE GIVEN RISE TO CERTAIN HOPES UNQUOTE. AS A RESULT IT HAD BEEN AGREED WITH SADDAM HUSSEIN THAT TARIQ AZIZ WOULD TRAVEL TO MOSCOW ON 17 FEBRUARY: AZIZ WOULD SEE GORBACHEV AND BESSMERTNYKH ON 18 FEBRUARY. THE SPOKESMAN DECLINED TO GIVE ANY FURTHER COMMENTS.

3. FEW ADDITIONAL DETAILS EMERGED DURING THE MFA PRESS BRIEFING WHICH IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWED THIS ANNOUNCEMENT. MFA SPOKESMAN CHURKIN REAFFIRMED SOVIET SUPPORT FOR THE UNSC RESOLUTIONS AND WELCOMED THE NAM INITIATIVE. HE REFUSED TO BE DRAWN ON THE IMPLICATIONS OF AZIZ'S VISIT FOR THE SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING. UNOFFICIALLY, A MEMBER OF THE MFA UNITED STATES DIRECTORATE HAS TOLD US THAT JUDGING FROM HIS PRELIMINARY REPORT, PRIMAKOV'S TALKS HAD NOT BEEN PRODUCTIVE.

VISIT OF KUWAITI FOREIGN MINISTER

4. DURING THE SAME PRESS CONFERENCE, THE MFA ANNOUNCED THAT THE KUWAITI FOREIGN MINISTER SHEIK SABAH AL SABAH WOULD VISIT MOSCOW 14-16 FEBRUARY, AND WAS EXPECTED TO CALL ON GORBACHEV AS WELL AS HOLD TALKS WITH BESSMERTNYKH. THE MFA DENIED THAT THIS VISIT WAS LINKED WITH THAT OF TARIQ AZIZ'S, SAYING THESE PLANS HAD BEEN IN THE PIPELINE FOR SOME TIME. THE KUWAITI EMBASSY HERE HAS CONFIRMED THIS, POINTING OUT

THAT THE ORIGINAL PLANS WERE POSTPONED DUE TO SHEVARDNADZE'S RESIGNATION. THEY ADDED THAT THE FOREIGN MINISTER WOULD BE SEEING SHEVARDNADZE AT SOME STAGE DURING HIS STAY IN MOSCOW.

BRAITHWAITE

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
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SECRETARY OF STATE

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PRIME MINISTER

VISIT TO WASHINGTON

CDS and I were very warmly received both by Dick Cheney and Colin Powell and then by the President and his team. Anthony Acland is reporting separately on our conversations with the President, and subsequently with Brent Scowcroft.

2. Cheney and Powell briefed us on the outcome of their discussions with Schwarzkopf over the weekend. Their collective view was that the air campaign was going well. Substantial damage had been done to the leadership's overall command capability. The Iraqi Air Force no longer posed any serious threat. Their small Navy was written off as was to a major extent their nuclear, biological and chemical production and storage. The threat from SCUD missiles continued, but at a low level. The US believe that CW weapons already filled and deployed before hostilities may be approaching the end of their shelf lives, so the Iraqis could be facing the dilemma of "using it or losing it". (Our experts do not share this assessment of shelf life). However, in military terms the CW threat did not worry them because the Iraqi could probably not achieve the necessary concentration of agents in a given area. We were adequately prepared to cope with what they could do.

3. Production and storage facilities for petrol, oil and (especially) lubricants were also severely damaged as was much of the electrical generation capacity. The disruption to the road and rail networks caused by destroying bridges and interdicting road



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traffic (the Baghdad/Basra railway is cut and not in use) means that the remaining capacity of the transportation system was probably no longer able to sustain fully the Iraqi forces in the KTO at present levels of activity. With the RGFC and other reserve forces in the north of Kuwait syphoning off their requirements, the flow of supplies to the units on the Iraqi front line was probably very inadequate. It would certainly be insufficient once operations increased the level of use.

4. Against this broad analysis, with which we agree, Schwarzkopf was switching more and more of the increasing offensive effort to targets in the KTO. They had concluded that the area bombing (eg by B52s) of the RGFC and other heavy divisions was not producing the best destruction of materiel. For the past couple of days they had been targeting tanks and artillery one by one with Maverick and other precision anti-armour weapons. On Monday night 40 aircraft had accounted for 79 tanks, so last night 65 aircraft were tasked. Schwarzkopf believes that this campaign should show real dividends in depleting the main battle fighting elements of the heavy Iraqi divisions. In their dug-in positions they were seen as no better than pillboxes and lacking fighting mobility. Nevertheless Cheney, Powell (and Schwarzkopf) believe that the coalition must mount a ground offensive to build on the destruction being achieved so far from the air, which will of course continue. They briefed us in outline about the way the ground offensive would start ('G' DAY); Powell thought that it would be a matter of days but acknowledged that much would depend on the Iraqis' (and Saddam's) determination to fight, regardless of odds, to achieve casualties on our side. They stressed that there would be a continuing need to try and get into the deep command bunkers in Baghdad (using F117As with Precision Guided Munitions) and to sustain the interdiction of supply routes and closure of airfields. But the weight of effort on these (and SCUD hunting) would now be very much reduced.



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SECRETARY OF STATE

5. Cheney made it clear that he was now awaiting Schwarzkopf's recommendation about the date for G day, and implied that they did not expect to have to wait very long for this. I indicated our confidence in General Schwarzkopf and readiness to support a ground offensive. I will report to colleagues orally on the discussion of the possible timing of offensive operations.

7. The French Defence Minister, M Joxe, was also in Washington yesterday. We avoided a trilateral meeting in case this gave an impression to Arab partners of the Western Allies settling issues without them.


8. I am sending a copy of this minute to OPD(G) colleagues and Sir Robin Butler.

Ministry of Defence
13th February 1991

(T K)



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SECRET

British Embassy
Washington

13 February 1991

By Fax

Sir Patrick Wright GCMG
PUS
FCO3100 Massachusetts Avenue N.W.
Washington D.C. 20008-3600Telephone: (202) 898-4292
Facsimile: (202) 898-4255

From The Ambassador

*Dear Patrick,***THE DEFENCE SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT: 12 FEBRUARY**

1. Since only David Craig and I accompanied the Defence Secretary on his call on the President, you might like an account of what was said. Present on the American side were the President, the Vice President, Cheney, Scowcroft, Sununu, Gates and Gompert.

2. The President began by asking the Defence Secretary to pass a very warm message to the Prime Minister, with whom he had talked recently. He was delighted with the cooperation with Britain and thought that the United Kingdom military briefings (he referred to Air Chief Marshal Craig as one of the stars) were very helpful to the US side. They showed that the United States was not alone. The President said that he felt very good about the relationship. Britain was doing a disproportionate amount and deserved very warm thanks. The command and control arrangements were going very well, as they were with the Saudis. Mr King added "and hopefully with the French too". The President said that he had no gripes of any kind as far as the British were concerned. He was, however, worried about the propaganda campaign. The British ITN correspondent (comment: Brent Sadler, I think) was better than Arnett; and the journalists who had come out through Jordan had been helpful in making clear that the Iraqis censored everything shown from Baghdad. It was very important not to lose the propaganda battle. Mr King said that journalists were short of material. As to what they wrote, he thought that "censored" was the wrong word. It was not foreign correspondents' material which was censored, but what was seen was Iraqi material which was fed to them and which they had to send. This should be made clearer. The President seemed interested in this comment.

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3. The President said that he had told the Prime Minister that he had made a number of telephone calls recently to Perez de Cuellar (who was upset about reports of his representations to Iraq), to the President of Venezuela (who liked to be kept in the picture), and to the Indian Prime Minister (to try to keep him on board about re-fuelling). He was somewhat worried about the Soviets. A lot of churning was going on about cease-fire moves, but he saw no sign of any pull-out from the coalition.

4. Mr King said that the Scud attacks on civilian centres were helpful to the coalition in propaganda terms. They showed that Saddam Hussein was utterly unscrupulous about targetting centres of civilian population indiscriminately. On the timing of the ground battle, there were clearly military considerations at one end of the spectrum and political pressures at the other. Politico-military considerations were in the middle. Militarily, our forces were approaching their peak and it was a question of how long they could be held there. He thought that it was necessary to do a bit more to tip the balance in the coalition's favour. But it was important to maintain the credibility of the air campaign. He thought that the peace pressures were at the bottom of the list. As an illustration of the problem of keeping the military in the theatre for very long, and the impact on families at home, Mr King said that 14 tons of service mail ("Blueys") had been received last week.

5. The President asked how long a ground war might last. Secretary Cheney said that he had briefed Mr King and Air Chief Marshal Craig on the campaign plans. He had hoped that it might go fairly quickly. Air Chief Marshal Craig commented that much depended on the fighting will of the Iraqi soldiers. The President asked about rations and supplies. Secretary Cheney said that the Iraqis were in difficulties now, but that they must have some emergency reserves. The President asked about the performance of equipment. He had the impression that it had been good. Air Chief Marshal Craig said that there had been a remarkably good rate of striking and the aircraft were being pushed very hard. He would have expected a slight fall off in performance, but this had not happened.

6. The President reverted to his worries about propaganda and civilian casualties. People were saying that with 64,000 sorties, an average of one civilian must have been killed in each, making 64,000 casualties. Mr King and others commented that this was a false picture, since a lot of the attacks had been in unpopulated areas of Iraq.

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7. Mr King ended by saying that Britain would back the President's military judgement over starting the ground battle. We had great confidence in General Schwarzkopf and the military leadership.

8. I was struck first by the very genuine warmth of the President's comments about the British contribution and performance. He spoke with great sincerity and feeling. I was also struck by the emphasis which he put on the dangers of Iraqi propaganda and the effect which this could have on coalition cohesion and public opinion in America. He is, of course, an avid television watcher himself, and tends to react to what he sees on the screen. He certainly has a point, however, which needs watching. I thought that, in appearance and manner, the President seemed well and robust and also relaxed. Mr King was asked in his television and radio interviews how he had found the President, and he responded very positively.

9. We then went on to see Brent Scowcroft briefly in his office. Bob Gates and David Gompert were also present.

10. Mr King mentioned the problem of financial contributions from Japan. Scowcroft said immediately that the UK and the US were not, and should not, be competing with each other. The United States would work to get contributions for both of us, although the Japanese were playing funny games. Mr King asked whether all the \$9 billion was for non-combatative expenses. Gates confirmed that Prime Minister Kaifu had made that commitment in the Japanese Parliament.

11. Mr King asked what Brent Scowcroft's views were about the war and what he had said to the President. Scowcroft commented that it was "right on". Mr King said that it was very important to maintain credibility. If the Iraqis thought that they could actually survive an air war, there could be a morale problem. Scowcroft commented that the Iraqis were digging their tanks in too deep and were turning them into fixed pillboxes. On the political front, he thought that there was a danger of being seen to "beat them down and make the rubble bounce", at least in propaganda terms. Later on, after the ground war had been joined, there could be a real problem over Prisoners of War but, in general, the cooperation within the ungainly coalition had been remarkable.

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12. Mr King said that European opinion in support of the Gulf war was coming round quickly. Prime Minister Martens in Belgium had said that he had made an initial mistake, and the French Defence Minister Joxe had been very positive. Scowcroft commented that Joxe had been very refreshing in comparison with his predecessor. Mr King said that Chevenement had been very difficult, but had been greatly influenced by his own experience in Algeria. It was indeed remarkable that the French had come under full US tactical command. It was important for NATO that the French should enjoy their experience within the coalition.

13. The meeting ended with some brief comment on the Soviet Union, which Scowcroft said was in a terrible mess. The situation was very depressing, with Gorbachev facing two revolutions - political and economic - at the same time. He was now being attacked for the first time over his handling of foreign policy. Even so, Scowcroft did not see the military taking over.

14. I am sending a copy of this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence).

Yours ever,

Antony

Antony Acland

SECRET

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MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB
Telephone 071- 21 82111/3

MO 6/17/15/1D

✓ *R. Minors* February 1991
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15/2

Dear Charles,

REPORT FROM RIYADH

The Defence Secretary's colleagues might find it useful to see the attached report from Commanders on operations in the Gulf.

I am coping this letter to the Private Secretaries to members of OPD(G) and to Sir Robin Butler.

Yours sincerely
Simon Webb

(S WEBB)
Private Secretary

Sir Charles Powell KCMG
No 10 Downing Street

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CDS 2066/2/1

13th Feb 91

PS/Secretary of State

THE VIEW FROM RIYADH 131800Z FEB 91

1. CDS had a short conversation with the Joint Commander this evening for an update on activities in the Gulf over the last 48 hours and to gain his perspective on progress to compare with that received in the Pentagon yesterday as reported in my earlier minute. The air campaign continues much as before with the majority of effort against forces and lines of communication in the KTO. The new F111 tactic of seeking out and destroying Iraqi tanks just after sunset seems to be bearing fruit and overnight US forces claimed destruction of 110 tanks, some artillery and a large number of soft skinned vehicles and trucks. Many of the latter had been detected by the JSTARS surveillance aircraft.

2. UK airforces had achieved several successes today and the Joint Commander reported that he had instructed AVM Wratten to concentrate all our Tornado effort on using PGMs and to desist from dive-bombing. The Buccaneer PAVESPIKE system continues to be effective and one of the two Tornado TIALD pods is working very well. The other is defective but the Joint Commander hopes that it can be rectified by contractors in theatre. Tornado bombing effort is now focussed on HAS in south east Iraq and bridges leaving F111F aircraft to concentrate on tank-busting. Commanders in theatre have now ceased attacks on fuel refinery and storage facilities and ammunition dumps, although they may well return to the latter in due course. However, on the down side, at the current rate of effort we will have exhausted our holdings of laser guided bombs by the 26 February. MOD staff is investigating further supplies. We have been able to reduce from three to two 1000lb LGBs against bridges and normal HAS although we are unable to take out Yugoslav built HAS s which require a 2000lb bomb. These remain the province of the US air force.

(Precision Guided Munition)
(Horizontal Aircraft Shells)

3. MCMVs are moving north to sweep areas closer to the Kuwaiti coast to allow the battleships more freedom of manoeuvre when conducting naval gunfire support (NGS). Finally, the Joint Commander reported that staff in theatre consider that there is a 70% chance of an Iraqi assault at at least divisional level within the next 72 hours, but as yet Gen Schwarzkopf has not commented on their assessment. There is some evidence to support this possibility within the DIS.

1 of 2

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
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4. UK air activity over the next 12 hours will include the usual Tornado F3 CAP and tanker support plus the following attack sorties:

- a. Dhahran 4 x GR1s
- b. Muharraq 8 x GR1s
2 x 4 Jaguars
Total of 6 Buccaneers with PAVESPIKE
- c. Tabuk 2 x 3 GR1s



D G LITTLEJOHNS
Cdre
PSO/CDS
MB6173 83353MB



Ref. AO91/352

PRIME MINISTER

cc Sir Percy Cradock
Mr Appleyard

OPD(G): 14 February

Item 1: Release of POWs in the context of a ceasefire

You might invite the Foreign Secretary to introduce the paper which is relevant to the ceasefire terms which we have been discussing in the UK/US talks.

2. You might then invite the Defence Secretary and the Chief of the Defence Staff for their views on the staged approach recommended in the paper to be negotiated through a third party: preferably the ICRC but possibly the UN or an acceptable neutral country. This involves the ICRC being notified of the names of POWs, being given access and the POWs being concentrated at specific locations before a ceasefire comes into operation; with the POWs being handed over between 24 hours and 4 days from the ceasefire. Parallel action would be taken with Iraqi POWs on the basis that the ICRC would look after those who did not want to return. The advantage would be that the Iraqis would have to take verifiable steps before a ceasefire came into operation. If the Iraqis did not comply with an agreement on that basis there would be two possible sanctions: hostilities could be resumed (although it is questionable how realistic this would be) and/or the repatriation of Iraqi POWs could be suspended (although this might not be much of a lever).

3. You might ask the Attorney General for his comments on the legal aspects and the Foreign Secretary for his assessment of



whether the ICRC would be prepared to act as intermediary, and if not, whom he had in mind. I understand that he has in mind Algeria or the Soviet Union, as the most effective mediators still with a presence in Baghdad.

4. You might conclude the discussion by approving the paper, subject to points made in discussion, and asking the FCO to pass the paper to the US Government as part of the follow-up to the UK/US talks.

Item 2: Current Military Situation

5. You will want to invite the Defence Secretary to report on his visit to Washington. The Defence Secretary will want to cover US thinking on the timing of the land campaign, where I understand that the indications were similar to those which President Bush gave you in his telephone call on Monday evening. The Defence Secretary may put some of this into writing beforehand. He will want to mention burdensharing which he discussed in Washington and possibly a number of more detailed military points.

6. You might then invite the Chief of the Defence Staff to report on allied and Iraqi operations and any further work which has been done on damage assessment, which the CDS discussed in Washington, and his conclusions from the operational briefing which he was given at the Pentagon.

7. You might conclude the discussion by agreeing on the line to take on the timing of the land campaign at Cabinet afterwards and at Prime Minister's Questions.

Item 3: Current International Situation

8. You might invite the Foreign Secretary to report on developments. The Security Council is meeting this evening. It is still not clear whether this will be in open or private



session: we can update on this tomorrow morning. You may wish to mention your telephone call to the UN Secretary General which included discussion of this issue. Further inconclusive diplomatic activity has continued at the non-aligned meeting in Belgrade and through Primakov's mission to Baghdad and Deputy Foreign Minister Belonogov's visit to Tehran and Ankara.

9. At OPD(G) on Tuesday the Foreign Secretary was asked to come back on humanitarian food supplies to Iraq when the US attitude had been clarified. The US Government apparently considers that the ICRC should first conduct a needs assessment covering Kuwait as well as Iraq. If the Iraqis refused to allow the ICRC to visit Kuwait the US Government might oppose the shipment, though there is some reluctance to take action which might cut across the signs of a more open policy on the part of the Iranians. The US seems content to allow the Sanctions Committee to discuss this issue on that basis. The Attorney General has sent you a minute on the legal aspects.

Item 4: Media handling

10. You might invite the Energy Secretary to report first. You might ask whether there are any current issues which could come up at Prime Minister's Questions in the afternoon which might not be covered by the normal briefing.

11. You might then ask Mr O'Donnell to cover day-to-day press questions. A story which may be continuing to run is the reported civilian casualties through a raid on a Baghdad bunker last night: the MOD put out a robust line on this today - copy --- attached. The Foreign Secretary also dealt with this firmly in the House today.

R.R.B.

ROBIN BUTLER

13 February 1991

REPORTS THAT ALLIED FORCES HAVE HIT A CIVILIAN SHELTER IN BAGHDADISSUED BY THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

13 Feb 1991

- We are aware of reports from Iraq that a civilian shelter in Baghdad has been hit by allied forces, causing many casualties.
- Present information from US military in Riyadh is that it was a military command and control facility in contact with Iraqi forces in the Kuwait area. A US military spokesman has said it had been on the allied target list for some time, but had become more active over the past couple of weeks. He said it was a legitimate military target hit with precision-guided munitions.
- The US spokesman added that, although it had been an airraid shelter in 1985, it was subsequently upgraded to a hardened structure and its roof had recently been camouflaged. Military personnel had been continuously in and around the bunker and there was nothing to indicate that any civilians were associated with the facility.
- We have always made clear that allies are only attacking military or strategic targets. Any civilian casualties are very much regretted and great care is taken to minimise the risk of causing civilian casualties.

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cc PC
Bup



PRIME MINISTER

We are to deal tomorrow with the question of the supply of "humanitarian" food to Iraq. It may be worth at this stage setting out the following thoughts.

Article 23 of the fourth Geneva Convention imposes an obligation upon the parties to permit the free passage of all consignments of essential foodstuffs, clothing and tonics intended for children under fifteen, expectant mothers and maternity cases. The full text is attached.

Under Security Council Resolution 666, if the Sanctions Committee should, after receiving reports from the Secretary General, determine that circumstances have arisen in which there is an urgent humanitarian need to supply foodstuffs to Iraq or Kuwait in order to relieve human suffering, it should report promptly to the Security Council its decision as to how such need should be met. In formulating its decision, the Committee is directed to bear in mind that foodstuffs should be provided through the United Nations in co-operation with the International Committee of the Red Cross or other appropriate humanitarian agencies and distributed by them or under their supervision in order to ensure that they reach the intended beneficiaries.

We should avoid suggesting to the Committee that the fulfilment of obligations under Article 23 should be made conditional upon Iraq's compliance with its own Convention obligations regarding prisoners of war or any other category. Whereas Saddam Hussein

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has already linked providing access to prisoners of war with the cessation of the bombing of civilians, our own position - and the coalition's - is that we fulfil our obligations under humanitarian law in any event.

Moreover, we can exert the leverage we need without resorting to linkage or reciprocity. Whether there is any obligation under Article 23 in this regard depends upon the country concerned being satisfied that there are no serious reasons for fearing:

- (a) that the consignments may be diverted from their destination;
- (b) that the control may not be effective; or
- (c) that a definite advantage may accrue to the military efforts or economy of the enemy through substitution.


Since the ICRC has lacked the clout in Iraq over a period of three weeks to secure access to POWs, we may well have serious reason to fear that the ICRC will be brushed aside in its efforts to get the food to its destination and to control its distribution there, including seeing that none gets to the military.

I am copying this minute to the Foreign Secretary, the Defence Secretary, the Energy Secretary, the Chief of Defence Staff and Sir Robin Butler.

B.M.

13 February 1991

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ARTICLE 23 OF THE FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION

ARTICLE 23


Each High Contracting Party shall allow the free passage of all consignments of medical and hospital stores and objects necessary for religious worship intended only for civilians of another High Contracting Party, even if the latter is its adversary. It shall likewise permit the free passage of all consignments of essential foodstuffs, clothing and tonics intended for children under fifteen, expectant mothers and maternity cases.

The obligation of a High Contracting Party to allow the free passage of the consignments indicated in the preceding paragraph is subject to the condition that this Party is satisfied that there are no serious reasons for fearing:

- (a) that the consignments may be diverted from their destination,
- (b) that the control may not be effective, or
- (c) that a definite advantage may accrue to the military efforts or economy of the enemy through the substitution of the above-mentioned consignments for goods which would otherwise be provided or produced by the enemy or through the release of such material, services or facilities as would otherwise be required for the production of such goods.

The Power which allows the passage of the consignments indicated in the first paragraph of this Article may make such permission conditional on the distribution to the persons benefited thereby being made under the local supervision of the Protecting Powers.

Such consignments shall be forwarded as rapidly as possible, and the Power which permits their free passage shall have the right to prescribe the technical arrangements under which such passage is allowed.



PRIME MINISTER

OPD(G): THE GULF

OPD(G) meets tomorrow. There will be a COI photographer present at the beginning for an official War Cabinet photograph.

The first item deals with release of prisoners of war in the context of a cease-fire. The paper is straightforward. In essence we insist on an Iraqi commitment to agree practical arrangements for PoW exchange before a cease-fire is accepted: and tell the Iraqis that the cease-fire would be at risk if they renege.

The main interest is in the report on the military situation. There are various notes in the hot-box about the Defence Secretary's visit to Washington. You will want to ask him to report more fully. You will want to be cautious about any mention of specific dates. The President has undertaken to consult you before any decision is reached.

Also under this item, you will want to discuss the US destruction of a bunker/shelter in Baghdad which appears to have caused substantial civilian casualties. The Americans are taking an admirably firm line.

For the discussion on the international situation, we shall know more tomorrow morning about the outcome in the Security Council. There is a fresh spate of diplomatic initiatives: the Russians and the Non-Aligned in particular. You will want to mention your talk with the UN Secretary-General (note in folder). On the question of humanitarian food for Iraq, the Attorney had minuted his views, which you will find in the folder. The Americans take the view that the ICRC should be allowed to conduct a needs assessment covering Kuwait as well as Iraq: that seems very sound.

E. R.

SECRET

- 2 -

There is a parliamentary point. The Scottish Nationalists want to use their half-day next Thursday for a debate on our war aims and the post-war prospects. The Foreign Secretary is not keen, but it seems hard to refuse. We should treat the debate in a low-key (a dream ticket of Douglas Hogg and Alan Clark perhaps!).

C.D.P.

CHARLES POWELL
13 FEBRUARY 1991

C:\WPDOCS\FOREIGN\OPDG.MRM

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69
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MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

Telephone 071 21 82111/3

MO 6/17/15/1D

13 February 1991

CM 13/2

Dear Charles,

GULF REPORT

I attach a copy of the midday report prepared for MOD Ministers on operations in the Gulf.

Yours

Janet Binstead

(MISS J R BINSTAD)
Private Secretary

Sir C Powell KCMG
No 10 Downing Street

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THE GULF CONFLICT - BRIEFING FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

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THE GULF CONFLICT

BRIEFING FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE - SITREP No. 76

SITUATION AS AT 1300Z, 13 FEBRUARY 1991

Contains

1. Classified sitrep
2. Unclassified material for use by Ministers

Distribution attached

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SEC(O)(C) AFTERNOON BRIEF, 13 FEBRUARY 1991

Summary

- News dominated by destruction of Baghdad air raid shelter. Two bombs reported to have scored direct hits. Conflicting reports of numbers of casualties.

General Situation

- Allied air campaign continues.

Political

- The Kuwaiti Ambassador to UN has accused Iraq of using Kuwaiti citizens as "human shields" at strategic targets in Kuwait.
- Saddam Hussein is reported to have said to Soviet envoy Primakov at their meeting yesterday that there could be a solution if the bombing of Iraq were to cease and a solution were found to the Palestinian problem. FCO have not yet received Soviet views on meeting.

UK Operations

Air Operations

- RAF combat sorties as at 131000Z:

	since 130100Z	total
Tornado GR1	14	986
Tornado GR1A	3	74
Jaguar	8	385
Tornado F3	8	479
Buccaneer	4	64
Nimrod	0	55
AAR (Victor, VC10K, Tristar)	5	434
	42	2477

Non-combat sorties (at 130100Z):

1454
3931

- 2 Tornado GR1As from Dhahran carried out a line search recce mission along the Saudi/Iraqi border as tasked yesterday afternoon. Among the military installations and equipment located were MBTs, AFVs, an electronic mast and vehicles and a number of bunkers. Both aircraft recovered safely.
- A Tornado F3 on a routine roulement flight from Dhahran to RAF Leeming diverted to Cambrai in France because of engine problems. The aircraft was fully armed with Skyflash and

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Sidewinder AAMs in line with JHQ policy that aircraft conducting any part of their flight in an operational theatre should be armed. Arrangements have been made for the recovery of the aircraft to the UK.

- 6 Tornado GR1 aircraft from Tabuk, including 2 TIALD equipped aircraft, attacked Al Asad airfield (1 on the attached map) with LGBs. 6 direct hits were seen.
- 4 Tornado GR1s from Muharraq, together with 2 Buccaneers in the laser designator role, attacked the Fallujah rail/road bridge (2). 5 direct hits on the bridge which, although still standing, is assessed as holed and unuseable.
- 4 Tornado GR1s from Muharraq, together with 2 Buccaneers, attacked Al Taqaddum (3) and Al Asad (1) airfields. A number of good hits on hardened aircraft shelters were reported.
- 4 Jaguars from Muharraq attacked a communications post in Kuwait (4). At least 4 direct hits.
- 4 Jaguars from Muharraq attacked artillery position (5) in Kuwait, scoring 3 direct hits.

Navy Operations

- No significant developments since last sitrep.

Army Operations

- No significant developments since last sitrep.

Allied Operations

- The Saudis and US have launched what is described as the heaviest assault so far in attacking Iraqi forces inside Kuwait. Attack combined aircraft, artillery and gunfire from USS Missouri. Operation did not cross the border or draw an Iraqi reaction.
- Today Italian Tornados will attack Republican Guard targets identified by helicopter. Saudi, Kuwaiti, French and Bahraini fighters will attack KTO targets. Canadian fighters will fly defensive caps. UK Tornado and Buccaneer aircraft will continue to attack point targets.

Iraqi activity

- US report that up to 50 oil refineries inside Kuwait are on fire and that the majority of these fires have been deliberately started to conceal Iraqi troop positions. US state that fires will not have an impact on Allied military operations.

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Logistics

- The HOVE, the last Army ammunition ship, docked at Al Jubayl yesterday and is now being unloaded. The SINGELGRACHT, carrying RAF ammunition, arrived at Bahrain yesterday and has now completed her discharge.
- MV MERCHANT PROMISE is being loaded at Emden with available UK/BAOR ammunition stocks, together with German provided 155mm HE and 155 mm SMK.

Media reports and coverage

- Media dominated by news of bombing of air raid shelter in Baghdad. Estimates of casualties range from "scores" to "up to 400". Iraq has claimed that shelter contained only women, children and old men and was capable of holding 1500. Appears that 2 bombs punched through the roof of the shelter and detonated inside. Situation very confused.
- Ceefax report that B52s are to be allowed to dump bombs at sea and that North Devon MP Tony Speller is to ask the PM to make safer arrangements.

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General Staff Map Section, OSGB 11592 (CAD) Edition 8 OSGB, November 1960 4/61

Produced under the direction of Director General of Military Survey, Ministry of Defence, United Kingdom 1960


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REPORTS THAT ALLIED MISSILES HAVE HIT CIVILIAN SHELTER IN BAGHDAD

- Aware of reports that a civilian shelter in Baghdad has been hit by allied missiles, causing many casualties.
- Not clear precisely where the shelter was. Have always made clear that allies are only attacking military or strategic targets.
- Greatly regret if civilian casualties are caused in such attacks, but Kuwait can only be freed if Saddam Hussein's vast military machine is disabled, and that is the sole aim of allied attacks.
- Have to rely on journalists' reports on damage being caused in Iraq. These journalists can only report what Iraqi authorities allow them to see. Brent Sadler said yesterday that he had seen no evidence of allies deliberately targeting civilian areas.

KUWAITI OIL WELL FIRES

- Aware of reports that [50-100] oil wells in Kuwait are burning.
- Have no independent confirmation of these reports.
- US report that majority of these fires were deliberately started by the Iraqis. Extremely unlikely that so many fires could have been caused by Allied bombing.
- Limited military value in setting these wells alight - smoke will not significantly hamper Allied operations.
- Another example of Saddam Hussein's total disregard for the environment. Utterly deplore further case of environmental terrorism.



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001449

Treasury Chambers, Parliament Street SW1P 3AG

071-270 3000

Fax 071-270 3456

The Rt Hon Peter Lilley MP
Secretary of State for Trade and Industry
Department of Trade and Industry
1 - 19 Victoria Street
London
SW1H 0ET

13 February 1991
CDP
B/2

New Rel.

INSURANCE AGAINST DAMAGE BY IRAQI TERRORISTS

Thank you for your letter of 23 January. I have also seen Kenneth Baker's letter of 31 January. The risk of Iraqi terrorism in the UK is for others to assess, but I would hope that the risk of major damage is remote. It is not in the Government's interest to excite alarm on this score by preparing a general compensation scheme for terrorist damage which as a general proposition the industry is normally prepared to cover, so I was disappointed to see that the insurance industry are apparently taking such a rigid attitude.


2. It is already regrettably the case that there are risks of terrorism in the UK, yet the insurance companies do not seek to use war risk exclusion clauses when claims arise in this way. Although it may be that war risk exclusion clauses will bear the interpretation that Iraqi terrorism now would be an act of war and not an act of terrorism, it does not in my view follow that isolated acts of terrorism associated with the present hostilities would automatically bring the exclusion clause into operation. I think it is essential that we explore the legal issues here fully before we decide on action, and so I would like to see an early reference of the question to the Law Officers. This is particularly so given the risk, as Kenneth Baker points out, that any concession in this area could have an unwelcome read-across to the status of other terrorist activity. From the expenditure point of view, I am greatly concerned as you can imagine with the proposition that the costs of any compensation scheme would not only lie wholly at the door of the Government but would also be unquantifiable.

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3. So far as a public line to take is concerned, I think we are entitled to look for industry's cooperation in the public handling of this issue; and so at least until we have had a view from the Law Officers I suggest that if we are pressed we simply say in public that the Government is aware of the issue, that we are in touch with the industry and are monitoring developments. I also support Kenneth Baker's point that we could make something of the fact that the insurers have not hitherto tried to disown responsibility for terrorists damage.

4. I am copying this letter to the Prime Minister, Douglas Hurd, James Mackay, Kenneth Baker, Tom King, Michael Heseltine, John Wakeham, John Gummer, Ian Lang, David Hunt, Peter Brooke, Patrick Mayhew and Sir Robin Butler.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be 'DM', with a long horizontal line extending to the right.

DAVID MELLOR

MIDDLE EAST: 511
ME

SECRET AND PERSONAL



10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

13 February 1991

Dear Sir,

THE GULF

I had a short round up with General Scowcroft this evening on a number of points.

I briefed him on the Prime Minister's conversation with the UN Secretary General. General Scowcroft said the President would be very grateful to the Prime Minister for following up on this.

General Scowcroft said the Americans were not worried about the Security Council discussion. They believe they have 9 votes to hold it in private, and that the Chairman intended to close off discussions by 6pm New York time.

We talked about the attack on the bunker/shelter in Baghdad. General Scowcroft said that all the evidence he had seen indicated that the building was being used as a military command and control centre. He believed the Administration's evidence was really very strong and was making an impact on public opinion in the United States. They were not getting too much trouble on this.

I mentioned the intelligence reports about the possibility that the Iraqis might launch a divisional strength attack from SE Kuwait in the next 72 hours. He had seen the reports but said they had not been highlighted, which indicated that the military were not taking them too seriously.

I mentioned some interesting reports we had seen in the last day or two which indicated the whereabouts of some important targets. General Scowcroft confirmed that he had also seen these.

General Scowcroft spoke warmly of the visit of the Defence Secretary and CDS, which had been very successful.

I am copying this letter to Richard Gozney (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and Sir Robin Butler.

Yours sincerely,
Charles Powell

CHARLES POWELL

Simon Webb, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence

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TEL AVIV TELNO 99 : VISIT OF ISRAELI DEFENCE MINISTER TO WASHINGTON

SUMMARY

1. ARENS SAYS ISRAELI WILLINGNESS TO REFRAIN FROM RETALIATION FOR SCUD ATTACKS IS WEARING THIN. PRESIDENT STRONGLY URGES CONTINUED RESTRAINT. ARENS RECEIVES NON-COMMITTAL REPLY TO HIS REQUEST FOR FURTHER DOLLARS ONE BILLION TO MEET ADDITIONAL ISRAELI MILITARY COSTS. DETAIL
2. DEFENCE SECRETARY ARENS MADE A HASTILY-ARRANGED ONE DAY VISIT TO WASHINGTON ON 11 FEBRUARY, DURING WHICH HE SAW THE PRESIDENT, BAKER AND CHENEY.
3. ARENS' MAIN MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT WAS THAT THERE WAS GREAT CONCERN IN ISRAEL THAT THE SCUD THREAT HAD NOT BEEN ELIMINATED. ISRAEL CONTINUED TO BE TARGETTED AND PATIENCE WAS WEARING THIN. ISRAELI PUBLIC OPINION NOW FAVOURED THE IDF TAKING ACTION. THE PRESIDENT STRONGLY URGED THAT ISRAEL CONTINUE ITS POLICY OF RESTRAINT. ISRAEL STOOD TO BENEFIT FROM THE SUCCESSFUL PROSECUTION OF THE WAR. COALITION FORCES WERE DEALING WITH THE IRAQI THREAT TO ISRAELI SECURITY. DIRECT ISRAELI INVOLVEMENT WOULD ONLY COMPLICATE THE ISSUE. THE PRESIDENT ALSO QUERIED ARENS' ASSERTION THAT ISRAELI PUBLIC OPINION NOW FAVOURED RETALIATION.
4. WITH BAKER, ARENS WENT OVER MUCH THE SAME GROUND AND THEN MADE A PITCH FOR ADDITIONAL US ASSISTANCE. HE SAID THAT THE CRISIS HAD ADDED ABOUT DOLLARS ONE BILLION TO ISRAELI MILITARY EXPENDITURE (COST OF MOBILISATION, CIVIL DEFENCE, EMERGENCY PURCHASES ETC). HE DID NOT GIVE BAKER A DETAILED BREAKDOWN BUT PROMISED TO PROVIDE ONE. BAKER WENT OVER THE DIFFICULTIES THE ADMINISTRATION WAS HAVING FINANCING ITS OWN ADDITIONAL

EXPENDITURE, BUT SAID HE WOULD MENTION ISRAEL'S PROBLEM TO COALITION PARTNERS WHO WERE PROVIDING FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE. THEY MIGHT BE PREPARED TO PICK UP SOME OF THE ITEMS ON THE ISRAELI LIST.
COMMENT

5. ARENS DOES NOT APPEAR TO HAVE REQUESTED ADDITIONAL MILITARY EQUIPMENT (THOUGH WE AWAIT A READOUT OF HIS TALKS WITH CHENEY). NEITHER DID HE RAISE ISRAEL'S REQUEST FOR EXTRA ASSISTANCE TO OFFSET ADDITIONAL NON-MILITARY EXPENDITURE/REVENUE REDUCTIONS. NOW THAT LEVY HAS POSTPONED HIS VISIT TO WASHINGTON, IT IS NOT CLEAR HOW THE ISRAELIS PLAN TO FOLLOW UP THE SUGGESTION FLOATED IN THE EAGLEBURGER/MODAI MEETING LAST MONTH, OF ADDITIONAL ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE.

6. THE PRESS HAVE INTERPRETED ARENS' MESSAGE AS PREPARING THE ADMINISTRATION FOR POSSIBLE ISRAELI RETALIATION AGAINST IRAQ. KURTZER (DAS, NEA, STATE) HAS TOLD US THAT THE ADMINISTRATION THOUGHT ARENS' PURPOSE WAS TO REGISTER DISAPPOINTMENT THAT THE SCUD THREAT HAS NOT BEEN DEALT WITH AND TO ENSURE THAT THE COALITION WAS CONTINUING TO PUT EFFORT INTO ELIMINATING IT. KURTZER ADDED THAT, WITH DISCUSSION NOW FOCUSING ON THE GROUND WAR, THE ISRAELIS MIGHT HAVE BEEN CONCERNED THAT THE SCUD THREAT WAS SLIPPING DOWN THE COALITION'S LIST OF PRIORITIES. KURTZER SAID THAT THE ADMINISTRATION'S VIEW REMAINED THAT THE ISRAELIS WOULD CONTINUE TO SHOW RESTRAINT UNLESS THEY WERE HIT BY A CHEMICAL SCUD ATTACK OR A CONVENTIONAL ATTACK WITH HEAVY CASUALTIES - IN WHICH CASE THEY WOULD RESPOND AND WOULD EXPECT THE ADMINISTRATION TO SHOW UNDERSTANDING.

ACLAND

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PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T438/91

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OCMIAN 0947
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OO JEDDA
OO RIYAD
FM FCOLN TO JEDDA
122015Z FEB
GRS 228

SUBJECT *a MASTER
OPS*

CONFIDENTIAL
FM FCO
TO IMMEDIATE JEDDA
TELNO 72
OF 122015Z FEBRUARY 91
INFO IMMEDIATE RIYADH

JEDDA FOR BLACKLEY
BURDENSARING: KUWAITI CONTRIBUTION
1. GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD TAKE THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY TO
DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO THE AMIR
OF KUWAIT:
BEGINS:

THANK YOU FOR YOUR KIND LETTER OF 31 JANUARY WITH ITS WARM
MESSAGE OF FRIENDSHIP AND SOLIDARITY.

DOUGLAS HURD HAS TOLD ME THAT YOU WERE GOOD ENOUGH TO SEE HIM
IN TRIP ON 9 FEBRUARY AND THAT YOU HAD AN EXCELLENT TALK ABOUT
PROGRESS IN OUR COMMON ENDEAVOUR OF LIBERATING YOUR COUNTRY. I
WAS ALSO TOLD IMMEDIATELY OF YOUR MOST GENEROUS RESPONSE TO OUR
SUGGESTION ABOUT HELP TOWARDS THE FINANCIAL BURDEN OF THE
CONFLICT. ON BEHALF OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE. I
THANK YOU MOST WARMLY. WHEN WE DECIDED TO HELP YOU RECUPERATE
YOUR COUNTRY FROM IRAQI AGGRESSION WE WERE DRIVEN BY THE
PRINCIPLE AT STAKE. CALCULATIONS ABOUT THE PRICE WERE SECONDARY.
BUT THE COSTS ARE CONSIDERABLE. AS YOU KNOW. AND KUWAIT'S
GENEROUS CONTRIBUTION IS GREATLY APPRECIATED.

I WAS GLAD TO HAVE FURTHER NEWS OF YOUR HIGHNESS AND OF HIS
HIGHNESS THE CROWN PRINCE. I AM GRATEFUL TO HIM FOR RECEIVING
THE DELEGATION OF BRITISH BUSINESSMEN. I SEND YOU BOTH MY VERY
BEST WISHES FOR THE TESTING PERIOD OF THE NEXT FEW WEEKS. I AM
CONFIDENT THAT IT WILL NOT BE LONG BEFORE LEGITIMACY IS RESTORED
TO KUWAIT.
ENDS

HURD

YYYY
(WOOLLEY)
GULF BURDENSARING (POL MIL EU)

OCMIAN 0947

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10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

CDP ②
Prime Minister

13 February 1991

CDP
13/2

Dear Prince Bandar,

THE GULF: TALKS WITH PRINCE BANDAR

Prince Bandar telephoned me at the princely hour of 0045 last night from Washington to report on reactions in Saudi Arabia to recent high-level contacts. The King had been very pleased indeed with the Prime Minister's telephone call: and had exerted himself to make a success of the meeting with the Foreign Secretary, whom he also held in high esteem. Any problems and misunderstandings over the Foreign Secretary's Blaby speech had been laid to rest. We could be confident that substantial financial help would be forthcoming from the Kingdom although it might take a little while to settle the details. There was enormous admiration and gratitude in Saudi Arabia for Britain's contribution to the war effort. Prince Bandar added that the visit of Secretary Cheney and General Powell had also been a success.

Prince Bandar said that he thought that a further message from the Prime Minister to the King in the fairly near future would be useful. It might deal in particular with the second phase of Al Yamamah, and look beyond that to subsequent phases, which would underline the continuity of our co-operation with Saudi Arabia. He would like to call on the Prime Minister when he next passed through London, and might receive such a message from him then to take on to the King.

I said that I was sure the Prime Minister would be happy to see him: I did not envisage any problem over a message. We must ensure that the flow of funds under Al Yamamah was synchronised with the progress of the various projects.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence), Jeremy Heywood (Chief Secretary's Office), John Neilson (Department of Energy) and to Sir Robin Butler.

Yours sincerely,
Charles Powell
Charles Powell

Richard Gozney Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

12 February 1991

THE GULF: PRIME MINISTER'S TELEPHONE CALL TO THE
UN SECRETARY GENERAL

The Prime Minister spoke on the telephone this evening to the United Nations Secretary-General about the situation in the Gulf.

The Prime Minister regretted that it was some time since and the Secretary-General had last spoken. He had talked the previous evening to President Bush: they both shared a concern at Iraq's efforts to make propaganda by claiming extensive civilian casualties as a result of Allied bombing. This seemed to be affecting opinion in the non-aligned countries, which in turn was creating pressure on the Secretary-General to intervene in some way. The Prime Minister continued that we could well understand the anguish which developments in the Gulf caused the Secretary-General. He had done everything humanly possible to avert the conflict there: and it was obnoxious of the Iraqis to accuse him of complicity in what they called crimes against Iraq. Responsibility for the present conflict rested simply and solely with Iraq.

The Secretary-General said that he very much agreed with this. But we must be careful not to provide the Iraqis with material to bolster their arguments that the Allies were indiscriminately killing civilians. They were beginning to gain ground with this line of argument internationally. The Prime Minister assured the Secretary-General that all Allied pilots were under strict instructions to minimise civilian casualties and avoid sites of religious and cultural significance. There was no policy to attack anything other than military targets, and we believed that the guidelines had been rigorously followed. He understood that the President would be letting the Secretary-General have some photographic evidence to sustain this. The Secretary-General said that he entirely accepted this and knew that the President and the Prime Minister were doing everything possible to avoid civilian casualties. Unfortunately he was a victim of Iraqi attempts to distort the truth.

The Prime Minister assured the Secretary-General that our aims remained those set out in the Security Council resolutions and we had no intention of widening them to include the destruction of Iraq or the downfall of Saddam Hussein. Nor was

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there any question of changing Iraq's borders. The Secretary-General said that he had dealt with the United States and the United Kingdom for many years and trusted them absolutely. He would not allow himself to be used by the Iraqis.

The Prime Minister said that we understood that pressure for a Security Council meeting could not be contained indefinitely. But we thought it better for any meeting to be held in private rather than open session. There were plenty of precedents for this. The key factor was that the meeting should not be exploited to blur the clear message that Iraq must withdraw from Kuwait. Public airing of proposals for a ceasefire or a pause in hostilities might give the Iraqis the false impression that they could even now get away without implementing the Security Council's resolutions fully.

The Secretary-General said that full compliance with the Security Council resolutions was the essential premise for a solution. Unfortunately there was no indication that the Iraqis were prepared to accept that. Suggestions of flexibility would be misleading and should be avoided. The Prime Minister said that it would be a tragic error if the unity and consistency of the Security Council, maintained over many months, were now to be put in jeopardy. The Secretary-General entirely agreed.

The Prime Minister spoke of our strong support for the Secretary-General and urged Sr. Perez de Cuellar to telephone him at any time if there were matters which he wished to discuss.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence), John Neilson (Department of Energy), Juliet Chalmers (Attorney General's Office) and to Sir Robin Butler.

C. D. POWELL

Richard Gozney, Esq.
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

12 February 1991

BURDEN SHARING: HONG KONG

Thank you for your letter of 12 February, proposing a message from the Prime Minister to the members of LegCo in Hong Kong, thanking them for Hong Kong's contribution to our costs in the Gulf conflict. I am sure the Prime Minister would be more than happy to send a message and the text enclosed with your letter may issue.

CHARLES POWELL

Simon Gass, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

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12 February 1991

Dear Charles,

Burdensharing: Hong Kong

Thank you for your letter of 10 February about Hong Kong's contribution to our costs arising from the Gulf conflict.

The Foreign Secretary has sent a message of thanks to the Governor but he and the Governor believe it would be much appreciated if the Prime Minister were to send a message to LegCo as a whole.

/ I enclose a draft which reflects the Governor's advice. If the Prime Minister agrees, this would be sent to Mr Allen Lee, the Senior Member of the Council.

Yours ever,
S L Gass

(S L Gass)
Private Secretary

Sir Charles Powell
10 Downing Street

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DRAFT MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO MEMBERS OF
HONG KONG'S LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL

"I am most grateful to members of Hong Kong's Legislative Council for the donation of HK dollars 230 million to HMG for logistic, humanitarian, medical and other support facilities in the Gulf.

The multinational force fighting Iraq is acting under the authority of the United Nations and to uphold the UN Security Council Resolutions which demand the immediate withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait. Britain, and over 30 other countries, have joined the coalition to remove Saddam Hussain's forces from Kuwait and to restore the rightful government. Britain now has over 40,000 men committed to the Gulf, including some who have been posted there from Hong Kong.

At a time of international crisis, that Hong Kong's Legislative Council has been prepared to play its part in support of these objectives is greatly appreciated".

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OF 122330Z FEBRUARY 91
AND TO DESKBY 130100Z CABINET OFFICE
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OUR TELNO 432 : IRAQ/KUWAIT : WASHINGTON SITREP

SUMMARY

1. PRESIDENT TELLS MR KING THAT US PROUD TO BE ASSOCIATED WITH UK IN THE GULF. ISRAELI DEFENCE MINISTER SAYS ISRAEL'S PATIENCE WEARING THIN. CONTINUING CONCERN OVER IRAQI TREATMENT OF COALITION POWS.

DETAIL

NOT YET RECEIVED

2. THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE SAW PRESIDENT BUSH ON 12 FEBRUARY (REPORTED SEPARATELY). IN A STATEMENT BEFORE THE MEETING, THE PRESIDENT SAID AGAIN THAT THE COALITION EFFORT WAS PROCEEDING ON SCHEDULE. HE WARMLY THANKED THE UK FOR ITS CONTRIBUTION IN THE GULF AND SAID THE US WAS PROUD TO BE ASSOCIATED WITH BRITAIN IN THIS EFFORT.

3. THERE IS WIDESPREAD MEDIA COMMENT ON 12 FEBRUARY TO THE EFFECT THAT THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT OF 11 FEBRUARY (TUR) SUGGESTS A PERIOD OF CONTINUED BOMBING BEFORE A GROUND WAR IS STARTED. A PENTAGON SPOKESMAN CONFIRMED THAT THE POINT OF DIMINISHING RETURNS IN THE ALR CAMPAIGN HAD NOT YET BEEN REACHED. OFFICIAL ESTIMATES OF 750 TANKS, 600 ARMoured VEHICLES AND 650 ARTILLERY PIECES DESTROYED INDICATED THAT THE AIR CAMPAIGN STILL HAD SOME WAY TO GO. LT GEN THOMAS KELLY, CHIEF OF OPERATIONS FOR THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, HAS SAID THAT OFFICIAL PENTAGON FIGURES MAY BE UNDERSTATING THE DAMAGE DONE, WITH PERHAPS AS MANY AS 1500 IRAQI TANKS UNABLE TO FIGHT.

4. THE ISRAELI DEFENCE MINISTER SAW PRESIDENT BUSH ON 11 FEBRUARY AND MADE WHAT OFFICIALS DESCRIBE AS AN EMOTIONAL PRESENTATION, RENDERED MORE DRAMATIC BY NEWS DURING THE MEETING OF A FURTHER SCUD ATTACK ON ISRAEL. AN ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL IS QUOTED AS SAYING THAT ARENS MADE CLEAR TO THE

PRESIDENT THAT ISRAELI PATIENCE WAS WEARING THIN, WHILE NOT SUGGESTING THAT TEL AVIV WAS ON THE VERGE OF ACTUAL RETALIATION. OFFICIALS WERE QUOTED AS SAYING THAT HE WAS LAYING THE GROUNDWORK SHOULD THE ISRAELIS DECIDE TO RETALIATE AND ALSO SOFTENING UP THE ADMINISTRATION FOR A NEW ISRAELI AID REQUEST. (ARENS SAID PUBLICLY THAT HE HAD MADE NO AID REQUEST IN HIS MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT).

5. THERE IS CONTINUED CONCERN HERE OVER TREATMENT OF ALLIED POWS, FOLLOWING REPORTS THAT IRAQ HAD MOVED TWO AMERICAN POWS, INCLUDING A WOMAN, TO BASRA. THIS CONCERN IS LINKED TO REPORTS THAT THE CHIEF US MILITARY LAWYER IN SAUDI ARABIA, ACTING UNDER ORDERS FROM THE JOINT CHIEFS, HAS FORMED A QUOTE WAR CRIMES DOCUMENTATION TEAM UNQUOTE TO COLLECT INFORMATION ON POSSIBLE IRAQI VIOLATIONS OF THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL TREATIES. THESE VIOLATIONS INCLUDED IRAQI ABUSE OF CIVILIANS IN KUWAIT, THE MISTREATMENT OF ALLIED POWS AND EVEN DELIBERATE DAMAGE TO THE ENVIRONMENT. THE US LAWYER SAID THAT WHILE NO DECISION HAD BEEN TAKEN ON WHAT TO DO WITH RESPECT TO IRAQI WAR CRIMES, THE US WERE IN THE PROCESS OF ESTABLISHING A DATA BASE.

6. THE STATE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN SAID IN A STATEMENT ON 11 FEBRUARY THAT THERE HAD BEEN ABOUT 100 INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST INCIDENTS SINCE THE START OF THE GULF WAR, A SIGNIFICANTLY HIGHER NUMBER THAN OCCURRED IN THE COMPARABLE PERIOD LAST YEAR. ONLY ONE HOWEVER (IN MANILA) WAS DEMONSTRABLY CONNECTED TO THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT. THE US HAD NO EVIDENCE THAT WOULD LINK THE IRAQIS TO LOCAL TERRORIST GROUPS NOR ANY INDICATION OF A QUOTE MASTER PLAN UNQUOTE DIRECTED BY SOME GROUP OR INDIVIDUAL.

7. THERE CONTINUES TO BE FRICTION BETWEEN THE ADMINISTRATION AND THE PRESS OVER REPORTING THE GULF WAR. THE PRESS ARE CHAFING UNDER THE POOL ARRANGEMENTS FOR JOURNALISTS, WHICH THEY CLAIM RESTRICTS THEIR ACCESS TO THE FRONT AND REDUCES THEIR ABILITY TO REPORT ACCURATELY. FOR THEIR PART THE ADMINISTRATION AND SOME REPUBLICAN SENATORS FEEL THAT THE MEDIA CONTINUE TO DO SADDAM HUSSEIN'S PROPAGANDA JOB FOR HIM.

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TELNO 145

OF 121548Z FEBRUARY 91

INFO PRIORITY CABINET OFFICE, ACTOR, MODUK, WASHINGTON, MOSCOW

INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK, MIDDLE EAST POSTS, EC POSTS

MY TELNOS 131 AND 138: MITTERRAND TV INTERVIEW: FRENCH REACTIONS

SUMMARY

1. CONTINUING STRONG SUPPORT FOR MITTERRAND'S GULF POLICY. BUT ANXIETY ABOUT THE RISK OF THE WAR SPREADING, ABOUT TERRORISM, AND IN POLITICAL CIRCLES ABOUT DAMAGE TO FRENCH INTERESTS IN THE ARAB WORLD. MITTERRAND'S RULING OUT THE USE OF UNCONVENTIONAL WEAPONS SURPRISED THE QUAI THEORETICIANS AND HAS ATTRACTED SOME OPPOSITION CRITICISM. IT REFLECTS HIS POLITICAL JUDGEMENT OF WHAT NEEDS TO BE SAID TO THE ARAB WORLD. BUT IT IS THE SENSITIVITY TO FRANCE OF THE MAGHREB, IN PARTICULAR, THAT AFFECTS FRENCH TACTICS.

DETAIL

2. AN OPINION POLL TAKEN AFTER THE PRESIDENT'S 7 FEBRUARY INTERVIEW AND PUBLISHED IN 'LIBERATION' OF 11 FEBRUARY SHOWS 70 PERCENT APPROVAL FOR THE PRESIDENT'S GULF POLICY (DOWN 7 POINTS SINCE THE LAST POLL ON 26 JANUARY, BUT STILL A HEALTHY FIGURE) THOSE BELIEVING THAT 'THE US AND THEIR ALLIES ARE RIGHT TO MAKE WAR AGAINST IRAQ' REMAIN CONSISTENTLY HIGH AT 75 PERCENT. BUT A MAJORITY (56 PERCENT) ALSO BELIEVES THAT THE WAR WILL 'MAKE THE RESOLUTION OF THE MIDDLE EAST'S PROBLEMS MORE COMPLICATED' AND 'LEAD TO TERRORIST ATTACKS ON FRENCH TERRITORY'. THERE ARE SIGNS TOO OF INCREASED ANXIETY ABOUT THE WAR SPREADING: THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE WANTING TO STICK BY THE UN OBJECTIVE OF LIBERATING KUWAIT HAS RISEN BY 8 POINTS SINCE 26 JANUARY TO 62 PERCENT: WHILST THE NUMBER WANTING TO BRING DOWN SADDAM HUSSEIN HAS FALLEN BY 11 POINTS TO 42 PERCENT. 62 PERCENT AGREE WITH MITTERRAND THAT 'FRANCE SHOULD NOT USE CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN RESPONSE TO AN IRAQI CHEMICAL ATTACK' (34 PERCENT DISAGREE).

3. AT THE POLITICAL LEVEL AND IN EDITORIALS THE DEBATE ON THE PRESIDENT'S INTERVIEW FOCUSED PRIMARILY ON THE DAMAGE THE WAR WAS LIKELY TO CAUSE TO FRANCE'S INFLUENCE IN THE ARAB WORLD: AND ON WHETHER THE PRESIDENT'S EXPLICIT EXCLUSION OF THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS UNDER-MINED FRANCE'S POLICY OF DETERRENCE. ANOTHER THEME OF

PAGE 1
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THE RECENT POLITICAL DEBATE HAS BEEN THE DEFICIENCIES IN FRENCH DEFENCE EQUIPMENT EXPOSED BY THE GULF WAR, AND THE COMPLICATIONS POSED BY LARGELY CONSCRIPT ARMED FORCES AND ESPECIALLY BY THE POLICY OF NOT SENDING CONSCRIPTS TO FIGHT IN THE GULF - CF A TYPICAL HEADLINE OF A WEEKLY JOURNAL 'WHAT SORT OF ARMY FOR WHAT SORT OF WAR?'. WITHIN THE POLITICAL WORLD THE WAR AND ITS STRAINS HAVE BROUGHT OUT THE LATENT STREAK OF ANTI-AMERICANISM IN THE EXTREME RIGHT AND LEFT AND IN PARTS OF THE SOCIALIST AND GAULLIST PARTIES.

FRANCE'S ARAB POLICY

4. THERE IS A TENDENCY IN THE MEDIA TO SUGGEST THAT FRANCE'S ARAB POLICY IS IN RUINS, AND EVEN TO QUESTION WHETHER THERE WAS EVER A POLICY RATHER THAN THE ILLUSION OF ONE. THE DOMINANT THEME HOWEVER IS THAT FRANCE'S 'COMMON BORDER WITH THE ARAB WORLD' AND THE PRESENCE OF SEVERAL MILLION MUSLIMS IN FRANCE POSE POTENTIALLY VERY SERIOUS RISKS FOR FRANCE (HENCE THE UNCEASING DIPLOMATIC EFFORT OF SUCH AS SCHEER, VAUZELLE ETC). SERGE JULY WRITES IN 'LIBERATION' OF 11 FEBRUARY THAT 'FOR DECADES, SUCCESSIVE FRENCH GOVERNMENTS HAVE PLAYED THREE CARDS IN THE NEAR EAST: IRAQ, THE PLO AND THE LEBANON THE OUTCOME HAS BEEN LITTLE SHORT OF TRAGIC'.

5. ON THE RIGHT, ESPECIALLY, THERE ARE FEARS THAT FRANCE COULD LOSE OUT IN THE ARAB WORLD VIS-A-VIS THE UNITED STATES AND THE UK. IN A RADIO INTERVIEW ON 10 FEBRUARY CHIRAC CRITICISED THE PRESIDENT'S DIPLOMACY FOR WEAKENING FRANCE'S POSITION. HE DISMISSED MITTERRAND'S SUGGESTION THAT THE UN SHOULD TAKE THE LEAD IN ORGANISING A POST-WAR PEACE CONFERENCE, PROPOSING INSTEAD THAT FRANCE SHOULD SEIZE BACK THE INITIATIVE BY INVITING ISRAEL AND THE ARAB STATES TO A 'REGIONAL CONFERENCE' IN PARIS, FROM WHICH THE GREAT POWERS WOULD BE EXCLUDED.

6. HOWEVER, ON THE EVE OF HIS VISIT TO WASHINGTON DEFENCE MINISTER JOXE ARGUED ON 10 FEBRUARY THAT PURSUIT OF FRANCE'S INTERESTS IN THE ARAB WORLD DID 'NOT IMPLY SYSTEMATIC MISTRUST OF THE AMERICANS. WE CAN BEST MAKE OUR VOICE HEARD BY THE AMERICANS BY CULTIVATING RELATIONS OF FRIENDSHIP AND SOLIDARITY ... AND THAT GOES FOR THE ENGLISH TOO'.

7. IT WAS ANNOUNCED LATER ON 10 FEBRUARY THAT FRANCE WAS SENDING A FURTHER MARINE INFANTRY REGIMENT (APPROX 700 MEN) TO SAUDI ARABIA TO PROTECT THE FRENCH LINES OF COMMUNICATION AND THE LOGISTICS BASE. THE REGIMENT WILL TAKE ABOUT 12 DAYS TO REACH THE GULF.

DEFENCE POLICY

8. THE PRESIDENT'S EXPLICIT RULING OUT OF THE USE OF CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL AND - ESPECIALLY - NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE GULF PROVOKED OPPOSITION CRITICISM AND DOUBTS EVEN AMONG SOME SOCIALIST COMMENTATORS. CHIRAC SAID THAT HE HAD SERIOUS RESERVATIONS ABOUT THE PRESIDENT'S ANNOUNCEMENT WHICH UNDERMINED DETERRENCE: FRENCH SOLDIERS FIGHTING IN THE GULF SHOULD BE REGARDED AS A 'PATRIMONY' TO BE DEFENDED JUST AS MUCH AS FRENCH TERRITORY. SIMONE VEIL (CENTRIST) WAS ALSO CRITICAL. 'LE MONDE' OF 10/11 FEBRUARY SAID THAT, WHILE THE PRESIDENT WAS COURAGEOUS IN NOT DUCKING THE ISSUE, HIS CHOICE CALLED INTO QUESTION THE SACROSANCT POLICY OF DETERRENCE, PILLAR OF FRANCE'S MILITARY DOCTRINE. BUT RAYMOND BARRE SUPPORTED THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION 'WE ARE AGAINST THE USE OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS AND SHOULD SAY SO'.

9. PERHAPS SURPRISINGLY, GIVEN PAST FRENCH SENSITIVITIES, THERE HAS BEEN LITTLE OR NO CRITICISM OF THE PRESIDENT SO FAR FOR HIS DECISION TO ALLOW B52 BOMBERS TO OVERFLY FRENCH TERRITORY (SEE MY TEL 131).

COMMENT

10. WE KNOW THAT THE ELYSEE HAD CAREFULLY PREPARED THE REFERENCE TO NON-USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS. BUT IT CLEARLY CAME AS A SURPRISE AND A 'DISAPPOINTMENT' TO THE THEORETICIANS IN THE QUAI. GUELLUY TOLD THE MINISTER ON 11 FEBRUARY THAT, ALTHOUGH FIRST USE OF NUCLEAR, CHEMICAL OR BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS WAS RULED OUT BY FRANCE'S EXISTING INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS, THE RETALIATORY USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS WAS NOT, AND ARGUABLY IT WEAKENED DETERRENCE PUBLICLY TO RENOUNCE ITS USE IN THAT WAY. GUELLUY ADDED THAT HE HAD SUBSEQUENTLY TRIED TO EXPLAIN THIS TO LANXADE, BUT THE LATTER HAS BEEN UNINTERESTED, PRESENTING MITTERRAND'S DECISION AS ESSENTIALLY POLITICAL. GUELLUY SPECULATED THAT MITTERRAND FELT THAT EAST/WEST DETERRENT THEORY TO BE IRRELEVANT IN THE GULF CONTEXT (AND INEFFECTIVE AGAINST AN MAN LIKE SADDAM). THIS SQUARES WITH MY VIEW THAT MITTERRAND WAS PRIMARILY CONCERNED WITH SENDING THE RIGHT POLITICAL MESSAGE TO THE ARAB WORLD. INDEED, FRENCH PREOCCUPATIONS WITH THE RISK OF INSTABILITY IN THE MAGHREB, IN PARTICULAR, AND THE POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES IN FRANCE AND FOR FRENCH CITIZENS THERE, ARE SUFFICIENTLY STRONG TO HAVE A CONSTANT EFFECT ON THE TACTICAL HANDLING OF FRENCH POLICY, E.G. IN THE UN.

FERGUSSON

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10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

12 February 1991

BURDENSARING: KUWAITI CONTRIBUTION

Rome telegram no. 96 contained the text of a draft message from the Prime Minister to the Amir of Kuwait thanking him for Kuwait's contribution to our military costs in the Gulf. I am sure the Prime Minister would be content for this to issue.

(C. D. POWELL)

Simon Gass, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

CONFIDENTIAL

12 February 1991

Dear Charles,

Prime Minister's Telephone Call with UN Secretary-General

The Prime Minister offered to President Bush to telephone the UN Secretary-General before the Security Council meets in formal session on 13 February.

The Secretary-General is under pressure. He told the Security Council on 8 February that he had watched the developments of the previous 23 days with "anguish and regret". He was saddened by the failure of diplomatic efforts, including his own. The Prime Minister might reassure him of our support and appreciation of his efforts to avert hostilities, including his last minute appeal to Saddam Hussein on 15 January, and his firm and measured reiteration of that appeal in his letter of 30 January to the Iraqi Foreign Minister (copy enclosed). The Prime Minister could say that Tariq Aziz's letters to the Secretary-General (of 24 January and 1 February), accusing the Secretary-General of sharing responsibility for "the heinous crimes committed against the noble people of Iraq", are a disgrace.

The Secretary-General is likely to express his concern about mounting civilian casualties in Iraq. The Prime Minister could say that:

- we are taking great care to direct military operations exclusively at military objectives, using precision weapons wherever possible, particularly in areas where there may be civilians near the target;
- all targets chosen are those which pose a threat to coalition forces, or support Iraq's forces in their illegal occupation of Kuwait;
- our pilots are following their clear instructions to minimise civilian casualties and to avoid damage to sites of religious and cultural significance.

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These points have been set out in the reports which the United Kingdom has submitted so far to the Security Council on actions taken pursuant to SCR 678. (I enclose a copy of FCO telno 107 to UKMis New York).

The formal meeting of the Security Council expected on 13 February is to be preceded by informal consultations to decide on whether the formal meeting should be private or public. The Prime Minister could say:

- our objectives are the implementation of UNSC Resolutions. There is no question of widening them to include the destruction of Iraq or the downfall of Saddam Hussain.

- It is vital that the Security Council debate should not be used to blur the clear message set out in the Council's resolutions, by airing vague ideas about a ceasefire, a pause in hostilities etc. No suggestion that any peace initiative has a chance of success.

- King Fahd told the Foreign Secretary on 10 February that as someone who had been Saddam Hussain's friend from 1965 to August 1990, he was sure that talk by the international community of a ceasefire in the absence of Iraqi withdrawal would only encourage Saddam Hussain to persist with the conflict.

- our preference is for a closed meeting, at which the Council can ask the proponents of a ceasefire for evidence of Iraqi intentions to comply with the Council's resolutions. In the absence of such evidence, we see no purpose in considering the idea of a ceasefire. If necessary, the Prime Minister could recall that there are precedents for the Council discussing substantive political issues in private rather than open session. These are the Middle East in 1973, Cyprus in 1974, and Western Sahara in 1975.

/I am

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/ I am enclosing a copy of the Secretary-General's statement to the Security Council on 14 January following his abortive visit to Baghdad.

Yours ever,
S. L. Gass
(S. L. Gass)
Private Secretary

Sir Charles Powell
10 Downing Street



THE SECRETARY GENERAL

30 January 1991

Mr. Minister,

I have read your letter of 24 January with regret and cannot but reject its connotations.

When we met in Amman on 31 August 1990 and in Baghdad on 12 January 1991, and again when I met President Saddam Hussein on 13 January 1991, I stated that our efforts to avert the unfolding tragedy would fail unless Iraq could signify its readiness to comply with the relevant resolutions of the Security Council, beginning with resolution 660. On each occasion, after returning to New York, I reported the views of your Government to the Security Council.


As you know, on 15 January 1991, I appealed again to President Saddam Hussein to indicate his readiness to proceed in the manner I had suggested to him, so that the course of events could be turned away from catastrophe and towards a new era of justice and harmony, based on the principles of the United Nations Charter. I pledged, in such circumstances, to work with him, and with all others concerned, to bring just and lasting peace to the Middle East as a whole.

His Excellency
Mr. Tariq Aziz
Deputy Prime Minister and
Minister for Foreign Affairs of the
Republic of Iraq
Baghdad

Today, I reiterate my 15 January appeal, as I did on 22 January 1991, when I also expressed my profound grief and anxiety at the increasing severity of the war, the widening of the area of hostilities and my fear that the toll in death and destruction would escalate unless my appeal received a positive response. I continue to believe that such a response is needed in order to find a peaceful solution to this grave and tragic conflict and to save human lives. In the meantime, in order to alleviate the present suffering which is causing me deep anguish, I have already asked the main humanitarian agencies of the United Nations system to coordinate their efforts with a view to ensuring that help is provided to those afflicted by the conflict as soon as circumstances permit.

You will recall, Mr. Minister, that when speaking in the formal meeting of the Security Council after the adoption of resolution 678, I stressed that, in requiring compliance with the resolutions of the Council, the United Nations sought not surrender but the most honourable way of resolving a crisis in a manner that respected all legitimate interests and was conducive to the wider peace and the rule of law. I also underlined that the actions of the United Nations in the present crisis must be perceived as part of the larger endeavour of the Organization to establish peace through justice, whenever the one was imperilled and the other denied.

That remains my view today and I would therefore urge your Government to make a serious effort to put this tragic situation on the road to a peaceful solution.



Javier Pérez de Cuéllar

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Javier Pérez de Cuéllar

Javier Pérez de Cuéllar

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SIC

YOUR TELNO 256: FURTHER REPORT UNDER SCR 678

1. PLEASE DRAW ON THE FOLLOWING FOR THE NEXT BRIEFING. IN PRACTICE, WE HAVE VERY LITTLE TO ADD TO THE COMPREHENSIVE US LETTERS AND BRIEFING WHICH COVERS MOST OF THE COALITION'S ACTIVITIES IN THEATRE. WE ARE CONTENT TO LET THE AMERICANS TAKE THE LEAD.

2. BEGINS

FURTHER TO MY LETTER OF 28 JANUARY, I HAVE THE HONOUR TO COMMUNICATE TO YOU A FURTHER REPORT ON OPERATIONS IN THE GULF PURSUANT TO OPERATIVE PARAS 2 AND 3 OF RESOLUTION 678.

AS ALREADY INUICATED IN THE LETTER FROM US AMBASSAUOR PICKERING OF 9 FEBRUARY, AIR ACTION HAS CONTINUED AGAINST MILITARY TARGETS. INITIALLY, BRITISH FORCES' AIR OPERATIONS CONCENTRATED ON ATTACKS ON AIRFIELDS AND ON ELEMENTS OF THE IRAQI AIR DEFENCE SYSTEM. IN THE SECOND PHASE, ATTACKS WERE ON BRIDGES VITAL TO THE MILITARY SUPPLY EFFORT TO AND FROM KUWAIT. IN THE THIRD PHASE, THE ROYAL AIR FORCE HAS ATTACKED SURFACE TO AIR MISSILE SITES, ARTILLERY POSITIONS, AMMUNITION STORAGE AND SILKWORM SURFACE TO SURFACE MISSILE SITES.

ATTACKS HAVE BEEN DIRECTED EXCLUSIVELY AT MILITARY OBJECTIVES, USING PRECISION WEAPONS WHEREVER POSSIBLE, PARTICULARLY IN AREAS WHERE THERE MAY BE CIVILIANS NEAR THE TARGETS. ALL TARGETS ARE CAREFULLY SELECTED BECAUSE THEY POSE A THREAT TO COALITION FORCES OR BECAUSE THEY SUPPORT IRAQ'S ILLEGAL OCCUPATION OF KUWAIT. PILOTS HAVE CLEAR INSTRUCTIONS TO MINIMISE CIVILIAN CASUALTIES AND TO AVOID DAMAGE TO SITES OF RELIGIOUS AND CULTURAL SIGNIFICANCE. INDEED, ON A NUMBER OF OCCASIONS, ATTACKS

HAVE NOT BEEN PRESSED HOME BECAUSE PILOTS WERE NOT COMPLETELY SATISFIED THEY COULD MEET THESE CONDITIONS. LATEST REPORTS SUGGEST THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ IS TRANSFERRING MILITARY HEADQUARTERS INTO BUILDINGS SUCH AS SCHOOLS, PRECISELY TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF ALLIED CARE AND CONCERN TO AVOID ATTACKING AREAS HOUSING CIVILIANS.

INDEPENDENT REPORTS FROM JOURNALISTS COMING FROM IRAQ CONFIRM THAT ALLIED ATTACKS IN GENERAL HAVE BEEN REMARKABLY ACCURATE AND HAVE ALSO CONFIRMED THAT IRAQI PROPAGANDA IS PRESENTING MILITARY CASUALTIES AS CIVILIAN. IN THE CASE OF THE ATTACK ON THE AN NASIRIYAH BRIDGE ON 8 FEBRUARY, BAGHDAD RADIO CLAIMED 47 CIVILIAN CASUALTIES. A WESTERN JOURNALIST WHO WAS AN EYE WITNESS REPORTED THAT THE BULK OF THE CASUALTIES WERE LARGELY MILITARY.

THE APPROACH OF THE ALLIES IS IN CONTRAST TO THAT ADOPTED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ NOT ONLY AS REGARDS INDISCRIMINATE MISSILE ATTACKS DIRECTED AT CIVILIANS, BUT IN USING ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE AS A FURTHER TERROR WEAPON BY DELIBERATELY RELEASING OIL INTO THE GULF. THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAS CONTRIBUTED TO COPING WITH THE EFFECTS AND HELPING TO PREVENT AN ENVIRONMENTAL DISASTER. WE HAVE AIRLIFTED NINETY TONNES OF POLLUTION CONTROL EQUIPMENT TO SAUDI ARABIA AND SENT OIL POLLUTION EXPERTS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORT TO HELP WITH EXPERT ADVICE. THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT RESEARCH COUNCIL HAS PRODUCED AN URGENT REPORT ON WILDLIFE BIOLOGICAL IMPACT WHICH HAS BEEN MADE AVAILABLE TO THE SAUDI ARABIAN AUTHORITIES. IN ADDITION, THE ROYAL SOCIETY FOR THE PROTECTION OF ANIMALS, WHICH HAS UNIQUE EXPERIENCE IN COPING WITH THE IMPACT OF OIL ON WILDLIFE, HAS SENT A THREE MAN TEAM TO INSTRUCT SAUDI ARABIAN VOLUNTEERS IN THE TECHNIQUES OF CLEANING AND RESCUING OIL-CONTAMINATED BIRDS.

MOREOVER, THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAS TAKEN UP AN OFFER FROM THE LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT OF KUWAIT TO PROVIDE VOLUNTEER CIVILIANS TO SERVE IN THE GULF IN SUPPORT OF BRITISH FORCES. UP TO 70 PERSONNEL ARE TO BE EMPLOYED AS INTERPRETERS AND LIAISON OFFICERS IN HOSPITALS AND IN PRISONER OF WAR CAMPS. THE DEPLOYED PERSONNEL WILL HAVE THE STATUS OF HONORARY OFFICERS IN THE KUWAITI ARMY, UNDER THE OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF THE COMMANDER BRITISH FORCES-MIDDLE EAST. THE FIRST GROUP OF KUWAITI PERSONNEL DEPLOYED TO THE GULF ON 7 FEBRUARY.

THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAS NOTIFIED THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS OF 10 MISSING BRITISH AIRMEN BELIEVED

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TO BE PRISONERS OF WAR IN IRAQI HANDS. AS YET, NO NOTIFICATION AS TO THEIR CAPTURE AND WHEREABOUTS HAS BEEN RECEIVED BY THE ICRC. AS STATED IN MY LETTER OF 21 JANUARY, THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT IS COMPLYING SCRUPULOUSLY WITH ITS OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS AND HAS GIVEN THE ICRC FULL AND IMMEDIATE ACCESS TO IRAQI POWS AND CIVILIAN DETAINEES BOTH IN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND IN THE GULF THEATRE. WE LOOK TO SEE IRAQ ACT SIMILARLY IN KEEPING WITH ITS INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN OBLIGATIONS.

WE NOTE STATEMENTS MADE BY THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT AS REGARDS THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH ICRC ACCESS WOULD BE GRANTED TO ALLIED POWS. MY AUTHORITIES REJECT AS ILLEGITIMATE IRAQI ATTEMPTS TO CREATE EXTRANEUS LINKAGES AS REGARDS IRAQ'S COMPLIANCE WITH ITS LEGAL OBLIGATIONS.
ENDS.

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MIPT: IRAQ/KUWAIT: SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REPORT

SUMMARY

1. SUMMARY OF SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REPORT TO MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

DETAIL

2. AFTER A BRIEF REFERENCE TO HIS MEETINGS WITH A NUMBER OF LEADERS EN ROUTE TO IRAQ, THE SECRETARY-GENERAL SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN RECEIVED FOR TWO AND A HALF HOURS BY SADDAM HUSSEIN ON 13 JANUARY. HE HAD URGED HIM TO COMPLY FULLY WITH SCR 660 AND SUBSEQUENT SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS. PROGRESS IN THIS DIRECTION WOULD FACILITATE MEASURES WITH RESPECT TO STABILITY AND SECURITY IN THE REGION. PEREZ DE CUELLAR HAD TOUCHED UPON POSSIBLE STEPS THAT COULD BE TAKEN IN THE POST WITHDRAWAL PHASE, EG OVER PEACEKEEPING, ASSURANCES OF NON-ATTACK AND SANCTIONS. HE HAD ALSO REFERRED TO POSSIBLE REGIONAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS. PEREZ DE CUELLAR HAD MENTIONED THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT OF 20 DECEMBER ON THE BORDER/MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS WHICH IMPLIED THAT A MAJOR EFFORT COULD SOON BE MADE.

3. SADDAM HUSSEIN HAD REPLIED THAT HE DID NOT WISH TO CONCEAL HIS AMBIVALENCE ABOUT THE MEETING. HE FEARED THAT IF THE RESULTS WERE INADEQUATE, THE MEETING COULD BE USED BY THOSE WHO WISHED TO WAGE WAR AGAINST IRAQ. IT WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE TO FIND READY SOLUTIONS TO SUCH A COMPLICATED SITUATION. WHEREAS SCR 598 ON IRAN/IRAQ HAD SET OUT A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH, THE COUNCIL HAD NOT ADOPTED A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH IN DEALING WITH IRAQ/KUWAIT. SADDAM HUSSEIN HAD ALLEGED THAT PRIOR TO 2 AUGUST KUWAIT HAD BECOME "A BASE FOR CONSPIRACY" AGAINST IRAQ. ALTHOUGH IRAQ HAS NEVER ACCEPTED SCR 660, IT HAD AGREED IN THE EARLY DAYS OF THE CRISIS TO ATTEND A MINI-SUMMIT IN JEDDA AND IT HAD BEGUN TO WITHDRAW ITS TROOPS FROM

KUWAIT. BUT THESE EFFORTS AT ACHIEVING AN ARAB SOLUTION HAD BEEN UNDERMINED BY THE INTRODUCTION OF FOREIGN FORCES INTO THE REGION. ISRAEL HAD NEVER BEEN SUBJECTED TO SANCTIONS OR OUTSIDE MILITARY INTERVENTION AS A MEANS OF ENSURING COMPLIANCE OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS. THIS INDICATED A DOUBLE STANDARD.

4. ON THE QUESTION OF WITHDRAWAL, SADDAM HUSSEIN HAD STATED THAT THE IRAQI PEOPLE REGARDED KUWAIT AS THE 19TH PROVINCE OF IRAQ AND WOULD NOT EVEN WHISPER THE WORD WITHDRAWAL FOR FEAR OF GIVING A PSYCHOLOGICAL ADVANTAGE TO IRAQ'S ADVERSARIES. AT THE SAME TIME, IRAQ WAS PREPARED TO DISCUSS A 'PACKAGE DEAL' BECAUSE IN SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT EACH PARTY KNEW WHAT IT WOULD HAVE TO GIVE AND WHAT IT WAS TO RECEIVE. THE IRAQI PEOPLE WERE 'READY TO SACRIFICE FOR THE CAUSE OF PEACE' IF OTHERS WOULD DO THE SAME.

5. ON TWO SEPARATE OCCASIONS SADDAM HUSSEIN HAD CALLED ON PEREZ DE CUELLAR TO USE HIS GOOD OFFICES, SAYING THAT IF THE OTHER PARTIES PERMITTED HIM TO PLAY A ROLE IN SEARCH OF A SOLUTION, IRAQ WOULD CO-OPERATE WITH HIM. WHEN THE SECRETARY-GENERAL HAD COMMENTED THAT THIS IDEA WOULD BE A NON-STARTER IF THE POSITION OF IRAQ WAS IRREVERSIBLE ON THE SUBJECT OF WITHDRAWAL FROM KUWAIT, SADDAM HUSSEIN HAD SAID THAT WAS NOT WHAT HE MEANT. HE HAD REITERATED THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL SHOULD TRY TO ENGAGE THE VIEWS OF THE PARTIES, INCLUDING IRAQ, IN ORDER TO MAKE PROPOSALS THAT COULD LEAD TO A SOLUTION. PEREZ DE CUELLAR HAD EXPLAINED THAT WHILE HE COULD REFLECT THIS SUGGESTION IN HIS REPORT TO THE COUNCIL, ANY EFFORT HE MADE WOULD NEED TO BE FURTHERANCE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS.

6. PEREZ DE CUELLAR CONCLUDED THAT THE SITUATION WAS OMINOUS. AT THIS SOLEMN HOUR COUNCIL MEMBERS MUST CONSIDER WHETHER THERE WERE ANY DIPLOMATIC MEASURES THEY COULD STILL TAKE TO SECURE FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF ITS RESOLUTIONS BY PEACEFUL MEANS.

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H. J. S. 17.

Statement by the Secretary-General to the Security Council
on 14 January 1991

UNP 640/22

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1. You will recall that on Thursday, 10 January, I informed you, Mr. President, that I had decided to accept a standing invitation from the Government of Iraq to visit Baghdad in order to have discussions with the authorities, in particular with President Saddam Hussein. I took this decision following the outcome of the meetings that were held in Geneva on 9 January between US Secretary of State James Baker and Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz, bearing in mind the provisions of resolution 678. Prior to my departure, I received messages of strong support from a great number of world leaders, including those of many Members of the Security Council. All of them expressed the profound hope, that a way be found to obtain the implementation of the relevant Security Council resolutions by peaceful means.

- 2 -

2. En route to Baghdad,
I made brief stops in Paris, Geneva and Amman.
In Paris, I met with President Mitterrand,
and in Geneva, I had the opportunity
to review the situation
with the Foreign Ministers of the European Community.
While there, I also met with Foreign Minister Loncar of Yugoslavia,
in his capacity as Chairman of the Movement of Non-Aligned States.
In Amman, I met with King Hussein, who was deeply concerned
about the impasse and the disastrous consequences
for Jordan and the region
if hostilities erupted.
While in Amman, I also met with Foreign Minister Nastase of Romania,
who was travelling in the area.

- 3 -

3. I travelled to Baghdad in the afternoon of 12 January where, upon arrival, I had a three-hour meeting with Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz.

On 13 January, prior to my meeting with the Iraqi President, I met with the Chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization, Mr. Yasser Arafat, at his request.

It should be noted in this connection that, like King Hussein, Mr. Arafat was extremely disturbed by the prospects of a military confrontation, the consequences of which would be devastating for the region, not least for the Palestinians.

4. In the evening of 13 January, I was received by President Saddam Hussein for some two-and-a-half hours.

At the outset of our meeting, I underlined to him that I had come to Baghdad at my own initiative, but with the widest possible support

from the membership of the United Nations.

I added that, as Secretary-General of the United Nations, I had responsibilities under the Charter to strive for peace and, accordingly, I urged him to comply fully with the relevant resolutions of the Security Council, starting with resolution 660.

- 4 -

I pointed out that I intended to report to the Council upon my return to New York and that, if I were to do so without serious progress having been made, I was duty-bound to reflect this in my report. In emphasizing the importance of the implementation of the resolutions, I stated that progress in this direction would facilitate the undertaking of measures with respect to stability and security in the region. I touched upon possible steps that could be taken in the post-withdrawal phase (such as those relating to peace-keeping, assurances of non-attack and the present sanctions). I also referred to possible regional security arrangements. In connection with the broader Middle East peace process, I referred to the resolutions already adopted by the General Assembly, my own efforts, and the Presidential Statement of the Security Council of 20 December 1990 which clearly implied that a major effort could soon be made.

- 5 -

5. In his opening comments, President Saddam Hussain said that he did not wish to conceal from me his ambivalence about our meeting. On the one hand, he had wanted me to come to Baghdad to discuss the present crisis because I had, through contacts developed during the Iran-Iraq conflict, dealt with his country and knew its "traits". On the other hand, he expressed concern that, if our meeting were to produce insufficient results, it could be used by those who wished to wage war against Iraq. Underlining a theme that had been emphasized during my meeting the previous evening with Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz, the President said that it would not be possible, in a single meeting, to find "ready solutions to such a complicated situation". He noted that whereas resolution 598, which Iraq had accepted, set out a comprehensive approach to the issues addressed therein, the Security Council had not, regrettably, adopted a comprehensive approach in dealing with the present crisis.

- 6 -

6. The President dwelt at length on Iraq's claim to Kuwait, and underlined that in the period prior to 2 August 1990, it had become "a base for conspiracy" against Iraq. He pointed out that although Iraq had never accepted resolution 660, it had agreed, in the early days of the crisis, to attend a mini-summit in Jeddah and had begun to withdraw its troops from Kuwait. But those efforts, which he stated were aimed at achieving "an Arab solution", were undermined by the introduction of foreign forces into the region, which heightened the threat posed to Iraq. Criticizing what he called "precipitous" actions by the Security Council, he stated that Iraq had been tried in absentia and his Foreign Minister had been denied the facilities he needed to be able to present his case. Further, he stated that on earlier occasions when the Council has called for the withdrawal of troops, this had been accompanied by a call for negotiations between the parties; withdrawal had not been set as a precondition for such negotiations. Moreover, he cited examples of Israeli occupation and annexation, noting that Israel had never been subjected to sanctions or outside military intervention as a means of ensuring compliance



- 7 -

with Security Council resolutions. This he stated, was indicative of a double standard that persisted until the present.

It was unfortunate, he said, that his initiatives of 12 and 19 August, which had advocated the application of a single standard and a set of principles in addressing comprehensively the issues of the region, had never been seriously considered.

7. On the question of withdrawal, the President stated that the Iraqi people today regarded Kuwait as Iraq's "19th province", and "would not even whisper the word withdrawal", as war was looming and such an utterance would give a psychological advantage to Iraq's adversaries.

At the same time, Iraq was prepared for an in-depth dialogue.

In this connection, I should add that in my meeting with the Foreign Minister the previous evening,

Mr. Tariq Aziz repeatedly stressed Iraq's desire for dialogue with the United States, the European Community and the Arab states, in particular, Saudi Arabia. The President stated that his Government was prepared to discuss a "package deal" because, in such an arrangement, each party knew exactly what it would have to give and what it would receive.

The Iraqi people were, he said, "ready to sacrifice for the cause of peace" if others would do the same.

- 8 -

8. On two separate occasions during our meeting, the President called on me to use my good offices, saying that if the other parties were to permit me to play a role in search of a solution, Iraq would facilitate my task and cooperate with me. In response to my comment that this idea would be a non-starter if the position of Iraq was irreversible on the subject of withdrawal from Kuwait, the President reacted by saying that that was not what he meant. He reiterated that I should try to engage the views of the parties, including Iraq, in order to make proposals that could lead to a solution. I explained to the President that, while I would reflect this suggestion in my report to the Security Council, I felt that any effort of mine would naturally need to be in furtherance of the relevant resolutions of the Security Council.

- 9 -

9. Mr. President,

From the foregoing, it must sadly be concluded that a most ominous situation exists at present.

Despite the near universal yearning for peace and the intense efforts of many, including myself, to secure compliance by Iraq, the relevant resolutions of the Security Council remain unimplemented.

At this solemn hour, with 15 January upon us, members of the Council must once again consider whether there are any diplomatic measures that can still be taken by the Organization, or by its members individually or collectively, to secure full implementation of the Council's resolutions by peaceful means. All of us are aware of the extreme gravity of the decisions to be made, for no one and no nation can - except with a heavy heart - resort to the other "necessary means" implied by Resolution 678, knowing in advance that tragic and unpredictable consequences can follow.

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12 February 1991

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Dear Charles,

GULF REPORT

I attach a copy of the midday report prepared for MOD Ministers on operations in the Gulf.

Yours ever

(MISS J R BINSTead)
Private Secretary

Sir C Powell KCMG
No 10 Downing Street

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THE GULF CONFLICT

BRIEFING FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE - SITREP No. 73

SITUATION AS AT 1300Z, 12 FEBRUARY 1991

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SEC(O)(C) MIDDAY BRIEF, 12 FEBRUARY 1991

Summary

No significant developments since 0600Z.

General Situation

- Allied bombing campaign continues. No indications of Iraqi preparations for any probing attacks in strength. It is possible that preparations are being made to use chemical weapons in anticipation of an Allied ground offensive.
- DIS assess that, although Iraq retains the ability to fire SRBMs, it does seem from those fired in the last 24 hours that it might not be able, or willing, to risk more than one launcher at a time.

Political

- Soviet envoy Primakov has arrived in Baghdad for talks with Saddam Hussein.
- Iranian foreign Minister Velayati says that Iran could not remain neutral if Israel attacks Iraq. Says that there are only 22 Iraqi aircraft in Iran, not 147.
- Prince Saud has said that some of the early grumblings about the the presence of foreign troops in Saudi Arabia had disappeared.
- The Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister has told the Jordanian Foreign Minister that what Jordan does over peace initiatives is up to the Jordanians. The Iraqis do not want to be directly involved.
- Austrian government reluctant to allow overflights of British aircraft carrying weapons to Gulf.

UK Operations

Air Operations

- 6 Tornado GR1s from Tabuk, 2 with TIALD and 4 with LGB, attacked H3 North West airfield. All aircraft recovered safely.
- 7 Tornado GR1s from Dhahran attacked the Latifiyua liquid propulsion plant (1) this morning; 7 direct hits claimed.
- 6 Tornado GR1s (2 with TIALD) from Tabuk attacked Ruwayshid airfield (2) with LGBs. A number of direct hits achieved; one aircraft failed to drop due to laser designation and

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technical problems. 7 Tornado GR1s from Tabuk later attacked radar at the airfield; all aircraft report hits, though some bombs seen to airburst high.

- 8 Jaguars from Muharraq attacked a multiple rocket launcher park in SE Kuwait (3) this morning; 10 hits, 6 on target and 4 in vicinity of nearby AAA site.
- 4 Tornado GR1s and 2 Buccaneers from Muharraq attacked Wadi Al Khirr airfield (4) with LGBs; 5 hardened aircraft shelters hit, of which 4 severely damaged.
- 3 Tornado GR1As were tasked with recce missions. 2 aircraft aborted with technical failures. 3rd aircraft carried out successful linesearch.
- Further Tornado GR1A linesearch mission last night obtained good imagery of Iraq, identifying inter alia AFVs, SAM and AAA positions and minefields.
- RAF combat sorties as at 120900Z:

	since 120100Z	total
Tornado GR1	13	942
Tornado GR1A	1	70
Jaguar	8	367
Tornado F3	8	463
Buccaneer	2	56
Nimrod	0	53
AAR (Victor, VC10K, Tristar)	<u>1</u>	<u>414</u>
	33	2365

Non-combat sorties (at 120100Z):	<u>1384</u>
	3749

Navy Operations

- The British contingent of the MCMV group are in Bahrain for 4 days leave and maintenance. They have been brought to 1 hour notice to sail from this morning.

Army Operations

- One officer was injured by shrapnel when an M548 blew up. Incident being investigated.

Allied Operations

- Battleship USS MISSOURI is rejoining the gun line today (in addition to USS WISCONSIN).

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- The USS AMERICA and her Group has left the Red Sea and is en route to the Gulf. ETA at the Straits of Hormuz is 36 hours.
- On the night of 10/11 Feb 2.5 million leaflets were dropped in the KTO in support of the Psy Ops campaign.

Iraqi activity

- CENTCOM reports that there are indications of a reduction, from 30 to 20 days, of supplies in the KTO.
- Iraq launched second SCUD attack of the night on Israel. Single missile fell in central Israel causing up to 6 injuries.
- The single SCUD launched at Riyadh was intercepted by PATRIOT, with one casualty from falling debris.
- 801 Iraqi tanks and 679 APCs assessed by DIS to have been destroyed.

Logistics

- 1,900 1000lb bombs from RN for RAF use being loaded onto ship at Hull.


Media reports and coverage

- Media focus on SCUD attacks on Israel and Riyadh, and President Bush's remark that he is in "no hurry" to start a ground war.

Other issues

- A Mr Brian Craggs has been charged with the killing on board SIR GALAHAD.
- The Germans have flown out 30 tonnes of equipment for oil spill control valued at \$3.5m. The Japanese are providing 30 km of oil spill booms.

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THE GULF CONFLICT - BRIEFING FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

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talking to the Secretary-
General on 12 Feb.

TELEPHONE CALL WITH THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL

C.D.P. 13/2.

You are to speak to the UN Secretary-General at 2000. The call is at your initiative, following your talk with President Bush last night. The purpose is basically to calm down the Secretary-General, who is getting agitated by Iraqi's propaganda on civilian casualties and feels under increasing pressure from some of the non-aligned to promote a cease-fire. There is likely to be a meeting of the Security Council later this week: we have stalled for some time but cannot head it off indefinitely.

The points which you might make to him are these:

- we well understand the anguish which developments in the Gulf cause him in his role as the conscience of the United Nations and guardian of its values. But no one seriously doubts that responsibility for these events lies simply and solely with Iraq;
- the Secretary-General did everything possible to avert hostilities. It is disgraceful that the Iraqis should accuse him of sharing responsibility for crimes against Iraq;
- you can assure him that we are continuing to attack only military targets which pose a threat to coalition forces or help Iraq to sustain its occupation of Kuwait;
- our pilots are under clear instructions to minimise civilian casualties and to avoid damage to sites of religious and cultural importance;
- we believe they are successfully following these instructions and that civilian casualties have been relatively speaking light. You understand the President is making available some evidence to the Secretary-General which will substantiate this;
- even the Iraqis did not claim anything else until recently. One feels they have suddenly realised the opportunities for

making propaganda by claiming "thousands of casualties";

- our objectives remain simply and solely the implementation of the Security Council resolutions. There is no question of our widening them to include the destruction of Iraq or the down-fall of Saddam Hussain. There is no question of changing Iraq's borders;

- you understand the pressures for a further meeting of the UN Security Council. But that should not be used to blur the very clear message to which the Security Council has hitherto remained absolutely faithful - Saddam Hussain must withdraw from Iraq;

- we think a private meeting would be better than a public one. That will enable the Council to discover whether those who are calling for a cease-fire have any evidence at all that Iraq intends to comply with the Security Council's resolutions. There are plenty of precedents for the Security Council discussing important issues in private session;

- public airing of ideas about a cease-fire or a pause in hostilities only give the Iraqis a false impression that they can even now get away without implementing the Security Council's resolutions fully. Vague expressions of intent are simply not enough. Iraq must withdraw from Kuwait in order for hostilities to cease. It would be a tragic mistake to let them off the hook now;

- the Secretary General has acted with enormous dignity and consistency despite the pressure on him. We are not grateful and promise him every support in future.

C. D. P.

(C. D. POWELL)

12 February 1991

20-23¹

SECRET AND PERSONAL



10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

12 February 1991

IRAQ: INTELLIGENCE ON OPERATIONS

Thank you for your letter of 8 February.

I am afraid that the enclosure is not what the Prime Minister had in mind: it is too detailed; it confines itself largely to British operations and does not cover the campaign as a whole; and it does not give him an idea of how General de la Billière or his most senior colleagues actually see the fighting. That is what the Prime Minister hoped to get in order to supplement the regular JIC assessments.

You speak of 'The View from Riyadh'. This is most useful: it deals with important developments and prospects; and it might form the basis of a solution to our problem. But it would be helpful if it could come more regularly, rather than every few days: and direct, rather than at second hand. You say it would be unreasonable to ask General Schwarzkopf to do this more than once a day. Once a day would suffice at present, though we may need more if the situation shows signs of warming up; and we would not in fact be seeking a message from General Schwarzkopf himself, merely from our own commander in the field, who would presumably have spoken to Schwarzkopf or senior US commanders in the course of the day.

The Prime Minister would be grateful if a daily telegram along these lines could be sent by General de la Billière at the end of each day in the Gulf.

CHARLES POWELL

Simon Webb Esq
Ministry of Defence

SECRET AND PERSONAL

CONFIDENTIAL



KW
cf foreign/morel

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

12 February 1991

THE GULF: FRENCH VIEWS

Pierre Morel, President Mitterrand's new diplomatic adviser, came to see me this morning to talk about the Gulf. I think he was also intending to make some calls in the Foreign Office later. I will therefore report our conversation only briefly.

Morel said that he was going with Admiral Lanxade to the United States tomorrow to discuss the post-conflict situation in the Gulf. President Mitterrand had been very insistent that he should come to London first to compare notes. In that context, the President would be replying very soon now to the Prime Minister's recent message about contacts between the Elysée and Whitehall, accepting our proposals.

We then went through possible scenarios for how the conflict would end and how to win the peace. I spoke on the lines of the various papers we have discussed with the Americans (although not quite so frankly). I also mentioned the need to impose stiff terms for any ceasefire. French thinking as described by Morel appeared to be very similar on most of these points. They are exercised about what would happen if Iraqi forces left Kuwait but continued to pose a threat to its security. They favour the concept of a security zone of indeterminate size, although it was not clear whether they envisage allied forces actually trying to hold or police such a zone. They are clearly worried that the Americans are moving towards more ambitious objectives and might march on Baghdad. I said we had no reason to think this was the case.

The main difference, predictably enough, came on the subject of a grand international conference following the end of the conflict, to deal with the whole gamut of regional problems. Morel went through the reasons why the French believe that it will not be enough just to slip back into quiet diplomacy on the Arab/Israel situation. The United Nations had provided the legal authority for the present conflict and must be fully involved in resolving the consequences of it. It would not be enough for the United Nations Secretary General to have a personal, mediating role as in the case of the Iran/Iraq war. I took him through the reasons why we did not think an early international conference was likely to be a practical way to proceed, while acknowledging that there had to be a process

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CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

which would give moderate Arab governments grounds for faith that progress would be made. Like an expedition setting out to conquer Everest, we might chart some camps along the way. This led Morel to mention a proposal, which he said he had put to President Mitterrand, for a broad declaration of principles which would guide a post-war settlement. These might be general in nature, such as confirming existing borders, as well as embracing some of the CSCE principles. He was unclear in which forum such a declaration might be made, although thankfully did not appear to envisage the Twelve as the appropriate place. I imagine that we may hear more of this.

Two other points which are worth mentioning:

- Morel claimed the French were not opposed to a meeting of the Security Council this week being private, just rather sceptical as to whether that was possible.

- He was emphatic about the need to subject Israel to any constraints agreed on arms and NBC capabilities in the region. Without that, there was no prospect of making progress. But he had little idea how this could be achieved if the Israelis just dug in their heels (as would be the case). I said that we had to distinguish clearly between restrictions on Iraq as the country responsible for the present Gulf war, and wider and probably looser arrangements which might apply to the region as a whole.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence) and to Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

CHARLES POWELL

Richard Gozney Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL

TOP SECRETNOTE FOR THE RECORD**THE GULF**

The Prime Minister and the Defence Secretary had a brief talk this evening, immediately before the Defence Secretary's departure for Washington, about the timing of a land battle in the Gulf conflict.

The Prime Minister reported on his conversation earlier in the evening with President Bush about the mission by Secretary Cheney and General Colin Powell to Saudi Arabia. The Defence Secretary said that Air Chief Marshal Sir Patrick Hine had picked up some pointers from General Schwarzkopf about the recommendations which he had made to Cheney and Powell. He had apparently proposed that action on the ground should start in earnest around 20-22 February. It might be preceded by some probing attacks by the US Marines. These could start as early as the next few days. When the main attack came, it would start as a feint by French and Arab (?) forces towards Baghdad, to draw the Iraqis out of their positions. The main breach in Iraqi defences at the border would be made by the US VII Corps on the second day: and the British 1st Armoured division would move through the gap created. That meant that British forces would probably not be engaged until day 3 or 4. It was not clear whether the target of 50 per cent degradation of Iraqi forces would have been met by 20/22 February, although the American military were confident that they would have been sufficiently weakened to enable an attack to succeed. They estimated that a ground campaign would take two weeks to complete.

In discussion, the Prime Minister said that if the Americans confirmed their intentions, it would be right for the Defence Secretary to support them. There were dangers in undue delay, in particular one could not expect the ground forces to remain at the highest state of readiness indefinitely. It was not ideal that British forces would not be engaged until several days into the battle. There were also risks that a probing attack by the Marines would be met by a CW

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response which could slow it down or even defeat it, which might enable the Iraqis to claim a victory. But this was a matter of military judgment. We should offer broad support to the American plans, if they were as indicated.

C DP

C. D. POWELL

11 February 1991

TOP SECRET

~~SECRET~~
~~DDOIP~~

FM ROME
TO IMMEDIATE FOO
TELNO 98
OF 111332Z FEB
INFO IMMEDIATE RIYADH

FROM SECRETARY OF STATE/S PARTY
BURDENSARING; SAUDI ARABIA

1. THERE WAS A BACKGROUND TO KING FAHD'S ASSURANCE TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE THAT THE SAUDIS WOULD HELP US OUT FINANCIALLY.

2. THE SECRETARY OF STATE DECIDED TO CONSULT PRINCE SAUD (TO WHOM SIR A MUNTO HAD DELIVERED THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE TO KING FAHD) PRIVATELY ABOUT THE BEST TACTIC FOR HANDLING THE SUBJECT WITH THE KING. PRINCE SAUD EXPLAINED THAT THE SAUDIS WERE VERY STRETCHED AS THE BANKERS COULD TELL US (AS THEY HAVE). THEY WERE HAVING TO BORROW. THE BEST THEY COULD OFFER IN THE PRESENT DIFFICULT SITUATION WAS HELP IN EXTRACTING CONTRIBUTIONS FROM THE OTHER GULF STATES, IN PARTICULAR KUWAIT, QATAR AND THE UAE.

3. THE SECRETARY OF STATE COMMENTED THAT WE HAVE BEEN VERY RELUCTANT TO RAISE THE SUBJECT BUT HAD BEEN OBLIGED TO DO SO AS THE RESULT OF RAPIDLY ESCALATING COSTS AND THE LOUD RATTLING OF THE AMERICAN CANS. PRINCE SAUD UNDERSTOOD THE PRESSURE ON US, VOLUNTEERING THAT THE US 13.5 BILLION HAD NOT BEEN INTENDED EXCLUSIVELY FOR THE AMERICAN POCKET. THE SECRETARY OF STATE EXPLAINED THAT WE HAD FOUND OURSELVES IN A SIMILAR BIND OVER THE JAPANESE MONEY. WE HAD ALREADY CANVASSED CONTRIBUTIONS FROM THE GULF, WITH TWO APPROACHES AT SHEIKH ZAYED WHICH HAD NOT YET PRODUCED A FIGURE, A SMALL CONTRIBUTION FROM OMAN AND A LARGE ONE FROM KUWAIT (AMOUNT SPECIFIED). WE WERE NOT BARGAINING BUT WE REALLY DID NEED A DIRECT SAUDI CONTRIBUTION.

4. IN RESPONSE, PRINCE SAUD AGREED THAT IT WOULD BE RIGHT FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO RAISE THE ISSUE IN GENERAL TERMS WITH THE KING ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT BOTH SIDES WOULD NEED TO DISCUSS IT FURTHER. HOWEVER ON THE WAY INTO THE KING, PRINCE SAUD SAID HE HAD JUST SPOKEN TO THE KING, WHO WOULD AFTER ALL SAY SOMETHING POSITIVE ABOUT A DIRECT CONTRIBUTION. HE DID. THIS IS NOW BEING FOLLOWED UP.

5. FOLLOWING THE MEETING WITH THE KING, WE BRIEFED THAT THE SECRETARY OF STATE HAD HAD A USEFUL AND FRIENDLY TALK WITH KING FAHD AND HAD RECEIVED A HELPFUL ASSURANCE ON BURDENSARING WHICH WOULD BE FOLLOWED UP.

EGERTON

YYYY

FOO. PLEASE ADVANCE PS, PS/MR HOGG, FAIRWEATHER, GOULDEN, PS/CHIEF SECRETARY, PS/CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER, PS/DEFENCE SECRETARY AND PS/NO 10.

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

031066
MDADAN 7950

CONFIDENTIAL
FM ROME
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 96
OF 111200Z FEBRUARY 91

Content

See Amir
Agree this
message?
CD.

FOLLOWING FROM PS/FOREIGN SECRETARY TO PS/NO 10

BURDENSARING: KUWAITI CONTRIBUTION

1. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SUGGESTS THAT THE PRIME MINISTER MIGHT
LIKE TO SEND A MESSAGE TO THE AMIR OF KUWAIT ON THE FOLLOWING
LINES:

BEGINS

THANK YOU FOR YOUR KIND LETTER OF 31 JANUARY WITH ITS WARM MESSAGE
OF FRIENDSHIP AND SOLIDARITY.

DOUGLAS HURD HAS TOLD ME THAT YOU WERE GOOD ENOUGH TO SEE HIM IN
TAIF ON 9 FEBRUARY AND THAT YOU HAD AN EXCELLENT TALK ABOUT
PROGRESS IN OUR COMMON ENDEAVOUR OF LIBERATING YOUR COUNTRY. I WAS
ALSO TOLD IMMEDIATELY OF YOUR MOST GENEROUS RESPONSE TO OUR
SUGGESTION ABOUT HELP TOWARDS THE FINANCIAL BURDEN OF THE CONFLICT.
ON BEHALF OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE, I THANK YOU MOST
WARMLY. WHEN WE DECIDED TO HELP YOU RECUPERATE YOUR COUNTRY FROM
IRAQI AGGRESSION WE WERE DRIVEN BY THE PRINCIPLE AT STAKE.
CALCULATIONS ABOUT THE PRICE WERE SECONDARY. BUT THE COSTS ARE
CONSIDERABLE, AS YOU KNOW, AND KUWAIT'S GENEROUS CONTRIBUTION IS
GREATLY APPRECIATED.

I WAS GLAD TO HAVE FURTHER NEWS OF YOUR HIGHNESS AND OF HIS
HIGHNESS THE CROWN PRINCE. I AM GRATEFUL TO HIM FOR RECEIVING THE
DELEGATION OF BRITISH BUSINESSMEN. I SEND YOU BOTH MY VERY BEST
WISHES FOR THE TESTING PERIOD OF THE NEXT FEW WEEKS. I AM CONFIDENT
THAT IT WILL NOT BE LONG BEFORE LEGITIMACY IS RESTORED TO KUWAIT.
ENDS

EGERTON

YYYY

ADVANCE

6

PS
PS/NO 10.
PS/MR HOGG

MR FAIRWEATHER
MR GORE-BOOTH
HD/EMERGENCY UNIT (PASSED)

NNNN

SUBJECT CC MASTER

me hi
ak

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

11 February 1991

From the Private Secretary

The Prime Minister had a brief word with the Defence Secretary tonight about what should happen following the completion of the conflict in the Gulf. The principal points which I retain are:

- The Prime Minister is determined to honour the pledge to bring home our forces in the Gulf quickly. If we have to retain some forces there, they should be fresh units sent out for the purpose: those engaged in the battle should return very rapidly indeed.
- As soon as Iraq is out of Kuwait and the conflict over, Defence Ministers should visit all the main bases from which units in the Gulf have come to thank the wives, families and support staff. This would cover both bases in the United Kingdom and Germany. Ministers from the FCO should join them if there are not enough Defence Ministers to go round.
- In implementing the "options for change" exercise we must take account of lessons learned from the Gulf conflict, although the exercise as such should not be held up. We should continue to plan on implementation of the reductions.
- Early thought should be given to various means to mark the outcome of the conflict. One obvious one would be a special medal for those taking part. There might be a parade and a thanksgiving service, on the model of what happened at the end of the Falklands Campaign. And recommendations should come forward in due course for suitable recognition for individuals who distinguished themselves.

The Defence Secretary undertook to follow up these points and discuss them further with the Prime Minister.

I am copying this letter to Richard Gozney (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and to Sir Robin Butler.

C. D. POWELL

Simon Webb, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence.

CONFIDENTIAL

031005
MDHIAN 3230

CONFIDENTIAL
FM ROME
TO DESKBY 111300Z WASHINGTON
TELNO MISC 22
OF 111104Z FEBRUARY 91
INFO IMMEDIATE FCO, CAIRO, RIYADH, DAMASCUS, TEL AVIV

FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY
MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO MR BAKER

1. PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO MR BAKER:

BEGINS

MANY THANKS FOR YOUR MESSAGE OF 9 FEBRUARY ABOUT OUR OFFICIAL TALKS WITH BOB KIMMITT AND JOHN KELLY ON THE WAY AHEAD. I AM GLAD THE EXERCISE WAS WORTHWHILE. YOUR MESSAGE REACHED ME IN RIYADH AT THE END OF TWO DAYS WITH THE EGYPTIANS (ABDUL MEGUID AND MUBARAK), THE KUWAITIS AT TAIF, THE SAUDIS (PRINCE SAUD AND KING FAHD) AND THE GCC (BISHARA). BEFORE LEAVING LONDON I HAD SEEN THE SYRIAN FOREIGN MINISTER, SHARA'A. I THOUGHT I WOULD PASS ON ONE OR TWO IMPRESSIONS.

I FOUND VIRTUALLY NO PRESSURE FOR AN ACCELERATED START TO THE LAND BATTLE. MUBARAK AND KING FAHD WERE ESPECIALLY FIRM ON THE NEED TO ALLOW THE AERIAL BOMBARDMENT AS MUCH TIME AS NECESSARY TO DEMORALISE AND DESTROY THE IRAQI LAND FORCES. ABDUL MEGUID WAS A LONE VOICE FOR EXPRESSING SOME CONCERN AT THE EFFECT ON ARAB OPINION OF REMORSELESS BOMBING, PROBABLY REFLECTING THE VIEW OF EGYPTIAN INTELLECTUALS.

I WAS ENCOURAGED BY THE FIRST SIGNS OF SERIOUS THINKING ABOUT FUTURE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS IN THE REGION ITSELF. THE MAIN RUNNER IS A SECURITY PACT AMONGST SYRIA, SAUDI ARABIA, EGYPT AND THE OTHER GULF STATES. THE FIRST THREE, WHO ARE THE PRINCIPAL MOVERS, SEEM TO KEEN TO GET THE PROJECT UNDERWAY AND ALL MEET ON 14 FEBRUARY IN CAIRO AS YOU PROBABLY KNOW. MOROCCO MAY OR MAY NOT ATTEND. SULTAN QABOOS' GCC GROUP IS WORKING MORE SLOWLY. THE SMALLER GULF STATES ARE HESITANT ABOUT EGYPTIAN AND SYRIAN INVOLVEMENT BUT AT THE END OF THE DAY THE SAUDIS WILL PROBABLY TWIST THEIR ARMS. THERE IS MUCH SUSPICION OF IRANIAN INTENTIONS, ESPECIALLY AFTER IRAQI WITHDRAWAL.

ON THE PALESTINIANS, BOTH THE EGYPTIANS AND THE SAUDIS URGE US NOT

PAGE 1
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TO WRITE THE PLO OUT OF THE SCRIPT. THEY ACCEPT THAT ARAFAT IS DISCREDITED BUT BELIEVE THAT IF A SERIOUS EFFORT IS MADE TO LOOK AGAIN AT THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE, CREDIBLE REPRESENTATION WILL BE FOUND. THEY TAKE THE LINE THAT WHILE THERE IS NO PEACE PROCESS IN MOTION, THEIR INDIVIDUALS AND GROUPS NATURALLY RATTLE AROUND IN THE VACUUM, BUT IF THERE WERE REAL WORK TO BE DONE THE PALESTINIAN VOICE WOULD NOT GO BY DEFAULT. THEY WERE ALL CLEAR THAT THERE WAS NO PROSPECT OF THE ISRAELIS REACHING SEPARATE AGREEMENTS WITH HER NEIGHBOURS WITHOUT INVOLVING THE PALESTINIANS. EVEN SYRIA COULD NOT AFFORD TO CUT A SEPARATE DEAL.

ON TWO POINTS WHICH YOU RAISED:

- PRINCE SAUD (AND HIS BROTHER PRINCE TURKI) WERE ADMIRABLY ROBUST ABOUT OUR NEED TO HAVE CONFIDENCE THAT WE WOULD HAVE OUR PRISONERS OF WAR BACK VERY QUICKLY FOLLOWING A CEASE-FIRE AND AGREED THAT THIS SHOULD BE ONE OF THE CONDITIONS FOR A CEASE-FIRE:
- AS FOR THE UN, PRINCE SAUD AND BISHARA WERE GROPING FOR A HARD-NOSED ROLE FOR THE UN TO HELP THE TRANSITION FROM THE PRESENCE OF WESTERN TROOPS OF THE COALITION TO THE LONG-TERM PRESENCE OF ARAB FORCES. IF THEY COULD PUT BLUE BERETS ON SOME US AND UK TROOPS, THAT WOULD PROBABLY DO THE TRICK. PRINCE SAUD IS ALSO THINKING OF A ROLE FOR THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL IN HELPING TO SORT OUT THE TERMS OF THE CEASE-FIRE BUT DID NOT SEEM TO HAVE THOUGHT THROUGH THE DANGER OF DIVISIONS AND MISCHIEF-MAKING AMONG THE SECURITY COUNCIL MEMBERS, INCLUDING THE PERMANENT FIVE.

I AM SUGGESTING DATES FOR A MEETING IN BERMUDA IN THREE WEEKS TIME, BUT WILL BE IN TOUCH BEFORE THAT IN ANY CASE. I SHARE YOUR CONCERN ABOUT ARMS PROLIFERATION IN THE REGION.

WARM REGARDS
DOUGLAS HURD
ENDS

EGERTON

YYYY

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UK COMMS ONLY

FM ABU DHABI

TO DESKBY 111230Z FCO

TELNO 109

OF 111046Z FEBRUARY 91

AND TO IMMEDIATE HM TREASURY, MODUK

INFO PRIORITY RIYADH, JEDDA, DUBAI, MUSCA, BAHRAIN, DOHA

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON

SIC 19M

YOUR TELNO 65 (NOT TO ALL) : BURDEN SHARING

SUMMARY

1. UAE OFFER DOLLARS 500 MILLION IMMEDIATELY PLUS COMMITMENT TO DISCUSS FURTHER DOLLARS 300 MILLION OR MORE AT LATER DATE. THEY LEAVE THE QUESTION OF PUBLICITY TO US.

DETAIL

2. I SAW THE FOREIGN MINISTER, RASHID ABDULLAH, JUST AFTER NOON LOCAL TIME TODAY (11 FEBRUARY). RASHID SAID THAT HE WAS AUTHORISED BY SHAIKH ZAYED AND THE CROWN PRINCE TO ACKNOWLEDGE BOTH THE PRIME MINISTER'S REQUEST AND UAE OBLIGATIONS. THE UAE WOULD LIKE TO HANDLE THE REQUEST IN TWO PHASES. FIRSTLY, DOLLARS 500 MILLION WOULD BE AVAILABLE FOR IMMEDIATE COLLECTION. THAT WAS A FIRM COMMITMENT. AT THIS STAGE THE UAE COULD NOT GIVE A FIRM COMMITMENT FOR THE REMAINING DOLLARS 300 MILLION. THIS DID NOT MEAN THAT THE UAE WAS REFUSING THE REQUEST, RATHER THAT CURRENT FINANCIAL CIRCUMSTANCES (US AND OTHER REQUESTS) DID NOT PERMIT A FULL COMMITMENT AT THIS STAGE. SOME TIME IN THE FUTURE HE WOULD BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS WITH ME ADDITIONAL PAYMENTS (PERHAPS EVEN MORE THAN THE ORIGINAL REQUEST) DEPENDING ON BOTH MILITARY AND FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENTS. MEANWHILE 500 MILLION WAS ALL THAT WAS READILY AVAILABLE.

3. RASHID ADDED THAT THE UAE REQUIRED NO DETAIL OF HOW THE SUMS WERE MADE UP - THIS WAS NOT NECESSARY BETWEEN FRIENDS. SHAIKH ZAYED RECOGNISED THE LOYALTY OF HIS FRIENDS AND INDEED HOPED FOR EVEN GREATER COMMITMENT FROM THEM IN FUTURE (SEE MIFT - NOT TO ALL).

4. I TOLD RASHID THAT I WAS SURE THAT YOU WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR THE OFFER AND WOULD BE SYMPATHETIC TO THE UAE'S CURRENT CASH FLOW PROBLEMS. I KNEW THAT YOU WOULD NONETHELESS WELCOME THE COMMITMENT TO DISCUSS ADDITIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS AT A LATER STAGE. I ASKED WHETHER HE HAD ANY STRONG VIEWS ON PUBLICITY FOR THE UAE CONTRIBUTION. RASHID SAID THAT WHILE HE DID NOT ENVISAGE LOCAL PUBLICITY HE WAS CONTENT TO LEAVE IT TO US TO DECIDE WHETHER TO PUBLISH THE FIGURE. I SAID THAT I SAW ADVANTAGE TO THE UAE IN UK PUBLIC OPINION TERMS IN PUBLICISING THE CONTRIBUTION AND THOUGHT THAT ON BALANCE WE WOULD WISH TO DO SO.

COMMENT

5. THIS IS AS GOOD A RESPONSE AS WE COULD HOPE FOR GIVEN THE CURRENT AND, AS FAR AS I AM AWARE, UNRESOLVED BARGAINING WITH THE AMERICANS. MOREOVER THE OFFER FALLS NOT FAR SHORT OF OUR INITIAL TARGET, WHILE HOLDING OUT THE POSSIBILITY OF ADDITIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS. I HOPE THAT YOU WILL AGREE TO ACCEPT WHAT IS ON OFFER NOW AND GO AFTER THE BIRDS IN THE BUSH LATER. A MESSAGE OF THANKS FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO ZAYED WOULD GO DOWN WELL.

6. IF THE OFFER IS ACCEPTED I SHALL NEED SOME PRACTICAL INSTRUCTIONS ON HOW AND WHERE THE MONEY SHOULD BE DELIVERED. RASHID ASKED ME TO ALLOW TWO OR THREE DAYS FOR THE LOCAL FINANCIAL AUTHORITIES TO BE INFORMED OFFICIALLY.

BURTON

YYYY

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HD/ERD

MR GOULDEN
MR GORE-BOOTH
PS/NO 10.
MR APPELYARD CABINET OFFICE
MR GOWAN CABINET OFFICE
MR REEVES CABINET OFFICE
PS/CHIEF SECRETARY HMT
MR FELLGETT HMT

CONFIDENTIAL



10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

11 February 1991

BURDENSARING

The Prime Minister notes that we are making quite good progress in our efforts to secure financial assistance with the costs of our military efforts in the Gulf. He thinks there is now a prospect that we shall secure as much as £2 billion. He takes the view that this figure should be taken into account in the forecast for next year's PSBR. He intends to raise this with the Chancellor at an early opportunity.

C. D. POWELL

John Gieve, Esq.,
H.M. Treasury.

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cuk

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

11 February 1991

BURDENSARING

I think the Prime Minister would wish to send a brief message of thanks to the Sultan of Oman for his contribution to our military costs in the Gulf, mingy as it is. I should be grateful if you could let me have a suitable draft reply.

C. D. POWELL

Simon Gass, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

RESTRICTED

M

SECRET

10 (A-G)



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB
Telephone 071-21 82111/3

MO 6/17/15/1J

11th February 1991

Dear Charles,

on

GULF REPORT

I attach a copy of the midday report prepared for MOD Ministers on operations in the Gulf.

Yours sincerely,

(S J AMBLER-EDWARDS) (MISS)
Private Secretary

Sir Charles Powell KCMG
10 Downing Street

SECRET

covering SECRET

D/Sec(O)(C)/2/30/1/1

THE GULF CONFLICT

BRIEFING FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE - SITREP No. 70

SITUATION AS AT 1300Z, 11 FEBRUARY 1991

Contains

1. Classified sitrep

This sitrep does not contain any unclassified material for use
by Ministers

Distribution attached

Sec(O)(C)

covering SECRET

SECRET

SEC(O)(C) MIDDAY BRIEF, 11 FEBRUARY 1991

Summary

- No significant developments since 0600Z sitrep.

General Situation

- Iraqi forces throughout the KTO remain in a defensive posture, whilst passively enduring the continued Allied bombing campaign. No indications of Iraqi preparations for any probing attacks in strength.
- Overall it is now assessed that some 20% of Iraqi tanks and guns in the KTO have been destroyed.

Political

- Foreign Secretary, in interview on BBC Radio, said there was not much point in discussing a ceasefire or peace initiatives while Iraq strayed in Kuwait.
- Saddam Hussein made a defiant morale-raising radio broadcast to the Iraqi people yesterday, claiming that Iraq's victory was assured.
- Prince Khalid emphasised during a press conference on 8 Feb that Ramadan would not be a hindrance to fighting.

UK Operations

Air Operations

- 7 Tornado GR1s from Dhahran attacked the Shaikh Mazhar ammunition storage depot (1) this morning; 6 aircraft report hits and observed the target on fire.
- 4 Tornado GR1s and 2 Buccaneers from Muharraq attacked the Ataq highway bridge (2) this morning. Bridge hit by 6 bombs on south side. Basic structure still in place although it is possible that only one lane remains passable.
- 4 Tornado GR1s and 2 Buccaneers from Muharraq attacked the Qalitsalih bridge (3) with LGBs. No confirmed hits, but full BDA not available.
- 8 Tornado GR1s from Tabuk attacked Army barracks and SAM support facilities at H3 airfield (4). Both targets were hit, but full BDA prevented by cloud.
- 7 Jaguar from Muharraq attacked an ASTROS 2 battery in SE Kuwait (5). A successful mission with all bombs falling on the target area causing damage to ASTROS support equipment.

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SECRET

SEC(O)(C) MIDDAY BRIEF, 11 FEBRUARY 1991

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- 4 Tornado GR1s and 2 Buccaneers from Muharraq attacked the Afaq highway bridge (2) this morning. Bridge hit by 6 bombs on south side. Basic structure still in place although it is possible that only one lane remains passable.
- 4 Tornado GR1s and 2 Buccaneers from Muharraq attacked the Qalitsalih bridge (3) with IGBs. No confirmed hits, but full BDA not available.
- 8 Tornado GR1s from Tabuk attacked Army barracks and SAM support facilities at H3 airfield (4). Both targets were hit, but full BDA prevented by cloud.
- 7 Jaguar from Muharraq attacked an ASTROS 2 battery in SE Kuwait (5). A successful mission with all bombs falling on the target area causing damage to ASTROS support equipment.

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- RAF combat sorties as at 111000Z:

	since 110300Z	total
Tornado GR1	23	902
Tornado GR1A	0	66
Jaguar	7	349
Tornado F3	6	449
Buccaneer	4	52
Nimrod	0	49
AAR (Victor, VC10K, Tristar)	5	401
	45	2268
Non-combat sorties:		1336
		3604

Navy Operations

- Lynx from CARDIFF attacked an Iraqi patrol boat 5 miles SE of Faylaka Island with SEA SKUA early this morning; surface CAP aircraft re-attacked on completion of Lynx attack. Boat observed to be on fire/sinking; CARDIFF's Lynx credited with kill.
- CARDIFF, MANCHESTER, GLOUCESTER, continue AAW and ASUW operations with Allied ships in the Northern Gulf. The British contingent of the MCMV group has arrived in Bahrain for 4 days' leave and maintenance. They remain on 48 hrs NTM.

Army Operations

- LCpl S R CROFTS RCT has died of burns sustained in a burner explosion in theatre, at a Bristol hospital. NOK were at the bedside.
- A casualty evacuation exercise is planned for today, involving the support helicopters.

Allied Operations

- Total Allied sorties now number over 59,000.
- Today, Royal Saudi Air Force, Kuwaiti and Bahraini fighters will be dedicated to battlefield preparation targets. French Jaguars will attack the Al Basrah highway bridge and artillery. Canadian fighters will continue escort and CAP missions.

Iraqi activity

- Iraqi PWs now number over 900; 75 Iraqi soldiers defected to Allied forces over 9-10 Feb.

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- According to an Iraqi PW, 2 captured US Service personnel (1 female) were transferred from Kuwait to Basra.

Logistics

- There are currently 498 tonnes of Priority 1 air freight awaiting movement to the Gulf from Germany and the UK.

Media reports and coverage

- Media concentrating on Cheney's meeting with Bush, Prime Minister's visit to Germany and RN Lynx success against Iraqi patrol boat.

Other issues

- The southern edge of the main oil slick was yesterday at Al Ghar, some 60km north of Jubayl. Some photographic evidence that the slick is also moving eastward, towards Kharg Island and the Iranian coast.
- 3 men have been arrested in the US in connection with the pipe bombs found in Norfolk, Virginia. Police believe the bombs were part of an insurance fraud and not terrorist-related.

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THE GULF CONFLICT - BRIEFING FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

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
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10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

11 February 1991

See line.

THE GULF: MILITARY SPOKESMAN

I should record that, when President Bush telephoned the Prime Minister this evening, he made special mention of the performance of Group Captain Niall Irving, who acts as our main military spokesman in the Gulf. Both he and Mrs. Bush thought that Group Captain Irving had done an outstanding job and they intended to invite him to Washington when the conflict was over, in order to convey their gratitude. You might like to draw this recognition to the Group Captain's attention, although it might be prudent not to mention anything about the invitation.

Your sincer,

C. D. POWELL

Simon Webb, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence.

PERSONAL

h

Chapman / Powell
- 10/1/80

Halliday
Hamp
W/H
Beebe



Prime Minister

Ref. AO91/329

PRIME MINISTER

cc Sir Percy Cradock
Mr Appleyard

You will want to report
on your talks with the
President, & in particular
a) your commitment to
deplane the UN
Security Council.
b) whether there is anything

OPD(G): 12 February

Item 1: Winning the peace

You might invite the Foreign Secretary to introduce the paper and to add to it by summarising his conclusions from his discussions in Taif, Riyadh, Cairo and Rome. You may wish to mention any discussion of this subject during your Bonn visit.

2. On the Foreign Secretary's visit, his talks revealed that the Gulf States and the Egyptians are finally buckling down to the task of looking seriously at future Gulf Security. President Mubarak is convening a Cairo Foreign Ministers' meeting on Thursday involving Saudi Arabia, Gulf States, Syria and Morocco (though the Moroccans may decide not to attend) to address this question. The Egyptians, Saudis and Syrians are already drafting papers and the Egyptians evidently envisage the process leading to a Summit. A GCC Committee has also been formed for the same purpose. Inevitably perhaps, the Gulf states still harbour suspicions of the Saudis, Egyptians, Iranians and Syrians and are inclined to hark back to traditional bilateral arrangements with Western powers. The UK/US talks showed that the US approach to Gulf Security is close to ours.

3. Moving on to the FCO paper, you might ask the Foreign Secretary whether his meetings reflected local enthusiasm for the ideas in the paper of a Gulf defensive alliance, which might include an integrated command, Egyptian deployment and Western underpinning. Turning to UK deployments you might confirm, as



the Defence Secretary and Foreign Secretary agree, that this should be limited to aircraft rotation and a naval presence (Mr Hamilton is not expected to raise his personal, dissenting view in favour of a ground presence). The issue is also relevant to the Foreign Secretary's meeting with General de la Billiere and the latter's earlier remarks about retaining a brigade in Kuwait. The FCO, Treasury and other Departments have begun to prepare work on economic support which will need to take account of Mr Baker's proposals on economic reconstruction, including a Middle East Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and Saudi sensitivities. The paper discusses arms control and non-proliferation on standard lines, noting that further work is being done on tightening supplier controls, and you may wish to endorse these ideas.

4. The most difficult issue is of course an Arab/Israel settlement on which the Foreign Secretary may have further thoughts. It seems clear the Americans will want to make progress by quiet diplomacy looking to us to put a brake on European pressure for a Conference. You might ask the Foreign Secretary for his assessment in the light of his visit of the settlement prospects, the future of Jordan, the role of the PLO with Arafat badly discredited and the influence of Iran. The latter seem poised to play a more important post-conflict role, with indications that they would like to re-open direct links with the US. The latest indications on the state of mind of King Hussein (Amman telegram number 002 to Riyadh: copy attached) are not reassuring. The resumption of PLO crossborder operations from Jordan is another unwelcome development. The US is reviewing economic and military aid to Jordan in response to King Hussein's speech. Our policy still is that the King is a better bet than any likely replacement.

5. You might conclude the discussion by endorsing the broad thrust of the paper, as amended in discussion in the light of the

It would
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to press
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Americans
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conference
or meeting
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Foreign Secretary's visit, which could be used as the basis for further discussion with the Americans when they send their team here. You might invite the Foreign Secretary to bring to OPD(G) the further work on tightening supplier controls and economic support for the region when it is ready.

Item 2: Current international situation

6. It might be more convenient this time to move straight on from the earlier paper to invite the Foreign Secretary to report on other aspects of his visit and the international scene. You may wish to congratulate the Foreign Secretary (again) on the success of his burdensharing discussion in Kuwait (on which you propose to send the Amir a message of thanks) and ask how we stand on a Saudi contribution. King Fahd left this to be discussed with Prince Saud. The FCO Political Director, Mr Weston, is travelling to South Korea and Japan to pursue the battle there. The Omanis have pledged the princely sum of \$5m., while the UAE, in the wake of the Chief Secretary's visit, have offered \$500m. now and a possible further \$300m. later. The Foreign Secretary might also say a word about his meetings and those of his accompanying business mission in Taif about the reconstruction of Kuwait.

7. The Security Council will be holding a formal debate on Wednesday though it is not yet clear whether this will be an open or a private session. There are bound to be allegations, following President Gorbachev's recent statement, that the allies have widened the war aims. President Gorbachev's envoy, Mr Primakov, is off again to Iraq and the Iranians are continuing to play the peacemakers. There is a non-aligned meeting in Belgrade tomorrow (Tuesday) where more countries will make speeches for the record. However, Saddam Hussain's bellicose statement of 10 February, and the uncompromising line taken by the Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Hammadi with President Rafsanjani (who described the Iraqi response as inadequate but not entirely



unsatisfactory), will make it hard for Iraq's supporters to claim that there is any real sign of willingness on Iraq's part to fulfil UN Resolutions.

8. The Iraqi Embassy in London continues to cause problems even though relations have now been broken. The Foreign Secretary is looking at recommendations that the Embassy should be inspected after the departure of the Iraqi diplomats to see whether, as the Metropolitan police suspect, it contains an arms/explosives cache. The FCO is also examining the question of which country should be the UK's protecting power in Baghdad (important for POWs). The Iraqis want the Zambians to act here. The US Government is conducting a similar review, as are a number of EC countries.

9. You may want to have a word about Iranian plans to send humanitarian food to Iraq on which there has been an exchange of Private Secretary letters with the FCO. The FCO are inclined to agree with the proposals in the Sanctions Committee if ICRC control of distribution can be effectively organised. You have reservations and would prefer to link the idea to an Iraqi commitment to grant ICRC access to POWs or at least to notify the ICRC of details about them. Unless the issue has been completely resolved by then, you might want to check the state of play on the Royal Jordanian Airlines Airbus contract.

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Item 3: Current military situation

10. In the absence of the Defence Secretary and the CDS, who will be in Washington, you might invite the Vice-Chief of the Defence Staff, General Sir Richard (Dick) Vincent, to report on the military situation. You might note that the first B52 raids on Iraq have taken place from Fairford without exciting an enormous press or public response.



11. The FCO paper on POWs, which was due to be taken at this meeting, has been postponed until Thursday so that the Defence Secretary can be present.

Item 4: Media handling

12. The Energy Secretary can report on broader issues. These might include countering Iraqi and other claims that the allies are widening the war: the focus of in-theatre briefing appears to place the main emphasis still on the more exciting operations inside Iraq. Making action in the Kuwait theatre of operations the lead item could pay dividends internationally.

13. Mr O'Donnell can report on day-to-day issues and any recurring themes from the weekend.

R.R.B.

ROBIN BUTLER

11 February 1991

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I SAID THAT WE WERE DISMAYED, NOT ONLY OVER THE KING'S QUESTIONING OF OUR MOTIVES BUT BECAUSE MANY OF THE POINTS IN HIS SPEECH WERE SIMPLY NOT TRUE. IT SEEMED THAT HE HAD TAKEN IRAQI PROPAGANDA AT FACE VALUE. ALSO I FOUND IT ASTONISHING THAT THE KING COULD REFER TO THE QUOTE NEED TO PROTECT THE LESS POWERFUL AGAINST THE MORE POWERFUL WHO SEEK TO SUBJUGATE THEM UNQUOTE WITHOUT ACKNOWLEDGING THAT THIS ALSO APPLIED IN THE CASE OF IRAQ/KUWAIT. HASSAN AGREED.

6. I EXPLAINED TO HASSAN THAT WHAT CONCERNED US MOST WAS WHETHER WE WERE SEEING A SHIFT OF POLICY WHICH WOULD INVOLVE JORDAN GIVING MATERIAL SUPPORT TO IRAQ. HASSAN SAID THAT THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF THIS. AS HE HAD TOLD ME BEFORE, HE HAD LITTLE TIME FOR BADRAN AND SOMETIMES WONDERED WHERE HIS LOYALTIES REALLY LAY. BUT HE REALLY DID NOT THINK THAT THE KING WAS INTENDING TO MAKE ANY SUCH MOVE, AND HE (HASSAN) WOULD STRONGLY RESIST ANY SUCH SWITCH OF POLICY. I SAID THAT THERE WERE VARIOUS INDICATORS, FOR EXAMPLE APPLICATION OF SANCTIONS AND ANY SIGNS OF CO-OPERATION WITH IRAQ, EITHER MILITARY OR CIVIL, WHICH WE WOULD OBVIOUSLY BE LOOKING AT KEENLY. HASSAN REPLIED THAT HE REALISED THAT. THE AMERICANS HAD MADE THE SAME POINT.

COMMENT

7. THIS CONVERSATION WENT CONSIDERABLY FURTHER THAN PREVIOUS EXCHANGES IN REVEALING THE EXTENT OF HASSAN'S DIFFERENCES WITH HIS BROTHER. HE IS CLEARLY A DEEPLY WORRIED MAN. AT ONE POINT HE SAID THAT HE FELT THAT HE WAS ON A ROLLER-COASTER - HE NEVER KNEW WHAT WAS GOING TO HAPPEN NEXT OR HOW THE KING MIGHT REACT. FOR THIS REASON I DO NOT THINK WE CAN TAKE AS READ HIS ASSURANCE THAT THERE WILL BE NO CHANGE OF POLICY, THOUGH PERSONALLY I THINK HE IS RIGHT. I FORMED THE IMPRESSION THAT, HOWEVER MUCH HE AGREES WITH YOUR MESSAGE, HE MAY JIB AT SHOWING IT TO THE KING, AT LEAST RIGHT AWAY. OVER LUNCH, I TRIED TO ENCOURAGE HIM TO KEEP TRYING TO GET HIS ADVICE ACROSS ON THE GROUNDS THAT NO-ONE ELSE WOULD OR COULD SPEAK SO FRANKLY TO THE KING. YOUR OWN MESSAGES, I KNOW, ARE GREATLY APPRECIATED SINCE HE REALLY FEELS BELEAGUERED. THE KING LOOKS INCREASINGLY A LOST CAUSE, THOUGH I WILL OF COURSE KEEP AT HIM. A MESSAGE TO HIM FROM THE PRIME MINISTER MIGHT STILL BE WORTHWHILE, THOUGH I SUGGEST THAT WE SHOULD ALLOW AN INTERVAL TO GET REACTIONS TO THE SPEECH OUT OF THE WAY FIRST.

REEVE

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
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From the Private Secretary

11 February 1991

THE GULF

President Bush telephoned the Prime Minister this evening, shortly after his return from Germany, to report on the visit by Secretary Cheney and General Powell to Saudi Arabia.

The President said that Cheney and Powell had so far reported to him only in general terms. They had told him that the Allies would have to use ground forces. But they were not yet recommending a firm time for action to start. They found that the Commanders in the Gulf were quite comfortable with the concept of a land battle. They also thought that the air campaign had gone better than official briefing from the Pentagon had suggested. They believed that the Iraqi forces were immobile pill-boxes. There had been quite a number of additional defectors in the last day or so, who painted a gloomy picture of morale in Iraqi forces in the Kuwait theatre of operations. Cheney and Powell had also reported greater confidence than in the past about the casualty levels which would be incurred in a ground operation. They still needed to make a few final adjustments to the US forces. But they would be coming to him very soon, probably within a week, with a clear recommendation for the timing of action on the ground. All in all, their report had been very upbeat and very positive. They would fill in the Defence Secretary and CDS when they visited Washington the next day.

The President continued that he had Secretary Baker and General Scowcroft with him and they were talking about the other side of the equation, in particular the pounding which the US was receiving on the propaganda front. He had himself talked to the UN Secretary General that day and found him wringing his hands and lamenting over the difficulty of resisting a further meeting of the Security Council. He had urged the Secretary General not to believe the propaganda coming out of Baghdad. The Indian Prime Minister had told him that the Indian Parliament was in a state of rebellion over the permission granted to US aircraft to refuel in India, and he would have to withdraw the facility. President Perez of Venezuela was concerned about the forthcoming NAM meeting. The President continued that he himself had been a bit worried about Gorbachev's comments, although in fact they seemed to have come out reasonably well. Nonetheless, he was concerned that Saddam Hussain might come forward with a statement to the effect that Iraq would withdraw, provided certain conditions could be met. In these circumstances, we should stay on course and refuse to blink. But it would undoubtedly

SECRET AND PERSONAL

complicate our task. The fact was that Saddam Hussain was making some progress in stirring up Arab and Third World opinion based on skilful propaganda.

The Prime Minister said that we would be happy to reinforce the President's efforts with the UN Secretary General. He would telephone him on 12 February. The President said that would be extremely helpful. The Americans were going to send him some briefing material and some aerial photographs. He wondered what the Prime Minister made of King Hussein's recent remarks. The Prime Minister said that the King was doing himself a lot of harm. The Foreign Secretary had sent Crown Prince Hassan a message, urging him to tell the King that his allegations were simply untrue. He would be ready to follow this up with a message direct to the King if the response was unsatisfactory. The President said that the United States had decided to give up on the King for now and just hoped there would be no destabilisation of Jordan. He took some comfort from the fact that the King had not attacked him personally.

The President continued that he had seen the Israeli Defence Minister that afternoon and found him quite demanding. He had taken the line that the latest SCUD attack had caused extensive damage and it was now very difficult to resist retaliation. Just as he was leaving, a message had come in about yet another SCUD attack, but fortunately it appeared to have landed in the sea. The Prime Minister asked whether the Israelis were serious about threatening retaliation or just trying to turn the screw to secure the funds. The President said that to be fair, Arens had not come up with any specific price tag. But there was no doubt that the Israelis were after substantial extra funds from the United States.

The President said he had just wanted to give the Prime Minister a quick fill in on the Cheney/Powell visit. The Defence Secretary and CDS would get a fuller account tomorrow. The Prime Minister asked how much notice the President and he would get of a request for permission to launch a ground campaign. The President said that Cheney and Powell would come forward with a recommendation for a definitive date and time, but would ask for two or three days leeway to take account of weather and other factors. He hoped the recommendation would come forward within a week. He could assure the Prime Minister as soon as he received a recommendation, he would let him know. He and the Prime Minister would get exactly the same amount of notice.

I am copying this letter to Richard Gozney (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and Sir Robin Butler.

Simon Webb, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence

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C. D. POWELL

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SECRET AND PERSONAL

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PRIME MINISTER

Gulf Gleanings: February 8-10

The Arab part of the coalition is in good order. Mubarak, King Fahd and even the Ruler of Kuwait emphasised that the air campaign must take its course. There was no pressure to accelerate it, except mildly from the Egyptian Foreign Minister, who alone of those whom I met mingled among people likely to be dismayed by reports of civilian casualties.

King Fahd's main message was that somehow or other Saddam Hussein must be finished off.

General de la Billiere believes that Saddam Hussein will use chemical weapons at the start of the land battle, and that this will slow up the campaign considerably.

He estimates that the physical task of getting the British expeditionary force and its equipment out of the area will take two years and be very expensive. He sees a need for a British brigade to stay alongside the Americans in a position west of Kuwait City for a few months after the war ends to act as a shield. These would be fresh troops; those who had fought would go home as soon as possible. This has not been fully thought

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@ F.S.
hi-lateral.

Discussed
in OPD (E) ✓
12 Feb 2008



through, because much will depend on whether there is some continuing threat. The Americans are planning such a shield. The Saudis and Kuwaitis wish to give it UN authority but not if this enfeebles it. For this short-term protection they in effect want US and UK troops with blue berets.

Burdensharing

The Ruler of Kuwait, with his usual hunted expression, gave us all we asked for. His Crown Prince made some useful promises to the senior British businessmen led by Jim Prior - whom I put in his way. Prince Saud, pleading hard times with (as we know) some justification, at first offered to help us only by leaning on other Gulf States. When I said we really needed a direct Saudi contribution he spoke to the King, and by the time I had my audience the line had changed and I was given an assurance of direct help which will (I hope) be followed soon by a figure.

The King, unusually accompanied by the two senior Princes, was very friendly, and I am sure that his assurances of gratitude and solidarity are genuinely felt for the present.

The future

Useful thoughts are stirring in the Arab world, but far from precise. Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia are coming together in a tripod, which if they can construct it sensibly could be the heart of a new political and security alliance derived loosely from the Arab League.

SECRET



The smaller GCC states have to some extent been kept in the dark by the Saudis (see eg a plea to us from Oman for information), and have somewhat differing ideas, some giving primacy to guarantees from the West, others to an arrangement which includes Iran. But the Saudis are pivotal and in the end I believe their smaller partners will have to follow them. The meeting in Cairo on Thursday of GCC plus Egypt and Syria is the next step. I would guess that the members of any such system would approach the US, UK and France, plus perhaps the USSR and China, for some underpinning.


Palestine, as ever, looms large and expectations of us high. Mubarak and Prince Saud want us to be patient with the PLO while they nurse them into a more tolerable position. There is much gloom and many theories about King Hussein's latest hostile speech. Some think he aims to be King of Iraq. Others that he will reassert Jordan's claim to represent the West Bank. The idea, probably true, that he is a genuine but misguided man drifting increasingly out of touch with reality is too simple to have many backers among Arabs.

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to be 'DH' with a flourish.

(DOUGLAS HURD)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
11 February 1991

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OUR TELNO 426: IRAQ/KUWAIT: WASHINGTON SITREP

SUMMARY

1. PRESIDENT INDICATES GROUND ASSAULT NOT IMMINENT. ADMINISTRATION CONCERNED BY IRAQI PROPAGANDA ON CIVILIAN CASUALTIES.

DETAIL

2. INTEREST IN WASHINGTON ON 11 FEBRUARY IS FOCUSED ON CHENEY AND POWELL'S RETURN FROM THE GULF AND THEIR MEETING TODAY WITH PRESIDENT BUSH. THE PRESIDENT GAVE A BRIEF PRESS CONFERENCE AFTER THE MEETING. HE SAID THAT THE AIR CAMPAIGN WAS VERY EFFECTIVE AND WOULD CONTINUE FOR A WHILE: QUOTE WE'RE NOT TALKING DATES UNQUOTE FOR THE START OF A GROUND CAMPAIGN. THE WAR GENERALLY WAS GOING WELL AND THE US WOULD TAKE WHATEVER TIME WAS NECESSARY TO SORT OUT WHEN THE NEXT PHASE OF THE CAMPAIGN WOULD BEGIN.

3. THE PRESIDENT'S REMARKS FOLLOW CONSIDERABLE PRESS SPECULATION ON 11 FEBRUARY ABOUT THE TIMING OF A GROUND ASSAULT. THE PRESS REPORT THAT IN HIS DISCUSSION WITH REPORTERS ON HIS FLIGHT BACK FROM SAUDI ARABIA, CHENEY HAD LEFT THE DUAL IMPRESSION THAT A FURTHER PERIOD OF SUSTAINED BOMBING WAS NEEDED BEFORE A GROUND ASSAULT AND THAT A LAND CAMPAIGN WOULD BE NECESSARY TO FLUSH OUT IRAQI FORCES FOR DESTRUCTION BY AIR POWER. CHENEY HIMSELF HAD REFUSED TO CONFIRM REPORTS THAT THE AIR CAMPAIGN WOULD CONTINUE FOR AT LEAST ANOTHER 3 WEEKS, ALTHOUGH A SENIOR MILITARY OFFICIAL IS WIDELY QUOTED AS SAYING THAT TOP MILITARY OFFICERS IN THEATRE GENERALLY FAVOURED ANOTHER THREE WEEKS OF SUSTAINED AERIAL BOMBARDMENT.

4. THERE IS CONCERN IN THE ADMINISTRATION OVER THE PICTURES OF CIVILIAN DAMAGE COMING OUT OF IRAQ. THE PRESIDENT SAID

PAGE 1
RESTRICTED

AGAIN IN HIS SHORT PRESS CONFERENCE TODAY THAT THE US WERE NOT
TARGETTING CIVILIAN AREAS. THE WHITE HOUSE SPOKESMAN
CONFIRMED THE PERCEPTION THAT SADDAM WAS SCORING POINTS IN THE
PROPAGANDA AND PR BATTLE BUT EMPHASISED THAT WHILE THERE HAD
BEEN COLLATORAL DAMAGE IN CIVILIAN AREAS THE
ADMINISTRATION DID NOT THINK IT WAS EXTENSIVE. BUT IT WAS
DISTRUBING TO FIND THAT PEOPLE WERE QUOTE BUYING UNQUOTE
SADDAM'S PROPAGANDA. FITZWATER REFERRED TO PRESIDENT
GORBACHEV'S STATEMENT OF 9 FEBRUARY (MOSCOW TELNO 325) AS
QUOTE UNFORTUNATE UNQUOTE EVIDENCE OF THIS.

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VISIT BY THE DEFENCE SECRETARY
SUMMARY

1. THE PRESIDENT MAY ASK MR KING FOR THE UK'S VIEWS ON
WHEN TO START THE GROUND CAMPAIGN.

DETAIL

2. THERE HAS BEEN CONSIDERABLE SPECULATION IN WASHINGTON,
FOLLOWING THE ANNOUNCEMENT THAT CHENEY AND POWELL WERE TO
VISIT THE GULF, ABOUT THE POSSIBLE EARLY START OF THE
GROUND CAMPAIGN. COMMENTS MADE BY CHENEY IN SAUDI ARABIA
(MY TEL 426) FUELLED THE RUMOURS.

3. FOLLOWING HIS MEETING WITH CHENEY AND POWELL ON 11
FEBRUARY, THE PRESIDENT TRIED TO PUT A DAMPENER ON SUCH
TALK. HE SAID PUBLICLY THAT THE AIR CAMPAIGN HAD BEEN VERY
EFFECTIVE AND WOULD CONTINUE FOR A WHILE. HE DENIED THAT
CONSIDERATION WAS BEING GIVEN TO SPECIFIC DATES FOR THE
NEXT PHASE AND ADDED THAT HE WOULD TAKE WHATEVER TIME WAS
NECESSARY TO DECIDE WHEN THE NEXT PHASE SHOULD BEGIN. IF
HIS MILITARY ADVISERS WERE TO ADVISE HIM THAT THERE NEEDED
TO BE ANOTHER PHASE, HE WOULD THEN MAKE THE NECESSARY
DECISIONS. MEANWHILE, HE WAS CONFIDENT THAT THE CAMPAIGN
WAS ON THE RIGHT PATH. IN SUBSEQUENT QUESTIONING, HE
REFUSED TO GO INTO DETAILS, REPEATING THAT NOW WAS NOT THE
APPROPRIATE MOMENT FOR COMMENT ON THE POSSIBLE START OF THE
GROUND WAR.

4. WE SPOKE TO THE NSC (ZELIKOW) ON 11 FEBRUARY ABOUT MR
KING'S MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT. ZELIKOW SAID THAT THE
PRESIDENT WAS ANXIOUS FOR THE MEETING TO INVOLVE GENUINE
CONSULTATIONS. THE PRESIDENT WOULD WANT TO HEAR UK VIEWS
ON THE TIMING OF A POSSIBLE GROUND OFFENSIVE.

5. ZELIKOW CONFIRMED THAT THE PRESIDENT WAS PLEASED WITH
THE WAY THAT THE CAMPAIGN TO DATE HAD GONE, AND FELT UNDER
NO IMMEDIATE PRESSURE TO MOVE TO THE NEXT PHASE. BUT A
NUMBER OF FACTORS MIGHT IN DUE COURSE INCREASE THE PRESSURE

ON THE PRESIDENT:

(I) THE DIFFICULTY WITH PRODUCING PRECISE ASSESSMENTS OF THE IMPACT OF THE ALLIED AIR STRIKES ON THE IRAQI GROUND FORCES MEANT THAT ONE COULD NOT PERMANENTLY SHELTER BEHIND THE ARGUMENT THAT THE AIR STRIKES SHOULD BE GIVEN MORE TIME:

(II) THE FEAR THAT, DESPITE THE ALLIED AIR ATTACKS, THE IRAQI FORCES IN THEATRE COULD - IN THE ABSENCE OF A GROUND CAMPAIGN - MAINTAIN THEMSELVES FOR MANY MONTHS YET, GIVEN THEIR EXTENSIVE STOCKPILES OF FOOD AND AMMUNITION BUILT UP BEFORE THE WAR STARTED, AND THE LIMITED IMPACT OF ALLIED AIR ATTACKS ON THAT STOCKPILE:

(III) THE POSSIBILITY OF AN ARAB BACKLASH, ONCE THE EXTENT OF IRAQI MILITARY CASUALTIES, WHICH NSC ESTIMATED AT LEAST 1,000 KILLED PER DAY, BECAME MORE WIDELY KNOWN.

6. WE WARNED ZELIKOW, WHO WAS PREPARING THE BRIEFING FOR TOMORROW'S MEETING, THAT BURDENSARING MIGHT POSSIBLY ARISE. WE SAID THAT THERE HAD BEEN CONCERN IN LONDON ABOUT THIS RECENTLY. THE RECENT CONTRIBUTIONS FROM THE GERMANS AND THE PROMISES FROM OTHERS HAD HELPED. BUT THERE WAS STILL A PROBLEM OVER JAPAN, WHERE THE US BID FOR THE FULL US DOLLARS 9 BILLION PUT AT RISK AN EQUITABLE SHARE FOR THE UK.

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SIC 19M

IRAQ/KUWAIT: YOUR VISIT TO SAUDI ARABIA

SUMMARY

1. A WARM WELCOME FROM KING FAHD AND OTHER SAUDI MINISTERS. SAUDI THINKING ON AN ARAB BASED REGIONAL SECURITY STRUCTURE BEGINNING TO UNFOLD. DISCUSSION OF DIPLOMATIC TACTICS. KING FAHD MORE CONFIDENT COALITION HAS UPPER HAND AND STRONGLY RESISTANT TO HAVING TRUCK WITH CEASEFIRE OR TO ACCELERATING LAND CAMPAIGN. HE BELIEVES SADDAM MUST BE TOPPLED. SAUD PRESSES FOR EARLY MOVEMENT ON ARAB/ISRAEL, BUT DUCKS ISSUE OF PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATION. BFME INDICATIONS THAT BRITISH MILITARY WITHDRAWAL FROM KUWAIT AND SAUDI ARABIA BOUND TO TAKE TIME WITH CONTINUING DEFENCE ROLE IN KUWAIT. ASSURANCE OF SOME FURTHER SAUDI FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTION BUT NO FIGURES: THE BALL IS WITH PRINCE SAUD. CLOSE BILATERAL HARMONY.

DETAIL

2. YOUR VISIT TO RIYADH ON 9 AND 10 FEBRUARY, FOLLOWING YOUR STOP-OVER IN TAIF TO SEE THE RULER OF KUWAIT AND HIS GOVERNMENT, AFFORDED A VERY USEFUL CHANCE TO SEE SAUDI ARABIA AT WAR AND GETTING ON WITH BUSINESS IN AN UNFLUSTERED WAY WITH THE KING AND LEADING SAUDIS FIRMLY BASED IN RIYADH. SURPRISINGLY SADDAM FLUFFED THE OPPORTUNITY TO SCUD YOU, CHENEY AND POWELL IN RIYADH ON THE SAME NIGHT. YOUR DISCUSSIONS COVERED THE SCOPE OF OUR OBJECTIVES, PROGRESS OF THE WAR, AND THE HANDLING OF DIPLOMATIC MANOEUVRES IN VARIOUS FORA WHICH ENCOURAGED COMPROMISE WITH IRAQ. IN PARTICULAR YOU WERE ABLE, IN YOUR TWO SESSIONS OF DISCUSSION WITH PRINCE SAUD AND HIS ADVISERS, THE FIRST BEING A WORKING

DINNER, TO DRAW THE SAUDIS OUT ON THE IDEAS WHICH THEY ARE NOW ADDRESSING FOR NEW REGIONAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS FOUNDED ON GREATER REGIONAL COHESION AND MILITARY BALANCE. THESE IDEAS WERE ALSO DISCUSSED, IN A MEETING WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE GCC. YOU ALSO FOLLOWED UP THE QUESTION OF A FURTHER SAUDI CONTRIBUTION TO THE COST OF BRITISH FORCES, THOUGH THE OUTCOME HAS YET TO BE SEEN. YOU HAD NEARLY TWO RUMINANT HOURS WITH KING FAHD WHO PAID YOU THE SPECIAL COMPLIMENT OF RECEIVING YOU IN HIS PRIVATE HOME WITH BOTH THE CROWN PRINCE AND PRINCE SULTAN INITIALLY IN ATTENDANCE. THE KING'S WELCOME WAS VERY WARM. YOU ALSO SAW GEN DE LA BILLIERE AND HIS SENIOR STAFF AT BFME'S HEADQUARTERS IN RIYADH AND MET THE OPERATIONS CENTRE STAFF. THIS PRODUCED A TIMELY DISCUSSION WITH HMA KUWAIT PRESENT ABOUT THE LIKELY PROBLEMS AND TIMESCALE INVOLVED IN WINDING DOWN THE BRITISH AND ALLIED MILITARY PRESENCE IN KUWAIT POST HOSTILITIES, AS WELL AS IN THE BACK LIFT FROM SAUDI ARABIA. YOUR VISIT PROVIDED A USEFUL MEDIA OPPORTUNITY WITH THE INTERNATIONAL PRESS. YOU MET SOME OF THE KUWAITIS ATTACHED TO BFME AS INTERPRETERS.

3. TO TAKE THE MAIN POINTS OF YOUR DISCUSSION:

A) THE CONFLICT. BOTH THE KING AND SAUD SHOWED CONFIDENCE IN THE WAY THE WAR WAS GOING, AND THAT SADDAM WAS HEADING FOR DEFEAT. SAUD AND TURKI RIGHTLY MADE THE POINT THAT SAUDI OPINION HAD, WITH THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES AND PARTICULARLY AS A RESULT OF THE SCUD ATTACKS ON RIYADH AND DHAHRAN AND SADDAM'S ILL-JUDGED MILITARY PUSH INTO SAUDI ARABIA TO KHAFJI, HARDENED YET FURTHER AGAINST IRAQ. THE INTERNAL SITUATION WAS WELL UNDER CONTROL. BOTH SAUD AND THE KING TOOK PAINS HOWEVER TO STRESS TO YOU THAT THE COALITION MUST NOT BE SUSCEPTIBLE TO SIREN VOICES IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WHICH SOUGHT TO DUCK A CONFRONTATION AND URGE COMPROMISE OR AN EARLY CEASEFIRE. YOU AGREED WE HAD TO TACKLE THESE WAVERERS AT THEIR SOURCES, AND IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL, AND COORDINATE OUR ACTION. SAUD WAS WARY OF IRAN'S EFFORTS TO STRIKE A COMPROMISE THOUGH THE NON-ALIGNED MEETING IN BELGRADE NO LONGER LOOKED SO OMINOUS. HE SUSPECTED THE IRAQI RESPONSE TO RAFSANJANI'S PROPOSALS MIGHT YET PROVIDE AN OPENING. YOU WERE SUBSEQUENTLY ABLE TO TELL THE KING OF RAFSANJANI'S NEGATIVE COMMENTS TO MR REDDAWAY IN TEHRAN ABOUT THE IRAQI RESPONSE. YOU AGREED WITH SAUD AND TURKI THAT ANY PRE-CONDITIONS FOR A CEASEFIRE MUST BE RIGOROUS AS TO TESTS OVER WITHDRAWAL AND OTHER SCR ISSUES SUCH AS COMPENSATION AND REDUCTION OF ARMAMENT. THE SECURITY COUNCIL MIGHT NEED TO CONTINUE ECONOMIC PENALTIES THOUGH AGREEMENT HERE DID NOT LOOK STRAIGHTFORWARD. KING FAHD EMPHASISED THAT NOW THE EXTENT OF SADDAM'S MILITARY MACHINE

WAS BECOMING APPARENT, AND THE SCALE OF HIS AMBITIONS, NO QUARTER MUST BE GIVEN TO HIM. WHILE HE AGREED IT MIGHT NOT BE POSSIBLE TO SAY SO PUBLICLY, OUR OBJECTIVE MUST BE HIS REMOVAL FROM POWER. YOU ALSO WARNED SADDAM MIGHT NOT BE EASY TO DISLodge.

B) THE LAND CAMPAIGN. ECHOING MUBARAK'S REMARKS TO YOU ON 9 FEBRUARY IN CAIRO, KING FAHD ALSO STRESSED THE NEED TO TAKE OUR TIME OVER THE AIR BOMBARDMENT FOR AS LONG AS WAS NECESSARY TO SOFTEN UP IRAQI FORCES AND INFRASTRUCTURE. WHEN THE LAND BATTLE CAME IT HAD TO BE BRIEF WITH MINIMAL CASUALTIES. A QUICK MILITARY SURRENDER BY IRAQ SHOULD BE THE AIM. THIS WAS THE BEST WAY TO PUT PAID TO SADDAM. (HE MADE MUCH THE SAME POINT TO CHENEY AND POWELL.) KING FAHD SAID HE WAS IMPRESSED BY THE RAF TORNADO'S PRECISION BOMBING CAPABILITIES AND ASKED FOR THIS EQUIPMENT TO BE MADE AVAILABLE TO THE SAUDI TORNADOS.

C) FUTURE REGIONAL SECURITY. YOUR REITERATION OF THE ASSURANCE THAT WE HAD NO INTENTION TO PRESCRIBE FUTURE MILITARY ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE REGION, WHICH MUST IN ESSENCE BE HOME-GROWN, WAS WELL RECEIVED BY SAUD, WITH NO REFERENCE MADE TO RECENT SAUDI CONCERN OVER CERTAIN PASSAGES IN YOUR BLABY SPEECH. INDEED BOTH THE KING AND SAUD CLEARLY SOUGHT TO PUT THIS BEHIND US, AND THE KING EXPRESSED HIS PLEASURE AT HIS TELEPHONE CONVERSATION ON 7 FEBRUARY WITH THE PRIME MINISTER. (PRINCES BANDAR AND SAUD WERE BOTH PRESENT AT THE AUDIENCE). SAUD OPENED UP WITH THE IDEAS HE WAS WORKING ON WITH THE EGYPTIANS AND SYRIANS ON THE ONE HAND, AND GCC PARTNERS ON THE OTHER, TO FORGE WHAT AMOUNTED TO A NEW BASIS FOR ARAB COOPERATION POST WAR. HE WAS NOT THINKING OF A NEW FORMAL ASSOCIATION, BUT OF A RE-DEFINITION OF COMMON PURPOSE BETWEEN THE ARAB STATES OF THE COALITION WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE ARAB LEAGUE, IN WHICH THE PRINCIPLES OF NON-INTERFERENCE AND RESPECT FOR NATIONAL INTEREST WOULD BE RE-STATED. ALONGSIDE THIS WOULD COME A BUILD UP IN THE MILITARY CAPABILITY OF THE GCC STATES IN AN INTEGRATED FASHION (PRESUMABLY DRAWING TOO ON MILITARY SUPPORT FROM EGYPT AND SYRIA). BUILDING UP THE GCC WAS THE TASK OF SULTAN QABOOS' COMMITTEE. SAUD YOUR VIEW THAT SMALLER GULF STATES SHOULD TO BE WEANED OF THEIR NOSTALGIA FOR DEFENCE LINKS WITH THE LIKES OF OURSELVES. THESE IDEAS ON NEW PRINCIPLES, WERE ALSO SPELT OUT IN GRANDILOQUENT FASHION BY THE GCC SECRETARY GENERAL. SAUD EXPLAINED THEY WERE TO BE DISCUSSED AT A KEY MEETING AT FOREIGN MINISTER LEVEL IN CAIRO ON 14 FEBRUARY. MOROCCO WAS INVITED. SAUD SCOUTED THE POSSIBILITY OF DIVERGENCE BETWEEN THE GCC AND THE TRILATERAL ELEMENT IN THIS PARTNERSHIP. (THE OMANI DEPUTY SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE GCC,

MASKERI, WAS LESS SANGUINE: WE UNDERSTAND FROM THE BAHRAINIS HERE THAT THE OMANIS MAY BE ALONE IN OPPOSITION TO THE EGYPTIAN/SYRIAN DIMENSION.) SAUD'S APPROACH TO LONGER TERM REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS HAD AN ARABOCENTRIC QUALITY AND HE EXPRESSED LINGERING MISTRUST OF IRAN WHILE ACCEPTING THAT SOME FORM OF ASSOCIATION WITH HER, AS WITH A FUTURE IRAQ, WOULD NEED TO BE WORKED OUT. SAUD WAS DISINCLINED TO CONSIDER A WIDER INTERNATIONAL OR WESTERN ROLE AT THIS STAGE, SAVE IN KUWAIT, THOUGH HE STRESSED THE NEED TO CONSULT CLOSELY WITH OURSELVES, THE AMERICANS AND THE FRENCH AS LOCAL PLANS EVOLVED. HIS EMPHASIS, AND THAT OF ABDULLAH BISHARA TOO, WAS ON THE NEED TO STRENGTHEN THE GCC'S DEFENSIVE CAPABILITY BEFORE ANY NETWORK OF WIDER REGIONAL UNDERTAKINGS COULD BE DEvised: IN OTHER WORDS ARM UP IN ORDER TO ARM DOWN (YOUR EMPHASIS IN PRESS INTERVIEWS HERE THAT ARMS CONTROL IN THE REGION SHOULD BEGIN WITH NON-CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS WILL BE WELCOME HERE). SAUD WAS DISPARAGING ABOUT THE OPPORTUNIST POLITICAL NATURE OF POPULAR SENTIMENT IN THE MAGHREB STATES, PAKISTAN, SUDAN, YEMEN AND ELSEWHERE. NOR DID SAUD HAVE TIME FOR GRANDIOSE EUROPEAN OR WESTERN BLUEPRINTS FOR REGIONAL CONFERENCES. THE SOUTHERN EUROPEAN STATES WERE OBSESSED WITH THE MAGHREB. CSCM IDEAS WERE PREMATURE: WE HAD TO BUILD FROM THE GROUND UP. YOU SHARED THIS VIEW AND SAID IT HAD RELEVANCE FOR YOUR DISCUSSIONS IN ROME TODAY AND WITH OTHER EUROPEAN PARTNERS.

D) SHORTER TERM SECURITY. SAUD ACKNOWLEDGED THE PROBABLE NEED FOR A CONTINUING MILITARY PRESENCE IN KUWAIT AS A PROTECTIVE SCREEN AND WHILE ORDER WAS RESTORED. THIS SHOULD BE COMPOSED OF PRESENT COALITION FORCES. THERE MIGHT BE A ROLE FOR A UN UMBRELLA AT THIS STAGE AND SOME PART FOR THE SECRETARY GENERAL. BISHARA TALKED OF A UN ENFORCEMENT FORCE. SAUD DEPRECATED THE IDEA OF LETTING CONTROL OF SUCH A FORCE PASS TO NORDICS OR OTHERS WITH NO DIRECT STAKE. BISHARA SAID WE DID NOT WANT ANOTHER UNIFIL THAT ONLY WROTE REPORTS WHEN ATTACKED. SAUD DID HOWEVER ACKNOWLEDGE A POSSIBLE ONGOING UN ROLE IN THE LONGER TERM, PERHAPS CONNECTED TO SCR 598. HE ALSO MENTIONED THE RELEVANCE OF UN MACHINERY TO ACHIEVE THE ELIMINATION OF MASS DESTRUCTION EQUIPMENT IN IRAQ AND ELSEWHERE IN THE REGION.

E) BFME. BFCME SPELT OUT TO YOU THE POSSIBLE MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF THE POST WITHDRAWAL SITUATION FOR BRITISH FORCES IN THEATRE. IT COULD TAKE UP TO TWO YEARS TO HELP CLEAR UP THE ENEMY ORDNANCE SITUATION IN KUWAIT AND TO BACK LIFT BRITISH EQUIPMENT PARTICULARLY IF CONTAMINATED, THOUGH TROOPS AND THE RAF COULD COME OUT FAIRLY QUICKLY. IF WE WERE TO JOIN IN A PROTECTIVE SCREEN IN

KUWAIT THIS COULD REQUIRE THE PRESENCE FOR SEVERAL MONTHS OF AN INFANTRY BRIGADE TO REPLACE THE PRESENT ARMY FORCE. INEVITABLY THE BACK LIFT WOULD INVOLVE A BRITISH MILITARY PRESENCE IN SAUDI ARABIA AS WELL AS KUWAIT FOR SOME TIME AHEAD. WE NEEDED TO WORK OUT OUR APPROACH NOW. SOME MILITARY ELEMENTS MIGHT STAY ON AS ADVISERS. ONCE REINSTATED THE EMBASSY IN KUWAIT WOULD HAVE A SUBSTANTIAL POLITICAL/MILITARY ROLE TO PERFORM AS WELL AS ITS OTHER FUNCTIONS. BRITISH FORCES WOULD HELP TO SECURE AND GUARD OUR COMPOUND. IN A BRIEFING ON ALLIED MILITARY SUCCESS TO DATE, THE RN REPRESENTATIVE WAS CRITICAL OF THE FRENCH LED WEU NAVAL GROUP IN THE SOUTHERN GULF, FROM WHICH THE RN HAD NOW WITHDRAWN TWO SHIPS TO BETTER PURPOSE. BFCME STRESSED NEED TO SECURE EARLY RELEASE OF BRITISH POW'S.

F) ARAB/ISRAEL. YOU POINTED TO THE FACT THAT THE POSITIONS OF THE TWO MAIN PROTAGONISTS WERE DIVERGING WITH OPINION HARDENING IN AN ISRAEL GIVEN CREDIT FOR ITS RESTRAINT WHILE THE PLO AND PALESTINIANS HAD BACKED THE WRONG SIDE. SAUD'S ARGUMENT THAT THE PROSPECT OF A RENEWED EFFORT TO FIND A SOLUTION WOULD CREATE THE CONDITIONS FOR A REINVIGORATED PALESTINIAN LEADERSHIP THE OUTLINES OF WHICH COULD NOT YET BE DISCERNED LACKED CONVICTION. HE FEELS STRONGLY ON THIS SUBJECT AND IS APT TO THINK WISHFULLY. THE KING TOO STRESSED THE NEED FOR NEW EMPHASIS AND A EUROPEAN ROLE. SAUD DID NOT RULE OUT NEW FIGURES EMERGING WITHIN THE PLO OR FROM WITHIN THE OTS. HE DOUBTED KING HUSSEIN'S SUITABILITY TO SPEAK ON PALESTINIAN BEHALF GIVEN HIS LAMENTABLE PERFORMANCE. ALL IN ALL THIS WAS THE LEAST SATISFACTORY PART OF YOUR DISCUSSIONS HERE. CONTINUING HOSTILITY TO ARAFAT WAS EVIDENT. BISHARA CLAIMED THE PLO WERE TRYING TO MUSCLE THEIR WAY INTO THE BELGRADE NAM EXERCISE TO PLEAD IRAQ'S CAUSE. (PRINCE TURKI CAME UP WITH THE FAR-FETCHED IDEA THAT HUSSEIN MIGHT HAVE IN MIND A RENEWED HASHEMITE BID TO RULE IRAQ, WHILE SAUD INDICATED RELIEF THAT THE SYRIANS WERE PREPARED TO SELL OIL TO JORDAN.)

G) BURDEN-SHARING. YOU RAN INTO PREDICTABLE SAUDI RESISTANCE TO MAKE A FURTHER CONTRIBUTION TO OUR COSTS. SAUD TOLD YOU A DEUX, PERHAPS DISINGENUOUSLY, THAT SAUDIS HAD EXPECTED US TO GET A SHARE OF THE DOLLARS 13.5 BILLION PROMISED TO THE AMERICANS AND PROTESTED SAUDI ARABIA HAD RUN OUT OF MONEY AND WAS HAVING TO GO THROUGH A HUMILIATING BORROWING ORDEAL. WHEN YOU POINTED TO THE KUWAITI CONTRIBUTION AND OUR GROWING BURDEN HE HAD ANOTHER WORD WITH THE KING WHICH PRODUCED A STATEMENT BY THE LATTER OF WARM APPRECIATION FOR OUR MILITARY CONTRIBUTION AND AN UNDERTAKING THAT SAUDI ARABIA WOULD DO WHAT IT COULD TO SHARE OUR FINANCIAL BURDEN.

PRINCE SAUD WOULD DISCUSS FURTHER WITH US. WE NOW AWAIT THE OUTCOME AND HAVE GIVEN SAUD A RUN-DOWN OF CONTRIBUTIONS TO DATE FROM ELSEWHERE. IT LOOKS AS THOUGH THE SAUDIS MAY COME UP WITH AN OFFER THOUGH THIS IS UNLIKELY TO BE ON THE KUWAITI SCALE. THEY ARE INDEED STRAPPED FOR CASH AND COLLECTING DONATIONS MAY PROVE ANOTHER MATTER. BUT THE OUTCOME WAS HELPFUL SO FAR AS IT WENT. I SHALL BE FOLLOWING UP WITH SAUD. ON THE BROADER ECONOMIC FRONT THE KING MADE IT PLAIN THAT THE UNPRECEDENTED WARMTH OF OUR RELATIONS POINTED TO YET CLOSER COOPERATION HENCEFORWARD. I AM SURE HE MEANS THIS.

4. ON THE MEDIA FRONT YOU GAVE A WELL ATTENDED PRESS CONFERENCE WHICH ENABLED YOU TO RESTATE OUR COMMON PURPOSE AND TO EMPHASISE THE PRIME ROLE OF REGIONAL STATES IN SETTING PLANS FOR FUTURE SECURITY, WITH IDEAS NOW IN EVIDENCE. YOU ALSO GAVE AN INTERVIEW ON THE BRITISH FORCES BROADCASTING NETWORK. YOUR GATHERING WITH BRITISH EMBASSY STAFF AND SOME OF THE COMMUNITY WAS CURTAILED BY THE KING'S SUMMONS BUT YOUR WORDS OF ENCOURAGEMENT WERE APPRECIATED. SAUD WAS ALSO APPRECIATIVE OF OUR PROMPT ACTION OVER THE OIL SPILL AND ON WILDLIFE PROTECTION.

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SIC I9M

MY TELNO 254: IRAQ/KUWAIT: SECURITY COUNCIL

SUMMARY

1. DISCUSSION WITH US PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE ON HANDLING OF SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING ON IRAQ/KUWAIT ON 13 FEBRUARY.

DETAIL

2. I DISCUSSED WITH THE US PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE ON 11 FEBRUARY OUR HANDLING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING SCHEDULED FOR 13 FEBRUARY TO DISCUSS IRAQ/KUWAIT. ON A NUMBER OF POINTS PICKERING PUT FORWARD IDEAS WHICH HE HAD NOT/NOT DISCUSSED WITH THE STATE DEPARTMENT, AND PARTICULAR CARE SHOULD BE TAKEN TO PROTECT HIS CONFIDENCE.

3. PICKERING SAID HE HAD SEEN BOLTON (STATE DEPARTMENT) EARLIER IN THE DAY IN NEW YORK: THE LATTER WAS NOW MUCH MORE REASONABLE ABOUT THE PROSPECT OF A FORMAL MEETING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO DISCUSS IRAQ/KUWAIT PROVIDED IT WAS PRIVATE. HE DID NOT EXPECT FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS FROM WASHINGTON VARYING HIS STANDING INSTRUCTIONS TO RESIST ANY FORMAL MEETING, BUT FELT HE HAD A SUFFICIENT BASIS ON WHICH TO OPERATE IN WORKING FOR A PRIVATE MEETING. WE AGREED HOWEVER THAT IF, AS SEEMED LIKELY, THERE NEEDED TO BE A VOTE ON WHETHER TO HOLD THE MEETING IN PRIVATE, THIS COULD BE A CLOSE-RUN THING. ON PAPER WE PROBABLY HAD THE VOTES (FOUR PERMANENT MEMBERS, ROMANIA, AUSTRIA, BELGIUM AND AT LEAST TWO OUT OF THREE AFRICANS): BUT IF THE FRENCH WOBBLED THEY COULD TAKE THE BELGIANS AND THE FRANCOPHONE AFRICANS WITH THEM. PICKERING SAID THAT US MISSIONS WOULD BE LOBBYING IN THE

CAPITALS OF SECURITY COUNCIL MEMBERS ON THE LINES THAT WHILE WASHINGTON REMAINED OPPOSED TO ANY FORMAL MEETING OF THE COUNCIL, IF ONE HAD TO BE HELD IT SHOULD BE IN PRIVATE.

(COMMENT: IT MIGHT BE AS WELL FOR US TO DO LIKEWISE TO AVOID OUR APPEARING LESS COMMITTED TO THIS APPROACH. THE FRENCH MISSION TOLD US LATER IN THE DAY THAT THEY DID NOT YET HAVE FINAL INSTRUCTIONS ON THE POSITION TO TAKE IF IT CAME TO A VOTE: THEY WERE '90 PER CENT CERTAIN' OF RECEIVING INSTRUCTIONS TO VOTE IN FAVOUR, BUT THERE WOULD ALSO BE THOSE IN PARIS ARGUING FOR AN ABSTENTION WHICH WOULD BETTER MEET MAGHREBI SENSITIVITIES.)

4. WE DISCUSSED HOW BEST TO PREPARE THE WAY FOR A PRIVATE MEETING. WE AGREED WE WOULD EACH SPEAK TO THE (ZIMBABWEAN) PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL TO ASK HOW HE PROPOSED TO HANDLE THE INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS OF CORY. AT THOSE CONSULTATIONS WE WOULD CONTINUE TO LAY OUT THE ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR OF A PRIVATE MEETING. THE BEST OUTCOME WOULD BE FOR THE PRESIDENT TO CONCLUDE ON THE BASIS OF THOSE CONSULTATIONS AND THE MAJORITY VIEW THERE EXPRESSED THAT HE SHOULD FORMALLY PROPOSE HOLDING THE FORMAL MEETING IN PRIVATE. BUT THE ZIMBABWEAN MIGHT WELL SHY AWAY FROM DOING THIS. THE COUNCIL WOULD THEN HAVE TO MEET FIRST IN PUBLIC AND THEN DEBATE AND VOTE ON A PROPOSAL THAT IT SHOULD CONTINUE IN PRIVATE. WE SHOULD HANDLE THIS PROCEDURALLY IN A WAY WHICH WOULD GAIN US THE MAXIMUM SYMPATHY AMONG THOSE WHO MIGHT BE TEMPTED TO WOBBLE. FOR EXAMPLE WE SHOULD NOT RESIST A PROPOSAL THAT THE AGENDA SHOULD BE ADOPTED AT THE PUBLIC FORMAL MEETING BEFORE A VOTE ON THE FORMAT OF THE MEETING (PRIVATE OR PUBLIC) WAS TAKEN.

5. WE AGREED THAT IN THE MEETING WHICH FOLLOWED WE SHOULD HAVE TO FIND PROCEDURAL WAYS OF MAKING THE DEBATE AS MUCH OF A DIALOGUE AS POSSIBLE. THOSE WHO CAME FORWARD WITH PREPARED STATEMENTS SHOULD BE PUT ON THE SPOT AND FORCED TO DEFEND ANY PROPOSALS (EG FOR A PAUSE OR A CEASEFIRE) WHICH THEY MADE. THE SAME WOULD HAVE TO BE OUR STRATEGY EVEN IF WE COULD NOT PREVENT THE COUNCIL FROM MEETING IN PUBLIC.

6. WE AGREED THAT IT WOULD NOT BE WISE (AND WOULD PROBABLY NOT BE POSSIBLE) TO RESIST PRESSURE, IN THE EVENT OF A PRIVATE MEETING, FOR HAVING THE VERBATIM RECORD PUBLISHED IN THE NORMAL WAY. THAT WAS THE PRECEDENT ESTABLISHED DURING THE LAST THREE OCCASIONS THE COUNCIL HAD MET IN PRIVATE. THIS WOULD IN FACT GIVE US A BETTER DEFENCE AGAINST THE CRITICISM THAT WE WERE WRONG TO EXCLUDE THE MEDIA.

7. FINALLY WE DISCUSSED THE POSSIBILITY OF A RESOLUTION BEING BROUGHT FORWARD WHEN THE COUNCIL MET. A RESOLUTION CALLING FOR AN UNCONDITIONAL CEASEFIRE WOULD PROBABLY RECEIVE LITTLE SUPPORT AT THIS STAGE. WE WOULD HAVE TO VOTE AGAINST. WHILE STRICTLY SPEAKING IT WOULD NOT BE A VETO BECAUSE THE RESOLUTION WOULD NOT HAVE ATTRACTED SUFFICIENT POSITIVE VOTES, THE MEDIA (AND SADDAM AND HIS FRIENDS) WOULD NO DOUBT SAY WE HAD VETOED IT. ANOTHER POSSIBILITY WAS A RESOLUTION ON THE AVOIDANCE OF CIVILIAN CASUALTIES: WE WOULD HAVE TO RE-WRITE ANYTHING ON THIS ISSUE SO THAT IT AMOUNTED TO NO MORE THAN A COMMITMENT TO OBSERVE THE LAWS OF WAR. I ARGUED THAT IN EITHER EVENTUALITY OUR POSITION WOULD BE STRENGTHENED IF WE HAD PRE-EMPTED SUCH A DRAFT BY TABLING A SHORT, CLEAR DRAFT OF OUR OWN REAFFIRMING THE EXISTING RESOLUTIONS OF THE COUNCIL, AND CALLING ON IRAQ TO COMPLY WITH THEM. PICKERING SAID HE PERSONALLY AGREED. HE WOULD CONSIDER HOW BEST TO BRING WASHINGTON ROUND TO THAT VIEW.

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10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

10 February 1991

Dear Sir,

BURDEN-SHARING: KUWAIT

The Prime Minister was very pleased to learn of the Foreign Secretary's success in securing a substantial financial contribution from the Kuwaiti Government. He thinks it would now be right for him to send a letter of gratitude to the Amir. I should be grateful for a draft as soon as possible.

I am copying this letter to Jeremy Heywood (Office of the Chief Secretary, HM Treasury), Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely,
C.D. Powell

C.D. POWELL

Richard Gozney, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth office.

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MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB
Telephone 071-21 82111/3

MO 6/17/15/1S

10th February 1991

CD 1072

Dear Charles

GULF REPORT

I attach the mid-day report prepared for MOD Ministers on operations in the Gulf.

Yours sincerely

(S J AMBLER-EDWARDS) (Miss)
Private Secretary

Sir Charles Powell KCMG
No 10 Downing Street

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THE GULF CONFLICT

BRIEFING FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE - SITREP No. 68

SITUATION AS AT 1300Z, 10 FEBRUARY 1991

Contains

1. Classified sitrep

This sitrep does not contain any unclassified material for use by Ministers

Distribution attached

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SEC(O)(C) AFTERNOON BRIEF, 10 FEBRUARY 1991

Summary

- No significant developments since 0800Z sitrep.

General Situation

- Allied air campaign continues. UK aircraft continue to concentrate on petroleum and ammunition sites and bridges.
- Low level of Iraqi military activity continues as both air and ground forces sustain themselves under Allied air campaign.

Political

- At a press conference this morning the Foreign Secretary reported that a post-war Gulf security structure was beginning to take shape with Arab states in the region taking a leading role.
- The Kuwaiti government-in-exile has promised Britain £660M as a contribution towards UK Gulf costs.
- Iraq has formally notified the United States of her intention to break off diplomatic relations.
- Soviet leader President Gorbachev has said that the Allies risked exceeding the UN mandate to get Iraqi forces out of Kuwait. He will be sending a personal envoy to Iraq.
- Israeli Defence Minister, Moshe Arens, to meet with Dick Cheney in Washington on Monday.

UK Operations

Air Operations

- 4 Tornado GR1s and 2 Buccaneers attacked a road bridge near Tallil and An Nasiriyah (1 on attached map). All 12 LGBs hit and the bridge which has been hit before was further damaged. Bridge now assessed as unusable.
- 7 Tornado GR1s armed with 1000lb bombs attacked an ammunition store in the vicinity of Tall Al Lahn (2). All reported hits on target and all recovered safely.
- 4 Tornado GR1s and 2 Buccaneer attacked Bayji petroleum refinery (3). Target was smoking when planes first arrived. First 4 LGBs hit causing fires and secondary explosions. Last 4 bombs did not guide due to smoke obscuring target, but did land on target site.

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- 2 Tornado GR1As successfully completed separate recce missions. First located infantry trenches, bunkers, field guns, microwave relay communications masts and logistic storage areas. No military activity was detected from good quality imagery from second. Both aircraft recovered safely.
- 8 Tornado GR1s from Dhahran attacked the Al Basrah petrol refinery (4). 7 reported hits, 1 aircraft air aborted. Several secondary explosions seen.
- 4 Tornado GR1 and 2 Buccaneers from Muharraq carried out LGB attacks on Al Fallujah highway bridge (5). Smoke from adjacent oil refinery caused lasing difficulties with result that bombs missed the bridge.
- 3 Jaguars from Muharraq armed with CBU 87 attacked an artillery position 7 miles SE of Kuwait International Airport (6). No battle damage assessment.
- 7 Jaguars from Muharraq armed with CBU 87 attacked a Silkworm site in Kuwait (7). Good results reported.
- 4 Tornado GR1 and 2 Buccaneers carried out LGB attacks on Ar Ramadi highway bridge (8). Target in clear for first 6 bombs, but drifting smoke from adjacent refinery denied lasing late in attack causing bombs to miss.
- 2 Tornado GR1 from Tabuk, attacked an artillery production plant near Habbaniyah (9). Hits from first aircraft were observed.
- 3 Tornado GR1 from Tabuk attacked an artillery production plant in vicinity of Saddam International Airport (10). 2 hits and 1 probable claimed.
- Final 3 Buccaneers are due to arrive at Muharraq today bringing the total in theatre to 12.
- RAF combat sorties as at 101100Z:

	since 100100Z	total
Tornado GR1	29	858
Tornado GR1A	1	63
Jaguar	10	342
Tornado F3	6	433
Buccaneer	4	44
Nimrod	0	47
AAR (Victor, VC10K, Tristar)	10	380
	60	2166
Non-combat sorties:		1330
		3496

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Navy Operations

- Following death of civilian Mr Foy of RFA Sir Galahad, a fellow crew member, Mr Craggs, has been arrested under Naval Discipline Act and is currently being held in military custody in Bahrain. A decision on whether to transfer Mr Craggs to civil jurisdiction is to be taken on Monday. Mr Craggs' NOK have expressed a wish that his name should not be released.
- In light of current operational situation, it is intended that CARDIFF and BRAZEN should return to the UK in accordance with the original planned roulement. They will depart Gulf on 15 January. GLOUCESTER and LONDON will continue in the Gulf for up to three more weeks.

Army Operations

- 2 replacement AVREs will fly out on 18 February in a C5 from the UK.

Allied Operations

- RSAF will today attack battlefield preparation targets. Kuwait, Qatari, French and Bahraini fighters will attack armour and artillery sites in the KTO. Canadian fighters will conduct escort and defensive counter air missions.
- Minor artillery exchanges between Saudi and Iraqi forces took place last night.

Iraqi activity

- No SCUD attacks last night although there are reports of a possible failed launch from south of Al Basrah at 0357Z.
- Another 2 Iraqi aircraft fled to Iran yesterday.

Logistics

- MV HANSA LINK, chartered to transport the Romanian Field Hospital from Constanta, loaded and sailed yesterday. ETA Al Jubayl is 23 February

Media reports and coverage

- UK Sunday press cover B52s flight from RAF Fairford and speculate on timing of land campaign.
- German magazine Der Spiegel reports that a German construction firm, Strabag Bau AG, broke the UN embargo against Iraq about 670 times between August and December last year. The firm is alleged to have delivered construction plans, chemicals, trucking equipment and gas

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masks to Iraq via a company in Amman.

- Media reports that Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Hamadi has said that the Red Cross will not have access to Allied POWs while the allies continue to bomb civilian targets.

Other issues

- An opinion poll in the Sunday Times shows 85% approving the war and 68% being ready to pay increased taxes to help with the costs involved.

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THE GULF CONFLICT - BRIEFING FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

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10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

10 February 1991

Dear Sir,

BURDEN-SHARING: HONG KONG

I have seen your proposal in FCO telegrams nos. 120 and 121 to Cairo that the Prime Minister should send a message of thanks to the Governor for Hong Kong's contribution to the costs of our military deployment in the Gulf. I am sure the Prime Minister would be happy to write in the terms proposed. I should be grateful if the message could be delivered as soon as possible.

Yours sincerely,

C.D. POWELL

Simon Gass, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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On SF 2

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FM FCO
TO IMMEDIATE CAIRO
TELNO 121
OF 081630Z FEBRUARY 91

MIPT: GULF BURDENSARING: HONG KONG: DRAFT MESSAGE

1. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF A DRAFT MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME
MINISTER TO THE GOVERNOR:

QUOTE WE HAVE ALREADY GIVEN A PUBLIC WELCOME TO THE DECISION
BY THE LEGCO FINANCE COMMITTEE ON 8 FEBRUARY TO MAKE A
VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTION OF POUNDS 15 MILLION TOWARDS OUR COSTS
ARISING FROM THE GULF CONFLICT. THIS DONATION IS VERY MUCH
APPRECIATED HERE AND I HOPE THAT YOU WILL PASS ON MY
GRATITUDE.

I SHOULD LIKE TO ADD MY WARM PERSONAL THANKS FOR YOUR
EFFORTS IN BRINGING THIS ABOUT. I KNOW THAT THIS WAS A
HIGHLY SENSITIVE ISSUE IN HONG KONG AND THAT A DONATION OF
THIS SIZE WAS NOT ACHIEVED WITHOUT A GREAT DEAL OF POLITICAL
EFFORT AND SKILL ON YOUR PART. AGAIN, VERY MANY THANKS.
UNQUOTE.

HURD

YYYY

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(2)

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB
Telephone 071-21 82111/3

MO 6/17/15/1J

10th February 1991

Dear Dominic

Re Minister
Will be announced while you are
in Geneva. CBJ 10/2

THE GULF: TELEPHONE CALLS

The Prime Minister may wish to be aware of a proposal by Cable and Wireless, British Aerospace and National Westminster to provide service personnel in the Gulf with a free Mercury phone card for three months. Discussions between MOD officials and the companies are continuing through the weekend to determine how we can ensure that all service personnel in the Gulf benefit equally from this (and not simply those with access to the card-operated telephone booths Mercury have installed). A press conference to announce this is scheduled for the morning of 11th February. Although details are not yet fixed, we hope that there will be Ministerial involvement in this launch.

I attach a short note on this proposal, together with a fact-sheet on the Gulf welfare telephone service and the new offer.

Yours ever *Sam*

(S J AMBLER-EDWARDS) (MISS)
Private Secretary

Dominic Morris Esq
10 Downing Street

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FREE CALLS FOR THE GULF TROOPS

Outline brief

Cable & Wireless, British Aerospace and National Westminster Bank have pledged a total of £1 million to pay for Mercury phone cards to be issued free to troops in Saudi Arabia. These can be used in the more than 80 payphones installed or currently being installed in various bases in Saudi.

The cards will be of face value £10, which buys approximately 8 minutes conversation with UK or Europe. Each card will bear the name of the sponsoring company.

At the press conference on Monday 11 February, a wider initiative will be announced to appeal for other companies to join the three initiators, to allow more cards to be sent out. Advertising space is being booked in London "heavy" newspapers to back this appeal.

Present at the press conference will be Lord Young of Cable & Wireless, and senior representation from the other two companies, plus Commodore Rutherford and possibly Colonel English.

Colonel English has alerted us to the need to avoid drawing funds away from the Gulf Trust. Provision will be made in the wording of the appeal to allow surplus from the phonecards appeal to be put into the Gulf Trust.

GULF TELEPHONES - BULL POINTS BRIEF

Existing system

Mercury

- Mercury phone card operated equipment
- Established mid-December
- 55 phones operational now
- 71 phones operational by next week
- 100 phones in-theatre by end of next week
- main coverage Al Jubayl (Camp 4 and Old Port)
- phones also at Dharhan, 33 Fd Hosp, King Khalid International
- 148,000 f4 cards supplied December: all used
- 100,000 f4 cards supplied January
- 100,000 mix of f4/f10 cards planned for February

- principal users: 1 Armd Div and supporting troops around Al Jubayl

Cable & Wireless Offer

- pledge of f1M from C&W, Nat West and B&E, to provide at least 2 free f10 phone cards to all personnel in the Gulf
- (based on f10 x 40,000 troops x 2 = f800K)
- f10 phone card will buy 8 mins
- appeal to other companies to pay for further cards to sustain the offer.

POINTS TO MAKE

- Welcome this generous offer. Sure it will serve as a further boost to morale. Extremely grateful to the companies for this gesture of support.

- Recognise the importance of enabling Service families to keep in touch during these difficult times. Hence our own concession introduced in January, which has been very well received. This offer will enhance our own arrangements in a very helpful way.

- Sure that other companies will wish to play their part in sustaining this offer.

Defensive lines to take

- No reflection on our own concessionary arrangements. Complements them, rather than replaces them.

- Confident that offer will not lead to congestion on phone lines; not all personnel will have constant access to phones, thus load should be evened out.


- Not a catching up exercise to match arrangements for US troops; they do not receive free phone calls, nor have they yet, as far as we know, introduced any similar concessions.

BT

- UK/Germany "Desert Direct Service"
- established end-December
- available to all personnel with access to Saudi telephone network
- BT claim heavy usage of the service

MOD concession

- f10 a month for all personnel in the Gulf
- announced by SoFS in the House on 31 January
- similar concession to that available to troops in N.Ireland
- examples of application: 5xf4 cards a month at f2 a month; 1xf10 card a mth
- concession management for users of BT system more complex; details being finalised
- charges before concession Mercury - f4 for 3 mins; BT - f1.15 a min
- concession equivalent to free 8-10 min call a mth



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FCO PLEASE ADVANCE TO PS/NO 10

MY TELNO 409: SECRETARY OF STATE'S TALK WITH PRINCE SAUD,
10 FEBRUARY

SUMMARY

1. FULL DISCUSSION OF REGIONAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS. PRINCE SAUD SAYS PRACTICAL AND IMMEDIATE ARRANGEMENTS FOR GULF SECURITY WILL BE NEEDED, DISMISSES CSCM. ALLIED TROOPS SHOULD STAY ON THE IRAQ/KUWAIT BORDER, IF NEED BE WITH BLUE BERETS. GULF STATES MUST BUILD UP THEIR OWN DEFENCES. THIS WILL BE FOCUS OF SULTAN QABOOS' COMMITTEE. EMPHASIS ON ARAB ASPECT. EGYPT/SYRIA/GCC CONFIGURATION NOT INTENDED TO REPLACE ARAB LEAGUE. SAUDI SUSPICION OF IRAN. PRINCE SAUD AGAIN SAYS THAT PROBLEM OF PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATION WILL FALL AWAY IF PALESTINIANS ARE OFFERED REAL HOPE OF PROGRESS.

DETAIL

2. THE SECRETARY OF STATE HAD A TETE A TETE MEETING WITH PRINCE SAUD AT THE FOREIGN MINISTRY TODAY, 10 FEBRUARY, FOLLOWED BY A PLENARY MEETING. THIS TELEGRAM REPORTS DISCUSSION AT THE LATTER ON REGIONAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS AND ARAB/ISRAEL.

REGIONAL SECURITY

3. PRINCE SAUD COMMENTED ON HOW EFFECTIVE COOPERATION HAD BEEN BETWEEN THE UNITS OF THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE. ARRANGEMENTS FOR FUTURE SECURITY MUST NOT FALL SHORT OF THE SACRIFICE NOW BEING MADE. THE PRESENT SITUATION PROVIDED POINTERS FOR THE FUTURE. UTILISATION OF THE UN WAS RIGHT. THINGS MUST BE TACKLED BETWEEN THE COUNTRIES OF THE REGION, BEFORE BEING DISCUSSED IN THE PUBLIC ARENA. SOME OF THE UNREALISTIC BLUEPRINTS FLOATING AROUND COULD OBSTRUCT PROGRESS. SYRIA, EGYPT AND THE GCC STATES (AND OTHERS WHO WISHED TO ATTEND PRINCE SAUD MENTIONED MOROCCO BUT WAS UNCERTAIN

WHETHER THEY WOULD DO SO) WOULD ATTEND THE FOREIGN MINISTERS' MEETING IN CAIRO ON 14 FEBRUARY. THE MEETING WAS INTENDED TO CLEAR MINDS. THE ISSUE WAS ONE FOR THE ARAB WORLD, AND NOT JUST THE GULF STATES. THEREAFTER THE COUNTRIES INVOLVED MUST TALK THINGS THROUGH WITH OTHER MEMBERS OF THE COALITION.

4. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT THE CAIRO MEETING WAS VERY WELCOME. IT DEMONSTRATED THAT THERE WAS NO VACUUM ON SECURITY ISSUES. SAUDI ARABIA WOULD BE THE PIVOT OF FUTURE ARRANGEMENTS. THE UK'S STANCE WAS CLEAR. WE HAD A LIVELY INTEREST IN THE SUBJECT, BUT IT WAS NOT FOR OUTSIDERS TO PRODUCE BLUEPRINTS. WE WOULD CONSIDER OUR RESPONSE, IF ASKED TO PLAY A PART WHETHER IN A UN OR OTHER CONTEXT. THE SMALLER GULF STATES HAD EXPRESSED INTEREST IN NEW, FORMAL ARRANGEMENTS WITH THE UK. WE HAD CAUTIONED THEM AGAINST AN UNREALISTICALLY NOSTALGIC APPROACH.

5. PRINCE SAUD SAID THE IMMEDIATE PRIORITIES WERE TO REVERSE THE IRAQI OCCUPATION OF KUWAIT AND TO PREVENT REPETITION OF AGGRESSION. THIS WOULD REQUIRE AN EFFECTIVE MILITARY PRESENCE ON THE KUWAIT/IRAQ BORDER. HE DID NOT THINK THE KUWAITIS WOULD BE ATTRACTED BY TALK OF NORDIC TROOPS. THEY WOULD PREFER COALITION TROOPS TO STAY. THOSE TROOPS WOULD BE THERE IN ACCORDANCE WITH UN RESOLUTIONS AND THERE WAS NO REASON WHY THEY COULD NOT WEAR BLUE BERETS. THE UN MIGHT ALSO BE INVOLVED IN DEALING WITH WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION IN THE MIDDLE EAST, ON WHICH A UN CONVENTION COULD BE NEEDED. INVOLVEMENT ON THIS ASPECT WOULD NOT BE SUCH A BIG LEAP FOR THE UN.

6. PRINCE SAUD SAID IT WAS EASY TO UNDERSTAND THE ANXIETY OF THE SMALLER GULF STATES, BUT SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION OF THE CURRENT CONFLICT SHOULD GO SOME WAY TO RESTORE CONFIDENCE. THE GULF STATES MUST CONCENTRATE ON DEVELOPING THEIR OWN MILITARY RESOURCES AND FACILITIES (COALITION FORCES WOULD HAVE BEEN AT A LOSS WITHOUT THOSE WHICH SAUDI ARABIA HAD IN PLACE). THEY MUST DEVELOP A CAPABILITY SUFFICIENT TO HOLD AN AGGRESSOR UNTIL A PROPER INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE COULD BE PUT TOGETHER. IF SUCH A CAPABILITY HAD BEEN IN PLACE ON 2 AUGUST, KUWAIT WOULD NOT HAVE SUFFERED AS IT HAD. SULTAN QABOOS' COMMITTEE WOULD FOCUS ON PRACTICAL MEASURES SUCH AS THIS, BOTH SHORT AND LONG TERM, AND WAS LIKELY TO BEGIN WORK SOON AFTER THE CAIRO MEETING.

7. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT DISCUSSION OF GULF SECURITY AMONG THE EUROPEANS HAD BEEN SOMEWHAT UNREALISTIC. IN ADDRESSING THE GULF ISSUE, SPAIN AND ITALY, AND TO A CERTAIN EXTENT FRANCE,

WERE MORE FOCUSED ON THE MAGHREB THAN THE GULF. PRINCE SAUD SAID THAT THE HELSINKI DECLARATION, WITH ITS COVERAGE OF ISSUES SUCH AS SOCIAL JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS, HAD NO RELEVANCE TO THE IMMEDIATE SECURITY PROBLEMS OF THE GULF STATES. THE CSCM APPROACH WAS IMPRACTICAL. SOME OF THE EUROPEANS WERE OBSESSED WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF TURMOIL IN THE ARAB WORLD. THEY WANTED TO DEMONSTRATE TO THE MASSES, PARTICULARLY IN THE MAGHREB, THAT THEIR HEARTS WERE IN THE RIGHT PLACE. PRINCE SAUD WAS STRUCK BY THE FACT THAT THE SPANISH FOREIGN MINISTER HAD GONE TO THE MAGHREB TO TALK ABOUT THE GULF CRISIS. HE SHOULD HAVE VISITED THE GULF INSTEAD.

8. IN ANSWER TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S QUESTION, PRINCE SAUD SAID THAT THE CAIRO MEETING WAS INTENDED TO AGREE GENERAL PRINCIPLES FOR FUTURE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS. THE INTENTION WAS TO LEARN FROM EXPERIENCE, REPAIR THOSE PARTS OF THE EXISTING SYSTEM WHICH HAD BROKEN DOWN AND ENHANCE FUTURE COLLECTIVE SECURITY, NOT TO DO AWAY WITH EXISTING STRUCTURES. PARTICIPANTS WOULD REAFFIRM THEIR COMMITMENT TO THE ARAB LEAGUE. THEY WERE NOT IN THE BUSINESS OF CREATING A SUB-GROUP LIKE THE ACC. ALL ARAB COUNTRIES WOULD BE INVITED TO JOIN IN THE PROCESS INITIATED IN CAIRO.

9. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT THE MORE CLOSELY THE NON-ARAB MEMBERS OF THE COALITION SUCH AS THE UK WERE KEPT INFORMED, THE BETTER ABLE THEY WOULD BE TO HELP. PRINCE SAUD SAID THAT EVERYBODY IN THE REGION WAS AWARE OF THE ROLE THE UK WAS PLAYING. THE REGIONAL ALLIES MUST OF COURSE DISCUSS FUTURE ARRANGEMENTS WITH US. THEY WOULD DO SO WITH OPEN MINDS AND HEARTS.

10. THE SECRETARY OF STATE ASKED ABOUT IRAN'S ROLE IN REGIONAL SECURITY. PRINCE SAUD SAID THE SAUDIS HAD TOLD THE IRANIANS THAT THEY HAD NO INHIBITIONS ABOUT DEALING WITH THEM IN THE CONTEXT OF GULF SECURITY. THEY RECOGNISED THAT IRAN MUST BE INVOLVED. BUT THE IRANIAN POSITION WAS AMBIGUOUS. IRAN HAD NOT SUCCEEDED IN DISPELLING GULF DOUBTS ABOUT THEIR REAL INTENTIONS, EVEN IN THE CASE OF GULF STATES THAT MAINTAINED GOOD RELATIONS WITH IRAN. THE ONUS OF PROOF WAS ON THE IRANIANS. THEY HAD ADOPTED A GOOD POSITION ON THE OCCUPATION OF KUWAIT, THOUGH IT REMAINED TO BE SEEN WHAT THE LATEST IRAN/IRAQ TALKS WOULD PRODUCE. BUT IN OTHER CONTEXTS EG HOSTAGES, THE PILGRIMAGE, AND DEFECTING IRAQI AIRCRAFT THEY HAD NOT BEEN STRAIGHT FORWARD. THEY CONTINUED FOR EXAMPLE TO INSIST THAT THEY HAD GIVEN REFUGE TO ONLY 24 PLANES. THEY SUPPORTED TERRORISM, AND MAINTAINED THEIR PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE GULF STATES. PRINCE SAUD AGREED WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE THAT PRESIDENT RAFSANJANI SEEMED TO BE IN CONTROL, BUT NOT YET ABLE FULLY TO CHANGE

IRANIAN POLICIES.

ARAB/ISRAEL

11. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT THERE WAS A GENERAL CONSENSUS ON THE URGENT NEED TO ADDRESS THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM ONCE THE CURRENT CONFLICT WAS OVER. THE PROBLEM WAS THAT THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT HAD BECOME MORE CONFIDENT IN ITS REJECTION OF DIALOGUE WITH THE PALESTINIANS AS A RESULT OF THE CREDIT IT HAD WON FROM RESTRAINT IN THE GULF WAR, WHILE THE PLO HAD PUT ITSELF ENTIRELY IN THE WRONG BY ALIGNING WITH SADDAM. IT WAS DIFFICULT TO SEE THE WAY FORWARD. PRINCE SAUD REPEATED HIS POINT OF THE PREVIOUS EVENING, THAT IF THERE WAS A PROCESS WHICH OFFERED SOME CHANCE OF SUCCESS DIFFICULTIES OVER PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATION WOULD FALL AWAY. IF THE US ACTED WITH ISRAEL, EGYPT AND SYRIA, AND OTHER ARAB STATES INCLUDING SAUDI ARABIA, WOULD BE ABLE TO DO SO WITH THE PALESTINIANS. BUT THE PROCESS COULD NOT BE ENTIRELY ONESIDED. POST-CONFLICT, THE AMERICAN PEOPLE WOULD RECOGNISE THE NEED FOR STABILITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST. PRESIDENT BUSH STOOD HIGH IN THE OPINION POLLS. THEN WOULD BE THE MOMENT TO MOVE. THE SECRETARY OF STATE POINTED OUT THE CONSTRAINTS ON THE US ADMINISTRATION, BUT AGREED THAT, WITHOUT MOVEMENT, PALESTINIAN FRUSTRATIONS WOULD BOIL OVER IN A RENEWED INTIFADA. PRINCE SAUD SAID THAT THIS TIME THERE WOULD BE AN INTIFADA IN JORDAN TOO. IN ANSWER TO A QUESTION ABOUT INVOLVING PALESTINIANS IN A JOINT ARAB NEGOTIATING TEAM, PRINCE SAUD SAID THAT THE IDEA OF A COMPOSITE ARAB DELEGATION WAS ALREADY ON THE TABLE. HE SPOKE DISMISSIVELY OF ARAFAT, BUT ARAFAT HAD NOT REJECTED THE FORTHCOMING STAND ON UNSCR 242 AND 338 HE HAD ANNOUNCED IN GENEVA. ALL PLAYERS WERE KEEPING THEIR OPTIONS OPEN, BUT NONE WOULD MOVE UNTIL THERE WAS SOMETHING ON OFFER.

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SIC I9M

FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

FCO PLEASE ADVANCE TO PS/NO 10

SECRETARY OF STATE'S TALKS WITH PRINCE SAUD, 9-10 FEBRUARY

1. THE SECRETARY OF STATE TALKED TO PRINCE SAUD OVER DINNER ON 9 FEBRUARY AND AT THE FOREIGN MINISTRY ON 10 FEBRUARY. PRINCE TURKI (GID) ATTENDED. THIS TELEGRAM REPORTS DISCUSSION ON:

- THE GULF CONFLICT
- THE PALESTINIANS
- JORDAN
- IRAN
- PAKISTAN

THE GULF CONFLICT

2. THE SECRETARY OF STATE ASKED ABOUT THE EFFECT ON PUBLIC OPINION IN SAUDI ARABIA OF REPORTS OF CIVILIAN CASUALTIES AND DAMAGE IN IRAQ. PRINCE SAUD SAID THAT THE SAUDIS HAD BEEN UNITED IN THEIR OPPOSITION TO SADDAM HUSSEIN BY WHAT HE HAD DONE TO THE KUWAITIS, BY THE MISSILE ATTACKS ON SAUDI ARABIA AND BY THE IRAQI INVASION OF AL-KHAFJI. PRINCE SAUD SAID THAT THE PICTURE HAD BEEN DISTORTED BY WESTERN TELEVISION. OFFICIAL IRAQI STATEMENTS SHOWED THAT CASUALTIES AND DAMAGE WERE IN FACT LIMITED. IN ANSWER TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S QUESTION HE SAID THAT SOME OF THE EARLY GRUMBLINGS ABOUT THE PRESENCE OF FOREIGN TROOPS IN SAUDI ARABIA HAD DISAPPEARED. THE ONLY TARGET ATTACKED BY FRIDAY SERMONS NOW WAS SADDAM HUSSEIN. IN THE MAGHREB THE PEOPLE WERE USING THE ISSUE AS A STICK WITH WHICH TO BEAT THEIR OWN GOVERNMENTS, ESPECIALLY IN MOROCCO. OVERALL PRINCE SAUD HAD BEEN EXPECTING A MORE INTENSE REACTION IN THE ARAB WORLD TO THE BOMBING OF IRAQ. EVEN IN IRAQ

ITSELF THE REACTION WAS ONLY LIMITED.

3. PRINCE SAUD SUGGESTED SADDAM MIGHT SHOW INTEREST IN IRANIAN IDEA ON WITHDRAWAL AND CEASEFIRE. THE SECRETARY OF STATE ASKED WHAT WE WOULD NEED TO SEE HAPPEN IF SADDAM HUSSEIN SAID HE WOULD ACCEPT RAFSANJANI'S PROPOSALS. THE IRAQIS WOULD HAVE TO START MOVING THEIR TROOPS OUT. PRINCE SAUD SAID WE WOULD AT LEAST NEED TO SEE SUFFICIENT IRAQI WITHDRAWAL TO SHOW THAT REVERSAL OF THAT WITHDRAWAL WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE. PRINCE TURKI SUGGESTED THAT MORE THAN WITHDRAWAL WOULD BE NEEDED FROM THE IRAQIS BEFORE A CEASEFIRE. PRINCE SAUD AGREED: SADDAM HUSSEIN WOULD HAVE TO COMMIT HIMSELF TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS. WE STILL HAD SANCTIONS IN HAND. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT ARRANGEMENTS FOR AN EXCHANGE OF PRISONERS WOULD ALSO BE IMPORTANT, ESPECIALLY WITH AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION. ALL IN ALL, THE COMPLICATED CEASEFIRE ARRANGEMENTS WOULD REQUIRE EXTENSIVE DISCUSSION. WE HAD BEEN TALKING TO THE AMERICANS ABOUT THAT. PRINCE SAUD SAID HE ASSUMED THAT THEY WOULD BE DISCUSSED AT THE UNITED NATIONS - OR WOULD THERE BE DIFFERENCES AMONGST THE PERMANENT FIVE IN SUCH A DISCUSSION? THE SECRETARY OF STATE THOUGHT THERE WOULD.

4. THE SECRETARY OF STATE ASKED IF SADDAM HUSSEIN COULD PERSONALLY SURVIVE WITHDRAWAL FROM KUWAIT. PRINCE SAUD SAID HE FAILED TO SEE HOW BUT PROFESSED HIMSELF POOR AT PREDICTIONS. PRINCE TURKI SAID THAT ALL THE SYRIANS FEARED THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN COULD SURVIVE. FOR A LONG TIME THEY HAD BEEN CROSS AT THE AMERICANS FOR NOT EXTENDING THEIR WAR AIMS TO THE ELIMINATION OF SADDAM HUSSEIN. PRINCE SAUD THOUGHT THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN MIGHT RESPOND TO THE IRANIAN INITIATIVE BECAUSE HE KNEW THE EFFECTS OF THE COALITION BOMBING ON IRAQ. HE WAS NOT ISOLATING HIMSELF, HIDDEN IN A BUNKER.

THE PALESTINIANS

5. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID HE HAD HEARD EUROPEANS CLAIM THAT ARAFAT WAS FINISHED. PRINCE SAUD SAID THAT MANY PALESTINIANS FAULTED ARAFAT AND THAT THERE WAS A VERY DEEP SPLIT IN THE LEADERSHIP. IF THERE HAD BEEN AN ALTERNATIVE IT WAS ABU IYAD, WHO HAD STARTED TAKING THE LINE OF FAISAL HUSSEINI. BUT IT WAS NOT JUST A QUESTION OF PERSONALITIES. AT ONE TIME, FOR EXAMPLE, ARAFAT HAD SHIFTED HIS POSITION CONSIDERABLY BUT HAD THEN BEEN FRUSTRATED. IT WAS GOING TO BE VERY DANGEROUS FOR ANY PALESTINIAN LEADER TO COMPROMISE. BUT IF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY REALLY WANTED TO FIND HONEST PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATIVES, THEN THEY WOULD BE FOUND. IT WAS A QUESTION OF A GENUINE INTEREST IN SOLVING THE PALESTINIAN

QUESTION.

6. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THIS POINT BUT IN THE IMMEDIATE TERM THE QUESTION OF WHO WOULD SPEAK FOR THE PALESTINIANS WAS CRUCIAL. PRINCE SAUD DID NOT ANSWER DIRECTLY BUT SAID THAT THERE WAS AN OPPORTUNITY TO BE GRASPED TO TACKLE THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION IF THERE WERE SUFFICIENT WILL IN THE SURROUNDING COUNTRIES.

JORDAN

7. ON THE WAY FROM THE AIRPORT PRINCE SAUD HAD TOLD THE SECRETARY OF STATE PRIVATELY THAT HIS ANALYSTS THOUGHT THAT KING HUSSEIN'S LATEST SPEECH HAD BEEN WRITTEN BY THE IRAQIS, NOT THE JORDANIANS. KING HUSSEIN WAS OUT TO STIR THINGS UP. SOME OF THOSE WHO HAD WORKED FOR HIM ALL THEIR LIVES WERE NOW BEING HARASSED BY THE POLICE. OVER DINNER PRINCE TURKI ASKED FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S ASSESSMENT OF KING HUSSEIN. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SPOKE AS EARLIER IN THE DAY TO MUBARAK AND THE KUWAITIS. PRINCE SAUD SAID THE PAKISTANI PRIME MINISTER HAD REPORTED HIS FEELING THAT KING HUSSEIN WAS BECOMING INCOHERENT, WHICH SEEMED TO FIT. HE ASKED IF THOSE AROUND KING HUSSEIN HAD STOPPED TALKING TO HIM. THE SECRETARY OF STATE THOUGHT NOT.

8. PRINCE TURKI SAID HIS THEORY WAS THAT KING HUSSEIN WAS PUTTING HIMSELF FORWARD TO THE IRAQI PEOPLE AS A FUTURE HASHEMITE KING OF IRAQ. IT WAS NOTABLE THAT HE NEVER MENTIONED SADDAM HUSSEIN. THE SECRETARY OF STATE DID NOT DISMISS THIS THEORY. HE REMEMBERED HOW STRONGLY KING HUSSEIN HAD FELT ABOUT THE DEPOSITION OF HIS COUSIN IN IRAQ IN 1958.

IRAN

9. PRINCE SAUD SAID THAT LINKS WITH IRAN WERE IMPROVING SLIGHTLY THOUGH THEY WERE NOT GOING TO MOVE AS FAST AS BRITAIN. BUT IF THE ISSUE OF THE IRANIAN QUOTA FOR THE PILGRIMAGE WAS SOLVED, HE SUPPOSED THAT DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS MIGHT BE RENEWED. THE IRANIANS WERE TEMPERING THEIR DEMANDS A LITTLE. PRINCE TURKI SAID, ONLY HALF-JOKINGLY, THAT PERHAPS THE SAUDIS HAD NOT YET PAID ENOUGH MONEY TO THE RIGHT IRANIAN MULLAHS.

10. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT HE WAS VERY DISAPPOINTED WITH VELAYATI OVER THE LACK OF PROGRESS TOWARDS THE RELEASE OF THE BRITISH HOSTAGES. PRINCE SAUD SAID HE COULD NOT UNDERSTAND THE IRANIANS' INTEREST IN HOLDING ONTO THE HOSTAGES. HE AGREED WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE THAT IT WAS PROBABLY ANOTHER SIGN OF THE

INTERNAL POWER STRUGGLE.

PAKISTAN

11. PRINCE TURKI HAD VISITED PAKISTAN ON 4 FEBRUARY AND BEEN TOLD BY THE PRIME MINISTER THAT HE WOULD NOT CHANGE PAKISTANI POLICY TOWARDS THE GULF CONFLICT. THE PAKISTANI PRIME MINISTER JUDGED THAT THE APPEAL OF SADDAM HUSSEIN IN PAKISTAN HAD PEAKED, AND BEEN COUNTERED BY THE PAKISTANIS' RESPECT FOR SAUDI ARABIA. PRINCE TURKI SAID THERE HAD BEEN SOME CRITICISM OF THE GULF CONFLICT IN AFGHAN CIRCLES, NOTABLY HEKMATIYAR AND SAYYAF, BUT THIS HAD NOT STOPPED SOME OF THEM SENDING FORCES TO HELP.

MEDIA

12. AT THE END OF DINNER PRINCE SAUD RETURNED TO HIS COMPLAINTS ABOUT THE WESTERN MEDIA. NOW THAT HE WAS SEEING BBC TELEVISION NEWS HE WAS EVEN MORE CRITICAL OF CNN, WHICH HE ACCUSED OF FLAGRANT BIAS. THE CNN LINE WAS QUITE DIFFERENT FROM THAT OF JOURNALISTS WHO HAD LEFT IRAQ AND WHO HAD BEEN REPORTED ON THE BBC, BOTH IN TERMS OF THE COVERAGE OF PUBLIC REACTION IN IRAQ TO THE BOMBING AND IN THE WAY LIFE IN BAGHDAD WAS DESCRIBED. HE HAD BEEN GLAD TO SEE THE BBC QUERYING IRAQI CLAIMS OF LARGE SCALE CIVILIAN CASUALTIES. PRINCE TURKI NOTED THAT PETER ARNETT OF CNN HAD ANNOYED THE AMERICANS YEARS AGO BY HIS BROADCASTS FROM HANOI.

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FOR SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY

MY TELNO 419: IRAQ/KUWAIT:

WASHINGTON SITREP

SUMMARY

1. CHENEY'S STATEMENTS, FROM RIYADH HEIGHTEN SPECULATION THAT THE GROUND CAMPAIGN IS NEAR. BAKER DOWNPLAYS SIGNIFICANCE OF GORBACHEV DECISION TO SEND A PERSONAL ENVOY TO BAGHDAD.

DETAIL

2. THE MAIN STORY IN THE US PRESS OVER THE WEEKEND REMAINS THE CHENEY/POWELL VISIT TO THE GULF. PROMINENCE WAS GIVEN TO THE CENTCOM BRIEFING OF 9 FEBRUARY, WHICH INCREASED THE US ESTIMATE OF DAMAGE TO IRAQI GROUND FORCE CAPABILITY TO AROUND 20 PER CENT. CENTCOM'S DAMAGE ASSESSMENTS HAVE CONSISTENTLY BEEN MORE UPBEAT THAN THOSE PRODUCED BY THE VARIOUS AGENCIES IN WASHINGTON. NONETHELESS, CENTCOM'S LATEST ESTIMATES HAVE FUELLED SPECULATION HERE ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF AN EARLY ALLIED GROUND OFFENSIVE. ALTHOUGH MOST OF THE US PRESS ARE REPORTING US MILITARY SOURCES AS PRESSING FOR A TWO WEEK OR MORE EXTENSION TO THE AIR CAMPAIGN, CHENEY'S STATEMENT DURING HIS DEPARTURE PRESS CONFERENCE IN RIYADH ON 10 FEBRUARY THAT THERE WAS A POINT OF DIMINISHING RETURNS IN THE AIR CAMPAIGN, AFTER WHICH GROUND OR AMPHIBIAS ACTION WOULD BE NEEDED TO INCREASE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF AIRSTRIKES BY FORCING THE IRAQI GROUND FORCES INTO THE OPEN, HAS LED TO RENEWED SPECULATION THAT THE START OF THE GROUND CAMPAIGN MAY BE NEAR. CHENEY'S REMARK THAT HE WAS STRUCK BY THE SIZE OF IRAQI MILITARY CAPABILITIES (QUOTE FAR BEYOND THOSE USED TO TAKE KUWAIT UNQUOTE) ALSO RECEIVED WIDE MEDIA ATTENTION, AS DO HIS REMARKS ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF AN IRAQI

SURPRISE (INCLUDING THE POSSIBILITY OF SCUDS WITH CW WARHEADS) AND HIS ADMISSION THAT, WHILE THE ALLIES HAD TRIED HARD TO AVOID CIVILIAN TARGETS, QUOTE IT DOESN'T MEAN IT DOESN'T HAPPEN FROM TIME TO TIME UNQUOTE. CHENEY IS NOW ON HIS WAY BACK TO WASHINGTON WHERE HE WILL BRIEF THE PRESIDENT ON HIS RETURN.

3. THE US PRESS HAS ALSO FEATURED GORBACHEV'S STATEMENT ON SOVIET TV IN WHICH HE EXPRESSED FEARS THAT THE WAR THREATENED TO QUOTE GO BEYOND THE LIMITS OF THE U.N. MANDATE UNQUOTE AND WHERE HE ANNOUNCED THE DESPATCH OF A PERSONAL ENVOY TO BAGHDAD. ON BREAKFAST TELEVISION ON 10 FEBRUARY, BAKER DOWNPLAYED THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE GORBACHEV STATEMENT, SAYING THAT THE ADMINISTRATION HAD HAD PRIOR WARNING OF IT, AND THAT IF THE PERSONAL ENVOY COULD COME AWAY FROM BAGHDAD QUOTE WITH FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS, QUOTE MORE POWER TO THEM UNQUOTE.

4. THE FORMAL NOTIFICATION OF THE IRAQI DECISION TO BREAK DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS (MY TELNO 420) RECEIVES SCANT COVERAGE HERE. MEANWHILE THE ATTEMPTED BOMBING OF CHEMICAL TANKS NEAR THE NORFOLK NAVAL BASE IN VIRGINIA IS NOW CONSIDERED TO HAVE HAD NO LINK TO GULF RELATED TERRORISM, WITH THE ARREST OF THREE US NATIONALS ON CHARGES OF ATTEMPTED INSURANCE FRAUD.

COMMENT

5. THE PRESS HERE HAVE SPENT MUCH OF THE LAST MONTH ANALYSING- ON THE BASIS OF VARIOUS COMMENTS FROM UNNAMED PENTAGON OFFICIALS- THE GROUND OPTIONS OPEN TO THE ALLIES, WITH SPECIAL ATTENTION TO THE SO-CALLED LEFT HOOK. IF IT OCCURS IT WILL BE ONE OF THE MOST CLEARLY TELEGRAPHED MILITARY PUNCHES EVER. TOGETHER WITH THE LATEST CHENEY REMARK WHICH SUGGEST THAT THE LAND WAR IS IMMINENT, ONE WONDERS WHERE THE ELEMENT OF SURPRISE WILL BE. ALTERNATIVELY THE ADMINISTRATION ARE TRYING TO TAKE THE IRAQIS, VIA THEIR USE OF THE MEDIA, FOR A RIDE. WHATEVER THEY ARE UP TO, THEY ARE ALLOWING EXPECTATIONS TO BUILD UP STRONGLY. IF IT TURNS OUT THAT THE LAND OFFENSIVE IS NOT AFTER ALL IMMINENT, THAT MAY TURN OUT TO HAVE A COST.

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10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

10 February 1991

See Answer.

HUMANITARIAN FOOD FOR IRAQ

Thank you for your letter of 8 February about the proposal before the UN Sanctions Committee that a consignment of food from Iran should be sent to Iraq.

The Prime Minister has considerable reservations about this. He is doubtful whether the ICRC would be able to exercise effective control over the distribution of the food. If their influence and standing in Iraq is sufficient to secure that, they should surely be in a position to insist on access to POWs. Furthermore, if one such operation is allowed, the ICRC are likely to be swamped with further offers of food, and the risks of leakage to the military will consequently increase. The Prime Minister's inclination is to try to tie agreement by the Sanctions Committee to the food consignment to an Iraqi commitment to honour its obligations under the Geneva Convention to grant the ICRC access to POWs, or at least to notify the ICRC of details about them.

Depending on the view taken by other OPD(G) colleagues, this is something which might be discussed in the Committee at a meeting next week.

I am sending copies of this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence), John Neilson (Department of Energy), Juliet Wheldon (Law Officers' Department) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).


Yours sincerely,

C.D. POWELL

Christopher Prentice, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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Charles

Phone call with UN SEC-GEN

FCO say earliest time available is 2000 (our time) which is on the outer limit of your preferred timescale. Furthermore the call would have to be set up their end as we wouldn't have a no. for him at that time.

Can you let Simon Gass know asap if this is acceptable

Blanch

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10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

9 February 1991

FOREIGN SECRETARY'S DISCUSSION WITH BFCME IN RIYADH

The Prime Minister has seen Riyadh telegram No.394 about the subjects which General de la Billiere plans to raise with the Foreign Secretary in Riyadh. He has noticed in particular the reference to current planning involving a phased back-lift of British troops from Kuwait and Saudi Arabia over several months: and the possibility of retaining a brigade in Kuwait for a longer period. He does not think this is consistent with his often repeated statement that British forces in the area will be brought back home as soon as possible after the conflict is ended. He believes that our aim should be to bring out all those involved in fighting or the re-entry into Kuwait very rapidly indeed, even if this means rotating others from Germany and the UK for temporary duty. He hopes the Foreign Secretary will make this point to General de la Billiere during their discussions, and that MOD will take it into account in their planning.

I am sending copies of this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

C.D. POWELL

The Resident Clerk,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

Telephone 071-21 8211/3

MO 6/17/15/1S

9th February 1991

CB 10/2

Dear Charles,

I attach the latest report prepared for MOD Ministers on Operations in the Gulf.

Yours sincerely

S J Ambler-Edwards

(S J AMBLER-EDWARDS)(Miss)
Private Secretary

Sir Charles Powell KCMG
10 Downing Street

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THE GULF CONFLICT

BRIEFING FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE - SITREP No. 66

SITUATION AS AT 1700Z, 9 FEBRUARY 1991

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SEC(O)(C) EVENING BRIEF, 9 FEBRUARY 1991

Summary

First B52 sorties (5 aircraft) left RAF Fairford this afternoon.

General Situation

- Allied air campaign's emphasis on RGFC continues. No significant land or sea activity.
- Little evidence of preparations for Iraqi offensive operations in the KTO.

Political

- BFCME has had discussions with Secretary Cheney and Gen Powell.
- The FCO was informed formally yesterday that Iraq wished to break diplomatic relations and establish an Iraqi interests section in the Zambian embassy.
- After his visit to Tehran, Turkish Foreign Minister told press that Iranian peace initiative stood little chance of success; Baghdad had not responded to President Rafsanjani's message; and the Iranians themselves were pessimistic.
- UN Security Council to meet next Wednesday to discuss the conflict in the Gulf.
- President Bush says that King Hussein's recent comments mean that Jordan has aligned itself with Iraq. The US government has announced a review of aid to Jordan (\$85m per annum).
- Jordanian Information Minister is reported to have said that Jordan would not bow to US pressure and change its policy on the Gulf conflict.
- Iraq has asked the UN to visit the "baby food" factory in Baghdad.

UK Operations

Air Operations

- 5 Tornado GR1s from Tabuk attacked an ammunition plant (1) near Al Iskandirah with 1000lb bombs; smoke but no secondary explosions observed. 3 further aircraft aborted.
- 9 Jaguars from Muharraq successfully attacked a logistics

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site (2) 15nm south of Kuwait City. CBU87 cluster bombs were dropped on vehicles and revetted positions.

- 8 Jaguars from Muharraq armed with CBU87 tasked to attack a multiple rocket launcher battalion site near (2); 1 aircraft returned to base with weapon hang-up; 1 aircraft attacked alternate target (SILKWORM site). Bombs seen to hit primary target but re-attack likely to be necessary.
- 4 Tornado GR1s from Dhahran supported by 2 Buccaneers from Muharraq attacked the Al Basra highway and the Ar Rumaylah highway bridge with 1000lb LGBs. Both targets reported as cut.
- Another group of 4 Tornado GR1s from Dhahran and 2 Buccaneers attacked Al Busalib highway bridge with 1000lb LGBs.
- 9 Jaguar aircraft from Muharraq carried out successful attacks with 1000lb bombs on Iraqi artillery positions 10 miles south west of Ash Ayban.
- 8 Tornado GR1s from Tabuk successfully attacked the Bayji Petrol refinery leaving the target burning.
- 8 Tornado GR1s from Muharraq successfully attacked with 1000lb bombs the Al Zubayr petrol production facility.
- Two GR1A missions of two aircraft each have been flown. The first obtained good quality imagery, locating a radar installation, military bunkers, infantry positions, stores and equipment in revetted positions and numerous military vehicles.
- 8 Tornado GR1s from Muharraq attacked the Uwayjah petrol refinery. 6 aircraft reported successful attacks, secondary explosions were observed and the southern half of the storage area was burning. A large storage tank in the northern part of the site exploded.
- RAF combat sorties as at 091400Z:

	since 090700Z	total
Tornado GR1	16	808
Tornado GR1A	0	59
Jaguar	17	332
Tornado F3	6	419
Buccaneer	0	32
Nimrod	0	47
AAR (Victor, VC10K, Tristar)	16	376
	55	2073
Non-combat sorties:		1330
		3403

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Navy Operations

- Now 5 DD/FF in the Northern Gulf: LONDON, MANCHESTER, CARDIFF, BRAZEN and GLOUCESTER.
- Death of civilian motorman Mr M J Foy, on RFA Sir Galahad, from knife wound following fight between two crew members. Investigation underway. NOK have been informed, and have asked that name should not be released.

Army Operations

- No significant events.

Allied Operations

- CENTCOM briefing this afternoon confirms destruction of over 750 Iraqi tanks and 600 APCs.
- 25,746 Allied offensive sorties to 072359Z, of which 4.3% flown by RAF.
- Major emphasis of allied air sorties against Tawalkana and Hammurabbi Divisions of RGFC. Emphasis for next 24 hours will remain on RGFC.
- 15000lb bombs were not dropped on 7 Feb. It is thought that the first drop (on 6 Feb) may have exploded too high off the ground for maximum effect; no BDA available.
- Today RSAF fighters were scheduled to attack radar relay facilities and KTO targets; Italian Tornados to attack artillery in the KTO in conjunction with US F16s; Bahraini F5s and Kuwaiti A4s and Mirages to attack an artillery battalion position; French Jaguars and Mirages to attack aircraft shelters at Shaibah; and Canadian CF18s to continue escort and CAP missions.

Iraqi activity

- Saddam Hussein met the Revolutionary Command Council yesterday, the first time that he has been seen since 28 Jan.
- SCUD attack on Israel first for 6 days. 25 injured by falling debris (including warhead) in Tel Aviv following interception by PATRIOT missiles.
- An Iraqi soldier who deserted on 4 Feb claimed during debrief that Allied air attacks have caused terror amongst all ranks, and that 5% of Iraqi 31 Inf Div have gone absent while on home leave.

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Logistics

- An informal approach has been made to Germany, Belgium, Denmark, Netherlands, Portugal, Norway, Italy and Spain to ascertain availability of 1000lb bombs.
- BAOR is releasing 2 M109s to replace those lost due to non-combat fires.

Media reports and coverage

- Media focus on visit of Cheney and Powell to Saudi Arabia and speculation about likely date of commencement of ground offensive.
- Peter Jouvenal, a BBC cameraman, has said that the bombing of the An Nasiriyah bridge resulted in predominantly military casualties, but that Iraqi officials prevented filming. This would be consistent with a DIS assessment that the 49th Infantry Division is located at An Nasiriyah. Mr Jouvenal also described anti-Saddam slogans painted on walls in Iraq.
- Iranian news agency (IRNA) reports that Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Belonogov has criticised what he said was the deliberate destruction of Iraqi residential areas by allied air raids.
- Reuters report that a first batch of 300 Afghan Mujahideen guerillas left Pakistan for Saudi Arabia on Friday.

Other issues

- Oil slicks will probably not reach the Jubayl desalination plant until Monday at the earliest.

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General Staff Map Section, OSGB 11592 (CAO) Edition 8 OSGB, November 1990 44/91

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THE GULF CONFLICT - BRIEFING FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

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YOUR VISIT TO EGYPT 8/9 FEBRUARY: DISCUSSION WITH EGYPTIAN FOREIGN
MINISTER

SUMMARY

1. ABDUL MEGUID GRATEFUL FOR THE PRIME MINISTER'S HELP OVER EGYPT/IMF. NEGATIVE IMPACT OF SUFFERING OF IRAQI CIVILIANS ON ARAB PUBLIC OPINION. EGYPTIAN/SYRIAN/SAUDI IDEAS ON FUTURE COMPATIBLE WITH A WESTERN CONTRIBUTION SO LONG AS WEST IS POLITICALLY SENSITIVE. PRIORITY OF TACKLING PALESTINIAN PROBLEM AFTER GULF WAR. EGYPTIANS BELIEVE WE CANNOT DISCARD THE PLO ENTIRELY.

DETAIL

2. YOUR MEETING WITH ABDUL MEGUID ON 8 FEBRUARY BEGAN WITH A 30 MINUTE TETE-A-TETE.

3. ABDUL MEGUID HAD RECENTLY VISITED WASHINGTON, NEW YORK AND OTTAWA TO DISCUSS THE GULF CRISIS AND EGYPT/IMF. ON THE IMF, ABDUL MEGUID THANKED MR MAJOR FOR HIS LETTER WHICH HAD BEEN VERY GOOD. HE HAD FOUND A BETTER CLIMATE IN THE IMF. CAMDESSUS HAD BEEN FLEXIBLE AND ENCOURAGING. FOLLOW UP WAS IMPORTANT, PARTICULARLY ON PARIS CLUB RESCHEDULING AND ON DEBT FORGIVENESS WITHIN THE G7 FRAMEWORK. EGYPT AND POLAND SHOULD RECEIVE PARITY OF TREATMENT.

4. ON THE GULF WAR, ABDUL MEGUID HAD TOLD MR BAKER THAT EGYPTIAN PUBLIC OPINION FELT RELATIVELY COMFORTABLE. THERE WAS NO SYMPATHY FOR SADDAM HUSSEIN BUT THERE WAS CONCERN FOR IRAQI SUFFERING FROM THE AIR RAIDS. IT WAS IMPORTANT TO EXPLAIN OUR POINT OF VIEW. THE VOICE OF AMERICA/ARABIC SERVICES WAS FRANKLY PRO SADDAM. THE BBC WAS NOW BETTER. IN EGYPT THE AL AZHAR RELIGIOUS LEADERSHIP WAS INDEPENDENT AND WAS SPEAKING OUT POSITIVELY ON THE GULF WAR ISSUE. THE VOICE OF AMERICA AND THE BBC SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED TO QUOTE SOME

OF THEIR ARTICLES AND SPEECHES.

5. YOU AGREED THAT THE NEXT TWO OR THREE WEEKS WOULD BE PARTICULARLY DIFFICULT AS REGARDS PUBLIC OPINION. DESPITE ALL THE ALLIED EFFORT TO TARGET MILITARY OBJECTIVES CAREFULLY, PEOPLE WERE INEVITABLY BEING KILLED. IT WAS IMPORTANT TO MAKE IT PLAIN THAT WE WERE NOT EXTENDING OUR WAR AIMS AND THAT SADDAM WAS RESPONSIBLE. ABDUL MEGUID SAID THAT AT HIS RECENT PRESS CONFERENCE IN ROME HE HAD POINTED OUT THAT NEITHER THE AMERICANS NOR THE UNITED NATIONS SOUGHT TO DESTROY IRAQ. YOU SAID THAT YOU HAD EXPLAINED TO CABINET COLLEAGUES RECENTLY THAT THE SUFFERING OF THE IRAQI PEOPLE TOUCHED ON A RAW NERVE. IT WAS ONE OF THE THEMES WHICH HAD BEEN EXPLOITED BY KING HUSSEIN IN HIS LATEST UNFORTUNATE SPEECH.

6. DR ABDUL MEGUID SAID SOME OF THE EGYPTIAN OPPOSITION LEADERS WERE BEING UNHELPFUL BUT THEY DID NOT HAVE MUCH IMPACT ON EGYPTIAN PUBLIC OPINION. SOME HAD BEEN TO BAGHDAD. IBRAHIM SHUKRI HAD BEEN TOLD WHILE HE WAS IN THE ANTE ROOM OF SADDAM'S OFFICE THAT IF HE WANTED TO MEET THE LATTER HE MUST NOT MENTION THE WORD KUWAIT. HE HAD FOOLISHLY ACCEPTED THIS CONDITION. IRAQ HAD NOW BROKEN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH CAIRO. THIS WAS TO EGYPT'S ADVANTAGE SINCE SHE HAD CLOSED HER EMBASSY IN BAGHDAD TWO WEEKS AGO AND SINCE THE IRAQI AMBASSADOR IN CAIRO HAD BEEN ACTIVE IN CAUSING TROUBLE.

7. TURNING TO THE POST WAR SITUATION YOU SAID THAT IDEAS ON THE FUTURE MUST COME FROM THE REGION. THIS WAS NOT 1918 OR 1945. WERE WE TALKING ABOUT ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE SECURITY OF THE GULF ALONE OR A WIDER TREATY? ABDUL MEGUID SAID THAT THIS WAS AN IMPORTANT AND SENSITIVE ISSUE. THE ROLE OF THE WEST ON THE ONE HAND AND THAT OF EGYPT/SYRIA AND THE GULF STATES ON THE OTHER SHOULD NOT BE INCOMPATIBLE. IT WAS IMPORTANT TO ACCEPT THAT WE HAD THE SAME OBJECTIVES AS REGARDS SECURITY, PEACE AND STABILITY AND ON THE STRATEGIC AND ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE OF THE REGION. THERE SHOULD BE NO CONTRADICTION BETWEEN THE ARAB COUNTRIES AND THE WEST SO LONG AS THE LATTER ACCEPTED THE PRINCIPLES OF NON-INTERFERENCE, MUTUAL RESPECT AND NON-EXPLOITATION. THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS MUST COME FROM WITHIN THE AREA. THERE SHOULD BE NO REVIVAL OF THE BAGHDAD PACT OR OF CENTO. RELATIONS WITH OTHERS HOWEVER WERE NOT EXCLUDED EG WITH TURKEY AND PAKISTAN OR INDEED WITH BRITON AND THE US THOUGH THIS WOULD COME AT A LATER STAGE. THE WESTERN FORCES SHOULD GO HOME AFTER THE WAR. IT WAS IMPORTANT TO GO ON REPEATING THIS POINT. HE HAD ANSWERED EGYPTIAN PARLIAMENTARY CRITICISM BY QUOTING WESTERN LEADERS GIVING UNDERTAKINGS TO THIS EFFECT. (AT A LATER STAGE IN THE DISCUSSION ABDUL MEGUID CLAIMED THAT SAUDI ARABIA WAS

SPEAKING FOR THE GULF STATES. YOU SAID THE SMALLER GULF STATES WERE SUSPICIOUS OF THIS COLLECTIVE SECURITY AND WERE ASKING BRITAIN TO REVIVE BILATERAL AGREEMENTS. WE WERE RESISTING THIS. TIMES HAD CHANGED).

8. ABDUL MEGUID SAID THAT THE ARRANGEMENTS WHICH EGYPT WAS MAKING WITH HER NEIGHBOURS OUGHT NOT TO BE DIRECTED AGAINST ANY OTHER POWER. THEY SHOULD NOT BE DIRECTED AGAINST ISRAEL SINCE EGYPT HAD RELATIONS WITH THE LATTER. THE SYRIAN FOREIGN MINISTER HAD TOLD ABDUL MEGUID THAT SYRIA WAS NOT AGAINST PEACE WITH ISRAEL SO LONG AS SYRIA COULD REGAIN THE GOLAN HEIGHTS. MEANWHILE THE SYRIANS AND KUWAITIS WERE BEGINNING TO DEVELOP CONTACTS WITH JEWISH GROUPS IN THE UNITED STATES.

9. YOU SAID THAT THIS POINTED UP THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE. DR ABDUL MEGUID SAID THAT THIS WAS THE KEY TO DIFFUSING THE PROBLEMS OF THE AREA AND THIS KEY WAS IN ISRAELI HANDS. DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS OF THE BAKER PLAN THE PLO HAD SHOWN THEY WERE READY TO ATTEND A DIALOGUE MEETING WITH ISRAELIS IN CAIRO. THIS PLAN WAS WRECKED WHEN THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT RESIGNED. THE EFFORT MUST BE MADE AGAIN. TALK SHOULD HOWEVER LEAD TO ACTION. THE AMERICANS, BRITISH AND EC SHOULD PRESS THE ISRAELIS TO RESPOND.

10. YOU SAID THAT IN YOUR RECENT DISCUSSIONS IN THE EC EVEN THOSE COUNTRIES TRADITIONALLY CLOSE TO ARAFAT FOUND IT DIFFICULT TO IMAGINE THAT ISRAEL COULD SIT DOWN WITH HIM. PERHAPS THE BEST WAY FORWARD WOULD BE TO ENCOURAGE THE HOLDING OF UN MONITORED ELECTIONS TO CHOOSE REPRESENTATIVE PALESTINIANS. ABDUL MEGUID SAID THIS WAS DELICATE. OF COURSE THE PLO AND PARTICULARLY ARAFAT HAD MADE MISTAKES BUT THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE SHOULD NOT PAY THE PRICE. IT WOULD BE WRONG TO MOVE TOO SOON TO ELECTIONS. THE ARABS WOULD HAVE TO TRY TO RESTORE THEIR RELATIONSHIP WITH THE PLO. IF THE PLO WERE NOT ENCOURAGED TO BE HELPFUL THEY COULD STILL WREAK DAMAGE. THERE WERE OTHER PALESTINIAN GROUPS EG HAMAS, WHICH WERE DANGEROUS. PERHAPS THE EGYPTIANS AND SAUDIS COULD OBTAIN PLO CONSENT FOR SOME POSITIVE ACTION. IT WAS IMPORTANT NOT TO PUT TOO MUCH PRESSURE ON THE PLO IN THIS PERIOD. THE WESTERN COUNTRIES SHOULD NOT CLOSE PLO OFFICES (YOU SAID THAT YOU WOULD NOT CLOSE THEIR OFFICE IN LONDON ALTHOUGH YOU WERE UNDER SOME PRESSURE TO DO SO). ABDUL MEGUID SAID THAT IF ONLY 10 PERCENT OF THE PLO REMAINED CREDIBLE THAT WOULD BE USEFUL. IN DUE COURSE SOME OTHER LEADERS (EG FAISAL HUSSEINI) MIGHT EMERGE.

11. YOU SAID THAT THE FRENCH STRESSED THE IDEA OF AN INTERNATIONAL

CONFERENCE AND THE INVOLVEMENT OF THE PERMANENT 5. WHEN YOU HAD PUT THIS TO BAKER THE LATTER HAD REPLIED NEGATIVELY, INDICATING THAT QUIET DIPLOMACY SHOULD BE TRIED FIRST. YOUR REACTION HAD BEEN THAT WE COULD NOT REMAIN SILENT AFTER THE WAR. WE COULD NOT SIT FOR MONTHS WITHOUT MAKING PROPOSALS. ABDUL MEGUID STRONGLY AGREED: HE WOULD SAY THE SAME TO BAKER.

12. ABDUL MEGUID SAID HE HAD HAD AN EXCELLENT DISCUSSION WITH THE DUTCH FOREIGN MINISTER IN AMERICA ON THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE AND ON THE NEED TO START PREPARING NOW. YOU AGREED THAT WE COULD AFFORD TO SPEAK OUT NOW SINCE LINKAGE WAS NO LONGER A PROBLEM BUT WE WANTED TO KNOW HOW THE EGYPTIANS WOULD PROPOSE TO RE-START THE PEACE PROCESS. DR ABDUL MEGUID REPEATED THAT WE COULD NOT DISREGARD THE PLO AT ANY RATE UNTIL WE COULD FIND GOOD PEOPLE IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES WHO COULD STAND UP AND NOT BE AFRAID. HE IMPLIED THAT THE NEED TO SUPPORT THE PLO WAS ESSENTIALLY A TACTICAL ONE. YOU POINTED OUT THAT THE PLO WERE MISBEHAVING VERY BADLY EG FIRING ROCKETS INTO ISRAEL FROM SOUTHERN LEBANON.

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SIC 19M

FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

SECRETARY OF STATE'S DISCUSSION WITH EGYPTIAN FOREIGN MINISTER

PLENARY SESSION

1. IN A PLENARY OF JUST UNDER AN HOUR ON THE EVENING OF 8 FEBRUARY THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND ABDUL MEGUID DISCUSSED:

- THE GULF CONFLICT
- JORDAN
- FUTURE SECURITY OF THE GULF
- THE SUDAN.

OVER DINNER YOU TALKED TO OSAMA AL BAZ, THE PRESIDENT'S DIPLOMATIC ADVISER, ABOUT:

- FUTURE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS IN THE GULF
- IRAN
- LIBYA
- OTHER MAGHREB COUNTRIES
- THE PLO.

THE GULF CONFLICT

2. ABDUL MEGUID SAID THE EGYPTIAN POSITION HAD BEEN CONSISTENT FROM THE START. HAVING WORKED WITH IRAQ IN THE ARAB COOPERATION COUNCIL, THE PRESIDENT AND PEOPLE OF EGYPT FELT ACUTELY BETRAYED. SADDAM HAMMADI, THE IRAQI MINISTER, HAD SPOKEN PRIVATELY TO ABDUL MEGUID WHEN IN CAIRO FOR A MEETING OF ARAB FOREIGN MINISTERS ON 3 AUGUST AND HAD ADVISED HIM THAT EGYPT SHOULD KEEP HER HEAD DOWN - A NEW DAY WAS DAWNING IN THE GULF. ABDUL MEGUID HAD EXPRESSED DOUBTS ABOUT SADDAM HUSSEIN FOR A LONG TIME AND WAS SAD THAT HIS JUDGEMENT

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HAD BEEN PROVED RIGHT.

3. THE BRITISH, MORE THAN ANYONE ELSE, UNDERSTOOD THE REGION. ABDUL MEGUID SAID THAT FOR EGYPT THE WAR WAS TERRIBLE. NO-ONE WANTED TO SEE IRAQ DESTROYED. THE TURNING POINT HAD BEEN UNSCR 678. THE EGYPTIANS HAD STUCK TO INTERNATIONAL LEGITIMACY AND LEGALITY. THEY HAD BEEN VERY GLAD THE UNITED STATES HAD ACCEPTED THE SAME POSITION, THAT ANY CONFLICT SHOULD BE UN-SPONSORED.

4. ABDUL MEGUID SAID THAT EGYPT COULD NOT ACCEPT THE ATTEMPTS TO ENCOURAGE A CEASEFIRE. ONLY A FIRM IRAQI COMMITMENT TO WITHDRAW WOULD SUFFICE. HE WAS CONCERNED ABOUT THE MEETING OF THE NON-ALIGNED IN BELGRADE ON 12 FEBRUARY. HE HAD WANTED TO ATTEND BUT GENSCHER'S VISIT TO CAIRO MEANT THAT HE HAD TO SEND BOUTROS GHALI. HE WAS IN TOUCH WITH LONCAR, THE YUGOSLAV FOREIGN MINISTER. THE LATTER WAS TOO MUCH UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF CUBA AND ALGERIA. IT WOULD HELP IF BRITAIN SPOKE TO THE ZAMBIANS AND ZIMBABWEANS AND ANY OTHER BRITISH FRIENDS WHO WOULD BE ATTENDING (HE MENTIONED NIGERIA, GHANA, INDIA, SRI LANKA AND CYPRUS AS THE COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES ATTENDING). BRITAIN COULD USEFULLY EMPHASISE TO THEM THE IMPORTANCE OF AN IRAQI COMMITMENT TO WITHDRAW. PRINCE SAUD HAD ALSO AGREED TO WORK ON THE NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES GOING TO THE MEETING.

5. SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT BRITISH AND EGYPTIAN VIEWS HAD BEEN VERY SIMILAR FROM THE START. WE WERE GRATEFUL FOR THE LEAD WHICH EGYPT HAD GIVEN AND FOR THE WAY THEY HAD KEPT IN TOUCH WITH US. EGYPTIAN STATEMENTS WERE VERY INFLUENTIAL IN THE ARAB WORLD AND SHOWED THAT THE CONFLICT WAS NOT A WESTERN ENTERPRISE. WE WERE ENTERING A DIFFICULT PHASE, WITH AIR SUPREMACY BUT NOT YET READY FOR THE LAND ATTACK BECAUSE WE NEEDED FURTHER BOMBARDMENT OF THE IRAQI ARMY TO REDUCE POSSIBLE CASUALTIES AMONG OUR TROOPS. THIS CREATED A NATURAL REACTION IN THE ARAB AND MOSLEM WORLD. IN RESPONSE WE WERE TAKING THE LINE THAT:

- THERE WAS NO WIDENING OF THE COALITION'S WAR AIMS.
- WE WERE NOT GOING TO SUGGEST WHO SHOULD GOVERN IRAQ.
- WHEN THE CONFLICT WAS OVER WE WOULD HAVE NO DESIRE TO IMPOSE A SOLUTION.
- OUR INSTINCT WOULD BE TO WITHDRAW OUR TROOPS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.
- ANY IDEAS FOR THE FUTURE MUST COME FROM INSIDE THE REGION.

WHAT ELSE SHOULD EGYPT'S WESTERN FRIENDS BE SAYING?

6. ABDUL MEGUID SAID THAT THE REACTION OF UNEASE OF ARABS AND MOSLEMS TO THE AIR RAIDS WAS INEVITABLE AND UNSURPRISING. THE EGYPTIANS REPEATED CONSTANTLY THAT THE WAR WAS ENTIRELY THE FAULT OF SADDAM HUSSEIN WHO COULD END IT AT ANY TIME. THIS POINT WAS MORE EFFECTIVE WHEN IT WAS MADE BY ARABS. HE NOTED THAT YOU WERE SAYING THAT IRAQ SHOULD NOT BE DISMEMBERED. THIS NEEDED TO BE SAID CLEARLY. WE ALL HAD AN INTEREST IN THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF IRAQ.

7. ABDUL MEGUID SAID THAT IN ANSWER TO IRAQI CLAIMS THAT THEIR CAUSE WAS JUSTIFIED ON RELIGIOUS GROUNDS, IT WOULD BE USEFUL IF THE BBC ARABIC SERVICE COULD PICK UP SPEECHES AND BROADCASTS BY PROMINENT EGYPTIAN RELIGIOUS FIGURES SUCH AS KHALED MOHAMMED KHALED, SHEIKH GHAZALI AND SHA'RAWI. RADIO WAS THE MOST EFFECTIVE MEDIUM. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THIS WAS A GOOD IDEA AND UNDERTOOK THAT WE WOULD FOLLOW UP.

8. IN TALKING ABOUT RESTRICTIONS ON WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, ABDUL MEGUID SAID WE SHOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT THE RESTRICTIONS SHOULD BE APPLIED TO ALL STATES IN THE REGION. ABDUL MEGUID SAID THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN'S ATTEMPT TO PLAY UP THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION WAS A WEAK POINT FOR HIM. NO-ONE REALLY BELIEVED THAT HE WAS WORKING FOR THE PALESTINIAN CAUSE. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID IT WAS WORSE THAN THAT: HE HAD HARMED THE PALESTINIANS. WE WERE PUTTING TOGETHER SOME MATERIAL ON CASES OF PALESTINIAN HARDSHIP IN KUWAIT AFTER THE INVASION.

9. ABDUL MEGUID SAID THAT ON TIMING HE ACCEPTED THAT THE MILITARY WERE IN A POSITION TO JUDGE BUT THE SHORTER THE WAIT THE BETTER. THE EUPHORIA AFTER THE INITIAL SUCCESSES OF 17 JANUARY HAD BEEN UNHELPFUL IN CREATING THE EXPECTATION OF A VERY SHORT WAR. ABDUL MEGUID HOPED THAT ALL COULD BE FINISHED BY THE FIRST WEEK OF MARCH, AHEAD OF RAMADAN. RAMADAN WAS NOT ITSELF AN OBSTACLE TO MOSLEMS FIGHTING BUT THE FACT THAT FORCES WOULD BE OPERATING FROM SAUDI ARABIA, THE HOME OF THE HOLY PLACES, MADE THINGS DIFFICULT. HE SAID THAT MILLIONS OF MOSLEMS SPENT THE FASTING MONTH IN SAUDI ARABIA. THERE WAS AN EMOTIONAL FACTOR.

10. THE SECRETARY OF STATE WONDERED IF THE CUSTODIAN AND PRESIDENT MUBARAK COULD TURN THIS POINT ROUND BY MAKING AN APPEAL TO SADDAM HUSSEIN URGING HIM TO WITHDRAW FROM KUWAIT BEFORE RAMADAN. ABDUL MEGUID SAID HE WOULD TAKE NO NOTICE. HE WAS MISCHIEVOUS AND WANTED TO FIGHT DURING RAMADAN. ABDUL MEGUID WAS NOT SUGGESTING THAT THE

COALITION SHOULD RUSH INTO THE GROUND BATTLE BUT DRAWING ATTENTION TO ONE CONSIDERATION.

JORDAN

11. ABDUL MEGUID SAID THE ATTITUDE OF KING HUSSEIN WAS SHOCKING. IN HIS LATEST SPEECH, ON 6 FEBRUARY, HE HAD NOT MENTIONED SADDAM HUSSEIN. THE SECRETARY OF STATE HAD HOPED THAT THE KING MIGHT BE MOVING BACK TOWARDS THE REST OF THE COALITION. INSTEAD HE HAD MADE A DAMAGING SPEECH. THE SECRETARY OF STATE WAS SADDENED. ABDUL MEGUID SAID HE HAD REFERRED TO EGYPT AS AN ARAB COUNTRY IN RELATION WITH ISRAEL IN A QUITE IMPROPER WAY. ABDUL MEGUID WONDERED IF HE WAS TRYING TO WIN SUPPORT FROM HIS OWN PALESTINIANS IN ORDER TO PUT HIMSELF FORWARD AS A FUTURE LEADER OF THE PALESTINIANS. AS TO WHAT BRITAIN COULD DO, HE THOUGHT WE SHOULD NOT IGNORE THE SPEECH BUT SHOULD DRAW THE JORDANIANS' ATTENTION TO OUR VIEWS, PRIVATELY. KING HUSSEIN HAD DONE GREAT DAMAGE BY ENCOURAGING SADDAM HUSSEIN. BUT KING HUSSEIN WAS NEEDED FOR THE SAKE OF STABILITY EVEN THOUGH WITH HIS LATEST SPEECH HE HAD GONE BEYOND A CERTAIN DIVIDING LINE. THE SYRIANS WERE SUPPLYING KING HUSSEIN WITH OIL BUT THE SAUDIS WANTED ABSOLUTELY NOTHING TO DO WITH HIM.

12. THE SECRETARY OF STATE THOUGHT THAT TO PUT OUR VIEWS PRIVATELY TO THE JORDANIANS WAS GOOD ADVICE. (COMMENT: SECRETARY OF STATE HAD EARLIER THAT DAY AGREED A MESSAGE TO CROWN PRINCE HASSAN.) HE AGREED THAT KING HUSSEIN WAS NEEDED FOR THE SAKE OF STABILITY. IF HE WERE TO LEAVE OR BE PUSHED, THE ISRAELIS WOULD CLAIM THAT JORDAN WAS PALESTINE AND THAT THEY NEED DO NO MORE ABOUT THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION. HE THOUGHT THAT THE KING WAS NOT A CONSPIRATOR BUT HAD MADE A MAJOR MISJUDGEMENT IN AUGUST. HE HAD COME TO BELIEVE THAT IT HAD BEEN A GOOD JUDGEMENT, AND THEREFORE HAD TO GO ON JUSTIFYING IT. WHILE SOME AROUND HIM WISHED HE HAD A BETTER GRIP ON REALITIES, ALL THE PUBLIC PRESSURE ON HIM WAS TO MOVE CLOSER TO SADDAM HUSSEIN.

FUTURE SECURITY OF THE GULF

13. THE SECRETARY OF STATE UNDERSTOOD THAT IT WAS LIKELY THAT WITHIN THE NEXT FEW WEEKS CONTACTS BETWEEN EGYPT, SAUDI ARABIA AND SYRIA WOULD LEAD TO IDEAS ABOUT FUTURE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS IN THE GULF. WE WERE ASKED CONSTANTLY ABOUT THIS AND REPLIED THAT IT WAS NOT A MATTER FOR US. ABDUL MEGUID SAID THAT THE THREE SHOULD BE IN A POSITION TO PRODUCE A WORKING PAPER IN TEN DAYS OR TWO WEEKS. THE SYRIAN FOREIGN MINISTER, SHARA', HAD TELEPHONED HIM AND

EXPRESSED SATISFACTION AT HIS MEETING WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE ON 6 FEBRUARY. ABDUL MEGUID HAD ALSO APPRECIATED THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S ATTENDANCE AT THE EURO-ARAB DIALOGUE MEETING IN PARIS IN DECEMBER. IN THE ARAB WORLD, THIS SORT OF GESTURE MATTERED.

14. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT WHEN EGYPT AND THE OTHERS WERE READY TO PRODUCE THEIR IDEAS, EVEN IF THEY WERE ONLY GENERAL, THIS WOULD BE VERY HELPFUL BECAUSE THE THREE COUNTRIES WOULD HAVE TAKEN THE INITIATIVE. HE IMAGINED THAT THE THREE WOULD BE TALKING ABOUT A SYSTEM WITH SECURITY GUARANTEES. ABDUL MEGUID SAID THAT THE CANADIAN FOREIGN MINISTER HAD ASKED HIM IF EGYPT WOULD BE READY TO JOIN A PEACEKEEPING FORCE IN THE REGION. ABDUL MEGUID HAD ANSWERED THAT EGYPT WOULD BE READY TO PARTICIPATE WITHIN A UN FRAMEWORK.

SUDAN

15. ABDUL MEGUID SAID THAT GENERAL BASHIR WAS IN A WEAK POSITION, MANIPULATED BY THE FUNDAMENTALISTS. THE EGYPTIANS WERE TRYING TO KEEP THEIR LINES TO HIM OPEN IN AN EFFORT TO REDUCE IRAQI INFLUENCE IN KHARTOUM. THE SUDANESE FOREIGN MINISTER HAD ASSURED HIM RECENTLY THAT THE IRAQIS HAD NOT SUPPLIED WEAPONS. BUT THE IRAQIS KNEW THAT SUDAN WAS VITAL TO EGYPT'S STRATEGIC DEPTH AND WERE TRYING TO MAKE TROUBLE FOR EGYPT THERE. THE EGYPTIANS TRIED NOT TO THINK OF SUDAN AS BEING A LOST CAUSE. BRITAIN HAD A ROLE TO PLAY, ALTHOUGH ABDUL MEGUID KNEW IT WAS DIFFICULT. HE HAD HEARD MRS CHALKER'S STATEMENT ABOUT SUDAN, WHICH HAD BEEN VERY TOUGH. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT WE HAD CONSIDERED WITHDRAWING OUR EMBASSY BECAUSE OF THE THREAT TO IT BUT HAD DECIDED TO KEEP IT THERE PRECISELY BECAUSE OF THE NEED TO KEEP LINES OPEN. ABDUL MEGUID SAID THAT THE EGYPTIANS WERE CHECKING UP ON SUDANESE PASSING THROUGH EGYPT IN TRANSIT BETWEEN IRAQ AND THE SUDAN, LOOKING FOR IRAQI AGENTS.

DR OSAMA AL BAZ'S COMMENTS FUTURE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS

16. OSAMA SAID THAT IN THE TRIPARTITE WORK WITH SYRIAN AND SAUDI ARABIA, THE GULF STATES, EGYPT AND SYRIA WOULD FORM A CORE. IRAN AND TURKEY WOULD BE BROUGHT IN AS A SECOND LAYER AS MIGHT BE IRAQ, DEPENDING ON WHO WAS RUNNING THE COUNTRY, AND THE WESTERN POWERS WOULD FORM A THIRD TIER. THE WESTERN POWERS WOULD NEED TO BE CONSULTED ABOUT WHAT THEY WERE PREPARED TO DO. THE SYRIANS WERE WANTING TO INSTITUTIONALISE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THEIR OWN ECONOMIC

REASONS AND TO PREEMPT A ROLE FOR IRAQ AFTER THE CONFLICT. HE INDICATED, HOWEVER, THAT THE EGYPTIANS SAW IRAQ BEING ACCOMMODATED IN THE ARRANGEMENT OF SECURITY GUARANTEES IF THERE WERE A SUITABLE GOVERNMENT IN BAGHDAD.

IRAN

17. OSAMA SAID THE IRANIANS WERE FOLLOWING THEIR NATURAL TENDENCY TO PLAY ONE GULF STATE OFF AGAINST ANOTHER. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THIS WAS ALL THE MORE REASON TO GET THE ARAB COUNTRIES' COLLECTIVE THINKING ONTO THE TABLE SOON.

LIBYA

18. OSAMA RAISED LIBYAN/UK RELATIONS. HE HAD BEEN TALKING TO THE LIBYANS VERY RECENTLY. THEY WERE KEEN TO RENEW LINKS WITH BRITAIN. HE HAD TOLD THEM THAT HE THOUGHT THIS WOULD NEED TIME. IN ANY CASE THE BRITISH WERE PREOCCUPIED WITH THE CONFLICT. IF WE HAD ANY POINTS FOR THE LIBYANS, HOWEVER, THEY COULD BE FED IN THROUGH HIM. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID HE WOULD BEAR THIS IN MIND. BUT OSAMA'S ADVICE TO THE LIBYANS HAD BEEN RIGHT: A GOOD DEAL OF TIME WOULD BE NEEDED. THIS HAD BEEN BROUGHT FORCEFULLY HOME BY THE SEMTEX IN THE IRA MORTARS ON 7 FEBRUARY.

ALGERIA, MOROCCO AND TUNISIA

19. OSAMA AL BAZ SAID THAT THE ALGERIANS WERE BEING ACTIVE IN WEAVING AND TALKING FOR WHAT THEY SAID WERE DOMESTIC REASONS. BUT THEY KNEW THAT THEY COULD GO SO FAR AND NO FURTHER. THE MOROCCANS HAD MADE A FIRM COMMITMENT TO THE SAUDIS (NOT TO STEP OVER THE LINE). THE TUNISIANS WERE IN A DIFFERENT POSITION BUT DID NOT MATTER MUCH.

PLO

20. OSAMA AL BAZ URGED US NOT TO DESPAIR OF THE PLO. THEY NEEDED TO BE BROUGHT BACK TO A POSITION WHERE THEY COULD BE NEGOTIATING PARTNERS. BUT ONE HAD TO GET RID OF ARAFAT AND QADOUMI WAS NOT ACCEPTABLE. THIS LEFT KHALID AL HASSAN.

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CAIRO PLEASE PASS TO SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY.

SIC I9M

MY TELNO 76: ATTACKS ON ISRAEL

SUMMARY

1. 25 INJURED IN SCUD ATTACK ON TEL AVIV. 4 IDF SOLDIERS INJURED IN CROSS BORDER INCURSION FROM JORDAN.

DETAIL

2. 25 PEOPLE WERE INJURED AT ABOUT 0245 LOCAL TIME THIS MORNING (9 FEBRUARY) WHEN A SCUD MISSILE (CONVENTIONAL WARHEAD) EXPLODED ON IMPACT IN A RESIDENTIAL AREA BETWEEN (ACCORDING TO OUR OWN OBSERVATION) HERZLIYA AND TEL AVIV. THE IDF SPOKESMAN ANNOUNCED THAT THE MISSILE LANDED IN CENTRAL ISRAEL. WE OBSERVED THREE PATRIOT MISSILES BEING FIRED, ONE OF WHICH INTERCEPTED AT LEAST PART OF THE MISSILE ALTHOUGH THE WARHEAD EXPLODED ON GROUND IMPACT (ON PAST EXPERIENCE, THE MISSILE WOULD HAVE STARTED TO BREAK-UP ON RE-ENTRY).

3. OF THE 25, TWO WERE DESCRIBED AS 'MODERATELY' INJURED, THE REST AS 'LIGHTLY'.

4. THE IDF SPOKESMAN'S OFFICE ALSO YESTERDAY ANNOUNCED THAT THREE 'INFILTRATORS' FROM JORDAN AMBUSHED A BUS 60 MILES NORTH OF EILAT NEAR THE ISRAEL/JORDAN BORDER. FOUR ISRAELI SOLDIERS WERE REPORTED TO HAVE BEEN INJURED IN THE ATTACK. THE INFILTRATORS WERE KILLED IN A SUBSEQUENT SHOOT OUT. DEFENCE MINISTER ARENS COMMENTED AFTERWARDS THAT ALTHOUGH TO THE BEST OF HIS KNOWLEDGE THE JORDANIAN ARMY WAS TRYING TO PREVENT INFILTRATIONS, ON THIS OCCASION IT WAS NOT TRYING HARD ENOUGH.

COMMENT

5. THIS WAS THE FIRST MISSILE ATTACK TO HIT TEL AVIV SINCE 26 JANUARY

PAGE 1
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(THE ATTACKS ON 28 AND 31 JANUARY, 2 AND 3 FEBRUARY FELL SHORT). THE ISRAELI AUTHORITIES HAD BEEN WARNING THAT THE THREAT WAS NOT OVER, BUT THE INFREQUENCY AND INACCURACY OF RECENT ATTACKS WERE INEVITABLY PROMPTING OPTIMISM AND REINFORCING THE RETURN TO BUSINESS AS NORMAL THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY. I JUDGE THAT LAST NIGHT'S ATTACK WILL NOT IN ITSELF LEAVE TO ANY SIGNIFICANT RE-EXAMINATION OF THE GOVERNMENT'S RESTRAINT POLICY AT THIS STAGE. PUBLIC BACKING FOR THE NO-RETALIATION LINE REMAINS FIRM, AND AWARENESS OF THE POSSIBLE NEGATIVE IMPLICATIONS OF RETALIATION (FOR INSTANCE ON JORDAN'S STABILITY) REMAIN HIGH. FOR THIS REASON TOO, I EXPECT REACTION TO YESTERDAY'S CROSS-BORDER INCURSION TO BE LIMITED TO 'MORE IN SADNESS' COMMENTS SUCH AS THOSE MADE BY ARENS. BUT IT WOULD BE RASH TO MAKE FIRM PREDICTIONS: WE LEARNT BY CHANCE LAST NIGHT (BEFORE THE SCUD ATTACK) THAT AN ISRAELI SPECIAL FORCES UNIT HAD BEEN CALLED UP FOR SOME SORT OF OPERATION. THIS MAY OF COURSE HAVE MERELY BEEN A TRAINING EXERCISE.

ELLIOTT

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SIC 19M

MIPT: GULF WAR: CANADIAN THOUGHTS ON POSTWAR PERIOD

1. MULRONEY'S THEME IN HIS SPEECH ON 8 FEBRUARY WAS THAT THE COALITION MUST WIN THE WAR AND WIN THE PEACE. HE BEGAN WITH A CONVENTIONAL EXPLANATION OF WHY THE UN MUST SUCCEED IN THE DIRECT CHALLENGE TO ITS AUTHORITY POSED BY SADDAM HUSSEIN. HE SAID THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY HAS A MORAL OBLIGATION TO STEP IN AND PUT AN END TO SADDAM HUSSEIN'S BRUTALITY AGAINST KUWAIT. CANADA SHARED IN THAT OBLIGATION AND WOULD FULFIL ITS RESPONSIBILITIES.

2. IN LOOKING FORWARD TO THE POSTWAR PERIOD, MULRONEY ADMITTED THAT THE PICTURE WAS FAR FROM CLEAR AND THAT ANY ASSESSMENTS AT THIS STAGE MUST BE VERY CAUTIOUS. MULRONEY SET OUT 4 PRINCIPLES FOR CANADA'S APPROACH:

- COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL BY SADDAM HUSSEIN FROM KUWAIT SEMI-COLON
- SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEMS OF THE REGION MUST HAVE THE SUPPORT OF THE GOVERNMENTS AND PEOPLE CONCERNED SEMI-COLON
- UNITED NATIONS MUST BE AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE SOLUTION SEMI-COLON
- REGIONAL SECURITY MUST COVER POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, MILITARY AND HUMANITARIAN ISSUES.

3. OTHER MAIN POINTS OF THE SPEECH WERE AS FOLLOWS:

- CANADA WOULD PROVIDE HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO THE DIRECT VICTIMS OF THE WAR WHEN THE FIGHTING STOPPED. THE PEOPLE OF IRAQ MUST BE ELIGIBLE FOR SUCH ASSISTANCE SEMI-COLON
- CANADA WOULD PARTICIPATE IN THE RECONSTRUCTION OF KUWAIT, WHICH HE ASSUMED WOULD BE FINANCED LARGELY BY KUWAIT AND HER ARAB NEIGHBOURS SEMI-COLON
- PEACEKEEPING FORCES SHOULD BE DRAWN PRIMARILY FROM ARAB STATES, FROM MUSLIM NON-ARAB STATES, AND POSSIBLY FROM THE NORDICS SEMI-COLON
- CANADA WAS WILLING TO PARTICIPATE IN THE DESIGN AND TRAINING OF THE FORCE AND TO CONTRIBUTE TO IT IF APPROPRIATE SEMI-COLON

- ??
- MILITARY SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS SHOULD INCLUDE A SYSTEM OF REGIONAL SECURITY BASED ON GUARENTEED BORDERS AND COLLECTIVE DEFENCE SEMI-COLON
 - A REGIONAL SECURITY SYSTEM FOR THE MIDDLE EAST COULD DRAW ON LESSONS LEARNED IN THE CSCE PROCESS SEMI-COLON
 - THE ECONOMIC DISPARITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST CONTRIBUTED TO SOCIAL INSTABILITY AND FED THE POLITICS OF EXTREMISM SEMI-COLON
 - AN APPROACH SIMILAR TO THE MARSHALL PLAN, PERHAPS BASED IN EXISTING REGIONAL INSTITUTIONS, AND FINANCED SUBSTANCIALY FROM REGIONAL RESOURCES WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND PEACE SEMI-COLON
 - HE WOULD PROPOSE TO PEREZ DE CUELLAR THAT THE UN CONVENE A GLOBAL SUMMIT ON THE INSTRUMENTS OF WAR AND MASS DESTRUCTION .
 - HE WOULD ALSO DISCUSS WITH THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL THE CONVENING OF A CONFERENCE ON WAYS TO PREVENT THE ENVIRONMENT FROM BEING USED AS A WEAPON.
 - NO REGIONAL SECURITY PLAN COULD SUCCEED UNLESS DETERMINED TO MAKE PROGRESS TOWARDS SETTLEMENT OF THE ISREAL/ARAB CONFLICT, INCLUDING THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION. SUCH A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT MUST BE FOUNDED ON RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338 OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

4. MR CLARK REMARKS WERE MAINLY VARIATIONS ON THE SAME THEME. HIS TONE WAS MORE LOW KEY AND HE STRESSED THAT IT WAS FIRST AND FOREMOST THE RESPONSIBILITY OF COUNTRIES IN THE REGION TO FIND SOLUTIONS.

FALL

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SIC I9M

SUMMARY

1. MFA VICE MINISTER BRIEFS WESTERN AMBASSADORS. IRAQI VICE PRESIDENT NOW IN TEHRAN : VAEZI NOT OPTIMISTIC ABOUT SADDAM HUSSEIN'S REPLY TO RAFSANJANI'S MESSAGE. IRAN WILL RETAIN IRAQI MILITARY AIRCRAFT.

DETAIL

2. VAEZI BRIEFED WESTERN HEADS OF MISSION THIS AFTERNOON 09 FEBRUARY. MAIN POINTS WERE :

(A) HAMMADI HAD ARRIVED AND WAS SEEING RAFSANJANI AS WE SPOKE. VAEZI TOLD ME AFTER THE BRIEFING THAT HE WAS NOT (NOT) OPTIMISTIC : IF THE IRAQIS HAD BEEN THINKING SERIOUSLY OF WITHDRAWING THEY WOULD NOT HAVE BROKEN RELATIONS WITH THE US AND OTHERS.

(B) IF SADDAM HUSSEIN'S RESPONSE TO RAFSANJANI'S MESSAGE WAS NEGATIVE THE IRANIANS DOUBTED THAT THE NAM MEETING COULD PRODUCE ANYTHING BEYOND A STATEMENT SETTING OUT VARIOUS, MOST LIKELY CONFLICTING, PRINCIPLES. BUT IRAN WOULD ATTEND, AND WOULD CONTINUE TO ARGUE FOR IRAQ'S WITHDRAWAL FROM KUWAIT. IRAN'S POLICY WOULD NOT (NOT) CHANGE.

(C) THE TURKISH FOREIGN MINISTER HAD REPEATED EARLIER PROMISES THAT TURKEY WOULD NOT (NOT) ENTER IRAQI TERRITORY. THE IRANIANS WOULD BE WATCHING THEM VERY CAREFULLY (COMMENT : I.E. IRANIAN DOUBTS ABOUT TURKISH INTENTIONS REMAIN).

(D) IF SADDAM HUSSEIN CAME TO HIS SENSES AND WITHDREW NOW, HIS GOVERNMENT MIGHT SURVIVE AND THE REST OF THE REGION COULD ADJUST TO THE PROSPECT OF REACHING COLLECTIVE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS THAT INCLUDED IRAQ UNDER ITS' PRESENT GOVERNMENT. IF A GROUND WAR BEGAN, EITHER A COUP OR THE UNITED EFFORTS OF THE POLITICAL OPPOSITION TO SADDAM WERE LIKELY TO DRIVE HIM FROM POWER.

(E) THE RECENT SOVIET AND FRENCH VISITS HAD ALLOWED AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON FUTURE REGIONAL SECURITY. IRAN'S IDEAS WERE VERY CLOSE TO

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THOSE EXPRESSED BY BOTH VISITORS (NO DETAILS).

(F) VAEZI DODGED A QUESTION ON NUMBERS OF IRAQI AIRCRAFT BUT ADMITTED THAT POST-CONFLICT BARGAINING MIGHT EXPLAIN IRANIAN VAGUENESS. HE INSISTED THAT IRAN WOULD NOT (NOT) RETURN THE AIRCRAFT AND CREW, SAYING THAT THIS WOULD BE LUNATIC BECAUSE IRAN FIRMLY BELIEVED IRAQ WOULD BE DEFEATED.

COMMENT

3. THE ABOVE REINFORCES MY BELIEF THAT SAUDI ALLEGATIONS ABOUT IRANIAN MALPRACTICES (RIYADH TELNO 399 TO FCO) ARE UNFOUNDED.

REDDAWAY

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CAIRO FOR SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY
OUR TELNO 389: IRAQ/KUWAIT: WASHINGTON SITREP
SUMMARY

1. AFTER THREE WEEKS OF FIGHTING, SUPPORT FOR THE ADMINISTRATION AND ITS CONDUCT OF THE WAR REMAIN STRONG. THE COUNTRY HAS RALLIED. WAR AIMS AND THE POST-WAR SETTLEMENT ARE NOW BEING DISCUSSED. SADDAM'S HEAD IS NOT (SO FAR) BEING DEMANDED BY THE PUBLIC OR THE ADMINISTRATION. ADMIRATION FOR BRITAIN'S ROLE.
DETAIL

2. AS OPERATION DESERT STORM ENTERS ITS FOURTH WEEK, IT MAY BE USEFUL TO ASSESS THE MOOD AND THE ISSUES BEING DISCUSSED IN THE UNITED STATES.

3. THERE REMAINS STRONG, AND INDEED GROWING, SUPPORT FOR THE ADMINISTRATION (78 PER CENT, UP FROM 75 PER CENT LAST WEEK). SUPPORT FOR THE PRESIDENT HIMSELF HAS REACHED UNPRECEDENTED LEVELS (82 PER CENT). THESE FIGURES SEEM GENUINELY TO REFLECT THE PUBLIC MOOD. THERE HAS BEEN A SURGE IN PATRIOTIC DISPLAYS AND STRONG SUPPORT FOR THE TROOPS. THE PRE-WAR DEBATE ON THE MERITS OF WAR AS OPPOSED TO SANCTIONS HAS ALL BUT ENDED. THE DOMESTIC FOCUS IS NOW ON BRINGING THE WAR TO A SWIFT AND SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION WITH MINIMUM ALLIED CASUALTIES.

4. ADMITTEDLY SOME POCKETS OF PROTEST REMAIN. BUT THEY ARE SMALL-SCALE AND HAVE GENERATED THEIR OWN OPPOSITION. ANTI-WAR DEMONSTRATIONS HAVE DECLINED IN SIZE AND FREQUENCY, AND HAVE WILTED IN THE FACE OF OVERWHELMING GENERAL OUTRAGE AT SADDAM'S PROSECUTION OF THE WAR. SUPPORT ALSO REMAINS SOFT AMONG BLACKS. BLACK LEADERS HAVE GENERALLY OPPOSED THE WAR AND EXPRESS CONCERN THAT BLACKS (12 PER CENT OF THE POPULATION) ARE HEAVILY OVER-REPRESENTED AMONG FORCES IN THE GULF (25-30 PER CENT).

5. THERE ARE OTHER CROSS-CURRENTS IN THE PUBLIC MOOD. THERE IS PUBLIC ANXIETY, BORDERING ON MILD HYSTERIA, ABOUT POSSIBLE

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TERRORIST ATTACKS AGAINST AMERICANS AT HOME AND ABROAD. THE SHARP DECREASE IN AMERICANS TRAVELLING OVERSEAS AND WITHIN THE US IS EVIDENCE OF THIS. SHORT OF A SPECTACULAR TERRORIST ATTACK, THIS ANXIETY SHOULD FADE. THERE IS ALSO A READINESS TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN THE IRAQI PEOPLE AND SADDAM, ALTHOUGH HIS DEMONIZATION HAS NOT REACHED THE LEVEL HERE WHICH IT APPEARS TO HAVE IN THE BRITISH POPULAR PRESS.

6. BIPARTISAN SUPPORT ON THE HILL REMAINS WIDE, IF NOT DEEP. THERE HAS BEEN LITTLE OVERT PARTISANSHIP SINCE THE WAR BEGAN. ON THE CONTRARY, THOSE WHO EARLIER OPPOSED THE PRESIDENT ARE NOW DEMONSTRABLY RALLYING TO HIM. THE TRUCE BETWEEN REPUBLICANS AND DEMOCRATS WOULD BE TESTED BY HEAVY US CASUALTIES. ONCE THE WAR IS OVER, HOWEVER, THERE MAY WELL BE A DETAILED POST MORTEM ON ADMINISTRATION POLICY TOWARDS IRAQ BEFORE THE CRISIS, AND ITS CONDUCT OF AFFAIRS AS IT HAS PROCEEDED. SOME ARE ALREADY ARGUING THAT THE ADMINISTRATION ARE ONLY REAPING THE WHIRLWIND WHICH THEIR PAST SUPPORT FOR SADDAM MADE INEVITABLE.

7. DOMESTIC SPECULATION ABOUT THE POSSIBLE START OF A GROUND OFFENSIVE HAS BEEN INTENSIFIED BY THE CHENEY/POWELL MISSION TO THE GULF (OUR TELNO 382). THERE IS DIVISION OVER HOW SOON A GROUND WAR SHOULD BEGIN. MANY ON THE HILL (IRONICALLY INCLUDING SOME WHO OPPOSED THE START OF THE WAR ITSELF) ARE NOW ARGUING THAT THE WAR NEEDS TO BE ENDED SOONER RATHER THAN LATER: TO PREVENT THE COALITION FALLING APART, TO PREEMPT ISRAELI INVOLVEMENT, TO MINIMISE CIVILIAN CASUALTIES IN IRAQ (TV PICTURES FROM BAGHDAD HAVE HAD A POWERFUL IMPACT HERE) AND TO IMPROVE THE CHANCES FOR A SUSTAINABLE POST-WAR SETTLEMENT. PUBLICLY EXPRESSED MILITARY OPINION, HOWEVER, PREFERS FOR NOW A CONTINUATION OF THE AIR WAR SO AS TO MINIMISE ALLIED CASUALTIES. MOST HERE, HOWEVER, AGREE THAT THE QUESTION NOW IS WHEN, NOT WHETHER, A GROUND WAR BEGINS.

8. ON WAR AIMS, THE ADMINISTRATION CONTINUE PUBLICLY TO RESTATE THE PRESIDENT'S ORIGINAL OBJECTIVES. BAKER SPELT THESE OUT AGAIN IN HIS TESTIMONY ON THE HILL ON 6 FEBRUARY (OUR TELNO 385): TO EXPEL IRAQ FROM KUWAIT, TO RESTORE ITS LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT AND TO ENSURE STABILITY AND SECURITY IN THE REGION. THERE HAS BEEN MEDIA SPECULATION THAT THE OVERTHROW OF SADDAM IS AN ESSENTIAL, IF SO FAR UNDECLARED WAR AIM. BUT PUBLIC OPINION HAS NOT YET SEIZED ON THIS, AND THE ADMINISTRATION HAVE DENIED THAT SADDAM'S HEAD IS WHAT THEY WANT. THEY RECOGNISE THAT AFTER THE CRISIS SADDAM MAY STILL BE AROUND AND SOMEONE TO DEAL WITH. IRAQI USE OF CW COULD OF COURSE CHANGE SENTIMENT ON THIS.

9. THE ADMINISTRATION CONTINUE TO BE SCEPTICAL ABOUT PEACE INITIATIVES, PARTICULARLY IN THE UN, WHERE THEY REMAIN STRONGLY OPPOSED TO ANY MEETING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL (OUR TELNO 390).

THE STATUS OF THE IRANIAN INITIATIVE REMAINS UNCLEAR, WITH PRESIDENT BUSH MAINTAINING ON 5 FEBRUARY THAT NO SPECIFIC IRANIAN PEACE PROPOSAL HAD BEEN CONVEYED TO THE US (OUR TELNO 373). THE FACT THAT SADDAM SHOWS NO INTEREST IN A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION, HOWEVER, HAS NOT PREVENTED THE ADMINISTRATION FROM THINKING HARD ABOUT HOW IT WOULD HANDLE POSSIBLE CALLS FOR A CEASEFIRE FROM THE IRAQIS OR THIRD PARTIES. US THINKING IS ALMOST IDENTICAL TO OUR OWN.

10. THE ADMINISTRATION REMAINS SENSITIVE TO CRITICISM THAT THEY HAVE NOT GIVEN ENOUGH THOUGHT TO POST-WAR CONSIDERATIONS. BAKER TRIED TO COUNTER THIS BY LAYING OUT US IDEAS FOR A POST-CRISIS AGENDA TO CONGRESS ON 7 FEBRUARY (OUR TELNO 385). THE ADMINISTRATION HAS NO ILLUSIONS ABOUT THE DIFFICULTIES. IN PARTICULAR, PUTTING US PRESSURE ON ISRAEL TO MAKE PROGRESS ON THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE WILL NOT BE EASY. THE ISRAELIS HAVE EARNED GREAT RESPECT WITHIN THE ADMINISTRATION, ON THE HILL AND AMONGST PUBLIC OPINION FOR THEIR RESTRAINT UNDER FIRE. THEY WILL EXPECT A RETURN, AND MANY HERE WILL JUDGE THAT THEY HAVE EARNED IT.

11. IN CONTRAST TO THE INCREASE IN ISRAELI POLITICAL CAPITAL, PALESTINIAN STOCK HAS FALLEN TO ITS LOWEST LEVEL IN YEARS. ALMOST WORSE THAN PALESTINIAN SUPPORT FOR SADDAM HAS BEEN REJOICING IN THE WEST BANK AT MISSILE STRIKES ON ISRAEL. KING HUSSEIN IS ALSO A LOSER. BITTERNESS IS PARTICULARLY NOTICEABLE ON THE HILL. BUT HOWEVER MUCH THE KING IS DISLIKED THE ADMINISTRATION RECOGNISES THAT ANY ALTERNATIVE WOULD BE MUCH WORSE.

12. THERE IS CLOSE SCRUTINY OF WESTERN CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE COALITION. SO FAR, ONLY BRITISH EFFORTS RECEIVE UNSTINTING PRAISE. WE ARE SEEN AS THE ONLY ALLY PREPARED FROM THE START TO OFFER UNHESITATING SUPPORT. OUR EFFORTS ARE EXTENSIVELY REPORTED IN THE MEDIA. THEY ARE CONTRASTED WITH THE VACILLATION OF THE FRENCH, WHOSE DIPLOMACY ON THE EVE OF THE UN DEADLINE AND SUBSEQUENT LIMITATIONS ON THEIR BOMBING HAVE CAUSED REAL IRRITATION. BUT JAPAN AND GERMANY HAVE COME OUT WORST. THERE IS PARTICULARLY STRONG FEELING ON THE HILL WITH MUCH TALK OF A POST-WAR BACKLASH. IT IS DIFFICULT TO QUANTIFY HOW ALL THIS WILL AFFECT LONGER TERM US POLICIES AND PERCEPTIONS. BUT FOR THE MOMENT THERE IS GENUINE ADMIRATION FOR THE BRITISH EFFORT WITHIN THE ADMINISTRATION AND IN THE COUNTRY AT LARGE.

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P. M.

(2)

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

9 February 1991

Prime Minister
CD 9/2

THE GULF

I had a talk this afternoon on the secure line with General Scowcroft in the White House. There is really very little to report.

General Scowcroft confirmed that the Scud fired at Israel last night had been destroyed by a Patriot missile and that the damage in Tel Aviv had been caused by falling debris.

We had some talk about indications that the Iraqis might be preparing to use CW shortly. General Scowcroft said the Americans had picked out from satellite photography activity round two CW storage sites. This seemed to indicate that they were preparing to move CW somewhere. But subsequent and very recent pictures showed both sites completely wiped out. The Americans had no indications of specific preparations for use of BW or CW.

General Scowcroft said the President had made half a dozen 'phone calls to various members of the multi-national coalition. Generally it was holding together pretty well. Those to whom he had spoken included the Amir of Bahrain, the Netherlands Prime Minister, the Spanish Prime Minister, the President of Venezuela and the Indian Prime Minister. Only the last had given any trouble, indicating that India would have to suspend the permission given to US aircraft to refuel in India. Chandra Shekhar had said that personally he was in favour of continuing the arrangement, but pressure in Parliament against it was too great to withstand. For my part, I briefed General Scowcroft on the Prime Minister's talk with King Fahd.

Finally, we wondered whether there was significance in the fact that Saddam Hussein seemed to have made no public appearance or speech or broadcast (I think) for over a week. We noted that the Deputy Prime Minister, Hamadi, was today taking what was described as Saddam's reply to the recent Iranian peace initiative to Tehran, but that was not necessarily conclusive.

SECRET AND PERSONAL

SECRET AND PERSONAL

- 2 -

I am sending copies of this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence) and to Sir Robin Butler.

C.D. POWELL

The Resident Clerk,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SECRET AND PERSONAL

Sir Charles Powell KCMG



With the compliments of

THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

Simon Cass

11/6

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FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

YOUR TELNOS 119-121 TO CAIRO: GULF BURDENSARING: CONTRIBUTION BY
HONG KONG

- Mr. Powell, No 10*
attached
You wrote on 10 Feb. As you can see,
the Secretary of State has sent a message to the Governor.
We are consulting Hong Kong about a possible message
from the PPR to LEGCO.
J. Brown
1. THE SECRETARY OF STATE DOUBTS THAT WE NEED ASK THE PRIME MINISTER TO SEND A MESSAGE TO THE GOVERNOR OF HONG KONG. IF THE PRIME MINISTER WERE TO SEND A MESSAGE TO ANYONE IT MIGHT BE TO LEGCO AS A WHOLE, IF THE GOVERNOR HIMSELF THOUGHT THIS WOULD BE USEFUL, (BUT SEE ALSO BELOW).
 2. THE SECRETARY OF STATE IS HAPPY FOR A MESSAGE TO GO FROM HIM TO THE GOVERNOR. THE TEXT IN FCO TELNO 121 TO CAIRO IS FINE, WITH THE LAST SENTENCE OF THE FIRST PARAGRAPH AMENDED TO READ: "THIS DONATION IF VERY MUCH APPRECIATED HERE AND I HOPE THAT YOU WILL PASS ON THE GRATITUDE OF THE PRIME MINISTER, DEFENCE SECRETARY AND MYSELF."
 3. PLEASE ADVANCE TO RESIDENT CLERK AND PS.

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PART ONE OF TWO PARTS

FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

SECRETARY OF STATE'S VISIT TO THE KUWAITI GOVERNMENT IN TAIF, 9
FEBRUARY

SUMMARY

1. ON THE WAY BETWEEN CAIRO AND RIYADH, THE SECRETARY OF STATE STOPPED OVER IN TAIF FOR AN HOUR AND A HALF'S TALKS WITH THE AMIR OF KUWAIT AND THE CROWN PRINCE. THE AMIR BALANCED THE KUWAITIS' WISH TO SEE THEIR COUNTRY LIBERATED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AGAINST A REALISATION THAT TIME WAS NEEDED TO SOFTEN THE IRAQI TROOPS BY BOMBARDMENT. HE WELCOMED THE PRIME MINISTER'S LETTER ABOUT BURDENSARING AND SAID THE KUWAITIS WOULD AGREE TO WHAT WE HAD ASKED. HE WAS CONFIDENT THAT THE IRANIANS WOULD REMAIN COMMITTED TO A FULL WITHDRAWAL OF IRAQI TROOP FROM KUWAIT. THE SECRETARY OF STATE INTRODUCED TO THE CROWN PRINCE A TEAM OF BRITISH BUSINESSMEN LED BY LORD PRIOR OF GEC. LORD PRIOR INTRODUCED A PROPOSAL IN WHICH 600 BRITISH ENGINEERS WOULD GO TO KUWAIT AT SHORT NOTICE, STAY ON BOARD A SHIP IN THE HARBOUR, AND START THE RECONSTRUCTION OF KUWAIT. LORD PRIOR AND HIS COLLEAGUES EMPHASISED THAT MANY OF THE BRITISH COMPANIES THEY REPRESENTED WERE FAMILIAR WITH KUWAIT AND HAD RETAINED PLANS OF THE INSTALLATIONS WHICH THEY HAD HELPED TO BUILD.

2. AFTER THE BUSINESSMEN HAD LEFT, THE CROWN PRINCE CONFIRMED THAT THE SECRETARY OF STATE COULD ANNOUNCE KUWAITI HELP TO BRITAIN ON POUNDS 660 MILLION IN RESPONSE TO THE PRIME MINISTER'S LETTER ABOUT BRUDENSARING. ON FUTURE SECURITY OF THE GULF, THE CROWN PRINCE OFFERED NO IDEAS OF HIS OWN BUT SAID THAT GULF FOREIGN MINISTERS WOULD BE MEETING THEIR SYRIAN AND EGYPTIAN COLLEAGUES IN CAIRO ON 14 FEBRUARY. PRIVATELY THE SECRETARY OF STATE TOLD THE CROWN PRINCE THAT HE WOULD BE WELL ADVISED TO RETURN TO KUWAIT AS SOON AS

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CONFIDENTIAL

POSSIBLE AFTER LIBERATION AND TO MAKE A PUBLIC APPEAL TO THE PEOPLE OF KUWAIT AROUND THAT TIME.

DETAIL

3. THE AMIR REPORTED A SURGE IN MORALE OF THE KUWAITIS WHICH PARALLELED A DROP IN THE MORAL OF THE IRAQI FORCES IN KUWAIT. BUT THE IRAQIS WERE STILL BRUTALISING KUWAITIS FROM TIME TO TIME. KUWAITIS WERE NO LONGER SEEKING TO ESCAPE BECAUSE THE START OF MILITARY OPERATIONS TO LIBERATE THE COUNTRY HAD ENCOURAGED THEM TO STAY.
4. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT MILITARY OPERATIONS WERE GOING WELL BUT THAT MORE BOMBARDMENT WAS NEEDED BEFORE THE START OF THE LAND BATTLE. THE AMIR SAID THAT THE KUWAITIS WISHED TO SEE THE LIBERATION OF THEIR COUNTRY AS SOON AS POSSIBLE BUT REALISED THE IMPORTANCE OF MINIMISING THE LOSS OF LIFE AMONG THOSE HELPING THEM. THEY ACCEPTED THAT TIME WAS NEEDED TO SOFTEN UP THE IRAQI TROOPS. THEY WERE CONCERNED, HOWEVER, ABOUT THE EFFECT ON PUBLIC OPINION IN EUROPE OF SOME OF THE SLANTED REPORTS ABOUT DAMAGE AND CIVILIAN CASUALTIES IN IRAQ.
5. THE SECRETARY OF STATE EMPHASISED THE NEED TO LAY AT SADDAM HUSSEIN'S DOOR RESPONSIBILITY FOR DAMAGE AND CASUALTIES. THIS POINT SHOULD BE MADE, FOR EXAMPLE, TO THE NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES MEETING IN BELGRADE ON 12 FEBRUARY.
6. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID WE WERE BEGINNING TO THINK ABOUT ISSUES WHICH WOULD ARISE WHEN THE CONFLICT FINISHED, SUCH AS PRISONERS OF WAR AND THE RESTORATION OF THE KUWAITI GOVERNMENT. THE AMIR SAID THAT KUWAITIS WERE TAKING THESE POINTS INTO CONSIDERATION.
7. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT WE WERE VERY GRATEFUL FOR THE AMIR'S REPLY TO THE PRIME MINISTER'S LETTER ABOUT BURDENSARING. WHEN FRIENDS HELPED EACH OTHER THE HELP CAME FIRST AND ANY ARITHMENTIC WAS SECONDARY. HE WAS SORRY THAT WE HAD TO RAISE THE FINANCIAL ASPECT BUT THE COSTS WERE GREAT. THE AMIR SAID THAT THE KUWAITIS HAD AGREED IN PRINCIPLE THE AMOUNT WHICH HMG HAD SOUGHT. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THIS WOULD BE GREATLY APPRECIATED. THE ISSUE WAS PRIMARILY A MATTER OF LIVES AND HONOUR, NOT ONE OF MONEY, BUT WE WERE VERY GRATEFUL.
8. THE SECRETARY OF STATE TOLD THE AMIR THAT HE WOULD BE INTRODUCING TO THE CROWN PRINCE A TEAM OF BRITISH BUSINESSMEN WHO

HOPED TO HELP THE KUWAITIS RECONSTRUCT THEIR COUNTRY.

9. THE SECRETARY OF STATE ASKED WHETHER THE AMIR THOUGHT SADDAM HUSSEIN WOULD FIGHT TO THE END OR SEEK A CEASEFIRE. THE AMIR FOUND IT IMPOSSIBLE TO PREDICT WHAT SADDAM HUSSEIN WOULD DO. HE WAS NOT LIKE HITLER WHO HAD THOUGHT GERMANY WAS MORE IMPORTANT THAN ANYTHING ELSE. SADDAM HUSSEIN BELIEVED THAT HE WAS MORE IMPORTANT THAN ANYTHING ELSE. HE WAS TOO CRUEL TO CARE ABOUT HIS OWN PEOPLE.

10. THE AMIR SAID KUWAITIS WERE WAITING TO HEAR THE IRAQI RESPONSE TO THE IRANIAN PROPOSALS. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID HE WAS INCLINED TO THINK THAT IRAN WOULD STAY NEUTRAL. THE AMIR AGREED: A FEW DAYS EARLIER HE HAD SENT THE DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER TO TEHRAN. RAFSANJANI HAD BEEN ADAMANT THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS WOULD BE APPLIED IN FULL. THE SECRETARY OF STATE ASKED IF ANY OF THE PLANES WHICH HAD FLED TO IRAN HAD BEEN KUWAITI PLANES. THE AMIR SAID THAT SOME OF THE CIVILIAN PLANES WHICH HAD MOVED TO IRAN WERE KUWAITI ONES. WHEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT THE IRANIANS SHOULD RETURN THEM TO THE KUWAITIS, THE AMIR REPLIED THAT HE HAD ASKED THE (BRITISH) INSURANCE COMPANIES INVOLVED TO TALK TO THE IRANIANS.

11. THE SECRETARY OF STATE EXPRESSED ADMIRATION FOR THE COURAGE OF THE KUWAITIS AND PRAISED THE GOOD JOB BEING DONE BY THE KUWAITI AMBASSADOR IN LONDON. HE LOOKED FORWARD TO HIS NEXT CALL ON THE AMIR, IN KUWAIT.

TALKS WITH THE CROWN PRINCE, WITH BUSINESSMEN

12. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT BRITAIN'S FIRST AIM WAS TO LIBERATE KUWAIT. SUBSEQUENTLY WE HOPED TO HELP THE RECONSTRUCTION. HE GAVE THE CROWN PRINCE A BROCHURE PRODUCED BY HMG. LORD PRIOR HANDED OVER A LETTER WHICH HE SAID SET OUT A PACKAGE OF PROPOSALS TO HELP RECONSTRUCTION. THE COMPANIES INVOLVED WOULD HOUSE 600 ENGINEERS ON BOARD A SHIP AT KUWAIT. HE REALISED THAT THE KUWAITIS' MINDS WERE FOCUSED ON THE LIBERATION OF THEIR COUNTRY. HE WAS CONFIDENT THAT IT WOULD BE QUICK. HE EXPECTED KUWAIT TO BE FREE WITHIN A MATTER OF WEEKS SO PREPARATIONS FOR RECONSTRUCTION NEEDED TO BE MADE. LATER IN THE EVENING THE BUSINESSMEN WOULD DIVIDE INTO GROUPS TO TALK TO INDIVIDUAL KUWAITI MINISTERS.

13. THE CROWN PRINCE SAID THAT BRITAIN HAD BEEN A WELCOME FRIEND IN THE PAST AND THE KUWAITIS LOOKED FORWARD TO WORKING WITH BRITAIN AGAIN IN THE FUTURE, DEVELOPING THEIR CLOSE LINKS IN EVERY FIELD TO THE MUTUAL INTEREST OF BOTH. HE REMEMBERED THAT IN 1961, WHEN IRAQ

HAD THREATENED KUWAIT, THE FIRST TROOPS TO ARRIVE TO HELP THE KUWAITIS HAD BEEN THE BRITISH. THIS TIME, TOO, THE BRITISH HAD NOT HESITATED IN SENDING FORCES.

14. THE CROWN PRINCE SAID THE DOOR WAS OPEN FOR ALL BRITISH FIRMS TO HELP KUWAITI RECONSTRUCTION. THE BUSINESSMEN MIGHT HAVE HEARD RUMOURS THAT ALL THE CONTRACTS HAD BEEN SIGNED WITH UNITED STATES' FIRMS. THEY SHOULD NOT BELIEVE SUCH RUMOURS. MANY CONTRACTS HAD BEEN SIGNED IN THE PREVIOUS FEW DAYS WITH, THE CROWN PRINCE CLAIMED, MANY BRITISH FIRMS. 22 PER SENT OF THE SUMS INVOLVED WOULD TO TO PURCHASE BRITISH PRODUCTS. CONTRACTS WOULD, OF COURSE, DEPEND ON PRICE.

MUNRO

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FM RIYADH

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 404

OF 092248Z FEBRUARY 91

INFO IMMEDIATE CAIRO, JEDDA, AMMAN, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK

INFO IMMEDIATE PARIS, BONN, LUXEMBOURG

INFO PRIORITY OTHER GULF POSTS

PART TWO OF TWO PARTS

FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

SECRETARY OF STATE'S VISIT TO THE KUWAITI GOVERNMENT IN TAIF, 9
FEBRUARY

15. LORD PRIOR SAID HE THOUGHT THAT BRITISH PRICES WOULD BE
COMPETITIVE AND EMPHASISED THAT BRITISH COMPANIES HAD SOMETHING
SPECIAL TO OFFER BECAUSE THEY KNEW KUWAIT WELL. ADAMS OF THE DTI
ADDED THAT A NUMBER OF BRITISH COMPANIES RETAINED PLANS OF THE
INSTALLATIONS OF KUWAIT ON WHICH THEY HAD WORKED EARLIER.

DISCUSSION WITH THE CROWN PRINCE AFTER THE BUSINESSMEN HAD LEFT

16. THE CROWN PRINCE SAID HOW RELIEVED HE WAS THAT NO BRITISH
MINISTERS HAD BEEN HURT BY THE MORTAR ATTACK IN LONDON ON 7
FEBRUARY. HE HOPED THE POLICE WOULD TRACK DOWN THE TERRORISTS
QUICKLY. HE ASKED AFTER, AND SENT WARM GREETING TO, THE PRIME
MINISTER.

17. THE SECRETARY OF STATE REPEATED HIS THANKS FOR THE KUWAITI
RESPONSE TO THE BRITISH REQUEST FOR FINANCIAL HELP. COULD HE
ANNOUNCE THE POUNDS 660 MILLION TO THE PRESS? IT WOULD BE HELPFUL
IF HE COULD QUOTE THE FIGURE. THE CROWN PRINCE AGREED THAT HE
COULD DO SO.

18. THE SECRETARY OF STATE ASKED ABOUT PLANS FOR THE POST-CONFLICT
PERIOD. THE CROWN PRINCE SAID THAT THE KUWAITIS WERE IN TOUCH WITH
ALL THE GULF COUNTRIES, TO EXCHANGE IDEAS. HE ASKED FOR THE
SECRETARY OF STATE'S THOUGHTS. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID HE KNEW
THAT COMMENTATORS WOULD BE ALL TOO READY TO SAY THAT THERE WAS A
BRITISH PLAN, AND AMERICAN PLAN OR A FRENCH PLAN. HE WAS ANXIOUS
FOR IDEAS TO COME FORWARD FROM THE GULF COUNTRIES THEMSELVES. THE
CROWN PRINCE INSISTED ON HEARING THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S VIEWS
HOWEVER INFORMALLY. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID, OFF THE RECORD,

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THAT HE WONDERED ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF A SECURITY ALLIANCE OF THE GULF STATES AND EGYPT AND, POSSIBLY, SYRIA. THIS COULD POSSIBLY BE UNDERPINNED BY THE GULF STATES' WESTERN FRIENDS. THE CROWN PRINCE SAID THAT PRINCE SAUD HAD BEEN TO SYRIA AND EGYPT THE WEEK BEFORE TO TALK ABOUT THE WORKING PAPER ON FUTURE ARRANGEMENTS WHICH HE HAD PROMISED TO GIVE THE KUWAITIS. WHEN THEY RECEIVED IT THEY WOULD LET US KNOW. THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE GULF COUNTRIES WOULD MEET THEIR EGYPTIAN AND SYRIAN COUNTERPARTS IN CAIRO ON 14 FEBRUARY.

19. THE CROWN PRINCE AND THE FOREIGN MINISTER SAID THAT THEY DID NOT THINK THAT KING HUSSEIN WOULD ALTER HIS HARD LINE, FOLLOWING HIS LATEST SPEECH. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SPOKE ABOUT KING HUSSEIN MUCH AS HE HAD TO MUBARAK IN CAIRO EARLIER IN THE DAY. THE CROWN PRINCE ADDED THAT THE KUWAITIS HAD LEARNED MANY LESSONS FROM THE INVASION. (HMA KUWAIT SAID AFTERWARDS THAT HE THOUGHT THIS IMPLIED THAT THE KUWAITIS WOULD TAKE A HARD LINE TOWARDS ANY PALESTINIANS IN THEIR TERRITORY AFTER LIBERATION.) THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID WE WERE BEGINNING TO THINK ABOUT THE RETURN OF PRISONERS AFTER THE CONFLICT. HE UNDERSTOOD THAT THE IRAQIS WERE HOLDING SEVERAL THOUSAND KUWAITIS. THERE WERE SOME BRITISH. THERE WERE LIKELY TO BE THOUSAND IF IRAQIS. THE FOREIGN MINISTER SAID THAT 20,000 KUWAITIS WERE MISSING, SOME MILITARY, SOME CIVILIANS. THE CROWN PRINCE ADDED THAT THREE OR FOUR MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY WERE AMONG THEM.

20. BEFORE HE LEFT, THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID PRIVATELY TO THE CROWN PRINCE THAT PERSONALLY HE THOUGHT THAT THE SOONER THE CROWN PRINCE WENT TO KUWAIT AFTER THE COUNTRY'S LIBERATION, THE BETTER. HE ALSO THOUGHT IT WOULD BE A GOOD IDEA IF HE COULD MAKE AN APPEAL OF A GENERAL SORT TO THE PEOPLE OF KUWAIT.

FCO PLEASE ADVANCE TO PS/NO 10

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FM RIYADH

TO IMMEDIATE CAIRO

TELNO 004

OF 092137Z FEBRUARY 91

INFO IMMEDIATE FCO, WASHINGTON, AMMAN, TEL AVIV, RABAT, BONN
INFO IMMEDIATE PARIS, UKMIS NEW YORK, LUXEMBOURG, ROME, ALGIERS
INFO PRIORITY GULF POSTS, BELGRADE

*All the same
old friends!*

FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

SECRETARY OF STATE'S CALL ON PRESIDENT MUBARAK, 9 FEBRUARY

SUMMARY

1. MUBARAK WAS IN CONFIDENT MOOD AND SPOKE IN FORTHRIGHT TERMS. EGYPTIAN PUBLIC OPINION WAS STEADY AND WOULD REMAIN SO AS LONG AS THE PRESIDENT AND OTHERS EXPLAINED CAREFULLY THEIR POLICY. BUT HE WAS CONCERNED AT THE POSSIBILITY OF LARGE-SCALE TROOP LOSSES IN THE GROUND WAR AND THEREFORE ENCOURAGED THE COALITION TO MAINTAIN THE PRIOR AERIAL BOMBARDMENT FOR AS LONG AS NECESSARY.

2. MUBARAK WAS CALLING A SUMMIT ON THE FUTURE SECURITY OF THE GULF. HE WAS INVITING KING HASSAN OF MOROCCO AS WELL AS THE SYRIAN, THE SAUDI AND OTHER GULF LEADERS. THE EXILED PALESTINIAN LEADERS HAD LITTLE CREDIBILITY ON THE WEST BANK BUT IF THE WEST DISPARAGED ARAFAT, THIS ONLY WORKED TO HIS ADVANTAGE. KING HUSSEIN NO LONGER LIVED IN THE REAL WORLD. EVEN SO MUBARAK EXPECTED TO BE EMBRACING HIM, AND EVEN ARAFAT, IN CAIRO ONCE THE CONFLICT WAS OVER. OF THE LIBYANS, JALUD WAS MUCH MORE DANGEROUS THAN QADHAFI.

3. MUBARAK WAS DELIGHTED AT THE INVITATION TO PAY A STATE VISIT TO BRITAIN IN JULY AND LOOKED FORWARD TO SETTING THE DATES. (HMA POINTED OUT TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE THAT THE EGYPTIAN NATIONAL DAY FELL WITHIN THE DATES PURPOSED.)

DETAIL

4. MUBARAK SAID THAT THE GOVERNMENT WERE EXPLAINING THEIR POLICY FULLY TO THE EGYPTIAN PEOPLE. THE EGYPTIANS HAD A NATURAL HATRED FOR THE IRAQIS, ESPECIALLY SINCE THE LATTER HAD PUT SOME 18,000 EGYPTIAN CIVILIANS IN THE FRONT LINE DURING THE IRAN/IRAQ WAR, AND TREATED THEM VERY BADLY AFTERWARDS. MORE RECENTLY, FOLLOWING THE INVASION OF KUWAIT, SOME 200,000 EGYPTIANS HAD LEFT KUWAIT AND LOST

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ALL THEIR SAVINGS.

5. THE SECRETARY OF STATE ASKED ABOUT THE EFFECT OF IRAQI PROPAGANDA WHICH PLAYED UP CIVILIAN CASUALTIES. MUBARAK SAID THAT IT HAD SOME, BUT NOT A GREAT EFFECT.

6. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT IN HIS LATEST SPEECH KING HUSSEIN SEEMED TO HAVE TAKEN A STEP BACKWARDS, UNLESS HE WAS PREPARING THE WAY FOR SOME NEW MOVE. IN JANUARY IN AMMAN, THE SECRETARY OF STATE HAD FOUND THE KING UPSET AND NERVOUS AND UNABLE TO ADMIT THAT HE HAD MADE A SERIOUS MISTAKE. MUBARAK SAID HE WAS AN INTELLIGENT MAN WHO HAD BENEFITED FROM HIS LINK WITH SADDAM HUSSEIN. THE IRAN/IRAQ WAR HAD BROUGHT HIM MUCH MONEY. THE KING HAD BECOME A VERY WEALTHY MAN, WITH HIS HOUSES IN SALZBURG, ST MORITZ, WASHINGTON, VIRGINIA, BRITAIN AND MARBELLA. HE THOUGHT THAT KING HUSSEIN AND SADDAM HUSSEIN HAD AGREED A FEW DAYS BEFORE THE INVASION OF KUWAIT THAT KING HUSSEIN WOULD TRY TO SQUARE THE EGYPTIANS WHEN IT HAPPENED. WHEN MUBARAK HAD INSISTED UPON AN EGYPTIAN STATEMENT OF CONDEMNATION, ON 3 AUGUST, KING HUSSEIN HAD BEEN MOST UPSET.

7. THE EGYPTIAN PRESS WERE VERY CRITICAL OF KING HUSSEIN AND ACCUSED HIM FOR FRITTERING, LARGELY ABROAD, THE DOLLARS 10 BILLION HE HAD BEEN GIVEN BY THE SAUDIS AND THE DOLLARS 6 BILLION FROM THE UAE.

8. MUBARAK THOUGHT THE COALITION SHOULD TAKE GREAT CARE IN DECIDING WHEN TO USE GROUND FORCES. IF THE COALITION SUFFERED BIG LOSSES OF TROOPS, THE PUBLIC REACTION WOULD BE BAD. SO THE AIR CAMPAIGN SHOULD CONTINUE UNTIL THE COALITION WAS SURE THAT IT HAD DONE ITS JOB. THE IRAQI SOLDIERS WHO HAD DESERTED TO THE EGYPTIANS SAID THAT MORALE WAS FALLING. THOSE WHO WERE SENT OUT AHEAD OF THE MINEFIELDS TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY TO DESERT. EVEN THE SOLDIERS' FAMILIES BACK IN IRAQ WERE URGING THEM TO DESERT IF THEY COULD.

9. MUBARAK SAID THE ALGERIANS WERE A VERY STRANGE PEOPLE WHOM HE COULD NOT UNDERSTAND. THE ALGERIAN GOVERNMENT COULD NOT CONTROL THEIR PEOPLE. THEY HAD FAILED IN THEIR EFFORTS TO PUT TOGETHER A RESOLUTION AT THE OAU MEETING IN HARARE BUT WOULD WORK ON THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT MEETING IN BELGRADE. ONE FAVOURABLE FACTOR WAS LONCAR'S HATRED OF THE IRAQIS.

FUTURE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS

10. MUBARAK SAID HE WOULD CALL A SUMMIT MEETING WITH THE GULF

COUNTRIES, SYRIA AND THE KING OF MOROCCO. THE KING OF MOROCCO MIGHT NOT COME BUT HE HAD SOME FORCES IN SAUDI ARABIA AND SHOULD BE INVITED.

11. THE SECRETARY OF STATE ASKED IF EGYPT WOULD BE WILLING TO GIVE SECURITY GUARANTEES TO THE GULF STATES. BRITAIN KEPT TELLING THE GULF STATES TO APPROACH THEIR ARAB BROTHERS FIRST. MUBARAK SAID THAT EGYPT WOULD BE PREPARED TO GIVE SECURITY GUARANTEES. HE THOUGHT THE GULF STATES WOULD ASK ALL THE COUNTRIES WHICH HAD HELPED THEM IN THE CONFLICT AGAINST IRAQ. BRITAIN AND OTHER WESTERN COUNTRIES SHOULD KEEP ON TELLING THE GULF STATES THAT THEY SHOULD TURN TO THEIR FELLOW ARABS FIRST. EGYPTIAN PUBLIC OPINION NEEDED TO UNDERSTAND THAT EGYPT HAD TO STAY INVOLVED ON THE GROUND BECAUSE THIS IS WHAT THE GULF STATES WANTED.

PALESTINIANS

12. MUBARAK SAID THAT THE WEST SHOULD BE VERY CAREFUL IN WHAT IT SAID ABOUT ARAFAT. EVEN TO SAY THAT HE HAD LOST HIS CREDIBILITY WOULD REINFORCE HIS POSITION. OUTSIDERS SHOULD KEEP QUIET AND LET THE PALESTINIANS DECIDE ON THEIR REPRESENTATIVES FOR THEMSELVES. IT HAD BEEN A GREAT MISTAKE FOR KING HUSSEIN TO REMOVE THE PLO FROM JORDAN. HE HAD HEARD THAT KING HUSSEIN MIGHT WANT TO REPRESENT THE PALESTINIANS IN POST-CONFLICT TALKS WITH ISRAEL. THIS WAS UNREALISTIC. THE KING WAS LIVING IN A SADDAM HUSSEIN-TYPE WORLD. PALESTINIAN LEADERS IN EXILE WOULD NOT GO BACK TO THE WEST BANK AND GAZA, WHICH THEY HAD NOT VISITED FOR DECADES. A SOLUTION TO THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM WOULD BE BAD FOR THEM.

13. MUBARAK SAID IT WAS A MISTAKE FOR THE ISRAELIS TO TRY TO PICK OFF THE ARAB COUNTRIES ONE BY ONE. THERE WAS NO INCENTIVE, FOR EXAMPLE, FOR THE SAUDIS TO ESTABLISH DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL. A SEPARATE AGREEMENT BETWEEN ISRAEL AND SYRIA WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE TO SYRIAN PUBLIC OPINION, ALTHOUGH SUCH AN AGREEMENT WOULD BE GOOD. BUT IT WOULD HAVE TO BE REACHED VIA THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION.

14. ASKED WHETHER HE MIGHT IN DUE COURSE RETURN TO HIS 10-POINT PLAN AND BAKER'S FIVE POINTS, MUBARAK SAID THIS WAS POSSIBLE IN THE LONGER TERM. HE COULD EVEN IMAGINE HIMSELF EMBRACING MUBARAK AGAIN, LIKEWISE KING HUSSEIN.

IRAQ

15. MUBARAK THOUGHT THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN WAS PROBABLY FINISHED. HE MIGHT COMMIT SUICIDE OR BE KILLED BUT IF HE DID SOMEHOW STAY AS

LEADER OF IRAQ, NO-ONE WOULD SHIFT HIM FOR YEARS. HE HAD APPARENTLY RECALLED TO WALDHEIM OF THE WAY IN WHICH NAZZER WAS SUPPORTED BY THE PEOPLE DESPITE HIS DEFEAT IN 1967. AS THE SECRETARY OF STATE MIGHT KNOW, THERE WERE 99 NAMES FOR GOD IN ARABIC. SADDAM HUSSEIN HAD POSTERS PRINTED WITH 98 OF THE NAMES FOR GOD PLUS A PICTURE OF HIMSELF. HE HAD EVEN REPEATED HIS CLAIM TO BE A DESCENDANT OF MOHAMMED IN A MESSAGE TO MUBARAK. AS A TIKRIT THIS WAS RIDICULOUS. MUBARAK HAD REPLIED THAT HE WOULD TRY TO FIND FOR HIMSELF SOME JUNIOR ANCESTRAL LINK TO THE PROPHET. MUBARAK DID NOT KNOW IF THE IRAQI OPPOSITION GROUPS WOULD BE EFFECTIVE AS A GOVERNMENT. THEY MIGHT JUST BE OUT FOR MONEY. ANY SERIOUS OPPOSITION WOULD COME FROM THE ARMED FORCES, NOT EXILED IRAQIS LIVING IN LUXURY.

SYRIA

16. MUBARAK SAID HE WAS VERY PLEASED THAT THE SECRETARY OF STATE HAD MET THE SYRIAN FOREIGN MINISTER A FEW DAYS EARLIER. THIS SORT OF DIALOGUE HELPED TO CONTAIN THE SYRIANS. IT WAS NOTABLE THAT KING FAHD HAD ASKED HIM TO ACT RECENTLY TO PASS A MESSAGE TO ASSAD, NOT WANTING TO APPROACH THE SYRIAN DIRECT.

LIBYA

17. MUBARAK SAID HE WOULD LIKE BRITAIN TO HELP TO CONTAIN QADHAFI, TOO. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID WE WOULD LEAVE QADHAFI TO MUBARAK. MUBARAK CLAIMED THAT QADHAFI HAD IMPROVED. THE BAD NUMBER WAS JALUD, WHO GAVE QADHAFI FALSE INFORMATION. WHEN MUBARAK SAW QADHAFI HE TOLD HIM THE TRUTH, WHICH SHOCKED HIM. ON ONE OCCASION MUBARAK HAD BERATED JALUD IN FRONT OF QADHAFI FOR SPOUTING RUBBISH ABOUT CAMP DAVID. QADHAFI HAD BEEN DELIGHTED, MUBARAK SAID.

SUDAN

18. MUBARAK SAID THAT THE EGYPTIANS WERE WORKING ON THE PROBLEM OF THE ISLAMIC FRONT. WE SHOULD NOT WORRY. HE WAS ALSO IN TOUCH WITH QADHAFI, WHO HAD AGREED TO MUBARAK'S REQUEST TO STOP SENDING OIL TO THE SUDANESE. BASHIR HAD TRIED TO TELEPHONE MUBARAK A DAY OR TWO EARLIER BUT MUBARAK HAD REFUSED TO SPEAK TO HIM. HE KNEW BASHIR ONLY WANTED TO BE ABLE TO SAY THAT HE WAS IN TOUCH WITH MUBARAK.

FCO PLEASE ADVANCE TO PS/NO 10 AND PS.

MUNRO

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10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

8 February 1991

Dear Simon,

DEFENCE SECRETARY'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON

President Bush telephoned the Prime Minister this morning to commiserate about the PIRA attack on No. 10. In the course of their conversation, the Prime Minister mentioned that the Defence Secretary and CDS would be visiting Washington next week to see Secretary Cheney and General Powell. The President said that he would himself like to see them while they were there. You will no doubt wish to follow this up.

I am copying this letter to Richard Gozney (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and to Sir Robin Butler.

Yours sincerely,
A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'C. D. Powell'.

(C. D. POWELL)

Simon Webb, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence.

CONFIDENTIAL

TOP SECRET

3(A-B)

PRIME MINISTER

GULF CRISIS: TIMING OF LAND CAMPAIGN

✓ You saw Percy Cradock's minute about the timing of the land campaign and agreed that we should be in no hurry. I am sure that is right but there are arguments the other way - or at least against excessive delay - and I think it worth setting them out if only because we may have to deal with them. Some, but not all, are touched on in paragraph 4 of Percy's minute.

First, there are the diary and climate constraints. The beginning of Ramadan is seen as a significant problem by the Arab members of the Gulf multinational force and they would want action to be over by then (Ramadan starts 17 March: only five weeks away). Moreover, the temperature starts to climb quite steeply in March and the conditions under which our forces would have to operate become distinctly more difficult.

Second, there is the morale and efficiency problem. You cannot keep forces hanging around in the desert indefinitely and expect their performance to remain razor-sharp. Some of the American forces have been there since August. Ours have been there a shorter time, but nonetheless quite a while. They have been brought to a peak of readiness about now. They can probably maintain it for a while, but not indefinitely.

Third, there is the argument of credibility. If we hold off too long and the perception in the Arab world is that we are frightened of taking a few casualties, that will begin to raise doubts in the minds of our Arab allies about our commitment. They might begin to turn their minds to political accommodation. Those countries who are constantly dreaming up cease-fire initiatives would be encouraged, and emboldened to step up their activities. And the Iraqis themselves would take heart from the perception that the multinational coalition is afraid of fighting on the ground.

TOP SECRET

thank you. We should
reprice when T. Kray + COS
return from W/ton
p.2

TOP SECRET

B

Fourth, there is the argument that delay in starting a ground battle will make it more likely that Saddam Hussein will escape our clutches with a fair part of his military machine intact. Unless we can grapple with his forces in Kuwait and destroy them, he is more likely to remain a significant regional power. One can also argue that we shall be better able to impose our own cease-fire terms if we have pinioned him in Kuwait.

Fifthly, we have been fortunate so far in containing disquiet both in domestic opinion here, in the US and in the Arab world about the effects of the bombing campaign. But that disquiet is now growing and becoming quite perceptible as numbers of civilian casualties inevitably mount. One can conceive circumstances in which the climate of opinion might move so much against the bombing that we have to stop it. The timing of a land campaign would no longer be in our hands, but would be dictated to us (with the only other option being to give up all together).

I think it is worth bearing these points in mind because I suspect they will be argued in Washington when Cheney and Powell return at the beginning of next week. We should never forget that the original estimate of the bombing campaign was 7-10 days. By the time of Cheney/Powell's return and the assessment of the results of their visit, it will have gone on four weeks. It will be important to avoid any impressions that political leaders are funkng a land battle.

e.d.p

C. D. POWELL

8 February 1991

A:\foreign\gulf (pmm)

TOP SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

026462
MDHOAN 7499

CONFIDENTIAL
FM FCO
TO IMMEDIATE CAIRO
TELNO 121
OF 081630Z FEBRUARY 91

MIPT: GULF BURDENSARING: HONG KONG: DRAFT MESSAGE

1. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF A DRAFT MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME
MINISTER TO THE GOVERNOR:

QUOTE WE HAVE ALREADY GIVEN A PUBLIC WELCOME TO THE DECISION
BY THE LEGCO FINANCE COMMITTEE ON 8 FEBRUARY TO MAKE A
VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTION OF POUNDS 15 MILLION TOWARDS OUR COSTS
ARISING FROM THE GULF CONFLICT. THIS DONATION IS VERY MUCH
APPRECIATED HERE AND I HOPE THAT YOU WILL PASS ON MY
GRATITUDE.

I SHOULD LIKE TO ADD MY WARM PERSONAL THANKS FOR YOUR
EFFORTS IN BRINGING THIS ABOUT. I KNOW THAT THIS WAS A
HIGHLY SENSITIVE ISSUE IN HONG KONG AND THAT A DONATION OF
THIS SIZE WAS NOT ACHIEVED WITHOUT A GREAT DEAL OF POLITICAL
EFFORT AND SKILL ON YOUR PART. AGAIN, VERY MANY THANKS.
UNQUOTE.

HURD

YYYY

DISTRIBUTION

236

MAIN 203

.GULF BURDENSARING
LIMITED
NPDD [-]

HKD
MR MCLAREN
MR BURNS

ADDITIONAL 33

.GULF BURDENSARING
(PASSED EMERGENCY UNIT)
(PASSED POLMIL UNIT)

PAGE 1
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026461
MDHOAN 7498

CONFIDENTIAL
FM FCO
TO IMMEDIATE CAIRO
TELNO 120
OF 082036Z FEBRUARY 91

*Content -
will close, David.
f10.2*

*Prime Minister
Agree to send to
attached message?*

MIPT: GULF BURDENSARING: CONTRIBUTION BY HONG KONG: DRAFT
LETTER TO NO 10

*CD
9/12*

1. THE FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF A DRAFT PRIVATE SECRETARY
LETTER TO NO 10:

QUOTE YOU WILL HAVE SEEN A TELEGRAM FROM THE GOVERNOR OF HONG
KONG (HONG KONG TELNO 448) ABOUT HONG KONG'S DECISION TO
CONTRIBUTE POUNDS 15 MILLION (HK DOLLARS 230 MILLION) TOWARDS
HMG'S COSTS
ARISING FROM THE GULF CONFLICT. THIS DONATION WAS APPROVED ON
8 FEBRUARY BY THE FINANCE COMMITTEE OF THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL,
FOR 'LOGISTIC, MEDICAL, HUMANITARIAN AND OTHER SUPPORT
FACILITIES.'

THE GOVERNOR HAS ALWAYS RECOGNISED THE SYMBOLIC IMPORTANCE OF
HONG KONG BEING SEEN TO PLAY ITS PART AT A TIME OF INTERNATIONAL
CRISIS. BUT WE ALWAYS KNEW THAT IT WOULD NOT BE EASY FOR HONG
KONG TO CONTRIBUTE TO GULF BURDENSARING, GIVEN THE CONTROVERSY
SURROUNDING HONG KONG'S CONTRIBUTION TO THE FALKLANDS FUND IN
1982 AND THE DANGER OF POLARISING OPINION IN HONG KONG. THE
PRO-COMMUNIST CHINESE PRESS HAS BEEN STRONGLY OPPOSED TO ANY
CONTRIBUTION TO HMG AND THIS SENTIMENT HAS INEVITABLY PLAYED
BACK INTO LEGCO. THIS IS WHY WE MADE CLEAR TO THE HONG KONG
GOVERNMENT THAT IF HONG KONG WISHED TO CONTRIBUTE TOWARDS OUR
GULF COSTS, IT WAS A DECISION WHICH WOULD HAVE TO COME FROM
THEM.

FOLLOWING THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES, THE GOVERNOR IMMEDIATELY
RECOGNISED THAT THE OPPORTUNITY TO GET A CONTRIBUTION THROUGH
EXCO AND THE LEGCO FINANCE COMMITTEE HAD GREATLY IMPROVED AND
HAS DONE SO WITH CONSIDERABLE SKILL. THE DIFFICULTIES HE FACED
ARE REFLECTED IN THE FACT THAT THE LEGCO FINANCE COMMITTEE
(A BODY WHICH CONSISTS OF THE FULL COUNCIL, MINUS ITS CIVIL
SERVICE MEMBERS AND WHICH HAS TO APPROVE ALL GOVERNMENT
EXPENDITURE) WAS MORE SHARPLY DIVIDED ON THIS ISSUE THAN ON ANY
OTHER MEASURE IN THE RECENT PAST (26 VOTES IN FAVOUR AND 14

AGAINST).

THE DECISION TO CONTRIBUTE TO HMG'S GULF COSTS HAS NOT BEEN ACHIEVED, WITHOUT SOME POLITICAL COST IN HONG KONG. ALTHOUGH WE HAVE ALREADY ISSUED A STATEMENT PUBLICLY WELCOMING THE DECISION (COPY ENCLOSED), THE FOREIGN SECRETARY BELIEVES THAT IT WOULD BE MUCH APPRECIATED IF THE PRIME MINISTER WERE PREPARED TO SEND THE GOVERNOR A PERSONAL MESSAGE OF THANKS FOR HIS EFFORTS. THE TEXT OF A POSSIBLE MESSAGE IS ENCLOSED. UNQUOTE

HURD

YYYY

DISTRIBUTION

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MAIN

202

.GULF BURDENSARING
LIMITED
NPDD [-]

HKD
MR MCLAREN
MR BURNS

ADDITIONAL

33

.GULF BURDENSARING
(PASSED EMERGENCY UNIT)
(PASSED POLMIL UNIT)

NNNN



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

8 February 1991

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Prime Minister

1. If such control by ICRC is possible - yes; but is it?

2. I assume in such cases ICRC could my minor things + demand access

to our POWs.

3. Will not ICRC then be swamped with food offers. Can they cope?

Humanitarian Food for Iraq

Agree to allow humanitarian food consignments from Iran to Iraq, provided there are effective arrangements for the ICRC to control distribution?

The Foreign Secretary wishes to consult OPD(G) colleagues about a proposal before the UN Sanctions Committee that a consignment of food from Iran should be sent to Iraq. The proposal could fit within the terms of Security Council Resolutions 661 and 666 in that the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) are seeking to make an independent assessment of the need for the food and we are discussing with them control of the distribution of the consignment so that it goes, as far as possible, only to civilians who are casualties, or the sick and needy.

We could seek to block the proposal on the grounds that we were worried that the food would find its way into military rather than civilian mouths. If we do so, Iran is virtually certain to act unilaterally for domestic reasons (to satisfy the constituency which is more anti-American than anti-Iraq). Other requests to send food to Iraq have come before the Sanctions Committee and so far the requirement for prior Sanctions Committee authorisation of food consignments to Iraq has been met. This is the first request from Iran. If the Iranians go ahead unilaterally, this could represent a major breach of the food embargo and encourage some other Arab nations to follow suit. If we obtain effective ICRC control, however, the food consignment would also make clear the allied point that we are not waging war on Iraqi civilians, but on Saddam Hussein and his armies. The Foreign Secretary believes that the balance of advantage would lie in authorising UKMIS New York to agree to the proposal if, but only if, the ICRC conduct a prior assessment that satisfies their own strict criteria and if they control the operation.

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/The key

cf. Shd. not
ICRC move
- before food
goes - or
access?
10.2



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The key to our attitude would seem to be effective ICRC control of distribution. If that can be achieved, we could agree in the Sanctions Committee; if not, we should block. The Foreign Secretary would be grateful for colleagues' views.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (MOD), John Neilson (Energy), John Gieve (Treasury), Juliet Wheldon (Law Officers) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,
Christopher Prentice

(C N R Prentice)
Private Secretary

Sir Charles Powell KCMG
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

Telephone 071- 21 82111/3

MO 6/17/15/1S

SK February 1991

Dear Charles,

IRAQ - INTELLIGENCE ON OPERATIONS

Thank you for your letter of 4th February. I am sorry that the Prime Minister feels short of prompt and reliable information on fighting in the Gulf. We do understand how he wants to be kept in the picture.

We have arranged to receive in MOD a stream of regular information about action of British units. This arrives on a computerised command and control system (called ASMA). Unfortunately for the layman this is in the kind of terse military jargon used to transmit essential information with the minimum use of communication circuits. The UK staffs do not, of course, automatically get access to the details of all Allied operations. It has not proved too difficult to keep abreast during air operations (where communications to HQs are well established). As Khafji showed, this will be much more difficult for a land battle. We introduced the "View from Riyadh" as a way of getting the senior Commanders to tell us every few days, how they see important developments and prospects. That circumvents the normal chain of command but means the Prime Minister should be in-touch with their thinking. Unfortunately it is not reasonable to ask General Schwarzkopf to do this more than once a day.

To get round the problem of rapid (but technical) reporting on UK activity but only intermittent reporting on the overall picture, we have introduced a system of daily updates for Defence Ministers. I am very happy to make a copy available to you (perhaps of the early afternoon edition so that we don't overlap with the JIC in the morning). An example is attached. We will also pass on any hot information received over the ASMA system between updates. I hope that such a system will be helpful to the Prime Minister, to complement what he gets from the Joint Intelligence Committee staffs.

Sir Charles Powell KCMG
No 10 Downing Street

SECRET AND PERSONAL



Could I strike a note of warning about being "behind the press". The media have demonstrated an excellent capability to get out some information rapidly usually when some military engagements are underway. It is, however, generally far from meeting your "reliable" criteria; as at Khafji, it can take several days to work out what actually happened. This is a tiresome feature of the fog of war in the electronic age.

Yours sincerely

Simon Webb

(S WEBB)
Private Secretary

C

covering SECRET

D/Sec(O)(C)/2/30/1/1

THE GULF CONFLICT

BRIEFING FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE - SITREP No. 64

SITUATION AS AT 1300Z, 8 FEBRUARY 1991

Contains

1. Classified sitrep
2. Unclassified material for use by Ministers

Distribution attached

Sec(O)(C)

covering SECRET

D

SECRET

SEC(O)(C) MIDDAY BRIEF, 8 FEBRUARY 1991

Summary

- No significant developments since 0600Z sitrep.

General Situation

- Allied air campaign's emphasis switching from RGFC to forward infantry divisions in the KTO. No significant land or sea activity.
- Iraqi forces remain in a primarily defensive posture, and there are no indications of a full-scale Iraqi offensive.

Political

- The Canadian government has decided that the "sweep and escort" role of its 24 CF18s in the Gulf has now been fulfilled, and it will announce that they are to be redeployed in a ground support role in anticipation of the start of the Allied land offensive.
- Gen Schwarzkopf is reported to have said in an interview (and in contrast to BFCME) that he does not know whether a ground war will be necessary, and that it is too early to tell whether air power alone could win the war.
- The Executive Director of UNICEF has asked for a "bubble of tranquility" covering the Tehran-Baghdad road on 16 Feb, to enable a UNICEF/WHO convoy to carry medical supplies to Baghdad.

UK Operations

Air Operations

- Two Tornado GR1As from Dhahran carried out successful recce missions last night. One air aborted with sensor equipment failure. Other continued and located a number of Infantry, towed artillery and fuel storage positions.
- A third Tornado GR1A from Dhahran located ammunition storage areas, fuel storage areas, vehicle and Infantry positions and logistic support areas in a successful recce flight over southern Iraq.
- 6 Tornado GR1s from Tabuk (2 armed with ALARM in the SEAD role) attacked Al Habbaniyah petrol production and storage facility. Grey smoke seen rising from target. All aircraft recovered safely.
- 6 Tornado GR1s from Dhahran attacked the petrol production

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and storage facility at Al Kut. 1 attacked the main facility and 5 attacked a subsidiary facility about 4nm away. Impacts seen at first target and numerous secondary explosion at second. All aircraft recovered safely.

- 4 Tornado GR1s and 2 Buccaneers from Muharraaq attacked the Samawah highway bridge over the Euphrates with 1000lb LGBs. All released their weapons on target, but 3 bombs did not guide. Central span of bridge dropped and all aircraft recovered safely.
- 3 Tornado GR1s and 2 Buccaneers from Muharraaq attacked the Ar Ramadi highway bridge over the Euphrates. Bridge was hit and holed. Southern carriageway at east end and northern carriageway and west end were cratered. All aircraft recovered safely.
- 8 Jaguars from Muharraaq attacked artillery positions 5-10 nm inland from Ash Shu'Aybah with 31 1000lb bombs. All aircraft hit targets. Artillery revetments were occupied as were many other trenches and revetments in the area. All aircraft recovered safely.
- RAF combat sorties as at 081100Z:

since 080200Z total

Tornado GR1	22	766
Tornado GR1A	3	58
Jaguar	8	306
Tornado F3	4	403
Buccaneer	4	28
Nimrod	0	45
AAR (Victor, VC10K, Tristar)	6	347
	47	1953

Non-combat sorties (as at 080200Z):	1136
	3089

Navy Operations

- CARDIFF's Lynx this morning attacked an Iraqi patrol boat with SEA SKUA 4 nm NE of Mina Al Ahmadi oil loading terminal. The vessel was hit and an explosion was seen. Survivors were abandoning.
- GLOUCESTER reports that mine passed 20 yds from ship before contact was lost in poor visibility. Lynx located mine this morning and it was destroyed by a US EOD team.

Army Operations

- 1(BR) Armd Div is carrying out maintenance after the FTX.

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- A second M109 was destroyed by accidental fire at the end of the exercise, possibly due to incorrect loading drills.

Allied Operations

- US yesterday announced destruction of Mi8 helicopter by F14 and Alouette helicopter by A10.
- The French Council of Ministers is reported to have decided on 6 Feb to deploy the 2nd Marine Inf Regt (now at 24 hrs NTM) to Saudi Arabia, in a rear area protection role.
- On 6 Feb, Kuwaiti A4s attacked the Al Jaber supply area in Kuwait; RSAF fighters flew 62 defensive counter-air and 54 interdiction sorties; Qatari Mirage F1s attacked possible FROG launcher sites; Bahraini F5s attacked a divisional command post; and Canadian CF18s continued defensive CAPs and attack escorts.
- The US announced yesterday that Allied sorties now totalled some 52,000.

Iraqi activity

- One SCUD fired at Riyadh at approx 2300Z last night; destroyed by PATRIOT 6 miles N of city centre, and no damage or casualties reported.
- UK estimate of Iraqi aircraft in Iran is now 143.

Logistics

- Current short term spare ATF capacity has led to 2 VC10s being offered to US for use between UK and Gulf.

Media reports and coverage

- Ceefax report that ICRC is "hopeful" it will gain access to Allied PW.
- Ceefax report the deployment of additional Buccaneers.

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
UNCLASSIFIED LINES TO TAKE

13.00 GMT, 8 Feb 1991

- At about 07.00 GMT this morning a Lynx helicopter from HMS CARDIFF located and attacked an Iraqi patrol boat in the Northern Gulf. One SEA SKUA missile was fired and it is believed the boat was hit and incapacitated.

- HMS GLOUCESTER spotted a floating mine at approximately 16.00 GMT yesterday when on patrol in the Northern Gulf. The mine was safely destroyed by an American explosive ordnance disposal team.

A The National Archives

DEPARTMENT/SERIES <i>REM 19</i>	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM <i>3447</i> (one piece/item number)	
Extract details: <i>minute from Cradock to Powell dated 8 February 1991</i>	
CLOSED UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	<i>23/1/145</i> <i>mi'lu -</i>
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Instructions for completion of Dummy Card

Use black or blue pen to complete form.

Use the card for one piece or for each extract removed from a different place within a piece.

Enter the department and series,
eg. HO 405, J 82.

Enter the piece and item references, .
eg. 28, 1079, 84/1, 107/3

Enter extract details if it is an extract rather than a whole piece.
This should be an indication of what the extract is,
eg. Folio 28, Indictment 840079, E107, Letter dated 22/11/1995.
Do not enter details of why the extract is sensitive.

If closed under the FOI Act, enter the FOI exemption numbers applying to the closure, eg. 27(1), 40(2).

Sign and date next to the reason why the record is not available to the public ie. Closed under FOI exemption; Retained under section 3(4) of the Public Records Act 1958; Temporarily retained; Missing at transfer or Number not used.

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FM CAIRO
TO IMMEDIATE AMMAN
TELNO 6
OF 082225Z FEBRUARY 91
INFO IMMEDIATE FCO, WASHINGTON, TEL AVIV, RIYADH

*Charles! I am quite inclined
to write similarly to the
King. What do you think?
4/10.2*

FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY
MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO CROWN PRINCE HASSAN.

1. PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE
TO CROWN PRINCE HASSAN:

BEGINS

YOUR HIGHNESS

I PROMISED TO STAY IN CLOSE AND INFORMAL CONTACT DURING THIS
DIFFICULT TIME.

WE HAVE PUT OUT A STATEMENT ON HIS MAJESTY'S SPEECH OF 6 FEBRUARY.
IT SAYS IN EFFECT THAT ALTHOUGH WE FULLY UNDERSTAND JORDAN'S
DIFFICULTIES WE NEVERTHELESS REGRET THE CONTENT OF THE SPEECH.

WHAT WORRIES ME IS THAT HIS MAJESTY SHOULD BELIEVE THAT OUR MOTIVES
AND OBJECTIVES IN THE GULF CONFLICT ARE SO DIFFERENT FROM WHAT THEY
REALLY ARE.

IT REALLY IS NOT TRUE THAT WE ARE SEEKING TO DESTROY IRAQ'S
EXISTENCE. WE ARE SEEKING TO GET IRAQ OUT OF KUWAIT. THIS IS WHAT
THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL HAS MANDATED. THERE CAN BE NO CEASEFIRE
BEFORE WE KNOW THAT THE OBJECTIVE WILL BE ACHIEVED. WHEN IT HAS
BEEN WE SHALL NOT WANT TO LEAVE WESTERN TROOPS IN THE AREA FOR ANY
LENGTH OF TIME.

IT REALLY IS NOT TRUE THAT THE WEST IS PURSUING A WAR AGAINST ARABS
AND MOSLEMS. WE ARE FIGHTING TO FREE AN ARAB AND MOSLEM NATION.
ARAB AND MOSLEM NATIONS FORM PART OF THE COALITION. OTHER ARAB
AND MOSLEM NATIONS SUPPORT THE SECURITY COUNCIL'S DECISION.

IT REALLY IS NOT TRUE THAT THE COALITION HAS ULTERIOR MOTIVES ON THE
DISPUTE BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE ARABS. ON 6 FEBRUARY I HAD A
LENGTHY DISCUSSION WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTER OF SYRIA ABOUT THE

PAGE 1
CONFIDENTIAL

NEED TO RETURN TO THE ARAB/ISRAEL PROBLEM WITH A NEW AND SPECIAL EMPHASIS AFTER THE CONFLICT IS OVER. WE AGREED THAT THIS WAS ESSENTIAL AND THAT THE LEGITIMATE RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIANS MUST BE TAKEN FULLY INTO ACCOUNT. THERE IS NO SUBTERFUGE HERE. PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE EVEN MORE DIFFICULT BY IRAQ'S INVASION OF KUWAIT AND THE MISSILE ATTACKS ON ISRAELI CIVILIANS AND BY THE POLITICAL MISTAKES MADE BY THE PLO IN THE LAST 6 MONTHS. BUT IT IS ABSOLUTELY CLEAR TO US AND TO OTHER MEMBERS OF THE COALITION THAT SETTLEMENT OF THE ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE AND THE PROBLEM OF PALESTINE IS VITAL IF THERE IS TO BE LASTING STABILITY IN THE REGION.

IT REALLY IS NOT TRUE THAT THE COALITION IS DESTROYING HOLY PLACES. THE AIRFORCES HAVE CLEAR INSTRUCTIONS TO AVOID THIS. I KNOW OF NO RELIABLE EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT IRAQI CLAIMS ON THIS SCORE, AND THERE IS PLENTY OF RELIABLE EVIDENCE TO THE CONTRARY.

WE DEEPLY REGRET THE ACCIDENTAL KILLING OF THE JORDANIAN DRIVERS OF TRUCKS BRINGING OIL FROM IRAQ. BUT THE COALITION HAS MADE EFFORTS UNPARALLELED IN THE HISTORY OF WARFARE TO MINIMISE THE NUMBER OF CIVILIAN CASUALTIES. YOU ONLY NEED TO COMPARE THE FIGURES ON CASUALTIES WHICH THE IRAQIS THEMSELVES ARE PUTTING OUT AT THE UNITED NATIONS WITH THE NUMBER OF SORTIES FLOWN BY THE COALITION AIRFORCES TO PROVE HOW HARD WE ARE TRYING.

I KNOW THAT EMOTIONS ARE RUNNING HIGH IN JORDAN, PARTICULARLY AFTER THE DEATHS OF THE TRUCK DRIVERS. WE DO UNDERSTAND THIS. BUT I MUST REITERATE THAT THOSE OF US WHO COUNT OURSELVES AS FRIENDS OF JORDAN FIND IT DIFFICULT TO EXPLAIN TO FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS OR TO COLLEAGUES AT HOME WHY THERE SHOULD BE MISREPRESENTATIONS OF WHAT THE COALITION IS TRYING TO DO.

WE ALL HOPE, AS I KNOW YOU DO, THAT THIS LONG NIGHT WILL BE OVER SOON AND THAT WHEN IT IS WE CAN FULLY RESTORE THE OLD PATTERNS OF COOPERATION AND FRIENDSHIP.

I AM SENDING THIS MESSAGE TO YOU, SIR, RATHER THAN ASKING THE PRIME MINISTER TO WRITE TO HIS MAJESTY BECAUSE I AM ON MY WAY TO CAIRO AND WILL NOT HAVE A CHANCE TO TALK TO JOHN MAJOR FOR A FEW DAYS. BUT IF YOU WISHED TO DO SO WE WOULD OF COURSE BE VERY HAPPY FOR YOU TO SHOW THIS MESSAGE TO HIS MAJESTY.

WITH WARM PERSONAL REGARDS

DOUGLAS HURD

RESTRICTED

025656
MDHIAN 3036

RESTRICTED

FM RIYADH

TO DESKBY 082359Z FCO

TELNO 398

OF 081900Z FEBRUARY

AND TO DESKBY 082359Z CABINET OFFICE

INFO IMMEDIATE HQBFME, POLAD HIGH WYCOMBE, MODUK, GULF POSTS,
IMMEDIATE CAIRO (FOR SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY)

SAUDI SITREP: 8 FEBRUARY

SUMMARY

1. KING SPEAKS TO PRIME MINISTER. PRESS CONFERENCE BY SAUDI JOINT COMMANDER. SAUDIS CLAIM TO HAVE INTELLIGENCE OF IRAQI/IRANIAN MILITARY COOPERATION. RETURN OF THE SCUD.

DETAIL

2. THE PRESS HEADLINE KING FAHD'S TELEPHONE CONVERSATION TO MR MAJOR TO DISCUSS THE GULF SITUATION.

3. CHENEY AND POWELL ARRIVED IN KINGDOM THIS AFTERNOON FOR A 3 DAY VISIT. THEIR INITIAL CALL IS ON THE KUWAITI GOVERNMENT IN TAIF.

4. PRINCE KHALID BIN SULTAN, SAUDI JOINT COMMANDER OF THE MULTI-NATIONAL FORCES, GAVE A PRESS CONFERENCE. HE UNDERLINED THE COALITION'S DETERMINATION TO LIBERATE KUWAIT IN ACCORDANCE WITH UN RESOLUTIONS AND HIS HOPE THAT IRAQ WOULD THEN BE WELCOMED BACK IN TO THE FAMILY OF NATIONS. IRAQI POWS WOULD BE TREATED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE HIGHEST STANDARDS, BASED ON ISLAMIC RELIGION AND CULTURE. HE EMPHASISED THAT RAMADAN WOULD NOT BE A HINDRANCE TO WAR. FOLLOWING THE END OF THE WAR, US AND OTHER FORCES WOULD RETURN HOME. HE DUCKED A QUESTION ON CONTINUING THE WAR INTO IRAQI TERRITORY, BY ANSWERING THAT ARAB MUSLIM FORCES WOULD DO WHATEVER WAS NECESSARY TO LIBERATE KUWAIT: THAT WAS THE OBJECTIVE OF THE WAR. PRINCE KHALID CONFIRMED THAT SAUDIS WHO HAD VOLUNTEERED FOR THE COLOURS WERE PARTICIPATING IN THE WAR AS GUARDS FOR POWS AND IN LOGISTICAL ROLES.

5. THE SAUDI MFA CONTACTED US THIS EVENING TO PASS ON INTELLIGENCE ALLEGING IRAQI/IRANIAN MILITARY COOPERATION. THIS CONFLICTS WITH OTHER RECENT SAUDI COMMENT (SEE MY SEPARATE TEL).

6. KING HUSSAIN'S SPEECH OF 6 FEBRUARY HAS PROVOKED A SHARP HOSTILE RESPONSE IN THE EDITORIALS.

PAGE 1
RESTRICTED

7. THE RSPCA BIRDWASHING TEAM BEGAN WORK IN JUBAIL TODAY.

8. ONE CONVENTIONALLY ARMED SCUD WAS FIRED AT RIYADH ON THE NIGHT OF 7/8 FEBRUARY. IT WAS INTERCEPTED BY A BRACE OF PATRIOT AND DEBRIS FELL OVER THE CAMPUS OF THE IMAM MOHAMMED ISLAMIC UNIVERSITY IN NORTH RIYADH (A CENTRE OF FUNDAMENTALISTS ACTIVITY). THERE ARE NO REPORTS OF CASUALTIES. WE HAVE RECEIVED NO (NO) CALLS FROM THE BRITISH COMMUNITY ABOUT IT.

MUNRO

YYYY

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IRAQ/KUWAIT
(PASSED TO EMERGENCY UNIT)
(PASSED POLAD HIGH WYCOMBE)

NNNN

FILE

PM



10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

8 February 1991

Dear Squadron Leader McNicoll,

Thank you for your letter of 5 February asking for a receipt for the photographic print which Sir Patrick Hine gave the Prime Minister when he came here earlier this week. I had in fact reached the conclusion that it was not appropriate for No.10 to hold this print, and I handed it personally to Rear Admiral Kerr (Chief of Defence Intelligence) on 6 February. It is no longer, therefore, in my possession.

*Yours most
faithfully*

C. D. POWELL

Squadron Leader McNicoll

W8

18/2

FROM THE OFFICE OF THE
CHIEF OF STAFF AND DEPUTY COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF
STRIKE COMMAND

5 Feb 91

PPS to PM

RECEIPT FOR PRINT

Air Chief Marshal Sir Patrick Hine today delivered a photographic print (reference 254/D) to the Prime Minister. In view of the sensitivity attaching to classified 'Op Crowsby' material, I would appreciate the completion (at para 3) of the enclosed receipt. Please return the receipt to me in the enclosed envelope.

Sir RW Mill.
1 W Newell
Sgt Ldr
PSO to Chief of Staff

MOD Form 24

9/29/29

Date 4 Feb 91

3. Receipt of papers detailed in Part 2 is hereby acknowledged.

Signed

Name (in BLOCK LETTERS)

Branch/Unit Stamp

Original Papers Transmitted — Subject <u>not</u> to be given				
Type of paper eg F — file L — letter etc.	No. of Copies	Copy Noted (if any)	Date	Reference
PRINT	ONE	10/1	3 Feb 51	ZS4/D

MOD FORM 565


If undelivered return direct to:-

R.A.F

HQSTC

HIGH WYCOMBE

HP14 4UE



Office of the PPS to PM
10 Downing Street
WHITEHALL
LONDON

HQ STRIKE COMMAND

- 5 FEB 1991

CINCS

SECRETARIAT

If undelivered please return to the nearest Ministry of Defence
establishment or to the following address:—

Office of the Chief of Staff
and Deputy Commander-in-Chief

HQ STRIKE COMMAND
RAF HIGH WYCOMBE

High Wycombe
Buckinghamshire
England HP14 4UE