

TOP SECRET

10 DOWNING STREET

THIS FILE MUST NOT GO OUTSIDE 10 DOWNING ST

FILE TITLE: Situation		SERIES MIDDLE EAST	
		PART: 43	
PART BEGINS: 17 February 1991	PART ENDS: 21 February 1991	CAB ONE: 	
PREM 19/3448			

TOP SECRET

RESTRICTED

FM (RIYADH)

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 333

OF 021330Z FEBRUARY 1991

INFO PRIORITY GULF POSTS, TEHRAN, UKDEL OECD PARIS, WASHINGTON

INFO PRIORITY HQBFME, POLAD HIGH WYCOMBE, ACTOR

INFO PRIORITY DEPT OF ENERGY

ADVANCE COPY

PARA 3 OF MY TELNO 288 (NOT TO ALL): SAUDI OIL PRODUCTION SUMMARY

1. PRODUCTION LEVELS CONTINUE TO FLUCTUATE, BUT EXPORTS APPEAR TO HAVE STEADIED. CONSUMPTION OF REFINED PRODUCTS MANAGEABLE.
DETAIL

2. PETROLEUM MINISTRY OFFICIALS HAVE TOLD US THAT ARAMCO WERE ABLE TO REOPEN THE OFF-SHORE NORTHERN OIL FIELDS LAST NIGHT (1 FEBRUARY), THANKS TO CONCLUSION OF THE BATTLE IN KHAJJI. THE OIL INSTALLATIONS IN THAT TOWN, MOREOVER, DID NOT APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN DAMAGED BY THE FIGHTING (BUT JAPANESE PRODUCTION IN THE SO CALLED NEUTRAL ZONE WILL REMAIN CLOSED FOR THE TIME BEING).

3. OUR SOURCES ADMIT THAT OIL PRODUCTION SINCE WAR BEGAN HAS BEEN HIGHLY VOLATILE. DECISIONS ARE TAKEN ON A DAILY BASIS, ACCORDING TO AVAILABILITY OF TANKERS AND STORAGE FACILITIES. ON THE FORMER, A SHUTTLE SERVICE FROM RASTANURA TO FUJAIRAH IS SAID BY LOCAL OIL REPRESENTATIVES TO HAVE RESUMED OPERATING ON 31 JANUARY. PETROLEUM MINISTRY SOURCES, HOWEVER, PLAY THIS DOWN, AND CLAIM THAT TANKERS ARE STILL PREPARED TO MAKE THE JOURNEY UP THE GULF. THEY ALSO MAINTAIN THAT EXPORTS HAVE HELD STEADY OVER THE PAST WEEK, AT AROUND 8 MILLION BPD (THIS BEARS OUT WHAT THE CHAIRMAN OF ARAMCO TOLD ME ON 29 JANUARY).

4. AS FOR STOCKS, MOST SAUDI CRUDE AND PRODUCT IS BEING STORED OUTSIDE THE KINGDOM; FUJAIRAH REMAINS A FAVOURITE DESTINATION. ARAMCO IS ALSO PULLING OUT ALL STOPS TO MAXIMISE CAPACITY OF THE EAST WEST PIPE LINE LINKING THE OIL FIELDS WITH YANBU. ALTHOUGH CAPACITY IS TAKEN TO BE 3.2 MILLION BPD, THERE IS SAID TO BE SCOPE TO INCREASE THIS TO AS MUCH AS 5 MILLION BPD, DEPENDING ON THE VISCOSITY OF THE CRUDE.

5. DOMESTIC CONSUMPTION OF REFINED PRODUCTS APPEARS TO BE MORE MANAGEABLE THAN EXPECTED. FIGURES FOR THE FIRST 14 DAYS OF THE WAR REVEAL THAT CONSUMPTION OF JET FUEL HAS AVERAGED 250,000 BPD (CONSIDERABLY LESS THAN THE 550,000 BPD FIGURE WHICH THE AMERICANS AND PETROLEUM MINISTRY HAD PLANNED ON). PRODUCTION OF JET FUEL IS RUNNING AT AROUND 200,000 BPD. BUT WITH STOCKS OF SOME 12 MILLION BARRELS, THE SAUDIS FEEL COMFORTABLE. AL NAIMY OF ARAMCO TOLD ME

THEY HAD BEEN ABLE TO SECURE EXTRA STOCK FROM ABROAD WITHOUT DIFFICULTY.

6. THE POSITION FOR DIESEL FUEL IS EVEN MORE REASSURING. CONSUMPTION IS 330,000 BPD, NO DIFFERENT FROM PEACE TIME (INCREASED MILITARY USE APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN CANCELLED OUT BY REDUCED CIVILIAN DEMAND). PRODUCTION IS RUNNING AT 450,000 BPD, AND STOCKS HELD ARE CURRENTLY 16 MILLION BARRELS.

MUNRO

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DISTRIBUTION

48

ADVANCE

48

IRAQ/KUWAIT
PS
PS/MR HOGG
PS/MR LENNOX-BOYD
PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE
PS/PUS
MR FAIRWEATHER
MR BROOMFIELD
MR SLATER
MR GORE-BOOTH
MR GOULDEN
MR JAY
MR BERMAN (LEGAL ADVISERS)
HD/MED
HD/AMC
HD/CONSULAR D
HD/ECDC(E)
HD/NAD
HD/NEWS D
HD/NENAD
HD/SECPOL D
HD/SED
HD/UND
CHIEF OF ASSESSMENT STAFF
MR PRIDDLE, DEPT OF ENERGY
MR APPLEYARD CABINET OFFICE

MR W D REEVES CABINET OFFICE
SIR C CURWEN CABINET OFFICE
MR CHARLTON CABINET OFFICE
MR GOWAN, CABINET OFFICE
PS/NUMBER 10 DOWNING ST
SIR P CRADOCK, 10 DOWNING ST
CABINET OFFICE DIO
SIR ROBIN BUTLER, CAB OFFICE
LT COL CRONIN CAB OFFICE
MR SHAPLAND CAB OFFICE
AUS (C) MODUK
HD/SEC (O) (C) MODUK
MR LS SMITH BANK ENGLAND
MR WICKS HMT
EMERGENCY UNIT(PASSED)
CAPT WHH MCLEOD
(MARINE POLLUTION CONTROL UNIT)
(DEPT OF TRANSPORT)
(SUNLEY HOUSE)
SHIP POL DIV
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DEPT OF ENERGY
DEPT OF ENVIRONMENT
DEPT OF TRANSPORT
RESIDENT CLERK

Suzuki

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10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

21 February 1991

I enclose a copy of a letter which the Prime Minister has received from Mr Shunichi Suzuki, Governor of Tokyo.

I should be grateful if you would let me have a draft reply for the Prime Minister's signature, to reach this office by Thursday 7 March.

CHARLES POWELL

S L Gass Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

h

SECRET



10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

21 February 1991

THE GULF: CEASE-FIRE PROPOSALS

I enclose a message from General Scowcroft, with the consolidated cease-fire proposals. This came in on the direct line over night, and is of course relevant to our reaction to the latest Soviet cease-fire proposal.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Richard Gozney (Foreign and Commonwealth Office), John Neilson (Department of Energy), Juliet Wheldon (Law Officers' Department) and Sir Robin Butler.

C. D. POWELL

Simon Webb, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence.

SECRET

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csc*

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FM WHITE HOUSE

TO CABINET OFFICE

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S E C R E T VIA CABINET CHANNELS

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PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO CHARLES POWELL FROM BRENT SCOWCROFT.

WE ARE PROVIDING FOR YOUR CONSIDERATION A DRAFT STATEMENT OF PROPOSED COALITION REQUIREMENTS RELATING TO AN IRAQI WITHDRAWAL SHOULD THE IRAQIS COME FORWARD WITH AN INITIATIVE REQUIRING A COALITION RESPONSE. IT TAKES INTO ACCOUNT SUGGESTIONS WE HAVE RECEIVED FROM YOU.

BEGIN TEXT:

DRAFT STATEMENT ON IRAQI WITHDRAWAL OFFER

THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAQS ANNOUNCEMENT THAT IT WILL WITHDRAW IMMEDIATELY AND UNCONDITIONALLY FROM KUWAIT IS LONG OVERDUE. IF THAT DECISION IS REAL, WE WELCOME IT. WE AND OUR COALITION PARTNERS HAVE EMPHASIZED REPEATEDLY OUR STRONG DESIRE FOR A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THE CRISIS, SO LONG AS IT IS FULLY CONSISTENT WITH ALL TWELVE UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS.

THE WORLD HAS GOOD REASON TO TREAT IRAQI COMMITMENTS WITH SKEPTICISM. THE COALITION HAS HEARD SUCH PLEDGES FROM THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT BEFORE. IN THE FIRST WEEK AFTER ITS INVASION, IRAQ PROMISED TO WITHDRAW AND INSTEAD REINFORCED ITS MILITARY FORCES IN KUWAIT. IRAQ ALSO PLEDGED IN THE DAYS PRIOR TO AUGUST 2 NOT TO INVADE KUWAIT. THE WORLD IS NOW LIVING WITH THE CONSEQUENCES OF THOSE BROKEN PROMISES.

STRICT, PROMPT, AND UNCONDITIONAL IRAQI COMPLIANCE WITH UNSC RESOLUTION 660 AND ALL OTHER RELEVANT UNSC RESOLUTIONS REMAINS THE ONLY PATH TO PEACE. THAT MEANS IRAQ MUST IMMEDIATELY BEGIN TO WITHDRAW ALL OF ITS FORCES FROM ALL OF KUWAIT, SO THAT KUWAIT'S SOVEREIGNTY AND LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT CAN BE RESTORED. AND IT MEANS IRAQ CAN ATTACH NO CONDITIONS TO ITS WITHDRAWAL FROM KUWAIT. FINALLY, UNTIL IRAQ FULLY AND UNCONDITIONALLY COMPLIES, RESOLUTION 678'S AUTHORIZATION OF THE USE OF FORCE REMAINS IN EFFECT.

INTERNATIONAL COALITION MUST SEE IMMEDIATE AND CONCRETE EVIDENCE OF IRAQ'S INTENTIONS. SPECIFICALLY, WE AND OUR COALITION PARTNERS REQUIRE IRAQ TO BEGIN TO TAKE THE FOLLOWING STEPS WITHIN 12 HOURS:

- -- BEGIN A MASSIVE MILITARY WITHDRAWAL FROM KUWAIT TO BE COMPLETED IN 96 HOURS. GIVEN THE FACT THAT IRAQ INVADED AND OCCUPIED KUWAIT IN A MATTER OF HOURS, ANYTHING LONGER THAN 96 HOURS FROM THE INITIATION OF THE WITHDRAWAL WOULD NOT MEET RESOLUTION 660'S REQUIREMENT OF IMMEDIACY.
- -- TO ENSURE THE WITHDRAWAL WILL BE COMPLETE, IRAQ MUST, WITHIN THE FIRST 48 HOURS, REMOVE ALL ITS FORCES FROM KUWAIT CITY, FROM ALL PREPARED DEFENSES ALONG THE SAUDI-KUWAIT BORDER, FROM BUBIYAN AND WARBAH ISLANDS, AND FROM KUWAIT'S RUMAYLLAH OIL FIELD-
- -- IN ACCORDANCE WITH RESOLUTION 660, ALL IRAQI FORCES MUST, WITHIN THE 96 HOURS SPECIFIED ABOVE, RETURN TO THEIR POSITIONS OF AUGUST 1. THOSE FORCES THAT WERE DEPLOYED WELL NORTH OF THE IRAQI-KUWAITI BORDER ON AUGUST 1, THEREFORE, MUST NOT ONLY LEAVE KUWAIT, BUT RESUME THEIR AUGUST 1 POSITIONS.
- -- ARRANGE WITH THE ICRC THE RELEASE OF ALL COALITION PRISONERS OF WAR AND THIRD-COUNTRY CIVILIANS BEING HELD AGAINST THEIR WILL, AND THE RETURN OF THE REMAINS OF KILLED AND DECEASED COALITION SERVICEMEN, WITHIN 24 HOURS FROM THE INITIATION OF THE WITHDRAWAL-
- -- REMOVE ALL EXPLOSIVES OR BOOBY-TRAPS ON KUWAITI OIL INSTALLATIONS-
- -- CEASE COMBAT AIRCRAFT FLIGHTS OVER IRAQ AND KUWAIT EXCEPT FOR TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT CARRYING TROOPS OUT OF KUWAIT-
- -- HALT ALL CONSTRUCTION OF DEFENSES IN KUWAIT-
- -- ALLOW COALITION AIRCRAFT EXCLUSIVE CONTROL OVER AND USE OF ALL KUWAITI AIRSPACE-
- -- CEASE ALL FURTHER ATTACKS, INCLUDING USE OF SCUD MISSILES AND TERRORISM BY IRAQ OR ITS SURROGATES AGAINST ANY COUNTRY, INCLUDING ISRAEL-
- -- CEASE ALL DESTRUCTIVE ACTIONS AGAINST KUWAITI CITIZENS AND PROPERTY AND RELEASE ALL KUWAITI DETAINEES- AND
- -- DESIGNATE IRAQI MILITARY LIAISON OFFICER(S) TO WORK WITH COALITION FORCES ON THE OPERATIONAL DETAILS RELATED TO IRAQ'S WITHDRAWAL, TO INCLUDE THE PROVISION OF ALL DATA ON THE LOCATION AND NATURE OF ANY LAND OR SEA MINES.
- THE UNITED STATES AND ITS COALITION PARTNERS WISH TO REITERATE THAT THEIR FORCES WILL NOT ATTACK RETREATING IRAQI FORCES SO LONG AS WITHDRAWAL PROCEEDS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ABOVE GUIDELINES. ANY BREACH OF THIS AGREEMENT WILL BRING AN INSTANT AND SHARP RESPONSE FROM COALITION FORCES IN ACCORDANCE WITH UNSC RESOLUTION 678.

END TEXT:

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TO CABINET OFFICE
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S E C R E T VIA CABINET CHANNELS
QQQQ

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• END TEXT:

• DECL: OADR

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FM MOSCOW

TO DESKBY 211700Z FCO

TELNO 438

OF 211617Z FEBRUARY 91

AND TO DESKBY 211700Z CABINET OFFICE, MODUK

INFO IMMEDIATE PARIS, BONN, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, UKDEL NATO

INFO IMMEDIATE RIYADH, PEKING

SIC 19M

IRAQ/KUWAIT: FCO TELNO 335 AND 336 TO WASHINGTON: SOVIET PEACE
INITIATIVE

SUMMARY

1. MFA CONFIRM THAT AZIZ'S ANSWER WILL BE TRANSMITTED TO COALITION PARTNERS INCLUDING UK PROMPTLY: AND DENY INTENTION TO CALL A MEETING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL BEFORE PERMANENT FIVE CONSULTED.
2. DESCRIPTION OF SITUATION IN BAGHDAD OBSERVED DURING PRIMAKOV'S VISIT. DENIAL THAT HIS 19 FEBRUARY TV INTERVIEW REPRESENTED OFFICIAL SOVIET POSITION.,

DETAIL

2. I TOOK ACTION TODAY (21 FEBRUARY) WITH KOLOTUSHA, HEAD OF NEAR EASTERN DIRECTORATE, MFA, AND DREW HIS ATTENTION TO YOUR ADDITIONAL POINTS CONCERNING (A) BRITISH POWS AND (B) THE NEED FOR ANY UNDERTAKING FROM BAGHDAD TO BE REINFORCED BY IMMEDIATE ACTION.

RETURN OF TARIQ AZIZ TO MOSCOW

3. KOLOTUSHA CONFIRMED THAT AZIZ WAS EXPECTED TO ARRIVE IN MOSCOW LATE THIS EVENING. HE AGREED THAT IF BAGHDAD WERE READY TO CONTEMPLATE AN UNDERTAKING OF WITHDRAWAL, IT WOULD NOT BE NECESSARY TO USE AZIZ AS A MESSENGER. GORBACHEV HAD EMPHASISED DURING THEIR MEETING ON 18 FEBRUARY THAT TIME CONSTRAINTS WERE TIGHT AND ASKED THAT THE IRAQI REPLY BE TRANSMITED VIA THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN BAGHDAD WHICH WAS MANNED ROUND THE CLOCK. KOLOTUSHA TACITLY AGREED THAT THE FACT THAT AZIZ HAD BEEN TOLD TO RETURN TO MOSCOW WAS NOT A HOPEFUL SIGN.

UN SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING

4. I REFERRED TO VORONTSOV'S BELIEF THAT, ON RECEIPT OF SADDAM HUSSEIN'S REPLY, HE WOULD RECEIVE INSTRUCTIONS TO CALL FOR A MEETING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL (UKMIS NEW YORK TELNO 315). KOLOTUSHA DENIED KNOWLEDGE OF SUCH INTENTIONS: THE USSR WERE WELL AWARE OF THE NEED TO CONSULT THE OTHER PERMANENT MEMBERS BEFORE WIDENING THE DEBATE TO INCLUDE ALL MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, SEVERAL OF WHOM HAD NOT VOTED FOR UNSCR 678. DETAILS OF THE IRAQI REPLY, WHENEVER IT CAME, WOULD BE TRANSITTED TO COALITION MEMBERS (INCLUDING THE UK) PROMPTLY.

SITUATION IN BAGHDAD.

5. KOLOTUSHA, WHO HAD ACCOMPANIED PRIMAKOV DURING HIS VISIT TO BAGHDAD, DESCRIBED AT LENGTH THE EXTENT OF DESTRUCTION. HE HAD SEEN NO LIGHTS, APART FROM CARS, ON THE DRIVE FROM THE IRANIAN BORDER. ELECTRICITY, WATER AND SEWAGE MAINTENANCE SYSTEMS IN BAGHDAD HAD COMPLETELY BROKEN DOWN AND THERE WAS A SERIOUS THREAT OF EPIDEMICS DEVELOPING WITH THE ONSET OF SUMMER. HE HAD COME ACROSS WIDESPREAD DISATISFACTION: EVEN MIDDLE-RANKING MEMBERS OF THE IRAQI MFA HAD EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT THE SITUATION. BUT KOLOTUSHA CONCLUDED AFTER HIS MEETING WITH SADDAM HUSSEIN THAT THE IRAQI LEADERSHIP DID NOT YET CONSIDER ITSELF DEFEATED: AND GIVEN THE STRICT CONTROL EXERCISED OVER INFORMATION, IT WOULD BE FUTILE TO IMAGINE THAT POPULAR DISCONTENT WOULD LEAD TO ATTEMPTS TO OVERTHROW SADDAM HUSSEIN. NOR SHOULD WE COUNT ON SADDAM HUSSEIN CAPITULATING. THE USSR DID NOT DOUBT THAT ONCE IT STARTED, THE COALITION WOULD WIN A GROUND WAR. BUT THE TASK WAS TO MINIMISE THE COST - HENCE THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP'S BELIEF THAT ALL POLITICAL ALTERNATIVES TO HOSTILITIES HAD TO BE EXPLORED. THIS WOULD NOT HOWEVER BE AT THE EXPENSE OF SOVIET SUPPORT FOR THE RESOLUTIONS.

PRIMAKOV INTERVIEW

6. ON PRIMAKOV'S TV INTERVIEW (MOSCOW TELNO 413), KOLOTUSHA CLAIMED THAT PRIMAKOV HAD BEEN CIRCUMSPECT IN HIS COMMENTS DURING HIS VISIT: HE HAD ACCOMPANIED PRIMAKOV ON A TOUR OF THE CITY AND HAD SEEN HOW DEEPLY MOVED HE HAD BEEN BY THE DESTRUCTION IN BAGHDAD. THEY HAD SURVIVED A HEAVY BOMBARDMENT, DURING WHICH THE PALACE OF CONGRESSES (ABOUT 200 YARDS FROM THE HOTEL RASHID WHERE THEY WERE STAYING) HAD BEEN DESTROYED. BUT PRIMAKOV HAD RESISTED IRAQI ATTEMPTS TO CONDEMN ALLIED ACTION, TELLING THEM THAT WAR WAS WAR.

7. I POINTED OUT THAT PRIMAKOV'S TV COMMENT THAT ALLIED ACTION EXCEEDED THE UN MANDATE CONTRADICTED THE POSITION OF GORBACHEV AND

BESSMERTNYKH. KOLOTUSHA REPLIED THAT THERE WAS NO POINT IN MILITARY TERMS OF DESTROYING EG THE PALACE OF CONGRESSES: AND IMPLIED THAT PRIMAKOV HAD BEEN RIGHT TO REFER TO 'PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE'. BUT GORBACHEV'S STATEMENT OF 5 FEBRUARY AND BESSMERTNYKH'S STATEMENT TO THE SUPREME SOVIET OF 19 FEBRUARY HAD BEEN CAREFULLY WORDED TO REFER ONLY TO THE THREAT OF EXCEEDING THE MANDATE. BESSMERTNYKH'S REMARKS REPRESENTED THE GOVERNMENT'S VIEWS.

COMMENT

8. TWO MESSAGES CAME ACROSS: FIRSTLY THAT THE RUSSIANS FEAR THAT AZIZ IS CARRYING AN ANSWER THAT WILL FALL SHORT OF A STRAIGHT FORWARD ACCEPTANCE OF GORBACHEV'S PLAN: AND SECONDLY THAT THEY ARE AWARE OF THE NEED TO CONSULT THE PERMANENT MEMBERS BEFORE CALLING A SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING. WHATEVER THE PERSONAL VIEWS OF KOLOTUSHA (A LEADING ARABIST IN THE MFA) ON THE SCALE OF ALLIED ACTION, HE CONFIRMED (IF UNHAPPILY) SOVIET SUPPORT FOR THE RESOLUTIONS AND THE CONTINUING VALIDITY OF CURRENT POLICY AS ARTICULATED BY GORBACHEV/BESSMERTNYKH.

LOGAN

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DISTRIBUTION

31

ADVANCE

31

IRAQ/KUWAIT SECRET

PS 2

PS/PUS

PS/MR HOGG

PS/MR LENNOX-BOYD

MR P J WESTON

MR FAIRWEATHER

MR BROOMFIELD

MR GOULDEN

MR GORE-BOOTH

~~MR SLATER~~~~HD/EMERGENCY UNIT~~~~HD/POLE HIL EU~~

HD/AMD

HD/NEWS D

HD/ISD(O)

HD/NENAD

HD/PUSD

DEPUTY HD/PUSD

HD/SECPOL D

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MR BERMAN (LEGAL ADVISERS)

PS/NO 10 DOWNING ST

SIR P CRADOCK, 10 DOWNING ST

PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE

CHIEF OF ASS STAFF CAB OFFICE


MR REEVES CAB OFFICE (VIA H29)

MR APPELYARD CAB OFFICE (H29)

MR D GOWAN CAB OFFICE (H29)

HD/SEC (O) (C) MODUK

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Cairley!

10 DOWNING STREET

Rin Minister

You may like
to glance at this,
just to get
the flavour. I
have underlined the
key passages.

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MDADAN 9421

ADVANCE COPY

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Secret

SECRET

FM MADRID

TO DESKBY 211600Z FCO

TELNO 171

OF 211450Z FEBRUARY 91

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, PARIS, RIYADH, JEDDA, DAMASCUS,
INFO IMMEDIATE CAIRO, ROME, UKMIS NEW YORK, BONN

FCO TELNO 335 TO WASHINGTON: GULF

FROM PS/LORD CAITHNESS

1. LORD CAITHNESS HAD A BRIEF MEETING ON 21 FEBRUARY WITH THE SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER IN THE MARGINS OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE MINISTERIAL MEETING.
2. BESSMERTNYKH SAID THAT TARIQ AZIZ WAS DUE IN MOSCOW LATE THAT NIGHT FOR A MEETING WITH HIM EARLY ON 22 FEBRUARY. THE IRAQIS HAD TOLD THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT THAT TARIQ AZIZ WOULD BE BRINGING A REPLY TO THE SOVIET PROPOSALS. BESSMERTNYKH HAD NO ADVANCE INDICATION OF WHAT THAT RESPONSE MIGHT BE. BUT HE WAS OPTIMISTIC. SADDAM HUSSEIN WAS BECOMING INCREASINGLY REALISTIC ABOUT THE SITUATION IN THE GULF. IN PUTTING FORWARD THIS PROPOSAL THE SOVIETS HAD MADE CLEAR THAT THEY WOULD NOT TOLERATE ANY "GAME-PLAYING" BY IRAQ. TARIQ AZIZ UNDERSTOOD THAT. IF IRAQ ACCEPTED THE PROPOSAL THERE WOULD BE AN URGENT NEED FOR A SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING TO ENDORSE THE PROCESS OF WITHDRAWAL.
3. LORD CAITHNESS SAID THAT IT WAS VERY IMPORTANT TO RESOLVE THE ISSUE OF PRISONERS OF WAR. IRAQ HAD REFUSED TO TELL US ANYTHING ABOUT THE BRITISH PRISONERS OF WAR THAT THEY WERE HOLDING. IRAQ WAS ALSO HOLDING MANY OTHER NATIONALS, ESPECIALLY KUWAITIS. THIS ISSUE COULD NOT BE LEFT TO BE SETTLED LATER. HE ASKED BESSMERTNYKH WHAT TIMETABLE HE ENVISAGED FOR AN IRAQI WITHDRAWAL.
4. BESSMERTNYKH SAID THAT THE ISSUE OF PRISONERS OF WAR HAD BEEN RAISED DURING THE TALKS AS PART OF THE GENERAL DISCUSSION. HE HAD SPOKEN TO TARIQ AZIZ ABOUT THIS. ON TIMING, BESSMERTNYKH SAID THAT THE IRAQI WITHDRAWAL MUST BE RAPID. BUT 96 HOURS MIGHT BE A TOO AMBITIOUS TIMESCALE. IT WOULD NOT MATTER IF WITHDRAWAL TOOK 4 TO 6 DAYS. BUT IT MUST NOT RUN INTO WEEKS OR MONTHS.

PAGE 1
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MDADAN 421

5. BESSMERTNYKH SAID THAT THE SOVIET PROPOSAL WAS CONSISTENT WITH UNSCR 660 , WHICH WAS THE RESOLUTION CALLING FOR WITHDRAWAL . LORD CAITHNESS EMPHASISED IRAQ HAD TO ACCEPT ALL TWELVE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS, NOT JUST THE FIRST. BESSMERTNYKH AGREED. BUT WITHDRAWAL WAS THE PRIORITY. OTHER ISSUED COULD, AND SHOULD, BE DEALT WITH LATER. THEY WOULD INCLUDE THE NEED FOR A PROPER SECURITY ARRANGEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST.


6. LORD CAITHNESS SAID THAT THE PRIME MINISTER WAS VERY MUCH LOOKING FORWARD TO HIS VISIT TO MOSCOW. YOU HOPED TO MEET BESSMERTNYKH VERY SOON AND HAD ASKED LORD CAITHNESS TO CONFIRM YOUR INVITATION TO BESSMERTNYKH TO VISIT LONDON OR AS SOON AS CONVENIENT . BESSMERTNYKH SAID THAT HE TOO WAS ANXIOUS TO ESTABLISH PERSONAL CONTACT WITH YOU. HE HOPED THAT A MEETING WITH YOU BEFORE THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO MOSCOW MIGHT BE POSSIBLE. IF NOT, IT WOULD HAVE TO TAKE PLACE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE THEREAFTER. HE HOPED TO VISIT SEVERAL EUROPEAN CAPITALS, INCLUDING LONDON SOON , IF THE GULF PERMITTED.

FEARN

YYYY

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MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

Telephone 071-21 82111/3

37 (a-d)

MO 6/17/15/1D

21 February 1991

Dear Charles,

✓
Ria Hunter
CBB
2 1/2

REPORT FROM RIYADH

The Defence Secretary's colleagues might find it useful to see the attached report from Commanders on operations in the Gulf.

I am coping this letter to the Private Secretaries to members of OPD(G) and to Sir Robin Butler.

Yours ever

J R Binstead

(MISS J R BINSTAD)
Private Secretary

Sir Charles Powell KCMG
No 10 Downing Street

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CDS 2066/2/1

21 Feb 91

PS/Secretary of State

THE VIEW FROM RIYADH - 211845Z FEB 91

1. It has been another frustrating day for Air Forces in theatre. The forecast of better weather proved to be wrong and of a planned 2900 sorties in the last 24 hours, 500 have been cancelled and many of the aircraft which did fly have returned to base without dropping their weapons. Only 2 Tornado attacks were carried out against airfield runways and taxiways although these were judged to be successful and one Jaguar sortie struck a Multiple Rocket Launcher (MRL) site. Overnight F15Es, in the West, claimed further successes against 2 TELs. This afternoon there was an increase in early warning (EW) radar activity and 8 surface-to-air missiles were fired unsuccessfully against Allied aircraft.
2. Gen Schwarzkopf has examined personally the latest assessments of Iraqi losses and effectiveness, as produced by his analysts in theatre, and has pronounced himself very content with their findings.
3. 90% of the Allied air effort is now being turned on Iraqi forces in the KTO. Attacks on lines of communications have been successful in that there is now only one route open (single carriageway in parts) between Baghdad and the KTO. As a result the rate of resupply of Iraqi ground forces has been further reduced and F117As are continuing attacks wherever signs of repair are evident. Only 60 tactical helicopters have been deployed forward; the remainder are in airfields in Northern Iraq. Against the possibility that the Iraqis may try to move more of these forward by night an AWACS aircraft with specially modified radar to detect slow speed aircraft will be on station overnight from now on.
4. There are continuing signs of deterioration in combat effectiveness, some ammunition shortages and low morale caused, in part, by distribution problems in several Iraqi Divisions. One has complained recently that they have had no rations for 5 days and that they have been eating dates for the last 2 days. Commanders in theatre suspect that instances of poor effectiveness are patchy and that the RGFC Divisions are still probably in reasonable order. There has been evidence that some Iraqi senior military leaders have been saying openly that they should withdraw because they cannot win. Of particular note there has been a report from inside Baghdad that the damage caused to civilians by Allied bombing is very limited but that the effect on military sites and installations has been "devastating".

1 OF 2

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
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5. You will be aware of the concerted and substantial barrage laid down between 0900Z and 1200Z by 1st Armd Div in conjunction with US artillery. We expended 720 rounds of 155mm, 180 rounds of 8" and 72 MLRS rockets against 5 artillery, 6 infantry, and 5 tank positions plus a Brigade command post and logistic storages. There was no counter battery fire but one UK soldier was killed during the withdrawal when he was run over by an M109. 37 Field Regiment will be involved again tonight in support of a cross border probe by the US 1st Mechanised Division. On the maritime front mine clearance has been hampered by marginal conditions caused by 30 knot winds. UK MCMVs have been able to operate slowly but the US minesweeping Sea Stallion helicopters have been grounded. On current progress it is unlikely that the 1000 metre wide channel to point E (the edge of the AOA) will be cleared until tomorrow afternoon. To quote the Senior Naval Officer Middle East (SNOME) "haste is inappropriate".

6. Weather permitting Tornado raids against airfields will continue tomorrow and there is a planned Tornado TIALD sortie overnight. Sea conditions have raised concerns about the 2 US warships mined recently. The USSR PRINCETON is being towed into Bahrain and ships including RFA DILIGENCE (UK repair ship) are standing by the USS TRIPOLI - the Command Ship for the MCM operation. There are signs of deterioration of the hull surrounding the 30ft by 20ft hole below her waterline.



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2 OF 2

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PRIME MINISTER

SADDAM HUSSEIN'S SPEECH

Those who listened to the speech in Arabic said there were no openings, no subtleties, no inclination to a peaceful solution. It was a straightforward encouragement to continue the battle.

I have spoken to Brent Scowcroft. He agrees with this assessment. The Americans are going public in about 15 minutes, saying they are very disappointed: they see nothing in the speech to give any cause for optimism: and that military operations will therefore continue as planned.

Brent added that one still had to ask why Tariq Aziz was going to Moscow. If the Saddam Hussein speech was intended as a straightforward rejection, there would be little point in his journey. So one could not rule out that we might still have some complications or surprises.

You might like to go outside to say to the cameras that:

- you have had an account of the speech
- you find it deeply disappointing, a lost opportunity. He said nothing new. He held out no hope for a peaceful solution.
- once again, he disappointed the expectations of millions round the world by his determination to try to hang on to Iraq's illegal conquest of Kuwait.
- Saddam Hussein is only bringing further misery on his own people. Iraq's defeat is inevitable.
- the conflict will go on, and only Iraq's acceptance and implementation of the resolutions of the United Nations Security Council will bring it to an end.

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Rice

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Jp 01330

SIR CHARLES POWELL

c Sir Robin Butler

Saddam's Speech - 1500 GMT 21 February

We do not yet have a full text of Saddam's speech.

All we have is a translation of parts of it, which has been provided by the BBC Monitoring Service. Some parts of the text are not clear because reception from Baghdad was poor.

2. Saddam began by explaining the background events, from Irangate to August 1990, stressing the conspiracies against Iraq and the betrayal of the Arab cause by some Arab rulers. Since Irangate the US had been paving the way for aggression against Iraq. He also spoke of the way the Saudi King, the Emir of Kuwait and others had conspired against the Palestinians. He went on to emphasise that there had been an information blackout by his international opponents concerning the strong link between Kuwait and Iraq - and the fact that Kuwait is part of Iraq.

3. Saddam referred to the 15 February initiative by the Iraqi RCC as being aimed at underlining the fact that the issue did not begin on 2 August 1990. Saddam told his audience that now that Iraq had accepted withdrawal, Bush, Fahd and even Mubarak wanted more.

4. He went on to note that those who used to fear the land offensive and avoided it for nearly a month, during which they hit civilians, were now demanding that Iraqis should pay for its avoidance with more concessions - harming their principles, dignity and rights, and the rights and the security of the Arab nation. Such people deluded themselves if they thought that they could establish peace in the Gulf and open the door to lasting



peace in the region as a whole, especially for the Palestinians, without Iraq's involvement.

5. Saddam declared that he was saying this in order to excuse the Iraqis for any action that followed, and in order that people might understand the justness of Iraq's attitude.

6. Towards the end of his speech Saddam said there was no other course than that Iraq had chosen, except that of humiliation and darkness. The Iraqis would proceed on their chosen course; if the "formulation and directions" which Tariq Aziz carried to Moscow were rejected, it would expose the true aggressive intentions of Iraq's opponents.

7. He spoke of preparing for the "mother of battles". There was apparently no reference to the Soviet peace proposal or to the Security Council resolutions.

66
PERCY CRADOCK

21 February 1991

Sir Charles Pole

21 FEB '91 17:27

FROM BBC MON SWB

TO CO

PAGE.001

ATTN. MR CRONIN

ROOM 213

GREENWAY

R910221188200000

17:23:53.42 FEB 21 '91 PAGE 3

SERIAL: NC2102164491

FROM BBC

COUNTRY: Iraq

MONITORING

01

SUBJ: Take 1 of Several--Saddam on 13 Feb 'Initiative'

REF: nc2102155891 4yi--baghdad carries saddam speech (4)

SOURCE: Baghdad Domestic Service in Arabic 1500 GMT 21 Feb 91

TEXT:

((("Full recording" of address by Iraqi President Saddam Husayn
on 21 February -- place not specified))

((Text)) In the name of God, the compassionate, the merciful,
Which, then, is the best? He that layeth his foundation on piety to
God and His good pleasure? Or he that layeth his foundation on an
undermined cliff of sand, ready to crumble to pieces? And it doth
crumble to pieces with him, into the fire of hell. And God guideth
not people that do wrong. The foundation of those who so build is
never free from suspicion and shakiness in their hearts, until their
hearts are cut to pieces. And God is all-knowing, wise. ((Koranic
verses))

O great people! O stalwart men in our valiant Armed Forces; O
faithful, honest Muslims, wherever you may be; O people wherever
faith in God has found its way to your hearts, and wherever it found

what embodies it in the sincerity of your intentions and deeds; O

PAGE 002

lovers of humanity, virtue, and fairness, who reject aggressiveness,

injustice, and unfairness: In difficult circumstances and their

events, some people more often than not lose the connection with the

beginning and preoccupy themselves with the results -- or forget.

when there are resemblances -- the connection between any result and

the reasons that gave rise to those events, and on whose basis those

results were based. Furthermore, in difficult circumstances, whose

difficulty is hard to describe, the mind and consciousness is

21 FEB '91 17:28

FROM BBC MON SWB

TO CO

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GREENWAY

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17:25:53.42 FEB 21 '91 PAGE 4

generally preoccupied with what influences the life of the
individual concerned with that circumstance. Thus, he bases his
opinion and position on it without connecting every individual case
with what is collective. The future is even absent at times, or not
given very great importance as a indispensable weight for assessing
the (influence) of each case, regardless of whether that case, or
individual item that is being assessed, is connected to the past and
present or to the reasons and beginnings, or whether it is part of
the results; and regardless of whether it was part of the simple
results and individual items, with limited effect, or of the major
results that have a comprehensive effect that go beyond the
individual, a number of individuals, or only a specific sector in
the society, to the society as a whole and where it goes beyond the
transient and quick moving present to the future as a whole.

((sentence as heard))

(more) 21:500 ka/murray/co 21/1641z feb

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GREENWAY

R910221139500000

17:25:36.74 FEB 21 '91 PAGE 3

SERIAL: NC2102164891

COUNTRY: Iraq

SUBJ: Take 2 of several--Saddam on 15 Feb 'Initiative'

REF: nc2102164091 baghdad domestic arabic 211500///sentence as
heard}}

TEXT:

((Text)) Some have either completely forgotten these influential
facts in the life of man, whether in this or that direction, or the
presence of these facts in their minds has become weak. Many facts
between causes and effects, or between the prelude to and the
results of the circumstances and events that preceded 2 August and
what took place on 2 August and afterward have been missed.

This description was in most cases applicable to some Arabs and
to many foreigners so that some of them could not remember what
Zionism and U.S. imperialism have done against Iraq, beginning with
the Irangate plot or the Iran-Contra ((scandal)) in 1986 until the
first months of 1990, when the plot against Iraq reached its
dangerous phases when U.S. and Western media began to prepare for
the Israeli aggression against us, but which we confronted in the
statement of 8 April 1990; when the Americans cut off bread from

21 FEB '91 17:29 FROM BBC MON SWB

TO CO

PAGE.005

Iraq and canceled the grain deal concluded with U.S. companies in

the third month of the same year, that is 1990; and when they raised

the slogan of an economic, technologic, and scientific boycott of

Iraq and worked to make Europe and Japan do the same.

(more) 211500 z1/murray/cp 21/1647z feb

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21 FEB '91 17:30 FROM BBC MON-SAT

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GREENWAY

R710221192300000

17:24:00.12 FEB 21 '91 PAGE 2

UNCLAS 5K/LD PMU

SERIAL: NC2102165591

COUNTRY: Iraq

SUBJ: Take 3 of 12--Saddam on 15 Feb 'Initiative'

REF: nc2102164091 baghdad domestic arabic 211501///do the same.

TEXT:

((Text)) We know that recalling the preludes and causes leading up to the results, and recalling the grounds for an event or events in a permanent manner and in all (cases) is not an easy undertaking. This is because this requires a high degree of awareness, or because this requires a vital connection between those recalling the backgrounds and preludes to these events, and the kind of immediate and long-term suffering produced by their causes and effects.

Those whom we describe as forgetful or being unaware of the connection between a given cause and a given effect do not all enjoy the same degree of awareness that provides the elements of ((word indistinct)) what is required. Most of them have not suffered the causes and effects of the circumstances, especially in the world arena. Therefore, they have faced serious difficulties in making them

ATTENTION CRONIN ROOM 273

SADDAM

06

21 FEB '91 17:31 FROM BBC MON SWB TO CU

PAGE 002

understand that what happened on 2 August. It is the clarity of

the entirely just historic dimension, is basically not a cause

within the course of the conflict between Iraq—as a bastion of

faith and honorable aspiration—and Zionism and U.S. imperialism.

The events of that day are one aspect of the results of the battle

or the conflict that preceded 2 August. The measure taken on the

glorious day of the call is a means of self-defense, and one aimed

at defending all honorable principles and values of Iraq. Although

((words indistinct)) an offensive form, an account of the events of

07

21 FEB '91 17:31

FROM BBC MON SWB

TO CO

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GREENWAY

R910221192500000

17:24:00.12 FEB 21 '91 PAGE 3

this day should not be taken out from the general context of
developments. A correct account of this requires that it be placed
within its comprehensive framework.

The failure of some world circles, especially among politicians
who are (outspoken) against the Arabs (word indistinct), to
understand has been boosted by the fact that--regardless of the
details-- the objective of these circles is to have Iraq's
accomplishments.

(more) 211300 ad/murray/cp 21/1656z feb

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R910221197400000

17:24:03.76 FEB 21 '91 PAGE 3

SERIAL: NC2102171091

COUNTRY: Iraq

SADDAM

(09)

SUBJ: Take 4 of 12--Saddam on 15 Feb 'Initiative'

REF: nc2102164091 baghdad domestic arabic///harm iraq's
accomplishments.

TEXT:

((Text)) Some tyrannical Arabs rulers, who betrayed the nation's principles and aspirations of their peoples, cooperated with and stooped to this tendency. They accepted degradation and humiliation, even inside the palaces and seats of their rule. They chose the path of obeying the tendentious foreigner and his evil, hostile intentions.

This flood of media campaigns officially conducted against us by 30 countries further complicated the prospect of establishing a link between causes and effects, and between what happened to the Arabs and to the Iraqis prior to 2 August, what happened on the day of the call to glory, and what happened after 2 August. All the accumulated extensions and influences of these countries accompany these campaigns, and are affected by them. Nevertheless, the noble person has remained noble, and is guided by the facts -- not merely

FEB '91 17:32 FROM BBC HON SWB

through what he sees and hears, but through that which his heart and

his faithful empathy with jihad and his destiny with the Iraqi

stance lead him. This is the stance of the people in this nation.

What has guided them in this direction has been their long suffering

at the hands of the ranks of injustice, the unjust, and the Arab

rulers who are their allies and who betrayed the nation and sold out

honor and religion to the foreigner. Some of those rulers chose

this course as an indispensable path to assuming their places on the

seat of power, and undeservedly impose themselves on their people.

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17:24:03.76 FEB 21 '91 PAGE 4

(11)

It was the advance price for their agency. Other rulers stooped to this after they discovered that there was no other way to keep the seat of power--taking into account the nature of rule they have chosen--except by complying with the will of the U.S. intelligence services. This applies without exception to the Arab rulers who are siding with the United States today and supplying its aggression under the Arab cover and with funds it needs, and with the false and fraudulent talk of Arab ability. Evil is what they are doing.

(more) 211301 as/murray/ml 21/1706z feb

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17:24:20:35 FEB 21 1991 PAGE 2

UNCLAS 5K/LD PMU

SERIAL: NC2102171491

SADDAM

12

COUNTRY: Iraq

SUBJ: Take 5 of 12--Saddam on 15 Feb 'Initiative'

REF: nc2102164091 baghdad domestic arabic 211500///they are
doing.

TEXT:

((Text)) Traitor Fahd, the betrayer of the two mosques, and
lighthheaded Husni, the ruler which noble Arab Egypt has been
afflicted with, stand at the head of the list. Faced with this
state of affairs. We found that the enemy media and the enemy policy
dropped a heavy screen on every event, stand, or cause that preceded
2 August 1990 that could shed some light on these incidents and
explain their true nature. Palestine -- whose just cause dates back
to more than 40 years, as well as its future and the positions on it
-- has been one of the most important pillars of the conspiracy in
which the oil rulers have participated as conspirators against Iraq,
led by the agent shaykhs of Kuwait and the Saudi rulers. Biased
people have even tried to neglect the fate of Palestine as being one
of the causes of these events. The tendentious media, which have

21 FEB '91 17:34 FROM BBC MON SWB TO CO

PAGE.008

widespread influence and impact and the suspect politicians, and

those who seek personal objectives -- backed by Zionism everywhere

-- began to focus on the 2 August events to depict them as having

taken place without any basis or background, and as though our

attention were being devoted only to these events. They even issued

orders to silence voices and prevent them from mentioning any

historical background that would explain to the foreigner or the

Arab what he does not know about the reality of the relationship

that exists between Kuwait and Iraq, and that Kuwait is part of

13

21 FEB '91 17:35 FROM BBC MON: SWB TO: CO

PAGE.009

GREENWAY

R910221198200000

17:24:20.33 FEB 21 '91 PAGE 3

Iraq, but was annexed following the partitioning conspiracy to
weaken the Arab nation, harm its status and role, and weaken every
Arab country that has some kind of leverage.

(more) 211500 ab/murray/cp 21/1715z feb

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21 FEB '91 17:43

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GREENWAY

R910221203100000

17:41:51.07 FEB 21 '91 PAGE 3

SERIAL: NC2102172891

COUNTRY: Iraq

SUBJ: Take 6 of 12--Saddam on 15 Feb 'Initiative'

REF: nc2102164091 and adds baghdad domestic arabic///kind of
leverage.

TEXT:

((Text)) In view of this deluge of the falsification of facts, and of this large number of the countries participating in the aggression, or those who have been confused about the real reasons for the results, it is insufficient to respond and clarify through media and political statements alone, in view of our modest influence. Measures and actions are inevitable in order to place the innocent, who do not know the (aspect of links), before a rational debate that bypasses the smokescreens and misinformation launched by hostile information media. Something must be done to place the enemies in an embarrassing situation or in an impasse -- something that will drive them to behavior and positions that will make those who have been anesthetized by hostile media wake up to new facts or new (opportunities) that will reveal to them the facts, free from covers, so that they can appear as they are:

crystal clear. Thus came the 15 February initiative which the

Revolution Command Council statement fired at the enemy goal--to use

the terms of sports and athletics--so as to shake the nets of the

enemy court. Either an acceptance that pleases friends, or

rejection that annoys the enemies. This may divide their ranks,

which are founded on rancor and rallied around wrong. Certain

people who have been misled will discover what will help them to

realize that what has happened, and the root of what has happened,

was not caused by 2 August and what followed. What preceded 2

16

GREENWAY

R910221203100000

17:41:51.07 FEB 21 '91 PAGE 4

August does not go back to 1990, its events, and circumstances

alone, but goes back to every iota of dignity and pride, faith and

tenacity toward right, rejection of the wrong, and hostility to

criminal usurper Zionism, support for the poor, and the fight

against injustice and corruption. These stands are the qualities of

Iraqis or what has been revived in them by the revolutionary

leadership.

(more) 211500 ng/murray/ml 21/1726z feb

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17:41:58.91 FEB 21 '91 PAGE 2

UNCLAS 5K/LD PMU

SERIAL: NC2102173691

COUNTRY: Iraq

SUBJ: Take 7 of 12--Saddam on 15 Feb 'Initiative'

REF: nc2102164091 baghdad domestic arabic 211500///the

revolutionary leadership.

TEXT:

(((Text))) The rencor against Iraq has been created as time went by and with every aspect of capability added to it or created to become a serious pillar of its characteristics and potential, with the steadfastness in the face of the aggression exposes the weakness of some of the Arabs vis-a-vis the aggression of Zionism and the ambitions of the Americans, with every book that has been written with the sweat in support of the blood of struggle, with every effort and every stage of building in Iraq's lofty edifice, with every floor in the building of its new civilization or a wheel in every factory or plant which has been built as a symbol of loftiness and as an introduction to a new happy and prosperous life under firm faith in God, the homeland, and the nation, and with the slogan of the poor have a right in the wealth of the rich, because they are

21 FEB '91 17:45 FROM BBC MON SWB ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ TO CO
members of the same people or members of the same nation, and all of

PAGE.005

(19)

them are the sons of Adam and Eve.

To those who ask about the rancor of Husni and others like him
toward the leadership and people of Iraq, and to those who were
alarmed by this rancor harbored by those who ate and drank under
Iraqi hospitality and were given attention which they do not
deserve: We say that we do not regret the hospitality and good
intentions accorded by us or the people of Iraq toward people whom
we wanted, at the time, to be brothers of the Iraqis, when they

GREENWAY

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17:41:58.91 FEB 21 '91 PAGE 3

20

stood in the ranks of the faithful, with noble convictions, and honorable intentions. But since they have committed treason, no one will feel sorry for them. May God's curse be upon them until the day of judgment. We say that these misled people have derived their rancor against you, O Iraqis, and against your leadership, from the attributes which you possess and which have characterized your leadership. These misled people have apparently found in every call for honor and purity of intention, and in every call stating that the ruler or leader should be part of his people, an insult aimed against him personally by the people of Iraq and its leadership.

(more) 211500 mk/murray/cp 21/1737z feb

** TOTAL PAGE.006 **

GREENWAY

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17:52:53.74 FEB 21 '91 PAGE 3

SERIAL: NC2102174791

MR
CROWINRoom
213

(21)

COUNTRY: Iraq

SUBJ: Take 8 of 12--Saddam on 15 feb 'initiative'

REF: nc2102164091 baghdad domestic arabic 211500//and its
leadership.

TEXT:

((Text)) Each placard you raised when you went out to receive them, which rejected the Zionist scheme and U.S. imperialism and denounced their agents, was viewed by them as a placard directed against them. Each word said about the importance of the fairness of the ruler or leader, and about his lightweight guilt when the money he carries is lightweight, was considered a personal attack against them. Each denunciation of weakness, submissiveness, and the acceptance of humiliation was a insult to them.

Yes, noble, mujahidin sons in Iraq: That group of Arabs, and maybe other rulers, and even some foreigners, have found that every positive feature in you and your structure reflects, in a shining mirror, their shortcomings and defects before the people and the nation. Each call for power, invincibility, faith, capability, nobility, pride, dignity, courage, liberation from the foreigner,

money; and each attempt to highlight the correct qualities of an

official, in accordance with Arab and Muslim standards, was

considered an instigation against them and a call to and

indoctrination of their peoples to triumph over them.

It seems this is the reason that filled some Arab rulers with
hatred against you. This, along with covetous designs, is also the
reason that may fill some foreigners with hatred against you. But,
brothers and sons, stalwart and honest men, and glorious women, what

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21 FEB '91 17:57

FROM BBC MON SWB

TO CO

PAGE.003

GREENWAY

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17:52:53.74 FEB 21 '91

PAGE 4

can we do other than this? Would anything other than this have left

even a grain of honor, faith, glory, and pride; or would it have

left a gift that we would taken pride in and a future toward whose

doors and shining promises we race?

(more) 21:500 ka/murray/61 21/1745z feb

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** TOTAL PAGE.003 **

21 FEB '91 18:10

FROM BBC MON SUB

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PAGE.001

FEUILHERADE

R910221209900000

18:08:21.15 FEB 21 '91 PAGE 2.

UNCLAS 3K/PMU LD

SERIAL: NO2102175191

COUNTRY: Iraq

SUBJ: Take 9 of 12--Saddam on 15 Feb 'Initiative'

REF: nc2102164091 and adds baghdad domestic arabic 211500///

promises we race?

TEXT:

((Text)) Would any action to the contrary -- in which we would follow the heels of the foreigner in the direction that he wants -- leave a drop of honor for the men and free women? Would any such act leave faith and its rites anything but decaying bones and fine dust that meets no need? Is there (anything) that our great Iraqi people and glorious nation takes pride in other than this course? We will all maintain our character and will demand anything else that will boost and entrench faith and cleanse souls to the satisfaction of ((word indistinct)) and the nation.

There is no other course than the one we have chosen, except the course of humiliation and darkness, after which there will be no bright sign in the sky or brilliant light on earth. We have chosen this course. The Iraqis have chosen this course in an era where

MR CRONIN
ROOM 213

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21 FEB '91 18:11 FROM BBC MON SWB, [REDACTED] TO CO
many characteristics became manifest. They continue to ask and work

PAGE.002

(25)

for what will make them more brilliant, faithful, and lofty. There

is no other course. We will protect it with our souls, funds, and

hearts. we will proceed on this course, irrespective of the nature

of the political efforts which we are exerting and whose formulation

and directions Tariq Aziz carried to Moscow, and which, if

rejected, will expose all the covers, and will only maintain the

premeditated intentions of the aggression against us without any

cover and without any slogans that will lead to intermingling ((al-

tadakhul))

[repeat: ARABIC AL = TADAKHUL]

(more)

FEUILHERADE

R910221211700000

18:09:11.01 FEB 21 '91 PAGE 2

UNCLAS 5K/LD PMU

SERIAL: NC2102175991

COUNTRY: Iraq

SUBJ: Take 10 of 12--Saddam on 15 Feb 'Initiative'

REF: nc2102164091 and adds baghdad domestic arabic 211500///to
intermingling ((ai-tadakhul)).

TEXT:

((Text)) After the 15 February 1991 initiative sprang from its
sister initiative of 12 August 1990, what did Bush say, and what did
his servant Fahd say? Bush rejected it, and regarded it as a cruel
hoax before he understood it. Fahd, who chews his words just as
camels chew the grass of their pastures, turned into an eloquent
orator to say that the war against Iraq will continue until Iraq
does this and that. Note, O observers; note, O people who have been
distracted by the 2 August 1990 events from the real intentions of
the aggression; note and examine that which you have overlooked.
The Iraqis and good people became aware of it at an early date.
Note how Bush and Fahd have designs regarding matters that were not
included among their slogans, either before or after 2 August, and
not until a short time ago. Note how they now have ambitions for

(27)

order to reveal their true intentions and not accept the 15 February

initiative. Remember how in the period that preceded the

announcement of the initiative, they and others in the West used to

say that as soon as the word withdrawal is said, everything will be

possible afterward. Note how they now have revealed their greed

more clearly than they did -- even in the moment preceding the

announcement of the initiative. Note what their media are talking

about now. These media are speaking about depriving Iraq of

FEUILHERADE

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18:09:11.01 FEB 21 '91 PAGE 3

strength and capability, and of the manifestations of progress,
honor, and good example. They want to deprive Iraq of every quality
characterizing truly faithful people and good sons who are faithful
to their people, homeland, and nation. Shame on them, and shame on
their cowardly act, and all they do.

(more) 211501 ns/murray/cp 21/1500z feb

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NNNN?

***** END OF DOCUMENT *****

FEUILHERADE

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18:22:13.41 FEB 21 '91 PAGE 2

UNCLAS 5K/LD PMU

SERIAL: NC2102181791

COUNTRY: Iraq

SUBJ: Take 11 of 12--Saddam on 15 Feb 'Initiative'

REF: nc2102164091 baghdad domestic arabic 211500///all they do.

TEXT:

((Text)) Note how those who, at one stage of the struggle, wanted to make of the word withdrawal an introduction to the undermining of our Armed Forces' determination and resolve, and to sow disarray in their ranks, no longer are interested in such a word now, or so they claim. They have started to neglect it, and to talk about what is new, now that this has become a gratuitous gain, as they believe. They forgot that our people and Armed Forces -- in addition to their evident great determination for jihad, which is a dowry to the wedding of jihad and sacrifice -- are also fully aware that every step we make should be countered by what it deserves in terms of guarantees and by an action that keeps the future open before the Iraqis and the Arabs and all the faithful who reject injustice in the world, and that the word withdrawal has been placed by the Iraqis, the Arabs, and the good men of this world within this

MR CROWIN
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21 FEB '91 18:29 FROM BBC MON.SWB. 10 00
context, and within the proper framework, from this premise, and in

the context of the comprehensive approach, it is the entire 15

February initiative, as a new beginning, that will make the Iraqis

more determined and more resolved if the initiative is rejected.

Their Armed Forces will become more capable. This will result from

the exposure of pretexts and disclosure of the true nature of the

premeditated intentions. All this will make them more patient and

steadfast, and better prepared for the battle which God blesses and

which good men support -- after which there will be only a glorious



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21 FEB '91 18:29

FROM BBC MON SWB

TO CO

PAGE.003

FEUILHERADE

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18:22:15.41 FEB 21 '91 PAGE 3

conclusion, where a brilliant sun will clear the dust of battle, and
where the clouds of battles will be dispelled to make room for a
brilliant moon surrounded by a halo, whose size will be commensurate
with the sacrifices that are required by the duties and conditions
of victory, and by the patience that God Almighty expects from the
people of jihad.

(more) 211500 ab/murray/co 21/1818z feb

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***** END OF DOCUMENT *****

18:28:06.24 FEB 21 '91 PAGE 2

FEUILHERADE

R910221219200000

UNCLAS SK/PMU LD

SERIAL: NC2102162391

COUNTRY: Iraq

SUBJ: Take 12 of 12--Saddam on 15 Feb 'Initiative'

REF: nc2102164091 and adds baghdad domestic arabic

211500///people of jihad.

TEXT:

(Text) O brothers, O people: Note how those who feared a ground battle have now avoided the showdown for over a month. They have persisted further in killing civilians ((word indistinct)) and destroying property with their long-range aircraft and missiles with rancor that dwarfs that of Hulegu ((grandson of Mongol ruler Genghis Khan)). They are doing this in an ((expression)) to cover up their inability to confront our land forces in southern Iraq. Note how they, and certain people who do not know the Iraqis' faith and capability, now portray matters in a way as though the mere fact of not launching the land offensive is a gain to Iraq that the Iraqis should respond to with further concessions that would harm their principles, dignity, and rights as well as the Arab nation's rights and security. Notice how they are indulging in illusions. With any

ative, Iraq seeks to establish peace in the Gulf that will open
the door to a comprehensive and equitable solution that achieves a

(33)

real and permanent peace in the region in its entirety -- foremost
in Palestine. Iraq does not seek a temporary truce or capitulation
which the failure and shameful want or have illusions about the
possibility of achieving.

O fair people, note all this, as the Iraqis have noted,
acknowledged, and concludes. Note all this so as to excuse the
Iraqis from any subsequent action, and to understand the justness of

FEUILHERADE

R910221219200000

18:28:06.24 FEB 21 '91 PAGE 3

the Iraqi position. God is great, and mercy and immortality for our
martyrs and our nation's. Dignity, glory, and victory for the
heroes of this path, the sons of our nation and mankind. God is
great, God is great, accursed be the lowly.

(endall) 211500 ng/murray/ml 21/1823z feb

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That's all we have
of Saddam, barring
any corrections from
our US colleagues.
Good night

***** END OF DOCUMENT *****

from BBC
CAVERSHAM.



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

21 February 1991

Dear Charles,

Oman: Burdensharing

Thank you for your letter of 11 February about a message of thanks to the Sultan of Oman for his country's contribution on burdensharing.

/ I enclose a draft reply.

*Yours ever,
Sir L Gass*

(S L Gass)
Private Secretary

Sir Charles Powell KCMG
10 Downing Street

RESTRICTED

FROM : Prime Minister

TO : HM Sultan Qaboos bin Said Al Said GCB GCMG GCVO

I am writing to express my personal thanks to Your Majesty for the contribution of five million pounds towards the costs of our commitment to the defence of the Gulf. As you know, our military costs have been high, and this expenditure will continue for some time. We are therefore grateful to our friends in the Gulf who have agreed to share our financial burden. I am also most grateful for Your Majesty's generous assistance for our RAF forces at the Wudum Naval Base. Your Majesty's continued support in this enterprise is particularly welcome.

When I last wrote to you on 9 January, I promised to let you have more details of our thinking on long-term security arrangements for the region. I know the Foreign Secretary has since corresponded with your Minister of State about this, and that ~~our Ambassador~~ Sir Terence Clark, took the opportunity of two recent calls on Mr Alawi ~~to~~^{to} exchange views ~~on the same subject~~. Your Ambassador has also been in contact with the Foreign Office. Such contacts are mutually beneficial and we must continue to remain in close touch.

I was pleased to hear of Qais Zawawi's intention to visit London in April. I shall be glad to see him. Arrangements are being made, with the help of our Ambassador, to organise a suitable further programme, and

I hope
to let
you have
some
considered
views, I
don't want
myself, as
I promised
you in
my letter

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Chompen / Qaboos
T. W. W.

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to announce the visit. I understand the
Foreign Secretary will be giving lunch to Mr Zawawi.

May I take this opportunity to assure Your Majesty
of my continued esteem.



MIDDLE EAST: S. + P + 43

CONFIDENTIAL



10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

21. 10. 1991

CM

24/-

21 February 1991

Dear Roland,

THE GULF

Pierre Morel from the Elysee telephoned this evening to tell me about the line which they were taking on Saddam Hussein's speech. It was very similar to ours. The French thought it was still possible that something might emerge from Tariq Aziz's talks in Moscow, but it was very hard to conceive that it could be in any way sufficient. I said that, in the light of the speech, surely no-one could believe anything that Tariq Aziz said.

Pierre Morel said that President Mitterrand would like to talk to the Prime Minister tomorrow. I explained that he would be travelling most of the day and was unlikely to be available. The best channel might be through the Foreign Secretary and Roland Dumas who would be together at the WEU meeting. Pierre Morel agreed with this, but said he thought the President would like to speak to the Prime Minister on Saturday morning. I will follow this up.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence) and to Sir Robin Butler.

*Yours sincerely,
C. D. Powell*

C. D. POWELL

Richard Gozney, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET AND STRICTLY PERSONAL



10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

21 February 1991

THE GULF

The Prime Minister mentioned to the Foreign Secretary this evening that very soon after the Gulf conflict was over, he would wish to make a rapid visit to the area to thank our forces. He had in mind a matter of a few days after the fighting had finished, although he recognised this would cause some logistical problems. He did not want anything said about this to our forces or indeed to anyone else at this stage. It simply for the information of the Foreign Secretary and the Defence Secretary.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence).

C. D. POWELL

Richard Gozney, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

SECRET AND STRICTLY PERSONAL

SECRET



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

Telephone 071- 21 82111/3

MO 6/17/15/1J

21st February 1991

GP

Dear Gen.

DISENGAGEMENT OF UK FORCES

As we discussed, I attach a paper by the MOD on issues concerned with the disengagement and withdrawal of UK forces at the end of the current conflict in the Gulf. The Defence Secretary would be grateful if this could be circulated for discussion at a convenient meeting of OPD(G).

2. I am sending an advance copy to Sir Charles Powell (No. 10), Richard Gozney (FCO), John Neilson (Energy), Jeremy Hayward (Treasury), Juliet Wheldon (Law Officers).

Yours faithfully

John Webb

(S WEBB)
Private Secretary

Len Appleyard LVO
Cabinet Office

SECRET

DISENGAGEMENT AND WITHDRAWAL OF UK FORCES

Note by the Ministry of Defence

1. This paper concentrates on the immediate issues concerned with the disengagement and withdrawal of UK Forces involved in Operation Granby. The problems of longer term security in the Middle East were considered in a paper by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office on 'Winning the Peace' (OPD(G)(91)8) which was taken by the Committee on 12 February 1991. That discussion reached the following conclusions, which have guided the approach to this paper:

- a. Short term considerations involved in recovery operations should not be allowed to evolve into any commitment to more permanent arrangements.
 - b. Vigorous efforts should be made to discourage any expectations of a permanent UK ground force in the region.
 - c. Forces involved in the conflict should be brought home as soon as possible.
 - d. Troops deployed for the recovery operation should complete that activity as soon as possible.
2. This paper assumes that when hostilities cease, Iraq will not represent a serious immediate threat to Kuwait. It has also been assumed that UK forces will not form part of any UN observer organization or international peacekeeping force. The UN is unlikely to call on any of the combatant nations, and it should be for Arab nations to provide the reassurance that Kuwait will undoubtedly require behind any United Nations tripwire. Such a

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proposal might not find favour with the Kuwaitis, and should a direct request be made to establish a Western force in Kuwait, the UK would need to consider its position carefully. However, such considerations need not necessarily delay the withdrawal of UK ground forces. Significant coalition (particularly US) forces will remain in theatre for some time, with air power providing a significant deterrent. That said, although a principal aim should be to signal to the Saudi and other regional governments the UK's clear intention to withdraw all ground troops from the Middle East, a common strategy will need to be developed with the United States and France to ensure that UK influence in the area is not damaged by withdrawal. Clearly we need to avoid creating the impression that we are not prepared to listen to any concerns which the Kuwaitis themselves might express.

3. The UK withdrawal process will fall into two phases. Following the Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait (nominally covering a period of 15 days), 4 to 6 weeks would be required both to disengage our forces from their final positions at the end of battle and to deal with a number of immediate practical problems that might arise. The second phase will cover the return of troops and equipment to the UK and Germany. Although the troops involved in the fighting can be brought back quickly, the recovery and withdrawal of equipment and stores will be a much more complicated and extended process. Moreover, the recovery will take considerably longer than the deployment, because taking equipment off the shelf for shipment in bulk is much more straightforward than reconstituting and recovering items that have taken out of packaging. The recovery process will therefore take at least 6 months and probably up to a year to complete. There is also a distinct possibility of a net increase in troop numbers during the initial stages of that process. In that

context, we shall need to explain to the Saudis the reasons for despatching any new forces to the Kingdom, and the length of troop deployments.

Disengagement

4. The period of disengagement will allow UK forces to prepare for withdrawal. During this period it will be important to provide for the security of our troops and materiel. Initial steps will also have to be taken to recondition and repair equipment in preparation for recovery to assembly areas. Other key tasks will include decontamination, battlefield area clearance in the immediate vicinity of our forces, and consolidation of lines of communication to departure ports and airfields, principally in Saudi Arabia. In total, this may take 4-6 weeks and will need to be largely complete before the bulk of UK personnel can begin withdrawing. (Tasks for this period are summarized at Annex A.)

Withdrawal

5. The issues and practical problems associated with UK withdrawal are summarized in Annex B.

6. Army. The withdrawal of ground forces (particularly equipment) will be the most complicated and lengthy task. If 1 (BR) Div has been involved in major offensive operations, it could have advanced some 200 kilometres from its starting point, and lead elements might be up to 600 kilometres from the port of entry at Al Jubayl. Damaged and destroyed equipment - some of it sensitive from a security point of view - could be spread over a considerable distance. The objective will be to draw the Division back along its line of communications, although it may be possible to take some

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equipment out through Kuwait. But the first priority will be to withdraw troops who have been involved in the fighting, and also those support troops who have been in theatre the longest: many who were associated with the early deployment of the RAF and 7 Armoured Brigade will have been in theatre for more than six months. Replacement troops will need to be sent out (eg armoured specialists from BAOR) and the total numbers involved in the recovery operation will be considerable over the period. In order to provide sufficient logistic troops in some categories (eg transport and stores) for the recovery operation, it might be necessary to retain or redeploy some who have already served in the Gulf, unless additional reserves are to be called out.

7. Royal Navy. In comparison, the problems of withdrawing naval forces will be more straightforward. Consideration is being given to the future level of frigate/destroyer deployments to the region (which, as pre-war, would also be used as a cost-effective way of fulfilling commitments further afield) but after the initial disengagement phase it should be possible to reduce deployments at least to the pre-August 1990 level of three ships. The mine counter-measures force could be withdrawn after completing any essential immediate clearance tasks, but it has already been recognised that the clearance task could well take up to one year to complete, possibly with UK forces forming a part of a coalition effort. That should be done on a contract basis. There will also be a need for logistic ships to be retained for a significant time to assist with the withdrawal of other forces, resupply and MCM support. The retention of some Sea King Mk 4 helicopters in theatre in the support role would present serious manning and refurbishment problems, which could be circumvented by the use of charter helicopters.

8. RAF. The major RAF units can also be withdrawn relatively quickly. However, battle damaged aircraft, weapon stocks and associated support equipment will take time to recover. The Air Transport Force will be involved throughout the withdrawal phase, although competing pressures and the need for refurbishment of the force might lead to greater use of charter aircraft than in the deployment phase. Similarly, although the need for support helicopters (including those from the Royal Navy) for other requirements is pressing, the retention of some support helicopters in theatre would also assist the recovery of ground forces.

9. The Management of Withdrawal. Management of the UK withdrawal would be best facilitated by retaining a headquarters in Saudi Arabia, albeit reduced in rank and described as an administrative headquarters. It might move from Riyadh to Al Jubayl (or even to a command ship) as most of our ground forces move back to the rear area. Although we understand that the US may be planning to move their headquarters to Bahrain, this reflects recognition that the Saudis will not want the American HQ to remain in the Kingdom for what will inevitably be a more protracted US withdrawal. We believe, however, that the Saudis will accept retention of a UK headquarters which is committed to managing a rapid withdrawal. There is also the danger that establishing a new headquarters in another country would be interpreted as indicating that we were willing to contemplate a longer term presence.

Longer Term Military Assistance

10. Although our aim is to withdraw Op Granby forces as soon as possible (and this will also be the wish of the Saudis) it is likely that others in the Gulf will be hoping for a continued Western presence, to include the British. Kuwait in particular will be

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looking for reassurance and for assistance in rebuilding its country and defences. There are a number of ways in which the UK could respond militarily - such as through defence sales, training, military deployments, exercises and assistance with technical tasks (including mine clearance on land and at sea). The establishment of a Defence Attache post in Kuwait is already under consideration. Some minor assistance could also be offered using forces that happen to be in theatre during withdrawal, provided that this does not delay the recovery process. Beyond that, the extent to which we might choose to take on or contribute to such tasks (and on what basis) will be a matter for political decision at the time. Such decisions might have a bearing on the withdrawal process.

Costs

11. The cost of recovering the force will be substantial, especially if our forces are badly damaged in operations. (There is likely to be little opportunity to sell or dispose of damaged or undamaged equipment in theatre.) To some extent too, there is likely to be a trade off between speed and cost - for example in the extent to which we use air rather than sea freight and in the type of ships that are chartered. Market pressures will also operate, as other nations compete for transport facilities. There will also be major costs to meet in restoring our essential defence capability through replacement and refurbishment. A provisional allocation of £100M has been included for return transport costs within the overall estimate for the operation of £3Bn, given by the Chancellor on 13 February. The scope of recovery operations, especially if major ground hostilities have taken place, is likely to be considerably wider than this and will be critically dependent on the circumstances in which our forces find themselves. It is therefore

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not yet possible to say whether this allocation will be sufficient. There may, however, be opportunities for obtaining further financial contributions from other countries to help offset the cost of withdrawal, or possibly some free provision of transport.

Conclusions

12. The withdrawal of UK forces involved in Op Granby will be a very high priority, not least to restore important defence capabilities elsewhere. It could take up to a year to complete the withdrawal of all equipment, although the bulk of the troops will be withdrawn much earlier. Any proposals for longer term military assistance in the region will need separate consideration but could affect the withdrawal process. The cost of the recovery operation and of the restoration of the forces involved will be considerable.

Recommendation

13. OPD(G) is invited to endorse this paper as a basis for planning the disengagement and withdrawal of UK forces following Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait under ceasefire terms.

Ministry of Defence

T K

21st February 1991

DISENGAGEMENT OF UK FORCES: KEY FACTORS AND TASKS

1. The following issues will need to be considered over a four to six week period following a 15 day Iraqi withdrawal:

- a) Treatment and evacuation of casualties (Allied and Iraqi).
- b) Monitoring of Iraqi forces withdrawn from Kuwait.
- c) Repatriation of enemy Prisoners of War.
- d) Battle area clearance (initial recovery of Chobham armour, own mines, etc) in immediate vicinity of own forces.
- e) Preparation for recovery of own damaged weapons and equipment, and initial husbandry of undamaged equipment to avoid deterioration.
- f) Decontamination.
- g) Recovery and repatriation or reburial of the dead.
- h) Essential security of own troops and equipment and protection from stragglers and irregular forces.
- i) Maintenance of essential logistic supplies.
- j) Explosive ordnance disposal in vicinity of own troops and around other British assets - eg British embassy and diplomatic

houses in Kuwait City.

k) Minefield (land and sea) marking and initial clearance work.

l) If capacity exists, and if politically advantageous, provision of emergency military aid to the Kuwaiti civil authorities (eg communications, medical support).

ANNEX BWITHDRAWAL OF UK FORCES: KEY FACTORS AND TASKS

1. Some of the tasks undertaken during the disengagement phase will continue into withdrawal (such as recovery of the dead, logistic resupply, security and disposal of live ordnance). However, the following issues will need to be dealt with during the withdrawal period, which might extend to 12 months.

a) Earliest possible recovery of combat personnel and other forces who have served a long period in theatre.

b) Provision of replacement manpower to carry out essential national post-hostilities tasks.

c) Residual HQ command arrangements for withdrawal:

(1) Two-star Joint Forces HQ in Riyadh, with an Army Commander, perhaps subsequently to move to Al Jubayl (or a naval command ship).

(2) JHQ command and co-ordination role to continue.

d) Sea/land minefield clearance (if requested and if capacity exists) to help regional states.

e) Reduction in destroyer/frigate presence.

f) Withdrawal of all or majority of RAF fixed wing aircraft.

SECRET

g) Consideration of the continued presence of support helicopters (to facilitate the withdrawal plan). Should take account of the lack of crews for roulement and the need for Support Helicopters in Europe.

h) Assembly of Army equipment at exit port.

i) Return of equipment to European theatre:

(1) Decision required on destination (eg Germany or UK) in light of decision on force levels post Options for Change.

(2) Means of return? Ship return is cheap but will be a lengthy process slowing down withdrawal and perpetuating operational weaknesses in Europe, particularly in Germany. Rapid return could be expensive.

(3) Accounting arrangements must be introduced to safeguard assets, and for write-off and disposal of surplus stores. Budget management, contracts and accounts staff must be provided.


j) The sale of equipment in theatre is unlikely to be an attractive option, except in the case of unused ammunition.

k) Disposal in theatre of damaged equipment either by destruction or sale as scrap.

l) Retention of captured Iraqi military equipment for intelligence and historical purposes.

m) Provision of assistance for Kuwaiti and other governments if capacity exists and political benefits are to be had. Concentrate on provision of expertise rather than manpower/military units.

n) Return of overseas military units attached to UK forces (mostly medical staff).





SECRET - UK EYES A

B.0735

PRIME MINISTER

cc Sir Robin Butler
Sir Percy Cradock

OPD(G): 21 February: Overnight Action Points

Item 1: Burdensharing

The Foreign Secretary's position on EC aid to Israel will reflect the fact that, in the face of united pressure from the other member states at a Foreign Affairs Council on 4 February, he reluctantly conceded the principle of EC aid to Israel. At OPD(G) the Foreign Secretary will argue that: in principle contributions from member states should be on a national basis; in practice we cannot now prevent some aid coming from the EC budget; we should continue to work with the Commission to minimise the amount and to draw out the process.

Item 2: Current international situation

2. The Iraqis have announced that Tariq Aziz will travel to Moscow "soon" but no precise timing has been made public. No indications have been given of the nature of the Iraqi response.

3. The Russians expect to call for an immediate meeting of the Security Council once the content of the Iraqi response is known. Meanwhile, the mischief-making Indian draft Resolution is gaining ground among the non-aligned and may prove tricky to handle. It "affirms that the terms for the re-establishment of peace and security in the region shall

SECRET - UK EYES A

*This is
dangerous!*

34a-b
2. Am
cor



SECRET - UK EYES A

be determined by the Security Council, in consultation with all the parties concerned". The Indian Ambassador at the UN has been arguing that the terms of a ceasefire are for Governments to determine and that the Security Council has been acting in effect as a Government. He agreed to look at less harmful language but seems dead set on tabling the Resolution in the next couple of days. The Indians appear to calculate that if the Soviet initiative fails, their Resolution will come to the fore. You may wish to ask the Foreign Secretary whether there is more lobbying we can do to scotch this dangerous move: the US view is equally strongly negative.

Item 4: Media handling

4. General Schwarzkopf's claim in Riyadh on 19 February that the Iraqi army was close to collapse has been set against more cautious assessments in Washington and from our own briefers and has intensified speculation about the timing of the land campaign and the extent to which the Iraqis can be expected to put up a fight. Mr O'Donnell may well have this quoted at him today.

L V Appleyard
L V Appleyard

Cabinet Office
21 February 1991

SECRET - UK EYES A



10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

Two important

telegrams which you

will want to see

ahead of OPD(G)

at 0930

CAP

21/2.

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MDADAN 9321

ADVANCE COPY

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FM WASHINGTON
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 515
OF 210530Z FEBRUARY 91
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, PARIS, MOSCOW, RIYADH, CAIRO
INFO IMMEDIATE DAMASCUS, JEDDA

IRAQ/KUWAIT: SOVIET PEACE PROPOSAL

SUMMARY

1. ACTION TAKEN WITH NSC AND WITH STATE. GENERAL AGREEMENT WITH THE SPIRIT OF OUR APPROACH. NSC ANXIOUS TO AVOID ANY RISK OF GETTING INTO NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE IRAQIS.

DETAIL

2. I SAW GATES ON 20 FEBRUARY AND TOOK HIM THROUGH THE POINTS IN YOUR TUR IN DETAIL. HIS FIRST REACTION WAS TO SAY THAT HE AGREED ENTIRELY WITH PARAGRAPH 2(A), (B) AND (C). THE AMERICANS HAD DEBATED WHETHER TO INSERT A SENTENCE INTO THEIR SECOND MESSAGE TO GORBACHEV MAKING IT CLEAR THAT THE VENUE WOULD SHIFT FROM THE USSR, ONCE THE IRAQIS HAD DEMONSTRATED SERIOUSNESS OF PURPOSE, TO DIRECT TALKS WITH COALITION PARTNERS. GATES ADMITTED HE MIGHT BE MORE SUSPICIOUS OF THE RUSSIANS THAN OTHERS, BUT THERE WAS A GENERAL VIEW IN THE ADMINISTRATION THAT THE SOVIET AGENDA WAS DIFFERENT. THE RUSSIANS DID NOT WANT TO SEE SADDAM HUSSEIN THROWN OUT, OR TO ALLOW THE IRAQI MILITARY MACHINE TO BE SET BACK AS MUCH AS THE AMERICANS WOULD LIKE. THEY WERE ALSO AFTER A PARTICULAR POSITION IN THE MIDDLE EAST. IT MADE NO DIFFERENCE IN THE PRESENT CONTEXT WHETHER GORBACHEV WAS ACTING IN PARTNERSHIP WITH THOSE WHO HAD THIS DIFFERENT AGENDA IN MIND OR WAS UNDER PRESSURE FROM THEM. THE IRAQIS FOR THEIR PART WANTED TO DETACH THE SOVIET UNION FROM THOSE ARRAYED AGAINST THEM AND WERE ALSO WORKING ON THE CHINESE. HE HAD NO DOUBT THAT THE US ADMINISTRATION, LIKE HMG WOULD WANT MATTERS TAKEN OUT OF RUSSIAN HANDS.

3. I POINTED TO THE PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE OF AGREEING ON WHAT WE SHOULD SAY IN PUBLIC IF THE IRAQI RESPONSE TO GORBACHEV WAS NEGATIVE OR STRONGLY QUALIFIED. GATES SAID THAT GREAT MINDS WERE

OBVIOUSLY THINKING IN THE SAME WAY. THE AMERICANS WERE PREPARING A PAPER FOR CIRCULATION TO COALITION PARTNERS SETTING OUT THE BASIC CONDITIONS IN VERY MUCH THE SAME WAY AS WE ENVISAGED (PARA 2(C) OF YOUR TUR). THEY HAD ALREADY TOLD THE RUSSIANS THAT THEIR PROPOSALS DID NOT PROVIDE FOR SUITABLE COMPLIANCE WITH THE RELEVANT UNSCRS.

4. GATES SAID THAT THE AMERICANS HAD SO FAR GIVEN LITTLE THOUGHT TO THE INTERESTING POSSIBILITIES SET OUT IN 2(D) AND (E) OF YOUR TUR, A POINT WE CAME BACK TO IN SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION. THERE WAS A LOT OF OVER-LAP BETWEEN US ON THE CONDITIONS FOR A CEASE-FIRE. THE OFFICIAL LEVEL POSITION WAS THAT SEVEN DAYS RATHER THAN FIFTEEN WOULD BE ENOUGH FOR AN IRAQI WITHDRAWAL. OUR POINT ABOUT HEAVY EQUIPMENT WAS WELL TAKEN. THE AMERICANS, LIKE US, ATTACHED IMPORTANCE TO POWS, KUWAITI PRISONERS AND THIRD COUNTRY DETAINEES. HE AGREED THAT THERE MIGHT HAVE TO BE SOME DIFFERENT PHASING FOR IRAQI WITHDRAWAL FROM PARTICULAR PARTS OF KUWAITI TERRITORY. THIS MIGHT HAVE TO INCLUDE NOT JUST KUWAIT CITY BUT ALSO THE FRONT LINES, RUMAILA, AND THE TWO ISLANDS, SO AS TO RULE OUT THE POSSIBILITY OF PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL. IN OTHER WORDS, WE MIGHT NOT AGREE ON EVERY DETAIL OF THE CONDITIONS BUT WERE ON VERY MUCH THE SAME WAVELENGTH. GATES SAID THAT WE WERE ALSO WORKING FROM THE SAME INFORMATION BASE IN ASSESSING THE SOVIET PROPOSALS, WHICH THE AMERICANS HAD SHARED WITH ALL THOSE WHO HAD THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER. THEY HAD HAD NOTHING SPECIFIC FROM THE RUSSIANS ABOUT A POSSIBLE RETURN TO MOSCOW BY TARIQ AZIZ AND KNEW NOTHING OF WHAT THE IRAQIS HAD SAID TO THE RUSSIANS BEYOND WHAT GORBACHEV HAD RECORDED.

5. HAASS RAISED A NUMBER OF POINTS. THE FIRST WAS THAT THE SCENARIOS ENVISAGED IN 2(B) AND (C) OF YOUR TUR APPEARED TO BE DIFFERENT. HE ASSUMED THE SPIRIT OF (C) WAS TO EXPLAIN IN PUBLIC WHY IRAQI PROPOSALS WERE INADEQUATE AND WHY MILITARY OPERATIONS THERE HAD TO RUN THEIR COURSE. WOOD POINTED OUT THAT THERE WOULD IN PRACTICE BE A SPECTRUM. WE COULD ONLY JUDGE AT THE TIME WHETHER THE IRAQI RESPONSE FELL ABOVE OR BELOW OUR LINE. I SAID THAT BOTH THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE PRESIDENT HAD ALREADY TOLD THE RUSSIANS WHAT WAS INADEQUATE ABOUT THEIR PRESENT PROPOSALS AND WHAT OUR CONDITIONS WOULD BE. GATES SAID THERE WOULD BE ZERO TOLERANCE IN WASHINGTON FOR ANY IRAQI ATTEMPT TO DEFLECT THE PRESSURE ON THEM. EITHER THEY WOULD SAY YES, IN WHICH CASE WE WOULD SPELL OUT WHAT WAS REQUIRED AND CONTINUE

OPERATIONS UNTIL THAT WAS ACCEPTED, OR THE EXERCISE WAS AT AN END. WE COULD NOT ALLOW SADDAM HUSSEIN TO BEGIN ANY SORT OF PROCESS OF NEGOTIATION.

6. HAASS ASKED HOW THE TALKS ENVISAGED BY US IN PARAGRAPH 2(D) AND (E) OF YOUR TUR COULD BE PREVENT FROM MOVING INTO THE NEGOTIATING PHASE. GATES STRESSED AGAIN THAT WE HAD TO LAY OUT THE CONDITIONS IN SUCH A WAY THAT THE IRAQIS COULD ONLY ANSWER YES OR NO. I POINTED TO A NEED, IF ONLY FOR PRESENTATIONAL PURPOSES, TO ESTABLISH CLEARLY THAT THE IRAQIS KNEW WHAT WAS BEING DEMANDED OF THEM. WE SAID THAT WE HAD ENVISAGED A NEED TO WORK OUT TECHNICAL DETAILS WITH THE IRAQIS IN THE TALKS ABOUT THE POSSIBLE APPROACH TO A CEASE-FIRE WE HAD HAD ON 4 FEBRUARY WITH THE STATE DEPARTMENT. NEITHER GATES NOR HAASS BELIEVED THERE WOULD BE ANY REAL DIFFICULTY ABOUT GETTING A COMPREHENSIVE MESSAGE THROUGH TO THE IRAQIS. THE IRAQI REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS MIGHT BE ONE CHANNEL, GENEVA ANOTHER. GATES EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT THE POSSIBILITIES FOR WEDGE DRIVING IF THE UNITED STATES AND OTHER PRINCIPLE ALLIES WERE PRESENT AT ANY TALKS IN GENEVA AND ALSO CONCERN LEST ANY SUCH TALKS REINFORCED THE IMPRESSION THAT THE PRESENT QUARREL WAS SOLELY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND IRAQ, OR CLEARLY DIVIDED THE COALITION INTO MAJOR AND MINOR PARTNERS.

7. I STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE AMERICANS MAKING UP THEIR MINDS QUICKLY. GATES SAID HE HOPED THEIR PAPER WOULD BE READY VERY SHORTLY. HAASS EXPRESSED SOME CONCERN ABOUT HOW BEST TO DEAL WITH THE HEAVY EQUIPMENT ISSUE. WE DID NOT WANT TO GET IN A POSITION WHEREBY WE MIGHT BE ACCUSED OF TRYING TO GO BEYOND UN RESOLUTIONS. WE AGREED THAT THE QUOTE PEACE AND SECURITY UNQUOTE RUBRIC OUGHT TO COVER US. THE NSC APPROACH HAD BEEN TO TRY TO DEAL WITH HEAVY EQUIPMENT IN KUWAIT BY SETTING AN OUTLINE TOO TIGHT FOR THE IRAQIS TO MOVE IT OUT IN TIME. WE ALSO HAD TO PRESERVE A DISTINCTION BETWEEN A CEASE-FIRE AND THE END OF HOSTILITIES, AND TO RESERVE THE RIGHT TO STRIKE AT STRATEGIC TARGETS IN IRAQ IF PROVOKED, FOR EXAMPLE, BY A SCUD ATTACK ON ISRAEL. A FORMAL END TO HOSTILITIES, GATES SAID, COULD ONLY TAKE PLACE WHEN THE LAST IRAQI HAD LEFT KUWAIT.

8. THE MINISTER TOOK SUPPORTING ACTION WITH KELLY (STATE), WHO MADE DETAILED NOTES AND UNDERTOOK TO INFORM KIMMITT AND BAKER

IMMEDIATELY. HE COMMENTED THAT A NUMBER OF POINTS WERE FAMILIAR TO HIM FROM EARLIER DISCUSSIONS. HE COULD NOT HOWEVER GIVE MORE THAN A PERSONAL REACTION TO WOOD'S REPRESENTATIONS AT THIS STAGE. HE VERY MUCH TOOK THE POINT THAT IT WOULD BE WISE TO MAKE A PUBLIC STATEMENT OF OUR BASIC CONDITIONS FOR A CEASEFIRE IN THE EVENT THAT THE RUSSIANS CLAIMED SOME PROGRESS WAS BEING MADE FOLLOWING AN IRAQI RESPONSE TO THEIR EARLIER EXCHANGES. WOOD ALSO EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE WE ATTACHED TO TAKING THE DETAILED ARRANGEMENTS FOR A CEASEFIRE OUT OF MOSCOW'S HANDS. KELLY INDICATED THAT HE AGREED. BUT IT WOULD BE UP TO THE NSC TO COORDINATE A REPLY.

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PRIME MINISTER, FIRST LORD OF THE TREASURY
AND MINISTER FOR THE CIVIL SERVICE, THE
RIGHT HONORABLE JOHN MAJOR, M.P.
LONDON

IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE SPIRIT OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AND THAT
OF THE TOKYO DECLARATION ADOPTED AT THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE OF MAJOR
CITIES OF THE WORLD, THE METROPOLIS OF TOKYO HEREBY WISHES TO EXPRESS
ITS STRONG DESIRE THAT THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION
NO. 660 BE IMPLEMENTED IMMEDIATELY AND THOROUGHLY SO THAT THE PERSIAN
GULF CRISIS MAY BE RESOLVED AND PEACE IN THE REGION RESTORED.

SINCERELY YOURS, SHUNICHI SUZUKI GOVERNOR OF TOKYO

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10 DOWNING STREET

~~Dear~~

I suggest it,

as much as

we shall forget.

It's better than

nothing.

C

Charles

What I expected

6.20.72

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cc/PC.



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

Telephone 071-21 82111/3

SECRETARY OF STATE

MO 6/17/15/1J

20th February 1991

Let's give it
a try.
CMB
22/L

Dear Charles,

INTELLIGENCE ON OPERATIONS

File in CDP

Thank you for your further letter of 12th February. We have been investigating what might be feasible.

I think it is important to understand that the British Force Commander Middle East does not have automatic access to the whole of the Allied campaign details. Although close to General Schwarzkopf in many ways, there are quite respectable reasons of operational security why he will not necessarily be in the picture about how some aspects of the operations are progressing if British forces are not involved. We must, therefore, be careful not to expect too much from him.

UK Military commanders in the field are normally given a great deal of delegated authority to conduct the details of military operations within the kind of broad directives that have already been issued. Reporting of the kind one gets in diplomatic telegrams is not, therefore, a normal part of military procedure and HQ staffs are not specially trained to do it. There have also been unhappy experiences of Governments trying to exercise too detailed control from afar. This is not just the UK view. The Pentagon for example has been given instructions that it is not to become a burden on General Schwarzkopf's staff by requesting too much information from them.

Nonetheless, we do understand that, in the special circumstances of an international force and the close consultation with Allies at all levels including the Prime Minister, regular summaries of the overall position would be helpful.

Sir Charles Powell KCMG
No 10 Downing Street



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
SECRETARY OF STATE

We will therefore undertake to produce a "View from Riyadh" daily in future, though we hope you will understand that sometimes there will be little new. For the reason mentioned, it will blend together reports from both BFCME direct and from General Schwarzkopf to the Joint Commander.

Ken Smith
John Webb

(S WEBB)
Private Secretary





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IRAQ/KUWAIT: SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER'S STATEMENT TO SUPREME SOVIET

SUMMARY

1. BESSMERTNYKH DELIVERS STATEMENT ON SOVIET POLICY ON THE GULF TO PARLIAMENT ON 19 FEBRUARY. DEFENDS SUPPORT FOR UNSCR 678, EMPHASISES SOVIET ATTEMPTS TO AVERT, THEN HALT, USE OF FORCE. DEFINES SOVIET AIMS AS RETURN TO STATUS QUO ANTE AND URGES GREATER ROLE FOR ARAB COUNTRIES AND UN IN POST-CRISIS ARRANGEMENTS. QUESTIONS FROM THE FLOOR UNIFORMLY PRO-IRAQI: CRITICISM THAT HOSTILITIES EXCEED UN MANDATE AND THAT SOVIET UNION DID NOT DO MORE TO HELP IRAQ. ONE DEPUTY DRAWS PARALLEL BETWEEN KUWAIT AND AMERICAN ACTION IN PANAMA AND GRENADA.

2. SUPREME SOVIET ADOPTS DECREE APPROVING SOVIET POLICY AND CONFIRMS TEXT OF ADDRESS TO WORLD PARLIAMENTS. ADDRESS ARGUES THAT PEACE MUST TRIUMPH OVER WAR, CALLS FOR IMMEDIATE AND UNCONDITIONAL WITHDRAWAL OF IRAQI TROOPS. NO (NO) MENTION OF UNSC RESOLUTIONS OR OF HOSTILITIES EXCEEDING UN MANDATE.

DETAIL

3. DURING THE EVENING SESSION OF THE SUPREME SOVIET ON 19 FEBRUARY, FOREIGN MINISTER BESSMERTNYKH MADE A STATEMENT ON SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY ON THE GULF CRISIS, AND THEN ANSWERED DEPUTIES' QUESTIONS. THE SUPREME SOVIET SUBSEQUENTLY APPROVED THE LEADERSHIP'S POLICY AND ADOPTED, WITH MINOR AMENDMENTS, THE TEXT OF AN APPEAL ADDRESSED TO PARLIAMENTS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD.

4. DESCRIBING THE GULF CRISIS AS THE MOST DISTURBING CONFLICT OF THE LAST 20 YEARS, BESSMERTNYKH REMINDED HIS AUDIENCE THAT IT HAD COME AT A CRITICAL TIME WHEN THE WORLD WAS ENGAGED IN THE PROCESS OF CREATING A NEW ORDER. AS A FRIEND OF IRAQ, THE USSR HAD POINTED OUT THAT THE ANNEXATION OF KUWAIT WOULD HAVE MORE SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES THAN THE IRAQI'S MIGHT THINK. BUT IN SPITE OF SOVIET EFFORTS, THE CRISIS HAD

BECOME MORE DANGEROUS. GUIDED BY THE PRINCIPLE THAT AGGRESSION MUST NOT BE ALLOWED TO PAY, THE USSR HAD THEREFORE DECIDED TO VOTE IN FAVOUR OF UNSC RESOLUTION 678: IF THEY HAD NOT, NO MIDDLE EASTERN STATE COULD HAVE LIVED WITHOUT THE FEAR THAT THEY WOULD BE THE NEXT TO SUFFER.

5. IT HAD BEEN AT SOVIET INSTIGATION THAT A 'PAUSE OF GOODWILL' HAD BEEN INCLUDED IN THE TEXT OF UNSC R/678. BUT IT HAD PROVED TO BE IN VAIN, AND ON 16 JANUARY A NEW PHASE IN THE CRISIS HAD BEGUN. THE SOVIET UNION HAD BEEN THE FIRST TO REALISE THAT THEY LOGIC OF WAR THREATENED TO CARRY THE SCALE OF HOSTILITIES BEYOND THE UN MANDATE: AND, FOLLOWING PROVOCATIVE ATTEMPTS TO INVOLVE ISRAEL IN THE CRISIS, THE SOVIET UNION HAD SUCCESSFULLY ENCOURAGED ARAB STATES TO RESIST THE TEMPTATION OF BEING DRAWN INTO THE CONFLICT. THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT HAD REDOUBLED ITS EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE A POLITICAL SOLUTION AND HAD BEEN IN CONTINUAL CONTACT WITH ALL COUNTRIES INVOLVED IN THE CRISIS (BESSMERTNYKH PAID TRIBUTE TO THE COURAGE AND DEDICATION OF THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR AND HIS STAFF WHO REMAINED IN BAGHDAD). GORBACHEV HAD ALSO MADE CLEAR THE ABSOLUTE INADMISSABILITY OF THE USE OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, AND THE USSR HAD TAKEN AN ACTIVE ROLE IN WORKING WITH OTHER COUNTRIES TO LIMIT THE CONSEQUENCES OF ECOLOGICAL DAMAGE IN THE REGION.

6. IN ALL THEIR DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY, THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT CONTINUED TO BE GUIDED BY THE PRINCIPLE OF ACHIEVING A RETURN TO THE STATUS QUO ANTE. THEY ALSO SOUGHT TO ACHIEVE GREATER ARAB AND UN INVOLVEMENT. BESSMERTNYKH THEN GAVE A SHORT SUMMARY OF THE MOST RECENT SOVIET ATTEMPTS TO BRING ABOUT A CEASEFIRE. HE APPEALED FOR ALL SIDES IN THE CONFLICT TO SHOW REALISM, AND WARNED THAT POST-CRISIS REGIONAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS HAD TO INCLUDE THE PARTICIPATION OF IRAQ IF THEY WERE TO HAVE ANY CHANCE OF SUCCESS. HE SAID THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS DEEPLY MOVED BY THE SUFFERING OF THE IRAQI PEOPLE (ADDING THAT ONE SHOULD NOT FORGET THAT THE KUWAITIS TOO HAD SUFFERED) AND CONCLUDED THAT EVERYTHING MUST BE DONE TO HALT THE CONFLICT WITHOUT DELAY.

QUESTIONS FROM THE FLOOR

7. BESSMERTNYKH THEN ANSWERED QUESTIONS (UNIFORMLY PRO-IRAQ) FROM DEPUTIES. SEVERAL DEMANDED TO KNOW WHY THE SOVIET UNION HAD NOT HONoured ITS TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP BY GOING TO IRAQ'S AID, OR REFUSING TO VOTE FOR UNSC R678. HE WAS ALSO CHALLENGED AS TO WHETHER THE SCALE OF HOSTILITIES EXCEEDED THE UN MANDATE. HE DENIED THAT THE SOVIET-IRAQI TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP OBLIGED THE USSR TO GIVE MATERIAL SUPPORT TO IRAQ. THE USSR WAS IN ANY CASE ENGAGED IN DEFENDING THE

INTERESTS OF THE PEACEFUL POPULATION OF IRAQ (BESSMERTNYKH WAS CAREFUL TO DRAW A DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE IRAQI LEADERSHIP AND THE PEOPLE). ON THE SUBJECT OF THE SCALE OF HOSTILITIES, HE ANSWERED THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAD BEEN THE FIRST TO POINT OUT THE SERIOUS RISK THAT THIS MIGHT OCCUR: BUT DODGED THE QUESTION AS TO WHETHER IN THE GOVERNMENT'S OPINION THE MANDATE HAD ALREADY BEEN EXCEEDED.

8. SEVERAL DEPUTIES ALSO CRITICISED THE UNITED STATES: ONE COMPARED THE INVASION OF KUWAIT WITH AMERICAN ACTION IN PANAMA AND GRENADA, WHILE ANOTHER SUGGESTED THAT AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST COULD BE MIRRORED IN THE FUTURE BY INTERVENTION IN THE BALTIC STATES OR CENTRAL ASIA. BESSMERTNYKH CONFINED HIMSELF TO SAYING THAT THE MFA DID NOT REGARD AMERICAN INTEREST IN THE BALTICS AS EXCEEDING THE BOUNDS OF LEGITIMATE INVOLVEMENT IN THE AFFAIRS OF ANOTHER COUNTRY. HE WAS ALSO ASKED TO CONFIRM RUMOURS OF THE EXISTENCE OF EARLIER PLANS TO CONTRIBUTE A SOVIET CONTINGENT TO THE COALITION FORCES. HE REPLIED THAT WHILE HE COULD NOT EXCLUDE THE EXISTENCE OF SUCH A DOCUMENT (PREPARED FOR EXAMPLE BY A RESEARCH INSTITUTE) HE COULD CONFIRM THAT AT NO TIME HAD SERIOUS ATTENTION BEEN GIVEN TO THIS POSSIBILITY BY THE GOVERNMENT.

ADOPTION OF DECREE

9. THE SUPREME SOVIET ADOPTED A DECREE (359 VOTES FOR, 1 AGAINST WITH 1 ABSTENTION) WHICH APPROVED THE COURSE OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY ON THE GULF AND CONFIRMED THE TEXT OF AN ADDRESS TO PARLIAMENTS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD.

10. THE ADDRESS EXPRESSES DEEP CONCERN OVER EVENTS IN THE GULF AND DESCRIBES HOSTILITIES AS INCREASING IN SCALE AND DESTRUCTION WITH EACH PASSING DAY. IT REFERS TO INNOCENT PEOPLE DYING AND TO HUGE MATERIAL DAMAGE. IN ORDER TO HALT THE SLIDE TOWARDS THE ABYSS, THE LOGIC OF PEACE MUST TRIUMPH OVER THE LOGIC OF WAR: A PEACEFUL SOLUTION IS THE ONLY POSSIBLE OR SENSIBLE ANSWER. AN IMMEDIATE AND UNCONDITIONAL WITHDRAWAL OF IRAQI TROOPS FROM KUWAIT, AND THE REESTABLISHMENT OF KUWAITI SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY WOULD OPEN UP THE WAY TOWARDS SOLVING OTHER PROBLEMS, SUCH AS THE ARAB-ISRAEL CONFLICT AND THE CREATION, WITH THE ACTIVE HELP OF THE UN, OF A SOLID SYSTEM OF REGIONAL SECURITY. THE APPEAL ENDS BY REAFFIRMING ITS STRONG BELIEF THAT THE WAY OUT OF THE CRISIS MUST BE BY POLITICAL MEANS ALONE: IT APPEALS TO ALL PEOPLE OF GOODWILL EVERYWHERE TO WORK TOWARDS THIS END.

11. THE DRAFT TEXT INCLUDED A SENTENCE CLAIMING THAT MILITARY ACTION THREATENED TO GET OUT OF CONTROL, AND WOULD LEAD TO FURTHER TRAGIC

CONSEQUENCES FOR THE PEOPLE OF THE MIDDLE EAST. THIS WAS DROPPED.

COMMENT

12. BESSMERTNYKH WAS SURPRISINGLY FLUSTERED AND HESITANT WHEN ANSWERING THE DEPUTIES QUESTIONS. ASKED ABOUT THE EXISTENCE OF A DOCUMENT IN THE EARLY DAYS OF THE CRISIS THAT REPORTEDLY ADVOCATED CONTRIBUTING A SOVIET CONTINGENT TO THE COALITION FORCES, HE GAVE AN EQUIVOCAL ANSWER. LUKYANOV, WHO WAS PRESIDING, REMARKED THAT THE FOREIGN MINISTER WAS A TRUE DIPLOMAT: HE WAS UNABLE EITHER TO CONFIRM OR DENY THE DOCUMENT'S EXISTENCE.

13. THE TEXT OF THE ADDRESS IS LARGELY UNREMARKABLE. TWO POINTS HOWEVER ARE WORTH NOTING: IT MAKES NO MENTION OF THE NEED FOR IRAQ TO COMPLY WITH THE RELEVANT UNSC RESOLUTIONS (THE ONLY REFERENCE TO THE UN IS TO A ROLE FOR THE ORGANISATION IN POST WAR ARRANGEMENTS): IT ALSO STOPS SHORT OF AN EXPLICIT REFERENCE TO HOSTILITIES EXCEEDING THE UN MANDATE.

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R. H. H. H.

PRIME MINISTER

cc Sir Percy Cradock
Mr AppleyardCDD
292OPD(G): 21 February

The FCO paper "No peace, no war" which was on the original agenda for today has been postponed to next week when it can be taken alongside an MOD paper on the logistics of recovering our weapons.

Item 1: Burdensharing

1. You might ask the Chief Secretary if he has any key points to add to his paper, which is admirably self-explanatory.

2. Three decisions are required. Whether the Foreign Secretary should send a message to Prince Saud to remind the Saudis of the King's undertaking; whether you should send a reply to President Bush's message; and whether any aid from the EC to Israel and the Occupied Territories should be on a national basis. You might ask the Foreign Secretary if he is prepared to send a message to Prince Saud at an appropriate moment. It would be desirable to give him discretion over timing. It seems sensible for you to reply to President Bush given the unsatisfactory nature of the latter's message, simply to register politely that we are not acquiescing. It must be right to argue in favour of placing any aid from the EC to Israel and the Occupied Territories on a national basis.

3. You might conclude the discussion by encouraging the Chief Secretary to keep up the good work, by asking the Foreign Secretary to send a message to Prince Saud at a suitable moment, by agreeing to send a reply to President Bush (draft to be provided by the Foreign Office in consultation with the Chief



b

Secretary) and by confirming the line on EC aid to Israel and the Occupied Territories.

Item 2: Current international situation

4. The principal issue will be the Soviet proposals on which there may well be further overnight developments. You might report any further exchanges with the White House over the previous 24 hours.

5. You might then invite the Foreign Secretary to brief colleagues on his meeting with the Soviet Ambassador and any further news from Moscow of Tariq Aziz's impending visit, which appears to have been delayed. The Foreign Secretary or Sir Charles Powell may have had indications of the latest US thinking in the light of your exchange of messages and contacts through the Embassy in Washington. The FCO have suggested a series of points on the handling of the Soviet proposals for discussion with the US Government. These will need to be sorted out soon so that we are not caught out by any sudden changes in the Iraqi attitude.

6. There is little other substantive diplomatic activity. The Security Council meeting is unlikely to take place very soon since the Russians will not be in a position to brief on Tariq Aziz's return visit. The Indians have tabled a draft Resolution which could be awkward, since it seeks to put the determination of ceasefire terms under the control of the Security Council. The EC Troika will meet the Jordanian and Israeli Foreign Ministers in Luxembourg on 25 February and then travel to Cairo to meet Gulf, Syrian and Egyptian Foreign Ministers and thence to Tripoli to meet Maghreb Foreign Ministers. The Foreign Secretary will probably mention the situation in Kuwait after liberation. A junior member of the Kuwaiti Royal Family argued that martial law would be needed for 6 months after Iraqi withdrawal.

Item 3: Current Military Situation

7. The Defence Secretary will want to report a conversation he had with Secretary Cheney today. Mr King argued strongly for our timetable for withdrawal (48 hours, 15 days) and the need to avoid public speculation on how soon the Iraqis could withdraw. He also stressed the importance of withdrawing the Russians from the loop. He also put to Mr Cheney the interesting thought that we should emphasise the continuous and growing pattern of ground operations with a view to lessening the significance of a decision to launch the full offensive.

8. You might invite the Chief of the Defence Staff to report on allied and Iraqi operations including attacks by units of the First Armoured Division. You might ask about the latest assessment of battle damage in the Kuwait theatre of operations and the extent to which the pounding the Iraqis are receiving might affect their attitude towards a ceasefire. I understand that 500 Iraqi soldiers gave themselves up as POWs today in just one action without resistance.

Item 4: Media Handling

9. The Energy Secretary can report on the broader issues. These might include the attitude in Parliament, the media and public opinion towards the Soviet proposals against the background of widely reported preparations for the land campaign and the reactions of Western leaders. You might ask whether there is more which needs to be done, though so far public opinion seems to have held up well.

10. Mr O'Donnell may well report that this remains the main Gulf issue along with the usual questions about the timing and likely course of the land campaign.

R.R.B.

ROBIN BUTLER

20 February 1991

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MY TELNO 490 : IRAQ/KUWAIT: WASHINGTON SITREP

SUMMARY

1. FURTHER CRITICAL REACTION TO THE SOVIET PROPOSALS. GENERAL SCHWARZKOPF'S CLAIM THAT THE IRAQI ARMY IS CLOSE TO COLLAPSE ADDS TO THE SENSE OF AN IMMINENT GROUND ATTACK. DETAIL
2. TWO STORIES VIE FOR THE HEADLINES ON 20 FEBRUARY: FURTHER REACTIONS TO THE SOVIET PEACE PROPOSALS AND GENERAL SCHWARZKOPF'S CLAIM THAT THE IRAQI ARMY IS ON THE VERGE OF COLLAPSE.
3. MOST PAPERS COMMENT ON THE SOVIET PEACE PLAN. THE THEME REMAINS THAT THE PROPOSALS ARE INADEQUATE, AND FALL WELL SHORT OF THE CONDITIONS SET OUT IN THE 12 UN RESOLUTIONS. THE NEW YORK TIMES IS TYPICAL OF MANY IN COMMENDING THE PRESIDENT FOR REFUSING TO SURRENDER HIS DECISIVE MILITARY ADVANTAGE IN RETURN FOR A MUDDY POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. SUSPICION OF SOVIET MOTIVES IS ANOTHER COMMON THEME, WITH MANY SEEING THE MOVE AS A SELF-INTERESTED PLOY BY THE SOVIETS TO STRENGTHEN THEIR HAND FOR THE POST-WAR SETTLEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST. THE WALL STREET JOURNAL SUMS UP THAT THE SOVIETS ARE IN NO POSITION TO DECIDE THE TERMS OF ANY SETTLEMENT OR THE PRECISE WAR AIMS: THE RIGHT TO DECIDE THOSE ISSUES HAS BEEN EARNED BY THE ALLIES FIGHTING IN THE REGION.
4. THE PRESIDENT'S REJECTION OF THE SOVIET PEACE PROPOSALS (TUR) HAS BEEN REINFORCED TODAY BY BAKER, WHO HAS MADE CLEAR THAT THE TIME FOR NEGOTIATIONS WITH IRAQ HAS LONG SINCE PASSED. THE ADMINISTRATION SEEM TO BE GIVING THE IMPRESSION THAT THE SOVIET PROPOSALS ARE DEAD AND PAST, EVEN THOUGH NO IRAQI REACTION IS YET AVAILABLE.
5. THE ADMINISTRATION'S ATTITUDE TO THE SOVIET PROPOSALS HAS PROMPTED A WIDESPREAD DISCUSSION IN WASHINGTON ABOUT

WAR AIMS. OFFICIAL SPOKESMEN CONTINUE TO STRESS THAT THE ADMINISTRATION'S WAR AIMS REMAIN AS SET OUT IN THE 12 UN RESOLUTIONS. BUT THERE IS AN INCREASING FEELING IN WASHINGTON THAT THE REMOVAL OF SADDAM IS NOW NOT ONLY DESIRABLE BUT ALSO ESSENTIAL IF THERE IS TO BE PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE REGION. THIS MORNING THE WALL STREET JOURNAL WONDERED WHETHER, EVEN IF SADDAM'S MILITARY IS DECEASED, THERE COULD BE STABILITY IF HE SURVIVED. A NUMBER OF SENIOR AND INFLUENTIAL CONGRESSMEN WENT FURTHER. SPEAKER FOLEY SUGGESTED THAT, WHILE IT WAS NOT A DEFINITIVE US WAR AIM, IT WOULD BE HARD FOR THE US TO ACCEPT THE CONTINUATION OF SADDAM'S REGIME IN IRAQ. SENATOR MITCHELL (MAJORITY LEADER) SAID THAT HE PERSONALLY WANTED US CONDITIONS TO CHANGE, WITH A CLEAR IMPLICATION THAT SADDAM'S REMOVAL SHOULD NOW BE AN OBJECT OF POLICY. SENATOR LUGAR (A SENIOR REPUBLICAN) SAID THAT ACCEPTANCE OF THE SOVIET PEACE PLAN WOULD LEAVE SADDAM AND HIS GOVERNMENT APPARATUS IN PLACE WHICH WOULD BE AN HISTORIC MISTAKE. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND, THE NEW YORK TIMES CONCLUDES THAT US PUBLIC OPINION GENERALLY MIGHT BE SHOCKED IF SADDAM WERE NOT SOMEHOW MADE PERSONALLY TO PAY FOR THE WAR.

6. GENERAL SCHWARZKOPF'S CLAIM IN RIYADH ON 19 FEBRUARY THAT THE IRAQI ARMY IS ON THE VERGE OF COLLAPSE ALSO RECEIVES WIDE COVERAGE. HE IS QUOTED AS SAYING THAT IT WAS NOW LOSING MORE THAN 100 TANKS PER DAY, AN ATTRITION RATE WHICH NO ARMY COULD SURVIVE. HE DESCRIBED IRAQ'S FORCES AS INCREASINGLY DEMORALISED: THEY WERE NOT YET BROKEN BUT THEY COULD NOT BE FAR FROM IT. THIS ASSESSMENT IS CONSIDERABLY MORE BULLISH THAN ASSESSMENTS CURRENT IN WASHINGTON. HERE THE VIEW IS THAT THERE COULD STILL BE SOME FIGHT IN THE IRAQIS. BUT NO ONE DENIES THAT THEIR MORALE MUST HAVE SUFFERED. REPORTS TODAY OF SUCCESSFUL COALITION GROUND PROBES ON THE IRAQI/SAUDI BORDER, AND THE CAPTURE OF SOME 500 IRAQI POWS, IS SEEN AS CONFIRMING THAT IRAQ'S MORALE IS NOW EXTREMELY FRAGILE.

7. MEANWHILE, CHENEY HAS REPEATED HIS WARNINGS TO THE HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS DEFENSE SUBCOMMITTEE THAT ANY PAUSE IN THE WAR, AS SUGGESTED BY THE SOVIETS, COULD BE LETHAL TO US FORCES. ANY CEASEFIRE MIGHT ENABLE THE IRAQIS TO REDEPLOY, RESUPPLY AND TAKE OTHER STEPS THAT COULD RESULT IN HIGHER US CASUALTIES THAN OTHERWISE.

8. FINALLY, THE STRONG FEELING REMAINS IN WASHINGTON THAT THE GROUND WAR IS JUST AROUND THE CORNER.

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SIC I9M

MY TELNO 309: IRAQ/KUWAIT: SOVIET PROPOSALS

SUMMARY

1. DISCUSSION WITH SOVIET PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE. HE INDICATES THE SOVIET UNION WILL CALL FOR A SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING AS SOON AS THE IRAQI REPLY TO THE SOVIET PROPOSALS IS RECEIVED. I WARN THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL THAT AN AFFIRMATIVE IRAQI REPLY WILL NOT BE THE LAST WORD.

DETAIL

2. I HAD A WORD IN THE MARGINS OF THE MONTHLY SECURITY COUNCIL LUNCH TODAY WITH THE SOVIET PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE. VORONTSOV SAID HE HAD NO NEWS OF TARIQ AZIZ. BUT HE MIGHT BE ON THE WAY BACK FROM BAGHDAD TO MOSCOW. IN ANY CASE IF THE ANSWER WAS SIMPLE AND AFFIRMATIVE IT WAS NOT NECESSARY FOR TARIQ AZIZ TO GO ALL THE WAY TO MOSCOW TO TELL IT. IT COULD JUST AS WELL BE GIVEN TO THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN BAGHDAD. IF THE ANSWER WAS OTHER THAN SIMPLE AND AFFIRMATIVE IT WAS RATHER DOUBTFUL WHETHER TARIQ AZIZ'S JOURNEY WAS WORTH WHILE IN ANY CASE.

3. VORONTSOV WENT ON TO SAY THAT HE EXPECTED TO BE INSTRUCTED TO CALL FOR AN IMMEDIATE MEETING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AS SOON AS THE IRAQI REPLY WAS GIVEN AT WHATEVER HOUR OF THE DAY OR NIGHT IT MIGHT BE. I QUERIED THIS AND ASKED WHETHER IT WAS WISE TO RUSH IMMEDIATELY INTO A SITUATION IN WHICH SOME MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL WERE ALL TOO LIKELY TO PRESS FOR INSTANT SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION ON A CEASEFIRE. AS THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT WOULD BY NOW KNOW FROM THE

REACTIONS THEY HAD RECEIVED FROM THE US, THE US AND PERHAPS OTHER OF THE ALLIES, THE PROPOSALS WHICH THE SOVIET UNION HAD PUT TO THE IRAQIS WERE CONSIDERED TO BE INADEQUATE AND NOT TO FORM A BASIS ON WHICH A CEASEFIRE COULD BE AGREED. IT WOULD SURELY BE WISER FOR THE SOVIET UNION TO TAKE ON BOARD THE POINTS MADE TO THEM BY THE ALLIES BEFORE TRIGGERING OFF A PROCESS IN NEW YORK. VORONTSOV SAID HE DID NOT TOTALLY EXCLUDE THE SOVIET UNION TRYING TO TIE THE IRAQIS DOWN ON SOME OF THE ADDITIONAL POINTS THAT HAD BEEN RAISED WITH THEM BY THE ALLIES, IN PARTICULAR THOSE RELATING TO PRISONERS OF WAR. BUT HE DID NOT MANAGE TO SOUND VERY CONVINCING ON THE SUBJECT AND HE REPEATED THAT HE EXPECTED HIS INSTRUCTIONS TO BE TO GO STRAIGHT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON THE BASIS OF THE IRAQI REPLY TO THE PROPOSALS PUT TO THEM BY THE SOVIET UNION ON 18 FEBRUARY.

4. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES I HAD A PRECAUTIONARY WORD WITH THE (ZIMBABWEAN) PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO MAKE SURE THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THAT AN AFFIRMATIVE IRAQI REPLY TO THE SOVIET PROPOSALS WOULD NOT BE THE LAST WORD ON THE MATTER. I POINTED OUT TO HIM THAT A NUMBER OF THE ALLIES HAD NOW MADE IT CLEAR TO THE SOVIET UNION THAT THE PROPOSALS THEY HAD PUT TO IRAQ WERE INADEQUATE. THERE WAS NO QUESTION THEREFORE OF A CEASEFIRE BEING AGREED SIMPLY ON THE BASIS OF THE SOVIET PROPOSALS AND IRAQI ACCEPTANCE OF THEM. IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT TO AVOID PRECIPITATE ACTION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL WHICH COULD ONLY LEAD TO DEADLOCK. MUMBENGEGWI TOOK THIS HEALTH WARNING PRETTY WELL AND SAID HE WOULD WANT TO CONSULT BILATERALLY BEFORE ANY ACTION WAS CONTEMPLATED FOLLOWING A SOVIET COMMUNICATION ON THE OUTCOME OF THEIR CONTACTS WITH THE IRAQIS.

COMMENT

5. I GOT THE STRONG IMPRESSION FROM VORONTSOV, WHO UNDERSTANDS VERY WELL THAT WE ARE NOT GOING TO ACCEPT THE SOVIET PROPOSALS AS THEY STAND, THAT THE SOVIET TACTIC IS LIKELY TO BE TO EXTRACT THEMSELVES FROM THE THANKLESS TASK OF MIDDLE MAN IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES AND TO LEAVE THE BABY IN THE ARMS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. VORONTSOV SAID THAT HE WELL UNDERSTOOD THAT AN IRAQI REPLY TO THE SOVIET UNION WOULD ONLY BE THE BEGINNING AND NOT THE END OF THE STORY, IN WHICH THE SECURITY COUNCIL WOULD HAVE A MAJOR ROLE TO PLAY.

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LUXEMBOURG FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY

MY TELNO 304: IRAQ/KUWAIT: IRANIAN VIEWS

SUMMARY

1. IRANIAN PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE SEEKS DISCUSSION ON SOVIET PROPOSALS AND LONGER-TERM PLANNING FOR SECURITY IN THE GULF. REPORTS INDICATIONS THAT IRAQIS ARE READY TO WITHDRAW UNCONDITIONALLY FROM KUWAIT: IRAN IS URGING THEM TO DO SO. ARGUES FOR BROAD SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS IN THE GULF WHICH WOULD TAKE IN IRAQ.

DETAIL

2. THE IRANIAN PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE (KHARRAZI), ASKED TO SEE ME ON 19 FEBRUARY. WE MET AT THE UNITED NATIONS SHORTLY BEFORE THE SECURITY COUNCIL CONSULTATIONS ON IRAQ/KUWAIT.

3. KHARRAZI ASKED FOR MY VIEWS ON THE SOVIET PROPOSALS FOR AN IRAQI WITHDRAWAL. I SAID THAT WE WERE STILL STUDYING THE PROPOSALS IN LONDON. WE HAD TO SEE HOW THE IRAQIS WOULD REACT. BUT I BELIEVED WE WOULD SEE SOVIET IDEAS AS AN INADEQUATE BASIS FOR A SETTLEMENT. WHAT WE WANTED WAS IRAQ'S EXPLICIT ACCEPTANCE OF ALL THE RELEVANT SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS. ANOTHER PARTICULARLY SENSITIVE ISSUE TO BE COVERED WAS THE RELEASE OF ALL ALLIED POWS.

4. KHARRAZI COMMENTED THAT THE MOST IMPORTANT ELEMENT IN THE PROPOSALS WAS THE OBLIGATION ON IRAQ TO WITHDRAW UNCONDITIONALLY. WHEN TARIQ AZIZ HAD PASSED THROUGH TEHRAN ON HIS RETURN TO BAGHDAD FROM MOSCOW RAFSANJANI HAD TOLD HIM THAT

THERE SHOULD BE AN IMMEDIATE MEETING OF THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMAND COUNCIL TO AGREE TO UNCONDITIONAL WITHDRAWAL ON THE BASIS OF SCR 660. IRAN HAD RECEIVED INDICATIONS THAT IRAQ WAS READY TO ACCEPT THIS: BUT THE IRAQIS STILL SPOKE IN TERMS OF WANTING 'AN HONOURABLE PEACE'. I SAID THAT WHAT MATTERED WAS FOR IRAQ'S COMMITMENT TO WITHDRAW TO BE TURNED INTO CONCRETE ACTION. THERE WOULD BE NO ENTHUSIASM AMONG THE ALLIES FOR SAVING SADDAM HUSSEIN FROM THE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF HIS MISTAKES.

5. KHARRAZI SAID THAT IF AN IRAQI WITHDRAWAL WAS ANNOUNCED THE ALLIED TROOPS SHOULD BE PREPARED TO HOLD OFF FROM ATTACKING THE WITHDRAWING FORCES. THE GROUND OFFENSIVE SHOULD BE POSTPONED UNTIL THE OUTCOME OF CURRENT DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITIES WAS CLEAR. I SAID WE HAD NOT GOT TO THAT POINT. IF ALL THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR AN IRAQI WITHDRAWAL WERE SATISFACTORY AND ALL THE ASSOCIATED CONDITIONS WERE MET THEN WE WOULD HAVE TO CONSIDER FURTHER.

6. I ASKED KHARRAZI WHERE IRANIAN CONTACTS WITH IRAQ STOOD. WHEN HE HAD ADDRESSED THE SECURITY COUNCIL LAST WEEK HE HAD SPOKEN OF A HIGH LEVEL MISSION TO BAGHDAD. KHARRAZI SAID THAT THIS MISSION HAD NOT SET OUT. THERE HAD HOWEVER OF COURSE BEEN OTHER CONTACTS AS TARIQ AZIZ HAD PASSED THROUGH TEHRAN.

7. KHARRAZI RAISED THE QUESTION OF REGIONAL SECURITY AFTER THE CURRENT CRISIS WAS OVER. IF A PLAN WAS IMPOSED ON COUNTRIES OF THE AREA AGAINST THEIR WILL THIS WOULD NOT RESOLVE THE PROBLEM. STATES IN THE REGION HAD TO WORK OUT THEIR IDEAS FOR SECURITY. IT WOULD BE UNWELCOME IF SYRIA, EGYPT AND THE GCC WERE TO COME UP WITH THEIR OWN LIMITED PLAN. WHAT WAS NEEDED WERE COMPREHENSIVE AND INCLUSIVE ARRANGEMENTS: THESE SHOULD TAKE IN IRAQ AND SHOULD NOT BE CONFINED TO SECURITY ISSUES. I SAID THAT WE WERE NOT ENGAGED IN PUTTING FORWARD PLANS: IT WAS FOR THE COUNTRIES OF THE REGION TO TAKE THE INITIATIVE. WE RECOGNISED THAT IRAN WOULD HAVE IDEAS TO PUT FORWARD AND THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT WOULD DO WELL TO EXPLAIN ITS THINKING TO THE OTHER COUNTRIES IN THE REGION.

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OUR TELNO 485: IRAQ/KUWAIT: WASHINGTON SITREP

SUMMARY

1. ATTENTION FOCUSED ON SOVIET PEACE EFFORTS. PRESIDENT'S RESPONSE SEEN AS VIRTUAL REJECTION.

DETAIL

2. THE SOVIET PEACE PROPOSALS DOMINATE ITS WASHINGTON NEWS ON 19 FEBRUARY. MOST EXPECTED THE IRAQIS TO USE TARIQ AZIZ'S VISIT TO MOSCOW TO MODIFY THEIR EARLIER WITHDRAWAL STATEMENT: NO ONE EXPECTED THE RUSSIANS TO PRODUCE THIS SURPRISE. COMING AT THE END OF A BANK HOLIDAY WEEKEND, THE SOVIET INITIATIVE CAUGHT THE ADMINISTRATION OFF BALANCE. THEY HAVE NOW MADE CLEAR THAT THEY COULD NOT ACCEPT IT.

3. ASKED THIS MORNING (19 FEBRUARY) FOR HIS REACTION TO THE SOVIET PROPOSAL, THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT, WHILE HE APPRECIATED GORBACHEV'S EFFORTS, THE PROPOSAL FELL QUOTE WELL SHORT OF WHAT WOULD BE REQUIRED UNQUOTE. HE SAID THAT THE SOVIETS HAD ASKED THAT DETAILS OF THE PROPOSAL BE KEPT CONFIDENTIAL QUOTE IN THE INTEREST OF THOROUGHLY EXPLORING THE INITIATIVE UNQUOTE BUT CONFIRMED THAT THE ADMINISTRATION HAD OFFERED COMMENTS. HE ADDED THAT THERE COULD BE NO CONCESSIONS TO IRAQ: QUOTE WE ARE NOT GOING TO GIVE UNQUOTE.

4. COMMENT IN THE MORNING PRESS INDICATES CONSIDERABLE SUSPICION OF SOVIET MOTIVES. THE ASSESSMENT IS THAT, BY PLAYING THE ROLE OF PEACEMAKER, THE SOVIET UNION IS WORKING TO CARVE ITSELF A POSITION OF INFLUENCE IN THE POST WAR MIDDLE EAST. MOST REGARD IT AS UNACCEPTABLE THAT THE UNITED STATES, HAVING BORNE THE BRUNT OF ITS WAR EFFORT, SHOULD BE UPSTAGED IN THIS WAY, WHILE THE SOVIET UNION TRIES TO SCOOP THE POOL. THE WASHINGTON POST, NEVERTHELESS, SAYS THAT THE SOVIET UNION DESERVES A LITTLE TIME TO TRY TO ARRANGE AN UNCONDITIONAL, IMMEDIATE IRAQI WITHDRAWAL WITHOUT HEAVY WEAPONRY. A PAUSE, ON THE OTHER HAND, WHICH

WOULD GIVE IRAQ TIME TO RE GROUP OR TO WIN PROPOGANDA POINTS, SHOULD NOT BE PERMITTED.

5. THE OTHER STORY OF THE DAY IS THE CONTINUING PREPARATION FOR A GROUND OFFENSIVE WHICH COULD START AT ANY TIME. ACCORDING TO THE WHITE HOUSE SPOKESMAN, THE PRESIDENT TOLD CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS TODAY THAT HE COULD NOT SAY WHEN THE GROUND OPERATION MIGHT COMMENCE, BUT THAT PREPARATIONS WERE ON SCHEDULE. THE MEDIA LINE TODAY IS THAT PREPARATIONS ARE GOING AHEAD AS IF NO PEACE PLAN WERE BEING DISCUSSED.

6. DOMESTIC SUPPORT FOR THE PRESIDENT AND HIS POLICIES CONTINUES TO BE HIGH. THE LATEST CNN/GALLUP POLL, RELEASED ON 19 FEBRUARY, SHOWS 81 PER CENT SUPPORT FOR THE WAR AND 78 PER CENT SUPPORT FOR A GROUND OFFENSIVE. THE PRESIDENT'S HANDLING OF THE WAR RECEIVES 84 PER CENT APPROVAL (UP FROM 78 PER CENT LAST WEEK), AND HIS OVERALL APPROVAL RATING STANDS AT 82 PER CENT.

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IRAQ-KUWAIT: ITALIAN POSITION ON GORBACHEV'S PLAN FOR WITHDRAWAL
ETC

SUMMARY

1. CONFUSED ITALIAN RESPONSE TO SOVIET PEACE INITIATIVE.
PARLIAMENTARY STATEMENT BY ANDREOTTI TOMORROW (THURSDAY) SHOULD
PROVIDE CLARIFICATION.

DETAIL

2. IN A BULLETIN ISSUED MID-MORNING TODAY, 20 FEBRUARY, THE ANSA
NEWS AGENCY REPORTED THAT THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT SUPPORTED THE
SOVIET INITIATIVE TO ACHIEVE A CEASE-FIRE IN THE PERSIAN GULF:
'ANDREOTTI TODAY SAID THAT THE GORBACHEV INITIATIVE WAS PERFECTLY
IN LINE WITH THE UN RESOLUTION CALLING FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF IRAQI
FORCES FROM KUWAIT, ACCORDING TO MINISTER OF STATE CHRISTOFORI IN A
PRESS BRIEFING GIVEN AFTER THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS MEETING. HE
ADDED THAT THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS HAD ENDORSED ANDREOTTI'S LINE
AT ITS MEETING. ASKED IF HE SAW SOME INCONGRUITY BETWEEN THE
POSITIONS OF THE US, UK, FRANCE AND ITALY IN THIS MATTER,
CHRISTOFORI SAID 'I DO NOT THINK ONE CAN TALK IN SUCH TERMS.....
WE HAVE STUCK TO THE WORDING OF THE SOVIET PLANWE MUST TRY
TO UNDERSTAND THE REASON WHY PRESIDENT BUSH HAS COME UP WITH
RESERVATIONS ABOUT IT. HOWEVER, THERE IS NO DIFFERENCE IN THIS
MATTER BETWEEN THE POLITICAL OBLIGATIONS ASSUMED BY THE UNITED
STATES AND THOSE ASSUMED BY OTHER ALLIES UNDER THE RELEVANT UN
RESOLUTION'.

3. COMMENTING ON THE BBC WORLD SERVICE REPORT AT 1200Z TO THE
EFFECT THAT ANDREOTTI TODAY CAME OUT IN FAVOUR OF THE GORBACHEV
PROPOSALS, A PALAZZO CHIGI SPOKESMAN (ANDREANI) TOLD US THAT THE
BBC REPORT WAS WRONG. HE SAID THAT AT TODAY'S CABINET MEETING DE
MICHELIS HAD BROUGHT HIS COLLEAGUES UP-TO-DATE ON THE DIPLOMATIC
SITUATION. THE GOVERNMENT HAD AGREED THAT IMMEDIATE IRAQI

WITHDRAWAL FROM KUWAIT WAS ESSENTIAL. MINISTERS HAD TAKEN NO POSITION ON THE GORBACHEV PROPOSALS OR ON OTHER GULF-RELATED MATTERS.

4. ANSA HAD EARLIER STATED THAT THERE WAS THIS MORNING AN EXCHANGE OF MESSAGES BETWEEN ANDREOTTI AND PRESIDENT BUSH ON THE EVOLVING GULF SITUATION. IT ALSO SAID THAT ANDREOTTI HAS SENT MESSAGES TO GORBACHEV AND RAFSANJANI. IN THOSE MESSAGES ANDREOTTI 'HAS ENCOURAGED EVERY EFFORT TO FIND A SOLUTION TO THE GULF CRISIS, AND IN THAT CONTEXT APPRECIATES THE GORBACHEV PLAN BUT WARNS THAT WE SHOULD NOT CONFUSE WILLINGNESS TO LEND A HAND WITH WEAKNESS'.

5. THIS AFTERNOON THE MINISTER FOR PARLIAMENTARY AFFAIRS MADE A FURTHER STATEMENT TO THE PRESS TO THE EFFECT THAT THE MEETING OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS IN QUESTION HAD BEEN VERY BRIEF AND THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO DISCUSSION AT IT OF THE GORBACHEV PLAN. HE NOTED FURTHER THAT NEITHER THE VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL, MARTELLI, NOR FOREIGN MINISTER DE MICHELIS HAD BEEN PRESENT AT THE MEETING. (SIC) WE HAVE SINCE BEEN TOLD BY ANDREOTTI'S SPOKESMAN THAT HE WILL MAKE A STATEMENT TO PARLIAMENT TOMORROW AT 1600 HRS LOCAL TIME WHICH WILL CLARIFY THE POSITION OF THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT. ACCORDING TO ANDREANI, ANDREOTTI WILL STATE THAT THERE ARE NO (NO) DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE PARTIES IN THE ITALIAN COALITION GOVERNMENT, NOR BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION, ON THE CENTRAL POINT, NAMELY UNCONDITIONAL WITHDRAWAL BY IRAQ FROM KUWAIT.

COMMENT

6. THIS LATEST TWIST SUGGESTS THAT ANDREOTTI HAS COME UNDER SOME PRESSURE HERE TO MODIFY HIS ORIGINAL STANCE.

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10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

The Iraqis have
now said that
they will send
Tariq Aziz back
to Moscow with
their response "soon".

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John Rumsfeld,

VIEWS FROM RIYADH AND WASHINGTON

The Defence Secretary spoke briefly to Secretary Cheney this afternoon mainly about ceasefire terms.

He asked about the thinking behind the figure of 96 hours for the Iraqi withdrawal. Mr Cheney said that this was based on the assessed fastest time for Iraqi personnel to leave Kuwait without taking their equipment, but the Department of Defense was not particularly wedded to this figure. One emerging problem was that large numbers of Iraqi personnel might not wish to return to Iraq while Saddam Hussein was still in power and it would take time to cope with these.

The Defence Secretary took the opportunity to explain the thinking behind the UK's two-phase approach. 48 hours was a reasonable allowance for troops to cross the Kuwaiti city limits. An Arab led, probably Kuwaiti, Government could then move in and liberate this key area where most Kuwaitis lived. Once there the coalition could ship in food and medical relief so as to have a good psychological effect on those retreating Iraqi forces who were ill fed or wounded. We thought the over-all withdrawal might then reasonably take 15 days. The UK Commitments Staff under Air Marshall Hayr could explain it further to the Pentagon if necessary.

Secretary Cheney said that he had not heard that idea before [no doubt the usual US inter-agencies problem]. What concerned him particularly about the Soviet proposals was the idea of a ceasefire ahead of a withdrawal; that was completely unacceptable to the US military. The Defence Secretary said that we shared these reservations and a telegram was just coming over to Washington setting out our views. It would be useful for Mr Cheney to see that and he would make arrangements for him to do so at the same time as it went to the State Department.

Richard Gozney Esq
Private Secretary to the Foreign Secretary



SECRET US/UK EYES A
GRANBY SPECIAL HANDLING CHANNELS ONLY



SECRETARY OF STATE

Mr King said that he had liked the recent US line that land operations had already begun (implying that there was no major fresh decisions on a land offensive). It defused a potentially difficult point that the Iraqis might exploit. There was no difficulty playing it in the UK now that our Artillery had been seen in action on television. Mr Cheney said that he hadn't considered that press line in quite that light before but agreed it was a good one. He would try to use it when he and General Powell appeared in front of the Senate Armed Services Committee tomorrow, for an important hearing. The Defence Secretary wondered whether the President might like to use it too.

In response to Mr King's concluding remarks that things were going well and the Iraqis might crumble, Mr Cheney said that he was trying to damp down to much enthusiasm among troops in theatre. There were promising signs but we had a long way to go.

I have taken the liberty of alerting the Embassy in Washington direct to Mr King's incidental suggestion that the Defense Department might get our views of the cease-fire at the same time as the State Department.

I am sending a copy of this letter to the Private Secretaries of OPD(G) and to Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office), and taking the opportunity to circulate "The View from Riyadh".

Yours sincerely
Simon Webb

(S WEBB)
Private Secretary



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Copy No 1 of 3 Copies

20 Feb 91

Repro Copy 1 of 5

PS/Secretary of State

THE VIEW FROM RIYADH - 201800Z FEB 91

1. Weather today above the Euphrates Valley, where UK Tornados were to operate, has been so bad that all of the planned 31 Tornado sorties either aborted in the air or on the ground. There were however 18 Jaguar sorties in the KTO, half of which were able to attack their primary targets, the remainder took on secondaries or alternatives, and it is assessed that there was a 75% success rate of bombs on targets. The weather has not been universally bad and therefore Allied air forces have been able to keep up the pressure on the Iraqis throughout the theatre. Gen Horner has been keen to ensure no misperception of an easing off as a result of political activity. Overnight, two more SCUD sites and launchers in the west were attacked by F15Es and it is now assessed in theatre that only 12 of the original 40 prepared launch sites remain. There has been evidence today of BW salvage at Latfiya and this facility will be attacked tonight. 30 of the 34 key bridges in the logistic supply chain remain out of action; nearly all traffic is now moving by night. One US OV-10 target spotting aircraft was lost today and there is evidence that the pilot is a prisoner of war. The Allies continue to mete out damage to Iraqi ground forces and are approaching General Schwarzkopf's required levels of attrition.

2. Defectors report that one entire Iraqi division (unspecified) is ready to surrender. There have been further reports of loss of morale caused, in part, by the fact that officers are enjoying hot meals but troops are receiving but one cold meal per day; outbreaks of cholera are reported in Baghdad and in the KTO. Air defence units in the KTO are said to be loth to take on Allied aircraft for fear of retribution although an A6 fighter bomber was today engaged by a Soviet built SA2 missile - the pilot evaded successfully. Ground forces, although low on food and water, still have 'sufficient' ammunition. A SCUD missile recently fired at Al Jubayl has been found in the harbour and is being recovered.

3. MCMV operations to clear a channel into a possible amphibious operating area (AOA) continue with UK forces in the lead; I attach a chart showing progress. We have now discovered 54 mines in the last 4 days; 18 have been destroyed and 2 (probable Russian built) are being recovered for exploitation.


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B/PSO(S)/2

SECRET US/UK EYES ONLY
UK/US EYES ONLY


4. 1st Armd Div has not been involved in operations today. Allied operations have continued; details are sketchy but, during a helicopter recce/attack mission by Apaches from the US 101st Airborne Div 50 kilometres into Iraq, well west of the Wadi Al Batin, between 400 and 500 Iraqi ground troops surrendered en masse and were last reported at a marshalling point in northern Saudi Arabia waiting to be ferried to POW camps by Chinook helicopters. In a second incident a battalion sized probe by US forces using tanks and Armoured Personnel Carriers (APC) destroyed 5 tanks, 2 artillery pieces, 1 APC and took 7 POWs for the loss of 1 killed, 2 APC's damaged and 7 wounded. Details are just coming in of a further airborne probe which discovered a large formation of about 100 artillery pieces on the move in the area of the Iraqi 28th Infantry Division; this is currently under air attack.
5. Tornado GR1As will carry out recce missions overnight and Tornado attacks tomorrow will again be mounted against airfields.


D G LITTLEJOHNS
Cdre
PSO/CDS
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MINE COUNTERMEASURES OPERATIONS 20-22 FEBRUARY 1991

1. 80 per cent clearance of Route 32 to Point E completed by 201200z Feb.
2. Night 20/21 Feb LONDON/GLOUCESTER/HERALD will move from Point C to Point E at High Water for MCM Support Operations.
3. 20-22 Feb MCM Forces will clear path from Point E to Point G.
4. Larger haven for AAW/SHOTGUN units also being swept in the vicinity Point E.
5. All other AD units and MISSOURI remain poised in H32 safe area.

2



SECRET



10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

20 February 1991

IRAQ/KUWAIT: US RESPONSE TO SOVIET PEACE PROPOSAL:
INSTRUCTIONS TO WASHINGTON

Thank you for your letter of 20 February covering draft instructions to the Embassy in Washington to discuss ceasefire requirements with the NSC staff and State Department. In the time available, there will not be an opportunity for the Prime Minister to see this telegram, although I believe he would be generally content with it. I have two comments which you may want to consider:

- my impression is that the Americans are not particularly keen to spell out our own ceasefire terms because they want to retain the maximum flexibility to respond to whatever happens. I myself see some advantage in this. The telegram might acknowledge the case for being studiously vague about our own ceasefire terms in public, although that does not of course remove the need to agree them among ourselves in private;
- I think the American deadline for all Iraqi forces to leave Kuwait of 96 hours was to an extent a political timescale. I doubt they will insist on it when it came to negotiate arrangements. But I think it does actually make an impact. From comments he has made, I think the Prime Minister takes the view that our own suggestion of 15 days is unduly generous (even with the modification proposed by the Defence Secretary involving Kuwait City). The French seem to be thinking more in terms of 8 - 10 days. I wonder if it is really wise to tie ourselves too firmly to 15 days at this stage.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence) and to Sir Robin Butler.

CHARLES POWELL

Richard Gozney, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SECRET

However, we've agreed 30 file

Prime Minister

1 year not sure was not time to clear

Yes - but it still seems to me that a statement of our position before Saddam's reply would have been a position to decline (or at least other)

this with you. I hope you find it satisfactory.

COP 20/2

SECRET

29a-d



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

20 February 1991

Dear Charles,

Iraq/Kuwait: US response to Soviet peace
proposal: instructions to Washington

The Defence Secretary, the Chief of Defence Staff and the Foreign Secretary have agreed the enclosed draft telegram of instructions so that the Embassy can engage the Americans today in detailed discussion of arrangements for a ceasefire.

We should be grateful for your clearance or amendments, before we send the telegram.

Yours ever,

Richard S.
(R H T Gozney)
Private Secretary

Sir Charles Powell
10 Downing Street

SECRET

SECRET

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DESKBY

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SECRET

FM FCO

TO DESKBY

WASHINGTON

TELNO

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INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, PARIS, MOSCOW, RIYADH, CAIRO

INFO IMMEDIATE DAMASCUS, JEDDA

IRAQ/KUWAIT: SOVIET PEACE PROPOSAL

1. MIFT contains the text of a message from the Americans to their coalition partners commenting on the Soviet peace proposal. I have reinforced the US message with the Soviet Ambassador today. Text of my speaking note is being telegraphed to you separately.

2. You should contact the NSC and say that we would welcome US views on handling the exchanges which have now begun between Moscow and Baghdad. There are also some points we would like to clarify with the Americans and some suggestions we would like to make. (We leave it to you as to whether to make the same points at a high level in the State Department.) Our ideas are as follows:

a) The Russians have to some extent established themselves as a channel and we are lanneded with them for the time being. But we see considerable risk in relying exclusively on Gorbachev

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N H R A BROOMFIELD

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who does not share our interest in imposing tough conditions on the Iraqis for their withdrawal from Kuwait. Nor do we want to invest the Russians with the aura of mediators.

b) if Tariq Aziz brings a response to Gorbachev's proposals, which shows that the Iraqis in effect are about to withdraw unconditionally, we should then aim to draw a line under the Moscow phase of this exercise and seek to establish a direct line to the Iraqis. We attach great importance to taking out of Moscow's hands the detailed ceasefire settlement. We see this very much as a matter for direct dealing between the coalition and the Iraqis, with hostilities continuing until the coalition has achieved a satisfactory outcome.

c) If the Iraqi response to Gorbachev is negative or strongly qualified, the situation may well be confused, with Gorbachev no doubt claiming that some progress was being made. One option for the Allies, in this situation, would be to reiterate publicly the basic conditions which the Iraqis would have to accept before we were prepared to suspend military activity. There would be danger in remaining silent and negative. The conditions, agreed with the main coalition partners, could be simple: for example an unequivocal commitment to immediate and unconditional withdrawal, together with concrete evidence of compliance and suitable undertakings on POWs and detainees and a suitable commitment to compliance with relevant Security Council Resolutions. The Allies could announce that if the Iraqis accepted these conditions forthwith we would be prepared to enter into direct talks with them to finalise details with a view to a ceasefire. If not the campaign would proceed as planned.

d) the modalities of direct talks between the coalition

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and the Iraqis need careful, urgent thought. In our view, Geneva (where Saddam Hussein's half-brother is Ambassador) would be a possible place. The actual dealings with Iraq might be conducted directly by the US with the main coalition partners (UK, France, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Egypt, query Syria) on hand for consultations but not necessarily at the table.

e) the delegations for these talks could be led by either military or civil figures. In our view the balance of advantage lies in military leadership backed by civilians of sufficient rank to deal with those conditions, eg release of POWs and civil detainees, which may lie outside the strictly military sphere. One advantage of this approach is that it might reduce the risk of other countries, eg Russia and China, muscling in on the act to quote balance unquote the Iraqi side of the table.

3. On the conditions for a ceasefire, we have the following queries:

a) We note that the deadline for all Iraqi forces to be out of Kuwait is 96 hours from the ceasefire. Our assessment is that this is unrealistically short for full withdrawal from Kuwait. Do the US envisage renewal of hostilities if this deadline is missed? If the intention is to force the Iraqis to leave most of their heavy equipment behind, we believe that is an issue better addressed in its own right than as a by product of a withdrawal timescale.

b) 15 days would be a sensible and strict time limit for the evacuation of all Iraqi troops from Kuwait. However, we think there is considerable merit in identifying separately Kuwait City and having that liberated on a 48 hour timetable. This early repossession of the capital with perhaps Kuwaitis and

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their Allies being flown in by helicopter and raising the Kuwaiti flag etc, would have very important presentational advantages and clearly the City itself could be evacuated within a 48 hour period.

c) We will need to give careful thought to the sequence of the massive Iraqi withdrawal (which is a pre-condition for a ceasefire in the President's message), the ceasefire itself and the cessation of hostilities. In order to give the Iraqis the necessary confidence that they will not be fired on as they begin their withdrawal, there will need to be tight coordination between Commanders. This could be done on the basis of Iraqi Commanders designating the divisions to be withdrawn and the Allied Commanders ensuring that no aggressive military operations, air or ground, took place in that area.

d) We have been told by the Kuwaitis that they have up to 17 thousand nationals detained in Iraq. It will physically be difficult to ensure their exchange together with the smaller number of allied POWs, and the thousand or so Iraqi POWs, in 24 hours. In our view it would be highly desirable to insist on some evidence that preparations for POW release through the ICRC were being made on the Iraqi side with the ICRC, combined with the clearest possible undertakings on the return of military and civilian prisoners before the ceasefire was agreed.

4. We would also find it useful to know how the Americans intend to manage the coalition. It is not clear how much information they have been given about recent exchanges and to what extent the Americans envisage bringing them into the next stages (including discussions of the detailed ceasefire terms), where coalition cohesion could come under strain. We have particularly in mind the French but it will be important to keep

SECRET

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Arab allies up to speed and take account of their views (cf
Kuwaiti views in UKMIS New York telno 305).


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IRAQ/KUWAIT SECRET

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10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

20 February 1991

Dear Richard

OPPOSITION DEBATE ON THE GULF:
THURSDAY 21 FEBRUARY

Thank you for your letter of 20 February about the proposed Government amendment to the SNP's move for tomorrow's Opposition Day on the Gulf. As I told you on the telephone, I wonder whether a Government amendment ought not to refer to our determination to implement all the Security Council Resolutions, since this is now very much the main plank of our policy (and our views that the Soviet proposals are seriously deficient). You said you would see whether this could be taken into account by some further re-drafting of the proposed amendment.

I am copying this letter to Murdo Maclean (Chief Whip's Office).

Yours sincerely,

CHARLES POWELL

Richard Gozney, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office



THE DEPARTMENT
OF TRANSPORT



FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE

2 MARSHAM STREET LONDON SW1P 3EB
TELEPHONE 071-276 3333

The Rt Hon Michael R D Heseltine MP
Secretary of State for the Environment
Department of the Environment
2 Marsham Street
LONDON
SW1P 3EB

My Ref:

Your Ref:

Com
29/2

20 FEB 1991

Dear Michael,

ENVIRONMENTAL ASSISTANCE IN THE GULF


Thank you for sending me a copy of your letter of 14 February to David Mellor following up your intervention in Cabinet last week about the possibility of a more positive UK role in the provision of environmental assistance in the Gulf.

Responsibility for protecting the marine environment from the consequences of oil spills from ships in UK waters lies, as you know, with my Department. I am glad that the Marine Pollution Control Unit has been able to play an active role in support of your initiative on the environmental aspects of the Gulf. The Unit will continue to provide expert advice to your officials on counter-pollution response and to facilitate the arrangements for whatever further practical assistance it may be decided should be sent from the UK.

I fully agree your assessment of the present situation and I support your conclusion that, if the UK is to be able to do more to help protect the environment in the Gulf and provide a timely response to requests for emergency counter-pollution assistance from our friends, it will be necessary to establish a small contingency fund on the lines you propose. My Department has no PES provision to offer for this. However, I feel that on this and on its scale we must be guided by Douglas Hurd's interpretation of what the Gulf states expect of the UK in the way of free counter-pollution response in addition to our considerable military contribution and of what downstream benefits are likely to accrue to the UK from such provision.

Subject to this, you have my full support for your proposal and my team in the MPCU stands ready to take forward with your officials whatever is agreed, within the need to continue to maintain proper cover for the protection of UK waters.

I am sending copies of this letter to the Prime Minister and to Norman Lamont, Douglas Hurd, John Wakeham, Chris Patten, Peter Lilley, Tom King, and Sir Robin Butler.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'Malcolm Rifkind', with a large, sweeping initial 'M'.

MALCOLM RIFKIND

CONFIDENTIAL AND PERSONAL



bc PC

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

20 February 1991

THE GULF: OPPOSITION VIEWS

I enclose, only for the Foreign Secretary's and Defence Secretary's information, a brief note of the Prime Minister's talk with Mr. Kinnock today about recent developments in the Gulf.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence).

CHARLES POWELL

Richard Gozney, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL AND PERSONAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Subject cc Master

NOTE FOR THE RECORD

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH THE LEADER OF THE OPPOSITION

The Prime Minister gave a further briefing to the Leader of the Opposition this afternoon on the Gulf situation.

The Prime Minister allowed Mr. Kinnock to read a copy of President Gorbachev's message dealing with the peace proposals which he had put to Tariq Aziz. It transpired that Ambassador Zamyatin had already given Mr. Kinnock an account of it. The Prime Minister then described what we saw as the deficiencies and drawbacks in it. Mr. Kinnock said he accepted that it did fall short of the Security Council Resolutions, although he would not himself insist that these be implemented absolutely in full. For instance, he would not die in the last ditch over reparations. It was not a good sign that the Iraqis had so far failed to respond. He did not know how far President Gorbachev's patience would extend. His impression was that, if the Iraqi's had failed to reply by 21 February, the Russians would let their proposals lapse. He thought the Government had been right not to respond precipitately to them in public. The Prime Minister might find there was some differences between Government and Opposition on the extent to which we should try to build on what might offer a possibility of a peaceful solution. But he did not place much weight on the Soviet proposals. Mr. Kinnock added he had asked Zamyatin whether the Soviet's proposals were put forward on a "take it or leave it" basis, or would simply be the start of a negotiation. Zamyatin had indicated that there was only limited scope for modification. Mr. Kinnock concluded that he was not optimistic that anything would come of the exercise, but he hoped the Government would not altogether exclude progress on the basis of the Soviet proposals.

The Prime Minister briefed Mr. Kinnock on the American attack on the bunker in Baghdad, and the RAF bombing of the bridge at Al Fallujah.

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- 2 -

Mr. Kinnock indicated that he expected the land campaign to start within the next few days. He profoundly hoped that it would be short. He added that he had a nephew who was a gunner out in the Gulf, and was particularly concerned that the artillery were the most likely targets for chemical attacks.

C.D.P.

CHARLES POWELL

20 FEBRUARY 1991

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SECRET



10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

20 February 1991

Dear Richard.

I enclose the final version of President Bush's message to other leading members of the Coalition about the Soviet peace proposals put to Tariq Aziz.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely,

CHARLES POWELL

Richard Gozney, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

SECRET



EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
LONDON

February 20, 1991

Dear Prime Minister:

I have been asked to deliver the attached message to you from President Bush. It was received late last evening. This message has also been sent to Paris, Ankara, Cairo, Riyadh, Damascus, Tel Aviv, Rome and Canberra and to the Kuwaiti Government in Taif.

Sincerely,



Henry E. Catto
Ambassador

Enclosure: SECRET

The Rt. Hon. John Major, M.P.,
Prime Minister,
10 Downing Street,
London, S.W. 1

The Rt.Hon.John Major, MP
Prime Minister
of the United Kingdom

Strictly confidential

Dear Prime Minister,

As agreed I inform you about the visit to Moscow of Tarik Aziz and about the results of discussions with him (he came accompanied by the Deputy Prime Minister Hammadi).

After my direct question - "what have you brought" - a very uneasy talk which lasted about three hours took a businesslike character.

I told them that regard the statement of the Revolutionary Command Council as a step towards the search for political settlement. But for the advance of the process one should exclude any "linkage" of the troops withdrawal with a preliminary condition. I made the point that there was no word "Kuwait" in the statement. Aziz reacted: it goes without saying. I said, if it is so, why nevertheless this state is not named...

During the discussion in respect of the conditions put forward in the statement of the Council the Iraqis had to clarify that it is not about the conditions of withdrawal, but as if about the "programme" of the settlement. I put my question straight forward: is it possible to regard this "programme" as a "reminder" of the existence of the named problems and not to consider that there will not be the withdrawal from Kuwait without their solution. From the Iraqis' clarifications it follows that the "programme" is aimed at the negotiating political process.

T.Aziz said, that he was sent here to listen to the recommendations - "how to proceed with the peaceful process which would lead to the decent and honourable peace".

I suggested the following plan:

- Iraq makes a statement about the withdrawal of its troops from Kuwait (not in general, but precisely from Kuwait);

- it declares the concrete date of the final withdrawal. And that term should be maximum short;
- it starts the actual withdrawal of its troops the next day after the cessation of the military activity;
- the departure from Kuwait is not overburdened by any conditions but one: a guarantee that the withdrawn troops are not the subjects of attacks, that they will not be "shot in the back", that the resumption of the military actions will not take place.

Unlike the previous contacts with the representatives of the Iraqi leadership this time no "indignant" objections to peace proposals followed. The interlocutors started to ask additional questions: whether the Security Council's resolutions under which Iraq found itself in blockade will be abolished; whether American and other troops of the coalition stay in the region after the settlement of the conflict in the Persian Gulf; how the solution of the Palestinian question will be proceeded with, the solution of the problem of Lebanon, the Middle East complex in general; what will be our, the Soviet Union, attitude towards the right of Iraq to have a decent access to the sea; what is the guarantee that the Middle East knot will not be pigeon hole again, etc.

My reply was: all these problems relate to the second stage and can be put and shall be put for a discussion after Iraq's unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait, after the end of the war. We told to Aziz and Hammadi very resolutely: attempts made in the statement of the Revolutionary Council to make a linkage between liberation of Kuwait and cessation of military actions with direct solutions to these problems or to some of them are unacceptable and unrealistic.

I told Aziz that as soon as Iraq starts withdrawal of his troops the Soviet Union will put forward a proposal to convene a special session of the Security Council in order to consider the guarantees of this withdrawal and non-renewal of military actions.

In accordance with its known position of principle the USSR will insist that the UN will energetically address itself to the whole complex of the Middle East settlement, including creation of the system of regional security. There are already different projects in this respect, including - which is especially important - those of Arab states. This is not an easy process but there is an understanding in the world community that the Middle East conflict should be solved, at long last, on a just basis, primarily through accord between the states of the region and with the assistance on the part of the United Nations.

I warned our interlocutors that the time-factor plays now an extremely important role. If they cherish the lives of their countrymen and the destiny of Iraq they must act without delay.

Thus, the character of the discussions shows that the Iraqis did not reject our proposals of the cuff, but perceived them as a subject for serious reviewing. But the final answer can be, naturally, given by Iraq only after Aziz reports, as he put it, of the "Gorbachev plan" to President Hussein and to the whole of the Iraqi leadership.

I feel essential to add that I have an impression, shared by all my comrades present at the meeting, that the very fact of the Revolutionary Command Council statement, the "comments" which were brought by Aziz and the reaction to our reasonings and proposals signify the beginning of a certain shift on the part of Hussein and his team in understanding the realities.

Aziz promised to send an answer promptly.

I feel that this should be taken into account in conducting military operations in the next few days. In this connection I would note that the Iraqis in different circumstances stressed that Bagdad was the target of the most fierce strikes, precisely at the time when the special envoy of the President of the USSR was present there.

In the interests of work it is desirable that the contents of this information for the time-being be kept secret.

I will timely inform of Hussein's answer.

M.GORBACHEV



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

20 February 1991

Dear Charles,

Opposition Debate on the Gulf: Thursday, 21 February

The SNP have tabled the following motion for tomorrow's
Opposition Day debate on the Gulf:-

That this House having given continuous overwhelming support to British Forces in the Gulf and therefore mindful of its responsibility to them, and to the status and integrity of the United Nations, calls on the Government to ensure that war aims, and efforts to create peace and security in the area, are restricted to the terms set out in the relevant United Nations Security Council Resolutions, and declares that no diplomatic opportunity should be lost to bring the present conflict to an end in terms compatible with UN Security Council Resolution 660.

The suggested Government amendment is as follows:-

to leave out from "House" to the end of the Question and add instead,

"having overwhelmingly supported the despatch of British forces to the Gulf, welcomes the affirmation by the government that the aims of British military action are ~~exactly~~ those set out by the UN Security Council in particular the eviction of Iraqi forces from Kuwait; the restoration of the legitimate government of Kuwait; and the re-establishment of peace and security in the area."

*to secure the incl
of this
relevant*

resulting

We shall need to pass the final version of our motion to the Whips Office by 7 pm.

(I am copying this letter to Guido MacLean.

Yours ever,

Richard Smith
(R H T Gozney)
Private Secretary

Sir Charles Powell KCMG
10 Downing Street






10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

20 February 1991

See T.M.

Thank you for your letter of 19 February about the arrangements for concessionary telephone calls by Service personnel in the Gulf. What is not clear from your letter is whether the Scheme is actually in operation. The Prime Minister points out that it was agreed three weeks' ago and appears - although this may be wrong - not yet to have been introduced. If that is the case he would think it little short of a shambles. I should be grateful if you could let me know what the precise position is.

Yours sincerely,


(C. D. POWELL)

Lieutenant Colonel J.R. Durance, R.E.

16

SECRET AND PERSONAL



10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

20 February 1991

27a-b

Rich. Linton

CBP

20/2

THE GULF

General Scowcroft telephoned me this evening to go through a few points on the Gulf.

General Scowcroft said that, as far as he knew, there had not been a squeak from the Iraqis. The Americans simply had no idea whether they were going to respond to the Soviet proposals or not. Nor had they heard anything back from the Russians. It was not clear to the Americans whether the Iraqis were delaying in order to drag things out, or were unable to reach agreement on a response. He was not sure how long the Russians would be patient, but was inclined to think that, if there had been no reply by tomorrow evening, they would wash their hands of the Iraqis. [It has subsequently been announced in Baghdad that Tariq Aziz will return to Moscow 'soon'.] General Scowcroft added that the Americans had had a further report from Mubarak on Tariq Aziz's conversations in Tehran. This had included two interesting points. First, Tariq Aziz had said that he simply did not know how he could convey the Soviet proposals to Saddam Hussein. Second, he had commented that, if there was a ground war, the Iraqis would definitely use CW.

I said that I had just been speaking to Pierre Morel in the Elysee (see my separate letter). General Scowcroft said that he had just put down the telephone from talking to Admiral Lanxade, who had sent him a paper with some thoughts on the terms for a ceasefire. It became clear that these were the same points that Morel had put to me. We agreed that they were a useful contribution. Scowcroft said that the Americans might take the UK, French and their own ideas and try to produce a paper synthesising them, which they would then circulate to us, the French and the Saudis. That way we would be ready to react if there were to be some sudden development. I said this was an excellent idea: we looked forward to seeing the result.

In a brief discussion of public opinion, General Scowcroft said that the widespread feeling in the United States was that the Soviet proposals were simply not acceptable.

Finally, Scowcroft said that General Schwarzkopf was reported as saying that Iraqi forces were near collapse. 'We could have done without that': it was a mistake to appear over-optimistic.

SECRET AND PERSONAL

SECRET AND PERSONAL

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- 2 -

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence), John Neilson (Department of Energy), Juliet Wheldon (Law Officers' Department) and To Sir Robin Butler.

CHARLES POWELL

R H T Gozney Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

SECRET AND PERSONAL

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10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

Prime Minister
These contacts are
provis until
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20 February 1991

✓ Yes

THE GULF: ANGLO/FRENCH CONTACTS

I telephoned Pierre Morel, President Mitterrand's diplomatic adviser, this evening to have a word about the Gulf. We agreed that there was little point in the Prime Minister and President Mitterrand speaking today, in the absence of any Iraqi reply to the Soviet proposals. We would take stock of the situation again tomorrow.

Morel said that the President had just seen the Iranian Foreign Minister and had stressed to him a number of the points which had come up in his conversation with the Prime Minister the previous day. In particular he had spoken of the extreme urgency of securing a response from the Iraqis to the Soviet proposals, a response which must be clear and to the point. The President had also referred to the need for direct discussions about a cease-fire between the Iraqis and the coalition in the event that the Iraqi response was positive. Velayati had said relatively little in response, although he might have been slightly more forthcoming in his subsequent talk with M. Dumas. He had described Iran's determined efforts to persuade the Iraqis to respond positively. But he had declined to give any estimate of what the Iraqis would actually do.

Morel then said he would like to give me some reactions from the French side to our paper on Conditions for a Cease Fire. Generally speaking they had found it very useful and in line with their own thinking. He had a number of specific comments:

- we would have to decide how to draw up cease-fire proposals agreed by all. One possibility would be for the United States, Britain and France to prepare a tripartite document, then bring in Italy, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. But if time was too short, we might simply have to coordinate positions between capitals on the telephone.
- he agreed that we must get the initiative out of the hands of the Russians and move to direct contacts between the coalition and the Iraqis as rapidly as possible.
- the military aspects of a cease-fire should be discussed between the American, British and French commanders on the

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CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

spot, subsequently bringing in the other main countries. It would no doubt be necessary to allocate specific duties for enforcing the cease-fire to different national contingents.

- he assumed that the initial contacts would take place between Iraqi and Allied military representatives in the area. I commented that we were also contemplating the possibility of cease-fire talks somewhere like Geneva. He did not rule this out.
- on the timescale for Iraqi withdrawal, the French thought the American proposal of four days a bit unrealistic but our own proposal of 15 days rather over-generous. They were settling somewhere around eight days, but were not dogmatic. They liked the idea of differentiating, with much more rapid withdrawal from Kuwait city. But they believed early withdrawal should also apply to the southern border area. We had to bear in mind that the interruption of normal routes might make it difficult for Iraqi forces to withdraw to the north. We should be flexible about the direction of withdrawal.
- he thought that we should insist that the Iraqis abandon any chemical-capable weaponry - in particular Frog missiles and artillery - in Kuwait. The French were not so insistent that the Iraqis should leave behind other heavy equipment.
- the President considered that a halt to SCUD attacks on third countries should be part of the cease-fire terms. He believed there was adequate justification for this in Security Council Resolution 678, with its provision for restoring international peace and security.
- we should consider the possibility of requiring some Iraqi forces to remain behind to clear mines and booby-traps, and to clean up any CW-contaminated areas.
- another point which might be covered was the need to place a limit on Iraqi forces south of the Euphrates. He had no specific figure to suggest, but was thinking of one or two divisions.
- finally, there was a question of how and when to involve the Security Council. The French had no clear view on this. The initial cease-fire arrangements should be a matter for the belligerents, although provision should be made to inform the UN Secretary General and the Security Council. This would have to be followed by gradual shift towards allowing the UN to make provisions e.g. for an observer force.

I said that these were very interesting and worthwhile suggestions, with most of which I agreed. I would arrange for them to be considered by our own experts and let him have further views. I also gave him, in somewhat bowdlerized form, some of the points in our telegram of instructions to Washington on the Soviet peace proposals. Morel said that he would reflect on these.

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- 3 -

I should be grateful for your comments if you would like me to take this further with Morel.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence), John Neilson (Department of Energy), Juliet Wheldon (Law Officers' Department) and to Sir Robin Butler.

(C. D. POWELL)

Richard Gozney, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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SECRET



*John
to FC
order
amendment
Old 22h*

John Charles Powell

26

*Foreign Secretary in 4 speak
in this case (X make further points
nally) at 1100*

IRAQ/KUWAIT: RESPONSE TO MR GORBACHEV'S MESSAGE OF 18 FEBRUARY
TO THE PRIME MINISTER

20 / 11

- The Prime Minister has asked me to give you our response to Mr Gorbachev's message of 18 February about the four-point plan which the President put to Mr Tariq Aziz.
- Like the Soviet Union, we attach the greatest importance to Iraq's immediate and unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait. This has been the essential element in SCR 660 and all subsequent Security Council Resolutions, which also contain a number of other provisions to which we attach importance, as we do to Iraq's compliance with the Geneva Conventions.
- We would expect Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait to be accomplished in a very short period of time, satisfactory to the coalition.
- Any ceasefire conditions must also include concrete evidence that there will be a very early release of all prisoners of war and release of foreign nationals, including Kuwaitis held by Iraq against their will.
- The Iraqi leadership know what they have to do to bring to an end the unnecessary suffering their continued intransigence has caused. Until they do, however, the coalition partners will continue their military actions.
- The Prime Minister noted the supplementary questions to President Gorbachev about wider political questions connected with the Middle East. The Prime Minister is in full agreement with President Gorbachev that these and other questions are those which any country will be free to raise after Iraq has withdrawn completely and unconditionally from Kuwait.

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Enter the department and series,
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Enter the piece and item references, .
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This should be an indication of what the extract is,
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Do not enter details of why the extract is sensitive.

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Treasury Chambers, Parliament Street SW1P 3AG

071-270 3000

Fax 071-270 3456

The Rt Hon Michael Heseltine MP
Secretary of State for the Environment
Department of the Environment
2 Marsham Street
London
SW1P 3EB

20 February 1991

Dear Secretary of State,

ENVIRONMENTAL ASSISTANCE IN THE GULF

Thank you for your letter of 14 February. I have also seen Tom King's letter of 18 February.

2. The cause of helping some friends in the Gulf deal with the consequences of this pollution is one which strikes a chord with me. I can also see the argument that it would also be in our best commercial and political interests to do so. I shall therefore try to respond constructively, though I am afraid some rigour needs to be brought to bear on both costs and methodology.

3. I am not persuaded of the case for establishing a special fund to cover the provision of oil pollution control equipment and advice. In particular, environmental assistance cannot be offset against military spending. In effect, therefore, you are proposing a claim on the Reserve.

4. I would rather look at this on a case by case basis. After all, different considerations apply to each country. The economic situation of Bahrain is, for instance, very different from that of Saudi Arabia. The lower Gulf would raise different points again. I do accept that there is some force in the case you make for the supply of the DTP's stock of booms to Bahrain, at a cost of some £4 million. So in this case I am prepared to agree that you should offer the booms to Bahrain without insisting on reimbursement, though obviously we should not turn down an offer of reimbursement if one were made. I hope however that you will be able to meet these relatively small costs from within your existing provision. I understand that you have underpends in various of your sub-programmes that would more than cover this.

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5. As to any other suggestions that may arise in the future, I reiterate my suggestion that we handle them on a case by case basis. I would, of course, hope that you could find a contribution from within your existing resources to any proposals to which you attach priority. Equally, even if that were so, I could not bind myself to accept any proposal until I had seen chapter and verse.


6. I am copying this letter to the Prime Minister, Norman Lamont, Douglas Hurd, John Wakeham, Chris Patten, Malcolm Rifkind, Peter Lilley, Tom King and Sir Robin Butler.

Yours sincerely

Stefan Bowl

DAVID MELLOR

[approved by the (High Secretary
and signed on his behalf)]



MIDDLE EAST

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S E C R E T VIA CABINET CHANNELS
QQQQ

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO SIR CHARLES POWELL, FROM
GENERAL BRENT SCOWCROFT ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS.

FEBRUARY 19, 1991

CHARLES --

HERE IS THE TEXT OF A GENERAL LETTER TO THE COALITION PARTNERS
WHICH WE DISCUSSED A FEW MINUTES AGO.

BRENT

BEGIN ATTACHMENT:

DEAR

I WANTED TO BRING YOU UP TO DATE ON OUR EXCHANGES WITH THE SOVIETS
AND MORE GENERALLY ON WHERE WE STAND. I FIRST HEARD FROM PRESIDENT
GORBACHEV YESTERDAY, FEBRUARY 18, ON THE VISIT OF IRAQI FOREIGN
MINISTER AZIZ TO MOSCOW. PRESIDENT GORBACHEV WROTE ME THAT HE HAD
PROPOSED TO THE IRAQIS A PLAN IN WHICH IRAQ WOULD ANNOUNCE THE
WITHDRAWAL OF ITS TROOPS FROM KUWAIT BY A DATE CERTAIN, TO BE
FOLLOWED BY A TERMINATION OF HOSTILITIES AND, THE NEXT DAY, BY THE
WITHDRAWAL OF THE TROOPS THEMSELVES. IRAQ WOULD RECEIVE A
GUARANTEE THAT ITS TROOPS BEING WITHDRAWN WOULD NOT BE ATTACKED AND
THAT THERE WOULD BE NO RESUMPTION OF HOSTILITIES. PRESIDENT
GORBACHEV ALSO DEPICTED A LARGE ROLE FOR THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL,
BOTH DURING THE WITHDRAWAL PERIOD AND BEYOND, IN A MANNER THAT
RAISED SERIOUS QUESTIONS OF LINKAGE.

I IMMEDIATELY RESPONDED TO PRESIDENT GORBACHEV'S LETTER, +
EMPHASIZING THE IMPORTANCE THAT IRAQ'S WITHDRAWAL FROM KUWAIT BE
UNCONDITIONAL AND IMMEDIATE AS CALLED FOR BY RESOLUTION 660. I
NOTED MY CONCERN OVER THE UNSPECIFIED LENGTH OF THE IRAQI
WITHDRAWAL, SUGGESTING THAT IRAQ SHOULD BE PERMITTED NO MORE THAN
96 HOURS TO COMPLETE THIS TASK. I ALSO UNDERLINED THE NECESSITY
FOR IRAQ TO COMPLY WITH ALL THE RELEVANT SECURITY COUNCIL DEMANDS
AND EXCHANGE ALL POWS AND OTHER THIRD-COUNTRY NATIONALS HELD
AGAINST THEIR WILL. LAST, I UNDERLINED THAT WE COULD NOT BE DRAWN
INTO ANY NEGOTIATIONS ABOUT IRAQ'S WITHDRAWAL.

I HAVE SINCE SENT A SECOND MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT GORBACHEV, ONE THAT
REFLECTED ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATION OF HIS LETTER BY ME AND MY MOST
SENIOR ADVISORS. IN ADDITION TO REITERATING THE THEMES OF MY
EARLIER COMMUNICATION, I IMPRESSED UPON PRESIDENT GORBACHEV THAT
THERE COULD BE NO CEASE-FIRE BEFORE A MASSIVE WITHDRAWAL FROM
KUWAIT WAS UNDERWAY AND NO CESSATION OF THE OVERALL STATE OF

HOSTILITIES UNTIL THAT WITHDRAWAL WERE COMPLETED. ANY OTHER ARRANGEMENT WOULD RISK THE LIVES OF COALITION FORCES. I MADE CLEAR THAT WE WOULD NOT ATTACK RETREATING IRAQI FORCES= AT THE SAME TIME, ANY IRAQI BREACH OF WITHDRAWAL CONDITIONS WOULD BRING INSTANT AND SHARP RESPONSE. THE EXCHANGE OF POWS AND OTHER THIRD-COUNTRY NATIONALS WOULD HAVE TO BE COMPLETED WITHIN 24 HOURS. FINALLY, THE IRAQIS HAD TO UNDERSTAND THAT ANY USE OF UNCONVENTIONAL WEAPONS ON THEIR PART WOULD TRIGGER NOT ONLY A MASSIVE COALITION MILITARY RESPONSE BUT WOULD AFFECT THE COALITIONS TREATMENT OF IRAQ IN THE WARS AFTERMATH. ✓


IN SHORT, AND AS I SAID PUBLICLY, THE SOVIET INITIATIVE AS IT CURRENTLY STANDS DOES NOT MEET OUR REQUIREMENTS= THAT SAID, WE ARE NOT CLOSING THE DOOR ON DIPLOMACY. THE IRAQIS KNOW AS THEY HAVE FOR MORE THAN SIX MONTHS WHAT THEY MUST DO. IN THE MEANTIME, WE ARE CONTINUING WITH OUR MILITARY ACTIVITIES AND PREPARATIONS. I WILL ENDEAVOR TO KEEP YOU ABREAST OF ANY DEVELOPMENTS= AT THE SAME TIME, I WOULD HOPE YOU WOULD NOT HESITATE TO CONTACT ME ABOUT ANY OF THE ISSUES RAISED HERE.

END TEXT.

DECL: OADR
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Prime Minister

(2)

You won't have
time for textual
exegesis. But you

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

19 February 1991

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might just glance.
or make more sense.

C DP

19/2

Dear Charles,

The Gulf: Latest Message from President Gorbachev

We have tried to produce a better translation of last night's message from President Gorbachev to the Prime Minister. I enclose the result. The linguists tell us that in the original it reads very much as though it was dictated by President Gorbachev himself and not subsequently revised.

Yours ever

Richard Smith

(R H T Gozney)
Private Secretary

Sir Charles Powell KCMG
10 Downing Street

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SECRET

TRANSLATION

The Rt Hon John Major MP
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom

Dear Prime Minister

As agreed, I am writing to inform you about the visit to Moscow of Tariq Aziz and about the results of my conversation with him (he arrived accompanied by Deputy Prime Minister Hammadi).

After I had put directly the question "What have you come with?", the very complicated conversation, which lasted about three hours, took on a business-like character.

I told them that I regarded the declaration of the Revolutionary Command Council as a step in the search for a political settlement. But in order to move the process forward it was necessary to exclude any linkage of the withdrawal of troops with preconditions. I pointed out that the word "Kuwait" did not appear in the declaration. Aziz reacted that it went without saying. "If that is the case" I said "why is that state nevertheless not named?"

In the course of discussions about the conditions laid down in the declaration of the Revolutionary Command Council, the Iraqis were obliged to make it clear that the question was not of conditions for withdrawal but of a sort of "programme" for a settlement. I asked directly: "Can this 'programme' be regarded as a reminder of the existence of the problems mentioned while not saying that without a solution of them there will be no withdrawal from Kuwait?" From the Iraqi explanations it emerged that the "programme" was designed for a process of political negotiation.

Tariq Aziz said that he had been sent here to listen to recommendations on "how to enter on a peaceful process leading to a worthy and honourable peace".

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I proposed the following plan:

- Iraq announces the withdrawal of its forces from Kuwait (that is, specifically from Kuwait, not a general statement);
- It announces a concrete deadline for the final withdrawal. This deadline should be as short as possible;
- It begins actually to withdraw its forces the day after the cessation of hostilities;
- Withdrawal from Kuwait is not subject to any conditions, with one exception: a guarantee that the forces being withdrawn will not be subjected to attacks, that they will not be "shot in the back", that there will be no renewal of hostilities.

Unlike in previous contacts with representatives of the Iraqi leadership, on this occasion these proposals were not followed by any indignant reactions. My interlocutors began to put supplementary questions: Would the Resolutions of the Security Council as a result of which Iraq is under a blockade be annulled? Would American and other forces of the coalition remain in the Gulf after the settlement of the conflict? How in future should the settlement of the Palestinian question, the problem of Lebanon and the whole Middle East complex be proceeded with? What was the attitude of ourselves, the USSR, to the right of Iraq to have a guarantee of adequate access to the sea? What was the guarantee that the Middle East tangle would not once again be put on one side? And so on.

I replied that all these second stage problems could be raised and would be raised for discussion after Iraq had withdrawn unconditionally from Kuwait and after the end of the war. Aziz and Hammadi were told in the clearest possible terms that attempts, such as those made in the declaration of the Revolutionary Command Council to link the liberation of Kuwait and the cessation of hostilities with the direct solution of these problems or any of them was unacceptable and unrealistic.

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I told Aziz that as soon as Iraq began the withdrawal of its forces, the Soviet Union would propose the convening of a special session of the UN Security Council to consider the question of guarantees for this withdrawal and of the non-renewal of hostilities.

In accordance with its well known position of principle, the Soviet Union would also insist that the UN should urgently concern itself with the whole issue of a Middle East settlement, including the creation of a system of regional security, on the subject of which there were already various proposals, including some - which was particularly important - emanating from the Arab states themselves. This process would not be easy, but in the world community there was understanding that it was necessary at long last to solve the conflict in the Middle East on a just basis, primarily through agreement between the states situated in the region and with the help of the United Nations.

I warned my interlocutors that a very important role now attached to the time factor. If they valued the lives of their fellow citizens and the fate of Iraq, they must act without delay.

Thus, from the character of the discussions which took place, it is apparent that the Iraqis did not reject our proposals out of hand but accepted them as a subject for serious consideration. But Iraq's final answer can of course be given only after Tariq Aziz has reported what he described as the "Gorbachev Plan" to President Saddam Hussain and the whole Iraqi leadership.

I consider it necessary to add that both I myself and all my comrades who were present at the meeting gained the impression that the very fact of the Revolutionary Command Council statement and the clarifications brought by Tariq Aziz, and also the reaction to our arguments and proposals, are evidence of the beginning of a definite shift in the understanding of realities on the part of Saddam Hussain and his people.

Tariq Aziz promised to send me his answer in the shortest possible time.

SECRET

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It seems to me that this should be taken into account in the conduct of military operations in the next few days. I would note in this connection that the Iraqis stressed in several different contexts that Baghdad had been subjected to particularly fierce strikes just at the time when the personal representative of the President of the USSR was there.

In the interests of making progress, it is desirable that the contents of this message should for the moment remain secret.

I will inform you of Saddam Hussain's reply at the appropriate time.

M Gorbachev

HB6AIU

SECRET

DECLARATION ON THE GULF CRISIS

(EPC Ministerial meeting, Luxembourg, 19 February 1991)

The Community and its member States have taken note with interest of the appeal of President Gorbachev to the Iraqi leadership and they welcome in particular his call for a full and unconditional withdrawal of the Iraqi troops from Kuwait and the reestablishment of the sovereignty and legitimate government of that country in conformity with the relevant Security Council Resolutions.

They renew their appeal to the Iraqi Government fully and unconditionally to implement all the relevant resolutions of the UN Security Council thus putting an end to the conflict and sparing new sufferings to their people and the people of Kuwait.

They reaffirm the commitment of the Community and its member States to contribute actively, once international legality is re-established, to security, stability and development for all the countries in the region, in an appropriate framework which also takes into account the need for a global, flexible and gradual approach to the various problems of the area. In this connection, they reaffirm their commitment to the sovereignty, unity, independence and territorial integrity of all the countries of the region. They will continue their consultations with the United States and other concerned countries, notably the Soviet Union.

They are fully committed to support the role of the United Nations in promoting security and international peace in the area. They believe that it is mainly for the States of the region to reach agreement on arrangements aimed at ensuring their future security both individually and collectively. The Community and its member States will be ready to play their full part in supporting the efforts of the states concerned, and to complement them with appropriate and convergent action. In this connection, the Community and its member States welcome the fact that at their meeting held in Cairo on 15-16 February the Foreign Ministers of Egypt, Syria and the Gulf Cooperation Council agreed upon a framework for future cooperation. They will undertake the appropriate contacts with those countries. A meeting of the Troika will be held in the near future with Israel at Ministerial level. Other countries, notably Iran, have also an important role to play for the future stability of the region.

The Community and its member States attach particular importance to their political dialogue with the GCC countries. They are looking forward to the early convening of the EC/GCC Cooperation Council.

The Community and its member States attach special importance to their cooperation and political dialogue with the countries of the Arab Maghreb Union. They will promote the pursuit of a meaningful and constructive dialogue at political level shortly, and will undertake the appropriate contact.

The Community and its member States believe that the Arab/Israeli conflict and the Palestinian question are fundamental sources of instability in the region. They consider that the international community should make renewed efforts urgently to achieve a comprehensive, just and lasting solution. They continue to believe that a properly structured international conference at an appropriate time will provide a suitable framework for negotiations. Such a conference will require a serious preparation. They will actively promote the search for a peaceful settlement through dialogue with and between all concerned parties.

Regarding the situation in Lebanon, they express their strong support for the full implementation of the Taif agreement as the means to achieve national reconciliation in a Lebanon free of all foreign troops.

The Community and its member States endorse the view expressed in the Cairo meeting about the importance of efforts by the Arabs themselves to foster greater economic and social development, respecting the principle of sovereignty over economic resources. The Community and its member States share this perspective and stand ready, in full respect of this principle and in a spirit of mutual solidarity, to develop their cooperation with the countries of the region. Their immediate priorities are to ensure the early implementation of their new Mediterranean policy and the rapid disbursement of their aid for the three countries most directly affected by the economic consequences of the Gulf crisis.

The Community and its member States are aware of the need for a comprehensive approach to all the problems of the Mediterranean, Middle East and Gulf region. In this connection, they are willing to explore the modalities for launching a process aimed at establishing a set of rules and principles in the field of security, economic cooperation, human rights and cultural exchanges.

B

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FM RIYADH
TO FLASH FCO
TELNO 484

OF 191215Z FEBRUARY 91

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INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK, HQBFME

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TELECON GORE-BOOTH/HMA

IRAQ/KUWAIT: SOVIET CEASEFIRE INITIATIVE

SUMMARY

1. SAUDIS APPARENTLY NOT YET INFORMED BY SOVIETS OF CONTENT OF GORBACHEV'S INITIATIVE. THEY STRESS THAT A CEASEFIRE IS ONLY POSSIBLE IF IRAQ MEETS ALL THE BASIC REQUIREMENTS OF THE COALITION. GCC SECRETARY GENERAL SAYS IRAQIS SHOULD ACCEPT A PACKAGE, INCLUDING COMMITMENT TO ALL SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS AND TO COMPLETE, ORDERLY AND NON-CONDITIONAL WITHDRAWAL, BEFORE ALLIES ACCEPT CEASEFIRE. BOTH OUR SAUDI CONTACTS AND BISHARA CLEARLY HOPE THE SOVIET INITIATIVE WILL COME TO NOTHING.

DETAIL

2. THE SAUDI PRESS TODAY HEADLINES GORBACHEV'S INITIATIVE, QUOTING THE 'BILD ZEITUNG' ACCOUNT OF IT. THE ONLY OFFICIAL SAUDI COMMENT SO FAR HAS COME FROM PRINCE SULTAN, WHO - IN ANSWER TO A QUESTION FROM THE PRESS - SAID THAT THE 'DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN GORBACHEV AND TARIQ AZIZ WOULD NOT HAVE ANY EFFECT ON THE MILITARY SITUATION UNLESS IRAQ RECOGNISED THE FUNDAMENTAL TRUTHS'.

3. WE SPOKE THIS MORNING TO MADANI (UNDER SECRETARY, MFA) AND TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE GCC. MADANI SAID THAT HIS INFORMATION WAS A FEW HOURS OLD, BUT AS FAR AS HE WAS AWARE THE SOVIETS HAD NOT YET INFORMED THE SAUDIS OF THE CONTENT OF GORBACHEV'S PROPOSAL. (MY US COLLEAGUE BELIEVES THIS TO BE THE CASE UNLESS BANDAR HAS BEEN ROUND THE SOVIET BACK DOOR IN WASHINGTON). THE SOVIET CHARGE HERE STILL HAD NO PROPER COMMUNICATIONS WITH MOSCOW. MADANI SAID

THAT, BEFORE AGREEING TO A CEASEFIRE, THE SAUDIS WOULD WANT TO BE REASSURED THAT THE IRAQIS WERE COMMITTED TO MEETING SAUDI ARABIA'S BASIC DEMANDS IE COMPLETE AND UNCONDITIONAL WITHDRAWAL FROM KUWAIT: RETURN OF THE LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT: AND AN END TO IRAQI THREATS AND TROOP CONCENTRATIONS ON SAUDI BORDERS. MADANI SAID THAT EVEN IF SADDAM WERE TO AGREE THESE DEMANDS, THE SAUDIS WOULD BE DEEPLY UNEASY ABOUT A CEASEFIRE WHICH LEFT SADDAM IN POWER AND IN POSSESSION OF VERY SUBSTANTIAL MILITARY ASSETS. (YOU HAD A RECENT EARFUL OF THIS FROM KING FAHD.) MADANI SHOWED SOME SUSPICION OF SOVIET MOTIVES, AND OF THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE SOVIETS MIGHT BE PREPARED TO RESUME SUPPORT FOR SADDAM IF HE AGREED TO WITHDRAW FROM KUWAIT.

4. BISHARA WAS ALSO DEEPLY SUSPICIOUS OF WHAT HE DESCRIBED AS A RUSSIAN RESCUE OPERATION FOR THE IRAQI REGIME. THE ALLIES SHOULD NOT ALLOW THEMSELVES TO BE STAMPEDED BY AN INITIATIVE WHICH APPEARED TO BE DRIVEN BY GORBACHEV'S DOMESTIC CONCERNS. BISHARA SAID HE SPOKE FOR THE GCC (IT IS DIFFICULT TO SEE HOW THIS CAN BE THE CASE, SINCE THERE CAN HAVE BEEN LITTLE TIME FOR ANY GCC DISCUSSION) AND THAT HIS VIEWS REFLECTED THOSE OF THE KUWAITI GOVERNMENT (THIS MAY BE NEARER THE CASE, SINCE HE SPENT YESTERDAY IN TAIF). HE SAID THAT ANY CEASEFIRE ARRANGEMENT MUST MAKE PROVISION FOR ORDERLY AND UNCONDITIONAL IRAQI WITHDRAWAL FROM THE WHOLE OF KUWAIT. THE IRAQIS SHOULD UNDERTAKE NOT TO DESTROY OIL FACILITIES OR PROPERTY AS THEY LEFT. THEY MUST COOPERATE IN IDENTIFYING MINEFIELDS. THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL SHOULD DESPATCH OBSERVERS TO SUPERVISE THE WITHDRAWAL. ALLIED, INCLUDING WESTERN FORCES, SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO MOVE IN TO KUWAIT WITHOUT HINDRANCE IMMEDIATELY AS THE IRAQIS WITHDREW.

5. BISHARA WENT ON TO SAY THAT IRAQI AGREEMENT TO WITHDRAWAL PROCEDURES OF THIS SORT, THOUGH ESSENTIAL, SHOULD NOT IN ITSELF BE TAKEN AS SUFFICIENT BASIS FOR ALLIED AGREEMENT TO A CEASEFIRE. THE IRAQIS MUST ACCEPT A PACKAGE, INCLUDING ALL SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS. IT WAS NOT SUFFICIENT FOR THEM TO ACCEPT UNSCR 660, STILL LESS TO TALK ABOUT 'DEALING WITH IT'. THE PROVISIONS OF UNSCR 660 WERE IMPORTANT, IN PARTICULAR THAT WHICH CALLED ON KUWAIT AND IRAQ TO RESOLVE THEIR DIFFERENCES PEACEFULLY. KUWAIT WOULD WANT THIS TO HAPPEN UNDER UN AUSPICES, AND NOT IN BILATERAL DISCUSSION. BUT THE IRAQIS MUST ALSO ACCEPT OTHER SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS. THEY MUST ACCEPT THE RETURN OF THE LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT (NOT MENTIONED IN UNSCR 660) AND REVOKE THEIR CLAIM TO HAVE ANNEXED KUWAIT: IF THEY DID NOT, THE FACT THAT THE IRAQI NATIONAL ASSEMBLY HAD APPROVED ANNEXATION WOULD

BE FOREVER THROWN IN THE FACE OF THE KUWAITIS. THEY MUST AGREE TO FULFIL UNSCR PROVISIONS CONCERNING THE RETURN AND SAFETY OF DETAINED OR MISSING KUWAITI CITIZENS. AND THEY MUST ALSO COMPLY WITH UNSCR 674 ON COMPENSATION. KUWAIT WOULD WANT A PEACEKEEPING FORCE WITH MUSCLE ON ITS FRONTIER. BISHARA PREFERRED THIS TO HAVE UN COVER, BUT TO INCLUDE AT LEAST TOKEN CONTINGENTS FROM THE PERMANENT MEMBERS: HE DID NOT SAY THAT HE EXPECTED THE IRAQIS TO ACQUIESCE IN THIS PARTICULAR DEMAND, THOUGH HE CLEARLY HOPED THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD. BISHARA'S FINAL POINT WAS THAT SANCTIONS SHOULD BE KEPT IN PLACE IF AT ALL POSSIBLE AS A BARGAINING CHIP FOR ARMS CONTROL.

COMMENT

6. WE CAN TAKE IT THAT THE SAUDIS WOULD SEE THE SOVIET PROPOSALS AS DANGEROUSLY DILUTED, AND WILL LOOK TO US TO JOIN IN CHALLENGING ANY IRAQI/SOVIET MOVE TO RUN THEM.

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LUXEMBOURG FOR PS/SECRETARY OF STATE

OUR TELNO 484: IRAQ/KUWAIT: WASHINGTON SITREP

SUMMARY

1. AN OTHERWISE QUIET BANK HOLIDAY MONDAY ENDS WITH WHITE HOUSE REACTION TO SOVIET PEACE PLAN

DETAIL

2. THERE WAS SOME SURPRISE HERE THAT TARIQ AZIZ'S VISIT TO MOSCOW WAS SO SHORT, BUT THE RESULTS HAVE CAUSED CONCERN AND CONFUSION HERE. THE PRESIDENT, WHO HAD SPENT THE WEEKEND AT KENNEBUNKPORT RETURNED TO THE WHITE HOUSE DURING THE LATE AFTERNOON AND CALLED A MEETING OF HIS TOP ADVISERS. ANY EARLIER ACTION WAS PREVENTED BY A LACK OF INFORMATION FROM MOSCOW AS TO WHAT THE SOVIET PAPER CONTAINED. (INDEED STATE HAD STILL NOT SEEN A TEXT AT THE TIME THE WHITE HOUSE MEETING TOOK PLACE).

3. FOLLOWING THE MEETING, AT AROUND 190015Z, WHITE HOUSE SPOKESMAN MADE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT QUOTE

PRESIDENT BUSH APPRECIATES HAVING RECEIVED A SUMMARY ACCOUNT FROM PRESIDENT MIKHAIL GORBACHEV OF HIS MEETING WITH IRAQI FOREIGN MINISTER TARIQ AZIZ. THE SOVIETS HAVE ASKED THAT WE TREAT THE SUBSTANCE OF THIS ACCOUNT AS CONFIDENTIAL, THUS WE WILL NOT COMMENT ON IT FURTHER. OUR MILITARY CAMPAIGN REMAINS ON SCHEDULE. UNQUOTE.

4. BEING A BANK HOLIDAY EVENING WE HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO SPEAK TO OUR USUAL CONTACTS. WE SHALL DO SO IN THE MORNING. MEANWHILE THE LOCAL MEDIA ARE INTERPRETING THE WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT AS A REJECTION OF THE SOVIET PEACE PLAN WITH SEVERAL COMMENTATORS PICKING UP ON THE REPORT IN BILD ZEITUNG, WHICH, AS REPORTED HERE, STATES THAT THE SOVIET PLAN CONTAINS THE FOLLOWING FOUR KEY ELEMENTS:

PAGE 1
RESTRICTED

- UNCONDITIONAL WITHDRAWAL FROM KUWAIT,
- A SOVIET GUARANTEE OF IRAQ'S BORDERS AND INSTALLATIONS,
- A SOVIET GUARANTEE THAT IRAQ WILL SUFFER NO PENALTY (AND EVEN THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN WILL BE SPARED ANY PUNATIVE ACTION),
- AN UNDERTAKING TO ADDRESS THE QUESTION OF PALESTINE AFTER WITHDRAWAL.

MANY HERE ARE CONVINCED THAT THIS IS A FAIR SUMMARY OF THE SOVIET PAPER.

5. OTHER NEWS OF THE DAY INCLUDES THE DAMAGE TO TWO US WARSHIPS BY MINES IN THE NORTHERN GULF, PROMPTING FURTHER SPECULATION THAT A GROUND WAR IS IMMINENT. THE REMOVAL OF SOME US CASUALTIES TO A BRITISH SHIP IS ALSO REPORTED.

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FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

IRAQ/KUWAIT: GORBACHEV INITIATIVE: SECRETARY OF STATE'S MEETING WITH
DUMAS, 19 FEBRUARY

SUMMARY

1. DUMAS NOT FULLY SIGHTED. SECRETARY OF STATE UNDERLINES
DIFFICULTIES RAISED BY THE SOVIET INITIATIVE AND IMPORTANCE OF
RELEASE OF POWS: GIVES DUMAS DIGEST OF UK CEASEFIRE/WITHDRAWAL
IDEAS. FURTHER MEETING TODAY AGREED.

DETAIL

2. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SPOKE BRIEFLY TO DUMAS BEFORE THE EPC
MINISTERIAL MEETING ABOUT THE GORBACHEV INITIATIVE. DUMAS CONFIRMED
THAT THEY HAD RECEIVED A MESSAGE FROM GORBACHEV, BUT ONLY AT 0100 ON
19 FEBRUARY. IT EMERGED THAT NEITHER WE NOR THE FRENCH HAD ANY
INFORMATION WHETHER OR NOT THE ITALIANS OR GERMANS HAD ALSO RECEIVED
MESSAGES FROM GORBACHEV.

3. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT THE PRIME MINISTER HAD ASKED
HIM TO CONTACT DUMAS TO COORDINATE A RESPONSE TO THE SOVIET
PROPOSAL. IT CREATED A DIFFICULT TACTICAL SITUATION. THE SOVIET
IDEAS OMITTED ELEMENTS ESSENTIAL FOR A CEASEFIRE E.G. A TIMETABLE
FOR WITHDRAWAL (WHICH SEEMED TO BE LEFT TO IRAQI DECISION): AND
PROVISION FOR THE RETURN OF PRISONERS OF WAR, A MOST IMPORTANT
POINT FOR US (DUMAS CONFIRMED THAT THERE WERE NO FRENCH PRISONERS
OF WAR IN IRAQI HANDS).

4. THE SECRETARY OF STATE GAVE DUMAS A PAPER CONTAINING A DIGEST OF
THE OPD(G) CEASEFIRE PAPER. HE SAID THAT THESE WERE UK IDEAS
PREPARED SOME DAYS AGO, BEFORE THE SOVIET INITIATIVE. THESE WERE
THE ELEMENTS WHICH WE SAW AS NECESSARY BEFORE A CEASEFIRE COULD BE
AGREED. THE SECRETARY OF STATE REPEATED THAT THE PRIME MINISTER WAS
KEEN THAT THE MAJOR COALITION PARTNERS SHOULD EXPRESS A CONCERTED
RESPONSE TO THE SOVIET INITIATIVE. THE RESPONSE SHOULD NOT COME
FROM THE UNITED STATES ALONE. UK-FRENCH CONSULTATION WAS
PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT. THE PRIME MINISTER HAD SPOKEN BRIEFLY TO

MITTERRAND LAST NIGHT AND HAD AGREED TO SPEAK AGAIN THIS MORNING (DUMAS APPEARED UNAWARE OF THIS).

5. THE SECRETARY OF STATE ASKED WHETHER WE WOULD BE ABLE TO AVOID A BIG DISCUSSION OF THE SOVIET PROPOSALS IN THE EPC MINISTERIAL MEETING. DUMAS SAID WITHOUT HESITATION THAT THIS WAS ALL STILL PRIVATE AND THAT THEY WOULD NOT BE SAYING A WORD IN THE MEETING. WE STILL KNEW NOTHING OF THE IRAQI RESPONSE. THE PICTURE WAS THEREFORE LESS THAN CLEAR. THE SECRETARY OF STATE AGREED: THE FIRST STEP WAS STILL FOR THE IRAQIS TO STATE CLEARLY THAT THEY ACCEPTED THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS, IN PARTICULAR THE DEMAND FOR IMMEDIATE UNCONDITIONAL WITHDRAWAL.

6. IN CONCLUSION DUMAS SAID AGAIN THAT IT WAS A DIFFICULT TACTICAL SITUATION. HE WOULD BE RETURNING TO PARIS THIS AFTERNOON TO PREPARE A PAPER FOR PRESIDENT MITTERRAND. HE AGREED TO TALK AGAIN TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE BEFORE HE LEFT.

COMMENT

7. DUMAS WAS NOT FULLY SIGHTED. IT IS HELPFUL TO HAVE FED IN OUR IDEAS ON WITHDRAWAL AND CEASEFIRE TERMS BEFORE THE FRENCH LINE DEVELOPS.

8. THE FURTHER MEETING WITH DUMAS IS LIKELY TO HAPPEN AROUND LUNCH, SCHEDULED FOR 1315. WE WILL TRY TO FIX IT FOR AFTER 1400 LOCAL, TO ALLOW US TO RECEIVE AN ACCOUNT OF TODAY'S OPD(G) DISCUSSION.

9. PLEASE ADVANCE TO PS, PS/MR HOGG, PS/NO 10, PS/DEFENCE SEC. AND CABINET OFFICE.

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19 February 1991

Dear Charles,

✓

Ria Austin

CO2

REPORT FROM RIYADH

The Defence Secretary's colleagues might find it useful to see the attached report from Commanders on operations in the Gulf.

I am coping this letter to the Private Secretaries to members of OPD(G) and to Sir Robin Butler.

Yours ever

Janet R. Binstead

(MISS J R BINSTAD)
Private Secretary

Sir Charles Powell KCMG
No 10 Downing Street

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PS/Secretary of State

THE VIEW FROM RIYADH - 191745Z FEB 91

1. Bad weather again has again affected the conduct of the air campaign in the KTO today. Although UK Tornados mounted 9 raids against airfields and ammunition storage sites, more than 40% of the bombs were not dropped because of cloud, haze and general obscurity. However, aircraft from Tabuk did hit a large ammunition dump at Al Jarah which resulted in secondary explosions which reached a spectacular 10,000 ft. 18 Jaguar sorties in the KTO were able to drop their weapons successfully, but on alternative targets due to dense smoke. Of note, more oil well-heads have been fired in the last 24 hours bringing the total to 35 (7-10%) of Kuwait's production capability. As the number of these fires increases the smoke is adversely affecting target acquisition.
2. The thrust of UK Tornado activity tomorrow will again be directed against airfields. Commanders in theatre assess that if the weather clears, as forecast, the Allies will have reduced Iraq's ability to operate from airfields in the south east to effectively zero by the end of the day. There is but a handful of HAS left undamaged in the KTO and all aircraft deployed in the open are now several kilometres away from their bases. As these aircraft have neither flown for several weeks nor been maintained properly it is most unlikely that the Iraqis would be able to get very many airborne and combat effective. Attention is now turning to enemy helicopter capabilities; Iraq possesses about 360 of which 190 are combat capable. At best, from anywhere in Iraq, they would be unable to produce a package of more than 25 at any one time. To operate in the KTO helicopters will have to use forward refuelling points which can service a maximum of 10 helos for three flights per day. These forward refuelling points and the airfield at Amara New, the main helicopter base, will be targeted for the next two or three days.
3. Gen Horner continues to wield his air power, unaffected by ongoing political activity, to prepare the battle area for a ground offensive. He has also tasked his intelligence staff to look at Iraq's ability to continue to deploy pontoon bridges to offset cuts in logistic supply routes as a result of the bridge campaign; it is possible that the Iraqis are running out. Three of the 15,000lb 'Daisy Cutter' bombs were dropped on Faylaka Island overnight; to date there is no BDA. On the SCUD front, F15Es last night claimed hits on 4 TELs in western Iraq. Other activity today has included the involvement of HMS MANCHESTER's

1 of 2


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Lynx with Allied fixed wing aircraft in attacks against 10 smallish boats in the Bubiyan Channel; the Lynx did not open fire. Mine clearance continues in the vicinity of the USS TRIPOLI and PRINCETOWN incidents and a channel has been cleared to allow HMS GLOUCESTER to provide air defence from inshore of the small ships. In the last 48 hours UK MCMVs have found and destroyed 3 mines one of which was a ground influence mine which was probably laid well before the current conflict. On the land, an RPV from 1st Armoured Division, looking for further BDA from yesterday's bombardment, discovered an artillery position, a brigade command post and some AAA sites which were engaged by MLRS between 1100 and 1145 this morning. While forward the gunners deployed sound ranging devices (directional hydrophones) which were used successfully to mount an air counter-battery strike against another enemy artillery position later in the day.

4. There is clear evidence that the Iraqi 18 Division in south east Kuwait is becoming increasingly concerned about the prospects of an Allied land offensive and has raised doubts about its ability to protect its perimeter, the eastern portion of which comprises the coastline.



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PRIVY COUNCIL OFFICE
WHITEHALL, LONDON SW1A 2AT

19 February 1991

Dear Phillip

COMMUNITY CHARGE AND SERVICEMEN IN THE GULF

Thank you for your letter of 18 February. As I confirmed to you by telephone earlier today, the Lord President is content with the proposed terms in which your Secretary of State should refer to this matter during his speech in the House this afternoon.


The Lord President is strongly of the view that we should avoid primary legislation in dealing with this problem. However carefully the scope of the Bill were drawn, it would not be possible to prevent a host of amendments dealing with possible exemptions of other groups; there is a possibility that a Bill drafted to deal with one specific group would be ruled hybrid; and we would not in any case want to add further to the pressures on the legislative programme this session if it could possibly be avoided.

You mentioned to me that you thought a scheme to compensate servicemen would not require even secondary legislation, while in addition to the primary legislation exempting servicemen a scheme to compensate Local Authorities would require its own secondary legislation. For these reasons the Lord President very much prefers, as does your Secretary of State, a scheme to compensate servicemen direct. The Lord President imagines that in public expenditure terms the effect of the two alternative ways of proceeding is very similar: either the Community Charges paid by servicemen in the Gulf are reimbursed to them, or they are paid instead from central funds direct to the Local Authorities. This being so, he hopes that Treasury and MOD Ministers will accept the business management case for avoiding legislation this session.

I am copying this letter to Barry Potter, Bryan Wells, Judith Simpson, Jim Gallagher, Stephen Bowden, and to Sonia Phippard.

T J SUTTON
Principal Private Secretary

Phillip Ward Esq
PS/Secretary of State for the Environment



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2/91

19 February 1991

NERC ADVISES GOVERNMENT ON ARABIAN GULF OIL POLLUTION

1 Reports released today (19 February) by Britain's Natural Environment Research Council (NERC) spell out the way in which the oil slicks are expected to behave in Gulf waters, and their possible impact on the environment. There are also recommendations for dealing with the oil spills in ways that will help to protect marine life.

A novel computer based model has been used to track the spill from the Mina al Ahmadi offshore terminal over the last few weeks, says one of the reports which have been prepared for the Department of the Environment and for the governments of Gulf states affected by the oil pollution.

A unique feature of the Gulf oil simulation model is its ability to plot the movement of both surface slicks and underwater plumes of oil, which can move independently. Says the report: "There is no doubt that a large proportion of the oil forms an underwater plume of great significance ecologically, to fish, crustacea, shellfish, sea grass and coral. It is also significant for power stations and desalination plant water inlets which are a few metres deep. Surface floating barriers may protect against the surface slick but will be less effective against the underwater plume."

So far NERC scientists have produced a 'hindcast' simulation of the recent oil movements, using data on winds and tides which drive the currents in the shallow waters of the Gulf.

mf...

The team has been able to respond to this challenging task with the help of its considerable oceanographic databank, a hydrodynamical model of the type used to predict currents in the North Sea, and an oil processes model from University colleagues. Wind field data for the Gulf model have been provided by the Meteorological Office.

The effectiveness of the model depends largely on the accuracy of the wind data. NERC is now hoping to run a longer-term forecast model with data from the Met Office, to help in assessing the ecological effects of the oil spills.

The other report prepared by NERC scientists elaborates on the chemical behaviour of the oil spills and the likely impacts on marine life. The actions of an oil spill are complex. Some is lost to the atmosphere by evaporation (including some of the toxic chemicals), some is dispersed at the water surface and the remainder is mixed into the water column, says the report. Over a period of weeks the oil is broken down by sunlight and microbes, it becomes more dense and ultimately sinks to the sea bottom.

The most important biological resources at risk are the sea grass and coral reef ecosystems, and the rich and varied plant and animal life that they support. This includes populations of dugong (sea cow) and turtles, besides the commercial fish and shrimp populations, for which the sea grass beds are nursery grounds.

The sea grass beds and coral reefs at risk are in the extensive shallow coastal waters of the western Gulf, so it is preferable if the oil is kept offshore. Key populations and habitats are best protected by floating booms with skirts.

The extensive intertidal mudflats, much of them covered in algae, are also biologically productive areas, and important feeding grounds for shorebirds, such as the greater flamingo and the broad-billed sandpiper.

Among other birds threatened by the oil spills is the Socotra cormorant, a seabird, which, says the report, "is particularly vulnerable as it is confined to the Gulf region, and around half the world population feeds and breeds in the Gulf."

mf...

The 25-page report states: "For aquatic species living beneath the sea surface it is preferable to minimise the effect of oil by not using detergents. The longer the oil remains at the sea surface the greater the proportion of its toxic constituents will be lost to the atmosphere."

However, the report recognises that the importance of organisms requiring access to the sea surface (such as seabirds, turtles and dugongs) may preclude this option in some areas, but points out that once oil is more than a few days old detergents are of limited use in its dispersal.

"Once oil is ashore it is preferable to rely on natural processes to degrade the oil, because often more harm is done to the biota and the habitat by Man's efforts to clean up the oil," the report suggests.

NERC scientists, whose experience with major spills spans more than 20 years, are concerned that toxic components of the oil will persist for several months to a year, especially on the sea bottom and in sediments. Those ecosystems that are affected, particularly the coral reefs, will not recover fully for years. The report says there is a need for long-term monitoring programmes to start "as soon as possible."

Both reports have been prepared in a short time, drawing on the expertise of scientists in a number of NERC Institutes and research groups, who have themselves consulted many others with specialist knowledge.

-ENDS-

Note to Editors

Copies of the reports are available from NERC. For further information please contact Jeremy Baldwin or Ursula Edmunds, NERC Public Relations, Polaris House, North Star Avenue, Swindon, Wilts., SN2 1EU. Tel. 0793 411561 or 411604.

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LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

19 February 1991

John R. [unclear]

THE GULF

Mr. Kossov of the Soviet Embassy telephoned this afternoon to ask whether we yet had any comments to offer on Mr. Gorbachev's message of last night. I said that we were still working on it and consulting with other members of the multinational coalition. He would have noted my comments last night: and I thought that when our considered comments did come, we would say that President Gorbachev's proposals as they stood were inadequate because they did not provide for immediate and unconditional withdrawal by Iraq from Kuwait, or for implementation of all the Security Council resolutions, which were of course mandatory. But he would have to wait a while for a formal reaction.

Mr. Kossov said he thought it was important for the Soviet Government to be given a clear reaction fairly soon. The absence of any comment might be misinterpreted. There were rumours that Tariq Aziz would return to Moscow tomorrow. He hoped it might be possible for the Soviet Ambassador to be summoned and given our response today or tomorrow. I said that I would see whether that was possible. If for no other reason than diary constraints, it was more likely that he would be summoned to the Foreign Office than No.10.

You will want to reflect on how best we can convey our views fairly rapidly to the Russians, once we have a response to the Prime Minister's message to President Bush, and an indication of the action the Americans have taken.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence), John Neilson (Department of Energy), Juliet Wheldon (Law Officer's Department) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

Charles Powell

CHARLES POWELL

Richard Gozney, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET



10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

19 February 1991

Dear Richard,

THE GULF: AMERICAN VIEWS ON THE SOVIET PROPOSALS

I enclose a copy of a message which the Americans will be sending to all their main coalition partners, recording their exchanges with the Russians on Gorbachev's proposals. You will see that they have taken some of the points from our message, but also gone beyond them in ways which Scowcroft forecast. We now need to consider urgently how and when we should send a separate response to the Russians.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence), John Neilson (Department of Energy), Juliet Wheldon (Law Officers Department) and Sir Robin Butler.

Yours sincerely,
C. D. Powell

C. D. POWELL

Richard Gozney, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

SECRET

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TO CABINET OFFICE LONDON
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S E C R E T VIA CABINET CHANNELS

QQQQ

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO SIR CHARLES POWELL, FROM
GENERAL BRENT SCOWCROFT ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS.

FEBRUARY 19, 1991

CHARLES --

HERE IS THE TEXT OF A GENERAL LETTER TO THE COALITION PARTNERS
WHICH WE DISCUSSED A FEW MINUTES AGO.

BRENT

BEGIN ATTACHMENT:

DEAR

I WANTED TO BRING YOU UP TO DATE ON OUR EXCHANGES WITH THE SOVIETS
AND MORE GENERALLY ON WHERE WE STAND. I FIRST HEARD FROM PRESIDENT
GORBACHEV YESTERDAY, FEBRUARY 18, ON THE VISIT OF IRAQI FOREIGN
MINISTER AZIZ TO MOSCOW. PRESIDENT GORBACHEV WROTE ME THAT HE HAD
PROPOSED TO THE IRAQIS A PLAN IN WHICH IRAQ WOULD ANNOUNCE THE
WITHDRAWAL OF ITS TROOPS FROM KUWAIT BY A DATE CERTAIN, TO BE
FOLLOWED BY A TERMINATION OF HOSTILITIES AND, THE NEXT DAY, BY THE
WITHDRAWAL OF THE TROOPS THEMSELVES. IRAQ WOULD RECEIVE A
GUARANTEE THAT ITS TROOPS BEING WITHDRAWN WOULD NOT BE ATTACKED AND
THAT THERE WOULD BE NO RESUMPTION OF HOSTILITIES. PRESIDENT
GORBACHEV ALSO DEPICTED A LARGE ROLE FOR THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL,
BOTH DURING THE WITHDRAWAL PERIOD AND BEYOND, IN A MANNER THAT
RAISED SERIOUS QUESTIONS OF LINKAGE.

I IMMEDIATELY RESPONDED TO PRESIDENT GORBACHEVS LETTER, +
EMPHASIZING THE IMPORTANCE THAT IRAQS WITHDRAWAL FROM KUWAIT BE
UNCONDITIONAL AND IMMEDIATE AS CALLED FOR BY RESOLUTION 660. I
NOTED MY CONCERN OVER THE UNSPECIFIED LENGTH OF THE IRAQI
WITHDRAWAL, SUGGESTING THAT IRAQ SHOULD BE PERMITTED NO MORE THAN
96 HOURS TO COMPLETE THIS TASK. I ALSO UNDERLINED THE NECESSITY
FOR IRAQ TO COMPLY WITH ALL THE RELEVANT SECURITY COUNCIL DEMANDS
AND EXCHANGE ALL POWS AND OTHER THIRD-COUNTRY NATIONALS HELD
AGAINST THEIR WILL. LAST, I UNDERLINED THAT WE COULD NOT BE DRAWN
INTO ANY NEGOTIATIONS ABOUT IRAQS WITHDRAWAL.

I HAVE SINCE SENT A SECOND MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT GORBACHEV, ONE THAT REQUESTED ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATION OF HIS LETTER BY ME AND MY MOST SENIOR ADVISORS. IN ADDITION TO REITERATING THE THEMES OF MY EARLIER COMMUNICATION, I IMPRESSED UPON PRESIDENT GORBACHEV THAT THERE COULD BE NO CEASE-FIRE BEFORE A MASSIVE WITHDRAWAL FROM KUWAIT WAS UNDERWAY AND NO CESSATION OF THE OVERALL STATE OF HOSTILITIES UNTIL THAT WITHDRAWAL WERE COMPLETED. ANY OTHER ARRANGEMENT WOULD RISK THE LIVES OF COALITION FORCES. I MADE CLEAR THAT WE WOULD NOT ATTACK RETREATING IRAQI FORCES- AT THE SAME TIME, ANY IRAQI BREACH OF WITHDRAWAL CONDITIONS WOULD BRING INSTANT AND SHARP RESPONSE. THE EXCHANGE OF POWS AND OTHER THIRD-COUNTRY NATIONALS WOULD HAVE TO BE COMPLETED WITHIN 24 HOURS. FINALLY, THE IRAQIS HAD TO UNDERSTAND THAT ANY USE OF UNCONVENTIONAL WEAPONS ON THEIR PART WOULD TRIGGER NOT ONLY A MASSIVE COALITION MILITARY RESPONSE BUT WOULD AFFECT THE COALITIONS TREATMENT OF IRAQ IN THE WARS AFTERMATH.


IN SHORT, AND AS I SAID PUBLICLY, THE SOVIET INITIATIVE AS IT CURRENTLY STANDS DOES NOT MEET OUR REQUIREMENTS- THAT SAID, WE ARE NOT CLOSING THE DOOR ON DIPLOMACY. THE IRAQIS KNOW AS THEY HAVE FOR MORE THAN SIX MONTHS WHAT THEY MUST DO. IN THE MEANTIME, WE ARE CONTINUING WITH OUR MILITARY ACTIVITIES AND PREPARATIONS. I WILL ENDEAVOR TO KEEP YOU ABREAST OF ANY DEVELOPMENTS- AT THE SAME TIME, I WOULD HOPE YOU WOULD NOT HESITATE TO CONTACT ME ABOUT ANY OF THE ISSUES RAISED HERE.

END TEXT.

DECL: OADR
EO072

NNNN

A The National Archives

DEPARTMENT/SERIES <i>PREM 19</i>	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM <i>3448</i> (one piece/item number)	
Extract details: <i>Letter from the US President to the Prime Minister</i> <i>dated 19 February 1991</i>	
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Instructions for completion of Dummy Card

Use black or blue pen to complete form.

Use the card for one piece or for each extract removed from a different place within a piece.

Enter the department and series,
eg. HO 405, J 82.

Enter the piece and item references, .
eg. 28, 1079, 84/1, 107/3

Enter extract details if it is an extract rather than a whole piece.
This should be an indication of what the extract is,
eg. Folio 28, Indictment 840079, E107, Letter dated 22/11/1995.
Do not enter details of why the extract is sensitive.

If closed under the FOI Act, enter the FOI exemption numbers applying to the closure, eg. 27(1), 40(2).

Sign and date next to the reason why the record is not available to the public ie. Closed under FOI exemption; Retained under section 3(4) of the Public Records Act 1958; Temporarily retained; Missing at transfer or Number not used.

E. R.

CONFIDENTIAL

Visited on
27 Feb.
Sayed

PRIME MINISTER

I'd rather go later

- there's lots I want to do

VISIT TO HEADQUARTERS AT HIGH WYCOMBE

for weekend.

We have been looking for a date when you could visit the Joint Headquarters of Operation GRANBY near High Wycombe: they are in fact very close to Chequers. One possibility would be next Saturday morning, 23 February. Would you like me to pursue this - say a visit from 10.00 to 11.30 that day?

C.D.

P.S. It is not

essential &

cd. he dropped
or postponed

CR

(C. D. POWELL)

19 February 1991

tmw a:HQ

CONFIDENTIAL

Subject cc NARTER CONFIDENTIAL



10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

19 February 1991

Dear Richard,

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH THE CANADIAN
PRIME MINISTER: THE GULF

The Prime Minister spoke to Mr. Mulroney on the telephone this evening, at the latter's request, to discuss the Gulf.

Mr. Mulroney said that he would be interested to know what view we took on the Soviet proposals. The Prime Minister responded on the lines in his message to President Bush. He thought that the US, Britain and France took a broadly similar view, while the Germans and the Italians had reacted more positively. Mr. Mulroney indicated that he was inclined to share our assessment.

Mr. Mulroney asked what would happen if Saddam Hussain accepted the Soviet proposals. The Prime Minister said we would be in a bit of a bind. We would simply have to make clear our own objections to the Soviet proposals. But he thought this scenario relatively unlikely. Mr. Mulroney asked why we thought that Gorbachev had put forward such unbalanced proposals. The Prime Minister said he thought it was a combination of domestic reasons, an attempt to enhance Soviet prestige in the Arab world, and a desire to limit growing American influence. Mr. Mulroney asked when we expected the Iraqis to reply: the longer this went on the more public expectations of peace would rise. The Prime Minister said we were dampening down such expectations. It was clear that President Gorbachev expected a rapid response. We were likely to hear something the next day. If not, we would draw our own conclusions. Mr. Mulroney asked why it was that the Iraqis were persisting, even though they were taking such a hammering. The Prime Minister said that Saddam Hussain might still hope to inflict some significant casualties on the Allies and emerge as an Arab hero.

Mr. Mulroney said that he had just wanted to get the position clear. Canada was considering intensifying its commitment to the Alliance, and was worried about being caught off balance by an abrupt acceptance of Gorbachev's proposals by the Iraqis. It was very important not to leave Saddam Hussain as a figure of influence in the Arab world. He had found his exchange with the Prime Minister reassuring.


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CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

Mr. Mulroney said that he wanted to express personally the horror which people in Canada felt at the outrageous, cruel and unlawful attacks carried out in London by the IRA. The Prime Minister said that this was much appreciated.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence), John Neilson (Department of Energy), Juliet Wheldon (Law Officers Department) and to Sir Robin Butler.

Yours sincerely,


C. D. POWELL

Richard Gozney, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Subject cc MASTER



10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

19 February 1991

Dear Richard,

**PRIME MINISTER'S TALK WITH PRESIDENT MITTERRAND:
THE GULF**

The Prime Minister telephoned President Mitterrand this evening to continue their discussion of the Gulf. They spoke for about 20 minutes. President Bush was due to speak to President Mitterrand immediately afterwards.

President Mitterrand said that he had wanted to consult the Prime Minister on the position which Britain and France should take on the Soviet proposals put to Tariq Aziz. He was engaged in discussing this with a small group of advisers. It seemed to him that the first task was to hasten Saddam Hussain's response to the proposals. We could not tolerate unnecessary delay. Second, we should insist that an Iraqi withdrawal should take place quickly. Only the experts could say how long was needed, but he was thinking of 8/10 days. Third, there was the question of what we expected Iraq to do with its heavy weapons in Kuwait. There were many other points to be resolved. Should we insist that Iraq cease firing SCUD missiles at Israel? How far from the borders with Kuwait must Iraq withdraw? In his opinion, it should be a long way. Should we insist that there should be no contamination by chemical weapons? All these questions would need to be addressed rapidly were Saddam Hussain to accept the Russian proposals. It was very important that the principal Allies should be in agreement. The worst scenario would be one in which we reached different conclusions at a time when our armies were so closely interwoven.

The Prime Minister said that he thought our views were fairly close, judging by the statement issued by M. Dumas. We thought that Gorbachev's proposals fell well short of the requirements of the Security Council's resolutions. The Prime Minister then listed the points he made in his message to President Bush. We agreed on the need for the earliest possible reply from Saddam Hussain, although our own assessment was that he might well reject the Soviet proposals or tried to add extra conditions to them. We also agreed on the need for a very rapid withdrawal from Kuwait. We were undecided whether we should demand that Iraq's heavy equipment should remain behind: it might be a condition which they could not accept, and any way it was of dubious value since only a relatively limited proportion of Iraq's heavy equipment survived within the borders of Kuwait.

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
- 2 -

There was one point which he wished to add to those listed by President Mitterrand and that was the need for direct contacts between Iraq and the Allies in the event that they responded positively to the Soviet proposals.

President Mitterrand said he would shortly be hearing President Bush's views. He wanted to stress again how important it was that we should all be on the same wavelength. Unfortunately Germany and Italy had already come out with rather enthusiastic comments on the Soviet proposals. The Prime Minister said that he had spoken to Chancellor Kohl that morning and tried to point out some of the deficiencies in the proposals. President Mitterrand said that, thinking aloud, he wondered whether we should not "have a meeting among ourselves", especially if we were intending to set new conditions. Those who were waging the war should get together. (It was not clear how wide he intended this meeting to go.) The Prime Minister suggested that President Mitterrand should put the suggestion to President Bush.

President Mitterrand said it would be helpful if he and the Prime Minister were to speak again the following day, since there might be a response from Saddam Hussain by then on which they would need to consult. We could not let the Iraqis string us along and try to prevent a land campaign from starting. If the Iraqis failed to respond or responded negatively, there should be a significant military reaction from the Allies. The Prime Minister said he was pleased to find that Britain and France were taking a broadly similar view. He looked forward to continuing the discussion the next day.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence), John Neilson (Department of Energy), Juliet Wheldon (Law Officers Department) and to Sir Robin Butler.

Yours sincerely,


C. D. POWELL

Richard Gozney, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL

E. R.

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIME MINISTER

TALKS WITH PRESIDENT MITTERRAND AND PRIME MINISTER MULRONEY

You are to speak on the telephone to President Mitterrand at 2000 and Prime Minister Mulroney at 2020. I attach for you:

- the Gorbachev proposals
- your message to President Bush
- the substance of the American response to the Russians
- my letter recording a talk with Mitterrand's diplomatic adviser earlier this evening
- the EC statement issued today.

C. D.

C. D. POWELL

19 February 1991

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10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

19 February 1991

THE GULF

Pierre Morel, President Mitterrand's diplomatic adviser telephoned me tonight, ahead of the Prime Minister's telephone conversation with President Mitterrand, to say that the French were just putting out a statement on the Soviet peace proposals, which were fairly similar to the line used by the Prime Minister in the House of Commons. They would confirm that they had been informed of the Russian proposals: that the proposals themselves were secret and they would not therefore comment on them specifically: but they looked to Iraq for an immediate and unequivocal reply which would conform strictly with all UN Security Council resolutions. I said this indeed sounded very close to what the Prime Minister had said. Morel was inclined to the view that the French statement was slightly more flexible. But they certainly agreed with us that it was for the Iraqis rather than the Allies to respond to the Russian proposals. His impression from contacts at the State Department was that the Americans would not reject the Soviet proposals. (This is rather interesting, since the White House definitely are rejecting them: it may reflect some difference of view between Secretary Baker and the President.)

Morel said that he had commissioned the French military to do some work on the time it would take Iraq to withdraw its forces from Kuwait. He would telephone me tomorrow with the results of this.

I record this principally to show the effort which the French are making to remain in regular contact with us following the Prime Minister's recent talks with President Mitterrand. It is a most positive sign.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence), John Neilson (Department of Energy) and to Sir Robin Butler.

C. D. POWELL

Richard Gozney, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL

File JM
cc PC
PM
CDP

SECRET AND PERSONAL



10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

22a-b (1)
R. H. Austin
C.D.
14/2

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OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT**

19 February 1991

See Richard

THE GULF

General Scowcroft telephoned me this evening for a round-up.

General Scowcroft said that the President had just spoken to Mitterrand and had been much reassured. Earlier in the day, the Americans had heard reports that Mitterrand thought the Soviet proposals positive, and was upset at the Americans for reacting negatively to them. But this had not been reflected when he spoke to the President: indeed he had been very firm. I gave him an account of the Prime Minister's talk with Mitterrand, from which he had drawn a similar conclusion. Mitterrand had spoken vaguely of a meeting between the main Allies. The Prime Minister had suggested that he mention the idea to President Bush: we were not sure whether Mitterrand had intended only a bilateral Anglo-French encounter. General Scowcroft said that Mitterrand had indeed alluded to the telephone being an inadequate means of communication, but had added: "I don't know what I mean by that". As far as the Americans were concerned, they would welcome an Anglo-French meeting if it helped to keep the French aboard. We were on the home stretch now and the coalition must not fall apart.

Rather unkindly I told Scowcroft that Pierre Morel had detected a softer line by the State Department on the Soviet proposals. Scowcroft said instantly that he could tell me confidentially that there was a considerable difference of view between the State Department and the White House, with the former taking a more positive view of the Gorbachev proposals.

General Scowcroft said that President Mubarak had been in touch to say that he fully supported the President's approach: we must not let ourselves be duped by the Iraqis.

I asked Scowcroft whether the robust language on the consequences for the Iraqis of using CW in his latest message constituted any change in the proposed American response to CW, as he had previously explained it to me. Scowcroft said that it did not. The Americans were simply doing everything they could to scare the Iraqis out of using CW.


SECRET AND PERSONAL

SECRET AND PERSONAL

- 2 -

General Scowcroft said that the build-up to the start of the land campaign was absolutely on course, to the timetable which the President had described to the Prime Minister.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence), and to Sir Robin Butler.

Yours sincerely,


C.D. POWELL

Richard Gozney, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SECRET AND PERSONAL

Subject cc master

CONFIDENTIAL

NOTE FOR THE RECORD

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH THE LEADER OF THE LIBERAL PARTY

The Prime Minister briefed Mr. Paddy Ashdown MP on developments in the Gulf, in particular the Soviet Government's peace proposals. He gave Mr. Ashdown a detailed account of these and explained the reasons for the Government's hesitancy about them. Mr. Ashdown expressed understanding for this and said he expected that his party would agree with him in rejecting the Soviet proposals if they were shown to represent less than the requirements of the UN Security Council resolutions dealing with Iraq/Kuwait.

C.D.R.

CHARLES POWELL

19 February 1991

c:\foreign\ashdown (ecl)

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cc back up

PRIME MINISTER

MEETING WITH MR. KINNOCK

You are seeing Mr. Kinnock tomorrow to bring him up to date on developments in the Gulf on Privy Council terms. The main points to cover are:

- The Ground Campaign. You will want to say that it is getting inexorably closer but you cannot give a precise date for the start. It is hard to see how it can be avoided now unless Saddam Hussain has a complete change of heart. You are confident we are as well prepared and equipped as we will ever be.
- Ceasefire proposals. You might offer to show him President Gorbachev's message explaining his ceasefire proposals and take him through the reasons why we regard them as inadequate. They do not require acceptance of all the Security Council resolutions: they do not provide for immediate and unconditional withdrawal: they do not make it necessary for Saddam Hussain to give up Iraq's claim to Kuwait: they do not provide for reparations. Beyond that, there is nothing said about the treatment of POWs. You are determined that we should not get caught in a cycle of fruitless negotiations. You have talked to President Bush, President Mitterrand and Chancellor Kohl: you find them and our Arab allies robust in their determination not to let Saddam Hussain off the hook but to see the Security Council resolutions implemented in full.

Civilian casualties. You might give the background to the Al Fallujah incident: we are determined that honesty is the best policy. You might also assure Mr. Kinnock that the Americans had good reason to believe that the bunker which they hit in Baghdad was being used for military purposes.

T.N.B.
Re Soviet
Ambassador
saw Mr.
Kinnock this
afternoon, no
doubt to
bring him on
to Soviet
proposals.
C.D.P.

C.D.P.
CHARLES POWELL

19 February 1991

c:\foreign\kinnock (ecl)

CONFIDENTIAL

21

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BT

FOLLOWING FOR GENERAL SCOWCROFT
FROM CHARLES POWELL.

DEAR GEORGE,

THE PROPOSALS THEMSELVES FALL WELL SHORT OF WHAT WE CAN ACCEPT. THEY DO NOT FULLY COVER UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 660. THEY IGNORE ALL THE OTHER RELEVANT SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS TO WHICH WE AND OTHER MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ARE COMMITTED. WE NEED A CLEAR GUARANTEE ON THE RELEASE OF ALL POWS, AND KUWAITI AND OTHER DETAINEES. WE ALSO WANT TO SEE ACCEPTANCE OF A TIGHT TIMETABLE FOR THE COMPLETION OF IRAQI WITHDRAWAL: PREFERABLY 48 HOURS FROM KUWAIT CITY AND 15 DAYS FROM KUWAIT. WE ALSO ATTACH IMPORTANCE TO ASSERTING CONTROL OF AIRSPACE OVER KUWAIT ONCE THE CEASEFIRE COMES INTO OPERATION.

WE FEEL THAT YOU SHOULD GIVE THE RUSSIANS AN INITIAL REACTION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE SO THAT THEY ARE CLEAR THAT THE PRESENT PROPOSAL IS UNACCEPTABLE TO THE COALITION. IT WOULD BE WISE NOT TO GO INTO DETAIL LEST WE ARE DRAWN INTO PREMATURE NEGOTIATION WITH THE RUSSIANS AS MIDDLEMEN. ALSO WE DO NOT WANT TO GIVE ANY PRETEXT FOR PROLONGING THE DISCUSSIONS IF SADDAM HUSSEIN TURNS THE PROPOSAL DOWN OR SEEKS TO IMPOSE UNREASONABLE CONDITIONS.

WE THEREFORE THINK THAT THE MESSAGE YOU PASS TO THE RUSSIANS SHOULD BE IN GENERAL TERMS. IT SHOULD POINT OUT THAT THE GORBACHEV PROPOSAL FAILS TO MEET THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS, AS WELL AS A NUMBER OF OTHER IMPORTANT POINTS INCLUDING IRAQ'S OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS. THE RUSSIANS SHOULD BE FURTHER TOLD THAT, IF THE IRAQIS ARE PREPARED TO ACCEPT THESE GENERAL CONDITIONS, THE COALITION WOULD THEN BE READY TO TALK DIRECT WITH THE IRAQI AUTHORITIES ABOUT THE PRECISE CONDITIONS FOR A CEASEFIRE. UNTIL THE IRAQIS HAVE ACCEPTED THE PRECISE CONDITIONS, ALLIED MILITARY OPERATIONS WILL CONTINUE AS PLANNED. IF THE IRAQIS SUBSEQUENTLY BREACHED THE CONDITIONS HOSTILITIES WOULD RECOMMENCE.

IN PUBLIC WE PROPOSE TO TAKE THE LINE THAT WE HAVE RECEIVED THE GORBACHEV PROPOSALS. WE HAVE BEEN ASKED TO TREAT THEM AS CONFIDENTIAL AND INTEND TO HONOUR THIS REQUEST. WE ARE IN TOUCH WITH OUR COALITION PARTNERS. BUT NOTHING HAS YET HAPPENED WHICH WOULD JUSTIFY CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES. UNTIL IRAQ IMMEDIATELY AND UNCONDITIONALLY WITHDRAWS FROM KUWAIT HOSTILITIES WILL CONTINUE AS PLANNED.

IT WILL BE IMPORTANT TO BRING ALONG OUR EUROPEAN AND ARAB COALITION PARTNERS WHO WILL HAVE AN IMPORTANT ROLE TO PLAY. BUT OUR FIRST PRIORITY SHOULD BE TO SEND A RAPID MESSAGE TO MOSCOW, STRESSING THE UNACCEPTABILITY OF THEIR PROPOSALS.

WARM REGARDS

JOHN

BT

NNNN

FILE KR²⁰

bc PC

SECRET AND PERSONAL



10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

19 February 1991

THE GULF

I enclose a copy of the Prime Minister's message to President Bush in the form in which it has been despatched.


I am copying this letter and enclosure to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence), John Neilson (Department of Energy), Juliet Wheldon (Law Officers' Department) and to Sir Robin Butler.

(C. D. POWELL)

Richard Gozney, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SECRET AND PERSONAL

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DEPARTMENT/SERIES <i>Prem 19</i>	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM <i>3448</i> (one piece/item number)	
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SUBJECT CE MASTER



10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

19 February 1991

Prime Minister's Conversation with Chancellor Kohl: The Gulf

Chancellor Kohl telephoned the Prime Minister this morning about the Gulf situation.

Chancellor Kohl said he had talked at length to Gorbachev yesterday, and now had the text of the proposals which he had put to Tariq Aziz. The Iranian Foreign Minister had also been in Bonn, and had in turn met Tariq Aziz shortly beforehand. From these various contacts, his impression was that the Iraqis were looking for a way out of the present situation. Gorbachev had taken a clear position on the basis of the United Nations Resolutions: he was insisting that Iraq must withdraw unconditionally from Kuwait. Other questions could only be considered once that step had been taken. Velayati had said that the destruction in Iraq was so bad that Saddam Hussein would have no option but to relent. He had added that Tariq Aziz had admitted as much to him. Gorbachev had made quite clear that the Iraqis must respond quickly. The next 24 hours would be crucial and perhaps decisive. This was the last chance for Saddam Hussein.

The Prime Minister thanked Chancellor Kohl, for this account. We were in the process of analysing the Soviet proposals. But we saw distinct deficiencies in them. For instance, they would enable the Iraqis to preserve all their forces and equipment in Kuwait, and thus a substantial part of their offensive capability. There was no provision for reparations, or for an early exchange of POWs, or any provision to hold Saddam Hussein responsible for what had happened in Kuwait. Moreover, there seemed a risk that the proposals might simply be the starting point for further bargaining. All that said, we were not closing our minds. We would wait and hear what the Iraqis had to say, and see whether their response indicated that a satisfactory settlement was possible.

Chancellor Kohl agreed that we must see how the Iraqis responded. At the same time, it was most important to keep Gorbachev on side with the Allied effort. If his proposals failed, he would have little option. The Prime Minister agreed that we should not be precipitate. It was certainly important to bind in Gorbachev. However, Gorbachev had particularly asked that we should keep his proposals confidential. We were not

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- 2 -

therefore intending to make any public comment. We would only say that it was the Iraqis who had been asked to respond and we must wait for that. Chancellor Kohl suggested that he and the Prime Minister get in touch again when the Iraqi response was known. But he hoped we would fully exploit the opportunities which now existed and not waste them.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence), John Neilson (Department of Energy), Juliet Wheldon (Law Officers' Department) and to Sir Robin Butler.

(C. D. POWELL)

Richard Gozney, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET AND PERSONAL



10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

19 February 1991

THE GULF

I had a brief word with General Scowcroft immediately after the meeting of OPD(G) this morning.

I told General Scowcroft that a message from the Prime Minister to the President setting out our views on how to respond to the Soviet proposals would be on its way shortly. It would suggest that we tell the Soviets that their proposals were unsatisfactory, because they did not provide for immediate and unconditional withdrawal and for the implementation of all the Security Council Resolutions. There were other important omissions such as references to Iraq's obligations under the Geneva Conventions and a timetable for withdrawal. But we would not want to go into too much detail with the Russians or use them as a conduit to the Iraqis. Once the Iraqis were ready to make an immediate and unconditional withdrawal, based on acceptance of all the Security Council Resolutions, they should communicate direct with the allies. General Scowcroft said that the Americans were about to go into another meeting. They would welcome our ideas as soon as possible. But what I had told him corresponded very closely with their own thinking. The only additional point was that they were thinking of characterising the Soviet proposals as only a very slightly amended version of the Iraqi proposals of last Friday.

I ask General Scowcroft whether the Americans had given details of the Soviet proposals to their Arab allies. He said they had told the Saudis and Egyptians that the proposals had some very negative factors. They were thinking of giving them a summary of the proposals but not the full text. They were nervous that would leak. OPD(G) concluded that we should not get out of step with the Americans on the handling of the Soviet proposals.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence), John Neilson (Department of Energy), Juliet Wheldon (Law Officers' Department) and Sir Robin Butler.

Charles Powell

Richard Gозney Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

SECRET AND PERSONAL

*The Minister**CDN**19/2*

Ref. AO91/390

PRIME MINISTER

cc Sir Percy Cradock
Mr AppleyardOPD(G): 19 FebruarySoviet Proposals

The FCO are circulating the text of a draft message to President Bush which you may wish to use as the basis for the discussion in addition to President Gorbachev's message to you.

2. You might invite Mr Hogg (the Foreign Secretary is in Luxembourg at an EC Foreign Ministers' meeting) to introduce the draft message. The prime objective at the present stage is to establish co-ordination with the US Government drawing on the papers on the ceasefire proposals, bringing the conflict to an end and POWs which we have sent them.

3. The draft message considers the allied response to the Russians. The essence is to tell the Russians now that their proposals are inadequate since they do not take account of the full range of UN Security Council Resolutions and that there are points of crucial importance which will have to be included in the conditions for a ceasefire. These are POWs, withdrawal timetable, leaving equipment behind and allied monitoring of Kuwaiti airspace. There will be other points of detail which will need to be covered later stemming from our ceasefire proposals, on which we have not had a specific US response.

*does any
part.*

4. The message will go on to say that once the Iraqis give an unconditional commitment to withdraw the coalition will want to begin direct talks with the Iraqis on the basis of the conditions set out above : ie cutting out the Russians as intermediaries at that stage. If we are to reach that stage we will need to



consider which countries will be on the coalition team. Until the Iraqis give an unconditional commitment to withdraw there will be no change in the allied campaign.

5. There are a number of issues which you will want to draw out in discussion. We will want to avoid being drawn into premature negotiations in giving the response to the Russians. You might invite Ministers to give their views on whether the proposed response to the Russians strikes the right balance between putting down a strong marker that the Soviet proposals are inadequate without going so far as to tempt the Russians to use them as the basis for further negotiations with the Iraqis. We will need to consider the public impact of our response if it becomes known in detail. A key question is whether it will be realistic to insist on the Iraqis leaving their equipment behind.

6. Having agreed the line to take with the US Government there are other issues which need to be considered urgently. You might invite Mr Hogg to say a word about consultation with other coalition partners: the Foreign Secretary is already in touch with M Dumas. The FCO will need to prepare a line for the Security Council which resumes its debate later today.

7. There may be pressure from the Opposition for a statement in the House this afternoon. The Foreign Secretary will be away and it will be difficult to make a statement while the proposals are confidential and we are at such an early stage of forming an allied view on them. You might consider having a word with Mr Kinnock to point out that the Russians had asked us to keep their proposals confidential and that discussion within the coalition was at a delicate stage so that a statement today would not help the allied cause.

8. Mr O'Donnell will need a press line. This might be to confirm that we had received the Soviet proposals, to add that



President Gorbachev had requested us to treat them as confidential and that we were in close touch with our coalition partners. This would avoid commenting on the merits of the proposals at this stage.

9. You might conclude the discussion by approving the lines of a message from you to President Bush, taking account of the comments made by colleagues, which would request an early US response, especially on the ceasefire conditions, the nature of the response to the Russians and coalition handling. You might agree the strategy to be adopted on handling any request for a Parliamentary statement and the press line. You might reaffirm that unless the Iraqis come up with an unconditional commitment to withdraw the allied campaign will continue and ask the Defence Secretary to make sure that theatre commanders are aware of this.

R.R.B.
ROBIN BUTLER

19 February 1991

SECRET

12(A-c)

PRIME MINISTER

OPD(G): THE GULF

The extra meeting of OPD(G) this morning will look at the Soviet peace proposals put to Tariq Aziz. On substance, we need to settle:

- our views on where the Soviet proposals are deficient; ✓
- the points that must be included in a ceasefire proposal if it is to be satisfactory. ✓

On procedure, we need to decide:

- how best to co-ordinate a response to the Russians with the Americans and French. (The Foreign Secretary will be talking to Dumas this morning in Luxembourg: you will need to speak later to Mitterrand.); ✓
- how to convey those comments to the Russians; and
- what you should say in the House this afternoon.

Deficiencies in the Russian proposals

These were set out in my comments to Scowcroft last night:

- the Iraqis preserve all their forces and equipment in Kuwait, and thus a substantial part of their offensive capability;
- no provision for POWs;
- no reparations;
- no attempt to hold Saddam responsible;

SECRET

- the proposals may simply be the starting-point for further bargaining.

Points we want to see included

These are set out in our paper on the conditions for a ceasefire (attached).

How to co-ordinate a response

We need to set out our views for the Americans: this can be orally by you with the President or me with Scowcroft: or we can set them out in a rapid message. We should then need to consider to what extent we are prepared to modify them to take account of American and French views.

There is also the tactical question of whether to comment fairly rapidly to the Russians: or wait until we know the Iraqi response. Arguably we should at least give the Russians a general steer that we find deficiencies in the proposals: this protects us against the risk that the Iraqis might accept them, and the Russians think they have a deal: equally we don't necessarily want to be the first to knock down the Soviet proposals.

What you say in the House

This depends on what has happened by mid-afternoon. The minimal position is to:

- confirm that Gorbachev sent you the proposals last night;
- point out that he asked you to keep them confidential, which precludes substantial comment;
- indicate that it is the Iraqis who have been asked to respond, not us;

SECRET

- 3 -

- but make clear that nothing has yet happened which would incline us to agree to a ceasefire or pause in the conflict.

Beyond that, you may need to say that we find the Soviet proposals deficient in some important respects: and that anyway satisfactory arrangements can only be made directly between the Iraqis and the Allies.

C.D.?

for a ceasefire
- a basis, but not a satisfactory basis for
a cease fire.

CHARLES POWELL

19 February 1991

c:\wpdocs\foreign\gulf2.dca

- of course favour peace: but not a
peace now @ expense of us later.

where does it
fall short of SCR?

SECRET

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PRIME MINISTER

THE GULF

After our exchange this morning, I spoke to the Foreign Secretary in Luxembourg. I said that you did not think it would be right to make our main pitch to the Russians a statement that we had to negotiate with the Iraqis directly. The Russians would have little incentive to pass this on since, for better or worse, they had manoeuvred themselves into the position of intermediary. You thought our comments should be directed rather to the substance of the Soviet proposals, where we found them deficient and what we believed acceptable ceasefire proposals would have to contain. It would be very helpful if he could take Dumas at least through our objections to the Soviet text and the points in our own paper on a ceasefire and try to bind the French into our general approach. That would be a solid base on which you could subsequently talk to President Mitterrand. At the same time, you were concerned to avoid any precipitate public statements or comments by the French or by the EC (it was not clear whether the Germans and Italians had also received the text of Gorbachev's proposals). The Americans would take it amiss if, having held back to some extent from making an early response themselves, the Europeans were then to jump in with some public statement.

The Foreign Secretary took these comments and will act on them. He agrees on reflection that we must put the ^{substance} questions of the Soviet proposals at the centre of our critique: but feels that we must also make the point that it is not in the end satisfactory to have to deal through a third party or through the United Nations Security Council. If there is to be a ceasefire, it will have to be agreed between Iraq and the Allies directly. I think this is acceptable as a secondary aspect of our comments.

CDP
CHARLES POWELL

19 February 1991

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10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

The results of
my discussions with
General Hancock
overnight

C DO

19/2.



10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

War Aims

Sec R

restore power + security

19 February 1991

1. Weapons/Intend.
2. POW
- 3.

Dear President Bush,

Our Penetration Proposals?
What did we say?

THE GULF: SOVIET PROPOSALS

I spoke to General Scowcroft shortly before midnight about the Soviet proposals put to Tariq Aziz, the text of which I sent you earlier in the evening. He had just emerged from a long meeting with the President, Secretary Baker and others.

General Scowcroft asked what I thought about the proposals. I said that I did not much like them, but was having some difficulty seeing how one could scotch them. There were no penalties on Iraq other than leaving Kuwait where they had no business to be anyway. They could withdraw the remainder of their forces and equipment without hindrance. They would not be held responsible for the appalling damage done to Kuwait or the crimes committed there. There would be no reparations. Nothing was said about POWs. The nature of commitment to discuss points of interest to the Iraqis in a second stage was unsatisfactory. Moreover it was not clear whether the proposals had been put to the Iraqis on a take it or leave it basis, or were simply an invitation to open negotiations. Our experts would be looking at the text overnight. But for myself I did not like it, and the Prime Minister's initial response had been clearly negative. The best one could say about the proposals was that Saddam Hussein was quite likely to reject them.

General Scowcroft said that the Americans were in the same position. They were trying to figure out how to respond without making it look as though they were changing their war aims and without unduly antagonising the Soviets, while yet coming out where they wanted to be. He agreed with the points I had made, in particular that the Soviet proposals looked like the opening of horse trading rather than a best offer.

SECRET AND PERSONAL

- 2 -

X I said that the Prime Minister thought it important to avoid a unilateral response by any of the recipients of the Gorbachev message. We should try to reply in a co-ordinated way. It might be best to reflect and consult further the next day. General Scowcroft said that the Americans were prepared to be patient. They had some thoughts but wanted to sleep on them. He was perfectly content with the idea of withholding any public comment for now. Indeed all that the Americans were saying to the press was that the Soviets had shared their ideas with them: they had no comment to make: meanwhile, the military campaign would continue. If we said that the proposals were terrible, there was a risk that might prompt Saddam Hussein to accept them. He wondered whether we had heard anything further from the French. I said that we had not, but planned to contact them further in the morning.

I asked General Scowcroft whether the Americans had started to work out the substance of their response. General Scowcroft said that they had so far had only some sketchy ideas. They would concentrate simply and solely on the four points and describe all the rest - in particular the contents of the so-called second stage - as totally unacceptable. As regards the four points, their approach might be that there could be no formal ceasefire, but if the Iraqis left Kuwait within 96 hours they would not be attacked, provided also that they released all POWs and accepted all UN Security Council Resolutions. But he admitted that this was only a very preliminary view. I said that it had some good points in it which we would look at in our own analysis.

General Scowcroft subsequently telephoned again at 0030 to say that the Americans had reflected further following his conversation with me. They were now concerned that the Russians might treat absence of any response as an indication that the Americans and others could live with their proposals. If Saddam Hussein told the Russians tomorrow that he could accept them, the Russians might think that they had a deal. They were inclined therefore to go back with a very preliminary response recognising that the Russians had made a serious effort but indicating they did not think it would work. They would point out the risks of simply setting up a negotiation and draw attention to the absence of any reference to full implementation of the UN Security Council Resolutions. They would make clear that they would have a fuller response tomorrow, including perhaps a statement of what we would regard as acceptable. I recalled that the Prime Minister has been anxious to avoid any unilateral response, particularly if it became public, because this made it look as though it was purely an American rather than a broader allied concern. We were certainly in favour of spelling out what should be contained in the ceasefire proposal: we had put our own ideas to the Americans some time ago and had been pressing for a response. General Scowcroft said he took these points: but the President's concern was that the absence of any response tonight could be misinterpreted. They thought they must say something, but would avoid any publicity. They would indicate that it represented only an initial view, based on preliminary contacts with their allies, and that they would be making a fuller response after consultation with them. I said I could see the

SECRET AND PERSONAL


SECRET AND PERSONAL

- 3 -

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We agreed to speak again in the morning.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence), John Neilson (Department of Energy), Juliet Wheldon (Law Officers' Department) and Sir Robin Butler.

Yours sincerely,


Charles Powell

Resident Clerk
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

SECRET AND PERSONAL

SECRET AND PERSONAL



10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

19 February 1991

Dear Resident Clerk,

THE GULF: SOVIET PROPOSALS

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SECRET AND PERSONAL

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
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advantage of letting the Russians know straightaway that we did not find their proposal adequate. Provided it was done in the discrete way which Scowcroft had suggested, I thought the Prime Minister would see the case for it. General Scowcroft said that he would send me overnight a copy of whatever the Americans decided to send.

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I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence), John Neilson (Department of Energy), Juliet Wheldon (Law Officers' Department) and Sir Robin Butler.

Yours sincerely,


Charles Powell

Resident Clerk
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

From: Lieutenant Colonel J R Durance RE
Military Assistant to Minister of State for the
Armed Forces



MINISTER OF STATE FOR
THE ARMED FORCES

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

Telephone 071-21 82216 (Direct Dialling)
071-21 89000 (Switchboard)

D/MIN(AF)/AH/5/3/30A

*we agreed this weeks ago. What has been
happening. This looks like a shambled.
19.2
Dear Sir Charles*

*R. Durance
CD*
19 February 1991/19/2

*[It wd. have been
deeper & easier all
round to deal so far
free at 39 calls!]*

You will recall that I set out in my letter of 24 January arrangements for the introduction of a concession of £10 a month on telephone calls made by Service personnel in the Gulf. You confirmed in your letter of 28 January to Jane Binstead that the Prime Minister was content to adopt this concessionary scheme, and it was announced in the House by the Secretary of State during his statement on the Gulf on 31 January. Some practical difficulties have now arisen in the implementation of the concession, and I thought, in view of the Prime Minister's interest in the scheme, you would wish to be aware of the approach we now plan to adopt.

There are, as you know, 2 different telephone systems operating in the Gulf which together form the welfare telephone service. The Mercury system operates on the basis of phone-card equipment, and the £10 concession would be relatively easy to manage for this. Phone cards are flown out to the Gulf and are issued through Service sources. The concession could be introduced either through the sale of 5 x £4 cards a month at a concessionary rate of £2, or through the free issue of £10 cards which Mercury would manufacture for this purpose. This would generate an administrative burden on the pay staffs in the Gulf, but this would not be unmanageable.

The real difficulties arise over the British Telecom system ("Desert Direct"), which operates on a reverse charge basis. Under this system, calls are in effect free to Service users in the Gulf, with the recipients of the calls ultimately having to pick up the bill. The original plan, designed inter alia to combat potential abuse of the system, was for the concession to be claimed on production of a copy of the recipient's quarterly telephone bill, on which Desert Direct

calls would be itemised separately. More detailed examination of how this would work in practice, however, has revealed an administrative nightmare. The system required to manage this would be cumbersome in the extreme, and expensive; more importantly, it would add an extra heavy burden on staffs in the Gulf and at High Wycombe, who, of course, have other, more pressing duties to undertake.

In the light of these difficulties, we have concluded that the most sensible way of introducing the concession, removing the potential for abuse and ensuring equity of treatment across all personnel in theatre would be to include the £10 telephone concession for all those in the Gulf in their monthly pay packets. This could be undertaken by pay staff with the minimum of extra work and has the great benefit of simplicity. There was resistance to this approach previously because of the potential for this to be seen as a new allowance, and being interpreted as a form of special "Gulf Pay"; there was also a concern about the potential for invidious comparisons to be drawn, if it was only paid in this way to users of the BT system. It is now quite clear, however, that the advantages outweigh the disadvantages, and that paying the concession to all personnel in the theatre by this method, accompanied by clear advice to personnel explaining the purpose of the concession, would overcome any presentational difficulties.

Ideally, we wanted to link the concession more directly with the use of telephones and adopt a similar system to that in Northern Ireland which is an example of this. In Northern Ireland a similar level of discount is managed directly through the sale of phone-cards through Service sources. We are now convinced that this is impracticable in the Gulf. It will therefore be important to ensure that the impact of the concession is not lost through the more indirect method of implementation we are now implementing, and we aim to continue to promote the concession in a positive fashion in order to achieve this.

Yours sincerely
John Durance

Sir Charles Powell
10 Downing Street

MIDDLE EAST: Sit
Pt 42

With compliments

(2)

Tim Davis

com
20/2/92

qr?



Department of Education and Science

Elizabeth House York Road London SE1 7PH

Direct Line 071-934
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GTN Number 3914
Fax 071-934 9082



THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION AND SCIENCE

ELIZABETH HOUSE YORK ROAD LONDON SE1 7PH
TELEPHONE 071-934 9000

ROBERT ATKINS MP
Minister for Sport

The Rt Hon Tom King MP
Secretary of State for Defence
Ministry of Defence
Main Building
Whitehall
London SW1A 2HB

RA/4256/1036

Dear Tom,

18 FEB 1991

I am enclosing a copy of a letter I have received from the Chief Executive of the Football Association about the rehabilitation of service personnel who may be injured in the Gulf War.

You will see that the Football Association has, very thoughtfully, offered the use of its Sports Medicine Institute at Lilleshall for service personnel requiring rehabilitation treatment. I understand that your Department rather than the Department of Health will be responsible for the rehabilitation of service personnel once they have received any necessary hospital treatment. I wonder therefore whether your people would like to get in touch with the Football Association to discuss how the offer may be taken forward.

I am copying this letter and the Football Association's to the Prime Minister, William Waldegrave and Douglas Hurd.

Regards,

ROBERT ATKINS

Robert Atkins

DES

THE FOOTBALL ASSOCIATION
LIMITED
Founded 1863

Patron: HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN
President: H.R.H. THE DUKE OF KENT
Chairman: F. A. MILLICHIP

Chief Executive:
R. H. G. KELLY FCIS



Phone: 071-402 7151/071-262 4542
Telex: 261110
Facsimile: 071-402 0486

16 LANCASTER GATE, LONDON W23LW

Our Ref:

Your Ref:

RHGK/CFCH/MP/137

28 January 1991

Mr. Robert Atkins MP
Minister of Sport
The Department of Education & Science
Elizabeth House
York Road
London SE1 7PH

Dear Minister,


GULF WAR - REHABILITATION OF INJURED PERSONNEL

As you are no doubt aware, The Football Association has its own International Sports Medicine Institute at Lilleshall. As part of that Institute, we treat 25 - 30 patients each week. Mostly, of course, the patients are athletes from various sports, in many cases requiring rehabilitation following major surgery.

We have, at Lilleshall, a very highly qualified medical staff and the most up-to-date equipment. The Football Association would be pleased to make both our staff and facilities available for any of our Servicemen from the Gulf requiring medical rehabilitation.

I appreciate that you may wish to forward this letter to the Department of Health and Social Security but, thought it appropriate for us to make the offer through yourself.

Yours sincerely


Chief Executive

c.c. F.A. Millichip
Dr. J.O'Hara
A. Hodson
P. Newton



CONFIDENTIAL

T01403

SIR CHARLES POWELL

cc Sir Robin Butler
Mr Appleyard

BURDENDSHARING

The Chief Secretary has seen the draft brief prepared by the FCO for the Japanese Ambassador's call on the Prime Minister this afternoon. I have been asked to convey his view as Chairman of OPD(G)(B) that, in the interests of clarity, it would be preferable if the Prime Minister were to tell the Ambassador that \$720 million is the figure we are seeking: or, if that is too strong, then at least that we are seeking 8% of \$9 billion, proportionate to our force strength in the Gulf.

W D Reeves

W D REEVES

18 February 1991

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET



10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

18 February 1991

Dear Reader Clear.

THE GULF: SOVIET PROPOSALS

The Soviet Ambassador called on me at 2230 in order to hand over a message to the Prime Minister containing the "proposals" which Mr. Gorbachev had put to Tariq Aziz in Moscow earlier today. I enclose a copy with the Russian original. The Ambassador said that no conditions were attached to Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait other than an undertaking by the Soviet Union to ensure that Iraqi forces would not be attacked while leaving. All other matters raised by Iraq could be discussed in a second stage. But they were not, and could not be, a condition of withdrawal. Attempts to establish linkage were, as the message said, unacceptable and unrealistic. The Russians hoped to hear the Iraqi response in the course of tomorrow. Meanwhile they would very much value any reactions from the Prime Minister.

*+ 1. Ambassador
ambassador
invitation?*

I said that I would pass the message to the Prime Minister. I would not offer any comments myself, but had one or two questions and observations. First, I wondered whether the proposals had been put to Tariq Aziz on a take it or leave it basis: or was President Gorbachev prepared to engage in further negotiation about them? The Soviet Ambassador said that he had no precise instructions. But his clear impression was that the Iraqis would be expected to accept the proposal as it stood and there was no room for bargaining. I said this was obviously an important point and it would be helpful to have clarity on it. I asked whether there was any time limit set for Iraq to reply. The Ambassador said that the message referred only to the need for Iraq to respond promptly. He understood that Moscow hoped for a reply in the course of tomorrow. I asked whether the countervailing obligations offered in the proposal - the guarantee that Iraqi forces would not be attacked while leaving Kuwait and that a special session of the Security Council would be convened to assure non-renewal of military actions - were envisaged as purely Soviet obligations towards Iraq, which the Russians would subsequently negotiate with the Allies, i.e. direct contacts between the coalition and Iraqis were not envisaged. The Ambassador thought this was the case. I said that I had one additional observation and that was the absence of any reference in the proposals to prisoners of war. They were a very major concern and it was hard to see how any ceasefire proposals could reasonably be put forward without reference to them. The Ambassador took note of this.


SECRET

SECRET

- 2 -

You will no doubt wish to arrange for the Soviet proposals to be analysed urgently so that we can give the Russians a preliminary response - if that is judged appropriate - tomorrow. I will also be seeking a view from the Americans.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence), John Neilson (Department of Energy), Juliet Wheldon (Law Officers' Department) and to Sir Robin Butler.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'John Webb' on the top line and 'Charles Powell' on the bottom line, with a small flourish at the end.

CHARLES POWELL

The Resident Clerk,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SECRET

The Rt.Hon.John Major, MP
Prime Minister
of the United Kingdom

Strictly confidential

Dear Prime Minister,

As agreed I inform you about the visit to Moscow of Tarik Aziz and about the results of discussions with him (he came accompanied by the Deputy Prime Minister Hammadi).

After my direct question - "what have you brought" - a very uneasy talk which lasted about three hours took a businesslike character.

I told them that regard the statement of the Revolutionary Command Council as a step towards the search for political settlement. But for the advance of the process one should exclude any "linkage" of the troops withdrawal with a preliminary condition. I made the point that there was no word "Kuwait" in the statement. Aziz reacted: it goes without saying. I said, if it is so, why nevertheless this state is not named...

During the discussion in respect of the conditions put forward in the statement of the Council the Iraqis had to clarify that it is not about the conditions of withdrawal, but as if about the "programme" of the settlement. I put my question straight forward: is it possible to regard this "programme" as a "reminder" of the existence of the named problems and not to consider that there will not be the withdrawal from Kuwait without their solution. From the Iraqis' clarifications it follows that the "programme" is aimed at the negotiating political process.

T.Aziz said, that he was sent here to listen to the recommendations - "how to proceed with the peaceful process which would lead to the decent and honourable peace".

I suggested the following plan: -

- Iraq makes a statement about the withdrawal of its troops from Kuwait (not in general, but precisely from Kuwait);

- it declares the concrete date of the final withdrawal. And that term should be maximum short;
- it starts the actual withdrawal of its troops the next day after the cessation of the military activity;
- the departure from Kuwait is not overburdened by any conditions but one: a guarantee that the withdrawn troops are not the subjects of attacks, that they will not be "shot in the back", that the resumption of the military actions will not take place.

Unlike the previous contacts with the representatives of the Iraqi leadership this time no "indignant" objections to peace proposals followed. The interlocutors started to ask additional questions: whether the Security Council's resolutions under which Iraq found itself in blockade will be abolished; whether American and other troops of the coalition stay in the region after the settlement of the conflict in the Persian Gulf; how the solution of the Palestinian question will be proceeded with, the solution of the problem of Lebanon, the Middle East complex in general; what will be our, the Soviet Union, attitude towards the right of Iraq to have a decent access to the sea; what is the guarantee that the Middle East knot will not be pigeon hole again, etc.

My reply was: all these problems relate to the second stage and can be put and shall be put for a discussion after Iraq's unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait, after the end of the war. We told to Aziz and Hammadi very resolutely: attempts made in the statement of the Revolutionary Council to make a linkage between liberation of Kuwait and cessation of military actions with direct solutions to these problems or to some of them are unacceptable and unrealistic.

I told Aziz that as soon as Iraq starts withdrawal of his troops the Soviet Union will put forward a proposal to convene a special session of the Security Council in order to consider the guarantees of this withdrawal and non-renewal of military actions.

In accordance with its known position of principle the USSR will insist that the UN will energetically address itself to the whole complex of the Middle East settlement, including creation of the system of regional security. There are already different projects in this respect, including - which is especially important - those of Arab states. This is not an easy process but there is an understanding in the world community that the Middle East conflict should be solved, at long last, on a just basis, primarily through accord between the states of the region and with the assistance on the part of the United Nations.

I warned our interlocutors that the time-factor plays now an extremely important role. If they cherish the lives of their countrymen and the destiny of Iraq they must act without delay.

Thus, the character of the discussions shows that the Iraqis did not reject our proposals of the cuff, but perceived them as a subject for serious reviewing. But the final answer can be, naturally, given by Iraq only after Aziz reports, as he put it, of the "Gorbachev plan" to President Hussein and to the whole of the Iraqi leadership.

I feel essential to add that I have an impression, shared by all my comrades present at the meeting, that the very fact of the Revolutionary Command Council statement, the "comments" which were brought by Aziz and the reaction to our reasonings and proposals signify the beginning of a certain shift on the part of Hussein and his team in understanding the realities.

Aziz promised to send an answer promptly.

I feel that this should be taken into account in conducting military operations in the next few days. In this connection I would note that the Iraqis in different circumstances stressed that Bagdad was the target of the most fierce strikes, precisely at the time when the special envoy of the President of the USSR was present there.

In the interests of work it is desirable that the contents of this information for the time-being be kept secret.

I will timely inform of Hussein's answer.

M.GORBACHEV

~~SECRET~~



10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

18 February 1991

Dear Reader Clear,

THE GULF: SOVIET PROPOSALS

The Soviet Ambassador called on me at 2230 in order to hand over a message to the Prime Minister containing the "proposals" which Mr. Gorbachev had put to Tariq Aziz in Moscow earlier today. I enclose a copy with the Russian original. The Ambassador said that no conditions were attached to Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait other than an undertaking by the Soviet Union to ensure that Iraqi forces would not be attacked while leaving. All other matters raised by Iraq could be discussed in a second stage. But they were not, and could not be, a condition of withdrawal. Attempts to establish linkage were, as the message said, unacceptable and unrealistic. The Russians hoped to hear the Iraqi response in the course of tomorrow. Meanwhile they would very much value any reactions from the Prime Minister.

I said that I would pass the message to the Prime Minister. I would not offer any comments myself, but had one or two questions and observations. First, I wondered whether the proposals had been put to Tariq Aziz on a take it or leave it basis: or was President Gorbachev prepared to engage in further negotiation about them? The Soviet Ambassador said that he had no precise instructions. But his clear impression was that the Iraqis would be expected to accept the proposal as it stood and there was no room for bargaining. I said this was obviously an important point and it would be helpful to have clarity on it. I asked whether there was any time limit set for Iraq to reply. The Ambassador said that the message referred only to the need for Iraq to respond promptly. He understood that Moscow hoped for a reply in the course of tomorrow. I asked whether the countervailing obligations offered in the proposal - the guarantee that Iraqi forces would not be attacked while leaving Kuwait and that a special session of the Security Council would be convened to assure non-renewal of military actions - were envisaged as purely Soviet obligations towards Iraq, which the Russians would subsequently negotiate with the Allies, i.e. direct contacts between the coalition and Iraqis were not envisaged. The Ambassador thought this was the case. I said that I had one additional observation and that was the absence of any reference in the proposals to prisoners of war. They were a very major concern and it was hard to see how any ceasefire proposals could reasonably be put forward without reference to them. The Ambassador took note of this.


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Yours sincerely,


CHARLES POWELL

The Resident Clerk,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SECRET

SUBJECT α MASTER
OPS

The Rt.Hon.John Major, MP
Prime Minister
of the United Kingdom

Strictly confidential

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T50191

Dear Prime Minister,

As agreed I inform you about the visit to Moscow of
Tarik Aziz and about the results of discussions with him
(he came accompanied by the Deputy Prime Minister Hammadi).

After my direct question - "what have you brought" -
a very uneasy talk which lasted about three hours took a
businesslike character.

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I will timely inform of Hussein's answer.

M. GORBACHEV

Его Превосходительству
господину Джону Мейджору
премьер-министру
Соединенного Королевства Великобритании
и Северной Ирландии

Уважаемый господин премьер-министр,

Как договорились, информирую Вас о визите в Москву Тарика Азиза, о результатах бесед с ним (он приехал в сопровождении зам.премьера Хаммади).

После прямой моей постановки вопроса - "с чем Вы приехали" - очень непростой разговор, который продолжался около трех часов, принял деловой характер.

Я им сказал, что рассматриваю заявление совета революционного командования как шаг к поиску политического урегулирования. Но для продвижения процесса следует исключить любую "увязку" вывода войск с предварительными условиями. Заметил попутно, что в заявлении не произнесено слова "Кувейт". Азиз реагировал: мол, это само собой разумеется. Но если так, сказал я, почему все же не названо это государство...

В ходе дискуссий в отношении выдвинутых в заявлении совета революционного командования условий иракцы вынуждены были уточнить, что речь идет не об условиях ухода, а как бы о "программе" урегулирования. Я прямо спросил: можно ли рассматривать эту "программу" как "напоминание" о существовании названных проблем и не считать, что без их решения ухода из Кувейта не будет. Из иракских разъяснений вытекало, что "программа" рассчитана на переговорный политический процесс.

Т.Азиз сказал, что послан сюда выслушать рекомендации - "как приступить к мирному процессу, который привел бы к достойному и почетному миру".

Я предложил такой план:

- Ирак заявляет о выводе своих войск из Кувейта (именно из Кувейта, а не вообще);
- объявляет конкретный срок окончательного вывода. Причем этот срок должен быть максимально кратким;
- реально начинает вывод войск на другой день после прекращения военных действий;
- уход из Кувейта не обременяется никакими условиями, за исключением одного: гарантии, что выводимые войска не подвергнутся

атакам, что им не будут "стрелять в спину", что возобновления военных действий не произойдет.

В отличие от прежних контактов с представителями руководства Ирака на этот раз не последовало "возмущенных" возражений на эти предложения. Собеседники начали задавать дополнительные вопросы: будут ли отменены резолюции Совета Безопасности, в результате которых Ирак находится в блокаде; останутся ли в регионе американские и другие войска военной коалиции после урегулирования конфликта в Персидском заливе; как дальше будет решаться палестинский вопрос, проблемы Ливана, вообще, ближневосточный комплекс; каково наше, СССР, отношение к праву Ирака на обеспечение достойного выхода к морю; какая гарантия, что ближневосточный узел опять не будет отодвинут в долгий ящик и т.д.

Я ответил: все эти проблемы второго этапа могут быть поставлены и будут поставлены на обсуждение, после того, как Ирак безоговорочно уйдет из Кувейта, после окончания войны. Азизу и Хаммади со всей решительностью было сказано: попытки, как делается в заявлении СРК, "увязывать" освобождение Кувейта и прекращение военных действий с непосредственным решением этих проблем или какой-то из них — неприемлемы и нереальны.

Сообщил Азизу, что как только Ирак начнет вывод войск, Советский Союз обратится с предложением о созыве специального заседания Совета Безопасности ООН, чтобы рассмотреть вопрос о гарантиях этого вывода и о невозобновлении военных действий.

В соответствии с известной своей принципиальной позицией СССР будет настаивать и на том, чтобы ООН энергично занялась всем комплексом ближневосточного урегулирования, включая создание системы региональной безопасности, по поводу которой уже имеются разные проекты, в том числе — что особенно важно — исходящие от самих арабских государств. Этот процесс не простой, но в мировом сообществе есть понимание, что конфликт на Ближнем Востоке надо, наконец, разрешать на справедливой основе, прежде всего — через согласие между государствами, расположенными в регионе, и с помощью Организации Объединенных Наций.

Я предупредил собеседников, что сейчас огромную роль играет фактор времени. И если они дорожат жизнями своих соотечественников, судьбой Ирака, то должны действовать незамедлительно.

Итак, из характера состоявшихся дискуссий вытекает, что иракцы не отвергли с порога наших предложений, а восприняли их как предмет для серьезного рассмотрения. Но окончательный ответ Ирак может дать, разумеется, только после того, как Азиз доложит, как он выразился, о "плане Горбачева" президенту Хусейну и всему составу иракского руководства.

Считаю необходимым добавить, что у меня самого и у всех моих товарищей, которые присутствовали на беседе, сложилось впечатление, что и сам факт заявления СРК, и "пояснения", которые привез Азиз, и реакция на наши аргументы и предложения свидетельствуют о начале определенного сдвига в понимании реальностей со стороны Хусейна и его команды.

Азиз обещал прислать ответ в самое ближайшее время.

Мне кажется, что это следовало бы учесть в проведении военных действий в эти дни. Замечу, кстати, что иракцы в разных контекстах подчеркивали, что Багдад подвергся особенно жестким ударам как раз тогда, когда там находился личный представитель президента СССР.

В интересах дела желательно, чтобы содержание этой информации оставалось пока в тайне.

Об ответе Хусейна своевременно проинформирую.

М. ГОРБАЧЕВ

CONFIDENTIAL



KW

c/foreign / french

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

18 February 1991

See Richard.

THE GULF: FRENCH VIEWS

Pierre Morel, President Mitterrand's diplomatic adviser, telephoned me this afternoon to give an account of his discussions in Washington about the post-conflict situation in the Gulf.

Generally he had been quite encouraged by what he had heard in Washington. The Americans agreed with the French that the period immediately after the end of the conflict was a window of opportunity: a chance to act, and to modify old habits and ways of thinking. They were also ready to contemplate a role for the United Nations in the aftermath of the conflict, at least in relation to longer term security arrangements, although they were much more reserved when it came to Arab/Israel. On the latter, and in particular when discussing the idea of an international conference, there was a divergence of views. Some American officials simply took the Israeli position: others saw an international conference as a potentially useful tool. There had been a readiness to discuss guarantees, including both bilateral and collective guarantees. But they had been vague on future arms control arrangements, and elusive on the subject of a dialogue with the Palestinians.

I thanked Morel for this account: it had been useful to have a talk with him before his visit Washington and to hear the results so speedily. I wondered whether the French yet had any information about the content of the proposals which President Gorbachev had put to Tariq Aziz. Morel said that the French were hoping for a call from Gorbachev this evening, although it had not yet come. In any event, President Mitterrand would like to speak to the Prime Minister on the telephone. We had to break off at this point, but left it that the President would call the Prime Minister shortly after 8 p.m.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence), John Neilson (Department of Energy) and to Sir Robin Butler.

Yours sincerely
Charles Powell

CHARLES POWELL

Richard Gozney Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL



10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

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THE PRIME MINISTER

18 February 1991

SUBJECT CL MASTER
OPS

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. TUA/91

For Mr. President,

Thank you for your letter of 31 January about your efforts to bring about a peaceful end to the present hostilities in the Gulf.

I am glad that you remain committed to achieving Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait and the restoration of its legitimate government. The coalition forces fighting in the Gulf, under the authorisation of Security Council Resolution 678, seek to achieve exactly those aims. This reflects the will of the whole international community as expressed in successive Resolutions of the UN Security Council.

I understand and share your wish to see an early end to the fighting. But the responsibility for prolonging it lies with Saddam Hussain. He can choose peace by announcing his acceptance of the relevant Security Council Resolutions and by beginning a swift and total withdrawal of his forces from Kuwait. I hope that you will use your influence with Baghdad to bring this about. But unless and until the Iraqis withdraw, the coalition forces will continue their operations to ensure that

Kuwait is once again a free and sovereign nation. We aim to achieve this objective as quickly as possible and with the minimum of casualties.

Yours Sincerely,
John Hope

His Excellency Mr. Zine El Abidine Ben Ali

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIME MINISTER

MEETING WITH MR ASHDOWN

Mr Ashdown is coming to see you tomorrow afternoon. He requested a meeting just when we were about to offer him one. He wants to discuss the Gulf.

The main points to cover are:

- the ground campaign. You will want to say that it is getting inexorably closer but you cannot say precisely when it will start. Its hard to see how it can be avoided, unless Saddam Hussein has had a complete change of heart.
- cease-fire proposals. Saddam Hussein's own proposals were hopeless - and you might compliment Mr Ashdown on his prompt dismissal of them. At the time of writing we still do not know what Gorbachev has proposed to Tariq Aziz. We shall need to react tomorrow. But an intention to withdraw will not be sufficient: we shall need to see actual withdrawal taking place: assurances on POWs: and limitations on the equipment which Iraqi forces are allowed to take with them.
- civilian casualties. You might give the background to the Al Fellujah incident: you are sure that honesty is the best policy. You might also say that the Americans had good reason to believe that the bunker they hit was being used for military purposes.
- UN Role. You might explain in more detail why you cannot give more concrete assurances about a UN role. You naturally assume that the UN will be involved in one way or another in dealing with the consequences of the conflict: but how they will be involved must depend in good part on what the regional powers want. It is not a foregone conclusion that they will want a UN force in Kuwait.

C.P.D.
Charles Powell
18 February 1991
c: Ashdown (MJ)

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TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON
TELNO
OF 181745Z FEBRUARY 91
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, PARIS

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FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

SECRETARY OF STATE'S CONVERSATION WITH SECRETARY BAKER

SUMMARY

1. Secretary of State urges Baker to focus quickly on concrete steps we would demand from Iraq in return for ceasefire. Baker recognises urgency but is inclined to respond to Iraqi proposals rather than take the initiative.

DETAIL

2. The Secretary of State telephoned Baker this afternoon. Baker had no information about the Soviet peace initiative although he expected to hear from the Russians at any moment. He would get the US Embassy in London to pass any information to us.
3. The Secretary of State said that Friday's Iraqi proposal had not done damage so far. But we needed to think how to react if the Iraqis went further and said that they would

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withdraw without linkage and in line with the UN Resolutions. We would be asked what conditions we demanded for a ceasefire. We had sent the Americans a paper dealing with this and the Secretary of State wondered what the American reaction had been. We might need a line quite soon. We also needed to think how we would communicate the terms of a ceasefire to the Iraqis.

4. Baker agreed with the general thesis. Release of POWs would be an absolute pre-condition. He saw four characteristics of the Iraqi withdrawal which would also be pre-conditions to a ceasefire: ^{IRAQI WITHDRAWAL} it must be unconditional, in good faith, ^{was based even close to} moving ^{to be} towards totality, and rapid. A statement alone would not be acceptable as the Americans continued to remind the Russians. It was impossible to judge exactly how we would respond to a new Russian initiative - that would depend on what it contained. One story was that Tariq Aziz was taking the plan back to Baghdad. More likely, in Baker's view, was that the Iraqis had their own plan which they would deploy if the Soviet Union could give certain guarantees. If the Iraqis came up with something, we needed to see what it was before we decided how to react.

5. The Secretary of State pressed on by saying that the Russians might say something at tomorrow's Security Council meeting. We should not appear as if we were ^{to be} on the ropes. He hoped, therefore, that Baker would organise the next stage so that we all knew what to say in order not to be wrong-footed.

6. Baker pointed out that not every item on our shopping list would be easy to achieve. On Iraqi military equipment in Kuwait, for example, the US agreed that we must not let Iraq keep a capability which allowed it to return to the offensive in a year or so. Equally, we had to be careful not to be seen to expand our war aims. We also had to be careful not to lose the rest of the coalition - the Egyptians, for example, would be reluctant to see us destroy all Iraq's military equipment, whereas the Saudis would probably be pleased. The Secretary of

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State said that he had seen reports that Schwarzkopf had said that we would not attack retreating columns. He understood, of course, that journalists would pester senior military officers: but this was a political rather than military decision. Baker agreed entirely. He added that he did not think that the Russians would part company with us: not least because, as the Americans continued to tell them, the prospect of Soviet participation in post-crisis security arrangements depended on them not doing so.

7. The Secretary of State said that there was no difference between the US and UK. We would be very happy if Baker had up his sleeve a clear statement spelling out what concrete steps would be required for a ceasefire. Baker commented that he was worried that we would need to respond to something less than an Iraqi commitment to unconditional withdrawal. What, for example, if the Iraqis sought simply an assurance that sanctions would be lifted? The Secretary of State said that we could not accept that. Baker agreed. Baker asked whether as part of our conditions for a ceasefire we wanted both the release of POWs and agreement on reparations. The Secretary of State said that it was the former. Baker concluded by recognising that what we wanted was some agreement on the operational questions of Iraqi withdrawal. He agreed to focus on that but said that it was hard to go beyond broad parameters until we knew the conditions on the ground.

8. Finally, Baker said that he was still looking at 6-7 March for a possible ~~visit by~~ ^{MEETING WITH} the Secretary of State to Washington. It depended a bit on what happened between then and now. But the Americans thought it very important that they go over the ground with us and the Saudis soon.

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MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

Telephone 071 21 8211/3

MO 6/17/15/1J

✓

18th February 1991

Rose Minier
CD 472

Gen Clarke

VIEW FROM RIYADH

Today's "View from Riyadh" covers telephone conversations between the Defence Secretary and General de la Billiere and between CDS and Joint Commander (both have been talking to Gen Schwarzkopf in the course of the day).

I am sending a copy to Private Secretaries to members of OPD(G) and to Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

For security
John Webb

(S WEBB)
Private Secretary

Sir Charles Powell KCMG
10 Downing Street

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GENERAL DE LA BILLIERE

UK Mine Counter Measure Vessels (MCMVs) have been deployed well forward in the northern Gulf to help deal with the mining problem which has turned out to be more serious than expected. Two US ships were damaged by mines. The US were keen to use our MCMVs because they are technically the best available but General de la Billiere is keeping a close eye to ensure they are not exposed to a disproportionate extent.

The local commanders are sensitive to the potential political reactions over civilian casualties from bombing. General Schwarzkopf reviews personally targets in built up areas particularly in Baghdad. The Defence Secretary said he was pleased to hear this because as the campaign advanced it was becoming more difficult for him to explain publicly bombing in towns in Iraq rather than the KTO.

General de la Billiere thinks that the assessment of 30/40% losses of equipment by Iraqi land forces is conservative. It was encouraging that the numbers of Iraqi troops not returning from leave was already into thousands in one Corps area; and these might increase as Iraqi troops got word of the "ceasefire" offer.

General de la Billiere is concerned that the coalition has a clear position on ceasefire terms particularly covering Prisoners of War. There is evident concern in military circles that key elements may be overlooked in any sudden rush to find a settlement.

General Smith is comfortable with the position of 1 Armoured Division which is now ready for combat. He had told BFCME that they had been "given a task within my capabilities which is fair and reasonable". I am convinced that I can get just as much air and artillery support as other divisions of the VII Corps." BFCME is reassured that General Schwarzkopf is anything but gung-ho and is ready to let the air campaign run as long as is necessary to ensure that the land forces action can proceed with minimum casualties. General de la Billiere has a concern that some Iraqi units might prove resistant in built-up areas and that, even if battle in open country moves quickly, it could get stuck there, for example in Kuwait city. If so, his inclination would not be to try to winkle out Iraqi forces but to isolate them and wait for them to surrender.

General de la Billiere thinks that the weather is now on the turn towards the hotter season; he was happy that the uniforms and equipment were available to cope with increased temperatures over the next month or two.

CDS 2066/2/4

REPRO COPY NO 1 of 7

18 Feb 91

THE VIEW FROM RIVADH - AIR CHIEF MARSHAL HINE

1. This evening the Joint Commander informed CDS of his discussions with Gen Schwarzkopf in theatre on the possibility of a ceasefire before the ground campaign had started. Schwarzkopf was aware of the UK criteria which we have forwarded to the USA. He was of the view that our conditions would be too rigid and unacceptable to world opinion if a land battle had not been joined. He felt that we could only be tough if we were fighting on the ground and winning. He opined that should an early ceasefire be in the offing, we should agree to stop military action and demand only that the Iraqis should be out of Kuwait by a particular date. He was working out a sensible but demanding timescale for the Iraqis to avoid, either continuous requests for extensions or one which would allow the Iraqis to save the majority of their equipment. He felt that we should resist any demands for eg additional fuel, the use of helos for transport, lorries etc and expect the Iraqis to walk, if necessary, to the nearest border. Schwarzkopf also stated that he did not expect a ceasefire to come into being immediately even if the Iraqis made an offer without strings. The US continue to look for a minimum of 48 hrs in which they intend to have a final concerted attack on the RGFC and NBC facilities. Throughout the Joint Commander's discussion with Gen Schwarzkopf the latter gave no indication that he had yet received any detailed directions from Washington on how to act in event of a ceasefire. Furthermore, it is not clear in theatre whether ceasefire conditions would be handled through the United Nations, the Saudis, the Kuwaitis or Gen Schwarzkopf himself. Following his talks with the Joint Commander it is likely that Gen Schwarzkopf will seek guidance from Washington.


2. As briefed earlier the Joint Commander also raised the confusing results arising from recent BDA. It appeared that the recent review by Gen Horner was taking effect and assessments are now based only on intelligence rather than on pilot mission reports. There are now but minor variations of degree in the assessments of the various authorities reporting to CENTCOM. The Joint Commander felt that Gen Schwarzkopf will be in a position to make an overall judgement that Iraqi combat effectiveness has been lowered sufficiently within about a week.

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4. You will have seen reports today of the success of the artillery engagement by 1st Armd Division. The accuracy and effect of the MLRS in conjunction with the PHOENIX RPV (Remotely Piloted Vehicle) had been most heartening. MCMV activity had been delayed somewhat by the mining of 2 US warships, one of which is the command ship for the operations, and by the discovery of rather more moored mines than had been expected. The air campaign had been held back during the morning by poor weather which was now improving. Tornado (1000lb LGB), F117 and F111 attacks had been mounted this afternoon against several airfields. These attacks will continue for another 2-3 days to make absolutely sure that airfields remain unserviceable before the start of the ground campaign.

5. The Joint Commander concluded by reminding CDS of the unusual incident yesterday in which 40 Iraqi prisoners of war decamped from their vehicles, were rounded up and herded to the Saudi border by APACHE helicopters. He believed that this was the first combat use of helicopters as drovers.

6. The air plan for tomorrow will not be available until much later this evening but, as noted above, Tornados will be employed primarily against airfields.



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TELECON BROWNE/STAGG: IRAQ/KUWAIT: VISIT OF TARIQ AZIZ TO MOSCOW

SUMMARY

1. TARIQ AZIZ ACCOMPANIED BY HAMMADI HELD TALKS, DESCRIBED AS "CONSTRUCTIVE" WITH GORBACHEV. BESSMERTNYKH, PRIMAKOV AND PRESIDENTIAL SPOKESMAN ATTEND. GORBACHEV PUTS FORWARD A SPECIFIC PLAN DESIGNED TO END THE WAR. AZIZ RETURNS TO BAGHDAD TO CONSULT FURTHER. MFA PROMISES THAT DETAILS OF GORBACHEV'S PEACE PLAN WILL BE TRANSMITTED TO COALITION STATES (INCLUDING UK). AZIZ DENIES THAT 15 FEBRUARY STATEMENT SET CONDITIONS.

DETAIL

2. IRAQI FOREIGN MINISTER TARIQ AZIZ TOGETHER WITH DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER SAADOUN HAMMADI ARRIVED IN MOSCOW LATE 17 FEBRUARY. ACCORDING TO A TASS REPORT, TARIQ AZIZ ANNOUNCED DURING HIS STOPOVER IN TEHRAN THAT HE WAS NOT BRINGING ANY NEW PROPOSALS WITH HIM: IRAQ HAD PUT FORWARD ITS PROPOSED OFFER AND IT WAS NOW UP TO THE OTHER SIDE TO SHOW ITS GOODWILL. HE ADDED THAT IF THE UNITED STATES REJECTED THEIR PROPOSAL, THE IRAQI'S WOULD HAVE NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO CONTINUE THE WAR.

3. IN MOSCOW AZIZ AND HAMMADI HELD TALKS WITH GORBACHEV, ACCOMPANIED BY BESSMERTNYKH, PRIMAKOV AND IGNATENKO (GORBACHEV'S SPOKESMAN). THEY TOOK PLACE THIS MORNING (18 FEB) AND LASTED APPROXIMATELY 3 HOURS. AZIZ AND HAMMADI THEN RETURNED TO BAGHDAD.

TALKS WITH GORBACHEV

4. AT A PRESS CONFERENCE AFTER THE TALKS IGNATENKO DESCRIBED THEM AS CONSTRUCTIVE (LATER HE SAID THAT HIS IMPRESSION WAS THAT AZIZ HAD

DENIED VERY CONSTRUCTIVE). THEY COVERED A NUMBER OF ISSUES CONCERNING THE GULF CRISIS. GORBACHEV HAD PUT TO AZIZ A 'SPECIFIC PLAN OF ACTION' CONTAINING 'VERY DETAILED PROPOSALS', EMBRACING A WIDE SPECTRUM OF ISSUES DESIGNED TO SETTLE THE CRISIS BY POLITICAL MEANS. AZIZ HAD UNDERTAKEN TO CARRY IT BACK TO SADDAM HUSSEIN. GORBACHEV HOPED THAT HE WOULD RECEIVE A REPLY TO HIS PROPOSALS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE: BUT IGNATENKO ADMITTED THAT THERE WERE NO PLANS AT PRESENT FOR AZIZ TO RETURN TO MOSCOW.

IRAQI STATEMENT OF 15 FEBRUARY

5. IGNATENKO WAS ASKED WHETHER AZIZ HAD GIVEN ANY SORT OF CLARIFICATION OF THE 15 FEBRUARY STATEMENT WHICH APPEARED TO LINK WITHDRAWAL WITH VARIOUS CONDITIONS. IGNATENKO SAID THAT AZIZ HAD DENIED THAT THE STATEMENT REFERRED TO CONDITIONS, AND HAD REFERRED INSTEAD TO A PROGRAMME. BUT IGNATENKO WOULD NOT (OR COULD NOT) ELUCIDATE FURTHER.

MISSING CBS CREW

6. GORBACHEV HAD RAISED THE QUESTION OF THE MISSING CBS CREW, NOW BELIEVED TO BE HELD BY THE IRAQI AUTHORITIES ON SUSPICION OF SPYING. AZIZ HAD GIVEN HIM AN ASSURANCE THAT THE ISSUE WOULD BE DEALT WITH BY THE IRAQI AUTHORITIES (ALTHOUGH IT DOES NOT SEEM THAT AZIZ PROMISED THAT THEY WOULD BE RELEASED).

CONTACT WITH OTHER LEADERS

7. IGNATENKO THEN ANNOUNCED THAT GORBACHEV HAD TELEPHONED CHANCELLOR KOHL TODAY (18 FEB) BUT DID NOT SAY WHAT THEY HAD DISCUSSED OR WHETHER THEIR CONVERSATION HAD TAKEN PLACE BEFORE OR AFTER GORBACHEV SAW AZIZ. IGNATENKO ADDED THAT DETAILS OF THE TALKS WITH AZIZ WOULD BE TRANSMITTED DURING THE COURSE OF TODAY TO LEADERS OF FOREIGN COUNTRIES, INCLUDING THE UNITED STATES, FRANCE, ITALY AND IRAN (THE UK WAS NOT MENTIONED). UNTIL THAT TIME, HE WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO GIVE ANY FURTHER DETAILS ABOUT GORBACHEV'S PROPOSALS. BUT THE SOVIET UNION'S POSITION REMAINED THE SAME: IT WAS WORKING FOR THE UNCONDITIONAL WITHDRAWAL OF IRAQ FROM KUWAIT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE RELEVANT UNSC RESOLUTIONS. IGNATENKO CONFIRMED THAT WASHINGTON HAD NOT BEEN TOLD OF GORBACHEV'S PROPOSALS BEFORE THEY WERE PUT TO AZIZ, AND DENIED THAT ANY KIND OF A MOSCOW/TEHRAN/PARIS/BAGHDAD AXIS EXISTED: THE PROPOSALS WERE GORBACHEV'S.

8. WE HAVE POINTED OUT TO THE MFA THE UK'S OMISSION FROM THE LIST OF THOSE TO BE BRIEFED AND ASKED IF THIS HAS ANY SIGNIFICANCE. KRASNOV (ACTING HEAD OF SECOND EUROPEAN DIRECTORATE) HAS CONFIRMED THAT THE UK IS INDEED INCLUDED AMONG THOSE WHO WILL BE RECEIVING A READOUT

FROM THE RUSSIANS: THE OMMISION WAS DUE TO 'TECHNICAL REASONS'. BUT HE WAS UNABLE TO SAY HOW OR WHEN TODAY THEY WOULD BE IN TOUCH WITH LONDON.

COMMENT

9. ALTHOUGH DETAILS OF HIS PROPOSALS WILL HAVE TO AWAIT THE PROMISED BRIEFING BY THE RUSSIANS, IT IS CLEAR THAT GORBACHEV HAS PUT ALL HIS PERSONAL AUTHORITY BEHIND THIS ATTEMPT TO SUCCEED WHERE SO MANY OTHERS HAVE FAILED. IGNATENKO WAS CAREFUL TO POINT OUT THAT THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP'S ADHERENCE TO THE UN RESOLUTIONS HAD NOT CHANGED IN ANY WAY. BUT GORBACHEV CONTINUES TO BE UNDER PRESSURE FROM ALL SIDES AS CRITICISM OF THE OFFICIAL SOVIET POLICY MOUNTS. LATEST EXAMPLES INCLUDE THE PUBLICATION ON 16 FEBRUARY IN PRAVDA OF AN APPEAL BY THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE COMMISSION FOR SCIENCE, EDUCATIOIN AND CULTURE, SIGNED BY AMONGST OTHERS LAVEROV (DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AND MINISTER FOR SCIENCE), GUBENKO (MINISTER OF CULTURE) AND MARCHUK (PRESIDENT OF THE ACADEMY OF SCIENCES). THE APPEAL CALLS FOR 'VOICES TO BE RAISED IN PROTEST AT THE ESCALATION OF WAR' AND WARNS AGAINST THE CONTINUED DESTRUCTION OF CIVILIAN BUILDINGS. SOVIETSKAYA ROSSIYA OF 16 FEBRUARY ARGUED THAT UNSCR 678 WAS 'ILLEGAL': AND ACCORDING TO ONE REPORT, MARSHAL AKHROMEYEV TODAY DURING THE SUPREME SOVIET PROCEEDINGS ROUNDLY CRITICISED GORBACHEV'S GULF POLICY AND DEMANDED THAT IT BE CHANGED.

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CDP. 8(A-C)



10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

18 February 1991

THE GULF

Following this morning's meeting of OPD(G), I sent General Scowcroft the enclosed personal message. He telephoned me this afternoon to say that he thoroughly understood our concern about the risk of being presented with some thoroughly undesirable cease fire proposals, with a need to react at short notice. He was sorry that the Americans had not yet responded to our paper on Conditions for a Cease Fire: but the President was returning to Washington this afternoon for a discussion of these problems and he would ensure that our paper was one of those on the table. He would let me know the outcome of the meeting first thing tomorrow morning.

In response to my question, General Scowcroft said that the Americans had not heard anything from Gorbachev about the proposals he was reported to have put to Tariq Aziz. Secretary Baker was considering putting in a call to Bessmertnykh, but did not want it to look as if the United States was unduly nervous. But they took the view that it was not good news that Gorbachev had put forward proposals without telling anyone.

General Scowcroft said that he very much agreed that we should not let the Iraqis off the hook too easily. He was considering whether the United States should not start to argue that we had to strip Iraq of its offensive military capability. He appreciated that it would be difficult to alter our war aims. But he thought the theme deserved to be put on the table. It would frighten the Iraqis. But it was not just tactical: he believed that our long term aim must be to end up with an Iraq without an offensive capability. After all, they had started two wars in the last few years.

General Scowcroft said that if the Americans heard from the Russians later today, he would get in touch: similarly if something dramatic emerged from their own meeting, which he did not particularly expect. Otherwise he would communicate early tomorrow morning their time.

SECRET AND PERSONAL

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence), John Neilson (Department of Energy), Juliet Wheldon (Law Officers' Department) and to Sir Robin Butler.

(C. D. POWELL)

Richard Gozney, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SECRET

COP C

FLASH

FOLLOWING STRICTLY PERSONAL FOR GENERAL SCOWCROFT FROM
CHARLES POWELL

Dear Brent

There is some disquiet here about General Schwarzkopf's remark that Iraqi forces withdrawing from Kuwait would have a safe passage. This is not easily compatible with the paper which we have put to you - and on which we await a response - on the terms of a cease-fire. What about a very tight time-table for a rapid and complete withdrawal? Commitments on handling of POWS? We must not give the impression of being ready to let the Iraqis off the hook too easily.

The likelihood of some further softening of Iraqi position over the next few days is quite high: and we may well find ourselves confronted at quite short notice with spurious cease-fire proposals, which will seem tempting to some countries, to which we have to react. We really need to be sure that Britain and the United States are absolutely together on this. Can you let us have a very early response to our ideas about what we should demand in return for a cease-fire? I think the Prime Minister is likely to want to discuss this with the President soon.

I am tied up with the President of Bulgaria from 1200-1330 London time, but could be free for a word after that.

Warm regards,

Charles.

C Dr.

Ends

SECRET

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10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

18 February 1991

THE GULF: FRENCH VIEWS

Pierre Morel, President Mitterrand's diplomatic adviser, telephoned me this afternoon to give an account of his discussions in Washington about the post-conflict situation in the Gulf.

Generally he had been quite encouraged by what he had heard in Washington. The Americans agreed with the French that the period immediately after the end of the conflict was a window of opportunity: a chance to act, and to modify old habits and ways of thinking. They were also ready to contemplate a role for the United Nations in the aftermath of the conflict, at least in relation to longer term security arrangements, although they were much more reserved when it came to Arab/Israel. On the latter, and in particular when discussing the idea of an international conference, there was a divergence of views. Some American officials simply took the Israeli position: others saw an international conference as a potentially useful tool. There had been a readiness to discuss guarantees, including both bilateral and collective guarantees. But they had been vague on future arms control arrangements, and elusive on the subject of a dialogue with the Palestinians.

I thanked Morel for this account: it had been useful to have a talk with him before his visit Washington and to hear the results so speedily. I wondered whether the French yet had any information about the content of the proposals which President Gorbachev had put to Tariq Aziz. Morel said that the French were hoping for a call from Gorbachev this evening, although it had not yet come. In any event, President Mitterrand would like to speak to the Prime Minister on the telephone. We had to break off at this point, but left it that the President would call the Prime Minister shortly after 8 p.m. *Frankline 7 p.m. UK time.*

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence), John Neilson (Department of Energy) and to Sir Robin Butler.

CHARLES POWELL

Richard Gozney Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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MS
File c: Mitterrand

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

SUBJECT CC MASTER

18 February 1991

PRIME MINISTER'S TALK WITH PRESIDENT MITTERRAND

President Mitterrand telephoned the Prime Minister this evening. The main reason was to express his condolences about the bomb explosions at Paddington and Victoria today. He wanted the Prime Minister to know that the French were very close to us in their thoughts. The Prime Minister thanked the President for his kind concern. All the indications were that it had been an IRA attack.

President Mitterrand said he assumed the Prime Minister was following closely what was happening in Moscow. He had received no information as yet about the Soviet proposals given to Tariq Aziz, and was now promised a 'phone call from Mr Gorbachev tomorrow and possibly a message later tonight. Until then, one could only speculate. If there was agreement between Iraq and the Soviet Union, it should only be on the basis of total withdrawal from Kuwait. But who knew what conditions might have been attached, and with what armaments Iraq would be allowed to leave Kuwait? If the Soviet proposals were unsatisfactory, France and Britain would need to consult in a hurry the next day.

The Prime Minister said that we were equally anxious about what the Soviet Union might have proposed. He agreed on the need to consult speedily. If we heard anything we would let the President know. It was a pretty odd way for Mr Gorbachev to proceed, without any prior consultation with the other Permanent Members of the Security Council. He hoped we would not be placed in an embarrassing and difficult position by inadequate proposals from the Soviet Union. President Mitterrand agreed. There was nothing for it but to wait and see what the morrow brought. If necessary he would telephone the Prime Minister again then.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence), John Neilson (Department of Energy) and Sir Robin Butler.

Charles Powell

Richard Gozney Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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cc PC
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB
Telephone 071-21 82111/3

SECRETARY OF STATE

MO 6/17/15/1S

February 1991

2 Michael,

CD 1872

rap

Thank you for your letter of 14th February proposing the establishment of a £5 million fund out of which we could meet deserving bids from Gulf states for environmental clean-up assistance.

I agree that there is a good case for saying that we are likely to open ourselves to criticism by continuing our policy of providing environmental assistance in the Gulf only on the basis that full costs are recovered, particularly by comparison with other countries which have already provided free assistance (including some which are making substantial military contributions in the Gulf).

There are also, as you point out, potential implications for our efforts to solicit contributions to the cost of our Gulf operations from Gulf states. An apparently parsimonious approach to a high-profile environmental problem in the Gulf (which the Gulf states can reasonably regard as being a genuinely international problem) might at best sour relations and at worse jeopardise the prospects for further contributions (which would easily outweigh the sum which you propose should be set aside).

The Rt Hon Michael Heseltine MP



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SECRETARY OF STATE

As you know, there is one respect in which the Ministry of Defence has been involved in the provision of clean-up assistance to date, through the provision of three charter aircraft flights to take pollution control equipment from the Oil Spill Services Centre in Southampton to Saudi Arabia on 28-30th January. In line with the full cost recovery policy, Aramco, which requested the equipment, was given an estimate of £1.15M, representing the full costs of these flights. Aramco made representations and asked that we waive at least part of this, to enable them to purchase further pollution control equipment. Arrangements are in hand to bill them for the actual costs of operating the charter flights, some £0.5M.

The question arises of whether, if a fund were to be established, this bill (or part of it) should be made a charge to that fund. My view is that it would be better to use the sort of fund you propose to meet future requirements than to withdraw the bill for these flights. This view is supported by the fact that the basis on which oil companies (including Aramco) have access to the Oil Spill Services Centre stockpile is clearly that they will meet any transport costs involved in getting the equipment to the site of an oil spill. You may, however, wish to consider the transport costs of booms for Bahrain.


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lan

Tom King



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FLASH

FOLLOWING STRICTLY PERSONAL FOR GENERAL SCOWCROFT FROM
CHARLES POWELL

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I am tied up with the President of Bulgaria from 1200-1330 London time, but could be free for a word after that.

Warm regards,

Charles.

C. P.

Ends

SECRET

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BT

MESSAGE FROM CHARLES POWELL

DEAR BRENT

THE LIKELIHOOD OF SOME FURTHER SOFTENING OF IRAQI POSITION OVER THE NEXT FEW DAYS IS QUITE HIGH: AND WE MAY WELL FIND OURSELVES CONFRONTED AT QUITE SHORT NOTICE WITH SPURIOUS CEASE-FIRE PROPOSALS, WHICH WILL SEEM TEMPTING TO SOME COUNTRIES, TO WHICH WE HAVE TO REACT. WE REALLY NEED TO BE SURE THAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES ARE ABSOLUTELY TOGETHER ON THIS. CAN YOU LET US HAVE A VERY EARLY RESPONSE TO TOUR IDEAS ABOUT WHAT WE SHOULD DEMAND IN RETURN FOR A CEASE-FIRE? I THINK THE PRIME MINISTER IS LIKELY TO WANT TO DISCUSS THIS WITH THE PRESIDENT SOON.

WARM REGARDS.

ENDS

STBY

QSL AT 1145Z IMI 1145Z



SECRET - UK EYES A

B.0733

PRIME MINISTER

cc Sir Robin Butler
Sir Percy Cradock

OPD(G): 18 February: Overnight Action Points

Item 1: Current military situation

The JIC Immediate Assessment carries a useful battle damage assessment. You might ask the Chief of the Defence Staff, as part of his stocktaking report, to comment on the scale of damage which Iraqi forces in Kuwait are judged to have suffered and the likely scale of further damage as the week advances. Neither Washington nor we have the full range of data which is available to General Schwarzkopf.

2. The artillery action in which the First Armoured Division would have participated for the first time has been postponed, possibly for 24 hours. In another first, two US ships have struck mines in the Gulf, though fortunately they are apparently still able to operate.

Item 2: Current international situation

3. Tariq Aziz is due to meet President Gorbachev this morning. So far the Iraqi line before the meeting is as rigid and bellicose as ever. Curiously, the BBC this morning was alleging that the BBC Monitoring Service at Caversham had re-examined their translation of the Iraqi offer and had concluded from the way the Arabic was phrased that the linkage between withdrawal and the other conditions was not as direct as had been originally thought. The Foreign Secretary may be able to comment on this story which could play back unhelpfully.

LV Appleyard
L V Appleyard

Cabinet Office
18 February 1991

SECRET - UK EYES A



Feb
PM

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

cc FCO
HMT
CST
MOD

SERIAL No. 748191

Subject cc Thatcher

THE PRIME MINISTER

ops

18 February 1991

Your
Highness,

David Mellor had told me of his visit to the United Arab Emirates on 2-3 February. He spoke with great warmth about his call on you and the exceptional courtesy with which he was received.

I have now heard of your generous response to our suggestion about help towards meeting the financial burden of the conflict. On behalf of the British Government and people, I thank you most sincerely. When we decided to help our friends in the Gulf deal with Iraqi aggression we did so because of the principle at stake. But as you know, costs are now considerable and rising, and the generous contribution you have made is greatly appreciated. I am also grateful to you for agreeing to consider a further contribution at a later date, depending on military and financial developments. Once again, the ties of friendship that so closely bind our two countries have proved effective in dealing with the problems we face.

May I take the opportunity also to welcome your close interest in the equipment of the United Arab Emirates' armed forces with British armoured personnel carriers and helicopters. This would represent a significant strengthening of their capabilities at a difficult and dangerous time.

I send you my best wishes for the testing period of the next few weeks. I am confident that it will not be long before legitimacy is restored to Kuwait and peace returned to the whole Gulf region.

Yours Sincerely,
John Figue

His Highness Sheikh Zayed Bin Sultan Al Nahyan, GCMG, GCB

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OUR TELNO 479: IRAQ/KUWAIT: WASHINGTON SITREP

SUMMARY

1. A WEEKEND SPENT RALLYING AROUND THE FLAG IN ANTICIPATION OF A GROUND WAR WITHIN DAYS.

DETAIL

2. PRESIDENT BUSH IS SPENDING THE 3 DAY HOLIDAY WEEKEND AT KENNEBUNKPORT. THIS HAS NOT PREVENTED HIM FROM MAKING A NUMBER OF PUBLIC STATEMENTS. IN ONE, HE EXPRESSED HIS CONFIDENCE THAT, DESPITE INITIAL SOVIET REACTIONS TO THE IRAQI OFFER TO WITHDRAW, THE SOVIET COMMITMENT TO THE COALITION REMAINS FIRM.

3. MEANWHILE, THERE REMAINS A GENERAL FEELING OF THE CALM BEFORE THE STORM. A GROUND WAR IS NOW SEEN AS BOTH INEVITABLE AND IMMINENT. THERE HAVE BEEN SEVERAL PATRIOTIC RALLIES, INCLUDING ONE IN WASHINGTON BY 500 PEOPLE ON WHAT WAS THE COLDEST DAY OF THE WINTER. BY CONTRAST WASHINGTON'S ANTI-WAR RALLY COULD MUSTER ONLY AN ESTIMATED 130. BUT BY FAR THE GREATEST DEMONSTRATION CAME BEFORE THE START OF THE DAYTONA 500 GRAND PRIX ON 17 FEBRUARY. SEVERAL HUNDRED THOUSAND PEOPLE, IN WHAT IS THE WORLD'S BIGGEST SPECTATOR SPORTS GATHERING, SANG PATRIOTIC SONGS AND WAVED FLAGS IN AN EMOTIONAL OUTPOURING OF SUPPORT FOR THE TROOPS. ALL THIS HAS BROUGHT A GREATER SENSE OF NATIONAL UNITY WITH CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS OPENLY SUPPORTING THE ADMINISTRATION'S CONDUCT OF THE WAR. CONFIDENCE IN THE ALLIED MILITARY LEADERSHIP IS ALSO STRONG. IN ONE WEEKEND COMMENT, TYPICAL OF MANY, THE NEW AND CONTROVERSIAL CHAIRMAN OF THE HOUSE INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE, REP. MCCURDY, SAID QUOTE THE SUCCESS OF DESERT STORM HAS BEEN THAT THE MILITARY COMMANDERS HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO TAKE THE DECISIONS UNQUOTE. HE SAID THAT AS LONG AS THOSE COMMANDERS DECIDED THAT THE TIME FOR A GROUND WAR HAD ARRIVED, THEN HE WOULD HAVE NO DIFFICULTY WITH THIS. HE WOULD ONLY

BE CONCERNED WERE A GROUND WAR BEGUN FOR QUOTE POLITICAL REASONS UNQUOTE.

4. PUBLIC REACTION TO THE BOMBING OF THE BAGHDAD BUNKER HAS BEEN TO ACCEPT THE ALLIED VERSION OF EVENTS. IN A 14 FEBRUARY WASHINGTON POST/ABC NEWS POLL 79 PERCENT PLACED THE BLAME WITH SADDAM HUSSEIN/IRAQ AGAINST 7 PERCENT WHO BLAME PRESIDENT BUSH/US MILITARY. 81 PERCENT ACCEPTED THAT THE BUNKER WAS A MILITARY TARGET. AND, WHILST WELL REPORTED, THE IRAQI REPORTS THAT THE RAF KILLED 130 CIVILIANS IN FALLUJAH ON 14 FEBRUARY HAS PRODUCED NO REACTIONS HERE. THE ATMOSPHERE IS ONE OF CONTINUING SYMPATHY FOR IRAQI CIVILIANS, BUT A HARDENING OF ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE IRAQI LEADERSHIP, WHO ARE INCREASINGLY BEING SEEN AS RESPONSIBLE FOR EVENTS :
THE HIGHLY CONDITIONED IRAQI PEACE OFFER OF 15 FEBRUARY IS LIKELY TO HARDEN ATTITUDES STILL FURTHER.

5. OTHER ITEMS PROMINENTLY REPORTED OVER THE WEEKEND INCLUDE DUMAS' ASSERTION THAT HE KNOWS THE DATE FOR THE BEGINNING OF THE GROUND WAR (AND A SIMILAR CLAIM BY THE LOS ANGELES TIMES): BOTH CLAIMS TREATED SCEPTICALLY BY US SPOKESMEN. BORDER SKIRMISHES DURING THE NIGHT OF 16/17 FEBRUARY, INCLUDING US CASUALTIES TO FRIENDLY FIRE HAVE ALSO BEEN COVERED.

6. IN A SIDE ISSUE THE ADMINISTRATION HAS REACTED STRONGLY TO A REUTER INTERVIEW GIVEN ON 14 FEBRUARY BY ISRAELI AMBASSADOR SHOVAL. IN THAT INTERVIEW SHOVAL SAID THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS GIVING ISRAEL QUOTE THE RUNAROUND UNQUOTE ON HOUSING AID FOR SOVIET JEWISH IMMIGRANTS AND THAT ISRAEL HAD RECEIVED NOT ONE CENT IN COMPENSATION FROM THE ALLIANCE FOR ISRAELI LOSSES FROM SCUD ATTACKS. WHITE HOUSE SPOKESMAN SAID ON 15 FEBRUARY THAT SHOVAL'S COMMENTS WERE QUOTE OUTRAGEOUS AND OUTSIDE THE BOUNDS OF ACCEPTABLE BEHAVIOUR BY THE AMBASSADOR OF ANY FRIENDLY COUNTRY UNQUOTE. SHOVAL WAS SUMMONED FOR A DRESSING DOWN BY SECRETARY BAKER AND PRESIDENT BUSH IS REPORTED TO HAVE SENT A STRONGLY WORDED TELEGRAM TO PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR.

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
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TOP SECRET PERSONAL

Prime Minister



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10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

17 February 1991 (7/2)

THE GULF

When General Scowcroft telephoned me this evening, he said that the President had asked him to pass on an 'adjustment' to the date for beginning the ground campaign. It was now planned to start at 0400 local time in the Gulf on Sunday 24 February. There were various reasons for this adjustment. One was that the Marines were shifting position. Another was a debate going on between the Egyptians and Saudis about the role they would play. A third was the weather, with the forecast not too good for several days. General Schwarzkopf was insisting on good weather for the first two days of the ground campaign to make sure that Allied forces had the close air support they needed. General Scowcroft added that the date might still be moved forward if some of these problems could be sorted out and the weather situation improved. Personally, he hoped very much that it would be possible to advance it: we were in a period of diplomatic activity when we needed to get action started as quickly as possible, before there was too much pressure for a ceasefire on the basis of less than satisfactory proposals for Iraqi withdrawal.

I am copying this letter to the Foreign Secretary and to Sir Robin Butler.

CHARLES POWELL

The Rt Hon Tom King MP

TOP SECRET PERSONAL



10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

17 February 1991

IRAQ/KUWAIT: UAE CONTRIBUTION TO BURDEN-SHARING

Thank you for your letter of 15 February covering a draft letter from the Prime Minister to Sheikh Zayed, thanking him for the UAE's offer of financial help with the costs of our military operations in the Gulf. The Prime Minister has signed this. You will see that we have added a brief paragraph about defence equipment. I imagine this will not cause any difficulty.

I should be grateful if the message could be delivered as soon as possible.

I am copying this letter to John Gieve (Treasury), Jeremy Heywood (Chief Secretary's Office), and Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence).

CHARLES POWELL

S L Gass Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

SECRET AND PERSONAL

Prime Minister



10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

17 February 1991

THE GULF

I had a talk with General Scowcroft this evening.

I asked General Scowcroft whether the President had replied to President Gorbachev's message asking that the Americans refrain from launching a ground campaign while Tariq Aziz was in Moscow. General Scowcroft said that the President had replied to the effect that the Americans were not going to adjust anything which they were doing in order to convenience the Iraqis. In short, the answer had been no. I asked whether the Americans had any further indications of Soviet thinking. General Scowcroft said that he had just been on television in a link-up with Churkhin, the Soviet spokesman, who had been very strong and reassuring on the Soviet commitment to full implementation of the Security Council resolutions. The President had also made some positive remarks about the Soviet role this morning, in the hope of encouraging the Russians to keep on board and not fall for any Iraqi proposals which Tariq Aziz might make. In reply to my further question, General Scowcroft said that the Americans had no information on what Tariq Aziz might be taking to Moscow. But speaking for himself, he was a bit nervous that something might emerge from the meeting which would complicate the Allies' task. I said this would be a pity, given that the Security Council discussion was going rather well. General Scowcroft agreed. I also gave him a brief account of the EC Troika's meeting with Gorbachev which he found reassuring.

We had a brief exchange about the fairly hopeless performance of Iraqi SCUD missiles in recent days. General Scowcroft said the evidence was that the Allies were now doing much better in the Western desert, and had caught up with quite a few of the Iraqi launchers. Where the Iraqis were firing them, they were having to do so in such a hurry that they had no time to aim them accurately.

I asked General Scowcroft whether American officials were yet ready for another round of talks about the ending of the war and the post-war arrangements. The response was "Oh my! Haven't you heard anything". He promised to come back to me tomorrow.

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SECRET AND PERSONAL

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I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence) and to Sir Robin Butler.

CHARLES POWELL

R H T Gozney Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

SECRET AND PERSONAL



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Prime Minister

Ref. AO91/372

PRIME MINISTER

cc Sir Percy Cradock
Mr Appleyard

Can with work to
take in conjunction
with the notes of my
talks with Secretary.

OPD(G): 18 February

COP
17/2Item 1: Current military situation

You might invite the Chief of the Defence Staff to give his Monday morning stocktaking report on allied and Iraqi operations. The allied ground forces are now carrying out increasingly substantial deep probes amounting to recesses in strength. The First Armoured Division, which is now in position, may be involved for the first time in the artillery phases. The pattern of air and naval engagements has continued. You may want to ask about the balance of the air campaign between the Iraq and Kuwait theatres of operations.

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2. You might ask the Defence Secretary for background on the Iraqi accusations that RAF aircraft caused civilian casualties in an attack upon a river bridge at Al-Fallujah last Wednesday. The Iraqi accounts are confused and inaccurate at some points (no wreckage of a shot-down aircraft was found) and even if an RAF attack did cause civilian casualties this was clearly not the intention and great care was exercised as usual. The Defence Secretary has written a Private Secretary note on the background. You might go on to ask the Chief of the Defence Staff what impact the Baghdad bunker incident has had, if any, on allied targetting. General Schwarzkopf is reported now to scrutinise personally any attack on a possible dual-use target. There are continuing reports that the Iraqis are faking attacks on religious and civilian targets.

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3. You may wish to conclude the discussion of this section by reaffirming your confidence in the very great care being taken by the RAF and the allied coalition to avoid civilian targets.

Item 2: Current international situation

4. You might invite the Foreign Secretary to sum up the international reactions to the Iraqi proposals, on which the JIC prepared an Immediate Assessment last Friday. The coalition countries reacted robustly, including the Arab members, with the Russians, Iranians and Senor Perez de Cuellar perhaps predictably giving Saddam more credit than the conditions merited. Friday's events underlined the need to reach agreement with the US on conditions for a ceasefire and the handling of an Iraqi withdrawal: we are following up with the Americans dates for the next round of the official talks.

5. You might then ask the Foreign Secretary to bring colleagues up to date on the Moscow diplomatic minuet. The troika saw President Gorbachev and Mr Bessmertnykh who assured them that the Russians were firm on the UN Resolutions. Happily the troika did not see Tariq Aziz who is set to arrive this evening after their departure. The Iranians have been equally active with their Foreign Minister, Mr Velayati, visiting Cairo and Rome and another Iranian delegation reportedly on its way to Moscow. The Cairo Foreign Ministers' meeting took place on 15-16 February and are to meet again on 4-5 March: we have had few indications so far about their discussions on longer term regional security.

X 6. In parallel with all the diplomatic activity elsewhere, the UN Security Council has continued its debate in private session. X
The exchanges have generally gone in the coalition's favour with some useful question and answer sessions both with allies and with the Iraqis and their friends. The Permanent Five met on Friday and agreed that the Iraqi proposals were unacceptable.



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The Council resumes on Tuesday. Meanwhile three Cuban Resolutions have been circulated but seem likely to be held off for the time being. You are due to see Sir David Hannay later in the day.

7. You will be discussing burdensharing in more detail on Thursday when the Chief Secretary will present a short report. You may wish to note that our Embassy in Tokyo believes that there is now a good chance that the Japanese \$9bn may be approved by the Diet and that we will obtain a share: whether this will be the full 8 per cent remains to be seen. When you see the Japanese Ambassador later in the day you may wish to give this a final push. President Bush's reply to you is unhelpful and you may need to go back to him; but this will be best discussed on Thursday. Meanwhile the Defence Secretary may want to mention that he has had a helpful but unspecific message for Stoltenberg about German help in kind; and you will want to note that the Belgians have found a new pretext - Iraq's Friday offer - for postponing yet again their decision on ammunition supplies.

Re rats!

Item 3: Media handling

8. You might ask the Energy Secretary to report on the broader picture, including the repercussions of the Baghdad bunker and the Iraqi proposals. He might also want to say a word about the weekend media coverage.

9. You might then invite Mr O'Donnell to report on the day-to-day questions, which will presumably include the Moscow diplomacy and the timing of the land campaign.

R.R.B.

ROBIN BUTLER

17 February 1991

SECRET

2a-d



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

Telephone 071-21 82111/3

MO 6/17/15/1J

2 in Minister

17H February 1991

It looks as though the Iraqis may be making more of this than in

CD 17/2

Dear Angus, justified.



ATTACK ON AL FALLUJAH

You might like to see our latest notes on the Iraqi allegations about the bombing of Al Fallujah this week.

Our spokesman in Riyadh will be setting out the position at the daily press conference this afternoon and probably showing a video of laser-guided bombs hitting the bridge. We shall then stick to this position until any further firm evidence arises.

I am sending a copy of this letter to the Private Secretaries to members of OPD(G), and to Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely

Sam Webb

(S WEBB)
Private Secretary

Sir Charles Powell KCMG
10 Downing Street

SECRET

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ATTACKS BY RAF TORNADOS ON BRIDGES AT AL-FALLUJAH

POINTS TO MAKE FROM 1630Z ON 17 FEB 1991

- The Iraqis have claimed that a number of civilians were killed at Al-Fallujah on Thursday 14 February as a result of attacks by RAF Tornado aircraft and that during these attacks one aircraft was shot down.

- If, as the Iraqis claim, civilian casualties did result from an RAF mission we greatly regret this. We are doing all we can to ensure that in attacking military and strategic targets the risk of causing civilian casualties and collateral damage is minimised. We have no evidence of our own that there were civilian casualties, but ready to set out the facts for press to compare with Iraqi claims.

- No attacks were carried out by the Allies on targets at Al-Fallujah on Thursday 14 February. RAF Tornado GR1 aircraft did attack two bridges at Al-Fallujah on Wednesday 13 February, as part of the allies' policy of attacking military targets and facilities supporting Iraq's occupation of Kuwait. One bridge was some way outside the town; the other on the edge. Both bridges were damaged in the attacks.

- The RAF attacked the bridges with laser-guided bombs, to ensure the greatest possible accuracy. [A video of the attack on the bridge at the edge of the town, which has been shown to the media, illustrates this accuracy.] The aircraft were flying up the line of the river. Nine out of twelve bombs were seen to hit the bridge; the other three are not accounted for.

- Iraq has also claimed that a Tornado was shot down during the attacks on bridges at Al-Fallujah. This is not so. No Tornado was lost on Wednesday 13 February. As already announced, the last Tornado was lost attacking an airfield on 14 February, not 13 February. Its mission was not against the bridges at Al-Fallujah.

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BACKGROUND NOTE

- The Iraqis have claimed that about 50 civilians were killed at Al-Fallujah as a result of RAF attacks on bridges at Al-Fallujah.

- There have been pictures on TV of damage caused in the vicinity of a communications tower in Al-Fallujah. It is not clear from press reports as to whether the alleged bombing of a marketplace in fact refers to the older damage in the vicinity of the communications tower. The first report from Peter Arnett acknowledged that the damage to the communications tower had been caused earlier in the war; other reports imply that there is a second bomb damage site.

- Imagery of the town taken on 22 January shows damage around the base of the communications tower consistent with that shown on television. Imagery taken on 14 February appears to show the same damage. Detailed analysis of the 14 February imagery could not find any further bomb damage in populated areas or any area which could have been an open air market place as alleged. It has to be said, however, that the imagery is of poor quality.

- We do not know precisely when the damage to the communications tower shown on the 22 January imagery was caused. The RAF were not involved in the mission against that target.

- There were two attacks on bridges in the Al-Fallujah area on 13 February.

- The first, at 0541Z, when 4 Tornado GR1 from Muharraq together with 2 Buccaneers in the laser designator role attacked the Fallujah railroad bridge, some 4 km from the town. Five bombs scored direct hits and 7 bombs missed; six

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due to a pod failure, and one because of a faulty bomb tail. All fell on empty ground.

- The second attack was at 1335Z. Four GR1 Tornado from Dhahran with 2 Buccaneers attacked the Al-Fallujah road bridge. The Tornados attacked in two pairs. The first pair attacked the left hand side of the bridge, the second pair the right hand side. The town is on the right hand side of the bridge. From the mission assessment it would appear that five of the six bombs dropped by the first pair of Tornados hit the left end of the bridge. It is not known where the sixth bomb impacted. Four of the six bombs dropped by the second pair hit the bridge, about one-third in from the right hand side. The pilot of the Buccaneer (recorded on the cockpit voice recorder) reported that one bomb fell short and one fell forward and right by about 800 yards in the town. From the mission report (which is compiled just after the mission from the reports of all crews as well as the video recording) it is however assessed that one bomb fell some 400 feet short, the other 700 feet long. It cannot be ruled out that the second bomb hit the town.
- It is not known why three of the bombs failed to hit the target. It is not considered that it was due to any particular malfunction.
- The Iraqis have also claimed that in the same attack they shot down an RAF Tornado. It is certainly not true that an RAF Tornado was lost on the attack on the Al-Fallujah bridges on Wednesday. An RAF Tornado was however lost during a mission on Thursday 14 February on the Al-Tagaddam airfield which is 15 km from Al-Fallujah. The aircraft was hit over the target and was seen to gradually descend, impacting 38 km NE of the target (some 30 km North of the town of Al-Fallujah).

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CAIRO TELNO 163: GCC/EGYPT/SYRIA FOREIGN MINISTERS' MEETING:
MESSAGE FROM ABDEL MEGUID

SUMMARY

1. EGYPTIANS SATISFIED WITH MEETING OF EIGHT AND HOPEFUL THAT DECLARATION OF INTENT WILL BE ADOPTED. OMANI RESERVATIONS ON ARAB PEACEKEEPING FORCE THE MAIN OBSTACLE.

DETAIL

2. ABUL NASR (ASSISTANT MINISTER, ARAB AFFAIRS, MFA) SUMMONED DHM ON 17 FEBRUARY IN HMA'S ABSENCE IN ALEXANDRIA TO HAND OVER A MESSAGE TO YOU FROM ABDEL MEGUID (TEXT IN MIFT). REPORTING ON HIS MEETING WITH GCC AND SYRIAN COLLEAGUES, SIMILAR MESSAGES ARE BEING SENT TO THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF OTHER PERMANENT MEMBERS, LUXEMBOURG, ITALY, AND POSSIBLY OTHERS.

3. ABUL NASR SAID THAT THE MEETING HAD BEEN A SAUDI INITIATIVE DESIGNED TO BRING THE OTHER FIVE GCC STATES INTO THE ONGOING DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN SAUDI ARABIA, EGYPT AND SYRIA. THE GROUP OF EIGHT WOULD MEET REGULARLY HENCEFORTH, REPLACING THE TRIPARTITE FORMAT. THE MOROCCANS HAD BEEN SOUNDED BUT INDICATED THAT THEY WERE NOT YET READY TO JOIN IN. THERE HAD BEEN GENERAL AGREEMENT ON THE TRIPARTITE DRAFT SUBMITTED TO THE MEETING SAVE FOR OMAN WHICH HAD ITS USUAL RESERVATIONS, PRINCIPALLY ON THE ARAB PEACEKEEPING FORCE. YOUSSEF ALAWI HAD INSISTED ON REFERRING THE DRAFT TO THE SULTAN.

4. ABUL GHEIT (ABDEL MEGUID'S OFFICE) CONFIRMED THIS SEPARATELY BUT WAS CONFIDENT THAT THE OMANIS WOULD COME ROUND IN THE END. HE ADDED THAT THE FUTURE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS HAD BEEN DISCUSSED ONLY VERY BRIEFLY. THE GCC WERE WILLING TO HAVE AN ARAB PEACEKEEPING

FORCE WITH, AS ITS NUCLEUS, THE EGYPTIAN AND SYRIAN TROOPS ALREADY STATIONED IN THE REGION. THERE WAS AN UNDERSTANDING THAT THESE ARRANGEMENTS SHOULD NOT BE SUCH AS TO THREATEN OR DISPLEASE NEIGHBOURING NON-ARAB STATES. THEY HAD TO COME FROM WITHIN THE REGION BUT EGYPT UNDERSTOOD THE DESIRE OF GCC STATES TO HAVE A FREE HAND TO MAKE ANY OTHER PARALLEL ARRANGEMENTS THEY WANTED WITH STATES OUTSIDE THE REGION. THIS HAD NOT BEEN DISCUSSED EXPLICITLY: ABUL GHEIT IMPLIED THAT THERE WAS A TACIT UNDERSTANDING ON THE POINT.

5. ABUL GHEIT SAID THAT THE EIGHT, ESPECIALLY THE SAUDIS, HAD EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT THE SOVIET ATTITUDE. ABDEL MEGUID HAD SPOKEN ON THEIR BEHALF TO BESSMERTNYKH ON 14 FEBRUARY TO URGE HIM NOT TO RESPOND TOO WARMLY TO THE IRAQI STATEMENT ABOUT WITHDRAWAL. HE HAD FOLLOWED UP WITH A FURTHER MESSAGE ON 17 FEBRUARY URGING HIM TO TELL TARIQ AZIZ THAT THE IRAQIS SHOULD CLEARLY EXPRESS THEIR READINESS TO WITHDRAW UNCONDITIONALLY, AND TO ALLOW THE IRAQIS NO ROOM FOR MANOEUVRE.

6. ABUL GHEIT CLAIMED THAT QADHAFI'S MEETING WITH THE EIGHT FOREIGN MINISTERS AND MUBARAK WAS INTENDED TO SHOW THE ARAB WORLD THAT A NOTORIOUSLY ANTI-WESTERN, ANTI-AMERICAN ARAB LEADER STOOD WITH THE ARAB MAJORITY IN CONDEMNING SADDAM'S AGGRESSION. IN GENERAL THE EGYPTIANS ARE PLEASED WITH QADHAFI'S FOUR-DAY VISIT TO CAIRO WHICH THEY REGARD AS A NECESSARY PART OF THE PROCESS OF KEEPING HIM UNDER CONTROL. THE HEAD OF STATE INFORMATION SERVICES TOLD DHM THAT QADHAFI HAD EVEN OFFERED TO ABANDON HIS THIRD UNIVERSAL THEORY IN THE EVENT OF LIBYAN-EGYPTIAN UNION: MUBARAK WOULD NOT GO THAT FAR EXCLAM.

7. ABDEL MEGUID'S MESSAGE DOES NOT SEEM TO REQUIRE A SPECIFIC ACKNOWLEDGEMENT. BUT YOU MAY WISH TO REFER TO IT WHEN YOU NEXT MEET OR WRITE TO HIM.

8. SEE MIFT.

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MIPT: TROIKA DISCUSSIONS WITH GORBACHEV AND BEHSSMERTNYKH: THE GULF

SUMMARY

1. GORBACHEV RERAFFIRMS SUPPORT FOR SUCURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS. DEFENDS SOVIET DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY.
2. BESSMERTNYKH SIMILARLY ROBUST. DESCRIBES PRIMAKOV'S MISSION TO BAGHAD. IRAQI PROPOSALS UNACCEPTABLE BUT REPRESENT PROGRESS. EMPHASIS ON COHESION IN FACE OF ANY SUBSEQUENT PROPOSALS. DESCRIBES ALLIANCE TACTICS AS WITHIN SPIRIT OF UN MANDATE.
3. IDEAS ON POST-CONFLICT ARRANGEMTNS. NEW SECURITY SYSTEM REQUIRING UN GUARANTEES NEEDED. NO SOVIET PLAN, BUT READY TO TAKE PART IN DISCUSSION.

DETAIL

4. GORBACHEV REAFFIRMED SUPPORT FOR THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS. THE SOVIET UNION HAD NO INTENTION OF SPLITTING THE COALITION. HOWEVER A RISK OF ESCALATION AND ENSUING CATASTROPHE EXISTED SEMICLN HENCE THE SOVIET UNION'S DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY. THERE HAD BEEN DISCUSSION IN THE WEST OF THE USE OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION. THIS MUST BE AVOIDED AT ALL COSTS. IRAQ LAY CLOSE TO THE SOVIET UNION'S SOUTHERN BORDERS. REFERRING TO TARIQ AZIZ'S ARRIVAL IN MOSCOW LATER TODAY, 17 FEBRUARY, GORBACHEV SAID THAT IT WAS NEVER TOO LATE FOR DIPLOMACY. HE WOULD TRY TO INFLUENCE TARIQ AZIZ BUT THERE WAS MUCH THAT WAS ILLOGICAL IN THE IRAQI POSITION. MEANWHILE THERE WAS CONTINUAL CONTACT BETWEEN BAKER AND BESSMERTNYKH SEMICLN THE US AND SOVIET POSITIONS WERE FUNAMENTALLY SIMILAR.

5. DISCUSSION WITH BESSMERTNYKH HAD BEEN DEVOTED ENTIRELY TO THE GULF. BESSMERTNYKH REPORTED THAT PRIMAKOV'S RECENT MEETING WITH SADDAM HUSSEIN LASTED FOR TWO HOURS. AS WE HAVE ALREADY REPORTED, HE DESCRIBED THE SCENARIO FOR THE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES ON THE FOLLOWING LINES:

- (A) ANNOUNCEMENT OF A TIMETABLE FOR WITHDRAWAL SEMICLN
- (B) CEASEFIRE, FOLLOWING IMMEDIATELY BY SEMICLN
- (C) WITHDRAWAL.

SADDAM HUSSEIN HAD NOT REJECTED THIS OUT OF HAND AND HAD SAID THAT TARIQ AZIZ WOULD GIVE A RESPONSE IN MOSCOW.

6. BESSMERTNYKH DID NOT THINK THAT THE FACT THAT THE RECENT IRAQI PROPOSALS HAD BEEN MADE IN THE NAME OF THE SUPREME REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL INDICATED SPLITS IN THE IRAQI LEADERSHIP. THIS DEVICE LEFT IT OPEN TO SADDAM HUSSEIN TO ADAPT HIS POSITION LATER. THE SOVIET UNION THOUGHT THAT THE IRAQI PROPOSALS REPRESENTED MORE THAN PROPAGANDA, EVEN THOUGH THEY CONTAINED UNACCEPTABLE CONDITIONS. THEY WERE A SIGN OF RETREAT SEMICLN IT WAS SIGNIFICANT THAT WHEN THE ANNOUNCEMENT WAS MADE THE IRAQI PEOPLE THOUGHT THAT THE WAR HAD ENDED. THE SOVIET UNION WERE CONCERNED THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN HAD REFERRED TO THESE PROPOSALS AS THE 'FIRST PART'. WERE THERE TO BE SUBSEQUENT PARTS, ALL WITH CONDITIONS ATTACHED? PERHAPS THIS WAS ONLY TACTICS, IN THE FACE OF WHICH THE COALITION MUST REMAIN FIRM AND REQUIRE UNCONDITIONAL ACCEPTANCE OF THE UN RESOLUTIONS. SADDAM HUSSEIN MUST BE BROUGHT TO UNDERSTAND THIS.

7. ASKED BY VAN DEN BROEK WHETHER HE THOUGHT THAT ALLIED MILITARY TACTICS REMAINED WITHIN THE SPIRIT OF THE UN MANDATE, BESSMERTNYKH HAD REPLIED THAT IT HAD NOT BEEN THE INTENTION OF SOVIET STATEMENTS TO MAKE A JUDGEMENT. THEY ONLY WISHED TO DRAW ATTENTION TO THE LOGIC OF WAR WHICH COULD LEAD TO ACTIONS WHICH WENT BEYOND WHAT HAD BEEN INTENDED. ASKED WHETHER THERE WOULD BE A ROLE FOR THE UN IN SECURING A CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES, BESSMERTNYKH SAID THAT A CEASEFIRE SHOULD NOT BE DELAYED WHILE THE SECURITY COUNCIL NEGOTIATED AGREEMENT ON THE PRECISE TEXT OF A RESOLUTION.

POST-CONFLICT ARRANGEMENTS

8. BESSMERTNYKH SAID THAT IT WOULD BE A GOOD PRECEDENT IF THE CRISIS CAN BE RESOLVED BY OTHER THAN PURELY MILITARY MEANS. HE HAD HEARD PROPOSALS FOR POST-CONFLICT ARRANGEMENTS WHICH DEPENDED ENTIRELY ON THE REGIONAL POWERS. THIS WOULD NOT WORK BECAUSE THERE

WAS NO EQUILIBRIUM IN THE REGION, PARTLY AS A CONSEQUENCE OF THE WEAKENING OF IRAQ. A NEW SECURITY SYSTEM WAS NEEDED WHICH REQUIRED THE ENGAGEMENT OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE SECRETARY-GENERAL. UN GUARANTEES WERE NEEDED. IT WAS NECESSARY TO ADDRESS THE LEVEL OF ARMAMENTS, THE ENVIRONMENT, ETC. THERE WOULD BE NO SOVIET PLAN, BUT THE SOVIET UNION WAS READY TO ENGAGE IN DISCUSSION AND DIALOGUE.

9. DE MICHELIS EXPOSED ITALIAN IDEAS. IT WOULD BE WRONG TO ADDRESS THE GULF SITUATION TOO NARROWLY. HE FORESAW CONCENTRIC CIRCLES OF DISCUSSION:- THE GULF, THE MIDDLE EAST SEMICLN AND OTHERS WITH LEGITIMATE INTERESTS IN THE REGION. HE SAW A ROLE FOR THE EUROPEANS, AND NOT JUST FOR THE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT WAS NEEDED SEMICLN PARTIAL SETTLEMENTS LED TO NEW WARS. IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO LAUNCH A SERIES OF CONFERENCES INSPIRED BY THE HELSINKI MODEL, IN WHICH A RANGE OF ISSUES NOT JUST SECURITY COULD BE ADDRESSED ON COMMON AGREED PRINCIPLES. BESSMERTNYKH SEEMED INTERESTED.

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MY 3 IPTS: IRAQ/KUWAIT: SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING: INFORMAL
CONSULTATIONS

SUMMARY

1. DISCUSSION OF THE WAY FORWARD IN INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS
FOCUSSES ON THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S GOOD OFFICES. AGREEMENT
THAT HE SHOULD HAVE FLEXIBILITY AND THAT MUCH WILL DEPEND ON THE
OUTCOME OF TARIQ AZIZ'S VISIT TO MOSCOW.

DETAIL

2. FOLLOWING THE PRIVATE FORMAL MEETING OF THE SECURITY
COUNCIL ON 16 FEBRUARY, COUNCIL MEMBERS MET IN THE INFORMAL
CONSULTATIONS. THE (ZIMBABWEAN) COUNCIL PRESIDENT (MUMBENGEGWI)
SAID THE IRAQI RCC COMMUNIQUE HAD NOW BEEN CIRCULATED AS A UN
DOCUMENT (S/22229).

3. AL-ASHTAL (YEMEN) SAID THE COUNCIL MUST NOW DECIDE HOW TO
DEAL WITH THIS PROPOSAL. PERHAPS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OR THE
PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL SHOULD SEEK CLARIFICATION FROM
THE IRAQIS, IN PARTICULAR TO WHAT EXTENT IRAQ WAS COMMITTED TO
SCR 660. QUESTIONS ALSO NEEDED TO BE ASKED ABOUT THE SO-CALLED
CONDITIONS. THE ALTERNATIVE WOULD BE TO WAIT UNTIL INDIVIDUAL
MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL HAD HAD CONTACTS WITH THE IRAQIS, SUCH AS
THOSE THAT WERE ABOUT TO TAKE PLACE IN MOSCOW. BUT THIS WAS A
MATTER FOR THE COUNCIL AS A WHOLE. IN VIEW OF REPORTS THAT THE
GROUND WAR WAS ABOUT TO START, THE COUNCIL SHOULD MOVE QUICKLY.
THE COUNCIL SHOULD ANYWAY EXPRESS A VIEW ON THE CHANGE IN THE
NATURE OF THE MILITARY OPERATIONS.

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4. GHAREKHAN (INDIA) SAID THE RCC COMMUNIQUE CONTAINED AN OPENING WHICH SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO SLIP BY. EVEN PICKERING HAD ADMITTED THAT IT CONTAINED A NEW ELEMENT, HOWEVER SMALL. AL-ASHTAL HAD REFERRED TO A ROLE FOR THE SECRETARY-GENERAL. WHATEVER THE ATTITUDE OF THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT IN ITS LETTERS TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, PEREZ DE CUELLAR MUST CONTINUE TO PLAY AN IMPORTANT PART. INDIA HAD TOTAL CONFIDENCE IN THE SECRETARY-GENERAL: THE IRAQI CHARGES HAD BEEN IMPROPER. THE COUNCIL COULD TELL THE SECRETARY-GENERAL THAT IT WOULD LIKE HIM TO DEVOTE HIS ENERGY TO THE CRISIS, BUT PERHAPS LEAVE IT TO HIM TO DECIDE HOW TO PROCEED.

5. PICKERING (UNITED STATES) SAID THAT THE ONE THING TO BE DONE IN BAGHDAD WAS TO READ THE RESOLUTIONS. THEY WERE QUITE CLEAR AND NEEDED NO INTERPRETATION. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL HAD MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE HAD NO WISH TO BE THE CREATURE OF THE COUNCIL. HIS MANDATE HAD IN ANY CASE BEEN SPELT OUT IN SCR 674. AL-ANBARI HAD INDICATED THAT THE RUSSIANS WOULD BE GIVEN A CLARIFICATION OF THE RCC STATEMENT WHEN TARIQ AZIZ WENT TO MOSCOW. HE HOPED VORONTSOV WOULD BE ABLE TO GIVE THE COUNCIL SOME INFORMATION ON 19 FEBRUARY. THE UNITED STATES WAS CONCERNED BY IRAQI ATTACKS ON THE SECRETARY-GENERAL. THE COUNCIL PRESIDENT MIGHT REASSURE THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE COUNCIL'S COMPLETE CONFIDENCE IN HIM.

6. I SAID THAT SCR 674 GAVE A GREEN LIGHT TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO USE HIS GOOD OFFICES: HE HAD MADE GOOD USE OF THEM DURING HIS TRIP TO BAGHDAD IN JANUARY AND IN HIS APPEAL OF 15 JANUARY. IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF HE COULD KNOW AT THIS TIME THAT COUNCIL MEMBERS WERE SHOCKED BY THE SLURS UPON HIM, BUT THOUGHT HE SHOULD CONTINUE TO PLAY A ROLE. WE COULD LOOK AT THIS QUESTION ON 19 FEBRUARY IN THE LIGHT OF THE IRAQI CONTACTS WITH THE SOVIET UNION.

7. LI (CHINA) SAID HIS AUTHORITIES HAD ALWAYS ATTACHED GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THE ROLE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL. THE COUNCIL COULD NOT TOLERATE ANY PERSONAL ATTACK ON HIM, AS THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OF THE UNITED NATIONS. THE COUNCIL SHOULD EXPRESS ITS FULL SUPPORT FOR HIM. ON HIS PRECISE ROLE IN THE NEXT STAGE OF THE CRISIS, THE COUNCIL PRESIDENT SHOULD CONSULT PEREZ DE CUELLAR HIMSELF.

8. AYALA LASSO (ECUADOR) SAID THE SECRETARY-GENERAL MUST BE

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TOLD THAT HE ENJOYED THE FULL SUPPORT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL SHOULD BE GIVEN FLEXIBILITY ABOUT THE BEST WAY TO EXERCISE THE MANDATE GIVEN TO HIM IN SCR 664. SOME POSITIVE RESULTS WERE ALREADY EMERGING FROM THE RCC STATEMENT. THE DISCUSSION IN THE PRIVATE MEETING OF THE COUNCIL HAD BEEN MEANINGFUL. THE STATEMENT OFFERED A TINY RAY OF HOPE WHICH MUST BE EXPLORED. IT WOULD BE WISE FOR THE COUNCIL TO WAIT TO HEAR THE RESULTS OF TARIQ AZIZ'S TALKS IN MOSCOW AND THEN CONSIDER THE RCC STATEMENT IN GREATER DEPTH.

9. MUMBENGEGWI SUMMED UP THAT THE GENERAL APPROACH WAS THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S ROLE WAS CLEARLY DEFINED IN SCR 674. BUT HE SHOULD BE ALLOWED FLEXIBILITY IN THE EXERCISE OF HIS MANDATE. THE COUNCIL WAS CONCERNED AT ATTACKS ON THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND WOULD LIKE TO EXPRESS FULL CONFIDENCE IN HIM. THE COUNCIL WOULD WAIT UNTIL THE RESULTS OF TARIQ AZIZ'S VISIT TO MOSCOW WERE KNOWN AND THEN DECIDE HOW TO PROCEED.

COMMENT

10. THIS DISCUSSION TURNED OUT WELL AND HAS ALREADY GONE A LONG WAY TO BURY THE CUBAN DRAFT RESOLUTION ON THE USE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S GOOD OFFICES.

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R. Webb

CB 17/2

Dear Charles,

REPORT FROM RIYADH

The Defence Secretary's colleagues might find it useful to see the attached report from Commanders on operations in the Gulf.

I am coping this letter to the Private Secretaries to members of OPD(G) and to Sir Robin Butler.

Yours faithfully

R. Webb

(S WEBB)

Private Secretary

Sir Charles Powell KCMG
No 10 Downing Street

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
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THE VIEW FROM RIYADH 171630Z FEB 91

1. CDS spoke late this afternoon to the Joint Commander who had just returned to Riyadh having spent 2 days visiting units in the theatre. He reported that morale was high among all units that he had visited and in particular that there was no undue tension among Tornado GR1 aircrew.
2. Air operations had been badly affected today by the weather and the morning sorties from Muharraq and Dhahran had been cancelled. Layered cloud was reported unbroken between 2,000 and 39,000 ft. Improved weather is anticipated tomorrow. Turning to ground operations, the Joint Commander reported that elements of UK Armd Div had planned to mount offensive operations under TACON of US 7 Corps this evening (in line with the continuing exchanges of artillery fire and cross-border skirmishing). The operation had however been cancelled but might be mounted again tomorrow evening. Finally, he reported that our mine-counter measure vessels were moving into the North Persian Gulf to commence mine-sweeping operations.
3. The Joint Commander today had an audience with the Emir of Bahrain who stated that the Iraqis had attached so many conditions to their recent peace proposal that it was not a serious option.
4. US Commanders in theatre were presently concerned with reports of a 'blue on blue' incident today in which 2 US servicemen were reported killed following the engagement of a US M113 (troop carrier) by an Apache armed attack helicopter. He concluded by saying that the thoughts in theatre envisaged stronger peace initiatives within the next 48 hours amid further signs of crumbling within the Iraqi forces.


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VISIT OF THE TROIKA, 16 FEBRUARY

THE EC TROIKA (THE INFO IMMEDIATE LUXEMBOURG, DUTCH, AND ITALIAN FOREIGN MINISTERS, PLUS COMMISSIONER ANDRIESEN) HAD TWO HOURS WITH GORBACHEV YESTERDAY AFTERNOON, WITHOUT THEIR ADVISERS. THEY THEN HAD A SUBSTANTIAL MEETING, FOLLOWED BY DINNER, WITH BESSMERTNYKH. THE LUXEMBOURG AMBASSADOR AND HIS THREE COLLEAGUES GAVE A COMMUNITY BRIEFING ON THE MORNING OF 17 FEBRUARY.

2. THE IDEA OF HOLDING THE MEETING IN MOSCOW, INSTEAD OF IN THE MARGIN OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE IN MADRID, CAME FROM THE RUSSIANS. THE MAIN SUBJECTS DISCUSSED WERE THE GULF (MY TELEGRAM NO 384 NOT TO ALL), AND THE BALTICS (MY TELRGAM NO 385 NOT TO ALL).

GORBACHEV

3. GORBACHEV SPENT COMPARATIVELY LITTLE TIME ON THE GULF. BUT HE GAVE AN UNEQUIVOCAL ASSURANCE THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD NOT DIVERGE FROM ITS PARTNERS ON THE ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENT THAT SADDAM SHOULD WITHDRAW FROM KUWAIT WITHOUT PRECONDITIONS.

4. MUCH THE LARGEST PART OF THIS MEETING WAS DEVOTED TO THE BALTICS. THE TROIKA MINISTERS SET OUT THE BASIS FOR WESTERN CONCERN CLEARLY, AND WITHOUT PULLING PUNCHES. GORBACHEV REACTED WITH MUCH EMOTION. HE WAS DETERMINED TO SETTLE THE PROBLEMS FACED BY THE UNION - WHICH WENT WELL BEYOND THE BALTIC'S - WITHIN THE LAW AND WITHOUT FORCE. THE EUROPEANS HAD JUMPED TO CONCLUSIONS WITHOUT KNOWING OR UNDERSTANDING THE FACTS. HE WOULD NOT BE DEFLECTED FROM HIS POLICIES: IF THE EUROPEANS DIDN'T LIKE IT, THEY COULD LUMP IT.

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5. THE TROIKA RAISED PRIME MINISTER PAVLOV'S REMARKS ABOUT A FINANCIAL PLOT AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION. GORBACHEV WAS SOMEWHAT DISMISSIVE. PAVLOV HAD HAD SOME CONCRETE INFORMATION: BUT SOVIET POLICY REMAINED TO COOPERATE WITH WESTERN BUSINESS. GORBACHEV SEEMED TO HAVE NO REAL INKLING OF THE DAMAGE WHICH SUCH STATEMENTS BY SOMEONE IN PAVLOV'S POSITION COULD CAUSE.

6. ON CFE GORBACHEV HAD SAID THAT HE WAS NOT CONCERNED WITH THE DETAILS: THESE WERE FOR MINISTERS OF DEFENCE AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS. BUT HE WAS CONFIDENT THAT THE DIFFICULTIES WOULD BE IRONED OUT AND THE TREATY RATIFIED.

7. THE DUTCH MINISTER (ACCORDING TO HIS AMBASSADOR) THOUGHT THAT, GORBACHEV WAS MUCH CHANGED. HE WAS IN A HIGHLY EMOTIONAL MOOD, ESPECIALLY ON THE BALTICS. HE FELT HE HAD BEEN MISUNDERSTOOD AND BETRAYED BY THE WEST - ESTPICALY THE PRESS WHICH HAD PREVIOUSLY LAUDED HIM TO THE SKIES. HE APPEALED SEVERAL TIMES FOR THE WEST'S TRUST AND UNDERSTANDING. THE DUTCH MINISTER COMMENTED THAT GORBACHEV SEEMED 'DESPERATE, IN CONTROL NEITHER OF HIMSELF NOR THE CIRCUMSTANCES'.

BESSMERTNYKH

8. THE DISCUSSIONS WITH BESSMERTNYKH WERE CONCERNED EXCLUSIVELY WITH THE GULF. BESSMERTNYKH REPEATED THE ASSURANCE GIVEN BY GORBACHEV, DESCRIBED PRIMAKOV'S EXCHANGES WITH SADDAM IN SLIGHTLY MORE DETAIL, EXPANDED ON SOVIET IDEAS FOR POST-WAR ARRANGEMENTS (ON WHICH DE MICHELIS ALSO APPEARS TO HAVE SPOKEN AT LENGTH), AND PROMISED A BRIEFING ON 19 FEBRUARY ABOUT TARIQ AZIZ' VISIT. (IN GENERAL THE RUSSIANS SEEM RATHER PLEASED WITH THEMSELVES: THEY ARE DEEPLY INVOLVED IN THE ENDGAME, WITHOUT BREAKING RANKS WITH THE AMERICANS.)

9. THE EUROPEAN MINISTERS WERE UNIMPRESSED BY BESSMERTNYKH, AND HIS ABILITY TO HANDLE COMPLEX ISSUES IN A BROAD AND STATESMANLIKE WAY.

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