

TOP SECRET

10 DOWNING STREET

THIS FILE MUST NOT GO OUTSIDE 10 DOWNING ST

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FILE TITLE: Situation		SERIES MIDDLE EAST
		PART:  44.
PART BEGINS: 22 February 1991	PART ENDS: 27 February 1991.	CAB ONE:

PREM 19/3449

TOP SECRET



gk
(2)

Foreign &
Commonwealth
Office

27 February 1991

CONFIDENTIAL

London SW1A 2AH

Dear Charles,

*There is absolutely
ought!*

*Jim
CD 27/1*

Priorities for the Restored Kuwaiti Government

The Foreign Secretary has been concerned by some recent reports about the attitude of the Al Sabah to the liberation of Kuwait.

In particular, we heard that they envisaged a leisurely timetable for their return. They are reported to have said publicly that they will install a military government which could last for three months. It was reported that during that period the Kuwaitis intended to drive many of the remaining Palestinians out of Kuwait.

In Taif on 9 February the Foreign Secretary emphasised to Crown Prince Sa'ad the importance of an early return to Kuwait. He also raised this with the Finance Minister, Shaikh Ali Khalifa, in London on 20 February. In addition to stressing the need for an early return to Kuwait, the Foreign Secretary suggested that the Kuwaiti Government should make a unifying broadcast to the Kuwaiti people, that the rule of law needed to be established as soon as possible and that summary justice should be avoided. The Foreign Secretary also suggested that the Kuwaitis quickly start to gather information on Iraqi atrocities.

These message are apparently getting home. Both we and the Americans have reports that Crown Prince Sa'ad and other Kuwaiti Ministers are raring to return to Kuwait. It is likely that the Amir will not return until security is assured. The Americans tell us that they have spoken in the strongest terms to the Kuwaitis about the need to avoid summary justice. They have received assurances on this from both the Kuwaiti Government and the Kuwaiti Resistance. The State Department are confident that the Palestinians at least will be reasonably treated. Any Iraqis who have remained in Kuwait may be less comfortable.

The Foreign Secretary has asked our people in Jeddah to watch for signs of backsliding by the Kuwaitis. It will be of key importance for the Kuwaitis and us that the restored

/government

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government is seen to behave responsibly and to fulfil their commitments, not only to human rights but also to greater popular participation in decision making.

Yours ever,
S. L. Gass
(S. L. Gass)
Private Secretary

Sir Charles Powell KCMG
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

From: The Dean of St Paul's
The Very Reverend Eric Evans



Tel: 071-236 2827

Fax: 071-248 3104

THE DEANERY
9 Amen Court, London EC4M 7BU

February 27, 1991

The Rt Hon The Prime Minister, PC
10 Downing Street
London
SW1A 2AA

Dear Prime Minister,

I would like you to know how much you and your Government are in our thoughts and prayers at this time, and here at St Paul's we rejoice in the fact that there has been such a speedy liberation of Kuwait. We hope that further hostilities will also be brought to a swift and satisfactory conclusion.

When you and your advisers think it appropriate, you may wish to consider a National Act of Thanksgiving. With the full concurrence of my Chapter, I am writing to say that we would be honoured to hold such a Service at St Paul's.

*With every good wish and Blessing
on all your endeavours,*

Yours very sincerely,
Eric Evans.



10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

27 February 1991

I attach a copy of a letter the Prime Minister has received from the President of Brazil.

I should be grateful for advice and a draft reply, to reach me by Wednesday 13 March.

Charles Powell

Christopher Prentice Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

28/3

Chamber/
M. refer



RR
Rhine River ①

PRIME MINISTER

THE GULF

I think you should
put the bottles on this -
at least "won't be
situation in clear": Agree?
CD 2072

With valuable support from Malcolm Rifkind's Marine Pollution Control Unit and others, I have as you know been closely involved for the last month in co-ordinating the UK's contribution to dealing with environmental problems in the Gulf. Our initial action was set out in my "Dear Colleague" letter of 6 February. Most recently, I have been agreeing with David Mellor arrangements to allow a contribution of pollution control equipment to be dispatched shortly in response to an appeal for help from Bahrain. For the long term, once the fighting is over, I see scope for a further valuable contribution from British science in helping the Gulf States to develop and put into practice ecological recovery strategies.

Again looking forward to the post-war period, there will clearly be enormous commercial opportunities to be taken in connection with the reconstruction of Kuwait and to some extent Saudi Arabia, and I believe that the environmental help that we have offered, as well as our military participation, has put us in a good position to take advantage of them.

For this reason, as soon as you and other key colleagues feel that the time is right, I propose that I should visit the area, in part to take a look at the environmental problems and the solutions being brought to bear and in part in order to give an entree at the highest level to a delegation of senior figures from the British construction industry. I know, of course, that Douglas Hurd recently took a group of businessmen, including construction people, to meet the Kuwaiti Government in Exile in Saudi Arabia and I have seen the prospectus prepared by Peter Lilley. While I have no desire to duplicate what colleagues are doing, my Department sponsors the construction industry and I am of course already familiar personally with many heads of Government and other leaders in the region from my days as Secretary of State for Defence. If you are content, I



should like urgently to work up practical details and likely timing in consultation with Douglas Hurd, Tom King and Peter Lilley.

I am copying this to Norman Lamont, Douglas Hurd, John Wakeham, Tom King, Peter Lilley, David Mellor and Sir Robin Butler.

MH

27 February 1991

MIDDLEBURY 816 Pt 44

COVERING SECRET UK/US EYES A
GRANBY SPECIAL HANDLING CHANNELS ONLY



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

Telephone 071-21 82111/3

MO 6/17/15/1J

R. Smith
27/2
27th February 1991

Dear Charles

60 (a-b-c)

REPORT FROM RIYADH

The Defence Secretary's colleagues might find it useful to see the attached report from Commanders on Operations today in the Gulf.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries to members of OPD(G) and to Sir Robin Butler.

Yours sincerely

Sir Ambler Stevens

ps (S WEBB)
Private Secretary

Sir Charles Powell KCMG
10 Downing Street

GRANBY SPECIAL HANDLING CHANNELS ONLY
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
CDS 2066/2/1

27 Feb 91

PS/Secretary of State

THE VIEW FROM RIYADH - 272030Z FEB 91

1. Despite the predictions the weather improved sufficiently for Tornado GRI sorties to be mounted against Iraqi airfields and airfield infrastructure. The weather in the KTO was however poorer adding to the difficulties of airspace management for offensive air operations - in essence the Allies have too many air assets available for too confined an area. Jaguars did not therefore fly today.
2. The attached map represents the position as at 1900 this evening. The overall disposition of Allied land forces shows a continued advance to isolate Iraqi forces from their lines of retreat. 6 French Armoured Division is established on the West flank but shortly to be chopped to 7 US Corps, possibly for future operations in Kuwait city. 24 Mechanised Infantry Division has the task of blocking to the South of Basra and is moving towards phase line CRUSH. Leading elements are reporting strong resistance. 82 Airborne Division is currently secured at objective GREY but preparing to support 24 Mechanised Infantry Division. 101 Airborne has a Brigade at COBRA, a Brigade mobile for objective TIN, and a third Brigade at Objective SAND, blocking the lines of communication to Baghdad. 1 US Armoured Division is at objective BROWN and elements are engaging the Republican Guard MEDINAH Division which is retreating to the North East. The lead elements of a Kuwaiti, Saudi and Egyptian liberation force are now in Kuwait City whilst 1 and 2 Marine Divisions hold the Southern boundary.
3. Turning to UK land forces, 7 Brigade secured objective VARSITY earlier today and took the opportunity to reorganise before their next task. The Brigade may shortly be tasked to move towards objective HAWK but the future employment of the UK Division is currently being addressed. 4 Brigade was delayed at objective TUNGSTEN by a vast number of Iraqi prisoners but is now moving to objective VARSITY. It is reported that the UK Division has some 8,000 prisoners of war.
4. Royal Navy operations have again been structured around Mine Counter Measures Tasking and Gun Fire Support.
5. Finally, Iraqi command and control seems to have ceased at national level.


A J STABLES
Gp Capt
DPSO/CDS
MB6173 82116MB

1 OF 1

GRANBY SPECIAL HANDLING CHANNELS ONLY
~~SECRET~~ US/UK EYES ONLY

A DPSO(S)/3

AN NASIRIYAH

101 AA DIV

TALLIL

STRIKER

CRUSH

BASRAH

24 ID(M)

G 82 AB DIV

LEGEND

B = BROWN
D = DORSET
M = NORFOLK
V = VARSITY
T = TUNSTEN
R = RALEIGH
H = HAWK
TI = TIN
S = SAND
G = GREY
C = COBRA

1 CAV DIV

RGFC

1 ADB

3 ADD

1 ID(M)


7x

4x

2 MAR DIV

KUWAIT CITY

1 MAR DIV





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GRANBY SPECIAL HANDLING CHANNELS ONLY



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

Telephone 071-21 82111/3

MO 6/17/15/1J

27th February 1991

Dear Charles,

VIEW FROM WASHINGTON

The Defence Secretary's colleagues might find it useful to see the attached report on Operations today in the Gulf.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries to members of OPD(G) and to Sir Robin Butler.

Yours sincerely,

Bryan Wells

(B H WELLS)
Private Secretary

Sir Charles Powell KCMG
10 Downing Street

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CDS 2066/2/1

27 Feb 91

PS/Secretary of State

FILE

THE VIEW FROM WASHINGTON - 271630Z FEB 91


1. CDS telephoned Gen Powell this afternoon to discuss progress against confusing signals from the United Nations, Moscow and Baghdad radio on Iraqi terms for ceasefire. Gen Powell began the conversation with a very genuine message of sorrow about the A10 attack on the Warriors yesterday.
2. On the question of ceasefire Gen Powell warned that we had to play to the Arab mentality. The best way to clear up Baghdad's conditions for a ceasefire was to get Saddam Hussein on CNN to spell out his proposals to the world. Until such time, he said, the coalition forces should press on as we have so far suffered minimum losses and now was not the time to slow down or stop. CDS probed Gen Powell's thinking on the possibility of an Iraqi surrender in the KTO, no clear message from Saddam Hussein and a continuation of SCUD launches. Gen Powell said that he had discussed this at length with Mr Cheney in the knowledge that within 24 hours there were unlikely to be any targets worth attacking in the KTO. The Iraqis were really now reduced to 1 fighting force - the Hamurabi RGFC Division. He felt that he could not really go on attacking the Iraqis for much longer than another 24 hours without appearing mean and unchivalrous. Coalition forces had already taken out numerous vehicles West and South of Basra.
3. If the current situation did not result in a ceasefire, Gen Powell felt that the best way to continue would be to run down our offensive activities in reverse order i.e. stop land activity but carry on with the air campaign against the remainder of Iraq. We should reduce to a few sorties a day which could be targeted against airfields, HASS, SCUDs and selective token targets. He did not feel confident that it would be easy to remove the SCUD threat completely as debriefings of defectors and prisoners of war seemed to indicate that the Iraqis still possessed several hundred missiles and 15 battalions of SCUD forces each with 15 MELs.
4. CDS then raised the specific question of coalition reactions to continued SCUD launches post surrender in the KTO. Gen Powell returned to his theme of not stopping the air campaign completely because although world opinion might agree that the use of SCUD would count as an act of international terrorism there might be political difficulties in restarting air attacks. He would much prefer to be in a position to respond to such an attack by stepping up the air campaign. He also agreed that it would be essential, in the formulation of ceasefire terms, to include a specific agreement that Iraq would not resort to the use of SCUDs and that if they did launch against coalition territory this would

be cause for retribution. He would not however be inclined, under ceasefire conditions, to use coalition forces to respond to any SCUD attacks on Israel. He felt that this would be a matter for the Israelis to deal with.


5. CDS asked about US intentions towards the associated ironmongery which is being abandoned by the Iraqi Army in the KTO. Gen Powell's response was short and to the point in that he said he intended to destroy it all. CDS then raised the spectre of 250,000 Iraqi prisoners of war and how best to deal with them. Gen Powell was disposed to help them on their way back to Iraq once they had surrendered all of their weapons having supplied them with water and rations. This course of action seems to be quite feasible in accordance with paragraph 4 of the note D/D Pers 6/9/4 of today entitled "Prisoners of War".

6. Gen Powell finished with an amusing anecdote. A US HUMVEE became stuck in the mud by the side of the road in the Euphrates Valley earlier today. Shortly afterwards an Iraqi tank approached and pulled the troop carrier back on to the road. When the American troops appeared out of their vehicle the Iraqi tank crew jumped out and surrendered to them.

Marine
Vehicle



D G LITTLEJOHNS
Cdre
PSO/CDS
MB6173 83353MB

DEPARTMENT/SERIES <i>PREM 19</i> PIECE/ITEM <i>3449</i> (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract details: <i>minute from Craddock to Powell dated 27 February 1991</i>	
CLOSED UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	<i>22/1/18</i> <i>M. M.</i>
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	
MISSING AT TRANSFER	
NUMBER NOT USED	
MISSING (TNA USE ONLY)	
DOCUMENT PUT IN PLACE (TNA USE ONLY)	

Instructions for completion of Dummy Card

Use black or blue pen to complete form.

Use the card for one piece or for each extract removed from a different place within a piece.

Enter the department and series,
eg. HO 405, J 82.

Enter the piece and item references, .
eg. 28, 1079, 84/1, 107/3

Enter extract details if it is an extract rather than a whole piece.
This should be an indication of what the extract is,
eg. Folio 28, Indictment 840079, E107, Letter dated 22/11/1995.
Do not enter details of why the extract is sensitive.

If closed under the FOI Act, enter the FOI exemption numbers applying to the closure, eg. 27(1), 40(2).

Sign and date next to the reason why the record is not available to the public ie. Closed under FOI exemption; Retained under section 3(4) of the Public Records Act 1958; Temporarily retained; Missing at transfer or Number not used.

0277771 09133
OVAL OFFICE ADDRESS
FEBRUARY 27, 1991

KUWAIT IS LIBERATED. IRAQ'S ARMY IS DEFEATED.
OUR MILITARY OBJECTIVES ARE MET. KUWAIT IS ONCE MORE
IN THE HANDS OF KUWAITIS, IN CONTROL OF THEIR OWN
DESTINY. WE SHARE IN THEIR JOY, A JOY TEMPERED ONLY BY
OUR COMPASSION FOR THEIR ORDEAL.

TONIGHT, THE KUWAITI FLAG ONCE AGAIN FLIES ABOVE
THE CAPITAL OF A FREE AND SOVEREIGN NATION. AND THE
AMERICAN FLAG FLIES ABOVE OUR EMBASSY.

SEVEN MONTHS AGO, AMERICA AND THE WORLD DREW A LINE
IN THE SAND. WE DECLARED THAT THE AGGRESSION AGAINST
KUWAIT WOULD NOT STAND. AND TONIGHT, AMERICA AND THE
WORLD HAVE KEPT THEIR WORD.

THIS IS NOT A TIME OF EUPHORIA, CERTAINLY NOT A
TIME TO GLOAT. BUT IT IS A TIME OF PRIDE -- PRIDE IN
OUR TROOPS, PRIDE IN THE FRIENDS WHO STOOD WITH US IN
THE CRISIS, PRIDE IN OUR NATION AND THE PEOPLE WHOSE
STRENGTH AND RESOLVE MADE VICTORY QUICK, DECISIVE AND
JUST. AND SOON WE WILL OPEN WIDE OUR ARMS TO WELCOME
BACK HOME TO AMERICA OUR MAGNIFICENT FIGHTING FORCES.

NO ONE COUNTRY CAN CLAIM THIS VICTORY AS ITS OWN. IT WAS NOT ONLY A VICTORY FOR KUWAIT, BUT A VICTORY FOR ALL THE COALITION PARTNERS. THIS IS A VICTORY FOR THE UNITED NATIONS, FOR ALL MANKIND, . . . FOR THE RULE OF LAW, AND FOR WHAT IS RIGHT.

AFTER CONSULTING WITH SECRETARY OF DEFENSE CHENEY, THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF GENERAL POWELL, AND OUR COALITION PARTNERS . . . AT MIDNIGHT TONIGHT, EXACTLY 100 HOURS SINCE GROUND OPERATIONS COMMENCED, SIX WEEKS SINCE THE START OF OPERATION DESERT STORM, ALL U.S. AND COALITION FORCES WILL SUSPEND OFFENSIVE COMBAT OPERATIONS.

IT IS UP TO IRAQ WHETHER THIS SUSPENSION ON THE PART OF THE COALITION BECOMES A PERMANENT CEASE-FIRE. COALITION POLITICAL AND MILITARY TERMS FOR A FORMAL CEASE-FIRE INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING REQUIREMENTS:

IRAQ MUST RELEASE IMMEDIATELY ALL COALITION PRISONERS-OF-WAR, THIRD-COUNTRY NATIONALS, AND THE REMAINS OF ALL WHO HAVE FALLEN. IRAQ MUST RELEASE ALL KUWAITI DETAINEES. IRAQ ALSO MUST INFORM KUWAITI AUTHORITIES OF THE LOCATION AND NATURE OF ALL LAND AND SEA MINES. IRAQ MUST COMPLY FULLY WITH ALL RELEVANT UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS. THIS INCLUDES A RESCINDING OF IRAQ'S AUGUST DECISION TO ANNEX KUWAIT, AND ACCEPTANCE IN PRINCIPLE OF IRAQ'S RESPONSIBILITY TO PAY COMPENSATION FOR THE LOSS, DAMAGE AND INJURY ITS AGGRESSION HAS CAUSED.

THE COALITION CALLS UPON THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT TO DESIGNATE MILITARY COMMANDERS TO MEET WITHIN 48 HOURS WITH THEIR COALITION COUNTERPARTS AT A PLACE IN THE THEATER OF OPERATIONS TO BE SPECIFIED, TO ARRANGE FOR MILITARY ASPECTS OF THE CEASE-FIRE. IRAQ SHOULD DESIGNATE POLITICAL REPRESENTATIVES TO MEET WITH SECRETARY OF STATE BAKER AND COALITION COUNTERPARTS TO DEAL WITH THE POLITICAL ASPECTS OF THE CEASE-FIRE. FURTHER, I HAVE ASKED SECRETARY BAKER TO REQUEST THAT THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL MEET TO FORMULATE THE NECESSARY ARRANGEMENTS FOR THIS WAR TO BE ENDED.

- 4 -

THIS SUSPENSION OF OFFENSIVE COMBAT OPERATIONS IS CONTINGENT UPON IRAQ'S NOT FIRING UPON ANY COALITION FORCES AND NOT LAUNCHING SCUD MISSILES AGAINST ANY OTHER COUNTRY. IF IRAQ VIOLATES THESE TERMS, COALITION FORCES WILL BE FREE TO RESUME MILITARY OPERATIONS.

AT EVERY OPPORTUNITY I HAVE SAID TO THE PEOPLE OF IRAQ THAT OUR QUARREL WAS NOT WITH THEM BUT INSTEAD WITH THEIR LEADERSHIP AND ABOVE ALL WITH SADDAM HUSSEIN. THIS REMAINS THE CASE. YOU, THE PEOPLE OF IRAQ ARE NOT OUR ENEMY. WE DO NOT SEEK YOUR DESTRUCTION. WE HAVE TREATED ^{YOUR} ~~THEIR~~ P.O.W.'S WITH KINDNESS. COALITION FORCES FOUGHT THIS WAR ONLY AS A LAST RESORT, AND LOOK FORWARD TO THE DAY WHEN IRAQ IS LEAD BY PEOPLE PREPARED TO LIVE IN PEACE WITH THEIR NEIGHBORS.

WE MUST NOW BEGIN TO LOOK BEYOND VICTORY IN WAR. WE MUST MEET THE CHALLENGE OF SECURING THE PEACE; IN THE FUTURE, AS BEFORE, WE WILL CONSULT WITH OUR COALITION PARTNERS.

WE HAVE ALREADY DONE A GOOD DEAL OF THINKING AND PLANNING FOR THE POST-WAR PERIOD, AND SECRETARY BAKER HAS ALREADY BEGUN TO CONSULT WITH OUR COALITION PARTNERS ON THE REGION'S CHALLENGES. THERE CAN BE AND WILL BE NO SOLELY AMERICAN ANSWER TO ALL THESE CHALLENGES. BUT WE CAN ASSIST AND SUPPORT THE COUNTRIES OF THE REGION AND BE A CATALYST FOR PEACE. IN THIS SPIRIT, SECRETARY BAKER WILL GO TO THE REGION NEXT WEEK TO BEGIN A NEW ROUND OF CONSULTATIONS.

THIS WAR IS NOW BEHIND US; AHEAD OF US IS THE DIFFICULT TASK OF SECURING A POTENTIALLY HISTORIC PEACE. TONIGHT, THOUGH, LET US BE PROUD OF WHAT WE HAVE ACCOMPLISHED. LET US GIVE THANKS TO THOSE WHO RISKED THEIR LIVES; LET US NEVER FORGET THOSE WHO GAVE THEIR LIVES. MAY GOD BLESS OUR VALIANT MILITARY FORCES AND THEIR FAMILIES, AND LET US ALL REMEMBER THEM IN OUR PRAYERS. GOOD NIGHT, AND MAY GOD BLESS THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

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- 5 -

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#

CONFIDENTIAL



10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

27 February 1991

Dear Sir,

THE GULF: STATEMENT

In the light of tonight's developments the Prime Minister will need to make a Statement to the House tomorrow. I attach a first draft, which might be considered at OPD(G) tomorrow.

I should be grateful if MoD and FCO could work on supplementaries, to be available by 1300 tomorrow.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Richard Gozney (Foreign and Commonwealth Office), John Neilson (Department of Energy) Juliet Wheldon (Law Officer's Department) and Sir Robin Butler.

*Yours truly,
Charles Powell*

CHARLES POWELL

Simon Webb, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET



10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

27 February 1991

Dee Simon,

THE GULF: PRESIDENT BUSH'S STATEMENT

I enclose the current (0045) draft of the statement which President Bush will make at 0200. I am not confident of being able to get in any amendment at this late stage, but please let me know if there are any essential points.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Richard Gozney (Foreign and Commonwealth Office), John Neilson (Department of Energy), Juliet Wheldon (Law Officers' Department) and to Sir Robin Butler.

Yours sincerely,
C. D. Powell

C. D. POWELL

Simon Webb, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence.

SECRET

SECRET

0101-202-456-2493
56(a-b)

Please pass following to General Scowcroft from Charles Powell,
No. 10 Downing Street.

Sent by Fax

COO
20/2

BRENT,

You asked me to let you have on a strictly personal basis any ideas for conditions to be attached to a ceasefire. Here are some suggestions:

CONDITIONS FOR A SUSPENSION OF MILITARY OPERATIONS

1. All Iraqi forces must cease hostile operations against coalition forces and any other country forthwith.
2. All Iraqi forces must withdraw immediately from the theatre of operations leaving their equipment and weapons behind.
3. Unarmed Iraqi personnel will be allowed to withdraw at any time without being attacked.

CONDITIONS FOR A CEASEFIRE

4. Iraq must communicate authoritatively to the Security Council her acceptance of the Resolutions of the Security Council relating to the invasion and occupation of Kuwait.
5. Immediately and prior to ceasefire, Iraq must notify to the ICRC the names of all allied POWs they are holding and make arrangements for ICRC to have access to them before the ceasefire. Prisoners must then be assembled in one place under ICRC supervision. Thereafter, they must be handed over within 48 hours of the ceasefire.
6. The release of Kuwaiti detainees must begin immediately and be completed as soon as possible and no later than 96 hours after the ceasefire.

SECRET

7. Iraqi military Liaison Officer(s) must be designated to work with Kuwaiti and other coalition forces on the operational details related to Iraq's withdrawal, to include the provision of all data on the location and nature of all explosives or booby traps and of all land or sea mines.

8. [All ballistic missiles and all weapons of mass destruction together with related stocks, equipment and production facilities must be identified within one week for destruction by coalition forces.]

9. Any breach of these terms will bring an instant and sharp response from coalition forces in accordance with UNSC Resolution 678.

I hope these are of some use to you.

Warm Regards,

CHARLES

RESTRICTED
FM WASHINGTON
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 575
OF 270105Z FEBRUARY 91
AND TO IMMEDIATE LISBON, HM TREASURY,

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LISBON FOR SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY

TREASURY FOR WICKS, EVANS, SEDGWICK, PICKERING AND SANDRA BROWN

GULF RECONSTRUCTION
SUMMARY

1. US TREASURY CONSIDERING RANGE OF OPTIONS FOR ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION IN THE MIDDLE EAST. NOT WEDDED TO BAKER PROPOSAL FOR NEW RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT BANK.
DETAIL
2. MINISTER (ECONOMIC) AND BROWN CALLED ON 25 FEBRUARY ON US TREASURY DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR DEVELOPING NATIONS, GEORGE FOLSOM. CHARLES SCHOTTA, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR ARABIAN PENINSULA AFFAIRS, WAS ALSO PRESENT.
3. MINISTER SAID UK GOVERNMENT WAS DOING SOME INITIAL THINKING ABOUT ARRANGEMENTS FOR ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION IN THE MIDDLE EAST. WE HAD NOTED SECRETARY BAKER'S RECENT SUGGESTION THAT CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO A NEW RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT BANK (WASHINGTON TELNO 421). WE WOULD BE INTERESTED TO KNOW MORE OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S THINKING ON THIS.
4. FOLSOM SAID THE US WAS LIKEWISE DOING SOME INITIAL THINKING. BAKER'S SUGGESTION SHOULD NOT BE INTERPRETED AS A FIRM PROPOSAL. THE ISSUE WAS ONE OF CAPITAL DISTRIBUTION NOT CAPITAL DEPRIVATION. THE PROBLEMS OF THE REGION WOULD MAKE IT VERY DIFFICULT TO CREATE A NEW INSTITUTION. THE TREASURY WAS THEREFORE LOOKING AT HOW EXISTING STRUCTURES AND INSTITUTIONS COULD BE USED, ALTHOUGH IT WAS ALSO CONSIDERING WHAT WOULD BE INVOLVED IN SETTING UP A NEW INSTITUTION. AN ATTRACTIVE OPTION WAS TO TRY TO DEVELOP THE GULF CRISIS FINANCIAL CO-ORDINATION GROUP (GCFCG) AS A COORDINATING BODY, WITH THE WORLD BANK AND POSSIBLY OTHER EXISTING INSTITUTIONS AS ITS EXECUTIVE ARM. ALTERNATIVELY THE GROUP MIGHT BE THE CHRYSALIS OF A NEW REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT BANK.
5. FOLSOM AND SCHOTTA SAID THAT EXISTING INSTITUTIONS SUCH AS THE ISLAMIC DEVELOPMENT BANK AND THE GULF INVESTMENT

CORPORATION INCLUDED MOST ARAB LEAGUE COUNTRIES INCLUDING IRAQ AND EXCLUDED ISRAEL. THEY WERE ALL CHANNELS FOR AID-GIVING BY THE RICHER COUNTRIES OF THE REGION. APART FROM THEIR WEAKNESSES AS INSTITUTIONS, THE DRAWBACK OF BASING NEW ARRANGEMENTS ON THEM WAS THAT THE MEMBERSHIP WOULD HAVE TO BE EXPANDED TO INCLUDE THE REST OF THE INDUSTRIALISED WORLD. ISRAEL WAS A PARTICULAR PROBLEM. THE BUSINESS COMMUNITY IN THE ARAB WORLD WOULD PROBABLY LIKE TO DISPENSE WITH THE ARAB LEAGUE'S BOYCOTT OF ISRAEL. BUT THERE WERE STILL IMMENSE POLITICAL OBSTACLES TO THIS. ANY NEW ECONOMIC INSTITUTION NEEDED TO QUOTE SUPPORT CLOSE QUOTE POST-WAR SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS IN THE REGION WHICH WOULD PRESUMABLY INCLUDE ISRAEL. MOREOVER PRESENT INDICATIONS WERE THAT CONGRESS WOULD INSIST THAT ISRAEL SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN ANY NEW ARRANGEMENTS. YET IT WAS BY NO MEANS CLEAR THAT ISRAEL ITSELF WOULD WANT TO BE INCLUDED. ISRAEL RECEIVED OVER DOLLARS 3 BILLION IN BILATERAL MILITARY AND ECONOMIC AID FROM THE US AND WOULD NOT WANT THIS TO BE JEOPARDISED. ALL THIS SEEMED TO POINT TO THE ADVANTAGES OF USING THE WORLD BANK AS THE MAIN CHANNEL FOR POST-WAR ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION.

6. MINISTER ASKED WHETHER US WOULD ENVISAGE MAKING A SUBSTANTIAL CASH CONTRIBUTION TO ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION. ALTERNATIVELY, IF A NEW INSTITUTION WERE SET UP, WOULD THE US ENVISAGE SIMPLY A NOMINAL SHAREHOLDING. FOLSOM SAID THAT ANY CONTRIBUTION WOULD BE KEPT TO A MINIMUM. US BUDGET PROVISION FOR REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT BANKS HAD BEEN CAPPED FOR 5 YEARS, AND ANY ADDITIONAL DEMANDS WOULD HAVE TO COMPETE WITH EXISTING ALLOCATIONS. THERE MIGHT BE OTHER NEW DEMANDS, EG FOR THE SOVIET UNION.

7. MINISTER ALSO ASKED ABOUT THE IDEA OF A TRUST FUND. FOLSOM SAID THIS OPTION WAS BEING EXAMINED. THE ADVANTAGE WAS THAT IT COULD BE IMPLEMENTED QUICKLY, THOUGH HE WAS PERSONALLY SCEPTICAL WHETHER THERE WOULD BE SUFFICIENT COOPERATION FROM ALL THE COUNTRIES CONCERNED. IT WAS IMPORTANT TO REMEMBER THAT MOST ARAB COUNTRIES HAD A LONG TRADITION OF PERSONALISED, BILATERAL, AID-GIVING. MULTILATERAL ARRANGEMENTS WOULD NOT COME NATURALLY TO THEM.

8. FOLSOM SAID ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION MIGHT BE AN AGENDA ITEM FOR THE MEETING OF THE GULF CRISIS FINANCIAL COORDINATION GROUP ON 11 MARCH. (COMMENT: WE HAVE SUBSEQUENTLY HAD CONFIRMATION THAT THE US HOPE TO PUT ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION ON THE AGENDA FOR 11 MARCH. A WORKING GROUP MEETING HAS BEEN ARRANGED FOR MONDAY 4 MARCH. THE US WOULD LIKE TO DISCUSS THEN WHETHER ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION SHOULD BE ON THE 11 MARCH

AGENDA, AND ARE URGING US ALONG WITH SOME OTHER MEMBERS OF THE WORKING GROUP TO ARGUE THAT IT SHOULD BE. WE UNDERSTAND THE INITIAL HM TREASURY REACTION IS TO DISCOURAGE THIS. GIVEN US VIEWS ABOUT THE POSSIBLE CONTINUING ROLE OF THE GROUP, HOWEVER, SOME DISCUSSION ON 11 MARCH MAY BE UNAVOIDABLE. GRATEFUL FOR FURTHER GUIDENCE BEFORE 4 MARCH.

9. FOLSOM SAID HE WOULD WELCOME ANY INFORMATION WE COULD GIVE ABOUT THE VIEWS OF OTHER EC COUNTRIES ON ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION. WE SAID WE WOULD DO WHAT WE COULD.

COMMENT

10. THREE POINTS ABOUT TREASURY THINKING CAME ACROSS CLEARLY. FIRST, THERE IS AS YET NO COORDINATED ADMINISTRATION VIEW ON POST-WAR ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION. OUR TREASURY CONTACTS HAD APPARENTLY HAD NO DISCUSSIONS WITH STATE DEPARTMENT ABOUT THE IDEA OF A MIDDLE EAST RECONSTRUCTION BANK EITHER BEFORE OR SINCE BAKER FLOATED THE IDEA ON 7 FEBRUARY. THEY SPECULATED OPENLY IN FRONT OF US AS TO WHETHER THE IDEA WAS MEANT AS A FIRM PROPOSAL OR NOT.

11. SECONDLY, WE SUSPECT THAT VIEWS WITHIN THE TREASURY ARE STILL FLUID, BUT THOSE WE SPOKE TO APPEARED TO FAVOUR WORKING THROUGH EXISTING INSTITUTIONS. THEY ALSO APPEAR TO BE KEEN TO USE THE GULF CRISIS FINANCIAL COORDINATION GROUP AS A COORDINATING MECHANISM - OR IF NECESSARY AS THE EMBRYO OF A NEW INSTITUTION.

12. FINALLY, THE US TREASURY IS (NOT SUPRISINGLY) NOT CONTEMPLATING A SUBSTANTIAL CONTRIBUTION OF FUNDS TOWARDS ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION. IT SEES THE US ROLE AS A MEMBER AND SHAREHOLDER, EITHER IN THE WORLD BANK OR IN WHATEVER NEW ARRANGEMENTS ARE SET UP.

13. OUR TELNO 574 OF 26 FEBRUARY BRIEFLY REPORTS STATE DEPARTMENT VIEWS, WHICH SEEM TO BE NOT SUBSTANTIALLY DIFFERENT FROM THOSE OF THE US TREASURY.

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OF 270104Z FEBRUARY 91

AND TO IMMEDIATE LISBON

AND TO ROUTINE CAIRO, TEL AVIV, TUNIS, JERUSALEM, UKMIS NEW YORK,
AND TO ROUTINE AMMAN, TREASURY

LISBON FOR SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY

TREASURY FOR WICKS AND PICKERING

IRAQ/KUWAIT: POST-CRISIS ISSUES
SUMMARY

1. STATE DEPARTMENT THINKING ON POST CRISIS ISSUES LITTLE
ADVANCED SINCE THE UK/US TALKS ON 4 FEBRUARY. BUT GROWING
RECOGNITION THAT, ON ARAB/ISRAEL, QUIET US DIPLOMACY WILL NOT BE
ENOUGH.

DETAIL

2. WITH YOUR VISIT IN MIND, WE SPOKE TO STATE DEPARTMENT (BURNS,
POLICY PLANNERS) ABOUT THE DEVELOPMENT OF US THINKING ON
POST-CRISIS ISSUES SINCE THE UK/US TALKS ON 4 FEBRUARY.

3. BURNS SAID THAT THE PROCESS OF FORMALLY AGREEING US POSITIONS
CONTINUED SLOWLY. THE INTER-AGENCY GROUP, CHAIRED BY GATES, HAD
ONLY FINALISED TWO PAPERS: ON POST-WAR SECURITY STRUCTURES AND
ARMS CONTROL. THESE REFLECTED CLOSELY THE POSITIONS TAKEN BY US
OFFICIALS DURING THE TALKS ON 4 FEBRUARY: AND IN BOTH AREAS UK
AND US THINKING WAS VIRTUALLY AT ONE.

4. ON POLICY TOWARDS IRAQ AFTER THE WAR, THE KEY VARIABLE
REMAINED SADDAM. PUBLIC EXPECTATION IN THIS COUNTRY THAT SADDAM
WOULD SOMEHOW BE REMOVED WAS GROWING. BUT ONE HAD TO PLAN ON THE
ASSUMPTION THAT SADDAM MIGHT BE AROUND AT LEAST FOR SOME TIME
AFTER THE END OF THE WAR, EVEN IF - AS SEEMED LIKELY - IT WERE TO
END IN CATASTROPHIC DEFEAT FOR HIM. IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES, AND
EVEN WERE SADDAM TO ACCEPT THE COALITION TERMS AS SET OUT ON 22
FEBRUARY, THE US AIM WOULD BE TO RETAIN THE OIL AND ARMS EMBARGO
AGAINST IRAQ FOR AS LONG AS POSSIBLE. THE OTHER SANCTIONS WOULD
BE HARDER TO SUSTAIN. BUT A MAJOR US CONCERN WOULD BE TO
FORESTALL THE RUSH TO PROVIDE NEW CREDITS AND ASSISTANCE TO IRAQ
(AND IRAN) WHICH WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY THREATEN ONCE THE FIGHTING

ENDED. THE US WOULD WANT SOLID GUARANTEES THAT ANY CREDITS WOULD BE USED FOR LEGITIMATE RECONSTRUCTION PURPOSES, AND NOT TO REBUILD THE IRAQI MILITARY. IT WOULD BE HARD TO AGREE CUT AND DRIED CRITERIA, BUT THIS WAS AN AREA IN WHICH FURTHER US/UK TALKS WOULD BE VALUABLE. ONCE SADDAM HAD DEPARTED THE SCENE, US THINKING REMAINED THAT A MORE GENEROUS ATTITUDE ON DEBTS AND RECONSTRUCTION WOULD NO DOUBT BE RIGHT.

5. ON THE HAVE/HAVE NOT ISSUE, BURNS SAID THAT THINKING HAD NOT DEVELOPED MUCH. BAKER'S REFERENCE TO A MIDDLE EAST DEVELOPMENT BANK (OUR TELNO 421) HAD BEEN SOMEWHAT PREMATURE. IT SMACKED TOO MUCH OF BRETTEN WOODS, AND IN ANY CASE PERHAPS A BANK WAS NOT THE RIGHT MECHANISM. THERE WERE OTHER OPTIONS SUCH AS THE G24. WHATEVER THE MECHANISM, THE MAIN FOCUS OF THE ORGANISATION SHOULD BE ON ACHIEVING A MORE COHERENT AND SYSTEMATIC PATTERN TO THE AID FLOWS THAN THAT WHICH ALREADY EXISTED IN THE REGION. THE PROBLEM WAS NOT ONE OF GENERATING ADDITIONAL, OUTSIDE FUNDS, RATHER OF ENSURING THAT THE EXISTING AID FLOWS ENTAILED GREATER ECONOMIC CONDITIONALITY. THE SAUDIS WERE INTERESTED IN US/EC PARTICIPATION, NOT SO MUCH AS A SOURCE OF FUNDS, BUT TO HELP IMPROVE SUCH CONDITIONALITY. (SEE ALSO OUR TELNO 575).

6. ON ARAB/ISRAEL, BURNS SAID THAT THERE WAS GROWING RECOGNITION IN WASHINGTON THAT THE US SHOULD TAKE EARLY AND HIGH LEVEL ACTION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AFTER THE WAR. QUIET DIPLOMACY WOULD NOT BE ENOUGH: THE US HAD TO BE SEEN TO BE ENGAGED. THE MOMENT WOULD BE PROPITIOUS: THERE WOULD BE A WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY WHICH IT WOULD BE A TRAGEDY NOT TO EXPLOIT. BUT THERE WAS STILL NO AGREEMENT IN WASHINGTON ON HOW ASSERTIVE US LEADERSHIP SHOULD BE.

7. POLICY PLANNERS' ADVICE TO BAKER WAS THAT HE SHOULD UNDERTAKE EARLY AND HIGH LEVEL ACTION TO REACTIVATE THE PEACE PROCESS AS SOON AS THE CRISIS WAS OVER. THIS SHOULD ENTAIL A MORE CAREFUL AND THOROUGH PROCESS OF CONSULTATION OF ALL PARTIES, INCLUDING THE EUROPEANS, THAN HAD BEEN THE CASE DURING THE ADMINISTRATION'S EFFORTS ON THIS ISSUE BEFORE THE WAR.

8. THAT SAID, THERE WOULD BE LITTLE ENTHUSIASM IN WASHINGTON FOR AN EARLY INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE. THE FOCUS OF US ACTIVITY WAS LIKELY TO BE ON PROGRESS TOWARDS A DIALOGUE BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE ARAB STATES ON THE ONE HAND, AND BETWEEN THE ARABS AND THE PALESTINIANS WITH A VIEW TO PRODUCING A CREDIBLE NEGOTIATING PARTNER FOR ISRAEL ON THE OTHER. ONE KEY QUESTION WOULD BE WHETHER THE ARAB COALITION PARTNERS COULD BE ENCOURAGED TO MAKE PUBLIC STATEMENTS SIGNALLING THEIR READINESS TO MOVE TOWARDS ISRAEL AND EG REMOVE THE ARAB BOYCOTT IN THE EVENT OF ISRAELI FLEXIBILITY. FOR ITS PART, ISRAEL SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED TO LOOK

AGAIN AT THE ISSUE OF ELECTIONS IN ORDER TO FACILITATE THE SELECTION OF REPRESENTATIVE PALESTINIANS.

9. POLICY PLANNERS' ADVICE TO BAKER WAS THAT HE SHOULD MAKE AN EARLY VISIT TO THE REGION TO PROBE THE VARIOUS PARTIES ABOUT THE KIND OF STEPS WHICH THEY MIGHT BE READY TO TAKE ON THESE ISSUES - WITHOUT ATTEMPTING TO TACKLE THE QUESTION OF PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATION HEAD ON. FOR HIS PART, BURNS WAS IN NO DOUBT THAT THE ADMINISTRATION SHOULD BE PREPARED TO TAKE MORE RISKS: THEY HAD BEEN AS GUILTY AS ANY OF THE OTHER PARTIES IN FOSTERING THE BELIEF THAT SOME RISK-FREE PROCESS COULD BE MANUFACTURED TO ENSURE PROGRESS ON THE ARAB/ISRAEL ISSUE. IN ANY CASE, IT WAS TACTICALLY ESSENTIAL FOR THE ADMINISTRATION TO DEMONSTRATE CLEARLY THAT THERE WAS A CREDIBLE ALTERNATIVE AVAILABLE, IF ONLY TO HEAD OFF FURTHER PRESSURE FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE.

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TO IMMEDIATE AIG 4116

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OPERATION GRANBY GENERAL SITREP TWO HUNDRED AND TWO 272359Z FEB 91. ADDRESSEES SHOULD DISSEMINATE INFORMATION WITHIN THEIR COMMANDS AS REQUIRED.

1. ENEMY SITUATION

A. NO AIR/SRBM ACTIVITY.

B. CURRENT ESTIMATE IS THAT NO IRAQI DIVS REMAIN INTACT. COMPOSITE FORCES TOTALLING A MAXIMUM OF 4 DIVS COULD BE FORMED FROM SURVIVORS BUT DEGRADED C2 PRECLUDES OFFENSIVE POTENTIAL. SOME EVIDENCE OF STIFFENING RESISTANCE BY ELEMENTS OF RGFC IN SE IRAQ AND POSSIBLE EFFORT TO CO-ORDINATE DEFENCE OF BASRAH.

2. POLITICAL SITUATION

A. IRAQI OFFER TO ABIDE BY CERTAIN US RESOLUTIONS IS CONDITIONAL ON OTHERS, INCLUDING THE TRADE EMBARGO, BEING DROPPED. ALLIES MAINTAINED THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN MUST PUBLICLY AND PERSONNALLY ACCEPT ALL UN RESOLUTIONS AND THAT NEGOTIATION IS NOT AN OPTION.

3. ALLIED OPS

A. FRENCH DIV POSSIBLY TO CHOP FROM 18 TO 7 CORPS FOR OPS IN KUWAIT CITY.

B. US FORCES TASKED TO ATTACK RGFC IN DEPTH/CUT LINES OF COMMS WITH BAGHDAD/BLOCK IRAQI WITHDRAWAL OPTION.

C. LEAD ELEMENTS OF KUWAITI/EGYPTIAN/SAUDI LIBERATION FORCE NOW IN KUWAIT CITY. 1/2 MARINE DIVS HOLDING SOUTHERN BOUNDARY.

D. INTERDICTION MISSIONS TO TARGET BRIDGES/PONTOONS TO ENSURE IRAQI WITHDRAWAL REMAINS ON ALLIED TERMS.

E. AIR ATTRITION OF IRAQI FORCES DELAYED BY BAD WEATHER BUT GRADUAL IMPROVEMENT ANTICIPATED.

4. RN OPS

A. EXETER CLOSE AAW ESCORT TO WISCONSIN/MISSOURI.

B. MCM FORCE NOW COMPLETED CLEARANCE OF BB AREA. NOW TASKED TO CLEARANCE OF TRANSIT LANE FROM FAYLAKE SEA ECHELON AREA TO KUWAITI PORT SHUYAYBAH. HERALD/HECLA TURNOVER PLANNED FOR 28 FEB.

C. SNAME TRANSFERS TO BRAVE 281300Z

5. UK LAND FORCES

A. 7 BDE ON OBJECTIVE. AWAITING FURTHER TASKING. 4 BDE DELAYED IN MOVEMENT TO THIS OBJECTIVE BY VAST NUMBERS OF IRAQI PRISONERS (8000

PAGE 1

SECRET

PLUS) BUT NOW MOVING TO JOIN 7 BDE. 1 BR ARMD DIV FUTURE TASKING TO BE CONFIRMED.

6. RAF OPS

A. ATTACK PROGRAMME SLIGHTLY HAMPERED BY TARGET OBSCURATION (CLOUD/ SMOKE) IN KTO. COMBAT SAR ALSO PREVENTED SOME ORDNANCE DELIVERY. TARGETS FURTHER WEST ATTACKED SUCCESSFULLY INCLUDED HAS/AIRFIELDS/POL /2 CUB A/C ON GROUND.

7. LOG/MOV

A. 10 RESUPPLY VESSELS ON PASSAGE.

B. 480 TONNES PRIORITY FREIGHT AWAITING AIRLIFT FROM BAOR/UK (1.5 DAYS AIRLIFT).

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10 DOWNING STREET
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From the Private Secretary

27 February 1991

THE GULF

President Bush telephoned the Prime Minister at 2300 this evening.

The President said he wanted to tell the Prime Minister personally how much the United States appreciated the total cooperation of the British forces in the Gulf. It had been a marvellous operation. The Prime Minister said he had visited our Joint Headquarters this afternoon, and had spoken in similar terms about the American forces. The campaign had been planned and executed in a remarkable way.

The President said that he and his political and military colleagues were heart sick about the casualties resulting from the mistaken attack by A10 aircraft on two British armoured vehicles and the resulting casualties. He simply did not know how to express his condolences to their families. He hoped the Prime Minister could find some way to convey what he felt. The Prime Minister said it had been a tragic accident but one of those things that happened in war. That was the way in which it was being taken in Britain. People understood and did not reproach the United States. It was a tragedy for the pilots concerned.

The President continued that, as Secretary Baker would have told the Foreign Secretary and General Scowcroft had told me, he planned to announce at 0200 GMT tonight that Kuwait had been liberated and that the coalition would suspend military operations at 0500 GMT. He would instruct General Schwarzkopf to meet a designated Iraqi commander to discuss the military details. He would also say that the coalition would go to the Security Council to work out the political aspects. This would include assuring Iraq's full compliance with all United Nations Security Council resolutions. He had reached this decision on military advice that there was no further gain from continuing to fight in Kuwait or southern Iraq. But before reaching a decision, he wanted to be sure that the Prime Minister was comfortable with this.

SECRET AND PERSONAL

- 2 -

The Prime Minister said that he was in general comfortable with what was proposed. If it was the clear view of the military commanders that there was no further purpose in prosecuting the conflict, we should not lose the moral high ground by continuing to attack Iraqi forces. A decision to suspend military operations would be seen as the right judgment. He assumed provision would be made for all Iraqi forces in the KTO to abandon their weapons and equipment. But he had been rather surprised to learn that the United States was thinking of postponing discussion of release of POWs until the Security Council met. Surely this should be dealt with immediately, in the talks between military commanders. The President said that he was engaged in changing his draft statement to provide precisely for that: it would call upon the Iraqi government to designate a senior commander to arrange the military aspects including the immediate release of all coalition POWs. The Prime Minister said he was pleased to hear this. Public opinion would not understand if we failed to make the most immediate and strenuous efforts to secure release of the POWs. The statement should surely also refer to the release of Kuwaiti detainees. The President undertook to cover this point too.

The Prime Minister said that we had one further concern and that was whether we should insist that Iraq destroy its ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction. There were divided views on this in London, but he thought it an important point. The President said that he would discuss this with his advisers. He did not think there was a concerted view in Washington about it, and it could not be covered in his statement tonight.

The Prime Minister said that we must keep clearly in mind the need for continuing leverage over Iraq after the suspension of military operations and until they had complied fully with all the Security Council resolutions. There were various options for this: the continued occupation of southern Iraq, continued strategic bombing, and continued sanctions. The President commented that it would become increasingly difficult to commence military operations again once they had stopped. Moreover, he was keen to start to bring home American forces as soon as possible. But General Powell had told him that the United States would need to leave forces in southern Iraq for a while at least. If Iraq dragged its feet over compliance with the Security Council resolutions, the option of using those forces would remain available.

The Prime Minister said that he wanted once again to congratulate the President on the tremendous success. The President said that he and the Prime Minister ought to meet face to face in the reasonably near future. The Prime Minister said he would be very willing to do so and would happily come to Washington. The President said he would be very welcome: alternatively they could find some other mutually convenient place. This should be followed up between General Scowcroft and me.

Finally the Prime Minister asked the President to let us have a draft of his statement as soon as possible.

I am copying this letter to Richard Gozney (Foreign and Commonwealth Office), John Neilson (Department of Energy), Juliet Wheldon (Law Officers' Department) and Sir Robin Butler.

C. D. POWELL

Simon Webb, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence.

2

PRIME MINISTER

THE GULF

Things are moving very fast tonight.

The Americans have reached the conclusion that they have done all they need to do in military terms in the Kuwaiti theatre of operations. They have destroyed Iraq's offensive capability. There are no Iraqi units putting up any resistance. The President is concerned that, in this situation we cannot go on fighting without being accused of butchery. His inclination is to announce a unilateral suspension of military operations in the KTO. I have established that the Americans would regard the condition for such a suspension that only unarmed soldiers would be allowed to leave the KTO, not units or weapons or equipment. The Americans are of course in a position to enforce this. The suspension of military operations would continue pending the negotiation of a formal ceasefire.

Since starting to dictate this minute, General Scowcroft has told me (and Secretary Baker has confirmed to the Foreign Secretary on a strictly personal basis) that the President will announce at 0200 tonight our time that, after consultation with the US' Allies:

- ^{unilateral} a suspension of military operations will take effect from 0500;
- he is asking Schwarzkopf and de la Billiere to meet a designated Iraqi general to discuss the military aspects;
- within the next two or three days the coalition will go to the Security Council to discuss a ceasefire, PoWs, etc.

At the same time there are further developments at the United Nations. There is now a letter from Tariq Aziz stating Iraq's acceptance formally of all twelve of the Security Council Resolutions. The Iraqis have already, in an earlier letter, agreed to the release of PoWs shortly after a ceasefire.

This still leaves a number of important questions to be resolved. We shall need satisfactory assurances about the PoWs and detainees in Kuwait. We shall need Iraq's help in finding and removing mines, land mines and other explosives and booby traps. We shall want to keep sanctions in place and Resolution 678 in effect, so that we have authority to resume operations if Iraq subsequently defaults. There is a case for saying that the Allies must be able to destroy all Iraq's ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction: this is aimed particularly at the Scuds.

We also need to consider what leverage we would have over Iraq to secure these objectives, following the suspension of military operations. There are three possibilities:

- to continue to occupy Southern Iraq until we receive satisfaction;
- to continue the strategic bombing campaign; and
- to continue economic sanctions.

They could of course be combined. On some of the ceasefire points, we shall be reliant on Iraqi commitment which they may subsequently not honour, in which case we have to have some means of compelling them.

All these points are dealt with in the attached papers for tomorrow's OPD(G), although on some of them we shall need decisions tonight. In particular we need to consider whether we should put out a parallel announcement to that being made by the President: and you will certainly need to make a Statement tomorrow.

CJP

CHARLES POWELL
27 FEBRUARY 1991

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274 February 1991

Gen Charles

Thank you for your letter of earlier this evening about possible US plans to suspend military operations pending a ceasefire. The Defence Secretary agrees that land operations should be suspended when General Schwarzkopf judges it to be the right time.

We believe, however, that air operations should continue for the time being (even if on a minimal basis) for three reasons:

- a. To provide ready air defence for our ground forces in Iraq (eg if fighters re-emerge from Iran).
- b. It would avoid a fresh decision to resume if Saddam Hussein misbehaves in an unpredictable way.
- c. We might want the option to attack limited military targets (eg SCUD launchers) if we got a chance, consistent with the objectives agreed by OPD(G).

Another consideration is that, if Iraq launched a SCUD against Israel, then the Israelis might think they could not rely on the coalition, and launch an attack themselves.

Possible wording for a US statement would be:

"Until a full ceasefire has been implemented on terms acceptable to the coalition, air operations will continue, both to provide air defence for coalition forces and to take any further action as may be necessary against military targets in Iraq.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Private Secretaries of OPD(G) Ministers and to Sir Robin Butler.

W. Webb
S. Webb

(S WEBB)
Private Secretary

Sir Charles Powell KCMG
10 Downing Street

SECRET



452

10/10/10

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10/10/10

10/10/10



CDP

R. A. Smith

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

27 February 1991

Dee Simon,

THE GULF

General Scowcroft telephoned me this evening, following the President's meeting with the Foreign Secretary.


General Scowcroft said that the Americans were reaching the conclusion that they might call a halt to the fighting very soon, even tonight. General Schwarzkopf said that he had done all that he needed to do. He had destroyed Iraq's offensive capability. Only one division of Iraqi troops were still putting up any resistance and that was nearly over. In the light of this, the President was reaching the conclusion that the coalition could not go on fighting without being accused of butchery. The Americans were therefore thinking about getting out a bit ahead of the UN process. Instead of it seeming that they were being dragged into a ceasefire, they would announce the suspension of military operations, pending negotiation of a ceasefire.

General Scowcroft said he was sitting at that moment trying to think of what conditions to attach to such an announcement. I said that surely the key was to be certain that we had captured, and were in a position to destroy, all Iraqi weapons and equipment in the Kuwaiti theatre of operations. That meant providing for individual Iraqi soldiers to be able to leave the area but not units. General Scowcroft agreed that that was certainly one necessary step. For the ceasefire itself, the Americans would demand early release of the PoWs and acceptance of all the United Nations Resolutions. I queried whether release of PoWs could not be attached to the suspension of military operations. Scowcroft said this was not feasible since the Americans simply did not feel they could go on with the military operation much longer. I said that we must in any event link the release of Kuwaiti detainees to the PoW question. Scowcroft agreed with this.

I said that another suggestion was being canvassed here and that was a commitment by Iraq to destroy all ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction, together with related stocks, equipment and facilities. General Scowcroft said that he liked the idea but thought it was probably better linked to war termination rather than a ceasefire. He would reflect further on this.

At this point, General Scowcroft was called way to the President. We agreed to speak again later tonight.

I am copying this letter to Richard Gozney (Foreign and Commonwealth Office), John Neilson (Department of Energy), Juliet Wheldon (Law Officer's Department) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely,


CHARLES POWELL

Simon Webb, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence



10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

27 February 1991

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THE GULF

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
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- 2 -

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Yours sincerely,


CHARLES POWELL

Simon Webb, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence

SECRET



file 51

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

27 February 1991

THE GULF:
CEASEFIRE TERMS

Thank you for your letter of 27 February about the ceasefire terms which the Foreign Secretary intends to discuss with Secretary Baker. In the time available I have not been able to discuss these with the Prime Minister, but have ^{no} reason to think he would be less than content with them. I think he would have some sympathy for point 8. I have written separately about my conversation with General Scowcroft on the same subject.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries to members of OPD(G) and to Sir Robin Butler.

CHARLES POWELL

Simon Gass, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

SECRET

SECRET



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

Telephone 071: 21 82111/3

MO 6/17/15/1J

27/1 February 1991

Joe Charles,

CEASEFIRE TERMS

Simon Gass sent me a copy of his letter to you of earlier this evening about draft ceasefire terms. It might be helpful if I was to set out some of the arguments the Defence Secretary had in mind when suggesting Para 8 on Control of Ballistic Missiles and Weapons of Mass Destruction.

Our starting position is the objectives that were agreed by OPD(G) on Iraq/Kuwait in January which included:

"Additional objectives of great importance are:

a. To remove the danger of the threat posed by Iraq's Nuclear, Biological and Chemical weapons potential/capability and her long range missile capability;"

We have not yet achieved this objective since a substantial ballistic missile capability remains intact; and despite successful attacks on CBW capability, we have not verified its destruction. While we could see the difficulties set out by the FCO, no alternative approach to achieving our objectives is proposed. The Defence Secretary would, therefore, like to keep this idea of military action open at least until some other way of achieving the objective with reasonable assurance has been devised.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Private Secretaries of OPD(G) Ministers and to Sir Robin Butler.

✓
Mr. Gass
Joe Webb

(S WEBB)
Private Secretary

*any other
points
to be
made*

Sir Charles Powell KCMG
10 Downing Street

SECRET



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

27 February 1991

SECRET

*Dear Charles,*Ceasefire Terms

As you are aware, the Iraqi Government is coming nearer to an authoritative statement that it is prepared to accept all of the SCRs in exchange for a ceasefire and the release of POWs. I enclose the text of a letter from Tariq Aziz to the UN Secretary General accepting the two SCRs - 662 (Status of Kuwait) and 674 (Compensation) - which we and Washington specified yesterday. The Americans have already rejected this new conditional offer of withdrawal. But the chances are that the Iraqis may, in the not too distant future, agree to implement all the relevant SCRs.

In our view it would be highly undesirable for Iraq to give the impression that it was setting the agenda for the ceasefire. Equally, it is not satisfactory for the coalition to appear simply to be rejecting the increasingly substantial offers which are coming from Iraq. We have a strong interest in controlling the agenda ourselves by setting out publicly and authoritatively the terms for a ceasefire. We should, in our view, do this as soon as possible.

The Foreign Secretary is meeting Mr Baker at 1615 hours (local time) in Washington today. He therefore has an opportunity to give Mr Baker our views on the ceasefire terms and encourage him to up-date President Bush's recent statements by setting out the definitive ceasefire terms.

/I enclose

SECRET



SECRET

I enclose a text of these terms which have been agreed in Cabinet Office discussions today by FCO and MOD officials. They have been shown to the Defence Secretary who has recommended that they should include the point in paragraph 8. We have argued against the inclusion of this on the grounds that it is almost certain to tip the scales against Iraqi acceptance of the terms and therefore diminish our chances of getting our POWs back quickly. In addition we doubt the practicality since it would mean taking charge of all Iraqi munitions to check whether they had CW charges. It might also give the impression that we were seeking to extend the coalition's reach over the whole of Iraq and that our aim was, in some measure, to control Baghdad.

The text of the ceasefire terms has been sent to the Foreign Secretary in Washington. As you know, the situation is moving fast and the Foreign Secretary may want to hand over the text, or draw on it, in his meeting with Baker. It would clearly be most valuable to have the Prime Minister's approval for the text by then, including his view of paragraph 8.

I am sending copies of this letter to Private Secretaries of OPD(G) Ministers and to Sir Robin Butler.

Yours ever.

(S. L. Gass)
Private Secretary

Sir Charles Powell KCMG
10 Downing Street

SECRET

ZCZC

ZC

BBC B URGENT//IRAQI-LETTER-TEXT=:

TEXT OF IRAQI LETTER TO U.N. SECRETARY-GENERAL

THE FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE LETTER FROM IRAQI FOREIGN MINISTER TARIQ AZIZ TO UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY-GENERAL PEREZ DE CUELLAR, AS BROADCAST ON IRAQI RADIO AT 1511GMT:

YOUR EXCELLENCY: I HAVE THE HONOUR TO NOTIFY YOU THAT THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT, AS IT ONCE AGAIN REITERATES ITS CONSENT TO FULLY ABIDE BY UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 660 FOR THE YEAR 1990, THE IRAQI ARMED FORCES HAVE EMBARKED UPON PULLING OUT TO THE POSITIONS THEY OCCUPIED PRIOR TO 1ST AUGUST 1990. HOPEFULLY, FULL WITHDRAWAL WILL BE FULLY COMPLETED WITHIN THE NEXT FEW HOURS, ALTHOUGH THE AMERICAN AND OTHER FORCES ARE CONTINUING THEIR ATTACKS AGAINST THE IRAQI ARMED FORCES IN THE COURSE OF THEIR WITHDRAWAL PROCESS.

I WOULD ALSO LIKE TO INFORM YOU THAT THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT AGREES TO ABIDE BY RESOLUTIONS NO. 662 FOR THE YEAR 1990 AND RESOLUTION 674 FOR THE YEAR 1990, IF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL ISSUES A RESOLUTION PROVIDING FOR AN IMMEDIATE CEASE-FIRE AND FOR HALTING ALL LAND, SEA, AND AIR MILITARY OPERATIONS, AND CONSIDERS AS NONEXISTENT, AND CONSEQUENTLY NULL AND VOID, ALL THE BASES ON WHICH COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 661 FOR THE YEAR 1990, 665 FOR THE YEAR 1990, AND 670 FOR THE YEAR 1990 WERE ADOPTED.

THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT ASSERTS ITS FULL WILLINGNESS, IMMEDIATELY AFTER A CEASE-FIRE TAKES EFFECT, TO RELEASE THE PRISONERS OF WAR AND RETURN THEM TO THEIR HOMELANDS WITHIN A VERY SHORT TIME IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE THIRD GENEVA CONVENTION FOR THE YEAR 1949, AND UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS.

PLEASE CONVEY THIS MESSAGE TO THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL AT ONCE AND GUARANTEE ITS DISTRIBUTION AS A COUNCIL DOCUMENT. PLEASE ACCEPT MY RESPECTS.

SIGNED: TARIQ AZIZ, DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AND FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE IRAQI REPUBLIC

DATE: 27TH FEBRUARY 1991

BBC MON LR/TC

1609270291

16:08 27 FEB 91

NNNN

CEASEFIRE TERMS

1. Iraq must communicate authoritatively to the Security Council her acceptance of the Resolutions of the Security Council relating to the invasion and occupation of Kuwait.
2. All Iraqi forces must cease hostile operations against coalition forces and any other country forthwith.
3. All Iraqi forces must withdraw immediately from the theatre of operations leaving their equipment and weapons behind.
4. Unarmed Iraqi personnel will be allowed to withdraw at any time without being attacked.
5. Immediately and prior to ceasefire, Iraq must notify to the ICRC the names of all allied POWs they are holding and make arrangements for ICRC to have access to them before the ceasefire. Prisoners must then be assembled in one place under ICRC supervision. Thereafter, they must be handed over within 48 hours of the ceasefire.
6. The release of Kuwaiti detainees must begin immediately and be completed as soon as possible and no later than 96 hours after the ceasefire.
7. Iraqi military Liaison Officer(s) must be designated to work with Kuwaiti and other coalition forces on the operational details related to Iraq's withdrawal, to include the provision of all data on the location and nature of all explosives or booby traps and of all land or sea mines.
8. [All ballistic missiles and all weapons of mass destruction together with related stocks, equipment and production facilities must be identified within one week for destruction by coalition forces.]
9. Any breach of these terms will bring an instant and sharp response from coalition forces in accordance with UNSC Resolution 678.

48(a-c)

Jp 01340

PRIME MINISTER

OPD(G): Thursday 28 February
Iraq/Kuwait: The End Game

The first part of the paper is uncontroversial: clearly we shall want to complete the encirclement and the destruction of Iraqi equipment. We also need to agree revised terms for a ceasefire: the latest Iraqi approach to the UN underlines the urgency of this.

2. The problems arise a little further down the road and relate to the contingency that if he survives Saddam may well recoil from accepting all our terms for a ceasefire. As explained in a minute earlier today, I think this a real prospect.

3. In this eventuality we are likely to face an acute question of what pressures we can apply in a "no peace, no war" situation to secure the early release of our POWs and the Kuwaiti detainees. There are three main courses:

(a) Continue to occupy southern Iraq along the lines of the present theatre of operations until satisfied on POWs.

(b) Continue strategic bombing.

(c) Rely on economic sanctions.

There could also be some combination of the above.

4. Each course has serious disadvantages. Occupation of southern Iraq will suggest that we are resiling on our undertaking not to dismember Iraq and will confirm all the suspicions in the Arab and Third World that we had wider

aims than the liberation of Kuwait and were in fact embarked on a neo-colonialist enterprise. It could play into Saddam's hands.

5. Continued strategic bombing would attract strong international and domestic criticism. It would probably be messy, involving Iraqi civilian casualties. As General Powell has commented, there are few good military targets left. Above all, it would not exert real pressure on Saddam himself.

6. The third course, economic sanctions, ought to be effective over a period, given the destruction of the Iraqi economy and main installations. But it too could run into trouble with public opinion: there will be much pressure from the UN to send doctors, food, etc urgently to Iraq to help the civilian population and we shall not want to frustrate such activities. Above all, sanctions would take time. I doubt whether domestic opinion here and in the States would tolerate delays of, say, one to two years in getting our POWs home.

7. It is a hard choice, but I think we should hesitate before dismissing option (a), ie occupation. It would be natural to stay where we were until our requirements were met. The decision would be readily understood by UK opinion. It would fit in with the Kuwaiti idea of a special régime for some three months until citizens can return and normal life resume. In our public statements we would explain it as temporary until the hostilities were finally wound up, a ceasefire signed and prisoners returned. Finally, occupation might stimulate most those we are anxious to influence, ie disaffected generals who might move against Saddam.

8. Further down the road, we would need to settle with the Americans the terms of the sanctions régime required in

two circumstances, (a) if Saddam survived and (b) if he fell and we were faced with a more co-operative régime.

9. There are, of course, a host of other matters, but many of them are tackled in our papers on winning the peace, long-term security arrangements etc.

le

PERCY CRADOCK

27 February 1991

Ref. A091/498

PRIME MINISTER

cc Sir Percy Cradock
Mr Appleyard

OPD(G): 28 February

Item 1: Current Military Situation

The Chief of the Defence Staff will be ready to report on the final stages of the military campaign. Depending on developments overnight, you may want to ask about the timing of the closure of exits for Iraqi forces from the Kuwait theatre of operations and the remaining level of organised Iraqi resistance. The crucial points appear to be (i) whether action should now cease against Iraqi forces which have escaped the allies' net and are now north of Basra; and (ii) whether disarmed Iraqi personnel in the KTO should be encouraged to travel north rather than be taken as POWs.

2. The Defence Secretary may want to say something about reactions to the tragic incident in which US A-10 aircraft attacked a Warrior Armoured Personnel Carrier resulting in the deaths of 9 British soldiers and 11 injured.

3. You will want to decide whether the stage has been reached at which you should make a statement to the House on the successful achievement of the allies' military objectives.

Item 2: Current international situation

4. You might invite the Foreign Secretary to report on his discussions in Washington. It looks as if the Security Council remains under control.

Item 3: The end game

5. You might ask Mr Appleyard to give a brief introduction to the paper which is designed to focus discussion on the main political issues likely to face Ministers in the next few days.

6. There are a number of issues on which we and the US Administration will need to keep in close touch. You might ask whether colleagues agree with the immediate aims set out in the paper (some of course may be overtaken by events). The Foreign Secretary will be able to report on the US Administration's position on ceasefire terms. We will also need to reach agreement privately with the US Government and the main coalition allies on the conditions for withdrawal from Southern Iraq. The Defence Secretary will wish to comment. The timing will depend in part on how long it takes us to complete destruction of Iraqi equipment.

7. Looking ahead to the next phase after 24-48 hours, you might ask the Defence and Foreign Secretaries for their views on securing the return of allied POWs and detainees. This is covered in the ceasefire terms, but if no ceasefire has been reached we need to consider how we can apply the most effective pressure on Iraq (paragraph 4 of the paper).

8. The Foreign Secretary will have views on the aftermath in the light of his talk with Mr Baker. The key issues will be how long we can keep on sanctions (which is related to who is running Iraq), to what extent public opinion will insist on action over reparations/personal responsibility, and how we can help the US Administration navigate the tricky course on Arab/Israel.

9. You might conclude the discussion by approving the strategy over the next few days, taking account of points made in discussion, and asking for these issues to be thrashed out with the White House and State Department very rapidly.

10. You may want to mention the immediate practical steps which need to be taken in the next few days, on which Sir Charles Powell has written to the FCO. These include, apart from a statement, messages and telephone calls to other leaders and a visit to the area, possibly as you return from Moscow. The latter event would have to remain highly confidential. I gather you have in mind a party for back room staff in a week or two which will be very much appreciated. In the longer term, we need to consider a thanksgiving service and parade, and honours lists. Work is being put in hand on these.

Item 4: Media handling

11. You might invite the Energy Secretary and Mr O'Donnell to give their customary reports. The Energy Secretary may want to mention media treatment of POWs and criticism of the continuing military campaign. Mr O'Donnell's current issues may include the final stages of the military campaign, the role of British troops in the offensive, the A-10 incident and the policy in relation to retreating units.

R.E.B.

ROBIN BUTLER

27 February 1991

JHQ/24/1/PANDA

OP GRANBY CASUALTY BRIEF TO PM BY ACOS LL AND P
AT JHQ 27 FEB 91

1. In the Air Battle Phase from 16 Jan - 24 Feb 91, 11 servicemen died on active service, the majority in traffic accidents. Also, 12 Tornado Aircrew (six crews) were notified as missing. There is some evidence, but no ICRC confirmation that at least 2 of these might be PW.

2. Since the Land Battle began at 0100 on 24 Feb, 14 servicemen have been confirmed as killed in action and one has died as a result of an accident. One man is missing believed killed but we have an unidentified body. We have 17 so far reported as wounded in battle.

3. The major Blue on Blue incident has claimed 9 killed in action, 7 confirmed wounded, and 4 missing believed wounded of which 2 have been reported to be in the American casualty system.

4. **Death Summary**

5 - Deaths before hostilities - accidents, etc.

11 ~~12~~ - Died on active service - mainly accidents.

14 - Confirmed Killed in Action.


1 - Missing Believed Killed.

~~32~~ 31

(duplication of serials 18 and 21)

5. There are unconfirmed operational reports of further small number of casualties.

6. KINFORMING THE ABOVE INFORMATION IS NOT YET COMPLETE



J C FEATHERSTONE
Gp Capt
DACOS PANDA
Ext 5001

271530Z Feb 91

CONFIDENTIAL

JHQ/24/1/PANDA

BATTLE CASUALTIES SINCE 240100Z FEB 91
AS AT 271115Z FEB 91

SERIAL NO	DTG (Z)	REPORT	CAT	KIN	ACOS INFO
1	250800	PTE TAYLOR 1 STAFFORDS (ND)	DAS	Y	Y
2	260200	LCPL HILL 54 ENGR SP RCT	KIA	Y	Y
3	260400	CPL G B COLES 39 HY REGT (MLRS)	UL	N	Y
4	260400	SGT C R LANGTON 39 HY REGT (MLRS)	UL	N	Y
5	260400	LCPL S H MEDLYN 39 HY REGT (MLRS)	UL	N	Y
6	260400	LCPL J L WILKINSON 39 HY REGT (MLRS)	UL	N	Y
7	260600	CPL HEAVEN 1 STAFFORDS	SI	Y	Y
8	261805	PTE N W DONALD 3 RRF (QO HLDERS) BOB	KIA	Y	Y
9	261805	PTE M FERGUSON 3 RRF (QO HLDERS) BOB	KIA	Y	Y
10	281805	PTE J W LANG 3 RRF (QO HLDERS) BOB	KIA	Y	Y
11	261805	FUS P P ATKINSON 3 RRF BOB	KIA	Y	Y
12	261805	FUS C P COLE 3 RRF BOB	KIA	Y	Y
13	261805	FUS R A GILLESPIE 3 RRF BOB	KIA	Y	Y
14	261805	FUS K LEECH 3 RRF BOB	KIA	Y	Y
15	261805	FUS S T SATCHELL 3 RRF BOB	KIA	Y	Y
16	261805	FUS L J THOMPSON 3 RRF BOB	KIA	Y	Y
17	261805	CPL D E DENBURY RE	KIA	Y	Y
18	262112	DVR J P MCFADDEN 10 REGT RCT	KIA	Y	Y
19	270045	PTE C MOULT 1 STAFFORDS	KIA	Y	Y
20	270045	CAPT T A TENNENT 1 STAFFS (SHPNL LEGS)	SI	N	Y
21	270530	2LT B A DUXBURY 3 RRF BOB	UL	N	Y
22	270530	PTE A MEECHAN 3 RRF BOB	UL	N	Y
23	270530	FUS S BAKKOR 3 RRF BOB	UL	N	Y
24	270530	CPL M C CROZIER 3 RRF BOB	UL	N	Y
25	270530	FUS M P TOTH 3 RRF BOB	UL	N	Y
26	270530	FUS D A WELSH 3 RRF BOB	UL	N	Y
27	270530	FUS D HALLIWELL 3 RRF BOB (TBCONF)	UL	N	Y
28	270730	LCPL F C EVANS 16/5 L REME	KIA	Y	Y

CONFIDENTIAL

JHQ/24/1/PANDA

BATTLE CASUALTIES SINCE 240100Z FEB 91AS AT 271115ZFEB91

SERIAL NO	DTG (Z)	REPORT	CAT	KIN	ACOS INFO
29	270730	SGT M J DOWLING 16/5 L REME (poss unident body)	MBK	N	Y
30	271122	PTE H W FINNAN 3 RRF BOB	MBW	N	
31	271122	LCPL P D FYFE 3 RRF (poss found - wounded) BOB	MBW	N	
32	271122	SGT T H SMITH 3 RRF BOB	MBW	N	
33	271122	FUS G J HUNT 3 RRF (poss found-wounded) BOB	MBW	N	
		16 JAN - 24 FEB 91 DAS	11		
		KIA	--		
		UL	1		
		SI	8		
		MNK	12		
		24 FEB - 27 FEB 91 DAS	1		
		KIA	14		
		UL	11		
		SI/VSI	2		
		MBK	1		
		MBW	4		
		GRAND TOTALS DAS	12		
		KIA	14		
		UL	12		
		SI/VSI	10		
		MBK	1		
		MNK	12		
		MBW	4		
			65		

RESTRICTED

BATTLE CASUALTIES 16 JAN-24 FEB 91

SERIAL NO	DATE	REPORT	CAT	KIN	ACOS INFO
01	17JAN	FLT LT A J NICHOL MUHARRAQ (PW ?)	MNK	Y	
02	17JAN	FLT LT J G PETERS MUHARRAQ (PW ?)	MNK	Y	
03	18JAN	WG CDR T N ELSDON MUHARRAQ	MNK	Y	
04	18JAN	FLT LT R COLLIER MUHARRAQ	MNK	Y	
05	19JAN	FLT LT R J STEWART MUHARRAQ (PW ?)	MNK	Y	
06	19JAN	FLT LT D J WADDINGTON MUHARRAQ	MNK	Y	
07	22JAN	SQN LDR G K LENNOX TABUK	MNK	Y	
08	22JAN	SQN LDR S D WEEKS TABUK	MNK	Y	
09	22JAN	SSGT D C TITE 203 PRO COY	DAS	Y	
10	24JAN	FG OFF S J BURGESS DHAHRAN	MNK	Y	
11	24JAN	SQN LDR R ANKERSON DHAHRAN	MNK	Y	
12	26JAN	CPL HARDING RAF WAR HOSP	SI	Y	
13	27JAN	SGT D B KINNEAR 32 ARMD ENG	DAS	Y	
14	31JAN	LT COL A J WRIGHT ACSA CAP	DAS	Y	
15	01FEB	LT COL J H SHORT HQ BFME	SI	Y	
16	04FEB	MAJ T S KINGHAN HQ FMA	DAS	Y	
17	05FEB	SPR R A ROYLE 21 ENG REGT	DAS	Y	
18	06FEB	LCPL S R CROFTS 1 ARMD DIV	DAS	Y	
19	09FEB	Mr M J FOY (RFA) RFA SIR GALAHAD	DAS	Y	
20	10FEB	SAC R D LINGE SH DET (Acct - limb loss)	UL	Y	
21	10FEB	LCPL S R CROFTS 1 ARMD DIV	DAS	Y	
22	12FEB	GDSM J HALLIDAY BATTLE CASU	SI	Y	
23	14FEB	FLT LT R J CLARK MUHARRAQ	MNK	Y	
24	14FEB	FLT LT S M HICKS MUHARRAQ	MNK	Y	
25	16FEB	LCPL R ROBBINS 1 ARMD DIV	DAS	Y	
26	21FEB	GNR P P KEEGAN 40 FD REGT RA	DAS	Y	
27	22FEB	PTE A J FOGERTY 12 AD REGT	DAS	Y	
28	22FEB	LCPL S R THORN 6 ARMD WKSP	SI	Y	

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BATTLE CASUALTIES 16 JAN-24 FEB 91

PAGE 2 OF 2

[illegible]

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RESTRICTED



10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

27 February 1991

Dear Simon,

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH THE KUWAITI AMBASSADOR

The Prime Minister invited the Kuwaiti Ambassador to call this morning in order to celebrate the freeing of Kuwait City. There was little substance in their meeting but the Ambassador was obviously pleased to have been invited. He was wearing his "Free Kuwait" button with the first word altered to "Freed". Subsequently the Prime Minister and the Ambassador went outside to talk to the press.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely,

(C. D. POWELL)

Simon Gass, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

RESTRICTED

SECRET



46(a-b)
FILE
DA
LPC

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

27 February 1991

Dear Richard,

THE GULF

There are growing signs that the Gulf war will be over by the end of the week. We need to sort out some of the immediate steps we might need to take over the next few days.

Statement

The Prime Minister will need to make a statement to the House to mark the end of the fighting, whether there is a formal end to the conflict or not. It could be required at very short notice and possibly on Friday. (We need to bear in mind that the Prime Minister will be in Moscow on Tuesday next week.) I should be grateful if early attention could be given to a draft. It would need to look both back over the past few months, and give praise where it is due: and forward to the problems which we shall face in the next, and possibly even more difficult phase.

Messages/Telephone Calls

It would probably be right for the Prime Minister to speak by telephone or send messages to several world leaders. Besides President Bush, the obvious ones for telephone calls are King Fahd, President Mitterrand, the Amir of Kuwait, President Mubarak, Mr. Mulroney, Mr. Hawke, Mr. Bolger and the UN Secretary-General. Candidates for messages are other Gulf rulers, the King of Morocco, President Assad and Mr. Shamir. There may be others. You might like to set drafts in hand. The Prime Minister will also want to speak to General de la Billiere.

Visits

It is for consideration whether the Prime Minister should make a very early visit to the area to thank our forces. But much would depend on the practicality. How accessible will some of them be? (Presumably it would not be right for him to visit them within Iraq.) Will there be British units in Kuwait which he could visit? Would he be able to get to the British Embassy in Kuwait? A visit would have most impact if made very shortly after the end of the fighting e.g. on the Prime Minister's way back from Moscow next week. When would we be able to assess the practicality of such a visit? I would be grateful if MOD would

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- 2 -

give some fairly rapid thought to this in a very restricted circle. The Prime Minister has also suggested that MOD and FCO Ministers should visit service wives and families here and in Germany shortly after the end of fighting, in order to thank them.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence), John Neilson (Department of Energy) and to Sir Robin Butler.

*Yours sincerely,
Charles Powell*

CHARLES POWELL

Richard Gozney, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SECRET



10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

There seems to
be a need for an
OPD(G) this morning,
so I have called
it off. But I
have asked CDS to
come over to brief
you at 10.15
instead.

C.D.I. 27/2

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covering SECRET

D/Sec(O)(C)/2/30/1/1

CD

THE GULF CONFLICT

BRIEFING FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE - SITREP No. 113

SITUATION AS AT 0600Z, 27 FEBRUARY 1991

Contains

1. Classified sitrep
2. Casualty sitrep

This sitrep does not contain any unclassified material for use by Ministers

Distribution attached

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covering SECRET

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SEC(O)(C) MORNING BRIEF, 27 FEBRUARY 1991

Summary

- Ground campaign continues to go well. Kuwaiti flag flying over Kuwait City. Blue on blue.

General situation

- Allied operations continue to progress well and military objectives are being achieved across the front and ahead of time.
- Iraqi forces are in full-scale retreat but fighting continues when Allied forces make contact.

Political

- The Saudi administration issued a brief statement rejecting the Iraqi announcement of a withdrawal. Crown Prince Abdullah in discussions with the US Ambassador has urged that the Republican Guard be eliminated.
- Gorbachev's press spokesman Ignatenko claims that Iraq's announcement of a withdrawal is sufficient basis for UNSC to declare a ceasefire.
- Israeli Prime Minister, Mr Shamir, has said the fall of Saddam Hussein is essential to the survival of Tel Aviv.

UK Operations

Army Operations

- 1(BR)Div advancing ahead of schedule and ready to advance into Kuwait. Both Brigades Divisional in action yesterday but details of engagements still sketchy.
- 7 Armd Bde: has taken objectives PLATINUM and LEAD and is firm on Line Smash. Likely brigade task for today is to secure objective MINDEN inside Kuwait.
- 4 Armd Bde: Secured objective STEEL and subsequently assaulted objective TUNGSTEN. Reports suggest objective now secured but completion delayed by large number of POWs. Possible objective today is area VARSITY.
- 16/5L: Conducting screening operations ahead of advancing brigades; currently in area of Line Smash.
- Div Artillery: providing support for both Bdes; main effort in support of 16/5L and targets in front of advancing Bdes.

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- Two Warrior APCs from 3RRF attacked at 261220 in error by 2 US A-10s with Maverick missiles. 9 killed 11 injured. Of those killed 6 were from 3 RRF and 3 from QOH. Next of kin of 8 have been informed. Action in hand to inform the NOK of those injured. Likely that news of this incident, including fact of likely US responsibility, will be released in theatre by BFCME this afternoon.

Air Operations

- Bad weather continues to hamper air operations, with offensive missions either being cancelled or aborted. A further mission against Habbaniyah airfield by 4 Tornado GR1s and 2 TIALD Tornados from Tabuk air aborted because of the poor weather.
- 3 Tornado GR1a aircraft from Dhahran conducted recce missions; observations included 9 tanks, 9 tank transporters, 30 plus engineering vehicles, numerous AFVs moving north and a possible bridging operation.
- RAF combat sorties as at 270600Z:

	last 24 hours	total
Tornado GR1	28	1489
Tornado GR1A	3	134
Jaguar	10	599
Tornado F3	16	680
Buccaneer	4	200
Nimrod MR	2	81
AAR (Victor, VC10K, Tristar)	<u>13</u>	<u>710</u>
	76	3893

Non-combat sorties (as at 260100Z):	<u>2108</u>
	6001

Navy Operations

- MCMV force continue to clear the return leg of the Battleship triangular loop.

Allied Operations

- Latest estimate of enemy POWs is 35,000
- XVIII Corps: 1 brigade of US 101 Air Asslt Div now blocking the road between Nasiriyah and As Samawah. 24 Mech Inf Div has taken objectives near the main Basra Nasiriyah road.

VII Corps: 1 and 3 Armd Divs now firm in Obj PURPLE and COLLINS respectively

MARCENT: Following fighting 1 Mar Div has secured Kuwait

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International Airport and is on the outskirts of the city. 2 Mar Div has secured the western outskirts of Kuwait City after light resistance and taking many enemy POWs. Have probably blocked all routes north from Kuwait City.

JFCN: Egyptian 3 Mech Div and 4 Armd Div have reached objective ALPHA, west of Kuwait City.

JFCE: The task force of Saudi, Omani, UAE, Bahraini and Kuwaiti forces continue their advance to the outskirts of Kuwait city. Elements of Kuwaiti forces advanced into the city and raised the Kuwaiti flag in the centre of the city.

Iraqi activity

- 22 Infantry divisions are now assessed to be non-effective along with 5 & 12 Mech Divs and the Republican Guard Tawakalana Mech Div.

Media reports and coverage

- Media focus on Allied successes and Iraqi retreat; reporters describe Kuwait City as a ghost town dotted with burned out buildings; Parliament building and hotels set ablaze in last few days; US defeat of Republican Guard division.

Other items

- A liaison team is, in conjunction with other Coalition forces, to set up a British presence in Kuwait to develop and assess contingency plans for civil affairs. The team will be led by a Colonel from BFME and will include Civ Sec representation in the form of one member of the existing staff in Riyadh, temporarily reinforced by Mr Stainton from Sec(O)(C). The team will be established before the end of the week at Kuwait International Airport.
- It is intended to re-occupy shortly the British Embassy in Kuwait simultaneously with French and US moves to open theirs.

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OPERATION GRANBY - CASUALTY REPORT

Report Number : 43 Situation as at : 270400Z FEB 91

CURRENT CASUALTY STATE

Number currently recorded as killed in operations (KIA, DOW) 13

Number currently recorded as wounded in operations (VSI/SI) 2

Number currently missing on operations 12

Total dead on active service (since 2 August) 31

CURRENT CASUALTIES IN OPERATIONS, BY SERVICE

RN/RM			Army			RAF			Civilians (inc RFA)		
	Men	Women		Men	Women		Men	Women		Men	Women
Dead	0	0	Dead	13	0	Dead	0	0	Dead	0	0
Wounded	0	0	Wounded	2	0	Wounded	0	0	Wounded	0	0
Total RN/RM missing	0		Total Army missing	0		Total RAF missing	12		Total civ missing	0	

Current manpower in the Gulf theatre : 42891

RN/RM			Army			RAF			Civilians (inc RFA)		
Total	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women
2650	2588	62	33213	32162	1051	6214	6039	175	814	814	0

CASUALTIES IN OPERATIONS CONFIRMED SINCE REPORT No. 42

Number confirmed dead in operations 11

Number confirmed wounded in operations (VSI/SI) 2

Number previously reported wounded, but now dead 0

Number reported missing since last report 0

Number previously missing, now confirmed dead 0

Number previously missing, now confirmed wounded 0

Number previously missing, now confirmed safe and well 0

CASUALTIES IN OPERATIONS, BY SERVICE

RN/RM			Army			RAF			Civilians (inc RFA)		
	Men	Women		Men	Women		Men	Women		Men	Women
Dead	0	0	Dead	11	0	Dead	0	0	Dead	0	0
Wounded	0	0	Wounded	2	0	Wounded	0	0	Wounded	0	0
RN missing	0		Army missing	0		RAF missing	0		Civilians missing	0	

TOTAL CASUALTIES IN OPERATIONS SINCE THE COMMENCEMENT OF HOSTILITIES

Total number confirmed dead 13

Total number confirmed wounded (VSI/SI) 2

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THE GULF CONFLICT - BRIEFING FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

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SUMMARY

1. WASHINGTON CONFIDENT THAT VICTORY IS CLOSE. BEGINNING TO FOCUS ON POST-CRISIS ISSUES. PRESIDENT HAS HAD A GOOD WAR, BAKER LESS SO.

DETAIL

2. IN A STATEMENT ON 26 FEBRUARY THE PRESIDENT DISMISSED SADDAM HUSSEIN'S MOST RECENT SPEECH AS AN OUTRAGE, AND CONFIRMED THAT THE WAR WOULD CONTINUE WITH UNDIMINISHED INTENSITY. IRAQI FORCES WERE NOT WITHDRAWING, BUT RETREATING. SADDAM HAD NOT ACCEPTED UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS OR THE COALITION TERMS OF 22 FEBRUARY. THE BEST WAY TO AVOID FURTHER CASUALTIES ON BOTH SIDES WAS FOR IRAQI SOLDIERS TO LAY DOWN THEIR ARMS. COALITION EFFORTS WERE AHEAD OF SCHEDULE, WITH THE LIBERATION OF KUWAIT CLOSE AT HAND.

3. THE PRESIDENT'S UNCOMPROMISING STATEMENT UNDERLINES HIS DETERMINATION. IT ALSO REFLECTS THE GROWING CONFIDENCE IN WASHINGTON THAT COALITION FORCES ARE ON THE VERGE OF DESTROYING THE IRAQI ARMY AS A FIGHTING FORCE AND, IN THE PROCESS, POSSIBLY FORCING A CHANGE OF REGIME IN IRAQ. THE MEDIA CONTINUE TO REPORT OVERWHELMING ALLIED SUCCESS ON THE BATTLEFIELD, WITH STATIC IRAQI DEFENCES OUTFLANKED BY ALLIED MOBILITY AND OVERWHELMED BY THE WEIGHT AND SPEED OF THE COALITION ADVANCE. WITH THE MEDIA REPORTING THAT IRAQI FORCES ARE NOW CUT-OFF AND SURROUNDED, AND WITH ALLIED CASUALTIES STILL REMARKABLY LIGHT (DESPITE THE SCUD STRIKE ON A US BARRACKS IN DHAHRAN), THE PUBLIC MOOD IS BUOYANT. ALL POLLS SHOW PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR THE WAR AT RECORD HIGHS (80-84 PERCENT), WITH APPROVAL FOR THE PRESIDENT AROUND 90 PER CENT (THE HIGHEST RATING FOR ANY PRESIDENT SINCE TRUMAN IN JUNE 1945, AFTER GERMANY'S UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER). THE OFTEN PREDICTED COLLAPSE OF PUBLIC SUPPORT IN THE FACE OF US CASUALTIES HAS NOT MATERIALISED: MILITARY SUCCESS HAS INSTEAD STRENGTHENED

PUBLIC SUPPORT AS THE CONFLICT HAS PROGRESSED.

4. THE PRESIDENT HAS HAD A GOOD WAR. HIS CONSTRUCTION AND MAINTENANCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COALITION: HIS LAST MINUTE OFFER OF DIRECT TALKS WITH IRAQ: HIS TACTICAL JUDGEMENT IN LAUNCHING FIRST THE AIR AND THEN THE GROUND CAMPAIGNS: AND FINALLY HIS ULTIMATUM OF 22 FEBRUARY ARE SEEN AS EVIDENCE OF HIS ABILITY BOTH TO GIVE PEACE A CHANCE AND TO PROSECUTE THE WAR WITH VIGOUR, WITHOUT AT ANY STAGE DEPARTING FROM THE POSITION OF PRINCIPLE WHICH HE STAKED OUT ON 3 AUGUST 1990. HIS RECORD STANDING IN THE POLLS MAY NOT LONG OUTLAST THE WAR AND MAY NOT TRANSLATE INTO APPROVAL FOR HIS DOMESTIC AGENDA. BUT THE PRESIDENT WILL AT LEAST BE ABLE TO APPROACH HIS DOMESTIC PROGRAMME WITH GREATLY ENHANCED AUTHORITY AND PRESTIGE, AND PERHAPS ALSO WITH A DEGREE OF THE PUBLIC AFFECTION WHICH HIS PREDECESSOR SO CONSPICUOUSLY ENJOYED.

5. BY CONTRAST, BAKER HAS NOT HAD AS OBVIOUSLY SUCCESSFUL A WAR. WHILE HIS COALITION-BUILDING EFFORTS HAVE BEEN ACKNOWLEDGED, THERE IS MUCH COMMENT TO THE EFFECT THAT HE HAS TO SOME EXTENT BEEN MARGINALISED BY SCOWCROFT, GATES AND EVEN CHENEY, TO WHOM THE PRESIDENT HAS TURNED MORE REGULARLY FOR ADVICE. BAKER HAS MADE ONE OBVIOUS GAFFE OVER THE BESSMERTNYKH JOINT STATEMENT IN LATE JANUARY AND HIS PROPOSALS FOR THE POST-WAR RECONSTRUCTION OF IRAQ WERE ALSO ROUGHLY HANDLED BY THE HILL. BUT AS THE ACTION SHIFTS BACK TO THE DIPLOMATIC ARENA, THERE WILL BE AMPLE OPPORTUNITY FOR BAKER TO REASSERT HIMSELF.

6. WITH VICTORY APPARENTLY CLOSE, THE ADMINISTRATION ARE BEGINNING TO FOCUS ON THE POST CRISIS ISSUES. THEIR LATEST THINKING IS DESCRIBED IN MY TELNO 574

ACLAND

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Overhead

GB 4/3

FROM: CHIEF SECRETARY
DATE: 26 February 1991

PRIME MINISTER

WITHDRAWAL OF UK FORCES FROM THE GULF

I have read the MOD paper which was circulated to OPD(G) colleagues on 21 February. I agree with much of it, but I would like to draw attention to the following points which are of direct concern to the Treasury.

Short-term costs

2. I fully agree with the four guiding principles set out in paragraph 1 of the paper. I would like MOD to continue to keep my officials closely in touch with the estimates of the additional costs involved, and I will want to take a personal interest in decisions on options which could have an impact on those costs. For the moment there are three particular points in the paper which strike me and which I think we will need to consider in more detail.

3. First, there is the consideration being given to the future level of frigate/destroyer deployments to the region and indeed the role of other ships there (paragraph 7 of the paper). I would be grateful if the Treasury could be involved in this so that we can be satisfied that these plans are consistent with the major savings in prospect, following Options for Change, from reducing frigate/destroyer numbers from present levels.

4. Secondly, paragraph 10 points out that there are a number of ways in which the UK could help the Kuwaitis militarily - training, assistance with technical tasks, including mine

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clearance, and so on. I think that it is essential that we should not enter into any such commitments without first agreeing on our objectives for recovering such costs from Kuwait. Any payments under these heads should be additional to the £660 million burden sharing contribution which they have pledged to us.

5. Thirdly, there are the costs of return transport. Of course we must bring troops home as quickly as possible. But, as noted in the paper, more thought needs to be given to the trade-off between the speed and cost of bringing equipment back and to the possibilities for getting free transport from host nations and for obtaining further financial contributions from others to help with the costs of withdrawal.

Medium-term costs

6. The paper suggests (paragraph 11) that "there will also be major costs to meet in restoring our essential defence capability through replacement and refurbishment." There will indeed be costs, but the scale and the speed of replacement, and the implications this has for public expenditure, is something which I will need to examine very carefully with Tom King in the course of the 1991 Survey. Indeed there may be policy issues on with OPD will need to give guidance.

7. In the meantime, and for the avoidance of any possible doubt, let me make very clear that we are in no way committed to overall additional costs of as much as £3 billion, even if this is spread over several years. That is a figure which we have mentioned publicly, with due caution and caveats, in order to put the burden sharing contributions from our allies into context and to guard against any possible charges that we could be making a profit. It does not represent a considered estimate of the total additional expenditure which we are prepared to incur. That is something which will have to be scrutinised and agreed between MOD and the Treasury over the next few months.

SECRET

8. I am sending copies of this minute to members of OPD(G) and to Sir Robin Butler.

A handwritten signature in blue ink, consisting of a stylized 'M' followed by a diagonal line.

DAVID MELLOR

SECRET



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

Telephone 071- 21 82111/3

MO 6/17/12D

26th February 1991

Dear Charles,

We have heard from our Ambassador in Abu Dhabi that the United Arab Emirates have decided to purchase the Russian BMP 3 Armoured Personnel Carrier in preference to Warrior. The Prime Minister mentioned our interest in selling armoured personnel carriers in his letter to Shaikh Zayed of 18th February, although we do not know whether the UAE decision was made before the Prime Minister's letter had been received. The Minister of State for Defence Procurement has also written to the UAE authorities in support of the GKN bid.

It may yet be possible to reinstate the Warrior in this competition; winning would be worth £400M to the UK. However, only a representation at the highest level is likely to be successful. I therefore attach a draft letter which the Prime Minister may care to send to Shaikh Zayed. This has been discussed with FCO officials.

I am copying this letter to Richard Gozney (FCO), Martin Stanley (DTI), Jeremy Hayward (Treasury) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely,

Bryson Wells

(B H WELLS)
Private Secretary

Sir Charles Powell KCMG
No 10 Downing Street

DRAFT LETTER FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO
SHAIKH ZAYED BIN SULTAN AL NAHYAN, GCMG, GCB

"But I do have to say to Your Highness that it was all
I was very disappointed to learn through our Ambassador
that you intend to procure the Russian BMP 3 instead of ^{the more of}
the United Arab Emirates' Warrior for your Armed Forces. ^a
^{disappointment}
^{to learn}

I am sure that you will appreciate that it will be very
difficult ^{needed} for the British public to understand why, at this
particular time in our relationship, a Russian vehicle should
be chosen in preference to one from Britain - above all
given ~~our~~ ^{our} respective roles in the Gulf conflict.

I would be most grateful, Your Highness, if, you-
personally, as a long standing friend of the United Kingdom,
~~could see your way to giving further consideration to the~~
decision. ^{this is a time when friends must stand}
^{together.}

"The great sense of the coalition's
military success has been stressed by
the hour & I very much hope that
by the time Your Highness receives this
message we shall have achieved all
our objectives. The armed forces of the
UAE have played a most courageous &
effective part in the Coalition's success
and ~~you~~ ^{your} ~~and~~ ^{many} warmest congratulations on this.

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Prime Minister

You will note the
very warm you to

CHARLES

PM'S VISIT TO JHQ, HIGH WYCOMBE: 27 FEBRUARY

say a few words
to the staff at the
end. CDF 20/2

I spoke to Flight Lieutenant Price at High Wycombe, who dictated this short programme.

1610 Arrive JHQ. Met by Air Chief Marshal Sir Patrick Hine and his Staff Officer.
Drive to PWHQ

1620 Current situation briefing in the PWHQ.
PM will meet the Land Deputy, General Sir Michael (Mike) Wilkes and the Naval Deputy, Rear Admiral Peter Woodhead, as well as various RAF Principal Staff Officers. (They want to stress the tri-Service element.) (Refreshments will be served.)

1650 PM will visit two individual 'cells' (couldn't discuss and this over the phone)

1700

1715 Address personnel in the canteen

c1725 Depart

When the PM lands at High Wycombe, Sir Patrick Hine will travel with him in the car to the PWHQ. You will travel in the CIC's car (which will be in front of the PM's leading the way) with Wing Commander Lacey.

PAM

26.2.91

C:\wpdocs\foreign\hw (pmm)

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MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

Telephone 071-21 82111/3

MO 25/4/4J

21st February 1991

Dear Charles

VISIT BY PRIME MINISTER TO JHQ/HQ STRIKE COMMAND HIGH WYCOMBE

I attach a brief for the Prime Minister's visit to Joint Headquarters tomorrow. Please let me know if you have any queries.

Yours sincerely

(S J AMBLER-EDWARDS) (MISS)
Private Secretary

Sir Charles Powell KCMG
10 Downing Street

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VISIT BY PRIME MINISTER TO JOINT HEADQUARTERS (JHQ) HIGH WYCOMBE
- 27 FEBRUARY 1991

Headquarters RAF Strike Command (HQSTC)

HQSTC is national HQ for RAF operational forces. *Normally*

Also has NATO role of Headquarters UK Air Forces (HQ UKAIR).

Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief HQSTC is also Commander-in-Chief UK Air Forces (CINCUKAIR), with NATO mission to preserve integrity of UK Air Defence Region and defend UK against air attack.

CINCUKAIR manages UK air defence resources in peace, and would exercise command and control in transition to war and war.

Strike Command has some:

54,000 personnel, of whom 49,000 are Servicemen;

800 aircraft;

30 airfields in UK;

smaller units for radar and communications, bringing total RAF units to 200.

Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief exercises command through 3 subordinate Group Headquarters:

HQ 1 Group, Upavon: responsible for strike/attack, offensive support, reconnaissance, air-to-air refuelling, transport and support helicopter forces; total some 20 squadrons.

HQ 11 Group, Bentley Priory: responsible for all air defence; 10 squadrons.

HQ 18 Group, Northwood: responsible for all maritime and search and rescue matters; 10 squadrons.

Under MOD's New Management Strategy, from 1 April 1991 Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief will hold cash "Top Level Budget" covering direct operating costs of HQ and all units within Strike Command. Estimated at some £1.2Bn for 1991/92.

Operation Granby: JHQ Position in Chain of Command

Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief HQSTC is UK Joint Commander of Operation Granby. Designation of HQSTC, one of the three major UK Headquarters, as a JHQ reflects scale of operation and Headquarters best placed to exercise command most effectively.

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RIF only?

UK Joint Commander and JHQ exercise full command of all UK forces assigned to Operation Granby. This covers authority and responsibility for every aspect of military operations and administration for forces concerned.

Command and control arrangements in theatre are designed to integrate UK forces with US and other coalition allies whilst protecting UK national concerns and participation in decision making.

In UK chain of command Joint Commander is appointed by and reports to Chief of Defence Staff, who in turn reports through Defence Secretary to Prime Minister.

US arrangements reflect different constitutional position. CINCENTCOM, General Schwartzkopf reports to President as Commander-in-Chief of all US forces. Defense Secretary deputises for President as necessary. General Colin Powell, Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, is not in chain of command but acts as principal military adviser to President.

A further contrast between US and UK approaches to overall command is that Pentagon is not set up as operations centre. For Gulf crisis operational headquarters has had to be established in theatre.

Both UK and US arrangements are designed to provide clear direction to military commanders based on sound military advice to political decision takers.


Options for Change

Timetable for implementation of some changes has been affected by Operation Granby. Units will not be disbanded or relocated while they are involved. Adequate time will be allowed for orderly transition after units and personnel have returned. Changes planned for units not involved in Gulf operations - eg Phantoms - will proceed.

Early disbandment of Bloodhound medium surface-to-air missile is proceeding. Its replacement - Patriot or similar - is not due to enter service until mid 1990s. This will leave UK without medium range surface-to-air missile cover in interim. HQSTC may be concerned about UK air defence.

PRIMARY WAR HEADQUARTERS

- AOC-in-C STC, Cinc UKAIR and the Op Granby Jt Cdr's War Headquarters.
- Initial planning commenced in 1978.
- Construction commenced in May 1982.
- **Building:**
 - EMP Shield, 620 tons of 5mm mild steel (16,000 m2).
 - 10,817 tons of steel reinforcement rods (equal to 2,050 miles end to end).
 - 420,000 tons of concrete/aggregate.
 - Measures 80 x 50 x 25m.
 - Detonation Slab capable of withstanding:
 - a. Multiple hits up to 1500 kg semi armour piecing.
 - b. Close proximity Nuclear Air Burst Explosion.
 - 8 G Shock loading.
 - 20 degree tilt capability.
 - Fully self sufficient for up to 900 personnel for 30 days, (food, fuel and water).
 - Full NBC Capability.
- **Layout:**
 - 4 floors designated as:
 - Upper - Administration/Domestic.
 - Middle - Operations.
 - Lower - Communications/Engineering.
 - Basement - Life Support.
- Occupied in Jan 1989.
 - Participated in numerous major NATO exercises as the UKAIR Command and Control Centre. In Jun/Jul 90 housed the 4 Star HQ for National Exercise Purple Venture 90. Designated the Joint HQ for Op GRANBY in Aug 90.



AIR CHIEF MARSHAL SIR PATRICK HINE GCB ADC FRAeS CBIM RAF

**COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF UNITED KINGDOM AIR FORCES
AND AIR OFFICER COMMANDING-IN-CHIEF STRIKE COMMAND**

Air Chief Marshal Hine was born near Southampton in 1932. He was educated at Peter Symonds School, Winchester before joining the Royal Air Force as a trainee pilot in 1950. After a first operational tour with No 1 Squadron flying Meteors, he became a Qualified Flying Instructor (QFI) and instructed at a Meteor Flying School and at the Royal Air Force Flying College, Manby. In 1956-7 he was a staff instructor at the Central Flying School (CFS) and a member of the CFS Aerobatic Team.

Between 1957-62 he was a Flight Commander on Day Fighter/Ground Attack Hunters with Nos 111 and 93 Squadrons, and also during this time was a member of 'Treble One's' famous Black Arrows aerobatic team.

In 1962-4 he commanded No 92 Squadron during their conversion to Lightnings in the all-weather air defence role, before attending the Royal Air Force Staff College in 1965. He spent the following four years in the Ministry of Defence, firstly as Personal Air Secretary to the Minister of Defence for the Royal Air Force and latterly as the Phantom Project Officer in Operational Requirements (RAF). In 1970 he reformed No 17 Squadron flying Phantoms in the strike/attack role in Royal Air Force Germany and, after attending the Air Warfare Course in 1972, became Group Captain Operations (Offensive Support and Transport) at Headquarters Strike Command.

In 1974-5 Air Chief Marshal Hine commanded the Royal Air Force Germany Harrier Force whilst he was Station Commander at Royal Air Force Wildenrath. He then returned to the Ministry of Defence to become the Royal Air Force's Director of Public Relations.

After attending the 1978 Course at the Royal College of Defence Studies, he became Senior Air Staff Officer, Royal Air Force Germany and was appointed Assistant Chief of the Air Staff (Policy) in December 1979.

Air Chief Marshal Hine was Commander Second Allied Tactical Air Force and Commander-in-Chief Royal Air Force Germany from 9 April 1983 and was appointed a Knight Commander of the Most Honourable Order of the Bath in The Queen's Birthday Honours List 1983. He was promoted to Air Chief Marshal on 1 July 1985 and was appointed Vice-Chief of the Defence Staff on 29 July 1985. In November 1987, he joined the Air Force Board as Air Member for Supply and Organisation, and, on 9 September 1988 became Commander-in-Chief United Kingdom Air Forces and Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief Strike Command. In the 1989 New Year Honours List Air Chief Marshal Hine was appointed a Knight Grand Cross of the Most Honourable Order of the Bath and, in August 1989, was appointed Air Aide de Camp to The Queen.

He is married to Jill and has three sons. His interests are golf, skiing, hill walking, caravanning and photography.



AIR MARSHAL SIR JOHN (KIP) KEMBALL KCB CBE RAF

Air Marshal Kemball was born in Bury St Edmunds in January 1939 and was conscripted into the Royal Air Force in 1957 for National Service. After training as one of the last National Service pilots he transferred to a permanent commission and became a qualified flying instructor at the Royal Air Force College, Cranwell. In 1962 he was appointed ADC to the Chief of Staff, Headquarters, Allied Air Forces Central Europe.

After a tour on No 8 Squadron (Hunters) at RAF Khormaksar during which he flew 43 operational missions, he filled an exchange post as an instructor pilot on F-4C Phantom aircraft at Davis Monthan Air Force Base, Arizona. He was promoted to Squadron Leader and became a fighter weapons instructor on Phantoms at RAF Coningsby. During this tour he became the first RAF pilot to log 1,000 hours on Phantoms.



He graduated from RAF Staff College in 1971 and after a short tour at Headquarters, RAF Germany, was promoted to Wing Commander and returned to the United Kingdom for air staff duties at Headquarters No 38 Group. In 1977 he commanded No 54 (Jaguar) Squadron at RAF Coltishall and on promotion to Group Captain in late 1978 became the Station Commander RAF Laarbruch (Buccaneers and Jaguars). He was made Commander of the Order of The British Empire in January 1981.

On return to the United Kingdom in 1981, he spent 18 months as Deputy Director Air Plans, Ministry of Defence, before being promoted to Air Commodore and taking up the appointment of Commandant of the RAF Central Flying School in January 1983.

In July 1985 he was promoted to Air Vice-Marshal and appointed **Commander British Forces Falkland Islands**. This appointment carried with it ex-officio membership of the Islands' Executive and Legislative Councils.

In March 1987 Air Marshal Kemball joined the Defence Intelligence Staff as Assistant Chief of the Defence Staff (Intelligence). Following reorganization in March 1988 he became Director General of Intelligence (Rest of the World) (that is non-Warsaw Pact countries) and Deputy to the Chief of Defence Intelligence.

In November 1989 he was promoted to Air Marshal and appointed to Headquarters Strike Command as Chief of Staff and Deputy Commander-in-Chief. He was knighted in the New Year's Honours List 1990.

Air Marshal Kemball is married with two adult daughters. He and his wife, Val, have their home in North Essex and their interests include tennis, gardening and most country pursuits. The Air Marshal is President of the Royal Air Force Equitation Association and the Royal Air Force Officers' Shooting Association, Chairman of the Combined Services Equitation Association and a member of the Council of the British Horse Society. Val, who served in the Corps before marriage, is a Trustee of the ATS and WRAC Benevolent Funds.

BIOGRAPHICAL DETAILS

LIEUTENANT GENERAL SIR MICHAEL WILKES KCB CBE

COMMANDER UK FIELD ARMY/INSPECTOR GENERAL TERRITORIAL ARMY

Lieutenant General Sir Michael Wilkes was educated at The Kings School Rochester and RMA Sandhurst. He was commissioned into the Royal Artillery in December 1960 and joined 7 Parachute Regiment Royal Horse Artillery. Whilst with the Parachute Brigade he served extensively in the Middle East and in Cyprus both before and after the formation thereof of the United Nations Force. In 1963 he was accepted for service with 22 Special Air Service Regiment where he served as Troop Commander (Mountain Troop) and latterly as Adjutant. During this period he saw active service in both Borneo and Aden (Radfan). After a short period as Adjutant of 42 Medium Regiment Royal Artillery in Devizes he attended Division II of the Staff College course. His first staff appointment was Brigade Major Royal Artillery at Headquarters 3rd Division, then based in Bulford. Following this appointment, in 1975, he joined 1 Regiment Royal Horse Artillery in Detmold and commanded The Chestnut Troop RHA for the following two years. In 1977 he was appointed Commanding Officer 22 Special Air Service Regiment following which he served within the Ministry of Defence as Military Assistant to the Chief of the General Staff. Before moving to command 22 Armoured Brigade in BAOR he served as Chief of Staff at Headquarters 3rd Armoured Division, which by this time had relocated to Soest, West Germany. Following his Brigade command he was appointed Director Special Air Service from December 1985, and subsequently became Director Special Forces from September 1987, taking under command both SAS and Royal Marine SBS as part of one formation. In June 1988 he was appointed General Officer Commanding the 3rd Armoured Division stationed in BAOR. This was his last appointment before becoming Commander UK Field Army and Inspector General Territorial Army in August 1990. He was appointed OBE in 1979, CBE in 1988 and KCB in 1991.

Lieutenant General Sir Michael Wilkes is married to Anne who is Jersey born and they have two sons, Jonathan who is an accountant and Jeremy who is at Exeter University. His interests include rugby, sailing, windsurfing, skiing and golf. He has assumed the presidency of the Army Rugby Football Union.

The Flag Officer Flotilla One

Rear Admiral A. P. Woodhead




The Flag Officer Flotilla One is responsible for the operational effectiveness of RN destroyers and frigates. He periodically flies his flag at sea in peacetime and commands a NATO Task Group in Tension and Transition To War.



Rear Admiral Peter Woodhead was born in Leeds in 1939 and educated at Leeds Grammar School. HMS CONWAY – a Naval Training Ship – and BRNC Dartmouth. A Seaman officer, he specialised in aviation and was actively involved in the Borneo confrontation when serving in the Military Support Role from HMS ALBION. Qualifying as a Flying Instructor in 1964 he then served in six aircraft carriers over the next ten years as well as working in MOD on the Staff of the Naval Secretary, the personnel department of the RN. After promotion to Commander in 1974 he commanded both HMS JUPITER and HMS RHYL and, following a course at the National Defence College, served two appointments in the MOD Naval Plans Division, the latter following promotion to Captain in 1979. His tenure as Chief Staff Officer to the Flag Officer Third Flotilla was followed in 1982, at the outbreak of the Falklands conflict, by an appointment as Chief of Staff to the Flag Officer Commanding the Falklands Task Force. After the conflict he became Captain Fourth Frigate Squadron and Commanding Officer HMS AVENGER. Admiral Woodhead is a graduate of the Royal College of Defence Studies. Before taking command of the aircraft carrier HMS ILLUSTRIOUS in 1986 he served as Director of Naval Operations in the Ministry of Defence. Promoted Rear Admiral in March 1988 he became Flag Officer Flotilla Two, the Sea Commander of the United Kingdom Task Group and principal advisor to CINCFLEET for all areas outside the NATO boundary. He assumed his current duties as Flag Officer Flotilla One in September 1989.

Rear Admiral Woodhead and his wife Carol live in Woking with their son and daughter.



The Flag Officer Flotilla One is responsible for the operational effectiveness of RN destroyers and frigates. He periodically flies his flag at sea in peace-time and commands a NATO Task Group in Tension and Transition To War.

Rear Admiral Peter Woodhead was born in Leeds in 1929 and educated at Leeds Grammar School, HMS COLWAY - a Naval Training Ship - and BRNC Dartmouth. A Seaman officer he was appointed in 1950 and was actively involved in a battle condition when serving in the Military School HMS ALBION. Qualifying as a Pilot Instructor in 1954, he then served in an aircraft carrier over the next ten years as well as working in MOD and the Staff of the Naval Secretary. He was promoted to Commander in 1964. After promotion to Commander, the personal department of the RN, after promotion to Commander, in 1974 he commanded HMS JUPITER and HMS RHYL and following a course at the National Defence College, served two appointments in the MOD Naval Plans Division, the latter following promotion to Captain in 1979. His tenure as

Chief of Staff to the Flag Officer Third Flotilla was followed in 1980 at the outbreak of the Falklands conflict by an appointment as Chief of Staff to the Flag Officer Commanding the Falkland Task Force. After this conflict, he became Captain Royal Fleet School and Commanding Officer HMS AVENTURER. Admiral Woodhead is a graduate of the Royal College of Defence Studies. Before taking command of the fleet carrier HMS ILLUSTRIOUS in 1988 he served as Director of Naval Operations in the Ministry of Defence. Promoted Rear Admiral in March 1988 he became Flag Officer Flotilla One, the Sea Commander of the United Kingdom Task Group and principal advisor to CINCPACFLT for its area outside the NATO boundary. He assumed his current duties as Flag Officer Flotilla One in September 1989.

Rear Admiral Woodhead and his wife Carol live in Woking with their son and daughter.



06
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SECRETARY OF STATE

com
28/2

MO 6/17/15/1D

FOREIGN SECRETARY

THE GULF CRISIS: INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF IRAQIS
FOR GRAVE BREACHES OF THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS

Following the OPD(G) meeting on 13th January, it was agreed that the Ministry of Defence should establish machinery for the collection and collation of evidence of grave breaches by Iraqis of the Geneva Conventions for subsequent use in the event that prosecutions take place.

2. Before advising colleagues of what I propose, I thought I should set out my views about the possibility of pursuing prosecutions by military tribunal under the Royal Warrant 1945, which is the option that would involve my department in the most work. Use of the Royal Warrant raises a number of difficulties. The instrument itself would need substantial amendment to reflect today's circumstances rather than those obtaining in 1945 (for example the Royal Warrant still allows the award of the death penalty). There must be serious doubts about whether the use of military courts for this purpose would be acceptable to today's parliamentary and public opinion, both at home and abroad, particularly given the less rigorous requirement for evidence that would be entailed. Accordingly, although I think it is too early to rule out altogether the use of the Royal Warrant, I support the view expressed by the Attorney General in his minute to you of 22nd January.



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SECRETARY OF STATE

3. On the question of machinery for collecting evidence, I believe we should try to place some limits on the size of the task. Some work is already in hand. For example we are logging appropriate media material (eg TV pictures of captured allied aircrew); and those UK citizens debriefed at the Joint Services Intelligence Wing at Ashford, following their return from Iraq and Kuwait after 2nd August, have been asked about possible grave breaches which they may have witnessed. None of this is necessarily evidence as such, but it may provide useful pointers to incidents that may require investigation, and individuals who may be required to give statements.

4. The main task however will be the gathering of evidence in theatre, particularly now the ground campaign has started and coalition troops have entered Kuwait. Given the need to satisfy likely evidential requirements it makes sense that responsibility should fall to the Military Police (both Army and RAF). I propose therefore to establish an investigation and collection team at Old Sarum in Wiltshire whose main purpose will be to collect and collate evidence gathered in the UK and by military police in theatre. This will comprise a total of 20 personnel to be found initially from existing resources. The majority of these staff would be employed full time on this task. If it persists for any length of time, some will need replacement by individual reservists if other military police and provost tasks are not to suffer. To avoid nugatory expenditure I intend that the team should be established for two-three months initially. By that time we will be clearer about whether or not prosecutions will actually take place; and in a better position to judge the size of the investigating team and whether or not to call out reservists. Some additional expenditure will be necessary, on Information Technology and other support. A first estimate of these non-manpower costs is about £200K which I





SECRETARY OF STATE

would charge to our separate Operation GRANBY account.

5. To avoid large amounts of nugatory work, I intend to issue directions to the team along the following lines:

- a) investigation and collection of evidence should concentrate on grave breaches by Iraqis, though any evidence of lesser breaches by them that comes to light as a result of that process should be retained.
- b) efforts should be concentrated on incidents/allegations which involve British citizens, either as victims or material witnesses, though again evidence that comes to light involving other nationalities should be collected for possible later transfer to other authorities.
- c) investigators in the UK and in theatre should work in a reactive manner, responding to information already to hand or received in the course of operations. I am advised that such an approach is sufficient to meet our obligations under the Geneva Conventions satisfactorily.
- d) investigations carried out in theatre must be given secondary priority to the efficient conduct of military operations.



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SECRETARY OF STATE

6. We shall need to decide whether to make our preparations public. I suggest we wait until we hear how the US are proceeding before deciding how to do so.

7. I am sending a copy of this minute to OPD(G) colleagues and the Chief Secretary, and to Sir Robin Butler.

A handwritten signature, likely of the Secretary of State, consisting of a large loop and a stylized 'K'.

(T K)

Ministry of Defence
2GH February 1991



RESTRICTED



U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

It is requested that you advise the Department of State of any developments in the case of the above-named individual, and if possible, advise the Department of State of the results of any action taken by you in this regard.

Very truly yours,
[Signature]

[Handwritten mark]

Very truly yours,
[Signature]

Dear Charles, P2612
I would be most thankful

PAULO TARSO FLECHA DE LIMA


Brazilian Ambassador

if you could ensure that the
attached letter be handed
to the Prime Minister.
I am looking

forward to meet you
next week.

7:11 there, my
best regards.
Yours as

26.2.91

A stylized, cursive handwritten signature in dark ink, located at the bottom right of the page. The signature is fluid and appears to be a single name, possibly 'John' or 'Johnnie', written in a personal, informal style.

PAULO TARSO FLECHA DE LIMA
Brazilian Ambassador

London, 26th February, 1991

The Right Honourable
Mr. John Major, MP
Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
London SW1

Dear Prime Minister,

I have the honour to forward to Your Excellency the enclosed message addressed to you by the President of Brazil, Fernando Collor, concerning the events in the Gulf.

May I also express my wishes for a rapid settlement and that peace will be soon restored for the benefit of all.

Sincerely yours

Paulo Tarso Flecha

PAULO-TARSO FLECHA DE LIMA

PERSONAL

Charles/ Thank you. But much of
the credit is yours. / 26.2

PRIME MINISTER

Sir Antony Acland telephoned me from Washington this evening to say that Henry Kissinger had been in touch with him. Kissinger had been at the White House last night and reported that the President heaped praise on your handling of the Gulf crisis and the closeness of the co-operation with the UK. Kissinger had described the President's warmth on the subject as awe-inspiring. He was particularly happy with the very close co-operation between the White House and No. 10. Kissinger was very anxious for all this to be passed on to you.

C.D.P

C. D. POWELL

26 February 1991

c:\foreign\kissinger (slh)

SPEAKING NOTE

P. 44
25/7

I cannot tell you exactly what the situation on the ground is. But there are reports that a good part of Kuwait City has been liberated. I think everyone who saw the pictures on television this evening, the happy faces of the people of Kuwait City, who suddenly find themselves free once more, will have been moved and uplifted.

We don't yet know what horrors there are to be uncovered, both the destruction of buildings and property and the atrocities committed against the people of Kuwait.

But freeing the City will be the first vital step, and we hope it will be followed by the very rapid liberation of the whole of Kuwait.

Our own forces have been very active today and have achieved some excellent successes.

Overall the military operations are going very well, despite the bad weather, and there is every reason to hope they can be brought to a speedy and completely successful conclusion.

Whatever Saddam Hussain may try to claim to the contrary, the whole world recognises that he is being utterly defeated: that he has once again - as in the war with Iran - sacrificed the lives of his people in vain.



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

Telephone 071-21 82111/3

MO 6/17/15/1J

Rich Austin
CD 26/2
26/4 February 1991

✓

Dear Charles

REPORT FROM RIYADH

The Defence Secretary's colleagues might find it useful to see the attached report from Commanders on Operations today in the Gulf.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries to members of OPD(G) and to Sir Robin Butler.

Wm. Webb
John Webb

(S WEBB)
Private Secretary

Sir Charles Powell KCMG
10 Downing Street

CDS 2066/2/1

26 Feb 91

Secretary of State

THE VIEW FROM RIYADH 261800Z FEB 91

1. With the exception of appalling weather in the KTO which has severely impacted on Allied air operations, events have moved swiftly since the OPD(G) this morning. For ease of reference I attach the most up to date map which represents current positions and shows only those Iraqi divisions which are still considered to be effective (it is assessed that 21 Iraqi divisions are now ineffective). The dotted yellow line shows an estimate of the FLOT (Forward Line of Own Troops). The latest count of POWs is now 25,000.

2. Starting from the West, the French are now clearing area White and moving to the North East. 101st Airborne Div is closing on the main road to Baghdad alongside the River Euphrates. 24 Div will arrive shortly in position Gold at An Nasiriyah. The US 3rd Armd Div is engaging units of the RGFC Tawalkhana supported by the 2nd Air Cavalry Regiment. 1st UK Armd Div is completing an engagement with the Iraqi 12th Div and will head NE along the line of the Wadi Batin. You will have heard of the unfortunate incident this afternoon when a US A10 on close air support attacked 2 Warrior armoured infantry fighting vehicles of 4th Armd Bde which resulted in 9 dead and 11 wounded servicemen from the 3rd Royal Regiment of Fusiliers. CDS and SoFS have already discussed an early release of the facts surrounding this incident as soon as all next of kin have been informed and the inquiry, now underway in theatre, has established the facts. The Egyptians have now advanced through the obstacle belt with a Saudi Division in reserve; the Syrians have not moved since the land fighting began. US Marines have reached point Bravo, the main cross-roads out of Kuwait City, and point Charlie which is Kuwait International Airport. The position of the Kuwaiti/Saudi/Qatari forces in the JFCE is not entirely clear although there are reports that they are approaching the outskirts of Kuwait City.

3. Latest reports from theatre indicate that the RGFC divisions are leaving their revetments and moving North towards Basra. Gen Schwarzkopf had planned to mass 5 divisions for an attack on them tomorrow but in view of their movement intends to task the US 1st and 3rd Divisions and 2nd Air Cavalry Regiment to advance on the RGFC tonight. Much hot planning is going on in theatre and many supporting air sorties are being planned but the weather may well play a major part. It is of little comfort that similar poor weather conditions are forecast for tomorrow and there is even the possibility of fog in the Euphrates Valley! Meteorologists claim that this is the worst recorded weather in the area for 25 years.

C

SECRET US/UK EYES ONLY
GRANBY SPECIAL HANDLING CHANNELS ONLY


4. Despite reports on CBS and CNN that Kuwait City is empty of Iraqi troops, as yet, we have confirmation only that half of the city has been vacated. As reported earlier a US/UK and French team of non-SF under SOCCENT control has established a small nucleus HQ at Kuwait International Airport to liaise with Kuwaiti civil and military authorities. They plan a coordinated reoccupation of the three Embassies tomorrow and I understand that the State Dept and the Quai D'Orsay have already agreed this. I understand that you have already been in touch with the FCO to seek concurrence to the plan.

5. An examination of the road systems from Kuwait to Baghdad reveals the following - all figures refer to the passage of vehicles if they are not subject to interdiction:

- a. The road from Kuwait City towards Basra is capable of passing 12,750 vehicles per 24 hours.
- b. The Euphrates route via An Nasiriyah towards Baghdad can pass 8,100 vehicles per 24 hours.
- c. The Tigris route from Basra to Baghdad can pass 5,350 vehicles per 24 hours.
- d. The road NNW from An Nasiriyah is heavily damaged and can pass 700 vehicles per 24 hours.


As reported previously, and weather permitting, there will be heavy interdiction against these roads overnight. There have been extensive leaflet drops on troops moving along the Euphrates road urging them to lay down their weapons and broadcasts into Kuwait City urging Iraqis remaining there to do the same.


5. The SCUD missile which attacked Dhahran last night killing 27 US service personnel landed 1km from British accommodation. UK servicemen were very quick to respond and to assist in casualty evacuation for which the US were most grateful. You may have heard that last night a Kuwaiti of unknown origin broke into a Saudi-run POW camp and ran amok killing an unknown number of Iraqi POWs. This story has apparently not yet reached the media. As a final snippet it has been reported in theatre, from sources unknown, that in the last 2 weeks there have been 2 unsuccessful attempts by senior army personnel to assassinate Saddam Hussein.



D G LITTLEJOHNS
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SECRET







10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

Prime Minister
A very upbeat
account from
Colin Powell
COO
29/2

26 February 1991

Dee Simon,

I had another talk this evening with General Scowcroft and Bob Gates. Both had just come back from a military briefing with General Colin Powell.

On the immediate military situation, they said that the US Marines and the Saudis had Kuwait City surrounded and more or less cut off. The plan was that Saudi, Egyptian and Kuwaiti forces would occupy it tomorrow, the Egyptians moving east from their sector. The marines were being slowed in their drive north-west of Kuwait City by huge numbers of destroyed and abandoned Iraqi vehicles.

Iraqi units trying to withdraw from Kuwait were in trouble. There were a couple of huge traffic jams south of Basra. The US 24th Division had reached the Euphrates valley and would be able to cut off any columns trying to escape that way. Two Republican Guard divisions were trying to pull back, covered by a third. But General Powell's judgement was that this would not work and they would become part of the rout. The Americans would then just move in on them. There was no way that the Republican Guard divisions could take their equipment north of the Euphrates, because the bridges were down. Every time they tried to build a pontoon, the allied air forces killed it. The only road, therefore, was that south and west of the Euphrates where 24th Division and 18 Airborne Corps were located and lying in wait.

In the light of this, General Powell's assessment was that there was only a day or two's battle left before the back of the Iraqi armed forces was completely broken. After that the Americans should cease to attack a purely passive army, except where it showed isolated signs of fighting. The equipment would all have to be abandoned and the Americans would destroy it piece by piece. I asked whether they saw any possibility of some of the Republican Guards removing their equipment. Gates said that, despite the bad weather, they were under heavy air attack and the hope was to finish off any existing columns tomorrow morning. In summary, the end was now very close.

I asked whether enough progress had been made with destroying targets, in particular NBC targets, elsewhere in Iraq. Scowcroft and Gates said that General Powell was saying that targets were now a little scarce.


I returned to the idea which I had put to Scowcroft earlier in the day that we needed to update the 22 February terms - although in the light of this military appreciation, they were obviously of declining significance. The most important thing was to avoid a ceasefire until the army had been effectively destroyed. Gates said that the Americans had quite a number of papers on individual aspects of finishing the conflict and the arrangements for what would follow. He was now trying to draw together an umbrella paper. His own thought was that a point would come relatively soon, once the Kuwaiti Government was back in Kuwait and the Iraqis all ejected, when we could say that we had achieved the objectives we had originally set ourselves, and announce that we would start to bring our troops home. That would be a clean break. The arrangements for what would follow would be a separate matter. These included peace keeping and security functions, what to do about continuing SCUD attacks (to which the Americans would react militarily) and POWs. I said that I was very surprised to hear POWs so far down the list. Scowcroft said they were right at the top of the President's list. But given the likely rapid end to the military campaign, they probably had now to be viewed as a problem to be resolved promptly after fighting had finished.

I asked what the Americans expected the Israelis to do. Would they exact a speedy revenge? Scowcroft and Gates thought their first priority would be to milk their restraint for every dollar and weapon they could get. That might change if the Iraqis continued to launch SCUDs at Israel. They would no doubt store up their revenge for later.

Gates added that the Americans still wanted to see Saddam Hussain removed. They would say that if he remained in power not only should all economic sanctions remain in place, but a world-wide arms embargo should be imposed on Iraq. In effect we would be saying to the people of Iraq that they had to yield up Saddam Hussain if they wanted to have any prospect of reconstruction. I said that we were thinking in similar terms.

Gates had an anecdote which he thought might amuse the Prime Minister. A Mutual Radio team had entered Kuwait this afternoon and, rather to its own surprise, had taken 20 Iraqi prisoners, who had emerged from their bunker yelling "George Bush for ever".

I am copying this letter to Richard Gozney (Foreign and Commonwealth Office), John Neilson (Department of Energy), Juliet Wheldon (Law Officers' Department) and Sir Robin Butler.

Yours sincerely,


(CHARLES POWELL)

Simon Webb, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence.

✓

42(a-c)

SECRET - UK EYES A

Ref. AO91/ 474

PRIME MINISTER

cc Sir Percy Cradock
Mr Appleyard

OPD(G): 26 February 1991

Item 1: Current Military Situation

You might invite the Chief of the Defence Staff to give a short report on the military situation. The essential point is the extent to which the allied forces have achieved their objective of encircling the Iraqi forces, including the Republican Guard, and being in a position to control and if necessary interdict their retreat. Our diplomatic aims and tactics will stem very much from this.

Item 2: Current International Situation

2. You may want briefly to take stock of the exchanges overnight with the US Administration on ceasefire terms. The Foreign Secretary may want to report on the discussions in the UN Security Council.

3. It is clear that the most urgent task now is to agree with the US Government, and subsequently with the coalition, a revised, updated set of ceasefire terms. These will need to reflect the new situation, compared with 22 February, with the onset of the land campaign and Iraqi conduct in Kuwait. The revised terms should be based on the 22 February statement, your message to President Bush and the White House statement last night. The Americans may well be working on this already, and there would be advantage in your sending a further message before the start of play in Washington to let them have our further ideas.

b

SECRET - UK EYES A

4. The White House statement reflected some of the points in your message. In particular, it contained explicit reference to UN Security Council Resolutions. It attempted to deal with the requirement for the Iraqis to leave their equipment behind, but only in an indirect way. They have not so far taken account of our comments on prisoners of war: one advantage of dealing with this is that it would allow time before the ceasefire came into effect in which the allied could complete their military aims. The US statement also does not entirely deal with the question of what happens to Iraqi forces currently surrounded or blocked off by the allied forces on Iraqi territory, which have all their equipment, especially the Republican Guard. We need to have a precise formula which deals with this question.

5. We will also need to decide instructions for our representative in the Security Council. We ought to be able to hold the line for the moment by demanding that Iraq subscribe to all the UN Resolutions. The next stage in the game will be governed by discussions with the allies on the ceasefire terms.

6. You may wish to conclude the discussion by asking officials to draft urgently a further message taking account of the points made at the meeting to reach the White House by noon our time.

Item 3: Media Handling

7. The immediate question which Mr O'Donnell will have to face at the lobby, and which is also likely to be raised in the House this afternoon, is our attitude to the Iraqi


SECRET - UK EYES A

announcement and the White House response. The Foreign Office has been producing a form of words on this which the Foreign Secretary should have with him.

F.R.B

ROBIN BUTLER

Cabinet Office
26 February 1991



Government and the White House. The President
has been receiving a large number of letters from
the public since he took office.

WHITE HOUSE

Washington, D.C.
February 1931



TRUE TO

SIR CHARLES POWELL

NO 10 DOWNING ST

With the compliments of

EMERGENCY UNIT
FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
LONDON, SW1A 2AH

✓
370

IC

RRC R URGENT///IRAQ-WITHDRAWAL 2=:

ORDERS ISSUED

THE STATEMENT BROADCAST BY IRAQI RADIO SAID:

+ORDERS HAVE BEEN ISSUED TO OUR ARMED FORCES TO WITHDRAW IN AN ORGANIZED MANNER TO THE POSITIONS THEY HELD PRIOR TO 1 AUGUST 1990. THIS IS REGARDED AS A PRACTICAL COMPLIANCE WITH RESOLUTION 660. THE SPOKESMAN EMPHASIZED THAT OUR ARMED FORCES, WHICH HAVE PROVEN THEIR ABILITY TO FIGHT AND STAND FAST, WILL CONFRONT ANY ATTEMPT TO HARM IT WHILE IT IS CARRYING OUT THE WITHDRAWAL ORDER.+

RRC MON MGA

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22:51 25 FEB 91

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BBC R IRAQ-WITHDRAWAL-TEXT=:

IRAQI WITHDRAWAL STATEMENT - TEXT

FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE STATEMENT READ OUT ON IRAQI RADIO AT 2230 GMT:

IN THE NAME OF GOD, THE MERCIFUL, THE COMPASSIONATE. OUR ARMED FORCES HAVE PERFORMED THEIR JIHAD DUTY OF REFUSING TO COMPLY WITH THE LOGIC OF EVIL, IMPOSITION, AND AGGRESSION. THEY HAVE BEEN ENGAGED IN AN EPIC, VALIANT BATTLE WHICH WILL BE RECORDED BY HISTORY IN LETTERS OF LIGHT.

ON THIS BASIS, AND BECAUSE THE LEADERSHIP AFFIRMED ITS AGREEMENT TO WITHDRAW IN ACCORDANCE WITH UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION NO. 660 THROUGH ITS APPROVAL OF THE SOVIET INITIATIVE, ORDERS HAVE BEEN ISSUED TO OUR ARMED FORCES TO WITHDRAW IN AN ORGANIZED MANNER TO THE POSITIONS HELD PRIOR TO 1 AUGUST 1990. THIS IS REGARDED AS A PRACTICAL COMPLIANCE WITH RESOLUTION 660.

THE SPOKESMAN EMPHASIZED THAT OUR ARMED FORCES, WHICH HAVE PROVEN THEIR ABILITY TO FIGHT AND STAND FAST, WILL CONFRONT ANY ATTEMPT TO HARM THEM WHILE THEY ARE CARRYING OUT THE WITHDRAWAL ORDER. THEY WILL FIGHT WITH THEIR KNOWN BRAVERY AND CAPABILITY TO MAKE THEIR WITHDRAWAL ORGANIZED AND HONOURABLE.

THE IRAQI NEWS AGENCY HAS LEARNED THAT THE FOREIGN MINISTER THIS EVENING INFORMED THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR OF THIS DECISION, WHICH CONSTITUTES A COMPLIANCE WITH THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL'S RESOLUTION 660. THE FOREIGN MINISTER ASKED THAT A MESSAGE BE CONVEYED FROM LEADER PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSAYN AND THE REVOLUTION COMMAND COUNCIL TO PRESIDENT GORBACHEV REQUESTING HIM TO EXERT EFFORTS AT THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO ACHIEVE A CEASE-FIRE AND PUT AN END TO THE CRIMINAL BEHAVIOUR OF THE UNITED STATES AND ITS ALLIES AND COLLABORATORS.

BBC MON MGA

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copy all.

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RRC R URGENT///IRAG-WITHDRAWAL=:

SOVIET ENVOY TOLD

+THE IRAQI NEWS AGENCY HAS LEARNED THAT THE FOREIGN MINISTER THIS EVENING INFORMED THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR OF THIS DECISION, WHICH CONSTITUTES A COMPLIANCE WITH THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL'S RESOLUTION 660, +THE STATEMENT, BROADCAST BY IRAQI RADIO SAID.

+THE FOREIGN MINISTER ASKED (THE AMBASSADOR) TO CONVEY A MESSAGE FROM LEADER PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSAYN AND THE REVOLUTION COMMAND COUNCIL TO PRESIDENT GORBACHEV REQUESTING HIM TO EXERT EFFORTS AT THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO ACHIEVE A CEASE-FIRE AND PUT AN END TO THE CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR OF THE UNITED STATES AND ITS ALLIES AND COLLABORATORS, +

RRC WOV NCA

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23:11 25 FEB 91
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10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

26 February 1991

THE GULF

General Scowcroft rang me just before mid-day to see how we thought things were going. I said that we were pretty happy with the progress being made, though much less so with the weather which was hampering flying. The main question in our minds was how long it would take coalition forces to encircle and cut off Iraqi forces in the theatre of operations. It had been suggested that it might take as long as 72 hours. We regarded it as a very high priority to cut off and disarm as many as possible, so as to underline the magnitude of Saddam Hussein's defeat and humiliation. General Scowcroft said that he had spoken to Secretary Cheney and asked a similar question. Secretary Cheney was not sure what the answer was. He would look into it further and get back to me. He very much shared our aim.

I said that we continued to believe that the Americans should issue a revised version of their 22 February conditions for a ceasefire, drawing on the points in the Prime Minister's message to the President yesterday evening. General Scowcroft asked whether the statement which they had issued last night was not sufficient. I said that it served its purpose well. But we needed a further document which was explicit about the points we required of the Iraqis and which commanded the support of all the main members of the coalition. General Scowcroft said he would talk further to his principal colleagues about this.

I added that the Prime Minister was minded to say something very specific this afternoon about the need for all Iraqi forces in the theatre of operations, both those occupying Kuwait and those supporting the occupation from within Southern Iraq, to lay down their arms. But we wanted to be sure that the Americans would be 100 per cent supportive of this before going public in Parliament. General Scowcroft said that personally he was very comfortable with the formulation. I asked whether the same would apply to Secretary Baker. He said that might be a problem. Why did I not send our form of words and he would try to get people pinned down on it? I pointed out that time was very short but undertook to fax him a form of words very rapidly.

- 2 -

I am copying this letter to Richard Gozney (Foreign and Commonwealth Office), John Neilson (Department of Energy), Juliet Wheldon (Law Officers' Department) and to Sir Robin Butler

Charles Powell

Simon Webb Esq
Ministry of Defence



the department for Enterprise

The Rt. Hon. Peter Lilley MP
Secretary of State for Trade and Industry

The Rt Hon Douglas Hurd CBE MP
Secretary of State for Foreign and
Commonwealth Affairs
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Downing Street
LONDON
SW1A 2AH

Department of
Trade and Industry

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Enquiries
071-215 5000

Telex 8811074/5 DTHQ G
Fax 071-222 2629

Direct line
Our ref
Your ref
Date

071 215 5623
JW2185

26 February 1991

Pl answer
after depth
comments.

00.26/2

Dear Douglas,

In normal circumstances, most export contracts with Iraq have been supported by guarantees in the form of performance bonds. Most of these bonds can be called by the Iraqi customer on demand, without the customer having to establish default by the exporter.

While sanctions have been in force, payments to Iraq in response to calls on the bonds have been prohibited. However, should sanctions be lifted there is a risk that large sums of money (estimated at several hundred million pounds sterling) will flow to Iraq in response to calls on the bonds made during or after sanctions. This could be seen as compensating Iraq for the imposition of sanctions. There is an urgent need for action to prevent this happening, as far as is possible, which could require primary legislation, particularly as recent events illustrate the possibility that UN sanctions could be lifted, or altered, at relatively short notice.

My officials, in consultation with those from other Departments, have been considering the options open to us for preventing the potential flow of money to Iraq. These are set out broadly in the attached paper.

I propose that my officials should use the paper for informal discussions with a group of representatives of UK commercial and industrial interests affected. This would not only re-assure them that the Government has identified measures to protect UK interests but would enable us to use their expertise to identify any potential problems with our proposals.





the department for Enterprise

If you or colleagues see problems in proceeding in this way,
it would be helpful to know by Thursday 28 February.

I am copying this letter to the Prime Minister, Tom King, John
Wakeham, David Mellor, Patrick Mayhew and Sir Robin Butler.

Yours ever

Peter



Recycled Paper

PERFORMANCE BONDS

Introduction

- 1 This paper, intended as a consultative document, examines the problems facing us in relation to performance bonds and associated guarantees and indemnities when sanctions against Iraq and Kuwait are eventually lifted. The paper outlines some ways in which action could be taken to prevent, as far as is possible, large sums of money (perhaps several hundred million pounds sterling) flowing to Iraq and Kuwait in consequence of the imposition of sanctions. It has been written taking account of the views not only of DTI but of other government departments and of UK industry and commerce, and is concerned with national measures only. It should be borne in mind that informal discussions are in prospect within the EEC as to how these problems might be addressed. However because of the potential urgency of the matter contingent unilateral measures are necessary.

Background

- 2 Contracts between UK suppliers and their customers in Iraq and Kuwait are often linked to bank guarantees. These guarantees are usually such that should the supplier fail to perform the contract, the customer can call the guarantee and so gain

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compensation without recourse to the courts. Such guarantees are known as performance bonds. Other types of contract-related guarantees exist, eg bid bonds, advance payment bonds, warranty bonds, maintenance bonds and customs bonds, some of which raise similar problems.

- 3 Most Iraqi and Kuwaiti performance bonds are "on demand" bonds. This means that payment can be required under the bond without it being necessary to establish that the supplier is in default. In addition, it appears that under Iraqi law a call may be made until such time as the bond has been physically released.
- 4 The normal arrangements for bonds related to contracts with Iraq are that a performance bond is given to the customer by the Rafidain Bank, a related counter-guarantee (itself a bond) is given to the Rafidain Bank by the UK supplier's bank, which itself requires an indemnity from the supplier. A call on the performance bond will thus give rise to liability under the indemnity. The supplier may or may not be insured against unfair calling of the bond.
- 5 It appears that the performance bond and counter-guarantee are normally governed by Iraqi law but the indemnity is governed by the law of the relevant part of the UK.

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Sanctions

- 6 The effects of the Orders and Directions introduced by HMG in response to United Nations Security Council Resolution 661 are many and various. In relation to bonds, Article 4 A of the Iraq and Kuwait (United Nations Sanctions) Order 1990 (as amended) prohibits, without a licence, the making of any payment to or to the order of any person in Iraq or Kuwait (as defined in Article 1 of the Order) under or in respect of any bond given in respect of a contract the performance of which is unlawful wholly or in part by virtue of that Order, or the Export of Goods (Control) (Iraq and Kuwait Sanctions) Order 1990 ("the Sanctions Orders"). Article 4 A also prohibits, without a licence, the doing of any act for the purpose of obtaining payment, or making any payment, in respect of any right to indemnity in respect of a bond, where payment under the bond would be unlawful under Article 4 A. Moreover the Control of Gold, Securities, Payments and Credits Directions 1990 for Iraq and Kuwait prohibit without permission the carrying out of an order for the payment of money given by or on behalf of the Government of Iraq or Kuwait or to any resident of Iraq or Kuwait. On 25 August 1990 the Bank of England withdrew its general permission for payments to be made into blocked accounts to meet calls under contract bonds.
- 7 Thus if a call is made by an Iraqi resident on a counter-guarantee, the bank is not allowed to make payment to meet the

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call, nor, where the counter-guarantee is associated with a contract the performance of which is unlawful under the Sanctions Orders, is the bank allowed to demand payment from the supplier under the indemnity.

- 8 Because contracts with Iraqi customers are presently affected by sanctions, demands are being made on the UK banks to 'extend or pay' the counter-guarantees. In normal circumstances if, say, a contract is delayed then the option to extend the associated bond and counter-guarantee could be taken. However, after taking Counsel's advice, DTI have taken the view that such an extension is in most cases unlawful, without a licence, in that extension normally constitutes an act 'calculated to promote the supply or delivery of goods'. DTI has not normally been prepared to issue licences for extensions of performance bonds etc.

- 9 Although the UN Sanctions Order and Treasury Directions generally prohibit payment under counter-guarantees to Iraqi persons, the effect of the prohibition is not to terminate any liability under the counter-guarantee, but to suspend it, so that were the prohibitions to be lifted the obligation to pay would remain. The consequence is that banks are not prepared to release exporters from their obligations under their indemnities or to release any security in respect of that indemnity. The contingent liability under the indemnity

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obviously affects the ability of the exporter to raise finance for his business.

Post-sanctions

- 10 When sanctions are lifted, Iraq may seek to require banks to make payments to meet calls on counter-guarantees which would, of course, give rise to liability under any indemnity given by the exporter, and exporters who are insured will make claims under their policies.

Policy Aims

- 11 Our overall policy aim is to stop Iraq being compensated for the imposition of sanctions by permanently preventing sums of money flowing to Iraq as a result of the calling of bonds consequent on sanctions. We may wish to allow some payments to be made, eg where non-performance of a contract was for reasons other than sanctions. A secondary aim is to facilitate, so far as possible, the release of exporters from their indemnities so that their funds are freed for use in other markets. However we see no reason to tamper with the balance of risk of loss between the parties associated with a bond. Moreover a solution which treated uninsured exporters more favourably than insured exporters may not be generally acceptable. Our proposed options were established with these policy aims in mind.

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12. We may also wish to ensure that any measures we take apply to bonds associated with contracts the performance of which is unlawful not only under UK legislation but also under EC Regulations or any other law founded on UNSCR 661. This would allow a multilateral approach to be adopted.

Payments Ban

- 13 It seems desirable, at least as a holding measure, to continue the existing ban on payments to Iraq or Iràqī controlled companies under or in respect of bonds (including counter-guarantees) where the bond is given in respect of a contract performance of which is unlawful under the Sanctions Orders. It would be possible to provide for licensing to permit payment to compensate for defective performance of the contract by the exporter where this was not the result of the imposition of sanctions.
14. It may be that a payment ban is all that is necessary to prevent Iraq being compensated for the imposition of sanctions, particularly if, as part of a negotiated settlement, the Iraqis promised to relinquish all outstanding rights under bonds/guarantees. However we can not be certain of this, and it would in any event take time to negotiate. Accordingly it would not seem sensible to lift the prohibition on payment until such a settlement had been reached.

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15. However, even with a prohibition which applied to payment taking place within the UK or, by UK citizens or incorporated companies, abroad, there is a risk that banks will be successfully sued outside the UK and the resulting judgments enforced against them outside the UK. It seems unlikely that any measures could be introduced which would entirely remove this risk but two such measures which have been considered are a custodian system and clawback. It should be emphasised that each would be in addition to an indefinite ban on payments.

Custodian System

- 16 The Trading with the Enemy Act 1939 makes provision for a custodian to be appointed in whom enemy property rights may be vested. Analogously to this, a custodian could be set up to take over Iraqi rights in respect of bonds/guarantees. The custodian would enforce these rights and pass any resulting payment to Iraq only where payment was to compensate for defective performance of the supply contract and where this was not the result of the imposition of sanctions.
17. The advantage of such a system over a mere prohibition on payments is that it is thought that a transfer of rights under a bond is more likely to be recognised and taken account of by foreign courts. There can be no certainty of this however. In addition a custodian system would be administratively cumbersome, costly and would probably be in existence for many

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years to come. Moreover as the custodian would not have information about all bonds it would seem difficult, if not impossible, to take any action necessary to preserve those rights to enable payment to be made where justified.

Clawback

- 18 Another legal device, which could be used in conjunction with a payments ban, is clawback. Section 6 of the Protection of Trading Interests (PTI) Act 1980 provides that where a judgment is given in a foreign jurisdiction for multiple damages, in certain circumstances the excess over simple damages can subsequently be recovered in a UK court. Similar legislation could be put in place for the post-sanctions period to provide that if a judgment were enforced in Iraq or a third country in respect of a liability under a bond or counter-guarantee given in respect of a contract performance of which had been made unlawful by sanctions, then an appropriate amount (i.e. any excess over an amount which would compensate for defective performance of the contract, where this was not the result of the imposition of sanctions) could subsequently be recovered in UK. It would obviously take time before any amount could be recovered, but the Iraqis might be deterred from taking legal action by the mere threat of counteraction in the UK courts.

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19. The benefit a clawback system could provide would depend on whether the Iraqis had sufficient assets in UK to be clawed back. If there were insufficient assets in UK, the clawback judgment could perhaps be enforced elsewhere, but this might depend on a multilateral arrangement being adopted. A feature of a clawback system is that after it is established there need be no government involvement.

Insurance

20. Were a prohibition on payment maintained (and indeed either a custodian or clawback system introduced) insurance companies might be prepared to offer insurance cover against the risk of ultimate liability under bonds. If insurance were available banks might be prepared to release the exporter from his indemnity and his funds could be freed for use in other markets. However it is not certain that the banks would indeed release the indemnity in these circumstances.
21. Neither the private insurance market nor ECGD so far has shown any enthusiasm for such a scheme. There seems nothing in the existing sanctions legislation to prevent such a scheme being put in place now, and the fact that it has not been might lead to the inference that such a scheme would not be viable. However it is too early to conclude this because the scale of the risk and its insurability depend on the decisions taken on the matters raised earlier in this paper.

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Summary


22. In summary, whether or not an insurance scheme is feasible remains to be seen; and assumption of risks by HMG is not justified since the bonds, guarantees and indemnities have been freely opened in the normal course of trade. A payments ban alone is unlikely to prevent enforcement of an adverse judgment in Iraq or elsewhere and would not therefore free suppliers' funds. Neither the custodian system nor the clawback system can totally remove the risk of loss resulting from calls under bonds, with the custodian system having the further disadvantage of legal and administrative complexity. Clawback is less complex, has no direct government involvement and, it is thought, might have a significant deterrent effect.

M J DIXON

DTI

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FEBRUARY 1991



I am sorry.

Thank you



10 DOWNING STREET


Prime Minister

Sadly one
private in the
Staffordshires was
killed.

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THE GULF CONFLICT

BRIEFING FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE - SITREP No. 110

SITUATION AS AT 0600Z, 26 FEBRUARY 1991

Contains

1. Classified sitrep
2. Casualty sitrep
3. Public line on Iraqi orders to withdraw

Distribution attached

Sec(O)(C)

covering SECRET

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SEC(O)(C) MORNING BRIEF, 26 FEBRUARY 1991

Summary

Iraqi claim to have issued orders to withdraw from Kuwait. Operations continue. 27 US servicemen killed in yesterday's SCUD attack near Dhahran.

General situation

- Allied operations continue to progress well and military objectives are being achieved across the front. Operations are now concentrating on destroying Iraqi tactical reserves, engaging the RGFC, and enveloping Kuwait.

Political

- At 2230Z yesterday Iraqi Radio broadcast a statement (BBC transcript attached) claiming that the leadership had ordered its forces in Kuwait to withdraw in accordance with UN SCR 660, and that Saddam Hussein had asked President Gorbachev to exert pressure on the Security Council to achieve a ceasefire (confirmed below).
- White House statement in response at 0330Z this morning (transcript attached) said that the war will continue; no reason to change position; first concern is safety and security of Allied forces; don't know whether Iraqi offer is genuine; no evidence that Iraqi units are withdrawing; won't attack unarmed Iraqi soldiers in retreat; but Saddam Hussein must now personally and publicly agree US 22 Feb proposals and all UNSCRs.
- Iraqi ambassador to UN has told reporters that he has been in touch with his government; while reaffirming Iraq's commitment to withdraw from Kuwait (UN SCR 660), he declined to say whether Iraq would comply with the other 11 SCRs.
- Security Council closed session took place from 0300Z this morning at Soviet request. Prior to this, in informal consultations among Permanent Five, Soviets reported message to President Gorbachev from Saddam Hussein accepting UN SCR 660, indicating that he had given order to begin withdrawal and asking Soviet Union to set in motion procedures for a ceasefire. Soviet representative invited coalition partners to set conditions for withdrawal. Yemenis tabling ceasefire resolution.
- Kuwait's ambassador to the UN dismissed the alleged Iraqi offer to withdraw, calling it "rhetoric" and claiming they were just trying to get out before being encircled.

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- King Fahd said yesterday that Saudi Arabia would exert all efforts in Arab and international fora once the war was over to help solve outstanding regional problems, particularly the Palestine question.
- Turkish President Ozal has said that responsibility for the war rests solely with Iraq; he hoped that the Iraqi people's suffering would end soon and a democratic system would emerge in Iraq.
- Oman's news media revealed the presence of Omani forces in the Allied offensive for the first time on 24 Feb.
- Polls published yesterday show an unprecedented 86% confidence in President Bush's handling of the war. In a short statement, the President confirmed that the war was going well but warned against euphoria.

UK Operations

Army Operations

- Main elements of 1 (BR) Armd Div now in blocking position facing east, 20-30 miles north of the Saudi/Iraqi border, as flank guard for VII Corps. 16/5 L screening ahead on Phase Line (PL) LAVENDER; 7 Armd Bde 5-10 miles north of 4 Bde, and 5-10 miles in advance; divisional artillery in support to rear.
- Lead elements of 7 Armd Bde are in Obj ZINC just short of PL LAVENDER having cleared Obj COPPER (North). 4 Bde is clearing Obj COPPER (South) before moving to clear Obj BRASS. Both 7 Armd and 4 Bdes have been in contact with the enemy. No UK casualties reported in first contacts yesterday by STAFFORDS and QRIH.
- As at 260200Z, 7 Armd Bde: QRIH and STAFFORDS awaiting next move. SCOTS DG Battle Group (BG) have cleared a major communications site and engaged an enemy tank company taking 60 PWs. Clearance operations due to continue at first light. 4 Bde: 14/20 H BG carrying out clearing operations. 1 RS BG have overrun artillery position, taking 50 PWs. Screen: 16/5 L is screening ahead for both brigades to identify targets for divisional artillery.
- A LCpl Hill RCT reported KIA; no further details. NOK not yet informed. 3 REME personnel attached to 39 Hy Regt RA wounded while handling an unexploded bomblet. 1 other wounded by mine. 1 soldier seriously injured with shrapnel wounds to abdomen.

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Air Operations

- Almost all RAF sorties planned for yesterday were aborted or cancelled due to bad weather or smoke obscuration, which continue to hamper air operations.
- 6 Tornado GR1s from Tabuk (2 with TIALD) attacked As Samawah road bridge (1) yesterday evening; 2 aircraft dropped 3 bombs each but these failed to guide through smoke.
- At 1933Z yesterday 2 Tornado GR1s and 1 TIALD aircraft attacked a "Bailey" bridge over the Euphrates at As Samawah. 3 bombs failed to guide, probably due to smoke and haze. 2 bombs were seen to fall about 500m short, on the edge of the town. No assessment of possible collateral damage yet possible.
- 2 Tornado GR1As from Dhahran carried out linesearch missions yesterday evening, identifying revetted stores (probably ammunition), AFVs, and 2 destroyed bridges. Mission reports from a further 3 planned recce sorties are awaited.
- RAF combat sorties as at 260100Z:

	last 24 hrs	total
Tornado GR1	42	1461
Tornado GR1A	5	128
Jaguar	18	589
Tornado F3	12	664
Buccaneer	8	196
Nimrod MR	2	79
AAR (Victor, VC10K, Tristar)	<u>24</u>	<u>690</u>
	111	3807

Non-combat sorties (as at 260100Z):	<u>2071</u>
	5878

Navy Operations

- The UK MCMV force has now cleared FSA 1 and commenced clearance of remaining 40% of FSA 2 at first light (0330Z). EXETER is providing "shotgun" support of MISSOURI, and also expects to provide 4.5" gunfire support itself.

Allied Operations

- XVIII Corps: French 6 Lt Armd Div now secure in Obj WHITE, having taken 3,000 PWs. 2 brigades of US 101 Air Asslt Div are firm in COBRA and conducting interdiction operations into the Euphrates valley. 1 brigade of 101 air Asslt Div is now forward blocking the lines of communication from

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Baghdad to Basra. 24 Inf Div has secured Objs BROWN, RED and GREY. 1 brigade now moving to Obj KELLY. US 3 Armd Cav Regt continuing advance on corps east flank.

- VII Corps: Leading elements of US 2 Armd Cav Regt have been in contact and a total of 40 T72 tanks claimed destroyed (believed elements of Iraqi 12 Armd Div). 1 Armd Div clearing Obj PURPLE. 3 Armd Div now in Obj COLLINS and is carrying out clearance operations. (see also UK Land Forces)
- JFCN: Egyptian 3 Mech Div and 4 Armd Div have cleared 8 lanes through the obstacle belt at breach and are expected to break out to first objective at first light today. Task Force Khalid has breached obstacle belt and gone firm.
- MARCENT: Progress of both Mar Divs has been hampered by the number of PWs. 1 MEF recce elements at the outskirts of Kuwait City. MARCENT to assault next objectives at first light today. 5 MEB is carrying out an administrative landing at Kabut (near Khafji) before moving up in support of 2 Mar Div. 1 and 2 Mar Divs have taken or destroyed more than 150 tanks and 2,500 PWs.
- JFCE: Task forces OTHMAN and OMAR (consisting of Saudi, Omani, UAE and Bahraini forces) are inside Kuwait and advancing north. Elements have made progress over the day. Qatari task force is providing flank protection.
- No authoritative figures on PWs but media sources indicate between 25-35,000.
- Prince Khalid said yesterday that deaths and injuries were low on the Iraqi side as well as the Allied side.
- WISCONSIN is moving north from the Saudi/Kuwait border (where it was supporting MARCENT) to join MISSOURI for simultaneous gunfire support operations.
- France is deploying 100 marines for possible roles in Kuwait City after liberation, including reoccupation of French embassy, medical support to the civil population and mine clearance.

Iraqi activity

- SCUD launched at approx 2230Z last night reported by BFME to have fallen into the sea east of Qatar.
- SCUD earlier yesterday evening which hit US military compound in Khobar City near Dhahran (about 1km from nearest UK compound) is now reported to have killed 27 and injured 98 US servicemen. Missile appeared to break up in flight; PATRIOT batteries were tracking, but assessed it

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would impact safely in the sea.

Logistics

- The main personnel body of the Romanian field hospital is now in theatre; their equipment will arrive at Jubayl today.

Media reports and coverage

- Television has given very extensive coverage of the Allied land offensive. Extensive speculation on the line of Allied advances and Iraqi countermoves. Reports on number of Iraqi PWs and light US and UK combat casualties have been accurate. SCUD hit on US military accomodation near Dhahran widely reported in papers and on television. Many papers carry stories of atrocities committed against Kuwaiti nationals. Late editions of papers will probably report and speculate on Iraqi Radio "withdrawal" statement.
- Also reports that Cpl Denbury was SAS man killed in cross-border mission; Foreign Secretary's alleged implication to House Foreign Affairs Committee that the Allies may need to police the Gulf after the war ends.
- Saudi press reaction to the start of the ground offensive has been uniformly enthusiastic.

Other issues

- The Gulf oil slicks now appear less extensive than originally thought. A Saudi academic has said that latest estimates indicate 1.5 million barrels of crude oil have been spilled in all; Saudi officials believe that 20-30% of this may have resulted from Allied attacks. The US, while admitting that their original estimate of 8-11 million barrels is overstated, believes total spill is at least 3 million barrels. DTp and DoE are working on the provision of 6 heavy duty oil skimmers to Bahrain, and may be in a position to ship them by the end of this week.

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KRC R IRAQ-WITHDRAWAL-TEXT=

IRAQI WITHDRAWAL STATEMENT - TEXT

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IN THE NAME OF GOD, THE MERCIFUL, THE COMPASSIONATE. OUR ARMED FORCES HAVE PERFORMED THEIR JIHAD DUTY OF REFUSING TO COMPLY WITH THE LOGIC OF EVIL, IMPOSITION, AND AGGRESSION. THEY HAVE BEEN ENGAGED IN AN EPIC, VALIANT BATTLE WHICH WILL BE RECORDED BY HISTORY IN LETTERS OF LIGHT.

ON THIS BASIS, AND BECAUSE THE LEADERSHIP AFFIRMED ITS AGREEMENT TO WITHDRAW IN ACCORDANCE WITH UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION NO. 660 THROUGH ITS APPROVAL OF THE SOVIET INITIATIVE, ORDERS HAVE BEEN ISSUED TO OUR ARMED FORCES TO WITHDRAW IN AN ORGANIZED MANNER TO THE POSITIONS HELD PRIOR TO 1 AUGUST 1990. THIS IS REGARDED AS A PRACTICAL COMPLIANCE WITH RESOLUTION 660.

THE SPOKESMAN EMPHASIZED THAT OUR ARMED FORCES, WHICH HAVE PROVEN THEIR ABILITY TO FIGHT AND STAND FAST, WILL CONFRONT ANY ATTEMPT TO HARM THEM WHILE THEY ARE CARRYING OUT THE WITHDRAWAL ORDER. THEY WILL FIGHT WITH THEIR KNOWN BRAVERY AND CAPABILITY TO MAKE THEIR WITHDRAWAL ORGANIZED AND HONOURABLE.

THE IRAQI NEWS AGENCY HAS LEARNED THAT THE FOREIGN MINISTER THIS EVENING INFORMED THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR OF THIS DECISION, WHICH CONSTITUTES A COMPLIANCE WITH THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL'S RESOLUTION 660. THE FOREIGN MINISTER ASKED THAT A MESSAGE BE CONVEYED FROM LEADER PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSAYN AND THE REVOLUTION COMMAND COUNCIL TO PRESIDENT GORBACHEV REQUESTING HIM TO EXERT EFFORTS AT THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO ACHIEVE A CEASE-FIRE AND PUT AN END TO THE CRIMINAL BEHAVIOUR OF THE UNITED STATES AND ITS ALLIES AND COLLABORATORS.

BBC MON MGA

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23:24 25 FEB 91
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TRANSCRIPT - MARLIN FITZWATER STATEMENT

We continue to prosecute the war. We have no reason to change that and, because there is a war on, our first concern must be the safety and security of United States and coalition forces. We don't know whether this most recent claim about Iraqi withdrawal is genuine. We have no evidence to suggest the Iraqi army is withdrawing. In fact, Iraqi units are continuing to fight. We remember when Saddam Hussein's tanks pretended to surrender to Khafji only to return and fire. We remember the Scud attacks today and Saddam's many broken promises of the past. There are at least an additional 22 dead Americans tonight who offer silent testimony to the intentions of Saddam Hussein.

The statement out of Baghdad today says that Saddam Hussein's forces will fight their way out while retreating. He will not attack unarmed soldiers in retreat but we will consider retreating combat units as a movement of war. The only way Saddam Hussein can persuade the coalition of the seriousness of his intentions would be for him personally and publicly to agree to the terms of the proposal we issued on February 22 and because the announcement from Baghdad referred to the Soviet initiative, he must personally and publicly accept explicitly all UN Security Council resolutions including especially UN Security Council Resolution 662 which calls for Iraqi recision of its purported annexation of Kuwait and UN Security Council Resolution 674 which calls for Iraqi compensation to Kuwait and others.

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OPERATION GRANBY - CASUALTY REPORT

Report Number : 41 Situation as at : 260400ZFEB91

CURRENT CASUALTY STATE

Number currently recorded as dead in combat 3

Number currently recorded as wounded (very seriously ill/seriously ill) 0

Number currently missing 12

CURRENT CASUALTIES BY SERVICE

RN/RM			Army			RAF			Civilians (inc RFA)		
	Men	Women		Men	Women		Men	Women		Men	Women
Dead	0	0	Dead	3	0	Dead	0	0	Dead	0	0
Wounded	0	0	Wounded	0	0	Wounded	0	0	Wounded	0	0
Total RN/RM missing		0	Total Army missing		0	Total RAF missing		12	Total civ missing		0

Current manpower in the Gulf theatre : 42859

RN/RM			Army			RAF			Civilians (inc RFA)		
Total	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women
2653	2591	62	33208	32157	1051	6186	6010	176	812	812	0

CASUALTIES CONFIRMED SINCE REPORT No. 40

Number confirmed dead 1

Number confirmed wounded (very seriously ill/seriously ill) 0

Number previously reported wounded, but now dead 0

Number reported missing since last report 0

Number previously missing, now confirmed dead 0

Number previously missing, now confirmed wounded 0

Number previously missing, now confirmed safe and well 0

CASUALTIES BY SERVICE

RN/RM			Army			RAF			Civilians (inc RFA)		
	Men	Women		Men	Women		Men	Women		Men	Women
Dead	0	0	Dead	1	0	Dead	0	0	Dead	0	0
Wounded	0	0	Wounded	0	0	Wounded	0	0	Wounded	0	0
RN missing		0	Army missing		0	RAF missing		0	Civilians missing		0


TOTAL COMBAT CASUALTIES SINCE THE COMMENCEMENT OF HOSTILITIES

Total number confirmed dead 3

Total number confirmed wounded (VSI/SI) 0

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260100Z



General Staff Map Section, OGS 11582 (CAO) Edition 6 OGS, November 1990 44/91

Produced under the direction of Director General of Military Survey, Ministry of Defence, United Kingdom 1990

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IRAQI ORDERS TO WITHDRAW

Line To Take

Heard reports of announcement that Iraqi troops have been ordered to withdraw from Kuwait. But, only this evening, Saddam Hussein has launched two more indiscriminate attacks with SCUD missiles, one causing significant casualties. Who can tell what Saddam Hussein's real intentions are. With ground campaign underway, cannot afford to put our troops at risk. Military operations are, therefore, continuing.



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10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

26 February 1991

From the Private Secretary

THE GULF: CEASEFIRE TERMS: FRENCH VIEWS

Pierre Morel telephoned me back at about 0700 this morning to say that the French were providing their Permanent Representative in New York with a draft resolution, which might be tabled as a tactical move in the event the Yemenis persisted with their resolution. The preamble would record the twelve previous Security Council resolutions, reiterate the necessity of applying them, confirm the sovereignty of Kuwait and deplore the atrocities committed by Iraq in Kuwait. The substantive paragraphs would then provide as follows:

- the Security Council notes Iraq's decision to accept all the resolutions of the Security Council, in particular 662 and 674;
- calls on all Iraqi forces to withdraw after laying down their arms;
- provides for a ceasefire on 1 March after confirmation of the withdrawal of all Iraqi forces;
- asks the UN Secretary General to send an observer team to verify the withdrawal after the ceasefire has taken place.

I said that our preference would still be to avoid a resolution at least for the time being. We should leave maximum time for coalition forces to encircle Iraqi forces in Kuwait and southern Iraq so that they could not leave with their weapons and equipment. We must not let them slip out of our hands at this stage. Morel said that the resolution was simply prepared on a contingency basis for use if necessary. The French Permanent Representative would consult with his British and American colleagues.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence), John Neilson (Department of Energy), Juliet Wheldon (Law Officers' Department) and to Sir Robin Butler.

CHARLES POWELL

R H T Gozney Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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26 Feb 1991
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10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

26 February 1991

From the Private Secretary

THE GULF: CEASEFIRE TERMS: FRENCH VIEWS

I spoke just before 0600 this morning to Pierre Morel in the Elysee to discuss the Iraqi statement about withdrawal and subsequent action at the United Nations. Morel said the French would be taking a very firm line indeed. So far as they were concerned, the situation had changed since 22 February. French forces had been committed to war. Their security was now the prime concern. Any statement or actions by the Iraqis had to be treated with great circumspection. They could not assume that the same ceasefire terms were available now as had been on offer. Iraqi forces would have to lay down their weapons if they were not to be considered valid military targets: in short, we would require their surrender although it might not be politic to use the word. We should also insist that Tariq Aziz should come to New York personally to put his name to any Iraqi statement of intent. One purpose of this would be to buy time.

I described the line which we were taking, in particular the insistence on full implementation of the UN Security Council resolutions. I also referred to the risk that the Yemenis or Cubans might table an unsatisfactory resolution in New York which in extremis we might have to veto, although we would try to work for delay. I also described our exchanges with the Americans (the French had clearly had something similar). Morel said that the French were working on what he described as a sequence: authentication, quasi-surrender and only then a ceasefire. Appropriate instructions were being sent to the French Permanent Representative. They hoped that a veto could be avoided because they attached importance to preserving the unity of the Security Council. But they did not rule it out if necessary. I welcomed this firm line and said we should remain in touch during the day.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence), John Neilson (Department of Energy), Juliet Wheldon (Law Officers' Department) and to Sir Robin Butler.

CHARLES POWELL

R H T Gozney Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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PRIME MINISTER



10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

26 February 1991

THE GULF: CEASEFIRE TERMS

Following reports after 2300 last night that Baghdad Radio had announced that Iraq would be withdrawing its forces from Kuwait in compliance with the Security Council resolution 660, I talked to Bob Gates in the White House. It was clear that they had been caught flat-footed. I referred to the Prime Minister's message to the President about the need for tougher ceasefire terms and my own conversation with General Scrowcroft earlier in the day. Gates said that the President would be chairing a meeting to consider this at 0100 GMT. Meanwhile, they were issuing a holding statement to the effect that the war would go on. Following discussion with FCO and MoD, we issued similar guidance through the Number 10 spokesman. Although I do not have the text by me as I dictate, it was to the effect:

- our forces had been committed;
- our first concern had to be with their safety and security;
- we had no authoritative reports of Iraqi intentions;
- anyway, it was not for the Iraqis to set conditions for withdrawal;
- as far as we were concerned, military operations would continue.

At 0325 this morning, MoD alerted me to the existence of telegrams from UKMIS New York containing a draft Security Council resolution prepared by Sir David Hannay and Mr Pickering which clearly fell well short of the requirements of the Prime Minister's message to President Bush. I spoke shortly thereafter once again to Mr Gates in the White House. He told me that the President's meeting had finished at 0300. He then read me the text of a statement which was at that moment being issued by the White House (he is sending a copy, which I will have circulated to those concerned). The gist of this was that the United States would continue to prosecute the war: that it could not trust any statement of intent by Saddam Hussein, particularly in view of military actions by Iraqi forces during the night and the conflicting nature of Iraqi statements: that the coalition would not attack unarmed Iraqi soldiers retreating northwards: but

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would treat armed Iraqi forces in whichever direction they were moving as units of war: and would agree to a ceasefire only if Saddam Hussein were personally and publicly to agree to the coalition's proposals of 22 February, and personally and publicly to accept explicitly all UN resolutions including 662 and 674. Gates added that the United States would resist any resolution at the UN, arguing that their statement obviated the need for one. If necessary, they would veto an unsatisfactory resolution and would hope to be joined by us and the French.

I said that I had a number of observations on this. Although satisfactory in some respects, the American statement did not go so far as the terms suggested in the Prime Minister's message to the President, in particular in what it said about withdrawal. Nor was it explicitly stated that Iraqi forces must abandon their equipment. Gates said that Secretary Baker's concern was with the danger of appearing to move the goal posts or move outside the UN resolutions. But he did not think there was any real difference between us. He could assure me there was no softness in the President. All he wanted was a political strategy to enable us to achieve our joint aims while keeping the international coalition together. He drew my attention particularly to the point in the statement which referred to not attacking unarmed soldiers while treating anything else as a unit of war. This wording had been specifically agreed with General Powell to enable unambiguous instructions to be sent to General Schwarzkopf. It was the equivalent of saying that the Iraqis had to abandon all their equipment if they were to avoid attack even in retreat.

I said that I would pass on these views. Meanwhile, we had the problem that our two Permanent Representatives in New York seem to have prepared a resolution which fell well short of the American statement. Gates said that he was astonished to hear this. He would speak to Secretary Baker and come back to me. He subsequently telephoned again at around 0350 to say that he had spoken to Baker: that it was clear that "our two boys had been playing": but he had been assured by Secretary Baker that there would be nothing more than a hip pocket resolution to buy time: that the text of this would be brought into conformity with the statement which the White House had just issued: that it would be tabled only if absolutely necessary: and that instructions to Pickering were to work to delay any resolution for a day or two. I retailed this to the Emergency Unit in the FCO, who arranged for appropriate instructions to go to Sir David Hannay.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence), John Neilson (Department of Energy), Juliet Wheldon (Law Officers' Department) and to Sir Robin Butler.

C. D. POWELL

Richard Gozney, Esq.
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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TO CABINET OFFICE LONDON
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S E C R E T • VIA CABINET CHANNELS
QQQQ
PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO CHARLES POWELL FROM
BRENT SCOWCROFT.

•
FEBRUARY 25, 1991

•
WE ISSUED THE FOLLOWING PUBLIC STATEMENT FROM THE WHITE HOUSE
THIS EVENING AT 10:30 P.M., WASHINGTON TIME. WE WILL OBVIOUSLY
NEED TO WORK CLOSELY TOGETHER AT THE UN OVER THE NEXT FEW DAYS.

•
BEGIN TEXT:

•
WE CONTINUE TO PROSECUTE THE WAR. WE HAVE HEARD NO REASON TO
CHANGE THAT. AND BECAUSE THERE IS A WAR ON, OUR FIRST CONCERN
MUST BE THE SAFETY AND SECURITY OF U.S. AND COALITION TROOPS.

•
WE DONT KNOW WHETHER THIS MOST RECENT CLAIM ABOUT IRAQI
WITHDRAWAL IS GENUINE. WE HAVE NO EVIDENCE TO SUGGEST THE IRAQI
ARMY IS WITHDRAWING. IN FACT, IRAQI UNITS ARE CONTINUING TO
FIGHT. MOREOVER, WE REMEMBER WHEN SADDAM HUSSEINS TANKS
PRETENDED TO SURRENDER AT KHAFJI, ONLY TO TURN AND FIRE. WE
REMEMBER THE SCUD ATTACKS TODAY AND SADDAMS MANY BROKEN PROMISES
OF THE PAST. THERE ARE AT LEAST AN ADDITIONAL 22 DEAD AMERICANS
TONIGHT WHO OFFER SILENT TESTIMONY TO THE INTENTIONS OF SADDAM
HUSSEIN.

•
THE STATEMENT OUT OF BAGHDAD TODAY SAYS THAT SADDAM HUSSEINS
FORCES WILL FIGHT THEIR WAY OUT WHILE RETREATING. WE WILL NOT
ATTACK UNARMED SOLDIERS IN RETREAT. BUT WE WILL CONSIDER
RETREATING COMBAT UNITS AS A MOVEMENT OF WAR.

•
THE ONLY WAY SADDAM HUSSEIN CAN PERSUADE THE COALITION OF THE
SERIOUSNESS OF HIS INTENTIONS WOULD BE FOR HIM PERSONALLY AND
PUBLICLY TO AGREE TO THE TERMS OF THE PROPOSAL WE ISSUED ON
FEBRUARY 22 AND (BECAUSE THE ANNOUNCEMENT FROM BAGHDAD REFERRED
TO THE SOVIET INITIATIVE) PERSONALLY AND PUBLICLY TO ACCEPT
EXPLICITLY ALL RELEVANT UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS,
INCLUDING ESPECIALLY UNSC RESOLUTION 662 (IRAQI RECISION OF ITS
PURPORTED ANNEXATION OF KUWAIT) AND UNSC RESOLUTION 674 (IRAQI
COMPENSATION TO KUWAIT AND OTHERS).

•
END TEXT

•
DECL: OADR
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10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

File 105
cc: Schluter
cc: FCO

THE PRIME MINISTER

SUBJECT cc MASTER
ORs

26 February 1991

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. 158/91

Dear Poul,

I was delighted to hear of Denmark's generous decision to help us with the medical costs we have incurred as a result of the Gulf conflict. As you know, our costs are considerable and rising fast. The money which you have agreed to let us have is greatly appreciated; it reflects the spirit of international solidarity and co-operation which has been such a feature of this enterprise.

We are also grateful for your agreement to make a Boeing 737 Medevac aircraft available to us whenever possible, and for your earlier decision to send a medical team to the Gulf.

As you will be aware, the international endeavour to liberate Kuwait in accordance with the decisions of the UN Security Council has reached a critical stage. It is particularly heartening at such a time to know of the support and assistance of our friends.

Warm regards,
Your Ever,

His Excellency Mr Poul Schluter.

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Foreign &
Commonwealth
Office

25 February 1991

London SW1A 2AH

880
Dear Charles,

Gulf Burdensharing: Danish Contribution

The Folketing Foreign Policy Committee agreed on 15 February to a Danish contribution of Kroner 90-100 million (£8-9 million) towards the medial costs of our forces in the Gulf. The Danes have also agreed to use by us on a mission-by-mission basis of a Boeing 737 Medevac aircraft. Although the contribution is considerably less than the original suggestion of £25 million which the Foreign Secretary put to the Danish Foreign Minister on 4 February, it nonetheless represents a welcome broadening of the list of contributors. HM Ambassador at Copenhagen has recommended a message of thanks.

The Foreign Secretary thinks that, despite the relative smallness of the sum, it would be worth thanking the Danes at Prime Ministerial level. I enclose a draft message. If the Prime Minister is content with the message, we will arrange for delivery. Our Ambassador will be calling early tomorrow morning on the Danish Foreign Minister: it would be helpful if the message could have been cleared by then.

Power
S L Gass
Private Secretary

Sir Charles Powell
10 Downing Street

RESTRICTED

From: Prime Minister

To: His Excellency Mr Poul Schlüter
Prime Minister of Denmark


I was delighted to hear of Denmark's generous decision to help us with the medical costs we have incurred as a result of the Gulf conflict. As you know, our costs are considerable and rising fast. The money which you have agreed to let us have is greatly appreciated; it reflects the spirit of international solidarity and cooperation which has been such a feature of this enterprise.

We are also grateful for your agreement to make a Boeing 737 Medevac aircraft available to us whenever possible, and for your earlier decision to send a medical team to the Gulf.

As you will be aware, the international endeavour to liberate Kuwait in accordance with the decisions of the UN Security Council has reached a critical stage. It is particularly heartening at such a time to know of the support and assistance of our friends.

PPFAAP





SECRET



10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

25 February 1991

THE GULF: CEASE-FIRE TERMS

I enclose a copy of the Prime Minister's message to President Bush on cease-fire terms in the form in which it issued tonight.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Richard Gozney (Foreign and Commonwealth Office), John Neilson (Department of Energy), Juliet Wheldon (Law Officers' Department), Sir Robin Butler and Sir Percy Cradock.

CHARLES POWELL

Simon Webb Esq
Ministry of Defence

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PERSONAL

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MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

Telephone 071- 21 82111/3

MO 6/17/15/1D

25th February 1991

✓ *See Minister*

Opp 25/2.

Dear Charles,

REPORT FROM RIYADH

The Defence Secretary's colleagues might find it useful to see the attached report from Commanders on Operations today in the Gulf.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries to members of OPD(G) and to Sir Robin Butler.

Yours sincerely

Sara Ambler-Stewart

pp (S WEBB) R&D
Private Secretary

Sir Charles Powell KCMG
No 10 Downing Street

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
25 Feb 91

PS/Secretary of State

6/12/05/1

THE VIEW FROM RIYADH - 251800Z FEB 91

1. In the course of their discussion late this afternoon the Joint Commander advised CDS that elements of 7 Brigade were in contact with the enemy, indeed a complete enemy battalion had just surrendered to 1 STAFFORDS. The first contact had been by 1 STAFFORDS against dug-in enemy infantry who appeared to be supported by dug-in enemy tanks to their rear. Our armoured units were manoeuvring to take them on from the flanks.
2. Air activity in the KTO in support of ground force operations was being curtailed by heavy rain and low cloud. Indeed the Royal Air Force had today been forced to cancel all close air support and battle field air interdiction missions. The weather is forecast to remain poor for tomorrow and possibly into the 27th.
3. Turning to enemy activity, elements of the RGFC (TAWAKALNA) Division were reported moving west. It was significant that Coalition forces had not, to any marked extent, been engaged by either artillery fire or FROG missiles although it is understood that enemy formation commanders at the front have the authority to use both systems. That they have not may indicate that their intelligence is poor in terms of targeting Allied units but more likely that there is no cohesion in their lines of command and control. Indeed there appears to be little national command authority guidance coming down to theatre forces. An intercept indicates that the commander of the RGFC ADNAN Division had no orders.
4. Equally there is a lack of cohesion and coordination in the ground defence of Kuwait City where enemy activity appears to be concentrated into a programme for the destruction of the city infrastructure under the direction of Saddam Hussein's brother-in-law.
5. In this fast moving ground campaign it is recognised that the military activity reported in this note may well be quickly overtaken.



A J STABLES
Gp Capt
DPSO/CDS
MB6173 82116MB

1 of 1

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

25 February 1991

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25/2
C88

Carl Clarke

Iraq/Kuwait : Overseas Information Campaign

I wrote to you on 24 January to report progress in our campaign. This letter covers events of the last three weeks.

Over the past month of hostilities in the Gulf, public opinion among the allies has held reasonably firm. This has been helped by the broad perception that the allied bombing campaign was making good progress against military targets, by the minimal losses on the allied side, and by Saddam Hussein's obduracy and rejection of calls from all corners of the world to withdraw from Kuwait. But there has also been criticism in a number of Muslim and other third world countries that the allied coalition's war aims and actions were going beyond the terms of the UNSCRs; and that the level of civilian casualties in Iraq was unacceptably high, especially after the bombing of the bunker in Baghdad. Jordan and Yemen apart, these criticisms have been widespread in the Maghreb and the Indian sub-continent; Morocco and Pakistan both have troops with the allied coalition in Saudi Arabia, but both governments are under pressure from public opinion. The Indian Government too is under pressure from Rajiv Gandhi.

We have sought to bolster allied opinion, and to undermine opponents of the war, particularly among Muslims, by reminding our audiences that the war was brought about by Saddam's aggression against Kuwait, and can be ended as soon as he implements the UN Security Council resolutions; that the allied aims are fundamentally the liberation of Kuwait and the reversal of Iraqi aggression there, not the dismemberment of Iraq;

/that we

SECRET AND PERSONAL



SECRET AND PERSONAL

that we are continuing to strike with precision at military targets, not civilian nor religious ones, unlike Saddam Hussein who attacks civilians indiscriminately; that this is not a confrontation between Islam and the Christian West, but that the alliance includes participants from all round the world and that Muslim members are playing a full part; and that the Iraqis meanwhile continue to pillage Kuwait and torture and kill the inhabitants. The Kuwaitis themselves have produced useful new information on this last point recently.

In addition we have drawn attention to other issues which show Saddam in a bad light, notably the environmental impact of his behaviour in the Gulf itself, the flight of the Iraqi Air Force to Iran leaving the skies open over the heads of his army, his treatment of POWs, the number of deserters from the Iraqi forces and Iraqi treatment of Palestinians. We are pointing out that burden-sharing is a demonstration of support for the multinational effort in the Gulf. We are also making it clear that while we look to governments in the region to take the lead in establishing post-war security and stability there, we are prepared to provide support if asked.

We continue to send the text of Ministerial speeches, statements and major interviews on the war and related issues to all our posts, by the fastest possible means, supplemented by briefing telegrams on specific topics such as those mentioned above. Many posts report that they have made good use of this material. The Foreign Secretary has given a number of interviews to the international press, notably during his visit to Egypt and the Gulf earlier this month. A recent article by the Foreign Secretary on our war aims was carried widely by the European press and in some Arab newspapers.

Mr Hogg addressed a lively meeting of the Union of Muslim Organisations in Luton on 2 February and met a delegation of Muslims from the British Muslim Forum on 5 February. At the Luton meeting there was considerable support for Saddam Hussein. The latter group were more concerned to see an end to the war and the risk of damage to community relations in Britain.

/We have

SECRET AND PERSONAL



SECRET AND PERSONAL

We have recently distributed in the Islamic world a video film on the Arab contribution to allied military operations in the Gulf. This will be followed next week by a film on precision weapons, to show that the allies are being highly selective in bombing targets of military and strategic significance.

We continue to produce radio tapes through the agency of the COI. These are regularly placed with radio stations in the Gulf. The Foreign Secretary's interview with COI radio on 13 February was widely broadcast in the Gulf region by the popular Radio Monte Carlo and local stations in Qatar and Bahrain. Radio Free Iraq continues to be heard in Iraq and Kuwait despite Iraqi efforts to jam it.

The extended BBC World Service (audible 24 hours a day in the Gulf area) and Arabic Service (14 hours a day) are broadcasting increased coverage of the crisis. In recent weeks very few complaints have been received. In particular, the criticism that CNN had allowed themselves to be exploited by the Iraqis in covering war damage in Iraq has not been levelled at the BBC World Service.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (MOD), John Neilson (c/o Mr Colin Ambrose, Security Controller, Department of Energy) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

THIS IS A COPY. THE ORIGINAL IS
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3 (1)
OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT


(S. L. Gass)

Private Secretary

Sir Charles Powell KCMG
10 Downing Street

SECRET AND PERSONAL

A The National Archives

DEPARTMENT/SERIES <i>PREM 19</i> PIECE/ITEM <i>3449</i> (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract details: <i>Attachment to letter from Goss to Buell dated 25 February 1991</i>	
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RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	<i>22/1/18</i> <i>M. L.</i>
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Use black or blue pen to complete form.

Use the card for one piece or for each extract removed from a different place within a piece.

Enter the department and series,
eg. HO 405, J 82.

Enter the piece and item references, .
eg. 28, 1079, 84/1, 107/3

Enter extract details if it is an extract rather than a whole piece.
This should be an indication of what the extract is,
eg. Folio 28, Indictment 840079, E107, Letter dated 22/11/1995.
Do not enter details of why the extract is sensitive.

If closed under the FOI Act, enter the FOI exemption numbers applying to the closure, eg. 27(1), 40(2).

Sign and date next to the reason why the record is not available to the public ie. Closed under FOI exemption; Retained under section 3(4) of the Public Records Act 1958; Temporarily retained; Missing at transfer or Number not used.

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FM DAMASCUS
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 124

ADVANCE COPY

OF 251410Z FEBRUARY 91
INFO IMMEDIATE CABINET OFFICE, MODUK, MOSCOW, WASHINGTON
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, GULF POSTS, RIYADH, JEDDA, CAIRO
INFO IMMEDIATE BONN, PARIS, ROME

GULF CRISIS : SYRIAN ATTITUDES

SUMMARY

1. SHARA' SEEMED RELAXED AND CONFIDENT. HE WAS NOT UNDULY CONCERNED ABOUT ARAB REACTION IN THE SHORT TERM BUT STRESSED THE NEED FOR RAPID POST-WAR PROGRESS ON ARAB/ISRAEL. IN DEFENDING OUR REJECTION OF SOVIET PEACE PROPOSALS SUGGESTS WE STRESS THEIR CONDITIONALITY, NOT THEIR LACK OF IMMEDIACY.

DETAIL

ARAB REACTION TO THE GROUND OFFENSIVE

2. IN A CALL ON THE FOREIGN MINISTER ON 25 FEBRUARY, I ASKED HOW HE JUDGED THE ARAB REACTION TO THE OPENING OF THE GROUND OFFENSIVE. SHARA' SAID THAT THERE WAS UNDOUBTEDLY A WIDESPREAD AND NEGATIVE REACTION IN THE ARAB WORLD BUT IT SHOULD NOT BE EXAGGERATED. SOME OF SADDAM HUSSEIN'S ARAB FRIENDS HAD TOLD HIM THAT THE ARAB WORLD WOULD ERUPT AS SOON AS HOSTILITIES BEGAN. THIS HAD NOT, OF COURSE, HAPPENED, BUT IT HAD SERVED TO ENCOURAGE SADDAM IN HIS OBDURACY. NEVERTHELESS, THE DELICATE STATE OF ARAB OPINION MADE IT ALL THE MORE IMPORTANT THAT WE HANDLE THE AFTERMATH OF THIS WAR WITH GREAT CARE. HE SAID (PREDICTABLY) THAT THE ARAB WORLD WAS LOOKING FOR EARLY PROGRESS ON THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION. FAILURE TO ACHIEVE THIS WOULD CONFIRM IN ARAB MINDS SADDAM HUSSEIN'S PROPAGANDA THAT THE WESTERN INTERVENTION WAS MOTIVATED BY SELFISH INTERESTS AND A DESIRE TO DOMINATE THE REGION RATHER THAN BY A WISH TO ENFORCE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS. I SAID THAT YOU HAD RECENTLY BEEN STRESSING THE IMPORTANCE OF PROGRESS ON THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE. SHARA' INDICATED THAT THE SYRIANS HAD ALREADY NOTED THIS WITH APPRECIATION.

SOVIET PEACE PROPOSALS

3. I ASKED WHETHER THE LAST MINUTE SOVIET PEACE EFFORTS HAD PLACED SYRIA IN A QUANDARY. SHARA' SAID THAT THEY HAD NOT. THE SYRIANS HAD ACCEPTED THE NECESSITY OF THE COALITION ULTIMATUM. THERE WOULD,

HOWEVER, BE A NEED TO MEET ARAB CRITICISM THAT THE COALITION HAD FAILED SUFFICIENTLY TO EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITIES FOR PEACE HELD OUT IN THE SOVIET SIX-POINT PLAN. WE SHOULD NOT ARGUE TO THE ARAB WORLD THAT THE PROPOSED WITHDRAWAL WAS INSUFFICIENTLY IMMEDIATE. THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THREE WEEKS AND ONE COULD NEVER JUSTIFY THE SPILLING OF SO MUCH ARAB BLOOD. EITHER TIMESCALE WOULD HAVE BEEN A POLITICAL HUMILIATION FOR SADDAM HUSSEIN, I SAID THAT THE SIGNIFICANCE FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW WAS TO REDUCE THE AMOUNT OF EQUIPMENT WHICH THE IRAQIS COULD HAVE TAKEN WITH THEM. SHARA' NEITHER CHALLENGED NOR ENDORSED THIS POINT. HE REMARKED THAT THE ARAB WORLD SAW THE IRAQI ARMY AS AN ELEMENT IN THE STRATEGIC BALANCE WITH ISRAEL. THE PROBLEM WAS NOT THE IRAQI ARSENAL BUT THE MENTALITY OF THE LEADERSHIP. OUR INFORMATION EFFORT SHOULD CONCENTRATE ON THE EXTENSIVE CONDITIONALITY CONTAINED IN THE FOURTH SOVIET POINT.

4. I TOLD SHARA' THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS STILL SEEKING TO KEEP THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN PLAY. THEY WERE CLAIMING THAT BAGHDAD WAS READY TO ACCEPT REVISED PROPOSALS FOR A CEASEFIRE AND WITHDRAWAL (FCO TELNOS 338 AND 339). I SAID THAT THE POSITION WAS NOT CLEAR BUT WE WOULD BE STUDYING ANY SUCH PROPOSALS WITH GREAT CAUTION. HE ASKED WHETHER THIS WAS YET PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE. I SAID NOT SO FAR AS I KNEW.

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

5. SHARA' ASKED ABOUT THE PROGRESS OF THE CAMPAIGN. I SAID THAT THE WAR HAD STARTED SUCCESSFULLY BUT THESE WERE STILL VERY EARLY DAYS. IT WAS ENCOURAGING THAT WE HAD NOT BEEN SERIOUSLY HELD UP BY THE ELABORATE IRAQI DEFENSIVE WORKS AND THAT CHEMICAL WEAPONS HAD NOT SO FAR BEEN USED. HOWEVER, THERE WERE STILL MAJOR IRAQI UNITS WHICH HAD NOT YET BEEN ENGAGED. UNTIL THESE HAD BEEN OVERCOME IT WOULD BE PREMATURE TO MAKE FORECASTS.

COMMENT

6. SHARA' WAS RELAXED AND CONFIDENT. HE HAD THE AIR OF A MAN WHO FELT THAT THE STAKES WERE HIGH BUT THAT HE HAD CALCULATED THE ODDS CORRECTLY.

GREEN

YYYY

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SUMMARY

1. THE PRESIDENT CONFIRMS THAT THE WAR IS GOING WELL BUT WARNS AGAINST EUPHORIA. THE WHITE HOUSE HAVE NOT SO FAR RESPONDED TO THE LATE BAGHDAD RADIO ANNOUNCEMENT OF IRAQI WITHDRAWAL, AND THE WAR CONTINUES.

DETAIL

2. IN A SHORT STATEMENT ON 25 FEBRUARY, THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT NEWS FROM THE FRONT WAS GOOD. COALITION AIR AND GROUND FORCES WERE ADVANCING ON THEIR OBJECTIVES, THE ENEMY WAS SURRENDERING IN LARGE NUMBERS AND US AND COALITION CASUALTIES WERE LIGHT. THE LIBERATION OF KUWAIT WAS ON SCHEDULE AND THE US HAD THE INITIATIVE, WHICH THEY INTENDED TO KEEP. THE PRESIDENT WARNED AGAINST EUPHORIA: THERE WERE CASUALTIES AND BATTLES STILL TO COME, BUT THE US WOULD PREVAIL. MILITARY SUCCESS WOULD HELP TO BRING SECURITY TO THE GULF BUT WOULD ALSO BE A CHANCE TO BUILD A NEW WORLD ORDER BASED ON THE PRINCIPLES OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY AND THE RULE OF LAW.

3. DESPITE CALLS FOR CAUTION BY THE PRESIDENT AND US MILITARY OFFICIALS (THE PRIME MINISTER'S WARNING THAT THE WAR WAS AT A VERY EARLY STAGE IS ALSO WIDELY QUOTED), THE HEADLINES ARE DOMINATED BY REPORTS OF THE SWIFT ALLIED ADVANCE, WITH LITTLE RESISTANCE AND THOUSANDS OF IRAQI PRISONERS. PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IS HIGH, BUOYED BY GENERAL SCHWARZKOPF'S CLAIM OF QUOTE DRAMATIC SUCCESS UNQUOTE AND INITIAL REPORTS OF EXTREMELY LIGHT US AND COALITION CASUALTIES. IN A CNN/GALLUP POLL PUBLISHED ON 25 FEBRUARY, 84 PER CENT OF THE PUBLIC APPROVED OF THE LAUNCH OF THE GROUND OFFENSIVE, WHILE THEIR CONFIDENCE IN THE PRESIDENT'S HANDLING OF THE WAR STOOD AT AN UNPRECEDENTED 86 PER CENT (UP FROM 84 PER CENT, ITSELF A RECORD).

4. THERE IS CONTINUOUS CLOSE INTEREST IN US WAR AIMS. IN AN EFFORT TO SCOTCH SPECULATION THAT THE US WOULD OCCUPY IRAQ

AFTER THE WAR, CHENEY HAS SAID AGAIN THAT THE US HAD NO INTEREST IN DOING SO. MILITARY PENETRATION OF IRAQI TERRITORY WAS INTENDED TO ENSURE THAT SANCTUARY INSIDE IRAQ WOULD BE DENIED TO IRAQI FORCES IN KUWAIT. THE SITUATION WOULD NOT BE PERMANENT. BUT THE MEDIA ALLEGE THAT THE ADMINISTRATION, WITHOUT BEING PUBLICLY EXPLICIT, WERE MAKING IT INCREASINGLY CLEAR THAT THE US NOW CONSIDERED THE DOWNFALL OF SADDAM AND THE ELIMINATION OF THE BAAATH PARTY STRUCTURE BOTH DESIRABLE AND ATTAINABLE. IN SUPPORT OF THIS THEY CITE BAKER, SCOWCROFT AND GATES, WHO ALL SUGGESTED ON 24 FEBRUARY THAT THE US WOULD KEEP ON UN SANCTIONS LONGER IF SADDAM REMAINED IN POWER. TODAY A SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL IS QUOTED AS SAYING THAT WHILE SADDAM'S REMOVAL WAS NOT AN OBJECTIVE OF THE WAR, THE US WERE TRYING TO CREATE AN ENVIRONMENT THAT ENSURED THAT THE IRAQI PEOPLE UNDERSTOOD IT WAS NOT IN THEIR INTEREST TO KEEP HIM AROUND. MEANWHILE CALLS FOR SADDAM'S REMOVAL ARE MORE EXPLICIT FROM THE HILL, WITH SENIOR REPUBLICANS AND DEMOCRATS EXPRESSING THE STRONG VIEWS OF THEIR CONSTITUENTS THAT SADDAM SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO SURVIVE AND CONVERT MILITARY DEFEAT INTO POLITICAL VICTORY. THERE IS DEBATE AS TO HOW THIS SHOULD BE ACHIEVED, BUT THE MAJORITY FAVOUR LETTING THE IRAQI PEOPLE DECIDE HIS FATE.

5. THE ANNOUNCEMENT BY BAGHDAD RADIO APPARENTLY ORDERING IRAQI TROOPS TO WITHDRAW FROM KUWAIT TO POSITIONS OCCUPIED ON 1 AUGUST 1990 CAME LATE IN THE DAY. THE WHITE HOUSE SPOKESMAN SAID THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO AUTHORITY CONTACT BETWEEN IRAQ AND THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE WHITE HOUSE DID NOT CONSIDER THAT THERE WAS ANYTHING HERE THE US SHOULD RESPOND TO AT THIS STAGE. FITZWATER MADE CLEAR THAT FOR THE TIME BEING THE WAR CONTINUED.

ACLAND

YYYY

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file.

subject cc Rastev

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

25 February 1991

Mr. Rastev,

**THE GULF: PRIME MINISTER'S CONVERSATION WITH
CHANCELLOR KOHL**

Chancellor Kohl telephoned the Prime Minister this morning about the situation in the Gulf.

The Prime Minister gave Chancellor Kohl a briefing on the military situation. Things were going as well as we could have hoped. There had been a maximum of progress and a minimum of casualties. But we were cautious about what lay ahead and remained to be done. Chancellor Kohl asked whether we had any further news about the wilful destruction being caused by Iraq in Kuwait. The Prime Minister said that reports suggested that the Iraqis were indeed doing great damage and committing atrocities. Chancellor Kohl said it was very important to get examples of this conduct confirmed and publicised as widely as possible. The more we could expose the true face of Saddam Hussain and his regime, the better we would fare with public opinion. The Prime Minister agreed that we should let the world see what Saddam Hussain was doing.

Chancellor Kohl said he had received yet another lengthy telephone call from President Gorbachev late on Saturday night. Gorbachev had stressed time and again that his talks with President Bush had remained friendly; that the major powers had to stay together at all costs; and that it was in his interests to preserve what had been achieved in relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. Saddam Hussain should not be allowed to put these achievements at risk. At one point he had said explicitly that he did not want to be identified with Saddam Hussain or his cause. The Prime Minister said that President Gorbachev had also telephoned him although had not spoken quite so frankly. But his remarks corresponded with our assessment of Soviet views. Chancellor Kohl continued that President Gorbachev had asked whether he would support a further meeting of the Security Council: but he had told Gorbachev that there was no point in this. We simply could not trust Saddam Hussain.

Chancellor Kohl continued that his assessment of Gorbachev's motives was that he genuinely wanted to prevent the horrors of war: and that he also got the impression that people were saying that the Soviet Union was no longer a world power because of its internal difficulties. It would be very important to include him

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
in any future talks and to remain in close touch with him. It was better to telephone him too often than not often enough. It was interesting that he was increasingly giving publicity to his telephone calls with foreign leaders. The Prime Minister commented that Gorbachev was wrong if he thought we did not take him seriously. We were keen to have him on board, and he would do what he could to reassure Gorbachev on this point when they met. Chancellor Kohl said that the Prime Minister's visit would indeed play an important part. Speaking frankly he could say that Gorbachev was suspicious that the UK was particularly critical of him, although this was more directed at Mrs. Thatcher than at the Prime Minister. This made it all the more important to establish a good contact. We had to deal with Gorbachev, and anyone who followed him would be worse. The Prime Minister thanked Chancellor Kohl for this advice and said that he would telephone him later in the week to discuss his forthcoming visit to Moscow. Chancellor Kohl suggested Friday.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence), John Neilson (Department of Energy), Juliet Wheldon (Law Officers Department) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely,
C. D. Powell

C. D. POWELL

Richard Gozney, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

DEPARTMENT/SERIES <i>PREM 19</i> PIECE/ITEM <i>3449</i> (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
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O/S

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. TS6A/91

The Right Honourable
Mr John Major, MP
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

Dear Prime Minister,

At this moment when British troops are engaged in the ground campaign for the complete liberation of Kuwait, may I on behalf of the Brazilian people and Government express to Your Excellency the wishes for a brief and low casualty fight. We hope that, in the shortest period, conditions are created for the full compliance of all resolutions adopted on the matter by the United Nations Security Council.

2. Like the United Kingdom, Brazil expects to see the immediate restoration of the frontiers of peace in the Gulf. We are, therefore, at the disposal of the international community for the efforts it might have to carry out so that, as soon as the conflict is over, the settlement of a just and lasting peace in the whole region would be rapid and smooth.

With my highest consideration,

FERNANDO COLLOR
President of the Federative Republic of Brazil

Planalto Palace, Brasilia, 25th February, 1991

A Sua Excelência o Senhor
John Major,
Primeiro-Ministro do Reino Unido da Grã-Bretanha
e Irlanda do Norte.

Senhor Primeiro-Ministro,

No momento em que tropas britânicas se engajam na campanha terrestre para a completa liberação do Kuaite, trago ao Prezado Amigo os votos calorosos do povo e do Governo brasileiro de que a luta seja breve, de que as baixas sejam mínimas e de que, no mais curto prazo, sejam criadas as condições para o pleno cumprimento de todas as resoluções que, sobre o assunto, foram adotadas pelo Conselho de Segurança das Nações Unidas.

2. O Brasil, assim como o Reino Unido, deseja ver imediatamente restabelecidas as fronteiras da paz no Golfo, e estará à disposição da comunidade internacional para aqueles esforços que esta vier a empreender para que, terminado o combate, a transição para uma paz justa e duradoura em toda a região seja rápida e tranquila.

Mais alta consideração,

FERNANDO COLLOR
Presidente da República Federativa do Brasil

Palácio do Planalto, Brasília, em 25 de fevereiro de 1991.



IO DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

25 February 1991

Dear Simon,

THE GULF


A point which emerged strongly at this morning's meeting of OPD(G) was that we should not let it be supposed that the coalition terms on offer to Iraq on Friday were necessarily still on offer unchanged, following the start of the ground campaign. Those terms had been designed to avoid a land battle. They had not been met by Iraq. We were therefore in a new situation. We should give some urgent thought to the sort of terms on which we would now be prepared to end the conflict and discuss them with the Americans.

As a preliminary step I had a word with General Scowcroft this morning. I took him through the reasoning above and suggested that, particularly in the light of the early progress of the military campaign, we should consider making the surrender of Iraqi forces - and thus the abandonment of their equipment - an absolute condition for the end of the fighting. Preferably the surrender should be made by the central authorities in Baghdad, although one could envisage major formations in the KTO surrendering separately. There was much to be said for making this clear publicly as soon as possible, particularly in the light of renewed Soviet efforts the previous evening to involve the Security Council in discussing terms for a ceasefire. We were going to put some ideas on paper and get them to the Americans as soon as possible.

General Scowcroft said he would very much welcome this. He agreed with the way our minds were moving (although as far as I could establish the Americans have not themselves thought this through). He added that we should also make implementation of all the Security Council Resolutions an explicit condition for a ceasefire: and should divert the Security Council into considering how they would be implemented. He added that another way to buy some time would be to make clear that we did not trust the Iraqis and that it would be necessary for Tariq Aziz to travel to New York for there to be any useful discussion of ceasefire terms. He would instruct people in Washington to do some very rapid work on these points, so that we could then try to reach an agreed position (which he did not expect to be difficult).

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I am copying this letter to Richard Gozney (Foreign and Commonwealth Office), John Neilson (Department of Energy), Juliet Wheldon (Law Officer's Department) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely,


CHARLES POWELL

Simon Webb, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence

SUBJECT cc Mander
OPS



PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

SERIAL No. T56(a)

THE PRIME MINISTER

25 February 1991

Your Majesty,

I am writing to express my personal thanks to Your Majesty for the contribution of £5 million towards the costs of our commitment to the defence of the Gulf. As you know, our military costs have been high, and this expenditure will continue for some time. We are therefore grateful to our friends in the Gulf who have agreed to share our financial burden. I am also most grateful for Your Majesty's generous assistance for our RAF forces at the Wudum Naval Base. Your Majesty's continued support in this enterprise is particularly welcome.

When I last wrote to you on 9 January, I promised to let you have more details of our thinking on long-term security arrangements for the region. I know the Foreign Secretary has since corresponded with your Minister of State about this. Our Ambassador took the opportunity of two recent calls on Mr. Alawi to exchange views: and your Ambassador has also been in contact with the Foreign Office. I hope to let you have some considered views in due course myself, as I promised when we met.

I was pleased to hear of Qais Zawawi's intention to visit London in April. I shall be glad to see him. Arrangements are being made, with the help of our Ambassador, to organise a

suitable further programme, and to announce the visit. I understand the Foreign Secretary will be giving lunch to Mr. Zawawi.

May I take this opportunity to assure Your Majesty of my continued esteem.

*Your Really,
Alan Reid*

His Majesty Sultan Qaboos Bin Said Al Said GCB GCMG GCVO

23 (a-k)

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THE GULF CONFLICT

BRIEFING FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE - SITREP No. 107

SITUATION AS AT 0600Z, 25 FEBRUARY 1991

Contains

1. Classified sitrep
2. Casualty sitrep
3. UK Forces Table
4. Unclassified material for use by Ministers

Distribution attached

Sec(O)(C)

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SEC(O)(C) MORNING BRIEF, 25 FEBRUARY 1991

Summary

- Ground offensive continues to go well. SCUD attacks on Israel.

Political

- On the occasion of Kuwait's National Day (25 Feb) the Emir has prayed for a rapid Allied victory and has called on all Kuwaitis to unite and re-build the country.
- A US Security Adviser has claimed that Iraqi troops are deliberately setting fire to Kuwait City. He also reports that 200 young Kuwaitis have been killed and mutilated by Iraqi forces occupying Kuwait.
- There has been a mixed political response to the start of the ground campaign, although reactions have been predictable. Syria has said that the ground offensive was inevitable in face of "stubborn and arrogant Iraqi leadership". Egypt Radio reports that the ground offensive was the only way to liberate Kuwait. Algeria has condemned what it calls a "savage attack". Tunisia has expressed itself extremely disappointed the ground offensive has started. Jordan has condemned the start of ground offensive and called for a ceasefire.
- The Soviet representative at the United Nations claims that Iraq is ready to agree to revised Soviet peace proposals (including withdrawal in 7 days). Iraqi representative is unaware of this and is checking with Baghdad. If the Iraqis are prepared to accept such a proposal Soviets will call Security Council back together under Zimbabwean Presidency.

UK Operations

Army Operations

- It is anticipated that 4 Bde and 7 Armd Bde will move from their staging areas at 250500Z and begin to cross the obstacle. This move is being preceded by a move of 1(BR) Armd Div divisional artillery, who have been supporting 1 Inf Div (Mech) breaching operations which are now complete. It is anticipated that 1 (BR) Armd Div will be tasked to take up blocking positions to guard the 7 (US) Corps right flank, and it is unlikely that they will be in position before last light 25 Feb (approximately 1510Z).

SECRET

Air Operations

- 2 Tornado GR1As from Dhahran carried out a recce search as tasked. Both aircraft recovered safely. A third Tornado GR1A following an earlier mission abort was re-tasked with a recce search. Among the items identified from the imagery were radars, AFVs, towed AAA and MBTs. All aircraft recovered safely.
- A fourth GR1A air aborted because of sensor failure after it had crossed Iraqi border. No imagery obtained, but aircraft recovered safely.
- 6 Tornado GR1s from Tabuk (2 of which were TIALD aircraft) conducted a successful attack on Tallil airfield (see 1 on attached map). All aircraft achieved direct hits on ammunition bunkers and immediate secondary explosives were seen. Fires were burning as the aircraft left. Aircraft recovered safely.
- A further 6 Tornado GR1s from Tabuk (again, 2 of which were TIALD aircraft) were tasked to attack Tallil airfield. 2 aircraft scored direct hits on main target while the remainder attacked an alternative target (Kut Al Hayy airfield (2)). 1 aircraft missed and 1 did not drop due to poor TIALD acquisition because of haze/smoke and TIALD technical problems. All aircraft recovered safely.
- RAF combat sorties as at 250100Z:

in last 24 hrs total

Tornado GR1	40	1419
Tornado GR1A	8	124
Jaguar	18	571
Tornado F3	14	652
Buccaneer	12	184
Nimrod MR	2	77
AAR (Victor, VC10K, Tristar)	<u>22</u>	<u>699</u>
	116	3696

Non-combat sorties (as at 240100Z):	<u>1996</u>
	5692

Navy Operations

- Mine clearance of Fire Support Area 1 proceeded successfully until approximately 0200Z. At 0155Z, a missile, believed to be SILKWORM, was fired at the Battleship group and was shot down by SEA DART from HMS GLOUCESTER. No damage or injuries reported. As a result, MCM operations have been suspended for the time being and the MCMVs have been moved to the east of the BBSEA.

Allied Operations

- Pentagon confirmed last night that 11 US soldiers died in the initial hours of the campaign.
- At 0200Z 24(US) Mech Inf Div reported to be racing forward north towards objective BROWN (see attached map) with 2 leading brigades. 3 ACR following 24(US) Mech Inf Div approximately 5 km behind. Little opposition met.
- 6 (FR) Lt Div and a Bde from 82(US) Abn Div have now reached objective WHITE.
- As at 0215Z the best figures for EPWs were: MARCENT 7,000; XVIII Corps 1,500; VII Corps 1,500; JFCN 500; 6 (FR) Div 2,500; and JFCE 1,000 (total 14,000). Many more EPWs are expected to come into coalition hands at first light. The possibility that numbers will hamper future operations has still to be assessed.
- The 101 Air Ass Div now conducting interdiction operations from FOB COBRA into the Euphrates valley.
- Theatre reports indicate that 14, 29, 45 and 48 Iraqi Divisions may be becoming non-effective. 14 Div has had its Command and staff captured.

Iraqi activity

- Iraqi troops in the KTO remain capable of conducting defensive operations. A lack of intelligence, however, has probably prevented Iraq from identifying the main axes of the Allied advance.
- 2 SCUD attacks against Israel. First at approximately 0130Z and second at approximately 0330Z. Both missiles landed in southern Israel. No reports of any damage or casualties.
- A military communique issued in Baghdad claimed that Iraqi forces had contained and repelled the allied attack and had destroyed hundreds of tanks. Communique went on to claim that Iraq was in full control.

Logistics

- Main body of the Romanian Field Hospital departed Constanta by air on 24 Feb.
- Denmark has offered an aircraft for evacuation of wounded from the Gulf or from European airports to destinations in the UK. This support to be provided on case by case basis.

Media reports and coverage

- Media covering the land campaign in detail, but there is not the saturation coverage that accompanied the start of the air campaign.
- UK newspapers reflect optimistic start of the campaign, but warn against over-confidence and point out that allies still have to engage the better elements of the Iraqi military structure.
- ITN report that Egyptian police used teargas against several hundred students who were protesting about Egyptian participation in the Allied campaign.

SECRET

COBRA

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WHITE

6  FR82 

BROWN PURPLE

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JFCN

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KUWAIT CITY

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FACE

MARCENT

18 US CORPS

7 US CORPS

TURKEY

TARGETS ATTACKED BY RAF AIRCRAFT

SYRIA

IRAN

BAGHDAD

JORDAN

②
Kut al Hagg airfield

①
Tikrit airfield

BASRA

IRAQ

SAUDI ARABIA

KUWAIT

THE GULF

0 100 200 Kilometres
0 100 200 Miles

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OPERATION GRANBY - CASUALTY REPORT

Report Number : 40 Situation as at : 250400ZFEB91

CURRENT CASUALTY STATE

Number currently recorded as dead in combat 0

Number currently recorded as wounded (very seriously ill/seriously ill) 0

Number currently missing 12

CURRENT CASUALTIES BY SERVICE

RN/RM			Army			RAF			Civilians (inc RFA)		
	Men	Women		Men	Women		Men	Women		Men	Women
Dead	0	0	Dead	0	0	Dead	0	0	Dead	0	0
Wounded	0	0	Wounded	0	0	Wounded	0	0	Wounded	0	0
Total RN/RM missing	0	0	Total Army missing	0	0	Total RAF missing	12	12	Total civ missing	0	0

Current manpower in the Gulf theatre :

RN/RM			Army			RAF			Civilians (inc RFA)		
Total	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women
2646	2584	62	33349	32298	1051	6176	6000	176	827	827	0

CASUALTIES CONFIRMED SINCE REPORT No. 39

Number confirmed dead 0

Number confirmed wounded (very seriously ill/seriously ill) 0

Number previously reported wounded, but now dead 0

Number reported missing since last report 0

Number previously missing, now confirmed dead 0

Number previously missing, now confirmed wounded 0

Number previously missing, now confirmed safe and well 0

CASUALTIES BY SERVICE

RN/RM			Army			RAF			Civilians (inc RFA)		
	Men	Women		Men	Women		Men	Women		Men	Women
Dead	0	0	Dead	0	0	Dead	0	0	Dead	0	0
Wounded	0	0	Wounded	0	0	Wounded	0	0	Wounded	0	0
RN missing	0	0	Army missing	0	0	RAF missing	0	0	Civilians missing	0	0

TOTAL COMBAT CASUALTIES SINCE THE COMMENCEMENT OF HOSTILITIES

Total number confirmed dead 0

Total number confirmed wounded (VSI/SI) 0

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CLASSIFIED FIGURES

(a) In theatre	42980
(b) Outside theatre	876
Total UK Forces committed	43856

PUBLIC FIGURES

(a) In theatre	About 42000
(b) Outside theatre	About 1000
Total UK Forces committed	About 43000

ROYAL NAVY

DD/FF in theatre		MCMVs in theatre		RFAs in theatre			LSIs in theatre		
Ship	Personnel	Ship	Personnel	Ship	RFA	RN	Ship	RFA	RN
HMS MANCHESTER	298	HMS ATHERSTONE	49	RFA FORT GRANGE	146	46	SIR GALAHAD	52	86
HMS LONDON	304	HMS CATTISTOCK	48	RFA DILIGENCE	43	93	(including FSU-02)		
HMS BRILLIANT	249	HMS HURWORTH	50	RFA BAYLEAF	58	1	SIR PERCIVALE	56	7
HMS GLOUCESTER	295	HMS LEDBURY	49	RFA RESOURCE	160	1	SIR TRISTRAM	51	7
Ashore	151	HMS DULVERTON	49	RFA OLNA	98	5	SIR BEDIVERE	53	19
12 x SEA KING	392	HMS HERALD	137	RFA ARGUS (PCRS)	92	306	ZUIDERKRUIS		4
		Total RN personnel in theatre							
		2646							
		Total RFA personnel in theatre							
		809							

Armilla Roulement

	Ship	Personnel	Location	ETA/Gulf	Replacing
Vessels (not included in totals)	HMS EXETER	289	Gulf	In theatre	HMS GLOUCESTER
	HMS BRAVE	294	Gulf	In Theatre	HMS LONDON
	HMS HECLA	132	Gulf	In Theatre	HMS HERALD

Ships taken up from trade **10**

ARMY

1st (British) Armoured Division - in theatre										Outside theatre					
Divisional Troops			7th Armoured Brigade				4th Brigade			Personnel		ETA/Loc	Total		
Personnel		Total	Personnel		Total		Personnel		Total	BCRs	26 Feb	75			
Divisional HQ		968	Fighting Echelon		4037		Fighting Echelon		4219						
Fighting Echelon		10881													
2nd Line Support															
3rd Line Support		5594													
Battle Casualty Repls		2465													
Total Divisional Troops			19908	Total 7th Armd Bde		4037		Total 4th Brigade		4219	Equipment	ETA/Loc	Total		
Equipment Total			Equipment Total				Equipment Total								
Tot *		Fgt Str	Tot *		Fgt Str		Tot *		Fgt Str						
M109 155mm SP g		12	Challenger MBT		162		Challenger MBT		59	59	1(BR)Armd Div				
M110 Howitzer		13	Warrior AIFV		172		Warrior AIFV		159	159	M109 155mm SP gu		0		
MLRS		15	M109 155mm SP g		31		M109 155mm SP g		24	24	Lynx helicopters		1		
Rapier		32	Javelin		60		Javelin		36	36	Gazelle helicopters		1		
Lynx helicopters		23									Scorpion/Scimitar		3		
Gazelle helicopters		23									Challenger		12		
		23									Striker		2		
		18									Engineer Eqp's.		7		
Total other Army support personnel in theatre										5185					
Total 1(BR) Armd Div in theatre					28164					Total 1 Div pers o/s theatre					75
Total Army personnel in theatre					33349					Total Army pers o/s theatre					75
														* - total no of equipment in theatre, inc WMR	

UNCLASSIFIED LINES TO TAKE: 0600Z 25 FEBRUARY 1991

Total RAF sorties now nearly 5,694 of which nearly 3,700 are combat sorties.

Ground campaign is going well, but must stress this is early days yet.

Appreciate that media want as much information as they can get, but for the safety of our own forces (and those of other nations) we must be able to maintain operational security. Hence not able to give any details.

SECRET

THE GULF CONFLICT - BRIEFING FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

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SIC I9M

MIPT: IRAQ/KUWAIT: SOVIET PROPOSALS

1 FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF THE SOVIET PAPER GIVEN TO PICKERING:

BEGINS THE SECURITY COUNCIL FIXES THE DATE OF THE START OF THE
WITHDRAWAL OF IRAQI FORCES FROM KUWAIT IN A SHORTEST PERIOD OF
TIME.

WE HAVE REASONS TO BELIEVE THAT THE ATTITUDE OF BAGHDAD TO THE
DECISION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN THIS REGARD WILL BE
CONSTRUCTIVE.

IN THIS CASE A POSSIBILITY WILL ARISE TO CONSIDER IN THE COUNCIL
THE QUESTION OF CESSATION OF MILITARY ACTIONS AND THEN THE
QUESTION OF CONFIRMATION, VERIFICATION AND SUPERVISION OVER THE
CEASEFIRE AND WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS. ENDS.

HANNAY

YYYY

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MY TELNO 337: IRAQ/KUWAIT: SOVIET PROPOSALS

SUMMARY

1 SOVIET PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE RECEIVES INSTRUCTIONS TO REACTIVATE SECURITY COUNCIL. CLAIMS BAGHDAD IS READY TO ACCEPT REVISED SOVIET PROPOSALS FOR CEASEFIRE AND WITHDRAWAL. IRAQI PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE SEEKING CLARIFICATION FROM BAGHDAD.

DETAIL

2 THE US PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE (PICKERING) TELEPHONED ME ON THE AFTERNOON OF 24 FEBRUARY. HE SAID HE HAD JUST BEEN CONTACTED BY THE SOVIET PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE (VORONTSOV). THE LATTER HAD RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS TO APPROACH THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND URGE HIM TO GET THE COUNCIL BACK INTO ACTION. VORONTSOV SAID THAT THE RUSSIANS HAD INDICATIONS THAT THE IRAQIS WISHED TO BRING HOSTILITIES TO AN END. HE WOULD BE CALLING SHORTLY ON THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO ASK HIM TO RESUME HIS BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS WITH COUNCIL MEMBERS. I AGREED WITH PICKERING THAT IF WE WERE CALLED IN BY THE PRESIDENT WE WOULD SIMPLY SAY THAT A PERFECTLY GOOD OFFER TO IRAQ REMAINED ON THE TABLE IN THE SHAPE OF THE COALITION'S PROPOSALS.

3 PICKERING LATER TELEPHONED ME AGAIN. HE SAID VORONTSOV HAD TOLD HIM HE HAD NOW CALLED ON THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL AND PUT TO HIM MOSCOW'S LATEST IDEAS, WHICH THE RUSSIANS BELIEVED WERE ACCEPTABLE TO THE IRAQIS. THESE IDEAS WERE SIMPLER THAN THE EARLIER SOVIET SIX-POINT PLAN AND TOOK FULL ACCOUNT OF THE VIEWS EXPRESSED IN THE MOST RECENT COUNCIL DISCUSSIONS. VORONTSOV

PAGE 1

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SUBSEQUENTLY FAXED A PIECE OF PAPER TO PICKERING, WHO PASSED IT ON TO ME. THE TEXT (IN MIFT) IS INDEED MUCH SIMPLER. THE EARLIER, AND OBJECTIONABLE POINT ABOUT THE COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS ON IRAQ/KUWAIT OTHER THAN SCR 660 BECOMING NULL AND VOID NO LONGER HAS ANY PLACE.

4 VORONTSOV TOLD PICKERING HE HAD ASKED THE PRESIDENT TO BEGIN BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS VERY QUICKLY IN ORDER TO DRAW UP AN AGREED COUNCIL POSITION ON A CEASEFIRE AND THE WITHDRAWAL OF IRAQI TROOPS FROM KUWAIT. HE HAD REPEATED THAT THE RUSSIANS BELIEVED THE IRAQIS WERE READY TO CALL A HALT TO THE FIGHTING. VORONTSOV SUGGESTED THAT THE PRESIDENT SHOULD BEGIN BY CONSULTING THE IRAQI PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE, AL-ANBARI, (WHO HAS NOW RETURNED TO NEW YORK FROM MOSCOW).

5 VORONTSOV TOLD PICKERING THAT HE HAD SUBSEQUENTLY SPOKEN TO AL-ANBARI HIMSELF. THE LATTER HAD KNOWN NOTHING ABOUT THE NEW SOVIET IDEAS OR ABOUT THE INDICATIONS WHICH THE RUSSIANS BELIEVED THEY HAD RECEIVED FROM THE IRAQIS. HE HAD ASKED VORONTSOV WHAT TIME SCALE THE RUSSIANS NOW ENVISAGED FOR A WITHDRAWAL AND WHEN IT SHOULD BEGIN: VORONTSOV HAD SAID WITHDRAWAL SHOULD BE COMPLETED IN SEVEN DAYS, BEGINNING AT MIDNIGHT. HE HAD URGED AL-ANBARI TO CONTACT BAGHDAD VERY URGENTLY, BY WHATEVER MEANS HE COULD, TO GET AUTHORITATIVE INSTRUCTIONS ON THE IRAQI POSITION. AL-ANBARI UNDERTOOK TO DO SO.

6 PICKERING COMMENTED TO ME THAT WASHINGTON WAS NOT AT ALL ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT THIS RENEWED SOVIET ACTIVITY, WHICH RISKED CONSTITUTING AN IMPEDIMENT TO THE GROUND ACTION NOW UNDER WAY. HE HAD POINTED OUT TO WASHINGTON THAT THERE COULD BE SOME ADVANTAGES FOR THE AMERICANS IF FORMALLY SPEAKING IRAQI'S CAPITULATION WAS TO THE UNITED NATIONS (AS INDEED HAD BEEN ENVISAGED IN THE COALITION TERMS) RATHER THAN TO THE ALLIED FORCES.

HANNAY

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c / Foreign / disengage
Prm.

bcc PC

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24

From the Private Secretary

25 February 1991

Dear Simon,

THE GULF: DISENGAGEMENT AND WITHDRAWAL OF UK FORCES

The Prime Minister has seen the MOD's note on Disengagement and Withdrawal of UK Forces in the Gulf (OPD(G)(91)16). He is generally content with it, commenting that we should pursue the earliest possible withdrawal of personnel at the end of the conflict: and should be ready to indicate the likely time-scale to our forces, as soon as hostilities cease.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries to members of OPD(G), to the Private Secretary to the Chancellor and to Sir Robin Butler.

*Yours sincerely,
C. D. Powell*

C. D. POWELL

Simon Webb, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence.

SECRET



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LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary



Pine Pine

Main overnight reports attached.

They do not yet add much to
what I told you last night. As of
one hour ago, our Armoured Brigades
had still not entered Iraq, but were on
10 minutes notice to move.

HMS Gloucester was attacked by
a Silkworm missile during the night, but
managed to shoot it down with sea
darts.

The anthrax report now turns out to
be - shall we say - slightly exaggerated. The



10 DOWNING STREET

monitoring equipment was faulty, the
men turn out to have 'flu, & the
dead animals had their throats cut!!

C.D.P

25/2.



SECRET - UK EYES A

Prime Minister
C.O.

B.0737

PRIME MINISTER

23(a-b)

cc Sir Robin Butler
Sir Percy Cradock

OPD(G): 25 February: Overnight Action Points

Item 1: Current military situation

The Chief of the Defence Staff is likely to report that First Armoured Division was due to leave the staging area at about 0500Z this morning to pass through the obstacle belt to take up a blocking position to the right of the US Armoured Division. They are not expected to be in position until last light today. The divisional artillery has preceded the armour and has been operating in support of US movements. No British casualties reported so far from this stage of the campaign.

2. You might ask the Chief of the Defence Staff about the position and intentions of the Republican Guard. They are not deployed to conduct a defensive campaign and could be used as counterattack forces. The speed of the allied advance so far means that they will have to decide soon whether to counterattack or retreat deeper into Iraq, with the risk either way of vulnerability to air attack. Their movements over the next 24 hours will be a significant indicator.

3. Other significant developments include a Silkworm attack on HMS Gloucester which was apparently shot down by a

SECRET - UK EYES A



SECRET - UK EYES A

Sea Dart ship defence missile. The RAF continued Tornado attacks on airfields and naval ships maintained minesweeping operations. b

Item 2: Current international situation

4. You might invite the Foreign Secretary to comment on the report that the Soviet Ambassador at the United Nations, Mr Vorontsov, has had instructions to reactivate the Security Council with the claim that the Iraqis are prepared to accept revised Soviet proposals for a ceasefire and withdrawal. The Iraqi Ambassador is seeking clarification from Baghdad. The revised proposals reportedly include a 7-day deadline for withdrawal and no reference to Security Council resolutions being null and void. No date yet set for a meeting which could complicate the land campaign.

L V Appleyard
L V Appleyard

Cabinet Office
25 February 1991

SECRET - UK EYES A



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file mem
(C:\ Foreign Home)

CC MOD

THE PRIME MINISTER

24 February 1991

Dear Cardinal Hume,

Thank you for your letter yesterday expressing concern about the possible use of napalm in the Gulf, and seeking an assurance that it will not be used against Iraqi troops and civilians.

I should say first of all that napalm is not available to British Forces in the Gulf. While the Americans have made it clear that it is available to their Forces in the Gulf and that it has recently been used, they have also made clear that their purpose in using it has been specifically to fire Iraqi oil filled trenches: it has not been used against Iraqi troops.

I hope you find this re-assuring. Do let me know if you wish to discuss current events - I will be happy to see you.

Yours Sincerely,
John Major

His Eminence the Cardinal Archbishop of Westminster

DS

PRIME MINISTER

DISENGAGEMENT AND WITHDRAWAL OF UK FORCES

You will want to look at the attached MoD paper on the disengagement and withdrawal of UK Forces. Its principal and sensible conclusions are:

- forces involved in the conflict should be brought home as soon as possible;
- but there will probably be a disengagement phase at the end of hostilities, which could last four to six weeks, during which they will need to remain. It will be used to recondition and repair equipment, decontamination, battlefield clearance and preparation of departure routes;
- thereafter the troops involved in the fighting can be brought back quickly;
- but the recovery and withdrawal of equipment and stores will be a much more complex and long drawn-out process. It will take at least six months and possibly one year. It may need a net increase in troop numbers;
- the main reason for these lengthy timescales is the likely wide dispersal of the Army and its equipment: anything up to 600 kms from their starting point;
- the Navy can reduce fairly quickly back down to pre-August 1990 levels;
- the RAF can also withdraw aircraft quickly, although more time will be needed for battle-damaged aircraft and for stores. We may need to keep support helicopters in the area, in order to assist the recovery of ground forces;

b

- an administrative headquarters will need to be established to supervise withdrawal, probably in Al Jubail (the port which you visited);
- we should avoid any attempt by local Arab Governments to lure us into leaving ground forces in the Gulf;
- the costs of recovering our ground forces will be substantial, with a trade-off between speed and cost. But the costs are included in the £3bn estimate given by the Chancellor.

C.D.R.

CHARLES POWELL

24 FEBRUARY 1991

a:\foreign\Disengagement.MRM



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SECRETARY OF STATE
MO 6/17/15/1D

24th February 1991

Dear Charles,

REPORT FROM RIYADH AND WASHINGTON

Today's view is a compilation of several discussions between the Defence Secretary and Secretary Cheney and General de la Billiere, and between the Joint Commander and General Schwarzkopf.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries to members of OPD(G) and to Sir Robin Butler.

Yours sincerely
Sue Webb

(S WEBB)
Private Secretary

Sir Charles Powell KCMG
No 10 Downing Street

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ANNEX

SECRETARY OF STATE

DEFENCE SECRETARY AND BFCME

General de la Billiere reporting on the operational situation is overtaken by subsequent reports. He reported, as he told the Prime Minister, that he was very happy with the degree of training and quality of equipment of 1(BR)Div. The Divisional and Brigades Commanders were relaxed and confident. They were happy to be moving forward earlier than planned.

General de la Billiere said that much attention had been given to marking armoured vehicles to avoid attacks by friendly forces. The new infra-red reflecting marker tape was very successful. The strobe lights tend to be confused by pilots with anti-aircraft artillery and are no longer being used.

There was a plan to separate out enemy prisoners of war who were found associated with chemical weapons for segregated handling. BFCME was looking at associated propaganda arrangements (eg leaflets) to encourage the Iraqis to abandon chemical weapon equipment.

DEFENCE SECRETARY TO DEFENSE SECRETARY

The Defence Secretary asked Mr Cheney about the news blackout policy. We followed the US lead but were now getting trouble from the UK media who said that General Schwarzkopf and others were breaking the policy already. Mr Cheney said that the policy was basically still in place and there would be no more briefings until tomorrow. They had been forced into letting General Schwarzkopf speak because of intense pressure and remarks being released by other coalition countries. He expected some new material acquired by the Media Research Teams with forward units to be released this evening.

Mr Cheney also asked about Anthrax. The Defence Secretary explained, that six British soldiers had gone down with some symptoms similar to Anthrax; some spores had been detected and sheep and goats were lying dead in the area. It was much too soon to reach any conclusions. Fortunately we had an expert from our specialist research establishment (CDE) in the area to undertake rapid analysis.

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CDS 2066/2/1

24 Feb 91

PS/Secretary of State

THE VIEW FROM WASHINGTON AND RIYADH - 241800Z FEB 91

1. CDS spoke first to Gen Powell this afternoon to discuss the progress of the land campaign in the last few hours. Gen Powell said he was very satisfied and that the Allied forces as a whole were on or ahead of their planning timetable. He gave a brief synopsis of achievements. The Saudis were doing well and had broken through some 30 km into Kuwait. Next to them 2 US Marine Divisions, taking advantage of the breaching work by recce parties in the last five days, had broken through to the airfield at Al Jaber. They had beaten off the only counter attack mounted against any Allied forces today without much difficulty and with minimum casualties. The Marines will spend the night in Al Jaber refuelling and re-arming but anticipate another counter attack from the Iraqi 3 Corps in the near future. Progress of both the Saudis and the US Marines had been held up by a mass of Iraqi Prisoners of War; the Marines had taken 6,000 today. The Egyptians and Syrians were also reported to be doing well although later remarks by Gen Schwarzkopf to the Joint Commander tended to contradict this statement - see below. Moving further West into the 7 Corps area, the Corps is moving rapidly and ahead of timetable towards the Border. 1st US Mechanised Brigade is opening a breach in the defences against minimal resistance. On the left flank in the 18 Corps area, 101st Airborne Division has reached its objective, the As Salman North airfield; 2 Brigades and 2 APACHE Battalions are now consolidating there. The French had also reached their target meeting no resistance but taking 600 Prisoners of War.

2. Gen Powell assessed that the Iraqi front line had virtually collapsed but commented that the will and the ability of 2nd Echelon forces and the RGFC Divisions to fight remained unknown. He wondered if the RGFC would be aware of what had happened today given that Saddam Hussein was telling them that the Iraqis had stopped the Allied forces in their tracks. He was going to monitor closely any movement amongst the RGFC tonight, their last chance to move either to reinforce Divisions in Kuwait or more likely to retreat into Iraq. They would be loth to move during daylight for fear of Allied air attacks. Gen Powell said that he was not too concerned to attempt to finish off every single RGFC tank if that meant taking disproportionately large numbers of Allied casualties. Confirming that the US Marines were not about to attempt to take Faylakah Island and also that paratroops had not been dropped into Kuwait City he was nevertheless pleased that both had proved to be good deceptions.

1 of 3

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
3. CDS and Gen Powell also spoke briefly about ongoing work on the withdrawal of forces post-war. US thinking is still at a reasonably early stage but they are looking to use Kuwait International Airport and the harbours in Kuwait for movements. Gen Powell agreed that it would be useful to exchange ideas on withdrawal plans in the near future. CDS also raised the question, on which he had written to Gen Powell last week, of combining our operational analysis after the war. The Gen agreed that this was a good idea and said that he had instructed his staff to formulate a plan. Finally on the question of media coverage and briefings the General reaffirmed that they would try to avoid any Pentagon briefings today. The media blackout is still in force but he had been forced to instruct Gen Schwarzkopf to give a short press statement today on behalf of the Coalition Forces because there were too many emerging pool press reports from Allied reporters which were slanted for national reasons. He had felt that these would serve only to cause confusion.

4. CDS and the Secretary of State then spoke by television link to the Joint Commander who had just been talking with Gen Schwarzkopf. The Joint Commander was able to give slightly more detailed information on progress. In the West the French advance had met no resistance except for 2 mortar bombs which had missed. The 3rd Brigade of 101st Airborne Division will tonight drive to As Salman North. The Division has now established a forward operating base (FOB) at the airfield and plan helicopter raids tomorrow into the Euphrates valley with the aim of cutting lines of communication between Baghdad and forces in the KTO. The 1st US Mechanised Division has already opened 16 lanes through the obstacle belt which contained no mines but merely barbed wire. Progress which has been remarkable had nevertheless been slowed by the capture of about 2,000 Prisoners of War. By first light they will have opened up 24 lanes and established a breach head. 1st Armoured Division is at 2 hours notice to move in the assembly area South of the breach. Moving further to the East the 3rd Egyptian Division is breaking through the defences and establishing its own breach head which should be completed by 0300Z; 4th Egyptian Division will follow them. There is apparently some irritation in theatre about the Egyptians commitment and speed of advance and there is uncertainty over the activities and intentions of the Syrian Divisions which are in company. In MARCENT the US Marines broke through in a 2 division front against very little resistance and casualties had been very light; 6 killed and 7 wounded. On the coast the 3 task forces of Saudis, Kuwaitis and Qataris have advanced 35 km into Kuwait.

5. In the air war 75% of Allied effort today has been on battlefield air interdiction (BAI) and close air support (CAS) in the KTO. UK Jaguars have been operating against artillery in South East Iraq although some of the aircraft did not drop their weapons because of the confused ground picture and smoke from the burning wellheads in Kuwait. The Joint Commander has instructed AVM Wratten to keep the Jaguars further North, away from the land battle, to give them more freedom of action. Tornados and Buccaneers have continued attacks against airfields in Iraq using LGBs.

6. At sea in the AOA UK MCMVs have cleared an area for USS MISSOURI to conduct naval gunfire support into Kuwait and they are now clearing a second area for the USS WISCONSIN. Of note HMS DULVERTON is the closest warship to the Kuwaiti coast at a range of just over 10 miles. Conditions are good for further operations as the sea is calm but the ships are hidden in the dense smoke from burning wellheads. US Sea Stallion minesweeping helicopters from the damaged USS TRIPOLI have again not been available today.

7. There is some evidence that the use of chemical weapons by Iraqi forces has been authorised but to date there is no sign that they have been used. It is assessed that by using alternative landlines the Iraqis still have reasonable command and control between Baghdad and the KTO down to divisional level. However below that level it is likely that their systems are badly degraded.



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IRAQ/KUWAIT : WASHINGTON SITREP

SUMMARY

1. NO SURPRISE BUT CONSIDERABLE RELIEF THAT THE GROUND WAR HAS STARTED. ADMINISTRATION CAUTIOUSLY OPTIMISTIC BUT WARN THAT SADDAMS BEST FORCES NOT YET FULLY ENGAGED.

DETAIL

2. PRESIDENT BUSH CUT SHORT HIS WEEKEND AT CAMP DAVID TO ANNOUNCE IN WASHINGTON ON 23 FEBRUARY THAT THE GROUND WAR HAD ENTERED ITS FINAL PHRASE (FCO TELNO 183 TO ISLAMABAD). SUBSEQUENTLY CHENEY SAID THAT TO MINIMISE THE NUMBER OF ALLIED CASUALTIES THERE WOULD BE FEW ANNOUNCEMENTS ABOUT THE STATUS OF OPERATIONS. HE CONFIRMED THAT 23 FEBRUARY HAD LONG BEEN A PLANNING DATE FOR THE GROUND OFFENSIVE SUBJECT OF COURSE TO THE WEATHER OR THE DIPLMATIC SITUATION. FULL TEXT OF HIS REMARKS HAS BEEN FAXED TO THE EMERGENCY UNIT.

3. THE NEWS OF THE GROUND WAR CAME TOO LATE FOR COMMENT BY THE SUNDAY NEWSPAPERS. BUT THE CLEAR SENSE DURING 24 FEBRUARY IS RELIEF THAT THE WAITING IS OVER AND ANXIETY TO FINISH THE TASK AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE SO THAT THE TROOPS CAN COME HOME. THE ROUNDING UP OF LARGE NUMBERS OF MALES AND REPORTS OF WIDESPREAD ATROCITIES AGAINST THE CIVILIAN POPULATION IN KUWAIT ARE ALSO PROMINENTLY FEATURED IN THE MEDIA, AS IS THE BURNING OF THE 200 OIL WELLS.

4. SCOWCROFT, CHENEY AND BAKER SEPERATLEY APPEARED ON THE 3 MAIN SUNDAY MORNING NETWORK NEWS PROGRAMMES (TEXTS FAXED TO THE EMERGENCY UNIT). ALL WARNED AGAINST UNDUE OPTIMISM GIVEN THAT THE BEST IRAQI FORCES HAD NOT YET BEEN ENGAGED. SCOWCROFT CONFIRMED THAT THE INITIAL OPERATION WAS GOING AS PLANNED AND THAT BOTH THE PRESIDENT AND SCHWARZKOPF WERE PLEASED WITH THE RESULTS SO FAR. HE SAID THAT COALITION FORCES WOULD MOVE AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE TO PUT AN END TO THE BRUTALITIES AND SADDAM'S ATTEMPTS TO COMPLETE THE

DESTRUCTION OF KUWAIT. HE REITERATED THAT THE ELIMINATION OF SADDAM OR THE OVERTHROWING OF HIS LEADERSHIP WERE NOT COALITION GOALS BUT SAID THAT IF THEY OCCURED IT WOULD BE A BENEFIT. ON POST WAR STRUCTURES HE SAID THAT THE EXACT FRAMEWORK STILL HAD TO BE WORKED OUT BUT THE PRIMARY SECURITY ROLE SHOULD BE PLAYED BY THE ARAB MEMBERS OF THE COALITION. HE WANTED TO SEE US FORCES BEGIN TO WITHDRAW VERY QUICKLY AFTER THE OPERATION WAS OVER. HE

ADDED THAT THE US WOULD LEAD A CONCERTED EFFORT TO TRY TO ACHIEVE A SOLUTION TO THE ARAB/ISRAELI CONFLICT.

5. CHENEY SAID THAT HE WAS PLEASANTLY SURPRISED AT THE WAY THE GROUND OFFENSIVE WAS GOING. RESISTANCE HAD SO FAR BEEN MINIMAL AND CASUALTIES EXTREMELY LIGHT. LIKE SCOWCROFT, HE WARND AGAINST UNDUE OPTIMISM ABT THE COSTS TO COALITION FORCES BASED ON THE SUCCESS SO FAR: SADDAMS BEST TROOPS HAD NOT BEEN FULLY ENGAGED YET. HE SAID THAT ONE OF THE BIGGEST PROBLEMS ON HE GROUND WAS DEALING WITH ALL THE PRISONERS OF WAR COMING SOUTH. HE WOULD NOT PREDICT HOW LONG IT WOULD TAKE THE COALITION TO COMPLETE THEIR TASK. BUT HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE A SHORT CAMPAIGN, BY THE END OF WHICH SADDAM WOULD HAVE LOST A VERY SIGNIFICANT PART OF HIS MILITARY CAPABILITY.

6. BAKER SPOKE IN A SIMILAR VEIN. IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS ON THE SOVIET ROLE HE REPEATED THE PRESIDENTS REMARKS THAT THEIR EFFORTS HAD BEEN USEFUL AND WERE APPRECIATED BY THE ADMINISTRATION. HE DID NOT DEEL THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS MAKING MISCHIEF. IT HAD A GENUINE ROLE TO PLAY AND COULD CONTRIBUTE TO STABILITY IN THE REGION. HE ADDED THAT WITHOUT SUPPORT FROM THE SOVIET UNION AT THE UN THE COALITION WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ABLE TO DO WHAT IT WAS NOW SET UPON.

7. A WASHINGTON POST/ABC POLL CONDUCTED ON 22 FEBRUARY, BUT ONLY PUBLISHED ON 24 FEBRUARY, INDICATES THAT 61 PERCENT OF AMERICANS BELIEVED THAT IF IRAQ HAD NOT STARTED A WTHDRAWAL BY THE DEADLINE THE GROUND WAR SHOULD START AT ONCE. A SIMILAR PERCENTAGE THOUGHT THAT THE US SHOULD END THE WAR ONLY IF SADDAM WAS REMOVED FROM POWER. ON WHETHER THE FINAL OBJECTIVE OF THE WAR SHOULD BE FORCING IRAQ OUT OF KUWAIT OR FORCING SADDAM OUT OF POWER ONLY 28 PERCENT CHOSE THE FORMER WHILE 71 PERCENT SUPPORTED THE LATTER. IF IT TRANSPIRES THAT ATTROCITIES ON THE SCALE CLAIMED BY THE KUWAITI RESISTANCE HAVE INDEED TAKEN PLACE THAT VIEW WILL ONLY STRENGTHEN.

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
From the Private Secretary

24 February 1991

Dear Sir,

OMAN

I enclose the Prime Minister's letter to the Sultan of Oman thanking him for Oman's contribution to our military forces in the Gulf. I should be grateful if it could be despatched as soon as possible.

Yours sincerely,


(C. D. POWELL)

Simon Gass, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

[Handwritten mark]

bcc CDP
PC

SUBJECT cc MASTER

10 DOWNING STREET

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From the Private Secretary

24 February 1991

Dear Simon,


THE GULF

I had a brief word with General Scowcroft at 1715 this evening. He had just come back from doing 'Meeting the Press'. He thought the ground campaign was going very well. It was good that virtually all the members of the coalition were now involved in the fighting, although with varying degrees of success. The Egyptians were not doing too well: the Syrians did not seem to be doing much at all. The most encouraging thing, in his view, was that the sweep around the left flank by XVIII Corps and VII Corps have been brought forward by some fifteen hours. The sooner they could break through the border defences and move north, the more surely it would cut off the Iraqi forces and destroy a large part of Iraq's remaining military strength. The US Marines were doing well in the eastern sector and had advanced a considerable distance. But we had to avoid excessive optimism and assume that there was a lot of tough fighting ahead.

We had some discussion why the Iraqis had not yet used CW. I said there were reports that the wind was currently in the south east, which seemed a good enough reason to me. Scowcroft thought that coalition forces had probably destroyed a great deal of Iraqi artillery and disrupted the supply of munitions, so that commanders were simply not able to get CW munitions off. In addition, the Americans had dropped a large number of leaflets warning Iraqi commanders of what would happen if CW was used. They might be assuming that the war was probably lost, in which case there was good reason for them to play safe.

Shortly after this, the President spoke to the Prime Minister. His assessment of progress made during the day was generally bullish. US forces had met considerably less resistance than expected. Casualties had been light: for the Americans, 14 killed so far and 6 wounded with 2 missing in action. The US Marines were about half way to Kuwait City. The Saudis were doing well, as were the French and the US 101st Airborne. The Egyptians were held up in the barriers, and the Syrians were not doing well. The Navy were pounding targets in Kuwait. The Prime Minister, in response, gave the President a summary of the briefing he had received from MoD, mentioning also the tentative reports that 6 British soldiers were showing symptoms of anthrax, although there was no report of any Iraqi attack in the area where they were stationed. He stressed that the reports were tentative.

I am copying this letter to Richard Gozney (Foreign and Commonwealth Office), John Neilson (Department of Energy), Juliet Wheldon (Law Officer's Department) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely,


CHARLES POWELL

Simon Webb, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence

PRIME MINISTER

THE GULF: MILITARY SITUATION

General Schwarzkopf gave a short briefing about 20 minutes ago on television. The main points which I jotted down are as follows:

- all the forces engaged so far in the ground action had achieved their first-day objectives by lunchtime, and are pressing on;
- the mechanised and armoured forces, including those of the UK, have breached the border and are moving north with great speed;
- contact with the enemy has so far been light except in one case (a counter-attack on the marines by an Iraqi armoured unit, which was repulsed);
- after 10 hours, the Allies had already taken 5,500 prisoners. Many others are displaying white flags north of the present location of Allied forces;
- friendly casualties are so far extremely "remarkably" light;
- thus progress so far could be characterised as a "dramatic success" although with the usual caveats about this being early days yet.

Smy

(C. D. POWELL)

24 February 1991

PP

PRIME MINISTER

GULF WAR: VISIT TO JHQ, HIGH WYCOMBE

Air Chief Marshal Sir Patrick Hine telephoned me this morning to ask whether you would be able to pay a visit to Joint Headquarters in the first half of this week, once they are in the thick of the battle. He clearly believes it would be good for morale and that must be right.

It is not an easy week for you. I attach a copy of the diary. Wednesday afternoon looks the best chance of clearing the diary. If we could end the Regional Newspaper Editors Lunch at 1430, squeeze in the UK Japan 2000 Group, then postpone all following appointments (the Israeli Foreign Minister has anyway cancelled), you could helicopter down to High Wycombe being there by 1615 and spend an hour or so looking around and meeting people there before helicoptering back to London by about 1800. You might then be able to reinstate the New York Times interview for that time. This seems a better prospect than either Monday or Tuesday, which are already very full. Would you like me to plan on this basis?

The alternative would be to do it after Questions on Thursday. But that would cut into speechwriting time for the Local Government Conference.

CHARLES POWELL
24 FEBRUARY 1991

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Ref. A091/455

PRIME MINISTER

cc Sir Percy Cradock
Mr Appleyard

OPD(G): 25 February

Item 1: Current military situation

1. The Chief of the Defence Staff will be ready to give a report on the ground campaign and the role of the First Armoured Division 24 hours in. General Schwarzkopf gave a confident briefing this afternoon from which it appeared that the early stages had been "a dramatic success". (This has its risks of building up hopes of a very quick victory which may be disappointed - see media handling below.) At that time casualties were described as extremely light and 5,500 POWs have been taken with some reportedly helping the allies find their way through the minefields.

2. On the naval side British minesweepers have been close in clearing a channel, partly as replacements for USS Tripoli which struck a mine a few days ago, and our destroyers and frigates are providing screen forces for actions by US Battle Groups. In the air campaign, Tornados have been revisiting airfields to preclude Iraqi ground support counterattacks and Jaguars have continued to attack artillery positions.

3. You might ask the Defence Secretary whether there are confirmed reports that the Iraqis have used chemical or biological weapons. You may also want to ensure that, in the event of use of these weapons being established, we know what the US and our response will be a) militarily and b) in public presentation.



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4. You may want to ask Sir Percy Cradock for his assessment of the oil field fires and reports of the murder and kidnapping of Kuwaitis. You may also want to ask about the assessment of likely terrorist activity in response to Saddam Hussein's final appeal; and you may want to ask the Foreign Secretary for any reports from posts of local Muslim unrest.

5. You might conclude the discussion by expressing pride and confidence in British and allied forces and by asking the Defence Secretary and the Chief of the Defence Staff to keep OPD(G) fully briefed on the offensive, especially on those days when the Committee is not meeting. You may want to confirm that the Defence Secretary will be making a Parliamentary statement: (the Foreign Secretary will be giving evidence to the Foreign Affairs Select Committee).

Item 2: Current international situation

6. You might begin by summarising your discussions by telephone with President Bush, President Gorbachev and other world leaders as the events since last Friday unfolded. You might then invite the Foreign Secretary to report on the latest state of play on the rest of the diplomatic front.

7. At the Security Council the Russians stimulated a round of informal discussions in the Permanent Five and the Council itself based on President Gorbachev's abortive negotiations with Tariq Aziz. In the end, once the land campaign got under way, the Yemenis and Cubans asked for the consultations to be brought to a close with the Yemeni giving an emotional press briefing in mid-discussion. You might ask the Foreign Secretary about the prospects for future Security Council action as the ground offensive unfolds. Presumably this will depend in part on how long the campaign lasts and how it ends. It seems clear that, although the Indian initiative has been occluded, the Council will see a role for itself in the post-conflict settlement.



8. The Russians appear to have decided that their relations with the West were the bottom line for them and seem resigned to demonstrating that they tried. You might ask the Foreign Secretary whether we can expect political problems from the EC or elsewhere or whether the campaign will be allowed to take its military course until the Iraqis are driven out. Finally you may like to ask the Foreign Secretary whether he is convinced that the Israelis will continue to exercise restraint, especially since there must be a risk that Saddam Hussein will make a final attempt to engage them in the war, possibly by a chemical attack.

9. You may like to note that papers are being prepared, for consideration by OPD(G) later this week, on terms for ending hostilities in the various scenarios which now seem possible. It is clear that our earlier ideas had a considerable influence on the US statement on Friday, and it would be good if we could continue to pass them ideas against the possibility that we may be dealing with an Iraqi surrender or collapse sooner than we previously anticipated.

Item 3: Media handling

10. You might ask the Energy Secretary to report on the broader issues. One important objective must be to avoid the situation which followed the start of the air campaign on 15 January of early euphoria followed by equally ill-founded claims that the campaign had failed because it did not end within days. You might ask him to coordinate with the Defence Secretary a media strategy which encourages the media, backbenchers and public opinion to take a balanced view of the campaign. This will be vital in the next few days.

11. Mr O'Donnell can report on the issues of the day. For the time being Ministers and press officers are being asked to refer questions to the MOD. These will presumably include queries



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about the land campaign and the role of British forces and perhaps some carping that the Russian initiative should have been given more of a chance and that the allies are bent on destroying Iraq and toppling Saddam Hussein as basic war aims. We need to get across that the difference between the coalition ultimatum and the Russian plan was not just a difference of timescales but that the Russian plan was conditional on rescinding, and therefore not fulfilling, important parts of the UN resolutions. Some material has been prepared on this for circulation to backbenchers and others.

R.B.

ROBIN BUTLER

24 February 1991

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MY TELNO 325: IRAQ/KUWAIT: SOVIET PROPOSALS

SUMMARY

1 MEETING OF SECURITY COUNCIL ANTICIPATED THROUGHOUT 22 FEBRUARY. SOVIET PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE SEEKING FRESH INSTRUCTIONS FROM MOSCOW: NO MEETING LIKELY BEFORE 23 FEBRUARY. CONTINGENCY PLANNING BY THE SECRETARIAT FOR A POSSIBLE MONITORING ROLE.

DETAIL

2 ON THE MORNING OF 22 FEBRUARY THE NON-ALIGNED MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL MET TO CONSIDER IRAQ/KUWAIT. BUT THEY DID NO MORE THAN LISTEN TO A BRIEFING FROM THE YUGOSLAV PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE ON THE RESULTS OF THE NON-ALIGNED MINISTERIAL MEETING IN BELGRADE ON 12 FEBRUARY. THEY DID NOT DISCUSS THE INDIAN DRAFT RESOLUTION AND THERE IS A GENERAL FEELING THAT IT HAS BEEN OVERTAKEN BY EVENTS. DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE INDIAN PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE KEEPS CLAIMING WIDESPREAD SUPPORT FOR HIS INITIATIVE, MEMBERS OF THE ZIMBABWEAN MISSION TOLD US THAT AFRICAN MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL HAD SERIOUS MISGIVINGS ABOUT THE TEXT: THEY THOUGHT IT WOULD GET NOWHERE.

3 FROM THE TIME OF THE COALITION REACTION TO THE SOVIET PROPOSALS (YOUR TELNOS 164 AND 165 TO CAIRO) THERE HAS BEEN MUCH SPECULATION AT THE UNITED NATIONS ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF A SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING, BUT SO FAR NO-ONE HAS COME FORWARD AND ASKED FOR ONE. AL-ASHTAL (YEMEN) TOLD ME THAT HE SAW NO POINT IN HAVING A MEETING. ALARCON (CUBA) SAID HE WOULD NOT BE CALLING FOR A MEETING. THE (ZIMBABWEAN) PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL HAS SHOWN NO SIGN OF TAKING

THE INITIATIVE. ALL EYES HAVE THEREFORE BEEN FOCUSED ON THE RUSSIANS.

4 DURING THE AFTERNOON OF 22 FEBRUARY PICKERING (UNITED STATES) TOLD ME HE HAD RECEIVED A TELEPHONE CALL FROM VORONTSOV (SOVIET UNION). VORONTSOV HAD SAID HE HAD RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS FROM MOSCOW TO BRIEF THE COUNCIL, BUT THEY WERE NOT VERY CLEAR AND HE DID NOT KNOW HOW TO CARRY THEM OUT. HE WOULD, FOR EXAMPLE, BE UNABLE TO SAY WHETHER THE IRAQIS ACCEPTED THE SIX-POINT PLAN NOW BEING CONVEYED TO BAGHDAD BY TARIQ AZIZ. HE ASKED FOR PICKERING'S ADVICE. PICKERING THEN CONSULTED ME. I SAID VORONTSOV OUGHT TO BE TOLD THAT IF HE INSISTED ON CALLING A COUNCIL MEETING, THE ALLIES WOULD BE OBLIGED TO POINT OUT THE WAYS IN WHICH EVEN THE LATEST SOVIET PROPOSALS WERE INADEQUATE. VORONTSOV SHOULD BE ASKED, IN THE LIGHT OF THE LONG TELEPHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THEIR TWO PRESIDENTS, WHETHER THEY WOULD THINK THIS WAS A GOOD IDEA.

5 PICKERING SUBSEQUENTLY TOLD ME THAT HE HAD SPOKEN TO VORONTSOV ON THE LINES I HAD SUGGESTED: VORONTSOV HAD TAKEN THE POINT. HE HAD SAID HE WOULD SEEK FRESH INSTRUCTIONS FROM MOSCOW, WHICH HE WOULD NOT EXPECT TO RECEIVE UNTIL THE MORNING OF 23 FEBRUARY. HE WOULD NOT TAKE ANY ACTION TO CALL FOR A COUNCIL MEETING BEFORE THEN.

6. VORONTSOV DID HOWEVER LATER CALL ON THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO HAND OVER A LETTER FROM GORBACHEV ON THE SOVIET SIX-POINT PLAN (WE UNDERSTAND A SIMILAR LETTER IS GOING TO CAPITALS OF THE ALLIES). THE LETTER EXPRESSED 'HIGH HOPES' THAT THE IRAQIS WOULD ACCEPT THE PLAN AND ASKED THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO 'SUPPORT THE CALLING' OF A MEETING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. PEREZ DE CUELLAR DECIDED HE SHOULD AT LEAST SEEK PICKERING'S VIEW ON THE HOLDING OF SUCH A MEETING. PICKERING TOLD HIM IT WOULD NOT SERVE ANY USEFUL PURPOSE: IN THE U S VIEW THE SOVIET SIX POINTS WERE FLAWED AND IT WOULD NOT BE HELPFUL TO BRING SUCH DIFFERENCES INTO THE OPEN. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL CONTINUED TO WORRY THAT A MEETING SHOULD BE HELD, BUT PICKERING DOES NOT BELIEVE PEREZ DE CUELLAR WILL TAKE ANY INITIATIVE.

7. SEPARATELY, ON THE AFTERNOON OF 22 FEBRUARY GOULDING (UNDER-SECRETARY-GENERAL RESPONSIBLE FOR PEACEKEEPING) SUMMONED A MEETING OF REPRESENTATIVES OF 21 POTENTIAL TROOP CONTRIBUTORS TO AN IRAQ/KUWAIT OBSERVER FORCE. THE COUNTRIES REPRESENTED AT THE MEETING WERE AUSTRIA, THE FIVE NORDIC COUNTRIES, IRELAND, ECUADOR, FIJI, GHANA, HUNGARY, INDONESIA, INDIA, KENYA, MALAYSIA, POLAND,

NIGERIA, SINGAPORE, URUGUAY, VENEZUELA AND YUGOSLAVIA. MOST SEEM TO HAVE BEEN SELECTED AS EXISTING TROOP CONTIBUTORS TO UNIIMOG. BUT CANADA, WHICH HAS TAKEN AN ACTIVE INTEREST IN CONTRIBUTING TO AN IRAQ/KUWAIT PEACEKEEPING OPERATION, WAS NOT INVITED, PRESUMABLY BECAUSE IT IS A PROMINENT MEMBER OF THE COALITION. IT IS ALSO PERHAPS SIGNIFICANT THAT NO ARAB STATES WERE INVITED.

8. GOULDING STRESSED THAT HE HAD SUMMONED THE MEETING PURELY ON A CONTINGENCY BASIS IN CASE THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WISHED TO ESTABLISH A PEACEKEEPING MISSION. IT WOULD BE CONTINGENT ON A REQUEST FROM THE SECURITY COUNCIL. FOR THE MOMENT, THE SECRETARIAT WERE LOOKING ONLY AT THE IDEA OF AN UNARMED OBSERVER FORCE TO MONITOR IRAQI WITHDRAWAL FROM KUWAIT, ALTHOUGH THEY MIGHT HAVE TO PROVIDE AN INFANTRY BATTALION FOR SECURITY, DEPENDING ON CIRCUMSTANCES. ANOTHER KIND OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATION MIGHT BE REQUIRED AT A LATER STAGE. GOULDING ASKED THOSE COUNTRIES AT THE MEETING WHO WERE TROOP CONTRIBUTORS TO UNIIMOG IF THEY WOULD BE PREPARED TO ALLOW THEIR UNIIMOG PERSONNEL TO TRANSFER TO AN IRAQ/KUWAIT OPERATION AND IF THEY COULD CONTRIBUTE A FURTHER 10 OBSERVERS FROM HOME AT SHORT NOTICE. NON-CONTRIBUTORS TO UNIIMOG WERE SIMPLY ASKED WHETHER THEY COULD SUPPLY 10 OBSERVERS EACH. THE AIM WOULD BE TO CREATE FORCE OF ABOUT 240 OBSERVERS.

9. THE REPRESENTATIVES OF AUSTRIA, VENEZUELA AND KENYA IMMEDIATELY INDICATED THAT THEY WOULD BE READY TO SUPPLY THE OBSERVERS REQUESTED. THE OTHER PARTICIPANTS IN THE MEETING WERE ASKED TO RESPOND TO THE SECRETARIAT ON 25 FEBRUARY. GOULDING SAID THAT NOT ALL THOSE WHO HAD BEEN INVITED TO THE MEETING WOULD NECESSARILY BE ABLE TO CONTRIBUTE TO AN OBSERVER FORCE IF ONE WERE CREATED: PARTICIPANTS WOULD REQUIRE THE CONSENT OF BOTH SIDES.

HANNAY

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RESIDENT CLERK

NNNN

SECRETDRAFT STATEMENT FOR THE PRIME MINISTER

It is almost seven months since Iraq invaded Kuwait. During all that time the world community, acting through the United Nations, has repeatedly called upon Iraq to withdraw immediately and unconditionally, but to no avail. Last November the United Nations gave Iraq one final opportunity to do so peacefully. But its appeal was ignored.

At no stage has Iraq accepted and agreed to implement in full all the Security Council resolutions. Despite efforts by President Gorbachev and others, Iraq's only response has been to prevaricate and to attempt to set conditions on its withdrawal. Meanwhile Iraq has committed unimaginable brutalities against Kuwait's civilian population. Over the past few days, this destruction of people and property has been taken a step further by setting fire to large numbers of Kuwait's oil wells in an act of pure destructive spite; and the abduction of large numbers of Kuwaiti citizens.

Yesterday the members of the international coalition ranged against Iraq offered Saddam Hussein a last chance to avoid a ground war. We spelled out the terms on which this would be possible. We gave Iraq until 5 pm GMT yesterday to state publicly and authoritatively its acceptance of our conditions and to begin large scale withdrawal from Kuwait.

That has not happened. In these circumstances, the international coalition initiated a major ground campaign against the Iraqi forces at 0100 GMT this morning, in order to drive Iraq out of Kuwait and secure the full implementation of the Security Council's resolutions.

At this moment of danger, I am sure that everyone will want to give full and unstinting support to our British forces and those of the other members of the coalition. Our thoughts will be with them and with their families. We admire their courage, we wish them success and we pray God that they will return home safe.

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SECRET

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TELNO 149

OF 230730Z FEBRUARY 91

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, PARIS, BONN, ROME, RIYADH, K

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, MODUK, POLAD HIGH WYCOMBE

YOUR TELNO 157 TO CAIRO

GULF CRISIS: SOVIET PROPOSALS

1. AT A PRESS CONFERENCE EARLY THIS MORNING THE JAPANESE SPOKESMAN SAID THAT JAPAN SUPPORTS THE POSITION SET OUT IN PRESIDENT BUSH'S STATEMENT. HIS MAIN POINTS WERE:

INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY DEMANDED IRAQ'S IMMEDIATE AND UNCONDITIONAL WITHDRAWAL FROM KUWAIT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS

PRESIDENT BUSH'S STATEMENT SETS OUT PUBLICLY THE VIEWS OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY, ESPECIALLY THE COALITION COUNTRIES

JAPAN STRONGLY HOPES THAT IRAQ WILL MAKE A CLEAR MOVE TO RESTORE PEACE BY WITHDRAWING IMMEDIATELY.

2. FOREIGN MINISTER NAKAYAMA CALLED IN THE IRAQI AMBASSADOR JUST AFTER NOON TODAY TO GIVE HIM THE MESSAGE THAT THERE COULD BE NO NEGOTIATIONS AND THAT THE KEY TO A SOLUTION LAY IN IRAQ'S UNCONDITIONAL AND IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL. THE MULTINATIONAL FORCES WOULD GUARANTEE NOT TO ATTACK IF IRAQ BEGAN TO WITHDRAW. HE HOPED SADDAM HUSSEIN WOULD LISTEN TO WORLD OPINION WHICH WANTED PEACE NOT WAR.

3. THE MFA ARE EXPECTED PRESIDENT BUSH TO TELEPHONE KAIFU LATER TODAY.

WHITEHEAD

YYYY

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

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OF 231110Z FEBRUARY 91

INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON, RIYADH, CAIRO, JEDDA
INFO PRIORITY JHQ HIGH WYCOMBE**PRESIDENT BUSH'S ULTIMATUM: FRENCH REACTION****SUMMARY**

1. GENERAL APPROVAL OF FRANCE'S REJECTION OF SOVIET PLAN AND SUPPORT FOR THE TERMS OF BUSH'S ULTIMATUM.

DETAIL

2. FRANCE'S UNEQUIVOCAL SOLIDARITY WITH HER MAJOR ALLIES OVER THE SOVIET PLAN AND OVER THE TERMS OF PRESIDENT BUSH'S ULTIMATUM IS GREETED WITH APPROVAL IN ALL BUT THE COMMUNIST PRESS. FRANCE'S COOL AND SCEPTICAL REACTION TO THE SOVIET PLAN IS FAVOURABLY COMPARED WITH INITIAL ITALIAN AND BELGIAN ENTHUSIASM. THE FACT THAT FRANCE WAS CONSULTED OVER THE TERMS OF THE ULTIMATUM IS REPORTED WITH SATISFACTION, AND FRANCE'S REFUSAL TO BE SEDUCED BY THE SOVIET PLAN WHEN SHE MIGHT HAVE BEEN EXPECTED TO BE THE COALITION MEMBER MOST LIKELY TO BE ATTRACTED TO IT IS SEEN AS GIVING THE COALITION PARTICULARLY VALUABLE SUPPORT AT A CRITICAL MOMENT.

3. THE COMMUNISTS, THE FAR RIGHT, THE ANTI-WAR WING OF THE SOCIALISTS AND THE PACIFISTS HAVE DECLARED IN FAVOUR OF THE SOVIET PLAN. BUT ELSEWHERE THERE SEEMS AN ALMOST UNANIMOUS CONVICTION THAT FRANCE IS FOLLOWING THE RIGHT COURSE. PRESIDENT MITTERRAND'S LATEST CONSULTATIONS WITH A WIDE RANGE OF POLITICAL FIGURES HAVE PROBABLY HELPED. ABOVE ALL ONE SENSES A FEELING OF RELIEF THAT FRANCE HAS NOW DEFINITELY PUT BEHIND HER THE AMBIGUITIES AND HESITATION OF THE PERIOD BEFORE THE CONFLICT AND THAT HAVING OPTED FOR ACTIVE PARTICIPATION IN THE COALITION FRANCE IS NOW DEMONSTRATING WHOLE HEARTED FIRMNESS AND COMMITMENT.

FERGUSSON

YYYY

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Subject a REGISTER

A/FOREIGN LEADERS.



17a-b

MEM

bcc PC
CDP

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

23 February 1991

THE GULF:
BRIEFING OF OPPOSITION LEADERS

The Prime Minister spoke to Mr. Kinnock and Mr. Ashdown earlier this evening, on Privy Council terms, to warn them of the impending start of the ground campaign in the early hours of tomorrow morning.

Mr. Kinnock said that the news was not surprising. He asked whether anything further was to be expected from the United Nations. The Prime Minister said that it was not: he did not believe the Soviet Union would push its proposals. Mr. Kinnock revealed that the Russians had given him a copy of the letter which Mr. Gorbachev had sent to the Prime Minister the previous day, together with a note of Mr. Gorbachev's side of their conversation this morning. Mr. Kinnock asked about Parliamentary handling. Would the Prime Minister make a Statement on Monday? The Prime Minister said that he had not decided. This should be settled through the usual channels. If there was a Statement, he would probably ask the Defence Secretary to do it. There could also be a debate a day or two thereafter. Mr. Kinnock commented that there would be a row if no Statement was made. He was relaxed about the possibility of a subsequent debate. Mr. Kinnock added that he would tell Mr. Kaufman later this evening of the information the Prime Minister had given him. The Prime Minister warned Mr. Kinnock that British Forces would not be much involved in the first 24 hours or so of the ground campaign.

Mr. Ashdown said that he assumed that President Gorbachev had nothing more to offer. The Prime Minister gave an account of his talk with Mr. Gorbachev and of recent Iraqi actions in Kuwait. He also told Mr. Ashdown about his telephone conversation with General de la Billiere, warning him that British Forces were unlikely to be involved in the very early stages of the ground battle. Mr. Ashdown said he was grateful to be informed and would do anything he could to help. The Prime Minister said that his comments on radio earlier in the day had been excellent. Mr. Ashdown asked whether there would be a Statement on Monday. The Prime Minister said that there probably would be one by the Defence Secretary.

The Prime Minister also briefed Mrs. Thatcher.

I am copying this letter to Richard Gozney (Foreign and Commonwealth Office), John Neilson (Department of Energy) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

CHARLES POWELL

Simon Webb, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence

16a-b

Covering SECRET US/UK EYES
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PERSONAL



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

Telephone 071-21 82111/3

MO 6/17/15/1D

23rd February 1991

CD
23/2.

Dear Charles,

REPORT FROM RIYADH

The Defence Secretary's colleagues might find it useful to see the attached report from Commanders on operations in the Gulf.

I am coping this letter to the Private Secretaries to members of OPD(G) and to Sir Robin Butler.

Yours sincerely,
Simon Webb

(S WEBB)
Private Secretary

Sir Charles Powell KCMG
No 10 Downing Street

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23 Feb 91

PS/Secretary of State


THE VIEW FROM RIYADH - 232000Z FEB 91

1. CDS had a short conversation with the Joint Commander this evening for an update of activities in the Gulf. Planning goes ahead as expected and the air campaign continues much as before with the majority of effort directed against the KTO. Our Tornados were however targetted against airfields in Iraq (the only aircraft flying these missions) and report a 60% success rate on airfield surfaces using LGB. 28 of the 34 bridges previously attacked remain down and it is intended to strike the other 6 tonight. GRIs will again be used against airfield targets tomorrow. There is no let up in the air campaign and 50 x F111 and 20 x F15E sorties are planned against the KTO tonight. The Joint Commander reports great confidence among our aircrews.

2. In the KTO it is reported that some 179 well heads are on fire and that the resultant smoke was reducing visibility at sea level to 900m in places. The smoke is rising to an altitude of 6000ft but pilots report that they are able to see down through it and no sortie profiles were affected by the smoke which is now assessed to cover 25% of the land area of Kuwait.

3. Communications are reported to be severely disrupted with no links between Iraq's 3rd and 4th Divisions and no link between Baghdad and the KTO. Communication difficulties have been compounded for the Iraqis by the recent heavy rain which has flooded some command bunkers.

4. The view from theatre is that there is currently no challenge to the Iraqi leadership. This could only be expected to come from the Military and there are currently no signs of this. It is expected that the Iraqis will use CW at an early stage of any Allied ground offensive. Finally it was suggested that several thousand Kuwaitis had been moved North into Iraq.



A J STABLES
Gp Capt
DPSO/CDS
MB6173 82116MB

1 of 1

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SECRET AND PERSONAL



10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

23 February 1991

Dear Simon.

THE GULF:
GROUND CAMPAIGN: STATEMENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER

I enclose the statement which will be issued by No.10 Press Office at 0300 tomorrow morning in the Prime Minister's name, about the opening of the ground campaign, in the form in which the Prime Minister has approved. If for any reason there should be any delay to the start of the campaign, I should be grateful if you could let me know instantly.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Richard Gozney (Foreign and Commonwealth Office), John Neilson (Department of Energy) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely,

CHARLES POWELL

Simon Webb, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence

SECRET AND PERSONAL

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CHARLES POWELL

Simon Webb, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence

SECRET AND PERSONAL

STATEMENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER

(Issued from No.10 at 0300 on Sunday, 24 February 1991)

It is almost seven months since Iraq invaded Kuwait. During all that time we have worked for a peaceful outcome. The world community, acting through the United Nations, has repeatedly called upon Iraq to withdraw immediately and unconditionally, but to no avail. Last November the United Nations gave Iraq one final opportunity to leave peacefully. But its appeal was ignored.

At no stage has Iraq ever accepted and agreed to implement in full all the Security Council Resolutions. Despite efforts by President Gorbachev and others, Iraq's only response has been to prevaricate and to set conditions on its withdrawal. Meanwhile Iraq has committed unimaginable brutalities against Kuwait's civilian population. Over the past few days, this destruction of people and property has been taken a step further by setting fire to large numbers of Kuwait's oil wells in an act of pure destructive spite: and the abduction of large numbers of Kuwaiti citizens.

On Friday the members of the international coalition ranged against Iraq offered Saddam Hussein a last chance to avoid a ground war. We spelled out the terms on which this would be possible. We gave Iraq until 5 pm GMT yesterday to state publicly and authoritatively its acceptance of our conditions and to begin large scale withdrawal from Kuwait.


That has not happened. In these circumstances, the international coalition began a massive ground attack at 0100 GMT this morning, in order to drive Iraqi forces out of Kuwait and secure the full implementation of the Security Council's Resolutions. We intend to achieve our objective as swiftly and with as few casualties as possible.

SECRET

- 2 -

British forces will play a full part in this operation. As they go into action, I am sure that everyone will want to give full and unstinting support to them and to the forces of the other members of the coalition. Our thoughts will be with them and with their families. We admire their courage, we wish them success and we pray God that they will return home safe.

SECRET

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2m February 1991

CDP
28/2

Jar Charles

THE GULF: STATEMENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER

Thank you for your letter of today's date enclosing a draft statement for the Prime Minister to issue. I attach a few amendments which you may care to make. To avoid distributing the text further than is absolutely necessary I have not had it re-typed, but have kept the amendments in manuscript form.

You will no doubt be thinking about the timing for release in relation to The Queen's message (as circulated with Andrew Turnbull's letter of 6th February).

I am sending a copy of this letter to Richard Gozney (FCO) and Sir Robin Butler.

Yours truly
Jim Webb(S WEBB)
Private SecretarySir Charles Powell KCMG
No 10 Downing Street

5

Throughout

leave
~~do so~~

And even in the last day or so
Over the past few days

with ^{Con. Mit} ~~no~~ further ~~concern~~ and continued suffering for the 129 people

British forces will play a full part in this operation. ^{with a few casualties as probable.} They go forward into action.

~~es, the international~~
was therefore initiated
~~against the Iraqi~~
forces

SECRET



A/FOREIGN/BUSI. MEM

bcc PC
CDP

B a-b

Subject cc Master

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

23 February 1991

THE GULF:THE PRIME MINISTER'S CONVERSATION WITH PRESIDENT BUSH

President Bush telephoned the Prime Minister shortly after 1800 this evening on the secure line from Camp David. The President said he thought it right for him and the Prime Minister to touch base after the expiry of the deadline set by the coalition for Iraq to start withdrawing from Kuwait. The Prime Minister said that the coalition statement had been an excellent stroke on which the President was to be warmly congratulated.

The President said that, like the Prime Minister, he had been telephoned by President Gorbachev. Gorbachev had tried to persuade him to extend the deadline for 24/48 hours. He had replied that with the oil fields burning and goodness knows what happening to the population of Kuwait, there was no way that the coalition could accept Saddam Hussein's good faith. But Gorbachev had been pleasant throughout the conversation and not at all difficult. The Prime Minister said that paralleled his experience earlier in the day. Gorbachev rather gave the impression of going through the motions and of realising that the coalition would not move. He had even implied fairly strongly that he realised that parts of the Soviet six-point plan fell short of the requirements of the United Nations Security Council Resolutions. The President commented that this was interesting: Gorbachev had not admitted as much to him.

The President said that the torching of the Kuwaiti oil wells was having a profound effect on public opinion. The Prime Minister said there were reports also of random murders and abductions of Kuwaiti civilians. This only served to convince public opinion that we were absolutely right to launch a ground campaign to save Kuwait.

The Prime Minister continued that he had spoken to President Mitterrand who seemed to be quite firm. He was always a bit edgy when talking to Mitterrand: you could never be quite sure that he would not produce some ill-considered initiative out of a hat. The President said that he had the same worry. The Quai d'Orsay were often difficult. He had also heard from Prime Minister Kaifu who was very supportive.

b

The President asked whether General Scowcroft and I had co-ordinated the timing of announcements during the night. The Prime Minister confirmed that we had. We would issue a statement at the same time as the President was speaking in Washington (2200 EST).

The Prime Minister said that he had spoken to General de la Billiere who had assured him that our forces were in excellent shape and morale. The President said they had been tremendous. The United States military had assured him they too were ready to move, so we were in synch. He hoped that all would go smoothly for the sake of 'our kids' out there.

The President said he had to go because Chancellor Kohl was ringing him on another line. The Prime Minister said that I had briefed Kohl's office earlier in the day about contacts with Gorbachev.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence), John Neilson (Department of Energy) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

CHARLES POWELL

Richard Gozney, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

SECRET

faxed
12a c

PRIME MINISTER

STATEMENT

I attach a revised version of the statement. It takes account of two minor comments by the Foreign Secretary, who is well content with it: and of some comments by the Defence Secretary. The Foreign Secretary is particularly keen that you should preserve the last paragraph unchanged.

If you could let me know if you are content, I will arrange for it to be sent down to Gus O'Donnell.

C.D.P.

CHARLES POWELL

23 FEBRUARY 1991

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SECRET

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STATEMENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER

(Issued from No.10 at 0300 on Sunday, 24 February 1991)

It is almost seven months since Iraq invaded Kuwait. During all that time we have worked for a peaceful outcome. The world community, acting through the United Nations, has repeatedly called upon Iraq to withdraw immediately and unconditionally, but to no avail. Last November the United Nations gave Iraq one final opportunity to leave peacefully. But its appeal was ignored.

At no stage has Iraq ever accepted and agreed to implement in full all the Security Council Resolutions. Despite efforts by President Gorbachev and others, Iraq's only response has been to prevaricate and to set conditions on its withdrawal. Meanwhile Iraq has committed unimaginable brutalities against Kuwait's civilian population. Over the past few days, this destruction of people and property has been taken a step further by setting fire to large numbers of Kuwait's oil wells in an act of pure destructive spite: and the abduction of large numbers of Kuwaiti citizens.

On Friday the members of the international coalition ranged against Iraq offered Saddam Hussein a last chance to avoid a ground war. We spelled out the terms on which this would be possible. We gave Iraq until 5 pm GMT yesterday to state publicly and authoritatively its acceptance of our conditions and to begin large scale withdrawal from Kuwait.

That has not happened. In these circumstances, the international coalition began a massive ground attack at 0100 GMT this morning, in order to drive Iraqi forces out of Kuwait and secure the full implementation of the Security Council's Resolutions. We intend to achieve our objective as swiftly and with as few casualties as possible.

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- 2 -

British forces will play a full part in this operation. As they go into action, I am sure that everyone will want to give full and unstinting support to them and to the forces of the other members of the coalition. Our thoughts will be with them and with their families. We admire their courage, we wish them success and we pray God that they will return home safe.

SECRET

SECRET AND PERSONAL



A/FOREIGN/SCOW. MEM

bcc PC
CDP

11

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

23 February 1991

THE GULF

General Scowcroft telephoned me again at 1700 with a few titbits.

General Scowcroft said that Gorbachev had just telephoned the President and spoken very much along the same lines as to the Prime Minister this morning. Gorbachev had said there was a new development, that the Iraqis had now agreed formally and at the highest level to unconditional withdrawal. He urged the President to go with the Soviet Union to the United Nations to combine the two plans. He was confident that within 24/48 hours we could get what the coalition required. The President had replied that the United States and the Soviet Union should certainly stick together but the fact was the coalition had set a deadline for action and it was clear the Iraqis were not going to meet it. We could not ignore the deadline without losing all credibility. In other words, he had said politely 'no'.

General Scowcroft added that the American information was that the Soviet Permanent Representative at the United Nations had instructions only to report to the Security Council on Soviet efforts and not to table a resolution. The informal meeting of the Five Permanent Members had apparently gone quite well. Our man had been great and the Chinese surprisingly very supportive, making clear that they did not accept the Soviet position. The only disappointment had been the French, whose Permanent Representative had claimed to have no instructions. This was very strange since Scowcroft had called the French only shortly before to brief them on the position.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence), John Neilson (Department of Energy) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

CHARLES POWELL

Richard Gozney, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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SECRET AND PERSONAL



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CHARLES POWELL

Richard Gozney, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

SECRET AND PERSONAL

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10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

23 February 1991

THE GULF

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I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence), John Neilson (Department of Energy) and Sonia Philippard (Cabinet Office).

CHARLES POWELL

Richard Gozney, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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SECRET AND PERSONAL



10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

23 February 1991

GROUND CAMPAIGN: STATEMENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER

The Prime Minister thinks it would be right for him to issue a statement from No 10 about the initiation of the ground campaign, at about the same time as President Bush addresses the nation on television (0300 GMT). I enclose a draft and should be very grateful for comments and amendments by 1800 today if possible.

I am copying this letter, and enclosure, to Richard Gozney (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and to Sir Robin Butler.

CHARLES POWELL

Simon Webb Esq
Ministry of Defence

SECRET AND PERSONAL

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WAST STATEMENT FOR THE PRIME MINISTER

It is almost seven months since Iraq invaded Kuwait. During all that time the world community, acting through the United Nations, has repeatedly called upon Iraq to withdraw immediately and unconditionally, but to no avail. Last November the United Nations gave Iraq one final opportunity to do so peacefully. But its appeal was ignored.

At no stage has Iraq accepted and agreed to implement in full all the Security Council resolutions. Despite efforts by President Gorbachev and others, Iraq's only response has been to prevaricate and to attempt to set conditions on its withdrawal. Meanwhile Iraq has committed unimaginable brutalities against Kuwait's civilian population. Over the past few days, this destruction of people and property has been taken a step further by setting fire to large numbers of Kuwait's oil wells in an act of pure destructive spite: and the abduction of large numbers of Kuwaiti citizens.

Yesterday the members of the international coalition ranged against Iraq offered Saddam Hussein a last chance to avoid a ground war. We spelled out the terms on which this would be possible. We gave Iraq until 5 pm GMT yesterday to state publicly and authoritatively its acceptance of our conditions and to begin large scale withdrawal from Kuwait.

That has not happened. In these circumstances, the international coalition initiated a major ground campaign against the Iraqi forces at 0100 GMT this morning, in order to drive Iraq out of Kuwait and secure the full implementation of the Security Council's resolutions.

At this moment of danger, I am sure that everyone will want to give full and unstinting support to our British forces and those of the other members of the coalition. Our thoughts will be with them and with their families. We admire their courage, we wish them success and we pray God that they will return home safe.

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10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

23 February 1991

Dear Sir,

THE GULF: PRIME MINISTER'S CONVERSATION
WITH GENERAL DE LA BILLIERE

The Prime Minister telephoned General de la Billiere this afternoon.

The Prime Minister began by congratulating General de la Billiere on his handling of the campaign so far, which had shown exceptional skill. He also wished him and all our forces luck in what lay ahead. General de la Billiere said that many people had performed prodigious feats by getting our forces into place and ready. Once it was all over, there would be many lessons to be learned for the future. He had recently met all his Brigade and Divisional Commanders. They were quietly confident and totally ready for whatever the job might entail. And something very rare in the Army, they were entirely satisfied with the training. We now had a very good and cohesive Division.

The Prime Minister asked if there was any further news about what Iraq was doing with the oil wells in Kuwait. General de la Billiere said that his last information was that they had set fire to 179 oil heads by this morning. This was producing a lot of thick black smoke which was drifting south into Saudi Arabia. But it was not curtailing air operations. He had just received a briefing on these: it had been a very successful day of battle field attrition. He understood that the United States intended, after the event, to send in some 600 oil technicians to bring the fires under control. The Prime Minister asked whether the firing of the oil heads was still going on. General de la Billiere confirmed that it was. Indeed the Iraqis appeared to be blowing up and firing everything in sight, devastating the whole country. There were stories of 1000's of Kuwaitis being taken away into Iraq, presumably to be used as bargaining counters, although this information came from Kuwaiti sources and might not be wholly reliable. The more one learned about Saddam Hussein and his behaviour, the more one realised how justified we were in going to war.


The Prime Minister told General de la Billiere that our forces enjoyed huge support here at home. General de la Billiere said that he had been asking soldiers about the threat from CW. He had found that they were not too concerned. They had great confidence in the excellent equipment which they had. Provided they did their drills, they did not believe it would cause heavy casualties or be a major feature of the battle field.

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The Prime Minister asked about the weather. General de la Billiere said it had finally turned for the better and looked likely to stay that way for a while.

The Prime Minister concluded by repeating his thanks to General de la Billiere and his best wishes to all our forces. General de la Billiere said he would include this in a short signal to the Division which he would issue this evening.

I am copying this letter to Richard Gozney (Foreign and Commonwealth Office), John Neilson (Department of Energy) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely,


CHARLES POWELL

Simon Webb, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence

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A: FOREIGN/MOREL MEM



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10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

23 February 1991

THE GULF:

PRESIDENT MITTERRAND'S TALK WITH PRESIDENT GORBACHEV

Pierre Morel telephoned me this afternoon to give a brief account of President Mitterrand's talk with President Gorbachev. Gorbachev had been somewhat more pressing with Mitterrand than with the Prime Minister, claiming that the differences between the Soviet six-point plan and the coalition statement were really not very great and that we could split the difference on matters such as the time scale for withdrawal. He had urged Mitterrand strongly to agree that the Security Council should sit down to integrate the two plans. President Mitterrand, in reply, had made very plain that France did not trust Saddam Hussein. The moment of truth could not be postponed any more. We had already given Iraq ample time to implement the United Nations Resolutions. Gorbachev did not, in reply, try to defend the provision in the six-point plan for eliminating the other Security Council Resolutions, but had focussed very much on time scales for withdrawal. But Mitterrand had given no ground, while expressing appreciation for Gorbachev's efforts. All in all, it had been stalemate, although Gorbachev had been less relaxed than our account of his talks with the Prime Minister had suggested.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence), John Neilson (Department of Energy), Juliet Wheldon (Law Officer's Department) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

CHARLES POWELL

Richard Gozney, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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A: /FOREIGN/GOVERNMENT

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10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

23 February 1991

THE GULF

I gave General Scowcroft an account this morning of the Prime Minister's talk with President Gorbachev, including our impressions of his general frame of mind. I also briefed him on the Prime Minister's talk with President Mitterrand and our other various contacts. He found this all encouraging. The coalition statement had attracted very wide support, and there was virtually no criticism in the United States or internationally of us being too demanding or peremptory. General Scowcroft continued that Bob Hawke had telephoned him late last night and had appeared rather agitated that, if the Soviet Union went to the Security Council with its six-point plan, it might receive more than nine votes. Scowcroft said he found this very hard to believe. Anyway, he did not judge that the Soviet Union wanted to push matters to a confrontation with the United States at the United Nations at this juncture.

We agreed that the President and the Prime Minister would talk on the secure line at 1800 London time this evening, following the expiry of the deadline for Iraq to start withdrawal from Kuwait.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence), John Neilson (Department of Energy) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

CHARLES POWELL

Richard Gozney, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

SECRET AND PERSONAL

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10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

23 February 1991

THE GULF: GERMAN AND ITALIAN VIEWS

For the sake of completeness, I should record that I have spoken during the course of this morning to Signor Vattani in the Italian Prime Minister's office, and to Peter Hartmann in Chancellor Kohl's office.

Signor Vittani was in a high old state of excitement. Had I heard the marvellous news that Saddam Hussein had accepted the Soviet six-point plan? Did I know there were many new elements which now made it possible to secure a peaceful solution? Etc, etc. I told him that he was way out of line with the view being taken by everyone else. The Prime Minister had spoken to Gorbachev earlier and made clear to him, politely but firmly, that the Soviet proposals were not acceptable, as had President Bush. We had to stand firm on the coalition statement issued yesterday as the only basis on which progress could be made. Anything else would only weaken the pressure on Saddam Hussein. Vattani clearly thinks I am a frightful old war mongerer and went off muttering darkly about the need to give diplomacy a chance.

I also briefed Peter Hartmann on the Prime Minister's conversation with Gorbachev. He indicated that the German government (which he later corrected to Chancellor Kohl) were standing firmly by the coalition statement.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence), John Neilson (Department of Energy), Juliet Wheldon (Law Officers' Department) and to Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

CHARLES POWELL

Richard Gozney Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

23 February 1991

THE GULF: PRIME MINISTER'S CONVERSATION WITH
THE NEW ZEALAND PRIME MINISTER

The New Zealand High Commissioner telephoned me late last night to say that the Prime Minister's comments to the press that all the coalition partners had been consulted about the statement issued yesterday in Washington had caused Mr. Bolger some embarrassment, since New Zealand had not in fact been consulted. The Prime Minister therefore telephoned Mr. Bolger early this morning to give him a briefing on current developments.

The Prime Minister described the background to the decision to issue the coalition statement and told Mr. Bolger about the increasing number of oil wells being set alight by the Iraqis. This was presumably in large part out of pure pique and spite, although the Iraqis might also hope to gain some military advantage, since the heavy smoke tended to obscure targets. Mr. Bolger asked whether this was affecting the military options open to the Allies. The Prime Minister said that it had not yet had any discernible effect.

The Prime Minister said that the most recent Soviet peace initiative still fell short of full implementation of the Security Council Resolutions. Iraq still seemed to speak with two different voices: Tariq Aziz in Moscow and Saddam Hussein in Baghdad. Any attempts to play for time were just not acceptable. That was why we had decided to spell out yet again our basic requirements for an end to the fighting. Now we could only wait and see how Iraq responded. Clearly we were very close to a land battle, indeed it was almost certainly unavoidable. How Saddam Hussein would react was hard to say. He might choose to go down in flames. Or he might try to disengage Iraq after a day or two and claim a victory, allowing him to withdraw.

Mr. Bolger said that he shared this judgement. He wondered how the Prime Minister thought the Russians would react in the event that there was a ground war. The Prime Minister said he thought they were probably reconciled to it. Iraq's latest conduct in firing the oil wells made it very difficult for anyone to support them. Gorbachev was unlikely to imperil relations with the West by seeming to back the Iraqis. He might choose to go back to the Security Council, but even this was not certain. If he did so, he would not get much support. Mr. Bolger asked why, in that case, the Russians would even consider going to the Security Council. The Prime Minister said that a peaceful

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solution at this late stage would still be an immense coup for Mr. Gorbachev and help Soviet prestige. Even if he failed, he would get credit for trying. Mr. Bolger agreed that an external victory would do Mr. Gorbachev no harm at home.

Mr. Bolger said that he still felt that Saddam Hussein would try to duck the final battle. The Prime Minister said it was perhaps surprising that Saddam Hussein's own supporters had not yet turned on him. He hoped the land battle, if it came, would not last too long. There were some signs that the Iraqi front lines were quite soft, although some of their forces were certainly still capable of putting up a hard fight. Beyond that, putting out the oil-field fires would be a lengthy business.

Mr. Bolger said that the New Zealand Government had received a low level approach some days ago from our Defence Attache about the availability of some armaments we needed. He had looked into the position and could say that New Zealand would be very happy to help if we followed up our request. The Prime Minister expressed gratitude for this, and suggested that he and Mr. Bolger should have a further word about developments early next week. Mr. Bolger expressed appreciation.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence), John Neilson (Department of Energy), Juliet Wheldon (Law Officer's Department) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

CHARLES POWELL

Richard Gozney, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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Subject cc Roster

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

23 February 1991

THE GULF: PRIME MINISTER'S CONVERSATION
WITH PRESIDENT MITTERRAND

President Mitterrand telephoned the Prime Minister late this morning about the situation in the Gulf.

The President said that his impression was that, between Britain, France and the Americans, everything had worked out rather well over the last few days. We were obviously moving into the last phase of our trials in good order, both politically and militarily. President Gorbachev had just asked to speak to him. He understood that the Prime Minister had already had a talk with him earlier in the day, on which I had briefed M. Morel. He would like to hear the Prime Minister's personal reactions before speaking to Gorbachev himself.

The Prime Minister agreed that matters were in good order. Gorbachev had made only two new points. First, that Saddam Hussein and the full Iraqi leadership had accepted the Soviet's six-point plan and given Tariq Aziz full authority to negotiate. Second, it had been clear that President Gorbachev was intending to revert to the UN Security Council. He felt that his six points and the coalition's statement could be integrated. For his part, he had explained why we felt that the six points fell short of what we required. President Gorbachev had acknowledged that the Soviet proposals had fallen short of the Security Council Resolutions in some respects.

The Prime Minister continued that Gorbachev had seemed quite relaxed, almost casual, about these matters. He had given no sign of agitation or irritation at the coalition statement. Gorbachev had not attempted to contradict his assurances that the Iraqis were lying about firing the oil wells. He had expressed the hope that it would be possible to go on working with the other Permanent Members of the Security Council. He had not asked for further concessions for Iraq or for an extension of the deadline. All in all, he had rather given the impression of going through the motions. He probably realised there was little hope of avoiding a land battle, short of Saddam Hussein accepting all the Allies' conditions.

President Mitterrand thanked the Prime Minister for his impressions which would be very useful to him. The two of them were now just waiting for the deadline to expire. Did the Prime Minister have any impression of mobility in Saddam Hussein's

position? The Prime Minister said the only new factor seemed to be the decision to fire the oil wells, which indicated that Saddam Hussein knew that all was lost. He had no evidence of any new flexibility. President Mitterrand said that he shared this view. He and the Prime Minister would need to keep in close touch over the coming hours. For now he wanted to thank the Prime Minister for the way in which our two countries had worked together over this very difficult period. The Prime Minister said that we were equally grateful for the close co-operation. He and the President would certainly need to talk, and possibly even meet, in the next few days. He would be very happy to do that as the need arose.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (MoD), John Neilson (Department of Energy), Juliet Wheldon (Law Officer's Department) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

CHARLES POWELL

Richard Gozney, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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KW
c/Foreign/Gorbachev

Subject: Roster

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

23 February 1991

PRIME MINISTER'S CONVERSATION WITH PRESIDENT GORBACHEV:
THE GULF

President Gorbachev telephoned the Prime Minister at 0945 this morning and they spoke for about an hour on the subject of the Gulf. Mr Gorbachev spoke in slow and measured terms. The tone throughout was affable and there was no attempt on his part to exert any pressure on the Prime Minister. He did not seek any concessions for Iraq or explicitly suggest any extension of the deadline for Iraq to accept the coalition statement. Indeed to some extent he appeared to be going through the motions. He expressed a strong wish to continue cooperation with the other Permanent Members. The only two new factors to emerge from the conversation were first that Saddam Hussein had accepted the six-point plan, and Tariq Aziz was announcing that in Moscow at the same time as the Prime Minister and Mr Gorbachev were speaking; and second Mr Gorbachev's clear intention to seek a meeting of the Security Council later today. It transpires that Gorbachev subsequently also telephoned President Mitterrand and Signor Andreotti.

Mr Gorbachev began by bringing the Prime Minister greetings from Moscow. He was glad they were able to have a talk on the telephone even before making each other's acquaintance. For today he was going to restrict the conversation to one subject only - the Gulf - and they could talk about the other matters which they both had on their minds when they met in ten days time.

Mr Gorbachev continued that earlier today he had received a reply from Saddam Hussein and the entire Iraqi leadership accepting the Soviet Union's six-point plan. He wanted to take the Prime Minister through the essential points of that. They were:

- Iraq agreed to comply with Resolution 660, in other words to withdraw all its forces immediately and unconditionally from Kuwait to the position which they occupied on 1 August 1990.

- withdrawal of Iraqi forces would begin on the day after a ceasefire and termination of all hostilities.

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- the withdrawal would be completed in 21 days, except that withdrawal from Kuwait city itself would be completed in four days.

- immediately on completion of the withdrawal of Iraqi forces, the motives which prompted adoption of the other Security Council resolutions would be removed and those resolutions would become inoperative.

- all POWs would be released and repatriated within three days following a ceasefire and the end of hostilities.

- confirmation, verification and monitoring of the ceasefire would be carried out by observer and/or peace-keeping forces, to be decided by the United Nations Security Council.

Mr Gorbachev continued that Tariq Aziz was at that moment appearing at a press conference in Moscow at which he would confirm Iraq's acceptance of these points on behalf of the Iraqi leadership. He would also add two more points - which Mr Gorbachev said he had not yet seen textually, but was familiar with the content:

- Iraq's acceptance of the six points was their reply to the US statement and nothing more was to be expected.

- rejection of the allegation that Iraq had launched an ecologically disastrous action. Tariq Aziz denied they had done so, and would say Iraq was prepared to receive a United Nations commission at any time to go there and take a look.

Mr Gorbachev went on that he had a number of additional comments. The present point had been reached only because the principal countries had acted in union and remained firm in their commitment to the basic provisions of the Security Council's resolutions. It was this which had exerted great pressure on Iraq. That should continue if possible. He did not believe that Saddam Hussein and those close to him would have accepted the six points had it not been for this steady pressure and the fear of a slide towards a land battle. Over the past few days we had all awaited a reply from Iraq, and meanwhile the United States and other members of the international coalition had not proceeded with ground operations. We were now very close to the goal of securing immediate and unconditional Iraqi withdrawal and a political solution. In the light of this new situation, we now needed to call a meeting of the United Nations Security Council. During that meeting we should consider an entire set of proposals, combining those which he had just listed and those in the US statement. These would become an integrated document with the authority of the Security Council behind it. Mr Gorbachev said that, to sum up: we should continue moving along the path of cooperation and understanding, in order to attain the goal of a peaceful solution and to prevent the

situation from taking a tragic turn. He would be grateful to hear the Prime Minister's thoughts.

The Prime Minister thanked Mr Gorbachev for telephoning and for explaining his views so clearly. He looked forward to their meeting in a week or so. He knew how much Mrs Thatcher had valued and indeed enjoyed her many meetings with Mr Gorbachev. But for today it was right to concentrate on the Gulf. He would like first to thank Mr Gorbachev for the efforts which he had made over the past few days to secure Iraq's immediate and unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait. They had been constructive, remarkable and well worthwhile. But one of our problems was the conflicting messages we received from Iraq. There was a world of difference between what Tariq Aziz said in Moscow and what Saddam Hussein said and did in Baghdad. Over the last few months we had learned to distrust Saddam Hussein deeply. The question of destruction of Kuwaiti oil fields was only the most recent example. Tariq Aziz was claiming to the Soviet Union that Iraq was not responsible for the ecological disaster in the making and that Iraq had not fired the oil fields. We had incontrovertible evidence to the contrary. They were being deliberately fired, the process was continuing and was happening on a very large scale indeed. So we simply could not believe what Tariq Aziz was saying.

The Prime Minister said he would turn next to some of the specific points raised by Mr Gorbachev. A particular difficulty we had with the Soviet six points was the notion that other Security Council resolutions apart from 660 should simply be eliminated. They contained important obligations on Iraq, we could not abandon them. This was particularly true given that we distrusted everything which Baghdad said. Moreover, we were not happy with the timescale for Iraqi withdrawal proposed in the Soviet six points. The coalition had set out its views on this in its own statement the previous day. We had all tried very hard to avoid an intensification of the fighting in the Gulf, and Mr Gorbachev's efforts had been helpful in this. But we had to recognise that matters have moved on over the last few days. In particular very substantial damage was now being caused to Kuwait: and there was no indication that Saddam Hussein was prepared to meet the full requirements of all the Security Council resolutions, which he had known about since 30 November. For these reasons, we were very sceptical of assurances from Baghdad, and were not prepared to get drawn into negotiations with Saddam Hussein at this late stage. We suspected that Iraqis were simply trying to drag matters out and delay. We had set out very clearly the conditions which Iraq had to meet. Only if Saddam Hussein met these could we now avoid a full scale land battle. The Prime Minister added that he understood and greatly respected the motives behind Mr Gorbachev's discussions with Tariq Aziz. His conclusion was that the only hope for a peaceful solution now lay with Iraq's acceptance of the position set out in the US statement the previous day to which we all subscribed.

Mr Gorbachev said that he had spoken at length to President Bush the previous evening. At that stage he had not received

Saddam Hussein's reply from Baghdad. But they had discussed all the options and exchanged their respective thoughts and assessments. He did not think the problem of conflicting statements from Baghdad and Moscow was any longer a problem, because the whole Iraqi leadership had now confirmed its acceptance of the Soviet proposals, and had indicated that Tariq Aziz had full authority to negotiate. This meant we were in a new political situation. We could not pretend that a major change had not taken place. What we needed now was a particular sense of responsibility and well thought through decisions. People realised that the Five Permanent Members of the UN Security Council had maintained intensive contacts over a long period in a search for a political solution and in order to avert a new phase of military operations which could have tragic consequences. Now we had Iraq's reply to the even tougher demands made in the new Soviet proposals, leaving all other issues to be looked into later. We could not allow ourselves the luxury of pretending nothing had happened. We must tread very cautiously and not make errors in taking decisions. Saddam Hussein was in fact accepting the immediate unconditional and total withdrawal required by Resolution 660. If we squandered this opportunity, he would be regarded as a hero and we would look inadequate in the eyes of the public.

Mr Gorbachev continued that of course he could just sit back and say: "let things go on as they are". But he had to be mindful of shared responsibility and a shared role. We should take advantage of the latest Iraqi statement and submit the issue back to the Security Council, with the aim of ending up with an integrated document which encapsulated the position of all sides. That would mean that we had attained the objectives set by the United Nations. He wanted to underline his wish that we should stick together at this crucial point in time. That way we could take the right decisions and avoid events taking a tragic turn.

The Prime Minister said that he was not convinced that further recourse to the Security Council was necessary or wise. Everything necessary for a peaceful solution was set out in the existing resolutions. We did not need anything else, only for Iraq to accept and implement them. We must be careful not to get into a situation which obscured the clarity of the united position taken by the Security Council so far. He could assure Mr Gorbachev of our wish to continue to work closely with the Soviet Union.

Mr Gorbachev said that he would have to take his leave of the Prime Minister at this point. They both had a full agenda. But he looked forward very much to seeing the Prime Minister in Moscow in a few days time. The Prime Minister confirmed that he was looking forward to their meeting. Mr Gorbachev continued that he was confident that he and the Prime Minister could develop the unique relations which were now in place between Britain and the Soviet Union. That was what he wanted. He asked the Prime Minister to give his best and most warm and friendly regards to 'Margaret'.

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- 5 -

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence), John Neilson (Department of Energy), Juliet Wheldon (Law Officers' Department) and to Sir Robin Butler.

CHARLES POWELL

Richard Gozney Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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faxed



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

Telephone 071-21 82111/3

MO 6/17/15/1D

22nd February 1991

Prime Minister

Dear Charles,

If you decide to
reply to
Cardinal, I would

THE GULF: USE OF NAPALM

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link.
COR.

Thank you for your letter of today's date attaching one from Cardinal Hume, who has written to the Prime Minister about his concerns over the use of Napalm bombs in the Gulf. I attach speaking notes for the Prime Minister's use when he telephones the Cardinal, together with a formal reply to the Cardinal's letter.

We discussed the possibility of having and MOD Minister on the wireless this lunchtime to explain the position on the use of Napalm. As I explained as the Cardinal's story has not yet made an impact in the media and we believe it would be best not to draw attention to the matter; we will, however, keep a close watch on the media and be ready to respond should the circumstances require it.

I am copying this letter to Richard Gozney (Foreign Office) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely,

P.S. I have
a written
reply ready
for you to
sign tomorrow
night.

(B H WELLS)
Private Secretary

Sir Charles Powell KCMG
No 10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

LINE TO TAKE ON US USE OF NAPALM

- Understand that US have stated that US Marine Corps have been using napalm in the Gulf.
- Have stated that purpose in using it is to fire Iraqi oil filled trenches.
- Napalm is not available to British forces in the Gulf.
- Use of napalm not covered by 1981 UN Conventional Weapons Convention (to which US and UK not parties). Third Protocol, on Incendiary Weapons, prohibits use against civilians, but does not prohibit use on troops in the field.
- Not for us to comment on possible future use of US weapon system. But coalition has repeatedly made clear that, in conducting military operations, we make every effort to minimise civilian casualties - therefore goes without saying that would not be using napalm against civilians in any case.

CONFIDENTIAL

MRM



10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

23 February 1991

See Sir,

THE GULF: USE OF NAPALM

I enclose a copy of a letter to the Prime Minister from Cardinal Hume expressing deep concern about reports that Napalm bombs are being used by the coalition in the Gulf. He has told us that he intends to make this public at mid-day. We have also received a telephone call from Lambeth Palace to say that the Archbishop of York wishes to associate himself with Cardinal Hume's remarks.

As I told you on the telephone, I think it is very important to get an MoD Minister on the radio at lunch time to deal with these allegations and provide reassurances. I think we should also enable the Prime Minister to reply to the letter before the end of the day. I should be grateful for a draft.

Since dictating the above the Prime Minister has telephoned me to say he would like to telephone Cardinal Hume later today to explain the position to him precisely.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Richard Gozney (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

Yours truly,

CHARLES POWELL

Simon Webb, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence

CONFIDENTIAL

ARCHBISHOP'S HOUSE, WESTMINSTER, LONDON, SW1P 1QJ

23 Feb 1991

Dear Prime Minister,

I am deeply concerned
to hear reports that Napalm
bombs are being loaded onto
coalition aircraft in the Gulf
conflict, and earnestly request
an urgent reassurance that they will
not be used against Iraqi troops
and civilians. Best wishes, Sincerely,
Basil Hume



✓ FERB
PC
FCO (Wozney)
MOD (Webb)
CDP on 0846
EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
LONDON

609451

February 22, 1991

Dear Prime Minister:

I have been asked to deliver the attached draft statement to you from President Bush. It was received early this morning. This message has also been sent to Paris, Ankara, Cairo, Damascus, Bonn, Rome and Ottawa and to the Kuwaiti Government in Taif.

The White House intends to release this statement at 3:00 GMT. We have been requested to provide your comment to Washington not later than 1:00 GMT.

Sincerely,

Henry E. Catto
Ambassador

Enclosure: SECRET

The Rt. Hon. John Major, M.P.,
Prime Minister,
10 Downing Street,
London, S.W. 1

DRAFT STATEMENT ON IRAQI WITHDRAWAL OFFER:

THE SOVIET ANNOUNCEMENT YESTERDAY REPRESENTS A SERIOUS AND USEFUL EFFORT BUT MAJOR OBSTACLES REMAIN.

AS PRESIDENT BUSH POINTED OUT TO PRESIDENT GORBACHEV, THE STEPS THE IRAQIS ARE CONSIDERING WOULD CONSTITUTE A CONDITIONAL (UNDERScoreD) WITHDRAWAL AND WOULD ALSO PREVENT THE FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS. ALSO, THERE IS NO INDICATION THAT IRAQ IS PREPARED TO MEET THE TEST OF IMMEDIACY IN ITS WITHDRAWAL.

FULL COMPLIANCE WITH THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS HAS BEEN A CONSISTENT AND NECESSARY DEMAND OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. THE COALITION MUST MAKE SURE THAT IRAQ HAS, IN FACT, RENOUNCED ITS CLAIM TO KUWAIT AND THAT THOSE WHO HAVE SUFFERED AS A RESULT OF THE IRAQI AGGRESSION WILL BE COMPENSATED. IN ADDITION, ONLY THE SECURITY COUNCIL CAN AGREE TO LIFT SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAQ, AND THE WORLD NEEDS TO BE ASSURED IN CONCRETE TERMS OF IRAQ'S PEACEFUL INTENTIONS BEFORE SUCH AN ACTION CAN BE TAKEN. IN A SITUATION WHERE SANCTIONS HAVE BEEN LIFTED, SADDAM HUSSEIN COULD SIMPLY REVERT TO USING HIS OIL RESOURCES ONCE AGAIN NOT TO PROVIDE FOR THE WELL-BEING OF HIS PEOPLE BUT INSTEAD TO REARM.

SO IN A FINAL EFFORT TO OBTAIN IRAQI COMPLIANCE WITH THE WILL OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, THE COALITION DECLARES THAT IT WILL NOT INITIATE A GROUND CAMPAIGN AGAINST IRAQI FORCES IF PRIOR TO NOON NEW YORK (UN) TIME SATURDAY, FEBRUARY 23, IRAQ ACCEPTS THE FOLLOWING TERMS.

-- BEGIN LARGE-SCALE WITHDRAWAL FROM KUWAIT BY NOON, NEW YORK (UN) TIME, SATURDAY, FEBRUARY 23;

-- COMPLETE MILITARY WITHDRAWAL FROM KUWAIT IN ONE WEEK. (GIVEN THE FACT THAT IRAQ INVADDED AND OCCUPIED KUWAIT IN A MATTER OF HOURS, ANYTHING LONGER THAN THIS FROM THE INITIATION OF THE WITHDRAWAL WOULD NOT MEET RESOLUTION 660'S REQUIREMENT OF IMMEDIACY.)

-- WITHIN THE FIRST 48 HOURS REMOVE ALL ITS FORCES FROM KUWAIT CITY, TO ALLOW FOR THE PROMPT RETURN OF THE LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT OF KUWAIT; FROM ALL PREPARED DEFENSES ALONG THE SAUDI-KUWAIT BORDER; FROM BUBIYAN AND WARBAH ISLANDS; AND FROM KUWAIT'S RUMAYLLAH OIL FIELD;

-- WITHIN THE ONE WEEK SPECIFIED ABOVE, RETURN ALL ITS FORCES TO THEIR POSITIONS OF AUGUST 1, IN ACCORDANCE WITH RESOLUTION 660;

-- ARRANGE WITH THE ICRC THE RELEASE OF ALL COALITION PRISONERS OF WAR AND THIRD-COUNTRY CIVILIANS BEING HELD AGAINST THEIR WILL, AND THE RETURN OF THE REMAINS OF KILLED AND DECEASED COALITION SERVICEMEN, WITHIN 24 HOURS FROM THE INITIATION OF THE WITHDRAWAL;

-- REMOVE ALL EXPLOSIVES OR BOOBY-TRAPS ON KUWAIT OIL INSTALLATIONS AND DESIGNATE IRAQI MILITARY LIAISON OFFICER(S) TO WORK WITH COALITION FORCES ON THE OPERATIONAL DETAILS RELATED TO IRAQ'S WITHDRAWAL, TO INCLUDE THE PROVISION OF ALL DATA ON THE LOCATION AND NATURE OF ANY LAND OR SEA MINES;

-- CEASE COMBAT AIRCRAFT FLIGHTS OVER IRAQ AND KUWAIT EXCEPT FOR TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT CARRYING TROOPS OUT OF KUWAIT AND ALLOW COALITION AIRCRAFT EXCLUSIVE CONTROL OVER AND USE OF ALL KUWAITI AIRSPACE;

-- CEASE ALL DESTRUCTIVE ACTIONS AGAINST KUWAITI CITIZENS AND PROPERTY AND RELEASE ALL KUWAITI DETAINEES;

-- CEASE ALL FURTHER ATTACKS, INCLUDING USE OF SCUD MISSILES AND TERRORISM BY IRAQ OR ITS SURROGATES AGAINST ANY COUNTRY, INCLUDING ISRAEL.

THE UNITED STATES AND ITS COALITION PARTNERS REITERATE THAT THEIR FORCES WILL NOT ATTACK RETREATING IRAQI FORCES SO LONG AS WITHDRAWAL PROCEEDS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ABOVE GUIDELINES. ANY BREACH OF THIS AGREEMENT WILL BEING AN INSTANT AND SHARP RESPONSE FROM COALITION FORCES IN ACCORDANCE WITH UNSC 678.

From: Lieutenant Colonel J R Durance RE
Military Assistant to Minister of State for the
Armed Forces



MINISTER OF STATE FOR
THE ARMED FORCES

D/MIN(AF)/AH/5/3/30A

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

Telephone 071 21 82216 (Direct Dialling)

071 21 89000 (Switchboard)

Line Minister

22 February 1991

You were concerned

about this.

Ap Pro3

CAF 25/2.

Dear Sir Charles

Thank you for your letter of 20 February about the arrangements for concessionary telephone calls by Service personnel in the Gulf. I should be glad to clarify the position over implementation.


Details of the £10 concession were promulgated to the Gulf on 31 January, immediately after the concession was announced in the House, along with initial instructions to pay staffs for its implementation. The concession came into effect from that point onwards; indeed, it is worth recording that it was deemed to apply for the whole of January, albeit that the announcement was made on the last day of the month. This meant that Servicemen could, from that day onwards use their £10 concession to purchase Mercury phone cards or claim a £10 refund on the 'Desert Direct' service.


Early experience of operating the concession caused us to rethink the method of implementation. No-one will be disadvantaged by the change in implementation arrangements we are now proposing; personnel will simply receive the benefit in another way. Perhaps I should also point out that some personnel in the Gulf, understandably, have no current access to telephones of any kind. It was always intended that their entitlement to the concession would be cumulative, and that they would make use of it when circumstances permitted. That remains the case.

I apologise that my earlier letter did not make this clear.

*Yours sincerely
John Durance*

Sir Charles Powell



DEPARTMENT/SERIES <i>PREM 19</i> PIECE/ITEM <i>3449</i> (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract details: <i>minute and attachment from Cradock to Powell</i> <i>dated 22 February 1991</i>	
CLOSED UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	<i>22/1/18</i> <i>M. Lunn</i>
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	
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DOCUMENT PUT IN PLACE (TNA USE ONLY)	

Instructions for completion of Dummy Card

Use black or blue pen to complete form.

Use the card for one piece or for each extract removed from a different place within a piece.

Enter the department and series,
eg. HO 405, J 82.


Enter the piece and item references, .
eg. 28, 1079, 84/1, 107/3

Enter extract details if it is an extract rather than a whole piece.
This should be an indication of what the extract is,
eg. Folio 28, Indictment 840079, E107, Letter dated 22/11/1995.
Do not enter details of why the extract is sensitive.

If closed under the FOI Act, enter the FOI exemption numbers applying to the closure, eg. 27(1), 40(2).

Sign and date next to the reason why the record is not available to the public ie. Closed under FOI exemption; Retained under section 3(4) of the Public Records Act 1958; Temporarily retained; Missing at transfer or Number not used.

A The National Archives

DEPARTMENT/SERIES <i>Prem 19</i>	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM <i>3449</i> (one piece/item number)	
Extract details: <i>Telegram 42 dated 22 February 1991</i>	
CLOSED UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
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10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

22 February 1991

bcc PC
CDP
7a-5

THE GULF

General Scowcroft and I had our customary talk this evening. General Scowcroft was very complimentary about the Prime Minister's appearance on television following publication of the statement on what Iraq has to do to avoid a land war.

General Scowcroft gave me an account of the President's talk on the telephone with President Gorbachev. The President had taken Gorbachev right through the coalition statement. Gorbachev said that Tariq Aziz had now agreed to six points. Some were different from those in the coalition statement: for instance he wanted three weeks for withdrawal rather than one. But there were also a lot of points of convergence. Gorbachev had proposed that the UN Security Council might be presented with both plans, which could then be combined into an integrated plan with the Security Council's authority. The discussion of this had gone back and forth for some time, with the President trying to explain that it was now too late for further action by the United Nations. Saddam Hussein was engaged in trying to burn down Kuwait. The whole country was black. There simply was not any more time for action at the United Nations. Gorbachev had not abandoned the idea of convening a meeting of the Security Council and Scowcroft thought it quite likely that he would persist with it. But it would be a side show.

General Scowcroft added that the President had gone out of his way to butter up Gorbachev while giving him the message it was no dice. Gorbachev had sounded perfectly relaxed, with no signs of irritation. He had undertaken to explain the coalition's plan to Tariq Aziz. He had also said, at one point, that Saddam Hussein's fate was probably already determined and he was not even trying to save him, let alone save his prestige.

General Scowcroft said that the President was in a bullish mood. He thought we were in good shape. Our train was going down the track. We were on automatic now. The situation in Kuwait itself was very nasty indeed. But although he hated to say so, Saddam Hussein had once again done us a favour by his behaviour. There had been opposition from some Governments to setting such short deadlines for Iraq to accept the coalition proposals and for withdrawal from Kuwait. But all misgivings had

D

evaporated once the President had explained what was actually happening in the country. There simply was no scope to extend deadlines: we had to get in there and put the fires out.

We then talked about the beginning of the ground campaign. I said the weather was apparently still bad. General Scowcroft confirmed this. There was now the additional hazard of smoke. But he had talked that afternoon to General Powell who believed weather they presently anticipated would permit the coalition forces to move at the appointed time, with effective air support. If the weather was even worse than expected, the start of the land battle could be postponed on a rolling 24 hour basis. But right now General Schwarzkopf thought it was manageable.

In reply to my question, General Scowcroft said he would not be at all surprised if Saddam Hussein tried to pre-empt the land battle by using chemical weapons against allied forces as early as tomorrow evening. Our main defence would be to overrun Iraqi artillery very rapidly. There was evidence that Iraqi front line troops were increasingly fragile.

General Scowcroft said the President would be at Camp David most of tomorrow, returning to Washington in the evening. He would make a statement to the nation on television at around 2200 Washington time (ie H + 2). He would give no details of the military action. The statement had not yet been written but he would let me see it tomorrow. We agreed that the President and the Prime Minister would speak to each other early evening UK time on Saturday, probably between 1700 - 1800.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

CHARLES POWELL

Richard Gozney, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL



10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

22 February 1991

Dear Richard,

THE GULF

The Soviet Ambassador called on me at 2130 this evening to hand over a personal message from President Gorbachev to the Prime Minister. I enclose a copy of it, together with the Russian original.

I said that I would convey the message to the Prime Minister in the country as rapidly as possible. After reading it through, I had a number of comments. First, I knew that the Prime Minister was grateful to President Gorbachev for his efforts to resolve the Gulf conflict peacefully. If those efforts failed, it would certainly not be for the lack of trying on Mr. Gorbachev's part. The Prime Minister attached great importance to the cooperation which had been established between the five permanent members of the UN Security Council over the past few months, and to the good working relationship between our Permanent Representative and his Soviet colleague. I knew that he hoped these gains could be preserved and built upon. I understood that President Gorbachev had spoken at length earlier in the evening to President Gorbachev and that the tone of their conversation had been constructive.


Turning to the substance of the message, I said there was a growing feeling that it was too late now for negotiations with Baghdad. Matters had moved on. Appalling damage was being deliberately caused to Kuwait. Moreover, no one had any trust at all in anything which Saddam Hussein said, as even a Soviet spokesman had recognised on television this evening. It was clear even at this stage that the Iraqis were still trying to attach conditions of their own to withdrawal and this was simply unacceptable. I was struck particularly by the sentence in President Gorbachev's message which said that all the other Security Council resolutions connected with Kuwait would cease to exist once Iraq had withdrawn. That was simply not the case: they contained important obligations which must be honoured by Iraq. They could not just be erased. There were other more detailed problems of which the Ambassador would certainly be aware, such as the Iraqi demand for three weeks in which to withdraw their forces. It was because the Iraqis constantly tried to impose conditions, that the coalition had decided to set out its requirements in unequivocal terms. Only if Iraq accepted these terms could a land battle now be avoided. I had heard reports that the Soviet Union might table its six points at the United Nations: I doubted this was any longer worth while.

CONFIDENTIAL

The Ambassador said relatively little in reply. President Gorbachev's only aim had been to avoid bloodshed. He had devoted great personal effort to moving the Iraqis and had brought them a considerable distance, although he did not deny that the six points still contained conditions. He did not know exactly what action was intended at the United Nations. But he thought that President Gorbachev would go on trying for a peaceful solution right down to the last moment. The Ambassador added that he would report my comments. He knew that President Gorbachev would appreciate any additional comments which the Prime Minister might wish to make. Given the speed with which events were moving, such comments would need to be made in the course of tomorrow.

I should be grateful if you could let me have some advice tomorrow on points which might be made on the Prime Minister's behalf to the Soviet Ambassador.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence), John Neilson (Department of Energy), Juliet Wheldon (Law Officer's Department) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely,


CHARLES POWELL

Richard Gozney, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Prime Secretary

22 February 1991

*Dear Mr. [unclear]***THE GULF**

The Soviet Ambassador called on me at 11.10 this morning and handed over a personal message from President Gorbachev to the Prime Minister. I enclose a copy of it, together with the Russian original.

I said that I would convey the message to the Prime Minister in the country as rapidly as possible. After reading it through, I had a number of comments. First, I knew that the Prime Minister was grateful to President Gorbachev for his efforts to resolve the Gulf conflict peacefully. If these efforts failed, it would certainly be because of the lack of trying on Mr. Gorbachev's part. The Prime Minister attached great importance to the cooperation which had been established between the five permanent members of the UN Security Council over the past few months, and to the special working relationship between our Permanent Representative and his Soviet colleague. I knew that he hoped these gains could be preserved and built upon. I understood that President Gorbachev had spoken at length to me in the evening to President Mitterrand and that the tone of their conversation had been constructive.

Turning to the substance of the message, I said there was a growing feeling that it was too late now for negotiations with Baghdad. Matters had moved on. Appalling damage was being deliberately caused to Kuwait. Moreover, no one had any doubt at all in anything which Saddam Hussein said, as even a Soviet spokesman had recognised on television this evening. It was clear even at this stage that the Iraqis were still trying to attach conditions to their own withdrawal and this was completely unacceptable. I was struck particularly by the sentence in President Gorbachev's message which said that all the other Security Council resolutions connected with Kuwait would remain in force once Iraq had withdrawn. That was simply not the case. They contained important obligations which must be honoured by Iraq. They could not just be erased. There were other more detailed problems of which the Ambassador would be fully aware, such as the Iraqi demand for three weeks in which to withdraw their forces. It was because the Iraqis constantly tried to impose conditions, that the coalition had decided to set out its requirements in unequivocal terms. Only if Iraq accepted these terms could a land battle now be avoided. I had heard reports that the Soviet Union might table its six points at the United Nations. I doubted this was any longer worth while.

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- 2 -

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I should be grateful if you could let me have some advice tomorrow on points which might be made on the Prime Minister's behalf to the Soviet Ambassador.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence), John Neilson (Department of Energy), Juliet Wheldon (Law Officer's Department) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely,
Charles Powell

CHARLES POWELL

Richard Gurney, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL

The Rt. Hon. John Major, MP
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

Dear Prime Minister,

I would like to inform you straight after the work we have done with T. Aziz who has been in Moscow on the instructions of the Iraqi leadership with the answer to the plan we have put forward on 18 February.

The talk with T. Aziz was a long and difficult one, but as the result, and this I can mention with satisfaction, great progress has been achieved. We managed to agree on all aspects of fulfilling resolution 660 of the Security Council, obtain from the Iraqis absolutely specific commitments to this end. T. Aziz said that due to understandable reasons he has to obtain the final agreement of President S. Hussein who was subsequently rushed the agreed wording of the proposals, but T. Aziz has no doubt that they will be approved in Bagdad.

As a result the agreement worked out last night with Iraq includes in its final version the following points:

1. Iraq has taken a commitment to fulfil resolution 660 of the Security Council according to its text, i.e. to pull out his troops from Kuwait, precisely from Kuwait, but not in general, immediately and unconditionally to the positions which they held before the intrusion into Kuwait.

The withdrawal will be carried out from the whole of the territory of that country. The Iraqis have removed their reservations pertaining to the future political structure in the re-established Kuwait. Any linkages of the withdrawal of the troops with any other questions are excluded. Thus all of the original reasons for adopting resolution 660 of the Security Council and all other agreements which followed it will be totally removed.

We managed to fix the exact time framework of the withdrawal of the troops from Kuwait. Subsequently really substantial difficulties to carry it out in a shortest possible period of time have emerged. The Iraqi representative was proving that the problem is not in the political will but in the practical ability to withdraw Iraq's half-million army from Kuwait together with its arms and ammunition, when all the communications have been destroyed. In the calculations of the Iraqis this would take from three to four months. Still we managed to persuade the Iraqis to take a commitment to finish the withdrawal not later than in 21 days and in connection of the Kuwait capital - to conduct this withdrawal in four days. We think that this fact - total liberation of the Kuwaiti capital already in the first days - has the greatest importance from all points of view.

The commitment pertaining to the exchange of POWs has been specified. The Iraqis firmly promise to carry it out not later than in three days. To make it even more quicker they would not be able because of the technical difficulties.

The biggest difficulty presented the finalizing of points 4 and 5 of the agreements reached last night. We persuaded the Iraqi side to remove the position that all economic sanctions will be abolished after Iraq had withdrawn two-thirds of its forces in Kuwait. This wording truly caused reservations in connection with sincerity of Iraq's pledge to withdraw finally from Kuwait. In the end a wording has been agreed which implies that all other resolutions of the Security Council connected with the Kuwait crisis will cease to exist only after the last Iraqi soldier had left Kuwait. This, by the way, will be an additional factor persuading the Iraqis not to delay the withdrawal of their troops from Kuwait: after a long blockade and war it is essential to them to restore as fast as possible normal economic ties with other countries. Putting the question in such a way is legitimate also in the sense that all of the following 11 resolutions of the Security Council followed from the fact that the Iraqis refused to fulfil resolution 660.

3.

We felt important to put under strict international control the fulfilment of all these Iraqi commitments. Subsequently we proposed a wording on the sending into Kuwait observers or peace-keeping forces as the UN Security Council would feel right.

I can say without exaggeration that we consider that the result we have reached finally allows to put a stop to the development of the military line of the conflict and start final removal of its results by political means. We do not see this result as just our service. The fact that a possibility emerged today to stop the war and thus save possibly many thousands of lives of Arabs and citizens of other countries is connected first of all with the fact that the world community, the Security Council have demonstrated during the whole of the conflict a striking unity. For the first time in the history of international relations after the World War II we managed by collective efforts to stop aggression and provide a lesson to any other possible aggressor in the future. This would not have been possible if there was no dramatic changes in international relations from confrontation to interaction and partnership. We managed to attain much in the settlement in Namibia, in the question of Cambodia, there was a significant progress in the settlement in Angola. Now we have a wonderful possibility to deepen our co-operation in the successful ending of the crisis in the Persian Gulf. Taking into account the agreements we have reached with the Iraqi leadership we put forward a proposal for an immediate convening of the Security Council, which would put in practical terms everything which pertains to the confirmation of the liberation of Kuwait and its re-establishment as a sovereign and territorially integral state, as an equal member of the United Nations. The Soviet representative in the Security Council will receive instructions to establish close contact with representatives of other states - members of the Council.

M. GORBACHEV

22 February 1991

CONFIDENTIAL

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

22 February 1991

*Dear Richard,*THE GULF

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
The Ambassador said relatively little in reply. President Gorbachev's only aim had been to avoid bloodshed. He had devoted great personal effort to moving the Iraqis and had brought them a considerable distance, although he did not deny that the six points still contained conditions. He did not know exactly what action was intended at the United Nations. But he thought that President Gorbachev would go on trying for a peaceful solution right down to the last moment. The Ambassador added that he would report my comments. He knew that President Gorbachev would appreciate any additional comments which the Prime Minister might wish to make. Given the speed with which events were moving, such comments would need to be made in the course of tomorrow.

X

Excluded

I should be grateful if you could let me have some advice tomorrow on points which might be made on the Prime Minister's behalf to the Soviet Ambassador.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence), John Neilson (Department of Energy), Juliet Wheldon (Law Officer's Department) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely,


CHARLES POWELL

Richard Gurney, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL

The Rt.Hon. John Major, MP
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

Dear Prime Minister,

I would like to inform you straight after the work we have done with T.Aziz who has been in Moscow on the instructions of the Iraqi leadership with the answer to the plan we have put forward on 18 February.

The talk with T.Aziz was a long and difficult one, but as the result, and this I can mention with satisfaction, great progress has been achieved. We managed to agree on all aspects of fulfilling resolution 660 of the Security Council, obtain from the Iraqis absolutely specific commitments to this end. T.Aziz said that due to understandable reasons he has to obtain the final agreement of President S.Hussein who was subsequently rushed the agreed wording of the proposals, but T.Aziz has no doubt that they will be approved in Bagdad.

As a result the agreement worked out last night with Iraq includes in its final version the following points:

1. Iraq has taken a commitment to fulfil resolution 660 of the Security Council according to its text, i.e. to pull out his troops from Kuwait, precisely from Kuwait, but not in general, immediately and unconditionally to the positions which they held before the intrusion into Kuwait.

The withdrawal will be carried out from the whole of the territory of that country. The Iraqis have removed their reservations pertaining to the future political structure in the re-established Kuwait. Any linkage of the withdrawal of the troops with any other questions are excluded. Thus all of the original reasons for adopting resolution 660 of the Security Council and all other agreements which followed it will be totally removed.

2.

We managed to fix the exact time framework of the withdrawal of the troops from Kuwait. Subsequently really substantial difficulties to carry it out in a shortest possible period of time have emerged. The Iraqi representative was proving that the problem is not in the political will but in the practical ability to withdraw Iraq's half-million army from Kuwait together with its arms and ammunition, when all the communications have been destroyed. In the calculations of the Iraqis this would take from three to four months. Still we managed to persuade the Iraqis to take a commitment to finish the withdrawal not later than in 21 days and in connection of the Kuwait capital - to conduct this withdrawal in four days. We think that this fact - total liberation of the Kuwait capital already in the first days - has the greatest importance from all points of view.

The commitment pertaining to the exchange of POWs has been specified. The Iraqis firmly promise to carry it out not later than in three days. To make it even more quicker they would not be able because of the technical difficulties.

The biggest difficulty presented the finalising of points 4 and 5 of the agreements reached last night. We persuaded the Iraqi side to remove the position that all economic sanctions will be abolished after Iraq had withdrawn two-thirds of its forces in Kuwait. This wording truly caused reservations in connection with sincerity of Iraq's pledge to withdraw finally from Kuwait. In the end a wording has been agreed which implies that all other resolutions of the Security Council connected with the Kuwait crisis will cease to exist only after the last Iraqi soldier had left Kuwait. This, by the way, will be an additional factor persuading the Iraqis not to delay the withdrawal of their troops from Kuwait: after a long blockade and war it is essential to them to restore as fast as possible normal economic ties with other countries. Putting the question in such a way is legitimate also in the sense that all of the following 11 resolutions of the Security Council followed from the fact that the Iraqis refused to fulfil resolution 660.

3.

We felt important to put under strict international control the fulfillment of all these Iraqi commitments. Subsequently we proposed a wording on the sending into Kuwait observers or peace-keeping forces as the UN Security Council would feel right.

I can say without exaggeration that we consider that the result we have reached finally allows to put a stop to the development of the military line of the conflict and start final removal of its results by political means. We do not see this result as just our service. The fact that a possibility emerged today to stop the war and thus save possibly many thousands of lives of Arabs and citizens of other countries is connected first of all with the fact that the world community, the Security Council have demonstrated during the whole of the conflict a striking unity. For the first time in the history of international relations after the World War II we managed by collective efforts to stop aggression and provide a lesson to any other possible aggressor in the future. This would not have been possible if there was no dramatic changes in international relations from confrontation to interaction and partnership. We managed to attain much in the settlement in Namibia, in the question of Cambodia, there was a significant progress in the settlement in Angola. Now we have a wonderful possibility to deepen our co-operation in the successful ending of the crisis in the Persian Gulf. Taking into account the agreement we have reached with the Iraqi leadership we put forward a proposal for an immediate convening of the Security Council, which would put in practical terms everything which pertains to the confirmation of the liberation of Kuwait and its re-establishment as a sovereign and territorially integral state, as an equal member of the United Nations. The Soviet representative in the Security Council will receive instructions to establish close contact with representatives of other states - members of the Council.

N. GOREACHEV

22 February 1991

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T55/91

The Rt.Hon. John Major, MP
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

Subject: *cc: Master
Ops*

Dear Prime Minister,

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The talk with T.Aziz was a long and difficult one, but as the result, and this I can mention with satisfaction, great progress has been achieved. We managed to agree on all aspects of fulfilling resolution 660 of the Security Council, obtain from the Iraqis absolutely specific commitments to this end. T.Aziz said that due to understandable reasons he has to obtain the final agreement of President S.Hussein who was subsequently rushed the agreed wording of the proposals, but T.Aziz has no doubt that they will be approved in Bagdad.

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M. GORBACHEV

22 February 1991

CONFIDENTIAL



10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

22 February 1991

Dear Robert,

THE GULF: EGYPTIAN VIEWS

President Mubarak telephoned the Prime Minister this evening to confirm that he was wholly supportive of the coalition's statement on the Gulf. The Prime Minister agreed that it was a good statement. The Iraqis had been trying to reach a settlement that fell short of the Security Council Resolutions. We had to stop them stringing us along. President Mubarak said you could never believe a word that Saddam Hussein said. All Iraqis were liars. They told you one thing and did another. The Prime Minister said that we had been right to take a robust line.

President Mubarak said he had talked to President Bush, who clearly thought things were on the right track. The Prime Minister expressed some concern that the Soviet Union might now try to take the issue to the Security Council. President Mubarak seemed rather startled by this, and commented that time was short. The Prime Minister observed that there was no third way. He added that he was delighted at the way in which the coalition was working together.

I am sending copies of this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence), John Neilson (Department of Energy), Juliet Wheldon (Law Officers' Department) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely,

C.D. POWELL

Richard Gozney, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

22 February 1991

Dear Richard,

THE GULF: SAUDI VIEWS

I spoke to Prince Bandar, the Saudi Ambassador in Washington, this evening. I said that we hoped the Saudi Government would be associating itself with the Coalition statement at Head of State level. Prince Bandar said that Prince Saud would be reading the text to the assembled press corps in Riyadh any minute now in the King's name. The Saudi Government were entirely supportive of it. They had also established that the Syrians supported it, and would be issuing a statement. Prince Bandar added that, in his view, the Iraqis had gone crazy by starting to fire the oilfields in Kuwait last night. But the end was near (I assume Saddam Hussein's).

I am sending copies of this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence), John Neilson (Department of Energy), Juliet Wheldon (Law Officers' Department), and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

C.D. POWELL

Richard Gozney, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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File



Subject cc Martin

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

22 February 1991

Dear Richard,

THE GULF: ITALIAN VIEWS

I should record that Signor Andreotti telephoned the Prime Minister, while he was in the car on the way to Northolt earlier this morning, to talk about the latest ceasefire proposals on the Gulf. He explained that he was about to speak in a debate and asked for the Prime Minister's assessment of the eight-point plan put forward by the Soviet Union the previous evening. The Prime Minister delivered the views which he had already explained in his early morning press conference. I translated them. At some point we seemed to have lost contact with Signor Andreotti, so I am not sure how much of the Prime Minister's wisdom disappeared harmlessly into the ether. But I see that Andreotti referred to the conversation in his subsequent speech.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence), John Neilson (Department of Energy) and to Sir Robin Butler.

Yours sincerely,
C. D. Powell

C. D. POWELL

Richard Gozney, Esq.
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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file

6

Subject cc MASTER

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

22 February 1991

Dear Richard,

THE GULF

I should record that the Prime Minister spoke to President Bush at around 1230 today from an office in the firm of Typerite Ltd in Warrenpoint (Northern Ireland) to discuss the proposed draft statement setting out the Allies' position on what is required of Iraq if a ground war is to be avoided. The Prime Minister said that we were generally content with the text, save for one or two fairly minor amendments which were being transmitted separately to the White House. He was sure the strategy of setting out precisely what Saddam Hussein had to do was the right one. It put the onus back on the Iraqis. If there was a land war, it would clearly be their fault. The Prime Minister added that the Foreign Secretary had reported that the French and Germans seemed to be on board for the statement. The President, for his part, made it quite clear that the United States were not going to be deterred from pressing ahead with their timetable for a land campaign.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence), John Neilson (Department of Energy), Juliet Wheldon (Attorney General's Office) and to Sir Robin Butler.

C. D. POWELL

Richard Gozney, Esq.
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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IRAQ/KUWAIT: ITALIAN REACTION TO SOVIET PROPOSALS

SUMMARY

1. ITALIAN PRELIMINARY REACTIONS CAUTIOUS BUT MODESTLY OPTIMISTIC. ANDREOTTI MAY TRY AND CONTACT PRIME MINISTER AGAIN LATER TODAY.

DETAIL

2. SPEAKING THIS MORNING AT THE CLOSURE OF THE DEBATE IN THE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES ON THE GULF WAR, ANDREOTTI SAID:

.... ' THE LATEST NEWS FROM MOSCOW, IN THIS ALTERATION BETWEEN HOPE AND DISAPPOINTMENT, HAS REAWAKENED CONFIDENCE THAT THERE WILL BE AN END TO THE CONFLICT AND THE RESTORATION OF FREEDOM TO KUWAIT WITHOUT THE SHEDDING OF ANY MORE BLOOD. PATIENCE AND WISDOM APPEAR TO BE WINNING AT LAST'.... UNQUOTE.

3. ANDREOTTI SAID THAT ON THE TWO POINTS IN THE GORBACHEV PLAN ON WHICH BUSH HAD EXPRESSED SPECIFIC RESERVATIONS, THAT CONCERNING THE RELEASE OF PRISONERS OF WAR WAS, IN HIS (ANDREOTTI'S) VIEW 'POSITIVELY RESOLVED': WHILE THE SECOND POINT, CONCERNING THE LENGTH OF TIME ALLOWED FOR WITHDRAWAL, 'OUGHT NOT (NOT) TO BE DIFFICULT'. GORBACHEV AS HAVING SAID THAT IT WOULD BE 'UNREAL AND UNACCEPTABLE' TO LET THE IRAQIS ATTACH CONDITIONS TO THE WITHDRAWAL.

4. ANDREOTTI, REFERRING TO THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS, STATED THAT DECISIONS ON THE LIFTING OF MEASURES AGAINST IRAQ WERE NOT A MATTER FOR BILATERAL AGREEMENTS AND COULD ONLY BE TAKEN WHEN THERE HAD BEEN COMPLETE IRAQI WITHDRAWAL FROM KUWAIT.

5. ANDREOTTI TOLD CHAMBER THAT HE HAD BEEN IN TOUCH THIS MORNING WITH PRIME MINISTER MAJOR AND HAD ASCERTAINED THAT THERE WERE 'VARIOUS POINTS IN COMMON IN OUR EVALUATION OF THE SOVIET PROPOSALS'. HE ADDED 'IT IS ESSENTIAL, AT THIS JUNCTURE, TO

MAINTAIN AND STRENGTHEN COHESION WITH OUR PARTNERS'.

6. WE HAVE BEEN TOLD BY HIS DIPLOMATIC ADVISER THAT ANDREOTTI WAS ABLE TO HAVE ONLY A BRIEF WORD WITH THE PRIME MINISTER THIS MORNING AND WAS PROPOSING TO TELEPHONE MR MAJOR AGAIN LATER TODAY ON HIS RETURN FROM BELFAST. VATTANI CONFIRMED TO ME THAT ANDREOTTI ALSO SPOKE THIS MORNING TO MITTERRAND.

COMMENT

7. IN HIS SPEECH YESTERDAY AT THE OPENING OF THE DEBATE, ANDREOTTI WAS CLEARLY AT PAINS TO PLACATE ALL PARTS OF THE POLITICAL SPECTRUM AND TO REASSURE PUBLIC OPINION, INCLUDING THE CATHOLIC CHURCH AND THE PACIFIST LOBBIES, THAT THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT HAD DONE EVERYTHING IN ITS POWER TO BRING ABOUT A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. ALTHOUGH HE WAS CAREFUL TO AVOID ANY REPETITION OF HIS ORIGINAL EUPHORIC REACTION TO THE SOVIET PEACE PLAN, HIS TONE THROUGHOUT WAS OPTIMISTIC. WHILE APPEARING TO ACCEPT THE INEVITABILITY OF A LAND OFFENSIVE, HE URGED HIS AUDIENCE TO LOOK BEYOND THAT TO THE 'NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER' WHICH WOULD FOLLOW IT. HIS WINDING-UP SPEECH TODAY WAS RATHER MORE SOBER. ALL THE SAME, WITH HIS CUSTOMARY SKILL, HE SKATED ROUND THE MAIN LACUNAE IN THE GORBACHEV PROPOSALS. ACCORDING TO PALAZZI CHIGI, ANDREOTTI'S CLOSING SPEECH TODAY CONSTITUTES THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT'S OFFICIAL REACTION TO THE SOVIET PLAN, AND NO FURTHER ADDITIONAL STATEMENT IS ENVISAGED FOR THE MOMENT. ITALIAN ATTENTION IS NOW FOCUSSED ON PRESIDENT BUSH'S T.V. SPEECH DUE AT 1500Z.

EGERTON

YYYY

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MR W D REEVES CABINET OFFICE

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MY TELNO 539: IRAQ/KUWAIT: WASHINGTON SITREP

SUMMARY

1. PRESIDENT SEEN TO DELIVER ULTIMATUM TO IRAQ. BUT SOVIET PROPOSAL PRESENTS DIFFICULT DILEMMA FOR ADMINISTRATION.

DETAIL

2. WITH PRESIDENT BUSH HAVING JUST DELIVERED WHAT IS WIDELY SEEN AS AN ULTIMATUM TO IRAQ (TUR), THERE IS WIDESPREAD COMMENT IN THE MEDIA THAT THE SOVIET PROPOSAL HAD PRESENTED THE ADMINISTRATION WITH ITS MOST DIFFICULT DIPLOMATIC DILEMMA SINCE HOSTILITIES COMMENCED: WHETHER TO PROCEED WITH A GROUND OFFENSIVE AND RISK THE COLLAPSE OF COALITION SUPPORT, OR SETTLE FOR LESS THAN UNCONDITIONAL IRAQI WITHDRAWAL. ANALYSTS HAVE NOTED THAT THE PRESIDENT MIGHT FIND HIMSELF CAUGHT IN THE GAP BETWEEN HIS PUBLICLY ANNOUNCED WAR AIMS AND THE ALLIES' UNOFFICIAL DESIRE TO TOPPLE SADDAM. THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT HAS PRE-EMPTED THIS SPECULATION AND COMMENTATORS EXPECT THE ADMINISTRATION TO SPELL OUT VERY TIGHT CONDITIONS FOR IRAQI WITHDRAWAL. THE SHORT DEADLINE OFFERED BAGHDAD (NOON ON 23 FEBRUARY) IS CONSIDERED ACCEPTABLE BY MILITARY COMMANDERS, AS IT DOES NOT SERIOUSLY RETARD MOMENTUM TOWARDS AN ALLIED GROUND ASSAULT.

3. REACTION IN WASHINGTON TO THE SOVIET PROPOSAL RANGED FROM HOPEFUL TO SCEPTICAL. WHILE SOME INFLUENTIAL OPINION, INCLUDING SENIOR DEMOCRATS ON THE HILL, SAW IT AS A REAL OPPORTUNITY FOR PEACE, THE MAJORITY VIEW WAS THAT THIS WAS PROBABLY YET ANOTHER EFFORT BY SADDAM TO PLAY FOR TIME. BUT COMMENTATORS RECOGNISED THAT THE PROPOSAL WAS MORE SERIOUS THAN ANY EARLIER OFFER AND THEREFORE DIFFICULT FOR THE US TO REJECT OUT OF HAND. MANY SPECULATED THAT IT WAS BASED ON A CHANGE OF PERCEPTION BY SADDAM AND A RECOGNITION THAT SURVIVAL - AND HIS RETENTION OF A SIGNIFICANT MILITARY CAPABILITY - WAS NOW MORE IMPORTANT THAN VICTORY.

4. THE SOVIET ROLE HAS CONTINUES TO RECEIVE CLOSE SCRUTINY.

WHILE THE PRESIDENT HAS PUBLICLY EXPRESSED HIS APPRECIATION FOR GORBACHEV'S INITIATIVE, ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS ARE REPORTED TO BE SUSPICIOUS OF MOSCOW'S RESCUE OF ITS OLD ALLY IN BAGHDAD. THIS HAS BEEN WIDELY SEEN AS A BID BY GORBACHEV TO REVIVE HIS INTERNATIONAL PRESTIGE. AT THE SAME TIME, MOSCOW'S IMPRIMATUR SEEMED TO MANY TO MAKE THE PROPOSAL MORE DIFFICULT TO DISMISS. COALITION REACTION TO THE PROPOSAL IS BEING CLOSELY WATCHED.

ACLAND

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PS/CHIEF SEC TO THE TREASURY
EMERGENCY UNIT
RESIDENT CLERK

NNNN

Ref. AO91/450

PRIME MINISTER

cc Sir Percy Cradock
Mr Appleyard

OPD(G): 22 February

Item 1: Statement on Iraqi Withdrawal

Ministers will have copies of the United States draft statement and my message to General Scowcroft giving our response. Spare copies are available. The original agenda has been overtaken by events.

2. You may wish to begin by reporting on your telephone call to President Bush. You might then ask me to report on the reply to the US statement. You might then ask whether the Foreign Secretary and Defence Secretary, who were consulted on the telephone, have any general points which they would like to make at this stage.

3. You might then invite the Foreign Secretary to consider what is likely to happen next and those points on which a British response will be required. The US statement will have been made at 1500 or thereabouts: we have asked the Americans to let us have a copy of the final version as soon as possible. The Russians are still beaver away with the Iraqis on revised proposals which the US statement will cut across. The Russians may react by switching the action back to the Security Council in

SECRET - UK EYES A



SECRET - UK EYES A

order to canvas support for a softer approach among Iraq's supporters and the non-aligned. The Indian draft Resolution, which fortunately has only made slow headway, may be revived. So we could have a messy diplomatic situation.

4. The Russians and their allies are likely to focus on a number of specific points. They may argue that the acceptance deadline of noon New York time tomorrow is too short and that more time should be given. We will need to consider with the Americans whether, as a last mile gesture, we might be prepared to add on another 24 hours if this seemed likely either to elicit the right response or, more probably, to underline the unreasonableness of the Iraqi position.

What happens if they don't retreat.
5. Attention might also be focussed on the final paragraph of the US statement in which we commit ourselves not to attack retreating Iraqi forces. This leaves us the discretion to attack other Iraqi forces even while orderly withdrawal is taking place. You may like to ask the Foreign and Defence Secretaries for their views on whether, if we decided to exercise this option, it would be politically sustainable internationally. You might also ask the Energy Secretary for his views on the domestic reaction, and the Attorney General on the legalities. This is an entirely separate matter from whether we resume hostilities if the Iraqis fail to withdraw properly: I take it there is general agreement that we should be prepared to do so.

6. M. Morel told me that the French were proposing to publish the statement themselves substituting "France" for "The United States" in the final paragraph. President Mitterrand hoped that other coalition colleagues will do the same and was going to make the suggestion to President Mubarak that the Egyptians did

SECRET - UK EYES A

likewise. No doubt we will want to express our solidarity by a statement of support rather than re-issuing the statement in our name, but it is worth considering whether we can do anything to ensure that the other coalition partners, particularly the Arabs, publicly associate themselves with the statement.

7. You might ask colleagues for their views on likely developments with the Opposition and with the House of Commons. You may wish to speak to Mr Kinnock, and the Foreign and Defence Secretaries might have a word with their opposite numbers.

8. You may wish to conclude the discussion by reaffirming the need for colleagues to emphasise the reasonableness of the terms and the need for the Iraqis to make a clear response. They have had six months to make up their minds on the main issues. You might remind colleagues that further OPD(G) meetings could be needed at short notice over the weekend and establish their availability.


Item 2: Media Handling

9. You might ask the Energy Secretary and Mr O'Donnell for their views on how we should handle media comment on the US statement over the next 24 hours as the deadline runs. They will need to do some intensive briefing of editors and correspondents. The Foreign Secretary will have with him a line to take on the US statement.

F.R.B.

ROBIN BUTLER

22 February 1991



PRIME MINISTER

THE GULF

There has been considerable activity over night. Tariq Aziz saw Gorbachev late last night. The Russians subsequently published an 8-point plan (attached) and Gorbachev telephoned President Bush about it. I subsequently spoke to General Scowcroft, and Secretary Baker telephoned the Foreign Secretary. The Americans have been careful not to say the plan is unacceptable: instead they have spoken of consulting their allies. In practice there seems some difference between Scowcroft, who does not regard the plan as a step forward, and Baker who is inclined to think it would be difficult to turn down. The Americans are doing further analysis and will contact us during the day. The French have also been on to me with a fairly positive reaction.

You might like to telephone the Foreign Secretary as soon as you have read these papers. There are two immediate points to decide:

- What we say. Our current line is that we are consulting the Americans and others. The question is whether we give a cautious welcome to some aspects of the proposals but pointing out they still contain major difficulties.
- What the implications are for yours and the Foreign Secretary's movements. He and the Defence Secretary are due to be in Paris all day for a WEU meeting. I think these plans should go ahead. But the question is whether you should return early for a meeting, say at tea-time, in London.

C D Q
C. D. POWELL

22 February 1991

C:\wpdocs\foreign\pm (pmm)

The 8 point plan

1. Iraq agrees full and unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait.
2. Withdrawal to be monitored by UN.
3. Withdrawal begins two days after ceasefire.
4. Economic sanctions to end when two-thirds of Iraqi forces withdrawn from Kuwait.
5. Immediate release of POWs after ceasefire.
6. Cancellation of all UN resolutions after all troops are out.
7. Withdrawal to be to a fixed time frame.
8. Further details to be announced today (22 February).

30-9

GULF CRISIS: SOVIET PEACE PLAN

Soviet Eight Points

A. Iraq states its full and unconditional withdrawal of its force from Kuwait.

Agreement to withdraw. Satisfactory if viewed in isolation from other conditions.

B. The withdrawal of forces begins on the second day after the cessation of hostilities.

Unsatisfactory. Coalition requirements are that a ceasefire would take effect only after Iraq had given an unambiguous commitment to withdraw and there was clear evidence that the withdrawal was underway. A pause would allow Iraq to organise its forces and preserve more of its military equipment. Unclear when the ceasefire would become effective.

C. The withdrawal of forces will take place in a fixed time frame

Duration of the withdrawal not so far defined (though we know from the Americans that the Iraqis have asked for 6 weeks). Allies will require Iraqis to leave quickly, preferably without their equipment.

D. After the withdrawal of two-thirds of the Iraqi forces from Kuwait the economic sanctions envisaged by the UN will cease to apply to Iraq.

Unsatisfactory. Inconsistent with the purpose of sanctions as set out in the Security Council resolutions (to secure full Iraqi withdrawal). Would remove the major element of Allied leverage on Iraq; lifting of sanctions could encourage Saddam to string out the later stages of the withdrawal. No mention is made of the lifting of sanctions on Kuwait.

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- E. After the end of a withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait the causes for the corresponding resolutions of the Security Council will cease to exist so those resolutions would cease to be in effect.

Unsatisfactory. Security Council resolutions cover not only Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait but other requirements too (restoration of legitimate Government of Kuwait, Iraq/Kuwait negotiations, reparations/compensation, grave breaches of Geneva Conventions etc). There is no automatic link between Iraqi compliance with SCR 660 and the withdrawal of other SCRs. Sanctions can only be lifted by a decision of the Security Council. Some will need to be kept in place as a means of pressure on Iraq: it is central to long term coalition strategy that a UN arms embargo be maintained for as long as possible.

- F. After the ceasefire all POWs will be immediately released.

Satisfactory in principle but arrangements need further definition. Iraqis must be tied down to very early release of Allied POWs.

- G. The withdrawal of forces will be monitored by the countries not directly involved in the conflict, being so entrusted by the Security Council of the United Nations.

Unsatisfactory. Monitoring of the withdrawal should be carried out by the Allies, who would reserve the right to recommence hostilities if the Iraqis did not meet their conditions. Outside observers would get in the way. Unclear who would decide whether Iraq's withdrawal was satisfactory and how its progress would be measured. The deployment of UN observers would require a new Security Council resolution.

- H. The final outcome will be made public on 22 February to Members of the Security Council.

Unsatisfactory. This contradicts an earlier steer given to the Embassy in Moscow by the Foreign Ministry that the Russians would

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consult the Five Permanent Members before going to the Security Council.

According to Gorbachev's spokesman, the Iraqi response to these proposals were "positive".

Questions for Consideration

(a) What further points do the Russians intend to negotiate with Tariq Aziz before conveying the package to Members of the Security Council? (An obvious example is the duration of the Iraqi withdrawal: there are probably others).

(b) Can we establish that the Iraqis have now discarded ^{other}/Phase II issues (Arab/Israel, Withdrawal of coalition forces, Access to the sea etc.).

US Reaction

The Americans have been careful not to rush into premature public comment (though they have let it be known that President Bush stated a number of concerns during his telephone conversations with Gorbachev). The White House spokesman said on 21 February that the Americans were examining the proposals in detail and consulting the other Allies. Meanwhile, they would continue to prosecute the war. A detailed response to the proposals was unlikely before well into 22 February (Washington time). He emphasised that the US was not directly involved in the negotiations.

Since the announcement of the Soviet Plan Sir Charles Powell has spoken twice to General Scowcroft and Mr Baker has telephoned the Secretary of State. Sir A Acland has also spoken to Mr Gates. The Americans have not yet decided how to react but are becoming increasingly dubious about the Soviet proposals. Apart from the timescale of the withdrawal (point C) they see the biggest problem as the lifting of sanctions (points D and E) and the suggestion that the ceasefire should take effect before the beginning of the withdrawal (point B). They were considering two possible courses: for the coalition partners simply to inform the Russians tomorrow

b

that the plan was not acceptable; or to accompany this with a statement of what would be acceptable (in effect a shorter version of their ceasefire paper which they have sent us but which has not yet been circulated by No 10). Baker told the Secretary of State that they might shortly go public with their list of requirements for a ceasefire and perhaps with some of their objections to the Soviet Plan, though Scowcroft thought it unlikely that a decision would be taken until later on 22 February. Sir A Acland believes that Congressional opinion would be in favour of a postponement of the land campaign while the Soviet proposals were evaluated.

Baker told the Secretary of State he did not favour direct discussion with the Iraqis about a ceasefire. He did not think Tariq Aziz had authority to settle the outstanding US objections. But if he did have such authority, to cover all their points, it might prove difficult not to settle.

News Management

Initially News Department took the line that we were, of course, studying the reports from Moscow, but at first sight these developments did not seem to change the picture of Iraq setting pre-conditions for withdrawal. Nothing we had yet heard from Moscow suggested any change from the position outlined by the Prime Minister in the House on 21 February.

Following Mr Baker's telephone conversation with the Secretary of State this line was modified to indicate only that we are in touch with the Americans who are keeping us closely informed of their contacts with Moscow.

Questions for HMG

We now need to consider with the Americans (and, as appropriate, French and other coalition members) the following points:

- (a) What, if any, action should we take to follow up US contacts with the Russians? The Americans are clearly in the lead but should we attempt to counter Soviet public diplomacy by lobbying others?

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(D) What action should now be taken to keep the coalition together. A public statement reiterating the basic requirements of the Security Council resolutions and pointing up some of the flaws in the Soviet proposals might be helpful. But this will depend in part on whether and when the Americans go public with their announcement for a ceasefire and objections to the Iraqi/Soviet package.

(c) How should we handle Soviet moves in the Security Council? first step will be to try and establish Soviet strategy in more detail; thereafter we need to consult sympathetic Council Members and involve key Arab allies. We need if possible to avoid putting ourselves into a position of having to veto a "peace" resolution.

(d) We need to advise the Secretary of State how to handle the WE Ministerial meeting in Paris on 22 February. This might be a suitable vehicle for a statement of the sort suggested at (b) above.

(e) Whether any modification will be necessary to our public line before the Americans have responded to the Russians. We should try to avoid this if we can.

8

STATEMENT BY
VITALY IGNATENKO
SPOKESMAN FOR PRESIDENT GORBACHEV

MOSCOW, USSR

6:30 P.M. (EST)
THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 21, 1991

TX

MR. IGNATENKO: (Through interpreter.) Please excuse me for having kept you for so long, but I do think that the effort was worthwhile.

So, the negotiations went for two hours, 20 minutes. They began at zero hours, ten minutes. They finished just ten minutes ago. Being entrusted by the President of Iraq and the Revolutionary Command, Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz presented the response to the plan put forward by Mikhail Gorbachev. They -- the response is positive.

Those responses, after their thorough discussion, the comparison of the various positions, the two parties came to the conclusion that it is possible to find a way out of the military conflict in the Gulf, along the following lines:

We see the following approaches being evolved in this process, that include the following positions:

First, Iraq states about its full and unconditional withdrawal of its forces from Kuwait.

Second, the withdrawal of forces begins on the second day after the cessation of hostilities.

The withdrawal of forces will take place in a fixed -- a fixed time frame.

Fourth, after the withdrawal of two-thirds of all the forces -- Iraqi forces from Kuwait,

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the economic sanctions envisaged by the UN will cease to apply to Iraq.

Fifth, after the end of a withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait, thus the causes will cease to exist, the causes for the corresponding resolutions of the Security Council, so thus those resolutions would cease to be in effect.

Sixth, right after the cease-fire, all the POWs will be immediately released.

Seventh, the withdrawal of forces would be monitored by the countries not directly involved in the conflict, being so entrusted by the Security Council of the United Nations.

And last point. The work on determining the details and specifications continues. The final outcome of this work will be made public today, on the 22nd of February, to the country members, present members of the Security Council of the United Nations.

This is what I had to say about the work conducted today, so I do think that I can say a very good morning. (Applause.) I do think that we can give some applause here.

END

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CONFIDENTIAL

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TO FLASH WASHINGTON

TELNO

OF 221520Z FEBRUARY 91

AND TO DESKBY 220700Z PARIS (FOR PS/FOREIGN SECRETARY AND
PS/DEFENCE SECRETARY ON ARRIVAL AT AIRPORT)

INFO IMMEDIATE MOSCOW (PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR)

FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

IRAQ/KUWAIT: SECRETARY OF STATE'S TALK WITH BAKER

1 Baker telephoned the Secretary of State at 0230 on 22 February. He said that Gorbachev had telephoned the President about the Russians' discussion with Tariq Aziz. The President had told Gorbachev of three main objections to the Soviet/Iraqi eight point plan:

(a) the timing was unacceptable: the Iraqis were talking of six weeks for withdrawal, the Russians were suggesting three weeks (and three-quarters of the Iraqi troops to leave in the first two of those three weeks). This was still too long.

(b) The question of lifting sanctions was not for discussion now. The Americans had in mind in particular that they would want to leave in place indefinitely the sanctions on arms transfers to Iraq. (Gorbachev apparently agreed with the President on this last point).

(c) It was also unacceptable to talk of lifting all the UN sanctions when Iraqi withdrawal was complete because the Iraqis had to do more than withdraw from Kuwait to fulfill the Security

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Council Resolutions.

2 The Americans were about to have another meeting at the White House. They might shortly go public with their list of requirements for a ceasefire and perhaps with some of the objections to the Iraqi/Soviet package set out above.

3 The President had told Gorbachev that the Americans were very appreciative of Soviet efforts but saw nothing yet to justify altering the military campaign.

4 Baker said that the Americans differed with the UK over the question of direct discussion with the Iraqis about a ceasefire. The Americans were not/not in favour of direct contact. The Americans felt that it would be very difficult to break off direct discussions with the Iraqis, if progress were not made, but easier to break off the indirect exchanges through the Russians.

5 Baker did not think that Tariq Aziz had authority to settle the outstanding United States objections. However, if he did have such authority, to cover all three points, Baker thought it might prove difficult not/not to settle.

HURD

YYYY

MAIN

IRAQ/KUWAIT SECRET

ADDITIONAL

PS/NO 10

PS/DEFENCE SECRETARY

NNNN



10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

22 February 1991

See Record.

THE GULF: FRENCH VIEWS

Pierre Morel from the Elysée telephoned me at 0545 this morning to give me the first French reactions to the 8 point plan put forward during the night by President Gorbachev. They were saying publicly:

- France was studying the plan and was in close touch with the governments principally concerned.
- France welcomed President Gorbachev's efforts and considered Iraq's acceptance of the plan a step in the right direction, which raised hopes for a peaceful solution.
- On the other hand they thought several Iraqi points remained imprecise. Particular points of difficulty were:
 - (a) the timescale for withdrawal from Kuwait. This should not be deferred. It should begin immediately and be completed in short order.
 - (b) Only the Security Council could decide whether or not to lift its earlier resolutions.
- France considered this a decisive moment and believed that the path opened by the Soviet plan could lead to a peaceful solution.

Morel amplified this by saying the French thought that six weeks was far too long for withdrawal: they could not accept the concept that sanctions would be lifted when withdrawal was two-thirds complete: and they did not accept the notion of simply cancelling earlier Security Council resolutions. They also noted that no reference was made to Iraqi heavy weapons in Kuwait and what should be done about them. Moreover the Soviet proposals envisaged too rapid a recourse to the Security Council. The ceasefire terms were a matter for the parties directly concerned.


I said that we were analysing the proposals. We identified similar points of difficulty. But we were likely to be more cautious in identifying the proposals as a step forward. Morel

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

said that his initial impression was that the Americans were equally hesitant.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence), John Neilson (Department of Energy), Juliet Wheldon (Law Officers' Department) and Sir Robin Butler.

Yours sincerely,


(CHARLES POWELL)

Richard Gozney, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

February 22, 1991

Statement on Iraqi Withdrawal

The Soviet announcement yesterday represents a serious and useful effort which is appreciated. But major obstacles remain. The coalition for many months has sought a peaceful resolution to this crisis in keeping with the UN resolutions.

As President Bush pointed out to President Gorbachev, the steps the Iraqis are considering would constitute a conditional withdrawal and would also prevent the full implementation of relevant UN Security Council resolutions. Also, there is no indication that Iraq is prepared to withdraw immediately.

Full compliance with the Security Council resolutions has been a consistent and necessary demand of the international community. The world must make sure that Iraq has, in fact, renounced its claim to Kuwait and accepted all relevant UN Security Council resolutions. Indeed, only the Security Council can agree to lift sanctions against Iraq, and the world needs to be assured in concrete terms of Iraq's peaceful intentions before such an action can be taken. In a situation where sanctions have been lifted, Saddam Hussein could simply revert to using his oil resources once again, not to provide for the well-being of his people, but instead to rearm.

So in a final effort to obtain Iraqi compliance with the will of the international community, the United States, after consulting with the Government of Kuwait and other coalition partners, declares that a ground campaign will not be initiated against Iraqi forces if prior to Noon, New York (UN) time Saturday, February 23, Iraq publicly accepts the following terms and authoritatively communicates that acceptance to the United Nations. The terms are as follows:

-- begin large-scale withdrawal from Kuwait by Noon, New York (UN) time, Saturday, February 23;

-- complete military withdrawal from Kuwait in one week. (Given the fact that Iraq invaded and occupied Kuwait in a matter of hours, anything longer than this from the initiation of the withdrawal would not meet Resolution 660's requirement of immediacy.);

-- within the first 48 hours, remove all its forces from Kuwait City (to allow for the prompt return of the legitimate government of Kuwait), from all prepared defenses along the Saudi-Kuwait and Saudi-Iraq borders, from Bubiyan and Warbah Islands, and from Kuwait's Rumaylah oil field;

-- within the one week specified above, return all its forces to their positions of August 1, in accordance with Resolution 660;

-- in cooperation with the ICRC, release all prisoners of war and third-country civilians being held against their will, and return the remains of killed and deceased servicemen, this action to commence immediately with the initiation of the withdrawal and to be completed within 48 hours;

remove all explosives and booby traps including those on Kuwaiti oil installations and designate Iraqi military liaison officer(s) to work with Kuwaiti and other coalition forces on the operational details related to Iraq's withdrawal, to include the provision of all data on the location and nature of any land or sea mines;

-- cease combat aircraft flights over Iraq and Kuwait except for transport aircraft carrying troops out of Kuwait and allow coalition aircraft exclusive control over and use of all Kuwaiti airspace; and

-- cease all destructive actions against Kuwaiti citizens and property and release all Kuwaiti detainees.

The United States and its coalition partners reiterate that their forces will not attack retreating Iraqi forces and, further, will exercise restraint so long as withdrawal proceeds in accordance with the above guidelines and there are no attacks by Iraq on other countries. Any breach of these terms will bring an instant and sharp response from coalition forces in accordance with UNSC Resolution 678.



10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

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From the Private Secretary

22 February 1991

See [unclear]

THE GULF

I should record two conversations which I had during the night with General Scowcroft about the latest Soviet/Iraqi proposals for a cease-fire.

In the initial conversation, Scowcroft said that the new proposals seemed, if anything, a step back from the proposals which Gorbachev had put to Tariq Aziz. However, Gorbachev was telephoning the President about them and he would speak to me again when the Americans had digested the phonecall.

General Scowcroft subsequently telephoned me back at about 0130. He first read the text of a statement which the White House was about to put out. This would record that President Gorbachev had telephoned the President to inform him of the latest proposals. It would say that the President had thanked Gorbachev for his energetic and constructive activity. It would add that the United States had serious concerns about the proposals but would be discussing them with its coalition partners. It concluded by saying that the military campaign would continue.

General Scowcroft added a few comments about the President's conversation with Gorbachev. Gorbachev had been enthusiastic about Tariq Aziz's willingness to consider a number of points. For instance he had said that America's requirements on POWs would not be a problem. He had described the timescale for a cease-fire as one of the biggest problems. The Iraqis were insisting on six weeks. The Russians had proposed about half this. Tariq Aziz said this was impracticable, given the damage to communications, roads, bridges etc. The President had made clear there could be no question of agreeing a cease-fire and taking the Iraqis on trust: no-one had any faith in their assurances. He had also said that it was out of the question to agree to lift sanctions as part of the withdrawal process or to agree to scrap the other Security Council Resolutions.

General Scowcroft said that he was in no doubt that the latest proposal did not represent progress. Equally, the Americans had not wanted to rebuff Gorbachev too sharply. They were now considering two possible courses. The first would be for the coalition partners simply to inform the Russians tomorrow

that the proposals were not acceptable, as had happened with the earlier Soviet proposals. The second course was to accompany this with a statement of what would be acceptable. This would be a simplified version of the paper on cease-fire proposals which he had earlier sent us. The Iraqis might be given 24 hours to accept it. They were undecided between these two options and would be discussing them further overnight. They would let us have their views in the morning.

I told General Scowcroft that we had put out a holding statement, based on four points: we so far had only press reports of the Gorbachev proposals: we were studying these: but at first sight, they did not seem to add anything: nor did they seem compatible with the clear statement of what was required for a cease-fire, which the Prime Minister had made in Parliament. General Scowcroft interjected that he liked the statement. I said that we saw some difficulty about issuing any more precise statements of our terms for a cease-fire. General Scowcroft agreed that it could well be a mistake to try to summarise in short form some very complicated issues. The Americans were torn between a number of considerations. Time was running out and they had no intention of delaying the start of the ground campaign. They did not, therefore, want to get involved in lengthy negotiations to which they saw no prospect of a useful outcome. At the same time, they did not want to be accused of simply cutting off a potentially positive proposal. In his own mind, he was clear that the right course would be to tell the Russians after a decent interval that these proposals were simply not adequate. But these considerations would be discussed further overnight and we could be in touch tomorrow.

I explained that we would be somewhat dispersed tomorrow, with the Prime Minister travelling and the Foreign Secretary and Defence Secretary in Paris. Nonetheless, he would be able to contact us in the course of the day without difficulty.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence), John Neilson (Department of Energy), Juliet Wheldon (Law Officers' Department) and to Sir Robin Butler.

Yours really,
C. D. Powell

C. D. POWELL

Richard Gozney, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

cc/fig
cc/MD
cc/PC

For Immediate Release

February 22, 1991

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

The Rose Garden

10:43 A.M. EST

THE PRESIDENT: Good morning.

The United States and its coalition allies are committed to enforcing the United Nations resolutions that call for Saddam Hussein to immediately and unconditionally leave Kuwait. In view of the Soviet initiative, which, very frankly, we appreciate, we want to set forth this morning the specific criteria that will ensure Saddam Hussein complies with the United Nations mandate.

Within the last 24 hours alone we have heard a defiant, uncompromising address by Saddam Hussein, followed less than 10 hours later by a statement in Moscow that on the face of it appears more reasonable. I say on the face of it because the statement promised unconditional Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait only to set forth a number of conditions. And needless to say, any conditions would be unacceptable to the international coalition and would not be in compliance with the United Nations Security Council Resolution 660's demand for immediate and unconditional withdrawal.

More importantly and more urgently, we learned this morning that Saddam has now launched a scorched-earth policy against Kuwait, anticipating perhaps that he will now be forced to leave. He is wantonly setting fires to and destroying the oil wells, the oil tanks, the export terminals and other installations of that small country. Indeed, they're destroying the entire oil production system of Kuwait. At the same time that that Moscow press conference was going on and Iraq's Foreign Minister was talking peace, Saddam Hussein was launching Scud missiles.

After examining the Moscow statement and discussing it with my senior advisors here late last evening and this morning, and after extensive consultation with our coalition partners, I have decided that the time has come to make public with specificity just exactly what is required of Iraq if a ground war is to be avoided.

Most important, the coalition will give Saddam Hussein until noon Saturday to do what he must do -- begin his immediate and unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait. We must hear publicly and authoritatively his acceptance of these terms. The statement to be released, as you will see, does just this and informs Saddam Hussein that he risks subjecting the Iraqi people to further hardship unless the Iraqi government complies fully with the terms of the statement.

We will put that statement out soon. It will be in considerable detail. And that's all I'll have to say about it right now.

Thank you very much.

END

10:47 A.M. EST

SECRET



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10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

Subject cc Master

SIR ROBIN BUTLER

THE GULF

The Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary had a talk about the Gulf situation and the Soviet proposals early this morning. As a result, the Prime Minister will return early from his engagements outside London and be available for a meeting of OPD(G) at around 3.30. My understanding is that the Foreign Secretary intends to do likewise. Meanwhile, officials should continue to work on an analysis and prepare a note for OPD(G).

Before departing, the Prime Minister intends to speak to the press and make the following four points:

- The proposals mark some advance on the previous position, which is welcome.
- But they still contain serious deficiencies.
- It is not clear whether the Iraqis have accepted them even as they stand.
- We shall be analysing them further during the day and discussing them with our allies. There is likely to be a meeting of the War Cabinet later today.

The Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary are inclined to the view that the right course now is to respond to the Russians, pointing out where the proposals are deficient, setting out the points which we believe are necessary to achieve a cease-fire, and giving the Iraqis a timescale of 24 hours to reply.

If there is pressure for a statement to the House, Mr. Hogg or Mr. Garel-Jones should give a very brief statement on the lines of that being used with the press.

I am copying this minute to Richard Gozney (Foreign and Commonwealth Office), Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence), John Neilson (Department of Energy) and Sir Percy Cradock.

C.D.P.
C. D. POWELL

22 February 1991

SECRET