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Conclusions of the Ad Hoc Group on the Gulf (AHGG)

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NOVEMBER 1990

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
S-11-90 14.2.91							
PREM 19/3456							

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CABINET OFFICE

70 Whitehall London SW1A 2AS Telephone ~~01-270~~ 071 270 0050

SECRET AND PERSONAL

T01079

8 August 1990

J S Wall Esq LVO
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Room 203
Whitehall SW1

Dear Stephen

IRAQ

This letter summarises the outcome of OD's meeting this morning.
CIRCULATION WITHIN DEPARTMENTS SHOULD BE ON A STRICTLY NEED-TO-KNOW BASIS. The minutes will follow.

- a. OD agreed the text of a public statement (copy attached) concerning the UK's willingness to provide military help in the region. Notes for the main supplementary questions on the statement are also attached.
- b. MOD should initiate immediate talks with the US about the precise nature of a UK military contribution, and on Rules of Engagement and command and control. MOD should also be in touch with Saudi Arabia to help establish the nature of the military requirement, and with Egypt regarding overflying. In the light of all this, MOD should prepare precise proposals for a UK military contribution.
- c. British forces sent to the region should remain under national command. Co-ordination on the ground should be organised with other participating nations, and should not be under UN auspices.
- d. MOD should very urgently explore means of supplying to Saudi Arabia NBC clothing and other means of protection against chemical warfare, if necessary at the expense of stocks in BAOR. Production of NBC clothing in the UK should be stepped up; if necessary MOD and DTI Ministers should take this up with the UK manufacturers.

SECRET AND PERSONAL

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SECRET AND PERSONAL

- e. The FCO should seek to establish what consultations have been and are taking place between the US Government and the Gulf states other than Saudi Arabia. We should also seek to establish whether Bahrain, Qatar, UAE and Oman would be seeking or would welcome help from us.
- f. The British Ambassador should return to Baghdad.
- g. As regards a maritime blockade of oil, the FCO should establish whether the US Government intend to proceed under SCR 661. There would be disadvantages in seeking at this stage to initiate a further SCR.
- h. MOD and DTI should ensure that the supply of spares and repair facilities for Saudi Arabian aircraft purchased from the UK is fully maintained, if necessary at the expense of RAF stocks.
- i. The Foreign and Transport Secretaries were given discretion to decide on the future of civil aviation links with Iraq, against the background that Iraqi flights to the UK should be conditional on co-operation regarding the release of Britons from Iraq and Kuwait and of the trapped British Airways aircraft.
- j. At its meeting tomorrow, the International Energy Agency should be encouraged to issue a public statement designed to calm the markets by emphasising the high level of oil stocks.
- k. There is no need at this stage to recall Parliament.
- l. The FCO should protest to the BBC World Service about their inaccurate broadcast report that all Britons have been advised to leave Saudi Arabia.

Yours sincerely
Bill Reeves

W D REEVES

Copied to: → Charles Powell Esq, No 10
 Tim Sutton Esq, Lord President's Office
 Simon Webb Esq, Secretary of State's Office, MOD
 John Gieve Esq, Chancellor of the Exchequer's Office, HMT
 Andrew Walker Esq, Minister for Trade's Office, DTI
 J Neilson Esq, Secretary of State for Energy's Office
 S C Whiteley Esq, Secretary of State for Transport's Office
 Ms Elizabeth Wilmshurst, Law Officers' Department
 J R Young Esq, Emergency Unit, FCO

Enc:

C

The Government will contribute forces to a multi-national effort for the collective defence of the territory of Saudi Arabia and other threatened States in the area and in support of the United Nations embargo. We are in urgent touch with the United States, our other allies and our friends in the Gulf on the contribution which we can best make in response to requests.

SUPPLEMENTARIES

WHAT FORCES?

We are discussing this with the United States and other allies. But in addition to our naval deployment, it is likely to take the contribution to air defence: we cannot be more specific at present.

WHAT REQUESTS HAVE WE HAD?

We have had a request from Saudi Arabia. We have had no other specific requests yet but we are in touch with our other friends in the area.

WHICH ALLIES ARE WE IN TOUCH WITH?

The United States, our NATO allies and our EC partners, the States in the Gulf with which we have treaties of friendship and other links (Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman).



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SECRET AND PERSONAL

T01080

8 August 1990

J S Wall Esq LVO
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Room 203
Whitehall SW1

Dear Stephen

IRAQ

We spoke about my letter T01079 of earlier today. It has been suggested to me that the emphasis of sub-paragraph g. is wrong in placing action on the FCO, and that the requirement is for MOD to pursue the practical aspects of the task with the Americans. You indicated that you were not making further enquiries of the Americans beyond those already made. I am therefore, through this letter, transferring action to MOD to pursue the practicalities as indicated above.

Yours sincerely
W D Reeves

W D REEVES

Copied to: Charles Powell Esq, No 10
Simon Webb Esq, Secretary of State's Office, MOD

SECRET AND PERSONAL



CABINET OFFICE

70 Whitehall London SW1A 2AS Telephone ~~01-270~~ 071 270 0050

SECRET AND PERSONAL

T01083

9 August 1990

J S Wall Esq LVO
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Room 203
Whitehall SW1

Dear Stephen

IRAQ

This letter summarises the outcome of the meeting of Ministers this morning. CIRCULATION WITHIN DEPARTMENTS SHOULD BE ON A STRICTLY NEED-TO-KNOW BASIS. The minutes will follow.

- a. The Defence Secretary will announce today that Jaguar, Tornado, Nimrod MPA and tanker aircraft, and the necessary ground protection for the aircraft and their crews, and also MCMVs, will be deployed to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf. More precise destinations or times of arrival should not be stated at this stage.
- b. At least some aircraft should reach their destination by the weekend, and the aim should be to achieve this if possible in the course of Saturday.
- c. Subject to the request of Sultan Qaboos, the Jaguars will be initially based in Oman. Aircraft should also be visible in Bahrain as well as in Saudi Arabia, since Bahrain has asked for assistance. This could if necessary be achieved by staging or visits.
- d. The MOD should ensure that all UK forces in the Gulf are issued with up-to-date timetables of international civil flights. Allies should be urged to take a similar precaution.

SECRET AND PERSONAL

Mr C Powell

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*A. J. G.
GM*

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SECRET AND PERSONAL

- e. Press facilities should not be made available in Saudi Arabia or the Gulf, but may be made available in Cyprus or the United Kingdom to permit coverage of the departure of aircraft.
- f. The aim at tomorrow's meeting of EC Ministers should be to obtain a clear and strong statement of support for the multinational force and for enforcing the oil embargo. The Prime Minister would speak in advance to Signor Andreotti as President of the Council.
- g. The Attorney General advised that, in the light of rulings of the International Court, use of force by a third country as part of a collective defence effort like the present international effort on behalf of Kuwait should be backed by a request from the country suffering attack. The FCO should urgently investigate whether requests so far made by the legitimate government of Kuwait constitute such a request and, if not, should seek to obtain one. This point is of equal importance for the US; the Foreign Secretary and the Attorney General should therefore contact their US opposite numbers to put the point to them.
- h. While it would be misleading to give the impression that the threat to Saudi Arabia had receded, there was less need to give a high profile to advice that dependants in Eastern Saudi Arabia should leave.
- i. At tomorrow's North Atlantic Council and European Community meetings it would be right to avoid giving details about the destination and timing of United Kingdom deployments.
- j. The instruction being prepared in MOD for those consulting the United States Government on naval and other rules of engagement should be cleared with the Attorney General.
- k. Following the expected statement from the International Energy Agency at the end of its meeting today, the Energy Secretary should issue his own statement with the aim of calming domestic markets and reassuring the public.

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SECRET AND PERSONAL

1. The Cabinet Office should draw the contents of paragraphs 19-22 of J180 of 9 August to the attention of the Home and Transport Secretaries.

Yours sincerely
Bill Reeves

W D REEVES

Copied to: → Charles Powell Esq, No 10
Simon Webb Esq, Secretary of State's Office, MOD
J Neilson Esq, Secretary of State for Energy's Office
Ms Elizabeth Wilmshurst, Law Officers' Department
J R Young Esq, Emergency Unit, FCO
P J Goulden Esq CMG FCO

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CABINET OFFICE

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SECRET AND PERSONAL

T01086

13 August 1990

J R Young Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Emergency Unit
Whitehall SW1

M. Jib
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Dear Rob

IRAQ

This letter summarises the action agreed at the meeting of the Ad Hoc Group on the Gulf under Mr Waldegrave's chairmanship this morning. CIRCULATION WITHIN DEPARTMENTS SHOULD BE ON A STRICTLY NEED-TO-KNOW BASIS.

- ✓ a. The meeting noted that replies on four issues raised by the Prime Minister (Mr Powell's letter of today to Mr Asquith) were being prepared by the FCO and MOD.
- ✓ b. FCO are concerting with EC and other allies on action to help UK nationals in Kuwait and Baghdad and in response to the Iraqi ultimatum on embassies in Kuwait. FCO to check that official advice to British citizens in Kuwait, Iraq and other Gulf states on whether or not to stay put is consistent to that given by the US and Japanese Governments. (Action: FCO). DTp should monitor to the extent possible Iraqi efforts to provide for their nationals to leave the UK. (Action: DTp).
- ✓ c. Following Miss Binstead's letter of 11 August, the Attorney General is writing today about the legal authority for enforcement of the embargo. This was identified by the meeting as a urgent action. (Action: Law Officers' Department).
- ✓ d. Against the background that a request from the legitimate Government of Kuwait is needed to underpin enforcement of the oil embargo, FCO to explore the most efficient means of ensuring that all countries participating in the enforcement are similarly authorised. (Action: FCO).

SECRET AND PERSONAL

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SECRET AND PERSONAL

- e. Egypt should be encouraged to participate in the naval enforcement operation. More generally, the forces of the Arab nations supporting the multi-national effort should be involved as fully as possible, treated with tact and their participation welcomed. (Action: FCO, MOD). MOD should keep in close touch with FCO over any negotiations on the use of Iran airspace or other matters involving co-operation with Iran. (Action: MOD and FCO).
- f. MOD are discussing with the US today the question of consistency between UK and US (and Saudi) ROE concerning aircraft operations near the Saudi border. The Chief of Defence Staff is also considering a report on the Washington talks on command and control arrangements today. (Action: MOD).
- g. As regards enforcement of the embargo, discussions with the US on allocation of duties are now in progress. A report should be made to the Ad Hoc Group as soon as possible. (Action: MOD).
- h. An option for deployment of British ground troops in the theatre should be prepared in case Ministers wished to offer such further support to the Americans. (Action: MOD)
- i. The possible need to protect British civilian workers in Saudi Arabia against chemical attack should be considered, and advice given to the Group. (Action: FCO, consulting MOD and DTI).
- j. On the trade embargo, MISC 118 should pursue issues requiring co-ordination within Whitehall. (Action: Cabinet Office). The FCO should pursue through the OECD issues requiring external co-ordination, including the potential loophole for imports on humanitarian grounds. (Action: FCO, in consultation with DTI.) A note on the water-tightness of the trade embargo, and means of putting pressure on backsliders, should be prepared today. (Action: FCO consulting DTI).
- k. The BBC reported this morning that a tanker was off Yanbu apparently preparing to breach the embargo. It was thought that it planned to draw off oil already in storage there. Its position under the embargo should be examined urgently, with the aim that the EC's interpretation of the embargo is followed by all states. (Action: Department of Energy). Possible means of preventing it from achieving its aim should be examined (Action: MOD). A report should be made to the Group on 14 August.

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SECRET AND PERSONAL

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SECRET AND PERSONAL

- 1. Against the background that a terrorist threat against US and British airlines and other targets must now be considered a reality, a note should be prepared for discussion by the Group on 14 August describing the measures being taken by the US authorities to guard against the threat, and the UK's measures by comparison. (Action: DTp consulting the Home Office).
 - m. Machinery should be put in place to warn national airlines immediately of any re-routing required by developments in the Gulf. DTp should discuss with the FCO the best means of doing so. (Action: DTp consulting FCO)
 - n. The Minister of State FCO (Mr Waldegrave) will give a daily press conference, in the afternoon. The Group's meetings should identify issues on which a press line is needed. No 10 should discuss with the press the need for reticence on escape routes from Iraq and Kuwait which British citizens might use. (Action: No 10).
2. The next meeting of the Group will be at the same time and place tomorrow (11.00 am in Conference Room A, Cabinet Office).

J. J. J. J.
Bill Harvey

W D REEVES

Copied to: ✓ C D Powell Esq, No 10
 T Perks Esq, No 10
 The Hon Dominic Asquith, FCO
 Miss Glynne Evans, UN Department, FCO
 Air Marshal Sir Kenneth Hayr KCB CBE AFC, MOD
 N Bevan Esq, MOD
 P Mountfield Esq, HM Treasury
 F J A Warne Esq, Home Office
 G R Sunderland Esq, DTp
 J Jack Esq, DTp
 Martin Baker Esq, DTI
 S W Fremantle Esq, DEN
 Ms Elizabeth Wilmshurst, Law Officers' Department





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70 Whitehall London SW1A 2AS Telephone 01-270

SECRET AND PERSONAL

T01088

14 August 1990

Graham Boyce Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Emergency Unit
Whitehall SW1

Dear Graham

IRAQ

This letter summarises the action agreed at the meeting of the Ad Hoc Group on the Gulf under Mr Waldegrave's chairmanship this morning. CIRCULATION WITHIN DEPARTMENTS SHOULD BE ON A STRICTLY NEED-TO-KNOW BASIS.

- a. A Legal Sub-Committee of Group should be established under the chairmanship of Mr F D Berman, FCO to provide legal advice to the Group, to Ministers and to UKMIS New York. It should hold its first meeting immediately to prepare advice for UKMIS on the legal underpinning of enforcement of the embargo. (Action: FCO in consultation with LOD, MOD, DTI and other Departments as necessary).
- b. On the exfiltration or protection of British nationals in Iraq and Kuwait, the FCO should consider all possible conventional approaches, for example through the ICRC or under the aegis of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. (Action: FCO). Against the possibility of a deterioration, military options should also be assessed on a contingency basis. (Action: MOD, in consultation with FCO and JIC). The instructions to be given to British diplomatic staff in Kuwait should be considered further following consultation with EC partners similarly affected. (Action: FCO).
- c. In preparation for Mr Alan Clark's visit to the smaller Gulf states this week, Departments should consider what can be said about military deployments to those states, in particular rotation of aircraft, recognising that their purpose would be political rather than military. Counter-

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Dominic (News)
Caroline (Secretary) to the
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SECRET AND PERSONAL

[He will accompany Alan]

terrorism advice might also be offered. The composition of Mr Clark's party, and the interaction between his visit and that of the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff, should be considered. (Action: FCO consulting MOD).

- d. The Prime Minister should be asked to agree that facilities for short and time-limited visits to British forces in the Gulf should be offered to the media. (Action: Mr Perks). MOD should prepare proposals, one option being to accompany Mr Clark (Action: MOD).
- e. The Chiefs of Staff are to consider ROE for the air defence of Saudi Arabia later today. Defence Ministers should put proposals directly to the Prime Minister today, with copies to other Departments concerned, after first obtaining the concurrence of the Law Officers' Department. MOD would be likely to propose a published warning, following the Falkland Islands precedent, of the circumstances in which our air defence forces would take military action. (Action: MOD consulting FCO and LOD).
- f. The Chiefs of Staff will also be considering today ROE for enforcement of the embargo. They should take account of advice from the Legal Sub-Committee. In this case too Defence Ministers should put proposals directly to the Prime Minister, with copies to other Departments concerned. Meanwhile the Royal Navy should be reminded that they do not yet have authority to board merchant shipping. (Action: MOD consulting FCO and LOD).
- g. The FCO should consider advising the Prime Minister to write or speak to President Bush today to stress the crucial importance of action to prevent evasion of the embargo through Jordan and prevention of intervention by Israel. The Prime Minister might wish at the same time to propose that the US take the lead in an international effort, possibly involving Japan, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, to provide economic assistance to Jordan. (Action: FCO).
- h. A Group of officials under FCO chairmanship, and with Treasury, MOD and Bank of England representation, should be established to co-ordinate advice on possible UK participation in economic assistance to Jordan. It should inter alia consider the scope for tempering the impact of sanctions on Jordan. The precedent of Zambia during the Rhodesia sanctions episode is relevant. A paper should be prepared for the Group's meeting on 16 August. (Action: FCO).

Done
AM.

CDP has
written
to
Secretary
AM.

b

SECRET AND PERSONAL

[He will accompany Clark]

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Done
AG.

CAP Len
spoke
to
Sawcross.
AG.

C

SECRET AND PERSONAL

- [PM ready
to
send
message]
- i. The possibility that Malaysia may fail to enforce sanctions should be investigated, and if this seems likely the FCO should consider how best to make representations to the Malaysian Government. (Action: FCO).
 - j. DTp should co-ordinate through their Transport Co-ordinating Centre the collection of information about merchant shipping movements, with the help of other Departments. (Action: DTp).
 - k. DTI is preparing a paper covering aspects of the trade embargo identified by MISC 118, including treatment of UK nationals under contract to Iraqi companies and treatment of Iraqi companies in the UK. (Action: DTI).
 - l. DEN should report to the Group on 15 August on action taken to ensure that the EC's interpretation of the embargo is being followed by all states. (Action: DEN).
 - m. The Home Office would be meeting the Metropolitan Police to urge that, in the policing of any demonstrations in London, especially outside the Iraqi Embassy, they should be careful to avoid giving rise to accusations of ill treatment which could be used as a pretext for retaliation against British nationals in Iraq and Kuwait. (Action: Home Office).
 - n. The options for modifying the frontier controls applying to Iraqi nationals in the UK should be examined. The 1967 precedent of action taken against Chinese diplomatic staff in London should be borne in mind. (Action: Home Office).
 - o. The Group noted that British Aerospace are taking steps to provide their workers in Saudi Arabia with protection against CW. Other employers of substantial numbers of Britons there should be recommended to consider taking similar action. (Action: FCO).
 - p. Departments should provide the FCO with information on action already taken to apply economic sanctions to Iraq and Kuwait, for use by Sir Crispin Tickell at the UN Monitoring Committee on 17 August. (Action: DTI, DEN, DTp, Treasury to write to FCO).
 - q. DTp should prepare a formula for public use about precautions being taken against an enhanced terrorist threat to airlines. This should be circulated to the Group before its meeting on 15 August. (Action: DTp).

d

SECRET AND PERSONAL

2. The next meeting of the Group will be at the same time and place tomorrow (11.00 am in Conference Room A, Cabinet Office).

*Yours sincerely
Bill Reeves*

W D REEVES

Copied to: ✓ C D Powell Esq, No 10
T Perks Esq, No 10
The Hon Dominic Asquith, FCO
Miss Glynne Evans, UN Department, FCO
Air Marshal Sir Kenneth Hayr KCB CBE AFC, MOD
N Bevan Esq, MOD
P Mountfield Esq, HM Treasury
F J A Warne Esq, Home Office
G R Sunderland Esq, DTP
Martin Baker Esq, DTI
S W Fremantle Esq, DEN
Ms Elizabeth Wilmshurst, Law Officers' Department

5 (A-D)



CABINET OFFICE

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SECRET AND PERSONAL

T01091

15 August 1990

J R Young Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Emergency Unit
Whitehall SW1

Dear Rob

IRAQ

This letter summarises the action agreed at the meeting of the Ad Hoc Group on the Gulf under Mr Waldegrave's chairmanship this morning. CIRCULATION WITHIN DEPARTMENTS SHOULD BE ON A STRICTLY NEED-TO-KNOW BASIS.

- a. The FCO are chairing a meeting this afternoon, at which the Treasury, DTI and the Bank of England will be represented, to discuss economic support for Jordan. (Action: FCO).
- b. The Legal Sub-Committee produced a useful brief yesterday on the legal basis for enforcement of sanctions, and this should be circulated to the Group. They should now produce a fuller paper on the subject, which should be endorsed by the Attorney General and circulated to the Group for the guidance of Departments. The Legal Sub-Committee should also prepare a note on the legal position with regard to consulting flag states before intercepting their ships. (Action: Legal Sub-Committee).
- c. The possible role of the UN Military Staff Committee in enforcing sanctions by naval means, which has been suggested by the US, should desirably be confined to co-ordination and information exchange. This initiative would be welcome if it created the conditions for explicit UN authorisation of a naval blockade.
- d. A number of options for diplomatic initiatives on behalf of British and other foreign nationals in Iraq and Kuwait are under consideration. They include the despatch of the UN Secretary General's Special Representative to see

SECRET AND PERSONAL

SECRET AND PERSONAL

Saddam Hussein, and a British high-level visit to the ICRC in Geneva. Mr Waldegrave could conveniently undertake the latter task when visiting Geneva for other reasons next week. (Action: FCO).

- e. The FCO are pursuing diplomatic action in respect of a number of countries whose willingness to implement the embargo may be in doubt. The list currently includes Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia (in response to a reported Slovak attempt to sell tanks to Iraq), Malaysia, Thailand, the Soviet Union, Yemen and Brazil. (Action: FCO)
- f. Mr Alan Clark and the Vice Chief of Defence Staff are beginning their visit to the Gulf today.
- g. The Cabinet Secretary is holding a meeting this afternoon with DTp, MOD and FCO to clarify the role of the All Sources Embargo Cell in DTp and the allocation of related tasks. The agenda for future meetings should contain an item under which reports can be made about observance of the embargo. (Action: Cabinet Office).
- h. As regards counter-propaganda against Iraq, there is an important need to convey our message effectively to Arab opinion. The FCO should consider how best to pursue this with the World Service and the Arab Language Service of the BBC. (Action: FCO).
- i. MOD have put proposals to the Prime Minister concerning naval ROE in the Gulf. Comments on naval enforcement of the embargo attributed to a MOD spokesman in today's Daily Telegraph do not accurately reflect the true position. Any further public comment by MOD should make it clear that HM Ships have the right to enforce the economic sanctions called for by the UN. The content of ROE should not be discussed. (Action: MOD).
- j. MOD described the position reached in discussion with the US and the Saudis on ROE for air defence of Saudi Arabia. MOD are in touch with the Americans and Saudis, and hope to put proposals forward this evening. (Action: MOD, consulting FCO and Law Officers).
- k. The Ruler of Bahrain has asked for a British Army battalion to be stationed in his country. This would be a matter for political decision. He also wishes to buy British military equipment; the Saudi Government may wish to do the same. These approaches should be vigorously pursued. (Action: MOD).

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SECRET AND PERSONAL

1. MOD confirmed that no Iraqis are under training by the British Services. A company in Perth engaged in training Iraqis as airline pilots has suspended the course. DTI should seek to resolve the issue with the company. The constituency interest of Sir Nicholas Fairbairn MP was noted. (Action: DTI).
 - m. The Home Office should convene a meeting with all interested Departments, including DES and DTI, to review the status of Iraqis in this country, including students, and should submit advice the Group. A paper on options for dealing with Iraqi residents has already been prepared by the Home Office, and should be circulated to the Group for discussion tomorrow. The Home Office should consider the feasibility of collecting statistics of Iraqis who leave the UK. (Action: Home Office).
 - n. DEn should report to the Group if they consider that any intervention with the US Government is necessary with regard to their reported wish to draw down Government oil stocks and encourage other Western Governments to do the same. (Action: DEn).
 - o. DTp should discuss urgently with British Airways at the highest available level the need to satisfy themselves about the security arrangements for British aircraft using Middle East airports, and should report the outcome to the Group. (Action: DTp).
 - p. In future, publicity arrangements for the day will be discussed by those directly concerned immediately after the Group's daily meetings. The No 10 Press Office should ensure that effective arrangements are put in place to co-ordinate the line taken by departmental press offices. (Action: No 10).
2. The next meeting of the Group will be at the same time and place tomorrow (11.00 am in Conference Room A, Cabinet Office).


Yours sincerely
Bill Reeves

W D REEVES

D

SECRET AND PERSONAL

Copied to: ✓ C D Powell Esq, No 10
T Perks Esq, No 10
The Hon Dominic Asquith, FCO
Miss Glynn Evans, UN Department, FCO
Air Marshal Sir Kenneth Hayr KCB CBE AFC, MOD
N Bevan Esq, MOD
P Mountfield Esq, HM Treasury
F J A Warne Esq, Home Office
G R Sunderland Esq, DTp
Martin Baker Esq, DTI
S W Fremantle Esq, DEN
Ms Elizabeth Wilmshurst, Law Officers' Department





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SECRET AND PERSONAL

T01092

16 August 1990

J R Young Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Emergency Unit
Whitehall SW1

Dear Rob

IRAQ

This letter summarises the action agreed at the meeting of the Ad Hoc Group on the Gulf under Mr Waldegrave's chairmanship this morning. CIRCULATION WITHIN DEPARTMENTS SHOULD BE ON A STRICTLY NEED-TO-KNOW BASIS.

- a. The Group took note of the FCO's paper "Jordan - the economic effects of the Gulf crisis" (AHGG(90)4). It will be submitted to the Prime Minister under cover of a minute from the Foreign Secretary or Mr Waldegrave. It was noted that, while Departments are agreed that the UK should be prepared to make a contribution to such an international effort, the Chief Secretary was likely to wish to comment on whether there should be an addition to the aid programme.
(Action: FCO).
- b. The FCO reported the Iraqi demand that all members of the British community in Kuwait should gather as soon as possible in one place and the diplomatic action being taken in response. The Legal Sub-Committee should consider urgently, on a contingency basis, what degree of mistreatment of British and other foreign residents in Kuwait and Iraq would provide legal justification for a military response, and should also define the legal status of this group in the event of their becoming effectively hostages. Their conclusions should be circulated to the Group.
(Action: Legal Sub-Committee). Subject to the Defence Secretary's approval, MOD should discuss urgently with the US and perhaps other Allies, through Service channels, what military options should be considered in such an event.
(Action: MOD). MOD will circulate to the Group a note on

SECRET AND PERSONAL

SECRET AND PERSONAL

the status of members of the British Liaison Team under the Geneva Convention. (Action: MOD). The FCO also reported the movement today from Kuwait to Baghdad of Embassy dependants and some non-essential staff, together with dependants of BLT personnel previously moved to Baghdad. It should be made clear in any press briefing that the Embassy in Kuwait remains fully active and functioning and that the convoy had been made available to other UK nationals. (Action: FCO). Policy regarding movement of other members of the British Liaison Team and their families should be resolved as rapidly as possible. (Action: MOD, consulting FCO).

- c. Discussions between the FCO and DTp regarding the application of Security Council Resolution 661 to airlines are to be completed today. (Action: FCO, DTp). The FCO are taking diplomatic action to put pressure on countries applying sanctions laxly: Brazil is a current example. (Action: FCO).
- d. Mr Waldegrave is minuting the Prime Minister today about arrangements for countering Iraqi propaganda to Arab audiences and is giving a press conference to the Arab press corps in London today. (Action: FCO).
- e. Requests from the US to stage aircraft and troops through the SBAs in Cyprus should as far as possible be dealt with by the local Service commander in consultation with the High Commissioner. The aim should be to simplify procedures and minimise the administrative burden, while at the same time keeping Whitehall in touch with any difficult issues. (Action: MOD, consulting FCO).
- f. The MOD reported that it had been established that the continuing uncertainty about ROE for the air defence of Saudi Arabia was for the US to resolve and should be resolved today. Failing this the matter may have be raised with the White House. It is important that this difficulty should receive no publicity. (Action: MOD).
- g. The Prime Minister has approved MOD's proposals for Naval ROE in the Gulf, subject to three provisos, of which one has been satisfied by the Attorney General's clearance. The agreement of friendly Gulf states to enforcement operations in their territorial waters should be sought on a case-by-case basis; ground rules should be agreed between MOD and FCO as soon as possible. (Action: MOD, consulting FCO). A formula for Mr Waldegrave's use in this afternoon's press conference, covering this matter and enforcement in the IAZ, should be drafted urgently. (Action: FCO, consulting MOD and LOD). Any

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SECRET AND PERSONAL

legal difficulties should be resolved by the Legal Sub-Committee urgently. (Action: Legal Sub-Committee).

- h. The meeting noted that a Sanctions Co-ordination Centre (SCC) has been set up in DTp. Daily meetings of all interested Departments will be chaired by DTp, who will be responsible for co-ordinating the output with the help of a smaller group cleared to the necessary level to handle intelligence. Daily reports will be circulated to the Group and to all Departments which require the information; it is hoped that the first such report will be available for tomorrow's meeting of the Group. (Action: DTp). The task of monitoring financial sanctions will be led separately by the Treasury. (Action: Treasury).
- i. DTI are seeing representatives of the Air Service training school in Perth today. The aim should be to persuade them voluntarily to cease training Iraqi pilots. (Action: DTI). DTp should if necessary use its powers to require the CAA not to grant pilot's licences to Iraqi nationals. (Action: DTp).
- j. A technical group of the International Energy Agency are drawing up options on a contingency basis for co-ordinated government action to intervene in the oil markets. DEN will consult the Group if decisions are required from the UK. (Action: DEN).
- k. The Group considered the Home Office's paper "Immigration Control: Iraqi Nationals" (AHGG(90)2), and endorsed the measures in paragraph 7 with the exception of (c) and (f), relating to students, which should be considered in the context of the wider Home Office-led review of the status of Iraqis in this country, including students. Subject to detailed comments from the FCO, the Home Office should report the Group's views to the Home Secretary and should recommend him to make urgent proposals to the Prime Minister, copying to the Foreign Secretary. The Home Secretary's minute should explain why it would be inappropriate at this stage to require Iraqis to obtain exit visas before leaving the UK. The timing of any publicity for the measures would need careful consideration in the light of the possible effect on the treatment of UK nationals in Iraq and Kuwait. (Action: Home Office, consulting FCO). The Home Office are taking steps to collect statistics of Iraqis who leave the UK. (Action: Home Office).

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SECRET AND PERSONAL

- 1. The Attorney General's views on the legal position with regard to consulting flag states before intercepting their ships are recorded in Miss Wilmshurst's letter of 13 August to Miss Binstead.
 - m. Following discussion between DTp and the Chief Executive of British Airways, British Airways are completing their assessment of security at Middle East airports with the utmost urgency and DTp will circulate a note to the Group on 17 August. (Action: DTp).
 - n. Mr Waldegrave would discuss with the Foreign Secretary whether he or the Defence Secretary should intervene with the Saudi and Omani Governments at Ministerial level to seek visas for British journalists wishing to cover British force deployments in the Gulf. (Action: MOD).
2. The next meeting of the Group will be at the same time and place tomorrow (11.00 am in Conference Room A, Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely
Bill Reeves

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SECRET AND PERSONAL

T01094

17 August 1990

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Des Roberts

IRAQ

This letter summarises the action agreed at the meeting of the Ad Hoc Group on the Gulf under the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's chairmanship this morning. CIRCULATION WITHIN DEPARTMENTS SHOULD BE ON A STRICTLY NEED-TO-KNOW BASIS.

- a. Iraqi intentions regarding British and US citizens in Kuwait are unclear following Iraq's failure to follow up its demand yesterday that all members of the British community should concentrate in one place. Consular advice to Britons in Kuwait is being reviewed. Diplomatic action is being taken through informal and private consultations with the Security Council, the Secretary General's office and the ICRC.
(Action: FCO).
- b. The Foreign Secretary intends to speak to Secretary Baker this afternoon to obtain a fuller account of President Bush's discussions with King Hussein yesterday, of US intentions with regard to enforcement of the embargo against the Jordanian route to Iraq, and of US intentions regarding economic assistance for Jordan. Submission to the Prime Minister of the FCO's paper on economic assistance will follow this conversation. (Action: FCO).
- c. Irregularities have been found in the paperwork relating to a shipment to Jordan of arms and ammunition, including anti-tank weapons and shells, currently at Hull docks. The meeting agreed that, where there is no clear evidence that warlike material to be shipped to Jordan could be used only by the Jordanian armed forces, and not by Iraq, export licences should be revoked or refused as the case may be.
(Action: DTI). The British Ambassador in Amman should

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explain the position to the Jordanian Government. The FCO will circulate a note on the subject to the Group. (Action: FCO).

- d. The reported statement by the UN Secretary General that use of force to enforce sanctions would be a breach of the UN Charter unless previously approved by the Security Council had now been favourably clarified (UKMIS New York telegram No 1004).
- e. The Secretaries will circulate to those concerned a provisional paper by the Legal Sub-Committee on the legal aspects of rescue of British nationals. (Action: Cabinet Office).
- f. Diplomatic efforts are continuing with states which appear lax in enforcing the UN embargo. Mr Tomkys has spoken to the Brazilian Ambassador. (Action: FCO). DTI are circulating to MISC 118 today a paper about enforcement of the embargo. (Action: DTI).
- g. The Foreign Secretary will be minuting the Prime Minister today about counter-propaganda against Iraq. (Action: FCO).
- h. MOD described the position reached in discussion with the US and the Saudis on ROE for air defence of Saudi Arabia. Previous uncertainties on the US side now appear to have been resolved and the matter should be resolved today. (Action: MOD).
- i. The directive on ROE in the Gulf has not yet been issued to ARMILLA ships. The meeting agreed that it would be inappropriate to put the new ROE into effect until the US had issued their own ROE for naval enforcement of the embargo. It was noted that Iranian agreement to surveillance operations within the IAZ might not be quickly forthcoming, but the issue could not be left open indefinitely. MOD should aim to resolve the matter and issue their directive within the next day or two. (Action: MOD, consulting FCO). The legal status of the IAZ following the ending of the Iran-Iraq conflict should be explored. (Action: FCO).
- j. Mr Alan Clark is to see the Ruler of Bahrain today. It is important not to encourage press speculation that the primary purpose of his visit to the Gulf is to counteract French influence. (Action: MOD, FCO).
- k. It was agreed that the Sanctions Co-ordination Centre in DTp should be renamed the Embargo Surveillance Centre (ESC). (Action: DTp).

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1. Air Training Services of Perth have suspended courses for Iraqi and Kuwaiti pilots and engineers, and will not resume them until they are legally able to do so. The company have been advised to explore the position of students sponsored by the legitimate Government of Kuwait with the Kuwaiti Embassy in London.
 - m. Following yesterday's decision by the Group, the Home Office have submitted advice on immigration controls on Iraqis to the Home Secretary, who will minute the Prime Minister on Monday. (Action: Home Office).
 - n. Following the JIC's assessment of the Iraqi terrorist threat, TO(P) will be convened to ensure that all Departments are acting comprehensively and efficiently to guard against this threat. (Action: Cabinet Office).
 - o. DTp will circulate to the Group today a note on the application of SCR 661 to airlines. (Action: DTp).
 - p. Satisfactory progress has been made towards obtaining visas from the Saudi authorities for press visits to British forces in Saudi Arabia. The Omani Government are being a little slower. The FCO will keep up the pressure, with a view to enabling the first group of journalists to set out for the region within the next 48 hours. (Action: FCO).
 - q. The International Energy Agency held a meeting yesterday at technical level. There was no pressure for co-ordinated action by governments. The governing body of the IEA is to meet next week to review the situation. The Saudi oil Minister has called for an immediate OPEC meeting; it seems likely that this is designed to seek OPEC cover for an increase in Saudi production.
2. The next meeting of the Group will be at the same time and place on Monday (11.00 am in Conference Room A, Cabinet Office) under Mr Appleyard's chairmanship. The Foreign Secretary will chair the meeting on 22 August.

Yours sincerely
Bill Reeves

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SECRET AND PERSONAL

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SECRET AND PERSONAL

T01096

8(A-0) (1)
Prime Minister

Today's
Ad Hoc Group

20 August 1990

meeting.
CDD 20/8/90

J R Young Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Emergency Unit
Whitehall SW1

Dear Mr

IRAQ

This letter summarises the action agreed at the meeting of the Ad Hoc Group on the Gulf under the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's chairmanship this morning, at which the Defence Secretary, Mrs Chalker and the Chief of Defence Staff were also present. CIRCULATION WITHIN DEPARTMENTS SHOULD BE ON A STRICTLY NEED-TO-KNOW BASIS.

- a. The consular advice to Britons in Kuwait and Iraq is to stay at home and lie low. The Foreign Secretary will broadcast this message on the BBC World Service later today. (Action: FCO.)
Meanwhile two senior UN officials are visiting Amman and Baghdad in an effort to obtain the release of those detained. They are expected to return to New York tomorrow.
- b. Mr Richard Branson wishes to send one of his aircraft to Iraq/Kuwait to bring home detainees who might be released by Iraq following an initiative by the Rev Jesse Jackson, but would like a Government request to do so. This will require careful handling. FCO and DTp should pursue the matter urgently. (Action: FCO, DTp.)
- c. MOD and LOD should be associated with current work to prepare a further SCR to provide added cover for naval enforcement of the embargo (which will be politically useful even though existing cover is judged to provide an adequate legal basis). (Action: FCO, consulting MOD and LOD).

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Surely only
Brits.
involved.

Col E. after
journal

SECRET AND PERSONAL

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- d. The Foreign and Defence Secretaries will attend meetings of the WEU and of EC Ministers in Paris tomorrow, with the aim of setting the seal on offers of military help from European partners. Ministers and Press Offices should welcome the involvement of the latter, and should avoid making invidious comparisons between their and our speed and scale of response. The question of the WEU's formal role in relation to forces will need careful handling. (Action: FCO, MOD).
- e. Secretary Baker has told the Foreign Secretary that the US agree that Jordan should receive economic assistance in return for her effective implementation of the embargo. The Foreign Secretary will minute the Prime Minister today. (Action: FCO).
- f. Further to the Group's discussion on Friday, it is now agreed that the criterion for granting UK export licences for consignments of warlike material to Jordan should be that there is a genuine Jordanian requirement for the consignment. (Action: DTI, consulting FCO and MOD). *and not over-embargoed*
- g. ROE were very briefly discussed. It was noted that the Royal Navy's enforcement measures apply to all goods, not just to oil. (Action: MOD, consulting FCO).
- h. The Embargo Surveillance Centre (ESC) has been set up in DTP and should be fully operational by Wednesday. Lists of sensitive routes involving third countries and of sensitive products are being compiled. (Action: DTp). It is important that as much as possible of the ESC's product, sanitised where necessary, should be made available to the UN Sanctions Committee. This will be discussed further at the Group's meeting on Wednesday. (Action: FCO, consulting DTp and MOD).
- i. It is important that the humanitarian exception for foodstuffs in SCR 661 should be rigorously interpreted, on the basis that there is no present risk of starvation in Iraq or Kuwait. This should be made clear in our dealings with the UN Sanctions Committee and the ICRC. The FCO should give further thought to how this issue may develop. (Action: FCO).
- j. DTp and the Security Service are to meet British Airways tomorrow afternoon to consider what measures are

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SECRET AND PERSONAL

necessary to protect British aircraft against the terrorist threat at airports overseas. (Action: DTp). TO(P) will meet this afternoon under Mr Appleyard's chairmanship to discuss this and other aspects of the terrorist threat. (Action: Cabinet Office).

k. Provision of facilities for the US in Cyprus, including staging facilities for aircraft, should continue to be handled sensitively. Use of Akrotiri should be kept to a reasonable minimum. (Action: MOD, consulting FCO).

← 1. The US Government have decided not to draw down their oil stocks. This week's meeting of the governing body of the IEA has been postponed.

m. Press briefing should make clear that the West's policy objectives remain unchanged, viz to deter further Iraqi aggression and to implement the embargo. The Foreign Secretary is giving a press conference today and the Prime Minister may do so tomorrow. It is for further consideration whether the Defence Secretary should do so on Wednesday.

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n. Selection of journalists for the press pools rests with the newspaper publishers themselves. The Omanis should continue to be urged to accept British journalists in Oman. The Foreign Secretary will be seeing the Omani Foreign Minister on Wednesday. (Action: FCO).

2. The next meeting of the Group will be at the same time and place tomorrow (11.00 am in Conference Room A, Cabinet Office) under the Prime Minister's chairmanship. The Foreign Secretary will chair the meeting on Wednesday.

Yours sincerely
Bill Reeves

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SECRET AND PERSONAL

T01098

21 August 1990

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CO 2/8.

Daw Rob

IRAQ

This letter summarises the action agreed at the meeting of the Ad Hoc Group on the Gulf under the Prime Minister's chairmanship at 10 Downing Street this morning, at which Mrs Chalker was also present. CIRCULATION WITHIN DEPARTMENTS SHOULD BE ON A STRICTLY NEED-TO-KNOW BASIS.

- a. The whereabouts of 124 British nationals detained in Kuwait are known. It is believed that they are not close to military sites, though this remains to be confirmed. The whereabouts of 223 people detained in Iraq (who include some non-British passengers from the stranded British Airways aircraft) are not known since the Iraqi authorities have repeatedly denied consular access. Half of the British Liaison Team (103 people including families) remain in Kuwait. If any parents should wish their children to join the diplomatic convoy leaving Kuwait for Baghdad on 23 August, the Embassy should supply facilities to the best of their ability. The health of travelling children is of particular concern. (Action: FCO).
- b. The ICRC were asked on 8 August by a group of nations to involve themselves in the protection of foreign nationals in Kuwait. Their response was correct rather than supportive. A further demarche was made to them on 10 August asking them to facilitate the departure of foreign nationals from Kuwait. The ICRC should be acting vigorously on behalf of these detainees and of the passengers and crew of the stranded British

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aircraft. Mr Waldegrave will be making these points when he sees the ICRC later today.

- c. Decisions concerning the text of the draft UN Security Council Resolution on enforcement of UN sanctions against Iraq have been separately recorded. It is important that MOD should be promptly and fully briefed on overnight developments at the UN, as recorded in diplomatic telegrams. To assist this, MOD will in future be represented at Mr Tomkys' daily meetings at 8.15am. (Action: MOD). The FCO will urgently examine ways of ensuring that participants at the Prime Minister's meetings are supplied with FCO telegrams on a special priority distribution before the meeting. (Action: FCO).
- d. MOD to submit additional proposals regarding naval ROE. (Action: MOD).
- e. The FCO were asked to clarify whether the IAZ can still be regarded as in existence in view of the rapprochement between Iraq and Iran. At the same time we should continue to press for maximum freedom of action in enforcing the embargo in the IAZ through consultations in New York. (Action: FCO).
- f. In discussion of a report of an Iraqi-flagged freight ferry carrying military equipment from Poland and the GDR, the arguments for a direct diplomatic approach to the Polish and East German Governments were considered. It was left to the FCO to decide on a case-by-case basis whether to make a direct approach to the Government of the country of origin in such cases or to work through the UN Sanctions Committee, though the latter could cause delay. (Action: FCO).
- g. Stocks of food in Iraq appear to be high. It was noted that OECD members were more robust than expected at yesterday's meeting in agreeing that there is no reason to exempt foodstuffs from the embargo at this stage. If and when a valid humanitarian case emerges for allowing import of foodstuffs into Iraq, this should desirably be organised under UN auspices rather than through trade.
- h. It was noted that Iraq and states friendly to her might attempt to organise an airlift, particularly for food. The Embargo Surveillance Centre (ESC) is concerned only with tracking ships, and is not equipped to monitor aircraft movements. MOD should consider how movements of aircraft to Iraq could best be monitored. (Action: MOD, consulting FCO and DTp).

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- i. All Iraqi and Kuwaiti students have been suspended from the courses for pilots and engineers run by Air Training Services of Perth.
- j. The Home Secretary will be minuting the Prime Minister today about immigration controls on Iraqis in this country. (Action: Home Office).
- k. It was noted that the scope for increasing oil production lay mainly in Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Venezuela and North America.
- l. Assistance to Jordan should be conditional on full Jordanian observance of sanctions, including those on services as well as goods.
- m. It was noted that journalists visiting the Gulf under MOD auspices had made some payment for their travel, but not enough to cover full cost. MOD should keep the press arrangements under review. (Action: MOD).

2. The next meeting of the Group will be at the same time tomorrow (11.00 am in Conference Room A, Cabinet Office) under the Foreign Secretary's chairmanship.

*Yours sincerely
Bill Reeves*

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SECRET AND PERSONAL

T01099

22 August 1990

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Das Lot

IRAQ

This letter summarises the action agreed at the meeting of the Ad Hoc Group on the Gulf under the Foreign Secretary's chairmanship this morning, at which the Defence Secretary and CDS were also present. CIRCULATION WITHIN DEPARTMENTS SHOULD BE ON A STRICTLY NEED-TO-KNOW BASIS.

- a. It remains essential to avoid diluting a UNSCR in the interests of achieving a consensus in Security Council, since this could weaken the legal underpinning for naval enforcement which we already enjoy under Article 51. As an interim measure, the FCO, in consultation with LOD, DEn and MOD, should consider on a contingency basis whether it would be advisable or feasible to seek a more targetted SCR, which contained fully adequate powers on the lines we were pressing for, but which would invite a specific nominated country (eg the UK) to enforce the embargo in relation to individual ships which were apparently breaking it, and perhaps also in relation to the operation of the refinery at Aden. The Attorney General's views should be sought on this approach, which has a precedent in the Beira patrol. It would remain to be seen whether this approach would be advantageous in meeting our objectives. (Action: FCO, consulting LOD, DEn and MOD).
- b. The US have temporarily modified their naval ROE in a restrictive direction, apparently to assist negotiations in the Security Council. They are now monitoring and following ships but not intercepting them. MOD have

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made a similar temporary change to keep in step, but will keep in close touch with US thinking. (Action: MOD consulting FCO).

- c. Yesterday's WEU Ministerial meeting went well. Arrangements were established for co-operation in the areas of operational concepts, area- and task-sharing, logistical support and intelligence gathering. Chiefs of Defence Staff or their representatives will meet on 27 August. It is desirable to avoid detailed discussion of command arrangements and ROE at this meeting. There will be a further WEU meeting of officials later next week. The robustness of European participants in the multi-national naval force will be influenced by success or failure in obtaining a satisfactory SCR on naval enforcement. (Action: MOD, FCO).
- d. Contrary to the Yemeni Ambassador at the UN's denial, the Iraqi tanker AIN ZALAH appears to have unloaded at Aden in breach of the embargo. This fact should be fully publicised, and brought to the attention of the UN Sanctions Committee, after consultation with the US Government. (Action: FCO).
- e. Although the ESC has made a good start, there is a need for fuller and more comprehensive information for Ministers on sanctions-breaking. The ESC should produce a daily chart for consideration at the Group's meetings setting out, in the form of a list rather than in narrative form, the ships which are of interest, their position and destination, their cargo and its destination. Full use should be made of commercial sources of information, including the General Council of Shipping and the Baltic Exchange. It cannot be assumed that existing patterns of trade will continue unchanged. (Action: DTp and DEt).
- f. Release of the ESC's product in a suitably sanitised form presents genuine security difficulties, but is politically important as an aid to obtaining UN support for enforcement measures. Even confirmation of press reports is useful in this context. These considerations should be discussed with GCHQ. (Action: Cabinet Office).
- g. The Polish and East German Governments should be approached in connection with the military cargo of the BALQEES, and asked to take steps to prevent similar shipments in future. (Action: FCO).
- h. Customs and Excise should be asked to follow up allegations that British firms are engaged in sanctions breaking. (Action: DTI to convey message to Customs and Excise). Consideration should be given to whether use could be made of

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SECRET AND PERSONAL

the report on links between the Soviet Bank and Iraq.
(Action: Cabinet Office and FCO).

- i. It will be important for the EC to maintain a common front on Iraqi moves to differentiate between their communities over departures from Kuwait. This will be discussed at the MEWG. The Iraqi offer to allow a Consul to stay behind if the Ambassador left was unacceptable since it would erode the clear legal position taken so far. (Action: FCO). Iraqi initiatives seeking bilateral political discussions should be rejected on the ground that it is up to Iraq to comply with the various SCRs.
- j. A communication to the Iraq Government will be prepared, for broadcast as well as despatch, drawing attention to the individual accountability of Iraqis under international law for any illegal acts they may commit. This should be reported by the BBC and other media. (Action: FCO).
- k. Evidence that air transport may be used systematically to evade the embargo is increasing. Military spares can readily be transported by air. Procedures for forcing a civil aircraft to land were codified following the Korean Air Lines disaster. MOD should produce a note on these. (Action: MOD, consulting FCO, LOD and DTp).
- l. In discussion of DTp's paper AHGG(90)8, it was noted that Iraq had now opened its airspace to civilian traffic. Although it might be commercially convenient for British Airways to resume overflying Iraq, the security arguments against doing so are considered by Ministers to be overwhelming. DTp should convey this firm advice to British Airways, and should report their reaction to Group. The Group endorsed AHGG(90)8 and invited DTp to keep them informed of major developments. (Action: DTp).
- m. DTp had a useful meeting yesterday with British Airways and the Security Service. A paper will be circulated to the Group tomorrow for discussion on Friday. (Action: DTp).
- n. Mr Richard Branson has been advised by the FCO that the Government has no objection to his sending an aircraft to Iraq for the purpose of evacuating British citizens, but that he would need to obtain Iraqi agreement, and insurance of the aircraft would be a matter for him. He took this advice in good part, and no more has been heard from him.
- o. In addition to the immigration control measures already agreed, the Home Office have identified 60 Iraqis in the

SECRET AND PERSONAL

UK whose expulsion could be justified on national security grounds. This could be a useful option, perhaps for implementation by the weekend depending on events in Kuwait. A clear distinction should be drawn between Iraqis having or not having diplomatic status, since action against the former could trigger off retaliation in Baghdad. The Home Office and FCO should devise a plan accordingly, as a matter of urgency, for consideration by the Foreign Secretary and a Home Office Minister with a view to a joint recommendation being made to the Prime Minister. The Home Office should establish whether a police check of addresses, which could give warning to those concerned, is an essential preliminary step. Home Office to continue pressing forward their work on Iraqi students and the implications of the seizure of Kuwaiti passports. (Action: Home Office, FCO).

2. The next meeting of the Group will be at the same time and place tomorrow (11.00 am in Conference Room A, Cabinet Office) under the Foreign Secretary's chairmanship.

*Yours sincerely
Bill Reeves*

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SECRET AND PERSONAL

T01100

23 August 1990

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IRAQ

This letter summarises the action agreed at the meeting of the Ad Hoc Group on the Gulf under the Foreign Secretary's chairmanship this morning, at which the Defence Secretary was also present. CIRCULATION WITHIN DEPARTMENTS SHOULD BE ON A STRICTLY NEED-TO-KNOW BASIS.

- a. The Defence Secretary will hold a press conference this afternoon to announce further force deployments to the Gulf. Mr Waldegrave will be present. If press reports of British children being held at gunpoint in Kuwait can be verified, this should be highlighted at the press conference. ODA will this afternoon announce a grant to the ICRC to assist refugees in Jordan. EC Political Directors are to meet tomorrow to discuss EC assistance to Jordan, which might also extend to Turkey and Egypt. We should seek to have this assistance organised by national contributions rather than through the Community budget. We should press for a generous contribution from the FRG, in recognition of the fact that they are not giving direct military help. The Security Council's consideration of requests for aid under Article 50 should be pressed forward quickly. (Action: FCO).
- b. The option of expelling from Britain some 40 Iraqis without diplomatic status who are suspect on security grounds is considered attractive by Ministers, provided the security grounds are adequate and there are no legal obstacles. But the Home Secretary had not yet been consulted. The timing of the expulsion should depend on events in Iraq and Kuwait and must therefore be flexible, but it may be necessary to act as early as

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tomorrow. The Home Office should as a matter of great urgency consult the Home Secretary and prepare an implementation plan, which should include provision for emergency action tomorrow if this should prove necessary. (Action: Home Office).

- c. The Foreign Secretary visited the Helpline organisation yesterday. The FCO are likely to provide them with some financial assistance. The organisation, which is supported by Mr Robert Hayward MP, is seeking accommodation in central London and may approach Departments. Any such approach should be reported to the FCO Emergency Unit. (Action: FCO in the first instance).
- d. The US and UK should keep in close touch on ROEs. (Action: MOD).
- e.

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- f. It was noted that Iraqi tankers en route to Aden appear to be transitting through Omani and Yemeni

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territorial waters without entering international waters. It is not clear whether this effectively gives the Omani and Yemeni Governments power to prevent naval enforcement of the embargo. This could prove to be an important point; the legal position should be examined. (FCO, consulting LOD and MOD). C

- g. It was noted that the policy is to turn back contraband tankers, not to impound them. Is this right? Since Kuwaiti oil exported by the Iraqi regime is effectively stolen, there is a case for impounding it. The FCO should examine the legal position and report back. DTp should report on the technical feasibility of distinguishing Kuwaiti from Iraqi oil, in the light of advice from the Warren Springs Laboratory. (Action: FCO, DTp).
 - h. A number of attempts have been made to obtain Iranian agreement to naval enforcement in the IAZ; the Iranian response has been opaque but not discouraging. The UK has never recognised the IAZ. The RN should now consider itself free to operate normally in the IAZ, within sensible limits, and the matter should not be raised again with the Iranians. (Action: MOD, FCO).
 - i. The ESC should obtain the following information as soon as possible:
 - i. the number and tonnage of tankers in the Iraqi and Kuwaiti merchant fleets, flagged and non-flagged;
 - ii. the volume of oil exported monthly by sea by each country under normal conditions;
 - iii. as a secondary priority, the total tonnage of tankers not under the control of Governments committed to enforcement of the embargo, which might be available for sanctions-breaking.
- The aim should be to record the movement of tankers at (i) on a map. DTp will make an initial verbal report to tomorrow's meeting of the Group. (Action: DTp in consultation with DEn and MOD).
- j. The FCO will summon the Iraqi Ambassador to convey a formal warning about the individual accountability of Iraqi nationals for any illegal acts. The language of this warning should take account of the precedent of Lieutenant Astiz, who committed crimes against prisoners in Argentina and was subsequently taken

SECRET AND PERSONAL

prisoner of war during the Falklands campaign, thereby acquiring the protection of the Geneva Convention. The FCO should examine this legal point urgently. (Action: FCO).

- k. It was noted that three English youths were arrested last night for causing damage to the Iraqi Embassy in London, and were subsequently charged. The Ambassador in Baghdad should be briefed on the incident, including the fact that the youths have been arrested and charged.
1. It was noted that British Airways intend to avoid Iraqi airspace as a matter of policy.

2. The next meeting of the Group will be at the same time and place tomorrow (11.00 am in Conference Room A, Cabinet Office) under the Foreign Secretary's chairmanship.

Yours sincerely
W D Reeves

W D REEVES

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SECRET AND PERSONAL

T01103

24 August 1990

J R Young Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Emergency Unit
Whitehall SW1

Dear Rob

IRAQ

This letter summarises the action agreed at the meeting of the Ad Hoc Group on the Gulf under the Foreign Secretary's chairmanship this morning, at which the Defence Secretary, Mr Waldegrave and Mr Hamilton were also present. CIRCULATION WITHIN DEPARTMENTS SHOULD BE ON A STRICTLY NEED-TO-KNOW BASIS.

- a. Any attempt by Iraq to close foreign embassies in Kuwait will require a rapid response. The option of recourse to the International Court at the Hague is being considered; the Attorney General is examining the legal aspects. (Action: FCO, LOD).
- b. The Home Secretary is expected to approve this afternoon a list of 46 Iraqis without diplomatic status who might be expelled from the UK, because their continued presence is not conducive to public good on grounds of national security. No further details would be given. Some of the 46 are intelligence officers based in the Iraqi Embassy; others are Baath party organisers, including some students. It is unnecessary for the Home Secretary to sign expulsion orders personally; the present plan is to send the letters by recorded delivery requiring the recipients to leave the country within nine days. The timing of such a measure will be of crucial importance, and must be determined by the FCO and Home Office in reaction to events in Kuwait and Iraq and the need to co-ordinate action with the Twelve and the US. The FCO should pursue the latter aspect urgently with the Governments concerned. (Action: FCO). The Home Office should place the 46 names in order of priority, to enable the expulsions to be implemented in tranches if so desired. (Action: Home Office). The Cabinet Office should ensure

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that efficient arrangements are in place to enable action to be taken over the Bank Holiday weekend if necessary. (Action: Cabinet Office, consulting Home Office and FCO).

- c. The Group considered a note by the Home Office on Iraqi students in the UK, and concluded that the recommendations in paragraph 12 were too weak. It was felt to be indefensible in present circumstances to admit new Iraqi students to higher education in the UK, and even more so to do this at the taxpayer's expense. The principle should be that students already here should be allowed to continue their studies up to a suitable break-point but not beyond, and in any case not at the expense of public funds. There should be a presumption that new students will not be admitted for the new academic year. The Cabinet Office, in consultation with interested Departments, should prepare proposals on this basis for Ministers' consideration. (Action: Cabinet Office consulting DES, Home Office, FCO, British Council and others).
- d. The Group discussed a proposal by DTp to direct the Civil Aviation Authority to refrain from issuing licences to Iraqi pilots and engineers. They concluded that no new licences should be issued, and that the presumption should be that extensions and renewals of existing licences would be refused. (Action: DTp). This question was felt to be one facet of a wider problem of Iraqi nationals in sensitive employment in the UK or by UK companies who might, through political loyalty or under pressure, be tempted to engage in terrorism or otherwise act against British interests. TO(P) should examine this problem urgently and make recommendations to Ministers. (Action: Cabinet Office).
- e.

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- f. In the course of discussion of tanker movements, it was noted that UN sanctions apply to refined products as well as crude

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oil. MOD will provide the ESC with maximum assistance with the results of photographic reconnaissance, on a regular basis. (Action: MOD). The ESC note helpfully identified regular customers for Iraqi oil, including Poland and Bulgaria. Efforts should be made to discover whether these countries are looking seriously for alternative sources of supply, since failure to do so could be an indication of intention to breach the embargo. (Action: DEn, FCO). The report of the Warren Springs Laboratory on how to distinguish between Iraqi and Kuwaiti oil will be circulated to the Group early next week. (Action: DTp). Given the volume of data now being assembled, the ESC should concentrate its attention on large tankers and ignore the small fry. (Action: ESC).

- g. AHGG(90)10, on aviation security, was not discussed and will be put on Tuesday's agenda. It was noted that Latin America cannot be ignored in a security context.
- h. Publicity should not be given to the plight of the British Liaison Team and their families or to Helpline's interest in them. (Action: MOD).

2. The timing of the next meeting of the Group will be confirmed as soon as possible. There will be a meeting on Tuesday at 10.00 or 11.00, and events may necessitate a meeting over the weekend.

Yours sincerely
Bill Reeves

W D REEVES

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SECRET AND PERSONAL

T01106

28 August 1990

J R Young Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Emergency Unit
Whitehall SW1

Dr Rob

IRAQ

This letter summarises the action agreed at the meeting of the Ad Hoc Group on the Gulf under the Foreign Secretary's chairmanship this morning, at which Mr Hamilton was also present. CIRCULATION WITHIN DEPARTMENTS SHOULD BE ON A STRICTLY NEED-TO-KNOW BASIS.

- a. We should inform our EC partners today that we are considering imposing travel restrictions on Iraqi diplomats in the UK and, separately, considering expelling from the UK 21 Iraqis who are not diplomats but are associated with the Iraqi regime. EC partners should be encouraged to take parallel action. The Home Office should draw up a list of 21 names, which should include the eight in the higher priority category already identified. Action to expel the 21 will be triggered by the FCO, probably tomorrow. No diplomats should be expelled at this stage. (Action: FCO, Home Office).
- b. The FCO will continue to deal with the problem of the two British families in Kuwait who face ejection from their hotels for non-payment of bills. (Action: FCO).
- c. The importance of providing an effective response to propaganda from Baghdad, during what may prove to be a lengthy period of stalemate while the embargo is given time to work, was emphasised. Arab and Western audiences both need to be addressed, in different ways. Departments represented on the Group were invited to contribute ideas, which should be sent to you in the first instance. The Secretary of State for Energy is considering names of people in the private sector who can help over dealing with Western audiences. This matter will be considered as a separate

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agenda item at future meetings of the Group. (Action: FCO, all members of the Group).

- d. It was noted that the WEU's military meeting yesterday, at which the First Sea Lord represented the UK, passed off successfully.
- e. It was noted the US Government are not at present authorising the US Navy to take enforcement action, and have in any case decided not to stop empty tankers. The Iraqis for their part are apparently allowing some at least of their ships to be searched. We should continue the efforts to clarify US policy on ROE. (Action: MOD)
- f.

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- g. Ministers are agreed that the UN embargo applies to food. Should the point be reached where the humanitarian exception for foodstuffs in SCR 661 needs to be invoked, it will be for the Security Council to take this decision (not individual governments or the ICRC), and to decide on the method of implementation. We should stake out a clear position on this in the UN and seek acceptance of it. (Action: FCO).
- h. The paper entitled "Interdiction of suspect vessels and cargoes by the Royal Navy" circulated with today's report from the ESC was endorsed after discussion, as a general guide for future action. (Action: MOD).
- i. In discussion of DTp's note on aviation security (AHGG (90)10), it was noted that the threat from terrorism would intensify if open hostilities broke out, and could continue

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even after the crisis is resolved. British Airways accept that a programme to intensify security is necessary and urgent, even at commercial cost to themselves. Within Europe, security at Stockholm and Paris airports leaves something to be desired. The French Government recognise the problem; representations to the Swedish Government should be made at Ministerial level. DTp will report again in the next week. (Action: DTp consulting FCO). DTp have prepared a formula for public use about the precautions currently being taken (circulated as AHGG(90)1), but it has not been used. A crisper statement should now be drafted; it should draw attention to the increased threat, go on to say that British Airways are taking additional precautions and that overseas governments are being pressed to do so (without saying what the precautions are), and exhort the travelling public to be vigilant. The statement should be agreed by the Departments immediately concerned and made by the Transport Secretary this week. (Action: DTp consulting FCO, MOD, Cabinet Office).

- j. It was noted that the Government of Oman have told us that they would not object to interceptions by the Royal Navy in Omani territorial waters, but that this should be done in close consultation with them, though diverting sanctions-breaking ships to Omani ports could cause problems. Other Gulf states, but not the Yemen, have taken a similar line.
 - k. Anchorages in the region to which sanctions-breaking shipping could be diverted should be identified. Khorfakan might be a possibility. (Action: MOD, consulting FCO).
 - l. The FCO should continue their discussions with LOD about the option of recourse to the International Court of Justice. (Action: FCO, LOD).
 - m. The next press conference will be tomorrow.
2. The next meeting of the Group will be at the same time and place tomorrow (11.00 am in Conference Room A, Cabinet Office) under the Foreign Secretary's chairmanship.

Yours sincerely
Bill Reeves
W D REEVES

SECRET AND PERSONAL

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SECRET AND PERSONAL

T01109

29 August 1990

J R Young Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Emergency Unit
Whitehall SW1

CMJ.

Dowd

IRAQ

This letter summarises the action agreed at the meeting of the Ad Hoc Group on the Gulf under the Foreign Secretary's chairmanship this morning, at which Mr Hamilton was also present. CIRCULATION WITHIN DEPARTMENTS SHOULD BE ON A STRICTLY NEED-TO-KNOW BASIS.

- a. Until the uncertainties surrounding Saddam Hussein's offer to allow women and children to leave were somewhat clearer, it would be premature to trigger the expulsion of Iraqis from the UK which the Group discussed yesterday. The Foreign Secretary would be recommending that action on this should be deferred. EC partners had agreed to restrict the movements of Iraqi diplomats accredited to them, in line with the earlier US decision. The UK should announce this comparatively minor measure as part of a wider package. The Prime Minister would be consulted on the content and timing of the action. (Action: FCO, Home Office).
- b. Against the background of a reported Japanese request for guidance as to how they can best help in the present crisis, the FCO should try to establish, before the Foreign Secretary visited Jordan, what the Japanese were currently doing. The Japanese might usefully concentrate on economic assistance to Jordan and Turkey and help with refugees. (Action: FCO).
- c. The Iraqi tanker HITIN, now apparently inbound to Iraq, could become a target for interception by the weekend if she tried to return laden. The Royal Navy would co-ordinate the plans to intercept her with the US and the French. If possible a HM ship should be employed in the interception rather than a Nimrod MPA; it was also desirable to involve the French. Meanwhile the HITIN should be subject to

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SECRET AND PERSONAL

continuous surveillance. (Action: MOD). The British owners of the GUR MARINER, on charter to Iraq, were being summoned by DTp to be told that they could not be permitted to commit breaches of the embargo. (Action: DTp).

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- e. The Dutch Foreign Minister had approached the Foreign Secretary urging a more positive and flexible British approach to co-ordination under the WEU umbrella. While the objections to joint command and control were understood and accepted, European political cover was important to the Dutch and also to the Italians and Spanish. These sensitivities should be recognised, and the aim should be to secure effective co-operation at sea without formal joint command structures. (Action: MOD).
- f. Miss Spencer briefed the Group on the positive information campaign, repeating yesterday's invitation to Departments to contribute ideas. She was asked to check the current position on Iraqi attempts to jam broadcasts of the BBC World Service and Voice of America to Iraq and Kuwait, and to inform the Group. (Action: FCO).
- g. It was noted that while the Iraqi-inspired terrorist threat to British interests remained high in the Middle East, in the UK it continued to be lower than the PIRA threat. TO(P) met yesterday to consider the threat from Iraqi nationals in sensitive positions in the UK. A paper identifying options would be circulated to the Group shortly. (Action: Cabinet Office). The Foreign Secretary asked to see the draft text of the proposed statement by the Transport Secretary on airline security. (Action: DTp).

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SECRET AND PERSONAL

- h. DTp were asked to report orally to the Group tomorrow on whether the ESC was yet receiving the results of photo-reconnaissance, as promised by the Defence Secretary last Friday. (Action: DTp).
- i. On the question of granting export licences for a consignment of arms and ammunition for Jordan which was unloaded at Hull docks earlier in the month, the DTI deployed the arguments for deferring action, including the possible US and Norwegian reactions to the despatch of this cargo. The Foreign Secretary accepted the case for some temporary deferment, but asked for a substantial paper dealing with the whole question of military co-operation with Jordan to be prepared, as part of the Prime Minister's briefing for the impending visit of King Hussein. The briefing should deal with Exercise PURPLE VICTORY; the financial case for cancelling the latter was noted. (Action: FCO, consulting MOD and DTI).
- j. The BBC were to broadcast a Panorama programme on 3 September which was expected to present past British Government dealings with Iraq in an unhelpful light. It had still to be decided whether a FCO Minister should accept an invitation to appear in the programme. In any case, the FCO should issue a press statement to all media when the programme was screened, setting out the Government's record in condemning and opposing Saddam Hussein's abuses and thwarting his secret arms procurement programme. Mr Goulden was co-ordinating the preparation of this; other Departments should give him every assistance. (Action: FCO consulting MOD, DTI, Customs and Excise).
- k. The case for a more formal system for collecting and collating intelligence about British hostages in Iraq and Kuwait was discussed. The FCO's Emergency Unit was well briefed on the whereabouts of hostages, in so far as this was known. A check should be made to ensure that MOD were being kept fully informed. (Action: JIO, FCO). The case for new machinery could be considered if necessary, though there was a reluctance to duplicate existing machinery. Valuable information could be gleaned from returning hostages. This should be made available as appropriate to the Assessments Staff. Arrangements for de-briefing returning families should be reviewed, against the possibility of a large-scale return of wives and children to the UK. (Action: FCO).
- l. The Cabinet Office should lead a review of the machinery for identifying and investigating possible breaches of sanctions within the UK. (Action: Cabinet Office consulting Departments).

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SECRET AND PERSONAL

2. The next meeting of the Group will be at the same time and place tomorrow (11.00 am in Conference Room A, Cabinet Office) under the Foreign Secretary's chairmanship.

Your sincerely
Bill Reeves

W D REEVES

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SECRET AND PERSONAL

TO1111

J R Young Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Emergency Unit
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15 (a-d).a
②
Prime Minister

no note outcome
of today's meeting

30 August 1990

claimed by the
Foreign Secretary.

md
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JRP

IRAQ

This letter summarises the action agreed at the meeting of the Ad Hoc Group on the Gulf under the Foreign Secretary's chairmanship this morning, at which Mr Hamilton was also present. CIRCULATION WITHIN DEPARTMENTS SHOULD BE ON A STRICTLY NEED-TO-KNOW BASIS.

- a. Against the prospect of substantial numbers of women and children returning to the UK from Iraq within the next few days, the FCO were preparing a paper on the financial implications, in consultation with the Treasury. A number of Departments would be concerned with the reception arrangements for those returning, including DSS and Home Office. The Cabinet Office should arrange a rapid meeting to co-ordinate the necessary arrangements, making use of the Central Contingency Unit. (Action: Cabinet Office, consulting Departments).
- b. The US had proposed an international study of burden-sharing, covering two aspects: military effort, and the economic impact on those countries suffering as a result of the embargo. Our objective was to get Japan and West Germany to pull their weight. These issues needed to be examined urgently to prepare a UK position for the international discussions. The Cabinet Office should plan and commission the necessary work, in consultation with the FCO, Treasury and MOD. A meeting on economic assistance already planned by the Treasury might form part of the exercise. It was recognised that the initial results would necessarily be broad brush. (Action: Cabinet Office consulting FCO, Treasury and MOD). It was noted that the Saudi Government were meeting the running costs of the US forces in Saudi Arabia but not those of the British forces.

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SECRET AND PERSONAL

- c. No action should be taken for the moment to expel Iraqis from the UK.
- d. As a general rule it would be wrong to be deflected from enforcing the naval embargo, by short-term considerations concerning hostages in Iraq and Kuwait. If the Iraqi tanker HITTIN tried to transit the Gulf laden, she should be intercepted. A plan should be prepared in consultation with US and France, taking account of the arguments in favour of a joint interception and of avoiding military action in the Gulf itself. There was similarly no political or diplomatic reason why the ZANOEBIA should not be intercepted. Surveillance of her should be co-ordinated with the US forces. (Action: MOD).
- e. It was noted that, as the number of national contingents in the multinational naval force grew, the problem of devising effective command and control arrangements was becoming more urgent, particularly since military operations might be necessary. This problem was inappropriate for the UN Military Staff Committee to tackle, and should be settled by the participating nations, preferably on the spot, with the US exercising general supervision by virtue of their supplying the largest contingent. The Gulf Naval Conference proposed by the US would be a suitable opportunity to address this task, but the proposal that the conference should be co-chaired by the US and France (as WEU chairman) was not acceptable. The US should be consulted urgently to establish how they intended to approach the problem. (Action: FCO, MOD). A paper should be prepared today for consideration at the Prime Minister's meeting at 10.00 am tomorrow. (Action: FCO, MOD). There should be maximum delegation of authority to local commanders.
- f. In discussion of the Embargo Surveillance Centre's latest report, it was noted that sanitised formulae covering the cases described in paragraphs 3, 7 and 12 on the first four pages were being prepared. The case described in paragraph 6 should be discussed by MISC 118 at their meeting this afternoon. The possibility of using powers of detention in such cases should not be overlooked. (Action: Cabinet Office, Home Office). Deportation could be considered in the case described in paragraph 4. Our Embassy in the Hague had been instructed to raise the case of National Foods of Holland with the Dutch Government. It was noted that complete coverage of ships sailing to and from Iraq had now been achieved, and there was no danger of the enforcement forces being taken by surprise. The JIC sitrep reported that the Pentagon had confirmed that US naval forces had boarded a Liberian and a Sri Lankan vessel on 28 August; the facts should be established. (Action: MOD).
- g. In discussion of MOD's paper on monitoring and interception of aircraft movements into Iraq (AHGG(90)12), it was agreed

SECRET AND PERSONAL

that a fuller study of air routes into Iraq was necessary. This should cover routes involving overflying third countries, and also the route over the international waters of the Gulf; the significance of the latter should be assessed. The scope for persuading Iraq's neighbours to co-operate in enforcing the embargo against aircraft overflying them, and measures which could be taken with Governments, airlines and airport authorities to preempt such flights and to discourage airlines involved, should be examined. (Action: MOD, consulting FCO and DTp). This work might be used additionally as part of an approach to the UN Military Staff Committee.

- h. It was noted that the Transport Secretary would be making his statement on airline security this afternoon.
- i. It was noted that, despite Iraqi attempts to jam them, BBC World Service broadcasts to Iraq and Kuwait were still getting through. The FCO would continue to monitor the situation. (Action: FCO).
- j. It was noted that the ESC were satisfied with the products of photo-reconnaissance that they were receiving.
- k. The legitimate Kuwaiti Government should be encouraged to sue recipients of Kuwaiti oil exported since the invasion, and to publicise that intention. (Action: FCO).
- l. A report from the Warren Springs Laboratory had indicated that it was difficult to distinguish scientifically between Iraqi and Kuwaiti oil. The matter should not be pursued further.
- m. It was noted that the legitimate Kuwaiti Government was concerned that the Iraqis might attempt to take over their Embassies in London and Berne by force, and were taking preventive measures. The FCO should inform EC partners of this fear so that any necessary action could be taken. (Action: FCO).

2. The next meeting of the Group will be at the same time and place tomorrow (11.00 am in Conference Room A, Cabinet Office) under the Defence Secretary's chairmanship.

PR Yenny

pp W D REEVES

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SECRET AND PERSONAL

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SECRET AND PERSONAL

Mr Powell

16 (a-d)

COM
31/8

31 August 1990

UO 4545

J R Young Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Emergency Unit
Whitehall SW1

Dear Rob,

IRAQ

This letter summarises the action agreed at the meeting of the Ad Hoc Group on the Gulf under the Defence Secretary's chairmanship this morning, at which Mr Waldegrave and Mr Hamilton were also present. CIRCULATION WITHIN DEPARTMENTS SHOULD BE ON A STRICTLY NEED-TO-KNOW BASIS.

- a. The first flight carrying evacuated women and children from Iraq might be today. This would be by Iraqi Airways, at Iraq's insistence. It would then carry Iraqi passengers from London to Baghdad. British Airways and Virgin Airlines were also in a position to make subsequent flights once further exit visas had been processed. Any remaining difficulties with overflying rights should quickly be resolved. (Action: FCO, DTp). It should be made clear that such flights were not a precedent for carriage of cargo by air in breach of the sanctions. The flight should go to Heathrow, which would be most convenient for the relatives. The arriving evacuees should be afforded every assistance, including orderly arrangements so as to enable them to avoid meeting the press if they so wished; medical support, using the airport hospital as required; and social services support. (Action: DTp, consulting FCO, DSS). Mr Waldegrave and a Social Services Minister would meet them. If British military liaison personnel were included among the passengers, a Defence Minister should also be present.
- b. It was noted that the Government would meet the costs of this flight, but would seek to recoup this subsequently where possible.

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SECRET AND PERSONAL

- c. It would be useful to obtain as much information as possible from evacuees about conditions and where they had been held. They should be given a letter, couched in general terms, from FCO consular department, inviting them to leave a contact address. Such a letter should not come from the Ministry of Defence. (Action: FCO, MOD).
- d. It was proposed that the Prime Minister, Mr Waldegrave, the Defence Secretary and the Foreign Secretary would (in that order) take part in this debate when Parliament resumed. Private Offices would commission briefing from Departments as required. (Action: FCO, MOD).
- e. It was noted that the Cabinet Office would chair a meeting this afternoon to organise further work on burden-sharing, which President Bush had raised in his speech last night.
- f. The Defence Secretary had received a warm welcome on his visit to the Gulf. This had been seen as timely. The principal issues affecting the forces on the ground related to command and control, and the need to co-ordinate the widest possible military effort. (Action: FCO, MOD). The arrival of HMS GLOUCESTER and the dispatch of minehunters direct to the Gulf had been announced. There were also a number of enhancements in Qatar about which the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary would inform the Ruler during his visit. (Action: FCO, consulting MOD).
- g. The Iraqi tanker HITTIN was capable of immediate departure from Mina al Bakr, and interception might take place very shortly. It would be of the highest importance to ensure that this first interception was a success. Urgent legal advice was required to define precisely the options available to the commanders of British warships after halting a tanker or other vessels breaching the embargo. In particular Commanding officers should have the clearest advice about the extent of their powers to divert, arrest or impound ships and crews. This advice should be made available today. The personal position, in terms of criminal and international law, of ships' masters who attempted to evade the blockade, should be addressed. (Action: FCO, Law Officers' Department, MOD).
- h. In discussion of the Embargo Surveillance Centre's latest report, it was noted that the Iraqi tanker AL QADISIYAH would be allowed to pass, being believed to be empty. It appeared to be heading through the Gulf to Iraq to reload. The cargo vessel ZANOOBIA no longer posed an immediate problem, as it was now headed for Hodeidah in Yemen. There were a number of indications that Yemen was being chosen as an alternative port of entry for goods destined for Iraq. Goods might then be shipped to Aqaba under non-Iraqi flags. Port Sudan might also be used for the same purpose. Action

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with the governments concerned should be considered, and taken urgently as appropriate. The Foreign Secretary should be kept fully up to date with the latest intelligence on ship movements and intentions during his visit to the area. (Action: FCO).

- i. British naval vessels were receiving more detailed information on ship movements than they could readily process. A system needed to be devised for providing them with a tailored service, highlighting what was of direct relevance. (Action: MOD).
- j. A number of cases of potential embargo breaches appeared to involve Austria, and these should be pursued with the Austrian authorities. (Action: FCO).
- k. Some cases in the United Kingdom considered by the ESC called for further investigation and action. An Embargo Enforcement Unit had been established in the DTI, which would take output from the ESC, and ensure that each report was pursued as required. It should be represented at Ad Hoc Group meetings and would produce a weekly report. (Action: DTI).
- l. A further Group had been established under Cabinet Office chairmanship to monitor efforts by Iraq to remove funds. A report of its first meeting had been circulated (AHGG (90)14). Following some initial Iraqi success in removing hard currency assets, the enforcement of the embargo had become increasingly effective. Iraq was, however, continuing to try to push through transactions contrary to the embargo, and the purpose of this Group was to ensure that effective steps were taken to counter these. The Bank of England would carry out spot checks on banks in the UK. The Group would provide weekly reports on its activities and trends. Action should be taken over the report in paragraph 24 of the JIC sitrep on payments to the Rafidain Bank. (Action: Cabinet Office).
- m. Further steps should be considered to ensure that company directors were fully aware of the precise scope of the sanctions, and of their personal liability in the event of breaches. The Confederation of British Industry and trade associations should be encouraged to take positive steps to make the position clear to their members. (Action: DTI).
- n. It was noted that the FCO had compiled statements of the key arguments against Saddam Hussein, his actions and his record for use with both Arab and Western audiences (the emphasis being significantly different between the two). These would be circulated to other Ministers. Steps were being taken to ensure that the British point of view was well represented in the Arab media.

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- o. The Panorama programme had invited a Minister to appear for its broadcast on 3 September, but had refused to allow the interview to be uncut or live. The producers should be pressed further to allow a Minister to appear live at the end of the programme. (Action: FCO).
 - p. It was noted that the Transport Secretary had not in the event made a statement on airline security on 30 August. He proposed to do so today, prefaced by more general remarks on the airlift of evacuees from Iraq.
 - q. The Prime Minister's meetings with King Hussein of Jordan and with President Bush's Chief of Staff today might generate press interest. It was possible that some points might call for a public response. (Action: FCO). Over the weekend, the Prime Minister would appear in the David Frost interview. If the HITIN were intercepted over the weekend, that could be expected to receive extensive media attention.
2. The next meeting of the Group will be at the same time and place on Monday (11.00 am in Conference Room A, Cabinet Office) under the Defence Secretary's chairmanship.

Yours sincerely
David Ball

D C J BALL

SECRET AND PERSONAL

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17 (a-e)⁹

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SECRET AND PERSONAL

3 September 1990

U04546

A F Green Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Emergency Unit
Whitehall SW1

Dear Andrew,

IRAQ

This letter summarises the action agreed at the meeting of the Ad Hoc Group on the Gulf under the Defence Secretary's chairmanship this morning, at which Mr Waldegrave was also present. CIRCULATION WITHIN DEPARTMENTS SHOULD BE ON A STRICTLY NEED-TO-KNOW BASIS.

- a. 25-40 British women and children still in Baghdad had exit visas. It had been hoped that the French would arrange their evacuation but Iraq had refused to allow any foreign airlines to fly from Baghdad. Discussions were in progress in the European Community (EC) about the possible joint charter of an Iraqi aircraft.
- b. Some 400 women and children (and possibly many more still in hiding) were still in Kuwait. It had been agreed that the Government should meet the cost of moving them to Baghdad, accommodating them and then evacuating them, and seek to recoup as much as possible afterwards. The Embassy in Baghdad should be informed accordingly. (Action: FCO). The preferred course would be for the dependants to travel by Iraq Airways to Jordan and then by a British aircraft to the United Kingdom. But the Iraqis might well insist on flying the whole journey.
- c. Urgent consideration should be given to setting up a regular time at which BBC broadcasts would be made specifically for the remaining Britons in Kuwait, to keep them informed and to show that their welfare continued to be a high priority. (Action: FCO).
- d. It was noted that most or all of the Western hostages being sent to industrial sites as protection were from Kuwait.

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Those based in Iraq were being permitted to continue their normal work and residence.

- e. Arrangements for the evacuation over the weekend had worked smoothly. Those who took part in the operation were to be congratulated. It was clear, however, that a similar operation would not be possible at a major civil airport in the middle of the day. The FCO should discuss with MOD the option of using an RAF airfield, recognising that this might involve allowing access to an Iraqi airliner. (Action: FCO, MOD).
- f. It was noted that action was in hand to interview those returning evacuees who had expressed a willingness to speak (in confidence) about the situation in Kuwait.
- g. Action to withdraw airside passes from Iraqi Airways staff should be postponed while the company's help was needed for the arrangement of evacuations. But the situation should be kept under close review. (Action: DTp).
- h. The Iraqi request to send supplies of medicines and drugs should be carefully scrutinised. The quantity and composition of the list should be examined. Provided that the consignment seemed reasonable, we should not object, but action would need to be concerted with other governments who had received similar approaches. (Action: FCO and DTI).
- j. It was noted that the position of EC embassies in Kuwait would be discussed on 5-6 September by the Political Committee. No EC embassy was likely to reach a position where it could not continue to function before then. It would be advisable to move away from the concept of a co-ordinated closure since the timing would be governed by the first to close.
- k. Mr Brady, the US Treasury Secretary, would be seeing the Prime Minister and possibly the Chief Secretary on 4/5 September as part of the US effort to secure fair burden-sharing for the costs of the forces deployed in the Gulf and aid to friendly states directly affected by the embargo. Our response should be supportive and positive. The US Government was unlikely to request a further contribution from the UK for the military operation (but see (l) below) but would expect the UK to make a contribution on the aid to front-line states. The main brunt of the Western contribution should come from those highly developed countries (eg West Germany and Japan) who had not committed significant forces to the Gulf. An approximate calculation should be made of what the UK had already contributed through the deployment of its forces. (Action: HM Treasury, FCO).
- l. Ministers had agreed that two RO/RO ferries should be offered in response to the US request through NATO. This would form

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part of the UK contribution to the burden-sharing effort in (k) above. Steps to make provisional bookings and to seek quotes should be taken as soon as possible. The cost, including insurance, should be borne by the Ministry of Defence under the separate Operation GRANBY head. (Action: DTp, consulting MOD).

- m. The WEU meeting of officials on 31 August had reached agreement on the co-ordination of naval operations. This kept the WEU as a political umbrella within which smaller nations could contribute without WEU taking over command and control. The arrangements should be kept under review in the light of experience. (Action: MOD).

- n. Rules of Engagement had been given to commanding officers on the measures they could take following an interception and in the event of repeated attempts to break the blockade.

- o. A Note should be prepared on negotiations over the status of British forces in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, which had not yet been fully resolved. It was important that agreement with Saudi Arabia should be reached this week. (Action: MOD).

- p. The FCO and MOD should establish exactly what Prince Sultan of Saudi Arabia had said at his press conference on 2 August. Press reports had suggested that he had said that aggressive action against Iraq from Saudi Arabia was inconceivable. (Action: FCO).

- q. In discussion of the Embargo Surveillance Centre's latest report, it was noted that the Iraqi tankers HITTIN, AL QADISIYAH and RUMAILA would probably be in a position to sail from Mina al-Bakr tomorrow, if the Iraqis decided to despatch them in a flotilla. AMURIYAH was now bound for Aden, and was believed to be empty. The British-managed (but Panamanian-owned) cargo ship GUR MARINER, which might be carrying chemical weapons-related equipment or precursors, had left Port Said yesterday. It had limited supplies of fuel. The Department of Transport would press the company hard to send the vessel to Gibraltar from where the cargo would be returned either to Britain or to the Netherlands and West Germany. The situation should be watched carefully. MOD should consider urgently whether the vessel could be shadowed by British or other Western naval vessels. (Action: DTp, consulting MOD). Some patterns of Iraqi shipping movements were beginning to emerge as described in the report. Aqaba remained the most important port of entry for cargo to Iraq. Shipping at Aqaba and other non-Iraqi ports

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could legitimately be stopped if doing so was necessary to enforce the sanctions: UN Security Council Resolution 665 was not specifically confined to the Gulf.

- r. Iraqi bank accounts in the United Kingdom had been frozen, so payments into these accounts were not in themselves a breach of the sanctions. The money would not be made available to the Iraqis. The Bank of England had not yet exercised its inspection powers over Iraqi accounts. The Treasury would check on further action. (Action: HM Treasury and Bank of England).

- s. There were some indications that goods were being smuggled over the borders from Iraqis neighbours, especially Syria. This should be pursued direct with the relevant governments. However, it was for the US Government primarily to action with Syria, and the FCO should liaise with the State Department. (Action: FCO).

- t. The reported involvement of East Germany in the maintenance of Iraqi fighter aircraft should be pursued with the East German Government. (Action: FCO).

- u. The Department of Trade and Industry should seriously consider issuing a stern general warning today that insuring Iraqi vessels could well constitute breaches of the law for which companies and individual company directors could be liable. Such a warning should make clear the seriousness with which any such breach was regarded. The Law Officers' Department should be consulted over the drafting. DTI Ministers should be informed of the Group's views at the DTI meeting later today. (Action: DTI, consulting LOD).

- v. Immediate steps should be taken to publish formally the UN Sanctions (Channel Islands) Order and the UN Sanctions (Amendment) Order made last week. (Action: DTI, FCO).

- w. Press coverage of the crisis had generally been helpful, and had not been unduly influenced by the Iraq's propaganda effort. A number of helpful points had been received about the positive presentation of the Western case. Consideration should be given to making use of the fact that Tariq Aziz made a point, in an interview on 31 August, of not ruling out the use of terrorism against Iraq's opponents. The Panorama programme tonight was likely to be unhelpful. A press briefing had been released to selected newspapers as a response to this. (Action: FCO). The prospect of further

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evacuations could be expected to remain foremost in the media coverage.

2. The next meeting of the Group will be at the same time and place on Tuesday 4 September (11.00 am in Conference Room A, Cabinet Office) under the Defence Secretary's chairmanship.

Your sincerely
David Ball

D C J BALL

- Copied to:
- C D Powell Esq, No 10
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 - J S Wall Esq LVO, FCO
 - The Hon Dominic Asquith, FCO
 - W R Tomkys Esq CMG, FCO
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SECRET AND PERSONAL

UO.4547

4 September 1990

A F Green Esq
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COG
4/4.

Dear Andrew,

IRAQ

This letter summarises the action agreed at the meeting of the Ad Hoc Group on the Gulf under the Defence Secretary's chairmanship this morning, at which Mr Waldegrave was also present. The Education Secretary was present for item 1. CIRCULATION WITHIN DEPARTMENTS SHOULD BE ON A STRICTLY NEED-TO-KNOW BASIS.

- a. The Group discussed the paper AHGG(90)13 (Revised). It was agreed that measures against Iraqi students in the United Kingdom should not be taken immediately, whilst sensitive negotiations on the evacuation of women and children from Iraq were in progress. The timing of any action should be kept under review. It would be preferable in the first instance to direct action against those Iraqis who were working on sensitive subjects. The immediate priority was to identify those students. The Home Office should consider what information it would be possible to obtain from their records and report to tomorrow's meeting. The Department of Education and Science should contact discreetly and in confidence the Committee of Vice Chancellors and Principals (CVCP) to ask if they could find out the subjects being studied by the small number of British funded students. DES should also make informal enquiries to see if anything was known of Iraq's intentions with regard to the return of students for the coming academic year (there had only been three student arrivals in the last month). The FCO should ask the Ambassador in Baghdad about the current state of visa applications. Further considerations would be given to the options listed in the paper when the timing was right. The present negotiations on the hostages could well continue for some time. (Action: Home Office, DES, FCO).

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- b. The Embassy in Kuwait had organised the evacuation of 306 women and children by road from Kuwait to Baghdad, where accommodation had been arranged for them. Exit visas would be sought for them once they had arrived in Baghdad. A number had apparently been prevented from reaching the rendezvous point in Kuwait. If all proceeded smoothly a further evacuation would be attempted in two days' time.
- c. Some 40 women and children with exit visas would travel on a US-chartered Iraqi Airways flight this evening to Amman. The French had also chartered a flight for tomorrow, on which some Britons would also be carried. Consideration would be given to the chartering of an Iraqi aircraft by the UK when more dependents were ready for evacuation. Stansted Airport had suitable facilities to receive evacuees, and a military airport would therefore probably not be required. A Virgin Atlantic aircraft would fly to Jordan today carrying humanitarian assistance and would bring refugees back to the United Kingdom.
- d. There had been further discussions with the BBC about arrangements to make regular broadcasts on the World Service for the benefit of the remaining British community in Kuwait. The BBC were now considering the modalities.
- e. The British offer of two roll on/roll off ferries had been made to the United States at the NATO meeting yesterday. The Italians had offered four ferries, the Portuguese three; others had been non-committal.
- f. The US Navy and Coastguard had boarded the cargo ship ZANOUBIA early this morning and were instructing it to go to Muscat. They had asked for HMS JUPITER to provide assistance. JUPITER would not reach the scene until later today. The French might also be invited to send a vessel. More information should be sought about American intentions as a matter of urgency. In the meantime the response to any enquiries should be that this was a routine US-led operation, but that the British were seeing what they could do to help. (Action: MOD).
- g. If the Iraqi tankers AL QADISIYAH, RUMAILA and HITIN left Mina al-Bakr their first contact would be with US ships. The US was the only source of hard intelligence on the vessels, and we were dependant on the supply of information from the US. Further work should be carried out rapidly on the arrangements and timing of information about the movement of these tankers. (Action: MOD).
- h. The GUR MARINER had been instructed by its British management company to head at full speed for Gibraltar, where it was expected to arrive on Thursday, and then on to the United Kingdom. There did not appear to be any real danger that the cargo would be diverted before then. The Governor of

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Gibraltar had been asked to ensure a smooth passage. HMS GLOUCESTER might be in a position to provide naval assistance should this prove necessary. (Action: MOD). The company wanted the Government to seize the cargo on its arrival in the UK (which might be by 12 September). Consideration was being given to the legal basis. (Action: DTI).

- i. Two Indian vessels carrying food had left Bombay yesterday and today bound for Iraq. The Indian Government had said that their purpose was humanitarian, but that they would abide by any ruling of the UN Sanctions Committee on that point. The Committee would meet shortly to consider the issue of foodstuffs. The British view was that a decision on whether food should be supplied on a humanitarian basis was for the Security Council to make, on the advice of the Sanctions Committee. An independent agency (such as the Red Cross) should be asked to make an assessment of whether humanitarian grounds existed for the supply of foods which would be considered in the first instance by the Sanctions Committee. Until the Security Council had come to a judgement, it would not be right to authorise the supply of food. (Action: FCO).
- j. Any applications to provide medical supplies to Iraq would be passed by DTI to FCO who would inform the UN Sanctions Committee of any such request and of the action which it was proposed to take. This would establish a suitable mechanism for considering applications of this kind which had been made to a number of countries. Applications should be closely scrutinised to determine that there was a genuine need for the supplies. (Action: DTI, FCO).
- k. The Trade and Industry Secretary had written to colleagues covering a number of issues relating to policy on the enforcement of sanctions. A press release had been prepared for issue tomorrow, with the aim of achieving the maximum publicity for sanctions measures amongst businessmen themselves, to ensure that they were aware of the risks and penalties of breaching the sanctions. This would be submitted to the Trade and Industry Secretary later today. (Action: DTI).
- l. So far as insurance was concerned, the DTI proposed to ask the Treasury to alter the position under the payments freeze to block all payments of claims to Iraqi accounts. This would effectively make insurance commercially worthless unless it were to be permitted for a specific humanitarian reason. In addition, the Trade and Industry Secretary would speak to Lloyds and other insurers to ask them to work on the basis of no new policies. (Action: DTI).

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- m. The FCO would confirm rapidly that the two most recent sanctions Orders had been published sufficiently fully to allow prosecutions to be made under them. (Action: FCO).

- n. The Head of the Assessments Staff introduced the paper JIC(90)(IA)60 of 31 August 1990. It gave a preliminary overview of the application of sanctions and of their impact on Iraq. Oil exports had been brought virtually to a standstill. In the long term this would severely damage the Iraqi economy. The financial embargo was also working well. On the other hand, Iraq had just had a successful harvest and had considerable strategic reserves of food, and could probably hold out until the spring harvest. There had been some reports that Iraq had made substantial purchases of food stocks shortly before the invasion. These should be further investigated. (Action: Assessments Staff). Food shortages might in any case not lead ordinary Iraqis to blame Hussein, but stiffen their resolve to resist foreign pressure. The trade embargo seemed unlikely to have a direct effect on Iraqi military activity, although further work was being done on the situation concerning military spares. The shortage of spares and the loss of foreign technicians would have some impact on industrial production. The paper's assessment emphasised the importance of making the enforcement of sanctions as effective as possible, so as to build up the impression in the minds of Iraqis that economic activity was grinding to a halt. Air freighting of spare parts was an important potential loophole which needed to be blocked. MOD was preparing a paper on this. (Action: MOD). The overall effects of the sanctions policy should be kept under review. (Action: Assessments Staff).

- o. The publicity campaign was currently concentrating on material to be directed at non-Arab Islamic and other third world states. Steps were being taken to encourage EC partners to take similar action. This focussed on the illegality of the occupation and on the treatment of hostages and of embassies in Kuwait. Material was being provided for use on television and radio overseas. Guidance would be issued to overseas posts following the Foreign Secretary's return. A briefing note should be circulated to all Ministers and press departments to ensure that a consistent line was taken throughout Whitehall. (Action: FCO).

- p. Last night's Panorama programme had been unhelpful but had contained no new material. A close eye should be kept on the activities of TDG, one of the companies mentioned on the programme, and on others (such as Matrix Churchill) which were in a similar position. Trade with TDG, which was Iraqi controlled, would currently be in breach of sanctions regulations. The Trade and Industry Secretary should be informed of the Group's concerns. (Action: DTI).

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- q. A bomb threat directed this morning at the Iraqi Embassy or Residence was believed to have been a false alarm.
- r. It had been reported that a member of the West German Foreign Ministry had been arrested on suspicion of spying for Iraq. In response to any press enquiries, it should be said that this was a matter for the German authorities. (Action: FCO).


2. The next meeting of the Group will be at the same time on Wednesday 5 September (11.00 am in Conference Room B, Cabinet Office) under the chairmanship of the Secretary of State for Energy. Please note the change of room.

Yours sincerely,

D C J Ball

D C J BALL

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SECRET AND PERSONAL

UO.4548

5 September 1990

A F Green Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Emergency Unit
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Dear Andrew,

IRAQ

This letter summarises the action agreed at the meeting of the Ad Hoc Group on the Gulf under the chairmanship of the Secretary of State for Energy this morning, at which Mr Waldegrave and Mr Hamilton were also present. CIRCULATION WITHIN DEPARTMENTS SHOULD BE ON A STRICTLY NEED-TO-KNOW BASIS.

- a. The convoy of buses with 306 women and children from Kuwait had safely reached Baghdad yesterday evening. They were reasonably confident of obtaining exist visas swiftly from the Iraqis. A further evacuation of dependants from Kuwait was planned for 7 September. A Virgin Atlantic Airways flight from Jordan carrying just over 100 evacuees, two-thirds of them British, had arrived in London this morning. The next flight of hostages was expected to come to the United Kingdom on Friday: Mr Lennox-Boyd would meet.
- b. A number of returning hostages were being denied unemployment benefit on the grounds that they remained under contract to companies in Kuwait. The Cabinet Office should co-ordinate steps to resolve these difficulties with the FCO, DSS and the Department of Employment. (Action: Cabinet Office).
- c. The option of deploying UK ground forces was still under consideration. (Action: MOD).
- d. The Embargo Surveillance Centre had provided the FCO with a sanitised account of the reported involvement of East Germany in the maintenance of Iraqi fighter aircraft, to enable this to be pursued. (Action: FCO).
- e. The two Indian vessels which were previously thought to be carrying food were now known to be empty. Their purpose was to bring back evacuees.

M.C. Powell

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- f. The GUR MARINER was expected to reach Gibraltar early on 7 September and the United Kingdom on about 13 September. The DTI had reason to believe that some of the cargo that had been loaded in the United Kingdom might be in breach of export controls. HM Customs and Excise would therefore detain the cargo on its arrival. The ship would be berthed at Marchwood near Southampton.
- g. The latest position on ZANOOBIA was that the vessel had not entered Muscat but had remained offshore under US control. The Iraqis wanted the vessel to be sent to Aden but this presented a significant risk of cargo diversion. This danger should be taken up by our Embassy in Washington with the US Administration. (Action: FCO).
- h. The tankers HITTIN and AL QADISIYAH were still in Mina al-Bakr, loaded and ready to sail. The TARIK IBN ZIYAD was heading homewards empty through the Suez Canal. The AMURIYAH, off Cuba, had probably off-loaded its cargo.
- i. The DTI had prepared a draft amendment to the payments freeze designed to block (subject to discretion) claims on Iraqi insurance policies. DTI officials would discuss this proposal this afternoon with representatives of the insurance industry to ensure that it would be effective in meeting its objectives. (Action: DTI).
- j. The Chairman of the Sub-Group on the UN Embargo on Iraq and Movement of Funds introduced his report. The Sub-Group was now meeting twice weekly to consider how to deal with information about attempts to breach the embargo on the Iraqi movement of funds. The embargo had been largely effective. The Bank of England was discussing with the DTI a number of specific cases in the United Kingdom. The Bank of England might need to issue further guidance on its own role when making approaches in specific cases. The Sub-Group was also following up recent information about attempts to breach the embargo in Sri Lanka, Austria and the Soviet Union. Follow-up action in recent cases involving the UAE and Bahrain had been successful. Iraqi attempts to move funds from Central Bank of Jordan accounts were a source of particular concern. This issue should be raised with Mr Brady, the US Treasury Secretary, who was in London today, in the context of financial assistance to Jordan. (Action: Cabinet Office, in consultation with FCO and Treasury).
- k. Mr Brady at his meeting with the Chief Secretary this morning on burdensharing had asked the United Kingdom to contribute \$100 million in the short term to an immediate package of aid for the worst affected states worth \$3.5 billion. The United States was also preparing a longer-term package worth \$6.3 billion. The US proposals would be considered by the Cabinet Office group co-ordinating action on burdensharing. (Action: Cabinet Office, Treasury, FCO).

C

SECRET AND PERSONAL

l. On the information campaign, outside consultants had been assembled and were providing useful contributions to the effort to ensure that the Western point of view was effectively presented. Hostages returning from Kuwait had said that they were able to receive BBC World Service broadcasts clearly. The BBC were now taking a co-operative attitude towards World Service broadcasts specifically for the benefit of the remaining British community in Kuwait. Discussions with the BBC about the Arabic Service were continuing. (Action: FCO).

m. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary would be holding a press conference in Jordan this afternoon. Press coverage in the United Kingdom was likely to continue to focus on the evacuation of hostages. The Trade and Industry Secretary was considering the timing and presentational aspects of a press notice drawing attention to the penalties of sanctions breaking. This was likely to be issued today.

n. The Home Office held some 1400 files on Iraqi students. These did not generally contain information which would be easily available to determine whether they were working on subjects which might be sensitive from a defence point of view. These files were very much concerned with the administrative aspects of their stay. Approaches to the universities and other institutions themselves provided the most promising avenue.

o. Similar problems arose in the context of the separate exercise to consider action that might be taken about Iraqis in sensitive posts in the United Kingdom. TO(P) would meet tomorrow afternoon to consider a paper on this subject. In this case it might be most effective to focus on the categories of post which were most sensitive.

p. Since 18 August, 340 Iraqis had arrived in the United Kingdom and 1500 had left. No Iraqi students had arrived over the last week.

q. The Civil Aviation Authority would shortly refuse pilots' licences to a small number of Iraqi Airways employees.

r. The Department of Transport had approached 56 other governments about security measures for British Airways, of which 30 had so far replied. Most replies had been encouraging. Those from Denmark and the Netherlands, however, had been unsatisfactory and would be followed up. In a significant number of other cases, further diplomatic efforts would probably be required to persuade other governments of their responsibilities in this regard. (Action: DTp, consulting FCO).

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2. There will be no meeting of the Group tomorrow. The next meeting will be on Friday 7 September at 11.00 am in Conference Room A, Cabinet Office under the chairmanship of the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary.

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20 (a-e)⁹

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SECRET AND PERSONAL

UO.4553

7 September 1990

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C 887/9.

See Andrew.

IRAQ

This letter summarises the action agreed at the meeting of the Ad Hoc Group on the Gulf under Sir Robin Butler's chairmanship this morning.

CIRCULATION WITHIN DEPARTMENTS SHOULD BE ON A STRICTLY NEED-TO-KNOW BASIS.

a. The Department of Social Security had established and funded emergency teams to handle problems arising from the return of families from Iraq and Kuwait. Guidance had been issued to local offices to treat such cases with particular care and understanding, and to give the benefit of the doubt in difficult cases. A special contact point had been set up in the DSS to handle cases of special hardship. Guidance would be issued shortly on the payment of Social Fund grants and loans for those with immediate needs. The Treasury should be consulted further before issue. (Action: DSS, consulting HM Treasury). The Social Services Secretary wished to maintain a low key approach to publicity for such measures. The FCO, with the assistance of the consular section in Baghdad, should keep DSS informed so far as possible of the names of those returning to the United Kingdom. The Embassy in Baghdad should give returning hostages a point of contact in DSS which they could approach. (Action: FCO).

b. A further 240 women and children had arrived at Gatwick this morning by British Airways. The next major flight into London would probably be on 9 September carrying a further 300. Some 2000 dependants would still be in Kuwait following these evacuations, and some 500 in Iraq. The FCO should ask the Ambassador in Baghdad for his best estimate of how many more were likely to wish to leave. The process of evacuation would clearly continue for some time yet. (Action: FCO).

c. MOD believed that it knew the location of the remaining 19 servicemen and 3 dependants in Kuwait, and 46 servicemen and 16 dependants in Iraq.

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- d. The UN Secretary General had confirmed that his talks with Tariq Aziz, the Iraqi Foreign Minister, had made no progress. He was considering sending a representative to Kuwait. The Sanctions Committee had had an unsatisfactory discussion on policy over food shipments.
- e. EC Foreign Ministers were meeting today to discuss aid to countries affected by the crisis; they would also consider other issues including the future of EC Embassies in Kuwait.
- f. The MOD introduced a Note (AHGG(90) 17) on the British view of international co-ordination of naval operations for the enforcement of the UN embargo. Navies should remain under national command and control, with close consultation both at the policy and governmental level and in-theatre in the handling of operations. Points of contact had been established in Washington and Paris which could be contacted either through the respective Embassies or directly if necessary. The Note also referred to the role of the WEU, which on 31 August had agreed a set of guidelines for co-ordinating naval contributions, and the UN Military Staff Committee, which was important for building up co-operation with the Soviet Union and for the discussion of emerging issues. In-theatre arrangements would be discussed at the Bahrain Naval Conference on 9-10 September, at which the United Kingdom would be represented by the senior naval officer in the Middle East, the Flag Officer 2nd Flotilla, and a member of the Defence Staff. The French had arranged a pre-meeting of WEU member states on 8 September.
- g. Proposals for a further British military contribution would be submitted to the Defence Secretary today. When the Defence Secretary had approved a set of recommendations Ministers in OD(G) would have an opportunity to consider them.
- h. Early this morning HMS BATTLEAXE had shadowed two tankers and a third ship which were sailing down the Gulf in Iranian waters. These had proved to be non-Iraqi vessels. Neither tanker had been prepared to communicate with BATTLEAXE. The incident had underlined the difficulties that arose if other countries did not co-operate with the naval operation.
- i. Paragraphs 10 and 11 of the report by the Embargo Surveillance Centre suggested that Iraq was actively seeking customers for its oil. It was possible that the Iraqi tankers waiting at Mina al-Bakr would not attempt to sail until firm customers had been found.

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j. The Iraqi Ambassador in Muscat had apparently instructed the cargo ship ZANOOBIA to return to Sri Lanka rather than go to Aden. The FCO should continue to discuss the lessons of the incident with the United States and with Oman. It was important that vessels which had been intercepted should not be allowed to go to Yemen, where there was a danger of cargo diversion, if this could be avoided. Commanding officers of naval vessels would need clear instructions about the action they should take if a ship intercepted on its way to Iraq sought to go to Yemen instead. (Action: FCO and MOD keeping Cabinet Office informed).

k. The GUR MARINER had docked at Gibraltar at 4.00 am today. The DTp had authorised the supply of fuel to enable her to proceed further. The ship's owners and insurers wanted her to return to the Netherlands, where it would be easier to dispose of the cargo. But in view of the level of public interest, the importance which the US Government was attaching to this vessel, the possible sensitivity of some of the cargo and the likely public perception of a British connection, the management company should be pressed hard to direct the vessel to go to the United Kingdom. HM Customs and Excise could then take direct responsibility for examining the cargo. It might become necessary to offer storage facilities at Marchwood to achieve this, but no commitment should be made to do this free of charge at the present stage. The Group should be kept posted on developments. (Action: DTp consulting MOD).

l. AHGG(90) 18 reported action taken with other Governments in response to reported sanctions breaches. The level of co-operation had been reasonably good. A number of cases involving Australia (paragraph 19 of today's ESC report) should be pursued. (Action: FCO).

m. The present Parliamentary debate was dominating media coverage. The plight of refugees in Jordan was receiving increasing attention. Over the weekend, the press could be expected to concentrate on the Summit meeting in Helsinki. Although there were no plans for a specific Ministerial media appearance it would be important to be able to react quickly to any substantial points that emerged from the Summit. (Action: FCO, No 10 Press Office).

n. The Group should review on Monday the range of possible measures against Iraqis in the United Kingdom, including travel restrictions, expulsions, withdrawal of airside passes and steps against students, and give a report to be considered by OD(G) on Tuesday. The action likely to be taken by others, and attempts to co-ordinate this in the EC, would be relevant. The FCO and DES should prepare short notes for the discussion. (Action: FCO and DES).

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o. An Iraqi in exile in the United Kingdom had collapsed and died in the course of giving an interview to the Daily Telegraph last night. The police were investigating and a post mortem would be carried out.

p. The Prime Minister would speak to President Bush this afternoon. On burdensharing she was likely to reaffirm Britain's readiness to contribute in 1990 but to emphasise the need for more information and consultation. The Cabinet Office was co-ordinating work to enable Ministers to take a more detailed view on the issue in the course of next week.

2. The next meeting of the Group will be at the same time on Monday 10 September (11.00 am in Conference Room A, Cabinet Office) under the chairmanship of the Defence Secretary.

Yours sincerely
David Ball

D C J BALL

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SECRET AND PERSONAL

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23 (A-E) ✓ Nb 10

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12/9

UO.4562

12 September 1990

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Sec. M,

IRAQ

This letter summarises the action agreed at the meeting of the Ad Hoc Group on the Gulf under the Defence Secretary's chairmanship this morning. Mr Waldegrave and Mr Hamilton were also present. CIRCULATION WITHIN DEPARTMENTS SHOULD BE ON A STRICTLY NEED-TO-KNOW BASIS.

a. The DES should carry out the postal survey of public-sector institutions proposed in AHGG(90) 26 now. This should seek information both on existing students and on those expected to arrive for the forthcoming academic year. The results should be reported back to the Group. The survey was likely to generate some public reaction and a press line should be prepared. This should say that the purpose of the survey was to establish the position; that this was a natural precaution; and that this was the most suitable time to do so. More information would be obtained on the funding arrangements for the ten research students whose fees were paid in part by DES. (Action: DES).

b. There were some indications, although these had not been confirmed, that Iraq would not be providing funds for students in the United Kingdom. If this happened, it could be expected to lead to a number of requests for political asylum.

c. The Cabinet Office introduced AHGG(90) 21 on Iraqis in sensitive posts in the United Kingdom. Confidential checks were being made of key Departments' employment records, Security Service files, work permits and immigration records. Further guidance might be given to Departments on vetting and access controls. In discussion, it was agreed that Departments should also now make confidential approaches to other bodies and agencies with which they had close relationships in the defence, energy and transport fields, and invite them to examine their records to determine whether Iraqi nationals were working in sensitive areas. (Action: Cabinet Office, consulting other Departments).

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- d. An American chartered Iraqi Airways flight would leave Kuwait today, carrying up to 100 British women and children. They would fly to Baghdad and then direct to Gatwick where Mr Scott would meet them.
- e. Mrs Chalker's visit to Jordan coincided with the start of real progress in tackling the problem of refugees. The UN Secretary General had appointed a special representative, Prince Sudruddin Aga Khan, to co-ordinate relief efforts. It was not yet clear what terms of reference he had been given.
- f. The approach being taken by the United States on foodstuffs in the UN Sanctions Committee carried a danger that the present consensus might be broken, possibly leading to an unsatisfactory vote in the Security Council. The FCO had briefed the Foreign Secretary to raise this when he saw Mr Baker.
- g. The Bahrain Naval Conference, which in the event the United Kingdom had chaired, had focussed on practical issues. The French proposal for a WEU zone had been dropped. We and the Dutch in particular had emphasised the loss of flexibility that this proposal would entail. Some co-ordination of patrolling plans had been put in place, and there would be regular meetings to determine (by agreement not direction) which ships should be in which areas. Rules of Engagement had been exchanged at the Conference; these revealed a commendable degree of resolution. All parties had agreed that interception of shipping should take place outside the Gulf if possible (although challenges could be made earlier) and that it was better to direct ships away from the area rather than into local ports, especially Aden.
- h. There had been a useful exchange of views with the US on the handling of the interception of the ZANOOBIA. One point of difference remained: the Americans still appeared to consider that it would be acceptable to divert ships to Yemen. They had been asked to look again at this.
- i. The GUR MARINER would arrive at Flushing in the Netherlands this afternoon. The US had expressed concern that she would not be docking in the United Kingdom. It would be vital to ensure that there was no possibility of cargo being removed before a thorough search had been carried out. The Dutch authorities should be pressed to do this as fast as possible consistent with their legal requirements. The Defence Secretary would speak to the Dutch Defence Minister, to emphasise that firm action in a case of this kind made as important a contribution to the collective effort as direct naval deployment in the Gulf. The Embassy in The Hague should take action at an appropriately senior level with the Dutch Government. A British Customs investigating

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officer was travelling to Flushing. The Dutch had agreed that he should be present throughout the examination of the cargo and be given access to relevant documents. It was important that there should not be delay between the berthing of the ship and the search. If a delay was unavoidable, the ship should be kept under surveillance. The Customs officer should report regularly on developments, and HM Customs and Excise should in turn keep in close touch with the FCO, who would inform the US of the action being taken. HM Customs and Excise should be prepared to provide additional resources if necessary. (Action: HM Customs and Excise, FCO).

j. There were indications that the Cubans might not accept without question the oil carried by the ALMUSTAN-SIRIYAH which was expected to arrive in Cuba on 20 September. The tanker, which had initially headed for Sweden, was believed to have been loaded before the imposition of sanctions. The US Government should be asked how it intended to deal with the vessel. (Action: FCO).

k. There had been no change in the location of the Iraqi tankers near Mina al-Bakr. These, and the tankers at Aden, should be kept under close watch. The latter might try to unload oil to other foreign tankers. (Action: DTp).

l. The Bank of England had sent a letter to the Secretary General of British Bankers Association for circulation to all banks, including foreign banks, in the United Kingdom. This reminded banks that amendment of letters of credit at the request of Iraqi banks would be in breach of sanctions legislation. The Bank of England should propose to the Governor that he or another senior figure should write as soon as possible to key figures in the banking industry to stress the importance of observing sanctions and to point out the penalties. Legal advice was being sought on the Bank's powers to carry out spot checks. The outcome should be reported to the Group tomorrow. (Action: Bank of England).

m. In his recent speech Mr Bush had emphasised very effectively that the crisis could not be treated simply as an Arab question. He had described it as the first great challenge for the new world order. He had also achieved a convincing balance between the need for a resolute approach and sympathy for the position of hostages.

n. A letter in the Daily Telegraph today from a returning hostage gave an indication of the public pressure that could be expected. An article by a respected Egyptian journalist in today's Times illustrated

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the line that many Arabs might be inclined to follow. Consideration was being given to what replies might most helpfully be made. These could build on recent statements from the IMF and World Bank that the real losers from the current crisis were the poorest countries. (Action: FCO).

o. The handling of British Muslim public opinion would be increasingly important. Mrs Rumbold would consider this aspect further when the delegation representing a number of Muslim groups returned to the United Kingdom. Efforts would need to be co-ordinated with the Saudi Embassy. (Action: Home Office). A close watch should be kept on applications for the release of Iraqi funds to British mosques which might be intended to pay for Iraqi propaganda. (Action: Bank of England).

p. Mrs Chalker should be invited to consider giving briefings following her return to High Commissioners and other representatives of the countries worst affected by the refugee problem. (Action: FCO). Mrs Rumbold and Mrs Chalker should be invited to a future meeting of the Group to discuss these and other presentational issues. (Action: Cabinet Office).

q. Channel 4 was intending to broadcast an item on sanctions on Saturday evening, and had sought information both on sanctions generally and on the GUR MARINER in particular. This would provide a good opportunity to explain Government policy and to indicate how well the machinery for enforcing sanctions was operating. The programme should be offered as much information as possible consistent with the need to protect sensitive matters. (Action: DTp).

2. The next meeting of the Group will be at the same time and place tomorrow (11.00 am in Conference Room A, Cabinet Office) under the chairmanship of the Defence Secretary.

Yours sincerely
David Hall

D C J BALL

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SECRET AND PERSONAL

UO.4563

14 September 1990

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EDD 14/9.

Dear Rob,

IRAQ

This letter summarises the principal points made and action agreed at the meeting of the Ad Hoc Group on the Gulf under the Defence Secretary's chairmanship yesterday morning. The Chief Secretary, Treasury, the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry and Mr Waldegrave were also present. CIRCULATION WITHIN DEPARTMENTS SHOULD BE ON A STRICTLY NEED-TO-KNOW BASIS.

a. The Cabinet Office introduced AHGG(90) 27 on burdensharing. This covered two aspects: contributions towards the cost of military deployments, and economic assistance to the countries directly affected by the crisis. In addition, it gave an overview drawing these two aspects together and making policy recommendations. The paper concluded that the United States had contributed more than its fair share militarily, but that the UK contribution was second only to this. It suggested that we should refrain from blatant attempts to benefit from a military compensation scheme, but that we should not rule out receiving some assistance if the opportunity arose. Jordan, Egypt and Turkey were identified as deserving assistance (provided, in the case of Jordan, that it observed the UN embargo), and Germany, Japan, the Benelux countries and the Gulf states as donors. A Mutual Support Fund (MSF) should be established as the mechanism for calculating contributions and directing aid. The paper did not suggest a specific figure for the British contribution. This would have to take into account the British military effort and others' payment of their share. There was not yet sufficient information about the basis of figures quoted by the United States, and one part of the next stage should be to press for more explanation of this. In discussion, a number of points were made:

- the oil producing states would benefit substantially from the increased price of oil;

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- the United Kingdom should avoid taking on a coordinating role, which should be carried out by an international mechanism (such as the MSF);
- in discussion in the FAC next week, the UK should press for a higher proportion of the EC share to be made through bilateral rather than Community resources contributions. The current Commission proposal implied that the UK would contribute some £90 million to the EC budget element, which was too high, particularly in view of the extent of the British military deployment. The Commission proposal could, however, be expected to attract a wide measure of support. The FCO should discuss with the Treasury the detailed position that the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary might be advised to take;
- it was important not to call into question the clear understanding that British military deployments were being made on their own merits, because of the threat to British interests and the need to come to the aid of friendly countries. It should clearly be the UK that paid for its own deployments, but we should be prepared to recover any associated in-country costs (eg. through provision by the host country of free fuel, water or food). This made it all the more important that the military contribution be counted in any calculation of aid;
- the Defence Secretary would suggest to the West German Defence Minister that the Germans should make a contribution in the form of ships to move men and equipment from Germany;
- some account should be taken in consideration of the issue of the losses incurred by British firms as a result of the crisis. It would, however, be difficult to insist that assistance was tied to trade;
- the humanitarian aid currently being provided to assist refugees in Jordan should also be taken into account.

The Group endorsed the paper, and invited the Secretariat to arrange for it to be submitted for consideration by OD on 14 September.
 (Action: Cabinet Office).

b. The Secretary of State for Trade and Industry introduced AHGG(90)28, which gave a broad indication of the impact of the crisis in terms of lost markets and other industrial consequences. Lost revenues, including services, were of the order of £1 billion a year. Few firms were in danger of going out of business as a direct result, however, and many would be covered against loss on specific contracts

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SECRET AND PERSONAL

through ECGD. The Note suggested that 20,000 jobs might be put at risk, but this took no account of diversion of labour or new trade opportunities. This figure should not be used in any public statements. He did not recommend that compensation should be paid to firms beyond what they might receive through export credit cover. But he would take the initiative in bringing the range of services and assistance which DTI could provide to the attention of affected companies. He was also looking urgently at the possibility of providing free assistance with export market research. The Group endorsed the Note and invited the Secretariat to arrange for it to be circulated for consideration by OD. (Action: Cabinet Office).

c. The Cabinet Office, introducing AHGG(90) 29, said that it was proposed to set up a Support Centre for the families of those still detained in Iraq and Kuwait. This would provide families with a single point of contact to which they could turn for information about hostages' whereabouts and the general situation in Kuwait and Iraq, and act as a focal point for government assistance and advice on the range of problems that families would face. A leaflet should also be prepared to give contact numbers in the Departments concerned. In discussion, it was agreed that the Unit, to be called the Gulf Families Support Unit, should be located initially in the FCO alongside the Emergency Unit; that a free telephone line should be installed; and that the Unit should be launched at a press conference on Monday, to coincide with publication of the leaflet. The Ministerial Group to oversee the unit would be chaired by Mr Waldegrave, with Ministerial representatives from the Department of Health, the Department of Social Security, HM Treasury and the Home Office. A Note summarising the Group's decisions should be circulated for consideration at the meeting of OD(G) on 14 September. (Action: Cabinet Office).

d. 73 British dependants had arrived at Gatwick the previous evening on a US-chartered flight from Kuwait, where they had been met by Mr Scott. Two further flights were planned for 14 and 15 September, on which places would again be offered to Britains. About 1500 British citizens remained in Iraq and Kuwait.

e. A UN Presidency statement on foodstuffs would say that an Indian consignment of food could be delivered to Iraq. Whilst this was not ideal, and might lead to requests for other consignments to be exempted from the embargo, it was unlikely that general UN support would have been forthcoming for the wider policy without this concession.

f. Prince Sudruddin Aga Khan had been appointed by the UN Secretary General as special representative with responsibility for co-ordinating all humanitarian aspects of the situation. His terms of reference, which did not confine his role to Jordan, were satisfactory.

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- g. Iraqi soldiers had entered the Dutch Ambassador's residence in Kuwait on 12 September. A protest would be made to the Iraqis.
- h. The GUR MARINER was anchored off Flushing and was expected to dock later in the day. A British Customs officer would be present when the Dutch authorities examined the cargo. Dutch customs were currently examining the precise scope of their powers to inspect and detain the cargo within Dutch law. The Defence Secretary had spoken yesterday to the Dutch Defence Minister, who had appreciated the importance of the case and had undertaken to look into it. HM Customs and Excise were in close touch with the FCO on developments. They should seek further information from the United States about the nature of the suspect cargo to assist them in their search. (Action: FCO, Customs and Excise).
- i. A sanitised version of the report in paragraph 1 of the ESC Situation Report had been prepared to enable the FCO to pursue the matter with the French authorities. The FCO should check with the United States that action was being taken to pursue the reports in paragraphs 3 and 9. DTp should remain in close touch with Swires on the case described in paragraph 4, and the FCO should make appropriate representations to the Yemeni Government. (Action: FCO, DTp).
- j. The Iraqi tankers ALFARAHIDI and JAMBUR would not be allowed to leave Piraeus pending a court hearing on 21 September.
- k. The paper being prepared by MOD and FCO on legal and practical aspects of an air embargo should be considered by the Group early next week. The US had been asked what stage their own consideration of the issue had reached. The case described in paragraph 28 of the ESC Report emphasised the importance of air transport in breaches of the embargo. (Action: MOD, FCO).
- l. The Governor of the Bank of England would speak to the Chairman about the letter which the Group agreed yesterday might be sent to senior figures in the banking industry about breaches of the sanctions. The Bank had received advice on its powers to conduct spot checks. These might be possible under the sanctions Orders. They should consult HM Customs and Excise and DTI on this and report the outcome to the Chairman later that day. (Action: Bank of England).
- m. The possible deployment of ground forces could be expected to dominate media coverage over the coming week-end. In making an announcement of the Government's decision, the Defence Secretary would stress that the purpose of any deployments was to fight harder for peace, and to demonstrate that there was no alleviation in Western governments' determination. The press would also be interested in the

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SECRET AND PERSONAL

cost of deployments. Any public statement would also be relevant to the discussions in the EC on burdensharing.

n. Ayatollah Khamenei's call for a holy war, and the possibility of an Iranian deal with Iraq, had been widely reported. This issue should be be approached in a low key way until Iranian intentions became clear. (Action: FCO, No 10 Press Office).

o. An attempt by two Arabs to pay a Bahraini a large sum of money to carry a television to Bahrain had been reported to the police. The police were treating the matter seriously. DTp was reviewing the security of flights to the area. (Action: DTp).

2. There is no meeting of the Group today (14 September). The next meeting will be on Monday 17 September at the same time and place (11.00 am in Conference Room A, Cabinet Office) under the chairmanship of the Defence Secretary.

Yours sincerely
D C J BALL


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SECRET AND PERSONAL

21 (A-E)

UO.4558

10 September 1990

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See Annex,

IRAQ

This letter summarises the action agreed at the meeting of the Ad Hoc Group on the Gulf under the Defence Secretary's chairmanship this morning. Mr Waldegrave and Mr Hamilton were also present. CIRCULATION WITHIN DEPARTMENTS SHOULD BE ON A STRICTLY NEED-TO-KNOW BASIS.

a. All the necessary groundwork should be done to enable us to take a selected number of measures against Iraqi interests in the United Kingdom discussed in AHGG(90)12 when Ministers judged appropriate. Ministers might be prepared to place a ceiling on the number of Iraqi diplomats in the UK; to impose travel restrictions on them; and to withdraw airside passes from Iraqi Embassy and Iraqi Airways staff. The Ambassador in Baghdad should be asked for his views on the possible effects of a package of measures. (Action: FCO, Home Office, DTp). Immediate action should be taken by the Bank of England to monitor strictly the expenditure of Iraqi funds. (Action: HM Treasury). A factor on timing would be the next major inward flight of hostages currently scheduled for 12 September. The aim should be to present a package of proposals for consideration by Ministers in OD(G) on 14 September.

b. It was too early to say how many Iraqi students would seek to enter the UK for the coming academic year. But only six had arrived since August. There was no easily accessible central information that would help to identify which students were engaged in sensitive work. The advice of the Committee of Vice Chancellors and Principals and the Committee of Polytechnic Directors should be sought urgently on how best to set about this task. The risk of ensuing publicity would have to be accepted, though the approach should be made in confidence. The Department of Education and Science should report back to the Group with proposals. (Action: DES).

B

+ letter to Amir

SECRET AND PERSONAL

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c. Ministers would wish to consider at OD(G) tomorrow the issue, which would be one of considerable public sensitivity, of the advice that should be given to the remaining hostages in Kuwait, many of whom were in hiding. A number of factors would be relevant, including the increasingly hard line attitude of the Iraqis; the difficulty in maintaining communications; and the impact on Kuwaiti morale if hostages were to give themselves up. It would be necessary to consult the US and EC about the advice they proposed to give.

d. The joint statement by President Bush and President Gorbachev following the Helsinki Summit had been satisfactory, particularly as regards its reference to additional measures consistent with the UN Charter. The continuing presence of Soviet military advisers in Iraq remained a source of concern. The Russians were apparently concerned that if they broke their contracts the advisers might become hostages.

e. The UN Sanctions Committee was expected to make recommendations to the Security Council today on the export of foodstuffs to Iraq. These would include the requirement that independent agencies should investigate the need for food on humanitarian grounds and be involved in its distribution. The text produced so far looked reasonably good. The Iraqis could be expected increasingly to focus publicity on this issue and seek to exploit international public opinion in favour of exempting food from the UN embargo. They might also take steps to make foreign embassies in Baghdad import food for their own use. At present, however, the British Embassy was still able to buy food locally.

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f. Mrs Chalker would travel with a Virgin Atlantic Airways flight taking further relief supplies to Jordan tomorrow. The plight of refugees in Jordan would be likely to attract increasing public attention in coming weeks. The question of further action in the UN and bilaterally would be looked at again on her return.

g. At the Naval Conference in Bahrain, which began yesterday, the French had suggested the establishment of a WEU zone in the Gulf of Oman. Steps were being taken to ride them off. (Action: MOD).

h. Negotiations were continuing with Saudi Arabia on the status of British forces. Prince Saud had told Mr Kaufman that any offensive action launched from Saudi territory would require the permission of the Saudi government. Unlike Prince Sultan's recent statement to a press conference, this did not rule out the use of force other than in immediate self defence. British and American forces had been invited to assist in the defence of Saudi Arabia; it was entirely consistent with this position that any further activity would require additional permission. Whilst it would be wrong to draw undue attention to this pre-emptive action should be taken to put the correct position clearly on the record. (Action: FCO and MoD). issue,

SECRET AND PERSONAL

i. The cargo ship GUR MARINER had left Gibraltar on the evening of 7 September. Her owners wished her to proceed to Rotterdam where the cargo could be sold most quickly and easily. Legal advisers of the Departments concerned should establish as a matter of urgency exactly what powers existed to instruct the vessel to enter a British port. If the GUR MARINER could not be instructed to enter UK waters, the British management company should be strongly pressed to tell her to do so. The company should not, however, be offered financial inducements to achieve this. If despite these efforts it proved impossible to prevent the vessel from going to Rotterdam, there should be close liaison with Dutch customs, supported by diplomatic approaches, to ensure that the suspect cargo was thoroughly checked. (Action: DTp, FCO, HM Customs and Excise).

j. There were a number of reports of goods being carried by air to avoid the embargo. Work was in hand to identify where such flights were coming from and the routes they were taking. The most effective measure to counter this problem would probably be the denial of overflying rights. (Action: MOD, consulting FCO).

k. Empty Iraqi tankers were heading for Mina al-Bakr and Aden. The loaded tankers remained at Mina. There were further indications that Iraq was actively seeking customers for its oil.

l. In some cases, for example Yugoslavia, the evidence of breaches of sanctions was not suitable to form the basis of diplomatic approaches to the countries concerned. It might nonetheless be possible to make generalised approaches, building on the information that could be used, to make it clear that the situation was being closely watched and to emphasise the potential penalties of sanctions breaking. Such action should be considered in respect of the activities described in paragraphs 33-34 of today's report by the Embargo Surveillance Centre. (Action: FCO).

m. A number of reports indicated that Tunisia was not enforcing sanctions. Mr Waldegrave would raise this with the Tunisian Deputy Foreign Minister today.

n. A number of Jordanian companies were acting as front companies for trade with Iraq. HM Treasury should review its regulations on the amendment of letters of credit and report back to the Group as soon as possible. (Action: HM Treasury).

o. There was now further information about Iraqi contacts with banks in Switzerland which justified an approach to the Swiss authorities. (Action: FCO, consulting Bank of England).

SECRET AND PERSONAL

p. There was some evidence that the Technology Development Group (TDG), which had been the headquarters of the Iraqi arms procurement network in Europe, might be seeking to move out of the UK because of the effect of the sanctions Orders on its business. Another company with Iraqi connections, Matrix Churchill, was reported to be trying to restructure its business in order to remove its manufacturing activity from Iraqi control. There were no current reports of suspect activity by these companies, but the situation should be kept under review. (Action: DTI).

q. Yemen had offered to allow a member of the Embassy in Sana'a to go to Hodeida to observe port activities. The most suitable person would be the Naval Attache. MoD were examining this option urgently. (Action: MOD).

r. Many returning families faced considerable financial hardship. First, it was important for them to be kept in touch with developments in Kuwait and Iraq affecting their next of kin held hostage. Second, to ensure that they were able to get in touch easily with the right officials in government departments to assist them with their problems on their return. FCO Consular Department would take the lead on the first requirement. On the second requirement, the Emergency Unit and Cabinet Office should work together to set up a network of contacts in the relevant government departments to deal with the problems of returning hostages. (Action: Cabinet Office and FCO).

s. Taking into account the likely Iraqi tactic of focussing attention on the supply of food (subparagraph e above) it was necessary to build up a pre-emptive publicity campaign drawing attention to the provisions of Security Council Resolutions. Publicity should also be given to Iraq's refusal to allow the ICRC to visit Kuwait and Iraq.

t. A group of British Muslims had written to The Queen expressing their disapproval of current British policy towards Iraq. The handling of Muslim public opinion would need to be approached with care. The Home Office should report to the Group on its proposals in this area. (Action: Home Office).

2. The next meeting of the Group will be at the same time and place tomorrow (11.00 am in Conference Room A, Cabinet Office) under the chairmanship of the Defence Secretary.

Yours sincerely
D C J Ball

D C J Ball

2

SECRET AND PERSONAL

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SECRET AND PERSONAL

UO.4561

11 September 1990

J R Young Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Emergency Unit
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CDP
22 (A-D)
CMA/114

Dear Rob,

IRAQ

This letter summarises the action agreed at the meeting of the Ad Hoc Group on the Gulf under the Defence Secretary's chairmanship this morning. Mr Waldegrave and Mr Hamilton were also present. CIRCULATION WITHIN DEPARTMENTS SHOULD BE ON A STRICTLY NEED-TO-KNOW BASIS.

- a. The Americans were organising a joint US/UK evacuation of women and children by air from Kuwait tomorrow. About 100 British dependants would travel on this flight.
- b. Mrs Chalker was travelling with the Virgin Atlantic Airways flight taking relief supplies to Jordan today.
- c. A draft paper on foodstuffs, approved by the five permanent members of the Security Council, had been put to the UN Sanctions Committee today. The text was broadly satisfactory. It was unlikely that there would be a consensus in the Sanctions Committee and it was therefore possible that there would eventually be a vote in the Security Council. Sir David Hannay would make a demarche to the Secretary General proposing that he send his representative, Mr Annan to Kuwait and that the UN should appoint a specific person with special responsibility for dealing with the refugee problems caused by the Gulf crisis.
- d. Ministers had agreed at the meeting of OD(G) this morning that the Cabinet Office should prepare a paper discussing the advice that should be given to the remaining British community in Kuwait. The paper should set out the arguments for and against advising people to remain where they were or to give themselves up to the Iraqi authorities. The paper should also explore the pros and cons on whether there was any prospect of securing their safe passage, perhaps through a figure like Prince Sudruddin Aga Khan, and whether there was any other basis on which we might negotiate on their behalf. (Action: Cabinet Office, consulting FCO).

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SECRET AND PERSONAL

- e. An overview paper on burdensharing by the Cabinet Office was in preparation. This drew together the threads from two more detailed papers on the costs of military forces and on economic assistance to countries directly affected by the crisis. This would be considered by the Group shortly, and would need to be discussed by Ministers at the meeting of OD(G) on 14 September. (Action: Cabinet Office).
- f. DTI should prepare a Note on the impact of sanctions on companies in the United Kingdom. This should give an indication of the number of companies affected and describe the extent of their lost business opportunities. The paper should be ready for discussion at OD(G) on 14 September. (Action: DTI).
- g. A Ministerial Sub-Group would be established to monitor the co-ordination and assistance for the families of hostages in Kuwait. The Cabinet Office should prepare a paper assessing all the implications of such assistance, to be ready for consideration by OD(G) on 14 September. (Action: Cabinet Office).
- h. At the Naval Conference in Bahrain which finished yesterday, the French had been persuaded not to pursue their proposal for a WEU zone in the Gulf of Oman.
- i. Mr Baker, the US Secretary of State, had said at the NATO meeting yesterday that he wished to use the civil NATO machinery to co-ordinate the provision of logistic support to forces in the Gulf. He had also asked for an extension of naval on-call forces in the Mediterranean (NAVOCFORMED) to the eastern Mediterranean, and for changes to be made to the coverage of AWACS aircraft. The MOD was following up these points. The MOD paper on an air blockade would be ready soon. (Action: MOD).
- j. DTp had met representatives of the owners and the British managers of the GUR MARINER yesterday. Their preference on commercial grounds would be for the ship to go to Rotterdam, where it could arrive tomorrow afternoon. They were prepared to bring the GUR MARINER to the United Kingdom only if on arrival all its cargo would be seized and if they could receive some form of assurance about their own legal position. Seizure would imply that the Government met considerable costs of unloading and storage. It would be acceptable for her to proceed to Rotterdam so long as we could be confident that the cargo would be thoroughly checked by the Dutch authorities. HM Customs and Excise should make preparations in liaison with Dutch Customs to send a British team to assist in the search. The FCO should co-ordinate diplomatic approaches bilaterally with the Dutch and in co-operation with the United States to ensure that the Dutch authorities fully understood the importance that we attached to the case. (Action: HM Customs and Excise, FCO).
- k. The Iraqi tanker AL FAO was believed to be heading empty from Aden to Mina al-Bakr. The loaded tankers were still at Mina.

C

SECRET AND PERSONAL

- l. There were indications that cargo was being transported by air between Yemen and Jordan, for onward movement to Iraq. Yemen would probably claim that such flights were for the evacuation of refugees. The FCO should find out what it could about the goods which might be being transported in this way. They should also establish what attitude the Saudis might take towards limiting flights through their airspace. (Action: FCO).
- m. Paragraphs 7 and 8 of the Embargo Surveillance Centre report raised the issue of the supply of chemicals and equipment in support of humanitarian activity (eg for water purification). This should be kept under review. (Action: DTp, FCO).
- n. A number of patterns were emerging from the from the wide variety of information about possible sanctions breaches. These would be drawn out in a paper to be put to the Group later this week. (Action: DTp).
- o. AHGG(E) would discuss this afternoon the amendment of letters of credit. The existing sanctions legislation appeared to provide sufficient legal authority on the basis on which the Bank of England could issue guidance. Assuming this position was confirmed, guidance should be issued very quickly. (Action: HM Treasury).
- p. It would be important to maintain the momentum of the positive information campaign, particularly if the general level of tension were to lower. The campaign should draw attention to the situation in Kuwait itself, although care should be taken not to cause unnecessary alarm amongst the families of those that remain there. (Action: FCO).
- q. The plight of refugees would remain the focus of much press attention. Mrs Chalker's visit would provide useful publicity for the action being taken by the Government, and draw further attention to the human cost of Iraqi aggression.
- r. The group of British Muslims who had written to The Queen expressing their disapproval of the Government's policy was sending a delegation to the Gulf. It would be important to ensure that they received a full briefing from the Saudis to counter the effects of Iraqi propaganda. (Action: FCO). The Home Office had consulted Mrs Rumbold, who had decided that the response to the views of this group, which by no means represented the opinions of the majority of British Muslims, should remain low-key at this stage. (Action: Home Office).
- s. Twenty journalists would visit HMS LONDON and HMS BRAZEN in the channel on their way to join the Armilla Patrol.

SECRET AND PERSONAL

2. The next meeting of the Group will be at the same time and place tomorrow (11.00 am in Conference Room A, Cabinet Office) under the chairmanship of the Defence Secretary.

*Yours sincerely,
D C J Ball*

D C J BALL

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SECRET AND PERSONAL

25 (Q-E)

5

UO.4565

17 September 1990

J R Young Esq
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Dear Rob,

IRAQ

This letter summarises the main points made and action agreed at the meeting of the Ad Hoc Group on the Gulf under the Defence Secretary's chairmanship this morning. Mr Waldegrave and Mr Hamilton were also present. CIRCULATION WITHIN DEPARTMENTS SHOULD BE ON A STRICTLY NEED-TO-KNOW BASIS.

- a. UN Security Council Resolution 667 condemning Iraqi intrusions into EC Embassies in Kuwait had been passed on 15 September. Resolution 667 also looked forward to a further Resolution imposing an air embargo.
- b. Following discussion in the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) today, the Foreign Secretary was expected to announce a number of measures against Iraqis in the United Kingdom, including expulsion of military attaches and restrictions on the movement of diplomats. (Secretary's note: the FCO has announced the expulsion of 6 members of the military section of the Iraqi Embassy in London and the deportation of 23 Iraqi non-diplomats.)
- c. On burdensharing, Japanese and German contributions had been secured. The United States had claimed that a total of \$20 billion had been pledged around the world in contributions to the costs of military deployments and of assistance to affected countries. The Foreign Secretary was discussing burdensharing in the FAC on the lines agreed at OD. The outcome was not yet known. The Cabinet Office would convene a meeting later in the week to consider the next stage. (Action: Cabinet Office). The Defence Secretary had spoken yesterday to the German Defence Minister to ask him to consider providing ships to help carry British forces and equipment to Saudi Arabia. A reply was awaited soon.

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- d. Two more US-chartered flights were expected to leave Kuwait in the coming week. There would be room for any further British women and children who wished to leave.
- e. Efforts were continuing through Mr Branson and King Hussein to put pressure on Iraq to allow sick and elderly men to leave Kuwait and Iraq.
- f. Reports from Kuwait suggested that the general situation was deteriorating. Large numbers of Kuwaitis were leaving. The removal of their passports as they left posed a potential security problem. The FCO should discuss with the Kuwaitis ways of preventing the Iraqis from making use of confiscated passports to infiltrate agents into the West. (Action: FCO).
- g. The FCO had informed the Embassies in Baghdad and Kuwait of OD(G)'s decision on Friday on the advice to be given to the remaining British community in Kuwait. Mr Waldegrave would do a broadcast on the BBC World Service today containing this advice.
- h. At the WEU Ministerial meeting tomorrow, which the Foreign Secretary and Mr Hamilton would attend, the United Kingdom would press WEU partners to give increased military support, with the emphasis on ground forces which formed an effective additional element to those already there. It had been agreed with the French that command and control should remain in national hands (no WEU integrated structure) and other countries would be asked to use the British and French forces as focal points for any new deployments. (Action: MOD, FCO).
- i. It was not clear exactly where French forces would deploy. The reconnaissance visit to find the most suitable base for further British aircraft continued.
- j. 17 British Liaison Team members and 5 dependants remained in Kuwait, and 48 members and 6 dependants in Iraq. On no account should these figures be made public. (Action: MOD).
- k. The launch of the Gulf Families Support Centre would be announced this afternoon by Mr Waldegrave at a press conference. The leaflet for families would be sent out under cover of a letter from Mr Waldegrave. It should also be distributed to all members of Parliament, the media and voluntary organisations. (Action: FCO). Ministers had discussed this morning the establishment of a fund for the families and had decided that further action on this should not be taken until the extent and nature of families' needs had been more clearly established.

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l. The Dutch authorities had not yet allowed a British Customs officer to go aboard the GUR MARINER. Dutch customs would shortly unload the vessel and had agreed that the British Officer should participate in the search. The Dutch search was likely to focus on a limited number of containers which were the most likely to contain illicit cargo.

m. The Embargo Surveillance Centre had considered which land routes into Iraq were the most likely to be used for sanctions breaches. They had concluded that the most suitable for high-volume traffic were from Aqaba through Jordan and from the Mediterranean ports through Syria. This conclusion tied in with evidence that Cyprus was acting as a focal point for trade in breach of the embargo. The least suitable land route was through Iran.

n. The FCO should discuss with the US Administration action to be taken over evidence on possible Chinese sanctions-breaking (today's ESC report paragraphs 9, 38, 41). (Action: FCO).

o. The Bank of England would pursue possible sanctions breaches by the Bank of Tokyo with its London office. The Embassy in Tokyo would also pursue the matter with the Japanese authorities. (Action: Bank of England, FCO).

p. The Iraqi tanker AL FAO, which had been boarded by a US warship on 14 September and allowed to proceed, had probably arrived at Mina Al-Bakr. There would as a result be 5 Iraqi tankers at Mina.

q. The case involving livestock (ESC report paragraph 6) should be kept under close review. One possibility that should be considered would be to have the cargo delivered to a refugee organisation. (Action: DTp, FCO).

r. The FCO should pursue with the authorities in Gibraltar the case of the Gibraltar registered vessel described in paragraph 7 of the ESC report. (Action: FCO).

s. The FCO introduced AHGG(90)30 about a possible air embargo against Iraq and Kuwait. There was not yet clear evidence of a sustained airbridge but air transport would become progressively more attractive to the Iraqis, particularly for high value goods. Work would continue today in the United Nations on a draft Resolution imposing an embargo. There were currently UK and US drafts under discussion by the five permanent members of the Security Council. The UK draft envisaged blocking all flights to Iraq and Kuwait except those authorised for humanitarian purposes or those which had been checked to ensure that they were not in breach of sanctions. The draft covered a full range of enforcement measures including punitive measures against states which did not observe the embargo and interception of aircraft in

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international airspace. The US draft covered a number of additional issues. Work was in hand to produce a draft containing the essence of the UK proposal but taking account of some points from the US text. The Law Officers' Department and the Department of Transport should be consulted as negotiations progressed. The Prime Minister should be kept closely in touch with developments. (Action: FCO, consulting LOD and DTp).

t. Every opportunity should be taken through international fora to make clear the potential penalties to countries which persistently allowed sanctions to be breached. Departments should prepare recommendations on action which could be taken against such countries through restriction or denial of bilateral and multilateral aid. (Action: Cabinet Office consulting other Departments).

u. Steps should be taken to ensure that Cable Network News was involved in press briefings in view of its wide coverage. (Action: No 10 Press Office, FCO).

2. There will be no meeting of the Group tomorrow. The next meeting will be on 19 September at 11.00 am in the same place (Conference Room A, Cabinet Office). The Foreign Secretary will be in the chair.

Yours sincerely
Nick Gibbons

pp.

D C J BALL

e

SECRET AND PERSONAL

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26(A-e)



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SECRET AND PERSONAL

UO.45688

19 September 1990

J R Young Esq
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Dear Rob,

IRAQ

This letter summarises the main points made and action agreed at the meeting of the Ad Hoc Group on the Gulf under the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's chairmanship this morning. The Defence Secretary was also present. CIRCULATION WITHIN DEPARTMENTS SHOULD BE ON A STRICTLY NEED-TO-KNOW BASIS.

a. There had been good progress by the five permanent members of the UN Security Council on a draft Resolution imposing an air embargo on Iraq and Kuwait. This would be discussed with the other Security Council members shortly. A vote was expected by the end of Friday. The Resolution would be comprehensive in its scope and in particular would allow for action against states which failed to respect its provisions. It would also incorporate a number of measures which the United States wished to see covered, including a requirement that UN organisations observe sanctions against Iraq, the detention of ships in certain circumstances and the freezing of assets. On legal advice, the draft referred specifically to the Chicago Convention, although it was recognised that this could draw attention to the difficulties of intercepting a civil aircraft which was determined to proceed. Action was being taken on the point on certification in operative paragraph 3, which the Prime Minister had raised.

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SECRET AND PERSONAL

b. The WEU Ministerial meeting yesterday evening had provided an opportunity for member countries to report on the most recent deployments of forces to the Gulf. The United Kingdom, France, Italy, Spain and the Netherlands reported further deployments. There had been a difference of view between the United Kingdom and France over the establishment of a WEU zone, the French claiming that this had been agreed. The matter should be resolved favourably in official discussions today. (Action: FCO, MOD).

c. Other developments in the United Nations had included the preparation by the United States of a shopping list of further UN action that they wished to see taken; a UN Military Staff Committee meeting yesterday which had exchanged information on maritime deployments; and agreement by EC representatives that they should not allow the export of foodstuffs by contractors for their employees in Iraq.

d. At the meeting of the EC Foreign Affairs Council on 17 September a decision had been postponed until the end of September on Commission proposals for an EC budget contribution to assistance for the states affected by the crisis. The Foreign Secretary would be putting proposals to the Prime Minister on the next steps. The US had agreed to chair a meeting of donor/creditor countries in the margins of the IMF/IBRD Annual Meetings in Washington next week, which HM Treasury would attend, to discuss in more detail the appropriate level of support. A paper by HM Treasury on this was in preparation. (Action: HMT). The Cabinet Office was co-ordinating work on how aid might be restricted to sanctions-breaching states, and would make recommendations next week. (Action: Cabinet Office). The Ministry of Defence was continuing to pursue with host governments the scope for assistance in the form of in-theatre support. (Action: MOD). It was important to ensure that the British military contribution was fully reflected in any overall calculus of the sharing of the burden. The door should not be closed to direct cash contributions by other countries to the British military effort, but these should not be actively sought at this stage. These points were reflected in current instructions.

e. The DES had arranged for letters to be sent to higher education establishments in England seeking information about the subjects being studied by Iraqi students engaged in courses in sciences, computing and engineering. Education departments in Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland would send similar letters. The results should be available by 28 September. These should be reported to the Group. DES had also established that the commitment to the few students who received financial support from public funds through the Committee of Vice Chancellors and Principals (CVCP) would probably be legally enforceable. If funds were to be stopped, DES might need to indemnify

C

SECRET AND PERSONAL

CVCP against court action. Further information about the precise subjects being studied by the CVCP-funded students should be sought. (Action: DES). The Home Office should take the necessary steps to prevent new Iraqi students from coming to the United Kingdom for the coming academic year. (Action: Home Office).

f. Dutch customs were expected to start unloading GUR MARINER this morning. A British customs official would be present. The process would take 5 to 10 days in total, but the Dutch would give priority to specific elements of the cargo, including chemicals and those items which might have a nuclear application. Information received from the ship's managers about a court action which might affect unloading, on the basis of which the Foreign Secretary had spoken to the Dutch Foreign Minister, had proved to be inaccurate.

g. The case of possible sanctions breaching by a British charity reported in paragraph 1 of today's Embargo Surveillance Centre (ESC) Report had been raised with the Charities Commission, which had no record of the organisation in question. The relevant agencies had been invited to investigate further.

h. The Indian vessel taking food to Kuwait was carrying representatives of the Indian Red Cross, but had no ICRC presence. Discussions were in progress to see whether an ICRC involvement might be achieved, possibly by designating one of the Indian Red Cross officials as an ICRC representative. The US hoped that the vessel would be searched before it reached Kuwait.

i. The sanitised material on sanctions evasion by air attached to today's ESC report had proved useful in discussion of the proposed air embargo. A sanitised account had also been prepared of reported sanctions breaches by East European countries. The Polish authorities had been approached about reports that cargo was being transported to Iraq by air from Poland. The FCO should check what follow up action had been taken. (Action: FCO).

j. The possible involvement of German companies in sanctions evasion was a source of concern (ESC report paragraphs 3-6). All the WEU member states had shown a robust attitude to sanctions breaches at yesterday's meeting.

k. The ESC was continuing to expand its liaison with organisations in other countries monitoring the enforcement of sanctions.

l. Attention was being focussed in the positive information campaign on Muslim states and on some others which had shown themselves to be potentially susceptible to Iraqi propaganda. The FCO were preparing briefing material on Iraqi activities in Kuwait and were in touch with

d

SECRET AND PERSONAL

Kuwaitis in the United Kingdom to bolster the presentation of their case. Messages have been sent to leaders of the Gulf states to urge them to mount a sustained publicity operation.

m. The visit by three Labour MPs to Iraq was the current focus of media attention. The return of British women and children was attracting less attention as the numbers involved dwindled.

n. The MOD was providing facilities for members of the press to go to the Gulf.

2. There will be no meeting of the Group tomorrow. The next meeting will be on 21 September at 11.00 am in the same place (Conference Room A, Cabinet Office). Mr Hamilton will be in the chair.

Yours sincerely

Daniel Ball

D C J BALL

2

SECRET AND PERSONAL

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27 (A-D)



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SECRET AND PERSONAL

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VO.4573

21 September 1990

J R Young Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Emergency Unit
Whitehall SW1

Dear Rob,

IRAQ

This letter summarises the main points made and action agreed at the meeting of the Ad Hoc Group on the Gulf this morning under the chairmanship of the Minister of State for the Armed Forces. CIRCULATION WITHIN DEPARTMENT SHOULD BE ON A STRICTLY NEED-TO-KNOW BASIS.

a. The United Kingdom, France, China and the Soviet Union had now accepted the latest text of a Security Council Resolution on an air embargo and associated measures. The United States delegation was awaiting instructions. Meanwhile, both the US and Soviet Governments were moving towards the idea of a special meeting of Security Council Foreign Ministers on Tuesday, to approve the Resolution. Whilst this would give the Resolution extra emphasis and underline the role of the Security Council, such a meeting would need very careful handling. It would need to be specifically limited to the air embargo Resolution, against the possibility that the Soviet Union might take the opportunity to launch their idea of a Middle East conference, or the Yemnis or Cubans to float their own peace Resolution. (Action: FCO).

b. There was some prospect next week of a General Assembly debate on the Gulf. UKMIS had prepared guidelines on the approach to be adopted to keep this within bounds and to try to influence the other countries to make the debate a display of world unity against Saddam. (Action: FCO).

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- c. The Indian ship Vishva Siddhi, carrying food to Kuwait and Iraq, was sailing towards the Gulf. The US Government had approached a number of other countries to search the vessel, with the Indian Government's agreement. Efforts continued to place a designated ICRC representative on board, either by ferrying in an ICRC representative or designating one of the Indian Red Cross officials on board as the ICRC representative.
- d. The Cabinet Office would convene a meeting today to examine the implications of Iraqi expropriation of UK assets and consider the options for responding to this. (Action: Cabinet Office).
- e. The Iraqis had retaliated against the measures recently taken against their Embassy by not allowing the new Defence Attache to travel out and by instructing two other members of the Defence Secretariat to leave within one week. Travel restrictions had also been imposed, though in practice they already existed.
- f. Arrangements were in hand to prevent new Iraqi students from entering the United Kingdom. The necessary change to the Immigration Rules would come into force at midnight tonight. The Home Office and FCO should, however, be prepared to exercise a measure of discretion in the case of students of Iraqi nationality who were unconnected with the current regime and where links with Iraq were slight. (Action: Home Office, FCO).
- g. The Defence Secretary would report at OD(G) on Monday on his visit to Washington, where his discussions covered command and control arrangements. The Ministry of Defence should keep in touch with No 10 Press Office on the line to take on press reports. The story was likely to build up over the weekend. (Action: MOD, No 10 Press Office).
- h. The ad hoc WEU meeting of officials on 19 September had discussed ways in which the smaller member states might make militarily useful contributions either operationally or through strengthening logistic support, particularly through the provision of sea lift. The meeting had also made suggestions on mutual logistic support by states using common equipment. They had agreed to set up military points of contact to supplement the naval contracts already in place. The French had accepted that their communique implying that a WEU zone of operation had been agreed was inaccurate. There had been press reports of a WEU call for a unified naval command; the source was being checked, but was probably WEU Parliamentarians.

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- i. The French were now discussing command and control with the Saudi Government. They planned to deploy on the left flank in north east Saudi Arabia alongside the Egyptians, Senegalese, and others under nominal Saudi supervision. They were under strict instructions from President Mitterrand not even to plan on a contingency basis for offensive operations.
- j. British movements of forces from Germany would begin shortly. The Portuguese had made a cargo ship available for WEU use. Its capacity was being examined. Further consideration should be given to the possibility of using Soviet shipping if this were offered. (Action: MOD, FCO).
- k. The Foreign Secretary would put forward recommendations to the Prime Minister early next week on the EC aspects of burdensharing. Plans were now firming up for the international meeting in Washington next week under US chairmanship to launch the wider exercise. It was hoped that a permanent arrangement might then be put in place, chaired by the Americans and serviced by the IMF, to enable burdensharing contributions to be orchestrated.
- l. The Group agreed that the Note by the Cabinet Office on the establishment of a fund for Gulf families, circulated as AHGG(90) 32, should be forwarded for consideration by OD(G) on 24 September. (Action: Cabinet Office).
- m. It was not known where three Iraqi tankers off Mina were now located. Discussions were being held with the US Government on how they might be relocated. They might have moved off to allow other Iraqi tankers to reload or they could have gone to Kharg to offload on to other tankers, possibly Iranian. There was no sign that they had set off down the Gulf.
- n. Sanitised material on Jordanian involvement in sanctions breaking, including financial transactions, the use of Aqaba by Iraqi shipping and cross-border road traffic, had been prepared. This would be useful for future high-level contacts.
- o. It was now believed that the tanker ALMUSTAN-SURIYAH was not likely to rendezvous with the Gibraltar-registered vessel WHITE SEA.
- p. Unloading of the GUR MARINER continued in Flushing. Examination of the load was likely to begin on 25 September.
- q. The Embargo Enforcement Unit would consider the options for responding to the case involving a London-based company reported in paragraph 2 of today's ESC report. The cargo might have particularly sensitive applications. (Action: DTI).

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- r. The Japanese authorities had taken the view that transactions by the Bank of Tokyo, involving the Central Bank of Jordan, had been consistent with their sanctions policy. There were, however, signs that they had tightened the monitoring of their systems following the British representations.
 - s. The air embargo and issues of command and control would be likely to be prominent in weekend press coverage.
 - t. The three Labour MPs visiting Iraq had not been asked to raise specific compassionate cases with the Iraqis. A report on the visit was awaited.
2. The next meeting will be on Monday 24 September at 11.00 am in the same place (Conference Room A, Cabinet Office). The Defence Secretary will be in the chair.

Yours sincerely
D C J Ball

D C J BALL

SECRET AND PERSONAL

Copied to:

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28 (A-E)



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SECRET AND PERSONAL

UO.4575

24 September 1990

J R Young Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Emergency Unit
Whitehall SW1

cm
24/9.

Dear Rob,

IRAQ

This letter summarises the main points made and action agreed at the meeting of the Ad Hoc Group on the Gulf this morning under the chairmanship of the Defence Secretary. Mr Waldegrave was also present. CIRCULATION WITHIN DEPARTMENTS SHOULD BE ON A STRICTLY NEED-TO-KNOW BASIS.

- a. The latest draft UN Security Council Resolution imposing an air embargo on Iraq was generally satisfactory. The intention was for the Resolution to be approved at the special meeting of Foreign Ministers tomorrow, though there could be problems since a number of Security Council members were disgruntled at being presented with a text agreed by the Five.
- b. On 20 September Saudi Arabia had given Jordan six hours' notice that Saudi oil supplies would be cut off. The Saudis had also expelled 20 Jordanian diplomats. It had been agreed at OD(G) that the United Kingdom, in line with the US, should avoid involvement in the dispute between the two countries.
- c. The Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs had suggested that Mr Gorbachev and the Prime Minister might meet if a suitable opportunity arose, for example if either was on their way to another international meeting. (Action: FCO).

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- d. OD(G) had agreed that there should be no government initiative at this stage to establish a fund for the benefit of families affected by the crisis. There had not been to date a call for the establishment of a fund. It was accepted that an initiative might prove counter-productive. It might be necessary to look again if the situation changed. The suggestion that there should be an initiative by the Lord Mayor to encourage City institutions contribute should be held in reserve. (Action: Cabinet Office, FCO).
- e. The Chancellor had spoken to Mr Brady over the weekend about burden-sharing. Preparations for the meeting in Washington on Wednesday were continuing. The US were proposing that there should be a loosely-organised co-ordinating machinery overseen by a Steering Committee, staffed by Washington-based officials. The United Kingdom would be represented on the Committee. (Action: Treasury). The EC was committed to reaching a decision by the end of the month on the Community package of support to the front-line states. The Foreign Secretary was expected to put proposals to colleagues shortly. (Action: FCO).
- f. The Cabinet Office was preparing a report on Iraqi sequestration of British assets. The Iraqis had not yet put this policy into effect. There did not appear at this stage to be sufficient basis for taking retaliatory measures, but this would need to be considered. (Action: Cabinet Office).
- g. A small number of British dependants had left Kuwait on the last US-chartered flight. Some of these remained in Baghdad but should be able to find alternative flights out of Iraq. Most dependants who wished to leave had now done so. Public attention could now be expected to focus increasingly on the sick and elderly.
- h. There would be a meeting today of the WEU military points of contact. The aim would be to clarify what contributions the smaller member states might make which would be of assistance to the 7th Armoured Brigade. (Action: MOD/FCO).
- i. The first six additional Tornado aircraft would go to Al Muharrag in Bahrain. The second batch of six would go direct to Tabuk where the first six would then join them. Their place in Al Muharrag would be taken by twelve Jaguars. The Bahrainis had been most co-operative and there were no points of difficulty which Mr Waldegrave need raise when seeing the Bahrain Foreign Minister. Mr Waldegrave could express appreciation for the Bahrain Governments assistance. (Action: FCO).

SECRET AND PERSONAL

j. The Defence Secretary would pay a visit to the 7th Armoured Brigade tomorrow. Preparations for its deployment were continuing and the first ships would sail on 28 and 29 September. There would then be a steady flow of shipments. Most of the personnel would fly to Saudi Arabia in mid-October.

k. There had not yet been a formal request from the French to use Akrotiri. It should not be encouraged, since an additional burden on the facilities of Cyprus would be unwelcome. (Action: FCO/MOD).

l. The four Iraqi tankers previously at Mina Al-Bakr had moved to Kuwait. Action should be taken in co-ordination with the Americans to bolster the surveillance and monitoring of the Northern Gulf. (Action: MOD).

m. The ESC had prepared sanitised material on sanctions breaking by Jordanian companies and individuals. This had been used today by the Prime Minister in writing to King Hussein. The extent of Jordanian sanctions breaching should be kept under close review. (Action: DTp).

n. Reports that there were regular Iraqi flights from Tunisia, and that Iran had given Iraq permission to use Iranian airspace, demonstrated the timeliness of the proposed air embargo. It should be established how quickly information about such flights could be obtained using RAF aircraft. (Action: MOD).

o. The US had turned back the vessel MV Huwal Tribute carrying equipment to Jordan before eventually allowing it to proceed. If there were to be exports of military equipment from Britain to Jordan it would be important to give the Americans advance warning of these. (Action: FCO).

p. The Indian food ship Vishva Siddhi was expected to dock today. It would have no ICRC presence on board. In the view of the UN Sanctions Committee, however, the Indian Red Cross would count as an appropriate humanitarian agency for the purpose of UN Security Council Resolution 666. This was very unsatisfactory. There were reports that the Sri Lankans and Yugoslavs proposed to send similar shipments. These shipments could be expected to increase the pressure from companies with personnel in Iraq to export food for them. Such pressures should be strongly resisted and a major effort made to block the loophole created by the Indian action. (Action: FCO).

q. Investigation was continuing into the supposed charitable organisation offering to supply foodstuffs to Iraq. (Action: DTI).

SECRET AND PERSONAL

r. The Gur Mariner should be unloaded by the end of tomorrow. The Dutch authorities had not yet begun to inspect the cargo in earnest, but it was being securely stored. A UK Customs Officer was still present at Flushing and would want to take part in the search. (Action: Customs).

s. There had been some difficulties yesterday when the press had wished to carry photographs which might have revealed information of operational significance. Further cases might arise in the future. MOD would give the Defence Secretary a report. (Action: MOD). Facilities had been provided for the regional media in Fallingbostal over the weekend. Tornado GR1s would be on view to the press at Marham tomorrow. Fleet Street editors had been invited to accompany the Defence Secretary on his visit to Germany tomorrow. MOD would consider the provision of press facilities at the departure of RO/RO ferries. (Action: MOD).

t. The price of Brent Crude for delivery in November would be about \$35 per barrel. Oil for purchase in the next few days would cost more than \$38 per barrel. The governing board of the International Energy Agency would consider at its meeting on 28 September whether there was any co-ordinated action that they should take. The Energy Secretary would visit the Gulf region next weekend.

2. The next meeting will be on Wednesday 26 September at 11.00 am in the same place (Conference Room A, Cabinet Office). The Defence Secretary will be in the chair.

Yours sincerely
Nick Gibbs

M

D C J BALL

SECRET AND PERSONAL

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29 Cases^a

SECRET AND PERSONAL

Em.
26/9.

UO.4578

26 September 1990

J R Young Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Emergency Unit
Whitehall SW1

Dear Rob,

IRAQ

This letter summarises the main points made and action agreed at the meeting of the Ad Hoc Group on the Gulf this morning under the chairmanship of the Defence Secretary. Mr Waldegrave and Mr Hamilton were also present.
CIRCULATION WITHIN DEPARTMENTS SHOULD BE ON A STRICTLY NEED-TO-KNOW BASIS.

a. The air embargo Resolution agreed yesterday was satisfactory. Cuba had voted against it (this was not the first time that a Resolution relating to the crisis had been opposed, Cuba and Yemen having voted against Resolution 666). Mr Shevardnadze's speech had been helpful and would have shaken the Iraqis. Fears that the meeting of Foreign Ministers might be used in a way that would threaten the unity of response had proved unfounded. Under the terms of the Resolution, the Sanctions Committee would have to be notified of legitimate flights to and from Iraq. It could be expected that countries wishing to by-pass the embargo would seek to deflect punitive action by trying to notify flights retrospectively. Recourse against states that breached the embargo would be through the UN Sanctions Committee, which could recommend a further Resolution (not limited to

SECRET AND PERSONAL

SECRET AND PERSONAL

an air embargo) directed against the offending country. The FCO and MOD should ensure that we stayed in close contact with the US to ensure that they fully appreciated our view of the Chicago Convention and measures which could be taken under it. (Action: FCO, MOD).

b. The FCO was considering the scope for obtaining the assistance of intermediaries in persuading the Iraqis to allow the evacuation of the sick and elderly. This would have to be handled with care to avoid giving credibility to prominent sympathisers with Iraq. (Action: FCO).

c. The time was now right to withdraw airside passes held by Iraqis. The Iraqi Embassy should be allowed to retain three passes, to put them in exactly the same position as the British Embassy in Baghdad. But the FCO should examine whether these passes could be issued to named individuals rather than be available to anybody to whom the Iraqi Embassy wished to issue them. This point was of particular importance given the current threat of terrorist action. All other passes held by the Iraqi Embassy, Iraqi airlines and Iraqis working for private companies should be withdrawn. It should be emphasised to the companies concerned that the withdrawal of passes did not imply that the individual pass holders were under suspicion. (Action: DTp, FCO).

d. Consideration should also be given to the withdrawal of passes from other nationalities, as part of a wider exercise to identify occupants of sensitive posts who were members of groups that might be sympathetic to Iraq. But the first priority should be to identify Iraqis in such posts. (Action: Cabinet Office, consulting other Departments).

e. Once a reply had been received from Prince Sultan, it should be possible to make a public statement about the arrangements agreed with the Saudis on command and control. (Action: MOD).

f. The Portuguese had offered the use of a cargo vessel, apparently without charge, to help take forces to the Gulf. MOD were considering how this could best be used. Belgium had offered to provide a frigate for protection purposes. Contacts had been made with a number of other nations about possible assistance and support. The Defence Secretary would contact other defence ministers to discuss the contributions that he would most like to see.

g. The Cabinet Office introduced AHGG(90) 35 on Iraqi impounding of foreign assets. The Iraqi decree of 16 September announcing the impounding of assets probably did not imply immediate confiscation, but was more likely to have been intended as an enabling measure. The scale of British assets in Iraq and Kuwait was hard to ascertain, but was not thought to be very large. The Iraqi action was clearly unjustified in international law. There should be a formal protest,

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SECRET AND PERSONAL

preferably through the EC Presidency on behalf of the Twelve. It was helpful that yesterday's Security Council Resolution specifically declared the Iraqi action to be null and void. The question of claims against Iraq did not yet arise. Retaliation against Iraqi assets in the United Kingdom would be premature; the Bank of England was particularly concerned about the effect that any such retaliation might have on London's standing as an international financial centre. In discussion, it was agreed that in addition to action through the Twelve the United Kingdom should make a bilateral demarche covering a series of Iraqi actions that had caused loss or damage or suffering to British nationals and companies or to HMG. The view that retaliation in kind would be premature was endorsed. (Action: FCO).

h. The four loaded Iraqi tankers were in Kuwait. It was unclear whether the HITIN was preparing to leave. A fifth tanker, at Mina al Bakr, was ready to depart. The tanker ALMUSTANSIRIYAH had been turned away from Aruba by the Dutch port authorities. Reports that Iranian tankers might be at Um Qasr should be checked. (Action: DTP, MOD).

i. The Jordanians were now saying that they were taking action in the light of the cases of sanctions breaking which the United Kingdom had put to them. However, the action by the Jordanian Director of Customs reported in paragraph 7 of today's ESC report would not apply to direct exports from Jordan to Iraq.

j. Although reports that there had been regular Iraqi flights from Tunisian civil airports were apparently without foundation, there were some indications that such flights might be taking place from military airfields. The aim of current surveillance efforts in this and other cases was to try to establish whether there might be regular patterns of cargo flights to Iraq. The US were understood to be taking action to challenge suspicious air movements to Iraq. They should be asked about the results of their investigations. (Action: FCO).

k. Unloading of the GUR MARINER at Flushing continued. Some of the cargo which had been loaded at Teesport had been examined, but had not been found to contain items which would have required licences at the time of export. It was not clear exactly what the current US view was of what the vessel might contain.

l. The FCO introduced AHGG(90) 36 on the positive information campaign. The campaign was concentrating on putting the blame for the current crisis firmly where it belonged. The statement by the Foreign Secretary last night would be made available for the use of posts. Selected Arab figures in the United Kingdom were being encouraged to

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put their views across. Further doubts had been raised about the balance of the coverage of the crisis by the BBC Arabic Service. The FCO would monitor it directly to establish the true position. (Action: FCO).

m. The issue of servicemen's pay on deployment in the Gulf was the principal current focus of press attention. Related issues included the liability of servicemen deployed to the Gulf to pay the community charge and the problems faced by wives who stood to lose their current jobs in Germany.

n. Press facilities should be provided when armoured recovery vehicles were loaded at Marchwood on Friday and tanks at Bremerhaven on Saturday. (Action: MOD).

o. At the meeting of the International Energy Agency on 28 September it was likely to be agreed that oil supplies would be sufficient for the winter and that there was no case for invoking oil sharing arrangements. We should press the IEA to make a statement that would reassure the markets. The Department of Energy should ensure that it was receiving regular and reliable information on areas of difficulty to enable it to move swiftly to scotch misleading reports and get across an accurate picture. (Action: DEn).

2. The next meeting of the Group will be on Friday 28 September at 11.00 am in the same place (Conference Room A, Cabinet Office).

Jim Mearns

David Ball

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SECRET AND PERSONAL

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COP
28/9.

SECRET AND PERSONAL

UO.4580

28 September 1990

J R Young Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Emergency Unit
Whitehall SW1

Dear Bob,

IRAQ

This letter summarises the main points made and action agreed at the meeting of the Ad Hoc Group on the Gulf this morning under the chairmanship of the Defence Secretary. Mr Waldegrave was also present. CIRCULATION WITHIN DEPARTMENTS SHOULD BE ON A STRICTLY NEED-TO-KNOW BASIS.

a. The Indian ship carrying food supplies was still off Umm Qasr together with two empty Indian ships. It was not clear why it had not yet been unloaded. The FCO was making enquiries through the Embassy in New Delhi. The issue of food supplies to foreigners in Iraq would be of increasing importance as the Iraqis sought to exploit it as part of the war of nerves. The FCO would prepare a paper for consideration by the Group at its meeting on Monday. (Action: FCO).

b. The public response to Iraqi threats, such as that directed against Embassies who sheltered foreigners, should be handled in a low key. It was often not clear with what authority such threats were made. A balanced response was generally appropriate, on the lines that such moves were not unexpected, although enough should be done to demonstrate to the families of hostages how seriously the matter was taken.

SECRET AND PERSONAL

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c. In any public statement about the resumption of diplomatic relations with Iran, there should be no elaboration beyond the language agreed with the Iranians.

d. The FCO were making contact with a number of possible intermediaries who might help secure the evacuation of the sick and elderly from Iraq and Kuwait. Yusuf Islam (formerly 'Cat' Stevens) presently seemed the person most likely to meet with any success. The MOD should consider contingency plans to make an RAF aircraft available to bring evacuees from Amman to the United Kingdom. (Action: FCO, MOD).

e. President Mitterrand was understood to be planning to visit the Gulf, possibly next week. His full itinerary was not yet known.

f. The FCO was preparing a paper looking ahead to the long term security structures that might be required following the end of the immediate crisis, particularly if Saddam Hussein were to withdraw from Kuwait without having been militarily defeated. (Action: FCO).

g. There had been some rumours in the press suggesting that Iraq was thinking about making Kuwait available to the Palestinians. Although there was no evidence to suggest that this was likely, the FCO should give some contingency thought to the implications of such a move. (Action: FCO).

h. Ministers in OD had agreed yesterday on the line that the Foreign Secretary should take on an EC contribution to assistance for the countries directly affected by the crisis. So far the meeting of the Foreign Ministers in New York to take a decision had not yet been convened. On burdensharing more widely, the US had chaired a meeting on 26 September. This had discussed procedures but not figures. There would be a meeting of technical experts on 1 October to consider countries' needs, and a meeting of the high-level co-ordinating group on about 12 October. Further work was in hand to consider how contributions might be secured from some of the wealthier neutral countries (such as Austria and Sweden). (Action: FCO). MOD was continuing to explore what contributions others might usefully make to the military effort. The Cabinet Office should hold a meeting in the course of next week to draw together the various aspects. (Action: Cabinet Office).

i. Of the 23 Iraqis whose expulsion from the UK had been announced on 17 September, one had proved not to be in the UK; 17 had now left; two had appealed (probably to buy time); and the police were taking steps to locate a further three. Those who had appealed would be required to report to the police each day. Appeals could take up to a month to

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hear. There were a further 20 Iraqis whom the Home Secretary had agreed should be expelled when the time was right, and 14 others whose cases would be submitted to the Home Secretary shortly.

j. Over the last week 306 Iraqis had left the UK and 57 had entered, of whom 54 were from Europe or America. Very few Iraqis, and no Iraqi students, were arriving from the Middle East.

k. The Home Office had been informed by the Registrar of Birmingham University that he had six Iraqi students on his books studying nuclear fusion. One had returned to the University; he did not know the intentions of the other five. Immediate action would be taken to prevent the five from entering the UK. More information was being sought about the student already here. (Action: Home Office).

l. A small number of armed servicemen would travel with the merchant shipping carrying equipment for the 7th Armoured Brigade to Saudi Arabia, who would help to deter sabotage or theft. Steps had been taken to monitor the ships' progress. Their security as they passed through the Suez Canal had been discussed with the Egyptian authorities.

m. A further Joint Intelligence Committee assessment of the impact of sanctions on Iraq was being prepared. Sanctions were unlikely to bite hard before the end of the year, although there would be shortages of particular items before then, possibly including some military spares. There was probably sufficient food to last until the Spring harvest.

n. Today's useful ESC report noted the success of sanctions in preventing oil exports from Iraq. Iraq had lost a total of some \$2 billion in oil revenues since sanctions were imposed. Oil fields were being closed for lack of customers and lack of storage space. Iraq might now be looking to use storage facilities in Kuwait.

o. The Americans were being approached to ask what action they proposed to take about flights between Iraq and India. There was no evidence at this stage that the flights in question, for which permission had been given before the air embargo had been imposed, had started to take place.

p. The DTI would raise with British Leyland at a senior level today reports that a member of the company was seeking to supply spares to Iraq. (Action: DTI).

q. Further investigation had revealed that there were no Iranian tankers at Umm Qasr.

SECRET AND PERSONAL

r. The United States was urging the authorities in Aruba to take a firm line on the tanker ALMUSTANSIRIYAH which was seeking to unload there. The FCO should keep in close touch with the Americans on this. (Action: FCO).

s. Detailed examination of the cargo of the GUR MARINER was unlikely to take place before next Tuesday. Some of the chemicals on board had been examined. These appeared to have been legitimately exported.

t. Monitoring of possible sanctions breaches was continuing to improve as it became clearer where resources could best be targeted. Amongst other countries, the United States and France in particular were taking a robust approach.

u. The FCO had asked posts to find out how successful the regular customers for Iraqi oil had been in finding alternative sources of supply. The outcome should be reported to the Group. (Action: FCO).

v. Mr Waldegrave would make a broadcast on the BBC World Service today. There was no reason to change the advice given to the British community in Kuwait.

w. Press facilities were being provided today at Waterbeach Barracks near Cambridge and at Marchwood military port near Southampton. There would also be a briefing this afternoon for defence correspondents which would focus on the logistic aspects of deployment to the Gulf.

x. The Department of Energy should review its contingency plans for action in the event of a severe oil crisis, and report to the next meeting of the Group. (Action: DEEn).

2. The next meeting of the Group will be on Monday 1 October at 11.00 am in the same place (Conference Room A, Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely
Nick Gubbins

mm D C J BALL

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SECRET AND PERSONAL

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SECRET AND PERSONAL

UO.4584

1 October 1990

J R Young Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Emergency Unit
Whitehall SW1

Dear Rob,

IRAQ

This letter summarises the main points made and action agreed at the meeting of the Ad Hoc Group on the Gulf this morning under the chairmanship of the Defence Secretary. Mr Waldegrave and Mr Hamilton were also present.
CIRCULATION WITHIN DEPARTMENTS SHOULD BE ON A STRICTLY NEED-TO-KNOW BASIS.

- a. President Hussain's most recent speech, in which he sought to drive wedges between other states by exploiting parts of President Mitterrand's speech, showed no shift in his underlying position. French officials were playing down Mitterrand's 'initiative', but there were some signs that they might be hedging their bets.
- b. The United States were understood to be considering putting forward a draft Resolution requiring Iraq to pay reparations for the damage done in Kuwait. It was not yet known what form this might take.
- c. A number of possible intermediaries who might help achieve the evacuation of the sick and elderly had been approached, including President Kaunda, Yusuf Islam, Richard Branson, Queen Nur and King Hussein.

SECRET AND PERSONAL

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- d. The International Labour Organisation had sought permission to send a technical mission to Iraq and Kuwait to examine the position of workers who were unable to leave.
- e. The British view of the extent of the application of UN Security Council Resolution 670 to passenger aircraft was quite clear. But others were continuing to say different things. It was important to ensure that the US and the UK spoke with one voice on this issue. (Action: FCO).
- f. The Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Baghdad had seemed prepared to allow two members of the British Embassy in Kuwait to leave for Iraq, but the Iraqis locally were causing difficulties and had asked to be given a few more days to sort the matter out. The Iraqis might well be thinking of linking this request to their efforts to secure the removal of all the Embassy staff.
- g. The Iraqi Minister of Information had said that foreigners would receive food ration cards, despite previous announcements. This example had borne out the view taken by the Group on Friday, that we should make a low key response to Iraqi threats. On foodstuffs more generally, the FCO introduced AHGG(90)38, which outlined the options for tackling the growing problem of foodstuffs for foreign nationals in Iraq and Kuwait. The next stage was to get together with other affected countries to assess the present situation and gather as much information as possible. If need be, following a determination from the Sanctions Committee, we should consider organising a joint relief convoy under ICRC auspices.
- h. All airside passes issued to Iraqi Airways had been withdrawn. The FCO had invited the Iraqi Embassy to nominate three individuals to hold passes; all other Embassy passes would be cancelled. Less than a dozen other airside passes had been issued to Iraqis working for other organisations. These would be withdrawn over the next few days. (Action: DTp).
- i. The Ministry of Defence would make announcements today covering who was to command British forces in the Gulf; the ultimate size of the 7th Armoured Brigade; and command and control arrangements. The text of the passages on command and control had not yet received final Saudi approval and it would be important to avoid any impression of a difference of view. If confirmation of Saudi agreement to the wording could not be obtained in time, the reference to British troops being always under British command should be deleted or amended. (Action: MOD/FCO).

SECRET AND PERSONAL

j. The requirement for medical support for operations in the Gulf might have some effect on NHS patients who were currently treated in military hospitals. Further consideration should be given to this point. (Action: MOD).

k. Eighteen ships had so far been taken up from trade to transport equipment for the 7th Armoured Brigade. A further ten might be taken up from trade. Five RFAs were also involved.

l. Letters had been sent to 355 institutions of higher education asking for details of Iraqi students and the subjects they were studying. Of these 85 had replied by the deadline of 28 September. 71 had given nil returns and 14 had reported a total of 94 students. At their annual conference last week, a number of University Vice Chancellors had taken the view that they should not co-operate with the survey. Their Chairman, Sir Edward Parkes, had raised the matter with the Secretary of State for Education in the margins of the conference saying that they were unhappy about co-operating in such an overt survey. It was understood that Sir Edward was proposing to write setting out the difficulties that he saw, but he had not yet done so. It would be preferable for Sir Edward to be contacted before he wrote such a letter, so the purpose of the survey and the value of openness in protecting the interests both of the universities and of bona fide students could be fully explained to him. The Department of Education and Science should put this suggestion to the Education Secretary. (Action: DES).

m. Five Iraqi tankers remained in Kuwait and five in Aden. There was some evidence that a Cypriot ship was going to Aden via Oman with spares for one of the tankers.

THIS IS A COPY. THE ORIGINAL IS
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3 (4)
OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT.

o. There was continuing evidence of the involvement of Jordanian firms in sanctions busting but there were also some signs that the Jordanian authorities were taking action (ESC report paragraphs 6 and following). It had been reported yesterday that they were turning back lorries which were attempting to enter Iraq without the required authority;

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while the Central Bank of Jordan was understood to have said that from 27 September it would not accept funds for Iraqi beneficiaries except in respect of obligations that pre-dated the imposition of sanctions.

p. The Vietnamese appeared to be involved in arranging shipments of food to Iraq. There were indications of involvement by a Belgian company. (ESC report paragraphs 3-5.)

q. A close watch should be kept on the two Iraqi registered ships currently near Mauritanian ports (ESC report paragraphs 13-14). (Action: ESC).

r. Reports of Japanese involvement in sanctions breaking (ESC report paragraph 15) would be sanitised to enable the FCO to make representations. (Action: ESC/FCO).

s. The Prime Minister had written to Prince Qaboos of Oman to enlist his help in persuading the Iranians to observe sanctions. The letter should be delivered today.

t. Unloading would resume today of the GUR MARINER in Flushing. The Dutch authorities were keeping a strict tally of the unloaded cargo. The Dutch were meeting the costs of unloading and storage.

u. Two Indian ships had been intercepted leaving Kuwait in a joint US/UK operation. Both had been carrying refugees and had been allowed to proceed. The Indians had made no difficulties over interception. It had been estimated that the food taken to Iraq/Kuwait would be sufficient to last the Indian community for 3-5 months if properly distributed.

v. The Department of Energy was reviewing its contingency measures and how these fitted into IEA planning. The options would be presented to Energy Ministers. A first stage, if world supplies ran sufficiently low, would be to ask companies to draw on stocks. The IEA had not felt that we had yet reached this point. The US had announced the release of 5 million barrels of oil from stocks. The reason, as explained to us by the US, had been to test the associated mechanisms. They now believed that they would need to draw 15 million barrels in order to test the mechanisms properly, and were making the necessary legislative changes to allow for this. The media had reported the release from stocks as a measure to calm the market but it had not had this effect. This reinforced the importance of careful handling of the presentation of oil issues. (Action: DEN).

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w. Press interest today was likely to focus on the MOD press conference. There had been good press coverage of the operation to transport British forces to the Gulf.

2. The next meeting of the Group will be on Wednesday 3 October at 11.00 am in the same place (Conference Room A, Cabinet Office) under the Chairmanship of the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary.

Yours sincerely,
David Ball

D C J BALL

P.S. A copy of the FLO paper on foodstuffs is enclosed for the benefit of those who were not present at the meeting.

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SECRET AND PERSONAL

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AD HOC GROUP ON THE GULF

SUPPLY OF FOODSTUFFS TO FOREIGN NATIONALS IN IRAQ AND KUWAIT

(Note by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office)

1. At the meeting of the Ad Hoc Group on the Gulf on 28 September, Mr Waldegrave undertook to provide a note for the Group's consideration at its meeting on 1 October on ways of tackling the growing problem of foodstuffs for foreign nationals in Iraq and Kuwait.
2. At present, the problem falls broadly into two areas:
 - (a) supply of food for the large Asian communities trapped in Kuwait. The Ad Hoc Group has received regular reports on the progress of the Indian food ship, the MV Vishva Siddhi, and the difficulties of ensuring adequate supervision by the humanitarian agencies of the distribution of the food it is carrying;
 - (b) other foreign nationals in Iraq and Kuwait. Numbers are far smaller, and the problem of food supplies so far less acute. The Iraqis have now said, following reported threats last week to deprive foreign nationals of basic food supplies, that food will be available equally to foreigners and Iraqis.
3. Iraqi statements on food supplies have been contradictory. Government claims that food stocks are high were followed by rationing. It is, however, clear that Iraq is using the supply of food as a weapon to break the embargo. This serves the dual purpose of pressurising countries, through concern over their nationals, to run in supplies in potential breach of the embargo, and of enabling the Iraqis to stockpile supplies for their own use.
4. We and other countries have three options:
 - i) we can acquiesce in breaching the embargo by allowing our business community (and those of other states) to import food either from third countries or by authorising the DTI to issue licences;
 - ii) we can stand by the strict terms of the embargo, refuse to allow any food imports and face mounting public concern and media tales of starving British citizens.

- iii) we can seek to organise a collective effort among inter alia the EC, other OECD countries and the Asian countries whose workers are suffering to provide food within the terms of Resolution 666.

5. The third option is the only one consistent with Government policy. As a first step, we need as realistic as assessment as possible of the food situation in Iraq. If genuine need exists, we need to rally as many countries as possible to joint relief effort sticking closely to terms that the UN Sanctions Committee could approve. FCO telno 914 to Baghdad of 28 September (attached) sets out a game plan comprising:

- (i) collection of further information in Baghdad on the food situation (ideally in the form of a joint assessment by the Twelve/OECD bringing in the Asians, Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Vietnam);
- (ii) transmission of the joint assessment to the Sanctions Committee in New York;
- (iii) if the food supply problem is judged sufficiently serious, a determination from the Sanctions Committee;
- (iv) the organisation of a joint relief land convoy under ICRC auspices.

Meanwhile, UKMIS New York have been instructed to express serious concern to the Soviet mission about the report from Moscow that the Russians are thinking of sending in unauthorised food supplies.

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FM FCO

TO DESKBY 290500Z BAGHDAD

TELNO 914

OF 281751Z SEPTEMBER 90

AND TO DESKBY 281900Z UKMIS NEW YORK

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS GENEVA, OECD POSTS, MOSCOW, AMMAN, ANKARA

INFO IMMEDIATE MOSCOW, PEKING, HANOI, BELGRADE, SOFIA

YOUR TELS NO 1548 : UN EMBARGO AND FOODSTUFFS

SUMMARY

1. INSTRUCTIONS TO PROMOTE FURTHER EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION AMONG EMBASSIES ON FOOD AND TO STIFFEN COLLEAGUES IN RESPONSE TO FRESH IRAQI PSYCHOLOGICAL PRESSURE. INFORMATION COULD PROVIDE BASIS FOR A REPORT TO UN SANCTIONS COMMITTEE AND FOR ORGANISATION OF A JOINT RELIEF CONVOY. UKMIS NEW YORK TO SEEK CLARIFICATION OF SOVIET INTENTIONS.

DETAIL

2. IT IS PERFECTLY CLEAR THAT IRAQ IS USING FOOD SUPPLIES AS A MEANS OF TRAPPING AS MANY COUNTRIES AS POSSIBLE INTO BREACHING THE EMBARGO. IRAQ'S INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS ARE CLEAR:

- I) THE FOREIGN NATIONALS SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO EXERCISE THEIR RIGHT TO LEAVE:
- II) IRAQ SHOULD NOT (NOT) EXERCISE ANY DISCRIMINATION BETWEEN RACES, RELIGIONS, NATIONAL OR SOCIAL ORIGIN ETC IN PERMITTING ACCESS TO FOOD SUPPLIES.

THESE OBLIGATIONS ARE NOT ONLY THE STANDARD CURRENCY OF INTERNATIONAL BEHAVIOUR. THEY ARE EXPRESSLY SET OUT IN COVENANTS TO WHICH IRAQ IS A PARTY (INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS).

3. THAT SAID, IRAQI BLACKMAIL IS WORKING WITH THE ASIAN COUNTRIES. THE SOVIETS APPEAR TO BE WEAKENING (MOSCOW TELNO 1846). SOME OF OUR WESTERN PARTNERS ARE ALSO LIKELY TO RESPOND TO PUBLIC CONCERN ESPECIALLY PRESSURE FROM FIRMS OVER THE FATE OF THEIR DEPRIVED FELLOW COUNTRYMEN. AS A FIRST STEP, IT WOULD BE MOST USEFUL TO HAVE A FOLLOW UP REPORT TO THE HELPFUL

PAGE 1
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ANALYSIS IN YOUR TEL NO 1450.

IN PARTICULAR, WE NEED AS FULL ANSWERS TO THE FOLLOWING AS YOU CAN MANAGE:

I) ARE FOOD SUPPLIES STILL GENERALLY AVAILABLE IN BAGHDAD MARKETS? WHAT IS IN SHORT SUPPLY? BASICS (EG TEA)?

II) WHAT FOODS CAN BE PURCHASED ONLY WITH RATION CARDS?

III) HOW DIFFICULT HAS IT BEEN HITHERTO TO BUY FOOD WITHOUT RATION CARDS? ARE THERE SIGNS OF NEW TIGHTENING UP AS FROM 1 OCTOBER?

IV) HOW ARE THE BRITISH (AND OTHER STATES') BUSINESSMEN MANAGING TO BUY FOOD? IS IT STILL FEASIBLE AT A PRICE? HOW MANY HAVE HAD RATION CARDS?

V) IS THERE ANY SCOPE FOR POOLING AND SHARING AVAILABLE STOCKS WITH OTHER COMMUNITIES?

VI) ARE THERE ANY PUBLISHED TEXTS AVAILABLE ABOUT FOOD RESTRICTIONS ON FOREIGNERS? FAXED COPIES WOULD BE USEFUL EVIDENCE (A SUMMARY IN ENGLISH WOULD BE HELPFUL).

4. IN ORDER FOR ANY COUNTRY TO RUN IN SUPPLIES TO FEED ITS NATIONALS WITHOUT BEING IN BREACH OF THE UN EMBARGO, IT IS NECESSARY

I) FOR THE UN SANCTIONS COMMITTEE TO RECEIVE INFORMATION FROM RELEVANT UN AND OTHER APPROPRIATE HUMANITARIAN AGENCIES AND ALL OTHER SOURCES ON THE AVAILABILITY OF FOOD IN IRAQ AND KUWAIT:

II) FOR THE OPERATION TO BE CONDUCTED UNDER ICRC AND UN AUSPICES (UNDER THE CONCORDAT BETWEEN THE LEAGUE OF RED CROSS SOCIETIES AND THE ICRC, IT IS THE LATTER WHO ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR IRAQ AND KUWAIT IN ORDER TO ENSURE THE APPLICATION OF THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS):

II) SPECIFIC AUTHORISATION FROM THE UN SANCTIONS COMMITTEE.

5. MINISTERS ARE NOT PREPARED TO SEE THE UK GIVE AUTHORITY FOR EG SHIPMENTS BY THE SRI LANKANS FOR THEIR NATIONALS UNLESS THE CORRECT PROCEDURES ARE FOLLOWED, ESPECIALLY DESPATCH AND DISTRIBUTION UNDER ICRC AUSPICES. WE MUST ENCOURAGE OECD PARTNERS

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AND OTHER PARTNERS TO FOLLOW THE SAME LINE. AS SET OUT IN OUR TEL NO 690 TO UKMIS NEW YORK, THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY HAS TO SUSTAIN MAXIMUM PRESSURE FOR ACCESS TO IRAQ BY THE ICRC. NOT ONLY DO THEY HAVE A KEY ROLE TO PLAY IN ORGANISING RELIEF AND DISTRIBUTING FOODSTUFFS WHERE MOST NEEDED, BUT ICRC ACCESS WOULD DO MORE TO SAFEGUARD THE POSITION OF FOREIGN NATIONALS, DETAINEES OR THOSE CONSTRAINED FROM LEAVING, THAN ANY OTHER SINGLE MEASURES. ICRC FIELD WORKERS ARE INDEPENDENT, NEUTRAL, TOUGH MINDED AND EXPERIENCED.

6. THE MOST USEFUL ASSESSMENT WOULD BE CONDUCTED NOT ONLY BY THE EC TWELVE OR OECD, BUT ALSO BRING IN THE ASIANS, THE USSR, YUGOSLAVIA, BULGARIA AND VIETNAM. THE LATTER ARE ALL UNDER PRESSURE TO SUPPLY THEIR COMMUNITIES IN IRAQ. WE APPRECIATE THE DIFFICULTIES IN ORGANISING SUCH A JOINT EFFORT. BUT, IF IT IS POSSIBLE EITHER TO ORGANISE A MEETING BRINGING IN AS MANY AS POSSIBLE OR, TO USE YOUR OWN OR OECD ASSESSMENT AS THE BASIS OF A REPORT TO WHICH OTHER EMBASSIES MIGHT BE INVITED TO CONTRIBUTE, IT WOULD BE INVALUABLE. THE OUTCOME OF THE JOINT ASSESSMENT COULD BE CHANNELLED BACK TO NEW YORK AND THE SANCTIONS COMMITTEE. THE ASSESSMENT OR REPORT WOULD NOT BE ON BEHALF OF WESTERNERS ALONE BUT ALL THOSE WHO HAVE NATIONALS TRAPPED IN IRAQ AND KUWAIT. (WE SHOULD WELCOME UKMIS'S NEW YORK'S VIEW AS TO WHETHER SUCH A REPORT (PARTICULARLY IF SUPPORTED EITHER BY ANY BAGHDAD BASED UN OR ICRC PERSON) COULD PROVIDE THE BASIS OF THE REPORT REQUIRED BY THE SANCTIONS COMMITTEE?).

7. IF YOUR JOINT ASSESSMENT WAS THAT A FOOD SUPPLY PROBLEM EXISTED EITHER GENERALLY OR IN SELECTED POCKETS, AND IF WE COULD SECURE THE NECESSARY DETERMINATION FROM THE SANCTIONS COMMITTEE, MINISTERS WOULD THEN WISH US TO WORK FOR THE ORGANISATION A JOINT RELIEF LAND CONVOY UNDER ICRC AUSPICES (MY TELNO 617 TO UKMIS IS RELEVANT). THE AIM WOULD BE FOR THE CONVOY OR CONVOYS TO TRAVEL TO THE IRAQI BORDER (WITH JORDAN OR TURKEY) AND EXERT MAXIMUM PRESSURE FOR ACCESS. IF SUFFICIENT COUNTRIES ARE PREPARED TO COOPERATE IN SUCH A JOINT EXERCISE THIS WOULD BE A DEMONSTRATION OF CONCERTED INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE ON SADDAM HUSSEIN IN THE MOST WORTHY HUMANITARIAN CAUSE. HENCE THE IMPORTANCE OF THE BAGHDAD PREPARATORY EXERCISE BRINGING IN AS MANY COUNTRIES AS POSSIBLE TO SHOW IT IS NOT AN EXCLUSIVE WESTERN OPERATION HENCE ALSO THE IMPORTANCE OF PREVENTING A SERIES OF BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS WITH IRAQ.

8. (FOR BAGHDAD) WE ARE SORRY TO ADD TO YOUR LABOURS. BUT THE

PAGE 3
CONFIDENTIAL

PREPARATION OF SOME FORM OF REPORT IS ESSENTIAL AND URGENT IF WE ARE TO PREVENT IRAQI BLACKMAIL TACTICS SUCCEEDING.

9. (FOR UKMIS NEW YORK)

ONCE WE HAVE THE NECESSARY REPORT FROM BAGHDAD, WE SHALL ASK YOU TO TAKE FURTHER ACTION. IN THE MEANTIME, YOU MAY WISH TO SPEAK TO THE SOVIET MISSION TO EXPRESS OUR PROFOUND CONCERN OVER THE REPORT FROM MOSCOW THAT THE SOVIETS ARE THINKING OF RUNNING IN UNAUTHORISED FOOD SUPPLIES. IT WOULD BE FAR PREFERABLE TO RUN A JOINT EAST/WEST/SOUTH OPERATION AS SET OUT ABOVE AND GET ACCESS FOR THE HUMANITARIAN ORGANISATIONS.

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70 Whitehall London SW1A 2AS Telephone 071-270

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3/4

SECRET AND PERSONAL

UO.4589

3 October 1990

J R Young Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Emergency Unit
Whitehall SW1

Dear Rob,

IRAQ

This letter summarises the main points made and action agreed at the meeting of the Ad Hoc Group on the Gulf this morning under the chairmanship of the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary. Mr Waldegrave and Mr Hamilton were also present. CIRCULATION WITHIN DEPARTMENTS SHOULD BE ON A STRICTLY NEED-TO-KNOW BASIS.

a. The British and American Missions in New York were considering a further UN Security Council Resolution which might be passed during the British presidency this month. This would cover the issue of reparations for damage caused by the Iraqis. It might also include a reference to individual responsibility for Iraqi actions. The aim would be to maintain the pressure on Iraq, creating what Secretary Baker had described as a ratchet effect.

b. Separately, the two Missions were considering what form a recourse to the Security Council might take if it were judged that this were needed before any military action was decided upon. Other states were not involved in these discussions at this stage.

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c. The mood at the United Nations was steady. Mr Shevardnadze's firm speech had been important, making clear to Iraq that it could not rely on a Soviet veto to prevent the use of force.

d. The oblique remarks by President Mitterrand had provided an unwelcome complication. This was likely to be compounded by what he might say during his forthcoming visit to the Gulf.

e. Jordan was making efforts to comply with Security Council Resolutions. King Hussein had scaled down his diplomatic activities. But his breach with the Saudis was severe. This could be a source of danger for the future.

f. The two members of the British Embassy in Kuwait who wished to leave were still unable to do so. This might be partly the result of failure of Iraqi communications, but probably also reflected the intention of some elements in the Iraqi government to use this as a means to secure the removal of all the Embassy staff. We had not yet received all this reassurances we were seeking. It might shortly be necessary to decide whether the two officials should leave nonetheless or whether they should stay on until the Embassy closed.

g. Differences of view had emerged between a number of Embassies in Baghdad and their capitals over how to respond to the Iraqi request for lists of non-diplomats staying in Embassy premises. Most capitals were firmly resisting the request.

h. Contacts were being pursued with President Kaunda and Mr Heath about their possible role as intermediaries to help secure the release of sick and elderly hostages from Iraq. If Mr Heath decided to become involved, any public statement if the matter were raised should say only that this was a plan on which Mr Heath had kept the Government in touch; that his purpose was humanitarian; and that if he decided to go to Iraq, he would be afforded all the appropriate courtesies by the Embassy. It was not for the Government to take the initiative in raising the matter publicly, still less to criticise the plan.

i. Three English and two French hostages had escaped from Kuwait by boat and had reached Saudi Arabia. Their escape would not affect the advice given to the British community. There would be benefits if the escape could be kept out of the public domain, because of possible repercussions for those remaining. But it was likely that word would get out through relatives in France or Britain.

j. The Saudi Ambassador had approached Mr Waldegrave asking if the Government would be prepared to lend oil to Saudi Arabia from strategic oil reserves in the event of a sudden interruption in Saudi oil production. In this situation, the IEA oil-sharing mechanisms would

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probably be triggered. The response was therefore likely to be on the lines that in those circumstances the United Kingdom would play its full part in international measures to share stocks with affected countries. It should be established which other countries had received similar enquiries. It was not clear whether the matter had also been raised directly with the Energy Secretary on his visit. It was important that the Saudis should receive a concerted reply. (Action: DEn, FCO).

k. Eight ships had embarked so far carrying equipment for the 7th Armoured Brigade.

l. The Saudis had replied to the Defence Secretary on the status of British forces in Saudi Arabia. Acceptable arrangements had now been agreed on their status and on command and control.

m. It had been reported in the press that an unnamed officer from the British Army of the Rhine had stated that chemical attacks would be met by a nuclear response. The MOD and FCO were co-ordinating a press line. (Action: MOD, FCO).

n. No activity had been reported by the Iraqi tankers in Kuwait. There were indications that tankers were being instructed not to accept boarding. To date the Iraqis had taken care to avoid a flashpoint. These instructions suggested that they might now be considering a more confrontational approach.

o. Today's ESC report included a note on Iraqi moves to explore the possibility of re-flagging their merchant ships, presumably to take them outside the provisions of UN Security Council Resolution 670. Assisting the Iraqis to re-flag would most probably amount to a breach of sanctions. A text was being prepared which could be used at the United Nations to warn other states of Iraqi intentions. (Action: DTp, FCO).

p. The Turks had turned back a Polish ship carrying chemicals which might be CW precursors, allegedly destined for Iran. The ship was supposed to be returning to Antwerp. Allied navies in the Mediterranean had been warned as had the authorities in Gibraltar. There was some concern that it might seek to dock in Libya or elsewhere on the North African coast. The consignment was of German origin, handled through a Belgian middle-man. The FCO should consider whether representatives might usefully be made to either Belgium or Poland. (Action: FCO, MOD).

q. It would be important to have a full report to the Sanctions Committee from the Indian ship that had returned from delivering food to Iraq/Kuwait. It had been suggested that the food would greatly

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exceed Indian needs and was likely to fall into Iraqi hands. The UN Sanctions Committee should be persuaded not to allow further shipments, particularly the proposed Sri Lankan consignment. The Indian food could be used for the Sri Lankans. (Action: FCO).

r. The Sunday Telegraph and Panorama had asked the FCO for briefing on British efforts to counter sanctions breaking. Whilst there was a good story to tell, and it would be wrong to offer no account of work in this area, including the domestic enforcement operation, it would be important to ensure that the ESC itself and its use of intelligence material were not compromised. The Cabinet Office should prepare a suitable brief in consultation with those concerned. (Action: Cabinet Office).

s. Unloading of the GUR MARINER continued. Examination of the cargo would probably start on 8 October and take several weeks. It was an unnecessary drain on resources for a British customs official to remain in Holland full time. HM Customs were confident that the Dutch authorities were carrying out the operation with scrupulous care, and would alert them to any significant development. Whilst it was not necessary for a British official to remain full time, there should nonetheless be continuing close liaison through regular visits. (Action: HM Customs). Looking further ahead, it would be discouraging to other British ship-owners if at the end of the process in this case the company was unable to regain possession of the vessel despite having co-operated fully in the exercise. This would damage the prospects of co-operation from other shipping managers in the future and might lead to difficult claims for compensation. The Department of Transport should consider this aspect further and report to the Group. (Action: DTp).

t. The FCO introduced AHGG(90) 39 on the positive information campaign overseas. The flow of information to key audiences was being maintained. Transcripts of the Foreign Secretary's speeches and statements had been sent to posts. New notes had been prepared on Security Council Resolutions and their implementation; on Iraq's continuing international isolation; and on the damage done in Kuwait (to complement video material about the Kuwaiti resistance). The FCO was in touch with the BBC about the Arabic service, whose head would shortly visit Saudi Arabia and Egypt to recruit new correspondents and to pursue Saudi complaints directly with the Saudi authorities. He would also try to stimulate the Saudis to give more press briefings themselves. There would be similar visits to other Gulf states by representatives of the Arabic service.

u. The Home Office would give the Home Secretary a report later today about the unexpected arrival of 150 Kurds from Syria. They should keep the Group informed of developments. (Action: Home Office).

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v. DES had contacted Sir Edward Parkes about the request for information about Iraqi students in the United Kingdom. He did not now propose to write to the Education Secretary. DES was exploring with him ways of using existing channels to pass information to the Government.

x. Three Britons had been arrested and charged in relation to the export of artillery fuzes to Iraq last November.

2. The next meeting of the Group will be on Friday 5 October at 11.00 am in the same place (Conference Room A, Cabinet Office) under the Chairmanship of Sir Robin Butler.

Yours sincerely
D C J Ball

D C J BALL

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Copied to:

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CD 6/8.

SECRET AND PERSONAL

UO.4591

5 October 1990

J R Young Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Emergency Unit
Whitehall SW1

Dear Rob,

IRAQ

This letter summarises the main points made and action agreed at the meeting of the Ad Hoc Group on the Gulf this morning under Mr Appleyard's chairmanship. CIRCULATION WITHIN DEPARTMENTS SHOULD BE ON A STRICTLY NEED-TO-KNOW BASIS.

- a. The Japanese Prime Minister, Mr Kaifu, had taken a firm line when he met the Iraqi First Deputy Prime Minister in Amman. There had been no sign of flexibility on the Iraqis' part. Their public stance continued to be that the withdrawal of Western forces from Arab soil was a precondition for any dialogue.
- b. Discussions were continuing in New York with the Americans on a possible Security Council Resolution on Iraqi compensation for damage caused in Kuwait.
- c. The General Assembly debate on the Occupied Territories would begin today and might last into next week.

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- d. There was no further news of the Yugoslav proposal to send a mission to Iraq on behalf of the non-aligned movement to bring home to Saddam Hussain that he must withdraw from Kuwait.
- e. Mrs Chalker would hold a meeting on Monday afternoon to consider the United Nations Disaster Relief Organisation (UNDRO) appeal for financial assistance in transporting refugees. An interim report should be given to OD(G) on Monday morning. (Action: FCO).
- f. Yusuf Islam ('Cat' Stevens) appeared confident that he could secure the release of about six of the most ill British hostages. Other countries, most recently Germany, had secured the release of limited numbers of the sick and elderly.
- g. The Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs had said that it had now sorted out arrangements for two members of the British Embassy staff in Kuwait to leave for Baghdad. It remained to be seen whether they would in fact be able to leave.
- h. Work was in hand to respond to the Kuwait request, raised at OD(G) yesterday, for mobile broadcasting stations. A report should be given to OD(G) on Monday. (Action: FCO).
- i. There would be further movements of Jaguar aircraft on 7 October and Tornados on 9 October.
- j. Twenty-six ships had so far been taken up from trade for the sea-lift of the 7th Armoured Brigade. The Brigade would be in place by the end of the month. There would then be a work-up period of about two weeks.
- k. There had been a meeting of WEU member states on Wednesday to discuss logistic aspects. Other countries had not been prepared to provide the medical support we had hoped for, and the Germans had refused to provide doctors to replace those withdrawn from Germany. But some countries might be able to help with water supplies.
- l. MOD was considering what contribution might most usefully be made by New Zealand. Their role should be associated with the 7th Armoured Brigade if possible. (Action: MOD).
- m. The Energy Secretary's visit to the Gulf had been well received. There had been warm appreciation for Britain's stance. He had spoken to the Ambassador in Kuwait from Abu Dhabi. In discussions with Gulf oil ministers, there had been general agreement that the current high price of oil was the result of uncertainty rather than levels of stocks.

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- n. It was too early to say how the IEA might react to possible American suggestions that there should be a stock draw-down. The present British view was that there was no need for this.
- o. The Department of Energy would consult the FCO and Treasury on the response to be given to the Saudi's contingency request for emergency stocks of oil. They were understood to want access to two days' supply in case their own were to fail because of the strain of increased production on equipment. The Energy Secretary wished to give as positive response as possible. A report should be made to OD(G) at the appropriate moment. (Action: DEN).
- p. A Note should be circulated summarising the impact on other countries of the loss of imports of oil from Iraq and Kuwait, and their success in finding alternative sources of supply. India, Pakistan and Bulgaria were the worst hit countries. (Action: DEN).
- q. The four loaded Iraqi tankers at Aden now had reduced crews and seemed likely to remain there. The fifth (the ALMUTANABBI) appeared to be leaving, possibly for the Gulf. Naval vessels in the area had been alerted.
- r. The legal status of Iraqi funds being transferred for the repair of tankers in Greece was unclear. The FCO should give background information to the Greek government and enquire about its intentions. (Action: FCO).
- s. Reports about Iraqi intentions to reflag vessels had been sanitised and used to alert others. It could be helpful for a future Security Council Resolution specifically to forbid acceptance of Iraqi-registered ships on to new registers. (Action: FCO to note). Recent reports that a Honduran company had bought two small Iraqi cargo-vessels might be connected to the reflagging policy. The Americans should be asked what action they proposed to take on these reports. (Action: ESC, FCO).
- t. The Polish ship carrying chemicals reached Alexandria yesterday en route to Antwerp. The Defence Attache would go to Alexandria to inspect.
- u. Reports that Iran and Iraq had agreed to allow the passage of lorries carrying food from Pakistan should be further investigated. (Action: ESC, FCO).
- v. The GUR MARINER was finally unloaded yesterday afternoon. Its cargo would be examined next week. The Dutch authorities had agreed to examine the cargo loaded at Middlesbrough first. HM Customs were also examining some cargo which had originally been earmarked for

SECRET AND PERSONAL

loading at Middlesbrough. DTp and DTI were looking to see what help they would provide to the ship's managers in their legal dispute which was preventing them from moving the vessel for use elsewhere.
(Action: DTp, DTI).

w. Extracts from Amnesty International's report on Iraqi atrocities in Kuwait had been sent to overseas posts. The Kuwaitis would also be encouraged to make use of it. (Action: FCO).

x. There had been wide press coverage of the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's speech yesterday. Press interest was also focussed on the arrival in the United Kingdom of the Britons who escaped from Kuwait by boat, and on the sale of the Army's stock of desert uniforms to Iraq. Press facilities would be available in the course of Mr Hamilton's forthcoming visit to the Gulf.

y. The 156 Kurds who arrived at Heathrow on Wednesday had been granted temporary admission while their applications for asylum were considered.

z. Birmingham University had confirmed that it would not receive any of the Iraqi students on its books to study nuclear physics. Those who in consequence were in the United Kingdom without fulfilment of their conditions of entry would be expelled. (Action: Home Office).

2. The next meeting of the Group will be on Monday 8 October at 11.00 am in the same place (Conference Room A, Cabinet Office) under Sir Robin Butler's chairmanship.

Yours sincerely
Nick Gibbons

pp D C J BALL

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SECRET AND PERSONAL

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SECRET AND PERSONAL

EDP
9/1x

UO.4592

8 October 1990

J R Young Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Emergency Unit
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Dear Rob,

IRAQ

This letter summarises the main points made and action agreed at the meeting of the Ad Hoc Group on the Gulf this morning under the Defence Secretary's chairmanship. Mr Waldegrave was also present. CIRCULATION WITHIN DEPARTMENTS SHOULD BE ON A STRICTLY NEED-TO-KNOW BASIS.

- a. On the diplomatic front, there were indications that the Iraqis had been surprised by the resolve which Mr Kaifu had shown in his talks with the Iraqi First Deputy Prime Minister. By contrast, Mr Primakov, Mr Gorbachev's representative, had made a more conciliatory statement after his visit to Baghdad. This was probably disingenuous and designed to secure the departure of Soviet citizens from Iraq. Yassir Arafat had put forward another peace plan.
- b. President Mitterrand had taken a low key approach on his visit to the Gulf, and had not built on his oblique remarks in New York. Nor had the Iraqi speech to the United Nations responded to the French line in any way.
- c. The two members of the staff of the British Embassy in Kuwait whom the Iraqis had finally allowed to leave had arrived in Baghdad on

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6 October. They had given effective press interviews, giving a clear impression of high morale.

- d. Other Embassies in Kuwait were gradually having to pull out. It was likely that shortly only the British, American, Bahraini and Omani Embassies would remain. The British Embassy should be able to last until the end of the month.
- e. Some companies had apparently been asked by the Iraqis for the names of those of their employees who were aged over 55, some but not all of whom had subsequently been granted exit visas. There had been no communication to Embassies about this.
- f. Of possible intermediaries to help with the evacuation of the sick and elderly, Yusuf Islam (Cat Stevens) was still in Iraq. Mr Heath had decided not to go to Iraq last week, and, if he intended to go, would probably not do so until after the Conservative Party Conference. There was no further news from President Kaunda.
- g. It was important that the United Kingdom should be suitably represented at the funeral of the ruler of Dubai. The FCO should explore the possibility that Mr Hamilton (who was already in the area) and Mr Luce might both attend. (Action: FCO).
- h. The Home Office had received the Home Secretary's agreement to the deportation of a further 14 Iraqis from the United Kingdom. The timing of their deportation needed further consideration. The FCO should put its views to the Group on Wednesday. (Action: FCO, consulting Home Office).
- i. Work was continuing to establish which channels between the universities and government Sir Edward Parkes would be prepared to recommend to Vice-Chancellors as the route for providing information about Iraqi students. The Cabinet Office should pursue this with the departments concerned. (Action: Cabinet Office).
- j. The Iraqi cargo vessel AL-WASSITTI had been boarded early this morning in a British-led operation. Although empty, the vessel had ignored warning shots by US, British and Australian warships, and had eventually been boarded by marines from a helicopter. A similar situation might shortly arise with the tanker TADMUR, which was also resisting interception. This policy by the Iraqis tied in with the recently reported message to some of their tankers not to stop to allow checks to be made.

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- k. There had been no change in the position of the Iraqi tankers at Kuwait, Umm-Qasr and Aden.
- l. 32 ships had so far been taken up from trade for the sealift of the 7th Armoured Brigade, out of a total convoy of 37 ships. 17 ships were currently en route, 11 of them in the Mediterranean. The first would reach Port Said this evening.
- m. Status of forces agreements were about to be signed with both Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. These covered civilian personnel engaged by HMG, but would not extend to other civilians (such as members of the press). Prince Sultan had not yet replied on command and control, but his reply was expected soon.
- n. Six of the twelve Jaguar aircraft in Oman had moved to Bahrain, and the other six would go tomorrow. The Tornado GR1s should move from Bahrain and from the United Kingdom to Tabuk later this week. The Ministry of Defence should check that fuel supplies, in terms of both immediate and longer-term availability, would be adequate at Tabuk. (Action: MOD).
- o. There was some concern over the position of women members of the armed forces in Saudi Arabia. There were some 200 British women presently in theatre, mostly nurses. We should take the same line as the Americans, that they were fully integrated into our forces, but ensure that their presence was discreet. (Action: MOD).
- p. There had been further staff level discussions about logistics in the WEU. The Germans had offered to train British personnel to operate their chemical reconnaissance vehicles, but had not yet offered the vehicles themselves. Belgium had offered a frigate to assist with protection, and this was being deployed. Belgium had also originally made an offer of two C-130 aircraft, but this had been withdrawn because of the situation in Ruanda. The ship provided by the Portuguese would be used to transport rations from Britain to Saudi Arabia.
- q. Seven Iranian ships were reported to be seeking to re-flag or pass themselves off as other shipping. This did not prevent us from keeping track of them. The Americans should be asked what action they were taking. (Action: FCO).
- r. The Embargo Surveillance Centre should explore ways of taking action in respect of the report (ESC report, paragraph 8) that a Japanese delegation was looking for ways of breaking the blockade.

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The intention was most likely to seek to export food to Japanese citizens in Iraq. The delegation in question was currently in Oman. (Action: ESC).

- s. The report that goods were arriving from Iran by train, if true, presumably referred to a combination of lorries and trains, since there were no direct train links (ESC report, paragraph 25). However, the report must be regarded as doubtful without collateral.
 - t. The trade embargo appeared to have had a significant effect on Iraqi poultry farming. Half the Iraqi flock was reported to have been slaughtered, as the Iraqis made desperate efforts to acquire feed.
 - u. It was important to ensure that the mobile transmitters which the Amir of Kuwait had requested were quickly made available. They would play a crucial part in ensuring that the right message was heard in Kuwait. The FCO should actively take this forward and report to the next meeting. (Action: FCO).
 - v. Cable Network News (CNN) provided an important means of getting the British point of view widely heard (including in Iraq). CNN were invited to MOD and FCO press conferences, and the Prime Minister had given an interview to them in New York. No 10 Press Office should ensure that they were aware that Ministers would make policy statements about the Gulf at the Conservative Party Conference. The FCO should check that the Arab press corps were similarly invited. MOD should consider arranging an interview by the Defence Secretary with selected members of the Arab corps. (Action: No 10 Press Office, FCO, MOD).
 - w. The press over the weekend had reported that Mr Heath might visit Iraq as an intermediary. The interception of the AL-WASSITTI was attracting considerable press attention. It would provide an opportunity to emphasise our determination to ensure that Security Council Resolutions were enforced.
2. The next meeting of the Group will be on Wednesday 10 October at 11.00 am in the same place (Conference Room A, Cabinet Office) under the Defence Secretary's chairmanship.

Yours sincerely
Nick Gibbons

mp D C J BALL

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SECRET AND PERSONAL

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SECRET AND PERSONAL

UO.4594

10 October 1990

J R Young Esq
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Emergency Unit
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Dear Rob,

IRAQ

This letter summarises the main points made and action agreed at the meeting of the Ad Hoc Group on the Gulf this morning under Mr Appleyard's chairmanship. CIRCULATION WITHIN DEPARTMENTS SHOULD BE ON A STRICTLY NEED-TO-KNOW BASIS.

- a. Discussions were continuing in the United Nations following events in Jerusalem. Three possible Resolutions were being considered. There might be a vote this evening. Iraqi reactions had been fierce, including a direct threat to fire missiles at Israel, as Saddam Hussain attempted to exploit the incident to the full.
- b. The UN Sanctions Committee had last night approved a further flight of evacuees. They were leaving Kuwait by bus and would fly from Basrah, arriving at Gatwick tonight. The precise number of Britons who would be on the flight was not known.
- c. The German Embassy in Kuwait had decided to close, and the Dutch and Belgians were following suit. The French were in difficulties. Of the Western Embassies, only the US, British and Canadian would shortly remain. The handling of the closing stages should be discussed with the United States and Canada. (Action: FCO).

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d. The Vietnamese request to send two food ships to Iraq would be raised at the UN Sanctions Committee meeting tomorrow. The two ships had left Vietnam on 4 October, and would not be able to reach Iraq until next week. Steps were in hand to establish whether they had yet reached Singapore: instructions were being sent to the High Commission. Problems would mount as they approached Iraq, because whilst we might wish to stop the cargo, we would not wish to obstruct the evacuation of foreign nationals. The United Kingdom should continue to argue firmly that the requests should be resisted, on the grounds that the situation was not yet so bad as to justify further shipments. We should also continue to insist that there should be no more shipments until a full report had been received of the recent Indian shipment and its distribution. (Action: FCO).

e. Foreign and Commonwealth Office Ministers had said that they would prefer to delay further deportation of Iraqis from the United Kingdom, in view of the current situation in Kuwait and Iraq, and in particular while efforts continued to secure the accreditation in Iraq of staff formerly in the Embassy in Kuwait. They suggested instead that when a suitable opportunity arose, the 14 whose deportation had most recently been approved should be expelled together with the further 20 who had been identified. The Iraqis in question did not represent an imminent threat. The FCO and Home Office should keep the position under review and report to the Group at intervals. (Action: FCO, Home Office).

f. The EC High-Level Energy Group had met yesterday to discuss the oil situation and a draft Presidency resolution. The proposal that this should be discussed in the Industry Council on 15 October should be resisted. The proper route for discussion should be the Oil Supply Group and then the Energy Council on 29 October. (Action: DEn).

g. The Iraqi tanker TADMUR was moored off Muscat. HMS BRAZEN was in attendance. The Omani authorities had agreed to receive TADMUR in port and participate in searching her. The first priority should be to ensure that the Omanis carried out a thorough inspection. The FCO should stay in close touch with the Omani government on this and on possible detention of the vessel under the terms of UNSCR 670, and MOD should review the need for HMS BRAZEN to remain with the vessel in the light of Omani action. (Action: FCO, MOD).

h. Despite some reports that the AL-WASSITI was not in fact empty, there was no reason to seek to conduct a fresh search.

i. The German Defence and Foreign Ministries were willing to offer assistance to the military effort, in particular through the loan of chemical reconnaissance vehicles, but the Finance Ministry was standing in the way of their efforts. Progress was unlikely before next week.

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SECRET AND PERSONAL

The FCO should ensure that pressure was maintained on the Germans, if need be making use of the Treasury's direct contacts with the German Finance Ministry. (Action: FCO, consulting HM Treasury).

j. The Bahrainis had made an informal approach about the possibility of obtaining British counter-terrorist training and assistance. This should be kept under active review. They would probably be looking for purely military help, but the Home Office should be consulted if there was any request for police involvement.

k. The Netherlands were seeking British help to secure Omani approval to the basing of British F-16 aircraft in Oman. It was not clear what their precise role would be, but we should be supportive of the Dutch efforts. (Action: MOD, FCO).

l. Today's ESC report referred to reports that two Iraqi ships (neither of them currently functional) might transfer to the Honduran flag. It was hoped that the next UN Security Council Resolution would specifically prevent such reflagging. If the reports could be suitably sanitised there would be benefit in bilateral approaches to the countries to whose flags ships were intending to transfer, to supplement the general material already given to the Sanctions Committee. (Action: ESC, FCO).

m. No detail was available to fill out the report that a Cypriot company had Ministerial authority for a shipment to Iraq. More generally, the Cypriot free trade area could help North African countries move goods through Cyprus to Lebanon for onward transmission to Iraq.

n. The ESC report included a Note on observance of sanctions by Eastern European countries. Generally they were observing the embargo. Only in the case of Yugoslavia and Poland was there evidence of continuing attempts of sanctions breaking on a significant scale. The FCO should ensure that the appropriate action was taken with Yugoslavia and Poland. (Action: FCO).

o. Baghdad tel no 1723 (copy attached) of 9 October gave a useful overview of the effect of sanctions on Iraq. Its description of shortages in the industrial sector was consistent with the most recent JIC assessments of the impact of sanctions on Iraq, which had noted the possibility that shortages of spare parts could appear quite sharply.

p. The Cabinet Office was co-ordinating the preparation of two papers on measures against sanctions breaking countries, for consideration at a future meeting of the Group. The first would identify offending countries and the steps that might be taken, while the second on a more limited circulation would describe some of the actions of the worst

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SECRET AND PERSONAL

offenders. It would be important to ensure that descriptions of the attitudes of offending countries were as up to date as possible and take account of any recent changes in their policy. The ESC should look further at the list it was providing to see whether any additional glosses were necessary. (Action: ESC).

q. Information on the enforcement of the air embargo was fragmentary. There was no evidence of systematic breaches. The principal concern remained the use of air transport to relieve particular shortages of spares or equipment (para o. above). The United Kingdom should continue to take what steps we could to ensure that UN obligations were met.

r. The FCO introduced AHGG(90) 43 on the positive information campaign. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's visit to Cairo on 12-15 October would present a useful opportunity to maintain the momentum of the campaign with Arab audiences. His subsequent visit to Israel would attract considerable attention. He would travel from Israel to Greece.

s. The Kuwaiti government had arranged for their Embassy in London to contact suppliers of mobile transmission equipment. The FCO should continue to play an active part in encouraging a successful outcome. (Action: FCO).

t. There would be a briefing for diplomatic correspondents today. Fifteen to twenty journalists would accompany the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary on his visit to the Middle East. He and the Defence Secretary would both make speeches to the Conservative Party Conference tomorrow. MOD would arrange a press facility tomorrow for the departure of Brigadier Cordingley, Commander of the 7th Armoured Brigade, for the Gulf.

2. The next meeting of the Group will be on Friday 12 October at 11.00 am in the same place (Conference Room A, Cabinet Office) under Sir Robin Butler's chairmanship.

Yours sincerely

Daniel Ball

D C J BALL

E

SECRET AND PERSONAL

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GM.

SECRET AND PERSONAL

UO.4600

12 October 1990

J R Young Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Emergency Unit
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Dear Rob,

IRAQ

This letter summarises the main points made and action agreed at the meeting of the Ad Hoc Group on the Gulf this morning under Sir Robin Butler's chairmanship. CIRCULATION WITHIN DEPARTMENTS SHOULD BE ON A STRICTLY NEED-TO-KNOW BASIS.

- a. The Soviet Foreign Ministry had briefed the British Embassy in Moscow on Mr Primakov's visit to Baghdad. Mr Gore-Booth had been given a similar briefing by the Soviet Embassy here. Primakov had tried to bring home to Saddam the extent of his isolation and the strength of allied determination, possibly with some effect. The Russians' primary aim, however, had been to secure the departure of their own community from Iraq.
- b. Discussions continued in New York about a UN Resolution or statement on the events in Israel on 9 October. It was not clear whether there would be agreement in the Security Council which would be meeting later in the day.
- c. Mr Heath's proposed visit to Iraq, widely reported in today's press, had been postponed for a week at Iraqi request.

SECRET AND PERSONAL

SECRET AND PERSONAL

d. The UN Sanctions Committee had considered a report from the Indian foodship yesterday. Distribution and unloading were under the control of the Indian Ambassador and the Indian Red Cross. The food problems seemed to have eased for the Asian communities in Iraq and Kuwait. The position of Western detainees and some Eastern European workers had deteriorated, however. A Bulgarian request for food supplies had been discussed with the Americans, who had initially been inclined to take too relaxed an approach to this.

e. The United States continued to favour seeking a deal with Iraq whereby early closure of the remaining Embassies in Kuwait would be exchanged for safe conduct for diplomats and others in the missions and progress on diplomats currently stuck in Baghdad. Instructions had been sent to the Embassy in Washington to seek to dissuade the Americans from this approach. It would be hard to justify such a deal without further UN cover, particularly in view of UNSCR 662's provisions about recognition of the Iraqi annexation.

f. There had been further meetings of officials in the WEU to consider co-ordination of logistic support of operations in the Gulf. Member states had been given until 22 October to say what concrete measures they would be prepared to take. This would be put to the higher-level WEU ad hoc Group on 30 October. In the meantime, these arrangements were being supplemented by bilateral contacts with the states most likely to provide valuable support.

g. The initial advice from the Embassy in Bonn had been that it would probably not be fruitful at this stage to employ the Treasury's direct contacts with the German Finance Ministry in efforts to encourage the Germans to provide logistic assistance. This should be explored further. (Action: FCO, HM Treasury).

h. The Dutch had acknowledged that the United Kingdom had given as much support as we could to their proposal to base aircraft in Oman.

i. The TADMUR had left Oman. Because of an administrative error, the Omanis had reloaded all the food found on her, despite the Sultan's instructions that only the food needed by the crew should be put back on the ship. The view of the Group was that steps should be taken to achieve the original objective of preventing the breach of sanctions, by whatever means would leave us least open to legal challenge. This meant ensuring that the food cargo did not reach Iraq. Preferably, HMS BRAZEN should board the vessel and remove the food cargo. This would be legally justifiable within the terms of the UN Resolutions. Or the vessel should be brought back to Oman to be unloaded. If an Omani request to take further action would assist, and could be obtained in time, this should be sought; but action should

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not be held up on this account. FCO and MOD should consult their Ministers as required on the proposed course of action. (Action: FCO, MOD).

j. A Dutch court had ruled that the owners of the GUR MARINER, which had been the subject of an arrest order sought by the Iraqis, could regain access to the vessel on payment of \$67 thousand. This was very much less than had been feared and represented a satisfactory outcome. Inspection by Dutch Customs of the cargo unloaded at Flushing would take several weeks.

k. The tanker ALMUTANABBI had left Aden empty and with a reinforced crew on 9 October, probably heading for the northern Gulf. Plans were in hand for a joint US/British/Australian operation to intercept the vessel in the Gulf of Oman on Saturday.

l. The ESC were preparing a Note for consideration at the Group's meeting on Monday about the level of traffic on the Jordan/Iraq border, which continued to be significant. (Action: ESC).

m. Action was in hand to sanitise reports of Polish and Yugoslav sanctions breaches for use by the FCO, as proposed by the Defence Secretary.

n. Today's news coverage was largely focussed on Mr Heath's proposed visit. The response to enquiries had been that this was a private initiative and that the FCO would offer hm the courtesies and assistance appropriate to a former Prime Minister. No comment had been offered about the value of the visit.

o. Media attention in coming days could be expected to focus on the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's visit to Egypt and Israel. Next week, the Newsnight programme intended to show three programmes on the Gulf crisis, covering the effectiveness of the embargo; operational aspects; and logistics, including medical support.

p. The Daily Telegraph had carried articles today which reflected the brief prepared on work to monitor the implementation of sanctions. Panorama, who had also been briefed, had not yet used this material.

q. The Cabinet Office would hold a meeting today to discuss arrangements for handling the media, particularly as tension mounted or following the outbreak of hostilities.

r. DES had sent reminders to institutions of higher education which had not yet replied to the questionnaire about Iraqi students engaged in sensitive areas of study. Responses to date had revealed 30 students at universities studying aviation or subjects which could

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enhance either nuclear or biological capability, together with 7 at colleges, including Hatfield Polytechnic where studies were in collaboration with British Aerospace. All 37 appeared to be sponsored by the Iraqi government. The next step, without waiting for the full trawl to be completed, should be to establish which of the students were actually in the UK; to seek the views of the universities or colleges in question about the possible value to Iraq of the studies in question; and to consider whether there were sufficient grounds under current procedures to justify deportation for national security reasons. The Home Office should prepare a Note, in consultation with DES and others concerned, on the steps which might be taken in respect of the 37. (Action: Home Office, consulting DES).

s. There would be a further co-ordinating group meeting on burdensharing in Washington today. It was not clear which EC member states would attend. The focus was likely to be on committee and administrative arrangements. Substantive discussion of figures and action were proceeding smoothly.

t. As reported in the media, the Americans had temporarily stopped aircraft training following a series of accidents. Training had now resumed. The MOD should enquire into the background of the American action, particularly to establish whether there were lessons about the effectiveness of the equipment which might be useful to the UK. (Action: MOD).

2. The next meeting of the Group will be on MONDAY 15 October at 11.00 am in the same place (Conference Room A, Cabinet Office) under Mr Waldegrave's chairmanship.

Yours sincerely
D C J BALL

D C J BALL

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SECRET AND PERSONAL

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COP 157X

SECRET AND PERSONAL

UO.4604

15 October 1990

J R Young Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Emergency Unit
Whitehall SW1

Dear Rob,

AD HOC GROUP ON THE GULF: 35TH MEETING

This letter summarises the main points made and action agreed at the meeting of the Ad Hoc Group on the Gulf this morning under Mr Waldegrave's chairmanship. Mr Hamilton and Mr Sainsbury were also present. CIRCULATION WITHIN DEPARTMENTS SHOULD BE ON A STRICTLY NEED-TO-KNOW BASIS.

- a. The Foreign Secretary on his visit to Egypt had found the Egyptians in robust mood, and suspicious of Jordan. Relations were close on all issues. He would travel to Israel today. He would not wish to be drawn into criticism of Israel went beyond UNSCR 672. His objective, as the Prime Minister emphasised at OD(G) this morning, would be to maintain reasonable relations with the Israelis, and to make clear the absence of any linkage between Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and the Palestinian issue by focussing on the fact that Saddam's actions lay at the root of the crisis.
- b. The Energy Secretary had reported to OD(G) this morning that he was exploring the scope for co-operation with the Norwegians on the maintenance of oil supplies.

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- c. Mr Heath's visit to Iraq would probably take place as planned later this week, and had some prospect of success. Mr Heath had conceived this plan following an approach by some of the families of hostages and had then discussed it with the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary. No further public comment should be made on the background to the visit. The public line should remain that this was his mission; and that any success in securing the release of sick and elderly hostages would be welcome.
- d. King Hussein had summoned the British and American Ambassadors on 13 and 14 October. He had underlined Jordan's commitment to enforcing sanctions, but had continued to float ideas about an Arab solution, possibly involving an Arab peacekeeping force in the disputed territories. He had given an account of the Iraqi Foreign Minister's visit which suggested little movement in Iraqi thinking, although the King had said that he detected a greater interest in negotiations than hitherto.
- e. In the longer term, there could be expected to be significant population shifts in the area, as Saudi Arabia in particular sought to replace Palestinians and Yemenis with migrant workers from further afield. The shipping of 70,000 Yemenis back to Yemen might be the first step in a longer process.
- f. Of the Western Embassies in Kuwait, only those of the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom remained. A number of staff formerly from Embassies in Kuwait were stuck in Baghdad. The Iraqis had refused requests to accredit them in Baghdad. A response was awaited from the United States about their proposal, which we should continue firmly to resist, to strike a deal with Iraq exchanging early closure of Embassies in Kuwait for progress in other areas.
- g. Yusuf Islam (Cat Stevens) would return to the United Kingdom tonight with four pilgrims whose release he had secured.
- h. The Defence Secretary would meet Mr Cheney this afternoon. He was seeing the Dutch Defence Minister this morning.
- i. The Sultan of Oman was considering whether he might be able to supply free fuel to British forces.
- j. The food cargo had been taken off the Iraqi cargo ship TADMUR by helicopter over the weekend. The tanker ALMUTANABBI had also been intercepted and allowed to proceed when found to be empty.

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k. The Cabinet Office introduced AHGG(90)45 on possible measures against sanctions breakers. The paper concluded that on the whole the sanctions regime was working, but that 11 countries had been sanctions-breaking on a significant scale. The actions of the worst offenders were described in MO 7944, circulated on a more restricted distribution. The position was not clear cut. It was not always clear how far there was government connivance, and attitudes of particular countries could change over time. The worst offender was probably Jordan, which was a special case. The measures available were in the field of aid, trade, finance and transport. Bilateral measures would probably be ineffectual and any steps should therefore be multilateral. These would best be taken by the Security Council, which would require a new Resolution for this purpose. Departments agreed that a formal warning or 'yellow card' would be appropriate in some cases, with the possibility of sanctions in reserve. The proposed first step was to discuss with the Americans what might be done and then invite Ministers to take stock. In addition, the paper raised the issue of the handling of current British Aid and Trade Provision (ATP) cases, the most immediate being tractors for Yemen, and whether machinery should be established to enable such cases to be considered by the Group before final approval.

In discussion, the following points were made:

- A general warning, made multilaterally, to offending countries that they stood to lose important aid could well be effective. Such a warning might be especially helpful in view of the time it might take in practice for multilateral action to be agreed and put in place.
- An offer of ATP aid could send the wrong signal to a number of countries if made at an unsuitable time, and it would therefore be helpful for the Group to be able to consider significant cases involving the countries listed in the paper. This should come after the normal processes of inter-departmental consideration and approval. The timing of any decision to cancel an aid offer (which could take some time to materialise) would need careful handling.

The Group agreed that the Note should be sent to the Embassy in Washington, with the object that they discuss with the State Department whether we should take action of a 'yellow card' nature against any of the sanctions-breakers (Action: FCO). In addition, a mechanism should be established for seeking the Group's view on ATP cases once they had completed their normal process of approval (Action: DTI, consulting Cabinet Office and others as necessary). DTI should prepare a brief Note on the case of tractors for Yemen for consideration by the Group at the appropriate time (Action: DTI).

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1. There had been a meeting of the Financial Co-ordinating Group on burden-sharing on 12 October. This had involved less procedural wrangling than had been feared. The French had announced a \$100 million contribution, to be disbursed quickly. The Italians had not pushed their proposal for a separate steering committee on this occasion, although they had done so at a preceding EC meeting. There would be a further meeting of the technical group later this week, and a co-ordinating meeting in Rome in November, under US chairmanship and Italian co-chairmanship, to which the other major potential donors would be invited. The assistance reaching affected states in the short term would be that from the Gulf states. Some of the Japanese aid, and the French package just announced, should be disbursed fairly quickly. The EC package would come from the 1991 budget. It was, inevitably perhaps, proving difficult for the Financial Co-ordinating Group to encourage and co-ordinate the swift provision of aid, rather than simply report the independently-reached decisions of states. We should use our best endeavours to ensure that the aid promised by Gulf states really materialised. In this context, the FCO should consider ways of ensuring that the Sultan of Oman was personally aware of requests for Omani assistance (Action: FCO). More generally, it was important to keep track of the actual movement of funds and not only of intentions (Action: HM Treasury).

m. The Cabinet Office introduced AHGG(90)46, which looked at the mechanism for funding the British Embassy in Baghdad when its present resources were exhausted and at the provision of support for British nationals in Iraq. It was legitimate to transfer funds to the Embassy: equally the Iraqis were entitled to send funds to the Iraqi Embassy here. Both countries were allowing the other's Embassy access to funds. It was unlikely that access to Embassy funds in Baghdad would be cut off by Iraq for fear of reciprocal action. So far as nationals were concerned who ran out of money, or were denied access to it, it was permissible under the embargo for the Embassy to make genuine distress payments, but not for funds to be sent from the UK to individuals or companies. As a matter of policy it would be inappropriate to demand undertakings to repay distress payments, but where they could afford to do so companies should be asked for a contribution in respect of their employees. By the end of the month, distress payments could amount to a total of some £134,000 per month, and this figure would probably rise.

In discussion the following points were made:

- if the DTI was approached by a company about the plight of its employees in Iraq, the advice should be to approach the Embassy locally;

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- some firms would find genuine difficulty in contributing to the cost of distress payments for their employees;
- it would be difficult in practice to seek to monitor or to prevent transfers between individuals or companies in Iraq, even if these transfers were technically in breach of the trade embargo;
- directly reciprocal action in response to Iraqi refusals to allow access by British companies and individuals to their accounts in Iraq would be impractical for the reasons described in the paper.

The Group endorsed the paper as the basis for policy in this area.

n. Paragraphs 1 and 2 of today's Embargo Surveillance Report pointed towards Yemeni involvement in large scale sanctions-breaking, but the picture was not yet clear. The reports should be pursued. (Action: ESC).

o. The Kuwaiti-owned, Qatari-flagged cargo ship BARZAN had been diverted to Jeddah after being found to be carrying foodstuffs misdescribed as medical supplies.

p. The Prime Minister at OD(G) had re-emphasised the vital importance of the positive information campaign, which should not be diverted from its principal themes. Arrangements would be made for the Foreign Secretary's speech in Cairo to be widely circulated. There would be further opportunities in the course of his visit to bring speeches by him to the attention of a wide Arab audience. Full use in the campaign should be made of reports of Iraqi atrocities such as that reported in paragraph 29 of today's Assessments Staff sitrep.

q. OD(G) this morning had noted both Saudi and Kuwait requests for mobile broadcasting units. The FCO should pursue these with a view to a report to OD(G) on Thursday (Action: FCO).

r. Press facilities would be provided tomorrow and on Wednesday for the departure of elements of the 7th Armoured Brigade from Germany.

s. The reference in paragraphs 3-4 of the annex to the Assessments Staff sitrep to terrorist activities should be followed up (Action: Cabinet Office).

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t. When a Note had been given to Iraq rejecting the Iraqi decree on impounding of foreign assets, we had also put down a marker in respect of losses and damage inflicted on those in Kuwait and Iraq as a result of the invasion. The issue would become public this week with the publication of advertisements inviting those affected to notify the government. The advertisements would make clear that they applied only to losses in Kuwait and Iraq, and were unconnected to broader questions of compensation for loss of trade. The FCO should keep in close touch with MOD about the losses of British Liaison Team personnel. (Action: FCO, consulting MOD).

u. The American move to stop all aircraft training flights temporarily had not revealed any particular lessons about the effectiveness of equipment. It appeared to be a matter of over enthusiasm on the part of pilots.

2. The next meeting of the Group will be on WEDNESDAY 17 October at 11.00 am in the same place (Conference Room A, Cabinet Office) under the Defence Secretary's chairmanship.

*Yours sincerely
D C J Ball*

D C J BALL

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SECRET AND PERSONAL

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SECRET AND PERSONAL

UO.4610

17 October 1990

J R Young Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Emergency Unit
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John 17/10

Dear Rob,

AD HOC GROUP ON THE GULF: 36TH MEETING

This letter summarises the main points made and action agreed at the meeting of the Ad Hoc Group on the Gulf this morning under the Defence Secretary's chairmanship. Mr Waldegrave was also present. CIRCULATION WITHIN DEPARTMENTS SHOULD BE ON A STRICTLY NEED-TO-KNOW BASIS.

a. US Secretary of State Baker had sent a message to the Foreign Secretary explaining the United States's decision to seek a UN Security Council Resolution about the plight of foreign nationals and the provisioning of Embassies in Kuwait, rather than pursuing (as previously agreed) a Resolution on reparations and personal accountability now. The US shift of position had caused some confusion. If as a result a Resolution could not be agreed until next week, there was a danger that the issue of Iraqi action in Kuwait would be harder to keep separate from the Arab/Israel question, when the UN Secretary General reported on progress over a mission to Israel. The FCO should pursue in the light of Mr Baker's message. (Action: FCO). More generally, the non-aligned states would seek to propose parallel Resolutions on the Arab/Israel to mirror those on Iraq.

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b. It was important to find out as much as possible of the line being taken by Mr Primakov on his visits to Italy, France and Washington. (Action: FCO). His apparent interest in compromise did not square with the Russian proposal that there should be an ad hoc meeting of the five Permanent Members of the Security Council in the UN Military Staff Committee at Chief of Staff level in order to intimidate the Iraqis. We need to handle the Soviet proposal with great care. Whilst there might possibly be something to be derived from this idea, we would need to be absolutely sure that it would not be seen as the first step in a process leading to UN command of forces. (Action: FCO, MOD).

c. King Hussein had obliged the New York Times to withdraw their claim that he had admitted that he had known about the Iraqi plan to invade Kuwait in advance. MOD should look into the allegation reported in today's Times (based on the same interview) that the Prime Minister had told him that troops were already on the way to Saudi before assistance had been invited, and prepare a press line setting the record straight. (Action: FCO, MOD, No 10).

d. The Foreign Secretary would visit the Occupied Territories today. He attached great importance to maintaining the separation between the Iraq/Kuwait and Arab/Israel issues.

e. Canada was preparing to close its Embassy in Kuwait tomorrow. The position of the French Embassy was becoming precarious. The British Ambassador was confident that our own Embassy could survive for several more months. We should continue to resist American suggestions of a deal in which we withdraw early in return for Iraqi agreement to allow diplomats to leave Iraq. (Action: FCO).

f. The BBC World Service was carrying broadcast messages for the benefit of personnel remaining in Kuwait. The MOD should monitor these and report to the Defence Secretary. (Action: MOD).

g. A number of wives of hostages (including wives of British Liaison Team personnel) were intent on visiting Iraq. They could not be prevented from doing so, but the FCO and MOD should continue to warn them of the dangers and advise against making the visits. (Action: FCO, MOD).

h. Iraq appeared to be seeking to mount some form of diplomatic offensive through Deputy Prime Minister Ramadan's visits to North African states.

i. The Amir of Kuwait would visit the United Kingdom next week. The aim should be to agree the text of a draft letter with him but that he should not sign it now. (Action: FCO, MOD).

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j. The build up of the 7th Armoured Brigade continued. 2,000 men from the Brigade were now in theatre, bringing total British manpower to 7,000. The airlift of men would begin on 22 October and be complete by 29 October, when all personnel would be in place. 35 out of 38 chartered vessels, together with four landing ships logistic (LSLs), were currently carrying equipment by sea, all of which would arrive by 4 November.

k. There were signs that Jordan was enforcing sanctions more rigorously, including restrictions on road traffic on the Jordan/Iraq border. The US and UK would continue to monitor this traffic. The Jordanians had said that they would like a single United Nations monitoring point, which might be acceptable if satisfactory detailed arrangements could be made. (Action: FCO, ESC).

l. The change in Jordanian attitude made it all the more important that compensation was available to cushion the economic loss. Although the United Kingdom and the United States were not providing money directly, we had an important role in encouraging others to play their part. There were currently few signs that significant cash aid would be forthcoming in the short term. The Cabinet Office, in consultation with the Treasury and other Departments, should co-ordinate follow-up action. (Action: Cabinet Office).

m. The Honduran authorities were reported to have revoked two transfers of Iraqi ships to the Honduran flag. Their action would probably put an end to present Iraqi attempts to reflag its vessels, although they might continue to attempt to disguise them.

n. The Embargo Surveillance Centre was drawing together information from various sources on air traffic, with a view to detecting unusual patterns of activity that might suggest breaches of the air embargo. No clear patterns had yet emerged. Efforts were also being co-ordinated with the Americans.

o. The Sub-Group established to monitor the movement of Iraqi and Kuwaiti funds would continue to ensure that the financial embargo was effectively enforced. Treasury Ministers had recently approved some relaxation in the controls over the bank accounts of Kuwaiti private individuals, provided that we were sure they were not involved in any way with Iraq. As in the case of sanctions more widely, we should look to take the initiative in encouraging other countries to approach the enforcement of the financial embargo with equal vigour. The Bank of England should suggest to the Governor that he raise this at a Basle meeting. (Action: Bank of England).

SECRET AND PERSONAL

p. The imposition of sanctions had prevented all exports of Iraqi oil, cutting off Iraq's principal source of revenue. There were still some relatively limited loopholes on imports, as limited traffic reached Iraq across the borders with Syria, Iran and Jordan and by air. Most reported sanctions breaches related to foodstuffs, not the industrial or military equipment which is of greatest importance. (In some measure the lack of such reports might reflect greater care on the part of the Iraqis in concealing evidence of sanctions breaking in these areas.)

q. The Home Office was continuing to investigate the cases of the 37 Iraqi students with places at universities and other higher education establishments researching into potentially sensitive areas which had come to light from the DES trawl. Information available to the Bank of England about the release of funds to the Iraqi Embassy for students might help in an assessment of how many students were in fact taking up their places. The Home Office was also looking into 18 Iraqis holding permits for work of sensitive nature. (Action: Home Office). The Cabinet Office should ensure that action was in hand to pursue with Sir Edward Parkes, Chairman of the Committee of Vice-Chancellors, the use of other channels for providing information about students. (Action: Cabinet Office).

r. The principal points of the positive information campaign were set out in the FCO's weekly sitrep, circulated as AHGG(90) 47. Broadcasts into Iraq by a variety of organisations were currently being made without being jammed. It might have been because facilities had been offered by Saudi Arabia and Egypt that Kuwait had not yet moved to acquire mobile transmission equipment. OD(G) tomorrow would consider further the issue of broadcasts in general.

s. The arrival of the first tanks in Saudi Arabia on 20 October would attract considerable media attention. Press facilities would be provided. Brigadier Cordingley would give a briefing today and Sir Peter de la Billiere would give an interview to the Newsnight programme.

2. The next meeting of the Group will be on FRIDAY 19 October at 11.00 am in the same place (Conference Room A, Cabinet Office) under Mr Appleyard's chairmanship.


Yours sincerely
D C J BALL

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EM 19/X

SECRET AND PERSONAL

UO.4612

19 October 1990

J R Young Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Emergency Unit
Whitehall SW1

Dear Mr Young

AD HOC GROUP ON THE GULF: 37TH MEETING

This letter summarises the main points made and action agreed at the meeting of the Ad Hoc Group on the Gulf this morning under Mr Appleyard's chairmanship. CIRCULATION WITHIN DEPARTMENTS SHOULD BE ON A STRICTLY NEED-TO-KNOW BASIS.

- a. The UN Secretary General had given up the mission to Israel following Security Council Resolution 672 for the moment. There would be informal consultations today between Security Council members on the next steps. Although Israel had probably not technically defied UNSCR 672, some members could be expected to seek firmer action against her. It would become increasingly difficult to keep the issue separate from Iraq/Kuwait in discussions in the United Nations next week.
- b. The next draft Resolution on Iraq/Kuwait, covering inter alia issues of compensation, personal accountability of Iraqis and the provisioning of Embassies in Kuwait, had been agreed by representatives of four of the five Permanent Members of the Security Council in New York, but the Americans had not yet received clearance from Washington.

SECRET AND PERSONAL

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- c. The EC Political Committee had met on 17-18 October in Rome. The Twelve had agreed that they should seek to discuss the plight of EC nationals in Iraq and Kuwait with the Iraqi Foreign Minister, and that they should look at further diplomatic action against Iraqi diplomats in the EC following Iraq's refusal to allow diplomats who were formerly in Embassies in Kuwait to leave Iraq. They had noted with misgivings the Swedish decision to send a senior Foreign Ministry Official to negotiate the evacuation of hostages. No EC state was contemplating a similar mission by its officials.
- d. Mr Heath was due to leave for Jordan today, where he would have an audience with the King, and to go on to Baghdad tomorrow. There were some signs that he might succeed in securing the release of a number of hostages. The FCO was considering a number of options for flying any released hostages back to the UK. (Action: FCO).
- e. Mr Primakov was in Washington. The Americans were understood to have prepared robust briefing for his visit. As described in paragraph 7 of today's JIC sitrep, there were concerns in some quarters about the firmness of the Soviet position and differences of view within the Soviet Foreign Ministry. It might be helpful if Mr Baker and Mr Shevardnadze were to reinforce their earlier joint statements at a suitable opportunity. The FCO should follow up Primakov's visit with the Americans as necessary. (Action: FCO).
- f. The Foreign Secretary would raise the issue of financial assistance for Jordan at the Foreign Affairs Council on Monday. The issue would also be discussed by the Technical Group on burdensharing on Monday. OD(G) had discussed yesterday the scope for diplomatic action we might take to encourage early disbursement of funds for Jordan, Turkey and Egypt. The FCO were in touch with the US on this, and should keep the Cabinet Office informed of developments. (Action: FCO).
- g. The FCO had, as agreed at earlier meetings of the Group, restricted to three the number of airside passes made available to the Iraqi Embassy. They had also considered ways of tightening the regime for the use of the remaining passes, but these should not be pursued for the present, in view of the risk of retaliation against the Ambassador's use of his pass in Baghdad. (Action: FCO).
- h. The airlift and sealift of the 7th Armoured Brigade continued. The first vessels carrying equipment had arrived yesterday. The Defence Secretary planned to visit Saudi Arabia in the week of 11 November.

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SECRET AND PERSONAL

- i. The Iraqi tanker AL-MUSTANSIYIRAH had transferred part of its load to a Panamanian flagged vessel for onward shipment to Cuba. The cargo predated the imposition of sanctions and the delivery was therefore legitimate.
- j. The possibility of further discussions between an Iraqi official and a Greek businessman on arms sales (ESC Report of 18 October, paragraph 2) should be kept under close examination. (Action: ESC).
- k. The reported transfer of funds by the Union Bank of Switzerland to the Central Bank of Iraq (today's ESC Report paragraph 1) was not, on closer examination, in breach of the embargo.
- l. The unloading in Libya by a Greek vessel of foodstuffs and supplies intended for Iraq (today's ESC report, paragraph 3), involved quantities too large for airlift. A close watch would be kept on attempts to transport the cargo to Iraq. (Action: ESC).
- m. Reports of Iranian involvement in sanctions breaking (today's JIC sitrep, paragraph 23), taken together with reports of a vessel at Hodeidah carrying cargo intended for Iraq but marked for Iran, might suggest the establishment of a channel for illicit imports via Yemen and Iran. The ESC should watch for the emergence of such a pattern. (Action: ESC).
- n. Today's ESC Report included a useful Note on measures taken to disguise Iraqi ships.
- o. Iraq had sought today to withdraw £5 million from the Rafidain Bank, possibly in order to send money to Embassies outside the UK which were short of funds. The Bank of England had refused the request. The FCO should be kept informed in view of the possibility of retaliation against British Embassy funds in Baghdad. (Action: Bank of England, consulting FCO, Cabinet Office).
- p. Recent press coverage of the crisis was raising questions about the staunchness of Western resolve, and was critical of US diplomacy. The impression was being conveyed that the US diplomatic message was becoming muddled, with suggestions of compromise and linkage with the Palestinian issue. This made it all the more important to get our message across clearly.
2. The next meeting of the Group will be on Monday 22 October at 11.00 am in the same place (Conference Room A, Cabinet Office) under the Defence Secretary's chairmanship.

Yours sincerely

Marti Stirling

pp D C J BALL

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SECRET AND PERSONAL

UO.4613

22 October 1990

J R Young Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
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Dear Rob,

AD HOC GROUP ON THE GULF: 38TH MEETING

This letter summarises the main points made and action agreed at the meeting of the Ad Hoc Group on the Gulf this morning under the Defence Secretary's chairmanship. CIRCULATION WITHIN DEPARTMENTS SHOULD BE ON A STRICTLY NEED-TO-KNOW BASIS.

- a. OD(G) this morning had discussed Mr Primakov's meetings with the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary, and developments at the United Nations.
- b. We did not yet know how many hostages would be released following Mr Heath's meeting with Saddam Hussain, nor whether they would fly back to the UK from Jordan or direct from Baghdad. Virgin Atlantic Airways was prepared to provide an aircraft, on which medical support would be provided. Officials from the departments concerned, but no Ministers, would meet the aircraft on arrival. The public response to Mr Heath's message should be that over 800 hostages had been released so far; we were pleased that Mr Heath had succeeded in adding to this number; but we remained concerned for the well over one thousand who were still unable to leave. The FCO should confirm the numbers to be

SECRET AND PERSONAL

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SECRET AND PERSONAL

included. Care should be taken not to draw attention to the number of Britons in hiding in Kuwait, in view of continuing Iraqi efforts to round them up (although a written Parliamentary Answer on 19 October had given this information). (Action: FCO, Press Offices).

c. The technical group on burdensharing would meet today in Washington. The figures prepared for the meeting suggested that the assistance pledged for Egypt exceeded the calculated Egyptian need, while that for Turkey and, especially, Jordan was less than required. The estimated total monies pledged for 1990/91, assuming that commitments were honoured, were close to the total need. The figures would be closely scrutinised. The basic problem in practice was that, despite the pledges, only a limited flow of funds was being made available to the frontline states. (Action: HM Treasury, consulting other Departments). Following a UK demarche the US had agreed to press Japan and Germany to provide early aid to Jordan, and had also encouraged EC Foreign Ministers to urge rapid disbursement of the bilateral element of the EC aid package for the front line states. There were signs that the Japanese might be prepared to contribute to non-military costs of the British deployment to the Gulf. MOD were looking at the options. (Action: MOD).

d. The primary legislation underpinning the present sanctions orders (the Import, Export and Customs Powers (Defence) Act 1939), enacted near the start of the Second World War, contained a clause providing for it to lapse once the emergency which led to its introduction was declared to have come to an end. This Act was the only major piece of wartime legislation still in use. The recent four powers settlement had significantly increased the risk of a successful legal challenge to the Act. Ministers had agreed that a short Bill should be enacted early in the forthcoming Parliamentary session to make the powers permanent. (Action: DTI).

e. The text of an EC Regulation imposing an embargo on Iraq, extending the existing Regulations to include certain non-financial services, had been agreed by the member states. It had gone to the European Parliament for its opinion. It was likely to be adopted later this week or next. FCO and DTI were discussing the handling of the Regulation's implementation in the UK. (Action: FCO, DTI).

f. The Iraqi supply ship AL-ARABI had been intercepted on 20 October carrying a cargo of wood and steel. The ship was instructed to return to Iraq, but had since resumed its course towards Aden. A further interception, involving HMS LONDON, was planned.

g. The AL-ARABI was one of a number of Iraqi vessels which had been involved in transporting industrial assets to Iraq which had been stripped from Kuwait. A Note on such asset-shipping was enclosed with

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today's ESC report. Goods had, in particular, been removed from Kuwaiti refineries. The announcement by the Iraqi Oil Ministry that petrol rationing would be introduced from 28 October might reflect a shortage of chemical additives, even following the stripping of stocks in Kuwait. The Joint Intelligence Organisation was assessing the likely impact of the shortage, including the possible effect on Iraqi military aircraft. (Action: JIO).

h. A number of strands of information pointed towards Sudanese involvement in sanctions breaking. Most recently there were suggestions that Sudan was operating flights to Aqaba. Further investigations should be carried out to find out more about what was happening to the contents of the aircraft once they arrived in Jordan. (Action: ESC). The FCO should examine further the scope for putting pressure on the Sudanese. Sudan already appeared on the list of worst offenders attached to the paper sent to the Americans for comment. In view of the importance of even quite limited quantities of key equipment to Iraqi capabilities, it was important to press ahead with discussion of action against sanctions-breakers as quickly as possible. (Action: FCO).

i. The Iraqi tanker AMURIYAH had arrived empty in Aden, apparently with instructions to leave soon for Iraq.

j. The ESC was preparing a report on possible smuggling routes involving Iran. A check should be made to establish whether ships which had been challenged en route to the north of the Gulf had claimed that they were heading for Iranian ports such as Bandar-e Khomeini. (Action: ESC, MOD).

k. The Embassy in Riyadh had been asked to find out more about Saudi knowledge of flights overflying Saudi Arabia, particularly from Yemen to Jordan. (Action: FCO).

l. The Amir of Kuwait's visit to London tomorrow should provide material to supplement the positive information campaign. (Action: FCO). The Kuwait Embassy should be encouraged to deploy the Kuwaitis' own information resources to best advantage and in particular to ensure that the Amir was briefed to make effective use of material about Iraqi atrocities in Kuwait. (Action: No 10 Press Office, consulting FCO).

m. Renewed emphasis should be given in the information campaign to Saddam's record, presenting the most recent atrocities against the background of his previous actions. (Action: FCO).

n. The Prime Minister would give a written interview for Arab newspapers on 24 October; the Defence Secretary would see the Arab press corps again today; and Mr Waldegrave would take part in a

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SECRET AND PERSONAL

photocall with the Association for Free Kuwait outside the House on 26 October.

o. Journalists from ITN would spend two weeks with the Navy in the Gulf. On 24 October a press facility would be provided for the departure of the Pumas.

2. The next meeting of the Group will be on Wednesday 24 October at 11.00 am in the same place (Conference Room A, Cabinet Office) under Mr Waldegrave's chairmanship.

*Yours sincerely
D C J BALL*

D C J BALL

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SECRET AND PERSONAL

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SECRET AND PERSONAL

UO.4614

24 October 1990

J R Young Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Emergency Unit
Whitehall SW1

Dear Rob,

AD HOC GROUP ON THE GULF: 39TH MEETING

This letter summarises the main points made and action agreed at the meeting of the Ad Hoc Group on the Gulf this morning under Mr Waldegrave's chairmanship. Mr Hamilton was also present. CIRCULATION WITHIN DEPARTMENTS SHOULD BE ON A STRICTLY NEED-TO-KNOW BASIS.

a. Mr Heath had arrived at Gatwick early this morning with the 40 detainees released by the Iraqis. A few more might follow. Prominent figures in other countries were looking to make similar visits. It was a source of some concern that some countries - Sweden and Bulgaria, in particular - were sending official representatives to negotiate the release of hostages.

b. Our position remained that imports of food to Iraq should not be allowed. The Russians and Bulgarians were pressing to be able to send foodstuffs to their nationals. If the point were reached where the pressure to send food for the benefit of hostages became irresistible, it would be preferable for this to be achieved through Red Cross parcels to named individuals. In the meantime, the FCO was looking, in consultation with the Red Cross, at ways of getting non-food parcels to detainees and of improving the flow of mail. The possibility was also being explored of encouraging a non-governmental organisation to send medical and clerical personnel to visit hostages. (Action: FCO).

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- c. The Americans were seeking to persuade Israel to shift its position on the UN Secretary General's mission. If their efforts were unsuccessful, there might be a further Security Council Resolution. The US attitude would be the key issue. Informal consultations were in progress with the other, non-permanent, members of the Security Council on the draft Resolution on Iraq and Kuwait agreed by the Five.
- d. Prince Sultan had said at a press conference on 22 October that some form of compromise might be possible if Kuwait ceded some territory. He had denied that he meant this, and King Fahd's statement had made clear that Saudi policy was unchanged. But these remarks probably indicated that there was some debate going on within the Saudi Royal family.
- e. The Prime Minister would see President Mitterrand this weekend. The aim would be to obtain a clear reaffirmation of French commitment to the collective policy and specifically to taking a full part in any conflict.
- f. Mr Baker's message on burdensharing to EC Member States encouraged them to make an early disbursement of EC bilateral aid. (He had also asked the UK to make a bilateral contribution in 1990.) The technical group on burdensharing had met in Washington on 22 October, and would meet again on 30 October. The meeting had focussed on the plight of Jordan, which had received few pledges of support, and little if any disbursement to date. The Arab nations, especially Saudi Arabia, were disinclined to help. There was, however, a pressing need to ensure that such assistance was provided, in view of the possible penalties of a Jordanian collapse. We should consider reinforcing Mr Baker's recent demarches to Germany and Japan with approaches of our own, setting the request in its political and military context. The Prime Minister might be invited to mention the issue at the European Council. (Action: FCO). It was not easy to check the figures given for actual disbursement to the front line states, but these should be checked so far as possible. (Action: HM Treasury, consulting other Departments.) Figures for disbursement should if possible be included in the burdensharing tables prepared by the Cabinet Office. (Action: Cabinet Office.)
- g. There were no signs of any Iraqi move to form a new defensive line further north in Kuwait.
- h. The report that military spares might be imported to Yemen from Iraq through Jordan (yesterday's ESC sitrep, paragraph 1) was less clear than first thought.
- i. It was now known that there had been five round trips by aircraft from Sudan to Aqaba between 13 and 15 October. This represented a

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total capacity for cargo of some 350 tons. There was no evidence relating to the contents of the aircraft. It was possible that smuggling routes to Iraq from Libya via Sudan and either Jordan or Yemen were being established. A range of reports of Sudanese involvement in sanctions breaking was being sanitised for use in diplomatic approaches. (Action: ESC, FCO.)

j. There were indications that Iraq had asked a Jordanian company to supply CW precursors (today's ESC report, paragraph 6); and that rocket launchers had been ordered from Romania (ESC report, paragraph 1).

k. Yemen had asked the United States whether it was permissible to use oil without payment from Iraqi tankers in Aden. FCO should keep in touch with the US. (Action: FCO.)

l. It was probably both lack of additives and general maintenance difficulties that lay behind the introduction this week of petrol rationing in Iraq.

m. The FCO introduced AHGG(90)49 on the positive information campaign. The aim was to focus attention on the principal theme of Iraqi aggression. A new film was being prepared, which would draw on the Foreign Secretary's statement to Parliament and an interview by the Kuwaiti Finance Minister. A version of the film would be used for the Home Office's meeting tomorrow with representatives of the British Muslim community.

n. The Foreign Secretary and the Association for Free Kuwait would both appear before the Foreign Affairs Committee today. This could be expected to attract considerable media interest. Other items of press interest included the arrival of further tanks in Saudi Arabia, and the follow-up to Mr Heath's visit.

o. The Home Secretary had been invited to consider the cases of four Iraqi nationals closely associated with Iraqi procurement activity in the UK. Once the Home Secretary's views had been obtained, the Home Office should consult the Group about the timing of any deportations, separately from consideration of the larger group for whom agreement in principle to deportation had already been secured. (Action: Home Office.)

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SECRET AND PERSONAL

2. The next meeting of the Group will be on Friday 26 October at 11.00 am in the same place (Conference Room A, Cabinet Office) under the Defence Secretary's chairmanship.

Yours sincerely
David Ball

D C J BALL


SECRET AND PERSONAL

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SECRET AND PERSONAL

UO.4618

26 October 1990

J R Young Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Emergency Unit
Whitehall SW1

Dear Rob,

AD HOC GROUP ON THE GULF: 40TH MEETING

This letter summarises the main points made and action agreed at the meeting of the Ad Hoc Group on the Gulf this morning under the Defence Secretary's chairmanship. Mr Waldegrave and Mr Hamilton were also present. CIRCULATION WITHIN DEPARTMENTS SHOULD BE ON A STRICTLY NEED-TO-KNOW BASIS.

- a. The French had commented on the level of British representation at the ad hoc meeting of the Military Staff Committee. The Head of the British Defence Staff in Washington was, however, an appropriately senior representative.
- b. There would be a meeting of oil experts under UN auspices on 6-8 November to discuss co-operation between producers and consumers. We should be cautious about attending such a meeting, taking account of the views of other IEA countries and of wider UN and foreign policy implications. (Action: DEn, consulting FCO).
- c. There had been no further formal requests to the UN Sanctions Committee for food shipments since the case of the Indian ship VISHVA SIDDHI. Pressure from the Russians and others for food deliveries to be allowed had been resisted. The Bulgarians now had access to the food originally intended for the Indians.

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d. The loss of foreign labour would have both short and long term consequences for Iraq. We could not, however, rely upon this factor to cause critical damage to the Iraqi military effort. The JIO would include an updated account of the impact of labour shortages in a future assessment. A fresh assessment was in preparation of shortages of refined oil products and lubricants. (Action: JIO).

e. The possibility of German assistance to the United Kingdom, about which Chancellor Kohl might speak to the Prime Minister at the European Council meeting, should be covered in the briefing material being prepared for the Prime Minister. (Action: FCO).

f. The FCO had invited the Ambassador in Riyadh to seek an audience with King Fahd to try to sort out the difficulties being experienced over obtaining visas for journalists. British journalists appeared to have been worse treated than others. (Action: FCO).

g. There were indications of further flights from Sudan in breach of the air embargo, involving British crews. Material was being prepared for diplomatic use with the Sudanese. A text was also being prepared for use with the Swiss in respect of an Iraqi Airways flight to Geneva next week. There was evidence that a number of smaller airlines were flying from Ostend to Amman before changing flight paths in Jordan. The Belgians should be asked to investigate, and encouraged to take a tough line with the operators. The aim, when we had information about such flights, should be to prevent them from setting off rather than to arrest the aircraft subsequently. (Action: ESC, FCO).

h. The status of a Dutch dredging operation in the northern Gulf, particularly in the light of the new EC instrument, should be investigated further. (Action: ESC, FCO).

i. Today's ESC report included a note on the potential use of Iranian routes in sanctions evasion. Although there were probably small-scale evasions through Iran, there was no evidence that Iran was a major conduit for goods destined for Iraq from third countries. The Iranian authorities appeared to be prepared to allow limited food shipments to Iraq. This aspect should be kept under review. (Action: ESC).

j. The tanker AMUYIRAH was being shadowed by HMS YORK and other vessels, heading for Iraq. The US Navy might intercept later today.

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k. The examination of the cargo of the GUR MARINER in Netherlands had been completed. No items of significance had been found, although further enquiries continued into a small quantity of one chemical. The cause of the original interest in the cargo might have been a consignment of laboratory equipment (not in fact licensable at the time) for the Iraqi Atomic Energy Authority. HM Customs would thank the Dutch for their assistance. The cargo, now subject to the embargo, would presumably stay where it was.

l. There had been a downturn in the flow of information of suspect financial transactions, suggesting that the embargo was generally effective. Notwithstanding earlier concerns, it was clear that the Midland Bank had in fact taken a positive attitude towards ensuring that the Central Bank of Jordan account was not used for Iraqi transactions. There were signs that Iraq was suffering from a shortage of foreign exchange.

m. Today's Assessments Staff Situation Report referred (paragraph 11) to Iraq's wish to seek volunteers from overseas to go to Iraq as 'guests'. The FCO should keep this under review. (Action: FCO).

n. Home Office officials would seek the Home Secretary's agreement later today to action against four Iraqis associated with TDG and the Iraqi procurement network in the UK. The general view of the Group was that action, if agreed by the Home Secretary, should be taken at an early opportunity. But the submission to the Home Secretary should also take account of the possible transfer of Matrix Churchill, a subsidiary of TDG, to British hands and the consequent need to have access to members of TDG management for purposes of making the transfer. (Action: Home Office, consulting DTI).

o. The Home Office, in consultation with DES and the Employment Department, had identified a number of students whose subjects of study might be a source of concern, together with others in employment in the UK in potentially sensitive areas. The Cabinet Office should convene a meeting of interested Departments to consider the individual cases further and to establish what action might be appropriate in each case. (Action: Cabinet Office).

p. Mr Heath had remarked following his visit to Iraq that Saddam Hussain and senior Iraqis were well informed about British and American opinion. This reinforced the need for a clear and resolute message to be conveyed in the media. The FCO should convene a meeting with interested Departments and the Cabinet Office to take stock of the direction of the positive information campaign and the co-ordination of our effort with the United States. (Action: FCO).

q. The deployments of British forces were receiving good publicity. Media facilities would be available for the departure from Devonport on 28 October of HMS ARGUS.

2. The next meeting of the Group will be on Monday 29 October at 11.00 am in the same place (Conference Room A, Cabinet Office) under Sir Robin Butler's chairmanship.

Yours sincerely
D C J BALL

D C J BALL

SECRET AND PERSONAL

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SECRET AND PERSONAL

TO1184

29 October 1990

J R Young Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
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Whitehall SW1

JR

AD HOC GROUP ON THE GULF: 41ST MEETING

This letter summarises the main points made and action agreed at the meeting of the Ad Hoc Group on the Gulf this morning under Mr Appleyard's chairmanship. CIRCULATION WITHIN DEPARTMENTS SHOULD BE ON A STRICTLY NEED-TO-KNOW BASIS.

- a. The Security Council had met on 26 and 27 October to consider a Resolution which inter alia demanded release of the hostages in Iraq and Kuwait and raised the question of compensation. It also contained a paragraph inviting the Secretary General to make his good offices available for peace-making. The Resolution was likely to be put to the vote today, having been postponed at Soviet request in order not to impede Mr Primakov's mission. The paragraph on peace-making was so drafted as to provide no basis for unwanted initiatives by King Hussein or others. It remained to be seen whether the Secretary General would launch an initiative in response to the Resolution. His experience following the Temple Mount killings should make him cautious and the Resolution did not call for immediate action. The Security Council were likely now to turn their attention to the Temple Mount issue. The Israeli Government's own report, while not entirely a whitewash, contained no condemnation of the killings which might have been useful in a Security Council context.
- b. The European Council's declaration on the Gulf had been satisfactorily firm in tone, and had provided a useful backdrop to President Mitterrand's discussions with President Gorbachev.

SECRET AND PERSONAL

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- c. Press reports suggested that Mr Primakov had emerged empty-handed from his discussions with Saddam Hussein. A Soviet proposal to send supplies of meat by air to their workers in Iraq was unwelcome and should be discouraged. Meanwhile Mr Nakasone was about to visit Iraq, probably with some encouragement from the Japanese Government, to secure the release of Japanese hostages. The French Embassy in Kuwait had closed on 28 October.
- d. The UN Military Staff Committee were to hold an ad hoc meeting in New York today. Major General Beckett, the Head of the British Defence Staff in Washington, would represent the UK.
- e. Iraq's decision to cancel petrol rationing was likely to be aimed at convincing the world that she could withstand the effects of sanctions.
- f. The Gulf Crisis Financial Co-ordination Group was to meet in Rome on 5 November to consider assistance to front-line states. The FCO were preparing a paper proposing a line to take for the British representatives; it was hoped that OD(G) would consider this on 1 November if provisional plans for a meeting on that date were confirmed. (Action: FCO). Assistance to Jordan was now high on the international agenda. Mr McLaren (DUSS, FCO), now in Tokyo, would press the Japanese Government to implement its pledge of \$100M to assist Jordan.
- g. The Defence Secretary had met wives of members of the British Liaison Team (BLT) on 26 October; although not an easy meeting, it appeared to have increased understanding among the wives of the reasons for Government policy. The press had shown commendable restraint over the Duncan tragedy. It was important that MOD's advice to members of the BLT should be fully consistent with that given by the FCO to British citizens in Iraq and Kuwait; the two Departments should continue to co-ordinate this. (Action: FCO, MOD).
- h. The WEU's ad hoc group would be meeting on 30 October to consider a British paper on logistic support; this would provide a further opportunity to put pressure on nations which were not contributing. MOD should check with No 10 whether Chancellor Kohl had raised the question of German support for British forces with the Prime Minister in the margins of the European Council. (NB: No 10 have since confirmed that he did.)

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- i. The Saudi authorities now appeared to be responding a little more helpfully to British representations regarding media coverage in Saudi Arabia. The Ambassador had been briefed to raise the matter at his next meeting with the King.
- j.

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RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3 (4)
OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT.

- k. The FCO were convening a meeting for later in the week to discuss the broad strategy of the positive information campaign. (Action: FCO).
 - l. CDS's visit to 7 Brigade, and HMS ARGUS at Plymouth, would attract publicity.
2. The next meeting of the Group will be on Wednesday 31 October at 11.00 am in the same place (Conference Room A, Cabinet Office) under the chairmanship of either the Foreign Secretary or the Defence Secretary.

*Yours sincerely
Bill Reeves*

W D REEVES

d

SECRET AND PERSONAL

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44 (A-e)



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SECRET AND PERSONAL

File
CAF
31/x

UO.4624

31 October 1990

S G Eldon Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Emergency Unit
Whitehall SW1

Dear Stewart,

AD HOC GROUP ON THE GULF: 42ND MEETING

This letter summarises the main points made and action agreed at the meeting of the Ad Hoc Group on the Gulf this morning under the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's chairmanship. The Defence Secretary was also present. CIRCULATION WITHIN DEPARTMENTS SHOULD BE ON A STRICTLY NEED-TO-KNOW BASIS.

- a. Mr Baker would visit London on 8 November following his visit to the Gulf. He would hold discussions with the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary. The talks would provide an opportunity to discuss US strategy and timing; means of maintaining cohesion among the five Permanent Members of the Security Council; and the position of Israel, which could be of critical importance in the event of a military option being pursued. Mr Baker would also meet Mr Shevardnadze in Geneva.
- b. UN Security Council Resolution 674 had been adopted on 29 October. This invited states to collate evidence on Iraq's breaches of international law and to collect information regarding claims for compensation from Iraq. The second part of the Resolution invited the Secretary General to make his good offices available for efforts to reach a peaceful solution and for states to support him in this. This had been drafted in such a way as not to give the Jordanians and others grounds for pursuing any compromise initiatives.

SECRET AND PERSONAL

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- c. We would hand over the UN Presidency to the United States tomorrow. There had been some discussion with the Americans in New York of the next steps. The US Administration was reported to want a series of Resolutions on single issues. There was advantage in the Security Council maintaining pressure. But there were also dangers, particularly if linkage with the Palestinian issue raised the possibility of a US veto. The US had been asked for a clearer picture of their intentions, and the situation should be kept under close review. (Action: FCO).
- d. President Gorbachev had given a joint press conference with President Mitterrand on 29 October. He had said that he favoured a political settlement and that he saw some evidence that Iraq might be prepared to consider this. He had also said that the military option was unacceptable, apparently contradicting the line previously taken by Mr Shevardnadze, and had referred to an Arab solution to the crisis. Reports were awaited from the Embassies in Paris and Moscow. The Soviet Embassy in London had said that they were thinking in terms of a 'post-solution compromise', involving some ceding of territory following a total withdrawal. This would be an adverse development.
- e. Today's Embargo Surveillance Centre (ESC) report noted that the Iraqi merchant fleet was hardly moving, apart from a continuing shuttle between Iraq and Kuwait. The ESC would prepare a Note for the next meeting drawing together the evidence from various sources about patterns of aircraft movements. It was helpful that the Cypriots were denying airspace to flights to Iraq or Kuwait, and that Egypt had foiled Sudan Air's attempts to operate a service between Khartoum and Aqaba. (Action: ESC).
- f. Iraq's request for aluminium hydroxide from Vietnam (yesterday's ESC report, item 18) probably related to the need for purified water for oil refining. This suggested a supply problem akin to that of petrol additives. This was consistent with the JIC assessment that sanctions might lead to areas of specific shortages such as those discussed in yesterday's Assessments Staff sitrep.
- g. The FCO introduced AHGG(90) 51 on the positive information campaign. Talk of a compromise solution was attractive to British Muslim opinion, and made it easier for Iraq to seek to drive wedges between members of the coalition. Iraq was portraying the United States and Britain as suppressing dialogue and bellicose. The media contributed to the difficulty of maintaining an effective coalition by highlighting signs of differences of view, whereas, by contrast, the GCC Foreign Ministers' robust statement on 29 October had gone almost unremarked. The key objectives of the campaign were to highlight the

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illegality and brutality of the invasion; to counter views that a compromise was attainable; and to demonstrate the unity and effectiveness of the multinational force. A number of first-person reports were reinforcing the portrayal of Iraqi brutality. The next report on the campaign should assess the extent of the take-up of the video and other material that was being provided. (Action: FCO).

h. There would be a press briefing at RAF High Wycombe today, and an unattributable briefing for the US media. There would be a press facility tomorrow for the departure of Puma helicopters from RAF Brize Norton. Briefings and facilities continued to be made available in the Gulf.

i. The article in this morning's Financial Times had been particularly unhelpful, alleging that relations between the United States and Syria were deteriorating significantly in the coalition. Articles of this kind had to be assessed individually, and steps taken to correct inaccuracies.

j. The Defence Secretary had met a group of wives of British Liaison Team personnel on 26 October. The FCO had asked the Ambassador to seek to establish whether mail delivered through the Embassy was in fact reaching detainees. Preparations were being made to send a parcel from the Embassy to all detainees, using the Iraqi Red Crescent as means of distribution, and with a system of receipts to monitor delivery. The aim then would be to send parcels from London. Helping mail and deliveries to reach detainees would be important in demonstrating that they had not been forgotten, and arrangements should be pursued as fast as possible. (Action: FCO).

k. The Arch_bishop of Canterbury would sponsor a plan for five churchmen and doctors, led by the Bishop of Cyprus, to visit as many detainees as possible. It should be stressed that their purpose was purely to look to the welfare of the detainees, and that it was not part of their mission to discuss political issues or to seek the release of further hostages. The Church should be made aware of these concerns. (Action: FCO). The FCO would play no direct part in arrangements for the visit.

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2. The next meeting of the Group will be on Friday 2 November at 11.00 am in the same place (Conference Room A, Cabinet Office) under Mr Waldegrave's chairmanship.

Yours sincerely
David Ball

D C J BALL

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Copied to:

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SECRET AND PERSONAL

UO.4628

2 November 1990

S G Eldon Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Emergency Unit
Whitehall SW1

Gen Stewart,

AD HOC GROUP ON THE GULF: 43RD MEETING

This letter summarises the main points made and action agreed at the meeting of the Ad Hoc Group on the Gulf this morning under Mr Waldegrave's chairmanship. Mr Hamilton was also present. CIRCULATION WITHIN DEPARTMENTS SHOULD BE ON A STRICTLY NEED-TO-KNOW BASIS.

a. At the United Nations, the United States had moved away from their previous desire to press swiftly for a series of Resolutions on specific issues, including compensation in respect of frozen assets. They would now await Mr Baker's return from his visit to the Gulf next week. In the meantime, the FCO should look in detail at the list of proposed items, in consultation with the Treasury, Bank of England, Law Officers' Department, Department of Energy and other interested Departments. (Action: FCO).

b. Mr Primakov's proposals, which had been developed into a six-point peace plan, had been sharply rebutted by the Saudis and Egyptians. The flurry of Russian diplomacy probably did not mean that they would not be stalwart in the end. They were looking in part to their position in the aftermath of any hostilities, when they would be able to point to their efforts to preserve peace.

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- c. There were indications that President Assad of Syria did not feel that his contribution to the coalition and his pressure on the Palestinians had been sufficiently rewarded by the West and the GCC. The first elements of the Syrian contingent of the multinational force were believed to have embarked.
- d. Despite the position taken by the European Council, and the Foreign Secretary's discussions with the German and Italian counterparts, it was likely that Herr Brandt would visit Iraq.
- e. The formal request by Kuwait Airways Corporation to operate scheduled services via London was welcome in principle. The FCO should consider this in consultation with the Department of Transport. (Action: FCO, DTp).
- f. The build-up of the 7th Armoured Brigade continued. 82% of the personnel were now in place.
- g. The FCO introduced AHGG(90)53 on burden sharing. The paper sought to pull together the available figures on money that had been pledged and disbursed to the front line states. Although there were some uncertainties over precise figures, the pattern was clear: sufficient money was likely to be given to Egypt, but considerably less than enough to Turkey and, especially, Jordan. The paper proposed that the UK delegation at the Financial Coordination Group meeting (FCG) on 5 November should stress the need for the disbursement of assistance to Jordan without delay. In discussion it was noted that it was not self-evident that countries should be automatically compensated for oil price increases. Discussion in the FCG should not become bogged down on this issue, although we should acknowledge that Turkey and Jordan had only a limited capacity to react to oil price changes. We should also seek to steer discussion away from questions of assistance for other countries affected by the crisis. The Group endorsed the recommendations of the Note.
- h. Today's Embargo Surveillance Centre report included a note on the air embargo and aviation movements over the last month. Of the twenty or so potentially suspect flights, the largest number were by Sudan Airways. Libyan Arab Airlines was also a significant suspect. It was less easy to be certain about others (Iran Air, Royal Jordanian and Iraqi Airways). Egypt had taken a firm line on use of its airspace. The Saudi position was less clear, and the FCO had sought further information about Saudi intentions. Pressure should if need be be kept on the Saudis. Indications that Libyan aircraft were changing flight plans in Jordan in order to proceed to Baghdad were a source of concern. Consideration should be given to raising this with the Jordanians. (Action: FCO).

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- i. The Jordanian government was looking at the possibility of setting up storage tanks for supplies of oil by sea. This suggested that Jordan was looking at alternatives to dependence on Iraq for oil. It was also encouraging that the level of cross-border road traffic between Jordan and Iraq appeared to have diminished.
- k. Public opinion in Morocco and Algeria, which Mr Waldegrave had recently visited, was strongly supportive of Saddam Hussain. The message of the Western positive information campaign was not penetrating the local media. Efforts should be continued to make inroads. The BBC remained the most effective means of achieving this, although there continued to be complaints about the bias in its coverage. The FCO had convened an inter-departmental meeting yesterday to consider how efforts should best be coordinated. A further meeting would be held after discussions with the US on 12 November. (Action: FCO).
- l. Press facilities were being provided at Dhahran. ITN would spend nine days on HMS London. The Iraqi offer of Christmas visits had been the subject of media interest. Over the coming weekend Mr Heath might make a speech critical of Government policy. Mr Waldegrave would be interviewed by David Frost on Sunday.
- m. The Home Secretary had written to the Foreign Secretary on 31 October conveying his agreement to serve notice of intention to deport four Iraqis and exclude a fifth, all connected with the Iraqi arms procurement network in the UK. The Group had asked on 24 October to be consulted about the timing of any deportation. A complication in this case, noted by the Group on 26 October, was the possible need to have members of the management of TDG in the UK to enable the transfer to be made of Matrix Churchill (a TDG subsidiary) to British hands. Heads of Agreement had now been signed. Whilst there could be expected to be further protracted negotiations, the decision of the Group was that the action agreed by the Home Secretary should be taken now, and not further delayed. (Action: Home Office).
- n. The US State Department response had been received today to the paper on possible action against sanctions breakers which the Group had agreed on 15 October should be sent to them for comment (AHGG(90)45). The US conclusion had been that there were no patterns of sanctions

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breaking sufficiently systematic to justify warning action. The FCO would consider the US response further in consultation with other Departments. (Action: FCO).

2. I should record one correction that should be made to my letter of 31 October, recording Wednesday's meeting. The last sentence of sub-paragraph k. should be deleted.

3. The next meeting of the Group will be on Monday 5 November at 11.00 am in the same place (Conference Room A, Cabinet Office) under the Defence Secretary's chairmanship.

Yours sincerely
David Ball

D C J BALL

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SECRET AND PERSONAL

John Giff

UO.4629

5 November 1990

J R Young Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Emergency Unit
Whitehall SW1

Dear Rob,

AD HOC GROUP ON THE GULF: 44TH MEETING

This letter summarises the main points made and action agreed at the meeting of the Ad Hoc Group on the Gulf this morning chaired by the Defence Secretary. CIRCULATION WITHIN DEPARTMENTS SHOULD BE ON A STRICTLY NEED-TO-KNOW BASIS.

a. Herr Brandt was in Iraq seeking to negotiate the release of hostages. It was thought that he may have taken a cargo of medicines and children's food with him. The latter would be in contravention of sanctions. He had not succeeded in securing UN cover for the visit. The Italians had called an ad hoc meeting of EC Ministers this evening, which Mr Garel-Jones would attend. Our line in respect of Herr Brandt's and similar visits should remain that we opposed them for the reasons stated in the declaration issued by the European Council.

b. A number of wives of British hostages had received calls from their husbands over the weekend, designed to encourage them to make the Christmas visit offered by the Iraqis or to go to Iraq to plead for their release. The FCO and the Gulf Helpline were in close touch on the advice being given to families on these calls.

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- c. There were conflicting signs of American intentions at the United Nations. The next steps at the UN would be discussed with Mr Baker when he visited the UK at the end of the week.
- d. Colonel Duncan and his son might leave Iraq sooner than originally expected. MOD should seek to extend the self-denying ordinance of the press. (Action: MOD).
- e. There had been a number of indications of involvement by an Austrian firm in attempts to breach the embargo. (Today's ESC report, item 2). The case should be pursued vigorously with the Austrian government, whose initial response on cases of sanctions breaches had been unsatisfactory. Guidance should be given to Ambassadors on the legal commitments by states to implement sanctions. Instructions to Ambassadors should make clear that they were required to treat following up evidence of sanctions breaches as a high priority and to take a firm line with governments. The FCO should prepare a list of the 17 countries which had not notified the United Nations of action to implement the sanctions Resolutions. Further consideration should be given to means of giving publicity to states' failure to enforce sanctions thoroughly. (Action: FCO).
- f. The Algerians had declared their intention of seeking UN Sanctions Committee approval for the despatch of milk and children's food to Iraq and Kuwait. We would continue to oppose such requests.
- g. The motivation for sanctions breaking was generally financial. It was important as part of the positive information campaign to bring home to those contemplating breaches that they were unlikely to be paid. This angle should be given greater prominence in the campaign. (Action: FCO).
- h. Financial sanctions appeared to be holding up well. There was no evidence of significant gaps appearing in the sanctions, or of divergences of view. There were signs that the Iraqis were having to move relatively small amounts of cash by hand from one place to another in order to keep Embassies functioning. Further analysis should be done of the options which the Iraqis could be expected to explore to bypass sanctions, to help ensure that they did not find any loopholes. The ESC and Cabinet Office should prepare a paper for the Group on financial sanctions. (Action: ESC, Cabinet Office).
- i. Yugoslavia's restrictions on flights to and from Iraq and Kuwait was welcome. But it should be watched with care, as it would not in itself prevent aircraft from diverting from Jordan. The FCO should seek to accelerate the UNSC's consideration of proposals for UN

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monitoring of Jordan's compliance with sanctions, and consider suggesting a presence in air traffic control at Amman as part of this. (Action: FCO).

j. A press facility would be provided on HMS BRAZEN today. The Panorama programme had requested facilities for a series of broadcasts describing the impact of the 7th Armoured Brigade on the local economy and the steps taken to take account of local religious sensitivities.

k. The Cabinet Office had convened a meeting on 2 November to examine the cases of 49 Iraqi students whose names had emerged from the trawl of further education establishments approved by Ministers in September. Another 83 names were in the pipeline, and there were likely to be more to come. Of the 49, 35 were studying subjects which might have military relevance. Under present Immigration Rules, the only available measure against them on national security grounds would be deportation. The meeting had concluded that further information was needed before deportation could be justified. If the education establishments were themselves asked for this further information, there would be problems of non-cooperation. The preferred approach was for the Home Office to write to the individuals directly, saying that their immigration status was being reviewed, and asking them to send details of their studies. The letter would also require them to send a letter from their tutors or supervisors confirming the details. (Action: Home Office). This approach was acknowledged to carry the risk that the replies might not be fully candid. Some follow-up would be possible with tutors. It might become necessary at a later stage to reach a broader judgment that it was unacceptable for Iraqi students in the United Kingdom to be engaged in certain areas of study, irrespective of the absolutely detailed evidence available of each individual case. The Cabinet Office should prepare a paper for the Group when replies to the Home Office letter had been received. (Action: Cabinet Office). The exercise would most likely quickly be public knowledge. Defensive press briefing should be prepared. (Action: Home Office).

l. The FCO should consult their Ministers about the timing of deportation action which the Home Secretary had agreed should be taken against 34 Iraqis when the moment was opportune, and report to the Group (Action: FCO).

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2. The next meeting of the Group will be at 11.00 am on WEDNESDAY 7 NOVEMBER in Conference Room A, Cabinet Office, under Sir Robin Butler's chairmanship. As you will know, Wednesday will be the day of the State Opening of Parliament, and those coming to the meeting may wish to ensure that they allow sufficient time to make their way here.


Yours sincerely
David Ball

D C J BALL

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Sir Charles Powell

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CABINET

AD HOC MEETING OF MINISTERS

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MINUTES of a Meeting held in
Conference Room C, Cabinet Office
on THURSDAY 14 FEBRUARY 1991 at 8.45am

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PRESENT

The Rt Hon John Wakeham MP
Secretary of State for Energy
(In the Chair)

The Rt Hon Lord Waddington QC
Lord Privy Seal

The Rt Hon Kenneth Baker MP
Secretary of State for the
Home Department

The Rt Hon Michael Heseltine MP
Secretary of State for the
Environment

The Rt Hon John MacGregor MP
Lord President of the Council

The Rt Hon Christopher Patten MP
Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster

The Rt Hon Ian Lang MP
Secretary of State for Scotland

The Rt Hon Sir Patrick Mayhew QC MP
Attorney General

The Rt Hon Richard Ryder MP
Parliamentary Secretary
Treasury

The Hon Archibald Hamilton MP
Minister of State for the
Armed Forces
Ministry of Defence

The Hon Mark Lennox-Boyd MP
Parliamentary Under-Secretary
of State
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Mr Stephen Dorrell MP
Parliamentary Under-Secretary
of State
Department of Health

ALSO PRESENT

Mr G S Barrass
Cabinet Office

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SECRETARIAT

Mr W D Reeves
Mr A M Russell
Mr D J Gowan
Colonel H R G Wilson

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2	UNCONVENTIONAL TERRORISM - MEDIA HANDLING ASPECTS	

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1. EMERGENCY LEGISLATION

THE HOME SECRETARY said that his Department was responsible for sponsoring legislation on emergency powers. A Bill and accompanying Defence Regulations had been prepared taking account of previous legislation in this field. The Bill, as drafted, was more relevant to a land conflict on the continent of Europe (with the risk of invasion of the United Kingdom) than to the present conflict in the Gulf. The introduction of the Bill, which contained a wide range of general powers, could stimulate public anxiety and new political pressures. The Home Office could, for instance, be criticised for not using the powers of expulsion and detention created by the Bill, even if there were no justification for doing so.

Continuing, THE HOME SECRETARY said that some of the provisions in the draft Bill and Regulations were for use in the event of a terrorist attack involving chemical or biological (CB) weapons against the public water supply. There was, however, no evidence at present that the Iraqis were planning to make an attack of this sort. The Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) continued to pose the main terrorist threat within the United Kingdom. Any Iraqi terrorism was more likely to involve the use of conventional firearms and explosives than of CB weapons, and adequate powers were already available to deal with the former threat. If CB agents were used, an attack against a building or public area was more likely than an attempt to pollute the water supply, which would necessitate the use of a large quantity of CB material. The Bill could also be used to modify the duties of coroners. If there were significant military casualties in the Gulf, provision might be needed in due course to relieve coroners of the obligation to carry out individual inquests on all bodies repatriated to the United Kingdom. This would not, however, pose an immediate legislative requirement as the Ministry of Defence planned temporary burial in theatre until the end of hostilities. In summary, there did not appear to be an immediate

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requirement for introducing the draft Bill and Regulations. The situation could, however, change in the light of developments in the Middle East.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE ENVIRONMENT said that an attack involving CB contamination of water supplies could happen without advance warning, for example at the weekend. If enabling legislation were not in place, it might for example be necessary to instruct the water authorities to take emergency measures for which there would be no legislative provision. This would be an awkward situation, though the risk of its occurring might be small. There would be no certainty that the water authority concerned would be prepared to act on the instructions of the Government in contravention of the existing law. In contrast, if the Emergency Powers Bill had been enacted, it would be possible to provide the necessary legislative cover by introducing an appropriate Regulation immediately. There were strong arguments for enacting the Bill, and explaining to Parliament and the public that this was a contingency measure which would enable the Government to introduce specific Regulations to cope with any emergency which occurred without warning.

THE CABINET OFFICE ASSESSMENTS STAFF said that the Iraqis had produced CB agents, and could be intending to use these weapons in the military conflict. There was no specific evidence to suggest that Saddam Hussein was contemplating the use of such weapons in terrorist-style operations in allied countries outside the Middle East, and there was no intelligence pointing to the use of CB weapons in the United Kingdom. The Assessments Staff could not, however, completely exclude the possibility that such weapons could already have been brought to the United Kingdom or that Saddam Hussein might in that case authorise their use in a terrorist attack if the conflict were turning against him. These conclusions rested heavily on broader assessments of Saddam Hussein's war aims. There was no firm evidence in either direction to show whether Iraq might

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intending to use CB weapons in this country, and the chances of intelligence being obtained in advance of an incident were low.

In discussion, the following points were made: -

- a. In the event of an emergency involving CB agents, a team of experts from the Chemical Defence Establishment, Porton Down would have to determine on the spot the measures which were needed to control the situation. In these circumstances the public would be likely to accept their advice and the directions of the police and emergency services.
- b. In an emergency involving contamination of water supplies, the Government could reasonably instruct the appropriate authorities to take all necessary measures even if full legislative cover were not available. It would then be open to the Government to introduce an Act of Indemnity. In practice criminal prosecution of the officials concerned would be unlikely given that action had been taken in the public interest.
- c. Certain drugs needed to treat infection by CB agents were not covered by existing medicines legislation. There was a possibility that an emergency provision might be needed in this field in the event of a CB terrorist incident.
- d. The Ministry of Defence did not attach high priority to requisition or any of the other provisions which would be covered by the Bill.
- e. The risk of a terrorist incident which might involve the use of emergency powers was lower in Scotland than in England.

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- f. The degree of public concern which could be aroused by the introduction of the Bill at this stage in its present form, particularly if explicitly related to a CB terrorist threat, strengthened the argument for deferring legislation for the moment. If legislation were required urgently, it would be possible for the Bill to be enacted within a day, provided that notice had been given. There was also a precedent in 1980 for enacting a Bill within a day without notice having been given. Such rapid passage would however require agreement with the Opposition. As long as Parliament was sitting, it would be possible to recall the House rapidly even at a weekend. The problems of recalling the House would be greater during the Easter recess, but not insuperable.
- g. The Parliamentary and public reaction to a Bill would depend in part on the extent of the powers which it contained. A revised Bill which contained more limited powers related to the specific areas identified by Departments might provoke less Parliamentary and public criticism. There might be ready Parliamentary and public acceptance of a proposal to introduce a Bill with a limited range of powers shortly before the Easter recess with the specific purpose of providing contingency cover for any emergency which might occur while Parliament was not sitting.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR ENERGY, summing up the discussion, said that some of the powers for which the draft Bill and Regulations provided would be useful to have in an emergency of the kind discussed. There were however strong presentational arguments against introducing the Bill as drafted at the present, and the Meeting agreed that the balance of advantage told in favour of not enacting the Bill for the time being, but keeping the question under review. In the event of an emergency, Ministers should instruct the appropriate authorities to take any measures which were necessary.

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Legislative cover could then be introduced subsequently. The risk that officials would refuse to co-operate was slight, though it could not be completely excluded.

Continuing, THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR ENERGY said that the Cabinet Office, in consultation with the Home Office and other Departments, should review the priorities attached to the specific provisions which would be covered by Regulations, and should prepare proposals for a Bill more restricted in scope. The Group should hold a further meeting two or three weeks before the Easter recess to re-examine the requirement for emergency legislation, taking account of developments in the Gulf and the relative difficulty of introducing legislation quickly in the event of an emergency during the recess.

The Group -

Took note, with approval, of the Secretary of State for Energy's summing up of their discussion, and invited the Cabinet Office and Departments to proceed accordingly.

2. UNCONVENTIONAL TERRORISM: MEDIA HANDLING ASPECTS

The Meeting considered the question of advice to the public and the emergency services in the context of the unconventional terrorist threat. It had before it a Note by the Home Office dated 12 February 1991.

THE HOME SECRETARY said the Note addressed the balance to be struck between on the one hand the need to provide adequate briefing for those who might have a role to play in countering any chemical or biological (CB) attack, and on the other hand the desirability of minimising public alarm (for which the potential was considerable). CB contingency planning, confined to a tight circle within central Government, had been accelerated since Iraq's invasion of Kuwait.

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The critical factor in determining the extent of briefing was the assessed threat of a CB attack within the United Kingdom. This, while still low, had increased somewhat since the outbreak of hostilities. Accordingly briefings had only been given to those who had a particular need and whose confidentiality could be trusted: senior police officers; customs, immigration and Special Branch officers at ports; Health Emergency Planning Officers; and senior management of water companies. Wider briefing had been given to the Metropolitan Police in recognition of the greater threat to the capital. So far, neither the fire and ambulance services nor local authorities had been briefed, since to do so would be tantamount to making a public statement. In view of the lack of any specific intelligence, the Government's response to questioning had not gone beyond the general line set out in paragraph 10 of the Note, namely that the Government had a wide range of contingency plans for countering the threat of terrorism which were kept under constant review at all times, particularly at present. While awareness of the potential threat had increased as a result of media articles and comment, there was no evidence of widespread public alarm; and he recommended colleagues not to engage in public debate on this matter. However, any use of CB weapons by Iraqis, either on the battlefield or elsewhere, and whether by military or terrorist means, would inevitably give rise to increased concern. Under such circumstances the case for warning and advising the public would be enhanced. The Home Office had prepared a press briefing pack which could be drawn on immediately in the event of a threatened or actual incident.

In discussion, the following main points were made.

- a. An adequate level of briefing would be required by, and could be made available to, medical and nursing staff of the National Health Service if the threat increased.
- b. There was no great pressure at this point from local authorities for fuller briefing beyond that currently given. It would be unwise to volunteer anything more.

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c. Any fuller briefing of the emergency services and others, on the lines of Annex A to the Note, would give rise to a number of difficult follow-on questions relating, for example, to the availability of drugs and the supply of, and training in the use of, protective equipment.

d. Advice to the public in the event of an incident would be dependent not only on the type or strain of the CB agent being used but also on the location and nature of attack, eg against a building, in a public place or against the water supply.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR ENERGY, summing up the discussion, said that the Meeting was agreed that the Home Office was maintaining the correct balance between preparedness for a CB terrorist attack in the United Kingdom and the need to avoid creating public alarm, and the recommendations in paragraph 14 of the Note were endorsed. In the light of the current low level of the threat, there was currently no requirement to consult or brief more widely than the Home Secretary had proposed. The press line set out in paragraph 10 of the Note remained correct. Should developments occur which were likely to affect the public's perception of the problem, for example use of CB weapons in the Middle East or elsewhere, Ministers should be prepared to meet urgently to review the matter. In the meantime the Home Office, in conjunction with other Departments as appropriate, should continue to prepare press statements and advice for the public to meet all possible contingencies.

The Meeting:

Noted, with approval, the Secretary of State for Energy's summing up of their discussion and invited Departments to proceed accordingly.

Cabinet Office
14 February 1991

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