Part 5

Confidential Filing

NATO Summits

NATO

Part 1: March 1982

Part 5: July 1990

PREM 19/3466

| Referred to | Date | Referred to | Date | Referred to | Date | Referred to | Date |
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PART 5 ends:-

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PART 6 begins:-

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NATO SUMMIT, 7-8 NOVEMBER: U.S BILATERALS

SUMMARY

1. THE NSC SAY THAT PRESIDENT BUSH WILL WANT A BILATERAL BREAKFAST WITH THE PRIME MINISTER ON 7 NOVEMBER IN ORDER TO CONCERT TACTICS FOR THE SUMMIT, ESPECIALLY OVER EUROPEAN SECURITY IDENTITY ISSUES.

DETAIL

2. WE ASKED THE NSC ON 29 OCTOBER ABOUT PRESIDENT BUSH'S SCHEDULE OF BILATERAL MEETINGS IN ROME, GIVEN SUGGESTIONS FROM OTHER U.S SOURCES THAT HE MIGHT HAVE ONLY 15 MINUTES TO SPARE FOR A MEETING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER BEFORE THE NATO SESSION GOT UNDERWAY ON 7 NOVEMBER.

3. THE NSC ASSURED US THAT THIS WAS NOT THE CASE. NO INSTRUCTIONS ON THE PRESIDENT'S MAIN BILATERALS HAD YET BEEN SENT TO U.S POSTS. THE NSC WOULD BE SENDING INSTRUCTIONS TO THE STATE DEPARTMENT, PROBABLY ON 30 OCTOBER, FOR THE U.S EMBASSY IN LONDON TO PROPOSE A U.S/UK BILATERAL OVER BREAKFAST ON 7 NOVEMBER (PROBABLY WHERE BUSH WILL BE STAYING AT THE VILLA TAVERNA FROM 0730 TO 0815-0830). WE WELCOMED THIS.

4. THE NSC FEEL IT IMPORTANT THAT PRESIDENT BUSH AND THE PRIME MINISTER SHOULD BE ABLE TO CONCERT TACTICS BEFORE THE NATO DISCUSSIONS GET UNDERWAY. THEY PARTICULARLY HOPE THAT THE MEETING WILL WORK OUT A COMMON APPROACH TO SECURING THE BEST POSSIBLE LANGUAGE IN THE NATO COMMUNIQUE ON THE EUROPEAN SECURITY IDENTITY. THEY HOPE THAT A MAJOR PORTION OF THE BILATERAL BREAKFAST CAN THEREFORE BE DEVOTED TO THESE QUESTIONS. (OTHER BITS OF THE ADMINISTRATION ARE SHOWING A RATHER MORE RELAXED ATTITUDE TO SECURING THE RIGHT OUTCOME ON THE EUROPEAN SECURITY IDENTITY ISSUE IN ROME. BUT IT IS THE NSC THAT WILL SHAPE THE BRIEFING WHICH WILL GO TO BUSH.)

5. AFTER THE BREAKFAST, BUSH WILL LEAVE AT 0835 FOR THE CONFERENCE

SITE. HE WILL HAVE A SHORT COURTESY MEETING WITH WOERNER, FOLLOWED BY A MEETING WITH ANDREOTTI. THE PRESIDENT AND ANDREOTTI WILL THEN JOIN OTHER HEADS OF GOVERNMENT OVER COFFEE BEFORE THE START OF THE MORNING SESSION. THE NSC INTEND THAT THE PRESIDENT'S BILATERAL WITH CHANCELLOR KHOL SHOULD BE ON THE AFTERNOON OR EVENING OF THURSDAY 7 NOVEMBER AND THAT WITH PRESIDENT MITTERRAND ON THE MORNING OF FRIDAY 8 NOVEMBER.

6. U.S THINKING ON BILATERALS BETWEEN FOREIGN MINISTERS IS AT A LESS ADVANCED STAGE. THE STATE DEPARTMENT ON THE WHOLE EXPECT THAT YOU AND BAKER WILL JOIN THE BREAKFAST WITH PRESIDENT BUSH AND THE PRIME MINISTER. BUT BRIEFING IS ALSO BEING PREPARED FOR A SEPARATE BILATERAL, IN CASE THAT IS DEEMED NECESSARY AND POSSIBLE. SENIOR LEVELS WILL, HOWEVER, ONLY BEGIN FOCUSSING ON THIS AFTER THEIR RETURN FROM THE MADRID MIDDLE EAST REGIONAL CONFERENCE.

7. WE BELIEVE THAT THE INFORMATION FROM THE NSC OVERTAKES INSTRUCTIONS WHICH WE UNDERSTAND (TELECON THOMSON/BOND, SEC POL DEPARTMENT) TO HAVE GONE TO UKDEL NATO TO PROPOSE BREAKFAST ON FRIDAY 8 NOVEMBER AS A SECOND BEST OPTION FOR THE PRIME MINISTER'S BILATERAL WITH PRESIDENT BUSH.

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10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

30 October 1991

Dear Simon,

**NATO SUMMIT: PREPARATORY LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY GENERAL**

Thank you for your letter of 29 October enclosing a preparatory letter from the Secretary General for the NATO Summit. I should be grateful if you could include a copy of the letter in the Prime Minister's briefing pack for the meeting.

Yours,
Stephen

J.S. WALL

Simon Gass, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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Foreign &
Commonwealth
Office

London SW1A 2AH

29 October 1991

Dear Stephen,

**NATO Summit : Preparatory Letter from the Secretary General**

I enclose a letter from the Secretary General to the Prime Minister setting out his views on issues to be discussed at the NATO Summit next week. This accords with his comments in London last week. Issues of substance will be covered in the briefing which we propose to let you have on 4 November.

Yours ever,

(S L Gass)
Private Secretary

Stephen Wall Esq CMG LVO
10 Downing Street

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ORGANISATION DU TRAITÉ
DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD

NORTH ATLANTIC
TREATY ORGANIZATION

LE SECRÉTAIRE GÉNÉRAL
SECRETARY GENERAL

BOULEVARD LÉOPOLD III
1110 - BRUXELLES
TÉL. 728.41.11 - 728.49.17

SG/91/723

28th October 1991

Dear Prime Minister,

As on previous occasions, I have the privilege of sharing with you some thoughts in preparation for the Rome Summit, which will be a decisive meeting for the future of our Alliance.

The purpose of this Summit is to bring this phase of the Alliance's transformation to a conclusion, to define clearly the rôle and tasks of our Alliance in the new political and military circumstances and chart the future course of our Alliance in shaping the new European environment. The Alliance has to be a key player in the system of interlocking institutions which will constitute the new European security architecture. We should state our concept of such a new Euro-Atlantic system and define our relations with the other two major players: the European Integration process and CSCE. It will be important to highlight the continuing relevance and enduring values of a transformed NATO for the stability and security of a new Europe whole and free.

The Summit will have to deal essentially with the new Strategic Concept and with the Political Declaration. In order to maximise media attention for both documents, I suggest that the Strategic Concept be finalised and publicized the first day, and that the Political Declaration be released on the second day.

The main topics at the Summit will be:

- enhancement of the Alliance's relationship with the Soviet Union, and the other countries of Central and Eastern Europe;

- strengthening of the CSCE process and its institutions;

.../....

The Rt.Hon. John Major, MP
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom
London

- preparation for the Post-Helsinki arms control and security dialogue;

- defining the relationship of the European Security and Defence Identity to the Alliance.

- the Strategic Concept.

I would like to briefly elaborate on these issues.

Relations with Central and Eastern Europe

The radical changes in the Soviet Union as well as the aspirations of the C+EE states call upon us to move beyond our current successful programme of diplomatic liaison, initiated at the London Summit. We should establish an institutionalised process of consultation and co-operation on security issues. This will meet not only the expectations of our Central and Eastern European neighbours, but those of our publics as well. In my view this will contribute to, and not infringe upon, the CSCE. At the same time we must also give thought to improving exchanges and the public information programme in these countries, where knowledge of NATO is still insufficient. A meeting with the Foreign Ministers of the Central and Eastern European countries in connection with the December Ministerial should symbolise this new quality of our future partnership.

Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe

The CSCE process has a vital rôle to play in promoting stability and democracy in Europe. In London the Alliance put forward several major proposals on strengthening the CSCE, including the establishment of the Conflict Prevention Centre. NATO should continue to actively promote this process and the building of its institutions. The Summit should produce constructive initiatives in this regard.

Post-Helsinki Arms Control

The Follow-Up Meeting in Helsinki will mark a turning point in the important arms control and disarmament process in Europe. The Alliance has been a driving force since the inception of this process. It will have to continue to play an active rôle and to produce a coherent approach to the preparations to the Post-Helsinki arms control and security dialogue.

.../...

European Security and Defence Identity

The Summit should not only reiterate the core functions of NATO but also our continuing support for a European Security and Defence Identity. At a time when several new proposals are circulating, it is important for the Alliance to reaffirm the Copenhagen principles, as a guideline of the future relationship, in particular maintaining an integrated military structure, retaining the transatlantic link and ensuring fully complementarity and transparency. The degree of progress and detail we can achieve in Rome depends very much on the state of discussions in Europe.

Strategic Concept

The preparation of the new Strategic Concept is almost complete. It will not only provide an essential element in our presentation of the transformed Alliance, but it also forms the basis for our future defence planning and force structures. Since the Strategic Concept will be the first of its kind to be released as a public document, it is certain to attract considerable attention. It is therefore of utmost importance to reach agreement on any issues still unresolved, such as the handling of nuclear issues and the question of how to specificially address the European Security and Defence Identity.

I offer these personal thoughts in the hope that they will contribute to a successful outcome of a Summit for which there are high expections. I look forward to seeing you in Rome and to our productive and useful exchanges there.

Yours sincerely

M. Wörner



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Foreign & Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

28 October 1991

Dear Stephen,

**NATO Summit: Rome, 7-8 November: Prime Minister's Bilaterals**

We need to set in hand arrangements for the Prime Minister's bilateral meetings in the margins of the Summit. We will have to fit bilaterals into the limited time available in the programme arranged by the Italians (outline enclosed).

In descending order of priority, the Foreign Secretary recommends that we proceed as follows:

(a) President Bush: The Prime Minister will wish to have a bilateral with President Bush. President Bush is also keen. The Prime Minister last saw Mr Bush in Kennebunkport on 29 August. If you agree, the agenda might cover:
- European Defence;
- Aid for the Soviet Union;
- Vietnamese Migrants;
- Iraq;
- UN Secretary General;
- GATT;
- Lockerbie.

(b) Prime Minister Gonzalez (Spain): This would be a convenient time and place for a short bilateral pre-Maastricht. Gibraltar need not be raised, leaving the way clear for an exchange on EC issues.

(c) Prime Minister Schluter (Denmark): Now is an important time to talk to the Danes as they are among our closest allies on a number of IGC issues.

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(d) Prime Minister Cavaco Silva (Portugal): The Portuguese are also allies on some IGC issues. We want to continue to build on our co-operation within the EC with the Portuguese, but we also need to have some input into setting the course of the Portuguese EC Presidency next year. In addition, we owe the Portuguese a return Prime Minister's visit as the Portuguese Prime Minister visited Britain in 1986 and 1988. Sr Cavaco Silva has recently been re-elected with a record majority.

(e) Turkey: There is likely to be a new Turkish Prime Minister following the 20 October elections (it is expected that Suleyman Demirel will be asked to form a government this week). This is in itself is a reason for having a bilateral if possible. It would be an opportunity to discuss issues such as Operation WARDEN and Cyprus. If no new Turkish Prime Minister come to Rome, then there is no case for a bilateral.

The Foreign Secretary and the Prime Minister have agreed that they should seek to call on the Pope while in Rome. At the moment the Foreign Secretary does not think the Prime Minister needs to see Chancellor Kohl in Rome as he will have met him on 1 November. You are still trying to find a date later in November for a separate meeting with President Mitterrand. If that proves impossible, there would be a case for a bilateral at Rome.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,

Richard Gozney

(R H T Gozney)
Private Secretary

J S Wall Esq
10 Downing Street

# PROGRAMME

WEDNESDAY 6TH NOVEMBER

20.00 ARRIVAL OF DELEGATIONS AT THE OPERA HOUSE TO ASSIST AT "LA DEL MANOJO DE ROSAS" BY PABLO SOROZABAL. RECEPTION DURING THE INTERMISSION (BY INVITATION).

THURSDAY 7TH NOVEMBER

10.00 MEETING STARTS WITH MEDIA ATTENDANCE.

10.05 OPENING STATEMENTS BY SECRETARY GENERAL AND THE PRIME MINISTER OF ITALY.

10.15 WORKING SESSION BEGINS.

12.45 WORKING SESSION ADJOURNS PHOTOGRAPH OF HEADS OF DELEGATIONS.

13.00 LUNCH FOR HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT, SECRETARY GENERAL, MINISTERS FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, DEPUTY SECRETARY GENERAL HOSTED BY THE ITALIAN PRIME MINISTER AT"TRE FONTANE RESTAURANT"(BY INVITATION).

LUNCH FOR PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES, CHAIRMAN MILITARY COMMITTEE, POLITICAL DIRECTORS HOSTED BY THE ITALIAN AT "TIVOLI RESTAURANT" (BY INVITATION).

14.30 WORKING SESSION RESUMES.

17.30/18.00 WORKING SESSION ADJOURNS.

21.00 DINNER HOSTED BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE ITALIAN REPUBLIC AT THE QUIRINALE PALACE (BY INVITATION).

FRIDAY 8TH NOVEMBER

09.30 WORKING SESSION RESUMES.

11.30/12.00 MEETING ENDS.

12.00/12.30 PRESS CONFERENCE AT MEDIA CENTRE.

28.10.
1991

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c/Foreign/~~Nato~~ Summit

bc PC

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10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

28 October 1991

**NATO SUMMIT**

Thank you for your letter of 24 October setting out the issues to be addressed at the forthcoming NATO Summit.

The Prime Minister has read your letter and found it very helpful.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

(J. S. WALL)

Richard Gozney, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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KK

10 DOWNING STREET

This arrived after your meeting with Hoover but is useful background to the NATO Summit. I also attach the relevant extract from the Copenhagen communique — still quite good language.

Stephen

20/x

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CAPC

Foreign & Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

24 October 1991

Dear Stephen,

**NATO Summit**

Thank you for your letter of 21 October. You asked for advice on the issues to be addressed at the NATO Summit in Rome on 7-8 November.

The Background to the Summit

NATO Summits take place irregularly, usually when important decisions on the future of the Alliance are needed (for example, when the decision to deploy Cruise missiles in Europe was taken). As a result of the rapidly changing situation in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, a NATO Summit has been held each year since 1988, most recently in London in July 1990.

The London Summit, July 1990.

At the London Summit the Allies issued a Declaration which recognised the changes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, and responded to them in a number of ways.

First, NATO 'extended the hand of friendship' to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, inviting the countries of the Warsaw Pact to establish 'regular diplomatic liaison' with NATO. This involved meetings between the Ambassadors of the Warsaw Pact countries in Brussels and the Secretary General and senior members of his staff, and (later) visits by the Secretary General and his staff to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. A number of Eastern European leaders have also visited NATO Headquarters or will soon do so. An invitation to President Gorbachev to visit NATO is still on the table.

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Second, the Summit set out the elements of a new strategy, involving smaller and more mobile forces and reduced reliance on nuclear weapons, making them 'truly weapons of last resort'. It launched a detailed review of military strategy, moving away from 'forward defence' (ie the heavy concentration of forces, particularly in Germany, on the border with the Warsaw Pact), and flexible response (that is the old strategy of the flexible use of a combination of nuclear and conventional forces to counter a massive simultaneous attack on all fronts by the Warsaw Pact).

The Rome Summit

The Summit has been called to set the seal on the process of change started in London. It is due to publish two documents: a Summit Declaration (which should offer a clear statement of the Alliance's purpose in the changed security environment of the 1990s), and a new Strategic Concept (which will show how Alliance military and political strategy has been changed to reflect the new realities). I enclose the latest drafts of the two documents.

The Rome Summit: Key Issues

The key issues for Rome are:

(a) NATO's relations with Central and Eastern Europe

Since the London Summit, contacts between NATO and the Central and Eastern Europeans and the Soviet Union (the CEEs) have grown rapidly. Some of the CEEs want NATO membership or 'associate membership', or at least some form of security guarantee. But membership or security guarantees would involve commitments to defend the CEEs which the Allies could not fulfil; and 'associate membership' would raise expectations on the same lines. To help reduce Eastern European fears that a 'security vacuum' was developing in that region, NATO Foreign Ministers issued a statement in Copenhagen in June 1991 which said that the preservation and consolidation of democracy in Europe was of 'direct and material concern' to the Alliance. This was repeated at the special Ministerial meeting of NATO after the Soviet coup attempt.

There is general agreement in NATO that the Alliance's relationship with the CEEs must be developed. Most nations favour some kind of consultative mechanism. Britain has put forward a proposal for periodic Ministerial and Ambassadorial meetings of the Alliance with the CEEs, including the Baltic States. The US and Germany have made more far-reaching proposals, including the opening of NATO Information Offices in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, about which we have doubts on cost grounds. The French are generally opposed to development of NATO's relations with the former Warsaw Pact, ostensibly because this dilutes NATO's military function (which it does not), in fact reflecting their unwillingness to give NATO a new lease of life.

Agreement on the development of NATO's relations with the CEEs will be a centrepiece of the Summit, to show that NATO has adapted to the changes in the East. But difficult questions will be raised: some of the issues which others are now suggesting NATO should discuss with the Eastern Europeans (for example, migration or the environment) are really the business of other organisations (EC, CSCE and Council of Europe), and NATO involvement is likely to lead to confusion; and many proposals would involve extra funds for NATO, which would be hard to justify publicly when national defence budgets were being cut. Any increase in NATO spending would conflict with the UK's long-standing policy of allowing no real growth in the budget of international organisations.

The Americans have proposed the establishment of a 'Ploughshare Fund', to pay for NATO's expanded relations with the CEEs; its name implies that it may also be intended to pay for the conversion of defence industries in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union to civilian use. We have serious doubts about this proposal, which, although having some PR value, could mean an unlimited expense.

We would view unlimited expense. It looks an unfortunate idea.

(b) Strategic Concept

Since the London Summit, the review of NATO strategy has continued, and is now close to completion. The result - NATO's

Strategic Concept - gives political and military guidance to defence planners. The document for the Summit will have four main parts:

(i) The Strategic Context: This sets out the changes which have taken place in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, and in Western Europe (including German unification and the development of the European defence identity), developments in arms control, the role of the CSCE and security challenges and risks to the Alliance: the risk is no longer from calculated aggression, but from the growth of instability in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and from proliferation and other risks in North Africa and the Middle East;

(ii) The Alliance's Objectives and Security Functions: This section restates NATO's purpose as the safeguard for the freedom and security of its members, the continuing importance of United States direct involvement in Europe, and the contribution of NATO to Europe's stability.

(iii) The Broad Approach to Security: This section states that NATO now has more opportunity to preserve peace by political means. It places increased emphasis on dialogue and cooperation with other countries. It highlights the continuing contribution to Alliance security made by arms control and disarmament, but notes that collective defence is still essential;

(iv) Guidelines for Defence: This section is the most important in the Strategic Concept, since it contains the most concrete guidance for defence planners. It stresses that the Alliance remains purely defensive. It retains adequate military strength to deter aggression. The security of NATO is indivisible. The vital role of US conventional and nuclear forces is emphasised. The document sets out in more detail the basic principles of the new strategy agreed at the London Summit: forces will be reduced in size, but their mobility will be increased. It underlines the importance of the new Rapid Reaction Corps which is to be commanded by the UK. It sets out the contribution which will be made by so-called "European

structures" (including the Franco-German brigade and any larger European formations). It describes nuclear forces, noting their importance as political weapons, confirming the elimination of short-range nuclear forces proposed by President Bush, and pointing out the role of the UK and French nuclear deterrents.

The negotiations on the new strategy have been long and hard. Many of the battles have been fought in a small group, of the UK, US, German and French Ambassadors, which is not generally known about in NATO. Officials think they will be able to recommend acceptance to Ministers.

(c) The European Defence Identity

The declaration issued by the NATO Foreign Ministers' meeting in Copenhagen in June included language on the relationship between NATO and a distinct European Defence. The NATO Summit in Rome should make clearer what that relationship should be, to establishing some guideline for the Maastricht European Council's discussions of European defence. The Dutch (at our instigation) are holding meetings of the Eleven Allies who are members of the EC to discuss what the NATO Summit Declaration should say on a European Defence Identity. There is as yet no sign that the French will be more cooperative in agreeing language to go beyond that agreed in Copenhagen.

Nuclear Issues

Following President Bush's initiative and President Gorbachev's response, all US and Soviet land-based nuclear systems of the shortest range (ie surface-to-surface missiles and nuclear artillery shells) will be eliminated. The Alliance has welcomed these moves, since US nuclear missiles and artillery assigned to NATO had already lost their political and military value. From now on, the key link between Europe and the US strategic nuclear deterrent will be aircraft (both US and European) based in Europe and carrying American free-fall nuclear bombs.

NATO Defence Ministers meeting in Sicily on 17-18 October decided that the number of nuclear bombs in Europe could be cut by about half. This will mean that the total number of nuclear weapons based in Europe will be cut by 80 per cent. These initiatives should mean that there is little discussion of nuclear issues at the Rome Summit. In the longer term the Alliance will need to consider nuclear force modernisation (that is, the question of replacement of the free-fall bomb by a stand-off missile, the Tactical Air to Surface Missile (TASM)). The Germans and others are already opposed, and the US decision to cancel their programme for a stand-off missile has undermined the Alliance's commitment to modernisation. The Summit is not the occasion to discuss this.

As part of the discussion on the new Strategic Concept, the UK has been fighting for adequate language on the future of NATO's nuclear forces, and in particular on their military role. This has been resisted by the Germans and others who are worried about the public impact of such language, and by the French because their nuclear strategy is different from that of the rest of the Alliance. But we and the Americans attach importance to public reaffirmation by NATO of the need for flexible sub-strategic (ie short-range) forces which are (a) based in a number of countries in Europe and (b) kept up to date. It would be damaging to move away from these fundamental principles to meet the objections of others.

Post-Helsinki Arms Control

The UK has played a leading part in the Alliance and among the CSCE States in Vienna in arguing for a new CSCE European Security Forum. In our view (shared by many Allies) the forum would have three basic functions:

(a) negotiations on arms control and disarmament measures (probably starting with a modest agenda of confidence building and other measures, designed to increase our knowledge of each others' armed forces, but not excluding the possibility of further negotiated reductions in manpower or equipment in the future);

(b) a continuing process of dialogue between CSCE states on security issues, in which any state will be able to raise issues in the military-security field which are of concern; and

(c) conflict prevention (based on the CSCE Conflict Prevention Centre, and probably concentrating on implementation of existing arms control agreements and ways in which the CSCE could support the process of political settlement of disputes - eg observer and fact-finding missions, possibilities for peace-keeping etc).

We would be in favour of these ideas and the current negotiations in Vienna (on manpower in Europe, on confidence and security building measures and on 'Open Skies') being given a boost in the Rome Summit Declaration.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,

Richard Gozney

(R H T Gozney)
Private Secretary

J S Wall Esq CMG LVO
10 Downing Street

# NATO Document

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Such documents are the responsibility of NATO and as the originators they reserve ownership of the documents they issue. NATO documents are, therefore, not public records even when they are kept in UK government records. When released they will be available in the NATO Archives in Brussels.

**Document Reference**: DSD/5

**Document Title**: Draft Summit Declaration

**Document Date**: 21 October 1991

**Destruction Date**: 28 November 2017

Signed _____ Date 28/11/17

**PREM Records Team**

# NATO Document

The NATO document which was enclosed on this file has been removed and destroyed.

Such documents are the responsibility of NATO and as the originators they reserve ownership of the documents they issue. NATO documents are, therefore, not public records even when they are kept in UK government records. When released they will be available in the NATO Archives in Brussels.

**Document Reference**: SRG(91)45

**Document Title**: Ad Hoc Group on NATO'S Military Strategy The New Alliance Strategic Concept: 10th Draft

**Document Date**: 7 October 1991

**Destruction Date**: 28 November 2017

Signed _____ Date _____

**PREM Records Team**

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10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

21 October 1991

Dear Richard,

NATO SUMMIT

In my letter of 30 September I asked, at the Prime Minister's behest, for a note setting out:

- what we expect from the NATO Summit;
- what our objectives should be;
- how we should set about achieving those objectives;
- how to make the Summit a success with the United Kingdom.

Christopher Prentice replied on 14 October. I have read his letter carefully and shown it to one or two others in this office. I am afraid that we were not much wiser at the end of the letter than at the beginning.

Were I to show the letter to the Prime Minister, questions which he would undoubtedly ask would be:

(i) what is the content of the NATO Strategy Review?

(ii) what do we mean when we say "our prime objective is to square away the nuclear component before the Summit?" What is the "nuclear component" and what does it mean to "square it away"?

(iii) what agreement do we envisage and on the basis of what approach, on the SNF talks? What do we mean by "we and the United States will have to decide how much dilution we can accept in order to meet French and German sensitivities"?

(iv) what new negotiations are to begin in the CSCE? What are the difficulties of emphasis between the Germans and the Americans?

I wonder if you could let me have a new letter which I can show to the Prime Minister. It needs to be written by someone who knows the subject well but can step back a bit from it and start at Chapter One. I should be grateful if the revised letter could reach me by Friday, 25 October.

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I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence) and to Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

Yours,
Stephen

J. S. WALL

Richard Gozney, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

(1)

CONFIDENTIAL

Foreign &
Commonwealth
Office

London SW1A 2AH

14 October 1991

Dear Stephen,

**NATO SUMMIT**

Your letter of 30 September about Ray Seitz' call on the Prime Minister asked for advice on British objectives for the NATO Summit in Rome on 7/8 November.

When Heads of Government last met in London in July 1990, a Strategy Review adjusting NATO's political rhetoric and force structures to a Europe without ideological frontiers or Soviet occupying forces seemed a relatively manageable task. Since then, the gathering pace of discussions on Political Union in the Twelve, the search for a European defence identity, the further disintegration of the Soviet Union and the radical changes in the threat have thrown almost everything into the melting pot. President Bush's nuclear initiative, while welcome to the allies on SNF, has made it even harder to answer the question "with what should NATO be defending against what?".

Nonetheless, while some allies would like to see the Strategy Review put into abeyance, we and the Americans are working as hard as we can to ensure that the Summit does produce a coherent re-definition of NATO's strategy for the foreseeable future, even if this will inevitably be less definitive than originally intended. What we are seeking is a "all weather" strategy which recognises that NATO's role will be an increasingly political one, weighted towards dialogue and crisis management, but preserving an integrated military structure as the basis of collective defence.

Strategy Review

There may be contentious matters still to be settled on the Strategy Review itself. Our prime objective is to square away the nuclear component before the Summit. With luck the meeting of NATO Defence Ministers on 16/17 October will agree a re-definition of the NATO nuclear stockpile. This will open the way for agreement on an approach to SNF talks, on lines now virtually established by the Bush initiative. The key decisions on NATO's future conventional force structures have already been taken at the DPC meeting in May, and our objective will be to ensure that they do not unravel on the argument that the strategic context has changed. The Defence Secretary will be submitting separate advice on the German dimension of this. Mr King has also written separately on NATO command structures, on which it still remains to be seen whether a satisfactory solution can be achieved at the Defence Ministers' meeting in Italy. We do not at all exclude the possibility of disagreement in this area, and of having to seek the Prime Minister's support in lobbying between now and the Summit. But it will be our aim to try and keep these matters away from the Summit itself.

Sir M Alexander in Brussels has been making efforts with his colleagues to steer the drafting process on the strategic concept towards a substantial and balanced result which we can live with. So far the exercise is going well on substance, though the document is likely to seem wordy and repetitive to the public. A particular effort is being made to produce a document to which the French can subscribe as much as possible. We and the United States will have to decide how much dilution we can accept in order to meet French and German sensitivities. Our aim will be to agree before the Summit a text which Heads of Government can endorse. We will keep you informed on this.

/Arms Control

Arms Control

Arms control in the round is likely to have a prominent place in the Summit Declaration. Given President Bush's initiative this should be relatively uncontentious. We shall want to put the emphasis on the need for the Soviet Union to respond to the gestures which NATO has already made, particularly on SNF. We may indeed be able to welcome Soviet steps. On the conventional side, the focus will be on preparations for new negotiations to begin in the CSCE context after next spring's Helsinki CSCE Review Meeting. There are difficulties of emphasis between the Germans and Americans on this, but compromise language is likely to be found. We have been contributing actively to discussions in the Alliance on a new European security forum. NATO will wish to reiterate the importance of CFE ratification and progress in manpower and Open Skies talks.

Public Impact

NATO needs to be able to show the public that it is adjusting to change, and is relevant to real European security in the 90s. A successful outcome, including agreement on the new Strategic Concept, would have a helpful impact upon the IGC Summit at Maastricht, where tying the European defence identity and NATO together will be one of our most important goals. The Summit therefore needs to reflect this in an eye-catching Declaration concentrating on the main points above. The working level draft for this is inadequate, but Sir M Alexander is working with his colleagues for something much shorter and to the point. As usual, much of the work behind the scenes is likely to fall unavowedly to the UK.

Caveats

First, the Summit and the preparations for it have sharpened the focus on France's relations with the Alliance. The first three issues in this letter all face Mitterrand with awkward choices. On present evidence, this pressure is likely to make him less, rather

than more, inclined to be cooperative. It is therefore not impossible that there will be a row with France in the run-up to, or at, the Summit.

Second, the possibility of another American initiative at the last minute. This was the case with the last NATO Summit Declaration. Though President Bush has shot his arms control bolt, the possibility of a major push towards opening NATO to the East Europeans in a manner which could cause the French to make difficulties on the Strategy Review is not to be excluded. We are in close touch with Washington and through Ambassador Taft on all these issues, but it would be useful, if the opportunity arises, for you to reinforce the message through White House channels that, with the Strategy itself at stake, too many surprises at the last moment could be counter-productive.

Yours ever,

Christopher Prentice.

(C N R Prentice)
Private Secretary

Stephen Wall Esq CMG LVO
10 Downing Street

SECRET

SUBJECT cc MASTER

(6)

HLE

DA.

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

30 September 1991

Dear Richard,

CALL BY THE US AMBASSADOR

Christopher Prentice kindly wrote on 26 September with some notes for the Prime Minister's meeting with the US Ambassador. The meeting took place this afternoon.

Since Christopher's letter, the President had of course announced his nuclear initiative and that was a major topic of conversation. I am recording in this letter the discussion about President Bush's speech on nuclear issues. Other issues are covered in a separate letter.

TASM

Ray Seitz said that on TASM the US Government's position was not yet fully clarified but he could assure the Prime Minister that we were "a long way from Skybolt". What was clear was that the programme of development for SRAM T was dead for technical reasons and for lack of congressional funding. The idea of modernization remained very much alive but the question was what form it would take.

In subsequent discussion Mr. Seitz agreed with the Prime Minister that if you talked about modernization but without the commitment to TASM it was not absolutely clear what modernization meant.

The Prime Minister said to Ambassador Seitz that he did not want to get into a situation where Britain talked up the need for TASM and then found the ground cut from under our feet by the Americans.

Trident

Ambassador Seitz said that the line in the President's speech about existing deterrents was designed to be helpful to Britain. The President's comments about SDI did not refer to the development of technology transfer with the Soviet Union. Any technical exchange would be about early warning.

The Prime Minister said he was grateful for what the President had said. He had no reservations about the President's announcement which had been momentous and was a tremendous

achievement. But the political ramifications here would need careful handling.

Four Power talks on control of nuclear weapons

Ambassador Seitz said that the President had deliberately not endorsed the French proposal but had tried to channel it towards bilateral discussion. The Prime Minister said that Four Power discussions would inevitably lead to pressure on France and Britain to put their deterrents into the pot. The idea was therefore a self-defeating one for France. He and Mr. Seitz agreed that there was an element in the French proposals of trying to recreate Four Power discussion which would be an anathema to the Germans.

Follow-up

I have already written about the work the Prime Minister would like done following the American announcement. Following yesterday's discussion the Prime Minister would be grateful if your reply could be set in the context of preparation for the NATO Summit, i.e. what do we expect from the Summit; what should Britain's objectives be; how do we set about achieving them over the next few weeks; how do we make the Summit a success for the United Kingdom. These are matters on which the Prime Minister would welcome the agreed advice of the Foreign Secretary and the Defence Secretary.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

Yours,

J.S. WALL

Richard Gozney, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

cdé
cerc
c/Cor/vatican

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

24 October 1991

**NATO SUMMIT 7/8 NOVEMBER: THE VATICAN**

Thank you for your letter of 14 October suggesting that the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary should seek an Audience of The Pope while in Rome for the NATO Summit.

The Prime Minister agrees with this advice and would be grateful if arrangements could be made accordingly. We shall obviously need to identify a gap in the programme.

**J. S. WALL**

Christopher Prentice, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

MRM

OK

10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

If you do not want my advice as a Papist you could ask Sarah or Cus, but I think this is a good idea (Saillac R.C. votes in Ulster) and it is always possible to persuade to say what things about devolution. He's also an interesting character: more tough, very little Pole than plaster saint; a real old reactionary but a dynamic one. Stephen 23/10

cc PC
B'UP

Foreign &
Commonwealth
Office

London SW1A 2AH

14 October 1991

Prime Minister ①

Dear Stephen, ①R

**NATO Summit 7/8 November : The Vatican**

It is now eleven years since Mrs Thatcher met the Pope in Rome. During that time, Sir Geoffrey Howe, then Foreign Secretary, met the Pope twice, in Brussels (1985) and in Mozambique (1988). (There have been more frequent calls by Ministers of State: the last by Mr Garel-Jones and Mr Lennox-Boyd (together) in April this year.) For some time now we have shared the view of our former and present Ambassadors to the Holy See that visits by both the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary are overdue; that they would be welcomed by the Vatican and that they would contribute substantially to the bilateral relationship. The Foreign Secretary has therefore suggested that he and the Prime Minister should have an audience with the Pope while in Rome for the NATO Summit.

Since the careful and wily Cardinal Casaroli retired as Prime Minister equivalent at the turn of the year, his successors (Prime Minister Sodano and Foreign Minister Tauran) have adopted a more refreshing outgoing style, noticeably on Yugoslavia (not a comfortable position for us or them) and on Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Both the Foreign Secretary and Mr Garel-Jones have had exchanges this year with Tauran. We believe the dialogue is well worth maintaining. For our part, the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary may like to raise Northern Ireland, on which the Pope recently denounced violence; and Terry Waite/Ian Richter, on both of whom the Vatican might be able to play a helpful role. In addition, the Pope has a grand design on the role of the church (social and spiritual) in the new Europe, of which the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary might wish to hear first hand.

Yours ever,

Christopher Prentice

(C N R Prentice)
Private Secretary

Stephen Wall Esq CMG LVO
10 Downing Street


14.10.
4191

CONFIDENTIAL

cc fc

Foreign &
Commonwealth
Office

London SW1A 2AH

14 October 1991

FAXED TO HARARE
14.10.91

Dear Stephen,

**NATO SUMMIT**

Your letter of 30 September about Ray Seitz' call on the Prime Minister asked for advice on British objectives for the NATO Summit in Rome on 7/8 November.

When Heads of Government last met in London in July 1990, a Strategy Review adjusting NATO's political rhetoric and force structures to a Europe without ideological frontiers or Soviet occupying forces seemed a relatively manageable task. Since then, the gathering pace of discussions on Political Union in the Twelve, the search for a European defence identity, the further disintegration of the Soviet Union and the radical changes in the threat have thrown almost everything into the melting pot. President Bush's nuclear initiative, while welcome to the allies on SNF, has made it even harder to answer the question "with what should NATO be defending against what?".

Nonetheless, while some allies would like to see the Strategy Review put into abeyance, we and the Americans are working as hard as we can to ensure that the Summit does produce a coherent re-definition of NATO's strategy for the foreseeable future, even if this will inevitably be less definitive than originally intended. What we are seeking is a "all weather" strategy which recognises that NATO's role will be an increasingly political one, weighted towards dialogue and crisis management, but preserving an integrated military structure as the basis of collective defence.

/Relations with

Relations with Eastern Europe

It is a paradox that, as NATO suffers something of an identity crisis internally, its attractions to the Eastern Europeans and even the Soviet Union have increased. We believe that if NATO remains limited to its classical function of deterring a Soviet threat (as France would wish), it will lose its way, and that it must find a means to reach beyond its present confines to address the real security problems which are likely to confront us in Eastern Europe. The further development of NATO policy towards Eastern Europe is therefore likely to be a major matter for discussion in Rome, although the French are clearly signalling their rooted opposition to anything which would give NATO a new lease of life. We are contributing actively to discussions which could lead to a new initiative in Rome involving extension of consultative status to the former Warsaw Pact countries.

European Defence Identity

Our second major objective is to achieve language on the European defence identity which goes beyond the rather grudging language in the Copenhagen NAC Ministerial, and is consistent with our concept of using the WEU as the basis of defence activity among the Twelve, as well as the European pillar within the Alliance. This could be difficult. The French and Germans are saying that the agreement on NATO's core functions at Copenhagen was the limit. Nothing more should now be said until the IGC has defined the European defence identity. The non-EC Europeans (Norway and Turkey) will be particularly sensitive. Slowly, our insistence that these countries, as well as the non-WEU EC members, should be associated if necessary with the work of the WEU seems to be being accepted. In terms of drafting, we are making a contribution through the Anglo-Italian Declaration, which we hope will feed into the WEU Ministerial, and in turn NATO Summit Declarations.

/Strategy Review

Strategy Review

There may be contentious matters still to be settled on the Strategy Review itself. Our prime objective is to square away the nuclear component before the Summit. With luck the meeting of NATO Defence Ministers on 16/17 October will agree a re-definition of the NATO nuclear stockpile. This will open the way for agreement on an approach to SNF talks, on lines now virtually established by the Bush initiative. The key decisions on NATO's future conventional force structures have already been taken at the DPC meeting in May, and our objective will be to ensure that they do not unravel on the argument that the strategic context has changed. The Defence Secretary will be submitting separate advice on the German dimension of this. Mr King has also written separately on NATO command structures, on which it still remains to be seen whether a satisfactory solution can be achieved at the Defence Ministers' meeting in Italy. We do not at all exclude the possibility of disagreement in this area, and of having to seek the Prime Minister's support in lobbying between now and the Summit. But it will be our aim to try and keep these matters away from the Summit itself.

Sir M Alexander in Brussels has been making efforts with his colleagues to steer the drafting process on the strategic concept towards a substantial and balanced result which we can live with. So far the exercise is going well on substance, though the document is likely to seem wordy and repetitive to the public. A particular effort is being made to produce a document to which the French can subscribe as much as possible. We and the United States will have to decide how much dilution we can accept in order to meet French and German sensitivities. Our aim will be to agree before the Summit a text which Heads of Government can endorse. We will keep you informed on this.

/Arms Control

Arms Control

Arms control in the round is likely to have a prominent place in the Summit Declaration. Given President Bush's initiative this should be relatively uncontentious. We shall want to put the emphasis on the need for the Soviet Union to respond to the gestures which NATO has already made, particularly on SNF. We may indeed be able to welcome Soviet steps. On the conventional side, the focus will be on preparations for new negotiations to begin in the CSCE context after next spring's Helsinki CSCE Review Meeting. There are difficulties of emphasis between the Germans and Americans on this, but compromise language is likely to be found. We have been contributing actively to discussions in the Alliance on a new European security forum. NATO will wish to reiterate the importance of CFE ratification and progress in manpower and Open Skies talks.

Public Impact

NATO needs to be able to show the public that it is adjusting to change, and is relevant to real European security in the 90s. A successful outcome, including agreement on the new Strategic Concept, would have a helpful impact upon the IGC Summit at Maastricht, where tying the European defence identity and NATO together will be one of our most important goals. The Summit therefore needs to reflect this in an eye-catching Declaration concentrating on the main points above. The working level draft for this is inadequate, but Sir M Alexander is working with his colleagues for something much shorter and to the point. As usual, much of the work behind the scenes is likely to fall unavowedly to the UK.

Caveats

First, the Summit and the preparations for it have sharpened the focus on France's relations with the Alliance. The first three issues in this letter all face Mitterrand with awkward choices. On present evidence, this pressure is likely to make him less, rather

than more, inclined to be cooperative. It is therefore not impossible that there will be a row with France in the run-up to, or at, the Summit.

Second, the possibility of another American initiative at the last minute. This was the case with the last NATO Summit Declaration. Though President Bush has shot his arms control bolt, the possibility of a major push towards opening NATO to the East Europeans in a manner which could cause the French to make difficulties on the Strategy Review is not to be excluded. We are in close touch with Washington and through Ambassador Taft on all these issues, but it would be useful, if the opportunity arises, for you to reinforce the message through White House channels that, with the Strategy itself at stake, too many surprises at the last moment could be counter-productive.

Yours ever,
Christopher Prentice.

(C N R Prentice)
Private Secretary

Stephen Wall Esq CMG LVO
10 Downing Street

USA : Croatian Pt 8



10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

8 July 1991

Dear Simon,

**GORBACHEV AND THE NATO SUMMIT**

Thank you for your letter of 5 July which I have shown to the Prime Minister. He agrees that if the idea of President Gorbachev attending the NATO Summit is resurfaced, we should seek discreetly to discourage it while not leading the pack.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

Yours,
Stephen

J. S. WALL

Simon Gass, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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EC/C

Foreign & Commonwealth Office

London SW1 2AH

5 July 1991

Dear Stephen,

**Gorbachev and the NATO Summit**

Following a number of stories in the press last week suggesting that Gorbachev might attend the NATO Summit in Rome in November, the Prime Minister may wish to know where things stand.

Initially press reports suggested that Wörner had encouraged this idea. The US then requested our help in killing the idea off. Our instructions to Sir M Alexander for the Council's discussion of preparations for the Rome Summit were to say that discussion of the possibility was premature until we had seen the effect that Gorbachev's presence had on the G7 Summit; and that the Rome Summit would have other important business from which Gorbachev's presence would be a distraction.

In the event, the NATO Secretary-General took preemptive action to kill the idea, making clear that he had not supported it and that in his view Gorbachev's attendance would not be helpful. No one subsequently took it up, and the idea appears to have died.

If the idea were to resurface we would seek discreetly to discourage it, while being careful not to appear to be leading an anti-Soviet pack.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (MOD) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,

(S L Gass)
Private Secretary

J S Wall Esq
10 Downing Street

# NATO Document

The NATO document which was enclosed on this file has been removed and destroyed.

Such documents are the responsibility of NATO and as the originators they reserve ownership of the documents they issue. NATO documents are, therefore, not public records even when they are kept in UK government records. When released they will be available in the NATO Archives in Brussels.

**Document Reference**: M-1(91)40

**Document Title**: Press Communique Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Copenhagen Denmark 6-7 June 1991

**Document Date**: 7 June 1991

**Destruction Date**: 28 November 2017

Signed _____ Date 28/11/17

**PREM Records Team**

FILE

bc PC

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

4 June 1991

Dear Simon,

**DATES FOR THE NATO SUMMIT**

Thank you for your letter of 4 June. 5/6 November do still cause difficulties for the Prime Minister. He has Questions on 5 November and a speech on that day. We also do not yet know the date of the State Opening of Parliament but it could fall on one of those days.

I realise the awkwardness of this. The Prime Minister would be grateful if the Foreign Secretary could continue to make the case for 25/26 November but not to the point of aggravation. If 5/6 November are the dates that everyone else can manage we shall simply have to try and plan around them.

Yours,

Stephen

(J.S. WALL)

Simon Gass, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CCPC

Foreign &
Commonwealth
Office

London SW1A 2AH

4 June 1991

Dear Stephen,

**Dates for NATO Summit** — top end.

Thank you for your letter of 17 May saying that, of the dates proposed for the NATO Summit, only 25/26 November look possible for the Prime Minister. UKDel NATO report that all the Allies bar three, (the others being Canada and France who as yet have no position) have expressed a preference for the early dates of 5/6 November. Secretary Baker's Round Robin message to Foreign Ministers received today expressed US willingness to quote a consensus for "late October or early November".

The Secretary General wants to reach agreement on this at the NAC Ministerial meeting on 6/7 June if possible. It would be helpful to have your advice on whether we should continue to hold out for the later dates.

Yours ever,

(S L Gass)
Private Secretary

Yes

J S Wall Esq
10 Downing Street

Prime Minister

Are you content for me to write as per the attached? You are due to address the Charities Aid Foundation on 5 December.

Stephen

4/6

NATO : summits pr $

RESTRICTED

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

17 May 1991

**DATES FOR NATO SUMMIT**

Thank you for your letter of 13 May. I have also seen UKDEL Telno. 220.

Of the dates suggested at the meeting this week, only 25-26 November look possible for the Prime Minister. We will note them in the diary, subject to confirmation in a few months' time.

**(J. S. WALL)**

Simon Gass, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

RESTRICTED

Private Secretary

Mr. Wall

We spoke about this. Grateful for advice on dates (from our narrow perspective, 12/13 are the least desirable since that week is tentatively earmarked for S America (fat chance)).

16/5

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MDHIAN 6662

CONFIDENTIAL
FM UKDEL NATO
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 230
OF 150756Z MAY 91
INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK, ROME
INFO PRIORITY OTHER NATO POSTS, UKREP BRUSSELS

We spoke

16/5

SIC EME

MODUK FOR SEC (NATO/UK)(P)

CORRECTED VERSION

UKDEL TELNO 220: NATO SUMMIT

SUMMARY

1. ITALY OFFERS TO HOST SUMMIT IN ROME. CHOICE OF DATES IN NOVEMBER OFFERED.

DETAIL

2. AT PERMREP'S LUNCH ON 14 MAY FULCI (ITALY) SAID HIS AUTHORITIES FAVOURED A DATE IN THE FIRST HALF OF NOVEMBER. THE ITALIAN AUTHORITIES WOULD BE READY TO HOST THE SUMMIT. NO NATO SUMMIT HAD EVER BEEN HELD IN ITALY OR, INDEED, IN A SOUTHERN FLANK COUNTRY. THIS WOULD BE AN APPROPRIATE MOMENT TO RECTIFY THE SITUATION. THERE WAS A GOOD DEAL OF SUPPORT FOR THE ITALIAN OFFER AND NO COUNTER-BID.

3. AS REGARDS DATES, THERE WAS A UNIVERSAL EXPECTATION THAT THE SUMMIT WOULD TAKE PLACE IN NOVEMBER. AFTER VARIOUS NATIONAL POSITIONS HAD BEEN ITEMISED, IT WAS AGREED TO PUT TO CAPITALS FOR THEIR FURTHER CONSIDERATION THE FOLLOWING PAIRS OF DATES:

5/6 NOVEMBER, 12/13 NOVEMBER, 25/26 NOVEMBER

4. GRATEFUL FOR INSTRUCTIONS.

5. PLEASE ADVANCE TO PS/NO. 10.

In the hope of avoiding this option, this was one of the dates I suggested earlier. S 17/5

026[redacted]
MDHIAN 6662

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PS
PS/MR HOGG
PS/MR GAREL-JONES
PS/PUS
MR P J WESTON
MR TAIT
SIR J COLES
MR BROOMFIELD
MR GREENSTOCK
MR GOULDEN
MR JAY

ADDITIONAL 16

NATO

NNNN

Stephen
Suggest Mon 28 -
Tues 29
October
or
Mon 25
Nov -
Tues 26
Nov.
(Hope latter will
not be appointment)

10 DOWNING STREET

Sandra

16/5

Grateful for a couple
of dates which I can put
to the PM. I guess it
could be practical both for
the whole of the day and
half the week, but would
better identify two whole
days if we can.

Stephen

Foreign &
Commonwealth
Office

London SW1A 2AH

RESTRICTED

13 May 1991

Dear Stephen,

**DATES FOR NATO SUMMIT**

You may have seen a copy of UKDel NATO telno 220 seeking instructions for a Council discussion on 14 May of the possible NATO Summit in the autumn.

In order to secure a balanced outcome in the IGC and the NATO Strategy Review, the two processes should be drawn together at about the same time. We expect the IGC to conclude at Maastricht European Council in December. This view seems increasingly to be shared by other EC partners. As a result, there is a general assumption among the NATO Allies that a NATO Summit should take place in the late autumn.

Woerner has been holding out for an early Summit but is now talking in terms of late October/November. He wants Foreign Ministers to fix the date for the Summit at the NAC Ministerial in Copenhagen on 6-7 June. We agree that this would be useful in imposing a deadline for agreement on a new NATO strategic concept.

NATO Ambassadors will have a preliminary discussion on 14 May, when they will be asked to confirm that there should be an autumn Summit, and to give a first indication of suitable dates. If the Prime Minister agrees, therefore, I should be grateful to know which dates in October/November would be convenient for the Prime Minister to attend a two day Summit. The location of the Summit is not yet known; Paris has been suggested: NATO Headquarters is perhaps more likely.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb, Ministry of Defence.

Yours ever,

(S L Gass)
Private Secretary

J S Wall Esq
10 Downing Street

RESTRICTED

**ROYAL NORWEGIAN EMBASSY**

Inquiries to
Paul Moe

Our date
25 July 1990
Your date

Our reference
90/917- PMo/AKS
Your reference

The Prime Minister's Office
No 10 Downing Street
London SW1

Dear Sir

Please find enclosed a letter from the Norwegian Prime Minister for Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher.

Yours faithfully

Paul Moe
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

Postal address:
25 Belgrave Sq.
LONDON SW1X 8QD

Office address:
25 Belgrave Sq.
LONDON SW 1

Telephone:
+44 1 235 7151

Telex:
+57 22321
noramb g

Telefax:
+44 1 245 6993

Cable:
Norwegian
Embassy

Prime Minister (4)
CDP 18/7

NEW SCOTLAND YARD
BROADWAY LONDON SW1H OBG

COMMISSIONER OF POLICE
OF THE METROPOLIS

Sir Peter Imbert QPM

16 July 1990

R 18/7

The Rt Hon Margaret Thatcher MP
Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
LONDON SW1A 2AA

Dear Prime Minister,

Thank you very much for your letter offering your warm thanks to the Metropolitan Police for their work in connection with the Summit Conference.

I am pleased to know that the way in which our officers carried out their duties made such an important contribution to the proceedings and I shall ensure that all those concerned are made aware of your very generous comments.

Yours sincerely

Peter Imbert.

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T 161 A/90

THE PRIME MINISTER

SUBJECT cc Master
OPS

Prime Minister (2)
CDS
2577

Oslo, 12 July 1990.

Dear Prime Minister,

Allow me to express my very sincere gratitude for the hospitality extended to myself and my delegation on the occasion of the NATO Summit in London last week. The Summit was indeed an historic event, which bears witness to the ability and the readiness of our Alliance to play a prominent role in the shaping of new structures of cooperation in Europe. The excellent framework provided by your Government for our discussions was the very best we could wish. Please convey to your collaborators the expression of my sincere appreciation.

I would also like to thank you for your beautiful gift, which will remain a precious souvenir of our meeting.

With my best regards,

Yours sincerely,

Jan P. Syse

Jan P. Syse

The Rt Hon Mrs Margaret Thatcher
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

10 July 1990

Dear Dominic,

**NATO Summit: Thank You's**

In addition to the thank you letters she has already sent, the Prime Minister may like to consider signing a draft on the lines of the attached to the Commissioner of Metropolitan Police recognising the contribution made by Chief Superintendent Rowe.

Yours,

Stephen Wall

(J S Wall)
Private Secretary

D C B Morris Esq
10 Downing Street

Draft Letter from the Prime Minister

To: Sir Peter Imbert QPM
Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police
New Scotland Yard
Broadway
London SW1H 0BG

I should like to tell you how much we appreciated everything you did to ensure the success of the NATO Summit. The Summit placed a heavy burden of responsibility on the Metropolitan police. You managed to combine good security with humour, patience and tact. I know that is your hallmark - but I am most grateful to you and to Chief Superintendent Rowe and the other police officers involved.



SUBJECT to OPS
MASTER

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

9 July 1990

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T 158/90

Dear Prime Minister

Thank you so much for sending me the reproductions of ancient Italian coins. They are very handsome and I was most grateful to have them.

I am glad that we had such a successful Summit. I send you my best wishes for your Presidency of the European Community - and look forward to seeing you in Houston.

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher

Onorevole Giulio Andreotti

KK

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

9 July 1990

Dear Commissioner

I just wanted to say how very grateful I am for all that the Metropolitan Police did to manage the very complex movements of sixteen Heads of State and Government through London over these last two days. It cannot have been a welcome addition to the Force's many duties, but it was done impeccably and with the minimum of disruption to everyone else. I should be most grateful if you would convey my warm thanks to all the officers concerned, as well as to those responsible for the security and protection of our visitors. Their work made a most important contribution to the overall success of the Summit.

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher

Sir Peter Imbert, Q.P.M.

CONFIDENTIAL

THE RT HON JOHN WAKEHAM MP

Department of Energy
1 Palace Street
London SW1E 5HE
071 238 3290

Simon Gass Esq
Private Secretary to
The Secretary of State for Foreign
& Commonwealth Affairs
Foreign & Commonwealth Office
Downing Street
LONDON
SW1A 2AH

9 July 1990

Dear Simon,

**NATO SUMMIT: EUROPEAN ENERGY COMMUNITY**

Thank you for sending me a copy of your letter of ~~4~~ July to Charles Powell.

As you say the Dutch proposal for a "European Energy Community" is very thin on detail and in places ambiguous. It is not therefore possible to analyse comprehensively.

Despite this, my Secretary of State considers that it might offer some opportunities for advancing our interests. Many of these lie outside his direct responsibilities. They concern the politics of assisting Eastern European and Soviet progress towards market-based economies and of ensuring that any financial and technical aid we give those countries is well adapted to helping those countries to help themselves. The proposal may also offer opportunities for environmental benefits associated with the production and use of energy.

Within the energy sector, my Secretary of State considers that the proposals could contribute towards:

i) helping Eastern Europe reduce its profligacy of energy use by developing proper energy pricing;

ii) helping the Soviet Union secure the successful development of its enormous gas reserves and clean up its own energy production processes. All European countries are looking to gas as a main means of reducing, any way in the shorter term, the carbon dioxide emissions from electricity generation.

CONFIDENTIAL

Without the development of and access to Soviet gas reserves, Mr Wakeham fears there will be an explosion in the price of gas which will inevitably affect the price of gas and electricity in Britain.

iii) providing opportunity for British companies to obtain access to the Soviet Union's energy reserves and for our suppliers of energy equipment to sell their technology in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. We should, in particular, be able to compete successfully in the upstream oil and energy efficiency sectors.

There are some threats in the Dutch plan to our policies. There are hints in it of dirigisme and protectionism and also arrangements which could affect our control over our oil and gas resources. There are also other opportunities in the proposal. Mr Wakeham believes that overall the opportunities outweigh the threats, particularly if we adopt an initially positive attitude and thereby maximise our influence over the development of their proposals.

There may be further opportunities to discuss this proposal at the informal Energy Council on 15-16 July and during Mr Wakeham's meeting with Mr Andriessen, the Dutch Minister for Economic Affairs, on 25 July.

I am copying this letter to Charles Powell at No 10.

Yours
John

**JOHN NEILSON**
Principal Private Secretary

NATO : Summits PTS



SUBJECT
ca MASTER
OPS.

CANADA

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T 157 A/90

PRIME MINISTER · PREMIER MINISTRE

July 7, 1990

12/7.

Dear Margaret,

I wish to thank you once again for your hospitality and offer my congratulations for the quality of the organization of the NATO Summit. I know the implications of arranging for such a meeting on short notice, at a crucial moment in the evolution of the Organization.

The Canadian delegation was extremely pleased by the arrangements made by the British team. We all agree that it was an important factor in the successful conclusion of the Summit.

As usual, it was a real pleasure for me to be in London and have this opportunity to exchange views with you and our NATO colleagues.

Yours sincerely,

And with best personal regards.

Brian

The Right Honourable Margaret Thatcher
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom
10 Downing Street
London, England

# NATO Document

The NATO document which was enclosed on this file has been removed and destroyed.

Such documents are the responsibility of NATO and as the originators they reserve ownership of the documents they issue. NATO documents are, therefore, not public records even when they are kept in UK government records. When released they will be available in the NATO Archives in Brussels.

**Document Reference**: S-1(90)36

**Document Title**: Press Communique London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance.

**Document Date**: 6 July 1990

**Destruction Date**: 28 November 2017

Signed _____ Date 28/11/17

**PREM Records Team**

SECRET

Cable file
bcc PC

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

SUBJECT cc MASTER

8 (A-D)

*From the Private Secretary*

6 July 1990

Dear Stephen.

**PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT BUSH**

The Prime Minister had an hour's talk with President Bush over breakfast at No. 10 this morning. General Scowcroft and the American Ambassador were also present.

<u>This letter contains sensitive material and should receive a very limited distribution only</u>.

<u>NATO Summit</u>

There was a brief discussion of the text of the draft Summit Declaration. The Prime Minister and the President agreed that it was broadly satisfactory, but they would both strenuously oppose Iceland's attempt to insert a commitment to naval arms control.

There was a brief exchange on the wisdom and/or desirability of keeping a ghost Warsaw Pact in existence. The Prime Minister suggested that it could be a fig leaf for Gorbachev. The President accepted that Gorbachev needed a bit of cover, at least for a year or two, but said his spirit rebelled against doing or saying anything to encourage the Pact's continued existence. The Prime Minister pointed to the risk that, if the Warsaw Pact formally dissolved itself, then people would question the need for NATO. The President admitted this. The issue was unresolved.

<u>Aid to the Soviet Union</u>

The President said that the whole concept of aid for the Soviet Union gave him great difficulty. Indeed it was a non-starter for the United States. There were various legal objections: and it would be impossible politically, while the Soviet Union was still devoting so much money to defence and to aiding and abetting countries like Cuba. American opinion would simply not stand for it. We would have to find language for the communiqué at the Economic Summit which said how much we all

supported Gorbachev, and that we were ready to give some sort of technical assistance as we had done to Poland and Hungary. It was just possible that the United States could agree to free up private lending, although even this had difficulties. But overall "I am back in the dark ages on this".

The Prime Minister described the discussion at the Dublin European Council and the conclusions which had been reached. She agreed with the President there was no point in pouring in money which would only add to the Soviet Union's indebtedness. But she thought we could help with some sort of Know-How Fund on the lines of the help we were giving to Eastern Europe. The President commented that Gorbachev had scarcely touched on this issue during his visit to Washington.

TASM

The Prime Minister asked how the President assessed the chances of getting a private assurance from Chancellor Kohl that he would say nothing during the German election campaign to rule out deployment of TASM. The President said he did not think Kohl was planning to make any trouble on this front, indeed he had been quite forthcoming in Washington. Was the Prime Minister asking him to speak to Kohl? The Prime Minister said that the effect would be more powerful coming from the President. The President said he would do what he could.

We shall need to follow this up in Houston.

Middle East

The President raised the subject of the Middle East, saying that he was utterly frustrated with Shamir and the new Israeli Government. The Prime Minister agreed that the situation looked bad. King Hussein was distraught: since he had pulled out of a role in Arab/Israel, he was no longer getting financial support from other Arab governments. Unless the United States could get some progress, it would appear to our Arab friends that Shamir had won. She very much welcomed the firmness the President had displayed over the issue of settling Soviet Jews in the Occupied Territories including East Jerusalem. The President said that he had been furious at the way the Jewish lobby had attacked him on this last point. They had accused him of bringing down the Israeli government. He was highly annoyed at Shamir and was determined not to allow him to determine US foreign policy. He thought that the Arab governments understood that the United States was trying its best. Some day there was going to be a confrontation, and he thought that United States public opinion would support a President who stood out for a constructive solution. The whole subject got him so mad that he had better let General Scowcroft describe what American policy really was.

General Scowcroft said that Shamir was proving very difficult, not least on settlements. But there was no alternative to trying to do business with him. The Administration was still trying to achieve agreement on names of specific Palestinians with whom the Israelis would agree to negotiate. But if Shamir refused this, they would declare the

peace process at an end. The President added that we ought to know the outcome within about a month. If the present approach failed, the United States might join up with "you all". Shamir kept trying to re-open old arguments, but the United States was going to insist on a straight yes or no on this plan. The Prime Minister agreed that it was a time for firmness.

The President said that it had been extremely stupid of Arafat not to condemn the PLF terrorist attack on Israel. He had not wanted to suspend the dialogue with the PLO, but had been left with no option.

South Africa

The Prime Minister gave the President an account of her meeting with Mr. Mandela. Some of what he said showed that he was still trapped in a time warp, although that was understandable after 27 years in prison. She believed Mandela would probably drop the armed struggle quite soon. She had tried to explain to him that sanctions were irrelevant. The President said that Mandela had been rather less forthcoming in Washington. He only hoped he could survive and control the more extreme members of his organisation. The Prime Minister said she thought Mandela was inclined to adjust what he said to the particular audience.

Economic Summit

The Prime Minister said that it would be very important to try to make progress on agriculture in the Uruguay Round at the Economic Summit. There must be something firm and positive in the communiqué. If the Uruguay Round failed, it would be disastrous for world trade. The President said that agriculture was a very contentious issue in the United States. It was essential to make progress on getting rid of subsidies. He would have to stay very firm on this at the Economic Summit.

START: Non-circumvention

The Prime Minister said that she wanted to thank the President very much for standing so firm in the face of Soviet attempts to restrict our nuclear co-operation with the United States. She thought the Russians understood really that they were not going to get anywhere by trying this.

Colombia

The Prime Minister gave the President an account of her recent meeting with the President-elect of Colombia. He had been inclined to complain about inadequate help from the United States, and about restrictions on the export of cut flowers. The President said he was rather surprised to hear this: Gaviria was a good man from the US point of view, and he had thought the problems over cut flowers had been resolved. He asked General Scowcroft to check this.

D

I am writing separately on one other matter.

I am copying this letter to John Gieve (H M Treasury), Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely,

C. D. POWELL

J. S. Wall, Esq., L.V.O.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T155/90

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

SUBJECT cc Master OPS

6 July 1990

Dear Prime Minister,

It was extraordinarily kind of you to present me with the handsome silver jug, which I found waiting for me on my return to No.10 Downing Street from the NATO Summit. I very much appreciate your generosity.

I am glad that the Summit was a success and we were able to agree such an excellent Declaration. It is very important in times of such great change that NATO should show itself united and forward-looking.

With every good wish,

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher

His Excellency Mr. Constantine Mitsotakis

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T 158/90

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

SUBJECT cc Martin OPS

THE PRIME MINISTER

6 July 1990

Dear M. President,

I found the most lovely dressing table set, which you so kindly presented to me, on my return to No.10 from the Summit. You are very kind and I much appreciate your thoughtfulness and generosity.

I do hope that you will get a good holiday once the 14 July celebrations are over. I was worried that you looked a little pale: the last few months have been very exhausting for all of us, and I am sure you need some rest.

With warm good wishes,

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher

His Excellency Monsieur le President Mitterrand, G.C.B.

STRICTLY PERSONAL

FILE KK

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T153/90

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

SUBJECT & MARKER OPS

6 July 1990

Dear Brian.

I found the very beautiful sculpture by Walter Bachinski when I got back to No. 10 after our talk. It is extremely kind of you and Mila to make us such an original gift, and it gives great pleasure.

I very much enjoyed our talk - I am sure you will get through despite the difficulties. Keep your spirits up!

Yours ever

Margaret

The Right Honourable Brian Mulroney

STRICTLY PERSONAL

DH

file
dlw
dlwpdocs/foreign/pse

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

6 July 1990

TURKEY: PROJECT EAGLE

Thank you for your letter of 4 July asking the Prime Minister to raise Project Turkey with the Turkish Prime Minister in the margins of the NATO Summit. The Turkish Prime Minister is not an easy man with whom to make conversation since there is never the slightest evidence that he has any idea what you are talking about. I regret to say that, having weighed the matter, the Prime Minister decided not to try and pursue it with him.

CHARLES POWELL

I M Woodman Esq
Ministry of Defence

CONFIDENTIAL

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

6 July 1990

NATO SUMMIT: EUROPEAN ENERGY COMMUNITY

Thank you for your letter of 4 July about Dutch ideas for a European Energy Community. This was not pursued, at least not with any vigour, at the NATO Summit.

CHARLES POWELL

S L Gass Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL

FILE KK

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

6 July 1990

**NATO SUMMIT**

I enclose thank you letters which the Prime Minister has written to President Mitterrand and Prime Minister Mitsotakis and would be grateful if you could arrange for them to be delivered as soon as possible.

I also enclose copies of letters which she has sent to Captain Latsis, to Lord Rothschild and to Oliver Miles.

You may find the easiest way, in the case of the letter to Mitterrand, is to hand it over to his office in Houston.

(C. D. POWELL)

J. S. Wall, Esq., L.V.O.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

TW

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

6 July 1990

Dear Captain Latsis,

Our NATO Summit has just ended, very successfully, and I wanted to write straight away to thank you most warmly for making Bridgewater House available yesterday.

Because of your generosity, we were able to show off London in the best possible way, and all the Heads of State and Government and the Foreign Ministers were enormously impressed. You were particularly kind to welcome them all personally and to show us round, to see the remarkable work of restoration which you have undertaken. It all helped to make the Summit a tremendous success and I am personally deeply grateful to you.

Kind regards.

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher

Captain John Latsis

cc FCO

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

6 July 1990

Dear Jacob,

Thank you very much for making Spencer House available for the lunch for NATO Heads of State and Government yesterday. They were all very impressed by three such magnificent houses - Spencer House, Lancaster House and Bridgewater House - in such close proximity, and it helped us show off London to the best advantage.

I am most grateful to you for your kindness and for all the help which we received from your staff.

Warm regards.

Yours ever

Margaret

The Lord Rothschild

file TW
cc FCO

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

6 July 1990

Dear Mr. Miles,

I wanted to write straight away to thank you most warmly for the outstanding work which you and your colleagues did in organising the NATO Summit at such short notice. Good organisation is the first step to a successful Summit and we excelled on this occasion, in the arrangements at Lancaster House, the excursions to Spencer House and Bridgewater House, and the ferrying of so many Heads of Government round London at the height of the summer season.

I would be grateful if you could give all those conerned my warm thanks for helping to make the Summit such a success. We could not have done better.

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher

Oliver Miles, Esq., C.M.G.
Room WH22, FCO

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**Document Date**: 6 July 1990

**Destruction Date**: 28 November 2017

Signed _____ Date 28/11/17

**PREM Records Team**

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

① Fighting for Peace - Caspar Weinberger

- unpreparedness

Our friend - resolve, unity

willingness to exhort hand of friendship

Nehru - message for
talks President Eisenhower
President Truman.

② Barbarossa

Two things have altered not

Since first the world began

The beauty of the world given earth

And the bravery of Man.

③ Century marked by war suffering on

an increased scale yet the same century

which has produced new hope ~~better health better living~~

and greater human aspirations about the world

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

(2)

The cornerstones of that defence must remain ~~forces~~ deterrent although some of the architecture may change in this new Strategic

Cap. Warsaw

Cerling Nadolny was talking

Barbarossa

Purpose of new Cold War - not that of

Liberalising Lever - feed back ahead

Did you welcome visit on efforts very success

LONDON SUMMIT
LANCASTER HOUSE
5-6th JULY 1990

NATO
OTAN

SOMMET DE LONDRES
LANCASTER HOUSE
5-6 JUILLET 1990

Mitterand

Adapt – to new situ.

Cohesion

Commit former adversaries – we are only defensive.

Alliance – 2 fold mission
deterrence – co-operation.

CSCE – all 35 nations;
meets in January 1 relations
on North bloc

France – special position – will not change
– not directly concerned with nuclear strategy
– not involved in organisational aspect

Nuclear objective – is deterrence
Should avoid having to resort to weapon

LONDON SUMMIT
LANCASTER HOUSE
5-6th JULY 1990
NATO
OTAN
SOMMET DE LONDRES
LANCASTER HOUSE
5-6 JUILLET 1990

Can't decide new balance

- Need another summit?

Complementary roles of different agencies

CSCE,

16 allies should decide their
goals for new summit, meeting in Paris

We are in process of changing a high mountain
? Descending the slopes?
Going towards a happy valley?

Plan for other meetings this year

LONDON SUMMIT
LANCASTER HOUSE
5-6th JULY 1990
NATO
OTAN
SOMMET DE LONDRES
LANCASTER HOUSE
5-6 JUILLET 1990

President of U.S.A

i/rdle - outgrowth of allied deliberations

4 tasks

(1) reach out to adversaries

(2) adapt conventional defence

(3) modern - weapon of last resort.

(1) Structures of co-op.

Pres. G. to meeting

Liaison missions at N.A.T.O.

(2) Short collective defence

U.S. - intends to remain a European power

'Weapon of last resort'

Use 'early' in conflict to help defeat attack by large forces.

Truly weapon of last resort

Carries in charges of strategy

(L.C. careful not to use term flexible response)

LONDON SUMMIT
LANCASTER HOUSE
5-6th JULY 1990
NATO
OTAN
SOMMET DE LONDRES
LANCASTER HOUSE
5-6 JUILLET 1990

Strategy will be transformed.

Will NATO adapt? Could say we are studying it.

Something to deliver

Phase last resort - leaves a lot of room for a new employment guidelines.

Strongly opposed to 'No first use'

Countries not in NATO command

(4) Helping establish framework.
CSCE

We will play our part.
Adapting to new realities.

Kohl - Commitments belongs to Party.
Came into NATO 1955
Harmel accord 1967
Active friendly support.
U.S. Forces in Berlin Germany as a whole

LONDON SUMMIT
LANCASTER HOUSE
5-6th JULY 1990

NATO
OTAN

SOMMET DE LONDRES
LANCASTER HOUSE
5-6 JUILLET 1990

Close political + economic
integration of Germany.
Security depends on relations partnerships..
Determining future course of NATO
Conference unprecedented - must be realistic.
N. America + Europe together.
Pan-European - CSCE.
Range of enormous importance,
Mostly our strategy.
NATO a pillar of PAN European security.
Use every European forum.
CFE by end of this year
Further drastic cuts in strategic weapons
Nuclear artillery reductions - look at approaches.
Before end of 1990 - reduce strategic nuclear weapons
Welcome chemical weapons redn
Building firm foundations for new peace
Keep transatlantic bridge
But new architecture across divisions of Europe

LONDON SUMMIT
LANCASTER HOUSE
5-6th JULY 1990

NATO
OTAN

SOMMET DE LONDRES
LANCASTER HOUSE
5-6 JUILLET 1990

● Our vision of peaceful Europe - reality

Portugal - Mr. Carlos Cruz

Switzerland. Security + dialogue

→ " + cooperation

~~Italy~~. - ~~Report a community~~

~~Aid is frozen~~

CSCE can help to overcome division of Europe

Norway - Political landscape is shifting.

LONDON SUMMIT
LANCASTER HOUSE
5-6th JULY 1990

NATO
OTAN

SOMMET DE LONDRES
LANCASTER HOUSE
5-6 JUILLET 1990

Paul Schluter

Soviet Union will remain a great power.

Must not fail marginalised.

Message (1) Underline assurances to S.U. about German membership of NATO.

(2) Determ to conclude CFE agreement

(3) Continue negotiations on arms control.

(4) Extended confidence building measures

(5) Welcome reduced reliance on nuclear weapons

Look forward to CSCE summit.

Political consultations on broad levels.

Appreciate initiatives by U.S. to provide us with new ideas.

Reaffirm alliance to openness and consultations.

LONDON SUMMIT
LANCASTER HOUSE
5-6th JULY 1990

NATO
OTAN

SOMMET DE LONDRES
LANCASTER HOUSE
5-6 JUILLET 1990

Premier Gorbachev

Year ago – confrontation, conflict

To partnership.
New relationship between East and West
Path of mutual understanding.

In USSR – uncertainty

Warsaw Pact not yet buried.

CSCE: – Regular meetings of Ministers.
Lightweight Secretariat in Admin.

Luxembourg – Council only?

Bonn – Turkey

Change in order to Consensus

Not Confrontation – but partnership

LONDON SUMMIT
LANCASTER HOUSE
5-6th JULY 1990

NATO
OTAN

SOMMET DE LONDRES
LANCASTER HOUSE
5-6 JUILLET 1990

Turkey — Thank you

Shevardnadze

Free debate tomorrow morning

SNF/Reductions should only be made after consultation

LONDON SUMMIT
LANCASTER HOUSE
5-6th JULY 1990

NATO
OTAN

SOMMET DE LONDRES
LANCASTER HOUSE
5-6 JUILLET 1990

15 mths

Mord Sprat

Gorbachev

Hurd

NATO

ABC

Gorbachev

Nuclear deterrent

Soviet Union

CSCE

10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

The text which has emerged. It has basically good. There are no points which you need raise.

CDP 6/7.

Wall Street Journal Thursday 5 July 1990.



# REVIEW & OUTLOOK

## The 'Signal' Summit

President Bush says that the policy changes he expects at the NATO summit will not be of "bombshell dimension." But his recent attempts to lower expectations will not calm those who hope the meeting today and tomorrow in London will be pivotal in scaling back the Alliance.

The American president himself opened the door to such expectations in letters to the capitals of the other 15 Alliance members. Mr. Bush reportedly broached the idea of altering NATO's strategic doctrines of "flexible response"—the declared option of using nuclear weapons at any point during a conflict. He also raised the possibility of foreswearing "forward defense"—the deployment of troops near the inter-German border.

Instead, nuclear arms would be declared "weapons of last-resort" and the "layer-cake" troop configuration in Germany would be reduced and replaced with a "raisin-bread" arrangement of highly mobile multi-national forces. The realignment would be accompanied by the elimination of U.S. nuclear artillery and reliance on new tactical air-to-surface missiles.

Perhaps some of these measures make sense as the Warsaw Pact disintegrates and as the potential adversary's targetable locations shift toward the flanks and to the east. The question is whether NATO's military strategy is being altered to match changing defense requirements or if such considerations are being subordinated to political objectives. One depends on changes in the Warsaw Pact, the other on changes in NATO.

It's evident that the cohesion once viewed as a chief attribute of the Warsaw Pact is now history. But its core, the Red Army, is a lessened threat only if Mikhail Gorbachev is as much a man of peace as some in the West make him out to be, and if he manages to keep control of the Kremlin. Betting a few billion D-marks on him is one thing. Western security is another matter.

The military picture has changed little. Although Moscow has cut manpower west of the Urals by about 5%, it's estimated, there remain more than half a million Soviet troops in Eastern Europe, nearly 400,000 of them in East Germany. While obsolescent tanks and artillery are being scrapped (or refitted, with poor results, as fire engines or excavators), the Soviet military continues to modernize. The more-battle-worthy equipment being withdrawn from Central Europe, such as backfire and Flogger fighter-bombers, are winding up on the Kola Peninsula, to the considerale alarm of Norway.

The most plausible impetus for reorienting NATO is political. Indeed, one—perhaps the only—common goal of today's meeting is to send the Soviets a "signal" of the Alliance's peaceful intentions. The debate will be over what kind of signal. To help things along, we suggest a preliminary discussion on *whom* such a gesture is really intended for and *why*. Do Mr. Gorbachev and his generals need to be reassured that they will not be overrun by marauding warriors from Paris, Bonn and Brussels? Or, more likely, do politicians in some Western circles want to hand the Russians a fig-leaf of sorts to help camouflage their loss of the Cold War.

That kind of an olive branch, along with ideas such as a possible invitation to Mr. Gorbachev to visit NATO, or offers of accreditation to the Pact's dignitaries to come and go at the Alliance's headquarters, have considerable symbolic value to the Soviets. But it's problematical whether all that, or even generous financial incentives can bring concrete results such as the removal of obstacles to full German unification.

Symbolism shouldn't drive NATO policy substance. The Alliance's primary goal should be to lock the Russians into an agreement on withdrawal from Central Europe. If experience is any guide, that can only come in the context of a credible Western military posture.

But that's not what this summit is about. Rather, a good part of it seems to be a battle of elbows for improved political position in the emerging European order. For example, the hierarchy of NATO never has and never will suit the French. They would prefer an institutionalized CSCE to assume responsibility for Europe's security. If the CSCE displaced NATO, Moscow would become an automatic partner, beholden, of course, to Paris. Watch for the "signal" in the summit communique—and hope it isn't a bombshell.

## *Perils of Kov An Entrepre Soviet Odys*

By DON BARNE

George Kovach is a man the limits of Perestroika in t one of the most well-known icans in the Soviet Union. O who associate with him of selves the object of unwanted the police. But no one's life than that of a young painter whose work caught Mr. Ko

It all started when Mr. K employee of the U.S. Inforn went to the Soviet Union i travelling exhibit. Travellin part of a U.S. goverment eff the average Soviet with flamboyant Russian-speakir was the toast of every tov visited. He gained his followi thumbing his nose at the KG opprobrium on the heads officials. From his stand in t he would harangue the crowd of communism, unmask plair in the audience and do Bre tions. Even an act as simple classified section of the New loud would bring a huge cro admirers.

The apparat fought back press with no fewer than 5 fe devoted to their tormentor. H an anti-Soviet agitator, a CIA art smuggler. Nowadays the c an anti-Soviet agitator could official compliment but the c a CIA agent really hurts. I nity protected him from Sc but the U.S. government near several occasions for the st denunciations.

* * *

Around the time Mr. travelling through the USS amazing phenomenon was s York city and the West coa rary Soviet Art.

Trade in Soviet art is no business proposition. For th right connections, a painting Moscow for $500 worth of ele and trinkets (including pay bureaucrats) can be sold Manhattan locale for $20,000.

Mr. Kovach saw an opport some money. When not blasti political system, he was revie of hundreds of artists aspiring latest discovery on the Soviet ica scene. Any of them would with their best canvasses for Sony TV. The honor fell to a from Tashkent, an Andy War named Konstantine Titov. made—all perfectly legal in t ronment.

The first batch of paintings from Tashkent to Moscow fo

The National Archives

| DEPARTMENT/SERIES PREM 19<br>PIECE/ITEM 3466<br>(one piece/item number) | Date and sign |
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| Extract details:<br>Letter from CD Powell to JS Wall dated 5 July 1990 | X |
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Use black or blue pen to complete form.

Use the card for one piece or for each extract removed from a different place within a piece.

Enter the department and series,
eg. HO 405, J 82.

Enter the piece and item references, .
eg. 28, 1079, 84/1, 107/3

Enter extract details if it is an extract rather than a whole piece.
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# NATO Document

The NATO document which was enclosed on this file has been removed and destroyed.

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**Document Reference**:

**Document Title**: London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance.

**Document Date**: 5 July 1990

**Destruction Date**: 28 November 2017

Signed _____ Date 28/11/17

**PREM Records Team**

7(AB)

PRIME MINISTER

BREAKFAST WITH PRESIDENT BUSH

You are having breakfast with President Bush at 0800 tomorrow. He will be accompanied only by General Scowcroft.

The issues you will want to cover:

- NATO Summit. There may be points of difficulty arising from the drafting of the Declaration.

- Houston Economic Summit. The contentious issues look likely to be GATT/agriculture, environment and aid to the Soviet Union. On the last of these, you now have Gorbachev's message.

- START Non-Circumvention. You will want to thank the President for the robust US rebuttal of Soviet attempts to constrain our nuclear co-operation.

- SNF. You will want to consult with the President on the best way to get a commitment from the Germans on TASM.

- Middle East. The situation is deteriorating. Shamir remains difficult over a dialogue with the Palestinians, and our friends in the area are worried and losing heart. We know the Americans are doing their best: it is very important to keep up the impression (at least) of activity.

- South Africa. Your impressions from your meeting with Mandela. The Houston Summit should recognise the changes and refer to South Africa's need for economic support. The key is for the US to lift its block on IMF balance of payments facilities for South Africa.

B

- China/Hong Kong. We are grateful to the President for taking account of Hong Kong's interests in renewing MFN for China. He should be grateful to us for taking Fang.

- Colombia. You promised President-elect Gaviria to mention to the President his feeling that the US were attaching conditions to their help.

- US Economy. You might sound him out on just how he sees things evolving on tax increases.

Fuller background is in the folder.

CD?

CHARLES POWELL
5 July 1990

c\foreign\pb\kw

You may also like to raise:

- Soviet Biological Warfare programme. We shall need to press the Russians again on this soon.

- Vietnamese Boat People. We want the US to stand aside & not block a consensus among allies on repatriation of non-refugees.

CDN.

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T151C/90

SUBJECT cc MASTER OPS

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FFFF PSE PASS NO 10 AT REQUEST OF R.C
DD 041930Z CAOFF
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OF 041700Z JULY 90
INFO DESKBY 041800Z UKDEL NATO
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, MOSCOW
INFO PRIORITY EAST EUROPEAN POSTS, NATO POSTS

NATO SUMMIT: MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT HAVEL

1. FOLLOWING IS A TRANSLATION OF THE TEXT OF PRESIDENT HAVEL'S MESSAGE:

DEAR PRIME MINISTER

I AM TAKING THE OPPORTUNITY OF THE FACT THAT IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS YOU WILL BE HOSTESS OF THE NATO MEETING, TO SEND A MESSAGE THROUGH YOU TO THE TOP REPRESENTATIVES OF THE NATO MEMBER STATES.

THE COLD WAR IS COMING TO AN END. THE BI-POLAR MODEL OF SECURITY WHICH MAINTAINED PEACE (OR AT LEAST A SITUATION WITHOUT WAR) IN EUROPE FOR MORE THAN 40 YEARS AND WITH IT ENSURED TO A CERTAIN EXTENT EUROPEAN DEMOCRACIES' PROSPERITY, IS COMPLETELY OUTMODED. AT THE SAME TIME, HOWEVER, THAT MODEL KEPT THE NATIONS OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE IN A HARD SHELL OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC UNIFORMITY. MOREOVER, THE CZECHS AND SLOVAKS HAD TO PAY FOR IT HEAVILY.

THE PAST DISAPPEARS ONLY WITH DIFFICULTY, AND LEAVES BEHIND IT A SERIES OF VISIBLE AND INVISIBLE TRACES. AMONG THE MOST VISIBLE OF THEM IS THE UNBELIEVABLE CONCENTRATION OF WEAPONS IN EUROPE. TWO ENORMOUS MILITARY MONSTERS STILL, DESPITE MANY CHANGES, REMIND US, PERHAPS AS A WARNING, OF WHAT LIMITS OF ABSURDITY A MUTUAL LACK OF CONFIDENCE AND SUSPICION CAN LEAD TO.

I DO NOT WANT TO EQUATE THE NORTH ATLANTIC ALLIANCE WITH THE WARSAW PACT. I AM NOT SUGGESTING THE DISBANDING OF NATO AND THE IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL AMERICAN TROOPS FROM EUROPE. I OUTLINED IN DETAIL MY VISION OF THE FUTURE OF EUROPE IN THE AMERICAN CONGRESS AND QUITE RECENTLY IN STRASBOURG, AS WELL AS IN DISCUSSIONS WITH YOURSELF, WITH PRESIDENTS BUSH AND MITTERRAND AND WITH PREMIER KOHL. CZECHOSLOVAKIA TOOK A MEANINGFUL STEP TOWARDS THE FULFILMENT OF THIS VISION AT THE MEETING IN JUNE OF THE HIGHEST LEADERS OF THE WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES IN MOSCOW. AT CZECHOSLOVAK INITIATIVE A DECLARATION WAS AGREED IN THE SOVIET CAPITAL, THE REALISATION OF WHICH COULD LEAD TO A RADICAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE WARSAW PACT INTO A DEMOCRATIC GROUP OF INDEPENDENT, SOVEREIGN STATES. THE TASK OF THIS GROUP WILL BE TO CONTRIBUTE - UP UNTIL ITS DISSOLUTION - TO THE SPEEDING UP OF THE EUROPEAN DISARMAMENT PROCESS AND TO THE FORMATION OF A STABLE ALL EUROPEAN SECURITY STRUCTURE.

I AM OF THE OPINION THAT THE NORTH ATLANTIC ALLIANCE SHOULD TAKE FURTHER STEPS ALONG THE PATH OF NECESSARY INTERNAL CHANGE AND SHOULD AT ITS LONDON SUMMIT CONFIRM AND, FURTHER, REVEAL TO ALL POSITIVELY WHAT IT IS DOING IN THIS DIRECTION.

I EXPECT THAT IN LONDON A DECISION WOULD BE POSSIBLE ON THE CHANGES UP TILL NOW IN NATO'S POLITICAL STRATEGY AS WELL AS IN ITS MILITARY DOCTRINES, IN PARTICULAR A REAPPRAISAL OF THE IDEAS OF ''FORWARD DEFENCE'', ''FLEXIBLE RESPONSE'' AND ''FIRST USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS''. AS A MEANINGFUL STIMULUS TO THE GRADUAL FORMATION OF AN ALL EUROPEAN POLICY IT SHOULD CERTAINLY GIVE ITS SUPPORT TO THE HELSINKI PROCESS, INCLUDING TO ITS PURPOSEFUL INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT. I MENTION IN THIS CONTEXT THAT CZECHOSLOVAKIA HAS PUT FORWARD PERTINENT PROPOSALS TO THIS END.

I ALSO THINK IT WOULD BE GOOD IF THE MEMBER COUNTRIES OF NATO BEGAN TO CONSIDER AS A PROSPECT THE CHANGING OF THE TITLE OF THE ALLIANCE. IF NATO BECOMES ONE OF THE PLATFORMS OF THE NEW SYSTEM OF SECURITY, ITS NAME SHOULD CONFORM MORE TO THE GEOGRAPHICAL REALITY OF OUR CONTINENT.

FINALLY I AM OF THE OPINION THAT, WITH REGARD TO THE CRITICAL STAGE IN WHICH SOVIET PERESTROIKA TODAY FINDS ITSELF, PUBLIC AND UNEQUIVOCAL SUPPORT FOR THE DEMOCRATIC AIMS OF THIS COUNTRY ADDRESSED TO THE SOVIET UNION FROM THE FOREMOST SUMMIT OF NATO WOULD HAVE QUITE EXTRAORDINARY SIGNIFICANCE NOT ONLY FOR THE FUTURE OF DEMOCRACY IN THE SOVIET UNION BUT ALSO FOR THE WHOLE OF EUROPE.

WE ARE THINKING THROUGH ALL THIS IN ORDER TO BE BEST PREPARED FOR THIS YEAR'S PARIS SUMMIT OF THE HELSINKI PROCESS. TO BE BEST PREPARED MEANS TO PREPARE FOR IT SO THAT A FULL STOP CAN BE PLACED AFTER THE COLD WAR AND THE HUMAN TRAGEDY OF THE YEARS 1939 - 45. THE SUMMIT IN THE FRENCH CAPITAL SHOULD DEFINITIVELY CLOSE A CHAPTER ON MORE THAN 70 YEARS OF EUROPEAN AND WORLD HISTORY IN WHICH STATES AND AND NATIONS WERE DIVIDED ON THE BASIS OF DEFEATS AND VICTORIES. IT SHOULD OPEN A NEW CHAPTER IN WHICH ALL WILL HAVE THE SAME RIGHTS AND THE SAME OBLIGATIONS, IN WHICH ALL WILL BE (VERB MISSING IN CZECH TEXT) ''ONLY'' BY PEOPLES.

THE COUNTRIES OF NATO HAVE AT THIS MOMENT A GREAT OPPORTUNITY TO MOVE SUCH A DEVELOPMENT FIRMLY INTO THE FOREFRONT. THEY MUST USE IT TO THE FULL.

WITH REGARDS... VACLAV HAVEL

ENDS

2. ORIGINAL FOLLOWS BY BAG.

O'KEEFFE

YYYY

PNHPAN 9231

SVLNAN 9889

NNNN

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T151 B190

Unofficial Translation

SUBJECT cc Market OPS

"Dear Mrs. Margaret Thatcher,

I recieved Your message of June the 27th, which You passed through our Ambassador. With gratitude I note Your desire to adopt at the London meeting of heads of NATO member-states such decisions on the transformation of relations between NATO and WPT, their member-states, which would open the way to the formation of new structures of European security. Our discussions in Moscow give ground for hope that the Soviet leadership's point of view will be taken into consideration in London. We also count that the declaration to be adopted there, will be a constructive contribution to the bilateral and multilateral efforts in settling external aspects of building the German unity.

We share the view that stability in Europe is a vital prerequisite for its democratic development. It, in turn, is impossible without the success of our perestroika. This is a question of strategic nature. In Your statements on this matter we see a desire to uphold the renovation of our society and thus to render good service to the whole of Europe.

It is clear that the central issue for perestroika today is to turn to the better the complicated situation in our economy. Moreover, it has to be accomplished within the nearest two - three year period.

It was with satisfaction that we took note of the constructive character of the Dublin session of the European Council, conclusions adopted with your perticipation, on the financial and other assistance to the Soviet Union. We also view positively the EC Commission's intention to specify through its contacts with us the appropriate concrete measures. We are preparing to discuss the matters pertinent in that context with Mr. J.Delors.

You have informed me in Your message, that the summit of the "seven" in Houston would review the approaches to widening the co-operation with the Soviet Union. I would like to say frankly that in the present conditions we develop requirements

of dual nature - both in the sense of obtaining urgent loans to level the balance of payments and to purchase the consumer goods, as well as finance for the specific programmes of investment co-operation with the participation of international consortia. The experience of the last years has shown that a full-scale co-operation would not start by itself. What is needed - is a special state programme, stimulation of investment through tax policies and other incentives.

I took note of your idea that international economic and financial organisations could also be included into this process. In my view, we can find some common ground on this issue as well.

If Houston conclusions were to be in this vein, we could agree to set up groups of experts who could, together with our specialists, work out recommendations on the implementation of specific programmes.

I am grateful for Your desire to see a positive conclusion to the Houston discussions of the practical support to our reform. Quite frankly, I appreciate Your message in these difficult time as a demonstration of good will towards our country.

With kind regards,

M. Gorbachev

4 July 1990"

Уважаемая госпожа Маргарет Тэтчер,

Получил Ваше послание от 27 июня с.г., которое Вы передали через нашего посла. С признательностью отмечаю Ваше стремление к тому, чтобы лондонская встреча руководителей стран-членов НАТО наметила такие решения о трансформации отношений ОВД и НАТО, стран - их членов, которые открывали бы путь к складыванию новых структур европейской безопасности. Наши дискуссии в Москве позволяют надеяться, что точка зрения советского руководства на этот счет будет учтена на встрече в Лондоне. Рассчитываем также, что заявление, которое будет принято там, конструктивно впишется в двусторонние и многосторонние усилия применительно к внешним аспектам строительства германского единства.

У нас единое мнение о том, что стабильность в Европе - жизненная предпосылка для ее демократического развития. Она же невозможна без успеха нашей перестройки. Это стратегический вопрос. В Ваших заявлениях на этот счет мы видим желание поддержать обновление нашего общества и тем самым сослужить добрую службу всей Европе.

Понятно, что центральный момент перестройки сейчас - это переломить к лучшему непростую ситуацию в нашей экономике. Причем сделать это необходимо в течение ближайших двух - трех лет.

Мы с удовлетворением отмечаем конструктивный характер решений дублинской сессии Совета ЕС, принятых с Вашим участием, об оказании финансового и иного содействия Советскому Союзу. Позитивно мы восприняли и планы Комиссии европейских сообществ уточнить в контактах с нами соответствующие конкретные меры. Мы готовимся обсудить возникающие в этой связи вопросы с господином Ж.Делором.

В своем послании Вы сообщили о том, что на встрече в верхах "семерки" в Хьюстоне будут рассмотрены подходы к расширению сотрудничества с Советским Союзом. Хотел бы откровенно сказать, что в нынешних условиях у нас возникают потребности двоякого рода, связанные как с получением срочных финансовых кредитов

для выравнивания платежного баланса и приобретения необходимых товаров для населения, так и с финансированием целевых программ инвестиционного сотрудничества с привлечением международных консорциумов. Опыт прошедших лет показал, что масштабное сотрудничество не пойдет самотеком. Нужны специальная государственная программа, налоговое и иное стимулирование инвестиций.

Обратил внимание на Вашу мысль о том, что к этим процессам могут быть подключены и международные экономические и финансовые организации. Думаю, что и здесь мы можем найти общие подходы.

Если решения в Хьюстоне пойдут в этом направлении, мы могли бы договориться о создании экспертных групп, которые совместно с нашими специалистами выработали бы рекомендации по реализации конкретных программ.

С благодарностью воспринимаю Ваше стремление к тому, чтобы обсуждение мер практической поддержки наших реформ завершилось в Хьюстоне позитивным образом. Скажу откровенно, Ваше послание в этот сложный момент расцениваю как проявление добрых чувств к нашей стране.

С уважением,

М.Горбачев

4 июля 1990 года

CANADA

PRIME MINISTER • PREMIER MINISTRE

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T151A/90

SUBJECT cc Marte OPS

July 4, 1990

Dear Margaret

I hope you will enjoy this work by Walter Bachinski, one of our finest sculptors. It is called 'Mother and Child'.

Both Mila and I had wanted to thank you most sincerely for your expressions of support during the last few trying months. Your thoughtfulness has genuinely appreciated.

Yours sincerely

Brian

Prime Minister

CDS
5/7

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TELNO 519
OF 041620Z JULY 90
INFO DESKBY 041800Z UKDEL NATO
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, MOSCOW
INFO PRIORITY EAST EUROPEAN POSTS AND NATO POSTS

NATO SUMMIT: MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT HAVEL

1. THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S PERSONAL ADVISER ASKED ME TO CALL THIS AFTERNOON IN ORDER TO GIVE ME A MESSAGE ADDRESSED TO THE PRIME MINISTER IN HER CAPACITY AS HOST TO TOMORROW'S LONDON NATO SUMMIT. THE TEXT, WHICH PALOUS SAID THE PRESIDENT PARTICULARLY WISHED TO BE DELIVERED BEFORE THE SUMMIT STARTED, IS IN MIFT.

O'KEEFFE

YYYY

PNHPAN 9226

SVLNAN 9890

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CONFIDENTIAL

file
to
c: weapons

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

4 July 1990

Dear Hugh,

**NATO SUMMIT DECLARATION**

Thank you for your letter of 4 July about the continuing dispute with the Americans over the phrase "weapons of last resort". I have been able to discuss the proposed new amendments only very briefly with the Prime Minister. She does not want us to put any alternative language to the Americans tonight, and is sceptical of the text enclosed with your letter. We shall have to look at this again tomorrow.

I have put one suggestion to her, on a personal basis, which is as follows:

> "With the total withdrawal of Soviet stationed forces and the implementation of a CFE Agreement, the Alliance will adapt its strategy, so as to make it even clearer that our forces are deterrent forces whose purpose is to prevent war. In other words they are weapons of last resort".

That seems to me to have the advantage of giving a definition to "weapons of last resort" with which we are content.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,

C. D. POWELL

J.S. Wall, Esq., LVO,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

file
KW

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

4 July 1990

**SOVIET UNION**

Mr Kossov of the Soviet Embassy called on me this evening to deliver President Gorbachev's reply to the Prime Minister's message of 27 June. I enclose the Russian original with an English translation.

Kossov said that the Prime Minister's message had been very well received in Moscow at what was a difficult moment for Mr Gorbachev and we should note that the language of the reply was particularly warm. Gorbachev had tried to spell out in the reply the view he took on the question of financial assistance to the Soviet Union, and how it might be organised, and hoped the Prime Minister would find this useful when it came to the Economic Summit. He would have no objection to her drawing on the message either at the NATO Summit or in Houston.

I am copying this letter, with the English translation of the enclosure, to John Gieve (HM Treasury), Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence), Martin Stanley (Department of Trade and Industry), Eamoinn Taylor (Overseas Development Administration) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

**CHARLES POWELL**

J.S. Wall Esq LVO
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL

Referred to HD/SEC IOLD for dist.
Advanced to PS
PS/No 10 ✓
MR GOULDEN

6 (A-B)

SECRET
PERSONAL DEDIP
FM UKREP BRUSSELS
TO DESKBY 041400Z FCO
TELNO 2032
OF 041315Z JULY 90
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, UKDEL NATO

FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

MIPT: THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S TALK WITH THE U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE, BRUSSELS, 4 JULY: NATO SUMMIT DECLARATION

1. BAKER SAID THE DECLARATION SHOULD HAVE AS LITTLE AS POSSIBLE FOR BUREAUCRATISE, HAVE A HIGH POLITICAL CONTENT AND BE REASONABLY SHORT. THE AMERICANS BELIEVED THAT THE INITIATIVES IN THEIR DRAFT WERE SENSIBLE AND WORTH ISSUING IN THE DECLARATION BOTH FOR THEIR INTRINSIC MERITS AND FOR THEIR PRESENTATIONAL VALUE. THE PRESENTATIONAL PITCH WAS NOT JUST TO THE SOVIET UNION BUT TO GERMAN PUBLIC OPINION. MORE WAS NEEDED THAN JUST GERMAN UNIFICATION WITH A UNITED GERMANY IN NATO: SUPPORT FOR NATO BY GERMAN PUBLIC OPINION WOULD BE CRUCIAL OVER THE NEXT FEW YEARS. THIS WOULD BE DIFFICULT. THAT MORNING FOR EXAMPLE MECKEL, THE GDR FOREIGN MINISTER, HAD BEEN TALKING TO HIM ABOUT THE DENUCLEARISATION OF GERMANY AND GETTING ALL ALLIED TROOPS OUT OF BERLIN.

2. BAKER SAID HE KNEW WE HAD A PROBLEM WITH THE REFERENCE (PARAGRAPH 16 OF THE DRAFT) TO NUCLEAR FORCES AS WEAPONS OF LAST RESORT. IN THE AMERICANS' VIEW THIS WAS NO MORE THAN A RECOGNITION OF CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES. THE AMERICANS ALSO WISHED TO RETAIN THE SYMBOLIC INITIATIVES SUCH AS INVITING GORBACHEV TO NATO. THIS WAS A COST-FREE GESTURE.

3. THE SECRETARY OF STATE EXPLAINED THE UK DIFFICULTIES WITH PARAGRAPHS 16 AND 17. WE FELT VERY STRONGLY THAT A REFERENCE TO NUCLEAR FORCES AS WEAPONS OF LAST RESORT WOULD MAKE IT MOST DIFFICULT TO MAINTAIN THE CREDIBILITY OF SUB-STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS BECAUSE WEAPONS OF LAST RESORT WERE UNDERSTOOD TO BE STRATEGIC FORCES. WE SAW THE DANGER OF ABANDONING AN IMPORTANT PART OF THE ALLIES' DETERRENT. IN ADDITION PARAGRAPHS 16 AND 17 SEEMED TO PREEMPT THE OUTCOME OF THE REVIEW OF ALLIED STRATEGY. BUT AT THE SUMMIT WE WOULD BE ANXIOUS NOT TO CROSS SWORDS WITH THE AMERICANS.

4. BAKER SAID THERE HAD BEEN UNANIMITY OF SUPPORT IN WASHINGTON FOR ALL THE INITIATIVES IN THE U.S. DRAFT DECLARATION. THE SUPPORTERS HAD INCLUDED THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF AND THE DEFENCE SECRETARY. THE AMERICANS WERE NOT TALKING OF ABANDONING FLEXIBLE RESPONSE BUT THAT STRATEGY HAD ACQUIRED THE MEANING OF AN INTENTION TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS WITHIN THE FIRST FEW DAYS OF A CONFLICT. IT NEEDED TO BE MODIFIED IF SOVIET FORCES LEFT EASTERN EUROPE. DESCRIBING NUCLEAR FORCES AS WEAPONS OF LAST RESORT WAS TO ADOPT A DELIBERATELY AMBIGUOUS PHRASE, THE DEFINITION OF WHICH WOULD BE FOR THE ALLIES THEMSELVES. BAKER UNDERSTOOD IT TO MEAN THAT NUCLEAR FORCES WERE WEAPONS TO BE USED AT THE POINT WHEN THEY WERE NEEDED. IT WAS A PHRASE VASTLY PREFERABLE TO ''NO EARLY FIRST USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS''. THE ACCEPTANCE OF ''NO EARLY FIRST USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS'' IMPLIED ACCEPTANCE OF THE ANTI-NUCLEAR LOBBY'S TERMS OF DEBATE. ZOELLICK WONDERED IF IT WOULD HELP IF THE DRAFT SAID ''.... MAKING ITS NUCLEAR FORCES TRULY WEAPONS OF LAST RESORT IN EUROPE''. IF THIS AMENDMENT WAS NOT ACCEPTABLE COULD THE UK OFFER ANYTHING ELSE, IF POSSIBLE AHEAD OF THE START OF THE SUMMIT ITSELF?

5. THE SECRETARY OF STATE EXPLAINED AGAIN THE UK FEAR THAT REFERRING TO NUCLEAR FORCES AS WEAPONS OF LAST RESORT MIGHT REMOVE UNCERTAINTY IN THE MINDS OF A POTENTIAL AGGRESSOR. HE UNDERTOOK TO GET BACK TO THE AMERICANS ON LANGUAGE.

6. AT THE END OF THE MEETING BAKER TOLD THE SECRETARY OF STATE VERY PRIVATELY THAT THE GERMANS WERE SEEKING DELETION OF THE REFERENCE TO KEEPING WEAPONS UP TO DATE. TO FEND THEM OFF THE AMERICANS NEEDED TO MINIMISE OTHER CHANGES TO THE DRAFT DECLARATION, AND VERY MUCH WANTED TO RETAIN THE PHRASE ''LAST RESORT''.

7. PLEASE ADVANCE PS, PS/NO 10, GOULDEN AND HEAD SEC POL D.

HANNAY

YYYY

NNNN

DG2ACU

**WEAPONS OF "LAST RESORT"**

1. Para 16 of the US text states that the Alliance can "adopt a new NATO strategy making its nuclear forces truly weapons of last resort."

This has two main drawbacks:

(i) it carries the connotation of falling back on strategic systems, thereby weakening the rationale for theatre weapons. The Comprehensive Concept refers to strategic forces as the "ultimate guarantee", which carries the same flavour as "last resort";

(ii) it is simply ambiguous: unless clarified it will mean different things to different people. In the US it may be read as meaning that US forces will not enjoy nuclear cover.

Alternatives

(i) ....."adapt our nuclear strategy so as to make it even clearer that our nuclear forces are deterrent forces whose purpose is prevent war".

(ii) "We have always kept these weapons only for circumstances in which all other possibilities for preserving our freedom have been tried and found insufficient. In the transformed Europe we shall adapt our nuclear strategy to make it even clearer that our nuclear forces are deterrent forces whose purpose is to prevent war." (Comment: the first sentence glosses "last resort" in acceptable language based on NATO's main text on nuclear doctrine, MC 14/3.)

(iii) If it becomes clear that the words "last resort" are unavoidable, we could offer the following: "We remain determined that there shall be no circumstances in which a potential aggressor might discount the prospect of nuclear retaliation in response to military action. But we have always kept nuclear weapons only for circumstances in which all other possibilities for preserving our freedom have been tried and found insufficient. In the transformed Europe we shall adapt our nuclear strategy so as to make our [theatre and strategic] nuclear forces even more clearly instruments of "last resort". (Comment: the first sentence balances "last resort" by drawing on language from the Comprehensive Concept.)



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL London SW1A 2AH

4 July 1990

Dear Charles.

**NATO Summit Declaration**

The Foreign Secretary discussed with Jim Baker in Brussels this morning our concern that the phrase "weapons of last resort" was open to misinterpretation. He has sent the Prime Minister a minute about it.

The Foreign Secretary does not think the Americans will budge on having some reference to nuclear weapons as weapons of "last resort". They have already shown that they are prepared to leak their version of events. If we could have a row and win, that would be one thing. But we do not have enough allies to carry the day and either a stand-off or our reluctantly accepting the American text would make the Summit look like a failure. Baker suggested that our officials should get together before the Summit begins to try to work something out. I enclose some language for the nuclear paragraphs of the text which would retain the uncertainty on which flexible response depends. The Foreign Secretary would like to put this to the Americans this evening.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (MOD) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

Yours.

(J S Wall)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

Proposed revision of paras 12-16 of US draft on Nuclear Issues

12. Our Alliance should also reduce the size and adapt the tasks of its nuclear deterrent forces. We have long sought the lowest and most stable level of nuclear forces needed to secure the prevention of war. The political and military changes in Europe, and the prospect of further changes, now allow us to go further:

- we propose that new negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union on the reduction of short-range nuclear forces should begin shortly after a CFE agreement is signed. We will develop an arms control framework for these negotiations which takes into account our requirements for far fewer nuclear weapons, and the diminished need for theatre nuclear systems of the shortest range;

- [we have decided that, once negotiations begin on short-range nuclear forces, the Alliance will propose the elimination, in return for reciprocal action by the Soviet Union, of all its nuclear artillery shells from Europe by the time all Soviet stationed forces in Europe have returned home;]

- with the total withdrawal of Soviet stationed forces and the implementation of a CFE agreement, the Alliance will adapt our strategy so as to make it even clearer that - while we are determined not to leave Europe safe for a purely conventional war [or without allowing anyone to discount the prospect of nuclear retaliation in response to military action] - our [strategic and sub-strategic] nuclear forces, as instruments of last resort, are purely deterrent weapons whose purpose is to prevent war.

CC PC
C. Lady

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

SECRET London SW1A 2AH

5(A-G)

4 July 1990

Dear Charles,

**Bilateral with President Bush: 6 July**

President Bush and the Prime Minister will meet over breakfast at No.10 from 0800-0900 hrs on 6 July. Their last meeting was in Bermuda on 13 April.

Washington telno 1560 describes the US domestic scene on the eve of the President's visit to London.

**Objectives**

These will be to:

- co-ordinate approaches at the NATO Summit;
- anchor US positions on the post-NATO Summit arms control agenda;
- co-ordinate views on German unification;
- seek common ground for the Houston Economic Summit (notably on economic aid to the Soviet Union, the Uruguay Round and the environment);
- co-ordinate views on pressing regional issues, notably the Middle East.
- agree future bilateral meetings.

The Prime Minister might draw on the following.

**START NON-CIRCUMVENTION**

Soviet intentions remain unclear despite approaches to us and the Americans expressing concern that unrestricted US/UK nuclear collaboration would be a circumvention of START. President Gorbachev told President Bush that US/UK co-operation should end after Trident II and that the UK and France should now become involved in START. But Shevardnadze's letter to the Foreign Secretary and their subsequent meeting in East Berlin on 22 June suggested that, rather than seeking to restrict co-operation after Trident, the Russians may want a statement from us confirming that we will not deploy strategic weapons other than Trident. (We have no plans to do so, but do not want to constrain our options). Shevardnadze also proposed that officials discuss

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this (which we oppose since it would de facto draw us into the negotiation).

The Americans have repeatedly told us that there will be no START Treaty if the Russians persist. We are now showing to the Americans our proposed reply to Shevardnadze. The next steps will be for the US and Russians to discuss the issue at the START negotiations in Geneva. We do not envisage further involvement once our position has been made clear in reply to Shevardnadze.

**SNF**

We and the Americans have been discussing at working level ideas about NATO's position in SNF negotiations. No conclusions have been reached. President Bush may not be fully sighted on the details. The Prime Minister might concentrate on the tactical handling of this issue at the Summit, emphasising the need to avoid damaging divisions on the substance.

If, as we hope, the NATO Summit agrees to establish a Special Consultative Group (SCG), we shall want to stay close to the Americans on how its work is handled. Ideally, we want to avoid the SCG reporting to NATO Foreign Ministers, until we are more certain about the likelihood of a German Government agreeing to take TASM. This points to playing it long. But the Americans may be sensitive to competing pressures in the Alliance for rapid progress in agreeing a negotiating mandate - to respond to the Soviet proposals for negotiations this autumn in advance of CFE signature. We want to resist this. We see no need to reward the Russians for their delaying tactics in CFE.

**GERMANY**

The 2+4 Ministerial meeting on 22 June made some progress. The next Ministerial meeting on 17 July (in Paris) is to consider a list of outstanding problems (primarily politico-military issues) to decide how and in what forum each should be handled. Although a Soviet text tabled on 22 June showed no flexibility, Shevardnadze and subsequent official-level contacts offered the possibility of compromise. The Russians attach much importance to the outcome of the NATO Summit and will be influenced by the CPSU Congress. The Ministerial meeting in Moscow in September may be the key to real progress.

The Prime Minister might say:

- while the Russians have genuine difficulties over the prospect of German unification, they will also make use of these to influence German public opinion.

C

- your nine points and the message from the NATO Summit should provide sufficient material to reassure the Russians, especially about capping the Bundeswehr.

- out of the question that 2+4 should take decisions on pol-mil issues dealt with in other fora. But a final 2+4 document, containing the text of a settlement, could usefully make cross-references to the other fora.

- must continue to reject Soviet attempts to prolong Four Power rights beyond unification, as well as their idea that the Four Powers now have any right to determine a special status for Germany.

- have stressed to de Maizière that we are conscious of Gorbachev's difficulties but we must keep our defences.

**HOUSTON ECONOMIC SUMMIT**

President Bush sent a message to the Prime Minister on 26 June, in which he highlighted two potentially divisive issues amongst the key subjects for Houston: trade and the environment. He hoped that Heads of Government could achieve breakthroughs which would allow governments to move forward on both. He also referred to the need to discuss the Soviet Union's request for Western assistance and said he would be back in touch on the subject. A summary of our views on these three issues follows.

The Uruguay Round

The GATT Uruguay Round will be a key issue at Houston. It is important that Houston finds a way forward. EC/US differences over agriculture remain to be resolved. The US are insisting on commitments to specified cuts in each of three areas of agriculture protectionism: internal support, import protection, and export subsidies. The EC want to base action on an aggregate measure of support (AMS) which will have an impact on all three areas of protectionism, including the export subsidies which are in fact the American main concern. But a cut in aggregate means of support cannot easily be translated into specified cuts in each of the three areas. This reflects the integrated way in which the CAP operates. We have been pressing the Commission to show more flexibility.

President Bush's letter to the Prime Minister reinforces in a constructive way the need for agreement on agriculture without demanding specific commitments. But the US stuck to a tough position at the New York Sherpas Meeting. It is not therefore clear on which terms the US will settle. Nor is it yet clear that the Commission and other member states are ready to reach agreement.

Meanwhile, the Chairman of the GATT Agriculture Negotiating Group has proposed specific commitments to reduce export subsidies by more than internal support, thus putting pressure on the EC. It will first be discussed in the EC on 6 July: we will encourage a constructive response.

If the GATT Round succeeds, particularly in agreeing strengthened rules for dispute settlement, then we expect the US to give up their practice of using unilateral measures. At the OECD Ministerial they agreed to use only multilateral routes if the dispute settlement rules were tightened up. We want them to repeat this at Houston.

The Prime Minister might say:

- Houston can make a real contribution to the GATT Uruguay Round. As you said in your letter, important that we do not simply restate EC/US differences on agriculture.

- EC's global approach, based on cuts in Aggregate Measure of Support, has great merit. Allows us to compare reductions in support and protection in our different systems. And will have an impact on export subsidies.

- But recognise that you want some assurance about effects of cuts in Aggregate Measure of Support on particular policies. We must try to find a way forward.

- We all want strengthened GATT rules, particularly on dispute settlement. If we succeed in getting them, then must be ready to commit ourselves to using the GATT system rather than unilateral measures.

Environment

The discussion of environmental issues, especially climate change, went better at the last meeting of Sherpas. The Americans seemed ready to agree that the environment section of the draft communique would identify the Second World Climate Conference as an opportunity to discuss an effective international response to climate change. The draft communique also addresses a Climate Convention under the auspices of UNEP and WMO, to be completed by 1992. But the Americans envisage a slower start to work on implementing protocols to the Convention than other Summit countries do.

The Prime Minister might draw on the following:

- Much has happened since last year, particularly on climate change. The IPCC report clarifies the science a great deal. World looking to Houston Summit to take forward debate on the environment, as your message of 26 June acknowledges.

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- Very much welcome your contribution to successful outcome of London Conference on Ozone Layer.

- On Climate Change, know you want more research and study on key issues. But we must also show progress on policy choices at Houston. Hope you can agree that Second World Climate Conference is place to consider strategies for stabilising greenhouse gas emissions. Important that Summit gives clear signal of determination to tackle problem, to help enlist third world cooperation in international response.

- Thereafter, focus should be on a climate convention, to be prepared under UNEP/WMO auspices. Need to start work both on a Convention and supporting protocols, to keep up momentum.

Aid for the Soviet Union

Possible assistance for Soviet economic reform will be high on the agenda at Houston. The Prime Minister may wish to explain our approach, in the light of the decisions taken at the Dublin European Council.

MIDDLE EAST

The peace process has been stalled since March. The stalemate is heightening the pressure on moderate Palestinian leaders who have little to show for their concessions. Soviet Jewish emigration, continuing repression in the Occupied Territories and the perceived US bias towards Israel feed Arab resentment. The 30 May terrorist raid on the Israeli coast and the subsequent US suspension of its dialogue with the PLO have set back the peace process. Tension has been heightened by belligerent Iraqi rhetoric and the situation is serious. King Hussein and other friends in the region are gravely concerned. The President may not know that the King has copied the Prime Minister his message urging the President in blunt language to act with the Israelis.

The Prime Minister will wish to:

- emphasise our concern at this dangerous situation

- urge the President to remain engaged in the peace process and to continue to work on Shamir to agree to a dialogue with representative Palestinians.

- say that we are concentrating our efforts, in our contacts with the PLO and aid to the Occupied Territories, on encouraging Palestinian moderation.

- explain that pressure for a higher EC profile is inevitable if US efforts with Israel do not produce early results. But we shall try to ensure that any initiative complements US efforts and is discussed with the US in advance.

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Recent statements from Iran on relations with the West (the US excepted) have been generally positive. However, the hardliners in Tehran remain in the picture and Rafsanjani's policy of rebuilding the economy under the new Five Year Plan, with Western assistance, can only proceed at a measured pace. The regime's more pragmatic approach to foreign policy including the release of the two US hostages, results from economic pressure, increased in the wake of the recent earthquake. But there is still no convincing Iranian commitment to internationally accepted standards of behaviour. The EC are currently attempting to negotiate statements on principles to govern EC/Iran relations, including Iranian respect for international norms of behaviour.

**SOUTH AFRICA**

The Prime Minister may wish to compare notes on Mandela, since she and the President will have just met him. The visit to the US (20-30 June) was a public relations success for Mandela and has stiffened the resolve of Congress to stand firm on sanctions. The President's public call for renunciation of the armed struggle met with a rebuke from Mr Mandela that the President was not properly briefed by the ANC.

The Prime Minister may also like to brief President Bush on the outcome of the Dublin Summit and suggest that the Houston Political Declaration should take a similar line in:

- recognising change in South Africa,

- calling for an end to violence and the rhetoric of armed struggle,

- recognising the need for capital inflows, including from the international financial institutions, to support the economic under-pinning of the transition in South Africa.

She might add that the last can only become practicable when the US lifts its block on IMF balance of payment facilities and urge President Bush to work for that with Congress.

**HONG KONG**

Mr Maude's visit to China (24-27 July) will largely focus on Hong Kong issues. His objective will be to improve our bilateral relations over Hong Kong and to persuade the Chinese to take a less unhelpful attitude on important Hong Kong issues, such as the new airport, the Bill of Rights, and the Nationality package.

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The Prime Minister might thank President Bush for his willingness to take account of Hong Kong's interests in his decision to renew China's MFN status (she wrote to him on 23 May and he has since stated publicly that the Hong Kong factor weighed heavily in the balance in reaching his decision). Congress, whose reaction is awaited, is unlikely to be able to overturn a Presidential veto.

**CHINA**

Dr Fang Lizhi, China's leading dissident, arrived in the UK on 25 June. This followed a confidential agreement between the US and China allowing his release from Peking where had sought refuge in the American Embassy in June 1989. Since his arrival, the Chinese have made a number of heavy-handed representations asking us to prevent Fang from contacting the press during his stay. The US have also expressed concern about Fang speaking to the press (in part reflecting anxiety that this would affect the prospect of Fang's remaining son leaving China). Fang appeared briefly before the media at the Royal Society on 29 June to issue a short and anodyne statement asking the press to desist from hounding him. He will now take up his appointment at Cambridge, organised by the Royal Society.

**COLOMBIA**

Colombia's President-elect Gaviria recently expressed concern to the Prime Minister at the "conditions" attached to US assistance, and his suspicions that the US was impeding additional help to Colombia from the World Bank, and obstructing Colombian trade to the detriment of their economy. The Prime Minister undertook to mention this to President Bush. But she will wish to be aware that Gaviria may have exaggerated the problems. IBRD stall do not believe the US is delaying World Bank lending.

The Prime Minister may wish to take this opportunity to inform the President of our plans to begin delivery of the £4.5 million worth of further British training and equipment to the Colombians as soon as possible after Senor Gaviria's inauguration in August.

Yours ever,

(J S Wall)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

SECRET

CC PC
V Backup.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL London SW1A 2AH

4 July 1990

Dear Charles,

**Bilateral with Prime Minister Mulroney: 5 July**

The Canadians have let us know through NATO, and through their High Commission here, that Mr Mulroney would much welcome a meeting with the Prime Minister in the margins of the NATO Summit. We have warned them that you are hoping to arrange this in Lancaster House following the afternoon session on 5 July. On past form, Mr Mulroney will be accompanied by Mr Stanley Hartt, his Executive Assistant, and by the Canadian High Commissioner.

The Prime Minister and Mr Mulroney both attended the North Atlantic Council meeting in December and the Commonwealth Heads of Government Conference in Kuala Lumpur but their last substantive bilateral was a year ago, at No.10, just before the Paris Economic Summit.

Mr Mulroney wishes to give the Prime Minister his personal view of prospects for Canada in the light of the current constitutional problems - as well as for himself and his Progressive Conservative Party. He may also wish to raise EC/Canada points (including Fisheries) and discuss the World Summit for Children. The Prime Minister could usefully touch on major issues at the NATO and Houston Summits.

**Canadian Constititional Situation**

Mr Mulroney is said to be exhausted in the aftermath of the Meech Lake constitutional crisis. His own political future is in question. Six Quebec MP's have so far left his Progressive Conservative Party. With a Parliamentary majority of only 25 and a standing in the polls of, at best 17%, his Government may be hard pressed to survive. There is no simple explanation as to why Meech Lake failed, and why it will not be easy to find a satisfactory alternative. The nub is that it remains very difficult to resolve outstanding problems in the two-dimensional (Anglo-French) model of Canada - and that it is no longer sufficient to do so. The third dimension (Indians, immigrants from third countries) can no longer be ignored. There is likely to be a pause for reflection over the summer. Quebec will examine its options. Proposals for some form of "sovereignty association" will probably emerge in the Autumn.

The UK's interest must lie in a unified Canada: and Canada's friends would rather she spoke with a single voice in

the Alliance, Group of Seven, United Nations and other international fora. But, given Canadian sensitivities, we should be cautious that in any public comment we do not appear to be interfering in Canada's internal affairs.

EC/Canada Relations

The Canadians are anxious not to be left out. They recently proposed to the Irish Presidency political consultation arrangements similar to those between the EC and US. We have argued in support of the Canadian proposal but there is a general reluctance in the Community to concede parity of treatment with the US. The Irish reply was non-committal.

The June Dublin European Council suggested a joint transatlantic declaration between the Twelve, US and Canada. We have doubts about this or indeed any treaty-like instrument which would raise divisive competence problems. If raised by Mr Mulroney, the Prime Minister could say:

- We will continue to argue your case in the Community for closer consultative links.

- Declaration idea only briefly raised in Dublin as one option for transatlantic cooperation. Community has not yet discussed in detail.

- (If necessary) An all-embracing declaration would raise competence problems. A short joint statement of commitment to closer relations would make better public impact and avoid EC pitfalls.

EC/Canada Fishing

The Canadians are also concerned about excessive fishing by Community vessels (mainly Spanish and Portuguese) in international waters adjacent to their territorial waters. The Community has responded by enforcing fisheries regulations and reducing catch levels. The Prime Minister made these points in a letter of 11 March replying to one from Mr Mulroney (copy enclosed). As a result of a useful visit to Canada in May by Mr Marin the (Spanish) EC Fisheries Commissioner, the EC and Canada have agreed to cooperate in fisheries research. If Mr Mulroney raises this subject, the Prime Minister could say:

- Recognise Canadian concerns. But, as I said in my reply to you of 11 March, this is a matter of Community competence. Little that can be done to further to allay Canadian concerns this year.

- Understand EC Fisheries Commissioner Marin had useful and constructive exchanges during his visit to Canada in May.

- 1990 EC catch levels in north-west Atlantic significantly lower than in 1989, and reflect a genuine attempt to balance Canadian and Community interests.

**World Summit for Children: New York, 29 Sept-1 Oct 1990**

Mr Mulroney may try to persuade the Prime Minister to attend personally. (He also intends to raise it at Houston). He is concerned that no other G7 member has yet agreed to attend. Our High Commissioner in Ottawa has been told in confidence that Mr Mulroney's main concern may be less with the substance of the meeting than with not ending up chairing a highly publicised but thinly attended flop. We have worked constructively in the Planning Committee and both working groups to try to ensure the Summit's success. The Prime Minister may wish to remain non-committal for now.

**Alliance points**

This would be a good occasion for the Prime Minister to:

- remind Mr Mulroney of the need to maintain NATO's defensive rôle as an effective insurance policy for the West;

- stress the political importance we attach to a continued Canadian military presence in Europe, and in the broader NATO context, as a tangible expression of transatlantic cooperation. (The Canadians sometimes feel that they do not get sufficient credit for their contribution - including 7000 troops in Germany, excellent low-flying facilities in Labrador as well as other troop training facilities elsewhere in Canada).

The Canadians do not take a prominent part in CFE, but they have been active proponents of Open Skies. If the subject is raised the Prime Minister could say:

- an Open Skies agreement, along the lines of the Western proposal discussed in Ottawa and Budapest, would serve a useful purpose - promoting openness, and assisting in verification of a CFE agreement, (especially on observation beyond the Urals);

- but we have doubts about negotiations until the Soviets show willingness to modify the unacceptable features of their approach (insistence that Soviet aircraft should be used in overflights of the Soviet Union, and unwillingness to accept more than a few overflights per year).

**Houston Summit Issues**

This would be a good opportunity for the Prime Minister to explain our approach. She could say:

(a) Aid to Soviet Union.

Dublin European Council commissioned preliminary analysis of the problems faced by the Soviet economy. We can decide possible remedy only when we know precisely what the patient is suffering from:

- lack of money not their problem. They need expertise and must learn how to mobilise their own resources. Essentially they are a rich, not a poor country;

- If our help is to be effective, it must be preceded by Soviet commitment to major structural reform. As aid begins to flow, reforms - including lasting switch away from spending on military programmes - must be implemented; no reform means no aid;

- Must not be just an EC exercise; there has to be broader coordination, above all with North America, Japan, and others with real expertise, including IMF (conditionality crucial for any help to bolster reform)

- Wrong to prejudge preliminary analysis. Best way forward may not be through eg new loan facilities for Soviet Union but through increased training and know-how. This our line in Twelve. Hope for Canadian support at Houston.

(b) Agriculture/dispute settlement etc.

EC differences with US and Canada over agriculture are unresolved and Mr Mulroney may raise these. The US, supported by Canada, is demanding specified cuts in internal support, import protection, and export subsidies (main US concern). The EC's response is the Aggregate Measure of Support (AMS) Canada has also played a leading role in the debate on strenthened rules for dispute settlement and the idea of bringing GATT within a multilateral trade organisation. Both these issues are covered in acceptable terms in the draft communique.

The Prime Minister might draw on the following:

- Houston can make a real contribution to the GATT Uruguay Round. Must not simply restate differences on agriculture.

- EC's global approach, based on Aggregate Measure of Support, has great merit. Allows for comparison of reductions in support and protection in our different systems. And will have an impact on export subsidies.

- But recognise that you want some assurance about effects of AMS on particular areas of agricultural protectionism. Text circulated by the Chairman of the Agriculture Negotiating

Group in Geneva (de Zeeun) puts the ball in the EC's court. It will be discussed tomorrow (6 July). We have pressed commission to show flexibility.

- Welcome constructive contribution Canada has made to debate on dispute settlement and the idea of a multilateral trade organisation. Latest draft of communique contains useful language on both these issues.

(c) Environmental Issues.

Despite confused discussion among Sherpas, UK and Canadian positions have been generally close. Sherpas have now rectified omissions from environmental section of the first draft of the communiqué, eg Second World Climate Conference. The document is now much improved. The Prime Minister could say:

- Great deal has been achieved since last year, particularly on climate change. IPCC report clairifes the science considerably.

- Know the US would prefer more research and study on key issues but important we show progress at Houston on policy choices.

- Houston should clearly signal international determination to tackle climate change. Second World Climate Conference in November must be identified as place to consider strategies for stabilising greenhouse gas emissions.

- Houston must also signal our firm support for negotiation, under UNEPO and WMO auspices, of Climate Change Convention by 1992. Must avoid differing views on timetable for associated Protocols becoming divisive.

- Third World co-operation on climate change essential. Montreal Protocol meeting in London showed this should be possible, with patience.

- I have already told President Bush all this. Hope you can offer support.

Yours ever,

(S L Gass)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

2/3

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIEL

PRIME MINISTER · PREMIER MINISTRE

OTTAWA, K1A 0A2

February 27, 1990

Dear Margaret,

As you may be aware, I wrote to President Jacques Delors last December to express my dismay at the decision taken by the Community's Council of Ministers concerning the EEC's fishing quota for northern cod and to ask the Council to review its decision.

I am now writing to you as a friend of Canada and as a colleague who I know is conscious of the necessity to respect the concept of sustainable development in the field of fisheries as well as in the rest of our environment.

By objecting to the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO) decision respecting a moratorium on the fishing of cod in the 2J3KL area and by unilaterally adopting a quota of 32,000 tonnes, the Community is flying in the face of the spirit of cooperation that should prevail within NAFO. Moreover, the Community failure to respect this conservation measure has become an important factor in the current fishery crisis in Atlantic Canada. The social, economic and political implications of this crisis are formidable and they constitute a major challenge for my government.

The Right Honourable Margaret Thatcher
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom
10 Downing Street
London, England

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I have noted with satisfaction that the Council of Ministers has decided to reduce the Community's quotas for certain stocks that are considered endangered and to bring them down to, or close to, NAFO recommended level. I urge you to use your influence within the Community to return to the spirit of cooperation that characterized the EEC's participation in NAFO until 1986. We should not let this irritant overshadow the otherwise fruitful relationship between the Community and Canada.

I would be pleased to discuss this crucial issue with you in a more detailed fashion at the earliest opportunity.

Yours sincerely,

(31)

MWC 134/4

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10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

11 March 1990

Dear Brian.

(23)

Thank you for your letter of 27 February about the EEC's fishing quota for northern cod.

I know of your correspondence with M. Delors in December, and of the exchange of letters between Tom Siddon and John Gummer concerning the Community's decisions on quotas in the NAFO area. Following his meeting with you in Ottawa in February, Douglas Hurd passed on to M. Delors your continuing serious concern.

As you recognise, these are matters of Community competence and I am grateful to you for recognising that the recent decisions of the Council of Ministers to reduce the Community's quotas for certain stocks were not easy. As regards your point about the 2J2KL cod stock, the Community has in fact reduced its quota for this stock by 62 per cent over the last twelve months, proportionately more than reductions by Canada for the same stock. In both cases, this has been in response to the concerns expressed by international scientists on the state of the stock. I can assure you that we are very much aware of the importance of continued careful fisheries management.

I fully agree with you that these differences in approach should not be allowed to overshadow the relationship between Canada and the Community. The EC/Canada Joint Co-operation committee meeting in May will provide an opportunity for further discussion.

With warm regards,

Yours sincerely,

Margaret

The Right Honourable Brian Mulroney



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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL London SW1A 2AH

4 July 1990

CDP
4/7

Dear Charles,

**NATO Summit: European Energy Community**

Our Embassy in The Hague have told us that the Dutch may raise their proposal for a "European Energy Community" at the NATO Summit on 5-6 July. This is particularly likely to come up if aid to the Soviet Union is discussed.

The Dutch circulated a paper with their proposal at the European Council on 25 July. Their ideas are very thin on detail but seem to envisage a new "community" comprising all of Western and Eastern Europe, as well as the Soviet Union, to boost cooperation on energy matters. The European Coal and Steel Community is cited as an inspiration. There are no details in the structure of the new community other than that there would be a basic charter providing a framework for greater integration of European energy supplies. The Dutch also seem to see the new community as a possible channel to help the Soviet Union restructure its energy industry and boost its exports, notably of gas, for which there could be strong demand in Western Europe in the long run.

We understand that Mr Lubbers has made his proposal in the context of the debate on aid to the Soviet Union and as an apparent alternative to Kohl's approach. However, this was not the main focus of the paper. Mr Lubbers may be particularly keen to discuss it at the NATO Summit as the Dutch are excluded from the G7 meeting in Houston, where aid to the Soviet Union will be a major issue.

The Prime Minister may wish to make the following points if the subject is raised:

- Agree that more active economic relationship between Western and Eastern Europe could play central role in defusing tensions. Right to focus on energy as potentially key sector. Striking complementarity of long term economic interests on gas trade.

/- Energy

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- Energy of high economic importance to USSR. Accounts for over 40% of hard currency exports. But managed with spectacular inefficiency, not least because prices unrelated to world prices. Must be a priority area for reform and candidate for assistance. Confident that if market conditions are made right Western Companies could play major role. Dutch proposal useful contribution to discussion.

- Cautious, however, about grandiose terms like "community". Role of Government must be to create conditions for fruitful economic exchange, giving market forces greatest possible play. Should not at this stage establish structures disproportionate to that objective.

I am copying this letter to John Neilson (Department of Energy).

Yours ever,

(S L Gass)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

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(1)

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PM/90/047

PRIME MINISTER

4/7.

## NATO Summit Declaration

1. You will have seen the telegram reporting my talk with Baker today. This is a gloss on that account. He and Zoellick were genuinely taken aback that anyone should suppose that their phrase "last resort" cast doubt on the credibility of theatre nuclear forces. Their military had been through the text and seen no objection. Uncertainty as to what "last resort" meant would be fully preserved in the mind of an enemy commander, and that was the point. There was not the slightest intention on the part of the Americans to run risks with NATO strategy. The real risk to NATO lay with German opinion. A dispute about nuclear doctrine within NATO could set off an argument in Germany, with disastrous results for us all. That in sum is the American case.

2. I made clear your deep unhappiness, but also your knowledge that a dispute in the Council is a dispute in the street. Genscher's line (separate and also private) was that the Germans had troubles with the US text. So did we, he understood, from the opposite direction. Better to leave it alone, on the basis of the American text.

[A German/American fix].

CONFIDENTIAL

3. Dumas was not in Brussels. It is not Mitterrand's style, or present mood, to fight robustly as a comrade by your side.

(DOUGLAS HURD)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
4 July 1990

Referred to HD/Sec Pol D for dist
Advanced to PS ✓
PS/No 10
Mr Gozden

SECRET
PERSONAL DEDIP
FM UKREP BRUSSELS
TO DESKBY 041400Z FCO
TELNO 2032
OF 041315Z JULY 90
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, UKDEL NATO

FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

MIPT: THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S TALK WITH THE U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE, BRUSSELS, 4 JULY: NATO SUMMIT DECLARATION

1. BAKER SAID THE DECLARATION SHOULD HAVE AS LITTLE AS POSSIBLE FOR BUREAUCRATISE, HAVE A HIGH POLITICAL CONTENT AND BE REASONABLY SHORT. THE AMERICANS BELIEVED THAT THE INITIATIVES IN THEIR DRAFT WERE SENSIBLE AND WORTH ISSUING IN THE DECLARATION BOTH FOR THEIR INTRINSIC MERITS AND FOR THEIR PRESENTATIONAL VALUE. THE PRESENTATIONAL PITCH WAS NOT JUST TO THE SOVIET UNION BUT TO GERMAN PUBLIC OPINION. MORE WAS NEEDED THAN JUST GERMAN UNIFICATION WITH A UNITED GERMANY IN NATO: SUPPORT FOR NATO BY GERMAN PUBLIC OPINION WOULD BE CRUCIAL OVER THE NEXT FEW YEARS. THIS WOULD BE DIFFICULT. THAT MORNING FOR EXAMPLE MECKEL, THE GDR FOREIGN MINISTER, HAD BEEN TALKING TO HIM ABOUT THE DENUCLEARISATION OF GERMANY AND GETTING ALL ALLIED TROOPS OUT OF BERLIN.

2. BAKER SAID HE KNEW WE HAD A PROBLEM WITH THE REFERENCE (PARAGRAPH 16 OF THE DRAFT) TO NUCLEAR FORCES AS WEAPONS OF LAST RESORT. IN THE AMERICANS' VIEW THIS WAS NO MORE THAN A RECOGNITION OF CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES. THE AMERICANS ALSO WISHED TO RETAIN THE SYMBOLIC INITIATIVES SUCH AS INVITING GORBACHEV TO NATO. THIS WAS A COST-FREE GESTURE.

3. THE SECRETARY OF STATE EXPLAINED THE UK DIFFICULTIES WITH PARAGRAPHS 16 AND 17. WE FELT VERY STRONGLY THAT A REFERENCE TO NUCLEAR FORCES AS WEAPONS OF LAST RESORT WOULD MAKE IT MOST DIFFICULT TO MAINTAIN THE CREDIBILITY OF SUB-STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS BECAUSE WEAPONS OF LAST RESORT WERE UNDERSTOOD TO BE STRATEGIC FORCES. WE SAW THE DANGER OF ABANDONING AN IMPORTANT PART OF THE ALLIES' DETERRENT. IN ADDITION PARAGRAPHS 16 AND 17 SEEMED TO PREEMPT THE OUTCOME OF THE REVIEW OF ALLIED STRATEGY. BUT AT THE SUMMIT WE WOULD BE ANXIOUS NOT TO CROSS SWORDS WITH THE AMERICANS.

4. BAKER SAID THERE HAD BEEN UNANIMITY OF SUPPORT IN WASHINGTON FOR ALL THE INITIATIVES IN THE U.S. DRAFT DECLARATION. THE SUPPORTERS HAD INCLUDED THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF AND THE DEFENCE SECRETARY. THE AMERICANS WERE NOT TALKING OF ABANDONING FLEXIBLE RESPONSE BUT THAT STRATEGY HAD ACQUIRED THE MEANING OF AN INTENTION TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS WITHIN THE FIRST FEW DAYS OF A CONFLICT. IT NEEDED TO BE MODIFIED IF SOVIET FORCES LEFT EASTERN EUROPE. DESCRIBING NUCLEAR FORCES AS WEAPONS OF LAST RESORT WAS TO ADOPT A DELIBERATELY AMBIGUOUS PHRASE, THE DEFINITION OF WHICH WOULD BE FOR THE ALLIES THEMSELVES. BAKER UNDERSTOOD IT TO MEAN THAT NUCLEAR FORCES WERE WEAPONS TO BE USED AT THE POINT WHEN THEY WERE NEEDED. IT WAS A PHRASE VASTLY PREFERABLE TO ''NO EARLY FIRST USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS''. THE ACCEPTANCE OF ''NO EARLY FIRST USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS'' IMPLIED ACCEPTANCE OF THE ANTI-NUCLEAR LOBBY'S TERMS OF DEBATE. ZOELLICK WONDERED IF IT WOULD HELP IF THE DRAFT SAID ''.... MAKING ITS NUCLEAR FORCES TRULY WEAPONS OF LAST RESORT IN EUROPE''. IF THIS AMENDMENT WAS NOT ACCEPTABLE COULD THE UK OFFER ANYTHING ELSE, IF POSSIBLE AHEAD OF THE START OF THE SUMMIT ITSELF?

5. THE SECRETARY OF STATE EXPLAINED AGAIN THE UK FEAR THAT REFERRING TO NUCLEAR FORCES AS WEAPONS OF LAST RESORT MIGHT REMOVE UNCERTAINTY IN THE MINDS OF A POTENTIAL AGGRESSOR. HE UNDERTOOK TO GET BACK TO THE AMERICANS ON LANGUAGE.

6. AT THE END OF THE MEETING BAKER TOLD THE SECRETARY OF STATE VERY PRIVATELY THAT THE GERMANS WERE SEEKING DELETION OF THE REFERENCE TO KEEPING WEAPONS UP TO DATE. TO FEND THEM OFF THE AMERICANS NEEDED TO MINIMISE OTHER CHANGES TO THE DRAFT DECLARATION, AND VERY MUCH WANTED TO RETAIN THE PHRASE ''LAST RESORT''.

7. PLEASE ADVANCE PS, PS/NO 10, GOULDEN AND HEAD SEC POL D.

HANNAY

YYYY

NNNN

PRIME MINISTER

NATO SUMMIT

I attach a file with some essential background papers for the NATO Summit. You are familiar with all of them. I shall be sitting behind you and have others with me.

You have your speaking notes in the flat. You will also need to say a few words of welcome, after the Secretary-General, at the beginning while the media are in the room (only about two minutes). I will let you have some notes this afternoon.

You will need to leave No. 10 at 0845 tomorrow morning.

CDP

C. D. POWELL
4 July 1990

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(1)

PRIME MINISTER

SOVIET UNION

I attach Mr Gorbachev's reply to your message of 27 June which was delivered to me by the Soviet Embassy this afternoon. They emphasised how very well received your own message had been and how much of a support it was for Gorbachev at a particularly difficult moment. In his reply he had tried to spell out his view on proposals for financial assistance to the Soviet Union and how it might be organised. He hoped that you would find this useful both at the NATO Summit and the Economic Summit. There would be no objection to your drawing on it on both occasions. You might like to have it with you tomorrow.

CAP.

CHARLES POWELL
4 July 1990

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MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB
Telephone 071-21 82111/3

Prime Minister

The contract is worth £300 million, & vital to Racal's future

CDS 4/7.

MO 14/25J

4th July 1990

Dear Charles,

TURKEY: PROJECT EAGLE

You will recall that the Prime Minister briefly mentioned Racal's bid for the fire control system for Turkey's air defence guns, a contract worth some £300M, to Mr Giray, the Turkish Defence Minister, when he visited the UK in early March. Mr Giray said then that the Racal bid would be looked at very closely, however no decision on this contract has yet been taken and Racal are continuing to face very strong competition from the Dutch company HSA.

With the key role played by the Prime Minister in securing the HFSSB radio contract for Marconi in mind, my Secretary of State believes it would be very useful if the Prime Minister could mention the Racal bid (Project Eagle) to Mr Akbulut at the NATO Summit. She might perhaps say she understands that Racal, who are a first class company, have put together an excellent package which would fully meet the Turkish Armed Forces requirements. She might add that Racal's proposal, which involves a substantial transfer of technology to TELETAS, is an excellent example of the close collaboration we would like to develop with Turkey in the defence field. I attach a background brief on Project Eagle which you might find useful.

Yours sincerely

(I M WOODMAN)
Private Secretary

Charles Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

Background

1. The most important defence sales prospect in Turkey is Racal's proposal (worth about £300M) for a fire control system for Turkey's 35mm air defence guns. The content is virtually all British and this would be the biggest defence contract ever won by the UK in Turkey.

2. Racal are offering Project Eagle (their surveillance radar and a Marconi tracker). Strong competition comes from the Dutch (HSA) and the Swiss (Contraves). Racal have set up a joint venture company with their Turkish partners TELETAS to which they will transfer technology, culminating in the manufacture of complete Eagle systems in Turkey.

3. Racal are reported to be in the lead both technically and on price. However, the Dutch government, who made a substantial gift of surplus equipment to Turkey in 1988 and have yet to win a major defence contract, are believed to be lobbying hard.

4. The Turks are close to making a decision and the summit will probably be the last chance we have of conveying direct and at the highest level HMG's support. Without it the Turks may assume that HMG are no longer interested in the business.

5. ECGD credit cover is limited and the position may become more difficult under the proposed Portfolio Management System. However, if insufficient cover were available under the current country limit, recourse to the special defence facility would be available as a fall-back option.

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10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

4 July 1990

Dear Hopkins,

NATO SUMMIT DECLARATION

Thank you for your letter of 3 July about the draft NATO Summit Declaration. On the three points which you cover:

- the Prime Minister has no great expectations of the French
- she is content with the revised proposals for amending the US draft text
- but on "last resort" she is not enamoured of alternatives (ii) and (iii). They should not be put forward without further consultation with me.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence) and to Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,

Charles Powell

J S Wall Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL

File.

bcc: PC.

PRIME MINISTER

NATO SUMMIT: COMMUNIQUE

There are three points here:

(i) We have been in touch with the French. It is unlikely that we can count on them. If the nuclear paragraphs are not to their liking, they will simply dissociate themselves from them.

(ii) Officials have produced revised amendments to the draft Declaration, following your meeting this morning. They fairly reflect the discussion. The only ones on which you will want to satisfy yourself are the amendments to paragraphs 16 and 17.

(iii) They have also produced three alternative forms of words on "last resort", indicating that they think we shall have to settle for the third. Neither the second nor the third option are at all satisfactory. We should either go for the first, which is what we agreed this morning: or use words culled directly from the Comprehensive Concept. But this is going to be the most difficult part of the discussion and may need to be resolved between you and the President at breakfast on Friday morning.

CHARLES POWELL
3 JULY 1990

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FILE

SECRET

JD
cdc

SUBJECT to Mail

4 (A-B)

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

3 July 1990

Dear Stephen.

**NATO SUMMIT**

The Prime Minister had a meeting with the Foreign Secretary and Defence Secretary this morning to discuss the American draft Declaration for the NATO Summit. The Chief of the Defence Staff, Sir Percy Cradock, Mr. Mottram, Mr. Appleyard and Mr. Goulden were also present.

The following points were agreed:

- the most potentially damaging passages in the American draft were paragraphs 16 and 17 calling for a revision of the strategy of flexible response and characterising nuclear forces as weapons of last resort. Although this was certainly not the American intention, the passages as they stood could gravely undermine NATO strategy and the deterrent value of nuclear forces. So far as possible, we should try to persuade the Alliance to abide by the careful formulations on deterrent strategy set out in the Comprehensive Concept, in particular paragraphs 24 and 44. We should point out that it was illogical to try to determine the outcome of a review of NATO strategy before the review had even been held. We should need to be prepared with alternative formulations for paragraphs 16 and 17. Paragraph 16 might refer to adapting our nuclear strategy so as "to make clear that our nuclear forces are primarily deterrent forces, whose purpose is to prevent war". A number of amendments would be required to paragraph 17. In addition to those proposed in the annotated text circulated before the meeting, we would need to remove the reference in line 5 to "a reduced reliance on nuclear weapons", and substitute the phrase "reduced number of theatre nuclear weapons". The sentence ending "revolutionary changes in Europe" should have added the phrase "but which at all times will give us a sure defence". The following sentence should have added at the end the words "primarily about manpower";

- we should try for amendment to paragraph 13 dealing with the American proposal for eliminating nuclear artillery shells, pointing out that specific concessions should be reserved for negotiations. But we need not die in the last ditch on this;

SECRET

- references to multi-national forces could be agreed, provided it was clear that they would not be below divisional level;

- we should try to work into the text references to the relevance of threats to NATO from out of area. There was an established NATO doctrine on this which should be preserved. We should also seek the addition of a reference to the deterrent effect of keeping ahead in military technology;

- some amendments to paragraph 20 dealing with the CSCE were desirable. In particular, the fourth tiret proposing an Elections Commission should be modified to bring it back into line with the original British and French proposal;

- other minor changes suggested in the annotated version of the text should be pursued. But our effort should concentrate heavily on getting the essential changes to paragraphs 16 and 17.

Some amendments to the Prime Minister's speaking note for the Summit were also proposed and will be reflected in a revised text.

It was agreed that we should try to enlist the support of the French in advance for our views, particularly on the treatment of nuclear issues. The Defence Secretary would speak to his French colleague, and there should also be contacts between officials. But it would not be appropriate to try to enlist the support of different parts of the US Administration or appear to be going behind the President's back. At the Summit itself we should do everything possible to avoid the appearance of open confrontation with the US on these issues, making clear that we were concerned about the impression which their draft might give, rather than implying that there were fundamental differences of principle between us. The Prime Minister would herself speak to Chancellor Kohl in the margins of the Summit to seek a private assurance that he would say nothing during the German election campaign which might rule out eventual deployment of TASM.

I am sending copies of this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely,

Charles Powell

C.D. POWELL

Stephen Wall, Esq., LVO,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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(2)

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB
Telephone 071-21 82111/3

Prime Minister
Re French may be helpful.
Re 1939 figures don't really bear out what we were told.
CDP 3/7

MO 13/1J

3rd July 1990

Dear Charles,

NATO SUMMIT

I have seen a copy of your letter of earlier today to Stephen Wall about the American Draft Declaration for the NATO Summit.

2. The Defence Secretary spoke to his French opposite number this afternoon. M. Chevenement agreed quite fervently with the UK views of the wording "last resorts"; and that it would be better to go back to the wording of the Comprehensive Concept. The two Ministers agreed that officials should have further discussions to work to a common wording.

3. I am also enclosing figures on the strengths of European Armed Forces in 1939, which I understand were requested at this morning's meeting.

4. A copy of this letter goes to Stephen Wall (Foreign Office) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely

p.p. (S WEBB)
Private Secretary

Charles Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

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## EUROPEAN ARMED FORCES PEACETIME STRENGTH 1939

| | Army Manpower | | Number of Naval Vessels | Numbers of Aircraft | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| UK | 237,000 | 737,000 | 297 | 1,500 | 3,200 |
| France | 500,000 | | 161 | 1,700 | |
| USSR | 1,900,000 | | 101 | 10,000 | |
| Germany | 730,000 | 1,130,000 | 88 | 3,600 | 6100 |
| Italy | 400,000 | | 240 | 2,500 | |
| USA | 200,000 | | 200 | 2,600 | |
| Poland | 450,000 | | 19 | 400 | |

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

CONFIDENTIAL

3 July 1990

Dear Charles,

**NATO SUMMIT DECLARATION**

Following the Prime Minister's briefing meeting this morning, we have revised the annotated US draft. I enclose a copy which covers all the points in your letter of today's date. It still looks as though the US draft will be the basis of discussion at the Summit, though there is much grumbling among allies about US tactics and alternative texts are in circulation.

On the question of "last resort" I enclose a note which offers three alternatives. The third seems most likely to offer the basis for a common position with the Americans. The Prime Minister might talk to President Bush about this before the Summit opens.

We have discussed the nuclear paragraphs with French officials in Paris. They share some of our doubts - including about "last resort" - and have some of their own. They think that President Mitterrand will be inclined simply not to subscribe to this section of the Declaration. We have urged them to reconsider this, bearing in mind the advantages we all derived from the fact that the Comprehensive Concept was signed by all 16 allies. We have also suggested that there would in any case be value in coordinating as far as possible the British and French line on nuclear issues at the Summit. They have undertaken to reflect and come back to us. But the Foreign Secretary does not think we shall be able to count on the French. Nor will the irritation of other allies manifest itself much at the Summit.

I am sending copies to Simon Webb in the MOD and Sonia Phippard in the Cabinet Office.

Yours,

Stephen Wall

(J S Wall)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

3 July 1990

Dear Charles,

**NATO Summit: Prime Minister's Programme**

As I have told the Duty Clerk, the version of the Prime Minister's programme for the NATO Summit which we sent you this afternoon was one which needed further up-dating. I now enclose a revision which we hope will be the final version.

Yours ever,

R. Gozney

(R H T Gozney)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

(1)

PRIME MINISTER

NATO SUMMIT: COMMUNIQUE

There are three points here:

(i) We have been in touch with the French. It is unlikely that we can count on them. If the nuclear paragraphs are not to their liking, they will simply dissociate themselves from them.

(ii) Officials have produced revised amendments to the draft Declaration, following your meeting this morning. They fairly reflect the discussion. The only ones on which you will want to satisfy yourself are the amendments to paragraphs 16 and 17.

(iii) They have also produced three alternative forms of words on "last resort", indicating that they think we shall have to settle for the third. Neither the second nor the third option are at all satisfactory. We should either go for the first, which is what we agreed this morning: or use words culled directly from the Comprehensive Concept. But this is going to be the most difficult part of the discussion and may need to be resolved between you and the President at breakfast on Friday morning.

CDP

MRS

CHARLES POWELL
3 JULY 1990

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**DRAFT ADMINISTRATIVE PROGRAMME FOR THE PRIME MINISTER'S ATTENDANCE AT THE NATO SUMMIT MEETING: 5-6 JULY 1990** (REVISED p.m. 3/vii)

Thursday 5 July

| | |
|---|---|
| 0900 or before | Arrive at Lancaster House with Foreign Secretary (accompanied by Mr Powell, Mr Ingham plus detectives). Met by Mr Miles (Head FCO NATO Summit Unit) and Mr Prebensen (Executive Secretary, NATO). Proceed to Delegates' Lounge (State Drawing Room First Floor). Press coverage outside Lancaster House. |
| 0900 | Greet NATO Secretary-General at entrance to Lancaster House. Escort to Delegates' Lounge. (Press coverage.) |
| 0910 | With NATO Secretary-General greet President Bush at entrance to Lancaster House (followed by Bush/Woerner bilateral at 0915.) (Press coverage.) |
| 0910-0950 | Greet Heads of Delegation, Foreign Ministers and Permanent Representatives over coffee in Delegates' Lounge. |
| 0950 approx | With NATO Secretary-General greet President Mitterrand at entrance to Lancaster House. (Press coverage.) |
| 0955 approx | Enter Long Gallery with President Mitterrand, President Bush and NATO Secretary-General. (Press coverage.) |
| 1000-1003 | Start of meeting. Photographic pool (3 TV, 5 Stills). |
| 1003-1010 | Secretary-General's opening remarks filmed live. Reply to Secretary-General's opening remarks (two minutes) filmed live. |
| 1015 | Working session begins. |
| 1245 | Working session ends. |
| | Proceed to garden for family photograph with other Heads of Delegation and NATO Secretary-General. (If wet photograph on Lancaster House Grand Staircase.) |
| 1255 | Walk to Bridgewater House for aperitif with Heads of Delegation and Foreign Ministers. Greeted by owner of Bridgewater House, Mr John Latsis at entrance. (Umbrellas if wet.) (Press coverage for walk.) |

| | |
|---|---|
| 1310 | Walk through Bridgewater House garden up stairway to raised terrace at Spencer House for lunch. Greeted by owner of Spencer House, Lord Rothschild. Limited photography in Palm Room. |
| 1315-1430 | Lunch (Heads of Delegation and NATO Secretary-General only) - whispering interpreters present. |
| 1435 | Walk back to Lancaster House through Spencer House garden and along Queen's Walk. (Umbrellas available: minibus if very wet.) (Press coverage from stand in Green Park and entrance to Lancaster House.) |
| 1445 | Working session resumes. |
| 1745-1800 | Working session adjourns. |
| 1805 | Return to No 10 Downing Street. |
| 1820-1900 | Possible bilateral with Mr Mulroney at No 10 Downing Street. |
| 1950 | Leave No 10 Downing Street for Buckingham Palace. (Press coverage on arrival.) |
| 2000-2150 approx | Attend dinner for Heads of Delegation, Foreign Ministers, NATO Secretary-General and others hosted by HM The Queen. (Photo call - rota, on arrival and family photograph before dinner.) |

Friday 6 July

| | |
|---|---|
| early am | Breakfast with President Bush. |
| 0920 | Arrive Lancaster House (accompanied by Messrs Powell and Ingham). (Press coverage.) |
| | Coffee available in Delegates' Lounge. |
| 0930-1230 approx | Final working session in Long Gallery. |
| 1245 approx | Leave Lancaster House by car for Queen Elizabeth II Conference Centre (accompanied by Messrs Powell and Ingham). |
| 1300 | NATO Secretary-General's Press Conference. |
| To be advised | Prime Minister's Press Conference in Churchill Auditorium, Queen Elizabeth II Conference Centre. |

3 July 1990

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

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MR POWELL

NATO Summit

At the Prime Minister's meeting this morning, I was asked to check on the Russian word for deterrence.

2. I have confirmed with Soviet Department of the FCO that the word they now use is сдерживание. This means restraint or holding back. They did use another word in the past устрашение which meant frightening off, but the much milder term is the one they now use.

L V Appleyard

L V Appleyard

Cabinet Office

3 July 1990


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dti
the department for Enterprise

(2)

The Rt. Hon. Nicholas Ridley MP
Secretary of State for Trade and Industry

CRP 3/7

Department of
Trade and Industry

1-19 Victoria Street
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Charles Powell Esq
10 Downing Street
LONDON
SW1A 2AA

Direct line
Our ref 071-215 5622
Your ref PE2AXW
Date 3 July 1990

Dear Charles

**TURKSAT COMMUNICATIONS PROJECT**

My Secretary of State would be grateful if the Prime Minister would take any opportunity that may arise during the NATO summit meeting on 5-6 July to remind Turkish Prime Minister Akbulut of our continuing interest in BAe's bid for this project. She raised it with President Ozal and Mr Akbulut during her visit to Turkey for the Gallipoli commemoration in April. BAe face strong French and American competition and our Ambassador in Ankara believes that a reminder to Mr Akbulut of HMG's strong interest in the project and support of BAe would be timely. A short aide memoire giving the line to take is enclosed.

Yours ever

Ben Slocock.

BEN SLOCOCK
Private Secretary

Recycled Paper

VISIT OF THE TURKISH PRIME MINISTER MR AKBULUT

**TURKSAT**

You will recall we talked about the bid by the British Aerospace-led European consortium for the US $300M Turksat satellite communication project in the margins at Gallipoli. We believe that on technical and commercial grounds this bid is highly regarded by Turkey and that British Aerospace has also offered an attractive technology transfer package.

I understand that the final bid evaluation was completed by Post, Telegraph and Telephone Administration (PTT) and passed to the Government some time ago. When might we expect a decision?

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PS TO PRIME MINISTER
NO 10 DOWNING ST

CONFIDENTIAL
FM PARIS
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 772
OF 031206Z JULY 90
INFO IMMEDIATE UKDEL NATO, WASHINGTON, BONN, ROME
INFO PRIORITY OTHER NATO POSTS

UKDEL NATO TELNO 302: THE LONDON DECLARATION
SUMMARY

1. MITTERRAND APPROVES THE GENERAL SPIRIT OF THE DECLARATION BUT HAS INFORMED BUSH OF A NUMBER OF FRENCH PROBLEMS WITH IT. FRANCE WILL WANT FORMULA MAKING CLEAR HER DISTINCT POSITION (THE ALLIES CONCERNED) AT VARIOUS POINTS, EG ON FORCE STRUCTURES (PARA 11) AND SNF(PARAS 13 AND 15) FRANCE WILL ARGUE FOR CHANGES IN OTHER ARTICLES, IN PARTICULAR ON NUCLEAR DOCTRINE (PARA 16) AND FUTURE OF CONVENTINAL ARMS CONTROL (PARA 9 AND 10). LIKELY TO PROPOSE NEW DRAFT OF ARTICLES 19 AND 20 ON CSCE.

DETAIL

2. VEDRINE (ELYSEE) EXCHANGE VIEWS ON THE US DECLARATION WITH THE MINISTER, LLEWELLYN SMITH OUTLINING OUR VIEWS ON THE BASIS OF TELECON RICKETTS-LYALL GRANT. ON MANY OF THE SPECIFICS WE ARE VERY CLOSE TO THE FRENCH.

3. VEDRINE SAID THAT MITTERRAND HAD WRITTEN TO BUSH GIVING HIS GENERAL REACTION (NOT AN ARTICLE BY ARTICLE COMMENTARY). HE HAD APPROVED THE GENERAL SPIRIT OF THE DECLARATION: BUT SINCE FRANCE'S RELATIONSHIP TO THE ALLIANCE AND INTEGRATED MILITARY STRUCTURE WAS UNCHANGED, IT FOLLOWED THAT CERTAIN PARAGRAPHS OF THE DRAFT WERE OF NO CONCERN TO FRANCE (VEDRINE SPECIFIED ARTICLES 11, 13 AND 15, AND SAID THAT IN THESE ARTICLES A FORMULA WOULD HAVE TO BE FOUND TO MAKE CLEAR FRANCE'S SPECIAL POSITION EG USE OF THE FORMULA ''THE ALLIES CONCERNED'').

4. IN OTHER ARTICLES THE FRENCH WOULD ARGUE FOR CHANGES. THEY DID NOT LIKE THE PASSAGE IN ARTICLES 5 AND 6 ON BEEFING UP INSTITUTIONAL RELATIONS WITH EASTERN EUROPE. THE INVITATION TO GORBACHEV WENT TOO FAR, AS DID THE PROPOSAL TO LAUNCH GENERAL GALVIN ON A PEACE MISSION. THEY DID NOT LIKE THE PROPOSAL FOR PERMANENT EAST EUROPEAN MISSIONS IN BRUSSELS.

5. THEY HAD SERIOUS PROBLEMS WITH PARAGRAPHS 9 AND 10 ON THE FOLLOW

UP CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS: THIS PASSAGE MUST LEAVE OPEN THE PROSPECT OF NEGOTIATIONS AT 35. PARAGRAPH 12 LOOKED TOO CLOSE TO FLEXIBLE RESPONSE FOR FRANCE TO BE HAPPY WITH IT, BUT MIGHT BE MODIFIED.

6. FRANCE COULD NOT ACCEPT PARAGRAPH 16 WITH ITS REFERENCE TO WEAPONS OF LAST RESORT. THIS FORMULATION UNDERMINED DETERRENCE, SUGGESTING RECOURSE TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS ONLY AFTER A CONVENTINAL WAR WAS LOST. MITTERRAND HAD DEVELOPED THE DOCTRINAL POINT IN THIS LETTER TO BUSH, SAYING THAT THOUGH IT WAS REALLY A QUESTION FOR THE OTHER ALLIES IN THE IMS AND NOT FOR FRANCE, HE WANTED THE PRESIDENT TO UNDERSTAND FRANCE'S POSITION. DETERRENCE (DISSUASION) ONLY MADE SENSE IF THE POSSIBILITY OF EARLY USE WAS KEPT OPEN.

7. PARAGRAPH 17 WAS OF KEY IMPORTANCE. BUSH HAD UNDERLINED IN HIS LETTER TO MITTERRAND THAT IT WAS DRAFTED SO AS TO ALLOW FRANCE TO TAKE A FULL PART IN THE STRATEGY REVIEW. FOR THIS TO BE POSSIBLE IT WOULD NEED TO BE SPLIT INTO TWO, DISTINGUISHING THE POLITICAL PROCESS OF REFLECTION IN WHICH FRANCE WOULD TAKE PART AND THE SEPARATE ACTIVITIES OF THE ORGANS OF THE INTEGRATED MILITARY STRUCTURE. IN OTHER WORDS, PARAGRAPH 17 AS DRAFTED IS TOO SPECIFIC FOR FRANCE TO GO ALONG WITH ALL OF IT.

8. ON PARAGRAPHS 19 AND 20, (CSCE) MITTERRAND APPROVED THE REFERENCE TO THE CSCE SUMMIT AND THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CSCE. IT WAS RIGHT FOR THE ALLIES TO DETERMINE THEIR POSITION (JUST AS IT WAS FOR THE 12 AT DUBLIN). BUT PARAGRAPH 20 PREEMPTED THE CONCLUSIONS OF THE CSCE SUMMIT AND WAS TOO SPECIFIC, EG IN ITS REFERENCE TO SITING CSCE INSTITUTIONS IN PARTICULAR CAPITALS. IT WAS NOT SENSIBLE TO GO SO FAR BEFORE THE NNA HAD EXPRESSED THEIR VIEW. FRANCE WOULD PROBABLY PROPOSE A NEW TEXT OF THIS PASSAGE (BUT HAD NO INTENTION OF PROPOSING A NEW TEXT OF THE WHOLE DECLARATION) AND WOULD INCLUDE IN IT THE POINT THAT THE FUTURE OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL LAY IN THE 35 FORUM.

9. VEDRINE SAID THAT, THOUGH THE FRENCH WOULD ASK FOR A BIT MORE PROMINENCE TO BE GIVEN TO THE ROLE OF THE EUROEPAN COMMUNITY, HE DID NOT (LIKE DUFOURCQ) SEE THIS AS A SERIOUS DRAWBACK IN THE TEXT. ON THE IDEA OF A DECLARATION BY MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE, HE REPEATED FRENCH OPPOSITION TO ANY BLOC TO BLOC ARRANGEMENT BUT SAID THAT HE SAW NO PROBLEM IN A DECLARATION BY THE NATO ALLIES INCLUDING AN INVITATION TO ALL THE 35 TO SIGN IT.

COMMENT

10. VEDRINE GAVE IT AS HIS PERSONAL OPINION THAT THE REVIEW OF NATO STRATEGY WAS LIKELY TO START DEAD IN THE WATER, SINCE THE AMERICANS APPEARED TO HAVE DECIDED IN ADVANCE WHAT THEY WANTED TO GET OUT OF IT. LLEWELLYN SMITH STRESSED OUR WISH TO HAVE THE FRENCH PLAY A FULL PART IN THE REVIEW. THE MORE SPECIFIC PASSAGE ON FORCE STRUCTURES, MULTI-NATIONALITY, AND THE REVIEW ARE EVIDENTLY, INDEED NOT SURPRISINGLY, TOO MUCH FOR THE FRENCH TO STOMACH. THE CHOICE MAY BE BETWEEN WATERING THEM DOWN TO THE POINT AT WHICH THEY BECOME ACCEPTABLE BUT RELATIVELY EMPTY, AND SEEING FRANCE DISSOCIATE HERSELF FROM THE SPECIFICS. THE LATTER COULD PUT AT RISK FRENCH PARTICIPATION IN THE REVIEW AND IN FURTHER WORK ON MULTINATIONAL STRUCTURES. IT IS REGRETTABLE BUT INEVITABLE THAT THE FRENCH FIND IT SO DIFFICULT TO SQUARE THE CIRCLE OF RECONCILING THE NEED TO KEEP THE AMERICANS IN EUROPE WITH THEIR TRADITIONAL AND POLITICALLY IMPERATIVE ATTITUDES. GIVEN THAT THE FULLEST POSSIBLE FRENCH PARTICIPATION IS ONE OF OUR AIMS, I SEE ADVANTAGE IN DISCUSSING WITH THE FRENCH IN ADVANCE OUR APPROACH TO THE NEGOTIATION IN LONDON, WITH A VIEW TO SECURING A TEXT WHICH CLOSES OFF AS FEW OPTIONS AS POSSIBLE FOR FRENCH INVOLVEMENT. GOULDEN'S INTENTION OF CONTRACTING GUELLUY IS THEREFORE OF PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE.

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FROM EGMG FOR COI RADIO TECHNICAL SERVICES

TRANSCRIPT OF BACKGROUND BRIEFING

GIVEN BY MR BERNARD INGHAM,

MR GOULDEN, MR WESTON, MR MOWER

ON MONDAY, 2 JULY 1990

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TRANSCRIPT A

MR INGHAM:

Delegations are due to be arriving on Wednesday evening and the meeting, the NATO Summit, will open at Lancaster House at about 10.00, there are arrivals from about 9.10 - 9.15, but the meeting will begin at 10.00, speeches by the NATO Secretary General and the Prime Minister.

The working session will begin at 10.10 and is due to continue until 12.45. There will then be a lunch hosted by the Prime Minister for Heads of Delegation and the NATO Secretary General at Spencer House, which is very close by. And the lunch hosted by the Foreign Secretary for Foreign Ministers, NATO Permanent Representatives and Political Directors at Bridgewater House, again nearby.

They are due to resume at 2.45 and to go on until round about 6.00 and then there will be a dinner for Heads of Delegation, Foreign Ministers and the NATO Secretary General at Buckingham Palace and there is also a dinner for officials at Bridgewater House.

BERNARD INGHAM (CONT):

The working session resumes on Friday at 9.30 and we assume will predominantly be concerned with discussion and endorsement of the final statement followed by a press conference due to be given by the NATO Secretary General at 1.00. All these times I do stress are tentative.

The order of speaking is decided by Mr Woerner but the normal course I think is for President Bush and President Mitterrand to speak first to kick off the principal debate and we would expect the Prime Minister, as is it were host government, to come in fairly soon thereafter.

As to substance, well this quite clearly is one of the most important, if not the most important possibly, NATO Summits since 1948 because of all the momentous changes that are taking place. And I think that we see the purpose of the Summit as to strike a balance between preserving the fundamentals of NATO, secure and collected defence, the transatlantic connection, credible deterrence, and adapting to the new circumstances which we see all around us.

And I would just remind you of the principles that the Prime Minister set out in her NATO speech to the Turnberry NATO Conference on 7 June, the day actually that she went to the Soviet Union for a meeting with Mr Gorbachev and she set out four main what she described as NATO's enduring principles:

- first, maintain a secure defence;
- second, continue to provide for our defence and our security collectively;
- third, preserve the United States' presence in Europe in both conventional and nuclear weapons;

BERNARD INGHAM (CONT):

- and fourth, our defence will continue to require nuclear weapons in Europe. Without adequate nuclear weapons kept up-to-date and based forward in Europe, our defence will be very much less secure.

Those I think are the principles upon which we shall operate at this conference.

MR WESTON:

I think all I need add is just an obvious reminder about the fact that this Summit fits into a sequence of Summits. We have already had the European Heads of State and Government in Dublin, now the NATO leaders and then after that the Houston Summit whereby the Western family, so to speak, is extended importantly to include Japan. And in a way it seems to me that running through all these is a basic theme which is how to make freedom, democracy and the rule of law secure and permanent, and how to ensure the international stability that is necessary for that which in a sense is the product of both security and of prosperity. And that is a common line which one can find, if you like, in the three Summits connected with the Western family which, when they have taken place, will set the tone for the approach to the CSCE Summit later in the year which we hope will take place once the CFE Agreement has been secured.

And there is of course a particular element or aspect of the NATO Summit that everyone will have in mind and that is the way in which it is read by the Soviet Union in the context of German unification. Of course the North Atlantic Alliance must set its course by its own lights but the meeting will be important in that

MR WESTON (CONT):

context and I need only quote from an article by Mr Shevardnadze in Pravda of 26 June where he wrote: "A very great deal will depend on the kind of decisions approved at the London NATO Council Session in July. It can be said without exaggeration that the choice made there will have far-reaching consequences both for Germany and for all of Europe."

But I think that all that needs to be said is that certainly British Ministers, and I think all Ministers in the Alliance, are conscious of that and it will be a question of building on Turnberry and the message delivered from Turnberry about the hand of friendship and we hope that the note struck by the NATO Summit will indeed send the right message on aspects of the conventional force picture, perhaps the nuclear element too, the strategic review and the possibility of some sort of joint declaration between the Member States of the North Atlantic Alliance and such Eastern European countries that wish to associate themselves with that.

If we manage in addition to charting the major strategic course for NATO and answering with a statement in plain language for the citizen the question: Why NATO?, if we manage in addition to that to send the right message to the Russians in the context of German unity we shall have achieved a very good and important Summit outcome.

As for the fine print, John Goulden is much better qualified than I to continue on that.

MR GOULDEN:

Not better qualified, but it is my job at the moment. I doubt if this is going to turn out to be single issue Summit as the

MR GOULDEN (CONT):

last two NATO Summits were. You will remember that last year it was basically an SNF Summit and the year before it was more about CFE and the conventional agenda than about anything else.

I do not think there is a single issue that stands out like that this time, but there are several issues which really need to be discussed at the Head of Government level, as a sort of culmination of a lot of debate that has gone on at Defence Minister level, Foreign Minister level and between governments bilaterally. And apart from Germany which John has mentioned, I would mention five.

First, East-West contacts in general, how to develop the concept of the hand of friendship which was the leit motif of the Turnberry communique, very much the second part of NATO's Harmell doctrine - dialogue and cooperation - and on that there will be several East-West themes running through the Summit. One important theme is of course preparation for the CSCE Summit and in particular the security aspects of that, the various ideas for security institutions on which people will want to talk and the concept which John mentioned of some sort of declaration involving the members of the two Pacts, an idea that is much discussed at the moment but certainly has not taken final shape yet. It is a point on which we have been doing soundings with many allies, including with Eastern European countries, to find out what they think because clearly their attitude to this is a very important part.

Secondly, the strategic review. The Summit will not do the strategic review but it is the moment where one would look for some broad policy guidelines. Those policy guidelines will probably have to be amplified later politically, possibly by Foreign Ministers as

MR GOULDEN (CONT):

the year goes on. But we hope that the Summit itself can give some clear guidelines on such things as: are we talking about an Alliance in which there is integrated structure with some sort of forward defence with some nuclear capability? I would not look for anything very specific there but even broad guidelines would be very useful to SACEUR (phon) and his people and to the Foreign and Defence Ministries as they wrestle with this for the next 6 - 12 months.

Thirdly, the political role of NATO, the increasingly political role that everybody agrees that it has got to have, how is that going to be given best expression, is it in relation to what some people call the third dimension, cooperation on the environment, science, etc; should it involve a much bigger out of area component? I think the view of our government is that it should involve a more intensive consultation on any policy issue that relates directly to European security and that of course will cover some out of area issues. And an important ingredient of course is steering the arms control agenda and coordinating its verification because coordinating the verification of arms control is going to be one of the big tasks of NATO in the post-CFE world.

And then finally the arms control agenda itself. I think the Summit will want to take stock of where we are on CFE but given how much was done at Turnberry by way of giving our negotiators in Vienna greater flexibility I do not think there is much need for any fine tuning by the Summit on the current negotiations. But the Summit ought to look ahead to what happens after CFE, both what happens in 1991, that small window between now and the Helsinki Summit, and then what should happen after 1991 on the assumption

MR GOULDEN (GOULDEN):

that the CFE framework itself will probably be exhausted by then and the idea of negotiating between two blocs on the basis of the Vienna mandate will probably be beginning to look a bit threadbare by the end of 1991. So quite an important look ahead to be begun there. And secondly SNF, because after a CFE agreement has been signed we are committed as an Alliance to consider arms control negotiations on SNF. It was agreed at Turnberry that there were a lot of issues here that needed very careful consideration. I doubt if the Summit will be the occasion to answer those and set out NATO'S negotiating objectives but I would hope that the Summit will at least set up the machinery from which those objectives will become clear.

So I would imagine probably a procedural outcome on SNF, setting up a consultative group of some sort, plus the guidelines for the strategic review which will obviously have to apply to nuclear weapons, laying down in general terms how we see the role of nuclear weapons changing in the new situation and then the actual negotiating position of the Alliance would emerge in the light of the work of that consultative group.

(END OF TRANSCRIPT A, CONTINUED ON TRANSCRIPT B)

FROM JAMES LEE FOR COI RADIO TECHNICAL SERVICES

TRANSCRIPT OF BACKGROUND BRIEFING
GIVEN BY MR. BERNARD INGHAM,
MR. GOULDEN, MR. WESTON, MR. MOWER,
ON MONDAY, 2 JULY 1990

TRANSCRIPT B - (CONTINUED FROM TRANSCRIPT A)

MR. INGHAM:

I think what is envisaged is that at the opening photo-call, there will in fact be short speeches by the NATO Secretary-General and the Prime Minister as the host government - that is why the media are there; then, the media will retire and then the conference will begin and I think if it follows true to form, then it will be President Bush, President Mitterrand and then probably the Prime Minister.

JOHN DICKIE (DAILY MAIL)

Just one point, if I may, do you expect TASM to be discussed in any detail and, if so, what is the British position about the distribution of TASM?

MR. GOULDEN:

I don't think this is the occasion to discuss TASM. What happens on TASM will flow from decisions later on, probably well beyond this year. I don't think the work itself will appear in

MR. GOULDEN (CONTD)

the communique - I would be surprised if it did - but it is clearly something that is affected by whatever emerges as NATO's position in the strategic review.

HELLA PICK:

John, you mentioned that there had been consultations with some East European countries about the declaration. Have there also been consultations with Moscow on it and could you say which countries in Eastern Europe?

MR. GOULDEN:

Yes, it is a matter that has been discussed with the Russians on several occasions. It was discussed when the Prime Minister saw Gorbachev; it was discussed subsequently between Mr. Shevardnadze and Mr. Hurd; I guess it has probably come up between officials too. It is the sort of topic that now comes up whenever we meet each other. I don't mean by that that it is the flavour of the month but is one of the new ideas that have emerged in the last two or three months and diplomats, being rather topically-minded people, tend to talk about topical issues. We have spoken, I suppose, to every Eastern European government on this.

QUESTION:

What are the contents of this declaration? What are they likely to be?

It is all very well talking about a "joint declaration", but what are we declaring?

MR. GOULDEN:

That is something that the countries - the 23 - will get together and talk about. We are not laying down that it has got to be a certain agenda but it would be to set out their attitude to mainly security issues; a lot of it would be in familiar form; it would be bringing together what they have agreed in other fora, in other documents, in other obligations they have already entered into. The aim would be to bring it together in order to try and set the scene of relations between the NATO countries and the Eastern European countries at a time when many things are changing. We will listen to what other people have to suggest in that respect, but there are a lot of things the reaffirmation of which are seen either in the West or in the East as possibly helpful at the moment. I cannot really be more specific than that.

QUESTION:

We have got a report in some of the American papers today that President Bush has proposed to the European Allies a reversal of some of NATO's defence doctrine - talking about nuclear weapons as "weapons of last resort", which is not to rule out first use but to get away to some extent from flexible response. I was wondering what the British reaction to that would be and whether you anticipated there will be some changes discussed or announced this week.

JOHN GOULDEN:

There has been some discussion going beyond that, of course. Some people have speculated that no first use itself could be looked

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at again. Our own view is that no first use would be incompatible in NATO strategy but one has to keep the uncertainty in mind.

As for flexible response, flexible response is classically an ambiguous doctrine and deliberately so because it is designed to create ambiguity and uncertainty in the minds of other people who might be thinking of attacking NATO countries.

I think everybody in the Alliance accepts that in a very radically-changed situation, i.e. after CFE and after Soviet withdrawals from Eastern Europe including from the GDR, we are talking about a situation in which there would be a change in the role of nuclear weapons. We would need fewer. The threshold of the use of nuclear weapons would rise. How you best describe that is a matter of some discussion at the moment but certainly between the American Government and our own, there is a total consensus that we do not describe it as being "no first use".

The idea that nuclear weapons should be used late, if at all, i.e. that they should not be used early, has been written into NATO documents for a very long time. We are talking here about a difference of degree probably.

QUESTION:

I wonder if you could give us an update on how you think CFE is going and what the particular points you would like this Summit to address are - the outstanding issues as it were?

MR. GOULDEN:

As I said, I don't think there is any need for any fine tuning by the Summit. They will no doubt take stock and somebody may suggest that we ought to look again at the flexibility that was agreed at Turnberry but the material that we sent down to Vienna is, I gather from our negotiators, still being used, deployed and people are exploring the scope for agreement on that basis.

The message from Vienna is that there is no need for any major new element of flexibility. We have made some progress in the last few weeks. The Tanks and Armoured Combat Agreement is now set aside as uncontested; they are very close together on artillery; they are making progress on helicopters; they are making slow but gradual progress on verification.

There is a debate going on in Vienna on the basis of the flexibility from Turnberry about aircraft. Foreign Ministers are going to have to look at this again between now and the autumn in order to decide what final deals need to be cut. I don't think there is a need for that at this particular Summit. The interest will be more probably in "what next?"

QUESTION:

John, can you say what the attitude of the British Government is to suggestions by the Americans that short-range nuclear artillery should be withdrawn from Europe now the decision has been made not to modernise either artillery or the Lance - and you did not answer the second part of Hella's question: which other East European countries, apart from the Soviet Union, have been consulted about a non-aggression declaration.

JOHN GOULDEN:

I did! I think we have in fact systematically discussed with all of them.

On artillery, the Prime Minister, as you know, supported President Bush's decision not to continue modernisation. We have never had, as a government, a major hang-up about nuclear artillery. It is quite obvious that the role of nuclear artillery will be much reduced - very significantly reduced - in the changed circumstance on which this Summit is predicated; forward planning is predicated on CFE, Soviet withdrawal from East Germany. In that situation, the role of nuclear artillery and of all short-range systems is very considerably reduced.

The NATO strategic review which has partially been launched and will be properly launched by the Summit will, of course, go into all of that.

QUESTION (SAME MAN)

...nuclear artillery. Would that be by negotiation with the Soviet Union or unilaterally as one or two reports out of Washington suggested might happen today?

MR. GOULDEN:

Whether one does these things by negotiation or unilaterally is a tactical matter which the Alliance needs to think about. It will no doubt come up in the special group which the Summit will set up. I do not think we are closed-minded on either of those routes. We are happy about the idea that the role of nuclear artillery will be very considerably reduced; we have no hang-ups about nuclear artillery.

QUESTION:

How about Super-Power troops in a future Germany? Is there a definite NATO demand that the Soviets leave Germany and that NATO forces can be in all of Germany or just the West?

MR. GOULDEN:

Who are these Super-Powers?

QUESTION (SAME MAN)

I mean the US and the Soviets.

MR. GOULDEN:

It is a view across NATO that one of the changes that has to happen in the context of German unification is a total normalisation of Germany's position and "total normalisation" includes sovereign control over who is on your territory and that applies in both directions. It is for the German people to decide whom they want on their territory. It is quite clear that they will not want, permanently, Soviet forces on their territory so all the Allies support the idea that the Soviet presence in the GDR should be a transitional matter.

What should happen on German territory as far as Western Governments is concerned is a matter between the German Government and Western Governments. I don't think there is a strong view among any NATO Governments that those forces should be removed but there is probably a consensus that they can be reduced.

Your specific question was about what happens to forces in the GDR. On that, there is, I think, a clear view that there would

MR. GOULDEN (CONTD)

be no NATO integrated forces in what is now the GDR, at least for a transitional period.

QUESTION:

Could I ask John Weston, please, how the message that comes from the Summit will affect the Two-Plus-Four talks. Here, I am thinking particularly about the non-acceptance by the Soviet Union of some of the basic position of the United States, France and Britain, particularly the point that the Two-Plus-Four Talks should not be the forum for deciding whether or not a united Germany would be in NATO and would the right kind of message from this Summit help to unblock those hang-ups in the Two-Plus-Four talks?

MR. WESTON:

It is certainly our hope, as I indicated earlier, that that will be the case. There are a number of disagreements within the Two-Plus-Four at the moment about where exactly the forum of the Two-Plus-Four has, so to speak, strict competence. We clearly do in relation to all matters directly bearing on quadrupartite rights and responsibilities; it is equally true that on some of the Soviet concerns arising under the item "politico-military issues" that they would like to see a kind of directorate put in place in the name of the Two-Plus-Four, which then fed out into wider fora its directions, so to speak, whereas we have made the point all along that many of the questions they raise are not for a small group like ourselves to decide but must be placed squarely in the other wider fora, ab initio, whether that wider forum is the Alliance itself or

MR. WESTON (CONTD)

a set of arms control negotiations or indeed the CSCE. We hope that if the message emerging from the London Summit is positive and encouraging on some of these aspects, that that would help allay Soviet concerns that they have not got a direct handle on it, so to speak, within the Two-Plus-Four.

(END OF TRANSCRIPT B - CONTINUED ON TRANSCRIPT C)

FROM EGMG FOR COI RADIO TECHNICAL SERVICES

TRANSCRIPT OF BACKGROUND BRIEFING

GIVEN BY MR BERNARD INGHAM.

MR GOULDEN, MR WESTON, MR MOWER,

ON MONDAY, 2 JULY 1990

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TRANSCRIPT C (CONTINUED FROM TRANSCRIPT B)

QUESTION:

Do you expect the question of aid to the Soviet Union to come up in any shape or form either perhaps within the context of NATO Political Cooperation or in some initiative by NATO?

MR WESTON:

I think I would say on that obviously the discussions on that subject at Heads of State and Government level are unfinished. There was some discussion as you know at Dublin, it is fair to assume that there will be some at Houston. The President of the United States in his press conference a few days ago indicated that he thought there might be some discussion at the NATO Summit. I think that he, though I cannot speak for him obviously, it seems to me what he may have had in mind was less that this question is a matter on the agenda in any formal sense at the NATO Summit, which it is not, but rather that if 16 Heads of State and Government get together in this fashion and this is something which is in the forefront of their minds, it would be fair to assume that somehow or other there will be some discussion of it.

MR WESTON (CONT):

But that is, as I say, very much an unfinished discussion and I think it is difficult to make any comment about it at this point.

QUESTION:

You just referred to a transition period when NATO troops will not be stationed in East Germany, could you give us some idea of what is involved and how long that transition is going to last? Secondly, will there be any discussion about maintaining Western forces in Berlin under agreement with Bonn? Thirdly, you skirted over the issue of the troop levels in Central Europe in 1991, will the Summit give any indication of figures or will it simply make a commitment that reductions will be discussed?

MR WESTON:

On the question of the transition, as you put it Hella, this was something on which a number of you present at Turnberry pressed very hard for answers from Mr Baker and Mr Hurd and I do not think we can take matters further than their answers on that day which was that these were simply matters on which there was no Alliance position as regards, that is to say, how long the period of time might be during which it is the case that the Alliance has decided not to deploy any of its forces into what was formerly East Germany.

On the question of Berlin, I do not think this NATO Summit will see any discussion of that. If there are to be forces of any colour in Berlin after German unity it will be because the German government has asked for them.

MR GOULDEN:

On the question of troop levels in 1991, it is clearly too difficult an issue to get settled in this CFE Agreement, it is a negotiation in itself. I think most allies see this as the main item perhaps for a 1991 CFE negotiation. It is clearly premature to indicate levels in general and it is not even easy to see how one would arrive at proposals for levels when we get to 1991, this is one of the things that is perplexing us.

There is a special problem which I think is at the back of your mind which is how assurance can be given to the Soviet Union about the force levels of particularly the united Germany and that is a matter on which the Allies will no doubt want to reflect both at this Summit and beyond. There are several options for ways in which it can be dealt with and one is simply to say that we will meet in 1991 and discuss this. But there are other possibilities, too, which we are trying to work through and I cannot really add any more to it now.

Clearly there will be no figures mentioned or mentionable that apply to most countries that were involved in the CFE negotiations until we actually get to those negotiations in 1991. But it may be possible to give some assurance meanwhile about the figures that might apply in a more narrow zone.

QUESTION:

You mentioned the guidelines for the strategic review, can we expect a big change of guideline and if so which would be the most important change of guideline?

MR GOULDEN:

It is hard to predict. I think there is going to be a day and a half of quite detailed intensive discussion at high levels between Foreign Ministers and most particularly between Heads of Government. This is not a pre-cooked Summit, we do not have a declaration in our pockets that everybody is going to sign now. But the topics that the guidelines would have to address to be useful to SACEUR and to the Defence and Foreign Ministers would obviously be how are conventional forces going to change after CFE? How is it possible to conceive politically of them being reorganised and how is the role of nuclear weapons likely to change, how is that going to be reorganised?

I think in both cases, as I said before, it is likely to be a rather general guideline but as one of the recipients of all of this I would find it very useful to get some very general guidelines from this Summit before the more detailed work starts.

QUESTION:

Regarding the capping of the size of a unified Federal Republic's military, could that be a decision best left to Bonn and Berlin to make on its own, would it be something that would be made under NATO auspices, if not this time perhaps discussed this time and moved to another Summit, or would it be left to the CFE talks?

MR GOULDEN:

There are many different aspects to that. The first thing is that everybody in the Alliance agrees that there will be no singularisation of Germany, we are not prepared to have somebody put a finger on some separate German feeling. As I say, the trend is

MR GOULDEN (CONT):

normality, not towards singularisation. Secondly, the decision is basically one for the German government to make. Thirdly, it is a decision that as with all decisions about allied forces, would probably involve a degree of consultation with Allies. And finally, it has a very important tactical element to it because this is a very important card which will be played at an important stage of the Two-Plus-Four negotiations. So there are several different aspects that will come up in the next few months.

QUESTION:

John, you mentioned earlier about hoping the Summit will send a message of some sort to the Soviet Union, assuming that the Soviets looking through the communique will look for the words flexible response and forward defence as being the sort of stalwarts of the present NATO structure, do you think there is any possibility that those particular words will be eliminated from the communique and that you will think of some other phrase to mean perhaps the same thing but put in a different light.

MR GOULDEN:

First of all, this is not the most important message the Russians should be looking for in the communique when we get it. The tone of the communique will be a very important message and there will be a lot of other paragraphs in it that have indirectly Soviet overtones. As to forward defence and flexible response, we can live with a communique that does not mention either, we can live with a communique that talks about modifying both. If anybody has the wit to work out a totally different formula for referring to

MR GOULDEN (CONT):

either while preserving the essence that we need to retain from it, then there will be a bottle of champagne for that person.

(INTERJECTION):

... comprehensive concept in reverse ...

MR GOULDEN:

Flexible response does not appear in the comprehensive concept, the forward defence does, that is right.

MR WESTON:

In the context of a possible non-aggression declaration, what future role do you visualise for the Warsaw Pact apart from its self-destruction?

MR GOULDEN:

That is a subject on which fortunately we do not have to take a decision and since we have got enough decisions on our plate we are very happy to leave it to the members of the Warsaw Pact to decide. And seriously, it is very much basically for the countries of Eastern Europe to decide how far they want the Warsaw Pact to survive, what roles they would wish to continue or to develop or whether they simply want over a period of time to wind the whole thing up. They are not getting advice from us on that, they are not asking for advice either fortunately, but they would not get it if they did ask. We have said this is hands-off as far as NATO is concerned. We will be talking about a declaration of relations between the countries, not between the Pacts, it is worth perhaps

MR GOULDEN (CONT):

underlining that. I do not think many people envisage this as a Pact-to-Pact arrangement.

QUESTION:

Has there been any reaction from other NATO countries about this idea of the Prime Minister's that the geographic area for NATO could be extended and that NATO could in fact begin to be some sort of worldwide organisation, the emphasis I think was on Middle East interests?

MR GOULDEN:

The Prime Minister did not suggest that NATO's area should be amended, but the thrust of her statement on this subject at Turnberry was that NATO should take more account of threats and risks from wherever they come and that NATO countries would do well to think about what capabilities they need to deal with such eventualities. I think she was reminding people that NATO does not just exist to deter a Soviet attack, NATO exists to deter an attack on the territory of NATO countries in Europe.

QUESTION:

A question on clarification on this declaration of non-aggression or whatever one chooses to call it, do you foresee this as a statement to be offered to the East European countries or is it going to be an offer to meet with the East European countries to work out a statement between you and them?

MR GOULDEN:

I would not assume that it will necessarily run, this idea is an idea that has been talked about, it will be discussed at the Summit, no doubt discussed afterwards. If we decide it is a good idea, if there is a consensus in the Alliance, I think what we would probably do is put together some sort of language to see what it looks like and see if we can agree what it ought to contain and then give it to others for comments. It certainly will not be a take it or leave it event if we do it, but there is a question mark over whether this idea is going to run at all, it is an idea that is much talked about, worth examining because it has some serious advantages in it, but we need to continue the debate before we know whether we are going actually to make something productive out of it.

QUESTION:

Do you detect a joint declaration to envisage a system of collective security in Europe?

MR GOULDEN:

I am never very sure what a system of collective security means. I know what it means between the NATO allies, they undertake to protect each other against an attack wheresoever it comes. It is quite hard, as we discovered during the ... war years, to develop that in a broader sense and I do not think that is the thinking that people have in their minds at the moment.

The idea of non-aggression is of course an obligation that I think all 23 countries have subscribed to in one form or another, through various European documents and various UN documents. But there is a difference between putting that sort of language

MR GOULDEN (CONT):

together and making out of a mutual collective security obligation which is qualitatively a different thing and probably ruled out.

(END OF TRANSCRIPT C AND END OF WHOLE TRANSCRIPT)

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THE LONDON DECLARATION

SUMMARY

1. TAFT PRESENTS DRAFT U S TEXT FOR THE LONDON DECLARATION. GENERAL WELCOME FOR THE U S INITIATIVE BUT SERIOUS DOUBTS EXPRESSED ABOUT VARIOUS ASPECTS OF THE SUBSTANCE AND ABOUT THE PROCEDURE ADOPTED.

DETAIL

2. TAFT (U S) PRESENTED THE DRAFT U S TEXT (SEE MIFT) FOR THE LONDON SUMMIT DECLARATION TO A MEETING OF AMBASSADORS ONLY THIS MORNING. HE SAID THAT THE TEXT HAD BEEN SENT TO CAPITALS ON 29 JUNE UNDER COVER OF A MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT. THE TEXT REPRESENTED THE PRESIDENT'S OWN THINKING AND WAS THE RESULT OF QUOTE WRESTLING WITH DIFFICULT PROBLEMS ON WHICH THERE ARE DIFFERENCES OF OPINION IN WASHINGTON AS WELL AS AMONG THE MEMBER OF THE ALLIANCE UNQUOTE. THE LONDON SUMMIT WOULD BE ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT MEETINGS OF ITS KIND SINCE 1949. THE DECLARATION WOULD QUOTE FIX THE IMAGE OF THE ALLIANCE FOR THE REST OF THE DECADE UNQUOTE. GIVEN ITS UNIQUE IMPORTANCE, DRAFTING SHOULD BE RESERVED FOR THE SUMMIT ITSELF. THE TEXT HAD BEEN CIRCULATED IN ADVANCE TO MAKE POSSIBLE DISCUSSION OF ISSUES OF SUBSTANCE BEFORE MINISTERS ASSEMBLED TO FINALISE THE DECLARATION. (IT WAS AGREED THAT THE COUNCIL WOULD REASSEMBLE AT 1015 TOMORROW MORNING TO CARRY FORWARD THE DISCUSSION).

3. TAFT THEN PRESENTED THE CONTENTS OF THE U S TEXT IN PREDICTABLE TERMS. ROBIN (FRANCE) WAS THE FIRST TO RESPOND. HE COMMENTED ON THE RISKS WHICH THE PROCEDURE ENVISAGED BY TAFT PRESENTED. THE TEXT CONTAINED MANY POINTS WHICH WERE ACCEPTABLE. IT ALSO CONTAINED POINTS WHICH WERE UNACCEPTABLE AND POINTS WHICH WOULD NEED NEGOTIATION. NEGOTIATION WOULD ONLY BE POSSIBLE IF THERE WAS FLEXIBILITY IN THE U S POSITION. IF THE ALLIANCE WISHED TO AVOID STARTING THE LONDON MEETING WITH A NUMBER OF OPEN DISAGREEMENTS, WHOSE EXISTENCE WOULD LEAK, THERE WOULD BE GREAT ADVANTAGE IN CLEARING AS MUCH OF THE GROUND AS POSSIBLE IN BRUSSELS. IT WOULD BE WISE TO USE THE NEXT 48 HOURS FOR THIS PURPOSE.

4. ENUMERATING THE DIFFICULTIES WHICH FRANCE HAD WITH THE U S TEXT, ROBIN STARTED WITH THE ABSENCE OF ADEQUATE RECOGNITION OF THE (WEST) EUROPEAN DIMENSION. IN REGARD TO THE POLITICAL ROLE OF THE ALLIANCE, HE AGREED WITH THE AMERICANS THAT A DECLARATION BETWEEN THE BLOCS WOULD NOT BE WISE. ANY SUCH DECLARATION SHOULD BE OPEN TO THE 35. FRANCE WOULD NOT WISH TO GO AS FAR AS OPENING LIAISON MISSIONS IN BRUSSELS. THE GLOBALITY OF THE CSCE PROCESS SHOULD BE EMPHASISED. IT DID NOT COVER ONLY SECURITY MATTERS. ON THE FOLLOW ON TO CFE, THE TEXT FOLLOWED A U S LINE WHICH NO-ONE ELSE SHARED.

5. FRANCE, OF COURSE, REJECTED NOFUN. EQUALLY PARIS WOULD NOT BE PREPARED TO ACCEPT REFERNECES TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS AS QUOTE WEAPONS OF LAST RESORT UNQUOTE. THE REFERNCES TO A REVISION OF NATO STRATEGY WERE DISAPPOINTING. THEY APPEARED TO IGNORE THE FACT THAT FRANCE HAD WITHDRAWN FROM THE INTEGRATED MILITARY STRUCTURE. THE TURNBERRY MANDATE HAD ALSO BEEN IGNORED. FRANCE WOULD NOT BE DISPOSED TO JOIN IN A STRATEGY REVIEW UNLESS:

A) THE REVIEW HAD A GLOBAL CHARACTER:

B) ITS CONCLUSIONS WERE NOT PRE-JUDGED - IN PARTICULAR THE MULTI-NATIONAL CONCEPT COULD NOT BE PRESENTED AS A CONCLUSION:

C) THE GROWING ROLE OF THE EUROPEANS IN THE ALLIANCE WAS TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.

6. VON PLOETZ (FRG) WELCOMED THE TEXT. THE PROCEDURE HAD NOT BEEN IDEAL, BUT THE RESULT WAS WHAT MATTERED. ON THE SUBSTANCE, MORE NEEDED TO BE SAID ABOUT THE DEVELOPMENT OF EUROPEAN SECURITY STRUCTURES AND IN PARTICULAR ABOUT THE ENHANCED ROLE OF COOPERATION. THE (WEST) EUROPEAN DIMENSION NEEDED MORE PROMINENCE. FURTHER WORK NEEDED TO BE DONE ON THE QUESTION OF A DECLARATION AMONG THE 23, WHICH WOULD BE OPEN TO OTHERS. CFE AND SNF WOULD NEED TO BE DISCUSSED AT THE POLITICAL LEVEL. MORE SHOULD BE SAID ABOUT THE POLITICAL ROLE OF THE ALLIANCE. THE SECTION ON GERMANY WAS TOO SHORT AND CAME TO LATE.

7. CAJAL (SPAIN) SAID THAT MADRID HAS BEEN QUOTE SURPRISED UNQUOTE BY THE PROCEDURE ADOPTED. FROM NOW ON AS MUCH WORK AS POSSIBLE SHOULD BE DONE IN BRUSSELS: IT WOULD BE DANGEROUS TO LEAVE EVERYTHING TO LONDON. THERE WAS IN ANY CASE NO POINT IN DOING SO SINCE A NUMBER OF ASPECTS OF THE TEXT (EG THE PROPOSAL ON NUCLEAR ARTILLERY, THE LANGUAGE ON LAST RESORT, AND THE IDEA OF A NON-AGRESSION DECLARATION) HAD ALREADY LEAKED. IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE

FOR SPAIN TO SUBSCRIBE TO THE APPROACH IN PARAGRAPH 11 OF THE U S TEXT. IT PRE-JUDGED THE OUTCOME OF THE STRATEGY REVIEW AND ASSUMED SPANISH MEMBERSHIP OF THE INTEGRATED MILITARY STRUCTURE. MADRID WAS DISAPPOINTED BY THE MINIMAL REFERENCE TO THE ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY. SPAIN WAS NOT HAPPY WITH THE UNILATERAL APPROACH TO A POSSIBLE DECLARATION INVOLVING MEMBERS OF THE TWO BLOCS.

8. THUYSBAERT (BELGIUM) SAID THAT HIS AUTHORITIES WERE PREPARED TO WORK ON THE BASIS OF THE U S DOCUMENT, WHICH CONTAINED MANY GOOD IDEAS. HOWEVER, MINISTERS SHOULD NOT GO TO LONDON ON THE BASIS THAT SOMETHING APPROACHING A CONSENSUS ALREADY EXISTED. THE BELGIAN CABINET WOULD BE CONSIDERING THE ISSUE TOMORROW. PRELIMINARY BELGIAN REACTIONS WERE THAT THE TONE OF THE DECLARATION WAS TOO QUOTE TRIUMPHALISTIC. UNQUOTE. THE UNDERLYING STRUCTURE OF THE TEXT RISKED SEEMING TO PLACE NATO TOO MUCH IN THE CENTRE OF EUROPEAN DEVELOPMENT AT THE EXPENSE OF THE COMMUNITY. THIS MIGHT NOT BE EASY TO CORECT. THE TEXT ALSO APPEARED TO ANTICIPATE THE OUTCOME OF A REVIEW THAT HAD YET TO TAKE PLACE. THUS THERE WAS NO AGREEMENT YET ON THE BENEFITS OF QUOTE MILITARY DIPLOMACY UNQUOTE AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL, NOR ABOUT THE ATTRACTIONS OF LIAISON MISSIONS AT EVERE. IT WAS NOT CLEAR WHETHER CFE SHOULD IN FUTURE BE CONDUCTED AT 23 OR AT 35: WHAT THE PRECISE ROLE OF MULTINATIONAL FORCES WOULD BE: NOR WHETHER AMERICAN IDEAS ON THE FUTURE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CSCE WERE RIGHT.

9. SMITH (CANADA) EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT THE PROCEDURES ADOPTED BUT, LIKE OTHERS, SAID THAT THE OUTCOME WAS WHAT MATTERED. AS REGARDS THE CONTENT OF THE U S DRAFT, HE AGREED WITH THUYSBAERT ABOUT THE NEED TO AVOID TRIUMPHALISM. HE THOUGH THAT A DECLARATION OF THE 23 SHOULD BE MANAGEABLE. NE NOTED WHAT OTHERS HAD SAID ABOUT THE RELATIVE LACK OF ATTENTION GIVEN TO THE QUESTION OF EUROPEAN DEFENCE COOPERATION. HE HOPED THAT WHATEVER LANGUAGE WAS AGREED WOULD AVOID SUGGESTING THAT THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY SHULD HAVE A SECURITY ROLE.

10. I SAID THAT I HAD HAD SOME PERSONAL DOUBTS ABOUT THE WAY THE TEXT WAS BEING HANDLED BUT THAT PLAINLY THE FINAL OUTCOME WAS WHAT MATTERED. THE U S DRAFT PROVIDED AN EXCELLENT BASIS FOR FURTHER WORK. IT WAS IMAGINATIVE, FORWARD-LOOKING AND, ABOVE ALL, SUBSTANTIVE. I THOUGHT THAT MY AUTHORITIES MIGHT BE HOPING TO SEE A LITTLE MORE CAUTION ABOUT THE FUTURE REFLECTED IN THE DRAFT. THEY WOULD PROBABLY WISH TO LOOK MORE CLOSELY AT THE PROPOSAL FOR LIAISON MISSIONS HERE, AT THE DESCRIPTION OF THE ROLE OF NUCLEAR FORCES AS QUOTE TRULY WEAPONS OF LAST RESORT UNQUOTE AND AT THE REFERENCE TO A QUOTE NEW NATO STRATEGY UNQUOTE. I THOUGHT THEY WOULD AGREE WITH

THOSE WHO CONSIDERED MORE PROMINENCE SHOULD BE GIVEN TO THE EUROPEAN DIMENSION AND TO THE GERMAN QUESTION. THEY ALSO THOUGHT THAT LANGUAGE ON A DECLARATION OF THE 23, OPEN TO OTHERS, COULD BE DRAFTED. FINALLY, REFERRING TO FRANCE'S DIFFICULTIES WITH PARA 11, I NOTED THE DILEMMA POSED BY THE NEED ON THE ONE HAND NOT TO PRE-JUDGE THE OUTCOME OF A REVIEW WHILE, ON THE OTHER, GIVING GUIDANCE TO THE MILITARY AUTHORITIES TO ENABLE THEM TO GET ON RAPIDLY WITH PRODUCING THE EVIDENCE OF CHANGE THAT EVERYONE WISHED TO SEE.

11. VIRTUALLY ALL THE OTHER SPEAKERS WELCOMED THE AMERICAN INITIATIVE AND APPROACH BUT EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT THE PROSPECT OF LEAVING TEXTUAL DISCUSSION UNTIL MINISTERS REACH LONDON. MY GREEK AND ICELANDIC COLLEAGUES WERE WITHOUT INSTRUCTIONS.

12. THE SECRETARY GENERAL, IN SUMMING UP, SAID THAT HE TOO WELCOMED THE U S PAPER. HE NOTED THAT CONCERN ABOUT THE PROCEDURE ADOPTED. HE WOULD WISH TO DISCUSS THIS FURTHER AFTER THE SUMMIT. MEANWHILE, HE COULD ONLY RECORD THE INCREASING EVIDENCE THAT CAPITALS CONSIDERED THAT REALLY IMPORTANT ISSUES SHOULD BE DEALT WITH OUTSIDE EVERE. THIS WAS LIKELY TO HAVE DAMAGING CONSEQUENCES IN THE LONG RUN. AS REGARDS THE PRESENT TEXT, IT WAS CLEAR THAT THERE COULD BE NO DRAFTING EXERCISE IN THE COUNCIL OR SPC. HOWEVER, A SUBSTANTIVE DEBATE TOMORROW MORNING WOULD BE USEFUL IN HELPING MINISTERS ON THURSDAY TO BRIDGE THE GAPS WHICH EVIDENTLY EXISTED. HE LEFT IT TO PERMREPS TO DECIDE INDIVIDUALLY WHETHER OR NOT THEY PRESENTED ALTERNATIVE TEXTS: EVEN IF THEY DID SO THERE WOULD BE NO ATTEMPT TO AGREE LANGUAGE.

13. AFTER WOERNER HAD FINISHED, VON PLOETZ (FRG) ASKED WHETHER IT WOULD NOT BE WISE TO ALLOW FOR THE POSSIBILITY OF A MEETING OF SENIOR OFFICIALS IN LONDON ON THURSDAY MORNING - ASSUMING THAT MINISTERS WOULD NOT START WORK UNTIL AFTER LUNCH. TAFT (U S) AT ONCE SAID THAT HIS AUTHORITIES WOULD BE VERY COOL TO THIS SUGGESTION.

14. EVEN THOUGH THE TEXT IN MIFT HAS BEGUN TO LEAK WIDELY I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF THE COPY RECIPIENTS WOULD CONTINUE TO TREAT IT FOR THE TIME BEING AS A DOCUMENT OF SOME SENSITIVITY.

ALEXANDER

YYYY

(3)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

2 July 1990

Dear Prime Minister

Agree to sign, please?

Dear Charles.

The Foreign Secretary wonders if the Prime Minister could sign the enclosed photograph so that we can give it to Secretary Baker when he is here for the NATO Summit later this week. 2/7

Yours,

Stephen Wall

(J S Wall)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

SECRET

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10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

2 July 1990

**NATO SUMMIT: MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT BUSH**

I enclose President Bush's reply to the Prime Minister's message about the American draft for the NATO Summit Declaration. It is relevant to tomorrow's meeting of Ministers to discuss the Summit.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence) and to Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

(C. D. POWELL)

Stephen Wall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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SECRET

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10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

2 July 1990

Dear Richard.

**NATO SUMMIT ITALIAN PAPER**

Thank you for your letter of 2 July about the Italian paper for the NATO Summit. I agree that Sir Michael Alexander should tell his Italian colleague that the Prime Minister was interested to read the non-paper: that she agrees the London Summit should issue a strong declaration: but that we understand that the Italians are, like us, willing to work on the basis of the US text.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,

C. D. POWELL

Richard Gozney, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

SECRET

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

SECRET

2 July 1990

Dear Charles,

**NATO Summit: Italian Paper**

UKDel NATO telnos 286 and 287 (copies enclosed) reported that the Italian Permanent Representative to NATO asked Sir Michael Alexander to forward to the Prime Minister a 'non-paper' on 'The Atlantic Alliance in the 1990s' which had been approved by Andreotti.

The Italian Permanent Representative told Sir M Alexander that his authorities had decided to circulate this non-paper in Brussels rather than in capitals to make the point that the preparation of a NATO Summit Declaration was a matter of concern to the Alliance as a whole.

The Italian paper, like Andreotti's message to the NATO Secretary General, (see my letter of 27 June) is unsatisfactory in a number of respects. In particular:

- it envisages the downgrading of NATO's defence role in favour of a vague pan-European security system.

- it proposes (para 4) a system of mutual security guarantees between NATO and the Soviet Union, the East Europeans (whether or not they are still members of the Warsaw Pact) and the neutral and non-aligned countries.

- it implies (para 6) a wholesale revision of nuclear strategy and gives no indication of the need for the continued deployment of nuclear weapons in Europe.

The Italian paper is inconsistent in a number of respects with the US draft declaration. But Sir M Alexander reports that the Italian Permanent Representative to NATO has nevertheless told his US colleague that the Italian authorities generally approve the US draft declaration. This suggests that the Italian paper was not intended as a contribution to the drafting of the declaration.

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We see no need for the Prime Minister to comment direct to Andreotti. As a courtesy we suggest that Sir M Alexander should tell his Italian colleague that the Prime Minister was interested to read the non-paper: that she agrees that the London Summit will be an important occasion which should issue a strong declaration: and that we understand that the Italians are (like us) willing to work on the basis of the US text.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Simon Webb (MOD) and to Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,

Richard Gozney

(R H T Gozney)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

SECRET

Mr Ricketts
27 June 1990



0920

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FM UKDEL NATO
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 286
OF 261343Z JUNE 90
AND TO IMMEDIATE ROME, PARIS, BONN, WASHINGTON

SUMMIT DECLARATION: ITALIAN VIEWS

1. MIFT CONTAINS THE TEXT OF A QUOTE NON-PAPER UNQUOTE ON QUOTE THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE IN THE 1990S UNQUOTE WHICH I HAVE BEEN REQUESTED BY MY ITALIAN COLLEAGUE TO FORWARD TO THE PRIME MINISTER. THE PAPER HAS BEEN PERSONALLY APPROVED, AND INDEED PARTLY WRITTEN, BY ANDREOTTI.

2. A QUICK READING OF THE DOCUMENT SUGGESTS, IF NOTHING ELSE, THAT IT IS UNLIKELY TO EASE THE TASK OF ACHIEVING CONSENSUS ON A SUMMIT DECLARATION.

3. THE ITALIANS WILL NOT BE CIRCULATING THE TEXT BILATERALLY IN CAPITALS. THE ONLY POINT OF SUBSTANCE IN FULCI'S BRIEF COVERING LETTER IS A REPETITION OF ANDREOTTI'S VIEW (SEE HIS MESSAGE OF 14 JUNE) THAT QUOTE THE FINAL DECLARATION OF THE FORTHCOMING LONDON SUMMIT SHOULD BE OF AN EMINENTLY POLITICAL NATURE, IN BOTH ITS CONTENT AND FORM UNQUOTE.

ALEXANDER

YYYY

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AND TO IMMEDIATE ROME, PARIS, BONN, WASHINGTON

SUMMIT DECLARATION: ITALIAN VIEWS
THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE IN THE 1990'S

1. THE RADICAL CHANGES IN EUROPE, BEGINNING DURING THE SECOND HALF OF 1989, MAKE IT NECESSARY FOR THE ALLIANCE TO REVIEW ITS PURPOSES AND OBJECTIVES. IT IS NO LOGER NECESSARY, AS IT WAS AT THE TIME OF THE HARMEL REPORT, TO SEEK RULES OF DIALOGUE BETWEEN DIFFERENT POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SYSTEMS, REPRESENTED BY OPPOSING ALLIANCES. RATHER, WE MUST RE-DEFINE OUR OWN SECURITY, IN THE LIGHT OF THE GRADUAL INTEGRATION OF THE EUROPEAN CONTINENT, ON THE BASIS OF PLURALISM, DEMOCRACY, THE MARKET ECONOMY AND SOLIDARITY IN THE SOCIAL SECTOR.

IT IS, THEREFORE, TIME TO GIVE CONCERETE MEANING TO THE CONCEPT, EXPRESSED SEVERAL TIMES DURING THE PAST FEW MONTHS, OF AN ALLIANCE THAT IS LESS MILITARY AND MORE POLITICAL. IN THIS PERSPECTIVE, A HIGH PRIORITY SHOULD BE ATTRIBUTED TO GIVING FULL EXPRESSION TO ARTICLE 2 OF THE TREATY AND TO DEVELOPING COOPERATIVE PROGRAMS AND INITIATIVES IN THE SCIENTIFIC FIELD, WHICH GIVE CONCRETE MEANING TO NATO'S SO-CALLED THIRD DIMENSION.

AS STRESSED AT THE MAY 1989 SUMMIT, WE ARE MORE THAN EVER CONVINCED THAT INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IS VITAL IN THE FIELDS OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, IN VIEW OF THE BENEFICIAL EFFECTS THAT CAN DERIVE FOR GLOBAL SECURITY.

TO BE MORE SPECIFIC, THE REVIEW OF THE NATURE AND TASKS OF THE ALLIANCE, WHICH IS NOT THE RESULT OF SELF-CRITICISM, BUT RATHER OF CHANGE CIRCUMSTANCES, SHOULD BE DEVELOPED AROUND THE CONCEPT OF PAN-EUROPEAN SECURITY.

IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE THIS, GOING BACK TO THE SECOND ELEMENT OF THE HARMEL REPORT, WE MUST MOVE FROM DIALOGUE TO COOPERATION. SUCH A SYSTEM CAN, HOWEVER, ONLY COME ABOUT BY MAKING USE OF THE ALREADY EXISTING ELEMENTS OF INTEGRATION, WITHIN AN INDIVISIBLE AND COORDINATED SYSTEM, OF WHICH THE ALLIANCE WILL BE THE FOUNDATION. NATO MUST TRANSFORM ITSELF FROM AN INSTRUMENT OF DEFENCE AND BALANCE WITH RESPECT TO THE ADVERSARY, INTO THE FIRST NUCLEUS OF STATES AROUND WHICH A CONTINENTAL SECURITY SYSTEM CAN GRADUALLY BE ORGANIZED, IN THE MEDIUM TO LONG TERM.

2. THE FIRST PREREQUISITE FOR CREATING THE NEW ORDER IS A MORE ADVANCED PHASE IN ARMS CONTROL. THE NEW PHASE SHOULD DIFFER FROM THE FIRST NOT ONLY IN QUANTATIVE TERMS, BUT ALSO IN ITS LOGIC AND PRINCIPLES SEMICOLON IT SHOULD NO LONGER BE BASED ON THE NEED TO ELIMINATE, AS IN CFE 1, THE MOST DANGEROUS ASYMMETRIES AND REINSTATE A BALANCE OF FORCES, WHICH, MOREOVER, NO LONGER EXIST IN THE TRADITIONAL SENSE. RATHER, IT SHOULD BE A GRADUAL MOVE TO A SITUATION THAT CAN BE DEFINED AS QUOTE ESSENTIAL DEFENSE UNQUOTE. A NEGOTIATION OF THIS TYPE CANNOT BE ONLY AT 23 OR 22, AIMED AT DETERMINING THE RESPECTIVE LEVELS OF EACH SIDE'S FORCES SEMICOLON IT MUST INDICATE THE LEVELS OF FORCES THAT EACH COUNTRY SHOULD HAVE AVAILABLE. IT FOLLOWS THAT PARTICIPATION MUST BE EXTENDED TO THE 35.

3. THE SECOND REQUIREMENT FOR DEVELOPING A SINGLE SECURITY SYSTEM IS THE IMPLEMENTATION, MUCH BETTER THAN HAS SO FAR BEEN THE CASE, OF VERIFICATION AND CONTROL MEASURES. SUCH MEASURES CONSTITUTE THE ESSENTIAL COMPONENT OF THE SINGLE SECURITY SYSTEMS AND AGREEMENTS SUCH AS QUOTE OPEN SKIES UNQUOTE REPRESENT THE BASIS FOR PERMITTING EACH COUNTRY TO LIVE IN PEACE ACCORDING TO NORMS IT HELPED TO ESTABLISH. NATO IS CAPABLE OF MAKING A DECISIVE CONTRIBUTION TOWARD THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THIS OBJECTIVE.

4. THE THIRD REQUIREMENT IS THE CONCLUSION OF A SERIES OF AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE ALLIANCE AND ITS FORMER ADVERSARIES. SUCH AGREEMENTS SHOULD LEAD TO A LOGIC OF CONCENTRIC CIRCLES, ATTRIBUTING TO THE ALLIANCE, IN THE FIELD OF STABILITY AND SECURITY, A ROLE SIMILAR TO THAT OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY IN THE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL SPHERE SEMICOLON THAT IS, AS THE CENTRAL NUCLEUS OF A CONTINENT-WIDE SYSTEM THIS MEANS THAT THE ALLIANCE CAN ENTER INTO MUTUAL GUARANTEE AGREEMENTS NOT ONLY WITH NEUTRAL AND NON/ALIGNED COUNTRIES, BUT ALSO WITH WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES, INCLUDING THE SOVIET UNION, AS WELL AS WITH COUNTRIES THAT HAVE CEASED TO BE MEMBERS OR WITH THE PACT ITSELF, SHOULD IT TAKE AN INTERNAL DECISION IN THIS REGARD BASED ON CONSENSUS. THE SOVIET UNION'S WILLINGNESS IN THIS SENSE HAS ALREADY BEEN EXPRESSED ON MORE THAN ONE OCCASION.

5. THE UPDATING OF THE ALLIANCE MUST BE CLOSELY COORDINATED WITH OTHER PROCESSES, FROM GERMAN UNIFICATION TO THE CSCE SEMICOLON AND THE LATTER NOT ONLY FOR ASPECTS RELATED TO ARMS CONTROL. INDEED, SECURITY ON THE EUROPEAN CONTINENT MUST BE ENSURED NOT THROUGH A BALANCE OF OPPOSING FORCES, AS HAS SO FAR BEEN THE CASE, BUT RATHER THROUGH A NETWORK OF INSTITUTIONS NEITHER EXCLUSIVE OF, NOR ANTAGONISTIC TO EACH OTHER, BUT RATHER COMPLEMENTARY, AROUND THE

NUCLEUS FORMED BY THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE. THE WIDEST CIRCLE WILL BE THE CSCE SEMICOLON A CSCE THAT DOES NOT SEEK TO COUNTER THE ALLIANCE, NOR TO ASSIMILATE IT INTO ITSELF. THE PARIS SUMMIT OF THE THIRTYFIVE WILL MARK THE BEGINNING OF A REVIEW AND FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF THE CSCE PROCESS, BOTH IN A HORIZONTAL AND VERTICAL SENSE SEMICOLON THAT IS TO SAY, IN TERMS OF THE TERRITORY COVERED AND SUBSTANCE. HORIZONTAL INTEGRATION WILL COME ABOUT THROUGH A GENERAL INSTITUTIONALIZATION, BEGINNING WITH THE COUNCIL OF FOREIGN MINISTERS, CAPABLE OF PROVIDING IMPETUS AND COORDINATION TO THE ENTIRE PROCESS.

VERTICAL INTEGRATION, OR INTEGRATION IN TERMS OF SUBSTANCE, WILL MAKE POSSIBLE FURTHER PROGRESS ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND UNIFORM JURIDICAL STRUCTURES, AS WELL AS IN THE ECONOMIC AND SECURITY FIELDS. EACH OF THESE OBJECTIVES WILL BE PURSUED ABOVE ALL THROUGH EXISTING STRUCTURES: RESPECTIVELY, THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE, THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND, FOR STABILITY, THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE. THE ALLIANCE WILL BE THE FORUM FOR WESTERN CONSULTATION ON PARTICIPATION IN THE PAN-EUROPEAN SECURITY STRUCTURES, BASED ON POLITICAL CONSULTATION, THE DEFUSING AND SOLVING OF CRISES, AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF INCREASINGLY FAR-REACHING FORMS OF VERIFICATION AND TRANSPARENCY WITH REGARD TO MILITARY APPARATUS, BUDGETS AND ACTIVITIES.

6. THE FULL DEVELOPMENT OF THE ALLIANCE'S POLITICAL ROLE SHOULD APPLY NOT ONLY TO ITS STRATEGY AND RELATIONS WITH THE OUTSIDE WORLD, BUT ALSO TO RELATIONS AMONG ITS OWN MEMBERS.

THE ALLIANCE MILITARY STRATEGY IS BASED ON THE CRITERIA OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE AND FORWARD DEFENSE. TODAY, HOWEVER, THE CONDITIONS THAT LED TO SOME OF THE OPERATIONAL MODALITIES OF THE PRINCIPLE OF FORWARD DEFENSE NO LONGER EXIST. CONVENTIONAL SUPERIORITY OVER THE WEST NO LONGER EXISTS, OR RATHER, WILL NO LONGER EXIST AFTER THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CFE AGREEMENTS. IT WILL NO LONGER BE POSSIBLE TO CONCENTRATE TROOPS FOR A LARGE-SCALE SURPRISE ATTACK ON WESTERN EUROPE. BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND ALLIANCE TERRITORY, A BUFFER ZONE OF DEMOCARATIC COUNTRIES WILL EMERGE.

IT SHOULD NO LONGER BE NECESSARY, FOR OUR DEFENSE, TO ENSURE A CAPACITY TO STRIKE THE POTENTIAL ADVERSARY DEEP INSIDE HIS TERRITORY. ONCE THE NEED TO PROJECT OUR DEFENSE BEYOND THE CONFINES OF THE ALLIANCE NO LONGERS EXISTS, IT WILL BECOME POSSIBLE TO SPEAK OF QUOTE DEFENSE WITHIN THE CONFINES OF THE ALLIANCE UNQUOTE, RESULTING IN A STRATEGY THAT IS EVEN MORE DEFENSIVE IN NATURE. AS FOR FLEXIBLE RESPONSE, IT IS NOT THE ABSTRACT PRINCIPLE OF FLEXIBILITY THAT MUST BE RECONSIDERED, IF BY QUOTE FLEXIBLE UNQUOTE ONE MEANS CORRESPONDING TO THE CIRCUMSTANCES AND AIMED AT

REINSTATING THE STATUS QUO. HERE ALSO, WITH REFERENCE TO THE NUCLEAR SECTOR, IF THE CONVENTIONAL IMBALANCE CEASES TO EXIST, THE THRESHOLD FOR POSSIBLE RECOURSE TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS RISES TREMENDOUSLY, MAKING FIRST USE A HIGHLY REMOTE HYPOTHESIS.

IN FORCE STRUCTURE, THE REDUCTION OF STRATEGIC ARMAMENTS WILL MAKE IT EASIER TO ACHIEVE THE OBJECTIVE OF MINIMUM DETERRENCE, WHILE THE THEATRE COMPONENT CAN BE LIMITED TO DUAL CAPABLE AIRCRAFT.

AS FOR FORCE DISTRIBUTION, WITH THE DISAPPEARANCE OF A THREAT THAT HAD WEIGHED ESSENTIALLY ON THE PRESENT BORDERS OF THE TWO GERMANYS, IT BECOMES SUPERFLUOUS TO KEEP A HIGH CONCENTRATION OF ARMAMENTS ON THEIR TERRITORY. SUCH ARMAMENTS COULD, THEREFORE, BE REDUCED AND REDISTRIBUTED.

ON THE OTHER HAND, IT WILL BE ESSENTIAL TO HAVE FORCES CAPABLE OF GUARANTEEING BOTH THE FUNCTIONING OF INFRASTRUCTURES AND LINES OF COMMUNICATION TO ENSURE THE FLOW OF REINFORCEMENTS FROM THE OTHER SIDE OF THE ATLANTIC. THE PRESENCE OF AMERICAN TROOPS COULD THUS BE REDUCED TO LEVELS SIMILAR TO THOSE EXISTING AT THE TIME OF THE SIGNING OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY. THE EMPHASIS ON THE TRANSATLANTIC LINK WOULD, THEREFORE, SHIFT FROM THE LAND COMPONENT TO NAVAL AND AIR FORCES.

7. THE OTHER INTERNAL ASPECT OF THE ALLIANCE CONCERNS THE TRANSATLANTIC LINK. DURING THIS CENTURY, THE UNITED STATES HAS INTERVENED REPEATEDLY TO RESTORE BALANCE ON THE EUROPEAN CONTINENT AND, ON THOSE OCCASIONS, THE THREAT DID NOT ALWAYS COME FROM THE SAME PLACE. IF TODAY, THANKS TO THE CSCE, THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA ARE AN INTEGRAL PART OF POLITICAL EUROPE, IT IS BECUASE THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE FIRST INSTITUTED THE TRANSATLANTIC LINK. THE FUTURE SECURITY ORDER NOT ONLY PRESERVES, BUT RE-CREATES THIS ESSENTIAL LINK, WHICH SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FROM BOTH A MILITARY AND AND A POLITICAL STANDPOINT, ALSO IN THE LIGHT OFF WESTERN EUROEPAN INTEGRATION.

THE EUROPEANS INTEND TO MAKE SECURITY ONE OF THE ELEMENTS OF THEIR UNION. INCREASED COHESION, ALSO THROUGH THE CREATION OF MULTINATIONAL UNITS, WOULD FIND IN THE ALLIANCE A CONTEXT FOR UNITY THAT HAD BEEN LACKING. THIS ALSO BECAUSE AN INTEGRATED EUROPEAN DEFENSE HAS, AT TIMES, BEEN PERCEIVED - INCORRECTLY - AS THE ANTITHESIS OF TRANSATLANTIC SOLIDARITY.

8. FINALLY, INCREASED EMPHASIS ON THE ALLIANCE'S POLITICAL ROLE COULD BE ACHIEVED BY GIVING MORE IMPORTANCE TO ARTICLE 2 OF THE TREATY AND TO THE SO-CALLED THIRD DIMENSION.

9. IF THE ALLIANCE BEGINS TO TRANSFORM ITSELF ALONG THESE LINES, THE

SOVIET UNION WOULD BE REASSURED AND SHOW GREATER WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT, THROUGH A TRANSITIONAL REGIME, A SHORT-TERM SOLUTION TO THE GERMAN QUESTION.

10. BASED ON THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, THE MESSAGE OF THE LONDON SUMMIT COULD BE INSPIRED ON THE FOLLOWING CRITERIA:

- THE AFFIRMATION THAT THE EAST-WEST CONFRONTATION IS OVER, AND THAT THE TRADITIONAL ADVERSARY NO LONGER EXISTS, MAKING IT POSSIBLE TO MOVE TOWARD A SECURITY ORDER BASED ON DEFENSE AND COOPERATION SEMICOLON
- THE INTENTION TO CONSTRUCT GRADUALLY A PAN-EUROPEAN SECURITY SYSTEM, DERIVED FROM VARIOUS COMPLEMENTARY INSTRUMENTS IN THE CSCE FRAMEWORK, BUT WHICH, WITH REGARD TO SECURITY AND STABILITY, WOULD HAVE THE ALLIANCE AS ITS NUCLEUS, AROUND WHICH THE PROCESS WOULD BE DEVELOPED SEMICOLON
- THE WILLINGNESS TO CONCLUDE GUARANTEE AGREEMENTS WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND THE EASTERN COUNTRIES, REGARDLESS OF WHETHER OR NOT THEY REMAIN MEMBERS OF THE WARSAW PACT, OR, EVENTUALLY, WITH THE WARSAW PACT ITSELF SEMICOLON
- THE COMMITMENT TO RE-DEFINE GLOBAL ALLIED DOCTRINE AND MILITARY STRATEGY, INDICATING, EVEN IF IN SUMMARY FORM, ITS GENERAL GUIDELINES SEMICOLON
- THE ADOPTION OF GUIDELINES FOR A RAPID CONCLUSION TO CFE 1, AS WELL AS FOR A SECOND PHASE IN THE CONVENTIONAL NEGOTIATIONS AND FOR BEGINNING NEGOTIATIONS ON SHORT-RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS SEMICOLON
- A REQUEST THAT THE MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS ASSESS THE PROCESS OF REVISION BEGUN IN VARIOUS ALLIED FORA AND PRESENT THEIR CONCLUSIONS AT A SUBSEQUENT SUMMIT.

ALEXANDER

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Prime Minister

President Bush's reply to your message about the NATO Summit: very helpful.

CDP

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
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