

Confidential Filing

Visit of Prince Salman Bin Abdul Aziz
of Saudi Arabia.

SAUDI ARABIA



S
3007

May 1979

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
21.5.79 20.5.91							
PREM 19/3520							
Series closed							



PART May '79 ends:-

Series closed : Future
pps see Saudi Arabia :
meetings with Saudi Govt .


~~PART _____ begins:-~~

PRIME MINISTER

PRINCE FAHAD BIN SALMAN BIN ABDULAZIZ OF SAUDI ARABIA

You met Prince Fahd, who is Vice Governor of the Eastern Province in Dhahran, and apparently invited him to call on you in London. The Prince is now in London and has asked Jonathan Aitken to bid for a meeting on his behalf.

The Prince is a nephew of the King and pretty low down in the pecking order. The FCO advise that if you see him the Saudis would exploit the fact to pester you to see all those who are above Prince Fahd in the pecking order. They therefore recommend that Graham Bright pleads diary pressures on your behalf. Do you agree?



J. S. WALL

20 May 1991

C:\foreign\fahd (pmg

CONFIDENTIAL

Saudi
Arabia
Beirut na.
GM
29/5

RS 530

CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO 231543Z MAY

TO IMMEDIATE JEDDA

TELEGRAM NUMBER 192 OF 23 MAY 1979

INFO ROUTINE CAIRO TEL AVIVI AMMAN DAMASCUS BAGHDAD KUWAIT

WASHINGTON MOSCOW BEIRUT

INFO SAVING UKDEL NATO UKREP BRUSSELS

VISIT OF PRINCE SALMAN BIN ABDUL AZIZ

1. PRINCE SALMAN, GOVERNOR OF RIYADH AND FULL BROTHER TO FAHD ARRIVED UNEXPECTEDLY IN LONDON ON THE AFTERNOON OF 19 MAY BEARING MESSAGES FOR THE PRIME MINISTER FROM KING KHALID AND FAHD, WHICH HE ASKED TO DELIVER PERSONALLY. HE CALLED ON THE PRIME MINISTER FOR A HALF HOUR MEETING ON 21 MAY.
2. AFTER CONVEYING CONGRATULATIONS TO MRS THATCHER ON HER APPOINTMENT, PRINCE SALMAN SAID HE HAD BEEN ASKED TO CONVEY SAUDI VIEWS ON THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION. HE SAID THE SAUDIS WERE NOT IN PRINCIPLE OPPOSED TO PEACE BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISREAL BUT THE ROOTS OF THE PROBLEM WOULD HAVE TO BE TACKLED FOR A FULL PEACE TO BE ACHIEVED. SADAT'S VISIT TO JERUSALEM SHOULD HAVE BEEN PROPERLY PREPARED, AND A UNILATERAL PEACE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SIGNED UNTIL THE BASIS FOR A WIDER SETTLEMENT HAD BEEN AGREED. THE SAUDIS HAD HOPED THE CAMP DAVID NEGOTIATIONS WOULD SUCCEED ON THESE LINES. EVEN NOW, THE SAUDIS COULD AGAIN SUPPORT SADAT IF THE ISREALIS COULD BE PERSUADED TO GRANT THE PALESTINIANS THEIR LEGITIMATE RIGHTS. IF THIS WERE DONE, SAUDI ARABIA WAS READY TO LIVE IN PEACE WITH ISREAL, BUT THE SAUDIS DID NOT EXPECT THE FORTHCOMING NEGOTIATIONS ON THE WEST BANK TO PRODUCE ACCEPTABLE RESULTS, SINCE MR BEGIN SEEMED PREPARED TO GIVE THE PALESTINIANS ONLY AUTONOMY FOR THEIR PEOPLE BUT NOT THEIR TERRITORIAL RIGHTS. HE URGED THE UK AND OTHERS TO EXERT PRESSURE ON ISRAEL TO MAKE CONCESSIONS.

/3.SALMAN

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

3. SALMAN SAID THE SAUDIS DID NOT WISH TO ALLOW CURRENT PROBLEMS TO UPSET THEIR TRADITIONALLY GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE US AND OTHER WESTERN NATIONS. BUT A MARTIAL US ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE OIL STATES DID HER INTERESTS NO GOOD AT ALL. ONLY THE SOVIET UNION AND THE COMMUNISTS GAINED FROM THE PRESENT SITUATION. HE HOPED THE TRADITIONAL FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN THE UK AND THE SAUDIS WOULD CONTINUE FOREVER.

4. SALMAN ASSERTED THAT SAUDI ARABIA REMAINED OPPOSED TO FURTHER INCREASES IN THE PRICE OF OIL AND WOULD DO ALL IT COULD TO MAINTAIN SUPPLIES TO THE WEST. HE SUGGESTED THAT THE EEC SHOULD URGE OPEC TO FREEZE OIL PRICES AND PUT PRESSURE ON THE OPEC COUNTRIES TO THIS END. THIS WOULD HELP THE SAUDIS AT THE NEXT OPEC MEETING. IT WOULD ALSO HELP IF THE WEST COULD REDUCE ITS OIL CONSUMPTION. THE SAUDIS KNEW THAT PRICE RISES DAMAGED WESTERN ECONOMIES AND DID NOT WISH THIS TO HAPPEN. IF THE WEST WERE TO ADOPT A SENSIBLE AND MODERATE POSITION, IT WOULD BE EASIER FOR THE SAUDIS TO ARGUE FOR MODERATION IN OPEC.

5. THIS WAS A USEFUL VISIT WHICH GAVE THE PRIME MINISTER THE OPPORTUNITY TO EXPRESS OUR CONCERN ABOUT SAUDI/EGYPTIAN RELATIONS (YOUR TELNO 310), SAUDI/US RELATIONS AND OIL. THE RELATIVELY MODERATE WAY IN WHICH SALMAN SPOKE OF CAMP DAVID AND OF THE SAUDI DESIRE FOR PROPERLY PREPARED PEACE NEGOTIATIONS IS ENCOURAGING. EQUALLY THEY CLEARLY REMAIN UNCONVINCED THAT THE AUTONOMY NEGOTIATIONS WILL LEAD ANYWHERE, AND THERE IS NO SIGN YET OF READINESS TO MEND FENCES WITH SADAT. IT IS ALSO USEFUL THAT THE SAUDIS SEEM PREPARED, GIVEN CERTAIN ACTION BY THE WEST, TO RETURN TO THEIR TRADITIONAL MODERATING STANCE ON OIL. IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO HAVE ANY REACTION YOU CAN OBTAIN IN DUE COURSE TO SALMAN'S MISSION HERE. WE MAY BE ABLE TO CARRY FORWARD THE DIALOGUE DURING PARSONS' FORTHCOMING VISIT.

CARRINGTON

DEPARTMENTAL DIST:

MED
NENAD
NAD
ES vSD
FRD
EID

ADDITIONAL DIST:

ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE
OIL

2

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

21 May 1979

*Copied to Master Set
+ Middle East
situation.*

JS B

Saudi Arabia

Dear Paul,

Call on the Prime Minister by Prince Salman Bin Abdul Aziz of Saudi Arabia at 10 Downing Street on 21 May 1979

As you know, the Prime Minister agreed to see Prince Salman of Saudi Arabia at 1430 this afternoon, in response to the Prince's request for a call in order to convey to the Prime Minister personal messages from King Khaled and Crown Prince Fahd. Prince Salman was accompanied by the Saudi Charge d'Affaires and by an interpreter. Mr. Galloway interpreted for the Prime Minister.

Prince Salman told the Prime Minister that he had been asked to convey to her congratulations on her appointment and warm best wishes both from King Khaled and from Prince Fahd. Prince Fahd recalled with pleasure his earlier meetings with the Prime Minister and hoped to renew his acquaintance with her. The Prime Minister thanked Prince Salman for sparing the time to call on her and convey these messages personally; she much appreciated his gesture in doing so.

Prince Salman went on to say that he had also been asked by his brothers to convey to the Prime Minister the opinion of the Saudi Kingdom concerning the present situation in the Middle East. Despite the well known friendship of the Saudi Kingdom for President Sadat, the President had at no time discussed with the Saudis the steps which he proposed to take in his negotiations with the Israelis and the Americans. The Saudis, who had been blamed by their fellow Arabs for adopting such a moderate stance on the question of a settlement in the Middle East, were by no means opposed in principle to peace between Egypt and Israel: but the Saudis were also convinced that peace could not come about unless the roots of the problem were tackled in a sensible manner. President Sadat's visit to Jerusalem should have been properly prepared. Prince Fahd had urged Sadat not to make a unilateral peace with Israel and Sadat had responded, prior to Camp David, by promising to put a stop to all unilateral meetings until the bases for a peaceful settlement had been agreed on a wider basis. The Saudi Kingdom had hoped that the Camp David negotiations would succeed although they were convinced that a lasting peace could not be found through these means but only when all the problems of the region, including those of the West Bank, Jerusalem and Gaza, had been resolved. The Saudis were asking only that the United Nations and EEC resolutions should be put into effect.

/ Prince Salman went

CONFIDENTIAL

JS

Prince Salman went on to say that the Saudi rulers could not believe that all Arab and Islamic countries were in the wrong and that only President Sadat was in the right. They hoped that the United Kingdom and others would exert pressure on Israel and persuade the Israelis to grant the Palestinians their legitimate rights: if that were to happen, the Saudis could once again support President Sadat. The Saudi Kingdom had no wish to allow current problems to interfere with their traditional good relations with the United States and with other Western nations. In the present situation, however, only the Soviet Union and the Communists were the gainers. Referring to earlier rumours that the United States was prepared to re-occupy, in a military sense, the oil bearing regions in order to protect her interests, Prince Salman commented that if this policy were adopted US interests would have disappeared even before the arrival of the first troops. Prince Salman said that he understood that the Prime Minister was shortly to have a meeting with Mr. Begin; this might give her the opportunity to urge the Israeli Prime Minister to give the Palestinians their rights - this would be the right moment for the Israeli Government to take this action. If it were done, the Saudi Kingdom was very ready to live in peace with Israel. In response to a question from the Prime Minister, Prince Salman said that the Saudis had no fixed views about the best arrangement for the administration of the West Bank and would not object to any structure on which all others could agree.

The Prime Minister told Prince Salman that both King Khaled and Crown Prince Fahd had been good friends of the United Kingdom and of the West, especially during the oil crisis; she asked Prince Salman how he saw the future development of the oil price issue, following the drastic reduction of supplies from Iran. Prince Salman replied that he hoped that the traditional friendship between the United Kingdom and the Saudis would continue for ever. The Saudi Kingdom remained opposed to an increase in the price of oil and would do all it could, within the technical possibilities, to maintain supplies to the West. He suggested, however, that the EEC should urge OPEC to freeze oil prices and put pressure on the OPEC countries to this end. This would be helpful to the Saudis at the next OPEC meeting. It would also be helpful if the West could reduce its consumption of oil. The Saudis knew very well that oil price rises damaged the Western economies and had no wish to see that happen. If the West were to adopt a sensible and moderate position, it would be easier for the Saudis to argue for moderation in OPEC.

The Prime Minister, concluding the discussion, asked Prince Salman whether Prince Fahd would not oppose the forthcoming negotiations on the West Bank, but judge them on their merits and by their results. Prince Salman replied that, in the Saudi view, the talks on the West Bank could not produce any results since Mr. Begin seemed prepared to give the Palestinians only autonomy for their people but not their territorial rights.

I am sending copies of this letter to Bill Burroughs (Department of Energy) and Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

*Yours ever,
Roger L. ...*

TO:

CONFIDENTIAL

Your Reference

SPEAKING NOTE FOR VISIT OF PRINCE
SALMAN BIN ABDUL AZIZ OF SAUDI ARABIA

Copies to:

*Copied to Master Set
+ Middle East
Situation*

SUBJECT:

Arab-Israel

The British Government is committed to a comprehensive settlement of the Middle East question on the basis of UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, and to providing a homeland for the Palestinians. We have welcomed the Treaty between Israel and Egypt and the negotiations on the West Bank and Gaza, as a step towards this goal. We shall do all we can to ensure that Israel negotiates positively towards full, general autonomy for the West Bank, and ceases its policy of settlements.

We recognise that even if this is achieved it is only a transitional phase towards the full implementation of the UN Security Council Resolutions. If the present negotiations break down, there will be a need to find a new way forward - that might be the time for some European initiative. In the meantime the more radical Arab critics of President Sadat seem to have no positive ideas to offer - they call merely for the abrogation of the Egypt-Israel Treaty and seem to be attempting to bring President Sadat down. We think this would have dangerous consequences for the security of the area as a whole.

/Saudi-Egyptian

CONFIDENTIAL

Saudi-Egyptian Relations

We therefore very much hope that a dialogue can be re-established between Saudi Arabia and Egypt. We are ready to urge this on President Sadat also. The proposed dissolution of the Arab Organisation for Industries could harm our interests, as well as those of the Arab countries who were to receive its products. We hope that some way can be found of continuing our cooperation with the Arabs in this important field.

Saudi-US Relations

We have been concerned at the recent strains on Saudi-US relations. We well understand the irritation felt by the Saudis at certain press leaks in Washington. We hope that the relationship will soon return to normal.

Energy

We are preoccupied at the real risk of oil price rises which would have dangerous economic consequences in both the industrialised and developing countries. If we are to avoid this there will have to be efforts by all parties, both producers and consumers. The consuming countries must cut back demand, and we are doing all we can in consultation with our International Energy Agency and EEC partners to achieve this.

Recognition of the PLO (if raised by Prince Salman)

We already have official level contacts with the PLO, which give us a picture of their thinking. A dialogue would be easier if the PLO were to recognise Israel's right to exist.



Saudi Arabia

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

21 May 1979

Dear Bryan

--- As requested I attach a speaking note for the Prime Minister's use for the call by Prince Salman at 2.30 pm today.

Yours sincerely
Margaret Turner

Margaret Turner (Miss)
Private Secretary

B G Cartledge Esq
10 Downing Street

TO: CONFIDENTIAL

Your Reference

SPEAKING NOTE FOR VISIT OF PRINCE
SALMAN BIN ABDUL AZIZ OF SAUDI ARABIA

Copies to:

SUBJECT:

Arab-Israel

The British Government is committed to a comprehensive settlement of the Middle East question on the basis of UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, and to providing a homeland for the Palestinians. We have welcomed the Treaty between Israel and Egypt and the negotiations on the West Bank and Gaza, as a step towards this goal. We shall do all we can to ensure that Israel negotiates positively towards full, general autonomy for the West Bank, and ceases its policy of settlements.

We recognise that even if this is achieved it is only a transitional phase towards the full implementation of the UN Security Council Resolutions. If the present negotiations break down, there will be a need to find a new way forward - that might be the time for some European initiative. In the meantime the more radical Arab critics of President Sadat seem to have no positive ideas to offer - they call merely for the abrogation of the Egypt-Israel Treaty and seem to be attempting to bring President Sadat down. We think this would have dangerous consequences for the security of the area as a whole.

/Saudi-Egyptian

CONFIDENTIAL

Saudi-Egyptian Relations

We therefore very much hope that a dialogue can be re-established between Saudi Arabia and Egypt. We are ready to urge this on President Sadat also. The proposed dissolution of the Arab Organisation for Industries could harm our interests, as well as those of the Arab countries who were to receive its products. We hope that some way can be found of continuing our cooperation with the Arabs in this important field.

Saudi-US Relations


We have been concerned at the recent strains on Saudi-US relations. We well understand the irritation felt by the Saudis at certain press leaks in Washington. We hope that the relationship will soon return to normal.

Energy

We are preoccupied at the real risk of oil price rises which would have dangerous economic consequences in both the industrialised and developing countries. If we are to avoid this there will have to be efforts by all parties, both producers and consumers. The consuming countries must cut back demand, and we are doing all we can in consultation with our International Energy Agency and EEC partners to achieve this.

Recognition of the PLO (if raised by Prince Salman)

We already have official level contacts with the PLO, which give us a picture of their thinking. A dialogue would be easier if the PLO were to recognise Israel's right to exist.

D. R.

MR. CARTLEDGE

As there was no time for the Prime Minister to have a photocall with Prince Sulman would it be possible for her to have a photocall at the end of the meeting? The Press men are all waiting in the hall and I think it would be appreciated, not only by the media but by the Press Office here, if she could come down with him after the meeting.



21 May 1979



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

19 May 1979

Dear Bryan,

Visit of Prince Salman Bin Abdul Aziz of Saudi Arabia

The Saudi Arabian Charge d'Affairs telephoned the Middle East Department at 4.30 on 18 May to say that Prince Salman, the brother of the King and Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia, had just arrived unexpectedly at London Airport with personal messages to the Prime Minister from King Khaled and Crown Prince Fahd, which he had been asked to deliver personally. Prince Salman at first wanted to see the Prime Minister during the weekend, but after consulting your office, we told him that she would not be in London then. He has now asked if he might see her briefly on Monday or Tuesday.

There are particular reasons at this point for an exception to be made to the normal rules of protocol, and for the Prime Minister to see Prince Salman if it is at all possible for him to be fitted in. We are very concerned at the sharp deterioration in relations between Saudi Arabia and Egypt in recent weeks, and at a parallel deterioration in relations between Saudi Arabia and the United States. The Americans are making efforts to stop the rot in both directions, with our full backing. (The Secretary of State intends to raise this subject with Mr Vance during his forthcoming visit). It is very much in our interests that these rifts should be healed as they seriously threaten stability in the Middle East, and our vital interests in the whole area. In direct UK terms, the most immediate threat to our interests is the recent Saudi decision to dissolve the Cairo-based Arab Organisation for Industries, set up to organise the manufacture in Egypt of various weapons systems for several Arab countries. The British Aircraft Corporation, Rolls Royce and Westlands have an important stake in this.

We understand that the King's message is merely one of congratulation. Prince Fahd's may have more substance. It could, for example, seek our good offices over Saudi relations with the U.S. or Egypt, or perhaps over the Arab Israel question. In any case it would be useful to express our concern over the latest rifts, and our hope that our co-operation on arms manufacture will not come to an abrupt end.


If Mrs Thatcher can receive Prince Salman, a short speaking note will be provided on Monday. - attached.

Yours etc

P LeverB G Cartledge Esq
10 Downing Street



21 MAY 1979



Grey Scale #13



A 1 2 3 4 5 6 **M** 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 **B** 17 18 19

