PREM 19/3548

M.T.

SECRET

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Contacts with, and calls by the Soviet Ambassador, Mr Lunkov. and his successor V. I. Popov. and his successor Mr Zamyatin

SOVIET UNION

SEPTEMBER 1979

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
~~18.9.79~~		~~10.3.87~~					
~~2.9.79~~		~~21.7.87~~					
~~15.10.79~~		~~28.7.87~~					
~~3.1.80~~		~~5.V.V7~~					
~~20.10.80~~		~~10.11.87~~					
~~4.2.81~~		~~25.2.88~~					
~~5.5.81~~		~~11.7.88~~					
~~11.3.81~~		~~16.1.89~~					
~~24.4.81~~		~~27.9.90~~					
~~31.12.81~~		~~26.2.91~~					
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~~23.12.86~~							
~~20.2.87~~							
~~6.3.87~~							

Series closed

PREM 19/3548

TO BE RETAINED AS TOP ENCLOSURE

Cabinet / Cabinet Committee Documents

Reference	Date
CC(86) 18th Meeting, item 2	01/05/1986
CC(86) 14th Meeting, item 2	10/04/1986

The documents listed above, which were enclosed on this file, have been removed and destroyed. Such documents are the responsibility of the Cabinet Office. When released they are available in the appropriate **CAB** (CABINET OFFICE) CLASSES

Signed J. Gray Date 15/4/2017

PREM Records Team

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Reo
SA

bc PC

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

3 December 1991

CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER BY THE
NEW SOVIET AMBASSADOR

Thank you for your letter of 28 November.

The Prime Minister could see the new Soviet Ambassador at 1700 hours on 20 January for 45 minutes. Perhaps you could kindly set this up.

J S WALL

R H T Gozney Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL

GL PC

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

28 November 1991

Dear Stephen,

Call by the new Soviet Ambassador : Message from President Gorbachev - Request to call on the Prime Minister

When the new Soviet Ambassador, Mr Pankin, called on the Foreign Secretary this afternoon, 28 November, he handed the Foreign Secretary a message from President Gorbachev to the Prime Minister together with the translation. I enclose the latter. It does not look as if it needs an early response; you may feel it best to wait until the Prime Minister can send President Gorbachev a clear answer to the final paragraph about the possibility of a visit to Moscow by the Prime Minister by the end of the year.

The Soviet Ambassador also made a request to call on the Prime Minister. Rod Lyne of Soviet Department has explained that there could be no question of such a call before Maastricht, but that we would put the request to you for a little later. The Foreign Secretary would favour a call by Mr Pankin if the Prime Minister has time before Christmas, or otherwise early in the new year. He is due to present his credentials to The Queen on 13 December.

Yours ever,

Richard Gozney

(R H T Gozney)
Private Secretary

J S Wall Esq
10 Downing Street

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T296A/91

SUBJECT
MASTER
OPS
~~FILED ON:~~

Dear John,

I would like to use the arrival in London of our new Ambassador and once again express my gratitude for an early decision on granting him an agrement. B.D.Pankin, who proved his adherance to democratic principals, is a broad-minded man, posessing an extensive diplomatic experience, will, I am sure, work in London on a level, worthy of the relations exsisting between our two countries.

I must say that I value highly your activities as the coordinator of the G7, in particular after our meeting in Moscow, immediately following the collapse of the coup. Without your contribution, attention and determination in fulfilling the agreements, there would have been no results, which, regardless of all pilings up and difficulties, have been achieved recently in contacts with the sherpas.

The events here are developing with lightning speed. Negative processes, unleashed by the coup, have not yet been stopped. But the long-term, objective regularities and real necessities of peoples will take their own. That is why I am persistently and relentlessly persuing the line for establishing a new stable state and a common economic space, capable of uniting with the world economic system.

The Rt.Hon. John Major, MP
Prime Minister of Great Britain

Of paramount importance for us today is to hold tight a couple of months in terms of food and finance, while the market mechanizms start more or less operating. That is why at this moment we desperately need your as well other G7 members support and solidarity.

I feel that the world more and more starts to understand how closely tied are our reform and the interests of the World Community.

I hope that you will be able, as we agreed, to visit Moscow by the end of this year. Our relations are dear and valuable to me.

With best wishes to you and Norma.

M. Gorbachev

Moscow, " " November, 1991.

CONFIDENTIAL

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SUBJECT cc MASTER

bcc PC
CDP

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

27 February 1991

Dear Richard,

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR

The Prime Minister had a brief meeting this morning with the Soviet Ambassador, principally so the Ambassador could say they had talked before the Prime Minister's visit to Moscow next week.

The Prime Minister said that he was looking forward very much to the visit. He hoped that President Gorbachev would subsequently pay an early visit to the United Kingdom. He would like to maintain the same frequency of contacts as had existed between the President and Mrs. Thatcher. The Prime Minister went on to thank the Ambassador for his role in conveying messages from President Gorbachev about the Gulf in recent days. He had found his telephone conversation with the President last Saturday very useful. The Ambassador said the Prime Minister's visit was awaited with interest. President Gorbachev would wish to explain the reality of what was happening in the Soviet Union. Given the Prime Minister's special expertise in financial and economic matters, the President would no doubt be particularly interested in the Prime Minister's views on the Soviet economy. The Prime Minister said we well understood President Gorbachev's objectives within the Soviet Union but was less clear how he planned to achieve them. The Ambassador said that practical assistance from the United Kingdom for the Soviet economy would be very helpful. Almost nothing had yet happened under the Know-How Fund.

The Prime Minister said there were a number of issues he wold like to discuss with President Gorbachev. He would of course look forward to an account of internal developments in the Soviet Union including the state of the Union. In particular he would hope to have a word about the future of the Baltic States. The Middle East would certainly be high on the agenda. We appreciated President Gorbachev's efforts to achieve a peaceful solution in the Gulf. But our fundamental problem was that we could not trust Saddam Hussain. He would also want to cover various European subjects and arms control, in particular the CFE Agreement and the difficulties which had arisen over Soviet data. The Ambassador said that he was sure President Gorbachev would be happy to talk about all these subjects.

CONFIDENTIAL

MRM

There was a brief exchange about the Prime Minister's meeting with Mr. Pavlov and Marshal Yazov (whom the Ambassador predicted would spend much of the time pointing out and explaining the decorations in his office).

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence), Martin Stanley (Department of Trade and Industry) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,

Charles Powell

(C. D. POWELL)

Richard Gozney, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

PRIME MINISTER

The Soviet Ambassador is coming in to see you tomorrow for a few minutes before you meet the Soviet journalists. His purpose is to be able to say that he has met you before you arrive in Moscow next Monday evening.

You will want to tell him how much you are looking forward to the visit (programme attached). You might also want to thank him for his role in conveying messages from President Gorbachev during the Gulf crisis, and repeat your appreciation for the Soviet efforts to achieve a peaceful solution. You might also explain our current view, which he will undoubtedly report before your visit.

You will want to discuss what you hope will be the main subjects discussed during your visit. I suggest these are:

- developments in the Soviet Union. You hope Mr. Gorbachev will give you an account of how he sees the prospects for political reform.

- you will also want to have a frank discussion with him about the Baltic Republics.

- in return you would like to explain to him Britain's approach to relations with the Soviet Union.

- you would be interested to hear Mr. Gorbachev's views on economic reform and the IMF report.

- the Gulf crisis. It is important that you should understand each other's mind very clearly on the Gulf and indeed the wider Middle East situation.

- arms control. You will want to explain our concern about deficiencies in Soviet data in relation to the CFE agreement and the difficulties this is likely to cause for ratification.

- you would like to tell him about your own views on the future of Europe and Britain's role in it.

- there may be some bilateral matters you will want to raise. You will invite Mr. Gorbachev to pay a visit to the UK.

C.D.P.

CHARLES POWELL
26 FEBRUARY 1991

c:\wpdocs\foreign\Soviet.MRM

PRIME MINISTER

MEETING WITH THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR

You have a brief meeting with the Soviet Ambassador following the Young Scientists' Seminar tomorrow. He has recently returned from Moscow and claims to have instructions from President Gorbachev, although I do not think these are very precise. The three subjects he wants to talk about are:

- the political and economic situation in the Soviet Union. He says that he has some information to give you from Gorbachev about recent developments;

- economic assistance. He says that there is great interest on Gorbachev's part in following up the proposals you made in your Aspen speech. He may also raise the question of short-term financial help. You will want to stick to the line that we must await the outcome of the EC and IMF studies. But you will want to say that we are very ready to explore further, in the light of the IMF report, how we could give help to a particular sector of the Soviet economy on the lines you proposed at Aspen.

- Anglo/Soviet relations. He will probably mention the proposal for a Declaration (or even a Treaty) on Anglo/Soviet relations. You will find there is a separate note from the Foreign Secretary in your box about this. I suggest you adopt a cautious approach. You have nothing against it in principle: indeed, if President Gorbachev attaches great importance to it, you would of course be helpful. But at first glance, it is clear to you that the language of the Soviet draft would need very considerable amendment.

You might also hint at your willingness to meet President Gorbachev some time in the autumn if he is travelling in

Western Europe, for instance at the time of the CSCE Summit in Paris.

C.D.P

CHARLES POWELL
27 September 1990

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1 SUBJECT MEETING RECORD
cc MASTER

CONFIDENTIAL

File JDB BRX

bc PC

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

16 January, 1989.

Dear Stephen,

CALL BY THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR

The Soviet Ambassador called on the Prime Minister this evening to deliver an oral message from Mr. Gorbachev. This said in essence that, because of pressing matters at home, Mr. Gorbachev is unable to travel abroad for the time being. But he wants to reinstate his postponed visit to the United Kingdom, and will propose dates when possible. The Prime Minister expressed understanding, and said that Mr. Gorbachev would be welcome whenever he chose to come.

The Soviet Ambassador said that he had seen Mr. Gorbachev in Moscow on 12 January for a long talk. Mr. Gorbachev had asked him to convey his gratitude for the understanding shown by the Prime Minister for the postponement of his planned visit to the United Kingdom in December. That had underlined the extent to which a good basis of personal trust had been established between them. Mr. Gorbachev had recalled several times during the talk their original meeting at Chequers, and how the Prime Minister had immediately seen and understood the significance of the thoughts which he was then beginning to develop about the future of the Soviet Union and a new structure of international relations. Since then, she had shown that she not only understood them, but believed in them and wanted to encourage them. Mr. Gorbachev had also read with great interest the Prime Minister's assessment of his United Nations speech, and was looking forward to discussing with her the issues raised in it. He always found his talks with the Prime Minister useful, important and interesting, and believed that Soviet/British relations carried a special importance in the broader East/West relationship.

The Ambassador continued that Mr. Gorbachev had asked him to say very frankly that, due to circumstances in the Soviet Union, he had found it necessary to curtail his plans for foreign visits. At the moment, all these visits were up in the air. With so many issues fighting for his attention in the Soviet Union ("I am floating on the waves"), he

simply could not get away. But he wished to emphasise that the postponement of his visit to the United Kingdom was just a technical hold-up and had no political significance. He had a great desire to hold a further meeting with the Prime Minister, and it would certainly take place. He had also wanted the Ambassador to express his sincere gratitude for the aid from the United Kingdom for Armenia.

The Ambassador continued that Mr. Gorbachev had initially been thinking in terms of a visit at the end of January. But the internal situation in the country led him to conclude that it was simply not possible to go abroad at present. He had to cope with the final stages of Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, with the Elections to the Supreme Soviet, with the Moscow Party Conference, with the continuing problems with the nationalities, and with reconstruction in Armenia. He very much hoped that the Prime Minister would understand this. As soon as he was able to consider foreign travel again, he would consult the Prime Minister immediately about dates, and a visit to the United Kingdom would be very high on the list. Any speculation about his plans to visit other countries - France, China, Germany, Cuba - should be disregarded. He was not at present able to find dates for any of them.

The Prime Minister said that of course she was disappointed that Mr. Gorbachev would not be coming in the near future. She always looked forward to her talks with him. They were consistently the most profound and challenging of the discussions she held with other Heads of Government. She knew that The Queen would be no less disappointed. But the most important thing was that Mr. Gorbachev's views should prevail within the Soviet Union. She fully understood the need to deal with pressing internal problems. Things at home must come first. She was confident that Mr. Gorbachev would continue along the path on which he had embarked, and not give up. She knew he would come to the United Kingdom as soon as he could, and we would do our best to fall in with his plans. The Ambassador should convey to Mr. Gorbachev both her disappointment and her full understanding. At the same time, he should give her warm good wishes to him and to Mrs. Gorbachev. The Ambassador said that he would certainly do this. He was convinced that the visit would take place, and his personal guess was it would be in the early Spring.

It was agreed that we would say to the press that the Soviet Ambassador saw the Prime Minister tonight at 10 Downing Street on his return from Moscow to deliver an oral message from Mr. Gorbachev dealing with a number of matters. The message confirmed Mr. Gorbachev's desire to pay an official visit to the United Kingdom, for which dates would be fixed when possible. The Prime Minister said that Mr. Gorbachev would be welcome whenever he came. We shall elaborate on this by adding that it is clear that Mr. Gorbachev has many pressing commitments at home, and that a visit is not to be expected in the near future.

As he was leaving, the Ambassador said that

Mr. Kamentsev, the Deputy Prime Minister who accompanied the Prime Minister on her visit to Georgia, would be visiting Britain from 6 to 9 February for talks on economic and trade matters. The Prime Minister said that she would do her best to see him.

Zamyatin obviously came in some trepidation about his likely reception. He made no bones about Gorbachev's current difficulties and heavy preoccupations at home. It is hard to judge whether these are genuine or whether he was simply covering himself for having led us to expect an early visit. He laid on the excuses fairly thick. Equally, on the way out, he said he had been surprised by how openly and frankly Gorbachev had spoken of his difficulties. The Prime Minister's view is that we should accept the account at face value and show ourselves entirely realxed about the dates of a visit.

I am sending copies of this letter to Bill Heseltine at Buckingham Palace and to Sir Robin Butler.

Yours sincerely,

Charles Powell

C.D. Powell

Stephen Wall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

The National Archives

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Use black or blue pen to complete form.

Use the card for one piece or for each extract removed from a different place within a piece.

Enter the department and series,
eg. HO 405, J 82.

Enter the piece and item references, .
eg. 28, 1079, 84/1, 107/3

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This should be an indication of what the extract is,
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CONFIDENTIAL

File KK

cc PC

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

29 July 1988

AFGHANISTAN: SOVIET PRISONERS OF WAR

Thank you for your letter of 29 July suggesting how we should pursue the question of the treatment of Soviet prisoners in the hands of the Afghan Resistance Alliance. This matches closely what the Prime Minister has already said to Mr. Gailani and I am confident she will be content with the Foreign Secretary's proposals.

(C. D. POWELL)

Stephen Wall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

JR

cc PC

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

29 July 1988

Dear Charles,

Afghanistan: Soviet Prisoners of War

Thank you for your letter of ~~11~~ 1 July recording the Soviet Ambassador's appeal from Mr Gorbachev to the Prime Minister to help secure the release of any Soviet prisoners held by the resistance.

The Foreign Secretary has considered this question carefully. There are obvious attractions for our dealings with the Soviet Union in showing willingness to help. This could also be of use to us if we wish to play an active part in promoting a settlement of the Afghanistan problem. Consequently the Foreign Secretary recommends that:

(i) we should speak to the Resistance Alliance in Peshawar and, if opportunities offer, to resistance commanders in Afghanistan urging them to apply the 1949 Geneva Convention on the Treatment of Prisoners of War (in particular to treat prisoners humanely and to protect their persons and honour) and to cooperate with the ICRC as the relevant international body with long experience in dealing with such issues. We should stress the presentational benefit they would derive from this;

(ii) we should tell the Russians that we are doing so. We should also urge them to press Najib to do likewise, and point out to them that the resistance can hardly be expected to give up their prisoners without some assurance of reciprocity from the Soviet/regime side.

The Foreign Secretary does not think we should become more deeply involved. There are a number of potential traps in the Soviet request:

- the war is not yet over. The resistance are engaged in a legitimate struggle and will want to hold on to their prisoners whilst hostilities continue. Any request that they should return the prisoners might at this stage be taken to imply that we were ready tacitly to acquiesce in Soviet attempts to foster the impression that the war ended at Geneva in April, and that the resistance are being unreasonable in continuing the fighting;

/

- the fact that some Soviet prisoners are held by the resistance must be set against the thousands of resistance members held by the regime (8,000 in Pol-E-Charkhi jail near Kabul alone). There is a real risk that the regime may seek to use its prisoners as hostages (or even execute them) as resistance pressure on Kabul mounts. The resistance are not likely to give up their Soviet prisoners until they have some assurance of reciprocity. Nor would it be appropriate for us to mediate; the ICRC are already in the field;

- there is the question of repatriation of Soviet prisoners. The Russians naturally want to get their prisoners back to the Soviet Union, and want us to help them. But we must recognise that some Soviet prisoners may not want to return. The Foreign Secretary believes that we should be careful to avoid becoming associated with what might be perceived as forced repatriation of Soviet prisoners. He thinks it best to leave detailed negotiations to the ICRC, who have great experience and would wish to interview all prisoners individually to establish their wishes before decisions are taken about their return.

Yours,

Stephen Wall

(J S Wall)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

SOVIET UNION: Contacts with Ambassador Sep

SUBJECT cc MASTER

CONFIDENTIAL

File SHUBNE
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10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

11 July 1988

Dear Alex,

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR: SOVIET PARTY CONFERENCE

The Prime Minister saw the Soviet Ambassador this morning to hear a report on the recent Party Conference of the CPSU which he attended

Mr. Zamyatin said that he had not seen such a Party Conference since 1949 in terms of the freedom and candour of discussion. An unprecedented feature had been the establishment of special commissions to discuss and amend the resolutions to be adopted by the Conference. The central issue had been the structure of political power. This in turn had a number of aspects. The role of the Communist party would be reduced and in future it would concentrate on three areas - ideology, education and personnel matters. It would not be involved directly in economic and social questions. These would be dealt with by the government which would be responsible to Parliament. The Parliament would meet between sessions of the Supreme Soviet and would be headed by the chairman of the Supreme Soviet who would be elected by secret ballot. Another major issue had been the proposal to combine the post of chairman of the Supreme Soviet with that of leader of the Communist party. Gorbachev had pointed out that, in most other countries, the leader of the strongest party was also the head of state and government and the Soviet Union should adopt the same practice. But not all delegates had been in favour of that, citing their fear of a renewed personality cult, and 247 had voted against it.

Zamyatin continued that the Conference had noted that the pace of economic reform was slower than had been expected. Gorbachev had cited two reasons for this: the scale of the problems had not been fully realised; and the implementation of economic reforms was having to take place within the limits imposed by existing Economic Plans. Many sectors of the economy such as steel were still operating under the old system. Delegates had also reported that people were dissatisfied with the disruption of supplies, particularly of food. In consequence the main theme of the meeting of the Central Committee to be held at the end of July would be the food programme. The other main question which had to be addressed was that of price reform.

I enclose a copy of Zamyatin's notes on which, as you will see, he expanded in discussion.

The Prime Minister said that the conference had been a very exciting event which had attracted enormous interest abroad, particularly in the United Kingdom. She was not surprised that the benefits of reform were proving slow to materialise; she had always predicted that the difficulties would be felt long before the advantages. Nonetheless she remained optimistic about the prospects for Mr. Gorbachev's reforms and she interpreted the Conference as a considerable boost for them. The Prime Minister added that she thought it had been a courageous decision to allow Yeltsin to speak. She understood Mr. Gorbachev's view that the party leader should also be the highest representative of the State. Overall she was optimistic about the direction in which things were moving in the Soviet Union.

I am copying this letter to Brian Hawtin (Ministry of Defence), Alex Allan (HM Treasury) and Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely,

Charles Powell

(C. D. POWELL)

Lyn Parker, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

I WISH TO EXPRESS MY OWN VIEW ON THE MOST IMPORTANT ISSUES OF THE PARTY CONFERENCE.

THAT WAS EXTRAORDINARY PARTY GATHERING SINCE 1941 - AN EVENT THAT PROVED EXTRAORDINARY IN EVERY SENCE OF THE WORD. NEARLY 5.000 DELEGATES MET IN KREMLIN TO DEBATE THEIR COUNTRY'S POLITICAL FUTURE AND SPECIFICALLY THE FATE OF THREE - YEAR - OLD PROGRAMM OF RESTRUCTURING.

I WOULD SAY, THAT CONFERENCE VERY DEFINITELY SPOKE IN FAVOUR OF THE CONTINUATION OF PERESTROYKA. THE OVERWHELMING MAJORITY OF DELEGATES STOOD FOR IT. IT IS AN EVIDENCE OF THE STABILITY IN THE SOCIETY AND LEADERSHIP.

HOWEVER, FROM THE REPORT, AS WELL AS FROM THE SPEECHES IT BECAME QUITE CLEAR THAT, THE PACE OF ECONOMIC REFORMS IS SLOWER THAN THE TARGETS. THERE ARE TWO MAJOR REASONS:

- AT THE BEGINNING WE DIDN'T FULLY REALIZE THE SCALE OF THE PROBLEMS;

- THE IMPLEMENTATION OF NEW ECONOMIC REFORMS IS TAKING PLACE WITHIN THE LIMITED CONDITIONS, IMPOSED BY PREVIOUS STATE PLAN. THEREFORE THE TRANSITION OF ENTERPRIZES INTO COST-EFFECTIVE MECHANIZM WAS FACED WITH THE NUMBER OF PROBLEMS. ONE OF THE NECESSARY ELEMENTS IS THE MECHANIZM OF FREE MARKET FOR WHOLESALE GOODS. THIS MECHANIZM IS STILL LIMITED BY OLD PLANS FRAMEWORK. THAT IS WHY MAJORITY OF ENTERPRISES COULD NOT EMBARK

ON THE ROAD OF NEW ECONOMIC REFORMS. MANY DELEGATES UNDERLINED THAT EXPECTATIONS OF PEOPLE FOR PROMPT RESULTS OF PERESTROIKA DID NOT MATERIALIZE.

BUT EVEN DESPITE IT, I SHOULD SAY, THAT PEOPLE DEEPLY BELIEVE IN PERESTROIKA, THEY ARE CONTENT WITH THE ATMOSPHERE WHICH HAS BEEN CREATED IN THE COUNTRY AS A RESULT OF DEMOCRATIZATION AND GLASNOST.

AT THE CONFERENCE IT WAS EMPHASIZED THAT IN FUTURE WE'LL HAVE TO FIT OUR EFFORTS INTO THE EXISTING LAWS OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF WORLD'S ECONOMY.

we shall

I WOULD NOT CONCEAL FROM YOU THE FOLLOWING. MANY DELEGATES SAID, THAT PEOPLE ARE DISSATISFIED WITH DISRUPTION OF SUPPLIES, FOOD SHORTAGES IN MANY

AREAS. AS A RESULT, THE CONFERENCE CAME TO A CONCLUSION, THAT THE PRIORITY TASK NOW IS TO FULFILL THE FOOD PROGRAMME. BIG RESOURCES WILL BE ALLOCATED FOR IT.

THE SECOND CENTRAL ISSUE WAS REORGANIZATION OF STRUCTURE OF POLITICAL POWER IN THE COUNTRY. IT IS ONE OF THE PRECONDITIONS FOR THE SUCCESS OF ECONOMIC REFORMS. THE OLD MECHANIZM WITH ITS HIGH CONCENTRATION OF POWER IN THE HANDS OF PARTY APPARATUS - IS ONE OF THE MAJOR OBSTACLES.

HENCE, THE CONFERENCE TOOK DECISIONS WHICH FORESEE:

1. RETENTION OF THE LEADING ROLE OF PARTY BUT FREEING IT FROM UNNECESSARY FUNCTIONS OF ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT. INSTEAD THE PARTY WILL FOCUS ITS ATTENTION ON IDEOLOGY, EDUCATION, PERSONALL POLICY.

2. CREATION OF NEW STRUCTURE OF LEGISTATIVE POWER IN THE COUNTRY, A RADICAL RESTRUCTURING OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT. WE WISH TO RETURN TO THE FORM, WHICH SERVED THE BASIC PRINCIPLE OF OUR STATE - THE SOVIETS OF PEOPLE'S REPRESENTATIVES. CERTAINLY, IN PRESENT CONDITIONS THEY WILL BE GIVEN NEW RESPONSIBILITIES FOR MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL OVER ECONOMY, SOCIAL PROBLEMS, ECOLOGY. BETWEEN SESSIONS OF SOVIETS THE GOVERING BODY WILL BE TWO-CHAMBER PARLIAMENT. IT WILL CONSIST OF APPROXIMATELY 400 DEPUTIES. THEY WILL BE FREE FROM OTHER RESPONSIBILITIES AND most of them WILL SIT ON A DAY-BY-DAY BASIS. THE PARLIAMENT WILL BE HEADED BY CHAIRMAN

THE SUPREME SOVIET, WHO WILL BE ELECTED BY SECRET BALLOT, AS A LEADER OF THE RULING PARTY.

THIRD ELEMENT. A NUMBER OF DOCUMENTS WERE ADOPTED, WHICH SEAL THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF DEMOCRATIZATION, ENVISAGE CREATION OF LAW-BASED STATE, GUARANTEE INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND WIDE INFORMATION OF PEOPLE ON ALL ISSUES.

IN CLOSING ADDRESS GORBACHEV PRONOUNCED: THE SOVIET PEOPLE WANT A CLEAR PERSPECTIVE, FULL-BLOODED AND UNCONDITIONAL DEMOCRACY. GLASNOST IN ALL THINGS, BIG AND SMALL, RESPECT FOR HARD WORK AND TALK, AND FAITH IN THE SERVICE FOR THE CAUSE AND GOOD OF SOCIETY. WE NEED NO SOCIAL UTOPIAS.

THAT WAS THE KEYNOTE OF HIS ADRESS, WHICH WAS SUPPORTED BY THE DELEGATES.

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT cc MASTER

SPWBNF

cPC.

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

11 July 1988

Dear Lyn,

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR: POSSIBLE VISIT OF MR. GORBACHEV

The Soviet Ambassador told the Prime Minister today that he had been able to speak only very briefly to Mr. Gorbachev in Moscow after the party conference. Nonetheless, he had raised the possibility of Mr. Gorbachev's visit to the United Kingdom. Mr. Gorbachev had said that such a visit had a high priority for him and he hoped to pay it in the Spring of next year. But his programme of foreign visits was still being worked out. The Prime Minister said that we would be happy to welcome Mr. Gorbachev whenever it suited him to come.

The Prime Minister also took the opportunity to say she would very much appreciate it if Mr. Gorbachev were able to see Sir Bryan Cartledge before he finally left Moscow in August. Mr. Zamyatin said that he would convey this personal request.

Yours ever,

Charles Powell

(C. D. POWELL)

Lyn Parker, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT cc MASTER

SRWBNG
cc

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

11 July 1988

Dear Lyn,

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR: AFGHANISTAN

At the end of his meeting with the Prime Minister this morning the Soviet Ambassador said that he had been charged by Mr. Gorbachev to convey an unofficial request to the Prime Minister. Some 300 Soviet officers and men had been taken prisoner by the Resistance in Afghanistan. The majority of them were held in Pakistan. Mr. Gorbachev attached very high priority to securing their release. He received a great volume of correspondence from their families on the subject. He would be very grateful for any help which the Prime Minister could give in terms of using her good offices to bring about their early release. The Prime Minister said that she would pursue the matter and consider how she could help.

The Prime Minister would be grateful for the Foreign Secretary's advice on whether and how we should pursue this. I should add that her personal inclination is that we should help.

I am copying this letter to Brian Hawtin (Ministry of Defence).

Yours sincerely,

(C. D. POWELL)

Lyn Parker, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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PRIME MINISTER

MEETING WITH THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR

You are to see the Soviet Ambassador at 1030 on Monday, so that he can report to you on the recent CPSU Party Conference and on any contacts which he had with Mr. Gorbachev while in Moscow.

You have of course followed the proceedings of the Conference very closely. You will want, therefore, to head Zamyatin off from giving a blow by blow account and try to get him instead to give you his impression of the way ahead.

Points which you might make are:

- you are grateful to him for getting you a full translation of Mr. Gorbachev's speech so rapidly;

- the lively and outspoken debate at the Party Conference was impressive;

- nonetheless our impression is that Mr. Gorbachev was well out in front of the majority of delegates and pulling a rather reluctant party behind him. Does Ligachev represent a focus for opposition to Gorbachev's policies?

- the time-scale for implementing political and economic reforms set out by Mr. Gorbachev is ambitious. Is it realistic?

- what will be the fate of the proposal to establish an executive Presidency by combining the role of General Secretary and Chairman of the Supreme Soviet?

- what will be the task of the Central Committee Plenum at the end of July?

- how does he expect nationalities' problems to be handled?

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Other points which you might raise are:

- is there further news of the likely timing of Mr. Gorbachev's visit to the United Kingdom? It is important to maintain the continuity of contacts;

- we are looking forward to a visit from an IPU Delegation from the Soviet Union later in the year. Is there any firm news yet who will lead this? (Some rumours have it that Ligachev will: that would be interesting to say the least);

- you very much hope that Mr. Gorbachev will find time to see Bryan Cartledge before he leaves Moscow in mid-August on retirement. It would be a good opportunity for Gorbachev to set out his views on the way ahead (as well as going some way to balance the access which you give Zamyatin).

C.D.P.

(C. D. POWELL)
8 July 1988

OTe

cc PC
cc B/P

CONFIDENTIAL

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

7 July 1988

Dear Charles,

Soviet Party Conference

The Soviet Ambassador is calling on the Prime Minister on 8 July to tell her about the Party Conference which he attended as delegate from Lithuania, though as far as we can tell he did not speak. You will have seen the reporting telegrams from the Moscow Embassy. The JIC are also preparing an assessment.

The Conference was a remarkable event. Gorbachev himself said that nothing like it had happened since the 1920's. The liveliness and frankness of the debate are a victory for glasnost and will have both impressed and set an example for the nation at large. In Sir Bryan Cartledge's phrase, the Conference has "transformed and raised the quality of Soviet political life"

At the same time, it was clear that the majority of delegates to the Conference were of a conservative complexion. Speakers who referred to the "excesses" of the more outspoken elements of the press were applauded, and Ligachev made a powerful speech at the end of the Conference which enhanced his own authority, and was better received than Gorbachev's closing peroration. Gorbachev will have been very conscious of the existence of a worried conservative constituency which it might be unwise to push too far too fast.

Nevertheless, Gorbachev succeeded in obtaining the Conference's authoritative endorsement of a potentially far-reaching programme of political reform (summarised in the attached annex). His proposals to create a Congress of Deputies and the post of executive President, together with the suggestion that Party Secretaries should stand for election to the Presidencies of Soviets at all levels, went beyond the 'Theses' published before the Conference and took delegates by surprise. Gorbachev had to return to the rostrum two days after his opening speech to clarify proposals on local Soviets.

The creation of a new post of executive President, which realistically could only be held by Gorbachev himself, will increase his popular legitimacy as well as enhancing his status as leader of the Soviet State. It will also serve to

/make

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make the General Secretary accountable to a representative body (the new Congress of Deputies) and therefore to a constituency outside the Party which, with the power of the office, might enable him in future at least on some issues to by-pass a still largely conservative Central Committee.

The proposal that Party First Secretaries at all levels should be Presidents of the corresponding Soviets at first sight contradicts the idea of separation of Party and State organs and was criticised on that account by some delegates, including the reformist wing. However, if there are genuine multiple candidacies for membership of the Soviets, if glasnost is not inhibited and if enthusiasm for participation can overcome traditional grass-roots apathy, Party Secretaries could be made both accountable and more responsive to a non-Party electorate.

The system has the potential to be a check on abuses of power and a step towards more representative Government. It also has the potential for abuse by local mafias, which are already a standard feature of Soviet life. Much will depend on how far the local population take advantage of the new opportunity for participation.

Rather less attention was paid to Party reform in Gorbachev's speech and the Conference debate. The continued existence of the one-party system, buttressed by the KGB, was unquestioned. But Gorbachev echoed proposals in the Theses for:

- less party direction of the day to day affairs of state and economic bodies;
- multiple candidacies in party elections;
- limitation of tenure (although his suggestion of exceptional third terms was rejected by the Conference); and
- more genuine debate.

The Conference Resolution on democratisation and political reform also reflects two controversial measures from the Theses - a proposal for regular conferences between five-yearly Party Congresses to re-elect 20% of the membership of Party Committees including the Central Committee; and a reference to the need to reform the nomenklatura system. Gorbachev had passed over these in silence in his speech. Their reappearance in the Resolutions suggest that, notwithstanding the overt conservatism of many delegates, Gorbachev was able behind the scenes to secure endorsement of proposals which may have given rise to some misgivings. We are promised a Central Committee plenum at the end of the month which will no doubt address these and other questions.

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The overall effect of the proposed Party reforms is likely to be a greater vitality and responsiveness at all levels in what remains, ultimately, the only instrument Gorbachev has to achieve his objectives.

Altogether, the Conference approved six Resolutions covering:

- Democratisation and political reform
- Glasnost
- Legal reform
- Implementation of the decisions of the 27th Party Congress (economic reform).
- Foreign policy
- Nationalities

These broadly followed the lines set out in the Theses, with the inclusion of the constitutional reforms unveiled in Gorbachev's speech. The Resolution on glasnost was notable for its ringing re-statement of the key importance of openness and debate in Soviet life and perestroika, notwithstanding the rather less liberal sentiments expressed and applauded at the Conference. The Resolution on economic reform reflects Gorbachev's speech with calls for improved food supplies and a speeding up of the transfer to wholesale trading and reform of the financial system. Contract and leasing arrangements in agriculture are endorsed, as is price reform - after consultations, and without loss of income. The Resolution on nationalities avoids reference to specific current problems while calling for more regional independence and observance of national characteristics within the federal system. The Resolution on legal reform closely mirrors the relevant part of Gorbachev's speech in affirming the principle that everything not forbidden should be allowed, that the rights of the individual should be more strictly protected and that the judiciary should be made more independent and defence lawyers more assertive. The Resolution on foreign policy adds little to the current concept of "new thinking".

Overall, the Conference can be regarded as a net gain for Gorbachev, who has achieved at least the framework for a more far reaching reform of the Soviet system that seemed likely, and created a substantial new post for himself. The Party is to remain the ultimate source of power, but its touch should be lighter and it ought to be subject to a degree of accountability.

It is nonetheless striking that the Conference concentrated on political reform. Economic reform, in terms of real improvements in living standards, remains in the doldrums and there is a certain note of desperation in the Politburo's references to the need for consumer-orientated

/improvements

improvements. Popular support at the traditionally cynical and lethargic grass-roots level will to a great extent depend on Gorbachev's ability to generate economic progress, or at least some realistic prospect of jam tomorrow.

Gorbachev will also have to keep a continuing eye on Ligachev and his more conservative colleagues in the leadership. While Ligachev in his speech was at pains to stress Politburo unity, he pointedly reminded Gorbachev of whom he had to thank for his own election. Gorbachev's strategy appears to be to keep moving the consensus forward as fast as is practicable with glasnost as a spur. So far the strategy has worked, but Gorbachev probably faces a continuing struggle with the middle level party bureaucracy to achieve implementation of his political reforms in the timescale laid down.

Against this background, the following are points which the Prime Minister might like to draw on for use with Zamyatin:

Prospects for political reform

- The Conference revealed considerable hesitations about the reforms. How can Gorbachev maintain momentum and prevent foot dragging? Ligachev seems now identified as the champion of caution. Has opposition to Gorbachev acquired a focus?

- Even the reformers were not united on the combining of the roles of Party Secretary and Chairmen of Soviets. Will this work?

- Where does the new role for the Party leave the party structure itself including the Central Committee and the Politburo. What role will they play? How can the Party in practice be brought to withdraw from day to day direction of state bodies?

[I would not labour this. If there is a change in membership, Zamyatin is likely to be sacked!]

- What happened to earlier intentions to change the party statutes and the membership of the Central Committee?

- What agenda and prospects for the plenum at the end of July? What is it expected to achieve?

Other issues:

- Economic reform is making very slow headway particularly in improving living standards. References at the Conference were very general. What will be done to keep grass-roots support?

- When will the plenum on nationalities take place. What is the prognosis for a solution in Armenia?

/- When

- When will the proposed new laws eg on glasnost and freedom of conscience appear?

- How is the process of economic reform now to be taken forward?

- Are the changes in the Supreme Soviet structure likely to affect the tentative programme of parliamentary exchanges this year, and in particular the November IPU visit? Is there any news of who might lead?

The Foreign Secretary also recommends that the Prime Minister raise with Zamyatin the proposal that Sir B Cartledge should be received by Mr Gorbachev before he leaves Moscow in mid August. It would be a useful opportunity for Mr Gorbachev to convey to the Prime Minister his reflections on the way ahead in the light of the Conference and subsequent plenum and his thoughts on East/West and Anglo/Soviet relations in the light of the changes now launched. A message may not be necessary but, given Zamyatin's own access to the Prime Minister, it would give more balance to the relationship to be able to have first hand impressions at this key juncture in Soviet reform.

Yours ever,

Lyn Parker

(L Parker)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

ANNEXE

SOVIET PARTY CONFERENCE

Summary of proposed reforms

I Soviets

a. Local

- to be financed from local enterprises, regardless of their subordination, and from the local population (a rates system?); greater jurisdiction over local industry;

- local officials to be elected by secret ballot or appointed through competition

- Some elected Deputies to be full time

- New organisational features: full-time Presidium and Chairman of local Soviets

- Chairman of local Soviet as a rule to be local Party First Secretary

- Members of the Executive Committee of the Soviet (except for the Chairman) and Heads of its Departments, as well as local judges, procurators and arbitrators, to be barred from election as Deputies

- Limited tenure of two terms (of 5 years against the current for all elected representatives and appointed officials

- Competitive election of Deputies from an unlimited number of candidates with no quotas laid down.

b. Supreme Soviet

- Add to the current 1,500 Deputies (elected on a territorial and national basis) another 750 elected as direct representatives of Social organisations (Party, Trade Unions, Co-operatives, youth, women's, veterans, academic, creative and others - the list and norms of representation to be written into the Constitution).

- The whole to form a Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR, to convene once a year and decide the most important constitutional, political and socio-economic questions.

- The Congress to elect from its own members a Supreme Soviet of the USSR, consisting (as now) of two Chambers, to act as a permanently functioning supreme organ of power accountable to the Congress.

- The two Chambers (Council of the Union and Council of Nationalities) to be more sharply differentiated so as to fulfil the function implied by their titles.

- The post of Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR to be created, the incumbent to be elected and recalled by secret vote of the USSR Congress of People's Deputies and to have wide powers, including deciding key issues of foreign, defence and security policy, heading the Defence Council and nominating the Chairman of the Council of Ministers.

- A presidium of the Supreme Soviet to be created to work under the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet and to comprise 2 First Deputy Chairmen (one of whom would be the Chairman of an upgraded USSR Committee of People's Control), 15 Deputy Chairmen (one from each Union Republic, as at present) and the Chairmen of the Chambers, Commissions and Committees of the Supreme Soviet. The Presidium would convene sessions of the Supreme Soviet and co-ordinate its work.

- The powers of the Supreme Soviet Commissions and Committees to be broadened, so that major decisions on internal and external policy and on appointments should be adopted only after discussion in them.

- A Committee of Constitutional Supervision, elected by the Congress of Deputies and headed by a First Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Soviet, to verify the constitutionality of legislation.

- Similar measures to be applied in Union Republics and, as appropriate, in Autonomous Republics.

- Ministers and Heads of analogous bodies to be barred from election as Deputies.

Timing: The necessary legal measures to be considered by the Supreme Soviet this autumn so that the reorganisation can take place after (already scheduled) elections next spring.

II Legal

- Election of judges for a 10-year term (currently 5)

- Ensure competitiveness and equality of parties, openness, presumption of innocence.

- Increase number of people's assessors for especially complex questions.

- The Procuracy should concentrate on its function of supervision.

- Amendment of criminal code to continue, followed by procedural and corrective labour legislation.

- Create an independent structure for the investigative apparatus of the MVD, not subordinate to local organs.

- Revise the role of defence lawyers as a self-managing association.

- Strengthen the legal service to Governnment and industry.

- A new training programme for legal experts.

III <u>Party</u>

- Potential recruits to Party to be discussed at open meetings, and views of the labour collective to be taken into account.

- Commissions of the Central Committee to be created on most important questions of internal and external policy.

- Members of the Central Committee to participate more frequently in work of Politburo.

- Politburo to report regularly to Central Committee Plenums.

- Lower Party organisations to be allowed, when electing delegates to a conference or congress, to propose names for inclusion in the higher Party organ.

- More nominations than available places to be permitted, up to and including the CC CPSU.

- Tenure of office at all levels to be limited to 2 consecutive five-year terms.

- Personal "attestation" of all Party members.

- No direct instructions from the Party to State and other organisations.

- Structure of Party apparatus to be changed to reflect proper functions of Party and not branches of administration, and apparatus to be reduced.

- A new Party control body, elected by Congress, to be created (in place of the Committee of Party Control and Revision Commission).

- Regular conferences between Party Congresses empowered to renew 20% of Party Committees' memberships at all levels, including Central Committee.

- Reform of the nomenklatura system of Party appointments.

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PRIME MINISTER

MEETING WITH THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR

You are to see the Soviet Ambassador on Monday. I attach a speaking note for you to use. It would be helpful to know before the weekend whether it is on the right lines.

CDP

MT

CHARLES POWELL

25 February 1988

CONFIDENTIAL AND PERSONAL

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10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

25 February 1988

From the Private Secretary

MEETING WITH THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR

I enclose a copy of the speaking note which I have put to the Prime Minister for use with the Soviet Ambassador on Monday.

CHARLES POWELL

A. C. Galsworthy, Esq., C.M.G.,
Foreign and Commonwealth office.

CONFIDENTIAL AND PERSONAL

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PRIME MINISTER

MEETING WITH THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR

You are to see the Soviet Ambassador on Monday. I attach a speaking note for you to use. It would be helpful to know before the weekend whether it is on the right lines.

CHARLES POWELL

25 February 1988

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CONFIDENTIAL

POINTS FOR THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR

- Understand that Mr. Gorbachev wants to know whether there has been any change in our attitude towards the Soviet Union.

- The answer is that there has not. We still proceed on the basis of the principles on which Mr. Gorbachev and I agreed at our first meeting in 1984, namely:

  - mutual respect;
  - recognition of equal right of both countries to feel secure;
  - no point in trying to detach each other from our respective alliances;
  - frank speaking as the best way to overcome differences.

- Much progress has been made since that first meeting in 1984. We want it to continue.

- You have given public support and encouragement - including in your recent remarks to NATO - to the changes which Mr. Gorbachev is making in the Soviet Union.

- You have welcomed Mr. Gorbachev's statement of the Soviet Union's intention to withdraw from Afghanistan. We hope it will be implemented rapidly.

- You have welcomed the progress made on family reunifications.

- But it is necessary to be realistic about the differences which remain between our systems and about our respective concerns over each other's policies. It does no-one a service to indulge in false optimism.

- We remain concerned about the scale of the Soviet Union's military might which seems to us far larger than required for legitimate defence.

- We see a continuing Soviet effort to denuclearise Europe. We believe this would jeopardise our security.

- We note Soviet support for Vietnam's subjugation of Cambodia, Soviet arms supplies to Nicaragua, their direct involvement in the conflict in Angola.

- We still do not see all the principles of the Helsinki Final Act being implemented in the Soviet Union.

- In the face of this, we are naturally determined to maintain a sure defence just as the Soviet Union is.

- That means continuing to modernise our weapons. You cannot deter war with obsolescent weapons. But of course we stick absolutely to our obligations under the INF Treaty.

- We also reaffirm our commitments to the ideals and purposes of NATO as a defensive alliance. That is the point of the NATO Summit.

- And we shall be no less forceful and robust than Soviet spokesmen in putting over our own point of view on all these issues.

- But our aim remains that of diminishing hostility and reducing armaments. We continue to support 50 per cent reduction in United States and Soviet strategic nuclear weapons, verifiable arrangements for the elimination of chemical weapons and the establishment of conventional balance.

We seek security at a lower level of armaments. Balance is critical. Without it we shall only have fears and suspicions and greater instability.

- Realism is also essential. Neither side is going to convert the other. But we can learn to understand each other better and live together more easily.

- Talking freely and openly is the best way to overcome misunderstandings and resolve differences. There is nothing to be gained by sweeping problems under the carpet.

- You very much hope that Mr. Gorbachev will - as a respected friend - take up the invitation to visit Britain. Past meetings have led to good progress in our relations. There is every reason to expect future meetings to do so too.

- Convey warm greetings to Mr. and Mrs. Gorbachev.

File

CCPC

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

10 November 1987

Dear Lyn,

MEETING WITH THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR

The Soviet Ambassador came to see me this morning at his own request. He was accompanied as usual by Mr. Kossov. He raised a number of points.

The Ambassador said that he had attended two recent meetings of the Central Committee in Moscow including the one at which Mr. Yeltsin had made his now notorious speech. It had not been very easy to follow exactly what Mr. Yeltsin had been saying. But his argument appeared to be that there was a conflict between what it was realistically possible to achieve as a result of perestroika and glasnost and what had been promised to the Soviet people. Expectations had been created which could not be met. It would be better to halt the whole process of restructuring temporarily, think it out more fully, and promise people only what could in practice be achieved. His attitude appeared to have been affected principally by the problems which had arisen in the Moscow district. Mr. Yeltsin had not received much support for this approach although it had not been widely recognised that there were great difficulties in reconciling new policies with an old Five Year Plan, and Mr. Yeltsin had subsequently spoken of resigning. It had been agreed that this was a matter to be considered at the Moscow Party Conference which, as I understand it, is now in progress or shortly will be.

The Ambassador asked what assessment we had made on Mr. Gorbachev's speech at the 70th Anniversary celebrations. I said that the general view was that it was slightly disappointing in its treatment of Soviet history and had said nothing very new on the current situation or future policies. The Ambassador said that this seemed to be the general view in the United Kingdom. Perhaps expectations had been too high. In Mr. Gorbachev's view, it was not for him to re-write Soviet history but for professional historians to be given access to all the documents and come up with their conclusions. This would now happen. Another important development was that the records of all Party Conferences since 1917 were now to be disclosed and made available to "subscribers and reading rooms". People would be able to see the truth for themselves.

The Ambassador recalled that there had been earlier mention of the possibility that Mr. Gorbachev might stop over in the UK on his way to or from the Summit meeting in the United States. He wondered whether this invitation remained open. I said that I had checked with the Prime Minister and that it certainly did, but that there was a slight preference for a stop-over on the way to Washington. I hoped that the Ambassador would make this clear to Mr. Gorbachev. We would make any convenient arrangements either in London or possibly at a Royal Air Force airfield. The Ambassador said that he had established that Mr. Gorbachev would need to make a technical stop somewhere en route to Washington, although he could fly back without stopping. A minimum of two hours would be required for a stop. He would make sure that Mr. Gorbachev understood that the offer remained open and would contact me if he received any instructions.

The Ambassador continued that he knew that Mr. Gorbachev was currently looking at his plans for travelling abroad next year. Although he had no specific authority to say so, he believed that Mr. Gorbachev might well want to take up the Prime Minister's invitation to pay a visit to the United Kingdom in the second half of next year. He enquired whether this was likely to be convenient. Mr. Gorbachev had told him there were many matters which he would like to discuss with the Prime Minister. He particularly appreciated her support for the INF Agreement which had been very important in bringing it to fruition. She had told Mr. Gorbachev in Moscow that she would support such an agreement and had honoured her word. I said that the invitation was an open one and that we looked to Mr. Gorbachev to make a firm proposal on dates. I could see no reason why a visit next year would not be welcome, subject to checking specific dates.

The Ambassador continued that he thought that chemical weapons might be one of the main issues for discussion during such a visit. He wondered whether it might be a good idea to establish an Anglo/Soviet working group on this subject to prepare for the meeting between the Prime Minister and Mr. Gorbachev. I said that this was something which he should raise with the Foreign Secretary. I recalled that we had not been attracted by the idea of a working group to prepare the Prime Minister's visit to Moscow.

We had a brief word about the visit of Academician Marchuk and Mr. Tolstykh. I explained the Prime Minister's preference for meeeting the two delegation leaders and one or two others only. She would of course meet all the members of both delegations at drinks at the Royal Society the preceeding evening. The Ambassador seemed quite content with this.

I am copying this letter to John Howe in the Ministry of Defence and to Trevor Woollev in Sir Robert Armstrong's Office.

Yours sincerely,

C. D. Powell

Lyn Parker, Esq.,
Foreign & Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

5 August 1987

MEETING WITH THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR

The Soviet Ambassador came to see me today at his own request. He raised a number of subjects.

Arms Control

The Ambassador said that Mr. Shevardnadze would be making a speech on arms control in Geneva tomorrow. Although he did not have the final text, he did know what Shevardnadze's main points would be. On INF, he would dismiss speculation that the Soviet Union might be ready for a compromise over the Pershing 1As. It was the firm Soviet view that the double zero option must be exactly that. If the West Germans were allowed to keep the Pershing 1As, then the GDR would want to retain a similar number of equivalent Soviet missiles. I set out our view on standard terms. The Ambassador said that the matter would no doubt be discussed between Shevardnadze and Shultz in September.

On chemical weapons, Shevardnadze would express Soviet support for the United Kingdom's ideas including our proposals on inspection and the creation of an international inspectorate. He would also deal with nuclear testing, holding out the prospect of agreement on a step by step approach and suggesting a system of permanent controls on recognised test sites.

The Gulf

The Ambassador said that he had received a report of Vorontsov's visit to Teheran. Vorontsov had told the Iranians that they should calm down their emotional approach and avoid any provocation. If tension could be reduced, it might make it possible for the United States to decrease the number of its warships in the Gulf. Vorontsov's assessment was that, on balance, the Iranians were unlikely to launch an attack against Gulf states or to provoke aggression. But the situation was unpredictable. I said that the Prime Minister would shortly be sending a message to Mr. Gorbachev setting out her views.

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The Ambassador added that it might be helpful in calming the situation if President Reagan were to make a public statement of the United States' position confirming that the United States had no intention of mounting an attack on Iran. The Iranians tended to believe reports in the press of American preparations to launch assaults against Iranian installations. I said that I hoped that no-one was feeding Iranian delusions about this.

The Ambassador added that he would be meeting the Saudi Chargé d'Affaires later today to enquire about the fate of Soviet pilgrims in Mecca. The Soviet authorities had no news of them.

Afghanistan

The Ambassador said that he wished to say an informal word about the Soviet position on Afghanistan. He did not want to go over all the history. Many in the Soviet Union had been opposed to sending in troops. Gorbachev himself tended to blame those who had taken the decision. His clear objective now was to settle the issue and withdraw Soviet forces. But he needed to be sure that Soviet withdrawal would not result in further bloodshed against those who had worked with the Soviet Union. There would also have to be guarantees that, following withdrawal, there would not be incursions into Afghanistan by right-wing extremist groups from Pakistan. The Soviet view was that the situation would be helped by excluding both left and right wing extremists.

The Ambassador continued that a number of interesting proposals had been made. For instance the Afghan Government could be enlarged to include representatives of exile groups. The Prime Minister himself might be drawn from among them. The new constitution did not envisage single party government but for a multiparty system. There had been contacts with the former King in Italy, to establish whether he could contribute to reconciliation. The King had said that he would only be prepared to play a part with the agreement of all the parties concerned. A proposal would shortly be made to allow opposition forces who were in de facto control of certain parts of the ocuntry to exercise legal authority and the functions of local administration there. All these were intended as steps towards Gorbachev's aim of being able to withdraw troops and leave a neutral and non-aligned Afghanistan.

provided

Unfortunately there were some negative factors. For instance it was quite clear that the United Kingdom had been supplying Blowpipe to the Afghan resistance. This was admitted by sources in Pakistan. There seemed to be those in the United Kingdom who were opposed to any peaceful solution. It was also suggested in some quarters that the Soviet leaders were under such pressure from public opinion at home that they would soon have no option but to withdraw Soviet troops. It was true that there was some criticism in the Soviet Union of policy on Afghanistan. People wrote to Gorbachev and pointed out that the Nicaraguans were able to defend themselves

without Soviet troops. Why could Afghanistan not do so too? But there was no question of a precipitate withdrawal without certain basic conditions being satisfied.

I said that the Ambassador's account had a number of interesting points. But it overlooked some key facts, such as that the withdrawal of Soviet troops was necessary to establish the conditions in which there could be a peaceful settlement. Our impression of the new Constitution was that it attempted to impose the nature of the government which would follow a Soviet withdrawal. That was not acceptable. It was for the Afghans themselves to determine freely the sort of government they wanted. There could be guarantees about the international status and role of Afghanistan but not about its internal system of government. It was certainly not the case that the United Kingdom was opposed to a peaceful settlement. If the Soviet Union was really willing to withdraw, they would find us ready to help them achieve that. But had they yet faced up to the basic decisions? The Prime Minister had drawn some encouragement from her talk with Mr. Gorbachev on this issue; and there appeared to have been some evolution in the Soviet position since then, which was welcome. But there was still a way to go.

The Ambassador said that he would like to remain in touch on this issue. You may want to arm me with some further points to make.

Bilateral

There were a number of miscellaneous bilateral points.

I conveyed the Prime Minister's thanks for the paper on Soviet economic reforms and said that she would like to meet Abangeyan in the autumn. I also thanked him for the film of the Prime Minister's visit to the Soviet Union.

The Ambassador said that he had seen the Prime Minister's message to Mr. Gorbachev following her visit to Washington and thought it a good one. He wished to thank the Prime Minister for having received the delegation of Soviet schoolteachers.

I am copying this letter to Ian Andrews (Ministry of Defence) and to Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

CHARLES POWELL

Lyn Parker, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

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10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

28 July 1987

MEETING WITH THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR

I wrote to you on 21 July about my meeting with the Soviet Ambassador. I should record that the Prime Minister has subsequently commented that she would very much like to see Mr. Aganbegyan in the autumn.

(Charles Powell)

Lyn Parker, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

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~~Please put in box 4~~

PRIME MINISTER

MEETING WITH THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR

You will, I think, want to see my note of the meeting with the Soviet Ambassador, together with the information brief on the Soviet economy which has been prepared for you on Gorbachev's instructions. You will note that Gorbachev is offering to send his chief economic adviser to brief you more fully in the autumn.

mf

C.D.?

C.D. POWELL
21 July 1987

EL3CCM

Prime Minister
For week-end box
CDP.

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

21 July 1987

Would very much like to see Mr Aganbegyan.

Dear Lyn,

MEETING WITH THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR

The Soviet Ambassador came to see me today at his own request. He was accompanied by his Private Secretary (the egregious Kosov being on holiday).

The Ambassador said that he had been in Moscow for the recent Central Committee plennum. He had subsequently had a very brief meeting with Mr. Gorbachev. The latter had charged him to convey his sincere congratulations to the Prime Minister on her election victory, and to say that he was glad but not surprised that she had won.

Soviet Economy

Mr. Gorbachev had also asked him to convey to the Prime Minister a note (copy enclosed) summarising the economic reforms on which the Central Committee plenum had agreed. This did not attempt to conceal the very real difficulties and problems. The reforms were far-reaching. From now on, the control of the central planning machinery would be drastically weakened. Decisions would be taken at plant level. Individual factories would have to pay for their inputs and calculate their prices on the basis of their costs. There would be scope for paying incentives. Some enterprises might go bankrupt with consequent loss of jobs. The Ambassador continued that Mr. Gorbachev would be willing to send over his chief economic adviser on these reforms, Mr. Aganbegyan, to brief the Prime Minister more fully in the autumn. Equally he (the Ambassador) would find it very helpful to have a briefing on how the Prime Minister had restructured the British economy.

I said that the Prime Minister would be grateful for the briefing paper. During her first meeting with Mr. Gorbachev in December 1984 they had discussed the difficulties of running a highly centralised economy. The recent reforms were clearly a major step towards decentralisation and greater autonomy at the level of the individual enterprise. I would only note, as a historical fact, that this was the direction which the Prime Minister had then urged upon Mr. Gorbachev. I added that one implication of the reforms seemed to me that unemployment would inevitably become a feature of the Soviet economy. The Ambassador said that it was certainly the case

that jobs would be lost in the drive for greater productivity or if individual enterprises went bankrupt. But since there was a shortage of labour in the Soviet Union, there would be no continuing unemployment.

Yes

I continued that I would ask the Prime Minister whether she would like to see Mr. Aganbegyan. I was sure that we could arrange for the Ambassador to be briefed on our own economic restructuring. Indeed it was gratifying that Thatcherite economics were in such demand. I should be grateful if you could consider who might best do this. Perhaps Terry Burns would take it on.

Arms control

The Ambassador said that he had noted claims being made during the Prime Minister's visit to Washington that the Soviet Union was dragging its feet in the INF negotiations in Geneva. He wanted to refute this strongly. He handed over a short speaking note, saying that it was his own work and had no official status. (I enclose a copy: you may wish to pick up some of the points in the Prime Minister's message to Gorbachev.) He wished to stress that the Soviet Union remained seriously interested in the conclusion of an INF agreement with President Reagan. Whatever the effect of the current Congressional hearings on his standing, they recognised that unless an agreement was concluded relatively soon it might be two years or more before there was another opportunity, and it would probably mean starting again from scratch. Mr. Gorbachev was ready for a Summit at the end of this year or early next, although for obvious reasons he could not manage November. There had been speculation as to why a meeting had not yet been arranged between Shevardnadze and Shultz. The Soviet side saw no point in such a meeting until the negotiations in Geneva had reached the point where political decisions were required. The Pershing 1As were a particular problem. If they were retained, then the GDR and Czeckoslovakia would insist upon retaining an equivalent number of Soviet missiles on their territory.

I recalled that the Prime Minister had said publicly in Washington that it was not a question of anyone dragging his feet. There were very difficult and detailed issues to be resolved, and it was important to get them right. That said, I did not accept that the Ambassador's notes gave a fair picture of the negotiations in Geneva. Indeed in several respects they seemed to lag well behind other indications of Soviet policy such as General Chervov's reported comments. There was no question of including the Pershing 1As in an agreement. They were a bilateral arrangement between the United States and Germany, and had never been raised throughout six years of discussions until relatively recently. Many of the alleged problems in the Ambassador's note would disappear if the Soviet Union accepted NATO's proposal for global elimination of INF systems.

The Ambassador asked whether the Prime Minister assessed that President Reagan was serious in wanting an agreement and a Summit later this year. I said that there was no doubt of that, but equally no question of the United States being ready to pay a price for a Summit. Our impression was that they were looking to Mr. Gorbachev to propose a date.

Prime Minister's Visit to Washington

The Ambassador asked whether I could tell him anything about the Prime Minister's visit to Washington. I said that, as he would have read, the Prime Minister would be sending a message to Mr. Gorbachev in the next few days setting out her reflections on the way ahead. I thought that this would cover arms control, Iran/Iraq and an international peace conference on the Arab/Israel problem. I drew the Ambassador's attention to the Prime Minister's comments in Washington about the historic and courageous changes being made in the Soviet Union by Mr. Gorbachev and our support for them.

We had brief exchanges about all three issues, which revealed nothing of any moment.

Possible Visit by Gorbachev

The Ambassador said that he had read some comments by the Prime Minister about a possible visit by Mr. Gorbachev. I said that the Prime Minister had made clear that we would be happy to have Mr. Gorbachev pay a visit. We would no doubt be following this up more formally soon. The Prime Minister had also indicated that if Mr. Gorbachev wished to stop briefly in London for a talk on his way elsewhere, he would be equally welcome.

Afghanistan

As he was leaving, the Ambassador said that he would welcome an opportunity to discuss with me soon Soviet views on Afghanistan and their contacts with the former King in Italy. I said that I was ready to listen.

I am copying this letter to Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely,

Charles Powell

CHARLES POWELL

Lyn Parker, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

Information brief for the Rt.Hon.
Margaret Thatcher,
the Prime Minister

Importance of the June 1987 plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union lies with the fact that it marked a crucial shift to large-scale practical measures in reforming the economy and society. The perestroika has been raised to a new level.

I think the Prime-Minister remembers from her recent visit to Moscow the animated discussion of the ways and means of reorganisation, on how it affects the lives of people, many changes being already visible.

Yet, at the plenary meeting both Mr.M.Gorbachev and other members of the Central Committee frankly admitted that reorganisation was advancing slowly, with numerous difficulties. Of course, we have some hopeful signs - higher industrial and agricultural output, more high-quality goods. Glasnost and democratisation make people more aware of what is happening around them, more active in pursuit of common goals. There is, as Mr.Gorbachev put it, "an explosion of spiritual activity".

At the same time, in the last 6 months the party realised fully the complexity of the problems and contradictions we face. They surfaced in the difficulties of the state quality control, anti-drinking campaign, drive for efficiency and discipline. We still cannot overcome wide-spread shortages both of industrial and consumer goods, management is by fiat. In short, the plenary meeting concluded that piece-meal changes in the economy cannot take it away from the "pre-crisis" situation.

We are now convinced that the reform in our country can only advance through a major overhaul of the national economy - from the factory level to management, planning, pricing, trade, finance. The Plenum approved the main guidelines for their reform with the aim of implementing most of it by the year 1990.

As you know we started with an individual enterprise - factory, considering it to be the basic unit of the economy at large. The Supreme Soviet has already adopted The Law on State Enterprise. Under the new economic mechanism, factories' accountability and dependence

on the end result will increase dramatically through introduction of the criteria like cost-effectiveness, self-financing, profit-and-loss accounting. Here are just a few of the new features:

- factories are free to draw up their own production and sales plans guided by the public demand expressed through direct competitive orders of the state, other factories, trading firms;
- economic competition is encouraged;
- after covering to the state the costs of basic assets, land, water,etc., factories retain their profits and can invest them at their discretion into modernisation, capacity build-up or into social amenities;
- funding from the state budget is only preserved for major national orders, while bank credits should be widely available;
- factories can determine the number of employees they need;
- factories, unable to show a profit sufficient to cover the losses and sustain a normal level of income for the workforce, can be closed, in which case the state still guarantees the constitutional right of citizens for work.

In exercising all these new freedoms and responsibilities we see as a major factor the right of self-management, election of executives, collective decision-making. Factories' economic well-being will now be directly dependent on meeting the present customer demand, making good use of resourses, raising quality level.

Instead of day-to-day running of subordinate factories, <u>ministries, state committees, other national economic bodies</u> will now focus on overall economic strategy, keeping the proportions in balance, organising research and development, introduction of new technologies. What control over factories is left in their hands will be executed through a system of economic norms and target figures (level of demand for goods of social priority, minimum efficiency rate, etc.).

<u>State planning organisations</u> should now concentrate on spelling out basic priorities and long-term macroeconomic and social targets, structural policy and investment criteria, guidelines for research and development, enhancing scientific, cultural, educational potential and maintaining defence.

Quite obviously, more low-key role for central planning and managment bodies will involve streamlining of cumbersome bureaucracies, cutting down on the staff. This creates, as you would know very well, another set of social problems.

Now modus operandi for factories and ministries can only function under a new system of procurement and supply. Wholesale trade and plant-to-plant co-operation replaces the supply quotas of materials, determined by the centre. Yet, it can only become possible if we overcome the wide-spread shortages in the economy both in industrial and consumer markets. That is another complex task of high priority.

As part of the drive to overhaul economic management, pricing is to be revamped. Currently, economically unjustified price fixing leads to ever increasing government subsidies which, I can tell you, have reached the annual level of 76 billion roubles. The Plenum has ruled that the government bodies will only fix the price for the priority products. Otherwise, the emphasis should be on wholesale and contract prices, determined by the supply and demand situation. More details of the pricing reform are yet to be worked out.

Finance and banking should be re-organised in such a way that monetary figures strictly corresponded to the volume and quality of goods and services produced. Banks cease to be a channel of government subsidies and return to their original role of creditors.

To implement all these reforms, we also need managerial personnel of a new mould - young, efficient, innovative. New measures to raise the level of professional training are to be adopted, new incentives introduced.

It is very important to satisfy the demand for high-quality consumer goods and foodstuffs now in short supply. Otherwise, there is no sense in raising wages and salaries, introducing new higher bonuses. The principle "to everyone according to his work" must be backed up economically.

This might be especially interesting for you. We feel that our standing on international markets should change. Many ministries and individual enterprises have now obtained the right of access to the foreign markets. They also retain larger part of their hard-currency proceeds. Steps are planned to strengthen the

rouble, make it a convertible currency. The structure of our foreign trade should be changed in a way that ensures us fuller participation in the international division of labour.

It was stressed at the Plenum that the ultimate success of this enormously complex and complicated economic reform depends on the continuation of the political process of glasnost and democratisation. New style of thinking, new style of management must lead to more active mass participation in governing the country - both economically and politically. A series of concrete measures to this effect were adopted.

We realise we face a difficult situation. It is aggravated by the fact that we undertake our reforms simultaneously on all directions. There will be a certain transitionary period, when both old and new elements are going to co-exist within the economy, adding to the confusion.

That gives additional significance to the conclusion drawn by the Central Committee, that in political terms there is no opposition to the course of reform we have taken. There are people reluctant to face new challenges, vested interests who do not want to part with their fringe benefits, bureaucrats opposing a change as such. But the vast majority of people fully supports the party's call to make socialism more socialist, to make our system more efficient. We are sure of that, and on that certainty rests our conviction in the ultimate success of perestroika.

Although the Soviet Union and the United States have come close to reaching an agreement to eliminate intermediate- and shorter-range missiles in Europe, there are still obstacles to signing such an accord soon.

One serious stumbling block is the U.S. insistence on the right to convert Pershing-2 missiles into shorter-range Pershing-1Bs rather then eliminate them.

But the reverse process would be just as simple. Pershing-1Bs can be easily turned back into Pershing-2s within two days.

Nor does the United States want to destroy its medium-range cruise missiles in Europe. The Americans suggest now that the problem can be solved by removing their warheads or by transferring those missiles to battleships near Europe.

Another important issue is the standing U.S. proposal that the Soviet Union should reduce and dismantle its missiles unilaterally while the United States monitors us. At the same time, the U.S. arsenal would remain intact, and our inspectors would not be allowed on American bases.

If any U.S. warheads are left in Europe under any pretext, it could hardly be called a "true zero" level. I am sure Washington would make the same argument if Moscow decided to store some warheads in an East European country for its own or another country's missiles. Thus, the American insistence on keeping 72 U.S. warheads for use on West German missiles poses a serious problem.

The Americans want to deploy their remaining Pershing-2 missiles in Alaska, thus increasing the nuclear threat to Soviet territory without allowing a reciprocal threat.

We have agreed to U.S. request that our remaining SS-20 missiles not be deployed west of the 80th meridian in the Eastern Hemisphere, thereby preventing the missiles from reaching Western Europe. Our medium-range missiles would also not be able to reach U.S. territory. So why does the United States insist on deploying Pershin-2s in Alaska?

The United States is planning to increase the number of submarine-launched cruise missiles, to deploy more bombers and atomic artillery and to enhance the range of Lance missiles.

All existing asymmetries should be dealt with decisively through reductions by the side that is ahead to establish equal, low levels of troops and arms. Those levels should be sufficient for defense but should exclude any possibility to conduct offensive operations.

We are ready for a "global zero" option - the elimination of all U.S. and Soviet intermediate-range weapons - provided that American nuclear weapons in the Far East are taken into account, including those in Japan, the Philippines, and South Korea, and that the U.S. carrier-based force in the Pacific be removed beyond certain agreed on boundaries.

The possibility for elimination of intermediate-range weapons is ripe, and we do not want to miss this chance.

We are convinced that the agreement on elimination of intermediate-range nuclear forces in Europe, together with an agreement on key elements of a 50 percent reduction of strategic nuclear weapons and a ban on space weapons, could provide a solid basis for a future U.S.- Soviet summit meeting.

Our impression is that our negotiating partner cannot decide what is the proper course. The remaining obstacles can be easily overcome once America finds the will to do so.

START
Vietnam,

CONFIDENTIAL

file

SC2AKJ
cc PC

SUBJECT cc MASTER

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

10 March 1987

Dear Tony,

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR

The Prime Minister saw the Soviet Ambassador this evening to discuss her forthcoming visit to the Soviet Union. Mr. Zamyatin was accompanied by Mr. Kossov.

The Prime Minister asked Mr. Zamyatin to convey her thanks to the Soviet Government for their message of sympathy about the Zeebrugge ferry disaster. This had been much appreciated. The Prime Minister continued that she had been pleased to meet the Soviet fireman who had received a 'Gold Star' award for his heroism at Chernobyl. Mr. Zamyatin said that the fact that the Prime Minister had received the fireman had created a very good impression in the Soviet Union.

Visit to the Soviet Union

The Prime Minister said that she was very much looking forward to her visit to the Soviet Union and was making thorough preparations for it. She had studied Mr. Gorbachev's recent speech to the Central Committee Plenum, as well as his earlier speeches, very carefully. It was clearly an exciting moment for a visit with a great deal of change and innovation being discussed. Mr. Zamyatin said that it was not easy to bring about change. In the late 1970s the Soviet Union had been handicapped by the age of its leaders who had failed to understand the need for new thinking. The Prime Minister said that she herself well understood the difficulties of change. She had been elected in 1979 to bring about change in the United Kingdom and it had taken over 7 years to achieve results. She hoped very much that Mr. Gorbachev would give her a very thorough and frank account of his reform plans. She would also wish to talk to him about the implications for the Soviet Union's external policies. Mr. Zamyatin said that Mr. Gorbachev had already been informed of the Prime Minister's wish to have a first-hand account of restructuring in the Soviet Union and had expressed his willingness to talk to her about this.

CA

The Prime Minister said that she would also wish to discuss a broad range of international issues including Afghanistan, the Middle East and Southern Africa as well as

arms control. Mr. Zamyatin said that he believed this would be welcomed by the Soviet leadership. He knew that Mr. Gorbachev would wish to raise with the Prime Minister the new Soviet initiative on INF. If good progress could be made on this at Geneva in the next few months, Mr. Gorbachev was ready for a Summit meeting with President Reagan to sign the agreement. The Prime Minister welcomed this, and added that she would hope to cover other aspects of arms control as well, notably the prospects for the START talks and the issues raised by the Strategic Defence Initiative. She did not exclude the possibility of setting down points of agreement. But this would depend on how the talks went.

The Prime Minister said that she would also propose to raise the issue of human rights. We were pleased with some recent developments, in particular the release of dissidents, and had publicly welcomed these. She would be ready to deal with the subject tactfully and sensitively, as she had done with Mr. Gorbachev at Chequers. She had a suggestion to make: the atmosphere for discussion of this issue would be much improved if it proved possible to settle a number of cases with which she and the United Kingdom Government had been personally concerned before her arrival in Moscow. Mr. Zamyatin said that Mr. Gorbachev was dealing with these issues by himself. He had learned from various sources in the Soviet Union that Mr. Gorbachev was encountering certain difficulties in this, but had nonetheless decided to take the necessary measures to settle the problem. But he wished to give the Prime Minister a word of frank advice. When the Soviet leaders talked of 'democratisation' we should not interpret it as an invitation to interfere in the Soviet Union's internal affairs. The Prime Minister said that the Helsinki agreements gave us a direct interest in these matters. As she had already said, she recognised the need to take account of the Soviet Government's sensitivities. Equally, they must realise how strongly she felt about these issues which were constantly being raised with her by people in this country.

Mr. Zamyatin said that he wished to mention two matters which he personally hoped would come up in the Prime Minister's talks in Moscow. The first concerned Anglo/Soviet trade. The Soviet Union was following a new policy on foreign trade and no longer insisted that all contracts should go through the Ministry of Foreign Trade. Rather they were allowing the industrial ministries to have direct contacts with firms and organisations in the West and were also establishing joint ventures. But progress was still hindered by bureaucracy on both sides. He himself was doing his best to increase Anglo/Soviet trade, and there were important contracts in the pipeline. But he needed the Prime Minister's help in Moscow in getting them unblocked. He found himself engaged in a battle with Soviet bureaucracy on this subject almost every day. The Prime Minister said that she certainly intended to raise the subject of trade in her talks.

Mr. Zamyatin said that the second matter concerned a proposal by his Embassy that representatives on the

Anglo/Soviet Joint Commission should be upgraded. On the Soviet side this would be to the level of deputy Prime Minister. The Prime Minister said that she would need to discuss this with Mr. Channon.

Visit to the Soviet Union: Programme

The Prime Minister said that she would be grateful to know how the planning of her programme was coming along. She attached particular importance to being able to hold at least two talks with Mr. Gorbachev in a very restricted circle indeed. This was the most important single aspect of the visit for her. There was a further point on which she would welcome the Ambassador's advice. When Mr. Gorbachev visited her at Chequers, Mrs. Gorbachev had come too. If it was appropriate, she would very much like to pay a courtesy call on Mrs. Gorbachev in Moscow. Beyond this, she had let the Soviet authorities have, through our Embassy in Moscow, a number of suggestions for the programme, including her wish to speak to the Soviet people on television, to be able to conduct a walkabout and to see something of the Soviet Union outside Moscow.

Mr. Zamyatin said that he did not yet have a final programme for the visit. The draft had been sent to Mr. Gorbachev for his approval but he had not yet given his views. He had, however, received from the Foreign Ministry, on a strictly personal basis, a number of indications of what would be in the programme. He would pass these on without commitment. There would be a short welcoming ceremony at the airport on the Prime Minister's arrival, where she would probably be greeted by Mr. Ryzhkov. National Anthems would be played and the Prime Minister would review an Honour Guard, after which she would shake hands with senior officials and meet Embassy staff. From there she would go straight to the Kremlin where she would be welcomed by the Soviet leadership. Mr. Gorbachev would be present and so would Mr. Gromyko. This meeting would last only some 15 minutes. Mr. Zamyatin continued that he understood that the Prime Minister wished to visit Zagorsk on 29 March. The Patriach of Moscow would be there to greet her. Official talks would begin on 30 March with a meeting with Mr. Gorbachev. He believed that they would certainly start in a very restricted circle and might continue on that basis, or might subsequently be slightly expanded. In the evening there would be a dinner in the presence of Mr. Gorbachev and leading members of the Soviet Government. This would be an occasion for formal speeches. On 31 March talks would be held with Prime Minister Ryzhkov. Mr. Gorbachev might also wish to resume his talks with the Prime Minister in a restricted circle that day. On 1 April the Prime Minister would visit Tibilisi. Arrangements would be made for her to meet as many people as possible. The opportunities for the Prime Minister to speak more formally to the Soviet people would come in her speech at the official dinner, at her press conference and on Soviet television. He would pass on to Moscow the Prime Minister's suggestion of a meeting with Mrs. Gorbachev. His personal expectation was that Mrs. Gorbachev would be present at the welcoming ceremony

at the Kremlin. He stressed once more that this was only preliminary information.

The Prime Minister thanked Mr. Zamyatin for these indications which seemed generally satisfactory, in particular the amount of time allocated for her to hold discussions with Mr. Gorbachev.

As Mr. Zamyatin was leaving the Prime Minister said that she very much hoped that arrangements could be made for a small advance party to visit Moscow next weekend to finalise practical arrangements. Mr. Zamyatin expected this to be possible, provided the programme was by then finalised. I subsequently said to him that I hoped that we could use the Prime Minister's aircraft for the travel to Tibilisi so that we could return direct from there to the United Kingdom. Mr. Zamyatin thought that the Soviet Government might want the Prime Minister to use one of their aircraft for travel to Tibilisi, with her own aircraft following. But he saw no difficulty about departing direct from Tibilisi for London.

I am copying this letter to Timothy Walker (Department of Trade and Industry).

Yours sincerely,

Charles Powell

C. D. POWELL

A. C. Galsworthy, Esq., C.M.G.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

MEETING WITH SOVIET AMBASSADOR

1. Thank him for message of sympathy on Herald of Free enterprise sinking.

2. Emphasise importance of forthcoming visit and thorough preparations for it. Want it to contribute in practical ways to progress in East/West relations.

3. Do not rule out trying to set down points of agreement on some issues if talks warrant it. Not interested in statements for form's sake.

4. See main issues as arms control, regional problems (Afghanistan, Middle East, Southern Africa), bilateral issues and human rights.

5. On arms control, points for discussion will be INF agreement and link with shorter-range systems, SDI and cuts in strategic weapons. Less to say on chemical and conventional.

6. In bilateral field, hope a number of agreements would be ready for signature. Would also hope that some substantial contracts might be finalised.

7. On human rights, propose to raise discreetly. Would help atmosphere of visit if some cases with which UK and you personally have been associated could be settled in advance.

8. Hope Ambassador will have details of programme. Need to know well in advance, so that can prepare properly. Look forward to very restricted discussion with Mr. Gorbachev, on same basis as he had here. Would very much like to see Mrs. Gorbachev separately if possible.

9. Urge Ambassador to ensure that our small advance team (Mike Horne and Mike Waller) be enabled to travel out next weekend.

cc Blue
CDPC

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

6 March 1987

Dear Charles,

Prime Minister's Visit to the Soviet Union :
Meeting with Soviet Ambassador, 10 March

You asked in your letter of 20 February for briefing for the Soviet Ambassador's call on 10 March.

I enclose Points to Make and a Background Note on the state of preparations for the visit.

The main point to press on Zamyatin is the need for early agreement on the programme. So far the Soviet Foreign Ministry have been able to give our Embassy virtually no information on this.

It will be useful for the Prime Minister to go over again with Zamyatin her general conception of the visit : the need for very restricted meetings with Gorbachev : her determination to cover a broad agenda including important regional issues and human rights as well as arms control.

The arms control agenda speaks for itself: the Camp David priorities (strategic arms, INF, CW) including the latest INF developments; and the need to make complementary progress in conventional arms control. Briefing for all these subjects is already in hand. The Prime Minister may also wish to signal to Zamyatin her wish to preface the discussion of specifics (which will also be covered between the Foreign Ministers) with a broader, more philosophical exchange on the respective approaches to security, and ways in which common ground can be established. We are preparing a note for her to use along these lines.

/On

On the more detailed content, we hope that the Prime Minister will flag clearly for Zamyatin her desire to see progress in increasing trade, including the signature of some contracts before or as a result of her visit. I enclose a list of contracts currently under discussion. We hope that she will also press for a response to the draft Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in Information and Culture which we have put to the Russians. If this is to be agreed we need to get on with it. We think it will also be useful to repeat to Zamyatin her wish to be interviewed live on Soviet television.

The Prime Minister might tell Zamyatin that much of the interest aroused by the visit in this country is focussed on the possibilities of further movement in the area of human rights, including freedom to travel and emigrate. There have been very numerous letters on the subject from people who are hopeful that the signs of relaxation of controls will be translated into action to release the hundreds of people in prison for their beliefs, and to allow the many thousands who wish to do so to leave the Soviet Union. The interest focusses not only on the position of Jewish refuseniks, but also on those imprisoned for their Christian beliefs, victims of abuse of psychiatric practices and others.

On the "political content" of the visit, we suggest a sceptical approach to any proposal by Zamyatin for a document. As you pointed out in your letter of 12 February, we are all sceptical about whether it is feasible or desirable to have a conventional communique; and we would not want to get locked into negotiation of a text in advance, risking either blandness, or disagreement and reports of "failure". The Foreign Secretary sees dangers also in the idea of negotiating a more limited text on the spot on a particular issue or issues. The Soviet aim in this would, we have no doubt, be to achieve language which they could subsequently

[As he was at Camp David!!]

/point

point to to try to embarrass us or the US or to divide us from the US. It is very difficult to envisage language on international issues which would be both of value and acceptable to the two parties. And there is a risk that even fairly bland language could be misinterpreted by allies and partners.

We have been preparing "building blocks" as you suggested for possible use in any discussion of a text in Moscow should an opportunity arise which could be exploited, and will let you have the results of this soon. The exercise tends to confirm the doubts expressed above.

Yours ever,

(L Parker)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
No 10 Downing St

ZAMYATIN'S CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER, 10 MARCH

POINTS TO MAKE

Programme

- Now that dates and places (Tbilisi, Zagorsk) agreed, need to settle programme as soon as possible. Ball in Soviet court.

- Aware of recent appalling weather in Georgia; avalanches, homeless: convey sympathy.

- Grateful Soviet leadership can receive me on a Saturday to enable extended visit.

- Understand normal Soviet practice to make internal flights in Soviet aircraft. Would find it very convenient to use my own VC 10. Perhaps solution to use this for visit to Tbilisi and leave direct from there for UK.

Content

- Want deep, restricted talks with Gorbachev, on developments in Soviet Union; arms control; regional issues (Afghanistan, Middle East, also Southern Africa); human rights and CSCE; bilateral questions.

- Also trade: expect talks with Ryzhkov to concentrate on this. Should be possible to agree contracts now under discussion in time for visit. List of contracts passed to your authorities in Moscow.

- Was glad to send message to CBI-sponsored Anglo-Soviet Economic Conference at end of February. Your view of discussions ?

- Much interest here, reflected in my postbag, in prospects for movement on human rights: release of those

.../imprisoned

imprisoned for beliefs (Christians, victims of pyschiatric abuses, etc); and freedom to emigrate and travel. Will want to discuss.

- Also to resolve few remaining personal cases (family reunification).

- Foreign Ministers to pursue regional issues, arms control, CSCE and bilateral issues separately in further detail.

Documents and Agreements

- Understand progress being made towards signature (by Foreign Ministers) of agreements on -
  Space Cooperation
  Upgrading UK/Soviet "Hotline"
  Exchange of Sites for new Embassies

- Want to match these with agreement on further cooperation in Information and Culture: important area where greater openness should give new opportunities. Urge rapid response to UK draft Memorandum of Understanding.

[If Zamyatin suggests signature of Air Services Agreement during visit.]

- Will have to consider.

Publicity

- Would like to be interviewed live on Soviet television.

MR ZAMYATIN'S CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER, 10 MARCH

B A C K G R O U N D N O T E

Programme

- Dates: 28 March to 1 april agreed by Russians and made public here.

- No draft programme yet provided by Soviet side. We have asked for: 2 restricted meetings, Prime Minister and Gorbachev; meeting with Ryzhkov; separate meetings of Foreign Ministers; final Plenary.

- Embassy pursuing Zagorsk arrangements with Patriarchate. Russians have ruled out Novosibirsk. Tbilisi acceptable in principle; we have invited them to go firm on this. (Torrential rain, floods in Georgia January/February: 16,000 evacuated, some deaths, millions of roubles of damage.)

- Other proposed elements: walkabout, possibly with Eltsin; visit Institute of Crystallography; open British-Soviet Chamber of Commerce offices; reception for British community at Embassy; Soviet hospitality; press conference.

- Elements not to be disclosed yet to Russians: meeting with Sakharovs at Embassy; possible meeting with refuseniks.

Documents and Agreements

- Space Cooperation Agreement: UK counter-draft to be put to Russians as soon as possible. Talks in Moscow to finalise text on 11 March.

- "Hotline" Agreement: Soviet team arriving in London for talks to finalise text 10-13 March.

.../Memorandum

- Memorandum on Information and Culture: still awaiting Soviet reaction. Ready to negotiate in Moscow or London.

- Embassy Sites: aiming for signature of Agreement during visit, on basis of our securing our two sites in Moscow; Russians to secure 1-7 Kensington Palace Gardens plus undertaking by us to look for alternative to Warwick Road site.

- Air Services: Memorandum additional to existing Agreement may be agreed in talks the week before the visit: Russians pressing for signature, possibly by Mr Spicer, during visit. Mr Spicer is seeking advice on this new development.

Contracts

- We are aiming to have at least one large or several smaller contracts ready for signature during the visit. DTI have provided a list of possibilities (attached). The post in Moscow have been asked to put this to the Russians.

Publicity

- Prime Minister's speech at main Soviet meal will probably be published in Pravda (as is normal).

- We have put in for a TV interview by the Prime Minister: no response.

- In advance understand the Prime Minister may brief Soviet correspondents in London and give interviews to BBC Russian Service and Soviet television.

- The foreign affairs weekly New Times have offered to print an article by the Foreign Secretary.

.../Special

- Special supplement on UK/Soviet trade will appear in Soviet journal Economic Gazette to coincide with visit, with foreword by Mr Clark.

- Mr Horne (No 10 Press office) to go to Moscow in week beginning 8 March to discuss press arrangements.

Security

- Russians have said their protocol requires Prime Minister to travel in Soviet aircraft for visit outside Moscow. If programme envisages departure from Soviet Union immediately afterwards (ie visit on final day) it would be logical to press for VC10 to be used. Gorbachev while in UK travelled in a Soviet aircraft from London to Edinburgh and thence direct to Moscow.

Company	Project	Location
Davy McKee	Polyester fibre plant	Blagoveshchensk
John Brown	Polypropelene plant	Budyennovsk
GEC/Simon Carves	Programmable logic controller plant	Yerevan
Courtaulds	Acrylic fibre plant refurbishment	Seratov
GEC	Railway signalling	Moscow-Kalinin
Case Communications	Railway communications equipment	N/A
GEC	Paint spraying robots	Gorki
Rieter Scragg	Equipment for textile mill	Kalinin
Taylor Woodrow	Rehabilitation of two clothing factories	Talinn, Riga

SOVIET UNION

CALL BY

SOVIET AMBASSADOR

9/79

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIME MINISTER

MEETING WITH THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR

The Soviet Ambassador is coming to see you on Tuesday for a discussion of your visit to the Soviet Union. There are a number of points which you will want to discuss with him.

General

You will want to stress to the Ambassador that, contrary to some press reports, you do not see this visit in any way in terms of domestic politics in this country. We have deliberately tried to counter attempts by the press to raise unrealistic expectations about it.

Nonetheless, you see it as a very important event, and above all as an opportunity to continue your dialogue with Mr. Gorbachev. You are going to particular lengths to prepare yourself thoroughly for the visit. You would like it to contribute in practical ways to progress in East/West relations. You recognise that many of the issues concerned require multilateral agreement, or are for direct negotiation between the Soviet Union and the United States. But you do not rule out reaching specific agreements on some points. You will approach your talks with Mr. Gorbachev with an open mind on this possibility.

The Programme

We gave the Russians our proposals some time ago but have had virtually no response so far. You will want to chivvy the Ambassador a bit on this, in the hope that he can extract some progress from Moscow.

You will recall that our main requests are: two very restricted meetings with Gorbachev (with separate meetings between Foreign Ministers); a meeting with Mr. Ryzhkov; a walk about in Moscow; a visit to the Institute of

Crystallography; signature of some bilateral agreements; an interview on television; a visit outside Moscow, probably to Tibilisi. You should not mention to the Ambassador the proposed meetings with the Sakharovs and with Jewish refuseniks.

We have been trying for two weeks to send Mike Horne and Mike Waller on a reconnaissance visit to set up arrangements. Each time the Russians have cancelled their visit at the last moment. It would help if you would press the Soviet Ambassador to ensure that they are allowed to go not later than next weekend.

It would also help if you could say to the Ambassador that you would find it very convenient if the Soviet authorities could agree to our using our own aircraft to travel from Moscow to Tibilisi on the last day of the visit (assuming that is when we visit Tibilisi) so that you can fly direct from there back to London. You could recall that we allowed Mr. Gorbachev to travel in a Soviet aircraft from London to Edinburgh and thence to Moscow.

Substance

We shall have had a discussion of this on Tuesday morning and you will no doubt want to take your line from that. The main issues will be arms control, regional problems (Middle East, Afghanistan, Southern Africa), bilateral issues including trade and human rights.

The Soviet Ambassador is likely to revert to the theme of giving political substance to the visit. He may suggest that this points to some sort of agreed communique or a statement dealing with arms control (on the lines of your Camp David statements). You will want to say that you would not want to be firmly committed to such a statement in advance. You would much prefer to hold your talks first and decide in the light of these whether there is sufficient common ground to justify

an agreed statement. Your mind is not closed to this and indeed it could be very useful as a means for both sides to mark the success of the visit. But you do not believe in doing things for form's sake. It is only worthwhile if a statement marks a real step forward.

Human Rights

You could say to the Ambassador that it would be your intention to follow your usual practice of raising these issues privately and in a very low key. You might go on to suggest to him, on a very personal basis, that it will improve the atmosphere of the visit very considerably if at least some cases with which the United Kingdom or you personally have been directly involved could be settled before you go to Moscow. This would apply to a number of family reunifications cases. Another example would be Ida Nudel with which you have had a special connection. You are making this suggestion to the Ambassador alone without telling anyone else. You will not again refer to it.

Bilateral

Particular points which you will want to stress are that you want to see the visit further Anglo-Soviet trade. We believe that there are a number of contracts which could be signed before, or during the visit. There are other bilateral agreements under discussion. We attach particular importance to a Memorandum of Understanding on Co-operation in Information and Culture.

CDP

CHARLES POWELL

6 March 1987

SRW

cpc

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

20 February 1987

PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO THE SOVIET UNION:
MEETING WITH SOVIET AMBASSADOR

The Prime Minister has decided that it would be useful for her to see the Soviet Ambassador a fortnight or so before her visit to Moscow. I have therefore invited him to call on 10 March at 1700. We shall need briefing, if possible by the preceding Friday, on the state of preparations for the visit. We shall also need to work out what the Prime Minister should say to the Ambassador about what the Russians call the "political content" of the visit. There will be an opportunity to develop our views on this further during the second part of the seminar on the Soviet Union on 27 February.

BF

(C. D. POWELL)

Lyn Parker, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

The National Archives

DEPARTMENT/SERIES PREM 19 PIECE/ITEM 3548 (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract details: Howe to Powell dated 23 December 1986 with attachment	
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Use black or blue pen to complete form.

Use the card for one piece or for each extract removed from a different place within a piece.

Enter the department and series,
eg. HO 405, J 82.

Enter the piece and item references, .
eg. 28, 1079, 84/1, 107/3

Enter extract details if it is an extract rather than a whole piece.
This should be an indication of what the extract is,
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GRS 200

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DEDIP

FM MOSCOW

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELNO 1472

OF 100800Z DECEMBER 86

MY TELNO 1469: PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE: CALL ON GORBACHEV

SECOND EUROPEAN DEPARTMENT MFA TOLD ME TODAY 10 DECEMBER THAT THE CALL IS NOW SCHEDULED FOR 1200Z ON MONDAY 15 DECEMBER.

2. IN CASE THE CALL FOR SOME REASON STILL DOES NOT MATERIALIZE I SHALL NOT (NOT) BE TELLING ANY COLLEAGUES IN ADVANCE OF THE MEETING. I AM ALSO LIMITING ADVANCE KNOWLEDGE OF IT IN THIS EMBASSY AND SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU COULD ENSURE THAT IT DOES NOT LEAK IN LONDON.

3. ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE SOVIET PRESS WILL PROBABLY REPORT MY CALL FAIRLY QUICKLY AFTERWARDS I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR AUTHORITY TO BRIEF AMBASSADORS OF THE THREE (US, FRANCE AND FRG) AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AFTER THE CALL, AND TO TELL THEM THE MAIN POINTS IN THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE.

4. IF QUESTIONED BY THE PRESS AFTER THE CALL I WOULD PROPOSE TO SAY NO MORE THAN THAT I HAD BEEN RECEIVED BY GORBACHEV IN ORDER TO TRANSMIT A MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER, THE CONTENT OF WHICH MUSH REMAIN CONFIDENTIAL. A FULLER LINE TO TAKE COULD THEN BE WORKED OUT IN CONSULTATION WITH YOU, IN THE LIGHT OF THE SUBSTANCE OF THE CALL.

CARTLEDGE

MXHPAN 6821

LIMITED

HD/SOVIET D.
PS
PS/MR RENTON
MR THOMAS
MR RATFORD

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT
cc Ops
master

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T 220/86

CONFIDENTIAL

OCMIAN 1229
CONFIDENTIAL
PP MOSCO
FM FCOLN TO MOSCO
251230Z NOV
GRS 1052

CONFIDENTIAL
FM FCO
TO PRIORITY MOSCOW
TELNO 995
OF 251230Z NOVEMBER 86
AND TO PRIORITY WASHINGTON
INFO ROUTINE PARIS, BONN, UKDEL NATO, MODUK
MODUK FOR PS/S OF S, DUS(P), HD/DACU

MIPT: PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE TO GORBACHEV
FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MESSAGE:
BEGINS. THANK YOU FOR LETTING ME HAVE YOUR THOUGHTS ON ARMS CONTROL BEFORE MY RECENT VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES. I WAS GLAD TO SEE YOUR AMBASSADOR ON 13 NOVEMBER AND FOUND OUR MEETING USEFUL. I WAS ABLE TO RESPOND IMMEDIATELY THROUGH HIM TO SOME OF THE POINTS WHICH YOU RAISED. ON OTHERS I HAVE THOUGHT IT BETTER TO WAIT UNTIL AFTER MY MEETING WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN. IT IS IN THE LIGHT OF THAT MEETING THAT I AM ASKING SIR BRYAN CARTLEDGE TO LET YOU KNOW MY VIEWS ON THE WAY FORWARD.

YOU SAID IN YOUR MESSAGE THAT SOME EUROPEAN LEADERS SEEMED TO BE FRIGHTENED BY THE PROSPECT OF A SOVIET-AMERICAN UNDERSTANDING. THAT IS CERTAINLY NOT THE CASE. WE HAVE FULL CONFIDENCE IN THE UNITED STATES AND ITS RECORD OF CONSULTATION WITH ITS ALLIES. THE DOUBTS WE HAD WERE ABOUT THE WISDOM OF TRYING TO ACHIEVE AN ALL-EMBRACING ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENT IN ONE LEAP, AS THE SOVIET UNION PROPOSED AT REYKJAVIK. EVENTS CONVINCE ME THAT A PROGRESSIVE APPROACH BASED ON SMALLER, MORE ATTAINABLE STEPS HAS A BETTER CHANCE. I HOPE VERY MUCH THAT YOU WILL REVERT TO

THAT.

AT MY MEETING WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN WE IDENTIFIED AREAS WHICH WE THOUGHT SHOULD BE GIVEN THE HIGHEST PRIORITY. THESE WERE:

- AN INF AGREEMENT WITH RESTRAINTS ON SHORTER RANGE SYSTEMS SEMI COLON
- A 50 PER CENT CUT OVER FIVE YEARS IN THE UNITED STATES AND SOVIET STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE SYSTEMS SEMI COLON AND
- A BAN ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS.

EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION WOULD BE ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL TO AGREEMENTS IN ALL THREE AREAS. I ATTACH PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE TO ACTION TO DEAL WITH SHORTER RANGE SYSTEMS. AS YOU KNOW, THE SOVIET UNION HAS FAR MORE OF THOSE THAN NATO AND THEY ARE A THREAT TO ALMOST ALL OF WESTERN EUROPE INCLUDING THE UNITED KINGDOM.

I BELIEVE THAT, WHILE PROGRESS ON ALL THESE MATTERS STILL REQUIRES MUCH DETAILED HARD WORK IN NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEVA, AGREEMENTS CAN BE REACHED WHICH ARE ACCEPTABLE TO THE UNITED STATES, THE SOVIET UNION AND TO EUROPE. THEY WOULD REPRESENT A VERY REMARKABLE ACHIEVEMENT. BUT THEY ALSO ADD UP TO A VERY SUBSTANTIAL AGENDA, AND I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT IT MAKES PRACTICAL SENSE AT THIS STAGE TO LOOK BEYOND THEM. THERE IS A RISK THAT, BY BEING TOO AMBITIOUS, YOU WILL SACRIFICE WHAT CAN BE ACHIEVED NOW.

THERE IS ANOTHER POINT WHICH I MUST PARTICULARLY DRAW TO YOUR ATTENTION. THAT IS THE SOVIET UNION'S DECISION TO RE-LINK THE INF NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SDI RESEARCH PROGRAMME. THERE IS NO LOGIC IN SUCH A LINK, AND I FIND IT A GREAT PITY THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAS TAKEN A STEP BACK ON THIS, THUS JEOPARDISING THE INF AGREEMENT WHICH IS AN ENTIRELY SEPARATE MATTER. I DO HOPE THAT YOU WILL RECONSIDER YOUR DECISION. BOTH OUR PEOPLES NEED TO SEE THAT REDUCTIONS IN ARMS CAN BE ACHIEVED.

MY TALKS WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN, AND THE AGREED STATEMENT WHICH ISSUED FROM THEM, ALSO MADE CLEAR OUR VIEW THAT EFFECTIVE NUCLEAR DETERRENCE WILL REMAIN ESSENTIAL FOR OUR DEFENCE. THIS WILL NOT HAVE COME AS ANY SURPRISE TO YOU, AS I HAVE FROM THE BEGINNING LEFT YOU IN NO DOUBT OF MY DETERMINATION TO MAINTAIN BRITAIN'S INDEPENDENT NUCLEAR DETERRENT AND TO MODERNISE IT WITH TRIDENT. WE REGARD DEPLOYMENT OF TRIDENT AS OFFERING THE MINIMUM EFFECTIVE DETERRENT FORCE WE NEED. THE UNITED STATES IS EQUALLY GOING AHEAD WITH THE MODERNISATION OF ITS STRATEGIC BALLISTIC MISSILE FORCE, INCLUDING TRIDENT.

I WAS GLAD TO HEAR THAT YOU AGREE WITH ME THAT REDUCTIONS IN CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND CONVENTIONAL FORCES ARE ALSO NEEDED. I AM FIRMLY CONVINCED THAT NUCLEAR WEAPONS CANNOT BE DEALT WITH IN ISOLATION. OUR DEFENCE REQUIRES A STABLE OVERALL BALANCE, AND THIS MUST MEAN ELIMINATION OF THE VERY LARGE DISPARITIES IN CONVENTIONAL FORCES, BY BRINGING THEM DOWN TO COMMON CEILINGS. I HAVE BEEN DISAPPOINTED BY THE SOVIET UNION'S FAILURE OVER MANY YEARS TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY ON THESE MATTERS IN THE MBFR TALKS IN VIENNA. THIS DOES NOT INCREASE CONFIDENCE IN THE PROSPECTS FOR ANY WIDER TALKS. BUT NATO WILL BE CONSIDERING ITS POSITION ON THESE MATTERS IN THE COMING WEEKS, AND YOU WILL FIND US READY FOR SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS. AS YOU YOURSELF SAY, NEGOTIATIONS MUST TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE SECURITY NEEDS OF BOTH SIDES, AND IN OUR CASE WE BELIEVE THAT SECURITY IN THE CONVENTIONAL FIELD IN EUROPE CAN ONLY BE ACHIEVED ON THE BASIS OF PARITY.

AS REGARDS CHEMICAL WEAPONS, PRESIDENT REAGAN AND I AGREED AT CAMP DAVID THAT A CHEMICAL WEAPONS BAN SHOULD BE AMONG OUR PRIORITIES. I THEREFORE WELCOME YOUR AGREEMENT TO USE THE BRITISH PROPOSALS OF JULY AS THE BASIS FOR DISCUSSION. YOUR ACCEPTANCE OF A STRINGENT VERIFICATION REGIME IN THIS AREA WOULD BRING THE PROSPECT OF AN AGREED BAN CLOSER. OUR EXPERTS ARE READY TO DISCUSS THESE MATTERS WITH YOURS.

THERE ARE TWO FURTHER MATTERS WHICH I SHOULD LIKE TO MENTION.

THE FIRST IS THE NEED TO MAKE PROGRESS TOWARDS REDUCING NOT JUST WEAPONS, BUT THE CAUSES OF SUSPICION AND OF CONFLICT. TWO STEPS WHICH THE SOVIET UNION COULD TAKE WHICH WOULD HELP GREATLY IN THIS RESPECT ARE FIRST TO MAKE AN EARLY COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET FORCES FROM AFGHANISTAN. THE SECOND WOULD BE TO EXTEND THE BASIC FREEDOMS OF INDIVIDUALS IN THE SOVIET UNION, SO THAT THEY CAN HAVE THE RIGHT TO EXERCISE THEIR RELIGIOUS BELIEFS, TO MONITOR YOUR GOVERNMENT'S IMPLEMENTATION OF THE HELSINKI ACCORDS, TO EMIGRATE OR TO JOIN THEIR FAMILIES ABROAD WHERE THEY HAVE BECOME DIVIDED.

THE SECOND MATTER IS ACTION AGAINST TERRORISM. I WELCOME THE AGREEMENT THAT OUR EXPERTS SHOULD GET TOGETHER TO DISCUSS THIS PROBLEM. I HOPE THAT A MEETING WILL YIELD SOME PRACTICAL RESULTS.

LET ME SAY FINALLY THAT WE IN BRITAIN GENUINELY WANT ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS AND ARE PREPARED TO WORK FOR THEM. BUT YOU AND I HAVE ALWAYS AGREED ON THE RIGHT OF EACH COUNTRY TO SECURITY: AND AGREEMENTS MUST PRESERVE RATHER THAN ERODE THAT SECURITY, IF THEY ARE TO HAVE OUR SUPPORT. SUCH AGREEMENTS ARE ATTAINABLE AND I HOPE THAT THE SOVIET UNION WILL PLAY ITS PART IN SERIOUS AND DETAILED NEGOTIATION TO ACHIEVE THEM.

I LOOK FORWARD TO DISCUSSING THESE AND OTHER ISSUES WITH YOU WHEN I COME TO MOSCOW. OUR OFFICIALS ARE DISCUSSING POSSIBLE DATES. ENDS.

HOWE

OCMIAN 1229

LIMITED

SOVIET DEPT
ACDD
DEFENCE D
CSCE UNIT
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NENAD
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NEWS DEPT
PLANNING STAFF
PS
PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR RENTON
PS/MR EGGAR
PS/PUS
MR THOMAS
MR GOODALL
MR FALL
MR RATFORD
MR GILLMORE
DR WILSON
MR SLATER

PRIME MINISTER

MESSAGE TO MR. GORBACHEV

You owe Mr. Gorbachev a message about your talks with President Reagan.

The FCO have done a draft. I started to amend it, but have now tried an alternative version. I think that, after Camp David, it needs to be rather firm in tone.

Agree to proposed message?

CDP

CDP

22 November, 1986.

JD3ASO

Thank you for letting me have your thoughts on arms control before my recent visit to the United States. I was glad to see your Ambassador on 13 November and found our meeting useful. I was able to respond immediately through him to some of the points which you raised. On others I have thought it better to wait until after my meeting with President Reagan. It is in the light of that meeting that I am asking Sir Bryan Cartledge to let you know my views on the way forward.

You said in your message that some European leaders seemed to be frightened by the prospect of a Soviet-American understanding. That is certainly not the case. We have full confidence in the United States and its record of consultation with its allies. The doubts we had were about the wisdom of trying to achieve an all-embracing arms control agreement in one ~~bound~~ step, as the Soviet Union proposed at Reykjavik. Events convince me that a progressive approach based on smaller, more attainable steps has a better chance. I hope very much that you will revert to that.

At my meeting with President Reagan we identified areas which we thought should be given the highest priority. These were:

- an INF agreement with restraints on shorter range systems;

- a 50% cut over five years in the United States and Soviet strategic offensive systems; and

- a ban on chemical weapons

Effective verification would be absolutely essential to agreements in all three areas. I attach particular importance to action to deal with shorter range systems. As you know, the Soviet Union has far more of those than NATO and they are a threat to almost all of Western Europe including the United Kingdom.

I believe that, while progress on all these matters still

requires much detailed hard work in negotiations in Geneva, agreements can be reached which are acceptable to the United States, the Soviet Union and to Europe. They would represent a very remarkable achievement. But they also add up to a very substantial agenda, and I do not believe that it makes practical sense at this stage to look beyond them. There is a risk that, by being too ambitious, you will sacrifice what can be achieved now.

There is another point which I must particularly draw to your attention. That is the Soviet Union's decision to re-link the INF negotiations with the SDI research programme. There is no logic in such a link, and I find it a great pity that the Soviet Union has ~~you have~~ taken a step back on this, thus jeopardising the INF agreement which it is an entirely separate matter ~~would stand in its own right. Your decision will not be understood in the United Kingdom or, I believe, in Europe~~. I do hope that you will reconsider ~~it~~ your decision. Both our peoples need to see that reductions in arms can be achieved. My talks with President Reagan, and the agreed statement which issued from them, also made clear our view that effective nuclear deterrence will remain essential for our defence. This will not have come as any surprise to you, as I have from the beginning left you in no doubt of my determination to maintain Britain's independent nuclear deterrent and to modernise it with Trident. In the light of developments in Soviet defences, we regard deployment of Trident as offering the minimum effective deterrent force we need. The United States is equally going ahead with the modernisation of its strategic ballistic missile force, including Trident.

as in the negotiations history shows, is an entirely separate matter

I was glad to hear that you agree with me that reductions in chemical weapons and conventional forces ~~will be~~ are also needed. ~~in parallel with reductions in nuclear weapons.~~ I am firmly convinced that nuclear weapons cannot be dealt with in isolation. Our defence requires a stable overall balance, and this must mean elimination of the very large disparities in conventional forces, by bringing them down to common ceilings. I have been disappointed by the Soviet Union's failure over many years to negotiate seriously on these matters in the MBFR

talks in Vienna. This does not increase confidence in the prospects for any wider talks. But NATO will be considering its position on these matters in the coming weeks, and you will find us ready for serious negotiations. As you yourself say, negotiations must take account of the security needs of both sides, and in our case we believe that security in the conventional field in Europe can only be achieved on the basis of parity.

As regards chemical weapons, President Reagan and I agreed at Camp David that a chemical weapons ban should be among our priorities. I therefore welcome your agreement to use the British proposals of July as the basis for discussion. Your acceptance of a stringent verification regime in this area would bring the prospect of an agreed ban closer. Our experts are ready to discuss these matters with yours.

There are two further matters which I should like to mention. The first is the need to make progress towards reducing not just weapons, but the causes of suspicion and of conflict. Two steps which the Soviet Union could take which would help greatly in this respect are first to make an early complete withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan. The second would be to extend the basic freedoms of individuals in the Soviet Union, so that they can have the right to exercise their religious beliefs, to monitor your government's implementation of the Helsinki accords, to emigrate or to join their families abroad where they have become divided.

The second matter is action against terrorism. I welcome the agreement that our experts should get together to discuss this problem. I hope that a meeting will yield some practical results.

Let me say finally that we in Britain genuinely want arms control agreements and are prepared to work for them. But you and I have always agreed on the right of each country to security: and agreements must preserve rather than erode that security, if they are to have our support. Such agreements

are, attainable and I hope that the Soviet Union will play its part in serious & detailed negotiation to achieve them.

I look forward to discussing these and other issues with you when I come to Moscow. Our officials are discussing possible dates.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

21 November 1986

Dear Charles,

Prime Minister's Message to Mr Gorbachev

The Prime Minister told the Soviet Ambassador on 13 November that she would ask Sir Bryan Cartledge to convey her considered response to Mr Gorbachev's message directly to him on her return from Washington (your letter of 13 November to me).

/ I now enclose a draft reply. This aims to reinforce the points made in the Prime Minister's Washington statement (and conveys to Gorbachev personally a copy of that statement). The Prime Minister underlined to Mr Zamyatin that relations with the Soviet Union could not be conducted solely on the basis of arms control. The draft therefore includes passages on Afghanistan, human rights and terrorism.

The Foreign Secretary recalls that the Prime Minister agreed to see the Soviet Ambassador on the clear understanding that Sir Bryan Cartledge would be able to see Gorbachev. He therefore proposes to instruct Sir Bryan, on this occasion, to press for a meeting with Gorbachev. But he also intends to give Sir Bryan discretion to deliver the Prime Minister's letter via Shevardnadze, should Gorbachev not be willing to see him.

Other points which we propose to include in the Ambassador's instructions are:

(i) that he should draw attention to the dates which the Prime Minister has already proposed, through Zamyatin, for her visit to Moscow, and seek an early response;

(ii) that the Embassy should follow-up in detail, at working level in the MFA, the passage on family reunification which has been incorporated in the draft of the Prime Minister's letter, and should urge that as many cases as possible should be cleared out of the way before the Prime Minister's visit.

Finally, the Foreign Secretary believes it would be right to let the White House know in broad terms what her letter to Gorbachev says about her meeting with President Reagan.

Yours ever,

Colin Budd

(C R Budd)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

DSR 1[illegible] (Revised Sept 85)

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1 +

FROM:
PRIME MINISTER

DEPARTMENT: TEL. NO:

BUILDING: ROOM NO:

Reference

Your Reference

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret
Secret
Confidential
Restricted
Unclassified

PRIVACY MARKING

..... In Confidence

CAVEAT .....

TO:
MR GORBACHEV

Copies to:

SUBJECT:

Thank you for letting me have your thoughts on arms control before my recent visit to the United States. I was glad to see your Ambassador on 13 November. Following my talks with President Reagan, I have asked Sir Bryan Cartledge to share with you my thoughts on the way forward.

I gave Mr. Zamyatin my

I responded immediately on some of the points which you raised. But,

I welcome your confirmation that you wish to continue your dialogue with President Reagan. [I hope that it will produce early progress]. An important lesson of Reykjavik was the immense difficulty of achieving an all-embracing arms control agreement in one bound. In my view such a project is not realistic. A progressive approach based on smaller more attainable steps, seeking progress in areas where progress is most likely to be made, ~~seems to me more likely to be successful~~ has a better chance.

Enclosures flag(s) .....

CONFIDENTIAL

For this reason ~~That is why~~ I identified with President Reagan at Camp David on 15 November the areas which should be given the highest priority: an INF agreement, with restraints on shorter range systems; a 50% cut over five years in US and Soviet strategic offensive weapons; and a ban on chemical weapons. ~~You will have seen the statement I issued following the Camp David meeting.~~ I also want to draw particular attention to two points underlined in the statement issued following my meeting with the President at Camp David: ~~it: the~~ continuing validity of NATO's current strategy; and the importance of a stable overall balance, with the elimination of conventional disparities as nuclear weapons are reduced.

Effective verification would be an essential element in all three areas.

The President and I also agreed on the need to press ahead with the SDI research programme which is permitted by the ABM Treaty. I see no reason why this should be a stumbling block, and I hope that you will work with us to ensure that it is not. The US position, Mr Karpov's comments to me when he came here in October, and Mr Shevardnadze's statement that the Soviet Union was prepared to accept a broad definition of research, all suggest to me that a solution should be possible. In the meantime we must press on in areas where progress can be made, quite independently of the continuing discussions on SDI. I very much regret your decision to relink the INF negotiations with the SDI research programme. There is no logic in such a link; and you had of course previously agreed that the two issues should be treated separately.

President Reagan and I agreed at Camp David that a chemical weapons ban should be among our priorities. I therefore welcome your agreement to use the British proposals of July as the basis for discussion. Your acceptance of a stringent verification regime in this area would bring the prospect of an agreed ban closer. Our experts are ready to discuss these matters with yours ~~at any time~~.

Mr Zamyatin told me that you were disappointed by the reaction to the Reykjavik meeting of some Western European leaders, who he described as almost frightened at the prospect of a Soviet-American understanding. There is no question of this. We want arms control agreements and will continue to work for them. But they must be agreements which enhance, not damage, our security.

I understand that in your meeting at Reykjavik with President Reagan you also touched briefly on regional questions. Unresolved regional disputes are dangerous. In particular the continued Soviet occupation of Afghanistan seriously undermines confidence between East and West. The key to peace in that troubled country, is the early and complete withdrawal of all the occupying forces. You have said you want to withdraw your forces: that would be a statesmanlike and courageous step, which the world would applaud.

CONFIDENTIAL

I am glad you were able to discuss human rights questions with President Reagan. In Britain too they are of great concern to a very wide range of people: there is keen interest here in the extent to which individuals in ~~the~~ your country ~~Soviet Union~~ are free, for instance, to exercise their religious beliefs, or monitor their country's implementation of the Helsinki accords; to join their families abroad, or simply go abroad for medical treatment. Nothing would do more to promote public confidence between East and West than for these freedoms to become standard in the Soviet Union.

I also attach great importance to the early resolution of cases of divided families in which the UK has a legitimate interest. I know you do too. I hope you will instruct your people to deal quickly with as many as possible of these cases. They are few in number and their resolution would be widely noted and welcomed in Britain.

At the Vienna CSCE meeting we are all working for better implementation of all participating states of the commitments freely undertaken at Helsinki, Madrid and Stockholm. I am glad that Sir Geoffrey Howe was able to meet Mr Shevardnadze in Vienna and discuss these questions with him.

They also discussed international terrorism, and agreed that our experts should get together to talk about this problem. I welcome this. No country can be sure of remaining immune to this modern scourge, and we all share an interest in eliminating it. That is why Geoffrey Howe provided you with a full account of the conclusive evidence of official Syrian involvement in the recent and potentially devastating terrorist incident in the UK. The decision to break diplomatic relations was not of our making. It was the inevitable result of unacceptable behaviour on the part of the Syrian authorities.

I look forward to discussing these and other questions with you when I come to Moscow. I should like then to explore with you ways of strengthening contacts between people in our two countries, and increasing mutual knowledge and understanding.

SOVIET UNION Contact with Soviet Ambassador Sep 79.

211134

CONFIDENTIAL
INWARD

ZCZC
LNPCAN 3487 OCMIAN 0401
CONFIDENTIAL
ZZ PARIS
FM FCOLN TO PARIS
211100Z NOV
GRS 369

CONFIDENTIAL
FM FCO
TO FLASH PARIS
TELNO 765
OF 211100Z NOVEMBER 86

FOLLOWING FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY TO FOREIGN SECRETARY

PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE TO GORBACHEV

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF DRAFT LETTER TO CHARLES POWELL

BEGINS THE PRIME MINISTER TOLD THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR ON 13 NOVEMBER THAT SHE WOULD ASK SIR BRYAN CARTLEDGE TO CONVEY HER CONSIDERED RESPONSE TO MR GORBACHEV'S MESSAGE DIRECTLY TO HIM ON HER RETURN FROM WASHINGTON (YOUR LETTER OF 13 NOVEMBER TO COLIN BUDD).

I NOW ENCLOSE A DRAFT REPLY. THIS AIMS TO REINFORCE THE POINTS MADE IN THE PRIME MINISTER'S WASHINGTON STATEMENT (AND CONVEYS TO GORBACHEV PERSONALLY A COPY OF THAT STATEMENT). THE PRIME MINISTER UNDERLINED TO MR ZAMYATIN THAT RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION COULD NOT BE CONDUCTED SOLELY ON THE BASIS OF ARMS CONTROL. THE DRAFT THEREFORE INCLUDES PASSAGES ON AFGHANISTAN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND TERRORISM.

THE FOREIGN SECRETARY RECALLS THAT THE PRIME MINISTER AGREED TO SEE THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR ON THE CLEAR UNDERSTANDING THAT SIR BRYAN CARTLEDGE WOULD BE ABLE TO SEE GORBACHEV. HE THEREFORE PROPOSES TO INSTRUCT SIR BRYAN, ON THIS OCCASION, TO PRESS FOR A MEETING WITH GORBACHEV. BUT HE ALSO INTENDS TO GIVE SIR BRYAN DISCRETION TO DELIVER THE PRIME MINISTER'S LETTER VIA SHEVARDNADZE, SHOULD GORBACHEV NOT BE WILLING TO SEE HIM.

OTHER POINTS WHICH WE PROPOSE TO INCLUDE IN THE AMBASSADOR'S INSTRUCTIONS ARE:

(I) THAT HE SHOULD DRAW ATTENTION TO THE DATES WHICH THE PRIME MINISTER HAS ALREADY PROPOSED, THROUGH ZAMYATIN, FOR HER VISIT TO MOSCOW, AND SEEK AN EARLY RESPONSE:

(II) THAT THE EMBASSY SHOULD FOLLOW-UP IN DETAIL, AT WORKING LEVEL IN THE MFA, THE PASSAGE ON FAMILY REUNIFICATION WHICH HAS BEEN INCORPORATED IN THE DRAFT OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S LETTER, AND SHOULD URGE THAT AS MANY CASES AS POSSIBLE SHOULD BE CLEARED OUT OF THE WAY BEFORE THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT.

FINALLY, THE FOREIGN SECRETARY BELIEVES IT WOULD BE RIGHT TO LET THE WHITE HOUSE KNOW IN BROAD TERMS WHAT HER LETTER TO GORBACHEV SAYS ABOUT HER MEETING WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN. ENDS

2. NOW SEE MIFT.

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CONFIDENTIAL
INWARD

FOLLOWING FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY TO FOREIGN SECRETARY
PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE TO GORBACHEV
1. MIPT. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE TO GORBACHEV.
BEGINS THANK YOU FOR LETTING ME HAVE YOUR THOUGHTS ON ARMS CONTROL BEFORE MY RECENT VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES. I WAS GLAD TO SEE YOUR AMBASSADOR ON 13 NOVEMBER. FOLLOWING MY TALKS WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN, I HAVE ASKED SIR BRYAN CARTLEDGE TO SHARE WITH YOU MY THOUGHTS ON THE WAY FORWARD.

I WELCOME YOUR CONFIRMATION THAT YOU WISH TO CONTINUE YOUR DIALOGUE WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN. I HOPE THAT IT WILL PRODUCE EARLY PROGRESS. AN IMPORTANT LESSON OF REYKJAVIK WAS THE IMMENSE DIFFICULTY OF ACHIEVING AN ALL-EMBRACING ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENT IN ONE BOUND. IN MY VIEW SUCH A PROJECT IS NOT REALISTIC. A PROGRESSIVE APPROACH BASED ON SMALLER MORE ATTAINABLE STEPS, SEEKING PROGRESS IN AREAS WHERE PROGRESS IS MOST LIKELY TO BE MADE, SEEMS TO ME MORE LIKELY TO BE SUCCESSFUL.

THAT IS WHY I IDENTIFIED WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN AT CAMP DAVID ON 15 NOVEMBER THE AREAS WHICH SHOULD BE GIVEN THE HIGHEST PRIORITY - AN INF AGREEMEN., WITH RESTRAINTS ON SHORTER RANGE SYSTEMS: A 50 PERCENT CUT OVER FIVE YEARS IN US AND SOVIET STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS: AND A BAN ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS. YOU WILL HAVE SEEN THE STATEMENT I ISSUED FOLLOWING THE CAMP DAVID MEETING. I WANT TO DRAW PARTICULAR ATTENTION TO TWO POINTS UNDERLINED IN IT: THE CONTINUING VALIDITY OF NATO'S CURRENT STRATEGY: AND THE IMPORTANCE OF A STABLE OVERALL BALANCE, WITH THE ELIMINATION OF CONVENTIONAL DISPARITIES AS NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE REDUCED.

THE PRESIDENT AND I ALSO AGREED ON THE NEED TO PRESS AHEAD WITH THE SDI RESEARCH PROGRAMME WHICH IS PERMITTED BY THE ABM TREATY. I SEE NO REASON WHY THIS SHOULD BE A STUMBLING BLOCK, AND I HOPE THAT YOU WILL WORK WITH US TO ENSURE THAT IT IS NOT. THE US POSITION, MR KARPOV'S COMMENTS TO ME WHEN HE CAME HERE IN OCTOBER, AND MR SHEVARDNADZE'S STATEMENT THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS PREPARED TO ACCEPT A BROAD DEFINITION OF RESEARCH, ALL SUGGEST TO ME THAT A SOLUTION SHOULD BE POSSIBLE. IN THE MEANTIME WE MUST PRESS ON IN AREAS WHERE PROGRESS CAN BE MADE, QUITE INDEPENDENTLY OF THE CONTINUING DISCUSSIONS ON SDI. I VERY MUCH REGRET YOUR DECISION TO RELINK THE INF NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SDI RESEARCH PROGRAMME. THERE IS NO LOGIC IN SUCH A LINK: AND YOU HAD OF COURSE PREVIOUSLY AGREED THAT THE TWO ISSUES SHOULD BE TREATED SEPARATELY.

PRESIDENT REAGAN AND I AGREED AT CAMP DAVID THAT A CHEMICAL WEAPONS BAN SHOULD BE AMONG OUR PRIORITIES. I THEREFORE WELCOME YOUR AGREEMENT TO USE THE BRITISH PROPOSALS OF JULY AS THE BASIS FOR DISCUSSION. YOUR ACCEPTANCE OF A STRINGENT VERIFICATION REGIME IN THIS AREA WOULD BRING THE PROSPECT OF AN AGREED BAN CLOSER. OUR EXPERTS ARE READY TO DISCUSS THESE MATTERS WITH YOURS AT ANY TIME.

MR ZAMYATIN TOLD ME THAT YOU WERE DISAPPOINTED BY THE REACTION TO THE REYKJAVIK MEETING OF SOME WESTERN EUROPEAN LEADERS, WHO HE DESCRIBED AS ALMOST FRIGHTENED AT THE PROSPECT OF A SOVIET-AMERICAN UNDERSTANDING. THERE IS NO QUESTION OF THIS. WE WANT ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS AND WILL CONTINUE TO WORK FOR THEM. BUT THEY MUST BE AGREEMENTS WHICH ENHANCE, NOT DAMAGE, OUR SECURITY.

I UNDERSTAND THAT IN YOUR MEETING AT REYKJAVIK WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN YOU ALSO TOUCHED BRIEFLY ON REGIONAL QUESTIONS. UNRESOLVED REGIONAL DISPUTES ARE DANGEROUS. IN PARTICULAR THE CONTINUED SOVIET OCCUPATION OF AFGHANISTAN SERIOUSLY UNDERMINES CONFIDENCE BETWEEN EAST AND WEST. THE KEY TO PEACE IN THAT TROUBLED COUNTRY, IS THE EARLY AND COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL THE OCCUPYING FORCES. YOU HAVE SAID YOU WANT TO WITHDRAW YOUR FORCES: THAT WOULD BE A STATESMANLIKE AND COURAGEOUS STEP, WHICH THE WORLD WOULD APPLAUD.

I AM GLAD YOU WERE ABLE TO DISCUSS HUMAN RIGHTS QUESTIONS WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN. IN BRITAIN TOO THEY ARE OF GREAT CONCERN TO A VERY WIDE RANGE OF PEOPLE: THERE IS KEEN INTEREST HERE IN THE EXTENT TO WHICH INDIVIDUALS IN YOUR COUNTRY ARE FREE, FOR INSTANCE, TO EXERCISE THEIR RELIGIOUS BELIEFS, OR MONITOR THEIR COUNTRY'S IMPLEMENTATION OF THE HELSINKI ACCORDS: TO JOIN THEIR FAMILIES ABROAD, OR SIMPLY GO ABROAD FOR MEDICAL TREATMENT. NOTHING WOULD DO MORE TO PROMOTE PUBLIC CONFIDENCE BETWEEN EAST AND WEST THAN FOR THESE FREEDOMS TO BECOME STANDARD IN THE SOVIET UNION.

I ALSO ATTACH GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THE EARLY RESOLUTION OF CASES OF DIVIDED FAMILIES IN WHICH THE UK HAS A LEGITIMATE INTEREST. I KNOW YOU DO TOO. I HOPE YOU WILL INSTRUCT YOUR PEOPLE TO DEAL QUICKLY WITH AS MANY AS POSSIBLE OF THESE CASES. THEY ARE FEW IN NUMBER AND THEIR RESOLUTION WOULD BE WIDELY NOTED AND WELCOMED IN BRITAIN.

AT THE VIENNA CSCE MEETING WE ARE ALL WORKING FOR BETTER IMPLEMENTATION OF ALL PARTICIPATING STATES OF THE COMMITMENTS FREELY UNDERTAKEN AT HELSINKI, MADRID AND STOCKHOLM. I AM GLAD THAT SIR GEOFFREY HOWE WAS ABLE TO MEET MR SHEVARDNADZE IN VIENNA AND DISCUSS THESE QUESTIONS WITH HIM.

THEY ALSO DISCUSSED INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, AND AGREED THAT OUR EXPERTS SHOULD GET TOGETHER TO TALK ABOUT THIS PROBLEM. I WELCOME THIS. NO COUNTRY CAN BE SURE OF REMAINING IMMUNE TO THIS MODERN SCOURGE, AND WE ALL SHARE AN INTEREST IN ELIMINATING IT. THAT IS WHY GEOFFREY HOWE PROVIDED YOU WITH A FULL ACCOUNT OF THE CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE OF OFFICIAL SYRIAN INVOLVEMENT IN THE RECENT AND POTENTIALLY DEVASTATING TERRORIST INCIDENT IN THE UK. THE DECISION TO BREAK DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WAS NOT OF OUR MAKING. IT WAS THE INEVITABLE RESULT OF UNACCEPTABLE BEHAVIOUR ON THE PART OF THE SYRIAN AUTHORITIES.

I LOOK FORWARD TO DISCUSSING THESE AND OTHER QUESTIONS WITH YOU WHEN I COME TO MOSCOW. I SHOULD LIKE THEN TO EXPLORE WITH YOU WAYS OF STRENGTHENING CONTACTS BETWEEN PEOPLE IN OUR TWO COUNTRIES, AND INCREASING MUTUAL KNOWLEDGE AND UNDERSTANDING.
ENDS

HOWE

OCMIAN 0402

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With the compliments of

THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

Colin

Nothing we're v. proud of! But it is a lot better than when we received it...

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

SW1A 2AH

DRAFT LETTER TO C D POWELL ESQ
PS/10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister's Message to Mr Gorbachev

The Prime Minister told the Soviet Ambassador on 13 November that she would ask Sir Bryan Cartledge to convey her considered response to Mr Gorbachev's message directly to him in her return from Washington (your letter of 13 November to Colin Budd).

I now enclose a draft reply. This aims to reinforce the points made in the Prime Minister's Washington statement (and conveys to Gorbachev personally a copy of that statement). The Prime Minister underlined to Mr Zamyatin that relations with the Soviet Union could not be conducted solely on the basis of arms control. The draft therefore includes passages on Afghanistan, human rights and terrorism.

The Foreign Secretary recalls that the Prime Minister agreed to see the Soviet Ambassador on the clear understanding that Sir Bryan Cartledge would be able to see Gorbachev. He therefore proposes to instruct Sir Bryan, on this occasion, to press for a meeting with Gorbachev. But he also intends to give Sir Bryan

SG1 AEZ

discretion to deliver the Prime Minister's letter via Shevardnadze, should Gorbachev not be willing to see him.

Other points which we propose to include in the Ambassador's instructions are:

(i) that he should draw attention to the dates which the Prime Minister has already proposed, through Zamyatin, for her visit to Moscow, and seek an early response;

(ii) that the Embassy should follow-up in detail, at working level in the MFA, the passage on family reunification which has been incorporated in the draft of the Prime Minister's letter, and should urge that as many cases as possible should be cleared out of the way before the Prime Minister's visit.

Finally, the Foreign Secretary believes it would be right to let the White House know in broad terms what her letter to Gorbachev says about her meeting with President Reagan.

CONFIDENTIAL

D 11 (Revised Sept 85)

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1 +

FROM:
PRIME MINISTER
DEPARTMENT: TEL. NO:
BUILDING: ROOM NO:

Reference

Your Reference

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret
Secret
Confidential
Restricted
Unclassified

PRIVACY MARKING

..... In Confidence

CAVEAT .....

Enclosures flag(s) .....

TO:

MR GORBACHEV

Copies to:

SUBJECT:

Thank you for letting me have your thoughts on arms control before my recent visit to the United States. I was glad to see your Ambassador on 13 November. Following my talks with President Reagan, I have asked Sir Bryan Cartledge to share with you my thoughts on the way forward.

I welcome your confirmation that you wish to continue your dialogue with President Reagan. I hope that it will produce early progress. An important lesson of Reykjavik was the immense difficulty of achieving an all-embracing arms control agreement in one bound. In my view such a project is not realistic. A progressive approach based on smaller more attainable steps, seeking progress in areas where progress is most likely to be made, seems to me more likely to be successful.

SG1 AFA

That is why I identified with President Reagan at Camp David on 15 November the areas which should be given the highest priority: an INF agreement, with restraints on shorter range systems; a 50% cut over five years in US and Soviet strategic offensive weapons; and a ban on chemical weapons. You will have seen the statement I issued following the Camp David meeting. I want to draw particular attention to two points underlined in it: the continuing validity of NATO's current strategy; and the importance of a stable overall balance, with the elimination of conventional disparities as nuclear weapons are reduced.

The President and I also agreed on the need to press ahead with the SDI research programme which is permitted by the ABM Treaty. I see no reason why this should be a stumbling block, and I hope that you will work with us to ensure that it is not. The US position, Mr Karpov's comments to me when he came here in October, and Mr Shevardnadze's statement that the Soviet Union was prepared to accept a broad definition of research, all suggest to me that a solution should be possible. In the meantime we must press on in areas where progress can be made, quite independently of the continuing discussions on SDI. I very much regret your decision to relink the INF negotiations with the SDI research programme. There is no logic in such a link; and you had of course previously agreed that the two issues should be treated separately.

President Reagan and I agreed at Camp David that a chemical weapons ban should be among our priorities. I therefore welcome your agreement to use the British proposals of July as the basis for discussion. Your acceptance of a stringent verification regime in this area would bring the prospect of an agreed ban closer. Our experts are ready to discuss these matters with yours at any time.

Mr Zamyatin told me that you were disappointed by the reaction to the Reykjavik meeting of some Western European leaders, who he described as almost frightened at the prospect of a Soviet-American understanding. There is no question of this. We want arms control agreements and will continue to work for them. But they must be agreements which enhance, not damage, our security.

I understand that in your meeting at Reykjavik with President Reagan you also touched briefly on regional questions. Unresolved regional disputes are dangerous. In particular the continued Soviet occupation of Afghanistan seriously undermines confidence between East and West. The key to peace in that troubled country, is the early and complete withdrawal of all the occupying forces. You have said you want to withdraw your forces: that would be a statesmanlike and courageous step, which the world would applaud.

I am glad you were able to discuss human rights questions with President Reagan. In Britain too they are of great concern to a very wide range of people: there is keen interest here in the extent to which individuals in ~~the~~ your country ~~Soviet Union~~ are free, for instance, to exercise their religious beliefs, or monitor their country's implementation of the Helsinki accords; to join their families abroad, or simply go abroad for medical treatment. Nothing would do more to promote public confidence between East and West than for these freedoms to become standard in the Soviet Union.

I also attach great importance to the early resolution of cases of divided families in which the UK has a legitimate interest. I know you do too. I hope you will instruct your people to deal quickly with as many as possible of these cases. They are few in number and their resolution would be widely noted and welcomed in Britain.

At the Vienna CSCE meeting we are all working for better implementation of all participating states of the commitments freely undertaken at Helsinki, Madrid and Stockholm. I am glad that Sir Geoffrey Howe was able to meet Mr Shevardnadze in Vienna and discuss these questions with him.

They also discussed international terrorism, and agreed that our experts should get together to talk about this problem. I welcome this. No country can be sure of remaining immune to this modern scourge, and we all share an interest in eliminating it. That is why Geoffrey Howe provided you with a full account of the conclusive evidence of official Syrian involvement in the recent and potentially devastating terrorist incident in the UK. The decision to break diplomatic relations was not of our making. It was the inevitable result of unacceptable behaviour on the part of the Syrian authorities.

I look forward to discussing these and other questions with you when I come to Moscow. I should like then to explore with you ways of strengthening contacts between people in our two countries, and increasing mutual knowledge and understanding.

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

12 November 1986

Prime Minister
The purpose of this meeting is to listen.
You will want to help your thoughts until after you have seen President Reagan.
If you wish to mention both for your visit, they are 30 March/1 April, 20-22 April.
CDP 12/XI

Dear Charles,

Soviet Ambassador's Call on the Prime Minister: 13 November

I enclose a brief for Mr Zamyatin's call at 0945 on Thursday 13 November. He will be accompanied by Mr Kossov of the Soviet Embassy as interpreter.

In telling Mr Zamyatin that the Prime Minister would be ready to see him, we made very clear to him that this was on the firm understanding on the part of the Prime Minister that after her visit to Washington she would wish to convey her thoughts to Mr Gorbachev through Sir Bryan Cartledge in Moscow. The Foreign Secretary made this point strongly when he saw Mr Zamyatin at the Soviet National Day Reception. Zamyatin said that while he could not speak in Mr Gorbachev's name, he expected the General Secretary to receive Sir Bryan.

The main purpose of Zamyatin's call is to put Gorbachev's views on arms control prior to the Prime Minister's visit to Washington. We have not included detailed briefing on arms control points, believing that for the most part the Prime Minister will want to keep her powder dry for her message to Gorbachev.

Yours ever,

Colin Budd

(C R Budd)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
PS/10 Downing Street

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SOVIET AMBASSADOR'S CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER:
13 NOVEMBER 1986

Points to Make

1. Useful to hear General Secretary's views before visit to Washington. Look forward to renewing personal contact when I visit Moscow.

2. On return from Washington aim to reply to Gorbachev's last message, and convey thoughts on way forward. Shall instruct Sir Bryan Cartledge to deliver. Agreed to see you on firm understanding that he will be received.

3. Ready to see Ligachev (or Dobrynin) when Supreme Soviet Delegation visits UK early next year.

Arms Control

4. We in Europe want movement on INF and 50% cuts in strategic arms. Clear where responsibility will lie if no movement because of SDI linkage.

5. Role of nuclear weapons: cannot be treated in isolation without taking into account overall balance of forces in Europe including conventional and chemical.

6. Conditions for UK contributing to nuclear reductions unchanged.

Syria/Terrorism

7. Soviet response to our decision to break relations with Syria disappointing. Syria Soviet ally. But our decision based on firm evidence of Syrian involvement with Hindawi. Now making this available in Moscow

.../and

and to your Embassy. Our action endorsed by European partners.

7. Look to Soviet Union to match condemnation of terrorism and readiness for bilateral talks with appropriate response. Syrian claims of innocence do not stand up.

CSCE/Human Rights

8. Human rights improvements fundamental to building confidence between East and West.

9. Noted Shevardnadze's proposal for CSCE conference on humanitarian issues in Moscow. Will study carefully at Vienna along with other proposals in this field. Best first step would be Soviet action, eg over prisoners of conscience, Jewish emigration.

ESSENTIAL FACTS

UK/Soviet Relations

1. Vienna telnos 168 and 169, reporting the Foreign Secretary's meeting with Shevardnadze on 4 November, are attached.

2. The Prime Minister saw the Soviet Ambassador on 28 April, when he handed over a message from Gorbachev. Sir Bryan Cartledge has not yet been received by Mr Gorbachev in Moscow. The Foreign Secretary has stressed (to Zamyatin) that Prime Minister has agreed to see Zamyatin on this occasion on the firm understanding that Sir Bryan Cartledge will be recieved by Gorbachev after her visit to Washington, to deliver a message conveying her thoughts on the way forward.

Visits

3. Mr Shevardnadze stressed to Sir Geoffrey Howe on 4 November in Vienna that the Soviet side wanted the Prime Minister soon to propose dates for her visit to Moscow. Call on Gorbachev would be the ideal occasion.

4. Russians have hinted that the Supreme Soviet delegation (we have proposed first week of February 1987) will be headed by Ligachev or Dobrynin (the Chairmen of the two Foreign Affairs Commissions of the Supreme Soviet). Ligachev would be more interesting. The Prime Minister has agreed in principle to receive the leader on this basis.

5. Other forthcoming visits: Mr Walker to Moscow and Chernobyl in mid-December; Mr Renton to Moscow in January; Mr Jopling to Moscow in February, during a British agricultural exhibition.

Syria/Terrorism

6. Soviet statements following the British decision to break off relations with Syria described our action as groundless, unfriendly and provocative. We have taken this up with the Russians in both London and Moscow, including with Shevardnadze (Vienna telno 169). As a result, HM Ambassador, Moscow now instructed to give the Russians full briefing on our evidence of Syria's involvement in the Hindawi affair. EC Foreign Ministers (except Greece) agreed on 10 November on measures against Syria.

7. Shevardnadze suggested bilateral talks on terrorism to the Prime Minsiter in July. We have accepted, and proposed dates in late November/early December.

CSCE/Human Rights

8. Vienna Follow-Up Meeting opened on 4 November. Agreed aim is to complete business by July 1987. First phase (until Christmas) is devoted to review of implementation.

9. Shevardnadze unexpectedly proposed Moscow conference on Basket III (human contacts, information, culture, education etc). Foreign Ministers of Twelve agreed on 10 November that delegations in Vienna should study proposal, with other new proposals; premature to accept or reject the idea/venue. But if such a meeting were to go ahead, West would require proper access for press, interested groups and individuals, and a concrete mandate focussing on implementation of existing commitments.

Foreign & Commonwealth Office
11 November 1986

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10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

6 November 1986

The Soviet Ambassador

The Foreign Secretary told the Prime Minister at their meeting this afternoon that the Soviet Ambassador wished to call on her before her visit to Washington, to deliver a message from Mr. Gorbachev. The Prime Minister agreed to this on the firm understanding that parallel arrangements would be made for Sir Bryan Cartledge to call on Mr. Gorbachev after the Washington meeting to deliver a message conveying her thoughts on the way forward. I should be grateful if you could inform the Soviet Ambassador that the Prime Minister could see him at 0945 on Thursday 13 November for some 45 minutes. I assume that he will come with only an interpreter.

(CHARLES POWELL)

C.R. Budd, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

PRIVY COUNCIL OFFICE
WHITEHALL, LONDON SW1A 2AT

12 May 1986

Dear Tony

The new Soviet Ambassador, accompanied by Mr Krasnov, paid a call on the Lord President last Thursday, 8 May. They had a friendly and relaxed discussion, from which you may wish to be aware of the following points.

Several times over the Soviet Ambassador stressed how pleased the Soviet authorities were at the high level of representation in the delegation, and the fact that, although it was a Parliamentary group, it had proved possible for the Lord President to be its leader. This was especially pleasing in Mr Zamyatin's view, given that the delegation was in return for the visit led by Mr Gorbachev in 1984.

The Lord President expressed sympathy to Mr Zamyatin over the Chernobyl disaster. Mr Zamyatin in responding expressed concern that the scale of the problem should have been exaggerated by the media in this country, especially as there was no evidence of contamination of any foreign nationals, in or outside the Soviet Union. As to allegations of secrecy on the part of the Soviet authorities, the accident had happened in a reactor which had operated satisfactorily for two years, and during the night. (Mr Zamyatin said the "night of 27 April"; it was not clear whether this was inadverdent or not.) Moreover, the first priority had been to reduce the emissions of radiation and treat those affected. Two hundred people who had been contaminated were undergoing treatment in Moscow and Leningrad clinics. The Western media had also exaggerated the scale of casualties: Mr Zamyatin repeated that the number of people killed was two; and that only about 18 people were in a serious condition as a result of injuries attributable to the incident.

In reply, the Lord President stressed that it was not part of our Government's wish to talk up the seriousness of the incident. The Government's view remained that nuclear power had an essential contribution to make to our energy requirements, subject to the continuation of the nuclear industry's very good safety record.

Tony Galsworthy Esq
Private Secretary to the Secretary of State
for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs

The Lord President, concluding the meeting, stressed that he was very much looking forward to the visit, and invited Mr Zamyatin to get in touch if there were any further points he wished to put to him. There will be an opportunity for further discussion on 20 May, when Lord Whitelaw and others have been invited to lunch at the Soviet Embassy. I will let you know of any further points of interest.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Charles Powell.

Yours sincerely
Nick Gibbons

JOAN MACNAUGHTON
Private Secretary

Subject cc Master

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

30 April 1986

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR

The Prime Minister saw the new Soviet Ambassador, Mr. Zamyatin, for an hour this afternoon at his request. He was accompanied by Mr. Kossov who interpreted.

Mr. Zamyatin apologised for being so insistent upon having an early interview with the Prime Minister. But Mr. Gorbachev had most particularly wanted him to see her before she met President Reagan at the Tokyo Economic Summit. The Prime Minister said that she attached great importance to her dialogue with Mr. Gorbachev and that was the reason why she had agreed to see Mr. Zamyatin. She did so on the understanding that Sir Bryan Cartledge would be received in a similar manner whenever we had an important message to communicate to the highest levels of the Soviet leadership. Mr. Zamyatin acknowledged that this should be the case.

Mr. Zamyatin said that he had seen the General Secretary very recently. Mr. Gorbachev had asked him to hand over a personal message to the Prime Minister (text enclosed). Mr. Gorbachev had in addition asked him to say to the Prime Minister that, even though they had their differences about the reasons for certain international events, he wanted to maintain a regular dialogue with her. This could take place either in Moscow or in London and whenever either side considered it necessary to consult. Mr. Gorbachev had found his meetings with the Prime Minister at Chequers and in Moscow extremely useful. In preparing for his Summit meeting with President Reagan, he had taken heed of the advice the Prime Minister had given him about President Reagan. A great deal of what she had told him about the President's personality and way of doing business had been confirmed when they met in Geneva. Mr. Gorbachev agreed with the Prime Minister that President Reagan was someone with whom one could do business and have useful talks. Mr. Gorbachev also recalled from his talks at Chequers that the United Kingdom clearly had a special relationship with the United States, and the Prime Minister a particularly close personal relationship with President Reagan which enabled her to speak frankly with him. It was for this reason that he wanted to share with the Prime Minister a number of thoughts before she went to Tokyo for

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the Economic Summit where she would undoubtedly have a meeting with the President. Mr. Gorbachev would like the Prime Minister to convey to the President his reflections on the next Summit.

Mr. Zamyatin continued that Mr. Gorbachev was of the opinion that a second Summit meeting would be useful. He wanted it to be held. Both the Soviet Union and the United States should follow the programme for future action which had been established at Geneva. The next Summit should be more productive of results and lead to the solution of specific problems. The priority area for such agreement was arms control. At the same time, Mr. Gorbachev was concerned by the apparent incoherence in Washington. While this had to some extent been evident at the Geneva Summit it had subsequently become much clearer. There were those in Washington who were clearly reluctant to see agreements reached with the Soviet Union and would be content if there was no further Summit. They were responsible for attempts to heighten tension. It was suggested in some quarters that Mr. Gorbachev had no option but to attend a further Summit regardless of developments. This was not the case.

The Prime Minister said that she was grateful to Mr. Gorbachev for his message. He clearly remembered and valued their talks at Chequers as she did. She believed they had set a tone in relations between the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union and perhaps more widely for East/West relations which was valuable. The Geneva Summit had gone well from the point of view of both the United States and the Soviet Union. It had also raised expectations throughout the world of a better relationship between East and West. She agreed that there had to be another Summit, that it should be this year, and there should be concrete agreements at it. However, there seemed to her to have been some slippage in the Soviet position since the Geneva Summit. She was not sure of the reasons for this. Various explanations had been suggested: that the Soviet Union was preoccupied with domestic issues and putting foreign affairs to one side; or that there were difficulties in agreeing a clear and consistent policy line. Whatever the reason, Soviet proposals in recent months had been cast in very general terms and appeared to reflect a desire to make propaganda rather than to negotiate seriously. She was confident that the United States was anxious to have a further Summit this year and to register results. So the task was to recapture the atmosphere which had existed at the Geneva Summit and at the same time to get down to serious and detailed negotiations on specific proposals.

Turning to Mr. Gorbachev's message, the Prime Minister noted that it dealt with a Comprehensive Test Ban, INF negotiations, conventional forces and regional issues. She was rather surprised to note the omission of chemical weapons. In none of the negotiations on these issues did we find the Soviet position sufficiently serious. Moreover there appeared to be particular difficulties over verification which was a disappointment in view of Soviet statements indicating a more positive approach to the

problem of verification. There was no substitute for serious detailed negotiations if progress was to be made.

The Prime Minister said there was a further point which she wished to stress very strongly to the Ambassador. The United Kingdom was very concerned at the growth of terrorism, above all state-sponsored terrorism. She supposed that the Soviet Union must also be concerned. It was essential that all civilised countries should come together to say clearly that state-sponsored terrorism was not a permissible way of conducting affairs and should be rejected utterly. To show the seriousness of this condemnation, all arms supplies to countries which adopted state terrorism as a policy should be suspended. In particular, the Soviet Union should stop supplying Colonel Qadaffi with weapons which enabled him to promote and support terrorism.

Mr. Zamyatin said that he would like to follow up the number of points made by the Prime Minister. On verification, the Soviet position had shifted significantly. The West would find that if agreement was close on specific arms control measures, verification would not be a problem. The Soviet Union would be able to go very far on verification. In particular there had been a substantial change as regards verification of a ban on chemical weapons.

Mr. Zamyatin continued that he noted that the Prime Minister was confident that the United States wanted a further Summit. But he persisted in believing that there were those in the United States who did not. As an example, he would quote the appearance of US warships in the Black Sea only six miles off the Crimean coast close to a resort used by the Soviet leadership. The Soviet Union had seen this as a deliberate provocation and had been tempted to retaliate. This had been personally countermanded by Mr. Gorbachev. There were many occasions of this sort by the United States and the only motive for them appeared to be to complicate the international atmosphere.

Mr. Zamyatin recalled that at the Geneva Summit, Mr. Gorbachev and President Reagan had agreed that regional problems should be settled peacefully wherever they occurred. The Soviet Union was prepared to proceed in this way, whether it was in Afghanistan or Angola. But they could not accept attempts to exert pressure from outside through so-called freedom-fighters. This would not solve anything. However, it was a positive sign that the Soviet Union and the United States had agreed to start a series of consultations on regional problems. These would begin soon.

Mr. Zamyatin said that the Prime Minister had mentioned conventional weapons. Mr. Gorbachev had recently made some far-reaching proposals for reductions in such weapons and hoped for early progress in this area. The Soviet Union was firmly opposed to terrorism which was barbaric behaviour, but differed from the West in its attitude to the most effective way in which to deal with those allegedly engaged

in it. The difference was over method, not principle. The Prime Minister said that there could be no doubt at all of Qadaffi's direct involvement in terrorism. This could not be tolerated. Mr. Zamyatin said that the Soviet Union had been worried that the United States action against Libya might be taken as a precedent for similar action against Nicaragua or Cuba. The laws of accepted international behaviour had been broken. The Prime Minister said that indeed they had: by Colonel Qadaffi.

The Prime Minister said that she wanted to express great sympathy for the accident which had occurred at the Chernobyl nuclear power station in the Soviet Union and to express her condolences to all those who had suffered as a result, although we had no precise information on numbers. Accidents tended to draw nations together. The United Kingdom was ready to offer any technical help or advice which the Soviet Union required. We had British students in Minsk and Kiev who we were anxious to get out. We looked to the Soviet Union to provide full cooperation. Mr. Zamyatin said that he would report the offer of technical advice. He could confirm that the Soviet Union would most certainly help with evacuation of the students.

The Prime Minister asked whether Mr. Zamyatin could tell her more about the details of the accident. Mr. Zamyatin said that the accident itself had happened in one of four reactors. There had been a fire leading to a radiation leak. The other three reactors had been promptly shut down. The fire appeared to be out but the nuclear reaction was continuing. A group of leading scientists were now on the spot to deal with the situation. Everyone within a 30 kilometer radius of the accident had been evacuated by helicopter and aircraft. The radioactivity in the atmosphere was at an insignificant level which would not affect human beings, although naturally a careful check was being kept.

The Prime Minister said that we regretted the Soviet Union's delay in releasing information about the accident and the continuing lack of full information of the nature of it. She recalled that the Soviet Union was a member of the Special Reporting Facility of the International Atomic Energy Agency. She hoped therefore that the Soviet Union would provide the fullest details promptly to other countries concerned and allow IAEA inspectors to visit the scene of the accident. There was criticism in this country of the lack of openness and a feeling that something very serious had happened and that the rest of us had not been told enough about it.

Mr. Zamyatin said that his Embassy had conveyed such information as was available to the Foreign Office that morning, although they still did not have many specific details. He repeated that a Commission was now operating which included people connected with the IAEA. Inevitably a certain amount of time was required to assemble the information but he would ensure that the British side was kept fully informed. Mr. Zamyatin added that the Soviet

Union had taken steps to inform President Reagan "immediately the explosion took place" so that what had happened should not be mistaken for something else. The Prime Minister enquired whether other reactors of a similar type in the Soviet Union would now be closed down. Mr. Zamyatin said that they were continuing to operate normally.

In conclusion the Prime Minister said that she would consider Mr. Gorbachev's message carefully and make a detailed reply.

I enclose a copy of the line given to the No.10 spokesman after the meeting.

Would you please note that the reference to President Reagan having been informed is sensitive and knowledge of it should be closely restricted.

I am copying this letter and enclosures to John Howe (Ministry of Defence) and Michael Stark (Cabinet Office). I am arranging separately for the section on the nuclear accident to be copied to the Department of Energy and the Department of the Environment.

(C. D. POWELL)

Colin Budd Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CAJAEQ

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR

LINE TO TAKE:

The Prime Minister saw the newly arrived Soviet Ambassador for half an hour this afternoon to take delivery of a message from Mr Gorbachev on a number of questions, among them arms control, and to discuss the nuclear accident in the Soviet Union. The call was at the Soviet Government's request.

The Prime Minister expressed the Government's sympathy for the accident at Chernobyl and offered British advice and technical assistance in dealing with the damaged reactor. The Soviet Ambassador undertook to report this offer.

The Prime Minister also told the Ambassador that we looked to the Soviet authorities for the fullest cooperation over the evacuation of British citizens from the areas of Kiev and Minsk. The Soviet Ambassador said that this would be provided.

The Prime Minister told the Ambassador that we very much regretted the delay in releasing information about the incident and the continuing lack of full information on the nature of the accident.

Did Mr Gorbachev's message deal with the nuclear accident?
No. It dealt with a number of international questions, in particular arms control.

Was it not unusual for the Prime Minister to see a new Ambassador so soon after his arrival?
These were exceptional circumstances.

Did the Soviet Ambassador give any further details of the accident and its effects?
The Ambassador was able to add a bit to our information.

Did Mr. Gorbachev invite the Prime Minister to visit the Soviet Union?
No. He expressed interest in continuing and building on the dialogue between him and the Prime Minister begun at Chequers and continued in Moscow.

30 April 1986

CONFIDENTIAL

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SUBJECT cc MASTER

cc PC

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

14 April 1986

Dear Colin,

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR

The Prime Minister received the Soviet Ambassador this morning for a farewell call.

The Prime Minister said that Mr. Popov had been in London during an interesting period. The highlight had been the visit of Mr. Gorbachev. She had been pleased to have the opportunity for a long talk with him before he became General Secretary. She continued to believe that the two of them could do business together. Their talk had created a better mutual understanding of their respective positions.

Mr. Popov said that he was grateful to the Prime Minister for finding time to see him and grateful to the Foreign Office for the assistance he had received during his five-and-a-half years in London. The Prime Minister said that she would wish Mr. Popov to represent very strongly to his authorities her hope that Sir Bryan Cartledge would be given access to Mr. Shevardnadze when he required it. Sir Iain Sutherland had been treated dismally on his departure from Moscow. She drew attention to the contrast between this and the access given to Mr. Popov in London.

Mr. Popov continued that he was proud to have contributed towards developing relations between the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom. He agreed with the Prime Minister that the visit of Mr. Gorbachev and his delegation had been a high point. The next step was to move on from general exchanges to solution of particular problems. The Soviet Union looked forward to the forthcoming visits of the Secretary of State for Energy and the Parliamentary delegation led by the Lord President. Equally, Mr. Shevardnadze was looking forward to his visit to the United Kingdom this year. The Prime Minister confirmed that we were also looking forward to Mr. Shevardnadze's visit. She would hope to see him while he was here and would talk with her customary frankness. Mr. Popov observed that it was 10 years since a Soviet Foreign Minister had visited the United Kingdom.

The Prime Minister said that progress on arms control was a high priority, both in the talks on nuclear arms in

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Geneva, in the talks to restrict chemical weapons and in the MBFR talks in Vienna. She was pleased to note that a Soviet delegation would be visiting London very shortly for talks with officials on these issues. Considerable expectations had been raised by the meeting between President Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev and there would be acute disappointment if that meeting did not lead on to concrete results. People had been relieved to see the two of them talking and doing business together. The next Summit in the United States must, therefore, show progress in some areas at least. It was no good setting unrealistic targets. Mr. Popov would have noticed that she herself had been sceptical of the goal of a world without nuclear weapons. The Prime Minister continued that she had hoped that after the Geneva Summit, the Soviet Union would have allowed more Soviet Jews to travel to Israel. She had been disappointed that there had been no progress on this but continued to hope that something would be done. It would have a good effect on world opinion.

Mr. Popov said he was glad to hear the Prime Minister speak of the need to achieve practical results. The proposals made by Mr. Gorbachev on 15 January to liquidate all intermediate range nuclear weapons in Europe were very realistic and should have been attractive to the United Kingdom. They were not necessarily the final proposals of the Soviet Union. They remained ready to discuss any proposals and to consider all international systems for verification. Mr. Popov continued that there were also problems to be solved in the commercial field. He had taken a personal interest in the development of trade between the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union. He was sad to see Britain losing out to Japan and West Germany, as well as France and Italy. Other countries seemed ready to offer better credit terms.

Mr. Popov said that he expected Mr. Gorbachev to invite him to call soon after his return to Moscow to talk about the United Kingdom in which he remained very interested. He wondered whether there was any particular message which the Prime Minister wished him to convey about the future of United Kingdom/Soviet relations or wider international developments. The Prime Minister said that Mr. Popov could say that her basic approach to the problems of arms control and security remained as she had explained them to Mr. Gorbachev at Chequers in December 1984. Every country was entitled to security and must respect the rights of others to security. She believed there was scope for progress on arms control but this required detailed negotiation in Geneva rather than the exchange of general proposals. As regards United Kingdom/Soviet relations, we were anxious for good trade relations. We also wanted to expand our contacts with the Soviet Union. She felt that her talks with Mr. Gorbachev had helped set the framework for his eventual Summit meeting with President Reagan in Geneva. She therefore hoped very much to be able to continue the discussion and dialogue with Mr. Gorbachev one day. She hoped that Mr. Popov would say that to Mr. Gorbachev.

Mr. Popov said that on his return to Mocow he would take up the job of Ambassador-at-large. He hoped this would continue to bring him into contact with the United Kingdom.

I am copying this letter to Michael Stark (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely,

Charles Powell

(C.D. Powell)

Colin Budd, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

11 April 1986

Prime Minister
You will also wish to thank him for the gift of vodka and caviar.
MCP 12/4.

Dear Charles,

Soviet Ambassador's Farewell Call

Thank you for your letter of 7 April. I enclose a brief for Mr Popov's farewell call on the Prime Minister at 1015 on 14 April; it has not been seen by the Foreign Secretary, but will be submitted to him in parallel tonight.

The Foreign Secretary considers it particularly important that we should use Popov's farewell calls to continue the process of establishing ourselves in Soviet eyes as independent interlocutors with views of our own (as well as with influence in Washington).

Popov is unlikely himself to raise any significant points of substance. Nor would we expect Popov's report of this call to carry much weight in Moscow; it will be the initial reports of his (much weightier) successor Zamyatin that will matter. It would therefore be best to leave for Zamyatin any hints about a Prime Ministerial visit to Moscow.

Nevertheless, we have suggested in the brief that the Prime Minister should remind Popov of the stark contrast between his farewell calls here and those of Sir Iain Sutherland from Moscow (the latter was lunched by a Deputy Minister and was given the minimum protocol call at the Supreme Soviet). And only last month Sir Bryan Cartledge was unable to see Shevardnadze to deliver the Prime Minister's reply to Gorbachev, but had instead to call on a First Deputy Minister. We also recommend that the Prime Minister raise some of the impediments to better UK/Soviet relations, notably human rights.

We have referred briefly to the need for a more serious approach to arms control, with less propaganda: Mr Karpov, the Soviet Union's Geneva negotiator, will be in London on 18 April for arms control talks with FCO officials.

Another issue worth touching on is the possibility of a Soviet/Argentina fisheries agreement covering part of the Falklands fisheries zone. A brief reference to this by the Prime Minister would indicate the importance we attach to the matter: a separate brief and background note are attached.

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In Popov's favour is the fact that Anglo-Soviet relations have improved a good deal since his arrival in 1983, and it is fair to assume that his recommendations must have done something to encourage Gorbachev to come here in 1984 (though he has failed to persuade either Gromyko or Shevardnadze to do the same).

He prides himself in particular on his activities in the commercial field (he may have been behind the goal of 40-50% increase in trade mentioned by Gorbachev to British businessmen). He is likely to speak of disappointing results, blaming uncompetitive UK prices and financing terms. In fact trade declined in 1985, in comparison with the quirkily high figures for 1984, reflecting the uneven rhythm imposed by their Five Year Plan.

Yours ever

Tony Galsworthy

(A C Galsworthy)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
PS/10 Downing Street

FAREWELL CALL BY SOVIET AMBASSADOR ON PRIME MINISTER

POINTS TO MAKE

1. Aware of your efforts to help improve UK/Soviet relations. They have borne some fruit. Pleased with Gorbachev's visit here: greetings to him. Sorry we have not seen Shevardnadze here in your time.

2. However, some unnecessary impediments to relationship. First, sense that Russians not treating UK with sufficient seriousness. Contrast your programme of farewell calls with extreme discourtesy of Soviet side to Sir Iain Sutherland in June 1985 - not a single call on anyone of political weight. Acknowledge Sir Bryan Cartledge has done better, but last month unable to deliver to Shevardnadze my letter to Gorbachev. Have to say that such matters bound to affect way in which Soviet Ambassador here will be treated.

3. Second impediment, Soviet behaviour towards individuals. Of closest concern to UK small number of outstanding marriage cases where partner unable to leave Soviet Union. Wait of several years is norm: an area where we hope Gorbachev's call for change and greater efficiency - and words about solutions in a humane spirit - will have an impact.

4. Of wider concern, Soviet behaviour towards own citizens who do not conform. Every society has criminals who should - humanely - be punished. But when we hear of an imprisoned Ukrainian poetess, Mrs Ratushinskaya, whose offense was clearly to write Christian poetry, or of another for being an unofficial teacher of Hebrew, we question standards of civilised behaviour by which Soviet

.../Union

Union wishes to be judged in other areas. Should be recognised by your leaders as a [redacted] block on Soviet ability to win trust in West.

5. Third impediment is Soviet urge to public diplomacy. When even Patriarch of Russian Orthodox Church writes to Archbishop of Canterbury about Gorbachev's 15 January proposals, seems like PR campaign rather than serious attempt to engage Western leaders. What people in West want to see is progress at negotiating table, eg at Geneva. Yet in one major area where elements of agreement - on strategic weapons - US still have no reply on 2 November proposals. 15 January proposals were not a reply.

6. Widespread non-reaction to Gorbachev's 27 March suggestion of immediate Summit on nuclear tests (when Soviet position has emphasised need for long and careful preparation of such meetings) shows credibility overstretched.

7. Still much cause for hope. Common interests in security at lowest possible balanced level of weapons. Noted interesting recent formulations by Gorbachev on peaceful coexistence; more of spirit of live and let live; and on verification. Note Soviet confirmation that US/Soviet Summit should go ahead (but attempts to exert pressure through not agreeing date misconceived).

8. Believe greater mutual understanding vital - and achievable. For your successor to indicate whether Soviet Union willing to allow development of UK/Soviet relations to play part in this. For my part, ready.

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH SOVIET AMBASSADOR: 14 APRIL 1986

Argentine/Soviet Fisheries Negotiations

- Concerned to hear of your negotiations with Argentina could be source of serious disagreement between us. What is the position?

[If Ambassador Popov unable to confirm such negotiations do not purport to cover Falklands water]

- Our efforts since 1982 to reduce tension and promote international cooperation.

- A Soviet/Argentine agreement with such provision would have no validity in international law.

- Our concerns made known to you since last November. So Soviet action on these lines would be unfriendly and irresponsible.

- Sharply at variance with Soviet role in Antarctic Treaty and in Convention for Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources [covers South Georgia].

- Must ask Soviet Government to reconsider.

- [If necessary] will take up soon with Zamyatin.

BACKGROUND

1. In November Russians and others denied they were negotiating with Argentina (Secretary of State's minute (PM 85/104 of 17 December) to the Prime Minister). They probably were not, at that time. We made clear to Russians our view that any such agreement would have no validity in international law and would be politically irresponsible. But recent reports (some secret) indicate negotiations between Soviet Union and Argentina have made considerable progress: Americans think agreement could be announced "sooner rather than later". On 8 April the Russians could offer no clarification to Sir W Harding. He said Popov should do so on 14 April.

2. Unclear what geographical area agreement covers. Likely to be Argentine Exclusive Economic Zone - a term that is interpreted by Argentina to cover waters within 200 miles of Falklands and of South Georgia and of Argentina's Antarctic claim (which overlaps largely with ours): ie waters that we have a right to claim as a fisheries zone in respect of our sovereignty over Falklands.

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bc PC.

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

7 April 1986

SOVIET AMBASSADOR

As you know the Prime Minister has agreed to see the Soviet Ambassador briefly before he departs. Could you arrange for Mr. Popov to be invited to come at 1015 on Monday 14 April for half an hour. It would also be helpful to have briefing on the subjects likely to arise. In particular the Prime Minister should of course make the point that we would expect to see reciprocity in the level at which Sir Bryan Cartledge is received.

Mr. Popov should be discouraged from bringing anyone else with him.

CHARLES POWELL

Colin Budd, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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SKW

Soviet Union

NOTE FOR THE RECORD

cc. Mr. Ingham
Mr. Coles (o/r)

Mr. Dolgov, Counsellor at the Soviet Embassy, telephoned me at 1700 yesterday. He said that he was calling on the instructions of his Ambassador. The Ambassador had been instructed by President Brezhnev to seek an interview with the Prime Minister. The purpose of the interview was to discuss "US/Soviet relations" and to pass on the President's "personal congratulations" to the Prime Minister. Mr. Dolgov said that there was some urgency about his request.

I consulted the FCO. Their advice was that the Prime Minister should refuse to see the Soviet Ambassador. They felt this was an attempt by the USSR to show that they were still on good relations with the Ten, despite the situation in Poland, and the measures announced by President Reagan. In these circumstances, to receive the Soviet Ambassador would embarrass the Americans. The FCO were confirmed in their view by the fact that Signor Spadolini had received a similar request from the Soviet Ambassador in Rome. Signor Spadolini was being advised to refuse this request.

In any case, the FCO pointed out that it was not normal practice for Prime Ministers to receive Ambassadors unless there was a specific, important, and urgent reason for doing so. The Soviet request in this case was hardly specific. The FCO advised that the Ambassador should be asked to address himself to the FCO through the usual channels.

I subsequently spoke to the Prime Minister, who accepted the FCO's advice. I then told Mr. Dolgov that the Prime Minister would be grateful if his Ambassador could address himself to the Foreign Office through the usual channels.

CDSR

31 December, 1981

CONFIDENTIAL
FM FCO 241034Z APR 81
TO IMMEDIATE MOSCOW
TELEGRAM NUMBER 240 OF 24 APRIL
AND TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, PARIS AND DOHA (FOR PS/PRIME MINISTER)

FOLLOWING TELEGRAM NOW REPEATED TO YOU AT REQUEST OF DEPARTMENT WAS SENT TO BONN TELEGRAM NUMBER 164 OF 23 APRIL.

MEETING WITH SOVIET AMBASSADOR AT NORTHOLT

1. THE MOST STRIKING ASPECT OF THE COMMUNICATION DELIVERED BY POPOV IS ITS INDICATION OF WILLINGNESS TO DEVELOP THE BILATERAL POLITICAL DIALOGUE, BY IMPLICATION AT A HIGHER LEVEL. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS WILL BE CLEARER WHEN WE KNOW WHETHER OR NOT THE COMMUNICATION IS A ROUND-ROBIN DELIVERED TO ALL WESTERN COUNTRIES AND HAVE HAD A CHANCE TO COMPARE NOTES IF (AS SEEMS LIKELY) IT IS. AT THE LEAST, THE COMMUNICATION GIVES US AN OPENING TO PUT FORWARD PROPOSALS TO THE RUSSIANS IF WE CHOOSE, AND THE RUSSIANS WILL NO DOUBT CONSIDER THAT THE BALL IS NOW IN OUR COURT.

2. WE HAVE THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS ON OTHER POINTS:

(I) TNF MORATORIUM: BASICALLY A RESTATEMENT OF THE MORATORIUM PROPOSAL PUT FORWARD IN BREZHNEV'S CPSU CONGRESS SPEECH IN FEBRUARY, AND REPEATED FREQUENTLY SINCE. IF THE COMMUNICATION IS A ROUND ROBIN, THE TIMING WOULD FIT NICE Y WITH THAT OF THE NAC MEETING IN ROME. THE ONLY NEW ELEMENT IS THE SUGGESTION THAT 'THE OBLIGATIONS OF THE SIDES IN CONNECTION WITH THE MORATORIUM COULD BE AGREED UPON EVEN BEFORE THE OPENING OF THE OFFICIAL TALKS.' ANY SUCH AGREEMENT COULD HARDLY BE REACHED WITHOUT A MEETING, AND IT IS CONCEIVABLE THAT THE RUSSIANS HAVE THE IDEA OF A MULTILATERAL ~~ONENZ~~ONE IN MIND ~~KBPD~~. THE AIM MAY BE TO MAKE IT HARDER FOR MINISTERS IN ROME TO REJECT THE MORATORIUM IN STANDARD TERMS, BY OFFERING THE PROSPECT OF DISCUSSION ON THE POINTS IN DISPUTE.

(II) THEATRE BALANCE: GENERALLY STANDARD, EXCEPT FOR THE SPECIFIC CLAIM THAT NATO HAS A MEDIUM RANGE WARHEAD ADVANTAGE OF 1.5:1. AS FAR AS WE KNOW THIS IS THE FIRST TIME THE RUSSIANS HAVE MADE COMPARISONS OF NUMBERS OF WARHEADS RATHER THAN DELIVERY SYSTEMS, BUT THE FIGURES ARE MEANINGLESS WITHOUT DETAILS OF THE DATA BASE. THE CLAIM CANNOT BE SUBSTANTIATED ON ANY BASE THAT WE WOULD REGARD AS REASONABLE BUT THE AIM MAY ONCE AGAIN BE TO ENCOURAGE DISCUSSION OF THIS AND RELATED QUESTIONS.

(III) CSCE: A CAUTIOUS ASSESSMENT OF THE NNA PAPER, BUT SPECIFIC POINTS ALL CONCENTRATED ON CBMS AND THE PROSPECTS FOR A DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE. SOVIET OFFER TO APPLY CBMS TO THE WHOLE OF THE EUROPEAN PART OF THE SOVIET UNION IS REPEATED, BUT WITH MORE THAN USUAL EMPHASIS ON THE NEED FOR RECIPROCAL STEPS BY THE WEST AND CLEAR IMPLICATION THAT THE PRECISE SCOPE OF THE AREA OF APPLICATION MAY BE FOR THE CONFERENCE ITSELF RATHER THAN MADRID. THE CRITERION OF 'MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE' IS IDENTIFIED WITH EXISTING SOVIET PROPOSALS FOR NEW CBMS. CONFIRMATION OF THE EQUIVOCAL NATURE OF SOVIET REFERENCES AT MADRID TO THE OTHER TWO CRITERIA ('POLITICAL OBLIGATION' AND 'VERIFIABILITY') BY INDICATING THAT ONLY 'SOME' CBMS SHOULD BE BINDING AND BY RESTRICTING THE SCOPE OF VERIFICATION. ALL THIS IS PRETTY TOUGH, THOUGH THERE IS AN INDICATION OF FLEXIBILITY OVER THE 'FIREBREAK' IN THE SUGGESTION THAT THERE MIGHT BE EITHER ONE CONFERENCE IN TWO STAGES, DEALING WITH CBMS AND DISARMAMENT RESPECTIVELY, OR TWO CONFERENCES TO DEAL WITH THE TWO SUBJECTS IN TURN. TOO EARLY TO TELL WHETHER THIS ON THE WHOLE DISCOURAGING SECTION IS A TACTIC INTENDED TO LESSEN WESTERN EXPECTATIONS ON THE RESUMPTION AT MADRID OR A SUBSTANTIVE INDICATION OF LACK OF FLEXIBILITY IN THE SOVIET POSITION. EXPERIENCE SUGGESTS THAT THE FORMER IS MORE LIKELY.

(IV) AFGHANISTAN/THE GULF: NOTHING NEW.

3. WE SHALL REPEAT THIS TELEGRAM TO NATO AND OTHER POSTS TO COINCIDE WITH THE ADDRESSEES OF YOUR TELEGRAM GIVING THE TEXT OF THE COMMUNICATION.

ENDS.

CARRINGTON

With the compliments of

EAST EUROPEAN AND SOVIET DEPARTMENT

Translation of message handed to the Secretary of State by Soviet Ambassador Popov at Northolt Airport, 23 April 1981

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
LONDON, SW1A 2AH

TRANSLATION

1. The Soviet side notes with satisfaction the readiness of the British government to develop a political dialogue on topical international problems. The Soviet Union's view on ways of solving these problems is contained in the specific foreign policy proposals put forward in L I Brezhnev's Report at the 26th Congress of the CPSU and set out by him in the message to Prime Minister M Thatcher. The main import of the new Soviet initiatives is to eliminate the danger of war, to open the way towards stopping the arms race, and to strengthen détente.

An arms race unleashed with the purpose of achieving unilateral military advantages gives no answer to the crucial problems facing mankind, but only aggravates them and, - what is more, - to an immeasurably greater degree than before. The interests of preserving peace call for the maximum of restraint and for a sober and far-sighted approach to the conduct of international affairs and for not permitting disagreements to escape from the bounds of the peaceful settlement of disputes and from being transformed into military conflict situations. In our view, the complex and at times conflictual nature of the realities of today's world emphasise the importance of a responsible inter-state dialogue with a view to easing the situation.

A realistic approach to the solution of international problems leaves no room for the so-called concept of "linking" truly urgent issues with contrived ones. Attempts to put such a concept into practice in fact divert away from constructive negotiations and businesslike cooperation.

The Soviet Union considers it necessary to conduct an active dialogue with other states, using for this purpose all existing possibilities up to and including the convocation of a special session of the Security Council with the participation of the highest leaders of the Council's member states, to discuss urgent

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international problems existing in and beyond Europe, and to seek keys for the improvement of the situation in the world.

Having made new foreign policy initiatives, the Soviet Union does not consider that it is, as it were, laying down the only possible formula for bringing about a turn for the better in world affairs. In his speech in Prague on 7 April L I Brezhnev noted that "if anyone else has other reasonable proposals, we are ready to examine them too".

All Soviet proposals for limiting the arms race and strengthening international security remain in force. This applies fully to the whole complex of problems which have at various times been discussed between the Soviet Union and United States and above all the problems of limiting strategic armaments.

2. In order to prevent the nuclear missile confrontation in Europe passing to a new and more dangerous level, the Soviet Union has proposed the establishment of a moratorium on the deployment in Europe of new medium-range nuclear missile weapons of the NATO states and the USSR, ie to freeze quantitatively and qualitatively the existing level of these systems, including the US forward-based nuclear systems in this region.

The Soviet Union is prepared here and now, without awaiting the outcome of the relevant negotiations, to halt the implementation of its current plans for modernising medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe. This reinforces our proposals on the possibility of reducing such weapons as a result of negotiations, and the scope of this reduction, moreover, could even be quite considerable, if our partners were prepared for this. The moratorium would enter into force immediately after the opening of negotiations on the limitation of nuclear weapons in Europe and would remain in force throughout the entire negotiations. The obligations of the sides in connection with the moratorium could be agreed even before the opening of the official negotiations.

/We cannot

We cannot agree with the assertion that the moratorium would perpetuate the allegedly "serious imbalance" in favour of the USSR in medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe.

First, at the present time there exists in Europe an approximate equality in the relavant types of weapons. NATO has here a powerful grouping of nuclear systems capable of reaching the territory of the USSR. The Soviet Union's nuclear weapons in Europe do not exceed this level. In analysing the correlation of nuclear forces of the sides, one should not take in isolation one single type of weapon, for example, ground-based missiles. Nuclear potentials should be considered as a complex, since only on this basis can the principle of the equal security of the sides be maintained.

Secondly, the Soviet Union, in replacing old missiles with new ones for the purpose of preserving nuclear parity, not only did not increase by a single unit the aggregate number of medium-range nuclear weapon carriers but even decreased that number, - with the deployment of each new ("SS-20") missile one or two old missiles in the Soviet Union were simultaneously withdrawn.

Thirdly, as regards the number of the nuclear charges of medium-range weapons in Europe, the advantage currently favours NATO by approximately 1.5 to 1. The replacement undertaken of old missiles by new ones has not led to the Soviet Union acquiring superiority in this field. And the aggregate yield of the charges of Soviet medium-range missiles has not increased but even diminished.

Consequently, the introduction of a moratorium would only entrench the existing approximate equality and would open the way for the establishment of such equality at a lower level. Conversely, if, as planned, the NATO countries deploy additionally in Europe 572 medium-range missiles, then a more than 1.5 superiority in medium-range nuclear weapon carriers will be created on the NATO side. Moreover, we cannot but take into account the fact that in relation to the Soviet Union this US weapon is strategic in nature. It is common knowledge that the Soviet Union does not possess on the

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territory of other countries such weapons capable of striking targets on US territory. Thus, the deployment of further American medium-range missiles in Europe would disrupt the strategic parity between the USSR and USA and would make the situation less stable. Such a turn of events would compel the Soviet Union to take the necessary countermeasures so as to not to permit the worsening of the strategic situation and in order to reestablish the balance, but at a higher level.

In drawing attention to the moratorium proposal, the Soviet side expresses the hope that the British government will carefully analyse once again all its aspects.

As regards the Soviet/American negotiations on the limitation of nuclear armaments in Europe the first round of which had took place in October/November last year, the Soviet side is prepared to resume them at any time, so it is now only up to the American side.

3. The Soviet Union considers it important to ensure that the Madrid meeting ends with results and it favours adopting understanding on all sections of the Final Act. We attach great importance to reaching agreement on convening a conference on military détente and disarmament in Europe and are ready for reasonable compromises. We could accept the option whereby a single conference would be held, with confidence-building measures being discussed at the first stage and issues of actual disarmament at the second. But we would also be agreeable to the holding of 2 conferences, having in mind that the first conference would be devoted to confidence-building measures and the second to disarmament issues.

The Soviet Union has expressed its agreement to a considerable expansion of the zone of application of confidence-building measures, applying them to the entire European part of the USSR, - subject to

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a corresponding extension of the zone by Western states. The specific parameters of the zone of application of confidence-building measures can be determined at the conference itself. What is required now is clarity on the approach in principle. Firstly, this means mutuality of obligations. Secondly, - their balance and the impermissibility of infringing the security interests of participating states.

The equality of states participating in the All-European Conference must be ensured in their rights and duties regarding confidence-building measures and in the All-European process as a whole. No one must have any privileges in comparison with others. Unilateral extension by the Soviet Union of the zone of confidence-building measures to the entire European part of its territory without reciprocal steps from the West would not correspond with the principle of equal rights and duties of all states participating in the All-European Conference.

In the decision on the convocation of the conference it would be possible to envisage, alongside the extension of the zone of confidence-building measures, an increase in the number of these measures (notification not only of major exercises by ground forces but also of major naval and air exercises and also of major troop movements, and the renunciation of military exercises involving the participation of more than 40-50,000 men). This would give the confidence-building measures a more important and more militarily significant nature as compared with the measures applied at present. Furthermore, the possibility would not be excluded of participants in the conference undertaking political obligations to carry out some of the confidence-building measures and of establishing, in certain circumstances, forms of verification making use of national means which would correspond with the nature of the specific confidence-building measures and which could be agreed between the sides.

/At present

At present, when the Madrid meeting is in recess, it is necessary to give serious thought to the current situation, bearing in mind the need for further development of the All-European process in the interests of peace and détente. In our view, the draft final document tabled by the neutral and non-aligned countries facilitates to some extent the achievement of mutually acceptable solutions. In Moscow it is hoped that the British government will make efforts for the constructive completion of the Madrid meeting.

4. The Soviet side is convinced that even the most acute problems in East/West relations can be solved, given the preservation of the legitimate interests of the sides. This applies also to the Middle East problem on which, in our view, there are and could be found new points of coincidence between the positions of the Soviet Union and Britain, and also to the settlement of the situation around Afghanistan, on which serious differences persist. A subject of real solutions could also be questions relating to the ensuring of peace and security in the Persian Gulf, if all interested parties show a desire to seek such solutions and to refrain from actions, particularly of a military nature, which might complicate the situation in that area. Specific proposals on this matter have been made by L I Brezhnev, including also those in his recent message to Prime Minister M Thatcher.

5. There is satisfaction in Moscow with the statement by the British government of its readiness to pursue a constructive course in East/West relations and to cooperate with the Soviet Union, on the basis of joint efforts, in specific actions to strengthen confidence, consolidate international security and develop mutually advantageous relations between our countries.

Such an approach meets with understanding on the part of the Soviet Union. We are in favour of putting to work the considerable potential for cooperation created over the years in order to seek

/

solutions to the urgent problems of curbing the arms race and strengthening détente, and of using existing opportunities in various fields of bilateral Soviet/British relations, giving them full development and translating them into specific actions. We are in favour of giving the political dialogue between our countries a level and content which would be in keeping with the requirements of the aggravated international situation.

CONFIDENTIAL
FM BONN 231325Z APR 81
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 281 OF 23 APR
INFO IMMEDIATE MOSCOW WASHINGTON SALALAH PARIS INFO PRIORITY UKDEL NATO ROME

CALL BY THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR ON SECRETARY OF STATE:
FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

1. POPOV CALLED ON LORD CARRINGTON AT HIS OWN REQUEST AT NORTHOLT BEFORE THE SECRETARY OF STATE LEFT FOR HIS VISIT TO THE FRG EARLY THIS MORNING. POPOV STRESSED THAT GROMYKO HAD WANTED HIM TO SEE LORD CARRINGTON PERSONALLY ABOUT A SUBJECT OF GREAT IMPORTANCE BOTH FOR ANGLO/SOVIET BILATERAL RELATIONS, AND FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION. HE THEN READ OUT THE COMMUNICATION IN MIFT.
2. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO STUDY THIS CAREFULLY BEFORE RESPONDING . HE AGREED THAT WE NEEDED BETTER BILATERAL RELATIONS, AND TO DEFUSE EAST/WEST PROBLEMS. THE UK ALSO SET GREAT STORE ON THE TNF TALKS, WHICH WAS AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT IN THE NATO DECISION. HE HAD SOME DOUBTS ABOUT SOVIET MATHEMATICS AND VIEW OF THE MILITARY BALANCE IN EUROPE. POPOV INTERJECTED THAT IT MIGHT BE USEFUL TO LOOK AT THIS AGAIN. THE MATHEMATICS COULD BE DISCUSSED. LORD CARRINGTON AGREED.
3. ON THE CDE, THE SECRETARY OF STATE ASKED WHAT THE RUSSIANS MEANT BY THE NEED FOR THE WEST TO QUOTE EXTEND THE CONFIDENCE ZONE ACCORDINGLY UNQUOTE IN RESPONSE TO SOVIET AGREEMENT TO APPLY CBMS TO THE ENTIRE EUROPEAN PART OF THE SOVIET UNION. THE AMBASSADOR SAID THAT THESE WERE MATTERS FOR THE TALKS THEMSELVES. LORD CARRINGTON ASKED WHETHER SUCH DISCUSSIONS WOULD BE HELD AT MADRID OR DURING THE FIRST STAGE OF ANY CONFERENCE. HE COULD NOT SEE HOW THERE COULD BE A FIRST STAGE UNTIL AN AREA OF APPLICATION FOR CBMS HAD BEEN AGREED. THE AMBASSADOR SAID THAT HE WAS UNABLE TO GIVE A FINAL REPLY ON THIS, AND DID NOT WANT TO MISLEAD THE SECRETARY OF STATE. BUT HE WOULD LIKE TO STRESS THAT THE SOVIET UNION WERE READY FOR A REASONABLE COMPROMISE. LORD CARRINGTON EMPHASISED THE IMPORTANCE OF MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT AND VERIFIABLE CBMS AS AN ESSENTIAL PRELIMINARY TO ANY DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE.
4. THE SECRETARY OF STATE THEN MENTIONED THE PHRASE IN THE SOVIET COMMUNICATION ABOUT THE NEED FOR ALL SIDES TO REFRAIN FROM ACTIONS QUOTE ESPECIALLY OF A MILITARY NATURE UNQUOTE WHICH COULD COMPLICATE THE SITUATION IN THE GULF REGION. HE WOULD NOT REHURSE OUR VIEW OF AFGHANISTAN, WHICH WAS FAMILIAR TO THE AMBASSADOR. THE FACT WAS THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE THEMSELVES CARRYING OUT MILITARY ACTIONS IN AFGHANISTAN. THE AMBASSADOR SAID THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE READY FOR POLITICAL DISCUSSIONS ABOUT AFGHANISTAN AS WELL. (IT WAS CLEAR FROM THE WAY THIS WAS SAID THAT NO NEW SIGNAL WAS INTENDED).
5. FINALLY LORD CARRINGTON REPEATED THAT HE WOULD STUDY THE TEXT ANDTHEN GIVE A PROPER ANSWER.
6. HM AMBASSADORS IN WASHINGTON , PARIS AND ROME CAN HAND OVER A COPY OF THE STATEMENT IN CONFIDENCE, AND SHOULD ASK WHETHER THE AMERICANS, FRENCH OR ITALIANS HAVE HAD ANY SIMILAR APPROACHES.LLORD CARRINGTON HAS GIVEN A COPY TO GENSCHER, WHO HAS SO FAR RECEIVED NO SUCH COMMUNICATION FFOM THE RUSSIANS.

TAYLOR

NNNN

M Alexander

30 Jan

PRIVY COUNCIL OFFICE
WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2AT

Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster

13th March 1981

Mr Richards

Dear Francis,

Thank you for your letter of 5 March about the points raised by the Soviet Ambassador during his recent call on Mr Pym.

In the light of your and other comments, I now attach a proposed draft reply for the Chancellor of the Duchy to send to Mr Popov. I should be grateful if you and copy addressees could confirm that you are content with its terms. I also plan to mention the matter to John Osborn, as chairman of the Anglo-Soviet Group, before Mr Pym writes.

I am sending copies of this letter to the same recipients as before.

Yours ever,

David.

D C R HEYHOE
Private Secretary

F N Richards, Esq
Private Secretary
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
LONDON

Enc

DRAFT LETTER FOR THE CHANCELLOR OF THE DUCHY TO SEND TO THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR, MR POPOV.

When you came to see me on 13 February, you asked about exchanges of visits between Parliamentarians and also about prominent members of the Conservative Party whom you might meet.

On both counts, I do not think that I can do better than draw to your attention the Anglo-Soviet Parliamentary Group, whose Chairman is Mr John Osborn MP.

You also asked about exchanges of visits at the level of scientific and research cooperation and on this I am advised that the right course would be for you to take up with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office any ideas that you may have.

I hope that this is helpful.

Soviet Union
Contacts with
Soviet Ambassador
Sept 79

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

(2)

Prime Minister

You will want to be aware of this.

5/3

5 March 1981

Dear David,

Thank you for your letter of 13 February recording the Chancellor of the Duchy's meeting that day with the Soviet Ambassador.

We have taken the view since the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan that the traditional exchanges of Parliamentary visits should be avoided. The Russians almost invariably blow them up into major manifestations of goodwill, and Lord Carrington agrees with the Chief Whip (Murdo MacLean's letter of 16 February) that we should not be seen to be giving a green light to events of this kind.

There is, however, another side to the coin. Although there have been no official Parliamentary exchanges since Mr Cledwyn Hughes MP and a small Parliamentary group visited the Soviet Union in April 1977, visits not arranged through Parliamentary channels and involving less representative Members of Parliament can give the Russians a propaganda field day. The Soviet presentation of the visit by Mr Norman Atkinson MP and Mr James Lamond MP last September is a case in point. There is something to be said for exposing the Russians to a more representative sample of British political opinion, if this can be done in a suitably low key.

The answer may be to have at the appropriate time an informal visit to Moscow by a small but representative group of experienced Members of Parliament. Lord Carrington understands that Mr John Osborn MP, the Chairman of the Anglo-Soviet Parliamentary Group, has been giving some thought to the possibility of such a visit to Moscow and that the GB/USSR Association might be involved in the arrangements. He would have no objection to such a development, though the timing would obviously have to be considered with the situation in Poland in mind.

Scientific, educational and other exchanges with the Soviet Union have continued at a working level since Afghanistan. This is a wide field. The principal activities take place under inter-governmental agreements, but others are arranged privately. While the Soviet Ambassador's proposal lacks any sort of definition, his emphasis on science and research reflects a traditional Soviet concern to 'share experience' on a basis which the British participants have not always found well-balanced.

/The

The subject is one which the Soviet Embassy might reasonably be invited to take up with the FCO if they have new ideas to put forward.

Finally, Lord Carrington agrees with the Chief Whip that the Soviet Ambassador should regard the Anglo-Soviet Parliamentary Group as his base for contacts with prominent Conservative Members of Parliament. I am enclosing a list of members of the group.

I am sending copies of this letter to the recipients of yours.

Yours ever,

(F N Richards)
Private Secretary

D C R Heyhoe Esq
PS/Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster
Privy Council Office
Whitehall
London SW1

LIST OF MEMBERS OF THE ANGLO-SOVIET PARLIAMENTARY GROUP

John Osborn, M.P. Chairman	Member of Parliament for Sheffield Hallam (Con) since 1959. Steel Works Director. Member of Anglo-Soviet Parliamentary Group since 1972. Member European Parliament 1975-79. Member Council of Europe since 1979
Julius Silverman Vice Chairman	Member of Parliament for Birmingham Erdington (Lab) since 1974. Barrister (Gray's Inn 1931) Member Commons Expenditure Committee.
Renee Short Joint Secretary.	Member of Parliament for Wolverhampton North East (Lab) since 1964. Freelance Journalist. Vice Chairman Parliamentary East-West Trade Group. Chairman Anglo-G.D.R. Parliamentary Group . Member Labour National Executive Commitee Sponsored by T.G.W.O. N.U.T.
Kenneth Warren Joint Secretary.	Member of Parliament for Hastings (Con) since 1970. Aeronautical Engineer and Management Consultant. Parliamentary Private Secretary to Sir Keith Joseph (Secretary of State for Industry).
David Atkinson Treasurer	Member of Parliament for Bounemouth East (Con.) since 1977. Managing Director of a printing and marketing company. Parliamentary Private Secretary to the Minister of State for the Civil Service Department, The Rt. Hon. Paul Channon, M.P., Member of the Council of Europe since 1979.
Frank Allaun	Member of Parliament for Salford East (Lab) since 1955. Engineer, Shop Assistant, Lecturer, Accountant and Journalist. Former Chairman of the Labour Party.

William Benyon	Member of Parliament for Buckingham (Con) since 1970. Farmer. Governor Dominion Students' Hall Turst.
Lord Bethell	4th Baron of Romford (Nicholas). Member European Parliament since 1975. Elected London North West 1979. Freelance writer.
Eric Cockerham	Member of Parliament for Ludlow (Con) since May 1979. Chairman Menswear Business. Former Governor of the Board of United Liverpool Hospitals.
Michael English.	Member of Parliament for Nottingham East (Lab) since 1964. Sponsored by N.U.G.M.W. Member of Council of Get Britain out (of EEC) Campaign 1975.
Raymond Fletcher	Member of Parliament for Ilkeston (Lab) since 1964. Journalist and author. Labour Friends of Israel. UK representative North Atlantic Assembly. Sponsored by T.G.W.U.
Alistair Goodlad	Member of Parliament for Northwich (Con) since 1974. Director Bowater Overseas Holdings Limited.
Grenville Janner	Member of Parliament for Leicester West (Lab) since 1970. Writer and Lecturer. Member All Party Committee for the release of Soviet Jewry.
James Lamond	Member of Parliament for Oldham East (Lab) since 1970. Design Engineer. Sponsored by A.U.E.W.-T.A.S.S. Ex-Vice President World Peace Council.

Kenneth Lewis	Member of Parliament for Rutland and Stamford (Con) since 1959. Director Business and Holiday Travel Limited.
David Lombie	Member of Parliament for Ayrshire Central (Lab) since 1970. Former Teacher. Member Select Committee on Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration.
John Loveridge	Member of Parliament for Havering, Upminster (Con) since 1954. Principal St. Godric's College London and Farmer. Member Select Committee on Expenditure.
John Page	Member of Parliament for Harrow West (Con) since 1960. Chairman Council for Indpendant Education since 1974. Chairman 1970-74 Conservative Parliamentary Labour Affairs Committ. Chairman of the Inter-Parliamentary Union.
Clive Soley	Member of Parliament for Hammersmith (Lab) since 1979. Probation Officer. Hammersmith Councillor 1974-78. G.M.W.U.
Lord Taylor	of Gryfe (Thomas) Member Scottish Economic Council 1971-74. Chairman Economic Forestry Group since 1976. Director Scottish Civic Trust.
William Wilson	Member of Parliament for Coventry South East (Lab) since 1974. Senior Partner of firm of Solicitors. Member Select Committee on Race Relations and Immigration.
Alec Woodall	Member of Parliament for Hemsworth (Lab) since 1974. Colliery surface foreman. Sponsored by N.U.M.

12 DOWNING STREET,
S.W.1.

With

The Private Secretary's

Compliments

X references please

17/2/81

CONFIDENTIAL

Soviet Union

B/F with any comments from FCO

Government Chief Whip

12 Downing Street, London SW1

16 February 1981

The Chief Whip has seen a copy of Robin Birch's letter of 13 February enclosing a note of the discussion between the Chancellor of the Duchy and the Soviet Ambassador on 13 February.

attached

He has commented: "We must not be seen either in the Party or in the country to be giving a green light to Parliamentary visits. There is an Anglo-USSR group which is surely enough of a base for meeting prominent Conservatives."

I am sending copies of this letter to Michael Alexander (No 10), George Walden (FCO), Brian Norbury (MOD) and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

(M MACLEAN)

D Heyhoe Esq
Office of the Chancellor of
the Duchy of Lancaster
Privy Council Office
68 Whitehall
SW1

CONFIDENTIAL

610

with compliments

Private Secretary to

CHANCELLOR OF THE DUCHY OF LANCASTER

~~and MINISTER FOR THE ARTS~~

70 Whitehall London SW1A 2AT

Telephone 01-233-8294

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIVY COUNCIL OFFICE
WHITEHALL, LONDON SW1A 2AT

Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster

13th February 1981

Le Rt

Dear George,

As you may know, the Chancellor of the Duchy this morning received the Soviet Ambassador, Mr Popov, for a courtesy call. There was in the course of the meeting, which lasted for about three quarters of an hour, some substantive discussion on various issues and I thought that you would wish to have the enclosed note of the proceedings.

You will see that the Chancellor has undertaken to consider some requests by the Soviet Ambassador and he will be in touch with colleagues as appropriate about how he should respond.

I am sending copies of this letter and of the enclosure to Michael Alexander at 10 Downing Street, to Brian Norbury at the Ministry of Defence and Murdo Maclean at 12 Downing Street, also to David Wright, Cabinet Office.

Yours ever,

Robin

R A BIRCH

G G H Walden Esq
Private Secretary to
The Secretary of State
for Foreign and Commonwealth
Affairs
Whitehall
LONDON SW1

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NOTE OF DISCUSSION BETWEEN THE CHANCELLOR OF THE DUCHY OF LANCASTER AND THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR, 13 FEBRUARY 1981

PRESENT:

The Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster

The Soviet Ambassador, His Excellency V I Popov

In attendance:

Mr Muradian

Mr Birch

During a courtesy call by the Soviet Ambassador, the Chancellor referred to the cancellation of a talk which he had intended to have with Mr Popov's predecessor: this had been called off because of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. While he did not wish to cross lines with any Ministerial colleagues, he felt bound to say that in his opinion the Soviet Government showed no sign of ever intending to retreat from Afghanistan.

In reply, the Ambassador said that the decision of the Soviet Government in respect of Afghanistan had not been easy. Three successive Afghan governments had however appealed for help and no other decision than that taken was possible in view of the treaty between the USSR and Afghanistan. Now the Soviet Government's concern was with the present situation and they did not wish to keep their forces in Afghanistan once the reason for doing so - the threat to Afghanistan - had disappeared. His Government had proposed a political solution last year, and when the situation began to improve they had withdrawn part of their forces.

Contd .....

Some observers held that arms were being supplied to the Afghan rebels to assist them, and the longer this continued the more a withdrawal would be delayed. Others said that a million refugees had fled the country but many had done so under duress. Already 200,000 had returned and others would do so. It was natural that some refugees would be afraid to return because of military activity on the border with Pakistan. It was important to obtain a political resolution of the tension on the borders with both Pakistan and Iran. He noted that Pakistan had started talks with Afghanistan but had then stopped them probably under external influence. The Afghan Government was sovereign and had responsibility to decide the issue. It was unrealistic to imply that anyone else could solve the issue.

The Chancellor thanked the Ambassador for his exposition but noted that not only the British but other Governments had a different perception of what had happened. Events had put a strain on Soviet-British relations and he hoped that no further strains would occur. He was not aware of any action by the British Government which placed a strain on the Soviet Government or was a source of any disagreement.

The Ambassador said that he was under instructions to promote good relations between the USSR and the UK but there were certain obstacles. It would be desirable to have more bilateral contacts. The Soviet Government had developed good relations with France, Germany and Italy, and as a result there were quite frequent contacts between Parliamentarians of their respective countries. Similarly, exchange visits with the USA occurred at this level. Such exchanges with the UK had not taken place for some time and this impeded better mutual understanding. Also there should be better relations at the level of commercial and financial dealings. He noted in reply to an inquiry by the Chancellor, that the last visit to this country by the Soviet Foreign

Contd .....

Minister had been in March 1976, and by the British Foreign Secretary (Dr Owen) in 1977. The Ambassador said that it was important for him to understand the current position in this country and he expressed interest in the ideas in the Chancellor's recent speech.

The Chancellor said that the speech stood on its own irrespective of the comments which had been made on it. It explained and restated the objectives of the Government and referred to the depth of the world recession which had affected Britain badly and set back the achievement of the Government's plans. When the recession ended we were well placed to take advantage of the improved economic situation. Unemployment was not peculiar to the UK but was serious in many other countries and worse in some. It was an unwelcome but inevitable consequence of the recession and had been made worse by the steep rise in the price of energy. The Government were however confident that they would come through the crisis and they had widespread support in pursuing this objective. It would take longer than had been expected for the Government to achieve its aims and meanwhile adjustments were needed in tactics and timing to help the people and industry through the present difficulties. He promised to send the Ambassador the text of the speech.

In reply to a question by the Ambassador, the Chancellor said that the Government had never claimed that their policy could bring results in less than ten years although they expected to make a significant start on fundamental changes within the lifetime of the present Parliament. They knew now that at least one more very difficult year lay ahead.

In conclusion the Ambassador asked two questions:

(i) What would be the possibility of developing exchanges of visits between Parliamentarians

Contd .....

of the two countries or at the level of scientific and research co-operation?

(ii) Could the Chancellor advise the Ambassador whom he would be well advised to meet among experienced and knowledgeable members of the Conservative Party?

In reply the Chancellor said that he would consider the points put to him by the Ambassador but he did not know if Members of Parliament would necessarily think that this was the right time for exchange visits. He would consider with his colleagues the names of contacts with whom the Ambassador might wish to have further discussions. In conclusion he expressed the hope that improved relations between the two countries would continue to develop and hoped that no further strain would be placed on the West by any events in Eastern Europe or elsewhere.

The meeting ended with mutual expressions of thanks.

RAB

R. A. B.
13 February 1981

File

DSG

Soviet

Union

20 October 1980

The Prime Minister has seen your letter to me of 17 October and has agreed to receive the Soviet Ambassador if he seeks a farewell call.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

Michael Arthur, Esq.,
Lord Privy Seal's Office.

MPCM

Prime Minister
Agree to see Lunkov if he asks for a farewell call?
Yes
MAP 17/X

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1A 2AH

17 October 1980

Dear Michael

The Soviet Ambassador called on the Lord Privy Seal on 13 October to say that he would shortly be leaving London on transfer to another (unspecified) European capital. He has been here over seven years. He thought that his date of departure might be 10 or 11 November. The Soviet Government are proposing that he be succeeded by Victor Ivanovich Popov, at present Rector of the Soviet Foreign Ministry's Diplomatic Academy. This is under consideration.

Although he did not mention the matter on 13 October, it seems possible that Mr Lunkov will seek a farewell call on the Prime Minister. If so, the Lord Privy Seal's advice would be that the Prime Minister should agree to see Mr Lunkov if she can - this will ensure that he returns to Moscow with a clear message given to him at the highest level about our view of Anglo-Soviet and East-West relations. We are planning that Lord Carrington or Sir Ian Gilmour should also see Mr Lunkov before he leaves. It is the tradition that an FCO Minister should host a farewell lunch, but the objective would be to get across points of substance.

Mr Lunkov may also seek calls on Ministers in other departments. If he does, Sir Ian Gilmour's view is that it would be appropriate for Mr Lunkov to be received by the Minister for Trade as British Co-chairman of the Anglo-Soviet Joint Commission, but that there should be no need for him to be seen by other Ministers whose departments do not have substantial dealing with the Soviet Embassy.

/I am

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street

I am sending copies of this letter to the Private Secretaries to the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Secretaries of State for Trade, the Environment, Social Services, Energy, and Agriculture, Fisheries and Food.

Yours ever

Michael Arthur

M A Arthur
Private Secretary to the
Lord Privy Seal

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Soviet Union.

RECORD OF A MEETING BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR, MR. N.M. LUNKOV AT 10 DOWNING STREET ON THURSDAY, 3 JANUARY 1980 AT 1500 HOURS

Original filed on Internal Situation Afghanistan Dec 79.

Present:-

Prime Minister — H,E. Mr. N.M. Lunkov

Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary

Mr. M.O'D.B. Alexander — Mr. N.N. Ouspenski

* * * *

After Mr. Lunkov had completed reading the message from President Brezhnev which he was delivering, the Prime Minister asked him about the "acts of external aggression" referred to in the message. She was aware of none. The Soviet Union constantly asserted in recent days that there had been external intervention or aggression but she could find no evidence of this. The only aggression of which the British Government was aware was that carried out by Soviet forces. The Prime Minister also enquired about the request which, according to the message, had been addressed to the Soviet Government by the Government of Afghanistan on 26 December. So far as she was aware President Amin had still been in power then. Had the invitation to the Soviet Government come from President Amin? Mr. Lunkov said that information from the Afghan authorities confirmed that internal counter-revolutionaries in Afghanistan had been receiving unlimited support from external sources. The support included weapons, equipment and money and the sources included the United States, China, Pakistan, Egypt and other countries. Scores of centres for subversives had been set up in Pakistan. They were disguised as refugee camps. Armed formations had been prepared for despatch into Afghanistan in these centres and had returned to them for recuperation. Among the instructors in the camps were members of the CIA, and specialists in subversion from China and Egypt. The United States had sought the agreement of

CONFIDENTIAL /the Pakistan

the Pakistan Government to an expansion of its activities. A good deal of evidence about these activities had appeared in the British media. There were relevant articles in The Times and Telegraph of the previous day. In an interview with Mr. Peter Sissons on New Year's Eve, the Chinese Ambassador had practically admitted that his Government was interferring in Afghanistan.

The Prime Minister said that even supposing subversive activity was taking place in a country this did not justify others in intervening. After all the Soviet Union itself was responsible for subversive activity in many countries. Such activity should be dealt with by the existing authorities in the countries affected. The Prime Minister noted the sequence of coups in Afghanistan involving Messrs Daud, Tarakki and Amin and repeated her question about the timing of the request from the Afghan Government to the Soviet Government for help. Mr. Lunkov said that the Soviet Government had had nothing to do with the coups in Afghanistan. He could only repeat what was said in President Brezhnev's letter. The Prime Minister said that it was remarkable that the Soviet intervention had begun while President Amin was still in power but that within a few hours of the arrival of the Soviet troops, President Amin had been shot and a man who was not even in the country at the time of the intervention placed in power. She could only assume that the new President was not the choice of the Afghan people but had been placed in power by the Soviet Army and was being kept there by 50,000 troops. Mr. Lunkov replied that following President Tarakki's assumption of power in the spring of 1979, the Afghan authorities had warned the world about external intrusions into the country and asked that assistance should not be given to those responsible.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that as he understood the position, President Amin had outraged the Muslims to the point where they had taken up arms against him. The opposition was internal. As a result President Amin had appealed to the Soviet Government. But no sooner had Soviet forces arrived than they had shot President Amin. Mr. Lunkov disclaimed any knowledge of these events. They were internal Afghan matters with which the Soviet

 /Government had

Government had nothing to do. The Soviet forces were limited in scale and had been sent purely to repel incursions. They had met no opposition within Afghanistan. On the contrary, some very influential Muslims had welcomed them. Their presence was entirely in accord with the Afghan/Soviet Friendship Treaty. Once a request for help had been made under that Treaty, the Soviet Government could not have rejected it. In any case the Soviet Government had a very long frontier in common with Afghanistan and could not be indifferent to what was happening there. Afghanistan might in some circumstances open a bridgehead for intervention in the Soviet Union. The Prime Minister interjected that this last point was the real reason for the Soviet Government's action.

Mr. Lunkov said that many other Governments had troops from the United States on their soil. When the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary observed that this was condemned by the Soviet Government, Mr. Lunkov replied that this depended on whether or not the forces in question were present by invitation. Soviet troops had been invited to enter Afghanistan. The Prime Minister said that this was not the case. Soviet troops had marched with the intention of annexing Afghanistan and turning it, in due course, into a buffer state. President Karmal was a puppet and a considerable military presence would be required to keep him in power. There would probably be continuing trouble from the Muslim population. If the Soviet Union's own claims were justified, Soviet forces could presumably leave Afghanistan within days. Mr. Lunkov agreed but declined to be drawn further when asked for a precise estimate of the length of time Soviet forces would remain in the country.

The Prime Minister said that this was the first time that the Soviet troops had entered a genuinely independent country. While their intervention in Hungary and Czechoslovakia had been appalling, it had been recognised that those countries were in the Soviet Union's sphere of influence. But heretofore Afghanistan had been regarded as a country which was free to choose its own destiny.

/Now it

Now it was occupied by 40,000 or 50,000 Soviet soldiers. Mr. Lunkov said that he was unable to confirm the number of Soviet troops in Afghanistan. This was a matter for the Soviet and Afghan Governments alone. He asked the Prime Minister to look beyond the text of President Brezhnev's message and to recognise that if stability in the region were to be preserved, the Governments concerned would need to display qualities of soberness, equanimity and commonsense.

The Prime Minister said that the British Government had all these qualities but this did not diminish the gravity of the situation that had been created. There were many Governments in the world of which she did not approve but she did not attempt to use armed force to change them. There was only one large imperialist and expansionist power left in the world today. This was the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union was engaged in annexing territory and using its undoubted military power to impose a Government of its own choosing. This was the first time since the war that the Soviet Government had taken such action. Although the Soviet Government had used proxies and surrogates elsewere e.g. the East Germans in South Yemen, and the Cubans in Angola and Ethiopia, their action in Afghanistan was something new. The Soviet Government should not be surprised that Western Governments regarded the situation as grave. Fresh light had been cast on the motives for the Soviet Government's enormous military expenditure. Nonetheless, the Prime Minister said that she was hopeful the Soviet Government would agree to withdraw from Afghanistan.

Mr. Lunkov said that the Soviet Government categorically rejected the Prime Minister's allegations about the situation in Afghanistan. He asked why the British Government pretended it knew better than the Soviet Government about the situation in the country. The Prime Minister said that the presence of massive Soviet forces and of a new Head of Government who required their presence to retain his office was obvious enough. Nonetheless it was of great importance for relations between the Warsaw Pact and the North Atlantic Alliance that the troops should be withdrawn

/soon. Their

soon. Their presence could only cause great alarm. She accepted that the Soviet Government was entitled to take measures to defend itself. So was the West. Both sides should be prepared to negotiate from positions of equal strength and to reduce that strength step by step. On that basis she was anxious to see as many contacts as possible between East and West. But recent events in Afghanistan cast doubts on the Soviet Government's motives and in the whole field of East/West relations.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary asked about the implications of the statement in President Brezhnev's message that Britain "could do something if it so wished" about the ending of armed invasions of the territory of Afghanistan. Did this mean that the British Government were being accused of involvement in these invasions. Mr. Lunkov said that President Brezhnev was seeking stability and peaceful co-operation in the region. The message invited the British Government to appeal to those who were seeking to overthrow the new regime to desist from their efforts. Despite what had been said in the Press, Mr. Lunkov was aware of no Soviet Government statement accusing Britain of involvement. Of course there had been some reports from Afghanistan of such involvement: the British Government would know best what weight to give these. The Prime Minister said that the British Government had not been involved in any way in activities of the kind referred to. Mr. Lunkov said that this was a very important statement. The Prime Minister concluded the conversation by repeating her hope that Soviet troops would leave Afghanistan very soon. The Afghan people must be free to choose their own Government. Mr. Lunkov said that he agreed.

The discussion ended at 1540 hours.

CC
Soviet Union, Sept 79
Call by Soviet
Ambassador

Top Copy: Defence, ~~FCO~~ Mar 79, TNF
~~CTB, SACT~~
~~MBFR~~

Soviet Union

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

15 October 1979

Dear George,

Soviet Ambassador's Call

The Soviet Ambassador called on the Prime Minister at 1630 this afternoon at his own request. He was accompanied by Mr. N.N. Ouspenski.

The purpose of Mr. Lunkov's call was to deliver a message to the Prime Minister from Mr. Brezhnev. I enclose a copy of the original together with a copy of the (rather indifferent) unofficial translation prepared by the Soviet Embassy.

Mr. Lunkov began the conversation by precising at some length Mr. Brezhnev's message. In reply the Prime Minister asked Mr. Lunkov to convey her thanks to President Brezhnev for the message. She reminded Mr. Lunkov of her conversation at Moscow Airport with Mr. Kosygin when she had said that it was best for talks between Governments to be conducted on the basis of facts rather than of claims and assertions. As a result of satellite photography both sides knew a great deal about each others capabilities. We knew that the SS20 was a highly sophisticated modern weapon. It had three warheads and its accuracy was much greater than that of the preceding weapons system. It was targeted on Western Europe. Mr. Kosygin would be aware that the Prime Minister would not be taken in by claims that the military capability of the Soviet Union was not being improved or that it was for purely defensive purposes.

Turning to the general question of the nuclear balance, the Prime Minister said that who ever initiated a nuclear exchange would be responsible for bringing civilisation to a end. She did not know what view might be taken in the Soviet Union, but her own view was that no-one would survive a nuclear war. Nuclear weapons were not intended to be used: they were intended to deter. To achieve this end each side needed to deploy an equivalent capability at every level. It was likely that because of the deployment of the SS20 and the Backfire bomber a gap was opening up at the theatre nuclear force level. Since the Soviet Union had deployed these new weapons systems, it was essential for the West to put something equivalent into the field.

/At this point

At this point in the conversation Mr. Lunkov read an extract from an article in today's Manchester Guardian by Mary Kaldor. This claimed that it could be argued that it was the West which, by deploying cruise missiles and Pershing II, was introducing a new element in the East/West balance. The Prime Minister replied that this was "poppycock". The SS20 was a highly effective new system. Since it was being deployed, the West had no option but to try to catch up. If the Soviet Union cared to destroy its SS20 missiles and the Backfire bomber there would be no need for the West to catch up. Mr. Lunkov claimed that even Western experts recognised the existence of a balance between the two sides in nuclear weapons. The Prime Minister rejected the assertion and repeated that the Soviet weapons systems were new, sophisticated and of high quality. She had told Mr. Kosygin that he should not be too modest about Soviet military technology. Deterrence came through strength. The SS20 and the Backfire bomber were strong: the West would have to deploy equal strength.

Mr. Lunkov asked what could be done to stop the process of response and counter-response. The Prime Minister said that both sides would have to reduce together on a basis of confidence and of certain knowledge of the other side's capabilities.

The Prime Minister said that she would study Mr. Brezhnev's message in detail and, having done so, would consider the question of a reply. It might be that the Alliance would reply as a whole to Mr. Brezhnev's speech but it was possible that she would reply directly herself. If she were to do so, she hoped that Mr. Brezhnev would receive Sir Curtis Keeble as rapidly as she had agreed to receive Mr. Lunkov. Mr. Lunkov did not react to this point.

As Mr. Lunkov was taking leave of the Prime Minister, he raised the question of Chairman Hua's visit. He said that the Soviet Government regarded it as perfectly reasonable for the UK to develop their relations with the Chinese Government but that he hoped this would not be on an anti-Soviet basis. The Prime Minister said that the development of Anglo/Chinese relations need cause concern to no-one.

I am sending copies of this letter and its second enclosure to Brian Norbury (Ministry of Defence) and Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever

Michael Alexander

G.G.H. Walden, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

unofficial translation

T119/79T

Dear Mrs. Prime Minister,

I am sending You this letter in order to draw your attention to the questions of military detente and limitation of armaments in Europe.

I would like to summarise briefly the substance of our ideas and proposals on these questions laid down in my speach in Berlin on 6 October a.c.

1. The allegations that are disseminated in the West to the effect that the Soviet Union is building up its military strength on the European continent over and above its defence requirements have nothing in common with reality. They could not be regarded otherwise than an intention to cover up the development, adoption and carrying out the plans to deploy the new types of American nuclear missile weapons in Western Europe. In other words they have an end to break the balance of forces existing in Europe, to try to give military superiority to NATO.

One can say in advance that these attempts would hardly be successful. The Soviet Union and its allies would have to make the necessary additional steps to strengthen their security. No other option would be left for them.

It is quite clear however that the fulfilment of the mentioned plans by the NATO countries would inevitably lead to the aggravation of the situation in Europe and would to a great extent contaminate the international atmosphere as a whole.

I would like to express the hope, Mrs. Prime Minister, that your Government and You personally will consider over and over again all the aspects of this problem, will assess thoroughly the consequences hidden in the deployment on the territory of your country of new types of American nuclear missile weapons aimed at the USSR and its allies.

As for the Soviet Union, I have already repeatedly said and would like to say it again to You personally: we do not seek military superiority; we have never threatened and do not intend to threaten anybody. Our strategic doctrine is purely defensive in nature.

I also confirm again that the Soviet Union will never use nuclear arms against those states that renounce the production and acquisition of such arms and do not have them on their territory.

2. As I have most definitely stated in Berlin, the number of medium-range carriers of nuclear arms on the territory of the European part of the Soviet Union has not been increased by a single missile, by a single plane during the past ten years. On the contrary the number of launchers of medium-range missiles and also the yeild of the nuclear charges of these missiles have even been somewhat reduced. The number of medium-range bombers, too, has diminished. As for the territory of other states the Soviet Union does not deploy such means there at all. Already for a number of years now we have not been increasing the number of our armed forces stationed in Central Europe either. Those are indisputable facts, Mrs. Prime Minister, and I am sure that they are well known to the appropriate bodies in your country.

Moreover, we are prepared to reduce the number of medium-range nuclear weapons deployed in western areas of the Soviet Union as compared with the present level but, of course, only in the event of no additional medium-range nuclear weapons being deployed in Western Europe.

As is known,important talks on SALT-3 are impending. We are in favour of starting them immediately after the entry into force of the SALT-2 Treaty. Within the framework of these talks we agree to discuss the possibilities of limiting not only inter-continental but also other types of armaments, naturally, with due regard to all relevant factors and with strict observance of the principles of the equal security of the parties.

3. The Soviet Union motivated by a sincere desire to extricate from a blind alley the efforts made over many years to achieve military détente in Europe, to set an example of the transition from words to actual deeds, have decided, in agreement

with the leadership of the GDR and after consultations with other member-states of the Warsaw Treaty, unilaterally to reduce the number of Soviet troops in Central Europe. Up to 20,000 Soviet servicemen, a thousand tanks and also a certain amount of other military hardware will be withdrawn from the territory of the German Democratic Republic in the course of the next twelve months.

We hope that this new concrete manifestation of the peaceableness and good will of the Soviet Union and its allies will be duly assessed by the governments of countries-members of NATO and that they will follow our example.

4. Being in favour of a further strengthening of trust among states we are prepared in particular to reach agreement that prior notifications about big exercises of ground forces envisaged by the Helsinki Final Act, be made not three weeks but one month in advance and not from the level of 25,000 men as it is the case now but, say, from the level of 20,000 men. We are also prepared, on the basis of reciprocity, not to conduct military exercises involving more than 40,000-50,000 men. Besides that, we propose to notify timely not only about military exercises but also about movements of ground forces numbering more than 20,000 men in the area defined by the Helsinki Final Act.

I think, Mrs. Prime Minister, that the essence of the new initiatives, taken by the Soviet Union in consultation with other member-states of the Warsaw Treaty, speaks for itself. I would emphasize only one point - all of them are motivated by our desire to strengthen peace and security in Europe by supplementing political detente with measures of military detente, including the measures of concrete reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe.

Naturally, all the proposals made earlier by member-states of the Warsaw Treaty, remain in force, including those concerning the conclusion among all participants of the All-European conference of a treaty on the non-first use of both nuclear and conventional arms; the non-expansion of military political groupings in Europe; the notifications about major air force exercises and naval exercises staged near the territorial waters

of other states-participants in the All-European conference; the extention of the confidence - building measures to the region of the Mediterranean.

On our part we shall be prepared to consider other proposals aimed at strengthening trust among states and lessening the danger of war in Europe.

These are the considerations about military detente and arms limitation in Europe, which I and my colleagues wanted to bring to your attention, Mrs. Prime Minister. I shall be glad to receive, if possible, an early reply from You on the matters raised by me.

Yours sincerely,

L.Brezhnev

14 October 1979

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.
Prime Minister of Great Britain

CONFIDENTIAL

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

15 October 1979

Dear Michael,

Call on the Prime Minister by the Soviet Ambassador

I enclose a brief on President Brezhnev's recent speech in Berlin for the Prime Minister when she sees the Soviet Ambassador at 4pm today.

This sets out a number of questions of clarification which the Prime Minister may wish to ask. As the Alliance is still considering the details of what President Brezhnev said and as there is general agreement that any reaction should be made by the Alliance as a whole in the appropriate fora, the questions we suggest are mainly factual. In particular we have avoided questions of substance on the reduction of medium range nuclear weapons and SALT III. These are still very much live issues in the Alliance and it may suit our purpose not to clarify the Soviet position on them. On these points, and indeed on the speech as a whole, we judge it right to avoid appearing to be too interested in what President Brezhnev had to say.

I am sending a copy of this letter and its enclosure to Brian Norbury (MOD) and Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever

(G G H Walden)

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR:
BREZHNEV'S BERLIN SPEECH

POINTS TO MAKE

1. The NATO Alliance is currently studying the Brezhnev speech. Any response will be made by the Alliance as a whole in the appropriate fora.

TNF

2. What is meant by "the European/part of the Soviet Union" [or "Western"]? Why did President Brezhnev not mention medium range systems east of the Urals which can be targeted on Western Euroope?

3. Why did President Brezhnev not discuss the increasing Soviet medium range nuclear capabilities (i.e. SS 20 has 3 warheads, is mobile and is much more accurate than earlier systems)?

4. What is meant by the section in the speech where President Brezhnev says, "It is clear that [if TNF modernisation goes ahead] the position of the FRG itself would considerably worsen"? How does this threatening language relate to the rest of the message?

Force reductions

5. How does the reduction of 20 thousand troops and a thousand tanks relate to the MBFR negotiations and in particular to the resolution of the data question?

6. What does "up to 20,000 Soviet servicemen" mean?

7. Where will the troops and tanks be withdrawn to? Will the troops be in formed units, and what kind of tanks will be withdrawn?

8. Will the post-reduction level of troops be taken as a ceiling for the future?

/Confidence

Confidence Building Measures (CBMs)

9. President Brezhnev stated that a European conference on military detente is "a very pressing task". How would this relate to the Madrid CSCE Review Conference next year at which CBMs are bound to be discussed?

CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER BY THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR

BACKGROUND

1. A copy of the speech is attached.

2. Mr Brezhnev said that the Soviet Union had decided to reduce unilaterally the number of Soviet troops in Central Europe. Up to "20,000 Soviet servicemen and 1,000 tanks" and a certain amount of other military hardware would be withdrawn from the GDR in the next 12 months.

3. On TNF, Brezhnev said "We are prepared to reduce the number of medium range nuclear weapons deployed in Western areas of the Soviet Union as compared to the present level but, of course, only if no additional medium range nuclear weapons are deployed in Western Europe". Later in the speech Brezhnev said that the Soviet Union agreed to discuss possibilities of limiting not only ICBMs but also other types of armaments in the framework of SALT III.

4. The speech was cleverly timed both to complicate NATO's decisions on TNF modernisation and to present a peaceful Soviet image at a crucial stage of the SALT II ratification debate in the United States. The Russians clearly hope to strengthen opposition to the basing of US-owned TNF in the Netherlands, Belgium, the FRG, Italy and the UK by offering the prospect of arms control negotiations as an alternative. The proposed troop and tank reductions seem intended to counter Western anxiety about the Soviet military build-up and to strengthen the impression that TNF modernisation will be contrary to the spirit of detente.

4. Mr Brezhnev claimed that the <u>number</u> of long range theatre missiles and aircraft stationed in the Western part of the Soviet Union had been reduced in the last 10 years. But Soviet <u>capabilities</u> in terms of accuracy, mobility, penetration and target coverage have increased substantially. Moreover, a number of Soviet missiles is now targeted on Western Europe from points east of the Urals. As Soviet systems have been modernised and up-graded, Western

/systems

systems have become increasingly obsolescent and vulnerable.

5. The Soviet troop reductions are not numerically significant. We are convinced that the Warsaw Pact has a superiority of about 160,000 ground troops in the MBFR area. (The discrepancy between the Western assessment of Warsaw Pact force levels in the area and the levels admitted by the Warsaw Pact is 155,000.)

6. There are 7,670 Soviet tanks in East Germany, 9,840 Soviet tanks in the MBFR reduction zone and 16,800 Warsaw Pact tanks in that zone. NATO has 6,500 tanks in that zone.

Defence Department
Foreign & Commonwealth Office
15 October 1979

Soviet Union

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

21 September 1979

Dear Michael,

Thank you for your letter of 18 September about the telephone call to you on that day from Mr Dolgov of the Soviet Embassy.

On his return from past visits to Moscow, Mr Lunkov has frequently asked to see the Prime Minister. But meetings with the Ambassador are not likely to be fruitful unless there is a specific subject to discuss. Lord Carrington agrees that there is no reason to recommend to the Prime Minister that she should receive Mr Lunkov at present.

Yours ever

Paul

(P Lever)

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

18 September 1979

If only as an example of the dog that did not bark, or at least that has not barked yet, you may wish to know that the Counsellor of the Soviet Embassy, Mr. Dolgov, rang me this morning to say that his Ambassador had just returned from Moscow where he had "seen members of the Soviet leadership". He had been asked to convey to the Prime Minister Premier Kosygin's warm regards and best wishes. Mr. Dolgov concluded by saying that his Ambassador was available to call on the Prime Minister at any time.

Mr. Dolgov did not offer any specific reason why the Prime Minister should see the Soviet Ambassador, and, subject to your views, I do not propose to recommend to the Prime Minister that she should take up the offer of a meeting with Mr. Lunkov at present.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

G. G. H. Walden, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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PRIME MINISTER

Ly. 19/9

The Counsellor at the Soviet Embassy rang this morning to say that his Ambassador had just returned from Moscow and had been instructed to convey to you the best wishes and warm regards of Premier Kosygin.

Mr. Dolgov said that his Ambassador was holding himself in readiness to call on you at any time. However, Mr. Dolgov did not say that Mr. Lunkov had any specific matter to raise with you and I do not imagine that you would wish to see him simply to have a general talk.

The relatively friendly tone of Mr. Dolgov's call is of some interest in the context of Mr. Pattie's attendance at the Katyn Memorial Service on Saturday. At the least it would seem to indicate that any protest which is made in the next few days will not be allowed to affect the general tenor of Anglo-Soviet relations. (You will have seen in the Press that ~~the~~ Polish dissidents have accused the Soviet Government of responsibility for the death of up to half a million Poles between 1939 and 1941. This makes it, in my view, even more likely that the Soviet and Polish Governments will feel impelled to react to Mr. Pattie's attendance).

18 September 1979