PREM 19/3592

SECRET.

Confidential filing.

... by Mr. Mugabe, Prime Minister of ...
... Zimbabwe, to the UK.

ZIMBABWE.

May 1980.

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
9.5.80.		19.4.88					
27.8.80		26.4.88					
24.9.80.		15.9.88					
12.12.80		23.9.88					
16.3.81		30.9.88					
24.2.82		1.10.88 PA					
22.12.81		8.3.89					
5.1.82		23.5.91					
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24.6.87							
28.6.88.							

Series closed

PREM 19/3592

SUBJECT
MASTER
OPS
FILED ON:

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

22 August 1991

Dear Mr. President,

Thank you for your kind letter of 22 July. I very much enjoyed meeting you in London on 23 May and was gratified to find that on many of the issues we discussed our views were close.

Douglas Hurd is looking forward to taking the dialogue further when he meets you in Harare on 9 September. And we will of course have the chance to talk personally during the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting in October. I very much look forward to that.

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No T220/91

Yours sincerely,
John Major

The Honourable Robert G. Mugabe

010

RESTRICTED

Foreign &
Commonwealth
Office

London SW1A 2AH

From The Minister of State

16 August 1991

J S Wall Esq CMG LVO
10 Downing Street
LONDON SW1A 2AA

Dear Stephen

PRESIDENT MUGABE'S LETTER OF 22 JULY TO THE PRIME MINISTER

Christopher Prentice forwarded to you on 8 August the original of a letter from President Mugabe to the Prime Minister (further copy enclosed), and promised a draft reply soon, which I now enclose.

...

President Mugabe's remarks on sanctions against South Africa raise no new points. The Prime Minister deployed our arguments comprehensively in May, and there is nothing to be gained from debating the point with Mugabe by letter. The draft reply therefore sticks to courtesies, apart from looking forward to the Foreign Secretary's visit to Harare on 9 and 10 September (when he is due to see Mugabe).

Yours Ever
John

John Duncan
Acting Private Secretary

RESTRICTED

Foreign &
Commonwealth
Office

London SW1A 2AH

8 August 1991

Prime Minister

Dear Stephen, (or)

Highlights, in particular.

Letter from President Mugabe

Stephen

The enclosed letter from President Mugabe to the Prime Minister was passed to the FCO by the Zimbabwe High Commissioner in London on 5 August.

14/8

The letter is largely a message of thanks for President Mugabe's reception in London in May. He recalls the main topics of conversation, ie aid and South Africa, and reiterates his position on both without making any specific request or suggestion to the Prime Minister.

I will send shortly a draft reply from the Prime Minister.

Yours ever,

Christopher Prentice.

(C N R Prentice)
Private Secretary

J S Wall Esq
10 Downing Street

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T199A/91

SUBJECT
MASTER
OPS
FILED ON:

President
State House
Harare

22nd July, 1991.

Dear Prime Minister,

I write to express my profound gratitude to you for the opportunity you afforded me on 23rd May, 1991, to meet and share ideas with you, firstly, on our close bilateral relations and, secondly, on issues of regional and international interest. I, naturally, look forward to the continuation in future of the dialogue we have begun. No doubt, both of us must be looking forward with tremendous interest to CHOGM and the great opportunity it will offer us and other Commonwealth Heads of State or Government for a wider exchange of views on quite a broad range of issues of interest and concern to all members of the Commonwealth.

The Right Honourable Mr J. Major,

Prime Minister of the United Kingdom,

LONDON,

England.

.../2

May I express my appreciation for the responsive manner in which you listened to those issues I had to present to you relating to our current economic reform programme and the structural adjustment strategy within it. As you will recall, I emphasized the need, on the part of Britain, to accord Zimbabwe preferential treatment, not only because it is a recently decolonised and, therefore, young and most needy State, but also because of the multiracial nature of its society and the demanding needs of that society.

I was glad to discover that our views on South Africa do not differ in any significant way, as both of us are agreed that, whilst commendable steps have been taken by President F. de Klerk to create a political environment more conducive to peaceful negotiations, much more remains to be done to bring about a democratic society in South Africa. It is in this regard that pressures of various forms, including sanctions, must continue to be applied until multi-party negotiations on a new political and constitutional dispensation have reached "an irreversible stage".

.../3

The recent visit to my country by Mrs Lynda Chalker offered us another welcome opportunity for yet another round of useful discussions. I am sure she has since reported to you her impressions of the visit. I trust our Governments shall continue to relate to each other in a more positive and meaningful way in the future.

Kind regards and best wishes for your good health.

Yours sincerely,

R. G. Mugabe.

PRESIDENT
22 JUL 1991
ZIMBABWE

R.G. MUGABE

PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF ZIMBABWE

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SUBJECT cc MASTER

RO
KW/SM
cc FC
PB

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

23 May 1991

Dear Sima,

ZIMBABWE: VISIT OF PRESIDENT MUGABE: 23 MAY 1991

Thank you for your letter of 22 May and for the briefing for the Prime Minister's lunch with President Mugabe. Attendance was as listed in your letter.

The meeting went well. President Mugabe was in lively but non combative form and there was a surprising meeting of minds, even on elements of the situation in South Africa, though Kieran Prendergast warns that President Mugabe will probably not follow through.

The main points were as follows.

President Mengistu

President Mugabe said that he had only heard of Mengistu's arrival as he was leaving for Europe and he had not therefore seen him. He would, however, be welcome and Mugabe would sit down with him on his return to discuss his future plans. President Mugabe denied that Mengistu or his family owned a farm in Zimbabwe, as had been reported in Britain, though two of his children were being educated there.

CHOGM/SOUTH AFRICA

The Prime Minister asked what President Mugabe saw as the main themes. The President said that there would be the usual global review and discussion of technical and cultural cooperation. The meeting would review the situation in South Africa and would no doubt receive a report from the high level appraisal group.

The Prime Minister regretted the violence in South Africa, particularly at a time when progress had been made and when there was a glittering prize to be had. He described his own contacts with President de Klerk and Mr Mandela. He would keep in touch with Mr Mandela. A conference on the future constitution of South Africa was the best way of dealing with impediments in the way of the progress we all wanted to see. To place impediments in the way of a conference was to risk getting nowhere. President Mugabe said that in his own dealings with the Rhodesian authorities he had avoided getting into the question of detainees

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etc and had concentrated on the greater constitutional question to which the other questions were subordinate. He could, however, imagine that, after nearly 30 years in prison, Mandela was moved by the plight of his colleagues who were left behind in prison. But he thought he should get down to business.

The Foreign Secretary commented on the lack of a popular front in South Africa by contrast with the Patriotic Front in Rhodesia. President Mugabe said that such a course was still open to the ANC and the other parties in South Africa - though Inkatha had a different stance. He did not think it realistic to expect all those whom the South African Government saw as their opponents to be released straightaway.

The Prime Minister saw a real danger to de Klerk from the right wing. It was important that de Klerk should show results. Hence the importance of talks. He could understand the strand of opinion within the ANC which opposed talks, but he hoped that Mr Mandela would have the support of his friends in South Africa in continuing the process. Once again citing his own experience, President Mugabe said that it would be a mistake for Mr Mandela to take account of all strands of opinion within his movement.

The Prime Minister asked what President Mugabe thought <u>would</u> happen in South Africa over the next few months as opposed to his views on what <u>should</u> happen. President Mugabe said he hoped negotiations would start. The parties could not avoid them. He hoped for some reconciliation between the ANC and the Inkatha. At a recent meeting in Lusaka he had urged that course. Inkatha and the ANC disagreed about the future constitution of South Africa but they should identify their common goals. There was disagreement on the protection of minorities but the ANC did not itself have a clear view of that yet. In reply to a question from the Prime Minister, President Mugabe said he did not think the fate of Mrs Mandela would impinge much on the negotiating process.

The Foreign Secretary said that the ANC had made a mistake in asking for the dismissal of South African ministers but they had basically won on their other demands. President Mugabe commented that the ANC had said that apartheid could not be reformed and must be replaced. Why then were they trying to reform it by demanding the sacking of ministers? He had refused to have any dealings with the Rhodesian regime. Nonetheless, he recognised that the ANC did have to negotiate with the South African Government.

The Prime Minister referred to the helpful role which the ANC were playing on sporting links with South Africa and asked President Mugabe what progress he expected before CHOGM. The President was obviously rather unsighted on this issue and talked about the Commonwealth taking its cue from the International Olympic Committee. He added that perhaps the Commonwealth should survey the situation and satisfy itself that there were no apartheid practices in South Africa. The Prime Minister acknowledged that there was an argument within the Commonwealth as to whether sporting contacts should be resumed sport by sport

or only when all were integrated. The ANC seemed to be favouring the sport by sport approach. President Mugabe commented that Zimbabwe's role in South Africa's admission to the ICC would depend on the effects and extent of integration.

Later in the conversation, the Prime Minister raised South Africa again, saying that there was a risk of the Commonwealth falling behind the European Community and the United States with its response to developments in South Africa. South Africa had once been part of the Commonwealth, and he hoped that a future South Africa would be a member again. The Commonwealth should be equal to events. President Mugabe said that he did not want to move too far too fast and then discover that the substantive changes that were expected in South Africa had not actually materialised. We should not anticipate progress. The Prime Minister commented that that suggested that Commonwealth moves on eg sport and things of symbolic importance were more readily realisable than economic moves. Yet the most striking figure in respect of South Africa was GDP growth at zero per cent and a population growth of three per cent. Inward investment was a vital need. He did not disagree with President Mugabe about going too far too soon, but we should not deny all movement. We needed some carrot as well as stick. We should help the South Africans get towards a conference which would lead to the abolition of apartheid and the introduction of one man one vote. President Mugabe commented that maybe the ANC were themselves beginning to think along these lines. The Prime Minister said it would be a shame to find ourselves on the wrong side of the debate.

Reverting to the agenda for CHOGM President Mugabe thought that Heads of Government would want to discuss the impact on the Commonwealth of events in Eastern Europe. Democracy in the Commonwealth was also an issue which had never really been discussed because of the fear of interfering in internal affairs. Given the spread of democracy elsewhere he doubted whether the Commonwealth could be seen to be cringing and avoiding the subject. The Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary both said that the focus might be, not on condemning people, but on finding ways in which the Commonwealth could help in fostering the growth of democracy. President Mugabe agreed. Nonetheless, there was a real issue. If the Commonwealth was faced by a coup in one of its Member States how did it react? There was a political and economic spin off from developments in Eastern Europe.

The Prime Minister thought the economic spin off from Eastern Europe was more significant than the political as far as the Commonwealth was concerned. One example was the focus of Germany on funding the former GDR with money that might otherwise have been available for other priorities. The European Community as a whole was focusing more on Eastern Europe than before. This changed the priorities for spending.

President Mugabe said that he hoped Britain would help Zimbabwe. The Commonwealth had more poor than rich countries in it. He feared a tendency towards protectionism in the developed countries. He wondered whether a united Europe would be more

protectionist. He had similar fears for the US/Canada/Mexico economic area. Some sort of exemption within GATT might be needed for the small states.

The Prime Minister said that in a climate where countries were having to consider aid in relation to other priorities, it was important that developing countries should create the best possible conditions for inward investment, eg by allowing the repatriation of profits and creating and instituting investment guarantees. The issues that President Mugabe had raised were very important ones, and there was no better institution that the Commonwealth to address them. President Mugabe agreed. The Prime Minister added that when he had proposed a radical change of terms on debt in Trinidad, the unanimous support which he had secured from the Commonwealth had given his plan a tremendous boost within the IMF. We should use that Commonwealth impetus on other issues such as trade and in the GATT Round.

President Mugabe expressed concern about US attitudes in the International Finance Corporation. Mr Kangai picked up this theme, saying that Zimbabwe was classified as a medium income country, even though 75 to 80 per cent of the people were very poor. This meant that she lost some of the concessional loans for which she would otherwise qualify. Nigeria and Congo had got themselves removed from that list. The Group of 7 had taken a decision to classify Hungary and Czechoslovakia as least developed countries. President Mugabe commented that if they were least developed countries, then Zimbabwe must be a 'leastest' developed country.

The Prime Minister said he was not unsympathetic to the basic argument and he hoped he could be given the facts about the distribution of income within Zimbabwe. At his request, President Mugabe give an account of his dealings with the IMF, about which he was reasonably optimistic.

Land

The Prime Minister asked about the redistribution of land. President Mugabe said that the final drafting of the Bill had now been concluded. The Government's view was that there should be no appeal against the assessed valuation and price of land or there would be endless disputes. Others were, however, suggesting that there should be a Land Tribunal. The Prime Minister went on to ask about inward investment, in which part of the discussion it emerged that the figure of 1.6 billion Zimbabwe dollars for inward investment referred not so much to inward investment as to hitherto blocked funds that were now being recycled. President Mugabe said that he was looking to Britain for more support for Zimbabwe's structural adjustment programme. The £30 million given in 1980 towards resettlement had mostly been disbursed. As Zimbabwe tackled the land issue she needed another injection of funds. It was an historical duty of Britain to help create a multi-racial society in Zimbabwe. It was his duty to make this request. He also hoped Britain would help Zimbabwe in international institutions and in the European Community. He had also been asked by the Prime Minister of

Mauritius to seek British help in the European Community over the reduction in the sugar price. The Prime Minister undertook to take this point on board. He commented that, as regards land, he understood the frustrations over distribution, but it was important to have a fair system of compensation with a right of appeal if inward investment was not to be discouraged. He again said that he would welcome the facts on Zimbabwe's pattern of prosperity.

UN Secretary General

President Mugabe made an eloquent appeal for Mr Chidzero in terms of his personal qualities, his linguistic ability and his experience of the United Nations. The Prime Minister asked how Mr Chidzero would approach disasters such as those affecting the Kurds or Bangladesh. The President said that Mr Chidzero was a humanitarian, a good man-manager and knew about the UN. He had been involved in dealing with Zimbabwe's refugee problems and, although he had not got experience of major disasters, he would rapidly develop the necessary capability. He would live up to everyone's expectations. The Prime Minister asked if he was an innovator. The President said he was an innovator and a thinker. The Prime Minister explained that we never revealed our voting intentions, but he would give very careful consideration to Mr Chidzero's candidature. The President seemed satisfied with this.

At the very end of the meal, President Mugabe said he hoped the Prime Minister would not hesitate to let him have his thoughts on the situation in Zimbabwe. He was not someone who rejected criticism. He knew that Zimbabwe's plans and programmes contained imponderables. We were partners in the Commonwealth. Even if we did not agree on South Africa, we should exchange ideas and see if we could agree. The Prime Minister readily assented to this. He looked forward to keeping in close touch with the President. President Mugabe, in this context, paid tribute to Mrs Chalker for the way she kept in contact with him.

I am copying this letter to Jeremy Heywood (Treasury), Martin Stanley (Department of Trade and Industry), Suma Chakrabarti (Overseas Development Administration) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

Yours,
Stephen

J S WALL

S L Gass Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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Foreign & Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

22 May 1991

Dear Stephen,

Zimbabwe: Visit of President Mugabe: 23 May 1991

Thank you for your letter of 10 May asking for briefing for the working lunch which the Prime Minister has agreed to host for President Mugabe (plus three) on 23 May.

President Mugabe asked to call on the Prime Minister to discuss the bid by his Finance Minister, Bernard Chidzero, to become the next UN Secretary General. I enclose two telegrams from Kieran Prendergast recording his meeting yesterday with President Mugabe. He will be accompanied by Kumbirai Kangai (Minister of Industry and Commerce), Dennis Norman (Minister of Transport) and Witness Mangwende (Minister of Land, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement). Personality notes on all four are attached. On our side the Foreign Secretary would like to attend, as you suggest, together with Kieran Prendergast, our High Commissioner at Harare.

Objectives

The Prime Minister has not met President Mugabe since the Kuala Lumpur CHOGM. In this meeting our objectives might be:

- to try to establish a productive personal relationship in advance of CHOGM, and discuss objectives for the meeting;

- to encourage a more flexible position on South Africa including a readiness to consider lifting economic sanctions if SAG complete legislation to repeal apartheid laws in June.

- to encourage rigorous implementation of Zimbabwe's economic reform programme;

- to advise caution on the GOZ's efforts to increase redistribution of land to black Zimbabweans;

- [if asked] to explain our policy towards achieving peace in Mozambique, and inform Mugabe that RENAMO have requested a meeting with the Zimbabweans in London (to which we have no objection).

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Political developments

Zimbabwe became independent in April 1980 when President Mugabe's ZANU (PF) party took power following elections. Keeping strictly to the provisions of the 1980 constitution, Mugabe amended it in 1987 to remove reserved seats for whites in Parliament and to replace the non-executive Head of State by an executive President (to which positon Mugabe was first elected in December 1987 and re-elected in March 1990). Elections are held every 5 years.

The early 1980s were marked by fierce and sometimes violent conflict between the ZANU (PF) government and Joshua Nkomo's PF-ZAPU party. Moves towards reconcilation culminated in unification of the two parties in 1989. This brought peace and new investment to Nkomo's Matabeleland (in south west Zimbabwe). Nkomo is now Vice President and other (formerly ZAPU) politicians occupy prominent positions.

The overwhelming victory of the (new) ZANU(PF) in the 1990 elections has resulted in the creation of a de facto one party state. But in September 1990 the ZANU (PF) Central Committee decided against moving to a de jure one party system (against Mugabe's strong wishes).

The observance of human rights in Zimbabwe is improving with the State of Emergency lifted in July 1990 after 25 years when the last person detained without trial was released. In addition, a general amnesty in July 1990 released some 200 political detainees.

President Mugabe, now 67, is an old-style anti-colonialist Marxist, but has proved pragmatic on difficult issues (relations with whites, land ownership, mixed economy). His wife Sally, now seriously ill with kidney failure, is a major influence. He is intellectually superior to his colleagues, with no potential rivals in sight. He has also become increasingly isolated. On major policy issues (the one party state, economic policy) he has been out of step with the vast majority of his party. He takes a particularly rigid view on sanctions toward South Africa despite publically moderating his criticism of President de Klerk.

Dr Chidzero's candidature as UN Secretary General

A background note on the wider issues involved in the possible successor to Dr Perez de Cuellar is annexed to this letter. Chidzero is a former Deputy Secretary-General of

/UNCTAD

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/UNCTAD

UNCTAD. Although a technocrat rather than a politician, he will be a leading African contender for the UN job, especially as he appears to have the support of Perez de Cuellar. He would, however, be a loss to Zimbabwe as it begins to implement the economic reform programme. While we would wish to avoid suggesting to President Mugabe who we might vote for, it might be useful to know what the Zimbabweans believe are Chidzero's qualifications for the job. The Prime Minister might therefore wish to make the following points to President Mugabe:

- will give Dr Chidzero's candidacy careful consideration;

- we attach great importance to finding the right candidate. Not only requires highest personal qualities and diplomatic skills, but also ability to administer and reform UN at a time of great challenges and change;

- how do you see Chidzero tackling the job if appointed?

- (If required). Welcome African candidates. But would not exclude qualified candidates from other regions.

- (If required). As you know, our consistent position is never to reveal how we vote, either before or after the event.

CHOGM

The Zimbabweans have not yet focussed on the content of CHOGM. The most important issue for Mugabe will inevitably be South Africa (see below). But he may be sympathetic to discussion of other key issues which should be preoccupying the Commonwealth, namely sustainable development, good government and human rights, and the environment. Meanwhile the Zimbabweans are pressing ahead with arrangements for CHOGM. We are providing modest help in the form of security training and the provision of office equipment.

South Africa

Our strategy for CHOGM is to ensure that by October we are in solid company internationally in lifting sanctions. We have already achieved this in the EC. Once the South Africans repeal the apartheid legislation next month and complete the process of releasing political prisoners, America's sanctions imposed under the Comprehensive Anti- Apartheid Act (CAAA) will automatically be lifted. Consequently by October it will be the Commonwealth and not the UK which is out of step with / the rest of the world. I enclose a list of sanctions imposed by the Commonwealth.

At CHOGM itself we shall be aiming at a statement which looks forward rather than back towards the positive contribution the Commonwealth may make to a South Africa in transition from apartheid. This should focus on the need to promote the negotiating process, to restore growth and to prepare blacks - through human resource development etc - for their future role. We also aim to achieve a firm statement of support for the resumption of international sporting contacts with South Africa for sports which are fully integrated and therefore comply with the Gleneagles Agreement (we would be building on the initial moves in that direction at the meeting of Commonwealth Foreign Ministers in February). We hope to see the end of the Commonwealth Committee of Foreign Ministers on Southern Africa (CCFM-SA), of which Zimbabwe is amongst the most hard-line members.

Discussion of South Africa at CHOGM will much depend on developments between now and October. Mugabe's immediate preoccupation is likely to be with the issue of violence.

The Prime Minister may accordingly wish to say :

- regret continuing township violence. Terrible human cost. Primary responsibility for law and order rests with the South African Government. Important for leaders of all parties in South Africa to promote calm and political tolerance. Could you use your influence with leaders to promote peace? No good delaying constitutional talks because of the violence. Why insist on perfecting human nature before drawing up a new constitution?

- as I said in my letter to you in March we should begin lifting economic sanctions well before CHOGM. Resumed growth is vital so that all South Africans can see benefit of peaceful transition to non-racial democracy. Hope that progress can be made at next CCFM-SA meeting;

- sport vital to promote racial tolerance. Zimbabwe's fine sporting reputation (cricket, rugby, athletics) gives her ideal chance to exert positive influence (in support of ANC) on resumption of contacts with sports that are properly integrated in South Africa;

- hope that at CHOGM discussion on South Africa can be forward-looking and focus on what the Commonwealth can do to help the transition to a post-apartheid democracy; human resource development is vital;

- what other topics does Mugabe want to see discussed at CHOGM? The environment; sustainable development; good government and human rights?

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Economic Issues and Aid

Since independence Zimbabwe's economic performance has been disappointing. Improvements have been made in health and education, but central control of prices, wages and foreign exchange have impeded both foreign and domestic investment. In January the GOZ unveiled an economic reform programme for 1991-6, drawn up with the help of the IMF and the World Bank. The plans, which envisage relaxing controls on imports, encouragement of exports, a cut in public spending and subsidies and a gradual move towards a market economy, won the approval of donor countries at a meeting in March. The UK pledged £10 million in programme aid (out of £150 million required) to support the plans in 1991/2 (payable in two tranches of £5 million each). A major problem is the limited ability of the Zimbabwean Civil Service to implement reforms. ODA are offering technical co-operation to help.

Including the new programme aid, the total value of our aid in 1991/2 is expected to reach £40 million (excluding CDC expenditure). This sum includes ATP spending on new projects to revitalise the national truck fleet and to supply new radar and emergency appliances to Harare Airport in time for the CHOGM in October. We have also offered to finance a comprehensive study of the Zimbabwe Iron and Steel Company (ZISCO) as a pre-requisite to possible further ODA financial support for ZISCO.

The Prime Minister may wish to say :

- pleased that we are able to support Economic Reform Programme with £10 million, provided programme makes progress;

- recognise that implementation will be painful. Willing to consider further technical assistance, eg civil service reforms;

- investor confidence is vital to success of Economic Reform Programme;

- (if asked) bilateral aid programme substantial : £40 million this year.

The Land Issue

The unequal distribution of land between the white and black populations is a long standing issue. Commercial (mostly white) farmers still occupy over one-third of the land and population pressures in the communal (black) lands are intense. ODA committed £20m at Independence (of which some £16m has been spent) to a plan to resettle blacks on former white-owned land on a willing buyer/willing seller principle. Against a GOZ target of 162,000 people, so far 52,000 have been resettled.

The 1980 Constitution included guarantees that land could only be acquired compulsorily for resettlement if it was underutilised, and that prompt and adequate compensation, which would be freely remittable abroad, would be paid. In December last year the GOZ amended the Constitution in a way which would allow seizure of any land (not only agricultural) without fair valuation or proper compensation. This threatened the confidence not only of commercial farmers but also of domestic and foreign investors in general. Since December the temperature of debate has cooled and there are indications that, as often happens in Zimbabwe, a more pragmatic approach will prevail in the leglislation which will probably be introduced later this year to enact the new provisions. It is important that this should include adequate arrangements for fair valuation, payment of compensation and right of appeal. We have made representations to the Zimbabweans at all levels. We do not need to press the issue hard and risk pushing the Zimbabweans out of their pragmatic mood. Nevertheless, it would look odd if no mention was made of the issue.

With this in mind, the Prime Minister might :

- ask when the GOZ plans to introduce legislation on compulsory purchase of land.

- stress importance of legislation being seen to be fair to avoid scaring overseas investors.

- ask what safeguards are planned (independent valuation? right of appeal?)

- (if asked) confirm HMG's willingness to consider further funding provided valuation/compensation arrangements are adequate, and that suitable arrangements are in place for implementing resettlement schemes.

Mozambique

Mozambique provides vital access to the sea for Zimbabwe. Since the late 1970s the country has been riven by civil war, with the insurgent organisation RENAMO in revolt against the FRELIMO government. Since the early 1980s, Zimbabwean National Army (ZNA) forces (12,000 men by 1985) have been deployed in Mozambique to assist FRELIMO.

Talks between the two sides began in Rome under Italian mediation in July 1990 and led to a partial ceasefire agreement on 1 December 1990, under which there would be no attacks on the Beira and Limpopo railway lines; and ZNA forces should withdraw from all other parts of the country. We, with other countries, agreed to participate in a Joint Verification Commission (JVC) to monitor the ceasefire.

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The 1 December agreement all but collapsed when RENAMO leader Dhlakama claimed that the ZNA were not abiding by the agreement. RENAMO resumed attacks on the Limpopo railway in retaliation. Talks resumed in Rome on 6 May but are bogged down trying to agree on an agenda. The problem is how to persuade RENAMO to give up its miliary aspirations in return for the ballot box.

Dhlakama has said that he will need to make his peace separately with Mugabe. He has asked us to convey a request for a meeting to Mugabe. We should do so without pressing Mugabe to accept. Dhlakama has also asked HMG to agree to RENAMO/Zimbabwe talks in London. We agree that these would be useful, provided that it is clear that we wish to avoid supplanting the Italians in the unenviable role of mediator. We have cleared our lines with President Chissano, who has no objection to the proposal being put to the Zimbabweans, but wishes to avoid any appearance of endorsing the meeting. We have not been able to approach the Zimbabweans in advance of Mugabe's visit. There is no need to raise this subject with Mugabe, who may not want to discuss it in front of his Ministers. But if he does, the Prime Minister might :

- ask for Mugabe's view of the way forward in Mozambique;

- say that Zimbabwean contacts with RENAMO could help reduce RENAMO's suspicions;

- explain that RENAMO have asked if the next round of contacts with Zimbabwe could be in London, to which we can agree if they wish;

- explain that we have informed President Chissano, who (while not enthusiastic) has not raised serious objection;

- add that Dhlakama also asked us to convey a request for a meeting with President Mugabe. We do so without comment.

I am copying this letter to Martin Stanley (DTI), Simon Whiteley (Department of Transport) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,

(S L Gass)
Private Secretary

J S Wall Esq
10 Downing Street

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FM HARARE
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PRESIDENT MUGABE'S VISIT TO LONDON

1. PRESIDENT MUGABE ASKED TO SEE ME AT SHORT NOTICE TODAY (21 MAY). HIS PURPOSE WAS TO HIGHLIGHT THE THREE AREAS OF MOST INTEREST TO HIM WHEN HE LUNCHES WITH THE PRIME MINISTER ON 23 MAY: AID, RESETTLEMENT , AND CHIDZERO'S CANDIDATURE FOR THE POST OF UN SECRETARY GENERAL.

2. ON AID, MUGABE SAID THAT ZIMBABWE WAS EXTREMELY GRATEFUL FOR BRITISH ASSISTANCE. BUT HE WOULD LIKE US TO INVOLVE OURSELVES STILL MORE, BY PROVIDING GREATLY INCREASED CONCESSIONAL AND GRANT AID SO AS TO HELP ENSURE THE SUCCESS OF STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT. I SAID THAT WE WERE DOING A GREAT DEAL ALREADY. APART FROM THE REGULAR AID PROGRAMME, AND THE #10 MILLION OF PROGRAMME AID FOR THE FIRST YEAR OF THE SAP, I HAD IN THE LAST YEAR OR SO SIGNED ATP AGREEMENTS AMOUNTING TO MORE THAN #30 MILLION IN GRANT AID. MUGABE REPEATED THAT HE WAS GRATEFUL FOR THIS (I AM NOT AT ALL SURE THAT HE KNEW ABOUT THE ATP DEALS) BUT WANTED MORE: ''I WOULD LIKE LYNDA CHALKER TO DIG DEEP INTO HER POCKET''. AFTER ALL, ZIMBABWE HAD THE LARGEST PERCENTAGE OF CITIZENS OF BRITISH ORIGIN OF ANY AFRICAN COUNTRY OTHER THAN SOUTH AFRICA, AND THEY WOULD BENEFIT FROM ZIMBABWE'S PROSPERITY.

3. MUGABE SAID THAT HE WOULD ALSO LIKE TO DISCUSS RESETTLEMENT. THE COST OF THIS WOULD BE CONSIDERABLE. OF COURSE, HE DID NOT WANT THE GOVERNMENT TO BE DRAGGED INTO THE COURTS, AS THIS WOULD ONLY HOLD UP THE PROCESS OF LAND PURCHASE. BUT THE GOVERNMENT WOULD PAY FAIR AND REASONABLE COMPENSATION, TO BE ASSESSED BY ESTABLISHED VALUERS. THERE WAS NO REASON WHY GOVERNMENT AND THE FARMERS SHOULD NOT REACH AGREEMENT BOTH ON IDENTIFYING UNDER-UTILISED LAND (OF WHICH THERE WAS PLENTY) AND ON THE AMOUNT OF COMPENSATION. IF SO, THERE WAS ANYWAY NO NEED FOR COURTS TO BE INVOLVED.

4. I TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY TO HAND OVER THE ORIGINAL OF MRS CHALKER'S LETTER OF JANUARY 1991 (I HAD BEEN PRESSING EVER SINCE FOR AN APPOINTMENT WITH THE PRESIDENT TO DO SO). HAVING READ THE

LETTER QUICKLY, MUGABE SAID THAT HE HAD SEEN THE COPY WHICH THE DEPARTMENT GAVE TO THE ZIMBABWE HIGH COMMISSIONER IN LONDON SOME TIME AGO, AND HAD ASKED CHIDZERO FOR COMMENTS. I EXPLAINED OUR CONCERNS ON JUSTICIABILITY AND THE TERMS OF COMPENSATION. WE DID NOT SEEK TO INTERFERE IN ZIMBABWE'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS. RESETTLEMENT WAS ULTIMATELY A SOVEREIGN MATTER FOR ZIMBABWE. BUT WE WERE CONCERNED THAT NOTHING SHOULD BE DONE TO DAMAGE THE PROSPECTS FOR FOREIGN INVESTMENT. THE SIGNALS SENT TO THE OUTSIDE WORLD WERE IMPORTANT, AND THE LAND ACQUISITION BILL OFFERED AN IMPORTANT OPPORTUNITY TO REASSURE POTENTIAL INVESTORS.

5. MUGABE SAID THAT HE HAD NOT/NOT YET SEEN A DRAFT OF THE LAND ACQUISITION BILL. HE HAD ASKED THE ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR A COPY SO THAT HE COULD TAKE IT TO LONDON. HOWEVER, WHAT MATTERED SURELY WAS THE WAY IN WHICH LAND PURCHASE WAS IMPLEMENTED. FOREIGN INVESTORS WOULD FIND THAT THIS WAS DONE IN A FAIR AND REASONABLE WAY AND WITH THE COOPERATION OF THE FARMERS. HE ACCEPTED THAT WE SHOULD TAKE A NATURAL INTEREST IN THE WELLBEING OF ZIMBABWEANS OF BRITISH ORIGIN. BUT I COULD TAKE IT THAT THERE WAS PLENTY OF LAND FOR ALL THE WHITE FARMERS, THOUGH SOME OF THEM MIGHT HAVE TO DO WITH A LITTLE LESS THAN HITHERTO. FORTUNATELY, THERE WAS A GREAT DEAL OF UNDER-UTILISED AND UNUTILISED LAND. I SAID THAT WE HAD AN OBLIGATION TO LOOK AFTER BRITISH CITIZENS AND BRITISH COMPANIES, BOTH OF WHICH CATEGORIES OWNED LAND IN ZIMBABWE. BUT OUR LARGER CONCERN WAS WITH THE ZIMBABWEAN ECONOMY AND THE PROSPECTS FOR FOREIGN INVESTMENT. I REPEATED THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO GET RIGHT THE SIGNALS BEING SENT TO THE OUTSIDE WORLD AND TO POTENTIAL INVESTORS.

6. ON CHIDZERO, MUGABE SAID THAT HE WOULD BE LOBBYING FOR BRITISH SUPPORT. BUT HE WOULD NOT BE SEEKING A YES OR NO ANSWER FROM THE PRIME MINISTER ON 23 MAY.

7. AS REGARDS OTHER ISSUES, I SAID THAT NO DOUBT THERE WOULD BE AN OPPORTUNITY AT THE LUNCH TO DISCUSS SOUTH AFRICA, REGIONAL PROBLEMS SUCH AS MOZAMBIQUE AND ANGOLA, AND THE PROSPECTS FOR CHOGM. MUGABE SAID THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO DO SO. I MENTIONED THAT WE WERE HOPING FOR PROGRESS MEANWHILE ON THE RESUMPTION OF SPORTING CONTACTS WITH SOUTH AFRICA ON A PHASED SPORT BY SPORT BASIS. THIS APPROACH HAD BEEN ENDORSED BY THE ANC, AND STEVE TSHWETE HAD BEEN HERE RECENTLY LOBBYING FOR READMISSION OF SOUTH AFRICA TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRICKET COUNCIL. MUGABE DID NOT COMMENT SUBSTANTIVELY,

SAYING ONLY THAT HE HAD RATHER LOST CONTACT WITH CRICKET BUT RECALLED THAT SOUTH AFRICA HAD PRODUCED GOOD CRICKETERS OVER THE YEARS.

8. ON MOZAMBIQUE, I MENTIONED THAT RENAMO HAD ASKED US TO ALLOW A FURTHER ROUND OF TALKS WITH ZIMBABWEAN OFFICIALS TO BE HELD IN LONDON. MUGABE SAID THAT RENAMO SEEMED TO WANT TO MEET IN A PROLIFERATION OF CAPITALS. HE SUPPOSED THAT THIS WAS THE RESULT OF THEIR PREVIOUS INTERNATIONAL ISOLATION. HE WAS INTERESTED WHEN I TOLD HIM THAT PRESIDENT CHISSANO HAD GIVEN HIS NIHIL OBSTAT. I SAID THAT DHLAKAMA WAS ALSO INTERESTED IN A MEETING WITH PRESIDENT MUGABE. MUGABE SAID THAT THIS WAS NEWS TO HIM.

9. WE ALSO DISCUSSED PRESIDENT MENGITSU'S DEPARTURE FROM ETHIOPIA, NEWS OF WHICH HAD JUST COME THROUGH. SEE SEPARATE TELEGRAM.

10. COMMENT. MUGABE WASRELAXED AND FRIENDLY, THOUGH HE TENSED UP A BIT DURING DISCUSSION OF LAND/RESETTLEMENT. HE WAS CLEARLY EXPECTING TO SEE MRS CHALKER AT THE LUNCH WITH THE PRIME MINISTER AND I GUESS WILL TRY TO SET UP A SEPARATE MEETING WITH HER.

11. SEE MIFT (NOT COPIED) ON SUGGESTED TACTICS.

12. FCO: PLEASE COPY TO NO 10

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MIPT: MUGABE'S VISIT TO LONDON

1. MIPT SETS OUT THE SUBJECTS WHICH ARE FOREMOST IN MUGABE'S MIND. WE IN TURN HAVE OUR OWN AGENDA. BUT, SEEN FROM HERE, THE SINGLE MOST IMPORTANT OBJECTIVE OF THURSDAY'S LUNCH IS TO GET THE PRIME MINISTER'S RELATIONSHIP WITH MUGABE OFF TO A GOOD START. IF THE PERSONAL CHEMISTRY IS RIGHT, MUGABE IS MUCH MORE RECEPTIVE TO OUTSIDE IDEAS. THE CONVERSE IS ALSO TRUE.

2. IT MIGHT THEREFORE BE WORTHWHILE STARTING OFF WITH A COUPLE OF EASY SUBJECTS, LEADING ON TO THE MORE DIFFICULT ISSUES WHEN MUGABE IS WARMED UP. THE PRIME MINISTER MIGHT BEGIN BY CONGRATULATING MUGABE ON THE FIRM STAND OF PRINCIPLE WHICH HE TOOK AGAINST THE IRAQI INVASION OF KUWAIT. I AM SURE THAT THE PRESIDENT WOULD ALSO WELCOME A PERSONAL ENQUIRY ABOUT MRS MUGABE'S HEALTH (HER BRITISH DOCTOR HAS TOLD US IN CONFIDENCE RECENTLY THAT MRS MUGABE HAD LOST 20% OF HER BODY WEIGHT, THAT HER CONDITION GAVE CAUSE FOR CONCERN, BUT THAT HE HAS NOW MANAGED TO PUT HER ON A FEEDING PROGRAMME). IT WOULD PROBABLY BE EASIER TO DEAL NEXT WITH NON-CONTENTIOUS REGIONAL ISSUES SUCH AS MOZAMBIQUE AND ANGOLA BEFORE GOING ON TO CHOGM, SOUTH AFRICA, AID AND RESETTLEMENT - WHERE MUGABE APPEARS TO THINK WE ARE MOTIVATED LARGELY BY KITH AND KIN CONSIDERATIONS. THE PRIME MINISTER MAY WISH TO CONSIDER TALKING TO MUGABE TETE-A-TETE ABOUT CHIDZERO'S CANDIDATURE, ON WHICH WE CAN ONLY BE NON-COMMITAL.

3. MUGABE IS A COMPLEX AND CONTRADICTORY PERSONALITY. HE IS A ROMAN CATHOLIC YET AT THE SAME TIME PROCLAIMS HIMSELF A MARXIST. HIS RELIGION IS THE RESULT OF UPBRINGING, HIS (UNIMPLEMENTED) POLITICAL THEORIES THE PRODUCT OF READING AND STUDYING DURING HIS LONG YEARS OF DETENTION UNDER IAN SMITH AND OF THE SUPPORT OF THE WHICH HE RECEIVED IN EXILE FROM CHAINA. NOT ONE FOR SMALL TALK, MUGABE REGARDS HIMSELF AS AN INTELLECTUAL AND TENDS TO ADOPT AN ACADEMIC APPROACH TO ISSUES. HE LIKES TO LECTURE HIS INTERLOCUTORS BUT RESENTS BEING ON THE RECEIVING END. THIN SKINNED AND PROUD, HE IS TOUCHY ABOUT ANY APPROACH WHICH IMPLIES THAT OUTSIDERS (ESPECIALLY BRITAIN AS THE FORMER COLONIAL POWER) HAVE A CONTINUING RIGHT TO OVERSEE ZIMBABWE'S POLICIES. IN ZIMBABWE, HIS APPROACH IS

AUTOCRATIC BUT HIS COLLEAGUES THWART HIM BY INACTION WHEN THEY DISAGREE. AT THE SAME TIME, HE IS USUALLY POLITE AND DIGNIFIED, AND RESPONDS TO COURTESIES. HE IS ALMOST INVARIABLY MORE PRAGMATIC IN ACTION THAN HIS RADICAL PUBLIC RHETORIC WOULD SUGGEST. HE IS SOMETIMES SURPRISINGLY MODERATE IN PRIVATE.

4. MUGABE'S PERSONALITY IN TURN REFLECTS A PARADOX IN ZIMBABWE'S ATTITUDE TO BRITAIN. SHE ASPIRES TO AN EQUAL RELATIONSHIP BUT KNOWS SUBLIMINALLY THAT THIS IS NOT POSSIBLE AND EXPECTS US TO MAKE ALL THE CONCESSIONS. ZIMBABWE IS USED TO TURNING FIRST TO BRITAIN FOR HELP AND WE ARE WIDELY REGARDED HERE AS THE MOTHER COUNTRY. BUT DEPENDENCE IS AN UNCOMFORTABLE POSTURE AND THIS LEADS TO A MARKED LACK OF GRACIOUSNESS AND PUBLIC GRATITUDE. ZIMBABWE HAS ONLY BEEN INDEPENDENT FOR 11 YEARS. SHE STILL HAS A LOT TO LEARN.

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MUGABE, ROBERT GABRIEL

President of the Republic of Zimbabwe since December 1987 (previously Prime Minister).

Commander of the Armed Forces. President and First Secretary of ZANU (PF), Politburo member.

Born Zwimba TTL, 21 February 1924. Zezuru. Educated at Kutama and Empandeni Catholic Missions and trained as a teacher. Taught at Todd's Dadaya Mission with the Rev Ndabaningi Sithole (qv) after leaving Kutama over a pay dispute. Fort Hare University (BA) 1951. Obtained two further degrees by private study. Taught in Salisbury until 1954 when he went to Northern Rhodesia. In 1956 went to Ghana, where he taught at the University and married Sally (qv), a Ghanaian. Honorary Doctorate (Edinburgh) 1984. MSc (Economics) London 1985.

Returned to Rhodesia, 1960 and joined NDP as publicity secretary and chairman of its first congress. Also publicity secretary and later Vice President of ZAPU. In charge of the Zimbabwe Liberation Army, ZAPU's underground wing, carrying out sabotage. After the banning of ZAPU in 1962, opposed Nkomo. Failed to oust him and set up ZANU with Sithole. Went abroad to canvass for ZANU; returned in December 1963, and detained until December 1974. Elected leader in place of Sithole by gaoled Central Committee members. Released following the Lusaka agreement 1974. Left Rhodesia in 1975 and was based in Maputo. In 1976 formally ousted Sithole to become leader of ZANU. In October 1976 linked with ZAPU to form the Patriotic Front. Attended 1976 Geneva Conference as joint leader with Nkomo of PF delegation. Joint leader of PF delegation at Lancaster House. Returned to Rhodesia, January 1980. Led successful ZANU (PF) election campaign.

Mugabe was convinced in the early 1960s that armed struggle was the only way to win independence, and pursued his aims with single-minded vigour. Maintained tough party morale and discipline in prison, through study. Gained in confidence when he finally became undisputed head of ZANU. Always reluctant to compromise on basic principles in settlement negotiations; the eventual agreement at Lancaster House owed much to pressure on him from the war-weary Mozambicans.

Widely branded as a Marxist extremist, he believed during the 1980 election campaign that the British were determined to keep him out of power. On winning the election amazed the whites by enunciating a policy of reconciliation between the races. Forged a close relationship with the Governor, Lord Soames, during the weeks before Independence.

Following a difficult and chequered ascent to power, Mugabe was regarded initially after Independence as a consensus politician with doubtful leadership qualities. But he grew in authority during the first five years, and his stature increased with his convincing 1985 election victory. Internationally his star also rose, and he assumed the Chairmanship of the NAM in 1986 and successfully guided the deliberations of the Eighth Summit in Harare. But he also shows signs of increasing remoteness, arbitrariness, indecision and lack of touch. Inaccessible except to a closed circle of advisers, which includes his wife. An obsessive personality, dogmatic and unable to abandon the rehetoric (one-party state, socialism) of his early ideology, even if he does not press it into practice. His peak of popularity is well past, but he is secure in his position. Intolerant of opposition, and no democrat.

Not anti-white as such, but in the past has made ill-considered statements which have alienated many whites. The majority of Zimbabwe's white population, however, now regard him as the only man who can hold the country together and guarantee their own future.

One of the few members of the Government not busily feathering his own nest, (the Party, to a certain extent, does it for him by the gift of a house etc), although the activities of his wife's family prevent his being placed above suspicion. In private speaks quietly, logically and effectively, but liable to harangue his audience if given the opportunity. Most convincing with an intimate group, less impressive when making set piece public speeches, when he is inclined to academic politicisation, often way above the heads of his listeners.

His feelings towards Britain and HMG are ambivalent – on the one hand a marked warmth and gratitude for BMATT and other assistance; on the other extreme prickliness over criticism in the British press and any hint of interference with Zimbabwe's sovereignty.

Despite the remote exterior and lack of human touch, he can unbend in private and is not without a sense of humour. Devoted to his wife. Still deeply marked by the loss of his son (the Rhodesian Regime refused to release him from prison to attend the funeral). Practises yoga: fit. Denies his Catholic faith, but sometimes attends mass with Sally.

KANGAI, KUMBIRAI MANYIKA

Minister of Industry and Commerce since April 1990. Politburo Deputy Secretary for Economic Affairs. Central Committee member. Finance and Economic Affairs Committee.

MP for Buhera South.

Born 1938 in Buhera. Manyika. One of 11 children. Educated Umtali (Mutare) Teachers' training college. Taught at schools in Mrewa district until 1964.

Leading activist in ZANU since its formation in 1963. Arrested 1964. Lost teaching post but obtained scholarship to USA, 1965. Studied Public Health and Clinical Laboratory Pathology at University of California until 1972. In America he was active in obtaining material support for Chief Representative of the party in North America.

Went to Zambia and was elected a member of Revolutionary Council of ZANU as Secretary for Labour and Social Welfare, 1973. Detained in 1975 in connection with the murder of Herbert Chitepo. Released October 1976 to attend Geneva Conference as a member of Mugabe's delegation. Member of Central Committee (Transport and Social Welfare) at Chimoio, Mozambique, 1977. Press reports allege he was tried and imprisoned by ZANU, April 1978. Minister of Labour and Social Services, April 1980. Minister for Industry January 1984. Minister of Energy, Water Resources and Development July 1985.

Before independence, had the reputation of being a maverick hard liner, But progressed at Labour from invariably siding with the employees to a reasonable balance. Implicated publicly in the Paweni corruption scandal spring 1984 and there have been subsequent persistent rumours of corruption. Tried to nationalise the milling industry in spring 1985 and failed. A survivor, bouncy and sometimes effective. Likes the good life and has put on a lot of weight. Clever.

Category 1 sponsored visitor to Britain in 1988.

Married with seven children.

NORMAN, DENIS

Minister of Transport and National Supplies since April 1990. Non-constituency MP since April 1990.

Chairman of Beira Corridor Group. Director of Barclays, Rothmans and other private sector companies.

Born 1931 Chalgrove, England. Worked on family farm in Oxfordshire, where he still has farming interests, 1947–53. Farm assistant in Matepatepa 1953–56; Farm Manager Umvukwes 1956–69. Bought farm at Kard in 1959 and owned three by 1975. Chairman of Karoi Intensive Conservation Area Committee, 1964–66. Vice Chairman of Karoi Farmers Association 1967–70. Vice Chairman of Rhodesia Grain Producers' Association, 1972 and Chairman, 1974–76. Vice President Rhodesia National Farmers Union 1976 and President 1978. President Commercial Farmers' Union (previously National Farmers' Union) 1979–80. Elected Senator by electoral college in November 1987 following abolition of reserved white seats.

Successful farmer and respected farmers' leader, always stayed out of party politics but kept helpfully in touch with HMG throughout 1970s. Made Minister of Agriculture by Mugabe in March 1980 at Lord Soames' suggestion and performed with considerable authority and success. Dropped by Mugabe in post 1985 election Cabinet reshuffle in revenge for CAZ success, but has remained in public life first via BCG then with a Senate seat and now as Minister.

Should make a good Minister of Transport, but will not be active on wider Cabinet issues.

Married with four children.

MANGWENDE, DR WITNESS

Minister of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement since April 1990. Politburo Deputy Secretary for External Affairs. Central Committee member.

MP for Chitungwiza. Political and Policy Committee.

Born 1946 in Charter District. A Zezuru. Attended University in Zimbabwe, where he became President of the students union, but was expelled in 1973 for political activities. Continued his studies in England where (on an ODA scholarship) he obtained a BA in international relations from Southampton University. Then took a job with Rank Hovis McDougall in order to support himself while studying for a PhD in international relations at the LSE. While in Britain, he was President of the (ZANU) Zimbabwe Students Union and had close contacts with the trade union movement. ZANU Director of Foreign Affairs (under Muzenda and Hove (qqv)) and ZANU Chief Representative in Mozambique, 1979. Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, April 1980. Minister of Foreign Affairs 1983. Minister of Information, Posts and Telecommunications January 1988.

An appalling Foreign Minister; overshadowed by Shamuyarira as Minister of Information. A lightweight, unlikely to make a major impact at Lands, Agriculture.

A large bluff man, of limited intelligence and a ponderous sense of humour. He seldom quotes Soviet ideology, but his world view is one of knee-jerk "anti-imperialism" notably anti-Americanism. Suspicious of Britain. Identifies unthinkingly with almost all radical causes. Considered by his Cabinet colleagues as something of a buffoon. Drinks, sometimes heavily.

Keen squash player and swimmer. His intelligent, shy and attractive wife, Eban, works for the Council of Social Services. No children.

THE NEXT UN SECRETARY-GENERAL

1. Perez de Cuellar's second term as UN Secretary-General ends at the end of 1991. He has indicated privately to the Americans that he does not wish to stay on. There is however some evidence that the French, Russians and Chinese would like him to do so, at least for part of a third term, for lack of an obvious alternative. We believe this would be a mistake.

2. Article 97 of the UN Charter provides that "the Secretary-General shall be appointed by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council". This means in effect that the choice lies with the Security Council, and that the Five, with their veto powers, have a central role to play. We and the Americans believe that the Five should as in the past discuss the succession informally; the Russians are prepared to do so, but the French and Chinese have firmly resisted. The French argue that the Five's exchanges might leak, and that efforts to concert a Western position might be seen as ganging up on the Third World, especially the Africans.

3. There has been some discussion in the Security Council as a whole of procedures. The idea of a Search Committee has been rejected. This suits us, since such a Committee would weaken the Five's control of the proceedings. There is general agreement that the election should take place well before the end of the year, perhaps in October, so that the new Secretary-General can play him/herself in and choose his/her key colleagues before taking office. We and the Americans support the idea that the President of the Council should write to all Member States announcing the Council's proposal to proceed to an election in October, and inviting candidates to come forward. We believe such an approach might help to bring forward some better candidates; it would also permit closer scrutiny of a candidate's record, so as to avoid

another Waldheim. But the French and Chinese, with some non-aligned support, argue that this is an unwelcome break with precedent. The matter remains deadlocked.

4. There are some thirty people known or rumoured to be interested in the job. We have received only two formal approaches so far: from the Nigerians on behalf of ex-President Obasanjo, and from Sierra Leone on behalf of Jonah, the UN Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Questions. We anticipate two more imminently: the Ghanaian High Commissioner is calling on 20 May to lobby for Dadzie, the UNCTAD Secretary-General, and President Mugabe is calling on the Prime Minister on 23 May to lobby for Chidzero, the Zimbabwean Finance Minister. Our line is that we want the job to go to the best candidate available, and that we have an open mind on who that person might be. A commitment to UN reform is essential. So are personal integrity, proven diplomatic and managerial skills, and an understanding of the new international agenda and how the UN should handle it. Regional background is not a key consideration for us; we do not accept the argument of some that it is "Africa's turn". Though we do not say so publicly, we also wish to have a Secretary-General who will heed the wishes of the Five, and who is not prone to be awkwardly independent.

SOUTH AFRICA: RESTRICTIVE MEASURES

EUROPEAN COMMUNITY MEASURES SIMILAR OR IDENTICAL TO COMMONWEALTH MEASURES

EUROPEAN COMMUNITY	COMMONWEALTH
Embargo on exports of arms, para-military equipment to South Africa (September 1985)	Enforcement of the mandatory UN Arms Embargo against South Africa (October 1985)
Embargo on imports of arms and para-military equipment to South Africa (September 1985)	Embargo on imports of arms, ammunition, military vehicles and para-military equipment from South Africa (October 1985).
Refusal to cooperate in the military sphere (September 1985)	Embargo on all military cooperation with South Africa (October 1985)
Recall of military attachés accredited to South Africa and refusal to grant accreditation to military attachés from South Africa (September 1985)	
Discouraging of cultural and scientific agreements except where these contribute towards the ending of apartheid or have no possible role in supporting it (imposed September 1985, lifted February 1990)	Discouragement of all cultural and scientific events except where these contribute towards the ending of apartheid or have no possible role in promoting it (October 1985, lifted by UK February 1990).
Freezing of official contacts and international agreements in the sporting and security spheres (September 1985)	Reaffirmation of the Gleneagles declaration of 1977 (October 1985)
Cessation of oil exports to South Africa (September 1985)	Ban on sale and export of oil to South Africa (October 1985)
Cessation of exports of sensitive equipment destined for the police and armed forces of South Africa (September 1985)	Ban on sale and export of computer equipment capable of use by South African military forces, police or security forces (October 1985)
Prohibition of all new collaboration in the nuclear sector (September 1985)	Ban on new contracts for the sale and export of nuclear goods, materials and technology to South Africa (October 1985)
Ban on imports of certain South African iron and steel September 1986 lifted in principle by EC EC Foreign Ministers 15 April 1991)	Implementation of any EC decision to ban the import of coal, iron and steel and of gold coins from South Africa (August 1986)

SB9AAO

EUROPEAN COMMUNTIY	COMMONWEALTH
Ban on import of certain South African gold coins (September 1986, lifted in principle by EC Foreign Ministers 15 April 1991)	A readiness to take unilaterally what action may be possible to preclude the import of Kruggerands (October 1985)
Ban on certain new investment in South Africa (imposed September 1986, lifted by UK February 1990, lifted by EC December 1990)	Voluntary ban on new investment in South Africa (imposed August 1986, lifted by UK February 1990)

COMMONWEALTH MEASURES NOT INCLUDED IN EUROPEAN COMMUNITY MEASURES

Ban on all new government loans to the government of South Africa and its agencies (October 1985)

No government funding for trade missions to South Africa or for participation in exhibitions and trade fairs in South Africa (October 1985, lifted by the UK 1 April 1991).

Voluntary ban on the promotion of tourism to South Africa (imposed August 1986, lifted by the UK February 1990)

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

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FROM CSAD
SOUTH AFRICA
1. PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT MUGABE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE:
TEXT BEGINS

I VERY MUCH LOOK FORWARD TO MEETING YOU IN HARARE AT THE NEXT COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING. WITH THIS IN MIND, I THOUGHT I WOULD WRITE TO LET YOU HAVE MY REACTION TO LAST MONTH'S MEETING OF THE COMMONWEALTH COMMITTEE OF FOREIGN MINISTERS ON SOUTHERN AFRICA.

I WAS GLAD THAT THE COMMONWEALTH COMMITTEE WAS ABLE TO MEET TO REVIEW THE RECENT MOMENTOUS CHANGES IN SOUTH AFRICA. BOB HAWKE TELLS ME THAT FOREIGN MINISTERS REACHED AGREEMENT ON SPORT. I AGREE WITH HIM THAT THE TIME HAS COME TO RESUME SPORTING LINKS WITH SOUTH AFRICA IN AREAS WHERE THERE IS NOW RACIAL INTEGRATION.

BUT I WAS DISAPPOINTED THAT FOREIGN MINISTERS COULD NOT AGREE TO BEGIN LIFTING ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL SANCTIONS AT ONCE. NELSON MANDELA ARGUED AT THE SADCC MEETING ON 31 JANUARY THAT RAPID AND VISIBLE IMPROVEMENTS IN THE BLACK COMMUNITY'S ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONDITIONS WERE ESSENTIAL TO SOUTH AFRICA'S FUTURE PEACE AND STABILITY. HE SAID THAT THIS IMPROVEMENT WOULD NEED ECONOMIC GROWTH. HE IS RIGHT. BUT THERE WILL BE NO SUBSTANTIAL GROWTH SO LONG AS ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL SANCTIONS REMAIN.

WHILE I WAS PLEASED TO SEE THAT THE COMMITTEE ACCEPTED THE PRINCIPLE OF A PHASED LIFTING OF SANCTIONS I BELIEVE THAT THE TIMETABLE ADOPTED IS UNREALISTIC AND WILL NOT MEET SOUTH AFRICA'S NEEDS. I HOPE THAT, WHEN IT MEETS AGAIN IN MAY, THE COMMITTEE WILL BEGIN LIFTING ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL SANCTIONS TO HELP RESTORE GROWTH TO THE SOUTH AFRICAN ECONOMY AND SO ASSIST PROGRESS TOWARDS A NON-RACIAL DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY.

I ALSO BELIEVE THAT THIS WOULD BE GOOD FOR THE COMMONWEALTH. ALL OF US INVOLVED IN THE HIGH LEVEL REVIEW HOPE THAT THE HARARE HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING WILL MARK A WATERSHED IN COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS. AS REGARDS SOUTH AFRICA, THIS WILL MEAN CONCENTRATING ON THE POSITIVE WAYS IN WHICH WE CAN HELP THE NEW,

NON-RACIAL SOCIETY. BUT THE GROUND WORK WILL HAVE TO BE DONE NOW, BY BEGINNING TO LIFT ECONOMIC SANCTIONS WELL BEFORE WE REASSEMBLE IN HARARE.
TEXT ENDS.
2. THERE WILL BE NO SIGNED ORIGINAL.

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PS/MRS CHALKER
PS/PUS
MR LANKESTER
CHIEF CLERK
MR FAIRWEATHER
MR SLATER
MR GREENSTOCK
MISS SPENCER
MR HEMANS
MR HUDSON
MR KERBY
CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL 7

SOUTH AFRICA LIMITED

NNNN

MR WALL

Lunch for The President of Zimbabwe
Thursday 23 May

I attach the list of guests attending the lunch tomorrow together with a draft seating plan.

Agree seating plan?

Sue

22 May 1991

LIST OF GUESTS ATTENDING THE LUNCHEON TO BE GIVEN BY THE PRIME MINISTER IN HONOUR OF THE HONOURABLE ROBERT MUGABE, PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF ZIMBABWE ON THURSDAY 23 MAY 1991 AT 1.00PM FOR 1.15 PM

The Prime Minister

The Honourable Robert Mugabe	President of the Republic of Zimbabwe
The Honourable Kumbirai Kangai	Minister of Industry and Commerce
The Honourable Denis Norman	Minister of Transport and National Supplies
Dr The Honourable Witness Mangwende	Minister of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement

His Excellency the High Commissioner for the Republic of Zimbabwe

Rt Hon Douglas Hurd, MP

Mr Kieran Prendergast	British High Commissioner, Harare

Mr Stephen Wall

DRAFT SEATING PLAN FOR LUNCH ON THURSDAY 23 MAY

Mr Stephen Wall	Dr The Hon. Witness Mangwende
Mr Kieran Prendergast	The Hon. Kumbirai Kangai
PRIME MINISTER	THE HON. ROBERT MUGABE
Rt Hon Douglas Hurd	The Hon. Denis Norman

His Excellency the High Commissioner for the Republic of Zimbabwe

ENTRANCE

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIME MINISTER

LUNCH FOR PRESIDENT MUGABE OF ZIMBABWE

I attach the guest list for your lunch for President Mugabe tomorrow.

A lot of the fire has gone out of President Mugabe in recent years. In the negotiations with the Patriotic Front in the late 1970s he was a tough and skillful debator. He remains pretty stubborn but (at the age of 67) he has lost some of his sparkle.

He has quite a lot of hang-ups about the days of white rule. This is hardly surprising. He was detained for 11 years by the Smith regime and was not allowed out to attend the funeral of his only son. His wife has serious kidney problems. She has had treatment in ~~Canada~~ London. You might want to ask after her.

To get on terms with him (which is obviously important given his chairmanship of CHOGM this year), you may need to deal a bit less fiercely with him than you did with President Museveni.

Kieran Prendergast, our High Commissioner, advises starting on the less difficult issues to warm him up a bit. You may therefore wish to congratulate him on the firm stand of principle which he took against the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.

You might go on to talk about relatively non-contentious regional issues, namely Mozambique. The Zimbabwean Army has been helping the Mozambique Government to fight the RENAMO rebels. Cease-fires keep breaking down and a 1 December cease-fire all but collapsed when the RENAMO leader (Dhlakama) said that the Zimbabwean Army were not abiding by it.

Dhlakama has now asked us to convey a request for a meeting with Mugabe and to agree to RENAMO/Zimbabwe talks in London. This may be a sensitive area but you might ask for Mugabe's views on Mozambique and, depending on what he says, indicate that we have heard Dhlakama is interested in a meeting with Mugabe.

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On South Africa you may want to seek his views before setting out our own. It would be worth making sure Mugabe knows that you saw Mandela here in London, have spoken to him since on the telephone and are keeping in touch with him. It would be worth showing some sympathy for Mugabe's perception of the violence in South Africa. We see de Klerk wrestling manfully with the problem: they see what is happening as the culmination of years of police brutality/indifference. It would be worth explaining to Mugabe that we have urged President de Klerk to respond to the genuine concerns of the ANC and he has done so: a conference on the violence; the permanent judicial commission; and action to curb the carrying of weapons. But he cannot do it on his own.

On sanctions, the evidence now is that the South African's will fullfil all the conditions of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act and therefore that the automatic lifting of US sanctions may occur shortly before CHOGM. It is also worth deploying with Mugabe the economic arguments ie that black South Africans need new investment if South Africa is to have the money to improve education, health etc., and even simply to keep pace with population growth.

On bilateral issues, President Mugabe is likely to make a pitch for more aid. You will want to encourage him to stick with his economic reform programme, in support of which the UK has pledged £10m in programme aid. We are willing to consider further technical assistance. Our bilateral aid is already substantial: £40m this year.

You will want to raise the issue of the distribution of land. Zimbabwe has amended its Constitution to allow the seizure of land without fair valuation or proper compensation. In practice, the Zimbabwean Government is likely to adopt a more pragmatic approach but you may want to point out the link between the handling of this issue and investor confidence, and the need for fair legislation.

President Mugabe will raise the issue of the UN Secretary-General. His candidate, Chidzero, the Zimbabean Finance

Minister, is competing with Obasanjo and a Sierra Leonean for the African nomination. Chidzero is probably the best qualified African candidate. You will want to take the same line you took with the Nigerians a few weeks ago, explaining that we never reveal our vote in advance and saying that we will be looking not just for qualities of political leadership but for the ability to administer and reform the UN. You may want mention in this context the problems of UN disaster relief, not least now that President Mengistu of Ethiopia has fled - to a farm owned by his family in Zimbabwe.

Stephen

STEPHEN WALL
22 MAY 1991

PS. The attached recent report brings out Mugabe's concern to see the Black Africans (apart from Ian Smith) establish a united front with the OAU in the lead. He probably sees an echo of his own experience in Rhodesia. His preoccupation is unlikely to make him any more sympathetic to our arguments.

Stephen

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bc: PC

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

10 May 1991

REQUEST BY PRESIDENT MUGABE FOR A CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER

Thank you for your letter of 9 May about President Mugabe's visit.

The Prime Minister would be happy to give President Mugabe lunch on Thursday 23 May.

I should be grateful if you could let me have briefing for the lunch to reach me by Tuesday 21 May. As part of the briefing, it would be useful to have a note on our thinking about the succession to the UN Secretary General.

I should be grateful if you could let me know who President Mugabe will be bringing with him. We can easily manage President Mugabe plus three for lunch. Perhaps you could also let me know whether the Foreign Secretary or Mrs Chalker would like to attend. I do not imagine that Kieran Prendergast will be coming back for this visit but, were he to do so, he would be very welcome to come to the lunch here.

J. S. WALL

Simon Gass, Esq.
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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QTS

d/o

Foreign &
Commonwealth
Office

London SW1A 2AH

9 May 1991

Dear Stephen,

Request by President Mugabe of Zimbabwe for Call on the Prime Minister

President Mugabe has asked if he might call on the Prime Minister on 23 May (or, failing that, on 24 May). He apparently wants to discuss the candidature of Mr Bernard Chidzero, Zimbabwe's Finance Minister, as the next Secretary-General of the United Nations.

The Foreign Secretary hopes that the Prime Minister will agree to receive Mugabe. Our objective would be to establish a personal relationship with the Chairman of CHOGM and to cover some of the issues which could be difficult at Harare, particularly South Africa. Mugabe is not a member of the High Level Group, and the Prime Minister may not have another opportunity to see him before October.

The Zimbabweans know, from our High Commissioner, that it is not our practice to declare voting intentions in advance, and Mugabe would not expect to obtain the Prime Minister's backing for Chidzero on the spot.

The only other bid we are making around that time is for Mrs Charles, the Prime Minister of Dominica.

Yours ever,

(S L Gass)
Private Secretary

J S Wall Esq
10 Downing Street

OK

Lunch ?

Pitsford.

(1)

10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

Mr Mugabe wants to come to London to see you. The House rises on 23 May so you could see him on that day. Shall I offer

(a) lunch or

(b) a call ?

It is a pretty tight week for foreigners.

light or tight?

Stephen 9/5

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Stephen - If, as I understand, the Horse is in that day, we could offer a lunch, or an afternoon could. There will probably be Cabinet that morning. S/S

Sarah

Can we do this?

DPM

RESTRICTED
FM HARARE
TO DESKBY 080800Z F C O
TELNO 193
OF 080700Z MAY 91
INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK

NEXT UN SECRETARY GENERAL: VISIT BY MUGABE TO LONDON

1. AS ALREADY REPORTED BY TELEPHONE TO JENNINGS (CSAD) I WAS SUMMONED AT SHORT NOTICE YESTERDAY EVENING (7 MAY) BY THE ACTING PERMANENT SECRETARY AT THE ZIMBABWE FOREIGN MINISTRY.

2. GOCHE SAID THAT PRESIDENT MUGABE WOULD LIKE TO TRAVEL TO LONDON OVERNIGHT ON 22/23 MAY IN ORDER TO CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER ON 23 MAY. COULD I PLEASE FIND OUT WHETHER MR MAJOR WAS AVAILABLE? IF NOT, COULD THE PRIME MINISTER SEE PRESIDENT MUGABE ON 24 MAY.

3. I ASKED ABOUT THE PURPOSE OF THE VISIT. GOCHE SAID THAT MUGABE WISHED TO TALK TO MR MAJOR ABOUT CHIDZERO'S CANDIDATURE FOR THE POST OF UN SECRETARY GENERAL, TO WHICH THE PRESIDENT ATTACHED GREAT IMPORTANCE. I EXPLAINED OUR POSITION, AS SET OUT IN RECENT FCO GUIDANCE. GOCHE SAID THAT PRESIDENT MUGABE UNDERSTOOD THAT HE WOULD NOT BE RETURNING FROM LONDON WITH THE BRITISH VOTE IN HIS POCKET. NEVERTHELESS MUGABE WISHED TO PUT CHIDZERO'S CASE TO THE PRIME MINISTER DIRECT.

4. I ASKED WHETHER THE PRESIDENT WOULD ALSO BE TRAVELLING TO THE CAPITALS OF THE OTHER PERMANENT MEMBERS. GOCHE THOUGHT THAT APPROACHES WOULD BE MADE IN THE OTHER CAPITALS AT A SLIGHTLY LOWER LEVEL (SHAMUYARIRA TOLD ME ON 6 MAY THAT HE WOULD BE TRAVELLING TO WASHINGTON SOON). BUT IT WAS POSSIBLE THAT MUGABE MIGHT VISIT PARIS AFTER SEEING THE PRIME MINISTER. OTHERWISE HE WOULD RETURN TO HARARE AS SOON AS HE HAD SEEN MR MAJOR.

COMMENT

5. GIVEN OUR NON-COMMITTAL ATTITUDE TOWARDS ANY OF THE CANDIDATES FOR THE POST OF UN SECRETARY GENERAL, THE PRIME MINISTER IS CLEARLY NOT GOING TO BE ABLE TO PROVIDE MUGABE WITH ANY ASSURANCES ON CHIDZERO. IT MAY ALSO BE NECESSARY TO DISABUSE THE PRESIDENT OF ANY UNREALISTIC EXPECTATIONS HE MAY HAVE OF BRITISH ''SPONSORSHIP'' OF CHIDZERO, WHO COUNTED AS BRITISH DURING HIS LONG PERIOD OF SERVICE

IN THE UN SYSTEM. NEVERTHELESS, I BELIEVE THAT THERE IS A STRONG CASE FOR MR MAJOR AGREEING TO RECEIVE HIM:

(A) MUGABE HAS A STRONG SENSE OF PERSONAL COURTESY, AND WOULD BE LIKELY TO TAKE IT AS A PERSONAL REBUFF IF MR MAJOR WERE TO REFUSE TO SEE HIM:

(B) THE HANDLING OF AWKWARD ISSUES SUCH AS SOUTH AFRICA AT CHOGM WILL BE EASIER IF THE PRIME MINISTER HAS DEVELOPED A GOOD PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP WITH MUGABE MEANWHILE. THE CONVERSE IS ALSO TRUE.

6. I THEREFORE RECOMMEND THAT, FOR WIDER REASONS, WE SHOULD RESPOND POSITIVELY TO MUGABE'S REQUEST. IF 23/24 MAY IS INCONVENIENT, I HOPE THAT WE CAN OFFER ALTERNATIVE DATES IN THE NEXT FEW WEEKS.

PRENDERGAST

YYYY

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MR P J WESTON
SIR J COLES
MR FAIRWEATHER
MR SLATER
MR GORE-BOOTH

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

8 March 1989

Dear Charles,

Visit to London by President Mugabe

The Prime Minister may wish to know that the Zimbabwean High Commissioner told us today that President Mugabe will be passing through London on his way to and from the Hague Conference on the Environment and will be spending the nights of 9, 12 and 13 March here. The High Commissioner has made no request for any programme for Mr Mugabe (and we have not taken the initiative in offering one).

Yours ever

Richard Gozney

(R H T Gozney)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
PS/No 10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIME MINISTER

Charles telephoned to say that Mrs. Mugabe and the Zimbabwean Foreign Minister - Dr. Shamuyarira - will **NOT** now be accompanying Mr. Mugabe this afternoon. He will, however, be bringing his Permanent Secretary plus, we think, the Zimbabwean High Commissioner.

The briefing for your meeting with Mr. Mugabe is in one of the slim red boxes, while the background information is in folder two of the large red box.

I have informed Dot of the change of visitors as it affects numbers for tea.

Lillian

1 October 1988

CONFIDENTIAL

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

1 October 1988

Dear Lyn,

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT MUGABE

The Prime Minister had a talk lasting nearly two hours with President Mugabe at Chequers this afternoon. The President was accompanied by his Cabinet Secretary and the Zimbabwean High Commissioner.

The meeting took place in an excellent atmosphere. The Prime Minister made our offer of £15 million aid for capital projects. Mugabe expressed appreciation for this and made clear that his highest priority was to continue the rural resettlement programme (he made no mention of rural housing as such). However, he hoped that we would also continue our balance of payments help which was Zimbabwe's most urgent need. Mugabe urged the Prime Minister to continue to press President Botha for further political reform in South Africa but studiously avoided any mention of sanctions. He asked whether the Prime Minister yet felt able to visit South Africa and renewed in pressing terms his invitation to her to visit Zimbabwe. He slid away from attempts to discuss the defence package, but did not challenge the Prime Minister's assertion that negotiations on it were going well and should be brought to fruition.

That summarises the main points of the meeting. The remainder of the letter records the discussion in greater detail.

Zimbabwe/US Relations

President Mugabe began by telling the Prime Minister abvout his recent meeting with President Reagan. The President had told him formally of the United States' decision to renew its aid programme to Zimbabwe. He had in turn expressed the hope that relations would improve particularly in the trade and economic sphere. He had also regretted that President Reagan's speech to the General Assembly had not contained a clearer message on South Africa. That apart, it had been a good meeting.

Aid

President Mugabe continued that, at home, things were going rather well. The main problem was lack of foreign exchange and investment in the manufacturing sector. Agriculture was doing well, particularly tobacco, as was the minerals sector. He particularly welcomed the new investment from Cluff Oil.

The Prime Minister said that Zimbabwe's relatively prosperous state was the result of good management. We would like to contribute a further £15 million of aid for capital projects. She would be interested to hear what President Mugabe's priorities for this were, although detailed discussion should be left to experts who would meet on 12/13 October. President Mugabe said he was very grateful for this generous offer which would be a great help. There were many areas in which it could be spent. One was education, especially post-secondary schooling. He wanted to develop technical and vocational education in particular. But the other very high priority was land resettlement. The Prime Minister would recall that there had originally been a target of resettling 162,000 families, and the United Kingdom had granted generous aid for this at the time of independence. However, those funds had now been exhausted with only 40,000 people resettled and the programme had come to a halt. He wanted to continue with it. There was plenty of land available for purchase and, under the terms of the Constitution, it would be taken only from willing sellers. The Prime Minister said that she did not see why use of our aid funds for this purpose should not be discussed at the talks on 12/13 October.

President Mugabe continued that, while grateful for aid for capital projects, Zimbabwe's most pressing need was for balance of payments help and continued support for the commodity import programme. The Prime Minister said that this would have to depend on Zimbabwe reaching agreement with the World Bank. President Mugabe said that this was not at all easy. The IMF wanted Zimbabwe to reduce its public spending, but the scope for this was very limited. Zimbabwe's commitments in Mozambique imposed a heavy burden on defence spending. However, Zimbabwe had an excellent record of paying its debts. It had not had to turn to the Paris Club for rescheduling. British banks were ready, indeed anxious, to lend more to Zimbabwe. He hoped, therefore that his request for help in this area would not be judged solely by the IMF's severe yardstick. Balance of payments help would enable Zimbabwe to trade more and also, of course, to import more from Britain. The Prime Minister said she could not go beyond what she had said but perhaps Zimbabwe's concerns could again be explained more fully at the forthcoming aid talks.

South Africa

The Prime Minister said that we were disappointed by the lack of forward steps in South Africa. She constantly tried to bring home to President Botha that the risk from not

taking steps was greater than the risk from taking them. We also continued to press for Mandela's release. It seemed unlikely that he would be sent back to prison. But the Government clearly feared the risk of uncontrollable violence if he were released altogether. There were positive developments in South Africa's relations with its neighbours, in particular their withdrawal from Angola and renewed contacts with Mozambique. All in all, she believed that many whites in South Africa, perhaps even a majority, were ready for progress. This included many within the Government itself. But President Botha himself seemed psychologically incapable of taking the necessary steps and was allowing himself to be put on the defensive by the ultra-conservative opposition.

President Mugabe agreed that President Botha seemed to want to follow an outward policy of sorts and the renewed contacts with Mozambique were certainly welcome (although he had not yet been briefed on the outcome of the meeting between Botha and President Chissano). But internally there appeared to be no movement at all. It would need constant pressure from outside, in particular from the Prime Minister who was one of the very few people who carried weight in South Africa. He believed that President Botha would listen to her. He wondered whether the Prime Minister was yet ready to visit South Africa. The Prime Minister said that she was constantly sending messages to President Botha and would continue to do so. She did not think the time was yet right for her to pay a visit there. There would have to be some forward movement first. It was no good hoping for such movement to result from her visit, because the South Africans would see that as yielding to outside pressure.

Angola/Namibia

The Prime Minister said that the quadripartite negotiations over Angola/Namibia seemed to be registering some progress, although she remained scepitcal of Cuban intentions. It was vital there should be some parallel progress towards internal reconciliation. This was not something that we could influence much from outside. The fact was that UNITA was a genuinely popular movement and must have a role in the future of Angola. She had declined to meet Savimbi because we had full diplomatic relations with the Angolan Government. But from all she heard, he was a man of strong purpose. She wondered whether Zimbabwe could not help towards internal reconciliation.

President Mugabe said there was hardly anything Zimbabwe could do. The position of the Front Line States was that internal reconciliation had to be left to President Dos Santos' judgement. If he was prepared to sit down with Savimbi, well and good. But his present attitude was that Savimbi was a South African puppet and he preferred to deal direct with the puppet master. But he agreed with the Prime Minister that there had been some positive developments. The United Nations Secretary General had returned from his visit to South Africa thinking that movement on Namibia was a

real possibility.

Bilateral Matters

President Mugabe expressed appreciation for our military training programme and hoped it would continue. He also hoped very much that the Prime Minister would take up his invitation to visit Zimbabwe in the coming months. He would really very much like her to come. The Prime Minister said that she was grateful for the invitation and would indeed like to take it up. She would have a look at her programme for the coming year. There were many factors to take into account, including the South African aspect.

The Prime Minister continued that she understood that negotiations on the defence package for Zimbabwe were going well. She hoped that they could be brought to a successful conclusion. President Mugabe nodded but did not comment directly, although he added later that defence had to be one of the highest priorities for government spending in Zimbabwe.

Commonwealth Secretary General

President Mugabe asked whether the Prime Minister had any views on the appointment of a new Commonwealth Secretary General. The Prime Minister said that she did not want to take up a position on this yet. There was still a long time to go before Ramphal needed to be replaced. She rated General Obasanjo very highly, but now that the Nigerian Government had put forward Anayuoku, Obasanjo would presumably not be a candidate. President Mugabe commented that the Nigerians were saving Obasanjo for the post of UN Secretary General. He wondered what the Prime Minister felt about Malcolm Fraser. The Prime Minister said that she wondered whether he would really be suitable for the post. The Secretary General should be the servant of the Commonwealth, not someone who tried to impose his own views. President Mugabe found this highly amusing, commenting that Mr. Fraser might be the servant who turned into the master. The Prime Minister asked whether President Mugabe knew of any other likely candidates, and whether Rajiv Ghandi had yet expressed a view. President Mugabe did not respond directly but commented that both Mr. Mulroney and Mr. Hawke shared the Prime Minister's view that there was no hurry to reach a decision.

I am copying this letter to Alex Allan (H.M. Treasury), Brian Hawtin (Ministry of Defence), Neil Thornton (Department of Trade and Industry) and to Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely

CHARLES POWELL

Lyn Parker Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

cc PC
Bo-Up
(2)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

30 September 1988

Prime Minister
No advice in not to
raise the matter of
Mr. Smith.
N.B. Mrs. Mugabe will not come
until
3/10.

Dear Charles

Call on the Prime Minister by President Mugabe: 1 October

Since my letter of 28 September (in PM box.) we have heard that Mr Ian Smith has been in touch with the press office at No 10 to ask that the Prime Minister raise with President Mugabe recent press reports that there has been a call for Mr Smith to be prevented from returning to Zimbabwe.

The background is that Ian Smith made a public plea during his recent visit to the United States, for more sympathy for South Africa and continued to voice his rejection of the Zimbabwe Government's call for sanctions against South Africa. This led to the issue being raised in the Zimbabwe Senate on 27 September. The leader of the Senate, who is also a junior Minister, is reported as having called for Mr Smith to be barred from returning to Zimbabwe. However the Zimbabwe Herald has quoted President Mugabe as saying that Mr Smith would "remain a free man" as long as he does nothing to subvert the Government. This statement was also carried in the Daily Telegraph on 29 September. Mr Smith is now in Britain and has been invited to address a fringe meeting at the Conservative Party Conference next month.

We believe that it would be both counter-productive and unnecessary for this issue to be raised by the Prime Minister with President Mugabe (even though Mr Smith, a Zimbabwean citizen, who travels on a Zimbabwean passport, has a claim to British citizenship by descent). Mr Mugabe would no doubt regard the matter as an internal issue, and he seems well aware of the damage that would be done to his long-standing policy of racial reconciliation if any action were taken against Mr Smith.

In the unlikely event of Mr Mugabe raising the matter, the Prime Minister might say that Ian Smith had never been easy to handle. She was pleased to note the President's reported statement that Mr Smith would remain

/a

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a free man as long as he did nothing to subvert the Government. If action were taken to prevent him re-entering Zimbabwe this would both damage race relations in Zimbabwe and hand a propaganda victory to Pretoria.

We have just heard from the Zimbabwe High Commissioner that neither the Foreign Minister, Dr Shamuyarira, nor Mrs Mugabe, will now accompany the President on his call on the Prime Minister. The President would however like the Permanent Secretary, Dr Mashingaidze, to attend.

Yours ever,

(L Parker)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

(2)

CHARLES POWELL

30 September 1988

Re Visit

CDP
30/9.

COSTAIN ZIMBABWE

I lunched with Peter Costain today and heard that their Zimbabwe company is in the final round to be awarded a military aircraft shelter project at Chegutu. Its total value is £30M with a British export content of £4M. The main competitor is Red China.

This doesn't sound very large, but Costain is our principal foreign currency earner from contracting, and it would seem a good thing to give them a push. Peter was aware from his peope in the field that the PM is to meet Mugabe soon and asked that she be aware of this contract since its very mention could be of great assistance to them.

GEORGE GUISE

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(2) copy
b-up.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

30 September 1988

mb Rir Minister

No need to read the speech.

Dear Charles,

Call on the Prime Minister by President Mugabe: 1 October CDP 30/9.

President Mugabe's address to the UN General Assembly

/ We have just received the text (attached) of President Mugabe's address to the UN General Assembly on 27 September, of which the Prime Minister will no doubt wish to be aware before her meeting with him on 1 October.

Mr Mugabe was clearly speaking primarily in his role as Chairman of the Non-Aligned Movement and pitched his message accordingly. You may wish to draw the Prime Minister's attention in particular to the following passages:

a) Mr Mugabe's welcome (page 4) for the ceasefire in Angola (which does not of course include the MPLA or UNITA) and his call on South Africa to implement UN SCR 435 on Namibian Indpendence; and

b) his predictable condemnation of apartheid as "the root cause of conflict" (in the region), and his call for comprehensive mandatory sanctions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

Mr Mugabe's speech also included a claim that the industrialised nations were dumping nuclear and toxic wastes in Africa. It was "not fair that the poorest nations should suffer the worst effects of progress" (page 13). He voiced particular concern at nuclear collaboration "between South Africa and certain Western states and Israel", and urged South Africa's suspension from the IAEA General Conference (page 13). If Mr Mugabe should mention either of these points the Prime Minister could say that we publicly condemn the shipment of hazardous waste to any developing country without that country's informed consent and without satisfactory evidence that it can be properly treated on arrival. On nuclear matters we have strictly observed the UN embargo

/since

CONFIDENTIAL

since its introduction in 1977 and the 1985 EC and Commonwealth undertakings which prohibit any new collaboration with South Africa in the nuclear field. We continue to urge South Africa to accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and firmly support the principle of universal IAEA membership.

On the positive side Mr Mugabe welcomed the Toronto proposals, based on the Chancellor's initiative, for dealing with the official debt of the least developed countries which "reflected a sensitivity that we hope will become part of the approach of the industrialised countries to the entire question of developiong world debt crisis".

Angola/Namibia

In my letter of 28 September I referred to the further round of talks in Brazzaville this week. We still await a full report from the Americans. But, on the basis of the initial report we have received, it seems that in four days of tough negotiation some progress has been made in closing the gap between the two sides on a timetable for Cuban Troop Withdrawal though the proposals put forward still require consideration in capitals. A further round of talks in Brazzaville is envisaged. The question of internal reconciliation between the MPLA and UNITA remains a key issue. It seems there is to be a meeting this weekend in Gabon between President Dos Santos and the Presidents of Gabon and the Congo to discuss it.

Yours ever,

(L Parker)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

(1)

ADDRESS BY HIS EXCELLENCY, THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF ZIMBABWE AND CHAIRMAN OF THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT, COMRADE R.G. MUGABE, TO THE 43RD SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY: NEW YORK: 27 SEPTEMBER 1988

Mr President,

Mr Secretary General,

Excellencies,

Distinguished Delegates,

First, I would like to congratulate Your Excellency, Dr. Dante Caputo, upon your election to the Presidency of the forty-third session of the General Assembly. Your elevation to that high office is a reflection, not only of your own proven diplomatic skills, but also of the esteem in which your country, an important Member of the Non-Aligned Movement, is held internationally. We are confident that under your able guidance our endeavours will meet with success.

His Excellency, Mr Peter Florin, has had a remarkably busy watch. Apart from the forty-second regular session, he was called upon to preside over several

../2

and special sessions of the Assembly. He more than justified the confidence that the international community had reposed in him. We are grateful to him.

The Secretary-General, of course, is the very personification of the internationalistic ethic itself. Throughout these turbulent and anxious years that have marked his second term, only Mr Javier Perez de Cuellar's steady and resolute determination has restored the organisation to its present high esteem, even among some of its detractors. Although the fortunes of the United Nations have not quite turned around, we have nevertheless passed the point where the Secretary-General feared he would preside over the dissolution of the United Nations.

Instead, he now presides over peace-talks, from the Gulf War to Afghanistan, Cyprus and Western Sahara, all under the auspices of, or in terms defined by, the United Nations. It is a remarkable achievement, a culmination of that patient and careful diplomatic choreography that has characterised Mr Javier Perez de Cuellar's tenure as Secretary-General. We of the Non-Aligned Countries derive great satisfaction in the achievements of one of the outstanding diplomats of Peru, a key member of our Movement.

../3

Mr President, the "outbreak" of peace in places of seemingly intractable conflict and a resurgence in the fortunes of the United Nations are the central features on the international stage today. In the Gulf War, perhaps the most painful and destructive war since 1945, the guns have fallen silent. The former belligerents now sit together in Geneva, talking peace. The basis of that peace continues to be Security Council Resolution 598 in whose evolution and balanced formulation the caucus of the Non-Aligned Countries in the Security Council played no small role. This cessation of hostilities not only puts an end to the anguish of the peoples of Iran and Iraq and affords those countries an opportunity for reconstruction and development, but also eliminates a dangerous threat to international peace and security. We, therefore, urge the two Non-Aligned countries, also member states of the United Nations, to cooperate with the Secretary-General in the effort to find a durable solution to the conflict.

Pursuant to the Geneva Accords on Afghanistan, negotiated under the auspices of the United Nations by the Secretary-General's special representative, Mr Diego Cordovez, then Under-Secretary for Political Affairs, and now

the distinguished Foreign Minister of Ecuador, another key Non-Aligned country in Latin America, thousands of foreign troops have already left Afghanistan. This not only paves the way for the Afghan people to decide their future free from outside interference, but again removes a threat to international peace and security. We urge all parties to respect the letter and spirit of those accords to ensure that nothing is done which can cause an unravelling of those agreements.

In Southern Africa also, we have seen the tripartite agreement which involves Angola, Cuba and the Pretoria regime and which provides for the withdrawal of South African troops from Angola and possible implementation of the United Nations plan for Namibia. We welcome the declaration of a ceasefire and the end of South Africa's illegal occupation of the sovereign territory of Angola. It is our earnest hope that South Africa will live up to the letter and spirit of the tripartite agreement and will proceed to implement Security Council Resolution 435.

Elsewhere in Africa, thanks to the United Nations, a breakthrough also appears imminent in the 13-year

war over Western Sahara. In particular, we note the proposal by the Secretary-General last month whereby a ceasefire would be declared, followed by a referendum of the citizens of the Western Sahara, including those living in refugee camps. It is also satisfying to note that Morocco and Polisario, the two parties to the conflict, are soon to engage in direct talks as called for by the Organisation of African Unity. We hope it should now be possible to resolve, once and for all, the central question of self-determination for the Saharawi people.

On Kampuchea, too, there are signs of movement. Vietnam has promised to pull out its troops from Kampuchea and the parties involved have held the Jakarta Informal Meeting and are in constant contact on the nature of the post-settlement order in South-East Asia. We in the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries will continue to prod the parties concerned to quicken their search for an honourable solution to the problem. On the vexed question of divided Cyprus, we have recently witnessed some promising stirrings, thanks to the efforts of the Secretary-General. We hope, here too, progress can be made.

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Mr President, the recent relaxation in tension on the international scene has not altered the essence of the problems we face in our region of Africa. The Non-Aligned Movement has always maintained that apartheid is the root cause of conflict, and that peace and security cannot be obtained in Southern Africa until that system is eradicated. The destabilization of the economies of the Frontline States continues unabated. Millions of displaced people, innocent men, women and children, tragic refugees of the evil system of apartheid, are constantly on the run in search of food and security. Only a month ago, I had the privilege of attending the "International Conference on the Plight of Refugees, Returnees and Displaced Persons in Southern Africa" in Oslo, Norway. This was the first Conference of its kind devoted entirely to the problem of refugees in Southern Africa. The Conference established that the number of persons uprooted from their homes by the apartheid regime's acts of destabilisation had reached the tragic figure of 5.4 million. Thousands of old men and women, the sick and little children, the weakest in our societies who cannot make it to safety, perish as victims of the harsh elements or the bayonets of Pretoria's financed bandits.

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In South Africa itself, the majority population continues to be victimized by the apartheid police for no crime other than the colour of their skin. Thousands are incarcerated in apartheid jails. The world must take note and do something. Apartheid cannot be wooed into oblivion but it can only be forcibly taken out by the roots. The only means of doing that, short of war, is the imposition by the entire international community of comprehensive mandatory sanctions under Chapter VII of the Charter. The arguments of those who oppose sanctions sound increasingly hollow and self-serving. Sanctions may cost some blacks and some whites jobs, but there is no doubt they do weaken apartheid. The non-application of sanctions leaves apartheid intact. Apartheid kills. Sanctions can have a powerful psychological effect on the white minority in South Africa. For no man is an island, nor a nation for that matter, not even a nation of unreconstructed racists.

The Middle East is another long-running sore where movement towards peace has been elusive. As Israel has continued to occupy captured Arab and Palestinian lands, the citizens of those occupied territories have met Israeli armour with their bare hands, sustaining

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many casualties. The uprising of the past nine months in the occupied territories is not a simple matter of bravery. No one wants to die. It is a matter of desperation. The Palestinian people, like all human beings, want to exercise their right to self-determination. Israel must withdraw from the occupied territories and let go of the Palestinian nation. It is our view that only the holding of the international peace conference, under the auspices of the United Nations, to address all aspects to the Middle East problem, can bring peace and security for all in the region.

In Central America, the Arias Plan has provided a concrete and viable framework for peace. Negotiations continue, even if intermittently, in countries with an insurgency problem. We note in particular that the Government of Nicaragua has continued to extend its hand to the opposition, asking them to continue negotiations. The ceasefire that was called for by the Plan has repeatedly been extended and is still holding. It would be irresponsible to call for, or cause the abandonment of, that ceasefire. Countries should not resort to the politics of intimidation or diplomacy of violence in the region. It is essential,

for the sake of the people and Governments of Central America, and also for international peace and security, that the Arias Plan be given a chance to succeed.

Foreign troops remain on the Korean Peninsula prolonging the unjustified division of that land and resulting in increased tensions. Therefore, we demand the removal of all foreign troops and call for talks to reunify the peninsula.

Mr President, in an age of apocalyptic destructive power, cooperation to reduce the means of war has become a categorical imperative. The international community has set itself clearly defined priorities in disarmament as contained in the Final Document of the First Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to Disarmament (SSODI) held in 1978. At the top of the list is the need to prevent the outbreak of nuclear war. Non-Aligned States have already stated that the use of nuclear weapons, besides being a violation of the Charter of the United Nations, would also be a crime against humanity. To this end, they have urged all nuclear-weapon States, pending the achievement of nuclear disarmament, to sign a binding instrument foreswearing the use of nuclear weapons. It would

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also be desirable, in the interim, for the nuclear-weapon States to give a solemn declaration that they will not be the first to use, or threaten to use, nuclear weapons. At the same time, the Conference on Disarmament must seek ways of fulfilling its mandate with regard to the item on the prevention of nuclear war with which it has been charged by the General Assembly.

Clearly, as long as the nuclear arms race persists and nuclear arms remain in the arsenals of States, the risk of nuclear war remains with us. For this reason, urgent measures must be taken to effect the cessation of the nuclear arms race and proceed to nuclear disarmament. We welcomed the treaty on the elimination of medium and short range missiles that was concluded between the USSR and USA late last year. That treaty, while of great symbolic importance as representing the first significant step of disarmament in our time, should not detract from the fact that it accounted for a mere 4 percent of nuclear warheads and that the remaining 96 percent, constantly being modernized and made more accurate, lethal and usable, are still with us. The occasion should not be one for mere self-congratulation, but for renewed efforts

to eliminate the remaining, far greater, arsenals of nuclear weapons. To this end, we wish to urge the USA and the USSR to move quickly towards the goal of 50 percent reductions in strategic offensive arsenals, which they have set themselves.

While bilateral negotiations on disarmament are important, success in that forum should not be used to curb the role of the United Nations in that field. The United Nations, as the sole universal forum, has a central role to play in all issues that affect the generality of mankind. To that extent, we profoundly regret that the momentum generated by bilateral negotiations last year was not translated into concrete achievements during the Third Special Session of the Assembly devoted to Disarmament. The Non-Aligned Countries have always believed that bilateral and multilateral negotiations on disarmament should mutually reinforce and complement, and not hinder or preclude, each other. This is particularly so in those disarmament topics of vital importance to all States such as a comprehensive test ban treaty, the prevention of an arms race in outer space, nuclear disarmament, chemical weapons, conventional weapons and the elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament.

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My country is particularly perturbed by the continued nuclecr collaboration between South Africa on the one hand and certain Western States and Israel on the other. As we have all along warned, Pretoria has now publicly admitted that it has the capability to produce nuclear weapons. We, therefore, hope that those responsible for transferring the know-how to the apartheid regime will now desist from any further collaboration with it in this and related spheres. The nuclearisation of South Africa does not only pose a direct danger to our part of the continent, but also hinders the implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearisation of Africa and is a threat to international peace and security as well. The Security Council has responsibilities, under paragraph 61(c) of the Final Document of SSOD 1, to ensure that the implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclecrisation of Africa is not hindered. That body should move at once to institute measures that curb South Africa's continued nuclearisation. Furthermore, we believe that South Africa's offer to the three Non-Proliferation Treaty nuclear weapons States to enter into negotiations on the possibility of its joining the treaty is only a ruse to delay its suspension from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). For that reason, we do not see the

need for any such negotiations and urge the IAEA General Conference to suspend South Africa immediately.

Mr President, while still on the issue of Africa and nuclear weapons, we indignantly protest the callousness shown by the industrialised nations in dumping their nuclear and toxic wastes in Africa. Africa already has enough problems of her own without becoming the garbage bin of the wealthy northern nations. It is not fair that the poorest nations should be the ones to suffer the worst effects of a "progress" in which they do not share.

The Indian Ocean is another region of vital concern to the littoral and hinterland states of the area. Seventeen years after the Assembly adopted the Declaration on the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean is still mired in fruitless squabbles about procedures and methodology. Meanwhile, Great Power militarization of the Ocean is proceeding apace and the envisaged Colombo Conference is repeatedly postponed. Since those who have spoken against the Conference used to cite the focal points of tension around the region as the reason why the Conference could not go ahead, the solutions in Afghanistan and

the Gulf should now pave the way to Colombo. It is our fervent wish that the Conference should not be postponed again from the present target date of 1990.

Mr President, the acute crisis affecting the international economy has not shown any signs of abating during the past year. Growth has continued to be either sluggish, non-existent or even negative in most developing countries. Commodity prices remain well below acceptable levels. External indebtedness continues to exact a heavy toll on the economies of the developing countries. High interest rates have drastically increased the burden of debt service. In addition, resource flows continue to go from the poor of the South to the rich of the North.

The reality of interdependence makes these problems the concern of every country. A solution requires the adoption of a comprehensive set of measures that addresses all aspects of the problem, and is geared towards the resumption and acceleration of growth in the developing and debtor countries. The Official Development Assistance (ODA) target of 0.7% of GNP in financial resource flows from developed to developing countries, which was agreed in the International Development Strategy, must be reached soon, as must the ODA target

of 0.15% of GNP for the least developed countries as agreed in the Substantial New Programme of Action.

In 1986, the General Assembly adopted the United Nations Programme of Action for African Economic Recovery and Development. Great hopes had been attached to that programme, but up to now we have not yet seen any African economic recovery despite the enormous sacrifices that the countries of the region have made during the past two years.

Mr President, only a year ago we were reminded by the World Commission on Environment and Development that poverty was one of the major causes of environmental degradation today. People may be forced to cut down the rain forest by economic necessity in the tropics, but the effects will be felt equally in New York, in London and in Tokyo. There was much talk of the green-house effect this year. The Commission on the Environment told us that a plausible way of reversing that trend may be to raise the standards of living in the Third World.

Unilateral solutions are impossible. What is needed is global dialogue. We of the Non-Aligned Movement

have consistently argued for the multilateral approach. We have called for the resumption of the North-South dialogue. We have called for the convening of an International Conference on Money and Finance with universal participation aimed at meeting the development and financing requirements of the international economy, particularly with regard to the economies of the developing countries. We have also stated that international negotiations on the debt problem, involving both creditor and debtor nations, multilateral financial institutions and international private banks, were a necessary step in the search for a lasting resolution of the current debt problem.

For our part in the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, we stand ready to contribute in any way possible towards the relaunching of dialogue. Earlier on this year, the Non-Aligned Committee on Economic Cooperation met in Harare to assess the state of North-South dialogue and formulate proposals for its revitalization. I commend that important document for your close study and serious consideration.

However, the Non-Aligned Movement forms only part of the family of nations. A comprehensive resolution

of the current crisis in the international economy needs the participation of all Members. It is our hope that the climate of dialogue that has been made possible by the new thaw in super-power relations will spill over to the economic sphere. It was, therefore, with a sense of hope that we noted the gentle breezes blowing from the Group of Seven Summit at Toronto. The proposals from Toronto, though limited, envisaging the cancellation of the official debt of the least developed countries of Sub-Saharan Africa, reflected a sensitivity that we hope will become part of the approach of the industrialised countries to the entire question of developing world debt crisis.

Later this year, the Mid-term Review of the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations will be carried out at a high level meeting to be held in Montreal. That meeting provides a unique opportunity for both the developed and developing countries to assess the development in the current Uruguay Round and to renew their commitments to the search for lasting solutions to the malaise affecting the present international trading system. In these negotiations it is imperative that approaches that seek to negate the spirit of international cooperation or the mutuality of interests between the developed and developing countries be avoided at all cost.

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Attempts to derogate or deviate from long-standing principles and rules of GATT for self interest should be resisted.

Great strides have already been made in recent years in the conceptual appreciation of the threat posed by these economic problems to international peace and security. The time has come to move these concepts to the realm of policy. We of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries stand ready to participate constructively in that process. We trust that others are ready to join with us.

Excellencies, I wish to return to the subject of the United Nations and the concept of multilateralism. The eighties will go down in the history of this century as the decade of a retreat from multilateralism. Many of us would like to believe that this phenomenon of the eighties has now peaked and is on the wane. But sadly, the reality is less reassuring. The UN is still mired in a financial crisis, deliberately engineered. The Secretary-General has been reduced to a virtual street beggar, passing on the hat to keep the organisation from closing its doors. This is most unseemly. Coming at the very time as

the UN role in defusing threats to international peace and security has been on the rise, it is doubly intolerable.

I appeal to all the member States to rally behind the Secretary General by fully honouring the legal obligations they solemnly undertook under the Charter.

On this note Mr President, let me conclude by reaffirming the commitment of the Non-Aligned Movement to the lofty ideals of this body. As you carry out your difficult duties, I wish to assure you of the continued support of the Movement of the Non-Aligned Countries.

THANK YOU.

RGM/rt..


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CONFIDENTIAL

PRIME MINISTER

MEETING WITH PRESIDENT MUGABE

You are to see President Mugabe at Chequers tomorrow. He arrives at 1500 and is due to leave at 1630. He will be accompanied by Mrs. Mugabe, by his Foreign Minister and by the Zimbabwe High Commissioner. Mrs. Mugabe is still waiting for a suitable kidney for her transplant operation at St. Mary's Paddington.

We have provided for the usual photocall on the steps shortly after his arrival. But if the weather is fine, you might like to make it a walk on the lawn. This would provide some good pictures, which would give a clear message of normality in our relations despite differences over South Africa and sanctions. At the start you might:

- compliment him on the performance of the Zimbabwe economy (5 per cent growth likely this year);

- welcome the succes of the unity process and the amnesty in Matabeleland;

- confirm that we will continue our military training;

- refer to the action we took recently to warn the South Africans off from an intended raid on Zimbabwe;

Thereafter there are three main issues to discuss:

- the defence package. We are keen to sell Zimbabwe radar and air defence missiles. The quite substantial additional aid we can offer Mugabe (see below) should be useful bait. But the Zimbabweans seem distrustful of our reliability as a supplier in the event eg. of a South African attack, and are looking once again to the Soviet Union (you should not reveal our knowledge of this last point). The Foreign Office want you to say that if

Zimbabwe was attacked, we would do everything possible to ensure that British companies stood by their obligations to supply. I think that may be too sweeping. Suppose an attack was preceded by some major act of ANC terrorism emanating from Zimbabwe and causing carnage in South Africa? It might be better to say only that we are dependable suppliers, a fact which has been recognised by a wide number of countries, including many in areas of tension and potential conflict, and we value that reputation for dependability;

- regional developments. You will want to focus on Angola/Namibia and developments in South Africa's relations with Mozambique. You will have seen that President Botha is likely to meet other African Heads of State shortly, starting with Mobutu of Zaire. The most pressing need is to encourage internal reconciliation in Angola between Dos Santos and Savimbi. Mugabe could be well placed to help, given his experience of merging ZANU and ZAPU;

- Aid. You are in the happy position of being able to offer Zimbabwe a new aid pledge of £15 million over the next few years for capital projects. We propose a public announcement on Monday. We gave £10 million in 1986 and 1987. Mugabe has a bee in his bonnet about building municipal-type housing in rural areas. We do not think this is a particularly sensible use of aid - simple village housing would be much more appropriate. But since we are also keen to get the radar and missile package for the UK, you will not want to turn down the idea flat if he proposes it. You could simply say that there are to be official talks soon to discuss how the money should be spent. If he asks about programme aid, you can say that we are ready to consider providing more such aid once there is agreement between Zimbabwe and the World Bank, which allows the Bank's policy-based credits to resume.

Finally you should be aware that Ian Smith has expressed concern to several people that he might not be allowed back into Zimbabwe after several very critical speeches in the United States. There has certainly been discussion of this in the Zimbabwe Senate and in the press, but the Zimbabwe government's line so far has been that he has not broken the law so there is nothing to be done. I doubt there is much to be gained by raising the matter with Mugabe.

Further briefing is in the folder.

eDP

C. D. POWELL

30 September 1988

PM3ACD

1. **MR POWELL**

2. **PRIME MINISTER**

Sir John Junor, of the Sunday Express, telephoned me this morning following a conversation he had had with Ian Smith as it was thought you were having a meeting with President Mugabe today.

John Junor said that Ian Smith, who was spending a few days in London, had heard that the Senate in Zimbabwe had decided not to let him back into the country because of the speeches he had made while in the US against sanctions saying they would hurt his country more than South Africa.

Shortly before John Junor's telephone call the Press Office received a similar call from John Carlisle MP asking if the Prime Minister was to meet President Mugabe today. He later spoke to Mark.

The FCO say that a Question was asked in the Zimbabwe Senate about Ian Smith's speeches to which the reply was that as long as he did not break the law there was not much that could be done about it. I understand that a leader in the Salisbury Herald was highly critical of Ian Smith and called for his exclusion from the country.

TJP

TERRY J PERKS
Deputy Press Secretary

28 September 1988

MR POWELL

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John Carlisle approached me yesterday to say that Ian Smith had rung him to express the hope that the Prime Minister would raise with Mr Mugabe, during their meeting, the suggestions made by some persons in Zimbabwe that Ian Smith should be imprisoned on his return to that country.

I appreciate, of course, that you know of Ian Smith's concern from but I wished you to be aware that John Carlisle is involved as well.

MLB

MARK LENNOX-BOYD
29.9.88

CONFIDENTIAL

cc BUKP
PC

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

28 September 1988

Dear Charles,

Call on the Prime Minister by President Mugabe: 1 October 1988

President Mugabe is due to call on the Prime Minister at 3.00 pm on Saturday, 1 October at Chequers. He will be accompanied by his wife, the Zimbabwe Foreign Minister, Dr Shamuyarira, and the Zimbabwe High Commissioner, Dr Murerwa. Mr Mugabe is in Britain breaking his journey to Zimbabwe from New York where he has been attending the United Nations General Assembly. The Prime Minister last saw Mr Mugabe on 26 April this year at No 10.

Objectives

The Foreign Secretary believes the Prime Minister's meeting with Mr Mugabe will be particularly timely in view of the cancellation of his own visit to Zimbabwe which had been scheduled for earlier this month. It will be an opportunity to reassure President Mugabe of our good faith as a supplier of equipment to meet Zimbabwe's air defence needs. The Prime Minister will wish to inform Mr Mugabe of a new £15 million pledge of British project aid to Zimbabwe which the Foreign Secretary was to have announced during his visit.

It will also be useful to discuss regional developments in Southern Africa, particularly the quadripartite negotiations on Angola/Namibia, and recent developments in relations between Mozambique and South Africa. Mr Mugabe may voice his concern at continuing South African efforts to interfere in Zimbabwe's affairs.

The Foreign Secretary saw Mr Mugabe in New York on 26 September and gave him an account of his recent visit to Africa. He found Mr Mugabe sceptical about South African intentions on the Nkomati Accord and Angola/Namibia. Mr Mugabe was critical of President Reagan for not mentioning South Africa in his speech to the General Assembly, but generally muted on sanctions.

/Mr Mugabe

Mr Mugabe asked for further British aid for rural development and said he intended to broach the subject with the Prime Minister.

Bilateral

Apart from our continuing disagreement over sanctions, which Mr Mugabe has repeatedly said should not be allowed to impinge on our overall relationship, there are no major bilateral problems between us and the Prime Minister's last meeting with Mr Mugabe on 26 April was particularly friendly. However, the relationship remains volatile and could change overnight, e.g. if the sanctions issue came to the fore again after the election of a Dukakis administration.

The Prime Minister may wish to refer to the Foreign Secretary's disappointment at having to cancel his proposed visit to Zimbabwe in mid-September. Both President Mugabe and Dr Shamuyarira, his Foreign Minister, would have been out of the country at the time. It is likely that Mr Mugabe will reiterate his invitation to the Prime Minister to visit Zimbabwe. The Foreign Secretary has of course seen your letter of 19 September to Stephen Wall about the Prime Minister's visits abroad in 1989. A reply is in preparation. But he hopes the Prime Minister will keep open the possibility of a visit to Southern Africa in Spring or early Summer, well before CHOGM.

Air Defence Package

The Prime Minister will recall her discussion last year with Mr Mugabe on Zimbabwe's air defence needs. The Zimbabweans are still in the market for a system of radar and air defence missiles and, perhaps in slower time, an air defence aircraft. The stiffest competition in radar and missiles comes from the Chinese who are offering 1960s technology on very soft terms. Mr Mugabe has told us that the Chinese offer is attractive. While we cannot compete with the Chinese on credit terms or costs, our aim is to convince the Zimbabweans of the marked technical superiority of the British equipment. Lord Trefgarne went to Harare in August to lobby on behalf of a British package worth about £120 million (Plessey/Marconi radars, BAe Rapier and Shorts Javelin), and to reinforce assurances already given that, in the event of Zimbabwe being the victim of aggression by any

/of

of her neighbours, HMG would make every effort to ensure the continued supply from Britain of spare parts and ammunition for any item of defence equipment obtained from Britain. We have pointed out, and the Prime Minister may wish to tell Mr Mugabe, that the Chinese already buy from us one of the radars (Plessey Watchman) which the Zimbabweans are interested. But the Zimbabweans remain suspicious of our reliability as a supplier in the event of conflict with South Africa, and this factor could well be crucial in determining the Zimbabweans decision.

The Foreign Secretary thinks it would, therefore, be very useful for the Prime Minister herself to tell Mr Mugabe that, if Zimbabwe should be attacked, we would do everything possible to ensure that British companies stood by their obligations to maintain supply. She could point out that we are now the world's second largest supplier of arms in the free world and have built up a reputation for reliability second to none.

If Mr Mugabe questions the terms of the package, the Prime Minister could say that we regard the terms on offer, as spelled out in Lord Trefgarne's letter of 26 May 1988 to Mr Nkala (Zimbabwe Defence Minister), to be very generous. We believe they compare favourably with terms likely to be available from our main Western competitors. Mr Mugabe will no doubt appreciate that continuous movements in interest rates occur and we might therefore need to look again at the terms in the light of such changes. We would of course continue to ensure that they were as generous as possible.

Meanwhile, the risk of Zimbabwe deciding after all to go for a purchase of Soviet Mig 29s (or possibly Mig 23s whose recent performance in Angola is likely to have impressed Mr Mugabe) remains.
the Zimbabwean Air Force Chief

But the Prime Minister might ask Mr Mugabe whether he has had any further thoughts on the offer she made at their meeting on 28 June 1987 to help Zimbabwe with the supply of modified Sea Harriers or Hawk 200s. If Mr Mugabe should himself refer to the possibility of a Soviet aircraft purchase, the Prime Minister might say that in

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our view this would have the undesirable effect of further internationalising the problems in the region and increasing tension with South Africa.

The Foreign Secretary believes that the meeting with Mr Mugabe could be crucial in deciding the fate of the air defence package. Mr Mugabe's view on the acceptability of the British offer is likely to be influenced by the general thrust of the Prime Minister's approach during the meeting, not just what she says on the air defence package itself.

Military Training Assistance

Mr Mugabe continues to be very appreciative of our training of the Zimbabwe army through BMATT and of our involvement in the training of Mozambican companies in Zimbabwe. The third Mozambican company, with a battalion command element, has just completed its training at Nyanga and is due to join the first two companies soon on the Limpopo line. All three companies have been provided with a package of non-lethal items, including boots, uniforms, medical kit and communications equipment. The Foreign Secretary met a contingent of Nyanga trained troops on the Limpopo line during his recent visit to Mozambique. They continue to acquit themselves well against RENAMO.

The Prime Minister may wish to assure Mr Mugabe of our continuing commitment to provide military training both for the Zimbabwe army and for elements of the Mozambican armed forces. She could say that we much appreciate the logistic support of the Zimbabwe army at Nyanga without which BMATT's training of Mozambican companies would not be possible. We regard the operation as an outstanding example of practical cooperation between our three countries.

Aid

The Foreign Secretary considers that the meeting would be a suitable occasion for the Prime Minister to offer a significant new aid pledge for Zimbabwe of £15 million, intended for capital projects over the next few years. It is proposed to announce the new aid pledge publicly on Monday, 3 October.

/The

The Foreign Secretary had intended to announce this new pledge in Harare had his visit gone ahead. In offering the new grant, the Prime Minister may wish to recall the grants of £10 million made in both 1986 and 1987 and to underline that this further pledge is a practical token of our commitment to the development of Zimbabwe, along with our substantial programme of technical co-operation.

The Prime Minister should be aware of Mr Mugabe's close interest in rural housing projects. He told the Foreign Secretary in New York of his campaign to replace "simple huts" in rural areas with "proper housing" and that the campaign was faltering for lack of money, despite £30 million having been spent. Mr Mugabe hopes that further aid will be given for this and he can be expected to broach the subject with the Prime Minister.

We are not attracted by Mr Mugabe's proposals for municipal housing in the rural areas of Zimbabwe; developments of this kind raise difficult questions of levels of rent and choice of tenant. But in view of the overall importance of this meeting and in particular the possibility that it could secure the radar and missile package for Britain, the Foreign Secretary believes the Prime Minister should avoid giving a direct rebuff to Mr Mugabe. Instead, she could say that Britain has supported programmes of re-settlement and rural development in Zimbabwe since independence. We expect that work on identifying proposals for the new £15 million pledge will begin at the UK/Zimbabwe aid talks due in Harare on 12/13 October. No doubt agreement can be reached there on projects to be financed from the new pledge.

It would also be useful for the Prime Minister to refer to the pledge of £15 million for Phase II of the rehabilitation of the Limpopo railway (running from the Zimbabwe border to Maputo) which the Foreign Secretary announced in Maputo on 18 September. The railway routes through Mozambique are crucial to Zimbabwe's efforts to reduce its dependence on South Africa as a conduit for its import and export trade. We have been very pleased at the close co-operation between Zimbabwe and Britain which has characterised the first phase of this project, now nearing completion.

/President

President Mugabe may ask about Britain's willingness to renew programme aid (balance of payments support) to Zimbabwe bearing in mind that all other major Western donors provide such assistance for Zimbabwe (the US having recently agreed to resume it on a small scale). The Prime Minister might say that the UK is ready to consider providing aid of this kind once Zimbabwe has reached an agreement on economic policies with the World Bank which will allow the Bank's policy-based credits to resume. This approach is consistent with our general policy on the provision of balance of payments support in sub-Saharan Africa, a line reiterated by the Foreign Secretary in all the countries he visited during his recent tour. The Prime Minister should be aware that this is a position which Zimbabwe does not find easy to accept, but the pledge of project aid may sweeten the pill.

Internal Political and Economic

Despite some unease about a lack of political direction, Mr Mugabe's position remains unchallenged. Following the endorsement in April of the Unity Agreement between Zanu and Zapu by the congresses of both parties, Zimbabwe has become virtually a de facto one-party state (though there still remains one opposition MP). Paradoxically, the Unity Agreement has brought about greater openness and freer debate in Zimbabwe. There are signs that new political links across the old tribal divisions are being formed. Zimbabwe is experiencing its own Glasnost and Perestroika.

Meanwhile, In Matabeleland, the amnesty announced in April seems to have ended the long running dissident violence. 90% of the bandits have surrendered and efforts are being made to rehabilitate them into civilian life. But the Government remain nervous about South African interference. They are also worried by continuing RENAMO raids along Zimbabwe's Eastern borders.

Zimbabwe Economy

After a period of stagnation, the Zimbabwean economy, helped by excellent rains last year, has started to expand again and GDP growth of approximately 5% is forecast for this year. Unlike many African countries, Zimbabwe has a good record on debt repayment. However, major problems remain. Education, defence and subsidies

(mainly for agriculture and the parastatals) absorb over 70% of recurrent Government expenditure. The budget deficit, projected to remain unchanged at 9% of GDP, is too high. Unemployment is an increasingly serious problem. Major structural changes are needed to set the economy on a path of steady growth, and it seems clear that Mr Mugabe is reluctant to implement them, although the Government has recently established a committee to examine possible trade liberalisation measures. There are also signs that Zimbabwe's sometimes difficult relations with the World Bank and the IMF are now improving. But the Government, and in particular President Mugabe, remain ambivalent in their attitude to foreign investment.

The Prime Minister may wish to compliment President Mugabe on the success of the Unity process and of the amnesty in Matabeleland and ask him how he now sees the way ahead both on the political and economic fronts. But the Foreign Secretary believes that he would be liable to react badly if pressed on the need for structural reform or on foreign investment.

Miss Forsyth

We are still trying to secure an Angolan exit visa for Miss Forsyth, a dual British/South African citizen who has sought refuge from the ANC in our Embassy in Luanda. Miss Forsyth, who was born in London and has full British citizenship, escaped from ANC captivity in Angola in May after 22 months detention. We have repeatedly asked the Angolan Government (most recently when the Foreign Secretary saw Foreign Minister Mbinda on 6 September) to issue an exit visa so that she could come to Britain as she has requested. We understand that Miss Forsyth's case may be discussed at a summit of FLS members proposed for next month. We believe the Angolan failure to let Miss Forsyth go is due to pressure from the ANC who are interested in the possibility of a prisoner exchange with South Africa. (We have made it clear that we are wholly opposed to any kind of deal.) We have however just heard from Luanda that President Dos Santos plans to send an emissary to London next week with a message from the President to the Prime Minister containing what the Angolan Foreign Minister has described as "very good news". The Ambassador has said such an emissary would be welcome in London. Meanwhile the Foreign Secretary took the opportunity of his meeting

/with

with President Mugabe on 26 September to seek Mugabe's help with the Angolans and make clear to them our unwillingness to do deals. Mugabe made no commitment.

The Foreign Secretary had intended to suggest that the Prime Minister should raise the Forsyth case with Mugabe. However as he has now done so himself, and as we now have news of a message from Dos Santos, this is perhaps less necessary, though we should not assume that the problem is about to be resolved. If President Mugabe should refer to it the Prime Minister might say that the case is already imposing a strain on our relations with Angola and is a wholly unnecessary diversion at a time when we should all be concentrating on helping forward the process of resolving the region's major problems.

If President Mugabe should refer to Miss Forsyth's activities as a South African agent, the Prime Minister could say that as far as we are concerned, she is a British citizen who has sought our protection. Even if she was acting for the SAG the wide publicity which the case has received means that she is now blown, and of no further use to them.

Angola/Namibia

Dr Crocker continues to work for agreement on a timetable for Cuban troop withdrawal (CTW). A further round of talks is taking place in Brazzaville this week but we have had no reports so far on its progress. When it began the South African and Angolan positions were still far apart, and the agreed date (1 November) for implementation of the UN Plan for Namibian independence seems bound to slip. Internal reconciliation in Angola looks increasingly the key to a settlement: progress in this area would create a better climate for agreement on CTW, and could help solve the related issue of continuing US aid to UNITA. We are, therefore, encouraging a number of African governments to persuade President Dos Santos to be more flexible in his attitude to UNITA. The UN Secretary General visited South Africa this week, to discuss progress towards the implementation of the UN Plan for the independence of Namibia. He also visited Angola. The visit should have been helpful as a demonstration of UN impartiality and support for the negotiating process.

/Mugabe

Mugabe may be resistant to any suggestion that he might intervene to urge President Dos Santos to be more flexible over UNITA. He also told the Foreign Secretary in New York that he thought the South Africans would use delaying tactics in the negotiations. But the Prime Minister may nevertheless wish to sound him out further about the prospects for a solution. She could say that we strongly support the US-led negotiations and were glad to have been able to facilitate the first round of the quadripartite talks in London in May which got the process off the ground. The talks have already achieved the disengagement of Cuban and South African forces, and the withdrawal of South African forces from Angola - more than seemed possible a few months ago. We have constantly urged the SAG to be flexible over the timetable for CTW and not to let slip this opportunity to bring at last peace to Angola, independence to Namibia and new hope to the region as a whole. We stand ready to help with the peace process inside Angola but believe that African leaders are best placed to help move it forward. In our judgement the quadripartite talks have now reached the stage where further decisive progress on a timetable for CTW depends on there being some movement towards internal peace in Angola. Could not the unity process between ZANU and ZAPU in Zimbabwe provide a possible model for Angola?

South Africa/Mozambique

The Foreign Secretary had a useful meeting with President Chissano in Maputo. He believes Chissano is genuinely committed to a policy of close co-operation with the South Africans and is prepared to give Botha the benefit of the doubt. There are indications however that President Mugabe remains sceptical about South Africa's intentions.

The Prime Minister might say that we have been encouraged by the recent meeting between Presidents Botha and Chissano in Mozambique (their first) and have consistently urged on Pretoria the need to improve relations with Mozambique and observe the letter and the spirit of the Nkomati Accord. The more President Botha is engaged in constructive co-operation with the Mozambican Government, the more difficult it will be for elements in his military to continue any support for RENAMO. If Mr Mugabe should claim that there is

continuing SAG support for RENAMO, the Prime Minister could say that, if the Zimbabweans are willing to share with us any hard evidence they discover of it, we would be willing to confront the SAG with that evidence.

The Prime Minister should be aware that, according to the SAG, President Botha will pay a one day visit to Zaire for talks with President Mobutu on 1 October. There is also press speculation that after Mobutu, he hopes to have meetings with Presidents Kaunda and Dos Santos.

South Africa

The Prime Minister may wish to make clear our disappointment and concern at the unacceptably slow pace of reform in South Africa. President Botha is paralysed by fear of the right; little progress can be expected until after the municipal elections on 26 October. Only then will we see whether the South African Government are prepared to return to the path of reform as we are pressing them to do. There are signs that the SAG are trying to find a way to release Nelson Mandela: we continue to urge them to do so soon and unconditionally.

If Mr Mugabe raises sanctions, the Prime Minister could reply that she understands the frustrations of those who see no alternative to sanctions. But we believe our policy of advocacy, pressure and aid to be the only way forward. Punitive sanctions - and ANC violence - can only make things worse and further delay the abolition of apartheid which we all seek.

The Prime Minister may wish to refer to the action we took (FCO telno 185 to Pretoria attached) on 23 September (after receiving a tip off) to warn the Zimbabweans of that we had heard of the possibility of a SADF raid to rescue certain South African agents from a jail in Harare. We also warned off the South Africans from proceeding with the raid. Our informant had told us that British mercenaries were to have taken part. Mr Mugabe told the Foreign Secretary in New York that he was very grateful for our action which had enabled the Zimbabweans to make defensive preparations.

Despite our pre-emptive action, it is possible that Mr Mugabe may express concern at South Africa's earlier use of agents within Zimbabwe (including certain dual

/British

British/Zimbabwean nationals) for attacks on ANC and Zimbabwean targets. In June, the Zimbabweans foiled an apparently South African backed attempt to rescue five of their agents from gaol in Zimbabwe. The Zimbabweans have privately expressed their dismay that two of those involved in the plot had entered Zimbabwe from South Africa on British passports. The Zimbabwe Home Affairs Minister, Mr Mahachi, told the Zimbabwe parliament in July that "subversives and saboteurs" working against his country included some British nationals exploiting our excellent bilateral relations.

The Prime Minister should rebut any suggestion that we are knowingly issuing passports to South African agents. She could point out we estimate that there are some 300,000 British nationals resident in South Africa and perhaps as many as 500,000 more may be entitled to a British passport. We cannot be expected to monitor the activities of all of these. She could assure Mr Mugabe that Mr Renwick has made clear our concern to the South Africans about the use being made of British passports and that we continue vigorously to condemn South African cross-border violations.

Mrs Mugabe

Mrs Mugabe is still waiting for St. Mary's Hospital, Paddington to find a suitable kidney for her organ transplant operation. She suffers from a rare condition which makes finding a matching organ very difficult. Meanwhile, Mrs Mugabe is obliged to undergo routine dialysis. Should a matching kidney be found, the costs of the operation will be met privately. The NHS is involved in helping to find a suitable kidney as Mrs Mugabe was once an NHS employee.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,

(L Parker)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

SECRET
FM FCO
TO FLASH PRETORIA
TELNO 185
OF 231800Z SEPTEMBER 88
AND TO FLASH HARARE, MAPUTO
AND TO DESKBY 240600Z GABORONE, LUSAKA

FCO TELNO 183 TO YOU AND 552 TO MAPUTO: POSSIBLE SOUTH AFRICAN RAID

1. IN THE LIGHT OF NEW INFORMATION IT NOW SEEMS ALMOST CERTAIN THAT THE POSSIBLE RAID INVOLVES NOT MAPUTO BUT A FURTHER ATTEMPT TO RESCUE SOUTH AFRICAN AGENTS IMPRISONED IN HARARE. THERE IS NO LONGER ANY REASON TO BELIEVE A RAID WILL TAKE PLACE AS SOON AS 24 SEPTEMBER BUT IT IS SAID TO BE IMMINENT. WE STILL ASSUME, THAT BRITISH NATIONALS AND MERCENARIES RECRUITED IN THE UK WOULD BE INVOLVED.

2. THE CASE FOR SPEAKING NOW TO THE SOUTH AFRICANS THUS REMAINS COMPELLING (THIS IS GIVEN FURTHER EMPHASIS BY GABORONE TELNO 278, NOW BEING REPEATED TO HARARE). THE IMPLICATIONS FOR UK/ZIMBABWE RELATIONS CARRY ADDITIONAL WEIGHT. YOU SHOULD THEREFORE APPROACH THE DFA THIS EVENING BARNARD SHOULD BE CONTACTED IN PARALLEL. WE ALSO CONTINUE TO FAVOUR SPEAKING TO GELDENHUYS (WHO IN THE LIGHT OF NEW INFORMATION POINTING TO HARARE MAY BE PRIVY TO THE EXERCISE).
THE FOLLOWING ADAPTED POINTS SHOULD BE MADE:

A) WE HAVE HEARD OF AN IMPENDING RAID INTO ZIMBABWE.

B) WE ARE PARTICULARLY DISTURBED TO LEARN OF THE REPORTED INVOLVEMENT OF BRITISH NATIONALS, INCLUDING MERCENARIES APPARENTLY RECRUITED IN THE UK:

C) IF SUCH A RAID WERE TO TAKE PLACE AND INVOLVE BRITISH NATIONALS AND MERCENARIES RECRUITED IN THE UK IT WOULD HAVE A SERIOUS EFFECT ON UK/SOUTH AFRICAN RELATIONS. YOU SHOULD DRAW ATTENTION TO YOUR EARLIER EXPRESSIONS OF CONCERN ON THIS POINT:

D) IN ORDER TO MAXIMISE THE IMPACT ON YOUR INTERLOCUTORS YOU SHOULD OFFER AS FULL AN ACCOUNT AS IS POSSIBLE AND PRUDENT OF THE DETAILS OF THE RAID AS WE UNDERSTAND THEM, MENTIONING

28. IX.
PM 8 8

THIS IS A COPY. THE ORIGINAL IS RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3 (4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT

E) A RAID INTO ZIMBABWE WOULD HAVE A VERY ADVERSE EFFECT ON SOUTH AFRICA'S RELATIONS IN THE REGION AT A TIME WHEN THEY ARE TRYING TO IMPROVE THEM AND HAVE INVESTED MUCH EFFORT ESPECIALLY OVER ANGOLA/NAMIBIA AND WITH MOZAMBIQUE.

3. IN THESE CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES THERE SEEMS LESS POINT IN SEEKING AN ASSURANCE (PARA 2F IN TUR). FIRST, SOUTH AFRICA IS LESS LIKELY TO BE DETERRED FROM THE KIND OF RAID WE NOW THINK MAY BE IMMINENT (THOUGH THE EFFORT IS WORTH MAKING). SECONDLY, IF THE TARGET IS INDEED TO BE HARARE VARIOUS CONSIDERATIONS OBLIGE US TO WARN THE ZIMBABWEANS ANYWAY WITHOUT WAITING TO SEE HOW THE SOUTH AFRICANS REACT TO OUR APPROACH. HOWEVER, YOU SHOULD MAKE CLEAR TO THE SOUTH AFRICANS THAT WE WOULD DEPLORE AN ATTACK ON ANY FLS, PARTICULARLY AT THE PRESENT TIME. FOR THAT REASON AND ALSO, MOST IMPORTANTLY, BECAUSE OF THE INVOLVEMENT OF BRITISH NATIONALS AND MERCENARIES RECRUITED IN THE UK, SUCH A RAID WOULD HAVE GRAVE IMPLICATIONS FOR OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS. YOU SHOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT THE GAME IS UP AND THAT WE EXPECT THE SOUTH AFRICANS TO CALL A HALT TO ANY OPERATION THEY MAY HAVE IN MIND. IF THEY ARE LED TO EXPECT THAT WE ARE TELLING THE ZIMBABWEANS THIS DOES NOT MATTER, BUT YOU SHOULD NOT CONFIRM IT.

4. FOR MAPUTO: IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE, NO NEED FOR ACTION BY YOU AT PRESENT.

5. FOR HARARE: IN VIEW OF THE CONSIDERATIONS REFERRED TO IN PARA 3 ABOVE, OF WHICH YOU ARE AWARE, AND IN THE ABSENCE OF MUGABE AND SHAMUYARIRA, YOU SHOULD NOW SEEK AN IMMEDIATE APPOINTMENT (THIS EVENING IF POSSIBLE) WITH MUZENDA, SEKERAMAYI, OR WHOEVER YOU THINK MOST APPROPRIATE IN THE ZIMBABWE GOVERNMENT. YOU SHOULD SPEAK ON THE FOLLOWING LINES TAILORED FROM OUR TELNO 552 TO MAPUTO:-

- YOU SHOULD SAY THAT WE HAVE OBTAINED INFORMATION WHICH WE CANNOT FULLY EVALUATE BUT WHICH POINTS TO A POSSIBLE IMMINENT RAID FROM SOUTH AFRICAN TERRITORY,POSSIBLY ON CHIKURUBI PRISON IN HARARE.

- IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE RAIDING PARTY MAY INCLUDE A NUMBER OF BRITISH MERCENARIES, A FEATURE WHICH WE WOULD STRONGLY DEPLORE.

THIS IS A COPY. THE ORIGINAL IS RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3 (4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT

- WE HAVE NO REASON TO BELIEVE THAT PLANS FOR A RAID HAVE BEEN AUTHORISED FROM THE TOP.

- WE ARE SEEKING URGENTLY TO TAKE PROPHYLACTIC ACTION IN PRETORIA TO PREVENT SUCH A RAID. HOWEVER WE CANNOT BE SURE THAT WE WILL SUCCEED.
- WE HAVE DECIDED THAT THE ZIMBABWEAN GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE WARNED SO THAT IT CAN TAKE ALL NECESSARY COUNTER MEASURES.
- WE LACK FURTHER DETAILS BUT SHALL, OF COURSE, KEEP YOU INFORMED IF WE OBTAIN ANY FURTHER INFORMATION.

HOWE

XXXX

YYYY

DISTRIBUTION 70

MAIN 68

LIMITED
SAFD
CAFD
PUSD
NEWS D
PS

PS/MRS CHALKER
PS/PUS
MR MUNRO
MR BOYD
MR FAIRWEATHER

ADDITIONAL 2

ASSESSMENTS STAFF,
(CABINET OFFICE)

OVERSEAS AND DEFENCE
(CABINET OFFICE)

NNNN

PRIME MINISTER

NEXT WEEKEND

I have now had confirmation from the Foreign Office that Mr. Mugabe will be able to come to tea on Saturday. I have therefore told Dot that he will be there at 3.00 pm.

Dot mentioned to me that your bedroom is still "drying out". She therefore thinks it best if you stay in bedroom 3 for this coming weekend.

I understand from John Whittingdale that you wish him, Mark Lennox-Boyd, Robert Harris ., and John Gummer to come down to Chequers on Sunday. Could you let me know what time you would like them to be there? Would you like to start the meeting at 10.00 am and go on until tea; or would you prefer to start at 9.30 am and hopefully stop at lunch time? (With the Saturday afternoon and evening taken up you will not have had much of a weekend, so it may be best to go for the second option if possible - given that you will no doubt be speech writing the following weekend).

Tessa

TESSA GAISMAN

27 September 1988

MR. POWELL

Lyn Parker phoned to say that Mugabe has, for reasons unspecified, had to change his plans and will now be passing through London only between 1200 and 1800 on Friday, 30 September. Since the Prime Minister is out that day at Brize Norton and then opening a school in Berkhamstead, we are working on the assumption that the Mugabe call is now off but I told Lyn I would let you know.

(D.C.B. MORRIS)

23 September 1988

MRS. GAISMAN

Would you please note that tea for President Mugabe at Chequers on 1 October will now be at 3pm and there will be a total of four Zimbabwean guests.

C. D. POWELL

15 September 1988

CONFIDENTIAL

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

15 September 1988

VISIT OF PRESIDENT MUGABE

I have seen Harare telegram number 428 listing those whom President Mugabe would like to bring with him to Chequers on 1 October. The Prime Minister has agreed to this, but I should be grateful if you could make clear to the Zimbabweans that we cannot accommodate a large administrative or security tail at Chequers.

C. D. Powell

R. N. Peirce, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

072370
MDHIAN 3529

Prime Minister
Agree to this?
Yes CDM.

CONFIDENTIAL
FM HARARE
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 428
OF 140845Z SEPTEMBER 88

MY TELNO 422: MUGABE'S CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER

1. AT THE AIRPORT LAST NIGHT TO SAY GOODBYE TO PRESIDENT MUGABE, DR NDANGA ASKED ME WHETHER WE COULD AGREE TO THE PRESIDENT BRINGING ONE EXTRA PERSON ON HIS CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER ON 1 OCTOBER. THE PRESIDENT, WHO WOULD BE ACCOMPANIED BY MRS MUGABE, WANTED TO HAVE DR SHAMUYARIRA WITH HIM AND WOULD ALSO LIKE THE ZIMBABWEAN HIGH COMMISSIONER IN LONDON, HERBERT MUREWA ALONG AS WELL. MOSTLY TO TAKE A NOT, WITHOUT WHICH LITTLE OF THE DISCUSSION WOULD BE PASSED ON TO ZIMBABWEAN MINISTRIES HERE.
NDANGA KNEW THAT I HAD SPECIFIED ONLY ONE OTHER BUT ASKED WHETHER AN EXCEPTION COULD BE MADE ON THIS OCCASION. I SAID THAT I WOULD PASS THIS ON. I HOPE THE P.M. CAN AGREE SEMI CLN IT WIS IN OUR INTEREST TO HAVE THE MEETING CORRECTLY REPORTED TO THE CIVIL SERVANTS WHO OTHERWISE WILL TAKE NO ACCOUNT OF THE MEETING.
NDANGA ASKED THAT OUR DECISION MIGHT BE RELAYED TO HIM HERE AS WELL AS TO THE PRESIDENT'S PARTY.

2. I WAS INCIDENTALLY RELIEVED TO NOTE THAT THE BOEING 707 TAKING THE PRESIDENT AND HIS PARTY TO GATWICK WAS HUSHKITTED. I HAD TOLD NDANGA LAST WEEK THAT I HOPE WE WOULD NOT HAVE A REPETITION OF THE EMBARRASSING ARRIVAL OF THE PRESIDENT IN A NON-HUSHKITTED 707.

MELHUISH

YYYY

DISTRIBUTION 41

MAIN 40

LIMITED
CAFD
PROTOCOL
NEWS

PS
PS/MRS CHALKER
PS/PUS
MR MUNRO

072370
MDHIAN 3529

ADDITIONAL 1

PS NO 10 DOWNING ST

NNNN

MRS GAISMAN

12/9

President Mugabe will not be coming to see the Prime Minister on 13 September as planned. The Prime Minister has instead decided to offer him tea at Chequers on Saturday 1 October.

I should be grateful if you could notify Chequers in due course.

CDP

C. D. POWELL

8 September 1988

RESTRICTED

file KAY

bc. PC
TG

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

8 September 1988

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT MUGABE

I have seen Harare telegram 416 saying that it will not be possible for President Mugabe to meet the Prime Minister on 13 September, but that he would be available at the end of the month.

I have discussed this again with the Prime Minister. She cannot see President Mugabe on Friday 30 September since she is out of London virtually all day. She will be at Chequers on Saturday 1 October when she will give a working lunch for President Mubarak. She has agreed, with some reluctance, to invite President Mugabe to tea at Chequers at 4.00 pm that day, after which he could no doubt go to Heathrow for his flight to Harare. The invitation would be limited to President Mugabe (and Mrs. Mugabe if she is accompanying him) plus one. The Prime Minister envisages that the meeting would last about an hour or a maximum of 1½ hours.

I should be grateful if this proposal could be put to President Mugabe, emphasising that the Prime Minister has gone out of her way to try to accommodate him.

(C. D. POWELL)

Lyn Parker, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

RESTRICTED

cc PC

071509Z
COPY FOR PS/PM
COMMENT

CONFIDENTIAL
FM HARARE
TO DESKBY 071445Z FCO
TELNO 416
OF 071345Z SEPTEMBER 88

YOUR TELNO 279: POSSIBLE CALL BY MUGABE ON THE PRIME MINISTER

SUMMARY

1. NO RESPONSE YET FROM MUGABE BUT MEETING ON 13 SEPTEMBER SEEMS MOSTLY UNLIKELY. ONLY POSSIBILITY WOULD BE AT END OF MONTH.

DETAIL

2. I PASSED THE MESSAGE IN TUR TO PRESIDENT MUGABE YESTERDAY VIA THE ACTING PERMANENT SECRETARY AT THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, NDANGA, WHO SEES MUGABE EVERY MORNING. I STRESSED THE DIARY DIFFICULTIES FOR THE PRIME MINISTER BUT SAID THAT SHE WAS VERY KEEN TO CATCH HIM ON HIS WAY THROUGH LONDON.

3. NDANGA TOLD ME TODAY THAT, AS MUGABE HAD LEFT EARLY IN THE MORNING FOR BULAWAYO, HE HAD BEEN UNABLE TO SPEAK TO HIM THIS MORNING. HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT THE CHANCES OF MUGABE GETTING TO LONDON ON TUESDAY 13 SEPTEMBER IN TIME TO SEE THE PRIME MINISTER AT 1630 WAS SMALL. THE POPE LEAVES HARARE AT 9 AM THAT MORNING AND MUGABE WILL SEE HIM OFF. HE THEN PLANS TO TRAVEL OVERNIGHT TO LONDON WHERE ON 14 SEPTEMBER HE WILL PICK UP A TRANS-ATLANTIC FLIGHT TO NEW YORK.

4. NDANGA WENT ON TO SAY THAT AT PRESENT MUGABE'S RETURN PLANS WOULD GET HIM TO LONDON AT 0830 HOURS ON FRIDAY 30 SEPTEMBER. HE WOULD THEN SPEND THE REST OF FRIDAY AND ALL SATURDAY 1 OCTOBER IN LONDON UNTIL THE DEPARTURE OF THE REGULAR AIR ZIMBABWE FLIGHT TO HARARE THAT EVENING. DESPITE MY POINTING OUT THAT THESE DATES WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR MRS THATCHER, NDANGA ASKED WHETHER THERE MIGHT BE THE SLIGHTEST CHANCE THAT SHE COULD SEE MUGABE AT SOME POINT IN THOSE TWO DAYS.

We must try

5. I HOPE TO GET MUGABE'S REACTIONS TOMORROW.

MELHUISH

YYYY

MAIN	84
LIMITED	6
CAFD	8
OADS	24
DEFENCE DEPT	4
UND	6
LEGAL ADVISERS	6
NED	5

PROTOCOL DEPT	7
CONSULAR DEPT	6
MVD	2
PS	7
PS/MRS CHALKER	1
PS/PUS	1
MR FAIRWEATHER	1
ADDITIONAL 9	
DMAO, MOD	1
DESO, MOD	1
SEC (O)(C), MOD	1
CSAD, ODA	1
OT4, DTI	1
BRITISH COUNCIL	1
ECGD	1
BANK OF ENGLAND	1
HM TREASURY	1
[R JOHNSON]	



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MJ2CRS

APC

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

2 September 1988

CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER BY PRESIDENT MUGABE

Thank you for your letter of 1 September suggesting the Prime Minister should see President Mugabe on his way to or from the United Nations General Assembly in New York. The Prime Minister would be ready to meet Mr Mugabe and of the dates suggested, she could manage 1630-1730 on Tuesday 13 September best. The later dates of 1/2 October would be much more difficult. I should be grateful if you could therefore propose 13 September to Mr Mugabe.

Charles Powell

Stephen Wall Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL

Charles 1630 –
1730 Tuesday
13 Sept. –
OK?
–
Jessa
2/9

10 DOWNING STREET

Jessa

Can we offer

times on

13/14 Sept ~~and~~

or

1/2 October.

Saturday
Sunday
& No

CP

ECPC (1)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL London SW1A 2AH

Prime Minister
Agree to
see President Mugabe? He usually does good!
CDP 1/9.

1 September 1988

Dear Charles,

Call on the Prime Minister by President Mugabe of Zimbabwe

The Foreign Secretary has had to drop the Zimbabwean leg from his tour of Africa next month because the most important Zimbabwean figures, including President Mugabe, will not be in the country at the time.

Relations with Zimbabwe remain central to our policy on Southern Africa. The Foreign Secretary will have a bilateral with Shamuyarira, his Zimbabwean opposite number, during the UN General Assembly session in New York later in September but he considers that it is very desirable that we should maintain our dialogue with President Mugabe, who is of course the key figure. He appreciates that the Prime Minster's diary is very full but the Foreign Secretary hopes that she would be able to fit President Mugabe in for talks at No 10 during one of his stop-overs on his way to or from his own visit to New York in September. The dates are likely to be 13/14 September and 1/2 october. Previous meetings with the Prime Minister and Mugabe have demonstrated that differences over South Africa need not prevent our having good relations and have probably been instrumental in Zimbabwe avoiding hasy action on sanctions which would have a devastating effect on her own economy.

There are other good reasons for the Prime Minister to offer to see President Mugabe at this time. Since she last saw the President in April, there have been significant developments in talks on Angola/Namibia and over the proposed sale of an air defence system to the Zimbabweans. (Lord Trefgarne will be in Harare later this month in the latter context.)

The Prime Minister might also take the opportunity to raise with him the Zimbabwean economy which, despite excellent rains this year and a correspondingly good harvest, presents a number of increasingly worrying features.

Yours,
Stephen Wall

(J S Wall)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

RESTRICTED

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SLH

file bc: PC

SUBJECT cc MASTER

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

26 April 1988

Dear Lyn.

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT OF ZIMBABWE

The Prime Minister had a long (one and a quarter hours) and very friendly talk with President Mugabe this morning. The Zimbabwe High Commissioner was also present. A good deal of it was discursive not to say gossipy. My note records only the main points.

Mrs. Mugabe

The Prime Minister enquired about Mrs. Mugabe's health. President Mugabe said that she would now base herself in London until a kidney became available, although she might travel briefly to Washington and New York at the end of the month, as part of her Child Survival in Southern Africa programme. She was looking forward with confidence to her operation.

Constitutional Change in Zimbabwe

The Prime Minister congratulated Mr. Mugabe on his election as President. She was pleased that other constitutional changes had been implemented without controversy and an accommodation reached with Mr. Nkomo. President Mugabe said that he had bided his time and made sure that constitutional changes had been strictly in accordance with the Lancaster House constitution. He had found useful work for Mr. Nkomo, supervising rural development. Nkomo was a changed man. There were still some dissidents in Matabeleland, but he was confident that Nkomo was now genuine in denouncing them.

Zimbabwe Economy

President Mugabe reported that the rains had been good and the harvest was expected to be excellent. The main worry was of transport bottlenecks. There was also some grasshopper damage to crops. In other spheres of the economy, he picked out in particular the need for more investment in mining.

Mozambique

President Mugabe was appreciative of our continued training of the Mozambique Armed Forces. The problem was that those whom we trained got widely scattered on their return. There was a need for re-training of whole units in Mozambique: Zimbabwe was ready to help with that. More widely

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the security situation was uneven, slightly better in some areas but worse round Maputo and in Zambezi province. Renamo remained a threat and was clearly receiving South African military help. He mentioned that the Zimbabweans were careful to warn the South Africans before undertaking any military operations in Mozambique. He referred with appreciation to British help in rehabilitating the Limpopo line.

South Africa

In response to a question from President Mugabe about our contacts with the South African government, the Prime Minister gave an account of her various exchanges with President Botha. We had held off for some time from seeming to press the South Africans so that they could not claim external interference. However she had let President Botha know earlier this year that we were expecting to see the reform process continue. President Botha had replied pointing to economic progress in South Africa but she had reminded him that this was no substitute for political freedom. The banning of seventeeen organisations had been a step backward which she had sharply and publicly criticised. President Mugabe interjected that he had appreciated the Prime Minister's prompt reaction. The Prime Minister continued that, against the background of continuing success by the extreme right-wing groups in by-elections, she had been quite pleased with President Botha's most recent speech. It showed that he would not be deterred by the extreme right. Of course it did not go far enough, but it was good to a limited extent. The very fact that he had given the speech was some encouragement. We now looked for some progress on the Group Areas Act as well. It would be important to welcome the speech as an encouragement to further progress and she intended to send a further message to President Botha in this sense.

President Mugabe commented that it was certainly good that Botha had refused to be pulled even further to the right. But he needed to re-define political progress. There was no way to reform apartheid: it had to cease. It would be better if he were to spell out a gradual process leading to the establishment of democracy in South Africa. President Mugabe said that he assumed that the Prime Minister's view of sanctions had not been modified. The fact was that Britain was the country with the greatest influence over South Africa. Was the Prime Minister yet thinking of going there? The Prime Minister said that we were always ready to use our influence, but it depended in part on not belabouring the South Africans and being ready to praise them when they took a step forward, while always making our basic beliefs known. If she thought that a visit to South Africa would help, she would be ready to go. But there was no question of it at this stage. There would have to be some major move forward, or the promise of it, first. She would make a point of letting Mr. Mugabe know before announcing any visit.

Angola

The Prime Minister raised developments in Angola. It seemed that the Angolan government were prepared to negotiate with UNITA but not with Savimbi himself. President Mugabe

confirmed this, saying that he found it surprising that the Angolan government had moved so far. It might be the first step in a longer-term process. He agreed with the Prime Minister that it would be difficult to by-pass Savimbi. But the Angolan government argued that it made more sense for them to talk direct to the South Africans who controlled Savimbi. The Prime Minister said that she found it hard to assess the situation without ever having met Savimbi. We were wondering whether to establish contact with him, not at Cabinet Minister level but at Minister of State or senior official level. President Mugabe did not react directly but commented that he himself had met Savimbi in the 1960s. Even the Cubans recognised that Savimbi could not be treated in the same way as, say, Dhlakama. But there was a psychological barrier for the Angolan government in dealing with him. Zimbabwe would support talks between Savimbi and President Dos Santos but at present none of the leaders of the Front Line States were prepared to propose this, because they knew Dos Santos would not contemplate it. The Prime Minister said that she had detected some willingness on the part of Kenya and particularly Nigeria to mediate but nothing seemed to have come of this so far.

President Mugabe commented that the Americans were not helping much. It was not practicable to ask the Cubans to leave while the South Africans and the Americans kept a free hand to strengthen UNITA. He wondered how the Prime Minister viewed the Angolan proposal that the South Africans should withdraw into Namibia and the Cubans withdraw north of the 30th parallel. The Prime Minister commented that there could be no question of partition. However, the Russians seemed more interested than before in a settlement. Angola seemed to be a problem on which progress was possible. President Mugabe commented that the Russians were talking of a regional conference on Southern Africa.

Possible visit by the Prime Minister

The Prime Minister gave a brief account of her visits to Kenya and Nigeria. President Mugabe asked when she would visit Zimbabwe. The Prime Minister said that she would like to do so, but would not wish to embarrass the President. President Mugabe said that, if the Prime Minister's reservations were based on differences over South Africa, that was nonsense. South Africa was only one issue. The Prime Minister must come and should visit other countries in the area as well. The Prime Minister said that she would be delighted to do so when she saw an opportunity in her programme.

I am copying this letter to Brian Hawtin (Ministry of Defence), Alex Allan (H M Treasury), Myles Wickstead (Overseas Development Administration) and Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely

C. D. POWELL

Lyn Parker, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

SECRET

PRIME MINISTER

MEETING WITH PRESIDENT MUGABE

You are to see President Mugabe tomorrow morning. He is on a private visit to get his wife settled into hospital for her kidney transplant operation, which is due quite soon.

You last met Mugabe at Vancouver and before that had a private meeting here in June last year. A note of it is in the folder.

The main developments in Zimbabwe since then are:

- there have been constitutional changes with Mugabe being elected Executive President;
- the 20 reserved white seats in the House of Assembly have been abolished - in terms which comply with the Lancaster House Agreement - but 14 whites have nonetheless been elected;
- there has been a reconciliation between Mugabe and Nkomo. Nkomo is in the Cabinet, violence in Matabeleland has declined and Mugabe has granted an amnesty to political opponents.

Points which you may like to cover with Mugabe are:

- enquire about his wife and her operation;
- congratulate him on his election as President;
- comment favourably on the reduction in political violence;
- enquire about the harvest and wider economic prospects;
- repeat our willingness to help Zimbabwe to meet its air defence needs. (We are negotiating on radar and Rapier, but the Zimbabweans have not so far taken up your offer of Sea Harriers or Hawk. Nor have they pursued discussions with the Russians on Mig 29s.)

- confirm our willingness to go on providing military training for Zimbabwe and Mozambique through BMATT and our aid for the Limpopo Line from Zimbabwe to Maputo;
- give an account of your visits to Kenya and Nigeria. This may lead him to renew his invitation to you to visit Zimbabwe. You might lke to say that you cannot take it up this year, but would hope perhaps to visit Southern Africa in 1989;
- you should ask how he sees the prospects in Angola and the prospects for African mediation. In your view this is an area of potential movement, particularly following Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. You think the Russians would probably like to get out under reasonable conditions: and the South Africans cannot relish the burden of their intervention. A negotiated settlement in Angola deserves priority - and would improve the prospects for a settlement in Namibia;
- he is bound to raise developments in South Africa. You might say that you wrote in sharp terms to President Botha following the repressive measures on 24 February and remonstrated about the need to renew progress on reform. His more recent pronouncements - although vague and complex - are a step in the right direction and you welcome them as such. Given his political difficulties with the extreme right-wing, they are not without courage. We have got to keep pushing him down this road.

There is a further note in the folder.

C.D.P.

CHARLES POWELL
25 April 1988

SECRET

cc PC
LBUP
3

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH
25 April 1988

Dear Charles,

Call on the Prime Minister by President Mugabe: 26 April 1988

President Mugabe is due to call on the Prime Minister at noon on Tuesday 26 April. He will be accompanied by the Zimbabwean High Commissioner, Dr Murerwa. Mr Mugabe is visiting Britain privately for a few days in order to see that his wife, who is to undergo a kidney transplant operation soon at St Mary's Hospital Paddington, is well settled. (The costs of the operation are being met privately but as Mrs Mugabe was once an NHS employee, the NHS is helping to find a suitable kidney.) He will probably wish to explain the position to the Prime Minister.

Objectives

The Foreign Secretary believes this would be a useful opportunity to reinforce the understanding which has developed between the Prime Minister and President Mugabe especially since their last meeting at No 10 on 28 June last year. It would be useful to reiterate to President Mugabe that change in South Africa will take time and that our disagreement over sanctions should not be allowed to obscure our common commitment to the abolition of apartheid. The Prime Minister might also repeat Britain's continuing support for the Front Line States, especially Zimbabwe and Mozambique, in their efforts to restore peace and to reduce their economic dependence on South Africa.

Internal

The Prime Minister will recall that in a number of constitutional changes late last year, carried out in a way which complied with the Lancaster House Agreement, the 20 reserved white seats in the House of Assembly and 10 in the Senate were abolished. However of the individuals nominated by the Government and elected by both Houses to fill these seats pending a general election in 1990, 14 are white. The change has been accepted with equanimity by the majority of the white population. In a further change the office of Executive President, elected by the two Houses of the Zimbabwe

SECRET

Parliament, was created. Mr Mugabe was unanimously elected and took up his new position on 1 January. The Prime Minister sent him a message of congratulation at the time.

The most important recent development has been the endorsement this month of the Unity agreement between ZANU and ZAPU by the Congresses of both parties. In his independence day speech on 18 April President Mugabe announced that Joshua Nkomo had been appointed a Vice President of the new party. He had already been given a senior Ministerial appointment in a major Cabinet re-shuffle in early January after the announcement of the Unity agreement. Since that announcement the level of violence in Matabeleland has significantly decreased, and there is a mood of guarded optimism in the country. Much work still has to be done however to make the agreement effective. Mr Mugabe also announced an amnesty primarily for political dissidents who lay down their arms by 31 May. The amnesty includes those in exile and the small number of ZAPU supporters still in detention. The Prime Minister may wish to welcome these developments and to ask President Mugabe how he now sees the way ahead.

Bilateral

Apart from our continuing disagreement over sanctions, which Mr Mugabe has repeatedly said should not be allowed to impinge on our overall relationship, there are no major bilateral problems between us.

We know that Mugabe was impressed by the Prime Minister's offer on 28 June last year at No 10 to supply a small number of sophisticated air defence aircraft (Sea Harriers or Hawk 200). Since then the Zimbabweans have made it clear in discussions with us that they want to concentrate first on acquiring a package of radar and air defence missiles (Rapier and possibly Javelin) with an aircraft purchase deferred for several years. This makes good economic sense. We are now engaged in detailed talks about the terms for the supply of radar and missiles. There is stiff competition from a number of countries including France, Italy, Switzerland and the Soviet Union. There have however been no recent indications of any Zimbabwean intention to purchase sophisticated fighter aircraft from the Soviet Union, though some Zimbabwean Air Force pilots are being trained there. The Foreign Secretary thinks it would be useful if the Prime Minister could repeat our willingness to help Zimbabwe to meet its air defence needs, and assure him of our good faith as a supplier if Zimbabwe should be

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the victim of aggression.

Mr Mugabe is very appreciative of our continuing training of the Zimbabwe army through BMATT and in particular of our involvement in the training of Mozambican companies at Nyanga for which Zimbabwe supplies the infrastructure and some logistic support. The first Nyanga-trained company has recently distinguished itself in its first action against RENAMO. The Prime Minister may wish to assure Mr Mugabe of our continuing commitment to help him and President Chissano to restore peace in Mozambique. She could say that our tripartite cooperation at Nyanga provides an example for others of practical help for the Front Line States.

Mr Mugabe also appreciates, and may mention, our aid for the reconstruction of the Limpopo line from Zimbabwe to Maputo. This is our biggest single aid commitment in the region (£14m). The first phase of the project, carried out by the Zimbabwe National Railways as agents for ODA, is now nearing completion. We expect to provide support also for phase 2 and are encouraging a number of other countries (Canada, Australia, FRG etc) also to participate.

Visits

President Mugabe would no doubt be interested to hear at first hand from the Prime Minister about her visits to Kenya and Nigeria. It is possible that he will repeat his invitation to the Prime Minister to visit Zimbabwe.

South Africa/Mozambique

Mr Mugabe may raise the question of South African support for RENAMO, especially in view of the claims of the former RENAMO spokesman, Paulo Oliveira, who has defected to the government and who gave a press conference in Maputo on 23 March. Oliveira's claims are broadly corroborated
which indicates that there is continuing SADF contact with and support for RENAMO. Apart from material help, there is also evidence of South African involvement in the planning and direction of RENAMO activity. The Prime Minister might say that there appears to be continuing contact between some elements of the South African military and RENAMO, though it is unclear how much help is being given. This is of course contrary to the Nkomati Accord. We constantly urge the SAG to refrain from acts of violence against their neighbours, which we

totally condemn. We also urge the SAG to work for better relations with Mozambique and have welcomed the recent agreement between South Africa, Mozambique and Portugal on the reconstruction of the power line from the Cahora Bassa dam in Mozambique to South Africa.

South Africa

Mr Mugabe may express continuing concern at the situation in South Africa and at South Africa's use of agents inside Zimbabwe for attacks on ANC and Zimbabwean targets. He stands by his view that outside pressure (including sanctions) is necessary to help bring about change though he recognises that Zimbabwe cannot afford to apply sanctions herself.

The Prime Minister might wish to make clear our disapproval of the repressive measures taken by the South African Government on 24 February (and about which the Prime Minister wrote to President Botha) and our determination to stand by our policy of doing what we can to help the situation over time. She might comment favourably on President Botha's challenge to the South African right in his speech to Parliament on 21 April but stress that time will tell whether his complicated and limited proposals to involve some blacks in central government will lead to genuine reform or progress towards negotiations.

Angola

The Prime Minister might ask Mr Mugabe whether an African mediatory effort between UNITA and the MLPA, about which we know he is informed, has any chance of success. The Prime Minister might point out that the fighting of the last six months has demonstrated that a military solution is not on the cards.

The Foreign Secretary, who is in Luxembourg today, has not yet seen this letter.

Yours ever,

Tony Galsworthy

(A C Galsworthy)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

Bf || 1830 on Friday 29 April

PRIME MINISTER

Mr Mugabe will probably be visiting the United Kingdom on Thursday 28 and Friday 29 April en route to Zimbabwe after a visit to Sweden. He has not asked if he may call on you, but we understand that he would welcome this, and Charles tells me that you have in the past found his visits quite useful.

Thursday 28 April is the usual problem with Cabinet and Questions, a meeting with the Imanns at 1700 and attending the Centre for Policy Studies AGM in the evening. On Friday, you are to visit Strike and Fleet. This visits finishes at 1530 and I understand there is some question as to whether you want to go straight to Chequers that evening as DT will be away. One possibility would therefore be to return to Number 10 for, say, 1630 and see Mr Mugabe at perhaps 1700.

What would you like to do?

Will consider

DTScala

pp P. A. BEARPARK
19 April 1988

DASALB

✓CSP.

To see. We have
Offer 1830 on Fri 29 at avoid
c rush.

PSJ 21/4

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT
CC MASTER

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

28 June 1987

Dear Lyn,

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER OF ZIMBABWE

The Prime Minister had a long and affable talk with Mr. Mugabe this evening, lasting some one and a half hours. The Zimbabwe High Commissioner and Mr. Mugabe's Private Secretary were also present.

Mr. Mugabe congratulated the Prime Minister on her "landslide" victory in the General Election. It was a tremendous mark of the confidence in her of the British people and would further enhance her international standing.

Soviet Union

Mr. Mugabe said he had just come from Moscow where he had seen Mr. Gorbachev. He was a remarkable man and very different from his predecessors. He found Gorbachev's casual and straightforward manner of talking very attractive. Gorbachev had particularly asked him to convey warm greetings to the Prime Minister.

The Prime Minister said that she shared Mr. Mugabe's assessment. She admired Gorbachev's courage in acknowledging openly that, seventy years after the revolution, Communism in the Soviet Union was not working and had to be changed. Nonetheless, we should not underestimate the difficulties which he faced and had to bear in mind the fate of the last reforming Soviet leader, Mr. Kruschev. There was evidently strong resistance in some parts of the Soviet bureaucracy to Gorbachev's reforms. But he seemed determined to press on. That at least was the evidence of the Central Committee Plenum. It was in the interests of the rest of us to support what he was trying to do.

Zimbabwe

In response to the Prime Minister's question, Mr. Mugabe said that Zimbabwe's harvest had been the worst since 1980. Fortunately there were fairly substantial reserves of maize remaining from last year. Cotton had done slightly better. The Prime Minister asked about the situation in Botswana.

Mr. Mugabe said that he had the impression that the drought had been even worse there. Botswana had to import grass from South Africa to feed its cattle.

Mozambique

The Prime Minister gave Mr. Mugabe an account of her meetings with President Chissano and of the help which we were giving Mozambique, both economic assistance and military training. Mr. Mugabe expressed appreciation for this. Britain's action had created a very favourable impression. One of the main things now was to ensure security for the transport routes through Mozambique, especially that to Maputo. He had not met President Chissano since his visit to London. Had he mentioned to the Prime Minister the need for helicopters to help patrol the railway line to Maputo? The Prime Minister said that it had been mentioned, but she had not been able to promise President Chissano any help with this. Mr. Mugabe commented that large parts of Mozambique simply had no contact with the government in Maputo. Following the recent Renamo raid over the border into Zimbabwe, he had tried to establish who was exercising effective control in the neighbouring area of Mozambique. He had discovered that no-one was.

Constitutional Issues

The Prime Minister said that she understood some amendments to the Zimbabwe Constitution were contemplated, as had been provided for at Lancaster House. Mr. Mugabe said that three steps were being considered: abolition of "racial representation", and introduction of a unicameral legislature and of an executive presidency. There was support for all three changes in his own party, but they still had to be discussed with white representatives.

Aircraft for Zimbabwe

The Prime Minister said that we had received Mr. Mugabe's request for information on the possible supply of aircraft, but were still working on some proposals. The most likely candidates seemed to be Sea Harrier and the Hawk 200. Mr. Mugabe, who seemed faintly surprised by this, said that his preference would be to keep Zimbabwe's air force at its current level of capability and equipment, making only gradual improvements. But because of the situation in Southern Africa, he faced the need to re-equip the air force at the expense of other services and other sectors. His Minister of Finance was very worried by the expenditure implications. The Prime Minister repeated that we were ready in principle to help. At no time did Mr. Mugabe make any reference to possible purchase of MIG 29s.

CHOGM

The Prime Minister said that she hoped that South Africa would not dominate the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Vancouver. There were many other problems needing

discussion. She understood that the Secretary General had recently written round about the agenda for the meeting, suggesting that it should focus on ways in which the Commonwealth could contribute to the solution of problems. She had three instinctive answers to that: the Commonwealth should stick together, the wealthier members should provide technical assistance to the less well off, and it should always adopt a practical approach. It was not always possible to achieve all that you wanted. What was important was to obtain progress in the right direction.

South Africa

Mr. Mugabe said that, in the front line states' view, the situation in South Africa was getting worse. There seemed to be no prospect of any significant change of policy by the South African Government. There were occasional references to the desirability of talks and a recent hint that the South African Government might be ready to talk to Mandela. There were also signs that the professional classes and the intellectuals were becoming more liberal. But the reality seemed to be a cycle of violence and repression followed by more violence. There was also a risk of further cross-border raids. The front line states remained of the view that South Africa would not change unless some (and he emphasised the word 'some') pressure was exerted from outside. The last Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting had failed to exert real pressure. He wondered how the Prime Minister saw the situation.

The Prime Minister said that she agreed that the situation in South Africa was untenable. She did not defend it, [illegible] rather she wanted to help to change it. We had deliberately refrained from contact with the South African Government in the period up to their elections so that they could not accuse us of trying to interfere. She found the results of the elections themselves difficult to interpret. There was some evidence of a growing constituency in favour of negotiations and a reinforcement of the centre. Against this, there was no doubt that increasing international pressure on South Africa, and particularly the measures taken by the United States, had slowed down the reform process. It would be important to try to identify the successors to President Botha and begin to try to convince them of the need for a more imaginative approach.

Mr. Mugabe asked whether there had been any move on the part of the European Community to resuscitate dialogue with South Africa. The Germans had hinted to him that some moves were afoot. The Prime Minister said that there had been no organised move by the European Community. She was sometimes asked whether she herself would be prepared to go to South Africa and talk to Botha. Her reply was that the time was not right. But she would in principle be prepared to go if there seemed a real prospect of achieving something. Basically she felt that the Eminent Persons Group had found the right concept and the right formula. The task was to get it adopted in practice. But it was important to choose the right moment.

Mr. Mugabe said that perhaps now was the time in the wake of the Prime Minister's tremendous election victory. She would be particularly well placed to influence Botha. The Prime Minister said that she would think further about this. Mr. Mugabe asked whether the Prime Minister thought the Eminent Persons Group ought to be resuscitated at the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting. The Prime Minister said that she doubted whether this would be a good idea, although some of its members, notably General Obasanjo, might have a useful role to play.

International Issues

Mr. Mugabe spoke of the great concern in the Non-Aligned Movement about arms control. The Prime Minister explained our thinking about nuclear deterrence in some detail and traced the development of arms control negotiations. Much of this appeared new to Mr. Mugabe, who expressed considerable interest.

There was also discussion of Iran/Iraq, of Arab/Israel and of a number of international economic questions which does not warrant recording in any detail.

I am copying this letter to Alex Allan (HM Treasury), John Howe (Ministry of Defence), Tim Walker (Department of Trade and Industry) and Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

yours sincerely,

Charles Powell

Charles Powell

Lyn Parker, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

PRIME MINISTER

MEETING WITH MR. MUGABE

Mr. Mugabe is coming to see you at 6.30 pm on Sunday. We have not said anything publicly about the meeting and are treating it as private (though it will probably leak). Mugabe is here privately on his way back from Moscow, where he has been addressing the Ninth World Congress of Women. The purpose is to allow Mrs. Mugabe to continue her kidney treatment (she is to have a transplant here in due course).

You will, I think, want to make it a reasonably conciliatory meeting, taking your cue from the very warm message which he sent you on the outcome of the General Election. The Zimbabwe government has recently announced its intention to abolish the 20 seats in Parliament reserved for whites, while making alternative arrangements for minority interests to be represented. This is within its constitutional rights and not an issue worth pursuing.

You will probably want to start by enquiring about Mrs. Mugabe's health and expressing the hope for a full recovery in due course. You could also ask for an account of the situation in Zimbabwe and the harvest prospects.

You might then ask about his visit to Moscow and which of the Soviet leaders he saw. This would lead into a discussion of change in the Soviet Union (on which there is a further interesting telegram in your Box).

I suggest that you then turn to Mozambique and talk about Chissano's visit here, your talks with him and what we are doing to help Mozambique.

You will want to express condolences for the recent Renamo raid into Zimbabwe.

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This would lead in to the prospects for CHOGM. The Secretary-General has recently written round about the agenda, and seems to envisage a very wide discussion without concentration on any one subject. This is a step in the right direction. Concentration on sanctions against South Africa will only lead to a divisive meeting, which in turn serves South African interests.

This will bring you on to South Africa. You could concede that the results of the elections were disappointing but we see no alternative to constant encouragement of the South African government to dialogue. The concept proposed by the Eminent Persons Group still looks to offer the best way forward. You will probably not want to get into any detail on sanctions: he is undoubtedly sensitive about the fact that Zimbabwe has not introduced them.

Finally there is the question of Fighter Aircraft (on which there is a separate letter in the folder). Once again he is very sensitive on this. The Zimbabweans have asked what we can offer. You will have to say that we are still considering what would be the most help to Zimbabwe. Ther are several possibilities, eg. Sea Harrier (very mobile and easy to hide) and the Hawk 200. You might try to establish how seriously he is interested in British aircraft, or whether he is already committed to the Russians (without asking directly). If he mentions credit, you would have to say that this would need to be considered (your colleagues have not yet been able to agree).

C.D.P.

C. D. POWELL

26 June 1987

CONFIDENTIAL

SLHAJZ

CONFIDENTIAL

cc PC
cc Blue

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

26 June 1987

Dear Charles,

Call on the Prime Minister by Mr Mugabe

Mr Mugabe is due to call on the Prime Minister at 6.30pm on Sunday 28 June. We have explained to the Zimbabweans the Prime Minister's wish that their talk should be very informal, with only one other on each side.

Objectives

The Foreign Secretary believes this should be a useful opportunity in the run up to CHOGM to build on the recent cordial exchange of letters between Mr Mugabe and the Prime Minister. In particular it could help to reinforce the understanding that we should try not to allow disagreement over policy towards South Africa to spill over into other areas of our bilateral relationship. It would however be useful to stress our common commitment to the fundamental objective of eliminating apartheid, and Britain's strong support for the Front Line States' efforts to reduce their economic dependence on South Africa.

Background

Mr Mugabe will be returning from a brief visit to Moscow to address the Ninth World Congress of Women (Mrs Mugabe, who is actively involved in women's rights issues, has been accompanying him). Mugabe will probably have had discussions with Soviet leaders including Mr Gorbachev. Zimbabwe's air defence needs, and in particular its approach to the Soviet Union for the possible purchase of Mig 29s, will no doubt have been discussed, though we think it unlikely that a final deal will have been concluded.

Mrs Mugabe, who is staying on in Britain for a week or so, has been having private treatment for a kidney ailment from time to time in Britain. She has recently asked for our help in making arrangements for her to have a kidney transplant operation in Britain.

Points for discussion

The Prime Minister may wish to begin by expressing her good wishes for a full recovery by Mrs Mugabe in due course. She could go on to deplore the recent Renamo raids from

Mozambique into Zimbabwe on 20 June and the loss of innocent life (about 11 Zimbabweans, including children, were killed).

Mr Mugabe will probably not raise the air defence package (about which I am writing to you separately); but he is waiting for a response from us which we are not yet in a position to give. The Prime Minister may wish to express her general concern, and to give Mr Mugabe an assurance that we are actively and seriously considering the request, made as we understand it on his authority, for details of alternative British aircraft which might be available. The Prime Minister should be aware that Mr Mugabe has recently shown himself extremely sensitive on this subject. In a recent conversation with the US Ambassador he angrily accused the US of claiming the right to decide from whom Zimbabwe could buy equipment to defend itself.

The Prime Minister could also usefully mention that she hopes that separate discussions on radar and other defence equipment which have been taking place with a number of British companies (eg British Aerospace, Plessey) will be successful.

On South Africa, Mr Mugabe is allergic to suggestions that sanctions should not be imposed because of the suffering they would inflict on blacks in South Africa and in the neighbouring states. He believes strongly that both within and outside South Africa, blacks should be, and are, willing to suffer in order to end apartheid (and are suffering already because of it). In fact, there is evidence of a growing realisation among some South African blacks of the damage which disinvestment can cause them. And it is clear from Zambia and Zimbabwe's prolonged delay in implementing the measures they have agreed that they are well aware of the likely costs. However, Mugabe personally feels under pressure to implement last August's Marlborough House package before the Vancouver CHOGM. The Foreign Secretary believes that we must avoid fuelling his disposition to do this, for example by pointing up the evident inconsistency between Zimbabwe's calls for action by others and its failure to take action itself. He suggests that the Prime Minister should stress that we all want to bring about the quickest possible end to apartheid by peaceful means and its replacement by a genuinely democratic non-racial government. Mugabe shows signs of recognising that in practice this will inevitably be a long haul, and the Prime Minister may wish to encourage such greater realism.

/If

If Mr Mugabe raises the issue of sanctions the Prime Minister might concentrate on the argument that we do not believe they would be effective in bringing about the more rapid end of apartheid. We have already put a wide range of measures in place to signal our disapproval of the apartheid regime. The Prime Minister could stress the desirability of avoiding concentration on the sanctions issue at the Vancouver CHOGM, which would lead to a divisive meeting from which only the South African Government would benefit.

Meanwhile we are concentrating on trying to help the Front Line States to reduce their economic dependence on South Africa and to improve security in the region. (British aid totalling $1 billion over the past 5 years - support for SADCC transport projects - BMATT training for Zimbabwean army - recent doubling of BMATT training for Mozambican armed forces - Chissano visit.) The Chancellor's initiative to alleviate the debt burden of the poorest sub-Saharan African countries would also be worth mentioning, although Zimbabwe itself is unlikely to benefit.

Finally, although the Foreign Secretary does not think it necessary for us to raise it, the Prime Minister will wish to be aware that the Zimbabwean President (Mr Canaan Banana) has just announced that the Government will introduce constitutional reform measures this year to abolish the 20 Parliamentary seats reserved for whites and to introduce an Executive Presidency and a unicameral system. At the same time we have had indications that arrangements will be made for minority interests to be represented, although not on a racial basis. Now that 7 years have elapsed since the Lancaster House agreement the Zimbabwean Government is within its constitutional rights in bringing forward these proposals which were generally expected by the white community. In this connection the / Prime Minister may wish to glance at the attached article by Stephen Glover in The Independent of 26 June.

Yours ever,
Lyn Parker

(L Parker)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
PS/No 10 Downing Street

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EEC[I] PSLC D2 A2
REP IRELAND PSLC D6
SOUTH EUROPE PSLC R9 D1
WEST EUROPE PSLC R9 D1

NUCLEAR ENERGY PSDM A13

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SOUTH AMERICA PSTE R2 D4 A9
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FALKLAND ISLES PSTE R2 D4 A9
UN PSTE R6 D2 A4

FAR EAST PSG R7 D4 A10
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SOUTH PACIFIC PSG D4 A10

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SOUTH AFRICA PSLC R1 D5 A11
WEST AFRICA PSLC R1 D5 A11

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OFFICE SERVICE TRANSPORT PSG SMR
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DEFENCE
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DIPLOMATIC

CENTRAL AMERICA
SOUTH AMERICA
CARIBBEAN UN

6. AFRICA

NATIONALITY IMMIGRATION AID
ENERGY SCIENCE SPACE TREATY
ECONOMIC CULTURAL RELS
COMMONWEALTH PARLIAMENT

THE INDEPENDENT

How whites can prosper while Africans rule

Politics are best left in black hands, argues **Stephen Glover**

THIS week something important happened which has passed almost unnoticed: the Zimbabwean government announced on Tuesday that it will introduce legislation to abolish the 20 seats which whites were "guaranteed" by the Lancaster House agreement. As a result, the country's whites will lose all their collective political power which, 10 years ago, Ian Smith said they would hold exclusively for a thousand years.

But to judge by reports from Zimbabwe, most whites are not terribly upset by this development. Few of them are saying that Robert Mugabe, the Prime Minister, is breaking all kinds of sacred promises. This is partly because he is not: under the terms of Lancaster House he may now alter the constitution provided that he obtains a sufficient parliamentary majority. But the chief reason why whites are not saying nasty things about Mr Mugabe is that they have come at last to realise how unimportant, for them, is political power.

The Rhodesian war was fought on the contrary proposition. Throughout Africa, once the process of de-colonisation began, whites, where they were present in any numbers, resisted. They fought in Algeria. They nearly fought in Kenya. They fought in Angola and Mozambique. They fought in Rhodesia. They are preparing to fight in South Africa. What were they fighting? The prospect of black political power. The reality, for most whites, has been infinitely more agreeable.

This is not to say that Mr Mugabe or other black leaders have demonstrated any particular saintliness in their forebearance of whites. Whites have not, on the whole, been molested in Zimbabwe and other African countries for the simple reason that they are no longer relevant to the main political struggle. In Zimbabwe the fight is between the majority Shona and the minority Ndebele. The Shona seem to be winning: the Ndebele-dominated Zapu party, led by Joshua Nkomo, is at present banned from making speeches or holding rallies. Quite soon, when Mr Mugabe feels confident enough, he will simply abolish Zapu.

When the Lancaster House agreement was signed in December 1979, the British Government, and Lord Carrington, the Foreign Secretary, were widely commended for having won safeguards for whites. But in a curious way the enlightened journalists who extolled Lord Carrington, and the Foreign Office officials who basked in his reflected glory, were making the same mistake as the Rhodesian whites, which was to assume that the well-being of the white man was the issue. In black Africa the black man is the issue. Because it failed even to conceive that the Ndebele, rather than the whites, needed safeguards, Lancaster House was no kind of triumph.

After Zimbabwe's independence some white civil servants did lose their jobs to blacks, but 100,000 whites remain, prosperous and, as long as they do not meddle in politics, relatively safe. Frenchmen are free to make money in the Ivory Coast, where there are more whites than before independence, as there are in Kenya. White men can even become involved in African wars — the French are defending Chad against the Libyans, the British are training Mozambiquan officers to fight "right-wing" guerrillas.

The odd white man may be allowed to play an uncontroversial political role and become an MP, as Richard Leakey has done in Kenya, but only black men can dare to take politics seriously. Politics is the obsession of the black African elite. There are few hugely successful black industrialists in Africa and not very many notable black commercial farmers, but there are very many first-class African politicians. This is not to say that they are good administrators; by and large, African countries are the worst governed on earth. A few are not governed at all in the normal sense — they just happen. But everywhere there are brilliant black politicians, hanging on to power against the odds, winning power when all seems stacked against them, salting money away in Swiss bank accounts, rarely having to fight free elections, creating convolutions and revolutions through which the white man lives and prospers.

To the south, white South Africans see things very differently. Afrikaners sometimes defend apartheid on the grounds that it is a bulwark against chaos and disintegration. They will talk, with no encouragement, of the genocide and maladministration of post-colonial Africa. But they miss the point that the genocide has always been directed against blacks and that the main victims of maladministration have been poor blacks, not rich whites. Bokassa killed black children, not white, in the Central African Empire. Idi Amin sometimes liked humiliating whites, but only killed a handful of them. He really enjoyed killing blacks.

Perhaps we could not expect white South Africans to draw much joy from such an interpretation. They see things differently, with themselves as the immovable centre of South African politics, involved in a deadly struggle with blacks. Rhodesian whites once saw their conflict in the same terms. They fought a war which probably need not have been fought.

The outcome in South Africa will be protracted because there are more whites in relation to blacks than there have been elsewhere: five million whites out of a general population of some 30 millions. This means that the whites will be better able to defend themselves against black military action than has been the case. Still, it would be unintelligent for the whites to assume that they will always remain in the ascendancy. Blacks want political power in South Africa no less than they have wanted it in the rest of Africa and one day they will get it.

What finally is political power if you can hang on to your swimming pool and your Mercedes? White South Africans are not attracted to power for reasons of benevolent paternalism. They want to defend their standard of life. But they have accepted the western analysis that political power and economic power go hand in hand. In Africa they do not. There will be millions of rich whites in South Africa and millions of poor blacks long after whites have stopped being politicians.

PM
87

10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

Mr. Mugabe

Mugabe has taken up with alacrity & enthusiasm your invitation to a private talk while he is here, and would like to come in on Sunday evening (Ian are in Brussels on Monday & Tuesday).

I have suggested 6.30/7.00 so that you do not have to hurry back from Chequers.

CDP 24/6

c.c. FCO
P.E.

10 DOWNING STREET

PRIME MINISTER'S

THE PRIME MINISTER

PERSONAL MESSAGE 31 July 1984

SERIAL No. T 139/84

a MASTER
OPS

Dear Prime Minister,

When we met during your recent visit to London we talked about Britain's assistance for Zimbabwe's development, and I undertook to write to you with clarification of our proposals for programme aid.

As I told you, we are ready to enter into agreements to provide, from the aid pledges we have made to Zimbabwe, £12 million for new programme aid. This is in addition to the £3 million of programme aid currently being spent. In accordance with your Government's wishes, £10 million of the new aid will fulfil our pledge at the Zimcord Conference to give further help with land resettlement. The other £2 million will come from an existing project loan which, following a request from your officials, we shall be happy to convert into programme aid. We expect as a first step to send your officials very shortly the draft of an agreement under which allocation of this money can begin.

You asked whether our aid for land resettlement could be paid in advance. The £10 million programme aid will finance urgent imports, with the importers then putting Zimbabwe dollars into the hands of your Government, to be used as required for its share of the cost of the land resettlement projects we are also supporting directly. This should help to speed up the progress of the scheme. What I am afraid that we cannot do is to provide funds in advance from the existing £20 million direct resettlement grant. This follows the reimbursement principle, in line with our standard practice.

R

As for police training, we shall be glad to do our best within the usual constraints to provide what help we can, and I have asked my officials to contact yours to consider what might be done.

It might also be useful if I were to explain more fully our position on Zimbabwe's sugar quota, which you also raised with me. We are in no doubt about the importance of sugar to the Zimbabwean economy and recognise that you have always regarded your 25,000 tonne quota under the Lomé Sugar Protocol as inadequate. But, as you will recall, the quota was part of the package which was negotiated on Zimbabwe's accession to the Lomé Convention and was the best deal that could be got at the time. We have since been on the lookout for ways in which your quota could be increased. In particular, we have been pressing hard for Zimbabwe to be given priority in the reallocation of quotas occasioned by other ACP states' inability to meet their supply commitments. At the moment there is at least 12,000 tonnes available for redistribution and we very much hope that a fair proportion of this will go to your country. The final decision lies with the EC Commission but we have left them in no doubt of our views. Portugal's accession to the Community should also provide an opportunity to obtain an increase in Zimbabwe's quota. The precise arrangements for meeting Portugal's sugar requirements are still under discussion within the European Community and no decisions have yet been taken. I can assure you that the interests of Zimbabwe and of other ACP suppliers of the Portuguese market are very much in our minds. You will, I am sure, be keeping up the pressure on the Commission and other European Community members.

I also told you that we shall be able to provide the additional military assistance you had asked for in the armour and artillery and logistics fields. I am pleased that we are able to help on this occasion, but you will I know understand that the resources available to us for this

sort of task are limited and we may well not be able to meet any further requests for assistance going beyond the advisory and staff training functions which we see as BMATT's principal role.

Finally, may I say once again, on the subject of remittances, that I fully understand your Government's need for severe measures in the present difficult economic situation. I appreciate it all the more, therefore, that you were able to agree to consider the cases of those individuals (often very elderly and sick) for whom the controls mean genuine hardship.

I very much hope that you enjoyed your visit to Britain and found it useful. We certainly did. My congratulations, once again, on the honour paid to you by Edinburgh University. I greatly look forward to our next meeting.

Warm regards

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher

The Honourable R.G. Mugabe

CONFIDENTIAL

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

30 July 1984

Dear Charles,

Thank you for your letter of 18 July giving an account of the Prime Minister's recent tete-a-tete meeting with Mr Mugabe.

As requested, I now attach a draft letter from the Prime Minister to Mr Mugabe giving him further details about our aid offer and covering the questions of Zimbabwe's sugar quota and of BMATT. I confirm that our High Commissioner in Harare raised the latter point with Mr Mugabe, who made clear that his understanding of our joint objective is that BMATT should progressively work itself out of a job.

The draft also includes a reference to Mr Mugabe's agreement to consider individual hardship cases caused by the tough Zimbabwean controls on remittances. This, as you know, is a problem in which we are under some pressure from domestic opinion and it would be useful to remind Mr Mugabe that he went some way to meet our concern.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,

Colin Budd

(C R Budd)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DSR [illegible])

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:

PRIME MINISTER

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

Reference

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret
Secret
Confidential
Restricted
Unclassified

TO:

The Honourable Robert G Mugabe
Prime Minister of the
Republic of Zimbabwe

Your Reference

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

SUBJECT:

Type for PM's signature

When we met during your recent visit to London we ~~discussed~~ talked about ~~British~~ Britain's assistance for Zimbabwe's development, and I undertook to write to you with clarification of our proposals for programme aid.

As I told you, we are ready to enter into agreements to provide, from the aid pledges we have made to Zimbabwe, £12 million for new programme aid. This is in addition to the £3 million of programme aid currently being spent. In accordance with your Government's wishes, £10 million of the new aid will fulfil our pledge at the Zimcord Conference to give further help with land resettlement. The other £2 million will come from an existing project loan which, following a request from your officials, we shall be happy to convert into programme aid. We expect as a first step to send your officials very shortly the draft of an agreement under which allocation of this money can begin.

Enclosures—flag(s).....

/ N.P. You asked

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You asked whether our aid for land resettlement could be paid in advance.

The £10 million programme aid will finance urgent imports, with the importers then putting Zimbabwe dollars into the hands of your Government, to be used as required for its share of the cost of the land resettlement projects we are also supporting directly. This should help to speed up the progress of the scheme. ~~But~~ What I am afraid we cannot do is to provide funds in advance from the existing £20 million direct resettlement grant. This ~~as~~ it follows the reimbursement principle, in line with our standard practice.

As for police training, we shall be glad to do our best within the usual constraints to provide what help we can, and I have asked my officials to contact yours to consider what might be done.

~~I thought it would~~ It might also be useful if I were more fully to explain our position on ~~the question of~~ Zimbabwe's sugar quota, which you also raised. We ~~fully understand~~ will be are in no doubt about the importance of sugar to the Zimbabwean economy and recognise that you have always regarded your 25,000 tonne quota under the Lome Sugar Protocol as inadequate. ~~We share your concern~~. But as you will recall, the quota was part of the package which was negotiated on Zimbabwe's accession to the Lome Convention and was the best deal that could be got at the time. We have since been on the lookout for ways in which your quota could be increased. In particular, we have been pressing hard for Zimbabwe to be given priority in the reallocation of quotas occasioned by other ACP states' inability to

CONFIDENTIAL

meet their supply commitments. At the moment there is at least 12,000 tonnes available for redistribution and we ~~would~~ will very much hope that a fair proportion of this ~~can~~ go to your country. ~~(although you will appreciate that~~ the final decision lies with the EC Commission~~)~~. Portugal's ~~prospective~~ accession to the Community ~~may~~ should also provide an opportunity to obtain an increase in Zimbabwe's quota. ~~(a precise amount for selling Portugal; higher restrictions are still~~ This matter is currently under discussion within the EC and no decisions have yet been taken. You will, no doubt, be keeping up the pressure on the Commission and other EC members. I can assure you that the interests of Zimbabwe and of other ACP suppliers of the Portuguese market are very much in our minds.

I also told you that we ~~will~~ shall be able to provide the additional military assistance you had asked for in the armour and artillery and logistics fields. I am ~~delighted~~ pleased that we are able to help on this occasion, but you will, I know, understand that the resources available to us for this sort of task are limited and we may well not be able to meet any further requests for assistance going beyond the advisory and staff training functions which ~~se~~ we see as BMATT's principal role.

Finally, may I say once again, on the subject of remittances, that I fully understand your Government's need for ~~tough~~ ~~measures~~ ~~delivery~~ measures in the present difficult economic situation. I appreciate it all the more, therefore, that you were able to agree to consider the cases of those individuals (often very elderly and sick) for whom the controls mean genuine hardship. /I very

ZIMBABWE : Mugabe May 80

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I very much hope that you enjoyed your visit to Britain and found it useful. We certainly did. My congratulations, once again, on the honour paid to you by Edinburgh University. I greatly look forward to our next meeting.

30 JUL 1984

Printed in the UK for HMSO Dd 8422057 2/84 (28592)

David Barlay

With the compliments of

THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

pse refer to Colin Budd's letter to you of 25 July.

with DB.

(& a letter to Mr. Heath)

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
SW1A 2AH

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM HARARE 251000Z JUL 84

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 387 OF 25 JULY

MY 2 IPTS: MUGABE'S VISIT: CONSULAR CASES

1. AS AGREED WITH THE DEPARTMENT, I SPOKE TO MUGABE DURING HIS VISIT ABOUT HARTLEBURY AND THE AIR FORCE OFFICERS' PENSIONS, ON THE BASIS THAT

A. THE PRIME MINISTER HAD HERSELF REFRAINED FROM RAISING THESE CASES, SINCE THEY WERE SOLELY A ZIMBABWEAN RESPONSIBILITY:

B. I WAS THEREFORE, NOT (NOT) IN ANY WAY MAKING REPRESENTATIONS:

C. BUT THE PRIME MINISTER WOULD BE GRATEFUL TO KNOW WHAT MUGABE WOULD LIKE HER TO SAY IN RESPONSE TO VARIOUS PETITIONS WHICH HAD BEEN SENT TO HER.

2. HARTLEBURY. MUGABE SAID THAT HE HAD RECEIVED A LETTER FROM MRS HARTLEBURY, AND ''THIS WOULD BE CONSIDERED''. HE WENT ON TO COMMENT THAT HARTLEBURY AND EVANS WERE ''SPIES, WHO HAD LET US DOWN'', BUT ADDED THAT ''DETENTION WAS NOT FOR EVER''.

3. AIR FORCE OFFICERS' PENSIONS. MUGABE WAS AGAIN ADAMANT THAT PENSIONS WOULD NOT BE PAID, ALTHOUGH CONTRIBUTIONS WOULD BE RETURNED. THIS WAS BECAUSE ALL THE AIR FORCE OFFICERS HAD BEEN IN SOME DEGREE CULPABLE, NOTWITHSTANDING THAT THERE HAD NOT BEEN SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SECURE CONVICTIONS. MUGABE MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE HAD NOTED PILE'S RECENT ARTICLE IN 'THE TELEGRAPH', AND HAD NOT BEEN AMUSED.

4. MUGABE RESPONDED AFFABLY ENOUGH ON BOTH THESE ISSUES. HOWEVER, GIVEN THE BASIS ON WHICH I RAISED THEM WITH HIM, IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WE SHOULD NOT GIVE THE IMPRESSION THAT WE HAVE MADE ANYTHING IN THE NATURE OF REPRESENTATIONS. I SUGGEST WE USE THE FORMULA ''DURING HIS VISIT TO BRITAIN, MUGABE TOLD US THAT .....''.

CONFIDENTIAL

/5. REMITTANCE.

1) Mr Powell : to see
2) pa

DMB
26/7

5. REMITTANCE HARDSHIP CASES. AS HE HAD ASSURED THE PRIME MINISTER, MUGABE TOLD HIS AUDIENCE AT THE MEETING IN PARLIAMENT THAT HE WOULD CONSIDER HARDSHIP CASES AFFECTED BY THE RECENT CLAMP-DOWN ON REMITTANCES, IF THESE WERE FORWARDED TO HIM THROUGH ME. HE EMPHASISED THAT THE RESTRICTIONS HAD ONLY BEEN IMPOSED OF NECESSITY AND THAT HE HAD CLOSELY QUESTIONED HIS MINISTER OF FINANCE BEFORE AGREEING TO THEM. HE WENT ON TO ASSERT THAT THE ECONOMY WAS LOOKING UP, IMPLYING (ALTHOUGH HE DID NOT STATE IT EXPLICITLY) THAT THE RESTRICTIONS WOULD BE RELAXED AS SOON AS THE SITUATION ALLOWED.

EWANS

LIMITED

CAFD
NEWS.D
PLANNING STAFF
PS
PS | MR. RIFKIND.
PS | PUS
SIR. J LEAHY.
MR. SQUIRE

THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T131/84

FILE

SUBJECT
cc Master
dpr

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

20 July, 1984

Dear Prime Minister,

Thank you so much for the handsome gift which you sent me following our meeting, a most kind thought.

I found our talk very useful and hope that we can remain in close touch. I am following up the particular matters we discussed.

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher

The Honourable R. G. Mugabe.

CONFIDENTIAL

JKRACK

Subject file
cc Master Set

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

18 July 1984

Dear Clive,

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH MR. MUGABE: 18 JULY

The Prime Minister met Mr. Mugabe for an hour's discussion at 1700 on 18 July at 10 Downing Street. The meeting was held tete-a-tete. The Prime Minister has given me the following account.

The Prime Minister complimented Mr. Mugabe on his Honorary Degree and asked about the Commonwealth Institute's Conference on SADCC.

The Prime Minister told Mr. Mugabe that we could agree to extend BMATT's tasks as the Zimbabwe Government had requested. Mr. Mugabe was grateful. (Because of pressure of other events, the Prime Minister did not see the Defence Secretary's minute of 18 July on this subject before she saw Mr. Mugabe. She spoke only on the basis of a hasty oral briefing. She did not therefore go into any detail. Nor did she make the point that Zimbabweans could not expect us to continue to grant such requests in future. It would be helpful if the High Commissioner could go over these points with Mr. Mugabe.)

The Prime Minister expressed sympathy for Zimbabwe's drought problem. She conveyed our offer to negotiate £12 million worth of programme aid from within existing pledges, including an element for land settlement. Mr. Mugabe said that the important point was to accelerate the disbursement of aid. At present Zimbabwe had to pay for land resettlement and obtain reimbursement. They wanted to be paid in advance. The Prime Minister said that she thought this would be the effect of our offer.

In response to a request from Mr. Mugabe, the Prime Minister said that we would do our best to help with police training.

Mr. Mugabe showed considerable interest in Mr. Botha's visit on which the Prime Minister briefed him. Mr. Mugabe

asked particularly about South African views and intentions on Namibia. The Prime Minister said that the South Africans wanted to get out of Namibia but this was impossible for them while the Cubans remained in Angola.

The Prime Minister asked Mr. Mugabe to show flexibility over blocked funds in hardship cases. Mr. Mugabe was not very forthcoming but said that he would be prepared to consider individual cases which were put to him.

The Prime Minister asked about the progress of the reconciliation campaign and referred to the continued detention of Bishop Muzorewa on which she was frequently tackled in the House of Commons. Mr. Mugabe said that the problem was that ZAPU was unable to accept defeat. Bishop Muzorewa was "all right". The Prime Minister did not press the subject further.

Mr. Mugabe raised the question of Zimbabwe's quota under the EC Sugar Protocol. Zimbabwe had initially received only 25,000 tons which he described as a "lousy, rotten, raw deal", compared with the 45,000 tons (sic) which Zimbabwe used to receive under the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement. Mr. Mugabe said that he looked to the United Kingdom for help in getting the quota increased and in particular to ensure that Portugal's accession to the Community resulted in an increase in the overall quantity under the Sugar Protocol by the full 300,000 tons which Portugal currently imported. The Prime Minister said that she was not familiar with the details but we would be ready to support a fair solution for Zimbabwe.

Finally, Mr. Mugabe invited the Prime Minister to visit Zimbabwe. The Prime Minister said that she would like to do so.

The Prime Minister commented afterwards that it had been a good session and she had been able to build on the better relationship created in their discussions in New Delhi.

The Prime Minister promised Mr. Mugabe that she would write to him with further details about our aid offer. I should be grateful if you would let me have a draft letter. I suggest that this might also cover the question of Zimbabwe's sugar quota and possibly also the point about BMATT (although I think it would also be as well for the High Commissioner to go over this orally with Mr. Mugabe before he leaves London).

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

yours sincerely,

Charles Powell

C.R. Budd, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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PRIME MINISTER

MEETING WITH MR. MUGABE - 18 JULY

Mr. Mugabe will be accompanied by his Foreign Minister and High Commissioner in London. John Leahy and Martin Ewans (High Commissioner in Harare) will attend on our side.

Briefing and card attached. There is an important point on BMATT. The Zimbabweans have asked it to undertake three additional tasks: assistance at the School of Infantry, armour and artillery, tactical training and assistance with logistics staff. Provided FCO/MOD can reach agreement tonight on how much each will pay of the cost, you should be able to tell Mr. Mugabe tomorrow that we can meet his request.

Mr. Mugabe will be seeing Lord Soames. The visit is private, primarily to attend the Commonwealth Institute Conference on SADCC and receive Honorary Degree at Edinburgh.

CDP

C.D. POWELL

17 July 1984

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CONFIDENTIAL

CDD 15/7.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

17 July 1984

Dear Charles,

Zimbabwe: Call on Prime Minister by Mr Mugabe: 18 July

In my letter of 16 July covering the briefing for the call on the Prime Minister by Mr Mugabe, I said that it might be necessary to provide some revised briefing on BMATT after Ministers had considered recent Zimbabwean requests for further training. The Foreign Secretary and Mr Heseltine have now had an opportunity to exchange views (copies of their minutes have gone to the Prime Minister and to members of OD) and they consider that we should agree to provide the Zimbabweans with the additional training they want. Mr Heseltine is writing to the Prime Minister suggesting a line to take with Mr Mugabe.

Temporarily Retained

THIS IS A COPY. THE ORIGINAL IS RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3 (4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT.

We have also been thinking of the advice to give to the Prime Minister about her tete-a-tete with Mr Mugabe. This will be important in setting a suitably warm tone for the discussions. Given Mr Mugabe's personality we would suggest that this might concentrate mainly on non-contentious issues. After the opening personal remarks about his visit to London, the Prime Minister might invite him to give his views on matters of particular interest to him: perhaps first his forthcoming Party Congress and national elections, and then recent developments in Southern Africa. The Prime Minister might wish to describe her own reaction to the Nkomati Accord and her meeting with Mr P W Botha, including the discussion on South Africa's relations with Zimbabwe. If this leads naturally to the internal security situation in Zimbabwe, the Prime Minister might wish to touch lightly on Matabeleland on the lines suggested in our briefing. Otherwise it would seem better to leave this sensitive issue until a suitable opportunity occurs later in the full meeting.

/Finally,

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Finally, may I take this opportunity to ask you to make a small amendment to the existing briefing. After further consideration the ODA would like the words 'if asked' inserted before references in the briefing to police training (ie at the beginning of para 4 of the Checklist of main Points to Make, and at the beginning of para 7 of the Points to Make - Bilateral and Internal issues).

Yours ever,

Ian Appleyard

for (C R Budd)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

CALL ON PRIME MINISTER BY MR MUGABE 18-7-84

Briefing : list of contents

A Checklist of main points to make

B Steering Brief

C Provisional programme and members of party

D Points to Make (bilateral and internal issues)

E Points to make (Southern Africa)

F Essential facts (bilateral and internal issues)

G Essential facts (Southern Africa)

H Record of conversation between the Prime Minister and Mr Mugabe in New Delhi, 24 November 1983

A

ZIMBABWE: CALL ON PRIME MINISTER BY MR MUGABE: 18 JULY

Check list of main points to make

1. Anglo/Zimbabwe relations. Delighted these have been so close since meeting in New Delhi. Prince Charles enjoyed his visit.

2. BMATT. We shall continue. [If necessary] We are considering further requests.

3. UK development aid. Sympathy over effects of 3 years of drought. Shall continue to do our best to meet your needs. We are ready to negotiate £12m programme aid agreement (from within existing pledges). Land resettlement: new programme aid agreement includes £10m for land resettlement and we hope this will accelerate disbursement: [If necessary] will consider further contribution in due course. We are giving high priority to manpower aid.

4. Other UK aid. Shall do our best to help with police training. Will provide adviser for National Economic Conduct Inspectorate.

5. Southern Africa/Mr Botha's Visit. We welcome signs of movement in the region. We stressed to Botha need for improved relations with all his neighbours: he seemed receptive. Nkomati Accord must be made to work: we are supporting. On Namibia Botha saw need for early progress and appeared personally committed to a settlement. Important to support regional negotiations, particularly South Africa/Angola on disengagement and US/Angola on Cubans. Do you see any scope for improvement in Zimbabwe's relations with South Africa?

/6.

6. Blocked funds. Understand need for tough measures and very glad that pension rights remain unaffected. But could you show greater flexibility for genuine hardship cases?

7. Internal situation. Developments in Matabeleland since New Delhi? Domestic concern about certain reports. We emphasise that this is an internal matter and that we support re-establishment of law and order. But importance of "hearts and minds" (cf N. Ireland). How is reconciliation campaign progressing?

8. CHOGM 1985. Is 17/18 to 21 October convenient?

B

ZIMBABWE: CALL ON PRIME MINISTER BY MR MUGABE: 18 JULY

Steering Brief

1. Mr Mugabe is here on a private visit, mainly to attend the Commonwealth Institute's SADCC conference and to receive an honorary degree from Edinburgh University. He will be accompanied by Mrs Mugabe and various Ministers. Our High Commissioner in Harare is returning here for the visit (and for consultations). Mr Mugabe's programme and list of his party are attached.

2. Relations with Zimbabwe were clouded for much of last year by the treatment of the Air Force officers and brutal behaviour by soldiers in Matabeleland. The atmosphere improved greatly after a meeting between the Prime Minister and Mr Mugabe in New Delhi in November. The officers were released at the end of last year and relations have remained good, although a number of difficult issues loom.

3. UK objectives

i) To build on the good personal relationship established by the Prime Minister at New Delhi.

ii) To show sympathy for Zimbabwe's problems (3 years of drought) and assure Mr Mugabe of our continuing support: BMATT, development aid.

iii) To explain our Southern African policies.

iv) To ask for more flexibility over hardship cases affected by Zimbabwe's controls on personal remittances.

v) To show concern (but very tactfully) over Army behaviour in Matabeleland.

4. Zimbabwean objectives

i) To ensure the continuation of BMATT and aid for land resettlement and economic development.

ii) To express concern about South Africa's policies.

5. It is suggested that the Prime Minister should concentrate mainly on bilateral and Southern African issues. There is much common ground and no major problem between us. The Prime Minister may wish to

repeat the highly successful technique at New Delhi of encouraging Mr Mugabe to explain his own concerns. As well as assuring Mr Mugabe that BMATT will continue, he could be told that we are ready to negotiate an agreement for £12m programme aid from existing pledges. It would be helpful if a brief reference could be made to the hardship cases caused by Zimbabwean controls on remittances: there is a good deal of Parliamentary and public concern. The most difficult issue is the situation in Matabeleland. It would seem right for the Prime Minister to touch on this. The Army's ineffectiveness against the dissidents and brutality against the populace is leading to a worsening security situation, and Mr Mugabe's policy of intimidation of ZAPU is spreading unrest outside Matabeleland. This heavy-handed approach arouses considerable criticism among domestic opinion here. But Mr Mugabe is convinced he is winning, and would react angrily to any criticism from the Prime Minister of his internal policies or any hint that our own policies towards Zimbabwe might be affected. The best course might be for the Prime Minister to concentrate mainly on signalling concern by asking questions, though she may wish to point to the importance of reconciliation on the lines suggested in the Points to make. (Lord Soames will no doubt have also raised Matabeleland during his lunch for Mr Mugabe on the same day.)

VISIT BY MR MUGABE: 17-21 JULY 1984

Provisional Programme

TUESDAY 17 JULY

0745	Arrive Gatwick by Air Zimbabwe Flight No RH124 Met by special representative of the Secretary of State (Sir Donald Logan) Go to Hilton Hotel (throughout the visit transport in London will be arranged by Zimbabwe House and in Edinburgh by the University)

WEDNESDAY 18 JULY

1035	Deliver keynote address to Conference on SADCC
1115	Tour Great Zimbabwe Exhibition
1300	Lunch with Lord Soames
1700	Call on Prime Minister

THURSDAY 19 JULY

1630	Meeting with MPs (Members of Britain-Zimbabwe Parliamentary Group)
1730	Return to Hotel
1900	Attend reception for SADCC Conference delegates at Commonwealth Institute

FRIDAY 20 JULY

0800 (approx)	Depart for Edinburgh (aircraft provided by British Aerospace)

0930 (approx)	Arrive Edinburgh
1100	Degree ceremony followed by reception, lunch
1500 (approx)	Depart by BAe aircraft for London
1630 (approx)	Arrive London. Return to Hotel.

SATURDAY 21 JULY

Free for private engagements

1900	Depart Gatwick for Harare by Air Zimbabwe Fligh No RH123

VISIT BY MR MUGABE: 17 - 21 JULY 1984

Party (provisional)

Mr Robert Gabriel Mugabe, Prime Minister

Mrs Mugabe

Dr Witness Mangwende (Minister of Foreign Affairs)

Dr Nathan Shamuyarira (Minister of Information and Posts and Telecommunications)

Senator Denis Norman (Minister of Agriculture)

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ZIMBABWE: CALL ON PRIME MINISTER BY MR MUGABE: 18 JULY

Points to Make

Bilateral and Internal Issues

Anglo/Zimbabwean Relations: General

1. Delighted that relations have been so close since our meeting in New Delhi last year. A number of useful ministerial visits since then. Prince Charles greatly enjoyed his visit to Zimbabwe in March.

BMATT

2. We agree that it should continue at least to the end of next year. If asked. We envisage around 35 for BMATT's established training tasks. We are considering your recent additional requests and will do what we can, though there are heavy calls on our resources.

UK Development Aid

3. We sympathise with Zimbabwe's problems after 3 years of drought. Glad to have helped with emergency food aid.

4. We shall continue to do our best to meet Zimbabwe's development needs. We are ready to negotiate an agreement on the £12m which has been converted to programme aid from other headings in our allocation for Zimbabwe.

5. We are continuing help for land resettlement programme. Hope that the conversion of resettlement aid into programme aid (para 4) will help swifter disbursement. If asked. Our existing pledges are still being committed,

/and

and we cannot give any firm undertaking on a further contribution now. We will consider what else might be done at a later date.

6. We are placing higher priority on manpower needs within our aid programme in response to your wishes, and look forward to receiving Zimbabwean reaction to detailed proposals we have made.

Other UK Assistance

7. Police training. We are carefully studying requests from Home Affairs Minister Mubako following his visit here. We shall do what we can.

8. We have agreed to finance the Thomson Foundation training for Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation.

9. If asked. Pleased to help over adviser for the National Economic Conduct Inspectorate (anti-fraud).

Remittances

10. Fully understand the need for tough measures in the present difficult economic situation. Appreciate that pension rights remain unaffected: this is very important. Glad to hear from Finance Minister Chidzero that recent tighter controls on remittances (other than pensions) should be temporary and that cases of genuine hardship will be considered sympathetically. Would much help with our domestic opinion if greater flexibility could be shown over hardship cases (very elderly and sick). Relatively few and should not involve much foreign exchange. Perhaps British High Commissioner could follow this up with you.

/Internal Situation

Internal situation

11. i) In New Delhi Mr Mugabe gave an account of his internal problems. How has the situation developed in Matabeleland since then?

ii) Considerable domestic concern about certain reports earlier this year from Matabeleland. We always emphasise that this is an internal matter, and that we fully support Mr Mugabe's efforts to re-establish law and order. Our experience in Northern Ireland and elsewhere is that must also win "hearts and minds" of populace. How are reconciliation efforts progressing?

12. No doubt the ZANU Party Congress in August and later national elections are greatly occupying Mr Mugabe. What are the prospects?

13. Only if appropriate. Remember what Mr Mugabe said in New Delhi about Bishop Muzorewa's links with South African destablisation. We make clear here that his case is an internal matter in which we have no standing. But there is considerable Parliamentary interest in his detention.

Commonwealth Head of Government Meeting, Nassau 1985

14. Our preferred dates are 17/18-21 October. We hope Mr Mugabe will also find these dates convenient.

British Press [defensive]

15. Some prejudice against Zimbabwe and Mr Mugabe personally does appear in a few papers, but not in the majority. We too suffer from the fact that in a free press editors tend to regard good news as no news. Furthermore, the Zimbabwean press does not pull its punches about Britain (or the Prime Minister).

ZIMBABWE: CALL ON PRIME MINISTER BY MR MUGABE: 18 JULY

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Central African Dept
FCO
July 1984

ZIMBABWE: CALL ON PRIME MINISTER BY MR MUGABE: 18 JULY

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Central African Dept
FCO
July 1984

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ZIMBABWE: CALL ON PRIME MINISTER BY MR MUGABE, 18 JULY

SOUTHERN AFRICA

POINTS TO MAKE

General

1. We welcome signs of movement away from destabilisation/violence in region. We continue to urge restraint on South Africa: negotiation and dialogue without bullying the only way forward.

South Africa and Mozambique

2. You know we welcomed the signature of the Nkomati Accord. See it as a potentially major step. Important that Accord should work and bring benefits to both sides. Shall do what we can to encourage this. Would greatly benefit Zimbabwe transit routes also. Our impression, South Africans are upholding Nkomati. We are keen to see end to fighting.

Visit of South African Prime Minister to UK

3. Appreciated your understanding approach. We believed it would have been wrong not to see Botha when in Europe. Have always made clear our commitment to dialogue, speaking frankly and firmly. Major opportunity to put across our views at highest level at important juncture. We left Botha in no doubt about the need for restraint in relations with neighbouring countries.

/4.

4. On Namibia, Botha appeared personally committed to a settlement. Saw need for early progress. We remain committed to SCR 435.

5. On internal matters had hard hitting discussions. We raised apartheid, forced removals, Nelson Mandela, black rights generally.

6. Did not expect any immediate results. Have given Botha much to reflect on. Part of long term effort to influence South African policies. Must keep up momentum. Can only do so through direct contact. Vital African states play their part. Need to involve no sacrifice of principle.

Zimbabwe/South Africa

7. Note you see no need for a Zimbabwean Nkomati Accord or for ministerial contacts with South Africa. Agree that each country is different case. But no doubt Zimbabwe is considering whether there might be scope for some improvement in relations. We believe the South Africans want this. Botha had spoken quite favourably about their relations with Zimbabwe. We stressed to him need to approach Zimbabwe in a positive spirit, and told him of the Prime Minister's high regard for Mr Mugabe.

Namibia/Angola

8. South African disengagement from Angola vital first step towards Namibia settlement. Both sides want military stand-off preserved. Important to encourage process of negotiation.

/US Role

9. US influence on SAG key to progress. US realise they must address security concern of all parties, including Angolans. We must make most of US commitment to a settlement.

10. SWAPO is militarily weak, though political stock probably remains high in Namibia. Present process offers only chance of early settlement. We must keep SWAPO in line. Patience in their long-term interest.

11. Do not accept formal linkage between Cuban withdrawal and Namibia Settlement. But Cuban withdrawal desirable. Fact that US and SAG have made link cannot be ducked.

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ZIMBABWE: CALL ON PRIME MINISTER BY MR MUGABE, 18 JULY

ESSENTIAL FACTS

I BILATERAL ISSUES

Anglo/Zimbabwean Relations

1. The Prime Minister and Mr Mugabe met in the margins of CHOGM in New Delhi on 24 November 1983 (record attached). Since then there have been successful visits here by the Zimbabwean Minister of Information and Home Affairs, the Minister of Lands for the Royal Show and the Minister of Defence for the British Army Equipment Exhibition, as well as frequent private visits by other ministers. The Prince of Wales paid a highly successful visit to Zimbabwe in March. Mr Stanley went there in May. [Not for use] Sir G Howe proposes to visit Zimbabwe in January 1985. We have not yet approached the Zimbabweans.

BMATT

2. Last January the Prime Minister agreed to proposals for a continuation of BMATT, with the numbers reduced from 60 to 30-odd by the end of this year and a further shift in the team's role away from field training of the Zimbabwe National Army towards concentration on the advisory and staff training functions. It was also agreed that a further review of the future of BMATT should be undertaken in the latter half of this year. Since then we have had a request from the Zimbabwean government that BMATT should undertake three additional tasks: assistance at the School of Infantry; armour and artillery tactical training; and assistance with the logistics staff at Army HQ.

The first of these tasks can be accomplished this year from within BMATT's existing resources and it has been agreed to go ahead. During his visit to Zimbabwe in May Mr Stanley agreed to feasibility studies on the remaining two requests. These recommended acceptance of the tasks and, following discussion by the Chiefs of Staff, Ministers are considering the policy and financial implications of a positive response.

Development Aid

3. Since independence we have pledged a total of £113m in aid and have so far spent approx £65m of this. £30m of the pledge is to meet half the cost of the land resettlement programme, but disbursement has been slow (about £8.5m to date) and we have therefore proposed to the Zimbabweans (and they have accepted) that £10m of the pledge (plus an unused £2m from a project loan) should be converted into programme aid for imports of raw materials, spare parts, and replacement equipment in the mining, manufacturing and agricultural sectors. Importers will deposit local currency with the Government against an allocation of foreign exchange from our aid, and the counter-part funds thus generated will be used in the land resettlement programme. We are now ready to negotiate an agreement on this transfer with the Zimbabweans. They may nevertheless ask about new money for land resettlement. The objectives of the programme remain valid and progress, while slow, has been broadly satisfactory. We can look at the question of more money when present funds have been fully allocated.

4. The Zimbabweans recently asked us for help over meeting a range of manpower needs, and we have now put detailed proposals to them identifying priority areas and making suggestions for recruitment at lower cost.

Drought

5. We have provided £1.5m for the purchase of 10,000 tonnes of maize (and contributed to help from the European Community) plus another approximately £0.7m for trucks for food distribution and food and medicines for the various voluntary agencies. Earlier fears that Zimbabwe would have to import 600,000 tonnes of maize (costing $200m) to make up for drought losses have now lessened, and it will probably be necessary to import about 400,000 tonnes. Tobacco and cotton have done well and the Zimbabwe dollar prices of most minerals have improved.

Other Assistance

6. Following the visit here in April of the Minister of Home Affairs we received requests for a range of police training. These are now being studied. In addition the Zimbabweans propose to create a National Economic Conduct Inspectorate to control the illegal outflow of foreign exchange, and we have agreed to help in selecting and paying for an adviser to it. We also hope to be able to help over a request for Zimbabwean judges to pay study visits here.

Blocked Funds

7. In March the Zimbabweans announced tighter exchange controls, largely as an emergency measure to meet the cost of food imports

/following

following three years of drought. Pensions (public and private are protected by the Constitution) are not affected. The controls are said to be temporary and allow for hardship cases. We continue to take up deserving cases with the Zimbabweans but very few are accepted in practice. Mr Mugabe will have little sympathy for these people: he considers they could have chosen to lead a good life within Zimbabwe. But he might respond to a plea for greater flexibility over genuine hardship cases. This would help to reassure the active parliamentary concern over this issue.

II INTERNAL/SECURITY SITUATION

Matabeleland

8. A further round of large-scale military operations against dissidents in Matabeleland ended in April. Few were killed or captured. Food was deliberately witheld from the population in the curfew area, and while there are no reports of deaths from starvation 100 to 300 may have died as a result of army brutality (5 Brigade and the Presidential Guard). These tactics have made the situation worse; dissident activity has since resumed and even spread to adjacent provinces. The security forces remain largely ineffectual in dealing with it. The Government is clearly trying to force a ZANU and Shona political and cultural identity on the Ndebele in the lead-in to the ZANU Party Congress in August, and the subsequent national elections (date not yet set but probably next year). Following the murder of a ZANU official political intimidation has spread to ZAPU areas outside Matabeleland. White commercial farmers

/are

are leaving Matabeleland; from 750 at independence there are now fewer than 300 left.

Party Congress

9. The ZANU Party Congress will take place 8-11 August. It will decide on a new party constitution, elect a central committee and Politburo and adopt a new political programme (no doubt giving high priority to the introduction of a one-party state). All major decisions are likely to be agreed before the Congress begins. It will generate considerable rhetoric.

Bishop Muzorewa

10. The Bishop was detained in October last year in connection with clandestine activities against the State. In Delhi last November Mr Mugabe told the Prime Minister at length about his belief that the Bishop is in collusion with South Africa. The Review Tribunal examined the Bishop's case in January. In April we heard that it had decided not to recommend his release. A further review is likely before end September (it is clear that there is to be no release before the Party Congress in August and probably not before the elections next year).

Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM): Nassau 1985

11. The Prime Minister has stated a preference for the next Heads of Government meeting to be in the second half of October 1985, after the Conservative Party Conference but before the opening of Parliament. She has written to Sir Lynden Pindling the Prime Minister of the Bahamas and to Mr Sonny Ramphal the Commonwealth Secretary General proposing 17 - 21 October 1985 as dates for the meeting.

The Palace have said that the autumn of 1985 and in particular the second half of October would suit Her Majesty The Queen. Our Missions in Commonwealth countries have been instructed to lobby their host Governments seeking support for 17 - 21 October 1985 for the CHOGM and the visit of the Prime Minister of Zimbabwe provides an excellent opportunity to consult at the highest level.

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ZIMBABWE: CALL ON PRIME MINISTER BY MR MUGABE: 18 JULY

SOUTHERN AFRICA

Essential Facts (may be freely used except where indicated)

ZIMBABWE/SOUTH AFRICA

Visit of Mr P W Botha to UK

1. The Prime Minister sent messages to Mr Mugabe before and after the visit here on 2 June by Mr P W Botha. In her second message the Prime Minister said: "I stressed our strong desire to see South Africa approach its relations with Zimbabwe in a positive spirit and told Mr Botha of my high regard for you." Mr Mugabe spoke with understanding to our High Commissioner about the visit. He said he was in favour of a policy of "enticing the Boers out of the laager". Mr Mugabe would no doubt welcome a first-hand account of the meeting. We should underline that we left the South Africans in no doubt about the need for restraint in their relations with their neighbours. Mr Mugabe had spoken strongly to the Prime Minister at New Delhi about his concern over South African destabilisation.

South African Attitude

2. The South Africans seem to be hoping for some improvement in relations with Zimbabwe (including opening a dialogue at ministerial level) and appear to have stepped down their destabilisation activities, though keeping open this option for the future. They have been helpful over maize imports. They seem to remain satisfied that the Zimbabwean authorities are maintaining their efforts to prevent ANC operations from Zimbabwean territory and that any probable successor to Mugabe is likely to be more difficult to deal with.

Zimbabwean Attitude

3. Mr Mugabe has also shown slightly greater flexibility. He has publicly welcomed the Nkomati Accord. Anti-South African rhetoric has not disappeared from Zimbabwean ministerial statements but is less strident than formerly. Some Zimbabwean Ministers (though probably not Mugabe) may be disposed to review the question

of ministerial contact with South Africa (in addition to the existing ad hoc talks between officials and permanent trade missions).

4. However, Mr Mugabe remains deeply suspicious of South African intentions and fears further destabilisation. He expects the Nkomati Accord to fail and is strongly opposed to any similar agreement for Zimbabwe. The Zimbabweans feel somewhat left out of recent regional developments and aware of their increased vulnerability to pressure in Matabeleland and over drought relief.

Prospects

5. Little further progress seems likely at least until after the ZANU Party Congress and national elections. However if by then the Nkomati Accord has shown real fruits, it is possible that Mr Mugabe might be persuaded to make some further gesture towards South Africa. There could thus be an opportunity gradually to nudge the two sides closer together.

SOUTH AFRICA AND MOZAMBIQUE

6. The Nkomati Accord between Mozambique and South Africa was signed on 16 March. Its main point is that neither country will serve as a base for acts of violence against the other or use the territory of a third state for this purpose. The real test of the agreement lies in its implementation. The Mozambicans have taken steps to curb the African National Congress in Mozambique. The South Africans appear to have stopped assisting RENAMO. But RENAMO remains very active. This is not surprising in the wake of the Accord, but we look for some lessening of their operations by the end of the year. Machel and his supporters are looking for some clear reward for the Nkomati signature. If Soviet influence is to be rolled back and the Accord made to stick the West will have to be forthcoming with their aid and investment, matters which we are discussing with our partners. We hope to increase our bilateral aid programme to Mozambique (£3m in 1984-5) considerably. We have already pledged under the auspices of the South African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) £10.1m for upgrading the Limpopo Valley Railway and a further £750,000 for improvements to Maputo Port. We have also sent disaster relief to Mozambique.

7. The Front Line States clearly understand the pressures Machel has been under. But they are undoubtedly concerned, and deeply mistrustful of South African intentions, fearing that similar pressures will now be exerted to secure further bilateral agreements.

NAMIBIA/ANGOLA

Zimbabwean Attitude [Not for use]

8. Aloof from Namibia/Angola developments. Generally cynical about SAG intentions.

Disengagement

9. Near completion. Still no dates for removal of Joint Monitoring Commission (JMC) to Namibian border. On 2 July Pik Botha announced postponement of final withdrawal until satisfied no SWAPO troops in vacated area. But said he was not greatly concerned by delay and SAG have proposed Joint Peacekeeping Commission to succeed JMC and preserve military stand-off. Angolans also want this but keen to involve SWAPO, so reducing risk of their disrupting disengagement. US trying to set up SWAPO/SAG talks.

SAG Intentions [Not for use]

10. SAG keeping options open as ever. Some evidence they are pursuing dual-track policy of:

a) affirming commitment to SCR 435 if agreement reached on Cuban withdrawal from Angola (which they say is unlikely without UNITA/MPLA reconciliation);

b) seeking interim coalition government to include SWAPO and administer Namibia, with South Africans retaining responsibility for security, in preparation for definitive settlement. SAG may believe this option attainable with co-operation of African neighbours (and maybe Western support). But content for the present to shelter behind US linkage requirement and advocate SWAPO renounce use of force.

US Diplomacy

11. US/Angola dialogue alive and continuing. Crocker met Angolans in Lusaka on 23 May and P W Botha and Pik Botha in Rome on 12 June. US now believe breakthrough unlikely before November. But determined to sustain activity through summer, focussing on a continuation of the Joint Monitoring Commission on the Angola/Namibia border; and on progress towards a ceasefire in Namibia.

Angolan Attitude

12. Have made serious attempt to control SWAPO. Committed to disengagement. Anxious to maintain SA/Angola military stand-off; and prevent SWAPO giving excuse to intervene in Angola again. [Not for use: but without progress towards Namibia settlement this would be inherently unstable, thus interest in direct SAG/SWAPO contacts].

Angola Internal

13. Angola still virtually on a war footing. Marked increase in recent months in UNITA's military threat. Central Government cannot provide effective administration outside the towns in one-third of the country. Chronic economic dislocation. But Moscow and Havana appear determined to keep MPLA Government in power and to pay the (so far modest) price. Result is military and political stalemate.

14. UNITA's declared aim to force negotiations on reconciliation. But difficult for MPLA to negotiate until more confident of their security. Best prospects for reconciliation likely to be progress in Western attempts for a regional settlement. Internal unity more likely to follow a regional settlement than precede it.

Central African Department
FCO

July 1984

SECRET

RECORD OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE PRIME MINISTER OF ZIMBABWE AT 1845 HOURS ON THURSDAY 24 NOVEMBER 1983 AT THE BRITISH HIGH COMMISSIONER'S RESIDENCE IN NEW DELHI

Present:

Prime Minister	Mr. Mugabe
Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary	Mr. Mnungagwa
Sir John Leahy	Mr. Mangwende
Mr. A.J. Coles	

JCP 020/3
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The Prime Minister said that she was glad to have the opportunity of a meeting because things were not going so well as they should between Britain and Zimbabwe. She understood that Mr. Mugabe had had a successful meeting recently with Mr. Rifkind. Our views on certain matters were well known and she would not repeat them. But she wanted fully to understand Mr. Mugabe's thinking - would he please talk?

We wanted to maintain our aid programme. We had agreed to supply Hunter aircraft. And BMATT were engaged in a valuable training operation. She would like a frank discussion. She had no toes to tread on. Her only wish was that at the end of the talk both sides could agree to cooperate. Britain had expected, and still expected, a great deal of Zimbabwe. We had always believed that an independent Zimbabwe, founded on free elections, could change the whole perspective of Southern Africa.

Mr. Mugabe thanked the Prime Minister for offering him an opportunity to exchange views and ideas and thereby to achieve a greater understanding than had existed in the recent past.

When Zimbabwe had commenced its life as a newly independent country, against a historical background of bitter fighting, his Party had pronounced itself as committed, were it elected to Government, to a process of reconciliation. That commitment

/ was genuine -

was genuine - they were deceiving no-one. Britain and the white community were shocked that the man whom they regarded as a terrorist and a guerilla leader was elected. But his people had never been terrorists - they were in search of freedom, justice and democracy. Having won the election, they had no need to be influenced by the hostile relations that had bedevilled Zimbabwe society. He had told Ian Smith and others that he was prepared to let bygones be bygones provided everybody else was prepared to respond to the hand of friendship. He had asked Lord Soames to remain to give him the tutelage which he needed. Neither he nor the other members of the Zimbabwe Cabinet had experience of Government or administration. The presence of Lord Soames was also needed to assure the British Government and people that the new Zimbabwe Government was not their enemy. Part of British culture had become part of Zimbabwe's culture. There was a large British community which needed assurance. Then help had been sought from Britain on the merging of the various armed forces. The former Rhodesian army had reservations about this exercise unless they were the central unit into which all others would be integrated. But he had set his face against this approach. None of the three armies could be allowed to exist as an army in its own right. There had to be reconciliation and unity.

Britain had immensely assisted the process. Zimbabwe was grateful to this day for the help which we had given in creating a national army. There had since been a few deserters who were creating problems here and there. And there was still much to be done to secure the full loyalty and commitment of the armed forces to the State. The present size of the armed forces - some 41,000 men - was the maximum necessary. The need now was to improve their quality.

Things had gone well in 1980 and 1981. Relations were gaining in strength. But not everyone had responded to the call for national reconciliation. For example, Ian Smith was bitter that the cause for which he had fought was lost. Others had similar feelings.

The Prime Minister said that these things could not be forgotten quickly. Mr. Mugabe said that his then friend and partner, Joshua Nkomo, had also been very bitter. Following

the Lancaster House Conference he had wanted to enter into a pact with Mr. Mugabe's party for electoral purposes. But Zanu had wanted the leadership question to be settled and believed that it was for the people to choose their leader. Nevertheless, they had pledged themselves to coalition with Zapu whether they won or lost. Zapu, however, had broken ranks. They had sought an alliance with Muzorewa and even with Ian Smith. Nkomo wanted to be leader and wanted his party to have a Parliamentary majority. His bitterness continued to simmer. After the elections, the Soviet Union had shipped arms to Zapu. Some of these, including 56 Sam 7 missiles had now come into the possession of the Zimbabwe Government.

In 1976/77, Zapu had worked out a "zero hour" strategy. They had decided to leave the fighting to Zanu in the expectation that the latter would become exhausted and would not in the end be able to resist Zapu. Then Zapu would have moved in with an army well equipped with Soviet weapons. Later, contrary to the agreement that all weapons would be handed over to a national army, Zapu had hidden weapons. They had acquired over 25 large farms for storing these weapons and also for retraining cadres. Deliberately, they had not integrated their crack forces. When the arms caches had been discovered, his confidence in Nkomo had been immediately dashed. He had removed Nkomo and one or two other members of Zapu from the Cabinet. But there were still Zapu people in the Cabinet today. The situation was now under control but pockets existed eg isolated farms where people felt unsafe.

As to Muzorewa, it was known that he had kept 5,000 of his former troops and sent them to South Africa. Taxed with this, Muzorewa had denied it and said that if it was true, it had been done without his knowledge. He had told Muzorewa that he would take his denial at face value - events would prove whether he was associated with this matter. In 1981 some of these troops, who had been retained by the South Africans, had been re-infiltrated into Zimbabwe. Later, the South Africans had stopped this traffic and concentrated instead on disrupting Zimbabwe's routes to Mozambique. They had also sent some of Muzorewa's soldiers on missions to Angola and Mozambique. The group which had attacked Mtola in Mozambique and some of the mercenaries who went to the Seychelles had been drawn from these people, both black and white.

/ Sithole

Sithole was also a very disappointed man. He had organised subversion but this had not been very significant. It was known that he had sent people to train in Mozambique alongside the MPRA. Now, Sithole was a spent force.

All these people had been accepted as partners to build a new Zimbabwe - it had been hard to accept that they had behaved in the way they had behaved.

Muzorewa had developed links with Zaire and, more recently, with Israel. Israel had earlier trained people in South Africa for the Rhodesian army. Latterly, Muzorewa had gone to Jerusalem, reportedly to study the bible. The fact that South Africa had again started to infiltrate men into Zimbabwe had been one of the factors leading to the detention of Muzorewa.

The outside world claimed that the Zimbabwe Government was harassing its opponents. But it wanted opposition provided it was lawful. There would be elections in a year's time - "they" would be free to set up parties and contest the elections.

With regard to the white community, there had been problems and it was in connection with these that our bilateral relations had gone a little sour. It took time for people with a history of privilege and racial domination to adjust and to accept a new position. He had shown understanding and given them time to adjust. Those who could not do so were urged to leave and some had. Others remained, among them those who had financial need of their pensions. People like this could not accept that the guerillas against whom they had fought yesterday had today become the Government. It was very difficult for them to sever their relationship with South Africa.

In 1981 £36 million worth of ammunition had been destroyed at a barracks just outside Harare. The loss had been tremendous. A committee had reached the conclusion that the sabotage had been arranged from within. Later, a group of three whites and one black had been caught while attempting to enter Zimbabwe from South Africa. Then, an agent of South Africa, working in the Zimbabwe army, had been arrested. He had confessed to giving

South Africa information about the locations of barracks and ammunition dumps, etc. But the policeman in charge of him, who had an Afrikaans name, had arranged for him to be released.

In the Central Intelligence Organisation, Mugabe had kept the people whom he had found there. He knew that they had worked for Smith and had connections with South Africa but they had pledged loyalty so they had been retained. The head of the CIO was initially Mr. Flower, who was well regarded, but who had now retired. Then Robertson had been appointed but he had had to retire through illness. Two members of the CIO had been arrested as agents of South Africa - a charge to which they had confessed. Their coordinator had got wind of their likely arrest and had gone to the UK on a false pretext of wanting to see a sick mother. The British High Commissioner had pleaded for the release of these people. The reaction in Britain had been disappointing. He had been accused of infringing human rights. The Conservative Party, the British press and then the United States had taken up the cry. Orchestration was apparent. The Prime Minister said that there was no orchestration - look at what the press said about her. But Mr. Mugabe was entitled to complain; the press were interested in discord. We knew all about preventive detention from our experience in Northern Ireland where many British soldiers had lost their lives. However, what had really provoked criticism in Britain was allegations of torture of which she thought Mr. Mugabe had no knowledge.

Mr. Mugabe said that no government would ever instruct that torture be used. But security people had their methods. Mr. Mnungagwa was deaf in one ear as a result of torture. Other members of the present Cabinet had suffered similarly. But the two South African agents in the CIO had not been tortured, though the conditions of their detention were not good. In the case of the air force officers, it had been alleged that three had been tortured and according to the Courts this was true. But his own people would not admit it even to him. If there had been torture it was not because that was the wish of the Zimbabwe Government. When people were arrested and detained - and there was immediate hostile reaction from the Conservative Party (the Prime Minister had at once made representations), then the Zimbabwe Government

wondered whether there was understanding. Did these critics recognise the good that he had tried to do? Did the good vanish because of one or two isolated acts? Where was the balance in this criticism? Why had the positive achievements been ignored? Look at the environment. The majority of the white community were content. They still had their privileges, except the privilege of ruling. They had a far higher standard of living and occupied prominent posts. Firms had not been nationalised and had even been encouraged to expand. Zimbabwe was saddened by criticism that did not recognise the positive achievements.

The Prime Minister said that she had to face questions twice a week in the House of Commons. Recently, she had been asked to cut off all aid to Zimbabwe. She had said that she would not do so - this would not be conducive to helping those whom we wished to help.

Mr. Mugabe said that four of the seven air force officers had now been released. The Zimbabwe Government had been fore-warned by the Attorney General that judgement would go against it. The Government had considered the issue and had taken the view that the Court had acquitted these people in view of certain technical considerations of the criminal law, particularly the requirement that confessions must be corroborated. The Government had therefore decided to examine the cases and had found that some had been more culpable than others. When three of the six who had been tried were on the point of release, he had received a message from the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister commented: "And you blew your top". Mr. Mugabe said that he could not accept direction from outside Zimbabwe. He had been very angry with our High Commissioner. The Prime Minister explained that she was continually asked whether we had made representations to the Zimbabwe Government - and we should continue to be questioned in this sense about the three who were still detained. Mr. Mugabe said that he could not be seen to be acting in response to representations by the British Government. No harm would come to the three who were still detained and they were likely to be released in due course. The Prime Minister said that we would try to find a new formula when faced with questions. We could perhaps refer to the fact that one more of the seven

detainees had been released and that our views on this matter were well known. Mr. Mugabe's helpful analysis had brought us up to the present time. Did he still want BMATT? Mr. Mugabe said that he did. They were doing good work. They would conclude the present exercise by August of next year and if another use could be found for them, they would stay on. The Prime Minister said that she was not pressing Mr. Mugabe to keep our soldiers - they were in great demand. She had been worried about the prospect of BMATT training elements of the Fifth Brigade. Mr. Mugabe said that the Fifth Brigade was notorious for nothing. The fact that they had been trained by the North Koreans did not make them any more dangerous than other units.

The Prime Minister said that since the question of the air force officers, there had been no fresh difficulty and we hoped that that situation could continue. Mr. Mugabe said that there was one point when he was very angry with the British Government. This had been when he had visited Ireland on his way to the United States. The Irish Government had told him that they were under pressure from Britain to raise the question of the detainees. The press there had been interested only in that issue. It had appeared that the British Government was preparing pressure for him everywhere he went. The whole matter seemed to be orchestrated. That was why he had made his public criticism of the Prime Minister, not because our general relationship was sour.

The Prime Minister asked Mr. Mugabe to understand. British public opinion expected perfection from Mr. Mugabe - his intellectual ability was unquestioned, he was known to be a religious man, he had won a free election. To have brought Rhodesia from its former condition to a state of independence was an enormous achievement. So when Mr. Mugabe had come to power people's expectations of him were unreasonably high. Everyone who knew him knew that he was incapable of corruption and everyone who met him thought highly of him. She had told him at No. 10 Downing Street that the Zimbabwe judicial system was very highly regarded. All these factors had led us to judge that acquittal of the air force officers must mean their release. Mr. Mugabe commented that these expectations were in a sense justified but people should take into account the fact that

/ Zimbabwe

Zimbabwe was going through a difficult period of transition. The Prime Minister said that it was true that critics did not take into account the fact that Mr. Mugabe and his people had suffered and had experienced preventive detention. The task of integrating the armies had not been easy. Mr. Mugabe said that he would never claim that the fact that he had been detained entitled him to detain others. But did people in Britain really expect that the situation in Zimbabwe would have been normalised so soon? What was the state of America four years after independence? The Prime Minister said that this was a fair point. Critics assumed that Zimbabwe should learn faster than others had. Britain had not moved to a one person/one vote basis until 1950. Mr. Mugabe said that if his Government had resorted to mass detentions, the world ought to be alarmed. But when it was only a matter of a few people, he ought to be given some credit for judgement. The cases of those still detained would come under review.

The Prime Minister repeated that we would try to find some new formula for use in public. We could state that there was a review tribunal which regularly reviewed cases. The cases of those still detained were on the cause list for the review tribunal. She now had a better understanding of Mr. Mugabe's viewpoint.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary recalled that when the air force officers had been acquitted he had received an immediate report to this effect. When this had been followed by a report of the detention of some of them, there had naturally been great disappointment.

The Prime Minister said that there would be occasion for more discussion at Goa. Taking up a reference by the Prime Minister to the President of Mozambique, Mr. Mugabe said that Mr. Machel had taken 2½ hours to describe to him his visit to Europe. Most of this time had been spent in praise of The Queen, the Prime Minister, etc. Machel had been deeply excited by his visit. He did not want to come under Soviet influence. No-one wanted to. Machel had been very grateful for the aid package he had been offered in London.

/ At this

At this point, the Prime Minister and Mr. Mugabe had to leave for dinner with Mrs Gandhi. The discussion ended at 2000.

A.B.C.

24 November 1983

CONFIDENTIAL

000177

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

16 July 1984

Dear Charles,

Zimbabwe: Call on Prime Minister by Mr Mugabe: 18 July

Mr Mugabe is paying a private visit to Britain from 17 to 21 July. He will be accompanied by Mrs Mugabe and by his Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Information and Agriculture. Mr Mugabe is to call on the Prime Minister on 18 July at 1700 hours. For the rest his appointments are private. The main purpose of the visit is Mr Mugabe's participation in the Commonwealth Institute Conference on SADCC on 18 July, and he is to receive an honorary degree at Edinburgh University on 20 July. Mr Mugabe will have a private lunch with Lord Soames on 18 July.

I attach a brief for the call on the Prime Minister, including an outline programme and a list of the party. Although he had hoped to attend, the Secretary of State will be unable to be present at the call on the Prime Minister. The Zimbabweans will probably wish Mr Mugabe to be accompanied by Mr Mangwende, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and by Mr Murerwa, their High Commissioner in London. If so we would suggest (we spoke) that Sir John Leahy and Mr Martin Ewans, our High Commissioner in Harare (who is now in London) should be present. We have already suggested that Mrs Thatcher may like to see Mr Mugabe alone for the first 15-20 minutes of the call.

The briefing recommends that the Prime Minister should concentrate mainly on bilateral and international issues, including a reference to the problem of remittances, but should also touch briefly on the security situation in Matabeleland (and, if appropriate, Bishop Muzorewa). There are a number of other problems on which we are under some pressure from domestic opinion but which do not seem to justify intervention by the Prime Minister, in particular the Air Force officers' pensions and the Hartlebury case (acquitted of spying but redetained on 'secret' evidence). It would be useful to be able to say in reply to enquiries that they were raised with Mr Mugabe during his visit. We

/are

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are therefore asking Mr Ewans to mention them at an appropriate moment during Mr Mugabe's stay. We propose to leave to Mr Ewans' discretion whether also to mention the Bertrands' case (they were found guilty in a fair trial). Mr Ewans will give Lord Soames an oral briefing on the points which might be raised with Mr Mugabe over luncy.

Ministers have still to take a final decision on recent Zimbabwean requests relating to BMATT, and it may therefore be necessary to provide some revised briefing on this point later.

Yours ever,

Colin Budd

(C R Budd)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

File

bc: Sir P. Cradock
Caroline Ryder

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

25 June 1984

MR. MUGABE'S VISIT: 19-21 JULY 1984

You wrote to John Coles on 11 June to ask whether the Prime Minister would wish to see Mr. Mugabe during his visit to Britain from 19-21 July.

The Prime Minister would be happy to see Mr. Mugabe at 5.30 p.m. on Friday 20 July. I should be grateful for briefs in good time.

Charles Powell

Roger Bone, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

cc PC.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

1) Mrs Ryder cc.
2) PA
DMB 25/6

22 June 1984

Submitted to PM on separate with CP? pps. CDP 22/6

Dear Charles.

Zimbabwe: Mr Mugabe's Visit (19-21 July 1984)

I wrote to you on 11 June about the possibility that Mr Mugabe might call on the Prime Minister during his forthcoming visit here. We have subsequently discussed possible timings with the Zimbabwe High Commission who now tell us that Mr Mugabe could leave Edinburgh after the degree ceremony on 20 July by a flight departing at 2.40 p.m. and arriving in London at 3.40 p.m. Allowing for the time needed to get back to the centre of London, Mr Mugabe could therefore call on the Prime Minister from 5.00 p.m. onwards, although, to be safe, a later time would be better. The only other constraint is Mr Mugabe's dinner with Lord Soames, which we expect to begin at 7.30 p.m.

Yours ever

(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

MR. POWELL

5.30 - 6.30 Sat Fri

MR. MUGABE'S VISIT

You will remember that we were waiting to hear whether the Prime Minister was addressing the 1922 Committee that evening. We cannot get Edward du Cann to give us a decision. But for the purposes of this, you had better assume that the Prime Minister will be seeing the 1922 on Thursday, 19 July, at 1800 hours.

This now leaves the Saturday morning as the alternative time, say at 9 a.m. Unless we can negotiate a late meeting on Friday, 20 July, after Mr. Mugabe returns from Edinburgh. For obvious reasons I am rather loath to muck up the Prime Minister's weekend.

But could you please put to her the alternatives and let me know?

14 June 1984

CR. CR.

Now agreed
Friday 20 July 1730/1830

CCPC (1)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

11 June 1984

Prime Minister
Agree to see Mr. Mugabe?
(Cd. be fitted in on 20 July)

Yes

Mr Mugabe's Visit: 19-21 July 1984

Mr Mugabe is to pay a private visit to Britain from 19 to 21 July. He will be accompanied by Mrs Mugabe, and possibly by Senator Norman, his Minister of Agriculture.

C.D.P 22/6

The main purpose of Mr Mugabe's visit is to deliver the keynote address at a conference being organised by the Commonwealth Institute on 'Development in the SADCC Region: Progress and Problems'. (The dates of the Conference were changed to enable Mr Mugabe to speak at it.) We understand that he will also visit the Great Zimbabwe Exhibition at the Institute, and go to Edinburgh to receive an honorary degree from the University. In addition, Mr and Mrs Mugabe have accepted an invitation to dine privately with Lord and Lady Soames at their London flat, probably on 20 July.

The Zimbabwe High Commission here, with whom we have discussed the visit, have made it clear that Mr Mugabe would greatly appreciate an opportunity to call on the Prime Minister. We are in favour of this. Despite tensions last year in our bilateral relations with Zimbabwe (largely caused by the treatment of the Air Force officers) the Prime Minister and Mr Mugabe had a very productive meeting in the margin of the CHOGM in New Delhi last November. The airmen who were still in jail were freed soon afterwards, and relations since then have been much improved, though there remain several difficult issues (eg Matabeleland, Bishop Muzorewa) and some actual or potential irritants (eg Air Force officers' pensions).

Sir Geoffrey Howe considers that recent developments in both Zimbabwe and Southern Africa as a whole have increased the importance of knowing Mugabe's thinking and of keeping him alongside us so far as we can. This is not an easy task, but there is no doubt that he responded well to his talks with the Prime Minister last year, and that he attaches considerable importance to his relations with her. Zimbabwe is going through a difficult time; we continue to have substantial interests there, and a further meeting between the Prime Minister and Mr Mugabe should stand us in good stead.

/Mr Mugabe

Mr Mugabe arrives in London on the morning of Thursday 19 July. He is due to address the SADCC Conference at 3pm on the afternoon of that day and he will be in Edinburgh for the whole of Friday 20th. He leaves Britain on the evening of Saturday 21 July. Would you let me know whether the Prime Minister would wish to see Mr Mugabe? Late morning on 19 July would probably be possible for him, but this would of course be a Cabinet morning, and the Prime Minister would have Questions in the House immediately after lunch. If 19 July is not possible, would eg Saturday morning, 21 July be a possibility?

Yours ever

(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

A.J.C. 14/6

With the compliments of

THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

for your information

B. FALL

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
SW1A 2AH

Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

Miss Solesby
PS

cc. PS/Mr Onslow
Mr Squire
Sir J Leahy
News Department

ZIMBABWE: HOSTAGES

1. Six tourists (including two Britons) were kidnapped in Zimbabwe on 23 July 1982.

A 2. A recent lead indicated that the hostages may have been killed the day following their abduction.

3. Because of fears of a press leak the families were informed of the lead on Saturday 11 June. They took the news remarkably well although they understandably hope that the lead will prove
B false. The Australian Foreign Minister made a statement yesterday about the possibility that the hostages may be dead.

C 4. Mr Mugabe is angry about the Australian statement. Our High Commission are doing their best to calm the situation. The trip to the area of the alleged burial site of the hostages this morning was abortive. The Zimbabwe authorities hope to try again in a day or two. Meanwhile the fate of the hostages remains in doubt.

5. We should continue to be guided by the following press line:

''We understand that some dissidents have been captured and are being interrogated. The Zimbabwe Government are keeping us informed of progress in their investigations.''

6. I will, of course, keep in close touch with the two British families.

L Stephenson
Central African Department
K 213 233 3459

13 June 1983

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

13 June 1983

Dear John,

Zimbabwe: Private Visit by Prime Minister Mugabe: 13-14 June

I attach Points to Make and Essential Facts for the call which Mr Mugabe is to make on the Prime Minister at 12 noon on Tuesday, 14 June. He is in Britain on a private visit, and is on his way to Geneva to address the ILO Conference. Mr Mugabe is accompanied in London by Mrs Mugabe and by Dr Shava (Minister of Manpower, Planning and Development). He was last here on 27 and 28 May, also privately, while returning to Zimbabwe after official visits to Hungary, Czechoslovakia and the GDR. He is proposing to visit the United States and the Soviet Union later this year.

Mr Mugabe paid an official visit to Britain from 18 to 20 May last year, and had lunch both with Her Majesty The Queen and with the Prime Minister. The visit was successful, and clearly much enjoyed by Mr Mugabe. On this occasion he has no other official appointments, although Mr and Mrs Mugabe lunched privately with Lord and Lady Soames at their London flat on 13 June.

In the attached briefing the question of the Air Force is treated in a low key fashion. Our views have been put to Mugabe directly and indirectly on a number of occasions, most recently by Sir A Acland at the end of May and by Sir James Wilson, Chairman of the Tobacco Advisory Council, when he saw Mugabe in Harare recently. The High Commissioner in Harare reports that it is clear that Mugabe has now got the message. Too much emphasis on this point could be counter-productive.

The most recent developments in the search for the kidnapped British (and other) hostages are not encouraging, and hope of them being found alive has diminished. Mr Mugabe may not be aware of the latest position in detail, but a general word of thanks for Zimbabwean efforts would be appropriate.

/Mr

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Mr Mugabe is unlikely to raise the future of Mr Nkomo. If he does, the Prime Minister can say that he is being treated purely as a private visitor and that we have had no contact with him except on immigration formalities.

We expect Mr Mugabe to be accompanied on his call on the Prime Minister by Dr Shava and by the Acting Zimbabwean High Commissioner, Mr Kajesi. Sir John Leahy will attend from the FCO.

Yours ever,

(B J P Fall)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

PRIVATE VISIT BY PRIME MINISTER MUGABE: 13-14 JUNE 1983

POINTS TO MAKE

British Support for Zimbabwe

1. Britain has repeatedly made clear in public its commitment to support Zimbabwe. We believe it is right and say so to other major aid donors. A recent example of our continuing support is our agreement that the British Military Advisory and Training Team (BMATT) should continue after completion of its current task at the end of June.

Hostages

2. We are grateful to Zimbabwe authorities for all they are doing to try to recover hostages.

Namibia

3. Grateful to Zimbabwe and other FLS for helping to achieve constructive outcome to Security Council meeting. Unanimous adoption of Resolution a positive step.

4. Five have taken careful note of views expressed during debate. They remain in close touch and seized of urgent need for progress. They are ready to cooperate fully with Secretary General in fulfilling his mandate.

5. Essential all parties continue to let US/Angola dialogue run its course. This offers best early prospect for a settlement. Discussions apparently at a delicate stage.

Air Force officers

6. Glad that trial has now begun, just as Mr Mugabe assured us it would. Considerable interest here in its progress. Confident that the final outcome of this whole affair (whatever the result of the trial) will justify the confidence and support of Zimbabwe's friends here and elsewhere.

/7.

Blocked Funds

7. Considerable parliamentary interest here in the problem of blocked funds. We are particularly concerned about the two categories of people affected:

i) elderly and retired people.

ii) those on low fixed incomes.

8. Fully appreciate need for exchange controls and no wish to interfere, but hope controls can be progressively relaxed as economy picks up.

[IF TIME ALLOWS]
Zimbabwe's Public Image

9. We recognise that British media reporting on Zimbabwe is not always balanced. We do our best to encourage a positive view. Recent visits by parliamentarians (Lord Chelwood, Messrs Farr and Johnson) should help: so should current visit here by group of leading Zimbabwean businessmen. Can Zimbabwe be more active in influencing Western journalists and other opinion leaders?

Internal Situation

10. We understand that there was a serious security situation in Matabeleland which had to be dealt with. We are pleased that the level of dissident activity is now lower. We were earlier much concerned at reports of civilian casualties.

11. Glad to know from Mr Mugabe's recent speeches that the Government remains committed to a policy of national reconciliation. We fully agree that the policy of persuading Zimbabwe to unite in a 'war of development' is the right one. What are the prospects for a political settlement with ZAPU?

/[DEFENSIVE

[DEFENSIVE POINTS]

Volume of Development Aid

12. We have pledged £113m since independence: less than £80m spent so far. It is premature therefore to consider new commitments.

Land Resettlement

13. We recognise the political importance of the land issue. We are doing more than any other donor in this area (£30m pledged): we are the only country contributing to the cost of land purchase. As we stated at Lancaster House, we cannot do it all. What are the prospects for help from others?

Drought

14. Regret to hear of effects of severe drought. We know Zimbabwe Government and international agencies are discussing what emergency relief is required. We provided trucks for food distribution and will consider further possibilities when needs are known (in addition to our developmental aid).

Central African Department
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
13 June 1983

PRIVATE VISIT BY PRIME MINISTER MUGABE, 13/14 JUNE

ESSENTIAL FACTS

British Support for Zimbabwe

1. Army excesses in Matabeleland and allegations of torture of Air Force officers have led to pressure to cut not only British aid (total pledged since independence: £113m) but also that from several other Western donor countries. Sweden postponed for some time a decision on next year's aid programme but is now going ahead again. There is strong pressure in Congress to cut US aid to Zimbabwe. There are similar pressures in Bonn.

2. Zimbabwe is important because:

(a) Its success essential to stability and multi-racial development of the region.

(b) About 90,000 of white community are of British origin.

(c) British investment estimated at about £800m; the trade balance is in the UK's favour and exports are growing (1982 - £95m).

(d) Significant military training aid (BMATT) and development aid (£113m pledged since independence).

Political Background

3. Early in 1983 Mr Mugabe clearly decided on a tough military and political approach to dissidents and ZAPU.

4. Zimbabwe National Army behaved brutally in Matabeleland. Many civilians were killed and injured. Nkomo fled to London: some ZAPU leaders detained. HMG expressed concern about excesses and the hope that political solutions could be found.

5. Situation in Matabeleland now improved and army brutality much reduced, although some dissident activity, including sporadic attacks on whites (who are generally well-treated by both the

/ Army

Army and civil authorities) continues. Remaining two-thirds or more of the country is calm. ZAPU elements in the Government and Army remain.

6. No evidence of any real progress in the inter-party talks. Mr Mugabe is apparently refusing to talk to the acting leader of ZAPU, Mr Chinamano, and shows no inclination to facilitate Mr Nkomo's return to Zimbabwe. Residual resentment among the population of Matabeleland at the behaviour of the Army and the apparent intransigence of the Government.

Economic Background

7. The economy is suffering the consequences of world recession and drought. Remarkable economic growth after independence has now slowed and there is a severe foreign exchange shortage. The Government is attempting to put matters right and has devalued the Zimbabwean dollar by 20 per cent and concluded agreements with the IMF and World Bank.

8. Mugabe and his Ministers continue to reiterate their commitment to turn Zimbabwe into a fully socialist state and to nationalise more industries. Such statements are probably partly rhetorical. It is likely that the Government's main objective remains participation in rather than exclusive control of any particular sector. The evidence suggests that proper compensation will be paid for any nationalisation and that encouragement of the private sector will continue.

Hostages

9. The dissidents have captured four British hostages: two tourists (together with four other whites) in July 1982; Mr Bilang (Irish, but we are dealing) in December 1982; and Mr Dyer-Smith, a farmer/accountant in mid-March 1983. The dissidents have demanded the release of the ex-ZANLA military commanders Dabengwa and Masuku (acquitted by the courts but re-detained) in exchange for freeing the hostages. We are satisfied

that the Zimbabwe Government are doing their best to secure the release of the hostages and we remain in close touch with them on the matter. Last week captured dissidents claimed the tourists were killed shortly after capture. Zimbabwean authorities are checking stories and investigating area.

Namibia

10. On 31 May the Security Council adopted Resolution 532 requesting the Secretary-General to consult with parties concerned and to report to the Council by 31 August. There was no mention of linkage or sanctions in Resolution, reflecting the generally constructive tone of the debate and FLS wish to avoid confrontation. Angolans have been left room to manoeuvre and Five have a little more time.

11. [NOT FOR USE] The Americans have heard indirectly that the Angolans will soon respond to the proposed timetable for Cuban withdrawal which the Angolan Interior Minister (Kito) took back after his talks in Washington in April. We are still doubtful that the Angolans will be able to make the commitment sought by the US, or that this will be enough to induce the South Africans to implement.

12. Foreign Ministers of the Five met in the margins of the Williamsburg summit and again in Paris (8 June, in margins of NATO ministerial meeting) to discuss strategy in the light of Security Council meeting. Five remain committed.
[NOT FOR USE: Shultz gave an upbeat account in Paris of the prospects for an early and positive Angolan response on Cubans. The Five briefly considered what next steps might be taken with the South Africans following such a response. The French remain in the Five but were unhelpful at the time of the Security Council: Cheysson's misgivings over linkage have not diminished.]

/ 13.

Detained Air Force Officers

13. In July last year a sabotage attack took place at the Air Force of Zimbabwe (AFZ) base at Thornhill, and a number of aircraft were destroyed. Thirteen AFZ officers and men were detained. Six were later released. Although five of the seven officers still in custody have British citizenship, all are also Zimbabwean citizens, and HMG therefore does not have the right of consular access. There is good reason to believe that some of the officers were tortured during interrogation. A number of confessions were obtained.

14. British Ministers have on several occasions raised the question of the AFZ detainees with Zimbabwean Ministers and urged that they should be brought to trial without delay. Mr Mugabe confirmed to Mr Onslow in January that once the case came to court allegations of torture could be investigated.

15. The officers are now in reasonable shape and being properly treated. The trial of six began on 23 May. A British QC has been engaged to represent them. The (black) Zimbabwean judge has impeccable credentials and we have no reason to believe that the trial will be other than fair.

16. Developments in other recent cases suggest that if all or any of the officers are found not guilty, they will risk being immediately re-detained by the Zimbabwe authorities under the Emergency Powers regulations and held indefinitely. We have expressed concern to the Zimbabweans about this eventuality.

Drought

17. The two years of drought in Zimbabwe are the worst since records started in 1890. In five of eight provinces crop failures have been almost total. 30% of cattle in West and South are expected to die. There are reports of malnutrition and even starvation. At least two million of country's seven million population are affected.

BMATT

18. BMATT (present strength about 100) has been a notable success. Its current rôle of training instructors for the Zimbabwe National Army comes to an end on 30 June 1983. We recently agreed that BMATT may remain in Zimbabwe at a strength of 50/60 until April next year to help with training and the ZNA's demobilisation plans. General Shortis (Commander BMATT, shortly to be replaced by Brigadier Jones) is discussing the precise form of BMATT's tasks after June with the Zimbabwe authorities.

UK/Zimbabwe Visits

19. To Zimbabwe:

1982

Mr John Nott, 24-26 September

HRH The Princess Anne, 27 October - 1 November

1983

Mr Onslow, 5-8 January

Mr Raison, 29 January - 1 February

Mr John Farr MP and Mr James Johnson MP, 1-8 May

Lord Chelwood, 6-14 May

HRH The Duke of Edinburgh, 20-21 May

HRH The Duke of Gloucester, late September (leading a British Consultants Bureau mission)

From Zimbabwe:

1982

Mr Mugabe, 8-20 May

1983

Dr Izac Mudenge, Secretary for Foreign Affairs, 23-25 February

Mr C D Ndlovu, Minister of Construction, 21-26 March

Mr Mugabe, 27-28 May (private)

Mr Godfrey Chidyausiku, Attorney-General, late June.

Blocked Funds

20. Since independence the Zimbabwe Government, with a serious shortage of foreign exchange, have begun to release specified sums of blocked capital (depending on age of applicant). But apart from these and small special allowances for elderly and retired people, all accumulated capital and income remains blocked, Some relaxations have been made (eg current income may now be remitted to the UK) but in other respects the controls have been tightened. As a result British Ministers have been under pressure from MPs and former Rhodesian residents now living in Britain. This pressure is often linked with criticism of the Lancaster House settlement in general.

21. So far we have not pressed for more urgent action in view of Zimbabwe's continuing balance of payments problems. British Ministers have, however, undertaken in response to Parliamentary Questions that they will remind the Zimbabwe Government of their promise to make further relaxations as soon as they can afford to do so. Pensions remain unaffected and continue to be paid to ex-residents.

Nkomo

22. He is likely to be given permission to stay for a further month (until 13 July). Apart from necessary contact with immigration officials, we have not been in touch with him.

Central African Department
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
13 June 1983

CONFIDENTIAL

A.J.C. 13/6

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

9 June, 1983

Zimbabwe: Mr Mugabe's Visit

The Prime Minister may like to be aware that Mr Mugabe is to pay another short private visit to London, this time on 13 and 14 June. The timings are:-

Arrive Gatwick	0745	Monday 13 June	from Harare
Depart Heathrow	1500	Tuesday 14 June	for Geneva

He will be accompanied by Mrs Mugabe and by Mr Shava (Minister of Manpower Planning and Development). On 13 June Mr and Mrs Mugabe will lunch privately with Lord and Lady Soames at their London flat. We do not yet know any of the other items on Mr Mugabe's programme. Lord Carrington and Lord Chelwood have been told about the visit so that they can make contact with Mr Mugabe if they wish.

When Mr Mugabe was here on a private visit on 27 and 28 May he did not see Ministers because of their involvement in the election campaign. Instead, he was met on arrival by Sir A Acland and had half an hour's talk with him (copy of record enclosed).

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary will be at the Foreign Affairs Council in Luxembourg on 13 June, and it would therefore be difficult for him to see Mr Mugabe. It would, however, be appropriate for a Cabinet Minister and a Foreign and Commonwealth Office Minister of State to offer to call on him. Arrangements are therefore provisionally in hand for Mr Heseltine to do so during the afternoon of Monday 13 June; and Mr Onslow has offered to call on him at noon on the same day.

In the circumstances, Mr Mugabe will no doubt understand if the Prime Minister, who wrote to him on his last visit, is unable to see him on this occasion, coming as it does so soon after the General Election. On the other hand, there is little doubt that he would greatly appreciate such a meeting if the opportunity were offered. I should be grateful if you would let me know whether the Prime Minister would like to see Mr Mugabe.

CONFIDENTIAL /I

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A.J.C. 13/6

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

9 June, 1983

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CONFIDENTIAL

I am copying this letter to Nick Evans (MOD).

Yours ever

Roger Bone

(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
Private Secretary
10 Downing Street

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RECORD OF A MEETING:

CONVERSATION BETWEEN PUS AND PRIME MINISTER MUGABE AT HEATHROW ON 27 MAY 1983

1. On Prime Minister Mugabe's arrival at Heathrow, the PUS was able to have about half an hour's conversation with him. The following were the main points.

2. The PUS handed to Mr Mugabe the Prime Minister's letter, the letter from Mr Onslow and the message from Lord Soames, with suitable explanations. Mr Mugabe read them all and said that in the circumstances he did not expect Ministerial attention. His visit was essentially transit and he would be coming again later. Mr Mugabe confirmed, with regret, that he did not feel able to accept Lord Carrington's luncheon invitation in the country, but looked forward to seeing him when he (Mr Mugabe) passed through London on his way to the ILO Conference.

3. After asking what General Acland was doing, Mr Mugabe said that the monitoring force and BMATT had made a major contribution. The PUS referred to the decision that BMATT would continue for a further period and said that he hoped that a useful role would be agreed for it. Mr Mubabe expressed his appreciation.

4. The PUS said that the concentration of the media on the general election left little room at present for reports on Zimbabwe. There was, however, a lot of interest in Zimbabwe who had many friends in this country. One subject on which there was particular interest was the trial of the Air Force Officers. Mr Mugabe had told Mr Onslow that they would be brought to trial about now, and this had been proved right. It was a good thing that the trial had started, and it was important to get the whole episode ended and out of the way. If asked, we were taking the line that it was an internal matter for Zimbabwe, and that we had every confidence in the process of justice and were sure that any of those acquitted would be released. This is what Mr Mugabe had said would happen,

/ and

and we were confident that this was what would happen. Mr Mugabe smiled but did not comment, though a side remark to the Acting High Commissioner showed that he had understood the point.

5. Mr Mugabe then showed interest in the latest position on Namibia, and the PUS brought him up-to-date. Mr Mugabe commented that the US and South Africa were making the linkage question the most important aspect. The PUS said that whatever the formal position about linkage might be, the withdrawal of Cuban forces had become an inevitable issue which had to be dealt with. In fact all those concerned in the negotiations could share the objective of Cuban withdrawal: what was needed was to find a way of achieving it which gave confidence to the Angolan Government that their security would not be endangered. In reply to an enquiry from Mr Mugabe, the PUS undertook to provide for him the text of Sir J Thomson's speech in the Security Council debate [this was later done].

6. There was then a brief discussion on the Arab/Israel question.

7. At the end of the discussion Miss Solesby raised the question of Lord Chelwood's wish to call on Mr Mugabe. Mr Mugabe agreed, but made clear that he would not give him a press interview in London.

Central African Department
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
31 May 1983

Distribution:

PS/No.10 Downing Street
PS
PS/Mr Onslow
PS/PUS
Sir J Leahy
Mr Squire
CAfD
SAfD
BHC Harare

9 JUIN 1983

Zimbabwe

SPEECH BY THE PRIME MINISTER

AT LUNCH FOR THE PRIME MINISTER OF ZIMBABWE

ON 19 MAY 1982

BRITAIN HAS A VERY SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH ZIMBABWE AND I AM DELIGHTED TO WELCOME YOU, MR. PRIME MINISTER, YOUR WIFE, AND YOUR DISTINGUISHED COLLEAGUES ON THIS, YOUR FIRST OFFICIAL VISIT TO BRITAIN SINCE ZIMBABWE'S INDEPENDENCE IN APRIL 1980.

THE DISCUSSIONS WHICH WE HAD BEFORE LUNCH PROVIDED ME WITH A MOST USEFUL OPPORTUNITY TO EXCHANGE VIEWS WITH A NATIONAL LEADER WHO HAS HAD HIS OWN SHARE OF DIFFICULTIES TO OVERCOME, AND WHO HAS TACKLED THEM WITH A STRENGTH OF PURPOSE WE HAVE ALL ADMIRED.

/ I AM INDEBTED

I AM INDEBTED TO YOU FOR THE FRIENDLY AND OPEN MANNER IN WHICH YOU GAVE ME YOUR ACCOUNT OF EVENTS IN YOUR COUNTRY, INCLUDING SOME OF THE PROBLEMS YOU STILL FACE, AND FOR ALLOWING ME THE OPPORTUNITY TO EXPLAIN OUR POINT OF VIEW ON THE GRAVE ISSUES WHICH ARE AT PRESENT UPPERMOST IN OUR MINDS.

I AM GRATEFUL TO YOU AND YOUR GOVERNMENT FOR THE SUPPORT THEY HAVE GIVEN TO OUR CONTINUING EFFORTS TO REACH A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THE CRISIS IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC.

YOUR VISIT IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES IS NOT WITHOUT A CERTAIN IRONY.

/ TWO AND A HALF

TWO AND A HALF YEAR'S AGO, AT LANCASTER HOUSE, WE WERE FACED WITH ANOTHER SEEMINGLY INTRACTABLE PROBLEM AND ONE WHICH SUCCESSIVE BRITISH GOVERNMENTS HAD TRIED IN VAIN TO RESOLVE. BUT WITH SUFFICIENT DETERMINATION, AND WILLINGNESS ON ALL SIDES TO WORK, AND WORK AGAIN, FOR AN ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION, WE WERE ABLE IN THE END TO REACH A SATISFACTORY RESULT.

MUCH PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE IN ZIMBABWE SINCE LANCASTER HOUSE.

THE FORMER SEPARATE MILITARY FORCES HAVE BEEN MERGED INTO A SINGLE NATIONAL ARMY, A TASK IN WHICH WE HAVE BEEN GLAD TO HELP THROUGH OUR BRITISH MILITARY ADVISORY AND TRAINING TEAM.

/ RECONSTRUCTION

RECONSTRUCTION AND REHABILITATION PROCEEDED AT REMARKABLE SPEED; AND THE ECONOMY HAS ACHIEVED LEVELS OF REAL GROWTH WHICH MOST COUNTRIES IN EUROPE WOULD FIND DIFFICULT TO EMULATE.

THE IMMENSE INTERNATIONAL GOODWILL TOWARDS THE NEW STATE AT INDEPENDENCE WAS TRANSLATED AT LAST YEAR'S AID CONFERENCE IN ZIMBABWE INTO SUBSTANTIAL PLEDGES OF FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE, MUCH OF WHICH, TOGETHER WITH OUR OWN CONTRIBUTION, IS NOW FLOWING INTO THE COUNTRY.

RECORD LEVELS OF MAIZE AND TOBACCO PRODUCTION HAVE BEEN ACHIEVED.

ON ALL OF THIS, AND MUCH MORE, WE MOST WARMLY CONGRATULATE YOU, MR. PRIME MINISTER, YOUR GOVERNMENT AND ALL THE PEOPLE OF ZIMBABWE.

/ SINCE INDEPENDENCE

SINCE INDEPENDENCE OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH ZIMBABWE HAVE DEVELOPED APACE.

THE LARGE NUMBER OF VISITS BY MINISTERS IN BOTH DIRECTIONS IS ONLY ONE REFLECTION OF THE IMPORTANCE WHICH WE BOTH ATTACH TO REINFORCING THESE CLOSE TIES.

I KNOW THAT PETER CARRINGTON THOROUGHLY ENJOYED HIS VISIT TO ZIMBABWE LAST FEBRUARY AND WAS MOST GRATEFUL FOR THE WARMTH OF THE WELCOME HE RECEIVED THERE.

BRITAIN IS THE BIGGEST SINGLE FOREIGN INVESTOR IN ZIMBABWE AND WE SHALL ENCOURAGE BRITISH FIRMS TO DISCUSS POSSIBILITIES FOR NEW INVESTMENT AND JOINT VENTURES WITH THE ZIMBABWEAN GOVERNMENT.

/ THE FACT

THE FACT THAT YOU HAVE BROUGHT A STRONG TEAM OF ECONOMIC MINISTERS HAS DEMONSTRATED YOUR WISH TO PURSUE SUCH COOPERATION, AND WE HOPE THIS VISIT WILL ENABLE US TO IDENTIFY FURTHER OPPORTUNITIES FOR BRITISH AND ZIMBABWEAN INDUSTRY TO WORK TOGETHER TO OUR MUTUAL ADVANTAGE.

THERE HAVE OF COURSE BEEN MANY CHANGES IN ZIMBABWE IN THE PAST TWO YEARS.

THERE IS ONE WHICH I WOULD PARTICULARLY LIKE TO MENTION.

RECENTLY YOU RENAMED YOUR CAPITAL CITY HARARE.

THIS I BELIEVE TRANSLATES AS 'THE ONE WHO NEVER SLEEPS'.

/ THIS SEEMS TO ME

THIS SEEMS TO ME TO BE A PARTICULARLY APT DESCRIPTION FOR THE HOME OF A PRIME MINISTER WHO HAS WORKED TIRELESSLY TO CONSOLIDATE THE INDEPENDENCE OF HIS COUNTRY AND IMPROVE THE QUALITY OF LIFE OF HIS PEOPLE.

WE HAVE BEEN ENORMOUSLY IMPRESSED BY WHAT HAS BEEN ACHIEVED AND WE SHALL CONTINUE TO PROVIDE AS MUCH MORAL AND MATERIAL SUPPORT AS OUR CIRCUMSTANCES ALLOW.

A SUCCESSFUL ZIMBABWE WILL UNDOUBTEDLY CONTRIBUTE TO THE PEACE AND STABILITY OF CENTRAL AND SOUTHERN AFRICA AS A WHOLE, AND WE WISH YOU AND YOUR COLLEAGUES WELL IN YOUR ENDEAVOURS.

SECOND REVISE SEATING PLAN FOR LUNCH ON WEDNESDAY, 19 MAY 1982

Mr Whitmore ✓ N.

Table A

THE PRIME MINISTER
THE HON. ROBERT MUGABE
The Lady Soames
Rt. Hon. Lord Carrington
Mrs. Richardson
Rt. Hon. Francis Pym
Lady Carrington
HE The High Commissioner for the Republic of Zimbabwe

Table B

MR. DENIS THATCHER
MRS. MUGABE
Rt. Hon. Lord Soames
Mrs. Byatt
The Hon. Dr. W. Mangwende
Mrs. Robinson
Rt. Hon. Michael Foot
Mrs. Zwinoira

Table C

MR. PETER REES
Mrs. Foot
Sir Charles Troughton
General Sir Edwin Bramall
Mrs. Francis Pym
The Hon. Dr. Bernard Chidzero
Mr. John Farr
The Hon. Senator Dennis Norman

Table D

MR. CRANLEY ONSLOW
Mrs. Dell
Sir Antony Acland
Lady Bramall
Rt. Hon. Gordon Richardson
Mrs. Marshall
Rt. Hon. David Steel
Mrs. Farr

Table E

LADY JUNE ONSLOW
The Hon. Dr. S.H.S. Makoni
Rt. Hon. David Owen
Professor R.E.R. Robinson
Mrs. Gabriel
Mr. Clive Whitmore
Mrs. Palmer
Rt. Hon. Edmund Dell

Table F

MR. JOHN COLES
The Hon. Dr. F. Shava
Major General Patrick Palmer
Mrs. Owen
Mr. R.A.C. Byatt
Dr. Roger Gabriel
Dr. Edmund Marshall
Lady Troughton

Duty Clerk

LIST OF GUESTS ATTENDING THE LUNCHEON TO BE GIVEN BY THE PRIME MINISTER AND MR. DENIS THATCHER IN HONOUR OF THE PRIME MINISTER OF ZIMBABWE AND MRS. MUGABE ON WEDNESDAY, 19 MAY 1982 AT 1.00 PM FOR 1.15 PM

The Prime Minister
and Mr. Denis Thatcher

Zimbabwe Suite

The Hon. Robert Mugabe
and Mrs. Mugabe

The Hon. Dr. W. Mangwende — Foreign Minister

The Hon. Dr. Bernard Chidzero — Minister of Finance and Economic Planning

The Hon. Dr. S.H.S. Makoni — Minister for Industry and Energy

The Hon. Dr. F. Shava — Minister for Manpower Planning and Development

The Hon. Senator Dennis Norman — Minister of Agriculture

His Excellency the High Commissioner for Zimbabwe
and Mrs. Zwinoira

HM Government

Rt. Hon. Francis Pym, MP
and Mrs. Pym

Mr. Peter Rees, MP
and Mr.

Mr. Cranley Onslow, MP
and Lady June Onslow

Members of Parliament

Rt. Hon. Michael Foot, MP
and Mrs. Foot

Rt. Hon. David Steel, MP

Rt. Hon. David Owen, MP
and Mrs. Owen

Mr. John Farr, MP
and Mrs. Farr — Chairman of Anglo-Zimbabwe Parliamentary Group

Dr. Edmund Marshall, MP
and Mrs. Marshall — Secretary of Anglo-Zimbabwe Parliamentary Group

House of Lords

Rt. Hon. Lord Carrington
and Lady Carrington

Rt. Hon. Lord Soames
and Lady Soames

Business

Rt. Hon. Gordon Richardson and Mrs. Richardson	Governor of the Bank of England
Rt. Hon. Edmund Dell and Mrs. Dell	Guinness Peat Group Ltd.

Others

General Sir Edwin Bramall and Lady Bramall	Chief of the General Staff - responsible for British Military Advisory and Training Team in Zimbabwe
Major General Patrick Palmer and Mrs. Palmer	Former Head of British Military Advisory Training Team in Salisbury
Sir Charles Troughton and Lady Troughton	Chairman, British Council - visited Zimbabwe recently
Professor R.E.R. Robinson and Mrs. Robinson	Beit Professor of the History of the British Commonwealth at Oxford University. A member of the Zimbabwe Election Observers Team 1980
Dr. Roger Gabriel and Mrs. Gabriel	St. Marys Hospital. Physician in charge of Mrs. Mugabe during her recent illness in London

Officials

Sir Antony Acland and Lady Acland	FCO
Mr. R.A.C. Byatt and Mrs. Byatt	British High Commissioner, Salisbury

10 Downing Street

Mr. John Coles

file BK

PRIME MINISTER

TALKS WITH MR. MUGABE

I suggest we use the Cabinet Room.

He will be accompanied by:

Dr. Mangwende: Minister of Foreign Affairs
Dr. Chidzero: Minister for Finance and Economic Planning
Dr. Zwinoira: High Commissioner

On our side there will be:

Mr. Francis Pym
Mr. Robin Byatt: Our High Commissioner in Harare
Mr. John Sankey: FCO

Some speaking notes for your speech after lunch are annexed to Brief No. 1.

We have asked the Carringtons to arrive at about 1245 pm so that they can have a private chat with the Mugabes. This would best be done in the Pillared Room.

A.J. COLES

18 May 1982

CONFIDENTIAL

File

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

18 May 1982

Courtesy Call on the Prime Minister
by Mr. Mugabe

Mr. Mugabe called on the Prime Minister today. He was accompanied by the Foreign Minister and the Zimbabwe High Commissioner. Robin Byatt and I were also present.

Mr. Mugabe said that the political situation in Zimbabwe was now very satisfactory, apart from a few misguided elements who were carrying out robberies in rural areas. The problem was that there were still numerous caches of arms accessible to such people. As to the economy, the droughts of the past year would affect the agricultural yield. But Zimbabwe still had enough food to feed itself with a little left over for export.

On Namibia, he commented that there was deadlock at present. SWAPO could not accept the complex voting system proposed by the Five. They found it confusing and believed it could be manipulated against them. Meanwhile, South Africa argued for an element of ethnic representation which Zimbabwe regarded as an attempt to import into Namibia the Bantustan system.

The OAU was split on the problem of the Western Sahara. Slightly over half its membership supported Polisario while slightly under a half supported Morocco.

No other points of substance were made, largely because, as you know, formal talks have been arranged to take place tomorrow.

AJC

Francis Richards, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

covering CONFIDENTIAL

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

18 May 1982

Dear John.

Visit by Mr Mugabe, 18-20 May

We have already sent you briefs for the Prime Minister's meeting with Mr Mugabe on Wednesday 19 May. We are also briefing Mr Lamont to raise the subject of the Beira/Umtali oil pipeline when he sees the Zimbabwean Minister for Industry on Thursday 20 May.

We would not expect this issue to arise during Mrs Thatcher's meeting with Mr Mugabe, but you may wish to be aware of the problem. I enclose a copy of the brief.

Yours ever,

(F N Richards)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

covering CONFIDENTIAL

The National Archives

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eg. Folio 28, Indictment 840079, E107, Letter dated 22/11/1995.
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Mr. Coles

PRIME MINISTER

Lunch for the Prime Minister of Zimbabwe
Wednesday, 19 May

I attach the list of guests attending your lunch on Wednesday together with a draft seating plan.

The seating plan has been seen by John Coles.

Do you agree?

Sue Goodchild

17 May 1982

c.c. Mr. Denis Thatcher
Mr. John Coles

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LIST OF GUESTS ATTENDING THE LUNCHEON TO BE GIVEN BY THE PRIME MINISTER AND MR. DENIS THATCHER IN HONOUR OF THE PRIME MINISTER OF ZIMBABWE AND MRS. MUGABE ON WEDNESDAY, 19 MAY 1982 AT 1.00 PM FOR 1.15 PM

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and Mr. Denis Thatcher

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and Mrs. Mugabe

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The Hon. Dr. S.H.S. Makoni — Minister for Industry and Energy

The Hon. Dr. F. Shava — Minister for Manpower Planning and Development

The Hon. Senator Dennis Norman — Minister of Agriculture

His Excellency the High Commissioner for Zimbabwe
and Mrs. Zwinoira

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Rt. Hon. Francis Pym, MP
and Mrs. Pym

Mr. Peter Rees, MP
and Mr[illegible]

Mr. Cranley Onslow, MP
and Lady June Onslow

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and Mrs. Foot

Rt. Hon. David Steel, MP

Rt. Hon. David Owen, MP
and Mrs. Owen

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and Mrs. Farr — Chairman of Anglo-Zimbabwe Parliamentary Group

Dr. Edmund Marshall, MP
and Mrs. Marshall — Secretary of Anglo-Zimbabwe Parliamentary Group

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Rt. Hon. Lord Soames
and Lady Soames

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Rt. Hon. Edmund Dell and Mrs. Dell	Guinness Peat Group Ltd.

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Dr. Roger Gabriel and Mrs. Gabriel	St. Marys Hospital. Physician in charge of Mrs. Mugabe during her recent illness in London

Officials

Sir Antony Acland and Lady Acland	FCO
Mr. R.A.C. Byatt and Mrs. Byatt	British High Commissioner, Salisbury

10 Downing Street

Mr. John Coles

DRAFT SEATING PLAN FOR LUNCH ON WEDNESDAY, 19 MAY 1982

Table A

THE PRIME MINISTER
The Hon. Robert Mugabe
The Lady Soames
Mr. John Farr
The Lady Carrington
Rt. Hon. Francis Pym
Mrs. Richardson
His Excellency the High Commissioner for the Republic of Zimbabwe

Table B

MR. DENIS THATCHER
Mrs. Mugabe
Rt. Hon. Lord Carrington
Lady Acland
The Hon. Dr. W. Mangwende
Mrs. Robinson
Rt. Hon. Michael Foot
Mrs. Zwinoira

Table C

MR. PETER REES
Mrs. Foot
Sir Charles Troughton
General Sir Edwin Bramall
Mrs. Francis Pym
The Hon. Dr. Bernard Chidzero
Rt. Hon. Lord Soames
The Hon. Senator Dennis Norman

Table D

MR. CRANLEY ONSLOW
Mrs. Dell
Sir Antony Acland
Lady Bramall
Rt. Hon. Gordon Richardson
Mrs. Marshall
Rt. Hon. David Steel
Mrs. Farr

Table E

LADY JUNE ONSLOW
The Hon. Dr. S.H.S. Makoni
Rt. Hon. David Owen
Professor R.E.R. Robinson
Mrs. Gabriel
Mr. R.A.C. Byatt
Mrs. Palmer
Rt. Hon. Edmund Dell

Table F

MR. JOHN COLES
The Hon. Dr. F. Shava
Major General Patrick Palmer
Mrs. Owen
Dr. Roger Gabriel
Mrs. Byatt
Dr. Edmund Marshall
Lady Troughton

VISIT OF MR. MUGABE

TO BRITAIN

18-20 MAY

OVERSEAS DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION
ELAND HOUSE
STAG PLACE LONDON SW1E 5DH

Telephone 01-213 5409

From the Minister

14 May 1982

Dear Duty Clerk,

VISIT BY MR MUGABE : 18-20 MAY 1982

Certain areas of Zimbabwe are experiencing a severe drought, and it is possible that Mr Mugabe may raise this in discussion with the Prime Minister. I enclose a short defensive brief to cover this eventuality.

Yours ever,
M. A Power.

(M A Power)
Private Secretary

Duty Clerk
No 10

CONFIDENTIAL

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

13 May 1982

Dear John.

Visit by Mr Mugabe to Britain: 18 - 20 May

Mr Mugabe will be paying an official visit to Britain next week. He will be paying a courtesy call on the Prime Minister at noon on 18 May, and will be having full discussions with the Prime Minister at noon on 19 May, followed by luncheon at 10 Downing Street.

I attach the following briefs:

Brief No 1: Steering Brief, Programme and Personality Notes.
Brief No 2: Internal Political Situation
Brief No 3: Aid (Including Students' Fees)
Brief No 4: External Policies (Including Namibia)
Brief No 5: Trade and Investment
Brief No 6: Military Matters (BMATT and Defence Sales)
Brief No 7: Exchange Controls.
Brief No 8: Beira/Umtali Oil Pipeline

Briefs No 2 (Internal Political Situation) and No 3 (Aid) cover the points most likely to arise from the Prime Minister's discussion.

We should also like the Prime Minister to raise the matter of exchange controls (Brief No 7), which is the subject of many Parliamentary Questions and MP's letters.

Notes for the Prime Minister's speech for the lunch on 19 May are attached to Brief No 1 (Steering Brief).

Updating maybe necessary, particularly on Namibia, which is currently being discussed in Paris by the Africa Directors of the Five.

Yours ever.

(F N Richards)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

13 MAY 1982

VISIT OF THE PRIME MINISTER OF THE REPUBLIC OF ZIMBABWE AND MRS MUGABE

18-20 MAY 1982

ADMINISTRATIVE PLAN

(to be read in conjunction with programme)

Tuesday 18 May

Arrival

When the aircraft has landed a representative of the British Airports Authority will escort the greeting party to the tarmac. The Zimbabwe High Commissioner will board the aircraft with the Chief of Protocol to meet the Prime Minister and Mrs Mugabe. After the official photographers have disembarked the High Commissioner and Chief of Protocol will accompany the Prime Minister and Mrs Mugabe to the tarmac where the following will be presented (in order):-

The Baroness Young
Lord Privy Seal, and Leader of the House of Lords.

Mrs Zwinoira

Mr R A C Byatt,
British High Commissioner at Harare and Mrs Byatt.

Mr John Sankey
Head of Central African Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Brigadier J A C Cowan
Government Hospitality Fund

Group Captain R Thomson
Government Hospitality Fund, Escort Officer.

The party will proceed to the VIP suite; a limited number of the Prime Minister's entourage will follow, (as listed in car plan at Annex A).

TRANSPORT

Cars are provided for the members of the official suite and car plans are shown at Annex 1. On the journey to and from the airport only members of the unofficial party are, exceptionally, included.

MRS MUGABE'S PROGRAMME

In addition to a number of events in her husband's programme when she will accompany him, Mrs Mugabe will have dinner with Lady Soames on 19 May at 7 St Alban's Mansions, Kensington Court Place W8. Mrs Zwinoira and Mrs Byatt will accompany her.

MINISTERS' SEPARATE PROGRAMMES

When the Ministers carry out their separate programmes they will be accompanied as follows:-

Dr Chidzero	Mr Kadhani
Senator Norman	Mr Gentleman
Dr Makoni	Mr Z Makoni
Dr Shava	Mr Madzi Mbakyika

An official from the Zimbabwe High Commission will also accompany each Minister.

OFFICIAL SUITE

Amendment: Please delete Mr Pafitis and insert Mr Shirihuru, Political Officer in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

PARTICIPATION OF OFFICIAL SUITE IN THE PRIME MINISTER'S PROGRAMME

18 May

Call on the Prime Minister

Dr Mangwende and Mr Zwinoira will accompany Dr Mugabe.

Meeting with members of the Zimbabwe High Commission

All members of the official suite will accompany Dr Mugabe.

19 May

Wreath-laying at Westminster Abbey

Ten members of the official suite will accompany Dr Mugabe.

Talks with the Prime Minister

The following will accompany Dr Mugabe:-

Dr Mangwende
Dr Chidzero
Dr Zwinoira
Note-taker.

Lunch with the Prime Minister

The following are also invited:-

Mrs Mugabe
Dr Mangwende
Dr Chidzero
Senator Norman
Dr Makoni
Dr Shava
Mr Zwinoira and
Mrs Zwinoira

Meeting with Organisation of African Unity - Heads of Mission

Dr Mangwende and Mr Zwinoira will accompany Dr Mugabe

Dinner given by Lord Soames

The following are also invited:-

Dr Mangwende
Dr Chidzero
Senator Norman
Dr Makoni
Dr Shava
Mr Zwinoira

Lunch hosted by Mr Lamont for Ministers on 20 May

The following are also invited:-

Mr Zwinoira
Dr Mugamba
Mr Z Makoni
Mr Gentleman
Mr Kadhani
Mr Madzimbakyika

NOTE: The Opera evening and meeting the Britain Zimbabwe Society on 18 May have been cancelled. The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs will host a dinner that evening. Details will be announced.

Dr Shava's arrival at Imperial College on 20 May is at 1015 hours and not 1000 hours as indicated in the printed programme.

14 May 1982

J H W Reid (Miss)
Visits Section
Protocol and Conference Department

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

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Annex 1

CAR SEATING PLAN

18 May

GATWICK AIRPORT TO HOTEL

Prime Minister's Car	Dr Mugabe Mrs Mugabe Baroness Young Mr Zwinoira Special Branch Officer
Car 2	Mrs Zwinoira Mrs Byatt Group Captain Thomson ADC Miss Chiguri
Car 3	Dr Mangwende Dr Chidzero Mr Byatt Senator Norman
Car 4	Dr Makoni Dr Shava Mr Sankey Mr Mudzimba Wing Commander Cody
Car 5	Dr Mugomba Mr P Chanetsa Mr Mutetwa Mr Morezu
Car 4	Mr Kanyere Mr Shirihuru Mr Chigwedere Dr Dombo Colonel Worrell
Car 7	Mr Kadhani Mr Tazvishaya Mr G Chanetsa Miss Kwesha

Note:

This car plan will apply also for the journey from the hotel to the airport on departure except that Mr Onslow will travel with the Prime Minister and not the Baroness Young. Also Mrs Mugabe and her party will not be departing until 21 May.

DISTRIBUTION

Buckingham Palace

Private Secretary to HM The Queen (2)
Press Secretary (2)

Downing Street

Private Secretary (2)
Press Office (2)

Zimbabwe High Commission (Mr Chinozo) (15)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Private Secretary (2)
Private Secretary/Mr Onslow (2)
PS/Mr Marten (2)
PS/PUS (2)
Sir John Leahy
Sir Leonard Allinson
Mr Sankey
WAD (Mr Godson) (6)
CCD (3)
News Dept (3)
Resident Clerk
PCD (8)
Heads of Mission Section, POD

Government Hospitality Fund (35)

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ACT 2000

Minute from Reid, 14/5/82

SECOND REVISE SEATING PLAN FOR LUNCH ON WEDNESDAY, 19 MAY 1982

Mr Coles.

Table A

THE PRIME MINISTER
THE HON. ROBERT MUGABE
The Lady Soames
Rt. Hon. Lord Carrington
Mrs. Richardson
Rt. Hon. Francis Pym
Lady Carrington
HE The High Commissioner for the Republic of Zimbabwe

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MRS. MUGABE
Rt. Hon. Lord Soames
Mrs. Byatt
The Hon. Dr. W. Mangwende
Mrs. Robinson
Rt. Hon. Michael Foot
Mrs. Zwinoira

Table C

MR. PETER REES
Mrs. Foot
Sir Charles Troughton
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Mr. John Farr
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Table D

MR. CRANLEY ONSLOW
Mrs. Dell
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Mrs. Marshall
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Mrs. Farr

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LADY JUNE ONSLOW
The Hon. Dr. S.H.S. Makoni
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Professor R.E.R. Robinson
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Mrs. Palmer
Rt. Hon. Edmund Dell

Table F

MR. JOHN COLES
The Hon. Dr. F. Shava
Major General Patrick Palmer
Mrs. Owen
Mr. R.A.C. Byatt
Dr. Roger Gabriel
Dr. Edmund Marshall
Lady Troughton

PRIME MINISTER OF ZIMBABWE'S VISIT TO BRITAIN: 18-20 MAY 1982

ADDITIONAL BRIEF: DROUGHT

POINTS TO MAKE (DEFENSIVE)

1 Sorry you have suffered this setback. Imagine maize stored from last year's bumper harvest will assist greatly.

2 Will consider what it might be possible and appropriate for us to do to help, either directly or through our participation in the programmes of multilateral agencies.

PRIME MINISTER OF ZIMBABWE'S VISIT TO BRITAIN: 18-20 MAY 1982

DROUGHT

ESSENTIAL FACTS

This year certain areas of Zimbabwe have suffered a serious drought. Matabeleland has been particularly badly affected. It is mainly ranching country; the Zimbabwe Government has made arrangements to purchase livestock from smallholders in the drought stricken areas and is transporting many of these animals to other areas where adequate pasture is to be found.

2 The overall maize crop will be very much smaller than last year's bumper harvest and it is estimated that it will fall slightly short of overall needs. However, the shortfall can be made up from the very large reserves of last year's crop which are in storage.

3 The cost of transporting cattle and of feeding those whose crops have failed will be substantial; the Zimbabwe Government has estimated the cost of cattle drought relief at £42 million, with possibly an additional sum of the same order for human drought relief. They are looking to aid donors for assistance. The local EEC representative has recommended an emergency contribution of £1.7 million from Community emergency funds. A decision has yet to be taken in Brussels on this.

PRIME MINISTER OF ZIMBABWE'S VISIT TO BRITAIN: 18-20 MAY 1982

BRIEF NO 1: STEERING BRIEF (INCLUDING PROGRAMME AND PERSONALITY NOTES)

General

1. At the Prime Minister's invitation, Mr Mugabe will pay an official visit to Britain from 18-20 May. He will be accompanied by Dr Mangwende (Minister for Foreign Affairs), Dr Chidzero (Finance and Economic Planning), Senator Norman (Agriculture), Dr Shava (Manpower Planning and Development) and Dr Makoni (Industry and Energy).

2. Mr Mugabe's programme is attached (Annex A). It includes appointments with the Prime Minister and the Minister of State. Mr Mugabe will lunch with HM The Queen on 20 May and with the Prime Minister on 19 May. A speaking note for the Prime Minister's lunch is attached. (Annex B)

3. Separate programmes for the accompanying Ministers are also being arranged. Dr Chidzero will sign a Project Aid Agreement during his call on Mr Marten.

Bilateral Relations

4. The success of an independent Zimbabwe is not only of great importance to the stability and prosperity of southern Africa, but also to Britain because of history, sentiment and for sound economic and political reasons. We have therefore given full backing to Zimbabwe, the main elements being our aid programme (£112 million, one of our biggest in Africa - brief no 6); military assistance (BMATT - brief no 7); trade and investment (Britain second only to South Africa in the Zimbabwe market, and the biggest single investor with investments valued at £700 million at independence - brief no 5).

5. Bilateral relations have been enhanced by many high level visits in both directions since independence, the last being

Lord Carrington's successful visit to Zimbabwe in February. Mr Mugabe has visited London on three occasions since independence. (In January 1982 he came privately to visit his wife who was receiving treatment in St Mary's Hospital London for kidney disease. She is now sufficiently recovered to accompany him on this visit).

Objectives

6. Under Mugabe's leadership much has been achieved. But formidable political and economic problems remain, and he will continue to need political and material support from Britain and the West in general. His visit to Britain (which is the first call in a tour of Western European capitals including Rome, Bonn, Brussels, Paris, Athens and The Hague) continues the process of developing Zimbabwe's international relations, national image-building and fund-raising. A main objective in London will be to obtain promises of more help for land resettlement schemes and for concessions on the level of fees for Zimbabwean students.

7. Our main objective for the visit is to reinforce our bilateral relations and underline our commitment to the success of an independent Zimbabwe within the framework of the Lancaster House settlement.

8. Our specific aims are:

(a) To encourage Mugabe to continue policies of national reconciliation and to get his view on the present political and security situation in Zimbabwe;

(b) To defend our record on aid to Zimbabwe, and to reassure Mugabe of our continued support. Whilst we cannot give any specific commitment to increase our aid at the present time, we should avoid giving him the impression that we have washed our hands of the land question. It is imperative both for the future

direction of the land resettlement programme and our relations with Zimbabwe that Mugabe leaves London reasonably reassured that more assistance will be available once present allocations are exhausted;

(c) To stress the importance we attach to increased trade with Zimbabwe. The prospects for new British investment would be enhanced by the conclusion of an Investment protection and promotion agreement;

(d) To remind Mugabe of concern in this country about (i) Stuttaford and others being held without trial in Zimbabwe and (ii) the hardship being caused to many Britons by Zimbabwe's exchange controls;

(e) To explain our point of view on Namibia and the Falkland Islands and request Zimbabwe's continuing support.

Central African Department
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
12 May 1982

A

VISIT BY MR MUGABE - 18-20 MAY 1982

TUESDAY 18 MAY

0750 Arrive Gatwick Airport. Met by the Lord Privy Seal, The Rt Hon The Baroness Young

1200 Courtesy call on the Prime Minister at 10 Downing Street

2000 Meeting with Britain/Zimbabwe Society at the Commonwealth Institute

WEDNESDAY 19 MAY

0930 Lay wreath at tomb of unknown warrior, Westminster Abbey.

1000 Meeting with Mr Peter Blaker, Minister of State for Defence

1200 Talks with the Prime Minister at 10 Downing Street

1300 Lunch with the Prime Minister

1530 Meeting with OAU Heads of Mission

1715 Meeting with Anglo/Zimbabwe Parliamentary Group at Houses of Parliament

2000 Attend dinner hosted by Lord Soames

THURSDAY 20 MAY

AM Press Conference/BBC Interview

1300 Lunch with The Queen

1500 Meeting with Diplomatic and Commonwealth Press Writers

1830 Depart Heathrow for Rome

B

DRAFT SPEECH BY THE PRIME MINISTER AT LUNCH FOR THE PRIME MINISTER OF ZIMBABWE: 19 MAY

Britain has a very special relationship with Zimbabwe and I am delighted to welcome you, Mr Prime Minister, your wife, and your distinguished colleagues on this, your first official visit to Britain since Zimbabwe's independence in April 1980. The discussions which we had before lunch provided me with a most useful opportunity to exchange views with a national leader who has had his own share of difficulties to overcome, and who has tackled them with a strength of purpose we have all admired.

I am indebted to you for the friendly and open manner in which you gave me your account of events in your country, including some of the problems you still face, and for allowing me the opportunity to explain our point of view on the grave issues which are at present uppermost in our minds. I am grateful to you and your Government for the support they have given to our continuing efforts to reach a peaceful resolution of the crisis in the South Atlantic.

Your visit in present circumstances is not without a certain irony. Two and a half years ago, at Lancaster House, we were faced with another seemingly intractable problem and one which successive British Governments had tried in vain to resolve. But with sufficient determination, and willingness on all sides to work, and work again, for an acceptable solution, we were able in the end to reach a satisfactory result.

Much progress has been made in Zimbabwe since Lancaster House. The former separate military forces have been merged into a single national army, a task in which we have been glad to help through our British Military Advisory and Training Team. Reconstruction and rehabiliation proceeded at remarkable

/speed

speed; and the economy has achieved levels of real growth which most countries in Europe would find difficult to emulate. The immense international goodwill towards the new state at independence was translated at last year's Aid Conference in Zimbabwe into substantial pledges of financial assistance, much of which, together with our own contribution, is now flowing into the country. Record levels of maize and tobacco production have been achieved. On all of this, and much more, we most warmly congratulate you, Mr Prime Minister, your Government and all the people of Zimbabwe.

Since Independence our bilateral relations with Zimbabwe have developed apace. The large number of visits by Ministers in both directions is only one reflection of the importance which we both attach to reinforcing these close ties. I know that Peter Carrington thoroughly enjoyed his visit to Zimbabwe last February and was most grateful for the warmth of the welcome he received there.

Britain is the biggest single foreign investor in Zimbabwe and we shall encourage British firms to discuss possibilities for new investment and joint ventures with the Zimbabwean Government. The fact that you have brought a strong team of economic Ministers has demonstrated your wish to pursue such cooperation, and we hope this visit will enable us to identify further opportunities for British and Zimbabwean industry to work together to our mutual advantage.

There have of course been many changes in Zimbabwe in the past two years. There is one which I would particularly like to mention. Recently you renamed your capital city Harare. This I believe translates as 'the one who never sleeps'.

/This

This seems to me to be a particularly apt description for the home of a Prime Minister who has worked tirelessly to consolidate the independence of his country and improve the quality of life of his people. We have been enormously impressed by what has been achieved and we shall continue to provide as much moral and material support as our circumstances allow. A successful Zimbabwe will undoubtedly contribute to the peace and stability of Central and Southern Africa as a whole, and we wish you and your colleagues well in your endeavours.

PERSONALITY NOTES

1. Mr Robert Mugabe (Prime Minister).
2. Dr Bernard Chidzero (Minister of Economic Planning and Finance).
3. Dr Witness Mangwende (Minister of Foreign Affairs).
4. Dr Simbarashe Makoni (Minister of Industry and Energy Development).
5. Dr Frederik Shava (Minister of Manpower Planning and Development).
6. Mr Denis Norman (Minister of Agriculture).

1. MUGABE, ROBERT GABRIEL

Prime Minister and Minister of Defence. President ZANU (PF).

Born 1924. A Zezuru. Educated at Roman Catholic Missions and trained as a teacher. Taught at Todd's Dadaya Mission with the Rev Sithole. Went to Fort Hare University where he got a BA in 1951. Taught in Salisbury until 1954 when he went to Northern Rhodesia. In 1956 went to Ghana, where he taught at the University College and married Sally, a Ghanaian.

Returned to Rhodesia, May 1960. Publicity secretary and later Vice President of ZAPU. After the banning of ZAPU in 1962 opposed Nkomo and set up ZANU with the Rev Sithole. In December 1963 he was arrested and remained in detention until December 1974. Left Rhodesia in 1975 and was based in Maputo. In 1976 ousted Rev Sithole to become leader of ZANU. Linked with ZAPU to form the Patriotic Front, attended 1976 Geneva Conference as joint leader with Nkomo of PF delegation. Joint leader of PF delegation at Lancaster House Conference. Returned to Rhodesia January 1980. Prime Minister April 1980.

Mugabe was regarded by the Smith Government as a dangerous, Marxist revolutionary. He was convinced in the early 1960's that armed struggle was the only way to win independence. Gained in confidence when he finally disposed of Sithole in 1976 and became undisputed head of ZANU. Always reluctant to compromise on basic principles in settlement negotiations, and his eventual agreement to accept a return to British rule in 1979 owed much to pressure on him from the war-weary Mozambicans. Believed during the 1980 election campaign that the British were determined to keep him out of power. Amazed the whites by enunciating a policy of reconciliation between the races on winning the election. Then despite his past differences with the British formed a close relationship with Lord Soames.

Regarded initially as a consensus politician with suspect leadership qualities. But has grown in stature since independence and is in an unrivalled position. His dismissal of Tekere showed that he is not reluctant to see off potential rivals. Still describes himself publicly as a Marxist. But says that his philosophies need to be adapted to suit Zimbabwean conditions, and has so far been pragmatic in his approach. Genuinely concerned to keep the whites in the country, having seen what a mass exodus did to Mozambique.

Quietly spoken. A scholarly manner. Most convincing with a small group, less impressive when making set-piece speeches particularly to a foreign audience. Overall a remarkable man not afraid to do what he thinks is right.

2. CHIDZERO, DR BERNARD

Minister of Economic Planning and Finance. Member of the Senate.

Born 1927, son of a Nyasa worker. Educated at Kutama Roman Catholic Mission, Roma University in Lesotho (BA University of South Africa Psychology), and Ottawa University where he gained an MA in Political Science. 1958-60 Nuffield College, Oxford.

Came to prominence politically when prevented from taking up appointment as lecturer at University College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland on account of his white (French Canadian) wife. Joined UN Economic Mission for Africa at Addis Ababa late in 1960 (under the British quota). Resident representative UN Development Programme, Nairobi 1963-68. Director of Commodities Division of UNCTAD, Geneva, 1969. At time of his Cabinet appointment he was Deputy Secretary General of UNCTAD.

He kept well out of the struggle but was careful to keep his lines open to nationalist leaders, particularly ZANU, and was an obvious candidate for a senior technocratic post. He has the suave and competent manner of a senior international civil servant and, although his style of achieving his ends by stealth and sleight-of-hand gives some people the wrong impression that he is not a decision taker, his influence is beginning to be felt in government without being too obtrusive.

He has written a good book on Tanzanian development and one of the first Shona novels. He recently declined the offer of appointment as Deputy Secretary General (Economic) at the United Nations. His wife regrets no longer living in Europe. They have 4 children one of whom is at Swansea University.

3. MANGWENDE, DR WITNESS

Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Born 1946. A Zezuru. Attended University in Zimbabwe but was expelled because of his political activities. Continued his studies in England where (on an ODA scholarship) he obtained a BA in International Relations from Southampton University. Took a job with Rank Hovis and McDougall in order to support himself while studying for a PhD in international relations at the LSE.

While in Britain, he was President of the (ZANU) Zimbabwe Students' Union and had close contacts with the trade union movement. ZANU Director of Foreign Affairs and ZANU Chief Representative in Mozambique, 1979. ZANU(PF) MP for Mashonaland East 1980. Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, April 1980. Promoted to Minister of Foreign Affairs, January 1981.

A close protege of Mugabe, to whom he largely owes his rapid advancement. But he is not yet a member of the ZANU (PF) Central Committee. Has a bombastic and didactic manner which can be tiresome and leads him to adopt more extreme positions than Mugabe would sometimes wish.

4. MAKONI, SIMBARASHE HERBERT STANLEY

Minister of Industry and Energy Development.

Born March 1950 at Rusape. Educated Umtali and St Augustines Penhalonga. Enrolled at University of Rhodesia to read Chemistry and Zoology, March 1971, but was expelled for leading a political demonstration against the authorities in July 1973.

University of Leeds (BSc Chemistry and Zoology), 1973-75. Polytechnic of Leicester (Phd Medicinal Chemistry), 1978.

During his studies in Britain was active in Zimbabwe student politics. Member of Leeds branch and UK District Executive Committee of ZANU. Chief Representative in Western Europe. 1977-80.

Deputy Minister of Agriculture, April 1980, where he champed at the bit for lack of responsibility. Promoted Minister of Industry and Energy Development in January 1981 and, although astonishingly young for such an important portfolio, may well have the quality to make a reasonable success of it. The added responsibility is likely to make him seem less of a firebrand than he did as a Deputy Minister.

Intelligent and polite but somewhat prickly in manner. Says that he did not enjoy his time in Britain.

Married with two children.

CONFIDENTIAL

5. SHAVA, FREDERICK

Minister of Manpower Planning and Development. Member of House of Assembly for Manicaland (ZANU (PF)).

Born 20 March 1949. A Karanga.

Educated at the Kutama Mission. He was expelled in 1965 after a demonstration against UDI. Left Rhodesia to study chemistry and biology at the University of Zambia, 1970. He graduated in 1973. While there he was elected ZANU (PF) Branch Secretary and later Chairman.

Awarded Commonwealth Scholarship to study Nematology Masters Degree at University of London, 1974. Later obtained a diploma in the same subject. Doctorate in medical parasitology. Was appointed as a ZANU (PF) representative in London and attended Malta talks, 1978. Attended Lancaster House Conference in 1979.

Returned to Zimbabwe during the Governor's time for the election campaign. Was elected as MP for Manicaland and appointed ZANU (PF) Chief Whip when Parliament assembled. A protege of Mugabe, he performed well as Chief Whip and was tipped for a Ministerial position.

Made Minister of Manpower Planning and Development in Cabinet reshuffle in January 1981.

Quiet and polite. In so far as he lets his views show, he seems to be one of the moderate and pragmatic members of the cabinet.

6. NORMAN, DENIS

Minister of Agriculture. Member of the Senate.

Born March 1931 Chalgrove, England. Educated All Saints School Bloxham. Worked on family farm in England from 1947-53 when he moved to Southern Rhodesia. Still has farming interests in England. Farm assistant in Matepetepa 1953-56; Farm Manager Umvukwes 1956-69. Bought farm at Kard in 1959 and owned three by 1975. Chairman of Karoi's Intensive Conservation Area Committee, 1964-66. Vice Chairman of Karoi Farmers Association 1967-70. Vice Chairman of Rhodesia Grain Producers' Association, 1972 and Chairman, 1974-76.

Vice President Rhodesia National Farmers Union 1976 and President 1978. President Commercial Farmers' Union (previously National Farmers' Union) 1979-80. Very successful farmer, highly respected farmers' leader, always stayed out of party politics. Made Minister of Agriculture by Mugabe in March 1980 at Lord Soames' suggestion and has assumed the role with considerable success. He and his very charming wife get on well with their Ministerial colleagues. Both very pro-British and pro-settlement. They have four children, the youngest in her late teens.

PRIME MINISTER OF ZIMBABWE'S VISIT TO BRITAIN : 18-20 MAY

BRIEF NO 2 : INTERNAL POLITICAL SITUATION

POINTS TO MAKE WITH MR MUGABE

1. Glad Mrs Mugabe is well enough to accompany you to London.

2. Zimbabwe has made great strides in the past two years. The transition from war to peace and the process of reconstruction and reconciliation has gone better than many critics expected. We are glad to have played our part in this (eg BMATT, Aid Donors Conference).

3. We have of course been concerned about recent difficulties with Mr Nkomo. This is of course an internal matter for Zimbabwe. But Britain, because of our role in the Lancaster House Agreement, is naturally concerned at any threat to that settlement. We hope that the situation is settling down.

4. It is encouraging that some of the former Republican Front MPs are now playing a more constructive role and that you have found room for two of them in your Cabinet.

5. Peter Carrington mentioned to you the concern in this country about Mr Stuttaford and others at present being detained without trial in Zimbabwe. I hope you do not mind me mentioning it again and expressing the hope that they will soon be brought to trial (or released). We have a particular interest in Mr Hartlebury, who is a British subject, and we have requested normal consular access.

PRIME MINISTER OF ZIMBABWE'S VISIT TO BRITAIN : 18-20 MAY

BRIEF NO 2 : INTERNAL POLITICAL SITUATION

ESSENTIAL FACTS

Introduction

1. The Lancaster House Agreement of December 1979 provided a framework within which Zimbabwe moved from war to peace, and from UDI to African majority rule. Independence in April 1980 could have been followed by reprisals and a massive white exodus. In fact, Mugabe's policy of reconciliation and reconstruction has been generally successful, and Zimbabwe has returned to normality with remarkable speed.

2. However, the problems which remain (or have now emerged) tend to be more complex and intractable. Ministers are increasingly having to face up to the real difficulties of governing Zimbabwe.

Internal Security Situation

3. The situation remains generally stable but armed banditry and ex-ZIPRA dissident activity in parts of Matabeleland (south of Bulawayo) and Mashonaland (north-west of Harare) continues. Most of the violence is armed hold-ups of stores and buses. Some is caused by deserters from a few units of the Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA). At least 13 people are thought to have been killed over the past two months. The blowing-up on 1 May of a railway line, a water tank and two electricity supply installations near Beitbridge (on the South African border) suggest the dissidents may now be aiming at military or economic targets rather than pure banditry.

/4.

4. But with the possible exception of the sabotage near Beitbridge, we see no evidence of any pattern to or central control of the incidents in Matabeleland and elsewhere. Nor are the numbers of dissidents very large. But the Government is taking the problem seriously and remain confident that they can contain it and eventually eliminate the dissidents. Mugabe announced a crackdown recently and a major anti-dissident campaign is being launched in Matabeleland by the security forces.

5. Following outbreaks of interfactional fighting in five (out of the 50) battalions of the ZNA during March and April, the situation in the army has stabilised. Although as many as 2,700 troops may have left their units without leave, only a few are involved in dissident activity or banditry. Two former ZIPRA commanders of the ZNA remain in detention on arms charges, but it does not appear that the loyalty of the bulk of former ZIPRA elements to the Government, and the cohesion of the army as a whole, have significantly weakened.

ZANU/ZAPU Relations

6. Relations between Mr Mugabe's ZANU and Mr Nkomo's ZAPU remain strained. Although the immediate threat of widespread violence following Nkomo's dismissal in February and the later arrest of ex-ZIPRA commanders has been passed, tension could increase if and when Nkomo is brought to trial. The Government is still considering the possibility of a prosecution.

7. Public castigation of ZAPU by ZANU has noticeably decreased, probably by design. Mugabe's appointment of some ZAPU members as Ministers in the recent Government reshuffle was intended

/as a conciliatory

as a conciliatory gesture (and also fits well with Mugabe's efforts to further isolate Nkomo within his party).

8. Nkomo is now looking more isolated and vulnerable. He is lying low. His only recent public statement, strongly criticising the dissidents and disassociating ZAPU from them, showed a welcome concern not to aggravate ZANU/ZAPU tensions. Mugabe's own position in ZANU and the Government looks stronger than ever.

One-Party State

9. There has been little talk of the one-party state recently. Mugabe clearly believes that the one-party system is in Zimbabwe's best long-term interest. But he has repeatedly said that he does not intend to introduce constitutional change unconstitutionally.

10. The Zimbabwe Constitution provides for the right to form (and belong to) political parties for a period of ten years. This provision cannot be changed before then except by the unanimous vote of the House of Assembly. The Constitution also provides for separate representation in 20 white roll constituencies. This provision cannot be changed for a period of seven years except by unanimous vote.

The White Community

11. White morale has improved recently. The white business community has been reassured by meetings between its representatives and Mugabe and by the appointment in April of three additional white Ministers. The detention on 6 May (under emergency powers legislation) of two whites the day after their acquittal on firearms charges has shocked white opinion.

12. At least twelve whites, including the Republican Front MP Mr Stuttaford, remain in detention, suspected of plotting against

/the Government.

the Government. While there was no mass exodus of whites, the steady departure of some 1,500 a month is affecting certain professional and technical occupations. Operational efficiency in its army and airforce has suffered and its police and civil service are also becoming less efficient. About 85 per cent of the white population (as at independence) is still resident in Zimbabwe; emigrants have mostly gone to South Africa.

Detentions

13. Most of the whites under detention are Zimbabwean citizens and we therefore have no locus standi. One exception is Mr Phillip Hartlebury, a British citizen who was arrested under the emergency powers legislation along with two other members of the Zimbabwe Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) in January, accused of illegally possessing weapons. No formal charges have yet been brought against him, but the Zimbabwe authorities almost certainly believe that he is a South African spy. We have no evidence that Hartlebury is being treated other than in accordance with his legal rights. Our High Commission has applied formally to the Zimbabwe authorities for consular access.

Central African Department

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

12 May 1982

PRIME MINISTER OF ZIMBABWE'S VISIT TO BRITAIN: 18-20 MAY 1982

BRIEF NO 3: AID (INCLUDING STUDENTS' FEES)

POINTS TO MAKE

Land Resettlement

1. We understand and sympathize with the pressures and difficulties you face over land settlement. We are willing to help within the limits of what is possible for us. We are reasonably satisfied with the progress of the present scheme that we are financing together with your Government, but have instructed our officials to discuss with yours possible means of speeding up the administrative procedures. We have also indicated to your Minister our willingness to discuss whether the criteria established for the present scheme (to which our contribution is £20m) can be relaxed when it comes to the next joint scheme, for which we pledged an additional £10m at Zimcord, so that the money available can settle more people.

2. Our present bilateral aid for Zimbabwe, for commitment in the period up to the end of March 1983, amounts to £112m. £30m of this is earmarked for land resettlement in joint programmes. We recognise the importance of agricultural development, in which land resettlement plays a vital part, to the future of Zimbabwe. We are therefore prepared to look at ways and means by which we can provide a further contribution to your overall agricultural development programme. I must, however, tell you that our aid programme will be under heavy pressure over the next several years

and we are therefore unable to make any firm commitment at the present time. But I would hope that when the present £30 million runs out, our circumstances might allow us to provide a further sum. [If pressed: this would probably be of much the same order as the sum pledged by Lord Soames at the Zimcord Conference.]

3. I am very glad to note that other donors have begun to make contributions to land settlement and I hope that you will continue to encourage them to do so. Also that you will look urgently at schemes to use the monies promised by the various major donors at Zimcord for upgrading production in the existing peasant areas. For this, in the long run, will surely be the most effective way of improving the income of the greater mass of the peasantry and ensuring that your valuable and virtually unique advantage in Africa of self-sufficiency in food production and high foreign exchange income from agricultural surpluses is maintained to the benefit of your economy as a whole.

Students

4. Regret we cannot make exceptions from the worldwide policy on students' fees, but we shall continue to help as much as possible.

5. The Overseas Students Trust plan to publish their report at the end of this month. We are not committed to conclusions but will look at their recommendations as constructively as possible, bearing in mind economic constraints.

PRIME MINISTER OF ZIMBABWE'S VISIT TO BRITAIN: 18-20 MAY L982

BRIEF NO 3: AID (INCLUDING STUDENTS' FEES)

ESSENTIAL FACTS

British Aid Pledged since Independence

			£	£
1.	i.	Independence pledge		
		of which: Refugees	1.0 m.	75.0 m.
		Reconstruction	12.0 m.	
		Resettlement	20.0 m.	
		Programme Loan	10.0 m.	
		Joint Funding Scheme	0.5 m.	
		EDF Contribution	2.0 m.	
		Technical Cooperation	10.3 m.	
		Training	5.7 m.	
		Under negotiation) Mixed Credit/ATP	5.0 m.	
		) Umbrella Project Agreement	5.0 m.	
		Uncommitted Balance	3.5 m.	
	ii.	Ongoing training expenditure		14.0 m.
	iii.	ATP (Railway electrification)		8.0 m.
	iv.	Donors Conference pledge (excluding regional money) of which:		
		Resettlement	10.0 m.	
		Training	5.0 m.	15.0 m.
				£112.0 m.

Land Resettlement

2. Land resettlement continues to pose major problems for Zimbabwe politically, because of the Government's credibility with its supporters; economically, because of the implications

large-scale resettlement; and because of the difficulty in practical terms of achieving settlement at a faster pace than at present. Failure to cope effectively with the problem over the next few years could have very damaging consequences: it would be likely to vitiate progress towards a pragmatic economic policy, and indeed to sabotage the country's general stability.

3. Mugabe has now publicly committed himself to a target of settling 162,000 families in 3 years. He has even said at least once that if there is not enough money to buy land it might have to be confiscated and that would be the fault of the British and the Lancaster House Constitution. He is not actually contemplating unconstitutional action, but rather looking for excuses for the Government's inability to meet the wilder expectations. However, even if the money were not a constraint, the target of 162,000 families is wholly unattainable in practical terms. Chidzero and others in Government realise this and indeed regard the target as undesirable in developmental terms (it would certainly mean eating into currently productive farms).

4. The issue is at a very sensitive stage and our task should be to help strengthen the hand of the realists and steer things the right way. There is a parallel with military amalgamation, where Mugabe was at the outset convinced of the inescapable political need to provide a military career for all ex-guerillas. Regardless of the size of the army, it took time and tactful presentation to get him to agree to the present major demobilisation programme. Getting a change of course on land will be more difficult, but no less important.

5. Our present joint programme of £20 m. with the Zimbabwe Government is proceeding roughly on schedule, though the Zimbabwe Government is slow in making claims for reimbursement of expenditure. We have not yet begun to discuss the use of

the additional £10 m. which was pledged by Lord Soames at the Zimcord Conference in April 1981. Manpower constraints on the Zimbabwean side will mean that despite any new targets, land settlement cannot proceed very much faster than it has done so far.

6. The ODA consider that our present commitment of £30 m. discharges the undertaking we gave at Lancaster House to assist with the land problem in Zimbabwe, and have pointed out the severe financial constraints in the next Aid Framework period (1983/84 - 1985/86) and the fact that many countries much poorer than Zimbabwe will suffer cuts in their planned allocations. They also question the developmental value of aid for land purchase, and would be opposed to any scheme which would affect the commercial farming land which at present forms that backbone of the Zimbabwean economy. The Department of Trade have also made it clear that they would wish the provision of further aid to bring commercial benefit to Britain and would therefore be opposed to the use of UK aid for land purchase as distinct from the supply of agricultural equipment in the context of the land resettlement programme.

7. The FCO view is that we cannot yet claim to have fully discharged the Lancaster House undertaking which set no specific cash limit or time scale on our support. There is a problem in reconciling the need to provide more land for African farmers while retaining the viability of the commercial sector. But a decision to wash our hands of the land question could easily trigger off a reaction from Mugabe leading to expropriation of white farms without compensation, and this would be profoundly damaging to the Zimbabwe economy, cause difficulties in our bilateral relations and might thus possibly harm our longer term trade and investment interests.

8. We should, if at all possible, avoid providing more aid in the form of cash grants for direct land purchase. But

there are good prospects of designing a scheme (eg one involving programme aid or contributions in the form of British equipment and materials) which could in the broadest sense assist the land resettlement programme and also bring trade advantage to Britain.

9. Time does not allow for full consultation and consideration of the complex issues involved before Mugabe's visit. The 'Points to Make' are therefore essentially a holding operation, but one which is aimed to give Mugabe some reassurance that we have not lost interest in the land problem or ruled out any possibility of making a further contribution at the appropriate time. In this way we can hope to be able to keep ourselves in a position where we would be listened to. If we let Mugabe return from London entirely disappointed on the land issue he will be all the more inclined to blame us and disbelieve those who argue for a more sensible course.

10. The ODA and Department of Trade agree.

Students

11. Very large numbers of overseas students have been financed over the years from our aid programme. The allocation for training of Zimbabweans has been largest of all. We are continuing to help within the limits of available resources.

12. At CHOGM last year Mr Mugabe asked the Prime Minister if Zimbabwe could be exempted from the rules on overseas students' fees, and he is expected to revert to the question when he meets the Prime Minister in London.

13. In her letter of 18 January, the Prime Minister told Mr Mugabe that it was not possible to exempt Zimbabwean students from the rules. We have, however, agreed to provide a further £1.7 m. (from the £75 m. independent pledge) to be used

used for further training awards. This is in addition to the extra £5 m. for students pledged by Lord Soames at ZIMCORD last March.

14. Our position on overseas students' fees is unchanged. However, we have been cooperating with the Overseas Students Trust who are preparing a report on a number of options on policy towards overseas students. The Trust plans to publish its report at the end of May. The Government is not committed to its conclusions but will look at recommendations as constructively as possible, bearing in mind economic restraints. Lord Carrington mentioned the work of the Overseas Students Trust when he met Mugabe last February and it is quite likely that Mugabe will want to know of any developments.

Central African Department
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
12 May 1982

PRIME MINISTER OF ZIMBABWE'S VISIT TO BRITAIN:
18-20 MAY 1982

BRIEF NO 4: EXTERNAL POLICIES (INCLUDING NAMIBIA)

POINTS TO MAKE

A. Namibia

1. Regret that Five's latest proposals for Namibian Constituent Assembly election have met with a negative response from SWAPO and Front Line States Governments. We are urgently considering how to take negotiations forward but demand for a UN-sponsored Conference unrealistic and unhelpful.

2. Five remain committed to pursuing efforts to achieve a negotiated settlement in Namibia as soon as possible. Front Line States must realise that, whatever the delays, Five's efforts provide only hope of bringing about peaceful settlement and therefore speeding Namibian independence. Alternative would be increase in violence with wider repressions throughout Southern Africa and no guarantee of success in the end.

3. On our side, we shall not let ourselves be used by South Africans. Hope that Zimbabwe will use its influence with Front Line States colleagues and with SWAPO leadership to promote flexible and constructive attitudes so that the objective of a genuine Namibian settlement, which should be within reach, can be achieved.

B. South Africa

5. Disturbed by South Africans' continued acts against neighbouring states. We share Zimbabwe's abhorrence of apartheid.

6. But the economic facts of life require that Zimbabwe and South Africa must co-exist. The return of locomotives to Zimbabwe is encouraging in this respect, as is the continuation of the Preferential Trade Agreement.

7. We shall continue to urge the South Africans to show a more co-operative attitude towards Zimbabwe. But our influence is very limited after Lancaster House.

C. Falkland Islands

8. [As appropriate at the time]

Central African Department

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

11 May 1982

PRIME MINISTER OF ZIMBABWE'S VISIT TO BRITAIN:
18-20 MAY 1982

BRIEF NO 4: EXTERNAL POLICIES (INCLUDING NAMIBIA)

ESSENTIAL FACTS (Paras 1 & 2 may be used freely)

A. Namibia

1. In early April the Five proposed to modify 'one man two votes' for the Namibian Constituent Assembly, by providing that each voter would cast one vote, which would be counted twice, first for the 50% of the Assembly to be chosen under the Five's proposals by proportional representation, and secondly for the rest who are to be elected from single-member consituencies.

2. On 1 May SWAPO replied to the Five, rejecting the mixed electoral system altogether, and calling for a conference under the UN to resolve all outstanding issues: Front Line States Foreign Ministers broadly endorsed the SWAPO line in Dar es Salaam on 4 May. The preliminary reaction of South Africa (which has accepted the mixed electoral system itself) was that decisions on the voting procedures should be taken later, by their own Administrator-General in the territory and the UN Special Representative who is to be stationed there.

3. (Not for use:) Dr Crocker met a South African delegation headed by Dr Brandt Fourie in Geneva on 9-10 May, for bilateral consultations on UNTAG, US/Angolan relations, and economic questions (such as the South African request for a promise of western economic aid after independence). Africa Directors of the Five then met in Paris on 12-13 May, to decide on whether tocontinue the search for agreement on constitutional principles,

or to press on to subjects planned for discussion in phase 2, such as impartiality and UNTAG. They heard a report of the US/South African bilateral talks, and made further preparations on phase 2 subjects.

4. (Also not for use:) By the time of Mr Mugabe's visit, the Five may have decided on a new approach to the parties concerned aimed at breaking the current deadlock.

B. South Africa

5. South Africa is the dominant issue in Zimbabwe's external policies. Diplomatic relations were quickly severed after independence and Mugabe remains deeply worried about South African intentions. He has reiterated his policy of no political contact with South Africa but acceptance of commericial links. A Trade Office with limited consular functions is retained in Salisbury and Johannesburg.

6. There have been recent signs of improving commerical relations. Railway locomotives, earlier withdrawn, have been provided again by the South Africans; some Zimbabwe government loans have been rolled over; South Africa has been generally more helpful over fuel supplies; and agreement has been reached on the continuation of the Preferential Trade agreement which the South Africans announced last year would be terminated.

7. Nevertheless, South Africa's de-stabilising operations continue in Mozambique, and the sabotage of the pipeline and road and rail links to the west hurt Zimbabwe more than Mozambique.

South Africa believes that its long term security is served by keeping its neighbours unstable. We try to dissuade them from this approach. The trouble is that in the assessment of these policies South African Defence Forces have the loudest voice.

C. Other Foreign Relations

7. Despite his formal status of ''non-aligned'' and the occasional use of familiar OAU/UN rhetoric, Mugabe looks to the West for economic support. Diplomatic relations have been established with most Western nations plus countries which had supported Zanu - North Korea, China, Romania and Yugoslavia. Relations with Mozambique, where Mugabe lived during the war, are particularly close; and he accepted military assistance from the North Koreans who are providing equipment and training a special brigade of the Zimbabwe National Army. But most of the Koreans are expected to leave Zimbabwe by the end of June.

8. In February last year relations were established with the Soviet Union who have now established an Ambassador in Salisbury. But Mugabe remains properly suspicious of Russian intentions and their links with Nkomo and made strict conditions about their activites before letting them in. The Russians are frustrated at the lack of success in getting any closer to Mugabe.

Falkland Islands

9. Zimbabwe's statement, urging Britain and Argentina to abide by SCR 502, was disappointing. The Zimbabwe Government made no public statement in reaction to recapture of South Georgia.

Central African Department

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

11 May 1982

PRIME MINISTER OF ZIMBABWE'S VISIT TO BRITAIN:
18-20 MAY

BRIEF NO 5: TRADE AND INVESTMENT

POINTS TO MAKE

Trade

1. Pleased that our trade with Zimbabwe has picked up so well (in both directions) since independence. Hope it will continue to grow.

2. Hope that British firms will be given the opportunity to provide Zimbabwe's first earth sattelite station. We have produced an attractive training and management package (including aid support outside the original bilateral aid programme).

3. British companies are also anxious to take part in the second phase of railway electrification.

Investment

4. We do what we can to encourage private investment in Zimbabwe, but investors need to be assured more clearly that they can repatriate profits and be given more guidance on the conditions that will be imposed. Does the Zimbabwe Government still intend to issue an investment code?

5. We have found elsewhere that an Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement can have a significant effect in promoting invest from Britain. We know you have misgivings about the need for an IPPA. But we hope you can reconsider the compromise agreement we offered last Autumn.

PRIME MINISTER OF ZIMBABWE'S VISIT TO BRITAIN:
18-20 MAY 1982

BREIF NO 5: TRADE AND INVESTMENT

ESSENTIAL FACTS

Trade

1. Before UDI in 1965 Britain had an estimated 30 per cent of the Rhodesian market. Since independence the British share of the Zimbabwe market has risen to 11 per cent, second only to South Africa's (which is declining). During the next five years, Zimbabwe could become Britain's third largest market in sub-Saharan African (after Nigeria and South Africa) with exports of £200 million or more annually.

2. But competition is fierce and we do not expect any special advantage. Our statistics show the value of British exports to Zimbabwe as £16.2 million in 1980, but many exports are routed through South Africa. Official Zimbabwean statistics of £30 million and around £50 million for 1981 are probably more representative.

3. Imports from Zimbabwe, principally tobacco, iron and steel totalled £40 million in 1981 (£30 million in 1980). Transport problems in Zimbabwe (and Southern Africa generally) are a constraint on overall export performance but are expected to ease during 1982.

4. British firms have obtained a major share of three big public sector contracts awarded in Zimbabwe since independence -

Wankie Power Station Phase I and II (worth £35 million with the possibility of a further £15 million) and railways electrification Phase I (worth £50 million). We hope to win further contracts in telecommunications and railways.

EC/Zimbabwe

5. UK has been pressing within EC for early Zimbabwean accession to Lomé Sugar Protocol. This is now expected to come into force on 1 July.

6. Important that, as required by Lomé accession agreement, Zimbabwe should consult Community about any proposed changes to trade agreement with South Africa, or any new agreement. Even if no changes expected, it would be sensible for Zimbabwe to keep in close touch with Community about extension of existing agreement, in view of difficulties it caused in negotiation of Lomé accession agreement.

Investment

7. Britain is the single largest foreign investor in Zimbabwe with current investment estimated at £700 million (most of which dates from before UDI in 1965). Major British companies with subsidiaries in Zimbabwe include GEC, Lonrho, Turner & Newall, BP, Tate & Lyle, Brooke Bond and RTZ.

8. New British (and other foreign) investment in Zimbabwe has been slow to materialise. This is partly because potential investors are still doubtful about Zimbabwe's political stability, but the Zimbabwe Government's own lethargic and equivocal

attitude towards foreign investment and its failure to produce specific ground rules and investment incentives are also to blame. Conditions offered do not compete with many other countries (e.g. on repatriation of profits, tax and conditions for expatriate workers).

8. Potential investors are also worried about Government policy on state involvement in industry. Mugabe, while professing his long term aim to be socialism, has often declared his commitment to a mixed economy for at least the next ''two decades''. He has recently made special efforts to reassure the (predominantly white) private sector of its future role. But he and other leading Ministers are given to intemperate rhetoric (usually at the weekends and to party audiences) in which wholesale nationalisation comes across as their primary aim, and this does not help to allay white fears.

IPPA

9. An important step in promoting investment from Britain and raising confidence would be the proposed Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement (IPPA). Discussions started with the Zimbabweans in April 1980 but they are having great difficulty in accepting certain provisions, e.g. on remittance of profits, definitions of nationality and the status of existing investment. They would also prefer to see any Agreement limited to corporate investment, which would create a bad precedent for our IPPA negotiations elsewhere. Mugabe told Lord Carrington in Harare in February 1982 that a bilateral agreement was unnecessary since

Zimbabwe's Constitution guaranteed compensation.

10. None of this augurs well for the early conclusion of an IPPA. But the issue is important enough to continue pressing for it.

11. The Zimbabweans have now invited the FRG to negotiate a bilateral IPPA. FRG do not always insist, as we do, on covering all existing investment. But in this case they are likely to insist. If so, both sides will find the same problem occurs.

Economy

12. A note on the Zimbabwean economy is attached at Annex A.

ANNEX A

ECONOMY

1. The end of the Rhodesian war and lifting of sanctions brought two years of rapid economic growth - 14% in 1980 and 8% in 1981. However, shortages of skilled manpower and continuing balance of payments problems mean that growth in 1982 will probably be no more than 4%.

Balance of Payments

2. The persistence of low world mineral prices, the adverse effects of drought on agricultural production and the downturn in demand in Zimbabwe's main export market, South Africa, will compound balance of payments difficulties. But Zimbabwe can afford some modest increase in borrowing: her debt service commitment is reasonably low (10%) and credit standing high.

Development Plan

3. A three year development plan is due to be published shortly. This envisages rapidly increasing investment, shared equally between the public and private sectors, amounting to some Z$4 billion. Over half of this is likely to be sought from abroad.

Prospects

4. Future prospects are reasonably encouraging. Transport problems, notably on the railways, have eased and tobacco prices are high. The anticipated reopening of the Beira/Umtali oil pipeline should also ensure some growth in foreign exchange earnings. Moreover, the economic infrastructure is fundamentally sound and/should be capable of sustained growth during the next decade.

PRIME MINISTER OF ZIMBABWE'S VISIT TO BRITAIN: 18-20 MAY 1982

BRIEF NO 6: MILITARY MATTERS (BMATT and Defence Sales)

POINTS TO MAKE

British Military Advisory and Training Team (BMATT)

1. Glad that BMATT has been able to assist in the creation of the Zimbabwe National Army.

2. Now that main task of integration has been achieved, BMATT can concentrate on training, with a smaller and more specialised team. Ready to continue providing personnel, despite demands for manpower elsewhere, and glad that Zimbabwe has agreed to meet a greater share of the local costs. AS

3. Pleased you will soon take delivery of your first Hawk aircraft. Sure the Air Force of Zimbabwe will find it as successful and economical as the RAF.

4. Glad that Dr Sekeramayi (Minister of State for Defence) will attend the British Army Equipment Exhibition in June. We have a wide range of equipment to meet Zimbabwe's needs.

Cecil Parkinson

PRIME MINISTER OF ZIMBABWE'S VISIT TO BRITAIN: 18-20 MAY 1982

BRIEF NO 6: MILITARY MATTERS (BMATT and Defence Sales)

ESSENTIAL FACTS

British Military Advisory Training Team (BMATT)

1. BMATT arose from British element of Commonwealth Monitoring Force which supervised the transitional period leading to the independence of Zimbabwe. Maximum strength (160 men) was reached in mid 1981. Mr Mugabe has publicly praised the work of BMATT on several occasions.

2. Major task of integration of different armies (ZANLA, ZIPRA, Smith's forces) into Zimbabwe National Army is now complete. Objectives are now seen as improving administrative organisation and intensive training of officers and NCOs at Zimbabwe Staff College and Military Academy.

3. Average strength of BMATT in financial year April 1982 to March 1983 will be 70/75. Estimated cost is nevertheless £2.95 million (25% of UK's worldwide military assistance budget more than can be borne without detriment to activities elsewhere). Shortfall of £.5 million between estimated cost and a military assistance budget contribution will be largely covered by Zimbabwe's agreement to pay greater share of charges arising within the country. Mr Mugabe has indicated a willingness to do so and details are being considered by Zimbabwean Treasury.

Other Military Assistance

4. Two RAF instructors were attached to Air Force of Zimbabwe last year. They reported shortage of pilots, and declining standards. Further flying instruction is planned. We have also sent two parachute instructors.

5. 41 Zimbabwe military students attended training courses in Britain in 1982/2, 25 at Army training establishments. (including Sandhurst), and 16 with the RAF. The UK military Training Assistance Scheme will cover costs of further visits by senior Zimbabwean officers and students at UK Staff colleges.

Defence Sales

6. The Defence Sales Organisation has obtained significant contracts in Zimbabwe since independence, including one Hawk aircraft, two Canberra aircraft and cluster bombs (total value £35.5 million). Delivery of the Hawks starts in June. Order for the Zimbabwean army worth £2.5 million have been secured with good prospects of follow-up order worth considerably more.

British Army Equipment Exhibition

7. The Zimbabwean Minister of State responsible for Defence (Dr Sekeramayi) has been invited to the BAEE in June as the guest of the British Government.

Central African Department
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
11 May 1982

RESTRICTED

PRIME MINISTER OF ZIMBABWE'S VISIT TO BRITAIN:
18-20 MAY 1982

BRIEF NO 7: EXCHANGE CONTROLS

POINTS TO MAKE

1. We fully appreciate need to continue exchange controls inherited from UDI. We note that there has been some relaxation on the controls and hope they can be relaxed further as economy picks up. This is important not only for individuals but potential investors.

2. The main problem is that blocked funds are causing many individual British citizens hardship. Would it be possible to consider releasing some more funds on phased basis - the amounts would probably not be large.

3. We particularly have in mind two categories:

(i) elderly and retired Britons who have never been resident in Zimbabwe but who have, in many cases, invested funds there;

(ii) ex-Rhodesians who left before UDI in 1965.

4. Considerable parliamentary interest in this problem. Would be helpful if we could point to signs of sympathetic approach by Zimbabwe authorities, especially in cases where ~~no~~ real hardship is being caused. Could the limit of $3,000 be raised?

Central African Department
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
11 May 1982

PRIME MINISTER OF ZIMBABWE'S VISIT TO BRITAIN:
18-21 MAY 1982

BRIEF NO 7: EXCHANGE CONTROLS

ESSENTIAL FACTS

1. The Lancaster House settlement and the lifting of sanctions gave rise to expectations that blocked funds would soon be released. But because of a continuing shortage of foreign exchange, Zimbabwe has not been able to do this.

2. In its first budget in July 1980 the Zimbabwe Government began to release blocked capital up to a limit of $3,000 but apart from this, and small special allowances for elderly and retired people and one or two minor exceptions, all accumulated capital and income remains blocked.

3. As a result British Ministers have been under pressure from MPs and former Rhodesian residents now living in Britain. This pressure is often linked with criticism of the Lancaster House settlement in general. There is also increasing pressure on behalf of white Zimbabweans who have emigrated since independence, as well as those who have never been resident in Zimbabwe but have funds (mostly derived from investments or inheritances) blocked there.

4. We periodically remind the Zimbabweans at official level of the difficulties which their exchange controls cause and Lord Carrington raised the question with Ministers during his visit to Zimbabwe in February. He was assured that the controls are maintained because they are economically necessary, not as a

matter of principle.

5. In present circumstances it would be unrealistic to expect the Zimbabweans to make substantial relaxations in their exchange controls in the near future - indeed, last September new restrictions were placed on the export of emigrant's household effects and motor cars and the limit on annual remittance of income was cut.

6. Nevertheless, we do have a legitimate interest in the historical problem of blocked funds as it affects:

(i) British citizens who have never been resident in Zimbabwe, many of whom are now elderly and living in poor circumstances; and

(ii) ex-Rhodesians now living in Britain who left before UDI in 1965.

7. It would be reasonable to suggest that the Zimbabweans should give priority to 'welfare' cases, and to point out that sympathetic treatment of such cases would generate a disproportionate amount of goodwill in this country.

PRIME MINISTER TO ZIMBABWE'S VISIT TO BRITAIN: 18-20 MAY 1982

BRIEF NO 8: BEIRA/UMTALI OIL PIPELINE

POINTS TO MAKE (By Minister of State for Industry with Dr Makoni)

1. We should be grateful to hear how the question of the pipeline now stands. Has it now been repaired, and when do you expect it to come into operation?

2. We have heard indirectly that discussions between the Zimbabwe Government and the company which owns the pipeline over the rates to be charged are still continuing. If the Zimbabwe Government would like the benefit of independent advice to determine what rates would be reasonable, there are two internationally known American companies which we could recommend:

(i) Purvin and Gertz; or

(ii) Williams Brothers.

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PRIME MINISTER TO ZIMBABWE'S VISIT TO BRITAIN: 18-20 MAY 1982

BRIEF NO 8: BEIRA/UMTALI OIL PIPELINE

ESSENTIAL FACTS

1. A pipeline was constructed from Beira Port (Mozambique) to Umtali (Zimbabwe) in 1963. It had only just commenced operations when UDI was declared, and the pipeline was then blocked.

2. The pipeline is owned by an independent company, in which Lonrho (Mr 'Tiny' Rowland) is a majority share holder. Lonrho say that it is now technically able to operate, but that they have been unable to reach agreement with the Zimbabwe Government over the rates to be charged for each ton of oil product transported through the pipeline. The Zimbabwe Government have reached agreement with the Mozambique Government on the royalties to be paid to Mozambique, but that is a separate issue.

3. Mr Rowland telephoned Sir L Allinson (Under Secretary for Africa, FCO) on 14 May to suggest that we should take advantage of Mr Mugabe's visit to offer Zimbabwe 'expert advice' to try and resolve this problem. The Department of Energy have been consulted and consider this would be a good idea, as it would be in the general interest to see the pipeline back in operation.

4. It is suggested that it would not be appropriate for the Prime Minister to raise this matter with Mr Mugabe himself. Instead, we propose that the Minister of State for Industry (Mr Lamont) should raise this with the Zimbabwe Minster of Energy (Dr Makoni) at his meeting at 12.30 on 20 May.

Central African Department
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
17 May 1982

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The National Archives

DEPARTMENT/SERIES PREM 19 PIECE/ITEM 3592 (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
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FILE RM

Zimbabwe

MR COLES

VISIT OF PRIME MINISTER MUGABE:
WEDNESDAY, 19 MAY

June Reed from Protocol rang. At the moment Mugabe only wants his Foreign Minister, his Finance and Economic Development Minister and the High Commissioner present at the talks.

CAROLINE STEPHENS

6 May, 1982

CONFIDENTIAL

MFJ

cc Miss Stephens

BF

23 April 1982

Visit by the Prime Minister of Zimbabwe

Thank you for your letter of 21 April.

The Prime Minister will see Mr. Mugabe at noon on 18 May for a brief courtesy call. But I should point out that it is most unusual for Mrs. Thatcher to see such a visitor twice. If it emerges that it is Mr. Mugabe's officials rather than he himself who are pressing the point, and if you can find any elegant way of avoiding the double commitment, this would be appreciated.

JC

CS

F.N. Richards, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIME MINISTER

Prime Minister of Zimbabwe

You have agreed to hold talks with and give lunch to Mr. Mugabe on Wednesday, 19 May.

The attached letter reports some concern in Zimbabwe that under this arrangement Mr. Mugabe will have been in London since the morning of Tuesday, 18 May without seeing you and that this would be presentationally embarrassing for him.

You could see him briefly at noon on 18 May. He would undoubtedly welcome this. On the other hand, it is not normal for such visitors to call on you twice.

Agree that Mr. Mugabe may pay a courtesy call on 18 May?

A.J.C.

Yes - but I think it is ridiculous. No-one else has courted such problems

MT.

22 April 1982

Caroline

Can you fit in ½ hour on 18 May if the P.M. so decides?

A.L.C. 11/4

Jon.

11.30-12.00 on TUE 18th.

In some ways, 12.00 wd be better because we normally have on E on Tuesday a/m.

C.I.

10 DOWNING STREET

With the compliments of

CONFIDENTIAL

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

21 April 1982

Dear Tobin,

Visit by Prime Minister of Zimbabwe

As you know, Mr Mugabe will be paying an official visit to Britain next month and the Prime Minister has agreed to hold talks with him, followed by lunch, on Wednesday 19 May. The Zimbabwean MFA have now told us that they expect Mr Mugabe to arrive in London early on the morning of Tuesday, 18 May. They have expressed some concern that virtually half the time set aside for his visit here will have elapsed before Mr Mugabe meets the Prime Minister, and that this would be presentationally embarrassing for him. Although Mr Mugabe may be less sensitive than his officials over this, their point is a fair one and there is no doubt that an early meeting with the Prime Minister would get the visit off on the right foot.

Would it be possible for Mr Mugabe to pay a brief courtesy call on the Prime Minister shortly after his arrival on Tuesday, 18 May? If this is acceptable, I suggest the call might take place after 1030 to allow Mr Mugabe time to travel from the airport. Needless to say, we do not wish to disturb the arrangement for formal talks and lunch with the Prime Minister on the 19th, to which Mr Mugabe will attach much importance.

Yours ever,

Francis Richards

(F N Richards)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

27 APR 1982

Original with Sue Goodchild.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

14 April 1982

Dear John,

Visit of the Zimbabwe Prime Minister

The Prime Minister has kindly agreed to host a luncheon in honour of Mr Mugabe on 19 May.

As requested, I now attach a draft guest list of 48 persons (including spares), plus reserves.

We do not yet know which Ministers will be accompanying Mr Mugabe; we have suggested the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Finance, but will confirm later.

There is one overlap with the list for dinner for Mr Muldoon on the same day - Mr Charles Douglas-Home, Editor of the 'Times'. We suggest he should be dropped from one or other list; we have suggested reserves.

Yours ever,

Francis Richards

(F N Richards)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing St

LIST OF SUGGESTED GUESTS FOR LUNCH ON 19 MAY

IN HONOUR OF THE PRIME MINISTER

OF ZIMBABWE

Full Name, Title and Decorations	Address	Reason for Invitation
<u>Host</u> The Prime Minister and Mr Denis Thatcher		
<u>Guests of Honour</u> The Hon. Robert Mugabe and Mrs Mugabe		
<u>Zimbabwe Suite</u> HE the High Commissioner for Zimbabwe and Mrs Zwinoira	Zimbabwe High Commission, Zimbabwe House, The Strand, London SW1 Tel No:(01) 836 7755	
The Hon. Dr W. Mangwende and Mrs Mangwende	''	Foreign Minister of Zimbabwe
The Hon. Dr Bernard Chidzero and Mrs Chidzero	''	Minister of Finance and Economic Planning Zimbabwe
<u>HMG</u> The Rt Hon Francis Pym MC MP and Mrs Pym	Foreign and Commonwealth Office	

12

Full Name, Title and Decorations	Address	Reason for Invitation
HMG (Contd)		
Mr Cranley Onslow MP and Mrs Onslow (Lady Susie)	Foreign and Commonwealth Office	
Officials		
Sir Antony Acland, KCVO, CMG and Lady Acland	Foreign and Commonwealth Office	Permanent Under-Secretary of State, FC
Sir Peter Preston, KCB and Lady Preston	''	Permanent Secretary, Overseas Development Administration.
Mr R A C Byatt CMG and Mrs Byatt	''	British High Commissioner, SALISBURY
(Reserves)		
Sir John Leahy KCMG and Lady Leahy	Foreign and Commonwealth Office	Deputy Under-Secretary of State, FCO
Mr A J Coles	Number 10, Downing Street	Private Secretary
Members of Parliament		
The Rt Hon Michael Foot MP and Mrs Foot	House of Commons London SW1	Leader of the Opposition
The Rt Hon David Steel and Mrs Steel	''	Leader of the Liberal Party
The Rt Hon David Owen MP and Mrs Owen	''	Social Democrat Party

15

/Contd...

Full Name, Title and Decorations	Address	Reason for Invitation
Members of Parliament (Contd)		
The Rt Hon Lord Soames GCMG, GCVO, CBE and Mrs Soames	House of Lords	Former Governor of Southern Rhodesia
Mr John Farr MP and Mrs Farr	House of Commons	Chairman of Anglo-Zimbabwe Parliamentary Group
Dr Edmund Marshall MP and Mrs Marshall	''	Secretary of Anglo-Zimbabwe Parliamentary Group
(Reserves)		
The Rt Hon Mark Carlisle MP QC and Mrs Carlisle	House of Commons	Member of recent House of Commons Delegation to present Independence gift to Zimbabwe
The Rt Hon J D Concannon MP and Mrs Concannon	''	''
Media		
Mr Charles Douglas-Home and Mrs Douglas-Home	'The Times' 200 Grays Inn Rd London WC1 01-837-1234	Editor of 'The Times'
(Reserve)		
Mr B J Beedham and Mrs Beedham	'The Economist' 25 St James's Street, London SW1 01-839-7000	Foreign Editor, 'The Economist'
Business		
The Rt Hon Gordon Richardson MBE and Mrs Richardson	Bank of England London EC2R 8AH No:(01) 601-4444	Governor of the Bank of England
The Rt Hon Edmund Dell and Mrs Dell	Guiness Peat Group Limited PO Box 442 St Mary at Hill LONDON EC3P 3AJ	Possible telecommunications contract in Zimbabwe. 01-623-3111

12

Full Name, Title and Decorations	Address	Reason for Invitation
(Reserves)		
Lord and Lady Weinstock	GEC Limited 1 Stanhope Gate London W1 (01)493-8484	Managing Director, GEC Ltd - Contract for Railway Electrificatio in Zimbabwe
The Rt Hon Lord Barber TD and Lady Barber	Standard Chartered Bank Ltd, 10 St Clements Lane Lombard Street London EC4 (01)632-7500	Chairman, Standard Chartered Bank Ltd
Sir John King and Lady King	Babcock International Ltd, Cleveland House, St James's Square, London SW1 (01)930-9766	Chairman, Babcock International Ltd -- Power Station contract in Zimbabwe
Others		
General Sir Edwin Bramall GCB, OBE, MC and Lady Bramall	Ministry of Defence	Chief of the General Staff - responsible for British Military Advisory and Training Team in Zimbabwe
The Rt Hon Sir Antony Duff GCMG, CVO, DSO, DSC and Lady Duff	Cabinet Office	Formerly Deputy Governor of Rhodesia
Sir Charles Troughton CBE, MC, TD and Lady Troughton	British Council (01)930-8466	Chairman of British Council - visited Zimbabwe recently
Professor R E R Robinson CBE, DFC and Mrs Robinson	Balliol College Oxford 0865-49601	Beit Professor of the History of the British Commonwealth at Oxford University a member of the Zimbabwe Election Observers Tea 1980

/Contd...

Full Name, Title and Decorations	Address	Reason for Invitation
Dr Roger Gabriel and Mrs Gabriel (Reserves)	St Mary's Hospital Paddington Praed Street LONDON W2 262-1280	Physician in charge of Mrs Mugabe during her recent illness in London
Professor Richard Gray and Mrs Gray	School of Oriental and African Studies, London University 673-2388	Chairman, British-Zimbabwe Society
Sir Edgar Williams CB, CBE, DSO and Lady Williams	94 Lonsdale Road, Oxford. Oxford 55199	Secretary of the Rhodes Trust, 1951-1980

5 January 1982

Visit of Mr. Mugabe

Thank you for your letter of 4 January. I enclose a letter to Mr. Mugabe signed by the Prime Minister and would be grateful if you would arrange for its delivery.

A. J. COLES

Brian Fall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SUBJECT

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ops
a. FCO
ds

10 DOWNING STREET

T

THE PRIME MINISTER

5 January 1982

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL NO. T1/82

Dear Mr. Mugabe,

This is to welcome you to London and to say how very sorry I was to hear of your wife's illness. I do hope that you will find her in good heart and on the way to an early recovery. Please give her my best wishes.

I hope that you will not hesitate to let me know if there is anything we can do to make your wife's stay here more comfortable, or if there is anything we can do for you during your brief visit.

Every good wish,

Yours sincerely,

MT

The Honourable R.G. Mugabe

Dup

(3).

10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

Mr. Mugabe

He arrives in London on 7 January to see his wife who has been in St. Mary's Hospital, Paddington for the last month with kidney failure. He returns to Salisbury on the evening of 8 January.

2. You may care to write to him on the attached lines.

A.J.C. 4/1.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

4 January 1982

Dear John.

Visit of Mr Mugabe

You will have seen from Salisbury Telno 1 of today that the Prime Minister of Zimbabwe is arriving in London early on the morning of Thursday 7 January and returning to Salisbury on the evening of the following day. He will be here to see his wife who has been in St Mary's Hospital Paddington for the last month with kidney failure.

We would like to suggest that the Prime Minister write a short letter to Mr Mugabe to await his arrival and I / enclose a draft. We can arrange delivery.

Yours ever,

(B J P Fall)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

DSR 11 (Revised)

DRAFT: ~~xxxxx~~/letter/~~xxxxxx~~/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:

Prime Minister

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

Reference

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret
Secret
Confidential
Restricted
Unclassified

TO:

The Hon R G Mugabe
Prime Minister of Zimbabwe

Your Reference

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

SUBJECT:

This is to welcome you to London and to say how very sorry I was to hear of your wife's illness. I do hope that you will find her in good heart and on the way to an early recovery. Please give her my best wishes.

I hope that you will not hesitate to let me know if there is anything we can do to make your wife's stay here more comfortable, or if there is anything we can do for you during your brief visit.

Enclosures—flag(s).....

CONFIDENTIAL

file

cc: C. Stephenson.
B. Ingham

Zimbabwe.

original filed on:-

Malawi: Visit by President Banda: July 79

22 December 1981

Visits of Dr. Banda and Mr. Mugabe

Thank you for your letter of 18 December.

Following a discussion with the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary this morning, the Prime Minister agrees that Mr. Mugabe may be invited to visit the United Kingdom from 18 - 21 May. However, the Prime Minister would wish to keep publicity for this visit within bounds.

A J COLES

Roderic Lyne, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL

(1)

Original filed on:-

Malawi: Visit by President Banda: July 79

PRIME MINISTER

MUGABE

You minuted on the Foreign and Commonwealth Office letter below that you did not want to invite the above from 18-21 May.

I wonder whether we may not be getting into an awkward situation. With your agreement Lord Soames conveyed an invitation from you to Mugabe last March to visit Britain as a guest of the Government. Mugabe accepted the invitation. I can quite see that his visit will attract some criticism but, if the May date is missed, will it not be even more difficult later on? Would it not be better to get it over and done with?

Would you be willing to have a word about this with the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary when he comes to see you about Poland tomorrow morning?

Yes MT

A.J.C. 21/12

21 December 1981

CONFIDENTIAL

Original filed on:-
Malawi: Visit to UK by President Banda: July 79

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

18 December 1981

Dear John,

Visits of Dr Banda and Mr Mugabe

Our letter of 18 August confirmed that we had conveyed an invitation to President Banda of Malawi to make an official visit to Britain in 1982. We asked you to keep open the dates of 18-21 May in the hope that the President would accept our invitation.

The President has now indicated at a meeting on 2 December with the High Commissioner in Lilongwe, Mr Peters, that he does not wish to take up our invitation for a visit in May. His reluctance seems to stem from his continued hankering for a State Visit. The President has, however, asked that our invitation should remain on the table. We are considering the implications of this postponement, but it is now clear that the President will not be coming to the UK in May next year.

We have considered alternative uses of the slot made available by President Banda's refusal, and would wish to propose that the dates be offered instead to Mr Mugabe, Prime Minister of Zimbabwe. You may recall that at the time of the ZIMCORD conference in Zimbabwe in March this year, Lord Soames conveyed an oral invitation from the Prime Minister to Mr Mugabe to visit Britain. Mr Mugabe accepted the invitation, but no dates have yet been agreed.

In his letter of 3 April, Francis Richards indicated that we should prefer the first half of 1982 for a visit by Mr Mugabe, if that were possible. Until now, no dates in that period have readily presented themselves. However, with the vacation of President Banda's slot, the way would now seem clear to offer Mr Mugabe the period 18-21 May. Mr Mugabe's visit would be an official one, the same status as that offered to President Banda. Little change in planning would therefore be required to accommodate Mr Mugabe.

No - I do not think we should respond at all

Subject to your approval, we would now wish to instruct our Post in Salisbury formally to offer Mr Mugabe the dates of 18-21 May 1982 for his visit.

Yours ever
Roderic Lyne

(R M J Lyne)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

file SL

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

6 April 1981

ZIMBABWE: INVITATION TO MR. MUGABE
TO VISIT BRITAIN

The Prime Minister has seen your letter to me of 3 April. She would prefer not to send a letter based on the draft enclosed with your letter. She does not think the content of your draft warrants a signed communication.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDE

F. N. Richards, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

a

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

Not Sent C/o 6/4/81

I was very pleased to hear from Christopher Soames that you have accepted my invitation to pay an official visit to Britain. I have asked our High Commissioner to keep in close touch with you on possible dates and about any particular ideas you may have for inclusion in your programme. Apart from the official talks with Peter Carrington and myself and other engagements in London, we would be happy to make arrangements for you to see something of our countryside and life outside the capital. I hope that Mrs Mugabe will be able to come with you; we would be very glad to welcome her here.

Christopher has told me all about ZIMCORD and I am delighted that it has been such a resounding success. This is due principally to the hard preparatory work done by Dr. Chidzero and his colleagues. But I hope the lobbying that we were able to do in advance of the Conference also played a role.

I much look forward to our next meeting.

The Honourable R.G. Mugabe.

(3)

10 DOWNING STREET

I don't think a letter is absolutely necessary

FCO draft. Background attached. An additional reason for writing this apparently rather unnecessary letter is that it will get Mr Byatt into see Mr Mugabe: I understand that Mr M. has been proving rather elusive.

The case for writing seems rather marginal. But if you are content to do so,

"Dear Prime Minister"

3/4

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

3 April 1981

Dear Michael,

Zimbabwe: Invitation to Mr Mugabe to Visit Britain

Thank you for your letter of 16 March.

While he was in Salisbury for the Aid Donors Conference, Lord Soames conveyed the invitation to Mr Mugabe from the Prime Minister to pay an official visit to Britain at a mutually convenient time. No dates were discussed. Mr Byatt now thinks it would be desirable to confirm the invitation in writing, and that we should say something about possible dates.

As you know, dates are a problem for us. The UK Presidency and the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting mean that a visit in the second half of this year would not be convenient. We should prefer the first part of 1982, although to suggest such a distant date so soon after issuing the invitation might be taken amiss.

We do not know Mr Mugabe's views on timing and it may be he does not want to come here before 1982. On the other hand, if he asks to visit in the autumn we can hardly refuse to consider it. We should like to find out what timing Mr Mugabe has in mind and at the same time discreetly encourage him away from an early visit by arranging for Mr Byatt to deliver a letter from the Prime Minister confirming the invitation but leaving the question / of dates deliberately vague. A draft letter is attached.

Yours ever,

Francis Richards

(F N Richards)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street

3 APR 1981

DSR 11 (Revised)

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:
Prime Minister

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

Reference

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret
Secret
Confidential
Restricted
Unclassified

TO:
The Hon R G Mugabe

Your Reference

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

SUBJECT:

I was very pleased to hear from Christopher Soames that you have accepted my invitation to pay an official visit to Britain. I have asked our High Commissioner to keep in close touch with you on possible dates and about any particular ideas you may have for inclusion in your programme. Apart from the official talks with Peter Carrington and myself and other engagements in London, we would be happy to make arrangements for you to see something of our countryside and life outside the capital. I hope that Mrs Mugabe will be able to come with you; we would be very glad to welcome her ~~too~~ here.

Christopher has told me all about ZIMCORD and I am delighted that it has been such a resounding success. This is due ~~to a great measure~~ principally to ~~all~~ the hard preparatory work done by Dr Chidzero and his colleagues. But I hope the lobbying that we were able to do in advance of the Conference also played a ~~its part in ensuring such an excellent result~~ role.

I much look forward to our next meeting.

Enclosures—flag(s).....

vb

Zimbabwe

16 March 1981

Zimbabwe

The Prime Minister has seen your letter to me of 13 March. She has agreed that the Lord President may issue an invitation from her to Mr. Mugabe to visit Britain as a guest of the Government at a mutually convenient time.

MODBA

R.M.J. Lyne, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

1
PRIME MINISTER
Agree x ?

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

MJS
13/3

13 March 1981

Dear Michael,

Zimbabwe

In your letter of 15 December (about a message from the Prime Minister to Mr Robert Mugabe on the Aid Donors Conference), you said that the Prime Minister did not at that time wish to issue an invitation to Mr Mugabe to pay an official visit to Britain.

At the time of your letter, the trial of Edgar Tekere was under way and there was considerable uncertainty about the course which Mr Mugabe would adopt. As you know, Mr Mugabe has since then revealed more of his hand, with the dismissal of Tekere and Cabinet reshuffle, and in his firm handling of the recent clashes involving dissident elements of ZIPRA and ZANLA. Following these clashes the security situation has returned to something like normal. The integration of the different elements in the national army is continuing, as are measures to disarm former guerillas. The economic outlook is good. Zimbabwe has not adopted radical positions on African and other issues. Although Zimbabwean Ministers have not foresaken their habit of lobbying for increased British aid through the columns of the press, at times in an apparently ungrateful fashion, our relations with Mr Mugabe and his Government remain close and generally harmonious.

Against this background, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary considers that it would be useful to invite Mr Mugabe to visit Britain. There is no need to try to set a date for the visit yet, and the most appropriate time might not be until the early part of next year. As you know, Lord Soames is to lead the British delegation to the Aid Donors Conference in Salisbury from 19-26 March. Lord Carrington hopes that the Prime Minister will agree that he should convey an invitation from her to Mr Mugabe to visit Britain as a guest of the Government.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Edward Chaplin in the Lord President's Office.

yours ever
Robin Lyne

(R M J Lyne)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing St

Top Copy: PM Tours Abd, Gost Notes

Zimbabwe

PRIME MINISTER

Visits and Visitors - 1981

I attach a summary of your programme of outward visits and inward visitors next year as it is at present shaping up. I also attach the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's programme together with a background note.

Subject to your views, your programme seems to me at present to be manageable. However, I hope you will agree that it would be wise to resist proposals to extend it much further. In particular the programme of inward visits* is already looking rather ambitious: there will inevitably be a considerable number of unforeseen additions.

* The FCS would like to issue an (undated) invitation to Mr Mugabe early next week for a visit to London next year. Agree?

(Can we wait a little. I am not sure it would be sufficiently well received by public opinion. MT.

12 December 1980

PRIME MINISTER'S VISITS AND VISITORS - 1981

OUTWARD VISITS

Fixed, in hand or highly probable

United States of America	Late February/early March
European Council - Maastricht	23-24 March
India/Gulf	15-23 April
North/South Summit - Mexico	Early June
European Council - Luxembourg	29-30 June
Ottawa Summit	19-21 July
CHGM - Melbourne	30 September - 7 October
Anglo-German Summit - Bonn	? October

Proposals

Portugal - now looks less attractive	1 day
Strasbourg	December - 1 day

INWARD VISITORS

Fixed, in hand or highly probable

Panama President	30 March - 1 April
Ghana President	Early 1981
Romania Prime Minister	13-16 April
Anglo-German Summit	11-12 May
Anglo-Italian Summit	? May or later
Anglo-French Summit	? June
Anglo-Irish Summit	June/July
European Council	26-27 November

/ Proposals

Proposals

Mauritius Prime Minister	Early February
French Prime Minister	Early 1981 - if at all
Zimbabwe Prime Minister	
Jamaican Prime Minister	
Belgian Prime Minister	Late 1981
Cameroon President	
Peruvian Prime Minister	
Dominican Prime Minister	

Notes

(i) The Prime Minister of Singapore is likely to visit the United Kingdom under his own steam in 1981, to become a Freeman of the City of London.

(ii) The Sultan of Brunei is coming for 4-6 weeks in the Spring to learn about the arts of government.

(iii) The Prime Minister of Fiji may also come under his own steam.

Top Copy: PM Tours Ad, Govt Visits

MR. ALEXANDER

Prime Minister's Visits Overseas and Visitors 1981

I have checked through Roderick Lyne's letter to you of 1 December and can confirm all the dates he mentions on page 4, both for the outward visits and the inward visitors. I would be grateful, however, if when you write back to him you could ask him to go firm as quickly as possible with any of his "proposals". I think it would also be a good idea to show the Prime Minister the whole programme.

The FCO ask for a specific date for Sir S. Ramgoolam. I can manage a dinner on either Wednesday 11 or Thursday 12 February and talks on either day, though the 12th would be infinitely preferable. Not much alternative around that time.

I really am going to be in great difficulty fitting anything more in.

C.S.

5 December 1980

CONFIDENTIAL

Top Copy

Fr Tours Abd, Government Invites

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

MODBA O/R.

1 December 1980

Dear Michael,

Prime Minister's Overseas Visits and Visitors 1981

Lord Carrington has been considering possible programmes of visits and visitors for the Prime Minister and himself in 1981. I enclose a schedule of existing plans at Prime Ministerial level and of Lord Carrington's additional proposals, as well as a schedule of the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's own plans. We assume of course that events are likely to necessitate additional visits, outward and inward, which cannot now be foreseen.

The Queen

As background, I should recall the plans for State Visits next year. The recommendations are likely to be that King Khalid of Saudi Arabia be invited in June and President Shagari of Nigeria in November. If there is a recommendation for a State Visit in March, it may be for President Marcos of the Philippines or President Banda of Malawi. The Queen will visit Norway in May, Australia for the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHGM) in September/October, and New Zealand and Sri Lanka later in October. Canada is a possibility in July. - Patriation ? Constitution ? - We may be having difficulty at that time.

Outward Visits by the Prime Minister

In view of the UK Presidency in the second half of 1981, the Prime Minister may prefer to fit as many of her outward trips as possible into the first half of the year.

Lord Carrington welcomes the idea that the Prime Minister should visit the Gulf in early January or in connection with her Indian visit in April. He suggests that the best countries to visit would be Saudi Arabia, Oman and

/the

the United Arab Emirates. If the Prime Minister agrees, we shall submit draft telegrams to the Posts with instructions and detailed suggestions. (There will not be time to include visits to all six Arab states in the Persian Gulf, but the Prime Minister has met in the relatively recent past the Amir of Qatar, and the Prime Ministers of Bahrain and Kuwait. They will be borne in mind for another Ministerial visit in the not too distant future.)

The proposals in the schedule for visits to the US and to the North/South Summit in Mexico need little explanation. Lord Carrington will make specific suggestions in due course. We shall also make detailed suggestions about a visit to India in April. A visit to Spain would only be appropriate if the Lisbon Agreement on Gibraltar is implemented. If this condition was met, a visit during the UK Presidency would be particularly appropriate. A visit to Portugal (Paul Lever's letter of 7 November) could be extremely brief, but the Portuguese would wish it to be separate from any visit to Spain.

The schedule of outward visits does not include an Anglo/Italian Summit in Rome in November. The Prime Minister may feel that the frequency of these meetings could be eased by suggesting in due course to the Italians that the second Summit due in 1981 might be postponed because of the UK Presidency until early 1982.

Inward Visits

Sir S Ramgoolam, although Prime Minister of Mauritius since independence, has never paid an official visit to Britain. Despite his age he is not expected to retire soon. He is firmly pro-Western and his country is among the few which have preserved the Westminster model of Parliamentary democracy. Lord Carrington recommends that Sir S Ramgoolam should be invited here in the second week of February, when the Mauritian parliament (where the government have a slender majority) will be in recess and when The Queen should be able to receive him. Given the short time available, we would be grateful to know the Prime Minister's wishes as soon as possible.

An invitation to Mr Mugabe would be an excellent way of keeping up the momentum of our relations with Zimbabwe. One of the regular Anglo/Irish Summits will be due in mid-year and should probably be held after the Northern Ireland

/local

local government elections in June. We shall be writing shortly with detailed suggestions about inviting M. Barre. It would be a suitable gesture to invite the Belgian Prime Minister for a brief visit before we hand over the Presidency to Belgium at the end of the year.

An invitation to Mr Seaga would be an excellent goodwill gesture after the change of government in Jamaica.

We have tended to neglect Cameroon, a stable, moderate country which is one third Anglophone. The Cameroon market, with its sound agricultural base and significant oil reserves, is buoyant and attractive. President Ahidjo, in office since independence in 1960, has just started another 5 year term. Lord Carrington recommends an official invitation in 1981.

Peru has recently returned to democratic government. The economy is strong and offers opportunities for investment and exports. Dr Ulloa, the Prime Minister, is also Minister of the Economy and Commerce and the most important person after the President. An official visit could win us a valuable friend.

The new, moderate Dominican Government would welcome an invitation to the Prime Minister, Miss Charles. There is advantage in demonstrating support for governments favouring stability in the volatile Eastern Caribbean.

You will see that Lord Carrington's schedule of inward visits includes the possibility of inviting the Polish Foreign Minister. But, depending on how things go in Poland, we may later wish to sound the Poles about the possibility of a higher level contact instead.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries to the members of OD and David Wright in the Cabinet Office.

yours ever

Roderic Lyne

(R M J Lyne)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing St

RESTRICTED

SECRETARY OF STATE'S OVERSEAS VISITS AND VISITORS, 1981

OUTWARD VISITS

Fixed or in hand

Morocco/Egypt		3-17 January
Foreign Affairs Council	- Brussels	19-20 January
Foreign Affairs Council	- Brussels	16-17 February
Political Cooperation Foreign Ministers	- The Hague	25 June
Foreign Affairs Council	- Brussels	16-17 March
European Council	- Maastricht	23-24 March
Foreign Affairs Council	- Luxembourg	13-14 April
Hong Kong/China/Japan/Pakistan		?28 March - 9/10 April
State Visit to Norway		May
Foreign Ministers' Informal weekend	- Netherlands	9-10 May
Foreign Affairs Council	- Brussels	18-19 May
NATO Ministerial Meeting Location not fixed		2 days in May
Foreign Affairs Council	- Luxembourg	22-23 June
European Council	- Luxembourg	29-30 June
Foreign Affairs Council	- Brussels	13-14 July
Ottawa Summit		19-21 July
Foreign Affairs Council	- Brussels	14-15 September
CHGM Melbourne		30 September - 7 October
Foreign Affairs Council	- Luxembourg	19-20 October
Anglo-German Summit	- Bonn	?October
Foreign Affairs Council	- Brussels	16-17 November
NATO Ministerial Meeting	- Brussels	2 days in December
Foreign Affairs Council	- Brussels	7-8 December

Proposals

USA	?February/March
Pakistan en route to Hong Kong	?26 March
FRG	Early 1981
Moscow	Early 1981
Nigeria	February 1981
France for brief Bilateral	
North/South Summit - Mexico	Early June
Netherlands (handover visit to outgoing Presidency)	One day late June
UNGA (speaking engagement in US?)	September
Luxembourg: Churchill Memorial Lecture	One day October
Berlin after the Anglo-German Summit	October
ASEAN two countries en route to or from CHGM	September-October

INWARD VISITORS

Fixed or in hand

Mozambique Foreign Minister	26-29 January
Foreign Ministers' informal weekend	5-6 September
Anglo-German Summit	?May
Anglo-Italian Summit	?May
Anglo-French Summit	?June
Political Cooperation Foreign Ministers	13 October
European Council	26-27 November
Iraqi Foreign Minister (perhaps in 1980)	

/Proposals

Proposals

Foreign Ministers of:

Poland

Yugoslavia

India

Luxembourg

Mexico

Botswana

Venezuela

Brazil

Sweden

Finland

Notes

(i) The Department may wish later to recommend that the Secretary of State should attend the opening session of the Global Negotiations, which may be in late January.

(ii) New Australian Foreign Minister likely to come under own steam in 1981.

(iii) The same applies to the Portuguese Foreign Minister;

(iv) and to the Kuwaiti Foreign Minister.

(v) The Foreign Minister of Guinea may come in early 1981 as a COI Visitor.

Zimbabwe

GPS 275
UNCLASSIFIED
FROM SALISBURY 290800Z AUG 80.
TO PRIORITY F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1942 OF 29 AUGUST.
INFO UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON.

Prime Minister

MAP 29/8

YOUR TELNO 1501: MR MUGABE'S VISIT TO LONDON.

1. MUGABE MADE A SHORT STATEMENT TO THE PRESS ON HIS RETURN TO SALISBURY THIS MORNING. HE HAD BEEN SURPRISED BY THE WARMTH OF HIS RECEPTION IN THE UNITED STATES. TOP BUSINESSMEN HAD SHOWN GREAT INTEREST IN ZIMBABWE. PRESIDENT CARTER HAD EXPLAINED THE DIFFICULTIES ABOUT PROVIDING MORE AID AT PRESENT, WITHOUT SPECIAL CONGRESSIONAL APPROPRIATION, BUT HAD SAID THAT HE HOPED THAT MORE AMERICAN AID MONEY WOULD BE AVAILABLE IN THE FUTURE.

2. MUGABE SAID THAT HE HAD DISCUSSED SOUTHERN AFRICAN MATTERS, PARTICULARLY NAMIBIA, AND AID WITH YOU. YOU HAD EXPLAINED THAT IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR BRITAIN TO PROVIDE MORE AID IN FACE OF THE CURRENT ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES BUT THAT BRITAIN WOULD ENCOURAGE HER FRIENDS AND ALLIES TO OFFER MORE AID.

3. HE SUMMED UP BY SAYING THAT HIS TOUR HAD BEEN A GREAT SUCCESS BOTH IN TERMS OF THE INTERNATIONAL WELCOME TO ZIMBABWE AND IN TERMS OF PROSPECTS FOR FURTHER AID MONEY.

4. JOURNALISTS' QUESTIONS WERE DIRECTED EXCLUSIVELY TO THE FUTURE OF GENERAL WALLS. MUGABE REPEATED, SOMEWHAT GRIMLY, THAT GENERAL WALLS' PRESENCE WAS NOT ACCEPTABLE. HE WOULD NOT BE DRAWN ON HOW WALLS, A ZIMBABWE CITIZEN, COULD BE REMOVED FROM THE COUNTRY BEYOND SAYING THAT THE GOVERNMENT'S DUTY WAS TO RULE, THAT IT INTENDED TO DO SO FIRMLY, THAT A DISLOYAL CITIZEN COULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO REMAIN TO ENCOURAGE DISLOYALTY AMONG OTHERS AND THAT THE PRESS WOULD SEE WHAT MEASURES THE GOVERNMENT WOULD TAKE.

BYATT

LIMITED
C.A.F.D.
O.A.D.'s
NEWS D
PS
PS/LPS
PS/Mr LUCE
PS/Pres
SIR E. YOUDE
SIR L. ALLISON

COPIES TO
PS/LORD SOAMES C.S.D.

COPIES SENT TO
No. 10 DOWNING STREET

THIS TELEGRAM
WAS NOT
ADVANCED

Prime Minister

To see this account of Lord Carrington's talk with Mr Mugabe.

41328 - 2

- esp para 3, on armed forces.

MAP 29/8

CONFIDENTIAL

GRS 673
CONFIDENTIAL
FM FCO 281800Z AUGUST 1980
TO IMMEDIATE SALISBURY
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1501 OF 28 AUGUST,
AND TO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON,
INFO MODUK (PS/SOFS).
FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY
MR MUGABE'S VISIT TO LONDON

1. MUGABE DULY ARRIVED THIS MORNING WITHOUT CHIDZERO AND MANGWENDE, WHO STAYED ON IN NEW YORK. HE WAS RATHER TIRED AND ASKED TO BE EXCUSED THE JOURNEY TO DORNEYWOOD. LORD CARRINGTON THEREFORE GAVE HIM LUNCH IN LONDON: HE WAS ACCOMPANIED BY MISS NHIWATIWA AND SHEBA GAVA.

2. THE LUNCH WENT WELL, THOUGH MUGABE SEEMED A LITTLE SUBDUED BY FATIGUE. THERE WAS A GOOD DEAL OF TALK ABOUT NAMIBIA. MUGABE STILL FAVOURED A CONFERENCE UNDER UN AUSPICES, BUT DID NOT SEEM TO HAVE THOUGHT THIS THROUGH, AND DID NOT TRY TO PUSH THE IDEA VERY HARD IN THE FACE OF SOME DRAWBACKS MENTIONED BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE (NOTABLY THE ABSENCE OF OBVIOUS TERMS OF REFERENCE AND THE DIFFICULTY OF THE UN PROVIDING THE FIRM CHAIRMANSHIP NECESSARY). THE SECRETARY OF STATE HOWEVER MADE IT CLEAR THAT WE WOULD NOT OPPOSE A CONFERENCE IF THE PRINCIPAL PARTIES WANTED ONE. MUGABE SEEMED TO THINK THAT SOME FORMULA COULD BE REACHED TO ENABLE BOTH THE SOUTH AFRICANS AND THE INTERNAL PARTIES TO ATTEND, (THOUGH HE HAD NOT THOUGHT THIS THROUGH EITHER). HE WAS, HOWEVER, ADAMANT THAT SWAPO WOULD INSIST ON SOUTH AFRICAN ATTENDANCE.

3. MUGABE WAS CLEARLY PRE-OCCUPIED HOWEVER BY ZIMBABWEAN AFFAIRS, NOTABLY INTEGRATION OF THE ARMED FORCES AND AID. HE WAS MILDLY OPTIMISTIC ABOUT INTEGRATION BETWEEN ZANLA AND ZIPRA AND GRATEFUL FOR THE EFFORTS OF THE BRITISH MILITARY ASSISTANCE TEAM. BUT HE COMPLAINED ABOUT THE LACK OF CO-OPERATION FROM MCLEAN OVER INTEGRATION OF THE RAR AND THE FORMER GUERRILLA FORCES

/HE SAID

HE SAID THAT HE HAD DECIDED FOR THE TIME BEING AGAINST APPOINTING A NEW COMMANDER TO REPLACE WALLS: FIRSTLY, BECAUSE THE MILITARY LEADEDRS COULD NOT AGREE ON AN INTERNAL APPOINTMENT, AND NONE WANTED A FOREIGNER: AND SECONDLY BECAUSE INTEGRATION HAD NOT GONE FAR ENOUGH FOR A COMMANDER TO TAKE EFFECTIVE CHARGE. MEANWHILE DECISIONS WOULD BE TAKEN BY CONSENSUS, UNDER THE CHAIRMANSHIP OF AN OFFICIAL (PAGE). MUGABE WAS DETERMINED NOT TO ALLOW MCLEAN (WHOM HE CLEARLY DISLIKES) TO BECOME CHAIRMAN.

4. ON AID, MUGABE WAS, OF COURSE, DISAPPOINTED WITH THE FAILURE OF THE AMERICANS TO COME UP WITH MORE, BUT UNDERSTOOD THE PROCEDURAL DIFFICULTIES. HE HOPED THAT THE UK WOULD INCREASE ITS OFFER: HE NEEDED MONEY FOR COMPENSATION PAYMENTS OVER AFRICAN ADVANCEMENTS IN THE CIVIL SERVICE, AND ESPECIALLY LAND. 'TO DATE' HE HAD AVOIDED UNCONSTITUTIONAL MEASURES OVER LAND RE-DISTRIBUTION 'BUT NEEDED MONEY TO BACK THESE PRINCIPLES'. THE SECRETARY OF STATE EXPLAINED OUR OWN DIFFICULTIES, AND ALSO HIS EFFORTS WITH EG, THE SAUDIS TO PERSUADE THEM (AND ALSO THE EUROPEANS AND OTHERS) TO DO MORE. HE UNDERTOOK TO HAVE ANOTHER GO AT THE JAPANESE. MUGABE WAS APPRECIATIVE.

5. MUGABE DID NOT PURSUE HIS COMPLAINTS AGAINST WALLS, BUT THE SECRETARY OF STATE TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY TO RECALL THAT WALLS HAD BEEN LARGELY RESPONSIBLE FOR BRINGING THE WHITES ROUND TO A SETTLEMENT AT THE TIME OF LANCASTER HOUSE, AND THAT HE HAD BEEN UNDER UNDERSTANDABLE STRAIN SINCE THE ELECTIONS. HIS STATEMENT TO THE PRESS HAD BEEN FOOLISH, AND HE CLEARLY REGRETTED IT.

6. WE ARE TELLING THE PRESS THAT SOUTHERN AFRICAN QUESTIONS AND BILATERAL MATTERS (INCLUDING AID) WERE DISCUSSED BUT ARE DECLINING TO GO INTO DETAILS. MR LUCE WILL SEE MUGABE OFF AT GATWICK THIS EVENING. MR MUGABE GAVE AN INTERVIEW TO ITN NEWS AT LONDON AIRPORT THIS MORNING. HE SAID THAT AID WAS ONE OF THE CHIEF SUBJECTS DISCUSSED WITH PRESIDENT CARTER, AND IMPLIED THAT HE HAD HOPED THAT BRITAIN AND THE USA WOULD HAVE GIVEN MORE. ON THE OTHER HAND, WHEN ASKED ABOUT INTEGRATION

/OF MILITARY FORCES

OF MILITARY FORCES HE SAID HE WAS GRATEFUL FOR BRITAIN'S MILITARY ASSISTANCE IN THE RETRAINING PROGRAMME. HE REPEATED THAT GENERAL WALL'S WAS 'OUT OF STEP' AND CONFIRMED THAT THERE WAS NO PLACE FOR HIM IN ZIMBABWE SOCIETY. MUGABE SAID THERE WERE NO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN HIM AND NKOMO AND THAT THEY WERE WORKING WELL TOGETHER IN THE COALITION GOVERNMENT.

CARRINGTON

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

LIMITED
CAFD
OADS
HD/NEWS D
PS
PS/LPS
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR E YOUDE
SIR L ALLINSON

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FM WASHINGTON 272335Z AUG 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NO 3860 OF 27 AUGUST

INFO PRIORITY SALISBURY UKMIS NEW YORK PRETORIA

INFO SAVING LUANDA LUSAKA MAPUTO DAR ES SALAAM GABORONE

MIPT: MUGABE'S VISIT TO THE US: 22-27 AUGUST

1. PAUL HARE, DIRECTOR SOUTHERN AFRICA BUREAU HAS GIVEN US THE FOLLOWING ACCOUNT FROM HIS NOTES OF MUGABE'S MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT EARLIER THIS AFTERNOON. THE MEETING WAS PRECEDED BY AN ELABORATE CEREMONIAL ARRIVAL AT WHITE HOUSE AND FOLLOWED BY A RECEPTION AT WHICH MUGABE PUBLICLY ENDORSED THE PRESIDENT FOR REELECTION. IT LASTED 50 MINUTES AND COVERED THE ACHIEVEMENT OF INDEPENDENCE, AID, AND NAMIBIA, WITH NOTHING ON ZIMBABWE OR SOUTH AFRICAN INTERNAL AFFAIRS.

2. INDEPENDENCE. MUGABE EXPRESSED WARMEST THANKS FOR US HELP OVER THE YEARS, PARTICULARLY MENTIONING CYRUS VANCE AND ANDREW YOUNG. HE REFERRED REPEATEDLY TO THE US AND ZIMBABWE AS ALLIES.

3. AID. MUGABE MADE NO SPECIFIC REQUEST FOR MORE US AID, BUT SAID ZIMBABWE COULD NOT COPE WITHOUT AN EXTRA DOLLARS 350 MILLION FOR RECONSTRUCTION (ROADS, SCHOOLS, ELECTRIFICATION OF RAILWAY) IN NEXT TWO YEARS. HE PUT TOTAL OF FUNDS NEEDED FROM ALL SOURCES (INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL) OVER NEXT 4 - 5 YEARS AT 4 BILLION DOLLARS. MUCH OF THE 75 MILLION POUNDS STERLING AID FROM THE UK (FOR WHICH HE WAS MOST GRATEFUL) WAS ALREADY EARMARKED FOR MILITARY RETRAINING COSTS, ETC. THE PRESIDENT IN REPLY OBSERVED THAT PART OF THE PROBLEM OVER US GOVERNMENT AID WAS THAT THE TIMING OF THE PEACE SETTLEMENT DID NOT COINCIDE WITH THE US BUDGETARY PROCESS. HE RECALLED THE VARIOUS CATEGORIES OF U.S. AID ALREADY PROVIDED OR

/PROMISED

PROMISED FOR ZIMBABWE AND SAID (WITHOUT FURTHER PRECISION) THAT HE PLANNED TO INCREASE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE LEVELS IN THE MONTHS AHEAD. HE ALSO SPOKE OPTIMISTICALLY ABOUT OPPORTUNITIES FOR PRIVATE TRADE AND INVESTMENT IN ZIMBABWE AND MENTIONED THE WANKIE DAM PROJECT IN WHICH THE PRESIDENT TOOK A PERSONAL INTEREST.

4. NAMIBIA. THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT THE OBJECTIVE WAS AN EXPEDITIOUS SETTLEMENT. MUGABE DISCUSSED THE UN PLAN IN CONSIDERABLE DETAIL. HE REFERRED APPROVINGLY TO THE RECENT REAFFIRMATION AT LUSAKA THAT SWAPO WAS THE SOLE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE NAMIBIAN PEOPLE. THIS WOULD RAISE PROBLEMS FOR THE PARTICIPATION OF THE INTERNAL PARTIES IN ANY MEETING BETWEEN THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT AND SWAPO. HE MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE ENVISAGED SUCH A MEETING AS BEING ASSOCIATED WITH AND NOT AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE UN PLAN, BUT APPARENTLY DID NOT SPECIFY AT WHAT POINT IN THE UN PROCESS IT MIGHT BE HELD, OR ON ITS LOCATION. HE SPOKE APPROVINGLY OF THE THREAT OF SANCTIONS AND MENTIONED AN OIL BOYCOTT, (IN SPITE OF ZIMBABWE'S HIGH DEGREE OF DEPENDENCE ON OIL FROM SOUTH AFRICA). HE TOOK THE LINE THAT A CLEAR THREAT OF SANCTIONS WOULD REMOVE THE NEED FOR THEIR IMPLEMENTATION. PRESIDENT CARTER IN REPLY POINTED OUT THE PROBLEMS FOR SOUTH AFRICA'S BLACK NEIGHBOURS IF THE SOUTH AFRICAN SYSTEM WERE QUOTE DEVASTATED UNQUOTE, BUT DID NOT SPECIFY WHETHER HE MEANT BY SANCTIONS OR BY INTERNAL DISRUPTION.

FCO PASS SAVING TO GABORONE LUANDA LUSAKA MAPUTO AND DAR ES SALAAM.

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FM WASHINGTON 272330Z AUG 80

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NO 3859 OF 27 AUGUST

INFO PRIORITY SALISBURY, UKMIS NEW YORK, PRETORIA

INFO SAVING LUANDA, LUSAKA, MAPUTO, DAR ES SALAAM, GABORONE

Prime Minister

Lord Carrington mentioned to you this report on Mr Mugabe's US visit

MF 28/8

MUGABE'S VISIT TO THE US 22-27 AUGUST

1. APART FROM THE UN ASPECTS OF HIS VISIT (WHICH UKMIS WILL REPORT SEPARATELY), MUGABE'S MAIN OBJECTIVES IN PUBLIC APPEARANCES IN NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON WERE TO STIMULATE US PRIVATE INVESTMENT AND PRESS FOR MORE U.S. GOVT AID TO ZIMBABWE. HE SOUGHT THROUGHOUT TO PRESENT HIMSELF AS A PRAGMATIC REVOLUTIONARY, REMARKING IN ONE INTERVIEW THAT SOME OF HIS PAST STATEMENTS SHOULD NOT BE TAKEN TOO SERIOUSLY SINCE THEY WERE PART OF A WARTIME PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN.

2. ON INVESTMENT, MUGABE STATED AT A MEETING OF THE FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION IN NEW YORK THAT ALTHOUGH HIS GOVERNMENT'S PRINCIPLES WERE BASED ON MARXISM, IT WOULD NOT COMMIT THE MISTAKES WHICH OTHER NEWLY INDEPENDENT COUNTRIES HAD MADE IN IMPLEMENTING SOCIALISM: A CAPITALIST STRUCTURE EXISTED IN ZIMBABWE WHICH COULD BE EXPLOITED FOR THE GOOD OF THE NATION. FOREIGN INVESTMENT WOULD BE SAFE AND THE REPATRIATION OF PROFITS WOULD BE ALLOWED. HOWEVER HE SUBSEQUENTLY QUALIFIED THIS BY SAYING THAT THE UNDERTAKING WAS SUBJECT TO ZIMBABWE'S FOREIGN EXCHANGE POSITION AND THE NEED TO PROMOTE THE COUNTRY'S DEVELOPMENT BY PLOUGHING BACK A ''SUBSTANTIAL PORTION'' OF EARNINGS. ALTHOUGH HIS SPEECH WAS WELL RECEIVED, THIS QUALIFICATION MAY TEND TO DAMPEN BUSINESS CONFIDENCE IN PRIVATE INVESTMENT IN ZIMBABWE, WHICH MUGABE'S GOVERNMENT HAS SOUGHT TO BUILD UP IN THE US.

3. ON AID, MUGABE USED A NUMBER OF TV AND PUBLIC APPEARANCES TO EXPRESS DISAPPOINTMENT ABOUT THE EXTENT TO WHICH PROMISED US ASSISTANCE FELL SHORT OF THAT CONTAINED IN THE 1977 ANGLO/AMERICAN PROPOSALS, RESTING HIS ARGUMENT MAINLY AND PERHAPS ILL-ADVISEDLY ON THE DUTY OF THE RICH TO HELP THE POOR RATHER THAN ON U.S. SELF-INTEREST. HIS SPEECHES TO THE HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE AND THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE WERE MORE EFFECTIVE IN THIS REGARD. HIS VISIT PRODUCED SEVERAL USEFUL EDITORIALS URGING THE ADMINISTRATION TO BE MORE FORTHCOMING ON AID, THESE PLEAS HAVE HAD NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. WE HAVE BEEN TOLD IN STRICT CONFIDENCE THAT PRESIDENT CARTER HAS REJECTED A STATE DEPT PROPOSAL FOR A GREATLY EXPANDED US PROGRAMME IN ZIMBABWE TO BE WRITTEN INTO THE FY 82 AID BUDGET.

4. MUGABE'S VISIT RECEIVED CONSIDERABLE MEDIA COVERAGE, PARTICULARLY HIS JOURNEY TO HARLEM IN NEW YORK WHERE HE WAS WELCOMED AS A HERO BY HIS MANY BLACK AMERICAN SUPPORTERS. HE DECLINED THEIR INVITATION TO CONDEMN US POLICIES ON URBAN POVERTY, THOUGH HE DID SAY ''THE AFRICAN PEOPLE, YOU AND I, REFUSED TO SUBMIT: MASTER AND SLAVE HAVE BECOME EQUALS, BUT OF COURSE BLACKS HAVE BECOME MORE EQUAL''. ON SOUTHERN AFRICA, MUGABE MAINTAINED THAT THE WEST SHOULD DO MORE TO BRING PRESSURE ON SOUTH AFRICA TO IMPLEMENT THE UN PROPOSALS FOR NAMIBIA. HE SPECIFICALLY CALLED ON THE US AND BRITAIN NOT TO VETO ANY UN MOVE FOR A TRADE EMBARGO AGAINST PRETORIA.

5. DURING HIS VISIT MUGABE SEIZED SEVERAL OPPORTUNITIES TO MAKE FAVOURABLE COMMENTS ABOUT NKOMO: THESE WERE BALANCED BY STRONG ATTACKS ON IAN SMITH AND GENERAL WALLS, WHOM HE DESCRIBED AS HAVING BEEN DISLOYAL.

6. MUGABE'S VISIT WAS A SUCCESS TO THE EXTENT THAT HE RECEIVED WIDE AND GENERALLY FAVOURABLE PUBLICITY, AND A SUMPTUOUS WELCOME AT THE WHITE HOUSE. BUT HE WILL NOT HAVE WON ANY NEW FRIENDS FOR A CERTAIN EVASIVENESS IN REPLYING TO QUESTIONS ABOUT AFGHANISTAN

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/AND

AND THE CUBAN PRESENCE IN AFRICA, NOR WITH HIS REMARKS THAT TANZANIA PROVED THAT IT WAS POSSIBLE TO HAVE A DEMOCRATIC ONE PARTY STATE. HE DID NOT MAKE TANGIBLE PROGRESS TOWARDS THE TWO OBJECTIVES OF MORE GOVT AID AND MORE PRIVATE INVESTMENT.

7. SEE M.I.F.T. FOR ACCOUNT OF MUGABE'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT CARTER. attached

FCO PASS SAVING TO GABORONE LUANDA LUSAKA MAPUTO AND DAR ES SALAAM.

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Zimbabwe

27 August 1980

Thank you for your letter of 26 August, about Mr. Mugabe's stop-over in London tomorrow.

Given that there is no sign of pressure on Mr. Mugabe's side for a meeting with the Prime Minister, she would prefer not to return to London to see him tomorrow morning. She assumes that the Foreign Secretary will either see Mr. Mugabe himself, or arrange a suitable alternative meeting.

M. A. PATTISON

Christopher Jebb, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

26 August 1980

Dear Mike,

Zimbabwe: Mr Mugabe's Stopover in London, 28 August

Mr Mugabe will be passing through on Thursday, 28 August en route from Washington to Salisbury after his attendance at the UN Special Session in New York, at which Zimbabwe was admitted to the UN, and his subsequent visit to Washington for a meeting with President Carter. Mr Mugabe will be arriving in London at 07.25 and departing at 19.10 on 28 August.

There are no pressing matters we need to discuss with Mr Mugabe. However, he has recently been going through a difficult period in Zimbabwe with the arrest of Mr Tekere, the ZANU Secretary General and Minister of Manpower Planning, and the controversy surroudning General Walls's recent statements. Although it is not essential for the Prime Minister to see him, a meeting would usefully consolidate Anglo-Zimbabwean relations and indicate our support for the moderate policies Mr Mugabe has been pursuing. Likely topics of conversation are Zimbabwe's economic development, including the role of British aid; UK military assistance, including the possible provision of a British General to succeed General Walls; and Zimbabwe's accession to the Lome Convention.

We are consulting Lord Carrington in Saudi Arabia to ascertain whether he would like to see Mr Mugabe at Bledlow at some stage on the 28th. If the Secretary of State agrees, the most likely appointment would be for lunch. Mr Mugabe would be free any time during the morning for a meeting with the Prime Minister. I should be grateful if you would let me know as soon as possible whether the Prime Minister wishes to see him.

Yours ever

Chris Jebb

(C Jebb)
Assistant Private Secretary

M Pattison Esq
Private Secretary
10 Downing Street

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26 AUG 1980

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Top File

Zimbabwe.

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

9 May 1980

Sec. Master set.

Zimbabwe : Sit : May 79

MEETING WITH MR. MUGABE

As you know the Prime Minister of Zimbabwe, Mr. Robert Mugabe, called on the Prime Minister earlier today. I enclose a record of their conversation.

I am sending copies of this letter and its enclosure to Brian Norbury (Ministry of Defence), John Wiggins (HM Treasury) and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

R.M.J. Lyne, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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RECORD OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE PRIME MINISTER OF ZIMBABWE, MR. ROBERT MUGABE, AT 10 DOWNING STREET ON FRIDAY 9 MAY 1980 AT 1140

Present:

Prime Minister — Mr. Robert Mugabe
Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary — Mr. E.R. Kadungure
Mr. Derek Day
Mr. Michael Alexander

* * * * * * * * *

Mr. Mugabe thanked the Prime Minister for extending Lord Soames's stay as Governor in Rhodesia. He had done a "marvellous piece of work" for the country. The contribution made by Britain in sending advisory teams from the Civil Service, the police, the BBC and the army had helped to get the new Government off to an excellent start.

However there were problems.

Security

The first and most serious problem was in the area of security. The Rhodesian army and the senior commanders had accepted the change of regime. The senior commanders in particular had behaved admirably. They had made it plain that they were at the disposal of the new Government and would stay as long as but no longer than the new Government needed them. There was more difficulty with some of the middle ranking officers. But the real problem lay with ZAPU and ZIPRA. It was not clear that Mr. Nkomo was responsible but some members of his organisation were not prepared to accept the new situation and wanted to continue the fight. They had been responsible for a number of very silly acts, some involving deaths. Those responsible had been arrested. But there was still a strong element who were tempted to resort to sabotage in the hope that the ensuing chaos might lead to new elections and the overthrow of the ZANU Government.

/ Mr. Mugabe

Mr. Mugabe said that the situation in the Assembly Points was a source of particular concern. At Assembly Point Mike 1,500 out of the 2,000 men there had disappeared in the last few days. It was true that a few ZANLA men had decided to be bandits and were being hunted out. But the number of dissidents from ZAPU and ZIPRA was increasing all the time. Moreover there seemed to be a political basis to their activity. The Government might have to act against them soon.

The integration process was not going well. It had started satisfactorily with the effort to integrate one or two units of ZANLA and ZIPRA. But now the Government had decided it was necessary to make a fresh start. The present plan was not working. It looked as though it might have been a mistake to appoint Rhodesian commanders to supervise the process. The trainees were alleging that the Rhodesians were too harsh. The reputation of the British instructors who had been in Rhodesia as members of the monitoring force stood high. Would it be possible for the number of British officers in Zimbabwe to be increased? The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary commented that some of the British officers in the monitoring force had considered that a larger number of them should have stayed behind. Mr. Day said that General Fursdon was hoping to see Mr. Mugabe soon. It might be possible for us to increase the number of instructors in Zimbabwe. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that the Defence Secretary was anxious to help. The Prime Minister said that Mr. Mugabe's request should be followed up.

In response to a question from the Prime Minister, Mr. Mugabe said that the integration scheme needed to be as comprehensive as possible. To this end it would be necessary to move guerrillas out of the Assembly Points and into barracks. Once there they could be disarmed and they would only be given their arms back when they were needed for training. This would obviously assist in dealing with the law and order problem. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary commented that some members of the Zimbabwean army forces were going to be trained in the United Kingdom. Mr. Day said that these would be future instructors. The basic training of the forces as a whole would have to be done inside Zimbabwe. The Prime Minister remarked that those who came to the United Kingdom would find it

tough here. Mr. Mugabe said "the tougher the better".

Civil Service

Mr. Mugabe said that the British Civil Service team which had visited Zimbabwe had recommended measures which might be adopted in order to advance Africans into senior positions in the Civil Service while allaying the fears of the white civil servants. The scheme involved the appointment of supernumeraries and the compensation of those whites who became redundant. The Government were still studying the scheme but it was clear that its implementation would require a lot of money. There were at present no black civil servants in the administrative grades and indeed none outside the very lowest levels of the Civil Service. The black graduates had not been allowed to join the Civil Service and they had all gone into industry or teaching or they had left the country. If they were now to be inserted into the senior grades in the Civil Service a considerable number of white civil servants would inevitably be displaced. Would HMG be prepared to help with the money that would be needed? The Prime Minister said that the problem would be looked at. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary commented that the inducement scheme, although introduced with the best of intentions, was now proving counter-productive in that it was tempting too many civil servants to leave their posts too soon.

Aid from third countries

Mr. Mugabe said that he would be grateful for assistance from the United Kingdom in getting members of the European Community to contribute as much bilateral and multilateral aid as possible. The French, for instance, had produced virtually nothing other than a few scholarships so far. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that the response of the Europeans had so far been very disappointing. He had been doing some private work to try to improve the situation. For instance in the United States, where the Government had so far been distinctly ungenerous, he had been in touch with Messrs. Rogers and Kissinger. They would be trying to get the American contribution increased. Mr. Wayne Frederick would be trying to get more industrialists involved. In this country, his own company Rio Tinto had announced the investment of £5 million. He would also be encouraging Lord Soames to be active in the City.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary asked whether the difficulties on the financial front with South Africa had been sorted out. Mr. Mugabe said that they had been but only in part. They were prepared to reach an agreement covering the first 80 million rand without any signature on the Zimbabwe side. But they were insisting that in regard to the remainder of the money (85 million rand) a member of the Zimbabwean Government should be sent to South Africa to negotiate and that the agreement should bear the signature either of Mr. Mugabe or of one of his Ministers. It was impossible for his Government to meet those conditions. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that he would try to help. The Prime Minister said that it was ridiculous to allow formalities of this kind to stand in the way of an agreement which was in South Africa's interest as well as in that of Zimbabwe.

The internal situation

The Prime Minister asked about the agricultural position in Zimbabwe. Mr. Mugabe said that the maize stocks were low but that this year's crop should not be too bad except in certain areas. The farmers had been granted a price rise but the Government did not wish to pass on the rise to the consumer and it was therefore having to subsidise prices. Resettlement had not yet started but work on a resettlement plan was continuing. The problem was urgent because of the return of refugees, half of whom had now returned from the neighbouring countries. There was a general problem over the expectations of the population. Everyone thought that the installation of a Government for which they had voted meant that they themselves had power. They would have to be educated in the realities. However he had anticipated far more serious problems, particularly with the Rhodesians, than had in fact so far developed. He agreed with the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary that the new country had got off to a marvellous start.

The meeting ended at 1220.

9 May 1980

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TO FLASH FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1472 BF 9 MAY 1980

BELGRADE TELNO 184: MUGABE'S VISIT

1. WHEN MUGABE SEES THE PRIME MINISTER AND LORD SOAMES I EXPECT HIM TO RAISE THE FOLLOWING SUBJECTS:

A) MILITARY ASSISTANCE. WHEN I LAST SAW HIM, MUGABE WAS CONCERNED AT THE SLOW PROGRESS IN INTEGRATING THE THREE ARMIES INTO A NEW NATIONAL ZIMBABWEAN ARMY. (MY TELNO 1443). HE MAY ASK FOR MORE BRITISH TRAINERS.

B) INTERNATIONAL AID FOR RECONSTRUCTION. THE ZIMBABWEANS HAVE NOT COMPLAINED ABOUT OUR AID PLEDGE. BUT THEY ARE DISAPPOINTED AT THE RESPONSE TO OUR APPEAL TO AID DONORS TO MAKE A SPECIAL EFFORT ON ZIMBABWE'S BEHALF. THEY TEND TO COMPARE WHAT HAS SO FAR BEEN OFFERED WITH THE SO CALLED 'KISSINGER PLAN'. MUGABE MAY ASK THAT WE MAKE A RENEWED APPEAL TO AID DONORS ON ZIMBABWE'S BEHALF.

C) INDUCEMENT SCHEME. THE ZIMBABWEANS ARE CONCERNED AT THE EFFECT ON THE CIVIL SERVICE OF THE INDUCEMENT SCHEME (MY TELNO 1407). NKALA COMPLAINED ABOUT THIS TO ME YESTERDAY, AND I SHALL BE REPORTING MY CONVERSATION WITH HIM SEPIGN EXCHANGE COSTS.

2. IT WOULD BE USEFUL FOR THE PRIME MINISTER OR LORD SOAMES TO

2. IT WOULD BE USEFUL FOR THE PRIME MINISTER OR LORD SOAMES TO MAKE TWO POINTS TO MUGABE.

A) CIVIL SERVICE TEAM. HOVE HAS TOLD US THAT THERE IS NO POINT IN THE CIVIL SERVICE TEAM RETURNING AT PRESENT (MY TELNO 1456).

THERE IS STILL PLENTY THAT THE TEAM COULD USEFULLY DO, INCLUDING TAKING A LOOK AT THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MINISTRIES AND HELPING TO SEE THAT A GOOD SCHEME FOR AFRICANISATION IS INTRODUCED. MUGABE TOLD LORD SOAMES ON 15 APRIL THAT HE WANTED THE TEAM TO RETURN AND THAT HE WAS SORRY THEY HAD NOT HAD A CHANCE TO CAST THEIR NET MORE WIDELY. THE PRIME MINISTER COULD REMIND MUGABE THAT WE ARE READY TO OFFER FURTHER ADVICE ON THE CIVIL SERVICE.

B) AID MISSION. THE PRIME MINISTER MIGHT REMIND MUGABE THAT THE AID MISSION IS DUE TO COME TO SALISBURY FROM 5-15 JUNE. THE AGREEMENT FOR THE DISBURSEMENT OF THE RECONSTRUCTION GRANT SHOULD HAVE BEEN SIGNED BY THEN AND THE TEAM WILL BE LOOKING INTO WAYS OF SPENDING THE REST OF OUR £75 MILLION OFFER.

BYATT

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PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH MR MUGABE, FRIDAY 9 MAY, 11.30 AM

POINTS TO MAKE

1. Hope to continue good relationships built up during Lord Soames' administration.

2. Hope Zimbabwe government will soon establish official mission in London - even if they are not yet ready to appoint High Commissioner.

3. ODA mission in June to identify targets for our aid programme.

4. Glad our military assistance programme has got off to good start. General Fursdon (Director, Military Assistance Overseas) now back in Zimbabwe. Will be making further recommendations after consultation with Joint High Command, which we will consider positively.

5. Ready to give further advice on public service. British advisory team will return as soon as Zimbabwe government indicates they are ready to receive them.

6. Glad that talks have started between officials on outstanding pre-UDI debts. Hope to reach agreement on a way to settle these in near future.

7. [If asked: We are continuing to urge other aid donors to make or to increase their contributions.]

Zimbabwe Unit
9 May 1980

BACKGROUND

Internal

1. Continuing problem of limiting crisis of black expectations (strikes for higher wages, need for land resettlement) at same time as retaining whites' confidence. Particularly low morale among white public servants and military.

2. Differences between Mugabe (ZANU-PF) and Nkomo (PF-ZAPU) persist. ZAPU disenchanted with their political standing in new government, slow progress of military integration. Violent incidents between party members in towns caused partly by ZANU victimisation, partly by ZAPU confrontation.

3. Little progress on amalgamation of forces presided over by General Walls. As yet no enlargement of pre-independence joint training programme. Assembly places still intact, evidence of increasing truancy and tension. Condescending attitude shown by some white commanders to senior ZANLA personnel.

UK/Zimbabwe

4. Debt talks started on Thursday 8 May in London at official level. The Zimbabwe side is headed by David Young, Treasury Secretary; on the British side by Treasury, Bank of England, Council of Foreign Bond Holders, FCO. There is about £100,000,000 out-standing, equally divided between debts to HMG and Southern Rhodesian government stock in default. The current round is not negotiations as such. Further talks will be needed after this first exploratory phase.

5. UK aid mission in June to discuss priorities for £75,000,000 British aid commitment.

6. Mr Parkinson, Trade Minister, to visit Zimbabwe later this month. Mr Norman, Zimbabwe Agriculture Minister, to visit London next month.

7. British technical assistance teams on public service, broadcasting and industrial training have submitted their reports. British adviser in Salisbury on establishment of Zimbabwe Foreign Service. Government machinery not functioning efficiently and policy decisions being avoided. Public service team ready to return to Salisbury in late April, but Zimbabweans not ready to receive them.

External

8. Pledge of good-neighbourliness with South Africa. Reasonable hope that South African economic assistance will continue. Mugabe said he will honour previous régime's debts.

9. Mugabe continues to rebuff Soviet Union, stalling on establishment of Soviet Embassy in Salisbury.

10. Lomé meeting in Nairobi to discuss Zimbabwean accession. Expected to apply for UN membership this summer.

11. Mugabe has welcomed foreign investment, but has asked that it should be Zimbabwe orientated, ie have a major Zimbabwean shareholder and profits reinvested. But there will be no government compulsion.

Zimbabwe Unit
9 May 1980

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SIR D MAITLAND
MR DAY
SIR L ALLISON
MR ZIMBABWE UNIT
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TO FLASH FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1472 BF 9 MAY 1980

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BYATT

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PS
PS/LPS
PS/Mr Luce
PS/PUS
Mr Day
Sir L. Allinson
HD. Zimbabwe Unit
HD. CAFD
HD. NENAD
PS/No. 10. Downing St. —

R. C.

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CO SALISBURY

GPS 170
CONFIDENTIAL
FM BELGRADE 081700Z MAY 80
TO FLASH FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 184 OF 08 MAY
AND IMMEDIATE TO SALISBURY

FOLLOWING FOR ZIMBABWE UNIT
TELECON MILLER/GRAY. MR. MUGABE'S VISIT.

1. MR MUGABE'S PRIVATE SECRETARY WILLIAMS, TELEPHONED CHANCERY JUST BEFORE PRIME MINISTER LEFT AT 1720 HRS WITH REQUEST TO PASS FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO NO 10.

2. MUGABE'S CHARTER FLIGHT (BRITISH CALEDONIAN) WILL ARRIVE GATWICK AT 1000 HRS FRIDAY, 9 MAY. WILLIAMS ASKED FOR ASSISTANCE WITH ONWARD TRANSPORT OF DELEGATION TO LONDON.

British ? Airways - Heathrow - 1115?

3. WILLIAMS SAID MUGABE HAD ARRANGED MEETING WITH LORD SOAMES FOR 1245 ON 9 MAY. HE ALSO KNEW THAT PRIME MINISTER WOULD BE TRAVELLING TO SCOTLAND THE SAME AFTERNOON. MR MUGABE THEREFORE REQUESTED A MEETING WITH HER AT NO 10 AT 1100 HRS.

Rlyne says

BOLLAND

MICHAEL *

Later FCO news - Mugabe definitely arriving at Heathrow at ~1000, apparently in the hope of seeing PM at, say, 1130 MJS

This is for you to sort out! No one here was sure whether there had been any contact in Belgrade between you and the Mugabe delegation, and there is much doubt in the FCO about Mugabe's exact schedule tomorrow morning.

NNNN

Derek Day will meet him at whichever airport he is actually coming to, so that we shall need to have cleared our lines by then, but the FCO are not expecting an answer immediately.

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GPS 170
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FM BELGRADE 081700Z MAY 80
TO FLASH FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 184 OF 08 MAY
AND IMMEDIATE TO SALISBURY

FOLLOWING FOR ZIMBABWE UNIT
TELECON MILLER/GRAY: MR. MUGABE'S VISIT.
1. MR MUGABE'S PRIVATE SECRETARY WILLIAMS, TELEPHONED CHANCERY JUST BEFORE PRIME MINISTER LEFT AT 1720 HRS WITH REQUEST TO PASS FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO NO 10.
2. MUGABE'S CHARTER FLIGHT (BRITISH CALEDONIAN) WILL ARRIVE GATWICK AT 1000 HRS FRIDAY, 9 MAY. WILLIAMS ASKED FOR ASSISTANCE WITH ONWARD TRANSPORT OF DELEGATION TO LONDON.
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BOLLAND

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST.]

FILES
ZIMBABWE UNIT
C AF D
ODA
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NEWS D
PS
PS/LPS
PS/MR LUCE
PS/MR MARTEN
PS/PUS
SIR D MAITLAND
MR DAY
SIR L ALLINSON

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