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Enlargement of the WEU

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DEFENCE

April 1988

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
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10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

2 January 1992

Dear Mr. President,

Thank you for your message of 9 December about Greek membership of the Western European Union. I believe that we can both take satisfaction from what was agreed on this at Maastricht.

As Douglas Hurd made clear to Andonis Samaras before the European Council, the United Kingdom neither is nor was opposed to Greek membership of the WEU. Our concern has been to ensure that the WEU develops in a way which enhances collective European security, and does not introduce distinctions between Allies, which could be divisive in NATO. We shall be working with our WEU partners for early agreement on arrangements for enlarging the membership of the WEU which will add to the effectiveness of the Alliance, and contribute to stability and security in the Aegean area.

I was touched by your reference to the many old and close links between our two countries. I share your sentiments.

*Yours Sincerely,
John Major*

His Excellency Mr. Constantine Karamanlis

SA



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CF again?

Foreign &
Commonwealth
Office

London SW1A 2AH


23 December 1991

Dear Stephen,

Letter from the Greek President

with JSW?
President Karamanlis of Greece wrote to the Prime Minister on 9 December asking the UK to lift her reserve on Greece's application to join the WEU.

I suggest the Prime Minister reply along the lines of the attached self-explanatory draft.

Yours ever,


(S L Gass)
Private Secretary

Stephen Wall Esq CMG LVO
10 Downing Street

Draft letter from the Prime Minister

TO: President Karamanlis
President of Greece

me

Thank you for your message of 9 December about Greek membership of the Western European Union. I believe that we can both take satisfaction from what was agreed on this at Maastricht.

As Douglas Hurd made clear to Andonis Samaras before the European Council, the United Kingdom neither is nor was opposed to Greek membership of the WEU. Our concern has been to ensure that the WEU develops in a way which enhances collective European security, and does not introduce distinctions between Allies, which could be divisive in NATO. We shall be working with our WEU partners for early agreement on arrangements for enlarging the membership of the WEU which will add to the effectiveness of the Alliance, and contribute to stability and security in the Aegean area.

I was touched by your reference to the many old and close links between our two countries. I share your sentiments.

PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC

Top Copy
PFA NSG, 022/5 LC30/10

2 of 2

fax to HNA Athens
Head of, PCO
N'Greenwood, PCO,

Athens, 9 December 1991

Mr Michael Ryder,
1/2 Sec Pol Dept.

Miss Clark

Athens telno 592 w PCO

Would you be happy
to take this on?

LC 12/12
x2967.

J
12 xii

Principally for
Sec Pol D. as
action dept.

Presumably we
shd reply.

Dear Mr. Prime Minister,

I know that at this historic moment for Europe your colleagues and yourself are dealing with many important issues in Maastricht.

I would like however to draw your attention to a problem of fundamental importance to Greece, that is her full membership in the Western European Union.

Our two countries are bound by very old and multiple links. We both believe in the same values, we have fought together in all the great wars and we are allies and partners.

In the name of these bonds I would like to ask you to withdraw your reservations on this matter. For, otherwise, the impression might be created that Greece is being made a captive of Turkey.

Yours sincerely,

KONSTANTINOS KARAMANLIS

His Excellency
The Rt Honourable
John Major,
Prime Minister
of the United Kingdom



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Foreign &
Commonwealth
Office

London SW1A 2AH

2 December

Dear Stephen,

WEU: Greek Membership

As you know, the Greeks are intensifying their campaign for membership of the Western European Union, and are publicly identifying the United Kingdom as the main obstacle to their membership. They are threatening to block agreement at Maastricht unless they get their way.

At the WEU Ministerial Meeting in Bonn on 18 November, it was agreed by all present, including Genscher and Dumas, that the time was not ripe for taking decisions on extending the membership of the WEU. Since then, however, Genscher, and probably others, have told the Greeks that they favour early Greek accession. Lubbers told the Prime Minister on 22 November that he was worried by the threat of a Greek veto, and was considering working for agreement at Maastricht that:

- (i) EC members who were also members of NATO should be eligible for WEU membership;
- (ii) satisfactory arrangements for non-EC NATO Allies should also be made; and
- (iii) there should be a provision - such as that issues arising between NATO Allies should not be discussed in the WEU - to prevent Greco-Turkish problems from spilling over into the WEU.

There is therefore a good chance that we shall be isolated at Maastricht in opposing Greek membership of the WEU. Despite this, the Foreign Secretary believes that we should stand firm in advocating equal treatment for both EC and non-EC Allies, using the

/formula

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formula in the Anglo-Italian Declaration ("a special relationship of association should be envisaged for other European partners and Allies"). We should try to dissuade the Presidency from making a pre-emptive concession that would reward Greek blackmail. For all the Greek bluster, it is unlikely that they would in the end block the Union Treaty over this. They lack the clout, and have much to gain from agreement. It is clear that the Turks would react badly to the Greeks stealing a march on them over WEU membership, especially if it were not accompanied by movement on the Fourth Financial Protocol. An over-hasty concession now could cause endless trouble in the future. It is not clear what we could buy at Maastricht by a concession made solely to the Greeks.

Nevertheless, the Foreign Secretary believes that it would be prudent to examine possible compromise formulae. There should be two pre-conditions for any such compromise:

- (a) first, it should be reached in the WEU, not the Twelve: only the WEU can decide on its future membership; and
- (b) second, movement on WEU membership should be clearly linked to unblocking of the Fourth Financial Protocol for Turkey.

We would therefore probably be talking about a passage in a WEU Declaration linked to some sort of undertaking given by Greece in the Twelve.

An opening position might be to suggest that the WEU should commit itself to agreeing principles covering enlargement in 1992. If this were not enough, then the next increment might be a commitment to take decisions in 1992 on the outstanding applications for WEU membership (from Greece and Turkey) at the same time, but without promises on the outcome.

If it were necessary to go beyond this, then we might pick up a proposal made by the Spanish (in a paper which they put to the WEU

/in June

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


in June this year) that all European Allies should be invited to take up a form of association with the WEU, which in the case of EC Member States would carry with it the perspective of eventual WEU membership. That would not exclude the possibility of WEU membership for non-EC Allies, but it would clearly tip the scales against them.

An alternative might be to concede Greek accession to the WEU in due course on the basis that Turkey would at the same time be granted a form of association which gave her the same rights in practice. The latter would involve a difficult negotiation over Article V of the Modified Brussels Treaty - the WEU mutual defence commitment - which would either have to be suspended for Greece in respect of conflict with Turkey, or extended to both full and associate members of the WEU with an exception for disputes between Greece and Turkey. Apart from the title, it is difficult to see what, if any, other differences there would be between Greek full membership and Turkish associate membership of the WEU. The Foreign Secretary believes that a great deal of further work needs to be done on the practicalities of this before it could be conceded.

Against that background, the Foreign Secretary recommends that we stick to our present position up to Maastricht. But the problem is not going to go away. The Prime Minister will need to have possible formulae in his pocket at Maastricht in case the argument develops into crisis. We shall continue to consider urgently possible ways forward on the lines suggested above.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence) and to Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).


(S L Gass)
Private Secretary

J S Wall Esq CMG LVO
10 Downing Street

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MANAGEMENT IN CONFIDENCE



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB
Telephone 071-21 82111/3

SECRETARY OF STATE

MO 13/4J

2nd December 1991

John Gass

WEU: GREEK MEMBERSHIP OF WEU

with JSW?

The Defence Secretary saw your letter to Stephen Wall of earlier today on Greek membership of the WEU. As foreshadowed in Athens telegram No. 583, Mr Varvitsiotis telephoned this afternoon. He said that Samaras would raise the question of the Chairmanship of the Military Committee on 4th December when he sees the Foreign Secretary.

The Defence Secretary repeated his earlier invitation for Mr Varvitsiotis to visit the UK and they tentatively agreed on late January or early February.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Stephen Wall (No. 10), Sir M Alexander (UKDEL NATO), and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

Simon Webb
Simon Webb

(S WEBB)
Private Secretary

Simon Gass Esq
PS/Foreign Secretary





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(I don't think we need die in a ditch or this at Maastricht. It's not a special UK interest)

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GREECE AND THE WEU

Difficult. What can we get in return? / 30.11

1. LEAVING BRUSSELS ON 27 NOVEMBER AFTER THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS' MEETING, MITSOTAKIS SPOKE TO THE PRESS ABOUT THE PROSPECTS FOR GREECE'S ENTRY INTO THE WEU. HE STATED THAT MR MAJOR WAS THE ONLY REMAINING EUROPEAN LEADER WHO HAD RESERVATIONS ABOUT GREECE'S PARTICIPATION. HE ALSO SAID THAT KOHL AND ANDROTTI HAD PROMISED HIM THAT THEY WOULD ASK THE UK TO LIFT ITS RESERVATIONS (INCLUDING AT THEIR BILATERAL MEETINGS WITH THE PRIME MINISTER). THIS DISTORTED VIEW OF THE BRITISH POSITION HAS ALSO APPEARED IN THE PRESS HERE. WE HAVE DONE OUR BEST TO COMBAT IT, IN TALKING TO SENIOR FIGURES IN THE MFA AND THE MEDIA. BUT IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO SPEAK FIRMLY AND CLEARLY ON 4 DECEMBER.

2. THE FT CORRESPONDENT HERE HAS JUST BEEN TOLD BY THE MFA, ON THE RECORD, THAT GREECE WILL MAKE HER MEMBERSHIP OF THE WEU A STICKING POINT AT MAASTRICHT. LOCAL PRESS INTEREST IN THIS ISSUE IS LIKELY TO INCREASE OVER THE NEXT 10 DAYS.

3. TELELETTER FOLLOWS ON SOME DETAILS OF THIS ISSUE.

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27 November 1991

18.00 hrs

WEU RESTRICTED

ROLE OF WEU AND ITS RELATIONS WITH THE UNION AND WITH THE
ATLANTIC ALLIANCE

This document has been drafted by the Special Working Group of WEU in accordance with the mandate from Ministers at their meeting in Bonn on 18 November.

The status of this document remains to be agreed. Some delegations consider that the part concerning the relations between WEU and the Political Union is also a matter for the Twelve in the context of the text of the Political Union Treaty whereas the two other parts are the responsibility of WEU. Other delegations consider that the document forms a whole and is the responsibility of the Nine member States of WEU.

Introduction

1. WEU member States agree on the need to develop a genuine European security and defence identity and a greater European responsibility on defence matters. This identity will be pursued through a gradual process involving successive phases. WEU will form an integral part of the process of European unification [leading to Union] and will enhance its contribution to solidarity with the Atlantic Alliance. WEU member States agree to strengthen the role of WEU, in the longer term perspective of a common defence policy [within Political Union] compatible with that of the Atlantic Alliance.

2. WEU will be developed as the defence component of the Union and as the means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. To this end, it will formulate [in whole or in part] common European defence policy and carry forward its concrete implementation through the further development of its operational role.

WEU's relations with Political Union

3. The objective is to build up WEU in stages as the defence component of the [Union.] OR [European integration process]. Accordingly WEU is prepared to create a clear [organic] link with the Union. WEU will [act in conformity with] OR [take as guidelines] OR [take account of] the decisions of the Political Union in the field of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. (x)

WEU is willing to take the following measures to develop a close working relationship with the Union:

- as appropriate, to synchronize the dates and venues of meetings and to harmonize working methods;

- to establish close cooperation between the Council and Secretariat-General of WEU on the one hand, and the Council of the Union and Secretariat-General of the Council on the other;

- to consider the harmonization of the sequence and duration of the two Presidencies;

(x) This paragraph should be read in conjunction with paragraph 4.

- WEU will ensure through appropriate modalities that the Commission is regularly [informed] OR [consulted] on WEU activities in accordance with the role of the Commission in the Common Foreign and Security Policy as defined in the Political Union Treaty;

- closer cooperation would be welcomed between the parliamentary Assembly of WEU and the European Parliament.

[The member States of the Community which also belong to the Alliance will be invited to become members of WEU; those which are not members of the Alliance will be offered observer status within WEU.]

OR

[A special relationship of association should be envisaged for other European partners and allies.]

Cross reference.

B. WEU's relations with the Atlantic Alliance

4. The objective is to develop WEU as a means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. Accordingly it is prepared to develop a [organic] link between WEU and the Alliance and to strengthen the role, responsibilities and contributions of WEU Member States in the Alliance. This will be undertaken on the basis of the necessary transparency and complementarity between the European security and defence identity as it emerges in the Twelve and WEU, and the Alliance. WEU will [act in conformity with] OR [take as guidelines] OR [take account of] the positions adopted by the Atlantic Alliance. (x)

- WEU member States will intensify their coordination on Alliance issues which represent an important common interest with the aim of introducing joint positions agreed in WEU into the process of consultation in the Alliance which will remain the essential forum for consultation among its members and the venue for agreement on policies bearing on the security and defence commitments of Allies under the Washington Treaty.

- Where necessary, dates and venues of meetings will be synchronized and working methods harmonized.

- Close cooperation will be established between the Secretariats-General of WEU and NATO.

(x) This paragraph should be read in conjunction with paragraph 3

- The European member States of the Alliance which are not at the same time members of the EC shall be associated in an appropriate manner to the work of WEU, in particular when their interests are affected.]

OR

[- A special relationship of association should be envisaged for other European partners or allies.]

C. Operational role of WEU

5. WEU's operational role will be strengthened by defining appropriate missions, structures and means covering in particular:

- WEU planning cell;
- closer military cooperation complementary to the Alliance in particular in the fields of logistics, transport, training and strategic surveillance;
- meetings of WEU Chiefs of Defence Staff.

Other proposals will be examined further , including:

- designation of military units answerable to WEU;
- enhanced cooperation in the field of armaments with the aim of creating a European armaments agency;
- development of the WEU Institute into a European Security and Defence Academy.

D. Other measures

6. As a consequence of the measures set out above, and in order to facilitate the strengthening of WEU's role, the seat of the WEU Council and Secretariat will be transferred to Brussels.

7. Representation on the WEU Council must be such that the Council is able to exercise its functions continuously in accordance with Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty. Member States may draw on a double-hatting formula, to be worked out, consisting of their representatives to the Alliance and to the EC.

8. The role of WEU and its relationship with the Union and the Alliance should be reviewed [in 1996] in the light of progress and experience [up to that date] and in the context of any review of the Political Union Treaty, without prejudice to the decisions to be taken.


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PRIME MINISTER

SIR GEOFFREY FINSBERG

Sir Geoffrey Finsberg has told the Foreign Office Overseas Visits Section that the President of the WEU is to call on you on Tuesday 16 July immediately after Questions in the House.

You are not answering Questions on that day because you are totally tied up with the Economic Summit. Sir Geoffrey Finsberg has said nothing of this to me or to Graham Bright. I propose to tell him that it is not possible, but to sugar the pill by saying that you are hoping to be able to visit the Council of Europe next February. Do you agree?



STEPHEN WALL

3 July 1991

c:\foreign\finsberg (ecl)



10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

26 June 1991

Dear Sir,

TELEPHONE CALL FROM MR. MITSOTAKIS

Thank you for your letter of 25 June about the telephone call from Mr. Mitsotakis which took place this morning.

Mr. Mitsotakis said that Greece's application to join the WEU was a question of vital importance for his Government. It was also a major internal political issue. Mr. Mitsotakis could not explain to his people why Greece, as a member of the European Community and NATO, could not join the WEU. The members of the EPP had agreed his application and the Dutch supported it.

The Prime Minister said that we had no difficulties in principle about the enlargement of the WEU though he could see some practical difficulties in trying to resolve the issue before the conclusion of the political union debate in the IGC and separately from other applications.

Mr. Mitsotakis said that there was a real sense of a lack of security in Greece. As a member of the Community, Greece believed she had a right to join. He hoped the Prime Minister could look into this issue in person. The Prime Minister said he would certainly examine the issue and consult colleagues about it. There were a number of membership applications. He understood that most people wanted to consider them when the EC debate was concluded. A lot depended on the decisions which we took about Europe's future defence role.

Mr. Mitsotakis said that Greece was the only EC member state which wanted to join the WEU now. Denmark and Ireland were not in that position.

The Greek Prime Minister did not ask the Prime Minister to receive the Greek Ambassador.

Perhaps you could let me know the outcome of tomorrow's WEU meeting so that the Prime Minister is forewarned when he sees Mr. Mitsotakis in Luxembourg on Friday.

J. S. Wall

(J.S. WALL)

Simon Gass, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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Foreign &
Commonwealth
Office

London SW1 2AH

25 June 1991

Dear Stephen,

Telephone call from Mr Mitsotakis

Mr Mitsotakis has said that he would like to telephone the Prime Minister tomorrow (26 June at 0930). It is likely that he will wish to raise Greece's candidature for the Western European Union. Of the three non-members amongst the Twelve (the others being Denmark and Ireland), Greece is the most enthusiastic.

The question of WEU membership is one of the most difficult areas in the European defence debate. Those partners who see the EC eventually taking over the WEU want to limit WEU membership only to members of the Union. Those (primarily the UK and the Netherlands) who do not accept the concept of a defence role for the Union, believe that the WEU should have close relations with all European members of NATO including, crucially, Turkey as well as Greece.

The 21 June meeting in Luxembourg of Christian Democrat leaders (Kohl, Andreotti, Lubbers, Martens, Santer and Mitsotakis) decided, according to the Greeks, to support Greece's candidature. There is some doubt that this represents the true picture. Both the Dutch and German Foreign Ministries have told us that there was no discussion of the subject at the EPP meeting after Mitsotakis had put the Greek case. The first version of the communique issued after the meeting made no reference to Greece and the WEU; but subsequent versions contained an additional tirect expressing the solidarity of the other five with Greece. The Greeks may be making more of it than the occasion warranted.

The Greek Ambassador called this afternoon on Jeremy Greenstock (having failed to secure an appointment with the Foreign Secretary) to carry out instructions from Athens to seek British support for Greece's candidature, which might now come on to the agenda at the WEU Ministerial on 27 June. The Ambassador said that the Greek Government would not understand if it was prevented from joining the WEU at an early date, as a member both of NATO and the EC. Greenstock explained that we had no worries about having Greece as an

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
eventual partner in the WEU, but that the UK wished to see what emerged from the Political Union IGC on the European security identity before any decisions were taken to expand the membership of the WEU. The Ambassador tried to argue that this was irrelevant: there was no need to delay the membership of Greece and Denmark: the candidature of other European allies, non-members of the EC (ie Turkey), could be considered later.

If Mr Mitsotakis raises the issue in similar terms tomorrow, the Prime Minister may wish to avoid making explicit the point about Turkish membership but:

- assure him that we have no qualms in principle about enlargement of the WEU
- make clear that the issue of membership is part of a wider set of questions on the relationship between the various organisations concerned with European defence
- and explain that there are a number of membership applications on the table and that it will be necessary to consider the whole question once this year's institutional debate is settled.

Sir David Miers has simultaneously reported on a conversation he has had with Mr Mitsotakis on the same subject. I enclose Athens telegram no 329.

If Mr Mitsotakis presses for the Prime Minister to receive the Greek Ambassador, the Prime Minister may wish to say, as we discussed, that Mr Hogg (who will be representing the UK at the WEU Ministerial on Thursday) will be glad to receive the Greek Ambassador on 26 June.


(S. L. Gass)
Private Secretary

Stephen Wall Esq CMG LVO
10 Downing Street

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PM/88/052

PRIME MINISTERWEU Enlargement

1. Your Private Secretary's letter of 7 October recorded your agreement that we should aim at the November WEU Ministerial meeting to invite Spain and Portugal to accede to the organisation, provided the commitments which the two countries had given in the course of negotiations were embodied in a satisfactory set of agreed conclusions.
2. Agreement has now been reached on texts recording the outcome of the negotiations with both countries. In the case of Spain, the substance of all the commitments outlined in paragraph 4 of my minute to you of 6 October is included. Spain and Portugal have agreed that the contents of the texts can be used in public.
3. Meanwhile it has become clear that none of the major NATO Allies have problems with the Spain/NATO guidelines, to which George Younger rightly attaches importance. Portugal and Greece have some minor quibbles, but these are expected to be ironed very soon.
4. The necessary preparations have therefore been set in hand for a Protocol of Accession to be signed in London on 14 November. This will be a major achievement for our WEU Presidency.

/5.

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5. I am copying this minute to George Younger and to Sir Robin Butler.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be 'G. Howe', written in a cursive style.

(GEOFFREY HOWE)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
28 October 1988

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Defence - Enlargement of
W&A April 88





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CD?
12/K.PRIME MINISTERWEU ENLARGEMENT

Hef

1. I have seen the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's minute to you of 6th October and Mr Powell's letter of 7th October recording your views.
2. Given recent progress in discussions with the Spanish, I agree that it is now possible to envisage inviting Portugal and Spain to join the WEU at the November Ministerial. In this context I attach particular importance to ensuring that we tie down the Spanish commitment and make completely sure that the Spain/NATO guidelines will be approved by both the Military Committee and the North Atlantic Council.
3. I am copying this minute to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and to Sir Robin Butler

LONDON G.Y.

Ministry of Defence

10 October 1988



DEFENCE = Enlargement
of wall: April 88

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LONDON



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be: PC

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

7 October 1988

From the Private Secretary

WEU ENLARGEMENT

The Prime Minister has seen the Foreign Secretary's minute of 6 October about the negotiations for Spain's accession to WEU. She agrees that the commitments given by Spain are in general satisfactory and that we should aim to reach agreement at the November WEU Ministerial meeting on inviting both Spain and Portugal to join WEU, provided these commitments are embodied in a satisfactory set of agreed conclusions.

I am copying this letter to Brian Hawtin (Ministry of Defence) and Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

Charles Powell

Lyn Parker, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.



①
cc/PC

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2. Minute

PM/88/049

PRIME MINISTER

Yes - very good mb-

Agree that we should seek to conclude the negotiations for Spanish membership in November, on the conditions accepted? proposed?

WEU Enlargement

*CBV
b/lk.*

and to tie up ERM?

1. On 8 April I minuted you proposing that Spain and Portugal be invited to open discussions with WEU on possible accession. I foresaw no difficulties in the case of Portugal. In the Spanish case, I proposed that we should use the lever of WEU accession both to tie up Spain's proposed contribution to NATO, and to explore the chances of achieving one or both of a nuclear commitment and a commitment to defence at partners' borders, either of which would need to be subject to coordination agreements with NATO.

2. Following agreement to issue an invitation to the two countries to open discussions at the Spring WEU Ministerial meeting, several rounds of talks have taken place with both and I am now in a position to propose a way ahead. As you said during your press conference in Madrid, our aim is to do our very best to see that Spain's application, which we support, is agreed; and it would be nice if it could be agreed fairly soon.

/3.

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3. The negotiations with Portugal have, as expected, gone very smoothly. No difficulties have emerged and I need not trouble you with the detail.

4. Spain has given a number of important commitments:

(a) It has confirmed that it shares the common European perception of the threat and that the Alliance must remain the fundamental instrument of Western Europe's collective defence;

(b) On the question of defence at partners' borders, it has confirmed that it is establishing a Rapid Deployment Force and that there will be no legal restrictions on its use outside Spanish territory. We expect it to confirm that it is prepared to engage in appropriate planning to this end.

(c) Spain's present defence expenditure (2.1% of GDP) is low. But it has confirmed that it is increasing it and will continue to do so to a level closer to that of its principal European Allies, in order to meet its obligations towards the common European defence. In financial terms, the defence budget has increased by 6% in real terms in 1987 and will rise by a further 5% in real terms in 1988. Over the past ten years it has increased by

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an average of 4.32% per annum in real terms. Spain intends to continue to restructure its armed forces to make them smaller but more efficient and better equipped. It is also prepared, apart from offering training facilities to its Allies, to consider assisting the rapid reinforcement of US forces in Europe.

(d) On Out of Area issues, Spain sees the WEU as a valuable forum for consultation and, where appropriate, cooperation.

(e) On the question of nuclear forces, Spain has recalled that it is a member of NATO's Nuclear Planning Group and has subscribed unreservedly to all Alliance communiqués since the 1986 referendum. This has included the General Political Guidelines on the use of nuclear weapons agreed at Gleneagles in October 1986. It has stated that it is not and has no intention of becoming a footnote country; and that the Spanish Government does not ask questions about the nuclear capabilities of ships and aircraft visiting Spanish ports or airfields. It has however shown no sign of movement on the Spanish policy which prohibits the deployment of nuclear forces on Spanish territory. Spanish officials have told us frankly in private that there is no prospect of the Spanish Government reopening this question with the Cortes in the

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abstract in the foreseeable future; but that their Government would, in a crisis, have to decide whether to relax their policy, with or without the agreement of the Cortes. Meanwhile, as we suspected, there is no prospect of our obtaining a Spanish nuclear commitment from the WEU discussions.

5. Two recent developments make it likely that the Spain/NATO Guidelines will be agreed with less difficulty than had earlier seemed possible. With signature in New York in 28 September of a new US/Spain Bases Agreement, US objections to adoption of the Guidelines are likely to fall away. The only other NATO member which had difficulties with them was Portugal, but those difficulties appear to have been largely resolved in a bilateral Spanish/Portuguese meeting in mid-September. It is thus probable that NATO's Military Committee will approve a revised version in the next few weeks and that formal endorsement will be given by the North Atlantic Council in early December.

6. In these circumstances, I believe that we may be able to envisage inviting Spain and Portugal to join WEU, through the medium of Protocols subject to ratification in all nine countries, at the November WEU Ministerial meeting. This would be subject to two provisos: tying down the commitments set out in paragraph 3 above in a

/set

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set of agreed conclusions (which would be made public to Parliaments); and being sure of no further difficulties with the Spain/NATO Guidelines.

7. Holding out the prospect of an invitation in November would increase our chances of securing Spanish agreement to a satisfactory set of conclusions. Tying up the substance of the negotiations in November would be a major achievement for our WEU Presidency. The prospect of it would also be welcome in the context of the State Visit to Spain next month.

8. I am copying this minute to George Younger and to Robin Butler.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be 'G. Howe', written in a cursive style.


(GEOFFREY HOWE)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

6 October 1988

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DEF: WEU Apr '88.



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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

19 April 1988

John Charles

WEU Ministerial, 18/19 April: Enlargement

/ The WEU Ministerial in The Hague has agreed the text of a public invitation to Portugal and Spain to open discussions with a view to their possible accession to the organisation. I enclose a copy of The Hague telno 161 reporting this.

/ It is possible that this could come up at the Prime Minister's question time this afternoon. I enclose a line to take.

John Charles

R N Culshaw

(R N Culshaw)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

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106104
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FM THE HAGUE
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 161
OF 181810Z APRIL 88
AND TO IMMEDIATE BONN, BRUSSELS, LISBON, LUXEMBOURG, MADRID
AND TO IMMEDIATE ROME, PARIS, UKDEL NATO AND WASHINGTON

WEU MINISTERIAL, 18/19 APRIL: ENLARGEMENT

SUMMARY

1. SPAIN AND PORTUGAL WILL BE INVITED TO OPEN DISCUSSIONS ON JOINING THE WEU ON THE BASIS OF THE TEXTS OF THE INTERNAL NEGOTIATING MANDATE AND THE PUBLIC INVITATION ALREADY AGREED AT OFFICIAL LEVEL.

DETAIL

2. THE TEXT OF THE INTERNAL NEGOTIATING MANDATE WAS CONTAINED IN FCO TELNO 72 OF 12 APRIL TO THE HAGUE:
THE TEXT OF THE PUBLIC INVITATION IS AS FOLLOWS:-

THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF WEU HAS TAKEN NOTE OF THE FACT THAT PORTUGAL AND SPAIN, WHICH ARE FULLY COMMITTED TO THE PROCESS OF EUROPEAN CONSTRUCTION AND ARE MEMBERS OF THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE HAVE FORMALLY STATED THAT THEY ARE PREPARED TO ACCEDE TO THE MODIFIED BRUSSELS TREATY AND ACCEPT UNRESERVEDLY AND IN THEIR ENTIRETY THE ROME DECLARATION OF 27 OCTOBER 1984 AND THE PLATFORM ADOPTED IN THE HAGUE ON 27 OCTOBER 1987 AND THAT THEY ARE PREPARED TO PARTICIPATE FULLY IN THEIR IMPLEMENTATION.

CONSEQUENTLY, THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF WEU HAS DECIDED TO INVITE, IN CONFORMITY WITH ARTICLE XI OF THE MODIFIED BRUSSELS TREATY, PORTUGAL AND SPAIN TO OPEN THE APPROPRIATE DISCUSSIONS WITH A VIEW TO THEIR POSSIBLE ACCESSION.

3. THERE WAS ONLY A BRIEF DISCUSSION. THE SECRETARY OF STATE STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF EXAMINING EXACTLY HOW SPAIN AND PORTUGAL WOULD MEET THE CRITERIA FOR ENTRY ON ISSUES SUCH AS DEFENCE AT THE BORDERS AND NUCLEAR ISSUES. THE DUTCH PRESIDENCY (VAN DEN BROEK) SUGGESTED THAT THERE SHOULD BE A PUBLIC LINE IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS ABOUT OTHER POSSIBLE APPLICANTS FOR MEMBERSHIP. IT SHOULD NOT ONLY INCLUDE A COMMITMENT TO THE MODIFIED BRUSSELS TREATY AND THE PLATFORM BUT ALSO TO THE PROCESS OF

EUROPEAN CONSTRUCTION. MR YOUNGER SUPPORTED BY ITALY (ANDREOTTI) AND FRANCE (RAIMOND) SAID THAT IT WOULD BE PREMATURE TO GO INTO SUCH DETAIL AT THIS STAGE. THE PRESIDENCY (VAN DEN BROEK), THEREFORE, SAID THAT IN RESPONSE TO ANY QUESTIONS HE WOULD SIMPLY INDICATE THAT THE ISSUE OF FURTHER INVITATIONS HAD NOT BEEN DISCUSSED.

JENKINS

YYYY

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WEU MINISTERIAL, THE HAGUE, 18/19 APRIL

Enlargement

- Ministers decided to invite Portugal and Spain to open discussions with a view to their possible accession.
- [invitation to join?] Invitation to discuss conditions for possible accession. Agreed at last Ministerial in The Hague in October 1987 that candidates should:

accept the WEU Treaty;

accept the WEU Platform on European security principles and express their readiness to give concrete expression to its obligations;

settle outstanding problems on defence issues within NATO.

- [invitation to others] Question of further invitations not discussed.

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cpc

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

11 April 1988

WEU ENLARGEMENT

The Prime Minister has considered the Foreign Secretary's minute of 8 April about the approach which he and the Defence Secretary propose to take on the issue of enlargement at the WEU Ministerial meeting. She makes the point that, while it may be necessary to handle the Spanish and Portuguese applications together initially, we should not commit ourselves to a procedure which makes it impossible to prise them apart later. There are circumstances in which we may wish to invite Portugal to join without Spain and we must not foreclose this possibility. The Prime Minister has also commented that we must not forget Turkey's wish to join: as a country fully integrated into NATO's military structure, her claim to do so is arguably stronger than Spain's.

I am copying this letter to Brian Hawtin (Ministry of Defence).

CHARLES POWELL

Lyn Parker, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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ls



PM/88/015

Prime Minister

cc/c

This does not look very sensible to me. Once we see the Spanish & Portuguese applications together we shall never persuade others to prise them apart.

PRIME MINISTER

Turkey who wants to join - and her main reason to do so. Then Spain

COP
E/L.

WEU Enlargement

1. Enlargement will be one of the principal agenda items at the WEU Ministerial meeting which George Younger and I will both attend on 18-19 April. I have discussed with him the handling of the issue. The following is how we intend to proceed.

2. When you saw the Portuguese Prime Minister on 11 March, you told him that you hoped that Portugal could join the WEU during our Presidency beginning in July. Portugal was the first country to ask to join WEU, (in 1984), and is well qualified. But there is little prospect of persuading other WEU members that Portugal's application should be processed separately from that of Spain; and we would need to consider the potential damage to our interests vis á vis Spain if we were to argue in isolation such a case. For practical purposes therefore we must accept that Spain and Portugal will be handled together, at least initially.

3. At their last meeting in The Hague in October 1987, WEU Ministers agreed that WEU need not remain a closed shop; but set strict conditions for entry which any candidate must meet:

- acceptance of the obligations deriving from the Brussels Treaty and the WEU Platform;
- readiness to give concrete expression to those obligations;
- settlement of any outstanding issues with NATO.



We agreed that, with these provisos, there should be a préjugé favorable for accession by Portugal and Spain. Since then, all of our partners have expressed a readiness to issue invitations to both countries to open discussions about their possible accession.

4. The inclusion of Spain would mean the addition of a member whose approach to security issues is markedly less robust and clear-cut than that of the other members; this, together with Portuguese membership, will reduce the political coherence and homogeneity of the WEU. Nonetheless we do not believe that there is any realistic prospect of postponing the opening of discussions with the two countries; and we accept that a decision in this sense will have to be taken at our forthcoming meeting.

5. Our aim however will be to ensure that the discussions are conducted on a basis that makes clear that membership of the WEU is not a soft, or automatic, option. In particular we should aim to use the prize of WEU accession to ensure that the Spanish contribution to collective defence in the NATO context is as positive and concrete as possible by insisting on strict prior application of the conditions laid down at The Hague.

6. We propose therefore to agree, at the meeting this month, to invite Spain and Portugal (separately) to discuss with WEU how each would propose to meet the obligations in the Brussels Treaty and the Platform, but without any commitment to a subsequent invitation to join.

7. In the case of Portugal there would be little problem. Portugal's current NATO tasks, including a Brigade to reinforce Italy, offer a satisfactory expression of its commitment to the common defence of other WEU partners at their borders. And the Portuguese Government subscribes unequivocally to nuclear deterrence.



8. The position of Spain is less clear-cut. Its offers to NATO, primarily in the maritime and air defence fields, are currently under discussion; guidelines for them should be agreed in May/June, with the detailed agreements taking perhaps a year or more afterwards to finalise. But they contain no commitment to a nuclear task, and no contribution to defence at partners' borders, both of which are key elements in the WEU Platform. NATO discussions are unlikely to elicit a Spanish contribution in either area. In our view, we should use the lever of WEU accession both to tie up the existing offer to NATO, and to explore the chances of achieving one or both of these additional commitments, which would of course also need to be subject to coordination agreements with NATO. A contribution to the Franco/German Brigade would not be an acceptable substitute.

9. If you agree with this approach we will examine in detail what we might ask for under both headings, taking particular account of the need not to impair the existing NATO command structure or the prospective arrangements for the coordination of Spanish forces with NATO. One possibility for a forward defence commitment might be agreement for Spain's Rapid Deployment Force (once it is established) to exercise with NATO forces in the Central or Southern Region. We might also seek an appropriate Naval contribution.

10. We will be writing to you in due course about the other objectives for our Presidency.

ff (GEOFFREY HOWE)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

8 April 1988

Approved by the foreign
secretary and signed in
his absence abroad.

84111
D.C. W. 1118



Grey Scale #13



A 1 2 3 4 5 6 **M** 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 **B** 17 18 19

