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FILE TITLE: <i>Attack on a Korean</i>		SERIES <i>DISASTERS</i>
<i>Airlines Boeing 747 by a</i>		
<i>Soviet fighter plane</i>		PART:
PART BEGINS: <i>1. SEPTEMBER 83</i>	PART ENDS: <i>November 1983</i>	CAB ONE: 

PREM 19/3655

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**PART**

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

**Cabinet / Cabinet Committee Documents**

Reference	Date
JIC(83)(IA) 17	02/09/1983
CC(83) 27 <sup>th</sup> Meeting, item 1	15/09/1983
CC(83) 28 <sup>th</sup> Meeting, item 1	22/09/1983

The documents listed above, which were enclosed on this file, have been removed and destroyed. Such documents are the responsibility of the Cabinet Office. When released they are available in the appropriate CAB (CABINET OFFICE) CLASSES

Signed J. Gray Date 7/12/2017  
**PREM Records Team**

# A The National Archives

DEPARTMENT/SERIES	Date and sign
PREM 19	
PIECE/ITEM ..... (one piece/item number)	
3655	
Extract details:	
Armstrong to Coles Dates: 1/11/1983	
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Use black or blue pen to complete form.

Use the card for one piece or for each extract removed from a different place within a piece.

Enter the department and series,  
eg. HO 405, J 82.

Enter the piece and item references, .  
eg. 28, 1079, 84/1, 107/3

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FROM UNITED KINGDOM MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS NEW YORK TO  
FCO TELNO 50 SAVING OF 21 OCTOBER 1983

AND REPEATED FOR INFO SAVING : SEOUL, TOKYO, WASHINGTON, OTTAWA,  
MONTREAL (FOR ICAO REP), CANBERRA, WELLINGTON, BONN, PARIS,  
THE HAGUE, UKDEL NATO

UNGA 38 : GENERAL DEBATE : KOREAN AIRLINER

1. At the meeting of Korean airliner "like-minded" on 22 September (my telno 863) it was agreed that efforts should be made to maximise the number of references to the incident in the General Debate. The shooting down of the airliner figured quite frequently, being mentioned in all by 75 out of the 149 countries which spoke. The large majority of these either unequivocally condemned the Soviet Union's role in the affair or, while placing the blame with the Soviet Union, regarded the incident to some extent as a consequence of international tension and bloc confrontation. A large number (about one third) of the total, and almost all non-aligned preferred not to ascribe blame at all, but spoke of "cold war politics" or "brinkmanship" on the part of both superpowers, or simply expressed sympathy with the relatives of the victims. Nine speakers, from the Warsaw Pact or dedicated followers of the Soviet Union, regarded the incident as an instance of US provocation or espionage, and the Soviet response as a justified reaction to an infringement of sovereignty.

2. Sadly, the proportion of non-aligned speakers who did not mention the subject is rather higher than the overall figure. Out of 92 who spoke, only 35 referred to the incident. Of these, only 10 (Bahamas, Belize, Central African Republic, Liberia, Malaysia, Mauritius, Singapore, Togo, Venezuela and Zaire) firmly condemned the Soviet Union, while three (Cuba, Laos and Vietnam) spoke, as throughout their speeches, against

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the US. The rest to some degree equivocated, either deploring the atmosphere of confrontation which led to such incidents as this or, like Vanuatu and others, believing it to be of chief importance that this "regrettable incident" should not be allowed to further sour international relations.

3. Almost all the Western European and NATO speakers forcefully attacked the Soviet Union's behaviour. Only Denmark, Turkey and Malta were less than enthusiastic in their condemnation: Denmark referred only to "innocent passengers, victims of the excessive assertion of security interests" while Turkey spoke of "the loss of innocent lives in a very regrettable incident" without making any mention of responsibility. Malta's dominant concern was to ensure there was no repetition of the incident. Of the WEOG nations only Finland did not mention the airliner.

4. A large number of speakers, including most of the Western Europeans, called for new procedures to be developed to deal with the infringement of territorial airspace, in order to prevent any recurrence of such incidents. Cuba, on the other hand, were alone in calling for codes of conduct forbidding the employment of civil aircraft in espionage activities.

5. Few mentioned Gromyko's absence from the GA. Ireland regretted that he was not present. Poland, Czechoslovakia and GDR attacked the US refusal to make arrangements for Gromyko's arrival in New York, although GDR did not specifically mention the Korean airliner. Libya made a similar statement, suggesting that such actions on the part of the US

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might make it necessary to remove the UN headquarters from New York. The Libyans also undertook, in another context, to shoot at any aircraft violating their territorial airspace.

6. Canada praised South Korea's responsible conduct following the loss of the aircraft, in the context of support for membership of the UN for the Republic of Korea.

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**THE PRIVATE SECRETARY**

**FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE  
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PP SANTO DOMINGO

GRS 150

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FM FCO 121245Z OCTOBER 83

TO PRIORITY SANTO DOMINGO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 43 OF 12 OCTOBER

KOREAN AIRLINER

1. THE PRIME MINISTER HAS RECEIVED FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE OF THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE BEGINS

SEÑOR PRESIDENTE DE LA ASAMBLEA NACIONAL,  
SENADO DE LA REPUBLICA DOMINICANA CONDENA ATAQUE NAVE COMERCIAL LINEA AEREA COREA DEL SUR COMETIDO POR NAVES DE GUERRA SOVIETICAS SENADA DOMINICANO LAMENTA PERDIDAS DE VIDAS Y EXPRESA CONDOLENCIAS PARTICULARMENTE PAISES TENIAN CIUDADANOS A BORDO. DESEAMOS HUMANIDAD VIVA EN PAZ.

LIC. JACOBO MAJLUTA A. PRESIDENTE DEL SENADO DE LA REPUBLICA DOMINICANA. ENDS.

2. GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD ARRANGE FOR A SUITABLE REPLY TO BE SENT. YOU HAVE DISCRETION ON HOW YOU DELIVER REPLY BUT IT MIGHT OFFER A USEFUL OCCASION FOR YOU TO CALL ON THE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE.

3. PLEASE REPORT ACTION THAT YOU TAKE.

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FM FCO 041500Z OCT 83  
TO IMMEDIATE MOSCOW  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 804 OF 4 OCTOBER 1983  
AND TO PRIORITY NATO POSTS, SEOUL, TOKYO, CANBERRA, WELLINGTON  
BERNE, HELSINKI  
RFI UKMIS NEW YORK, STOCKHOLM, DUBLIN, HONG KONG  
YOUR TELNO 1111 : MOSCOW LONDON AIR SERVICES

1. AEROFLOT FLIGHT SU 241 LANDED LAST NIGHT AT HEATHROW. THIS WAS INSPITE OF WARNINGS FROM BRITISH AIRWAYS THAT BECAUSE OF INDUSTRIAL ACTION BY THEIR GROUND STAFF AT HEATHROW THEY WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO HANDLE AEROFLOT SCHEDULED SERVICES FOR THE PRESENT SEMI COLON AND ALSO A WRITTEN WARNING FROM THE BRITISH AIRPORTS AUTHORITY TO AEROFLOT THAT THEY SHOULD NOT OPERATE INTO HEATHROW WITHOUT FIRST ARRANGING A HANDLING AGENT. AFTER SOME DIFFICULTY THE PASSENGERS WERE ALLOWED OFF BUT THE AIRCRAFT CANNOT NOW DEPART BECAUSE THE TGWU WORKERS AT THE AIRPORT WILL NOT SERVICE IT.
2. BRITISH AIRWAYS ARE TRYING TO PERSUADE THEIR GROUND STAFF TO HANDLE THIS FLIGHT ON A QUOTE ONE OFF BASIS UNQUOTE BUT WE DO NOT YET KNOW IF THEY WILL BE SUCCESSFUL. A SECOND SECRETARY FROM THE SOVIET EMBASSY WAS AT HEATHROW LAST NIGHT AND TOGETHER WITH AEROFLOT REPRESENTATIVES ACCUSED BRITISH AIRWAYS OF COMPLICITY WITH THE TGWU IN THE ACTION. WE THEREFORE EXPECT THE RUSSIANS TO PROTEST HERE AND IN MOSCOW.
3. OUR LINE WITH THE RUSSIANS WILL BE THAT THE PROBLEM HAS ARISEN ALMOST ENTIRELY BECAUSE AEROFLOT DISREGARDED THE CLEAR WARNINGS GIVEN BY BA AND THE BAA. BA IS AN INDEPENDENT BODY, RESPONSIBLE FOR LABOUR RELATIONS WITHIN ITS OWN ORGANISATION. WE ARE NOT ABLE TO GIVE THEM DIRECTIVES IN SUCH MATTERS, AND INDEED WERE WE TO TRY TO DO SO THE EFFECT WOULD BE TO EXACERBATE

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THE SITUATION. WE UNDERSTAND THAT BA ARE WORKING TO RESOLVE THE PROBLEM AT HEATHROW, AND AEROFLOT SHOULD REMAIN IN CLOSE CONTACT WITH THEM. THEREAFTER IT WOULD BE HIGHLY DESIRABLE THAT AEROFLOT SHOULD NOT OPERATE FURTHER SERVICES INTO HEATHROW UNTIL THEY HAVE AN ASSURANCE THAT GROUND STAFF WILL HANDLE THESE SERVICES. (THEY HAVE IN FACT CANCELLED THE SERVICE DUE IN TOMORROW).

4. FOR YOUR OWN INFORMATION WE DO NOT CONSIDER THAT WE ARE IN BREACH OF THE AIR SERVICE AGREEMENT. ARTICLE 13 COMMITS THE 'AERONAUTICAL AUTHORITIES' TO COOPERATE ' IN ALL MATTERS NECESSARY TO ENSURE THE SAFE AND EFFICIENT OPERATION OF THE AGREED SERVICES' AND TO 'CONSULT TOGETHER IN THE EVENT OF ANY DIFFICULTY ARISING IN THEIR OPERATION'.

5. YOU SHOULD ALSO BE AWARE THAT ALTHOUGH BA'S AIR CREW ARE NOW WILLING TO FLY TO MOSCOW THEIR CABIN STAFF WHO ARE MEMBERS OF THE TGWU MAY REFUSE TO FLY ON FLIGHTS TO MOSCOW. SERVICES TO MOSCOW MAY NOT THEREFORE START ON 6 OCTOBER.

HOWE

KOREAN AIRLINE<sup>R</sup>

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*From the Private Secretary*

4 October 1983

KOREAN AIRLINER

I enclose a message which the Prime Minister has received from the President of the Senate of the Dominican Republic.

I should be grateful if you could arrange for a suitable reply to be sent.

*AJC*

Roger Bone, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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*From the Private Secretary*

cc DEFENCE: future UK  
Defence Policy Oct '79

MR. HATFIELD  
CABINET OFFICE

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During the Prime Minister's visit to Canada last week she had some discussion with Mr. Trudeau of the Korean airliner incident. At one point, Mr. Trudeau said that he would not expect to be consulted if a hostile aircraft penetrated Canadian air space and the military judged it necessary to shoot it down. The Prime Minister took the view that our own procedures would require Ministers to be consulted before such action was taken.

BT  
I should be most grateful if you could arrange for me to receive a note of the procedures that would apply in such an event.

A. J. COLES

3 October 1983

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Note for file:

s/s Transport to PM  
of 27.9.83 - <sup>dictated version</sup> <sup>attached</sup> was  
dictated to the PM's  
party in Edmonton.  
The reply was: no  
objections to these  
proposals by the PM.

I relayed this  
message to Dept. Transport  
at 09.00 hrs. 28.9.83.

Susan Crappell.  
Duty Clerk  
28.9.83.

Prime Minister has no objections  
relayed to No 10  
28.9.85

PRIME MINISTER FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR TRANSPORT

ACTION AGAINST AEROFLOT

YOU WILL REMEMBER THAT AT LAST WEEK'S CABINET WE AGREED THAT THE GOVERNMENT BAN ON AEROFLOT FLIGHTS SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO EXPIRE ON 28 SEPTEMBER, ALTHOUGH INDUSTRIAL ACTION BY THE BRITISH AIRLINER PILOTS' ASSOCIATION AND THE TRANSPORT AND GENERAL WORKERS' UNION MIGHT DELAY THE RESUMPTION OF SCHEDULED SERVICES BY BA AND BY AEROFLOT RESPECTIVELY FOR A FEW MORE DAYS.

YOU AND THE COLLEAGUES PRIMARILY CONCERNED MAY LIKE TO KNOW OF SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS AND OF THE WAY I PROPOSE TO PROCEED.

THE TGWU STAFF AT HEATHROW HAVE DECIDED NOT TO HANDLE AEROFLOT FLIGHTS AT HEATHROW UNTIL 3 NOVEMBER. BRITISH AIRWAYS HAVE THEREFORE TOLD AEROFLOT THAT THEY WILL BE UNABLE TO HANDLE THE SERVICES FOR THE PRESENT. BA DO NOT BELIEVE THAT AEROFLOT WILL BE ABLE TO FIND ANYBODY ELSE WILLING TO HANDLE THE FLIGHTS AND EXPECT THEREFORE THAT AEROFLOT WILL BE UNABLE TO RESUME ITS SCHEDULED SERVICES FOR THE PRESENT. BA EXPECT TO BE ABLE TO RESUME THEIR SERVICES WHEN THE PILOTS CEASE THEIR INDUSTRIAL ACTION ON 7 OCTOBER.

BA SEE NO OBJECTION TO AEROFLOT BEING ABLE TO RESUME THEIR CHARTER SERVICES TO AND FROM GATWICK (WHERE THE TGWU STAFF ARE NOT APPARENTLY TAKING INDUSTRIAL ACTION) ON 29 SEPTEMBER. THE PASSENGERS ON THESE FLIGHTS ARE ENTIRELY BRITISH HOLIDAYMAKERS AND THERE IS LITTLE RISK OF DIVERSION FROM SCHEDULED SERVICES.

I PROPOSE THEREFORE TO TAKE NO ACTION TO EXTEND OUR BAN ON THE UK SOVIET AIR SERVICES BEYOND 28 SEPTEMBER. IN ORDER THAT THE CHARTER FLIGHT TO GATWICK MAY OPERATE ON 29 SEPTEMBER MY OFFICIALS WILL NEED TO APPROVE PRECISE DETAILS WHICH HAVE ALREADY BEEN FILED BY AEROFLOT. I PROPOSE THAT THEY SHOULD DO THIS AT 12 NOON TOMORROW GMT TIME SINCE I AM ADVISED THAT ANY FURTHER DELAY IN APPROVING THE FILING MIGHT MAKE IT IMPRACTICABLE FOR THE FLIGHTS TO OPERATE AND THEREFORE UNNECESSARILY INCONVENIENCE RETURNING HOLIDAYMAKERS WHO HAVE ALREADY SUFFERED A DIFFICULT JOURNEY TO MOSCOW AT THE BEGINNING OF THEIR HOLIDAY AS A RESULT OF THE BAN. AEROFLOT HAVE ALSO SOUGHT MY APPROVAL FOR THEIR NORMAL WINTER PROGRAMME OF CHARTER FLIGHTS. I PROPOSE IN THE MIDDLE OF NEXT WEEK TO APPROVE THE PROGRAMME.



PP BONN  
GRS 237  
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FM FCO 281400Z SEPT 83  
TO IMMEDIATE MOSCOW  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 771 OF 28 SEPTEMBER  
AND TO PRIORITY EC AND NATO POSTS. SEOUL, TOKYO, HELSINKI, H. KONG  
CANBERRA, WELLINGTON  
YOUR TEL 1085 (NOT TO ALL POSTS) - KAL: SUSPENSION OF FLIGHTS.

1. WE SHALL BE SENDING YOU INSTRUCTIONS ON SEMEONOV'S ORAL STATEMENT IN DUE COURSE.
2. WE CONFIRM THAT HMG'S SUSPENSION OF AIR SERVICES BETWEEN THE UK AND THE USSR AND OF AEROFLOT FLIGHTS IN OUR AIRSPACE WILL END AT MIDNIGHT TONIGHT (BST).
3. SINCE WE CANNOT SPEAK FOR THE UNIONS YOU SHOULD NOT GIVE THE SOVIET AUTHORITIES ANY INFORMATION ON ACTION WHICH THEY MAY TAKE WHEN HMG'S SUSPENSION HAS ENDED.
4. FOR YOUR OWN INFORMATION ONLY. IT APPEARS AT THE MOMENT THAT THE INTENTION OF TGWU STAFF AT HEATHROW IS NOT TO HANDLE AEROFLOT FLIGHTS UNTIL 3 NOVEMBER (SIC). BRITISH AIRWAYS HAVE TOLD AEROFLOT THEREFORE THAT THEY WILL BE UNABLE TO HANDLE THEIR SERVICES FOR THE PRESENT. BA THINK THAT AEROFLOT WILL BE UNABLE TO FIND AN ALTERNATIVE HANDLER.
5. TGWU STAFF DO NOT INTEND TO TAKE ACTION AT GATWICK AIRPORT AND AEROFLOT WILL BE FREE TO START CHARTER OPERATIONS AGAIN ON 29 SEPTEMBER (IN FACT THEY HAVE CANCELLED THEIR PLANNED FLIGHT FOR 29/30 SEPT BECAUSE THEY HAVE NO PASSENGERS).
6. BA EXPECT TO BE ABLE TO RESUME THEIR SCHEDULED SERVICES TO MOSCOW WHEN PILOTS END THEIR INDUSTRIAL ACTION ON 7 OCTOBER.
7. WE SHALL OF COURSE ADVISE YOU OF ANY CHANGES OF WHICH WE BECOME AWARE.

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PS/S of S FOR TRANSPORT  
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27 Sept 1983/2233

The Prime Minister  
Palace of Westminster  
London SW1 OAA England

The Senate of the Dominican Republic condemns the attack on the South Korean Airlines commercial aircraft by Soviet military aircraft. The Senate of the Dominican Republic regrets the loss of life and offers its condolences in particular to those countries whose citizens were on board. It is our wish that humanity live in peace.

Lic. Jacobo Majluta A.  
President of the Senate of the  
Dominican Republic

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27 SEP 1983/2233

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SANTODOMINGODR 62 27 517P EST VIA RCA

SEÑOR

PRESIDENTE DE LA ASAMBLA NACIONAL

PALACIO DE WESTMINSTER,

LONDRES/SWI/OAA/INGLATERRA

SENADO DE LA REPUBLICA DOMINICANA CONDENA ATAQUE NAVE COMERCIAL

LINEA AEREA COREA DEL SUR COMETIDO POR NAVES DE GUERRA SOVIETICAS.

SENADO DOMINICANO LAMENTA PERDIDAS DE VIDAS Y EXPRESA CONDOLENCIAS

PARTICULARMENTE PAISES TENIAN CIUDADANOS A BORDO. DESEAMOS

HUMANIDAD VIVA EN PAZ.

LIC. JACOBO MAJLUTA A.

PRESIDENTE DEL SENADO DE LA

REPUBLICA DOMINICANA.

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No objections  
by PM  
27.9

Prime Minister

ACTION AGAINST AEROFLOT

*attached* You will remember that at last week's Cabinet (CC(83)28th) we agreed that the Government ban on Aeroflot flights should be allowed to expire on 28 September although industrial action by the British Airline Pilots Association and the Transport and General Workers Union might delay the resumption of scheduled services by BA and by Aeroflot respectively for a few more days.

You and the colleagues primarily concerned may like to know of subsequent developments and of the way I propose to proceed.

The TGWU staff at Heathrow have decided not to handle Aeroflot flights until 3 November. British Airways have therefore told Aeroflot that they will be unable to handle the services for the present. British Airways do not believe that Aeroflot will be able to find anybody else willing to handle the flights and expect therefore that Aeroflot will be unable to resume its scheduled services for the present. BA expect to be able to resume their services when the pilots cease their industrial action on 7 October.

BA see no objection to Aeroflot being able to resume their charter services to and from Gatwick (where the TGWU staff are not apparently taking industrial action) on 29 September. The passengers on these flights are entirely British holidaymakers and there is little risk of diversion from scheduled services.

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I propose therefore to take no action to extend our ban on UK-Soviet air services beyond 28 September. In order that the charter flight to Gatwick may operate on 29 September my officials will need to approve the precise details which have already been filed by Aeroflot. I propose that they should do this at 12 noon tomorrow since I am advised that any further delay in approving the filing might make it impracticable for the flights to operate - and therefore unnecessarily inconvenience returning holidaymakers who have already suffered a difficult journey to Moscow at the beginning of their holiday as a result of the ban.

Aeroflot have also sought my approval for their normal winter programme of charter flights. I propose in the middle of next week to approve the programme.

I am sending copies of this minute to the Secretaries of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Defence and Trade and Industry, to the Minister of Agriculture and to the Attorney General.

TOM KING

27 September 1983

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Faint, illegible text, likely bleed-through from the reverse side of the page.

Handwritten notes in the center of the page:  
 Dec 9  
 9:50 pm  
 (21:50)  
 27.9.83  
 JH

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10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

26 September 1983

ACTION AGAINST AEROFLOT

Thank you for your letter to John Coles of 22 September. The Prime Minister has noted this without comment.

I am sending copies of this letter to Roger Bone (FCO), Richard Mottram (MOD) and Henry Steel (Attorney General's Office).

W. P. S. RICKETT

Andrew Melville, Esq.,  
Department of Transport.

da



10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

23 September 1983

The Prime Minister has asked me to thank you for your letter of 20 September which was forwarded to her by the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary. The Prime Minister was extremely grateful for the message from your President.

W. F. S. RICKETT

His Excellency Dr. Young Hoon Kang

NR





Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

23 September 1983

*See 5/12/83*  
*MA*  
*WA*  
*26/9*

Korean Airliner: Claims

The Americans have been putting out feelers to discover whether we would be willing to support them in submitting an application to the International Court of Justice in pursuit of our claims against the Soviet Union resulting from the Korean airline disaster. Paragraphs 2 and 3 below contain the views of Legal Advisers here, which we are submitting in parallel to the Foreign Secretary this evening, in case this matter is raised during talks with the Americans next week.

In terms of providing a route to an adjudication on the claims and to the payment of compensation, the US idea is a non-starter. The jurisdiction of the ICJ depends on the consent of the parties. The Soviet Union have a long-standing policy of non-submission to the jurisdiction of the Court and we have every reason to believe they will not consent in this case. There would therefore be no question of the Court even considering, let alone giving judgement on the merits of the claim. The Court could only receive the application and forward it to the Soviet authorities, who would refuse to consent to its jurisdiction.

The main American argument will be a political one; that the mere act of putting forward an application to the Court, and the ensuing Soviet denial of consent to the jurisdiction will draw further public attention to the Soviet refusal to entertain the possibility of meeting any claims or even of having them impartially considered.

If the point is raised in Washington, the Prime Minister may wish to ask whether US Legal Advisers share the view of our own people on the likelihood of a successful application. If it becomes clear that the Americans nevertheless wish to pursue this course of action, she may wish to say that the logical first step would be the presentation of detailed claims to the Soviet Union (the UK claim is under preparation at the moment) and that once these have been prepared and presented to the Soviet Union we shall all be in a better position to reach conclusions on the possibilities for further action, including that of application to the ICJ.

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The Americans have told us informally at official level that they have already approached the Canadians, who have expressed grave doubts about the US ideas.

*Yours —*  
*R B Bone*

(R B Bone)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORT  
2 MARSHAM STREET LONDON SW1P 3EB

01-212 3434

A J Coles Esq  
Private Secretary  
10 Downing Street  
LONDON SW1

22 September 1983

Prime Minister

Dear Mr Coles

mt

WM  
23/9

ACTION AGAINST AEROFLOT

In your letter of 12 September to Henry Steel you asked for advice as to whether there was a need for a new international agreement relating to aircraft in the airspace of other countries.

The Convention on International Civil Aviation ("the Chicago Convention") recognises that every State has complete sovereignty over the airspace above its territory and territorial waters. It and its Annexes contain a number of provisions about the procedures which should be followed if a civil aircraft enters territorial airspace without the authority of the country concerned. These are designed to avoid disasters such as that which befell the Korean airliner. They include detailed procedures under which aircraft of the country whose airspace is being violated may intercept the trespasser, use internationally agreed signs to show that he is trespassing and if he does not respond may use further signs to require him to land at an airport in the country whose airspace he is violating. Although the Soviet Union is a party to the Chicago Convention its fighters do not appear (despite

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Soviet claims to the contrary) to have followed the agreed procedures before shooting down the Korean airliner.

We believe that the best hope of avoiding similar disasters in future lies in an international investigation into the incident in the light of which we and the other parties to the Chicago Convention can consider whether, and if so how, its provisions should be strengthened. This can best be undertaken by the International Civil Aviation Organisation (which was established under the Chicago Convention and which is responsible for its successful operation). ICAO has 151 members who meet every three years at an Assembly; in the meantime its day to day business is conducted by a 33 member Council.

The Koreans called for a special meeting of the ICAO Council last week to discuss the disaster. We and a number of western countries tabled a resolution which was carried by 26 votes to 2 (the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia). Three members (Algeria, China and India) abstained and two (Iraq and Lebanon) were not present when the vote was taken. The executive part of the resolution:-

- (i) directs the Secretary General to institute an investigation to determine the facts and technical aspects relating to the flight and destruction of the aircraft and to provide an interim report to the Council within 30 days of the adoption of this resolution and the complete report during the 110th session of the Council;
- (ii) urges all parties to co-operate fully in the investigation;

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- (iii) further directs the Secretary General to report urgently to the Council on the status of adherence to and implementation of the provisions of the Chicago Convention, its Annexes and other related documents as they bear upon this incident;
- (iv) directs the Air Navigation Commission urgently:
  - (a) to review the provisions of the Convention its Annexes and other related documents and consider possible amendments to prevent a recurrence of such a tragic incident;
  - (b) to examine ways to improve the co-ordination of communication systems between military and civil aircraft and air traffic control services and to improve procedures in cases involving the identification and interception of civil aircraft;
- (v) instructs the President of the Council to report this decision to the 24th session of the Assembly of the Organisation [which is being held in Montreal this month] for the Assembly to take appropriate action".

We shall support any proposals for action which seem likely to reduce the risks of similar disasters in the future provided they do not detract from a State's obligations under customary international law or adversely affect our normal interception procedures (e.g. the use of fighter aircraft and the firing of tracer to attract the intruder's attention).

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Despite the support which we obtained at the Council meeting it may be difficult to reach agreement on a strengthening of the Convention. Any proposal for such action needs support by at least two thirds of those voting at an Assembly meeting and does not come into effect until it has been ratified by two thirds of the total membership. Even then the amendment only applies to those member states who have accepted it.

The reluctance of member states to accept restrictions on their freedom of action when their territorial integrity is violated was demonstrated in 1973 when Israel shot down a Libyan civil aircraft over Sinai. The ICAO Assembly almost unanimously condemned Israel. A proposal which would have required member states to refrain from the use or threat of force against civil aircraft failed however to obtain the necessary two thirds support.

Against this background it may well be possible to achieve little more than amendments to the technical Annexes to the Convention. The condemnation of the Soviet action which will no doubt continue during the debates, however, should cause the USSR anxiety and make it less likely that they will fail on another occasion to comply with agreed procedures.

I am copying this letter to Roger Bone (FCO), Richard Mottram (MOD) and Henry Steel (Attorney General's Office).

*Yours sincerely*  
*Andrew Melville*

ANDREW MELVILLE  
Private Secretary

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Disasters 9183 Korean summer

...the answer which was provided at the Council...  
...to each member of the Convention...  
...at least two thirds of those...  
...and not otherwise...  
...two thirds of the...  
...only voting...  
...to those members who have accepted it.

...the retention of member states to accept...  
...provisions on their freedom of action than their...  
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INFO ROUTINE OTTAWA

MY TEL NO 1039 : KOREAN AIRCRAFT : SOVIET COMMENT

SUMMARY

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1. WITH THE PUBLICATION IN PRAVDA AND RED STAR ON 20 SEPTEMBER OF A MAJOR ARTICLE BY AIR MARSHAL KIRSANOV (COMMANDER, FAR EAST AIR FORCES), THE RUSSIANS HAVE ADVANCED ALLEGEDLY NEW EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF THEIR CHARGE THAT THE KOREAN AIRCRAFT HAD BEEN ON AN INTELLIGENCE MISSION APPROVED BY THE US ADMINISTRATION. IN PARTICULAR, THE ARTICLE ASSERTS THAT THE AIRLINER'S FLIGHT WAS SYNCHRONISED WITH ORBITS OVER THE SOVIET FAR EAST OF A "FERRET" SATELLITE.

---

DETAIL

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2. ACCORDING TO KIRSANOV, ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON THE AIRLINER'S FLIGHT HAD COME TO LIGHT. IT HAD BEEN DELAYED TO ANCHORAGE SO AS TO SYNCHRONISE THE TIMING OF ITS APPROACH TO KAMCHATKA AND SAKHALIN WITH THE ORBIT OF THE RADIO-TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE SATELLITE "FERRET D". IN THREE CONSECUTIVE ORBITS, AND WITH THE ABILITY TO COVER A 3,000 KILOMETER BAND OF TERRITORY, THE SATELLITE FIRST APPEARED OVER THE SOVIET FAR EAST BEFORE THE AIRLINER'S INCURSION (1845 HOURS MOSCOW TIME). IT THEN COVERED KAMCHATKA AT PRECISELY THE MOMENT OF INCURSION (2030 HOURS) AND FINALLY SAKHALIN (2207 HOURS), TO COINCIDE WITH THE AIRCRAFT'S ARRIVAL OVER THE ISLAND. THIS GAVE THE SATELLITE THE OPPORTUNITY TO MONITOR SOVIET RADIO-ELECTRONIC INSTALLATIONS IN CHUKOTKA, KAMCHATKA, SAKHALIN, AND THE KURIL ISLANDS "IN THEIR NORMAL REGIME" AND AFTER THE INSTALLATIONS HAD BEEN ALERTED BY THE INCURSION. "IT WAS NATURAL THAT THE VIOLATION OF THE AIR BORDER HAD FORLED TO A DOUBLING OF THE INTENSIVENESS OF THE WORK OF OUR RADIO AND RADIO-TECHNICAL INSTALLATIONS...".

3. THROUGHOUT ITS FLIGHT, THE AIRCRAFT WAS NOT ONLY IN RANGE OF AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL BUT ALSO OF THE AMERICAN "LORAN-S" RADIO NAVIGATION SYSTEM, WHICH WAS ABLE TO ESTABLISH ACCURATELY AT ANY

MOMENT



MOMENT ITS TRUE POSITION. THE AMERICANS WERE CAREFULLY CONCEALING THIS. ACCIDENTAL DEVIATION FROM COURSE FOR 2 AND 1/2 HOURS WAS IMPOSSIBLE. THIS WAS BORNE OUT BY A STUDY CARRIED OUT BY SPECIALISTS OF THE BRITISH CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY, WHOSE FINDINGS WERE REPORTED ON BRITISH TELEVISION ON 14 SEPTEMBER. THE ACTIONS OF THE AIRCRAFT CONFIRMED THAT IT WAS THROUGHOUT PERFECTLY CONTROLLED. IT TRIED TO EVADE THE WARNING MANOEUVRES OF SOVIET AIRCRAFT. WITH SPECIALISED INTELLIGENCE EQUIPMENT ON BOARD, THE CREW, FOLLOWING ORDERS FROM THE GROUND, DID NOT WISH TO LAND ON A SOVIET AIRFIELD.

4. PRIOR TO AND DURING THE INCIDENT, BESIDES THE RC-135 ALREADY MENTIONED, ANOTHER AIRCRAFT OF THE SAME TYPE WAS IN THE AREA, AS WERE TWO ORIONS AND AN AMERICAN FRIGATE. THERE WAS ALSO 'CONVINCING DATA' THAT AN AWACS AIRCRAFT HAD MONITORED THE INCIDENT.

5. OTHER POINTS MENTIONED BY KIRSANOV :-

(I) THE AIRCRAFT CARRIED ELEVEN CREW MEMBERS MORE THAN USUAL: THESE WERE INTELLIGENCE SPECIALISTS.

(II) THE PILOT WAS KOREAN AIRLINES' BEST, KNOWN FOR HIS LINKS WITH AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE, AS WAS THE SECOND PILOT.

6. THE ARTICLE CONCLUDED THAT ON 31 AUGUST/1 SEPTEMBER 'AN INTELLIGENCE COMPLEX' HAD BEEN DEPLOYED, COMPRISING THE KOREAN AIRLINER, SEVERAL SPECIALIST INTELLIGENCE AIRCRAFT, A NUMBER OF U.S. NAVAL VESSELS, VARIOUS GROUND TRACKING STATIONS, AND THE 'FERRET' SATELLITE. THE AIM HAD BEEN TO SECURE INFORMATION ON THE AIR DEFENCE SYSTEM IN THE SOVIET FAR EAST AND ON STRATEGIC INSTALLATIONS AT KAMCHATKA AND SAKHALIN.

7. FULL TRANSLATION AND COPY OF SOVIET MAP ACCOMPANYING THE ARTICLE FOLLOW BY BAG (TO FCO ONLY)

RATFORD

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KOREAN EMBASSY  
4, PALACE GATE,  
LONDON, W8 5NF

Prime Minister

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

20 September 1983

SERIAL No. T 132<sup>A</sup>/83

Sir,

LM  
W/S

mt

I have the honour to request that you be so kind as to convey to The Right Honourable Margaret Thatcher MP, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the following telegraphic message from His Excellency Chun Doo Hwan, President of the Republic of Korea:

"SEOUL, 15 SEPTEMBER 1983

EXCELLENCY,

I AM DEEPLY APPRECIATIVE OF THE INVALUABLE SUPPORT YOUR GOVERNMENT RENDERED TO THE POSITION OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA AT THE MEETING OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL WHICH WAS HELD ON SEPTEMBER 13, 1983 IN CONNECTION WITH THE INCIDENT OF THE SHOOTING DOWN OF A KOREAN JETLINER BY THE SOVIET UNION.

ON BEHALF OF THE GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA, I WOULD LIKE TO EXPRESS OUR HEARTFELT THANKS TO YOUR GOVERNMENT ESPECIALLY FOR YOUR AFFIRMATIVE VOTE TO THE RESOLUTION CONDEMNING THE CRIMINAL ACT OF THE SOVIET UNION, THOUGH NOT ADOPTED DUE TO THE SOVIET VETO.

IT IS MY EARNEST HOPE THAT THIS TRAGIC INCIDENT WHICH CLAIMED SO MANY LIVES OF DIFFERENT NATIONALITIES WILL GIVE A VIGOROUS MOMENTUM TO OUR COMMON EFFORTS TO OPPOSE VIOLENCE AND DISORDER AND THEREBY CONTRIBUTING TO THE ENHANCEMENT OF HUMAN CONSCIENCE AND MORALITY.

CHUN DOO HWAN  
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA"

Please accept, Sir, the assurance of my highest consideration.

*Young Hoon Kang*  
Young Hoon Kang  
Ambassador

The Rt Hon Sir Geoffrey Howe, QC, MP  
Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State  
for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs  
London



KOREAN EMBASSY  
AT PALACE GATE  
LONDON W9 3NE

RECEIVED  
GENERAL NO. \_\_\_\_\_



22 SEP 1988

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15 September 1983

KOREAN AIRLINES: MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN

Thank you for your letter of 14 September enclosing a draft reply from the Prime Minister to President Reagan. The Prime Minister approved a slightly revised version which is being sent on the hot line this morning. A copy will reach you separately.

A. J. COLES

R. B. Bone, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

file

SUBJECT cc MARGARET OPS

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CONFIDENTIAL

151057Z SEP 83

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T 132/83

FROM: PRIME MINISTER  
TO: PRESIDENT REAGAN

BT  
DEAR RON,

THANK YOU FOR YOUR MESSAGE OF 8 SEPTEMBER ABOUT THE SHOOTING DOWN OF THE SOUTH KOREAN AIRLINER. MY VIEWS ON THE BARBARITY OF THIS ACT ARE COMPLETELY AT ONE WITH YOURS. I SHARE YOUR PROFOUND HORROR AT WHAT OCCURRED AND EXPRESS MY SINCERE SYMPATHY TO THE FAMILIES AND RELATIONS OF THE AMERICANS WHO LOST THEIR LIVES.

THIS INCIDENT HAS VIVIDLY ILLUSTRATED THE TRUE NATURE OF THE SOVIET REGIME. ITS RIGIDITY AND RUTHLESSNESS, ITS NEUROSES ABOUT SPYING AND SECURITY, ITS MENDACITY, AND ITS APPARENT INABILITY TO UNDERSTAND, LET ALONE APPLY, THE NORMAL RULES OF CIVILISED CONDUCT BETWEEN NATIONS, HAVE BEEN AN OBJECT LESSON TO THOSE WHO BELIEVE THAT GOODWILL AND REASON ALONE WILL BE SUFFICIENT TO ENSURE OUR SECURITY AND WORLD PEACE.

I ALSO VERY MUCH AGREE THAT WE MUST CONTINUE OUR SEARCH FOR BALANCED AND VERIFIABLE AGREEMENTS WITH THE SOVIET UNION WHICH REDUCE THE THREAT OF WAR AND ENHANCE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY. EQUALLY, I AM CONVINCED THAT LONG-TERM STABILITY IS UNATTAINABLE UNLESS THE SOVIET UNION IS CONVINCED OF OUR COLLECTIVE STRENGTH OF WILL AND THE ADEQUACY OF OUR COLLECTIVE DEFENCES.

I THEREFORE VERY MUCH AGREE WITH YOU, BOTH FOR THE IMPORTANT REASONS OF AIRLINE SAFETY AS WELL AS THE WIDER QUESTIONS I HAVE TOUCHED ON ABOVE, THAT OUR COLLECTIVE RESPONSE TO THE SOVIET ACTION MUST BE COORDINATED AMONG AS WIDE A CIRCLE OF COUNTRIES AS POSSIBLE. THE RUSSIANS MUST NOT BE ALLOWED THE EASY OPTION OF TRYING TO PORTRAY THIS AS AN EXERCISE IN EAST/WEST CONFRONTATION. THIS IS VERY MUCH AN ISSUE FOR THE WHOLE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. I WAS THEREFORE GLAD THAT OUR JOINT LOBBYING EFFORTS WERE SUCCESSFUL IN PRODUCING THE NECESSARY NINE VOTES FOR THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION TO HAVE BEEN ADOPTED HAD THE RUSSIANS NOT USED THEIR VETO.

I AM DISAPPOINTED THAT WE WERE NOT ABLE TO SECURE A STRONGER NATIONAL RESPONSE FROM OUR EUROPEAN PARTNERS IN THE TEN AND OUR ALLIES IN NATO. AS YOU KNOW WE PRESSED HARD FOR A TWO-WAY BAN OF ALL AEROFLOT FLIGHTS, INCLUDING OVERFLIGHTS, OF AT LEAST A MONTH. IT WAS VERY CLEAR, HOWEVER, THAT WITH THE FRENCH AND GREEKS STARTING (AND REMAINING) AT NIL, 14 DAYS WAS THE UPPER FIGURE WHICH COMMANDED BROAD SUPPORT. THE BAN WILL, HOWEVER, AFFECT NOT ONLY AEROFLOT FLIGHTS TO OUR COUNTRIES, BUT ALSO NATIONAL AIRLINES FLIGHTS TO THE SOVIET UNION. WE AND OTHERS HAVE ALSO BANNED AEROFLOT OVERFLIGHTS, WHICH WILL PROVE A SUBSTANTIAL ADDITIONAL PROBLEM FOR THE RUSSIANS FOR THEIR REMAINING SERVICES TO THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE, INCLUDING CUBA.

WE MUST NOW CONCENTRATE ON THE MEETING OF THE COUNCIL OF THE INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANISATION IN MONTREAL ON 15 SEPTEMBER. I BELIEVE WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO OBTAIN AN ADEQUATE RESOLUTION COMMANDING WIDESPREAD SUPPORT AND SETTING IN MOTION BOTH AN IMPARTIAL INVESTIGATION AND SPECIFIC MEASURES FOR INCREASING THE SAFETY OF FLIGHT IN THE FUTURE. IN THIS WAY WE MAY HOPE TO DERIVE SOME LONGER-TERM BENEFIT FROM THIS DISASTER. I KNOW THAT OUR DELEGATIONS WILL BE COOPERATING CLOSELY TO ACHIEVE THIS.

IN CONCLUSION MAY I SAY THAT, THROUGHOUT THIS INCIDENT, I HAVE GREATLY ADMIRERD AND APPRECIATED THE LEAD YOU HAVE GIVEN. YOUR FIRM STATEMENTS, TOGETHER WITH INSISTENCE ON THE WIDEST POSSIBLE CONSULTATION, STRUCK EXACTLY THE RIGHT NOTE.

I LOOK FORWARD ENORMOUSLY TO OUR MEETING IN WASHINGTON LATER THIS MONTH.

WITH BEST WISHES  
YOURS EVER  
MARGARET  
BT

**IMMEDIATE**

**ADVANCE COPY**

KOREAN AIRLINER - ADVANCE COPIES

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FM WASHINGTON 142335Z SEP 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2596 OF 14 SEPTEMBER

INFO UKDEL NATO, MOSCOW, WARSAW, TOKYO, PEKING, PARIS, BONN

**KOREAN AIRLINE DISASTER: A BACKLASH**

1. THE ADMINISTRATION ARE FACING STRONG RIGHT WING PRESSURE FOR FURTHER ACTION AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION IN PROTECT AGAINST THE SHOOTING DOWN OF THE KOREAN AIRLINER. THE INTERNATIONAL SUCCESS, RELATIVELY SPEAKING, OF THE PRESIDENT'S POLICY OF SEEKING CONCERTED, LIMITED, BUT CONCRETE ACTION IN THE CIVIL AVIATION FIELD HAS MADE LITTLE DOMESTIC IMPACT, AND THE PUBLIC MOOD, WHICH THE PRESIDENT ANTICIPATED IN HIS BROADCAST TO THE NATION ON 5 SEPTEMBER (MY TELNO 2475) HAS BECOME ONE OF MOUNTING FRUSTRATION IN THE FACE OF SOVIET BARBARISM. GROMYKO'S UNREPENTANT ATTITUDE IN MADRID, THE ATTEMPTS TO BLAME THE UNITED STATES, AND THE SOVIET VETO AT THE UN HAVE FED THIS SENTIMENT. A VAST PROPORTION OF LETTERS WRITTEN TO THE PRESIDENT AND SENIOR CONGRESSMEN IN RECENT DAYS HAVE CALLED FOR TOUGHER ACTION. THE MEMORIAL SERVICE FOR CONGRESSMAN MCDONALD.

~~THE ATTEMPTS TO BLAME THE UNITED STATES, AND THE SOVIET VETO AT THE UN HAVE FED THIS SENTIMENT. A VAST PROPORTION OF LETTERS WRITTEN TO THE PRESIDENT AND SENIOR CONGRESSMEN IN RECENT DAYS HAVE CALLED FOR TOUGHER ACTION. THE MEMORIAL SERVICE FOR CONGRESSMAN MCDONALD, ORGAINSED BY THE RIGHT WING CONSERVATIVE CAUCUS ON 11 SEPTEMBER, PROVIDED THE OCCASION FOR PREDICTABLE OUTBURSTS FROM LEADING RIGHT-WINGERS. WHEN CONGRESS REASSEMBLED ON MONDAY, THE LEADERSHIP OF BOTH HOUSES THOUGHT TO CATALYSE THIS MOOD IN A JOINT RESOLUTION OF CONDEMNATION OF THE SOVIET UNION. HOWEVER, EARLY HOPES OF A SWIFT PASSAGE THROUGH THE SENATE WERE DASHED WHEN CONSERVATIVES, INCLUDING SENATORS HELMS, SYMMS AND ARMSTRONG, PRESSED FOR FAR-REACHING AMENDMENTS. ORIGINALLY THESE INCLUDED A HALT TO ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS AND REDUCING THE US PRESENCE IN MOSCOW TO A SKELETON STAFF. AFTER DISCUSSION IN THE REPUBLICAN PARTY CAUCUS, THESE WERE MODERATED SOMEWHAT, BUT STILL INCLUDE SUCH ELEMENTS AS SEEKING STRICT RECIPROCITY IN NUMBERS BETWEEN US AND SOVIET PERSONNEL IN THE OTHER COUNTRY, CALLING POLAND INTO DEFAULT, AND AN EXTENSION OF TRADE SANCTIONS AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION. THERE IS LIKELY TO BE A HEATED DEBATE ON THIS TOMORROW. SOURCES IN CONGRESS TELL US THAT THESE AMENDMENTS ARE LIKELY TO BE DEFEATED AFTER A FIGHT, AND THAT THE LIKELIHOOD OF THE SENATE AND HOUSE PASSING A JOINT RESOLUTION ON FURTHER SANCTIONS WHICH WOULD BE BINDING ON THE ADMINISTRATION ARE SLIM. IN PARTICULAR THERE IS VERY LIMITED SUPPORT FOR BREAKING DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS, HALTING ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS, OR SACRIFICING THE RECENTLY NEGOTIATED LONG TERM GRAINS AGREEMENT.~~

2. HOWEVER, THESE ARE PRESSURES WHICH THE WHITE HOUSE MUST TAKE INTO ACCOUNT. THIS WAS REFLECTED IN THE PRESIDENT'S RADIO BROADCAST OF 10 SEPTEMBER, WHEN HE RECALLED THAT HE HAD BEEN CRITICISED EARLY IN HIS ADMINISTRATION FOR ACCUSING THE SOVIET UNION OF RESERVING THE RIGHT FOR THEMSELVES TO COMMIT ANY CRIME, TO LIE, AND TO CHEAT IN FURTHERANCE OF COMMUNIST EXPANSION. HE SAID THAT THEIR RECENT BEHAVIOUR WOULD DISPEL ANY LINGERING DOUBTS ABOUT THE KIND OF REGIME WE WERE DEALING WITH, AND WHAT US RESPONSIBILITIES WERE AS TRUSTEES OF FREEDOM AND PEACE. HE URGED CONGRESS TO INCREASE FUNDING FOR VOICE OF AMERICA BROADCASTS. STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS CONFIRMED THAT THEY HAVE HAD A HARD TIME IN RECENT DAYS IN DISSUADING CONGRESSMEN FROM PRECIPITATE ACTION, AND IN HOLDING THE ADMINISTRATION TO THE POLICY INITIALLY ENUNCIATED BY THE PRESIDENT.

3. THE HEAD OF THE WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE ON THE KAL DISASTER CONFIRMED TO US TODAY THAT THERE HAD BEEN STRONG PRESSURE ON THE WHITE HOUSE TO UNDERTAKE FURTHER RETALIATION. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, THEY HAD TO BE VERY SENSITIVE ABOUT THE SIGNALS THEY SENT ON SUCH RELATED ISSUES AS POLAND. WHATEVER TECHNICIANS WITHIN GOVERNMENTS FELT. PUBLIC OPINION SAW A LINK BETWEEN THESE ISSUES. THE NCC

~~WHITE HOUSE TO UNDERTAKE FURTHER RETALIATION. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, THEY HAD TO BE VERY SENSITIVE ABOUT THE SIGNALS THEY SENT ON SUCH RELATED ISSUES AS POLAND. WHATEVER TECHNICIANS WITHIN GOVERNMENTS FELT, PUBLIC OPINION SAW A LINK BETWEEN THESE ISSUES. THE NSC HAD NO IMMINENT FURTHER MEASURES BEFORE THEM, AND WERE TRYING TO KEEP THE U.S. RESPONSE WITHIN BOUNDS. THERE WERE FURTHER BILATERAL AVIATION STEPS WHICH THEY MIGHT CONSIDER IN DUE COURSE. BUT HE INDICATED THAT THIS WAS AN EVOLVING ISSUE, AND THAT THE UNITED STATES HAD NOT RULED OUT FURTHER STEPS IF CIRCUMSTANCES DEMANDED.~~

4. IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN HOW LONG THIS MOOD WILL LAST. THERE IS NO SIGN AT PRESENT OF IT ABATING AND THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH AT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON 25 SEPTEMBER OFFERS A POSSIBLE PLATFORM FOR FURTHER RHETORIC. EMOTIONS MAY NOT THEREFORE YET HAVE PEAKED. BUT IN DUE COURSE, UNLESS THE RUSSIANS DELIBERATELY STOKE THINGS UP, PRESSURE HERE FOR FURTHER CONCRETE ACTION IS LIKELY TO DISSIPATE.

WRIGHT

NNNN



Top copy on Italy: Anglo Italian Summit A3

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cc Disasters: Alitalia  
Korean Airlines  
Boeing 747 1 Sept '83



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

14 September 1983

Joe She.

Amended.

AR 15/9.

Visit of the Italian Prime Minister: South Korean Airliner

You will have seen from Rome telno 427 (copy attached) that the Italians have decided to suspend all Alitalia and Aeroflot flights between Italy and the USSR from 15 September for 15 days.

Paragraph 9 of the Steering Brief for the Prime Minister's meeting with Signor Craxi suggested that the Prime Minister might urge the Italians to take such action. You may wish to amend the paragraph accordingly, and suggest that she welcome the Italian Government's decision.

*[Handwritten signature]*

(R B Bone)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

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FM ROME 131615Z SEPT 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 427 OF 13 SEPTEMBER

INFO PRIORITY SEOUL, MOSCOW.

INFO SAVING TO NATO POSTS, E C POSTS, TOKYO, PEKING.

YOUR TELNO 1484 TO WASHINGTON: SOUTH KOREAN AIRLINER

1. ACTION TAKEN WITH THE RELEVANT M F A OFFICIAL (BATTISTINI) IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 3 OF YOUR T U R . BATTISTINI WAS AWARE OF OUR MEASURES AS DESCRIBED TO YOUR COMMUNITY COLLEAGUES ON 12 SEPTEMBER.
2. ITALIAN ACTION HAS BEEN AS FOLLOWS.  
ON 10 SEPTEMBER (SATURDAY) THE DUTY OFFICER AT THE SOVIET EMBASSY (IN THE ABSENCE OF THE AMBASSADOR) WAS SUMMONED TO THE M F A TO RECEIVE A NOTE COMMUNICATING ITALIAN INTENTION TO SUSPEND ALL ALITALIA AND AEROFLOT FLIGHTS BETWEEN ITALY AND THE U S S R FROM 15 SEPTEMBER FOR 15 DAYS. SIMULTANEOUSLY, AN M F A PRESS RELEASE (TEXT BY BAG, NOT TO ALL) ANNOUNCED THE GOVERNMENT'S DECISION, ADDING THAT THE ACTION WAS UNDERTAKEN TO SHOW SOLIDARITY WITH THE VIEWS OF THE MAJORITY OF THE WESTERN ALLIES AS EXPRESSED AT THEIR MEETINGS IN MADRID AND BRUSSELS. THE PRESS RELEASE ALSO MENTIONED ITALIAN SUPPORT FOR THE DRAFT SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION ON THE SUBJECT, FOR THE NECESSARY IMPROVEMENTS TO I C A O CONVENTIONS CONCERNING OVERFLIGHTS, AND FOR SOUTH KOREAN CLAIMS FOR COMPENSATION.
3. THE GOVERNMENT'S DECISION WAS REVIEWED BY THE ITALIAN CABINET ON SEPTEMBER 12. THE ABSENCE OF A REFERENCE IN SATURDAY'S STATEMENTS TO A SUSPENSION OF OVERFLIGHTS OF ITALIAN TERRITORY BY AEROFLOT WAS NOTED BY THE CABINET AND WILL BE CORRECTED (THIS WILL ENTAIL A FURTHER NOTE TO THE SOVIET EMBASSY). THE M F A ASSURE US THAT THE ORIGINAL OMISSION WAS AN ERROR, AND THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAD ALWAYS INTENDED FOR OVERFLIGHTS TO BE SUSPENDED FOR THE SAME PERIOD. THE M F A DID NOT ENVISAGE ANY HITCHES LEGAL OR ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEMS IN EXECUTING THE GOVERNMENT'S DECISIONS IN TIME (PARLIAMENTARY APPROVAL IS NOT (NOT) REQUIRED).

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/S. ITALIAN

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5. ITALIAN REPRESENTATIVE AT F C A O HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED TO EMPHASISE THAT ITALY REGARDS THIS SOVIET ACTION AS A FUNDAMENTAL BREACH OF F C A O PRINCIPLES. F C A O INQUIRY IS NEEDED TO ESTABLISH THE FACTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOR THE INCIDENT IS A PREREQUISITE TO F C A O MEASURES TO PREVENT A REPETITION. THE ITALIAN DELEGATION HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED TO KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH THE TEN, THE U S A , JAPAN AND KOREA.

F C O PLEASE PASS SAVING ADDRESSEES .

BRIDGES

(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

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PS/S of S FOR TRANSPORT  
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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Prime Minister

Agree only?

14 September, 1983

A.J.C.  $\frac{14}{9}$

John S. ...

Korean Airlines: Message from President Reagan

/ Thank you for your letter of 9 September. I enclose a draft reply from the Prime Minister to President Reagan, which has been seen and approved by the Foreign Secretary.

Your own

(R B Bone)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despach/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM: Prime Minister

Reference

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO: President Reagan

Your Reference

- Top Secret
- Secret
- Confidential
- Restricted
- Unclassified

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT: Korean Airliner

.....In Confidence

*Dear Lou,*

Thank you for your message of 8 September about the shooting down of the South Korean airliner. My views on the barbarity of this act are completely at one with yours. I share your profound horror at what occurred, and ~~would like to~~ <sup>5</sup> express my sincere sympathy ~~for the~~ *families and relatives of the American who lost their lives.* ~~61 Americans killed.~~

CAVEAT.....

This incident has <sup>vividly</sup> illustrated ~~in all too vivid a~~ way the true nature of the Soviet regime. Its rigidity and ruthlessness, its neuroses about spying and security, its mendacity, and its apparent inability ~~really~~ to understand, let alone apply, the normal rules of civilised conduct between nations, have been an object lesson to those who believe that goodwill and reason alone will be sufficient to ensure our security and world peace.

Enclosures—flag(s).....

~~Even so~~ <sup>also</sup> I very much agree that we must continue our search for balanced and verifiable agreements with the Soviet Union which reduce the threat of war and enhance international security. Equally, I am convinced that long-term stability is unattainable unless the Soviet Union is convinced of our collective strength of will

/and

the  
and /adequacy of our collective defences.

I therefore very much agree with you, both for the important reasons of airline safety as well as the wider questions I have touched on above, that our collective response to the Soviet action must be coordinated among as wide a circle of countries as possible. The Russians must not be allowed the easy option of trying to portray this as an exercise in East/West confrontation. This is very much an issue for the whole international community. I was therefore glad that our joint lobbying efforts were successful in producing the necessary nine votes for the UN Security Council resolution to have been adopted had the Russians not used their veto.

I ~~have, however, to confess some disappointment~~ <sup>am disappointed</sup> that we were not able to secure a stronger national response from our European partners in the Ten, and ~~our~~ allies in NATO. As you know we pressed hard for a two-way ban of all Aeroflot flights, including overflights, of at least a month. It was very clear, however, that with the French and Greeks starting (and remaining) at nil, 14 days was the upper figure which commanded broad support. The ban will, however, affect not only Aeroflot flights to our countries, but also national airlines flights to the Soviet Union. We and others have also banned Aeroflot overflights, which will prove a substantial additional problem for the Russians for their remaining services to the Western hemisphere, including Cuba.

We must now concentrate on the meeting of the Council of the International Civil Aviation Organisation in Montreal on 15 September. I believe we should be /able

able to obtain an adequate resolution commanding widespread support and setting in motion both an impartial investigation and specific measures for increasing the safety of flight in the future. In this way we may hope to derive some longer-term benefit from this disaster. I know that our delegations will be cooperating closely to achieve this.


In conclusion may I say that, throughout this incident, I have greatly admired and appreciated the lead you have given. Your firm statements, together with insistence on the widest possible consultation, struck exactly the right note.

I look forward <sup>enormously</sup> to our meeting in Washington later this month.

With best wishes  
Yours ever  
Rogent.  
MR 15.  
9

HOPE  
TH

DESKBY 131400Z



KOREAN AIRLINER - ADVANCE COPIES

18/16

PS  
PS/MR RIFKIND  
PS/PUS  
~~SECRETARY~~  
MR EVANS  
MR JAMES  
MR ADAMS

MR COLES ✓ NO. 10 DOWNING ST  
CABINET OFFICE  
PS/ S of S FOR TRANSPORT  
(MARSHAM ST)

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HD/ LEGAL ADVISERS

MR LANGLEY } IAT/DEPT TRANSPORT  
MR HUNT } (Victoria St)

~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

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RR OSLO

RR LISBON

RR ANKARA

RR WASHINGTON

GRS 100A  
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DESKBY 131400Z  
FM COPENHAGEN 131300Z SEPTEMBER 83  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 197 OF 13 SEPTEMBER  
INFO IMMEDIATE MOSCOW STOCKHOLM DUBLIN  
ROUTINE NATO POSTS

YOUR TELNO 1484 TO WASHINGTON: KOREAN AIRLINER

1. ACTION TAKEN.

2. THE DANISH GOVERNMENT DECIDED ON THE MORNING OF 13 SEPTEMBER TO SUSPEND FOR TWO WEEKS FROM 15 SEPTEMBER ALL LANDINGS BY AEROFLOT IN DENMARK AND BY SAS PLANES FROM DENMARK IN THE USSR. THEY HAVE NOT BANNED OVERFLIGHTS. THE GOVERNMENT OBTAINED THE SUPPORT OF THE FOLKETING FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE AT LUNCHTIME AND THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR WILL BE INFORMED OF THE DECISION AT 1300Z. IT WILL BE PRESENTED PUBLICLY AS A POLITICAL SIGNAL NOT AS SANCTIONS AND AT THE REQUEST OF OPPOSITION SOCIAL DEMOCRATS REPRESENTATIONS WILL BE MADE



BARRER OVER THE GOVERNMENT  
FOLKETING FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE AT LUNCHTIME AND THE SOVIET  
AMBASSADOR WILL BE INFORMED OF THE DECISION AT 1300Z. IT WILL BE  
PRESENTED PUBLICLY AS A POLITICAL SIGNAL NOT AS SANCTIONS AND AT THE  
REQUEST OF OPPOSITION SOCIAL DEMOCRATS REPRESENTATIONS WILL BE MADE  
TO THE SWEDES TO FOLLOW SUIT.

DALES

NNNN

SENT AT 13/1320Z JK//HK

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GRS 260

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 130600Z

FM F C O 122000Z SEP 83

TO IMMEDIATE MOSCOW

TELEGRAM NUMBER 707 OF 12 SEPTEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE HONG KONG WASHINGTON,

PRIORITY OTTAWA, SEOUL

ROUTINE OTHER NATO POSTS

KOREAN AIRLINER: UK CLAIM

1. JAMES SUMMONED BYKOV, SOVIET MINISTER/COUNSELLOR AT 17.15 ON 12 SEPTEMBER.

2. JAMES HANDED HIM THE NOTE SETTING OUT OUR CLAIM AGAINST THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT. AFTER READING IT BYKOV HANDED BACK THE NOTE, SAYING HE WAS UNDER INSTRUCTIONS FROM HIS AMBASSADOR NOT TO ACCEPT THIS KIND OF NOTE. JAMES REGISTERED HIS EXTREME DISSATISFACTION AT THIS MANNER OF PROCEEDING: THE EMBASSY WAS THERE TO TRANSMIT MESSAGES AND VIEWS FROM HMG TO THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT FOR THE EMBASSY TO REFUSE TO DO THIS WAS EXTRAORDINARY. BYKOV DID NOT RELENT ABOUT ACCEPTING THE NOTE, BUT OFFERED THAT HIS NOTE TAKER (IVANOV) WOULD TAKE ITS CONTENTS DOWN VERBATIM AT JAMES' DICTATION. JAMES THEN READ OUT THE NOTE (COPY OF TEXT IN MIFT) BUT MADE CLEAR THAT IT WOULD ALSO BE DELIVERED TO THE SOVIET EMBASSY.

3. BYKOV, READING FROM PREPARED NOTES, THEN SAID THAT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT EXPRESSED ITS REGRET AT THE LOSS OF INNOCENT LIVES AND SHARED IN THE GRIEF OF RELATIVES AND FRIENDS. HIS GOVERNMENT HOWEVER REGARDED THOSE KILLED AS THE VICTIMS OF US PROVOCATION. COMPENSATION SHOULD BE PAID BY THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ACTION, WHICH MEANT THOSE WHO HAD SENT THE AIRCRAFT TO

1

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17411 - 1

ITS END.

4. JAMES SAID THAT THIS STATEMENT WAS UNACCEPTABLE. THE SOVIET UNION WAS CLEARLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SHOOTING DOWN OF THIS CIVILIAN PLANE AND FOR THE LOSS OF LIFE AND PROPERTY.

5. THE TEXT OF THE NOTE WILL BE DELIVERED TO THE SOVIET EMBASSY ON 13 SEPTEMBER.

HOWE

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MR GIFFARD  
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MR DONALD  
MR ADAMS  
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MR COLVIN )  
MR WILLIAMSON )  
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(MARSHAM ST)

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Disables / Aug 83

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17407 - 2

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CONFIDENTIAL  
DESKBY 130600Z  
FM F C O 121934Z SEP 83  
TO IMMEDIATE MOSCOW  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 705 OF 12 SEPTEMBER  
INFO IMMEDIATE BUDAPEST (FOR SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY)  
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, BONN, PARIS, SEOUL, TOKYO,  
OTTAWA, UKDEL NATO, UKREP ICAO, MONTREAL

KOREAN AIRLINER: SUSPENSION OF FLIGHTS

- LADY YOUNG SUMMONED THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR AT 1700 HOURS ON 12 SEPTEMBER AND INFORMED HIM OF HMG'S DECISION TO SUSPEND AEROFLOT FLIGHTS TO AND OVER THE UK, AND ALL BRITISH AIRLINE FLIGHTS TO THE SOVIET UNION FOR 14 DAYS FROM 15 SEPTEMBER. SHE HANDED POPOV A COPY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORT PRESS NOTICE (TEXT TELEGRAPHED SEPARATELY).
- LADY YOUNG EMPHASISED HMG'S STRONG CONDEMNATION OF THE SOVIET ACTION, THE NEED FOR A PROMPT AND CREDIBLE EXPLANATION, COMPENSATION FOR THE VICTIMS AND A WILLINGNESS TO TAKE STEPS TO SEE THAT SUCH A THING NEVER RECURRED. WE STILL AWAITED A SATISFACTORY SOVIET RESPONSE TO THESE DEMANDS PUT BY THE GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH KOREA WHICH WE STRONGLY SUPPORTED. POPOV ATTEMPTED TO BLUSTER BY USING SOME OF THE POINTS FROM OGAKOV'S PRESS CONFERENCE AS JUSTIFICATION FOR THE SOVIET ACTION. RESPONSIBILITY LAY WITH THE US INTELLIGENCE SERVICES. THE UK'S BILATERAL MEASURES CONTRAVENE BOTH INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE UK/SOVIET BILATERAL AIR SERVICES AGREEMENT. LADY YOUNG CUT HIM SHORT. WE WOULD NOT ACCEPT ATTEMPTS BY THE SOVIET UNION TO LAY RESPONSIBILITY ON OTHERS. WE WERE CONFIDENT OF THE LEGAL BASIS FOR OUR ACTION. POPOV UNDERTOOK TO REPORT.

HOWE

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MR WRIGHT  
MR GIFFARD  
MR EVANS  
MR JAMES  
MR DONALD  
MR ADAMS  
MR CARTLEDGE

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MR J HUNT } IAT D/TRANS. VICTORIA ST  
MR COLES NO 10 DOWNING STREET  
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MR GOODALL }  
MR FACER } CABINET OFFICE  
MR COLVIN }  
MR WILLIAMSON }  
PS/S of S FOR TRANSPORT  
(MARSHAM ST)

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17

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PS/PUS  
~~MR ADAMS~~  
MR EVANS  
MR JAMES  
MR ADAMS

MR COLES NO. 10 DOWNING ST  
CABINET OFFICE  
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(MARSHAM ST)

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HD/ LEGAL ADVISERS

MR LANGLEY ) IAT/DEPT TRANSPORT  
MR HUNT ) (Victoria St)

RESIDENT CLERK

GRS 700

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY FCO 130900Z

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 130130Z SEP 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 813 OF 12 SEPTEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON SEOUL TOKYO PARIS PEKING GEORGETOWN  
VALLETTA HARARE AMMAN ISLAMABAD BUDAPEST (FOR S OF S PARTY)  
INFO PRIORITY UKDEL NATO MOSCOW MONTREAL (FOR ICAO REP) THE HAGUE  
BONN OTTAWA.

YOUR TELNO 443 (NOT TO ALL): KOREAN AIRLINER : SECURITY COUNCIL.

THE DRAFT RESOLUTION IN MY TELNO 794, AMENDED TO INCLUDE A  
PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPH REFERRING TO 'TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY',  
WAS PUT TO THE VOTE THIS AFTERNOON 12 SEPTEMBER. IT RECEIVED  
NINE VOTES IN FAVOUR (U.S., UK FRANCE NETHERLANDS ZAIRE  
TOGO PAKISTAN JORDAN AND MALTA) TWO VOTES AGAINST (USSR AND POLAND)  
AND FOUR ABSTENTIONS (ZIMBABWE GUYANA CHINA AND NICARAGUA).  
IT THEREFORE FAILED TO BE ADOPTED BECAUSE OF A SOVIET VETO.

2. MUCH OF THE DAY WAS TAKEN UP BY DISCUSSION IN THE LIKE-MINDED  
GROUP OF CO-SPONSORS OF THE DRAFT RESOLUTION (TO WHICH COLOMBIA  
WAS ADDED) AS TO WHETHER THE RESOLUTION WOULD ATTRACT NINE  
POSITIVE VOTES (THUS FORCING A SOVIET VETO) AND, IF NOT, WHETHER  
THE CO-SPONSORS SHOULD SEEK A FURTHER POSTPONEMENT OF THE VOTE  
IN AN ATTEMPT TO MUSTER THE EXTRA VOTES REQUIRED. THE KOREANS  
REPORTED THAT KING HUSSEIN HAD AGREED TO VOTE IN FAVOUR. WITH  
THOSE ALREADY COMMITTED TO DOING SO THAT MADE EIGHT VOTES. WITH  
THE REPORTED FAILURE OF EFFORTS TO CONVERT MALTA OR GUYANA  
FROM ABSTENTION THE SEARCH FOR THE NINTH CONCENTRATED  
ON ZIMBABWE. THE AMERICANS, FRENCH AND DUTCH AGREED WITH  
OURSELVES THAT WITH MUGABE IN WASHINGTON, ONE THE ONE HAND,  
AND THE MOMENTUM LIKELY TO RUN OUT OF THE DEBATE ON THE OTHER,  
THERE WOULD NEVER BE A BETTER MOMENT THAN TODAY FOR THE VOTE.  
ALTHOUGH JAPANESE WERE UNDER INSTRUCTIONS TO SEEK A  
POSTPONEMENT UNTIL TOMORROW OR WEDNESDAY THE KOREAN PERMANENT

~~POSTPONEMENT UNTIL TOMORROW OR WEDNESDAY~~ INSTRUCTIONS TO SEEK A  
OBSERVER (WHOSE PERFORMANCE THROUGHOUT THIS AFFAIR HAS BEEN  
IMPRESSIVE), SAID THAT HIS INSTINCT WAS THAT THERE WAS NO  
REALISTIC CHANCE OF INDUCING CHANGES IN VOTING INTENTIONS. WHEN  
A TOUR DE TABLE SHOWED THAT ALL THE OTHER CO-SPONSORS WERE  
READY TO RISK IT, THE JAPANESE CAME ALONG RELUCTANTLY.

3. WHEN THE DEBATED RESUMED THIS AFTERNOON THERE WERE FURTHER  
MAINSTREAM SPEECHES FROM PORTUGAL, VENEZUELA, IVORY COAST  
AND SUDAN EXPRESSING REGRET AND CALLING FOR AN INVESTIGATION.  
NETHERLANDS INTRODUCED THE TEXT EXPLAINING THE PURPOSE OF THE  
AMENDMENT AND STRESSING THAT THE MAIN CONCERN OF THE CO-SPONSORS  
WAS TO DEPLORE THE TRAGEDY AND SEE TO IT THAT IT DID NOT  
RECUR. CANADA CALLED FOR UNANIMOUS COUNCIL SUPPORT ON THE  
GROUNDS THAT THE RESOLUTION REFLECTED THE VIRUTAL UNANIMITY OF  
OPINIONS EXPRESSED IN THE COUNCIL.

4. IN EXPLANATIONS BEFORE THE VOTE, THE SOVIET UNION MADE IT  
CLEAR THAT IT WOULD VOTE AGAINST. FRANCE TRAILED A VOTE  
IN FAVOUR AND CHINA AN ABSTENTION. JORDAN CONFIRMED SUPPORT.  
IN THE BIGGEST SURPRISE OF THE DAY MALTA (WITH WHOM THE  
AMERICANS HAD LAST MINUTE EXCHANGS BEHIND THE SCENES), ANNOUNCED  
A VOTE IN FAVOUR. GUYANA (DESPITE HIGH LEVEL INTERVENTIONS BY  
BOTH OURSELVES AND THE AMERICANS AND THE INCLUSION OF THE  
PREAMBULAR REFERENCE TO 'TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY'), OPTED FOR  
AN ABSTENTION.

5. THE VOTE WAS THEN TAKEN WITH THE RESULT IN PARA 1 ABOVE.  
I SPOKE FIRST IN EXPLANATION OF VOTE. TEXT IN MIFT. MRS  
KIRKPATRICK CAME NEXT FOR THE USA CRITICISING THE SOVIET UNION  
FOR ITS SELF-JUSTIFYING AND SELF-DEFEATING ATTEMPT TO ARGUE  
AWAY RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE TRAGEDY. SHE WONDERED HOW THE  
BORDERS OF THE SOVIET UNION COULD BE MORE SACRED THAN THE  
BORDERS OF SWEDEN, AFGHANISTAN AND FOR THAT MATTER THE USA  
WHERE THERE HAD BEEN SEVERAL AEROFLOT UNAUTHORISED INTRUSIONS  
THAT HAD NOT BEEN PUNISHED BY DEATH. THE U.S. SOUGHT THE RIGHT  
TO WORK FOR GREATER SAFETY FOR ALL AND IF THIS INCIDENT HELPED  
DEFINE THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW THE 269 WOULD NOT HAVE  
DIED IN VAIN.

6. ZIMBABWE ATTRIBUTED ITS ABSTENTION TO 'EXTRANEOUS FACTORS'  
AND NICARAGUA CALLED FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE. JAPAN ATTACKED  
THE IRRESPONSIBLE AND ARROGANT ATTITUDE OF THE USSR AND THE  
FLAGRANT ABUSE OF THE VETO.

7. IN A DIGNIFIED CONCLUDING SPEECH KOREA SAID THAT THE VETO  
AMOUNTED TO AN ADMISSION OF SOVIET GUILT. KOREA WAS GRATEFU  
TO ALL THE COUNTRIES THAT HAD GIVEN THEIR SUPPORT IN THE COUNCIL  
AND WOULD PURSUE THE JUST FULFILMENT OF HER LEGITIMATE DEMANDS.

8. FOR A FULLER ACCOUNT OF TODAY'S SPEECHES SEE MY SECOND IFT  
(NOT TO ALL).

9. COMMENT

THE NINE VOTES WERE ACHIEVED (AS MY SOVIET COLLEAGUE LATER  
COMMENTED TO ME) BY THE SKIN OF OUR TEETH. BUT THEY WERE  
ACHIEVED, AND WITHOUT A WEAKENING OF THE DRAFT RESOLUTION.  
THE SOVIETS WERE OBLIGED TO VETO. WE GOT A MAJORITY OF THE  
NON-ALIGNED WITH NOT EVEN THE NICARAGUANS SUPPORT THE SOVIETS.  
THE MIXTURE OF WESTERN AND NON-ALIGNED CO-SPONSORS WORKED WELL.

(NOT TO ALL).

9. COMMENT

THE NINE VOTES WERE ACHIEVED (AS MY SOVIET COLLEAGUE LATER COMMENTED TO ME) BY THE SKIN OF OUR TEETH. BUT THEY WERE ACHIEVED, AND WITHOUT A WEAKENING OF THE DRAFT RESOLUTION. THE SOVIETS WERE OBLIGED TO VETO. WE GOT A MAJORITY OF THE NON-ALIGNED WITH NOT EVEN THE NICARAGUANS SUPPORT THE SOVIETS. ~~THE MIXTURE OF WESTERN AND NON-ALIGNED CO-SPONSORS WORKED WELL TOGETHER.~~ THE FACT OF THE SOVIET VETO WILL NOT PREVENT THE ONLY REALLY PRACTICAL ACTION FOR WHICH THE RESOLUTION CALLED VIZ ACTION IN ICAO. ALL THESE ARE POSITIVE POINTS. AT THE SAME TIME WE HAVE AVOIDED A SITUATION WHICH WOULD HAVE BROUGHT THE UN AND SECURITY COUNCIL INTO EVEN FURTHER DISRESPECT WITH AMERICAN AND OTHER WESTERN OPINION. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE SOVIETS AIMED TO POLARISE THE DEBATE ON EAST-WEST LINES AND TO A SIGNIFICANT EXTENT THEY SUCCEEDED. IT WAS REALLY THIS AT ROOT WHICH DETERMINED THE FIVE POSITIVE NON-ALIGNED VOTES AND ALSO THE FOUR ABSTENTIONS.

10. SEE MIFT.

THOMSON

NNNN

KOREAN AIRLINER - ADVANCE COPIES

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PS  
PS/MR RIFKIND  
PS/PUS  
~~SIR J BULLARD~~  
MR EVANS  
MR JAMES  
MR ADAMS  
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MR COLES NO. 10 DOWNING ST  
CABINET OFFICE  
PS/ S of S FOR TRANSPORT  
(MARSHAM ST) ..

MR LANGLEY } IAT/DEPT TRANSPORT  
MR HUNT } (Victoria St)

RESIDENT CLERK

GRS 150  
CONFIDENTIAL  
DESKBY 121630Z  
FM OSLO 121530Z SEP 83  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 130 OF 12 SEPTEMBER  
AND TO IMMEDIATE COPENHAGEN (DESKBY 121630Z) AND STOCKHOLM  
AND TO PRIORITY ALL OTHER NATO POSTS, UKREP BRUSSELS, MOSCOW,  
TOKYO AND SEOUL.

UKDEL NATO 213: KOREAN AIRLINER

1. THE NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT DECIDED THIS AFTERNOON TO SUSPEND  
ALL SAS FLIGHTS FROM NORWAY TO THE SOVIET UNION AND ALL AEROFLOT  
FLIGHTS TO MAINLAND NORWAY (IE EXCLUDING SVALBARD) FROM 15 TO 30  
SEPTEMBER.

2. THE NORWEGIAN FOREIGN MINISTER WILL SUMMON THE SOVIET CHARGE  
D'AFFAIRES AT 130800Z TO INFORM HIM OF THE BAN. BESIDES DEPLORING  
THE SOVIET ACTION, HE WILL EXPRESS THE HOPE THAT STEPS CAN BE  
TAKEN IN ICAO AND ELSEWHERE TO ENSURE THAT SUCH AN INCIDENT  
DOES NOT RECUR.

3. THE NORWEGIANS HOPE THAT THEIR ACTION WILL ENCOURAGE THE DANES,  
WHO ARE APPARENTLY STILL ARGUING THAT IT NEEDS A TRI-LATERAL  
DECISION TO STOP SAS FLIGHTS BETWEEN DENMARK AND THE SOVIET UNION,  
TO FOLLOW SUIT. THEY POINT OUT THAT PERMISSION TO USE NORWEGIAN  
AIRPORTS IS A MATTER FOR THE NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT, AND THAT SAS  
WILL HAVE TO ACCEPT THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE BAN.

LOGAN

NNNN

SENT AT 121

Repetition to *Reykjavik*  
referred for departmental decision.  
repeated at request of other posts.



CONFIDENTIAL

R M



OD: - HO ✓ LPS ✓  
LCO ✓ CDL ✓  
HMT ✓ CO ✓  
LPO ✓ DTI ✓  
MOD ✓ FCO ✓

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

12 September, 1983

KOREAN AIRLINER

The Prime Minister saw over the weekend the minute of 10 September by the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary.

As your Resident Clerk was told yesterday, the Prime Minister agrees with Sir Geoffrey Howe's conclusions.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Dinah Nichols, the Private Secretaries to the other members of OD and to Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

R. L. COLES

Roger Bone, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL

R M

CONFIDENTIAL

FILE

da

C. MASTER



10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

12 September 1983

Korean Airliner

The Prime Minister rang the President of Guyana yesterday evening about the prospects for voting in the UN Security Council.

She explained that she was concerned to hear that Guyana might abstain which might mean that the very modest draft resolution under consideration was not adopted. She recognised that Guyana had a special position and understood that it might want a reference in the preamble to respect for territorial integrity.

President Burnham said that he expected to have a meeting within 90 minutes with the Ministers concerned to consider the Guyanan position. Among the things which concerned him were, as the Prime Minister had mentioned, the absence of a reference to territorial integrity since the Venezuelans constantly overflew Guyanan air space. He was also worried about the use of civilian aircraft for espionage. Of course, he deplored the loss of life in the recent incident.

President Burnham went on to recall an incident in October 1976 when 11 Guyanan students lost their lives as a result of a terrorist attack by a Venezuelan terrorist who was then in the United States. The man in question had been trained in America as a member of the terrorist group, Condor. He had not been brought to justice and nobody seemed to care about the incident.

The sponsors of the resolution, Mr. Burnham continued, had not even had the courtesy to consult with Guyana as President of the Security Council about its text.

A final complaint was that the Americans had just vetoed an important loan for a large water control scheme in Guyana.

The Prime Minister said that if any discourtesy had been shown to Guyana as President of the Security Council she was indeed sorry. She would ensure that the points he had made would be brought to the attention of our representative in New York. But she very much hoped that the President would consider the larger issues involved because it was critical that the Security Council should adopt a satisfactory resolution on this question.

President Burnham thanked the Prime Minister for telephoning him and promised to telephone again early on Monday morning (he has not yet done so).

CONFIDENTIAL

/ Following

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Following this conversation I spoke to your Resident Clerk and asked him to bring to the attention of our representatives in Washington and New York the points made by President Burnham with the suggestion that they should do what they could to persuade the State Department and Mrs. Kirkpatrick to intervene helpfully with the Guyanans.

A. J. COLES

Roger Bone, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CM

BoF



FILE

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

12 September, 1983

ACTION AGAINST AEROFLOT

The Prime Minister has seen the Attorney General's minute of 8 September.

She has commented that she would not have thought it difficult to relate revocation of permits for charter flights to civil aviation considerations.

Mrs Thatcher has also asked whether there is a need for a new international agreement relating to aircraft in the air space of other countries. I should be grateful if advice could be provided on the latter question.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Roger Bone (Foreign and Commonwealth Office), Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence) and Toby Johns (Department of Transport).

A. J. COLES

H. Steel, Esq., CMG., OBE.,  
Attorney General's Office

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18

KOREAN AIRLINER - ADVANCE COPIES

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PS/PUS  
~~STR J BULLARD~~  
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MR JAMES  
MR ADAMS

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HD/ MAED  
HD/ NEWS D  
HD/ UND  
~~SS/ LEGAL ADVISERS~~

MR LANGLEY } IAT/DEPT TRANSPORT  
MR HUNT } (Victoria St)

[DIBY 120800Z] |

RESIDENT CLERK

00 FCO DESKBY 120800Z

PP PARIS  
GPS 400

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DESKBY 120800Z  
FM UKMIS NEW YORK 120119Z SEP 83  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TEL NO 809 OF 11 SEPTEMBER 1983  
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON  
INFO PRIORITY PARIS

MY TEL NO 806 AND 807 AND TELECON RESIDENT CLERK/FURSLAND  
KOREAN AIRLINER; SECURITY COUNCIL

1 RANG MRS KIRKPATRICK IN THE SITUATION ROOM IN THE WHITE HOUSE AND TOLD HER OF THE PRIME MINISTERS TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH FORBES BURNHAM. SHE WAS GRATEFUL AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH OUR SUGGESTION PROMISED TO CONSIDER AT ONCE HOW THE US SHOULD APPROACH HIM. I SUGGESTED SHE MIGHT ALSO CONSIDER ENLISTING THE SUPPORT OF CARIBBEANS OR LATINS E.G. BRAZIL.

2. IN REPLY TO THE FIVE POINTS MADE BY BURNHAM, MRS KIRKPATRICK SAW NO DIFFICULTY ABOUT INSERTING A REFERENCE TO "TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY" ON THE LINES ALREADY AGREED. OFF THE CUFF, SHE THOUGHT SOMETHING MIGHT ALSO BE SAID IN THE RESOLUTION DISAPPROVING OF THE USE OF CIVILIAN AIRCRAFT FOR RECONNAISSANCE. THE POINT ABOUT NOT CONSULTING GUYANA ON THE TEXT WAS EASY TO REBUT. THE TEXT WAS FORMULATED EXCLUSIVELY BY COUNTRIES WHICH HAD NATIONALS ON THE AIRCRAFT WHICH WAS NOT THE CASE SO FAR AS WE KNEW WITH GUYANA. BESIDES THE PRESIDENCY NORMALLY WISHED TO AVOID RESPONSIBILITY FOR DRAFTING. MRS KIRKPATRICK HAD NEVER HEARD OF THE 1976 INCIDENT INVOLVING A GUYANESE AIRCRAFT BUT SHE WOULD HAVE IT CHECKED OUT. THE SAME APPLIED TO THE ALLEGED US VOTE AGAINST THE HYDRO-ELECTRIC DAM.

INVOLVING A GUYANESE AIRCRAFT BUT SHE WOULD HAVE IT CHECKED OUT. THE SAME APPLIED TO THE ALLEGED US VOTE AGAINST THE HYDRO-ELECTRIC DAM.

3. MRS KIRKPATRICK SAID THE AMERICANS HAD RECEIVED A FORMAL COMMUNICATION FROM JORDAN PROMISING A POSITIVE VOTE.

4. THE CHINESE HAD CONFIRMED TO THE AMERICANS THEIR INTENTION TO ABSTAIN. THEY REFERRED TO SUPERPOWER RIVALRY AND NON-ALIGNMENT.

5. THERE WAS NO REPLY YET FROM MALTA BUT MRS KIRKPATRICK DOUBTED IF US INFLUENCE COULD PRODUCE A POSITIVE ONE.



6. THE US IS PULLING OUT ALL THE STOPS TO SWAY MUGABE WHO IS AT PRESENT IN ATLANTA. ANDY YOUNG HAS SPOKEN WITH HIM AND SO HAS SENATOR NANCY KASSENBAUM, THE FLOOR MANAGER IN THE SENATE FOR A DOLLARS 90 MILLION AID BILL FOR ZIMBABWE. MUGABES RESPONSE SO FAR IS THAT HE HAS TO SPEAK NOT ONLY FOR HIS OWN COUNTRY BUT FOR THE WHOLE OF AFRICA. (COMMENT: SO MUCH FOR TOGO AND ZAIRE). MRS KIRKPATRICK WAS NOT HOPEFUL BUT THE AMERICANS WOULD GO ON TRYING.

7. MRS KIRKPATRICK ASKED IF THERE WAS ANYTHING MORE WE COULD DO WITH MUGABE OR MINTOFF. I EXPLAINED THE DIFFICULTIES BUT UNDERTOOK TO PASS THIS ON. I AGAIN STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF A US APPROACH TO GUYANA.

THOMSON

NNNN

# A The National Archives

DEPARTMENT/SERIES <i>PRM 19</i> ..... PIECE/ITEM ..... <i>3655</i> ..... (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract details:  <i>Transcript of Teleco, dated 11/9/83</i>	
CLOSED UNDER FOI EXEMPTION .....	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	
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Instructions for completion of Dummy Card

Use black or blue pen to complete form.

Use the card for one piece or for each extract removed from a different place within a piece.

Enter the department and series,  
eg. HO 405, J 82.

Enter the piece and item references, .  
eg. 28, 1079, 84/1, 107/3

Enter extract details if it is an extract rather than a whole piece.

This should be an indication of what the extract is,

eg. Folio 28, Indictment 840079, E107, Letter dated 22/11/1995.

Do not enter details of why the extract is sensitive.

If closed under the FOI Act, enter the FOI exemption numbers applying to the closure, eg. 27(1), 40(2).

Sign and date next to the reason why the record is not available to the public ie. Closed under FOI exemption; Retained under section 3(4) of the Public Records Act 1958; Temporarily retained; Missing at transfer or Number not used.



CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
London SW1A 2AH

Telephone 01-

Duty Clerk  
10 Downing St

Your reference

Our reference

Date

11 September 1983

*Dear Duty Clerk,*

KOREAN AIRLINER: UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION

As you are aware, the UN Security Council has been debating the Korean Airliner incident. It is not certain, however, that the draft resolution will attract sufficient votes (nine) to avoid an embarrassing diplomatic victory for the Soviet Union. In particular the votes of Jordan, Zimbabwe and Guyana are important. As King Hussein is at the moment in Korea, and Mr Mugabe in the United States, the Koreans and Americans will be making high-level approaches to these two governments (we understand that President Reagan will be involved in both approaches). Our Permanent Mission in New York have recommended that we should consider a high-level message to the Guyanese government. Sir Geoffrey Howe has approved in principle the idea of the Prime Ministers sending a message to President Forbes Burnham.

We now understand that Mr Burnham will be telephoning the Prime Minister this afternoon. The Prime Minister may wish to use the attached draft telegram, containing a draft message, as a speaking note.

When Mr Burnham telephones, the Prime Minister should be aware that we have suggested to the Guyanese, as a result of concerns they have expressed, that a new preambular paragraph about territorial integrity be put into the message. Discussion of the detail of this could be referred back to New York.

I have discussed this with Tim Flesher who is broadly content with what we are proposing. I hope that it will be possible for our UN Dept to discuss things with him in more detail before Mr Burnham telephones. I have asked Georgetown to hold off suggesting a particular time to Mr Burnham until I hear from you.

*Yours sincerely*  
*Alistair Harrison*

A Harrison  
Resident Clerk

CONFIDENTIAL

Classification and Control

CONFIDENTIAL

IMMEDIATE

ZCZC  
GRS  
CONFIDENTIAL  
TELEGRAM NUMBER

1  
2  
3  
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9

ZCZC  
GRS  
CONFIDENTIAL  
FM FCO 111400Z SEPT 83  
TO IMMEDIATE GEORGETOWN.  
TELEGRAM NUMBER

*Duty Clerk, No 10*

*We spoke,*

*Alistair Harmin  
Resident Clerk  
11/9 FCO*

AND IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON  
UKMIS TELNO 807 (NOW REPEATED TO GEORGETOWN):KOREAN AIRLINER:  
SECURITY COUNCIL

1. It is clear that the Guyanan vote in the Security Council is going to be crucial to our achieving the necessary nine votes. We consider therefore that it is important that the Guyanan delegation in New York receive the right instructions. The Security Council is likely to resume its deliberations with a vote on Monday 12 September. Grateful if you would therefore seek the earliest opportunity to convey the following message from the Prime Minister to Forbes Burnham:

Begins

Dear President

We have all been struck by the tragic loss of the Korean Airliner with all 269 lives. It is important now that the international community acts together to ensure that such tragedies do not recur.

NRNN ends

To

File number

UND

Korean Airliner

Drafted by (Block initials)

M Kirk

Telephone number

4233

Approved for release

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

Classification and Comments

IMMEDIATE

1 <<<<

2 To this end, the outcome of the present meeting of the United  
3 Nations Security Council is important. The resolution  
4 currently before the Council should not be seen in an East/West  
5 context. It is intended primarily to ensure that such  
6 tragedies do not recur, and it is therefore important it  
7 receives the widest possible support in the Council. I therefore  
8 hope that Guyana will support this resolution, which refers to  
9 the consideration of the incident by the International Civil  
10 Aviation Organisation, which is not censorious, and which  
11 already has the widely based support of those countries whose  
12 nationals were affected.

13 Yours sincerely

14 Margaret Thatcher

15 Ends

16  
17 HOWE

18 NNNN

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NNNN ends  
telegram

FLANN

HAS/

EESD

MAED

FED

NEWS DEPT

INFO DEPT

PUSD

UND

NAD

PLANNING STAFF

PS

PS/MR RIFKIND

PS/PO3

SIR J BULLARD

MR WRIGHT

MR GIFFARD

MR EVANS

MR JAMES

MR DONALD

MR ADAMS

MR CARTER

RC

(D.O.) TRANSPO

No 10

CABINET OFF

ADVANCE COPY

IMMEDIATE

DESKBY 090900Z

UNCLASSIFIED

DESKBY 090900Z

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 090007Z SEP 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TEL NO 794 OF 8 SEPTEMBER 1983

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON SEOUL TOKYO UKDEL MADRID OTTAWA

CANBERRA THE HAGUE PARIS MONTREAL (FOR ICAO REP)

INFO PRIORITY BONN UKDEL NATO MOSCOW

MIPT: KOREAN AIRLINER: SECURITY COUNCIL

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF DRAFT RESOLUTION:

THE SECURITY COUNCIL,

HAVING CONSIDERED THE LETTERS DATED 1 SEPTEMBER 1983 FROM THE ACTING PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (S/15947), THE PERMANENT OBSERVER OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA (S/15949) AND THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF JAPAN (S/15950),

AND THE LETTER DATED 2 SEPTEMBER 1983 FROM THE ACTING PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF AUSTRALIA (S/15951),

GRAVELY DISTURBED THAT A CIVIL AIRLINER OF THE KOREAN AIRLINES ON AN INTERNATIONAL FLIGHT WAS SHOT DOWN BY NORTH KOREAN MILITARIES

GRAVELY DISTURBED THAT A CIVIL AIRLINER OF THE KOREAN AIRLINES ON AN INTERNATIONAL FLIGHT WAS SHOT DOWN BY SOVIET MILITARY AIRCRAFT, WITH THE LOSS OF ALL 269 PEOPLE ON BOARD,

EXPRESSING ITS SINCERE CONDOLENCES TO THE FAMILIES OF THE VICTIMS OF THE INCIDENT, AND URGING ALL PARTIES CONCERNED, AS A HUMANITARIAN GESTURE, TO ASSIST THEM IN DEALING WITH THE CONSEQUENCES OF THIS TRAGEDY,

REAFFIRMING THE RULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW THAT PROHIBIT ACTS OF VIOLENCE WHICH POSE A THREAT TO THE SAFETY OF INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION,

RECOGNISING THE RIGHT UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW TO APPROPRIATE COMPENSATION,

STRESSING THE NEED FOR A FULL AND ADEQUATE EXPLANATION OF THE FACTS OF THE INCIDENT BASED UPON IMPARTIAL INVESTIGATION,

1. DEEPLY DEPLORES THE DESTRUCTION OF THE KOREAN AIRLINER AND THE TRAGIC LOSS OF CIVILIAN LIFE THEREIN;

2. DECLARES THAT SUCH USE OF ARMED FORCE AGAINST INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION IS INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE NORMS GOVERNING INTERNATIONAL BEHAVIOUR AND ELEMENTARY CONSIDERATIONS OF HUMANITY;

3. URGES ALL STATES TO COMPLY WITH THE AIMS AND OBJECTIVES OF THE CHICAGO CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION;

4. WELCOMES THE DECISION TO CONVENE AN URGENT MEETING OF THE COUNCIL OF THE INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANISATION (ICAO) TO CONSIDER THE KOREAN AIRLINER INCIDENT;

5. URGES ALL STATES TO COOPERATE FULLY WITH THE ICAO IN EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN THE SAFETY OF INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION AND TO PREVENT ANY RECURRENCE OF SUCH USE OF ARMED FORCE AGAINST INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION;

6. INVITES THE SECRETARY GENERAL, MAKING USE OF SUCH EXPERT ADVICE AS HE DEEMS NECESSARY AND IN CONSULTATION WITH APPROPRIATE INTERNATIONAL BODIES, TO CONDUCT A FULL INVESTIGATION INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE TRAGEDY;

7. FURTHER INVITES THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO REPORT HIS FINDING TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL WITHIN FOURTEEN DAYS;

8. CALLS UPON ALL STATES TO LEND THEIR FULLEST COOPERATION TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL IN ORDER TO FACILITATE HIS INVESTIGATION PURSUANT TO THIS RESOLUTION;

9. DECIDES TO REMAIN SEIZED OF THE ISSUE.

IMMEDIATE

22  
18

KOREAN AIRLINER - ADVANCE COPIES

PS (6)  
PS/MR RIFKIND  
PS/PUS  
~~SIR J BULLARD~~  
MR EVANS  
MR JAMES  
MR ADAMS

MR COLES NO. 10 DOWNING ST  
CABINET OFFICE  
PS/ S of S FOR TRANSPORT  
(MARSHAM ST

HD/ EESD  
HD/ MAED  
HD/ NEWS D  
HD/ UND  
HD/ LEGAL ADVISERS

MR LANGLEY ) IAT/DEPT TRAN  
MR HUNT ) (Victori

RESIDENT CLERK

CONFIDENTIAL  
FM UKMIS NEW YORK 110125Z SEP 83  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TEL NO 807 OF 10 SEPTEMBER 1983  
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON PARIS

MY TEL 806: KOREAN AIRLINER: SECURITY COUNCIL

1. I HAVE CHECKED BY TELEPHONE WITH MRS KIRKPATRICK (SHE IS IN WASHINGTON) THAT SHE REMAINS SUBSTANTIALLY IN AGREEMENT WITH THE ASSESSMENTS AND JUDGEMENTS IN MY TUR. SHE DOES.

2. MRS KIRKPATRICK ATTENDED A NSC MEETING IN THE WHITE HOUSE THIS MORNING. SHE REPORTS THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN WILL BE PERSONALLY IN TOUCH WITH KING HUSSEIN IN KOREA TO ENSURE THAT THE LATTER UNDERSTANDS THAT THE US REALLY CARES AT THE TOP LEVEL. THE PRESIDENT WILL ALSO BE PARTICIPATING IN THE APPROACH TO MUGABE.

3. MRS KIRKPATRICK APPROVED THE CHANGE OF WORDING IN PARA 1 OF YOUR TEL NO 118 TO GEORGETOWN. SHE WAS GLAD THAT WE WERE PUTTING

ALSO BE PARTICIPATING IN THE APPROACH TO MOSBY.

3. MRS KIRKPATRICK APPROVED THE CHANGE OF WORDING IN PARA 1 OF YOUR TEL NO 118 TO GEORGETOWN. SHE WAS GLAD THAT WE WERE PUTTING THIS PROPOSAL TO THE GUYANESE.

4. GUYANA COULD BE IN THE PIVOTAL POSITION. WOULD YOU CONSIDER A VERY HIGH LEVEL MESSAGE OR TELEPHONE CALL TO THE GOVERNMENT OF GUYANA? MRS KIRKPATRICK DID NOT EXPLICITLY SUGGEST THIS BUT IT SEEMS EVIDENT THAT THE WHITE HOUSE WOULD BE GRATEFUL.

THOMSON

NNNN

*X ref please.*

TIM

(Message from Duty Clerk)

The FCO are recommending that the Prime Minister should speak to President Burnham of Guyana on the telephone, probably sometime this afternoon (the FCO are ringing Guyana to find out most convenient time), to talk about the UN Security Council discussion on the Korean airliner.

The Americans have not explicitly suggested that the Prime Minister should make the call, but it seems evident that the White House would be grateful. At the moment the Security Council are ranging up on how they will vote, and the people who have not yet decided are being lobbied. President Reagan has been personally in touch with King Hussein in Korea, and plans to approach President Mugabe as well.

Debbie Green

11 September 1983





10 DOWNING STREET

John

I told the Resident  
Clerk, FCO the  
Prime Minister's  
decision.

Nicky  
"19

INTERVIEW BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND GORDON FROST,  
BBC RADIO, 10 SEPTEMBER

Muxed to  
chequers  
10/9

RESPONSE TO KAL AIRLINER DISASTER

Question: What is NATO's Western European allies' response to this?

Answer: Well the position is that the majority of European countries with major civil aviation interests have agreed that Aeroflot flights to, from and over their countries should be suspended for 14 days, together with flights from their countries to the Soviet Union for the same period of 14 days.

Question: When will that start?

Answer: It will start on 15 September which is the date on which the International Civil Aviation Organisation will consider the very strong representations which we shall all be making about this incident to the Organisation.

Question: Is this an adequate response to what has been described as a barbaric international crisis?

Answer: We have been seeking to secure a rather more substantial response as have the Americans. On the other hand as well as getting the right response or the most effective response, one has to get the broadest possible response, the broadest possible number of countries supporting it. As I say, so far we have got the majority of European allies to do that and there may be others we can persuade to do it from outside Europe as well. I think one has also got to remember that no response can be sufficient to punish or secure compensation for what has happened. What has got to be done is to secure a quick response, a broadly based response and something which will as clearly as possible get home to the Soviet Union just how strongly the world feels about the monstrous thing that has taken place.

Question: It would still be true to level the charge at NATO European allies that the response is in some disarray, not united?

Answer: One could have wished for a more united response. On the other hand, I think if you compare the response on this occasion with what happened after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, after the imposition of martial law in Poland, on this occasion we have been able to secure a response which is much more prompt, much more widespread and for that reason more effective. In the last ten days or so we have seen the Soviet Union in greater public disarray and confusion, and rightly so in view of their responsibility for the dreadful thing that has happened. But for the first time we have seen them coming close to the bar of world public opinion, with high ranking Soviet officers facing interrogation from the Western media, with story after story pouring out as they try to set the record straight after falsehood<sup>after falsehood.</sup> So although nothing can be sufficient to compensate for what has happened, we have got to secure rules and effective rules to prevent such a thing ever happening again. We have been able I think to play our part in organising an impact on the Soviet Union and some impact I hope even conceivably on the people of the Soviet Union.

Question: Will President Reagan be satisfied with that level of response?

Answer: I do not think that anyone can be satisfied in a sense, because one is bound to have a feeling of hopelessness about doing <sup>being</sup> able to do more. But I think he should be encouraged by the extent to which the way he has handled this has in fact secured a broader and more united response from the allies than on previous occasions.

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BBC RADIO, 10 SEPTEMBER

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TELEGRAM FRM UKMIS NEW YORK TO FCO

TELNO 806 OF 10 SEPTEMBER

YOUR TELNO 441: KOREAN AIRLINER: SECURITY COUNCIL

The assessment in para 1 of your TUR is too pessimistic. We have seven votes (France, Netherlands, Pakistan, Togo, UK, US, Zaire). The like minded agree that there is a fighting chance of getting positive votes from Jordan and Zimbabwe given that King Hussein is presently in Korea and Mugabe in the US. I have the impression that most of the non-aligned and particularly Guyana have hitherto assumed that the Resolution would obtain nine votes and that they could therefore afford the luxury of an abstention without cost. The same could well be true of China. I do not exclude the possibility of Guyana or less probably China or Malta voting positively if they assess that it will be the ninth "yes".



*Mirrored to  
chequers*

KOREAN AIRLINER - ADVANCE COPIES 48 22

PS (6)  
PS/MR RIFKIND  
PS/PUS  
~~SIR J BULLARD~~  
MR EVANS  
MR JAMES  
MR ADAMS

MR COLES NO. 10 DOWNING ST  
CABINET OFFICE  
PS/ S of S FOR TRANSPORT  
(MARSHAM ST)

ED/ EESD  
ED/ MAED  
ED/ NEWS D  
ED/ UND  
ED/ LEGAL ADVISERS

MR LANGLEY } IAT/DEPT TRANSPORT  
MR HUNT } (Victoria St)

RESIDENT CLERK

ADVANCE COPY

IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL  
DESKBY 120900Z  
FM UKMIS NEW YORK 101654Z SEP 83  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TEL NO 806 OF 10 SEPTEMBER 1983  
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON PARIS

YOUR TEL NO 441: KOREAN AIRLINER: SECURITY COUNCIL

THE ASSESSMENT IN PARA 1 OF YOUR TUR IS TOO PESSIMISTIC. WE HAVE SEVEN VOTES (FRANCE, NETHERLANDS, PAKISTAN, TOGO, UK, US, ZAIRE). THE LIKE MINDED AGREE THAT THERE IS A FIGHTING CHANCE OF GETTING POSITIVE VOTES FROM JORDAN AND ZIMBABWE GIVEN THAT KING HUSSEIN IS PRESENTLY IN KOREA AND MUGABE IN THE US. I HAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT MOST OF THE NON-ALIGNED AND PARTICULARLY GUYANA HAVE HITHERTO ASSUMED THAT THE RESOLUTION WOULD OBTAIN NINE VOTES AND THAT THEY COULD THEREFORE AFFORD THE LUXURY OF AN ABSTENTION WITHOUT COST. THE SAME COULD WELL BE TRUE OF CHINA. I DO NOT EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY OF GUYANA OR LESS PROBABLY CHINA OR MALTA VOTING POSITIVELY IF THEY ASSESS THAT IT WILL BE THE NINTH 'YES'.

COST. THE SAME COULD WELL BE TRUE OF CHINA. I DO NOT EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY OF GUYANA OR LESS PROBABLY CHINA OR MALTA VOTING POSITIVELY IF THEY ASSESS THAT IT WILL BE THE NINTH 'YES'.

2. NEVERTHELESS THERE IS OBVIOUSLY A CONSIDERABLE CHANCE THAT ONE OR MORE OF THE WAVERERS WILL ASK FOR AMENDMENTS TO THE TEXT IF ONLY FOR FACE SAVING REASONS. ALL REPEAT ALL THE LIKE MINDED ARE AGREED THAT REASONABLE AMENDMENTS COULD AND SHOULD BE MADE TO SECURE NINE VOTES - MRS KIRKPATRICK HAS SAID SO CLEARLY BOTH IN THE LIKE MINDED GROUP AND PERSONALLY TO ME. FOR HER, DEFEAT AND COURSE (D) IN YOUR TUR ARE UNTHINKABLE. SHE HAS SPOKEN OF THE EFFECT ON US PUBLIC OPINION. SHE IS IN DIRECT TOUCH WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN.

3. THE QUESTION THEN ARISES WHAT ARE 'REASONABLE' AMENDMENTS'. THE LIKE MINDED GROUP AGREED (IT WAS I WHO SUMMED UP ON THIS POINT) THAT IT WAS PREMATURE TO RUSH AROUND OFFERING AMENDMENTS. WE SHOULD FIRST TRY THE PRESENT TEXT. IF THAT DID NOT WORK WE SHOULD THEN FIND OUT, ABOVE ALL FROM HUSSEIN AND MUGABE WHAT AMENDMENTS THEY WOULD REQUIRE. I OBSERVED WITHOUT CONTRADICTION THAT WE WERE ALL TO SOME EXTENT IN THE HANDS OF THE AMERICANS AND KOREANS WHO WOULD, IF NECESSARY, BE NEGOTIATING OVER THE WEEKEND.

4. SEVERAL POSSIBLE AMENDMENTS WERE KICKED AROUND IN THE LIKE MINDED GROUP (I.E. THE 15 CO-SPONSORS PLUS KOREA) BUT IN THE LIGHT OF PARA 3 ABOVE IT WAS CONSCIOUSLY DECIDED TO TAKE NO DECISION AT PRESENT. IT WAS RECOGNISED, HOWEVER, THAT THE GROUP MIGHT HAVE TO TAKE A COLLECTIVE DECISION AT VERY SHORT NOTICE ON MONDAY MORNING. AMONGST THE POSSIBLE AMENDMENTS DISCUSSED WERE:

A) THE IDEA IN PARA 1 OF MY TEL NO 804. THIS WAS PROPOSED BY THE US PRESUMABLY WITH THE ADVANTAGES MENTIONED IN PARA 2 OF MY TEL NO 804 IN MIND:

B) THE PAKISTANI IDEA IN PARA 2 OF MY TEL NO 805 ABOUT OPERATIVE PARA 2. IT WAS DOUBTED WHETHER THIS BY ITSELF WOULD MAKE A SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCE:

C) THE OMISSION OF ANY REFERENCE TO COMPENSATION GIVEN THAT THIS QUESTION IS IN ANY CASE BEING PURSUED THROUGH BILATERAL DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS. MRS KIRKPATRICK (US) AND LOUET (FRANCE) HAVE EACH EXPLICITLY VOLUNTEERED TO ME THAT IF NECESSARY THIS WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE.

D) THE OMISSION OF ANY REFERENCE TO SOVIET MILITARY AIRCRAFT. EVERYBODY IN THE GROUP RECOGNISES THAT THIS WOULD BE PARTICULARLY UNDERSIRABLE BUT THE UNANIMOUS THOUGH PROVISIONAL VIEW APPEARS TO BE THAT EVEN THIS WOULD BE PREFERABLE TO NO RESOLUTION OR A DEFEAT DUE TO FAILURE TO COLLECT NINE VOTES. MRS KIRKPATRICK AND LOUET HAVE EACH EXPLICITLY SAID THAT, IF NECESSARY, THIS OMISSION COULD BE ACCEPTED. HOWEVER, LOUET WAS PROBABLY SPEAKING

LOUET HAVE EACH EXPLICITLY SAID THAT, IF NECESSARY, THIS  
OMISSION COULD BE ACCEPTED. HOWEVER, LOUET WAS PROBABLY SPEAKING  
IN ADVANCE OF INSTRUCTIONS ON THIS AND ON (C) ABOVE.

5. MRS KIRKPATRICK IS NOT AT PRESENT WILLING TO CONSIDER THE  
COURSE IN PARA 6 OF YOUR TUR. SHE WOULD SAY THAT THIS IS DEFEATIST,  
SEE PARAS 1 AND 2 ABOVE.

6. THE US AND THE KOREANS ARE IN THE DRIVING SEAT PARTLY FOR OBVIOUS  
REASONS AND PARTLY BECAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT OF THE TWO VISITS  
MENTIONED ABOVE. I BELIEVE WE SHOULD LET THEM DRIVE. SEVERAL OF MY  
COLLEAGUES E.G. THE NETHERLANDS HAVE ALREADY SAID THAT THEY WOULD  
BE WILLING TO ACCEPT ANY AMENDMENTS ACCEPTABLE TO THE AMERICANS AND  
KOREANS. IF YOU AGREE, I SHOULD LIKE TO TAKE THE SAME LINE.

THOMSON

NNNN



PM/83/67

PRIME MINISTER

*I agree F-S; conclusion  
as expressed in para 9.*

*MS*

Korean Airliner

1. We discussed the instructions to Sir J Graham for the meeting of the North Atlantic Council (NAC) on 9 September.

/ I enclose a copy of his reporting telegram. It seems that there is little hope of any further change in attitudes except perhaps for Denmark and Norway. This would leave France, Greece, Spain and Turkey still dissenting.

2. If we are to implement measures on 15 September we need to decide now on their scope and duration, and to announce them on 12 September. The Germans have already publicly declared their intentions and Luxembourg is expected to do so today. I would not want us to be seen at the tail of the European group nor, in fairness to those affected, should our formal announcement be delayed beyond 12 September.

3. I think we are agreed that what is to be suspended is all Aeroflot flights to and from the UK and all British airline flights to and from the Soviet Union, together with all Soviet overflights over the UK.

4. A decision is required on the length of the suspension. We have argued for a month, but none of our European allies is willing to go beyond 14 days. Only Canada, which has already announced a 60 day one-way ban on Aeroflot flights, may want to stand on this position. (There are no flights by Canadian airlines to the Soviet Union). The US originally asked for a 60-90 day ban on all Aeroflot operations to and from our countries, and "an initial period, perhaps of 60-90 days" was mentioned in President Reagan's letter to you of 8 September. The measures agreed by the Europeans are however more substantial: our ban is a two-way one and includes overflights, which could prove a great inconvenience to Aeroflot. My impression is that in practice the Americans will not continue to press seriously for a longer suspension than their European allies as a group think appropriate.



5. I think we have three options for Monday:
- (a) ~~to~~ to announce a 14-day ban;
  - (b) ~~to~~ to announce a 30-day ban;
  - (c) to announce a 14-day ban and at the same time say that we are keeping open the possibility of an extension.
6. The advantage of a 14-day ban is that we maintain unity with the other Europeans. It is however shorter than the period for which the US originally asked. Perhaps more important, it would be shorter than the ban on British flights to the Soviet Union imposed by the British Airline Pilots' Association (BALPA), which started on 9 September and according to the announcement, is to last for 30 and possibly up to 60 days. If the Government were to ban Aeroflot flights for 14 days and BALPA stuck to 30 or 60 days, it would leave a period of 2-6 weeks during which Aeroflot would have a monopoly of the traffic between the UK and the Soviet Union in both directions. (There is in any case the risk of traffic being attracted by aircraft not involved in the ban, eg Air France. We suspect that the French are confident of being able to persuade their own pilots not to give practical effect to the IFALPA resolution). This problem would of course not arise if BALPA could be persuaded to match a 14-day Governmental ban (effectively 3 weeks in their case since their ban started earlier), or alternatively if the baggage handlers and ramp staff refused to handle Aeroflot services, thus effectively preventing their operation even after the Government ban is lifted. The intentions of the ground staff will remain unclear for at least a few days yet.
7. The advantages of 30 days are that it would be seen as a more substantial measure; and that it would offer a better prospect of persuading the airline pilots to reduce the period of their suspension to coincide with our own. On the other hand it seems that none of our European allies are willing to go beyond 14 days, and for the UK to opt alone for 30 days could attract Soviet retaliation against BA's own flights via the Soviet Union to Delhi (due to start



on 1 November) and complicate the negotiation of the overflying rights that we want to secure for Cathay Pacific and British Caledonian over the Soviet Union to Hong Kong.

8. I was originally attracted by option (c), ie an initial ban of 14 days with the explicit option to extend. On reflection, however, I think this would look indecisive, create uncertainties and merely postpone a firm decision which would be no easier to take in a fortnight's time than it is now, and perhaps harder.

9. My conclusion is that we should join others in announcing a ban of 14 days, to start on 15 September, while continuing to seek urgently for a solution to the anomaly that will arise at the end of that period if the pilots maintain their present stance.

10. At the NAC the Americans renewed three earlier requests for various sorts of inter-airline action against Aeroflot. I understand that these are being studied by the Department of Transport.

10. We hope to be in a position to convey our formal claims for compensation to the Soviet Union on 12 or 13 September, following the consultations which we have been having on this point with the Americans.

12. I should add that, so far as the UN Security Council is concerned, I have instructed Sir John Thomson in New York to continue to argue for the strongest obtainable resolution in close consultation with the Americans. A vote is expected there on Monday. I have also ensured that our delegation to the ICAO Council in Montreal is satisfactorily reinforced.

13. Finally, I consider it important to make our position clear on all this to the media. It was for that reason that I gave a radio interview at midday today to explain how much we had done to secure agreement by a majority of NATO members to a 14 day ban. We shall of course need to make a formal announcement of our own reaction to the NATO decision and, subject to your views on the above, I propose that this should be done by the Department of Transport on 12 September.

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14. I am sending copies of this minute to Tom King, colleagues in OD, and for his information, to Sir Robert Armstrong.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'Geoffrey Howe', written in a cursive style.

(GEOFFREY HOWE)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

10 September, 1983

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PS/MR RIFKIND  
PS/PUS  
SIR J BULLARD  
MR EVANS  
MR JAMES  
MR ADAMS

MR COLES NO. 10 DOWNING ST  
CABINET OFFICE  
PS/ S of S FOR TRANSPORT  
(MARSHAM ST)

HD/ EESD  
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HD/ LEGAL ADVISERS

MR LANGLEY } IAT/DEPT TRANSPORT  
MR HUNT } (Victoria St)

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FM UKDEL NATO 091950Z SEP 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO DESKBY 092100Z

TELEGRAM NUMBER 213 OF 9 SEPTEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE NATO POSTS, UKREP BRUSSELS, MOSCOW, TOKYO, SEOUL,  
INFO PRIORITY PEKING, DUBLIN,

NATO

MADRID TELNO 528: NATO DISCUSSION OF THE KOREAN AIRLINER INCIDENT

SUMMARY

1. AT THE COUNCIL MEETING THIS EVENING, THERE WAS UNANIMOUS AGREEMENT THAT THE ISSUE TRANSCENDED NATO/WARSAW PACT QUESTIONS, THAT THE MEETING SHOULD THEREFORE BE ONLY AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS, AND THAT NO NATO DECISIONS SHOULD BE TAKEN. RATHER, NATIONAL DECISIONS WOULD BE TAKEN IN THE LIGHT OF THE DISCUSSION. FRANCE, GREECE, SPAIN AND TURKEY REJECTED A MORATORIUM ON FLIGHTS, FOR VARIOUS REASONS. DENMARK AND NORWAY WERE UNCERTAIN WHETHER THEY COULD ACT.

DETAIL

2. NO ONE DISSENTED FROM THE FIRST THREE POINTS AGREED AT MADRID: THAT THERE SHOULD BE ACTION IN THE ICAO, A STRONG RESOLUTION IN THE UN, AND SUPPORT FOR SOUTH KOREA'S FIVE DEMANDS. (GREECE SPECIFIED THAT THE ICAO SHOULD ADDRESS CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY WORLD-WIDE).

3. VIEWS DIFFERED ONLY ON THE PROPOSED MORATORIUM. THE SAME MAJORITY AS IN MADRID SUPPORTED A TWO WEEK MORATORIUM. I STRESSED OUR WISH FOR THIRTY DAYS AND RESERVED THE U.K. POSITION ON EXTENDING BEYOND THE PROPOSED FOURTEEN DAYS. IT WAS AGREED THAT THE MORATORIUM SHOULD START ON 15 SEPTEMBER. THE FRG WILL ANNOUNCE THEIR MEASURES TONIGHT AND WILL SPEAK TO THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR. THEY URGED OTHERS



TONIGHT AND WILL SPEAK TO THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR. THEY URGED OTHERS TO ANNOUNCE SOON AND TO SUMMON THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR. LUXEMBOURG EXPECTED TO ANNOUNCE TOMORROW.

4. FRANCE AND GREECE REJECTED ALL IDEA OF SANCTIONS. FRANCE CONSIDERED ITS NATIONAL REACTION TO BE THE VIGOUR OF ITS CONDEMNATION AS EXPRESSED BY PRESIDENT MITTERRAND TO GROMYKO. TURKEY REITERATED THAT PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS (INCLUDING (SIC) THE MONTREUX CONVENTION) PREVENTED IT IMPOSING THE MORATORIUM, BUT MADE THE POINT THAT THERE WERE NO TURKISH FLIGHTS. SPAIN, DENMARK AND NORWAY EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT PRIVATE ACTION BY PILOTS AND OTHERS WOULD DO IN PRACTICE WHAT THEIR GOVERNMENTS MIGHT BE UNABLE TO DO, BUT THE LAST TWO INDICATED THAT THEY MIGHT JOIN A GENERAL WEST EUROPEAN MOVEMENT.

5. A MAJORITY OF SPEAKERS STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF THOSE NOT PARTICIPATING IN THE MORATORIUM PREVENTING ANY POACHING OF DIVERTED TRAFFIC. ONLY SPAIN RESERVED ITS POSITION, WHILE EXPECTING THAT ITS GOVERNMENT WOULD OFFER THE ASSURANCE THAT I SOUGHT.

6. I SOUGHT CLARIFICATION ALSO THAT THE MORATORIUM WOULD BE ON FLIGHTS BETWEEN, THROUGH AND OVER PARTICIPATING COUNTRIES (AS IN A PAPER CIRCULATED BY THE FRG DELEGATION). THERE WAS NO DISAGREEMENT, BUT I DOUBT IF THIS OR THE ASSURANCE ABOUT FLIGHTS ARE QUOTE BANKABLE UNQUOTE.

7. I SUGGESTED THAT, IN ADDITION TO WHATEVER FUTURE CONSULTATIONS MIGHT SEEM APPROPRIATE IN NATO, THE INFORMAL GROUP OF NATO AND OTHER AMBASSADORS IN WASHINGTON COULD USEFULLY CONTINUE. THERE WAS GENERAL SYMPATHY FOR THIS.

8. IN ANSWER TO DANISH AND NORWEGIAN HESITATIONS ON THE LEGAL POSITION, I OFFERED THE LINE IN PARA 2 OF YOUR TELNO 202. VISE (NORWAY) TOLD ME AFTERWARDS THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WERE ALREADY PLANNING TO USE THESE ARGUEMENTS. THE DUTCH SAID THEY WOULD ACT ON THE MORATORIUM DESPITE LEGAL UNCERTAINTIES. LUXEMBOURG EXPECTED TO OVERCOME ITS LEGAL PROBLEMS VERY SHORTLY.

9. THE AMERICAN (DOBBINS) ASKED FOR THREE OTHER MEASURES TO BE CONSIDERED, ALTHOUGH HE HAD TOLD ME THAT THIS WAS LARGELY (NEXT TWO WORDS UNDERLINED) PRO FORMA:

A) NO INTER-AIRLINE COMMUNICATION

B) NO TICKETING

C) NO HANDLING OF SHIPPING DOCUMENTS INVOLVING AEROFLOT.

WE ALL UNDERTOOK TO REPORT THESE. HE ALSO URGED ENCOURAGEMENT OF PRIVATE ACTION ALONG THE LINES OF THE PILOTS.

10. THE MOST HEATED DEBATE WAS OVER THE PRESS LINE, COMPLICATED BY THE FACT THAT THE FRG TOLD THE PRESS IN BONN THAT THE MAC WOULD BE TAKING DECISIONS. FRANCE WAS RELUCTANT TO ALLOW THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO SAY MORE THAN THAT THERE HAD BEEN AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS AND THAT NATIONS WOULD ACT INDIVIDUALLY IN THE LIGHT OF THIS DISCUSSION. IN THE EVENT, LUNS BROUGHT THE MEETING TO A CLOSE MAKING IT CLEAR THAT HE FELT ENTITLED TO SAY RATHER MORE THAN THIS (SEE M.I.F.T. FOR DETAILS OF HIS PRESS BRIEFING).

GRAHAM

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HL

Rof



10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

9 September 1983

Korean Airlines: Message from President Reagan

The Prime Minister has commented on President Reagan's message of 8 September that she would like to reply quickly and in robust terms making plain the action that we would have wished to take in response to this incident had we been able to secure wider agreement amongst our allies. I should be grateful if you could let me have a suitable draft as soon as possible.

A. J. COLES

Roger Bone, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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TEXT OF TELEGRAM FROM GEORGETOWN TO UKMIS NEW YORK

TELNO 3 OF 9 SEPTEMBER

FCO TELNO 341 TO ISLAMABAD: KOREAN AIRLINER - SECURITY COUNCIL

1. In absence of Foreign Minister (officially on leave but in office conferring by telephone with MIS UNPR and President Burnham) I called on Permanent Secretary MFA and made the points in your TUR in reasoning for support of the Resolution.

2. Gouveia, who had already seen others about same subject today including my Canadian and US colleagues, hedged. He said while his Government wholeheartedly condemned violence, the Resolution did not mention the counter-charges of the violation of air space of which Guyana (in the Venezuela context) and others, such as Zimbabwe and Nicaragua, were acutely sensitive. Given Guyana's role in the Presidency they were particularly conscious of the need to obtain consensus and it might be better to defer such a Resolution than for it to fail.

3. In short, it seems likely that Guyana will abstain.

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FM GEORGETOWN 091057Z SEP 83

TO FLASH UKMIG NEW YORK

TELEGRAM NUMBER 3 OF 9 SEPTEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE FCO, ISLAMABAD, WASHINGTON, SEOUL, TOKYO, UKDEL  
MADRID, OTTAWA, CANBERRA, THE HAGUE, PARIS, MONTREAL (FOR OCAO  
REP)

INFOR PRIORITY BONN, UKDEL NATO, MOSCOW

FCO TELNO 341 TO ISLAMABAD: KOREAN AIRLINER - SECURITY COUNCIL

1. IN ABSENCE OF FOREIGN MINISTER (OFFICIALLY ON LEAVE BUT IN OFFICE  
CONFERRING BY TELEPHONE WITH HIS UNPR AND PRESIDENT BURHAM) HE  
CALLED ON PERMANENT SECRETARY MFA AND MADE THE POINTS IN YOUR TUR  
IN REASONING FOR SUPPORT OF THE RESOLUTION.
2. GOUVEIA, WHO HAD ALREADY SEEN OTHERS ABOUT SAME SUBJECT TODAY  
INCLUDING MY CANADIAN AND US COLLEAGUES, HEDGED. HE SAID WHILE  
HIS GOVERNMENT WHOLEHEARTEDLY CONDEMNED VIOLENCE, THE RESOLUTION  
DID NOT MENTION THE COUNTER-CHARGES OF THE VIOLATION OF AIR  
SPACE OF WHICH GUYANA (IN THE VENEZUELA CONTEXT) AND OTHERS, SUCH  
AS ZIMBABWE AND NICARAGUA, WERE ACUTELY SENSITIVE. GIVEN GUYANA'S  
ROLE IN THE PRESIDENCY THEY WERE PARTICULARLY CONSIDIOUS OF THE NEED  
TO OBTAIN CONSENSUS AND IT MIGHT BE BETTER TO DEFER SUCH A  
RESOLUTION THATN FOR IT TO FAIL.
3. IN SHORT, IT SEEMS LIKELY THAT GUYANA WILL ABSTAIN.

FCO PASS ALL

LANKFORD

REPEATED AS REQUESTED

(Repetition to ~~UKDEL LANKFORD~~  
referred for departmental decision,  
repeated as requested to other posts.)

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TO FLASH UKMIS NEW YORK

TELEGRAM NUMBER 3 OF 9 SEPTEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE FCO, ISLAMABAD, WASHINGTON, SEOUL, TOKYO, UKDEL  
MADRID, OTTAWA, CANBERRA, THE HAGUE, PARIS, MONTREAL (FOR ICAO  
REP)

INFO PRIORITY BONN, UKDEL NATO, MOSCOW

FCO TELNO 341 TO ISLAMABAD: KOREAN AIRLINER - SECURITY COUNCIL

1. IN ABSENCE OF FOREIGN MINISTER (OFFICIALLY ON LEAVE BUT IN OFFICE CONFERRING BY TELEPHONE WITH HIS UNPR AND PRESIDENT BURNHAM) HE CALLED ON PERMANENT SECRETARY MFA AND MADE THE POINTS IN YOUR TURN IN REASONING FOR SUPPORT OF THE RESOLUTION.
2. GOUVENA, WHO HAD ALREADY SEEN OTHERS ABOUT SAME SUBJECT TODAY INCLUDING MY CANADIAN AND US COLLEAGUES, HEDGED. HE SAID WHILE HIS GOVERNMENT WHOLEHEARTEDLY CONDEMNED VIOLENCE, THE RESOLUTION DID NOT MENTION THE COUNTER-CHARGES OF THE VIOLATION OF AIR SPACE OF WHICH GUYANA (IN THE VENEZUELA CONTEXT) AND OTHERS, SUCH AS ZIMBABWE AND NICARAGUA, WERE ACUTELY SENSITIVE. GIVEN GUYANA'S ROLE IN THE PRESIDENCY THEY WERE PARTICULARLY CONSCIOUS OF THE NEED TO OBTAIN CONSENSUS AND IT MIGHT BE BETTER TO DEFER SUCH A RESOLUTION THATN FOR IT TO FAIL.
3. IN SHORT, IT SEEMS LIKELY THAT GUYANA WILL ABSTAIN.

FCO PASS ALL

LANKFORD

(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

( Repetition to ~~UKDEL MADRID~~  
referred for departmental decision,  
repeated as requested to other posts. )

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DESKBY F C O 091545Z SEPTEMBER

FROM MOSCOW 091510Z SEPTEMBER

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 997 OF 9 SEPTEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE UKDEL NATO, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, TOKYO, SEOUL, HONG KONG AND MADRID.

MY TELNO 991 ( NOT TO ALL ) : KOREAN AIRCRAFT.

1. THE FORMAL STATEMENT BY OGARKOV, CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF, AT TODAY'S PRESS CONFERENCE CONTAINED THE FOLLOWING NEW POINTS:

- (A) A SOVIET INTERCEPTOR AIRCRAFT " WAS GIVEN THE ORDER TO STOP THE FLIGHT OF THE INTRUDER WITH MISSILES".
- (B) " EVASIVE ACTION " BY THE AIRLINER IN THE AREA OF SAKHALIN HAD CONVINCED THE SOVIET ANTI-AIRCRAFT DEFENCE COMMAND THAT THE AIRCRAFT WAS ON A SPYING MISSION
- (C) ON THE DAY OF THE INCIDENT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT ESTABLISHED " A SPECIAL HIGHLY COMPETENT STATE COMMISSION ". THE COMMISSION'S REPORT AND CONCLUSIONS FORMED THE BASIS OF THE STATEMENT.

2. FOR THE REST, THIS STATEMENT MAINTAINED PREVIOUS SOVIET CLAIMS THAT THE ENTIRE RESPONSIBILITY LAY WITH THE U S GOVERNMENT.

DD

Ps  
Ps/Mr. Ruffin

Ps/ROS

Ps/Sops Sub  
D/Toms  
C. Marshall

Sir J. Bullard

Mr Langley  
Mr Hunt } IAI / D. Transport

Mr James

Ps/NOTO

Mr Adams

Cabinet off

Mr Evans

mf

Hel/ECSD

/MAAD

/News D

/UND

/Legal Adv

RC

2. FOR THE REST, THIS STATEMENT MAINTAINED PREVIOUS SOVIET CLAIMS THAT THE ENTIRE RESPONSIBILITY LAY WITH THE U S GOVERNMENT. SOVIET ACTIONS '' WERE CARRIED OUT IN STRICT CONFORMITY WITH THE CONSTITUTION AND LAW OF THE STATE BORDER OF THE USSR AND WITH EXISTING INTERNATIONAL REGULATIONS''. OGARKOV CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT THROUGHOUT HISTORY THE SOVIET ARMED FORCES '' HAVE BEEN DISCHARGING THEIR DUTIES WITH HONOUR '' AND , IN FUTURE, '' IF NEED BE, THEY WILL ALSO PERFORM THEIR COMBAT TASKS ''.

3. THE FOLLOWING NOTEWORTHY NEW DETAILS EMERGED FROM OGARKOV'S ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS :-

(A) THE AIRLINER WAS FIRED UPON BY SU-15 USING TWO AIR MISSILES OVER PRAVDA IN S W SAKHALIN. IT CONTINUED ITS FLIGHT, CONTACT WAS LOST , AND IT CAME DOWN OUTSIDE SOVIET TERRITORIAL WATERS AT AN UNKNOWN POINT.

(B) THE DECISION TO SHOOT DOWN THE AIRLINER WAS TAKEN BY THE REGIONAL AIR DEFENCE COMMAND. OGARKOV GAVE EVASIVE ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS ABOUT CONSULTATION WITH MOSCOW AND WHEN THE MILITARY AND POLITICAL LEADERSHIP WERE INFORMED : '' HIGHER COMMAND WAS INFORMED AT THE APPROPRIATE TIME ''.

(C) SOME WRECKAGE BUT NO BODIES HAD BEEN FOUND. EFFECTS WOULD BE HANDED OVER IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ESTABLISHED PROCEDURE. NO OBSTACLES WERE BEING PUT IN THE WAY OF OTHER NATIONS CONDUCTING A SEARCH.

(D) OGARKOV EXPLAINED RECORDING OF SOVIET PILOT'S REPORT OF SIGHTING NAVIGATION LIGHTS BY CLAIMING THAT THIS RELATED TO REPORT BY PILOT OF A SECOND SOVIET FIGHTER THAT HE HAD SIGHTED LIGHTS OF FIRST SOVIET FIGHTER AHEAD OF HIM.

(E) ASKED WHAT '' HADRD EVIDENCE '' RUSSIANS HAD THAT THE AIRLINER WAS A RECONNAISSANCE PLANE , OGARKOV CITED ONLY DEVIATION FROM ROUTE, FLIGHT PATTERN, '' COORDINATION '' OF FLIGHT WITH RC-135 AND EVASIVE MANOEUVRES.

4. FULL TEXT OF FORMAL STATEMENT IN MIFT ( NOT TO ALL).

RATFORD.

CCN PARA 3 SUB PARA (E) ASKED WHAT '' HARD EVIDENCE ''.....

NNNN

(D)

GRS357

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 091700Z

FM PCO 091630Z SEPT 83

TO IMMEDIATE UEMIS NEW YORK

TELEGRAM NUMBER 438 OF 9 SEPTEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, SEOUL, TOKYO, UKDEL MADRID, OTTAWA,  
MONTREAL (FOR ICAO REP), CANBERRA, THE HAGUE, PARIS, GEORGETOWN,  
ISLAMABAD, ANMAN, UKDEL NATO, MOSCOW

TELECON GRAY/GORE-BOOTH: KOREAN AIRLINES: SECURITY COUNCIL

1. YOU SHOULD SPEAK AFTER THE VOTE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL.  
YOU SHOULD REHEARSE AGAIN IN ANY CASE THE ARGUMENTS IN YOUR TELNO  
772, EMBELLISHING THEM AS NECESSARY TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF MORE RECENT,  
AND STILL UNSATISFACTORY, SOVIET OFFICIAL STATEMENTS  
(INCLUDING THAT REFERRED TO IN PARA 9 OF YOUR TELNO 776).
2. IF THE RESOLUTION HAS FAILED TO ATTRACT THE REQUISITE NINE  
VOTES, YOU SHOULD CONTINUE, TO  
EXPRESS REGRET AT THE INABILITY OF THE COUNCIL TO AGREE TO  
INVESTIGATE THIS TRAGIC ACCIDENT, TO NOTE THAT THE RESOLUTION AS  
TABLED BEFORE THE COUNCIL WAS NOT SET IN AN EAST/WEST CONTEXT  
BUT WAS DESIGNED TO EMPHASISE THE INTERNATIONAL CHARACTER OF THE  
REACTION TO THIS EVENT. YOU SHOULD CLOSE WITH AN EXPRESSION ON  
OF HOPE THAT THE INABILITY OF THE COUNCIL TO REACH AGREEMENT ON  
THIS TEXT DOES NOT IMPLY ANY LACK OF RESOLVE ON THE PART OF THE  
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO TAKE EFFECTIVE STEPS TO ENSURE THAT  
SUCH INCIDENTS DO NOT RECUR, THE SEARCH FOR WHICH YOU HOPE WILL  
NOW VIGOROUSLY BE PURSUED IN ICAO.
3. IF THE RESOLUTION DOES ATTRACT NINE VOTES AND THE SOVIET  
VETO, YOU SHOULD CONTINUE FORTHRIGHTLY TO CONDEMN THE SOVIET  
UNION. YOU SHOULD PULL NO PUNCHES. YOU SHOULD POINT TO THE  
VETO AS AN ATTEMPT TO SUPPRESS THE TRUE FACTS OF THE INCIDENT:



THE RESOLUTION SOUGHT MERELY TO ESTABLISH AN INDEPENDENT ENQUIRY WHICH YOU HOPED WOULD LEAD TO STEPS TO ENSURE THAT SUCH INCIDENTS DID NOT RECUR. NOW THE TRUE CALLOUSNESS OF THE SOVIET POSITION HAS BEEN MADE CLEAR TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. THE RUSSIANS' OUTRAGEOUS LACK OF CONCERN FOR THE COMMON DECENCIES OF HUMANITY HAS BROUGHT ABOUT THE INDIGNATION OF ALL PEACE-LOVING PEOPLES, AND THE NEED FOR A FULL INVESTIGATION OF THE INCIDENT, WHICH REGRETTABLY CANNOT BE CONDUCTED BY THE COUNCIL BECAUSE OF THE SOVIET VETO, BUT MUST NOW BE PURSUED IN ICAO, IS ALL THE MORE APPARENT.

RCWK

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 LEGAL ADVISERS  
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 PR/MR KIPKIN  
 PE/PUS  
 SIR J BULLARD  
 MR WRIGHT  
 MR GIFFARD  
 MR EVANS  
 MR JAMES  
 MR DONALD  
 MR ADAMS  
 MR CAPELEDGE

COPIES TO

MR LARGLEY }  
 MR J HUNT } 1st D/TRANS, VICTORIA ST  
 MR COLES NO 10 DOWNING STREET  
 SIR R ARTHURSON }  
 MR GOODALL }  
 MR PATER } CABINET OFFICE  
 MR COLVIN }  
 MR WILLIAMSON }  
 PS/S of S FOR TRANSPORT (MARSHAY ST)

CONFIDENTIAL

(D)

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CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 091700Z

FM FCO 091630Z SEPT 83

TO IMMEDIATE MEMIS NEW YORK

TELEGRAM NUMBER 438 OF 9 SEPTEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, SEOUL, TOKYO, UKDEL MADRID, OTTAWA,  
MONTREAL (FOR ICAO REP), CANBERRA, THE HAGUE, PARIS, GEORGETOWN,  
ISLAMABAD, AMMAN, UKDEL NATO, MOSCOW

TELECON GRAY/GORE-BOOTH: KOREAN AIRLINES: SECURITY COUNCIL

1. YOU SHOULD SPEAK AFTER THE VOTE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL.  
YOU SHOULD REHEARSE AGAIN IN ANY CASE THE ARGUMENTS IN YOUR TELNO  
772, EMBELLISHING THEM AS NECESSARY TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF MORE RECENT,  
AND STILL UNSATISFACTORY, SOVIET OFFICIAL STATEMENTS  
(INCLUDING THAT REFERRED TO IN PARA 9 OF YOUR TELNO 776).
2. IF THE RESOLUTION HAS FAILED TO ATTRACT THE REQUISITE NINE  
VOTES, YOU SHOULD CONTINUE, TO  
EXPRESS REGRET AT THE INABILITY OF THE COUNCIL TO AGREE TO  
INVESTIGATE THIS TRAGIC ACCIDENT, TO NOTE THAT THE RESOLUTION AS  
TABLED BEFORE THE COUNCIL WAS NOT SET IN AN EAST/WEST CONTEXT  
BUT WAS DESIGNED TO EMPHASISE THE INTERNATIONAL CHARACTER OF THE  
REACTION TO THIS EVENT. YOU SHOULD CLOSE WITH AN EXPRESSION ON  
OF HOPE THAT THE INABILITY OF THE COUNCIL TO REACH AGREEMENT ON  
THIS TEXT DOES NOT IMPLY ANY LACK OF RESOLVE ON THE PART OF THE  
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO TAKE EFFECTIVE STEPS TO ENSURE THAT  
SUCH INCIDENTS DO NOT RECUR, THE SEARCH FOR WHICH YOU HOPE WILL  
NOW VIGOROUSLY BE PURSUED IN ICAO.
3. IF THE RESOLUTION DOES ATTRACT NINE VOTES AND THE SOVIET  
VETO, YOU SHOULD CONTINUE FORTHRIGHTLY TO CONDEMN THE SOVIET  
UNION. YOU SHOULD PULL NO PUNCHES. YOU SHOULD POINT TO THE  
VETO AS AN ATTEMPT TO SUPPRESS THE TRUE FACTS OF THE INCIDENT:

1

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THE RESOLUTION SOUGHT MERELY TO ESTABLISH AN INDEPENDENT ENQUIRY WHICH YOU HOPED WOULD LEAD TO STEPS TO ENSURE THAT SUCH INCIDENTS DID NOT RECUR. NOW THE TRUE CALLOUSNESS OF THE SOVIET POSITION HAS BEEN MADE CLEAR TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. THE RUSSIANS' OUTRAGEOUS LACK OF CONCERN FOR THE COMMON DECENCIES OF HUMANITY HAS BROUGHT ABOUT THE INDIGNATION OF ALL PEACE-LOVING PEOPLES, AND THE NEED FOR A FULL INVESTIGATION OF THE INCIDENT, WHICH REGRETTABLY CANNOT BE CONDUCTED BY THE COUNCIL BECAUSE OF THE SOVIET VETO, BUT MUST NOW BE PURSUED IN ICAO, IS ALL THE MORE APPARENT.

HOME

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 SIR J BULLARD  
 MR WRIGHT  
 MR GIFFARD  
 MR EVANS  
 MR JAMES  
 MR DONALD  
 MR ADAMS  
 MR CAMERIDGE

COPIES TO

MR LANGLEY )  
 MR J HUNT ) IAP D/TRANS, VICTORIA  
 MR COLES NO 10 DOWNING STREET  
 SIR R ARMSTRONG )  
 MR GOODALL )  
 MR PACER ) CABINET OFFICE  
 MR COLVIN )  
 MR WILLIAMSON )  
 PS/S of S FOR TRANSPORT (MARSHAL

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Mufaxed to Chequers ②  
7/9



Prime Minister.

A.J.C. 8/19.

I would not have thought it difficult to relate revocation to civil aviation matters. Surely we need a new

PRIME MINISTER

ACTION AGAINST AEROFLOT

The minute of the Parliamentary Under Secretary of State, Department of Transport, yesterday referred to the possibility of challenges to use of the power to revoke permits for charter flights.

inter-related agreement on civil aviation in the context of a charter not

2. There are grounds on which the exercise of the power to revoke permits might be challenged in the courts here. A court might take the view that the Civil Aviation Act 1982 requires it to consider whether permits for Charter flights may be refused under the Convention. There would be respectable arguments to counter this.

3. As I previously advised in 1980, the powers of the Secretary of State in relation to denying permits for foreign carriers do not allow him to have regard to matters which are nothing to do with civil aviation. This limitation applies with equal force to revoking permits already granted.

4. In the present case there is a better chance of persuading an English Court that the grounds for revocation relate to civil aviation but a successful challenge could not be ruled out. The more closely the grounds for revocation are put in terms connecting revocation with civil aviation considerations the better the chance of the courts upholding the revocation.

5. There is no direct legal precedent from which one could assess the risk of legal proceedings. If the Courts found revocation ultra vires it would be difficult to resist claims for compensation for losses by tour operators and passengers



in relation to flights for which permits have been issued. This risk can also not be quantified in the absence of precedent. It might be prudent, if proceedings are instituted, to consider ex gratia payments. These would be a lesser embarrassment than a decision that the revocation was ultra vires.

6. I am copying this minute to the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, the Secretary of State for Defence and the Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Transport.

MH

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORT  
2 MARSHAM STREET LONDON SW1P 3EB

01-212 3434

John Cole Esq  
Private Secretary  
10 Downing Street  
LONDON SW1

*Prime Minister*

*DA*  
8 September 1983

*8/9*

*ms*  
Dear Mr Cole

KOREAN AIRLINER

The enclosed letter from Elizabeth Dole, the US Secretary of Transportation, to my Secretary of State was delivered to Mrs Chalker (in Tom King's absence) this lunchtime by Michael Calingaert, Minister for Economic Affairs in the American Embassy. We understand that a similar letter has been sent to some 27 countries in all.

In a brief discussion with Mr Calingaert, Mrs Chalker explained that the UK was pressing for rapid international agreement on multilateral action. She confirmed that the UK would support a strong resolution at the International Civil Aviation Organisation meeting on 15 September. The additional measures suggested in the letter would be considered though some - e.g. suspension of interlining arrangements with Aeroflot - might present considerable difficulties.

In addition to Government actions, it was explained that British Airways would be suspending flights to the USSR from Friday 9 September because of the action by the British Airline Pilots Association in support of the International Federation of Airline Pilots' Associations.

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Mr Calingaert asked if he could have information on unauthorised overflights of the UK by the USSR. Mrs Chalker undertook to see if this information could be provided.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Roger Bone (FCO), Richard Mottram (MOD), Jonathan Spencer (DTI) and Mrs Pitt (Attorney General's Office).

*Yours sincerely  
Andrew Melville*

ANDREW MELVILLE  
Private Secretary

*P.S. I also enclose the text of BA's announcement about suspension of services.*

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EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA


LONDON

September 8, 1983

Dear Secretary:

I have been asked to deliver the attached message to you from Secretary of Transportation Elizabeth H. Dole, which was received at the Embassy late last evening.

Sincerely,



John J. Louis, Jr.  
Ambassador

Enclosure

CONFIDENTIAL

The Rt. Hon. Tom King, M.P.,  
Secretary of State for Transport,  
Department of Transport,  
2 Marsham Street,  
London, S.W.1.P. 3.E.B.



CONFIDENTIAL

Message from Secretary of Transportation Elizabeth H. Dole to Secretary of State for Transport Tom King

I am writing to you as my counterpart in civil aviation regarding the attack by the Soviet Union against an unarmed commercial Korean aircraft. This attack, resulting in the loss of 269 innocent lives, calls into question the safety and security of international civil air traffic and, therefore, affects the interests of all nations. I believe there must be an appropriate united and firm response from the entire international community. As President Reagan urged in his address on September 5, "Our immediate challenge to this atrocity is to ensure that we make the skies safer..."

I know that many nations have already denounced the Soviet action; other measures can and should be taken. The Republic of Korea has called for an emergency session of the International Civil Aviation Organization Council on September 15. The United States believes it is imperative that the Council pass a strong resolution of condemnation and call for a full Soviet accounting and a thorough, impartial investigation in accordance with the provisions of the Chicago Convention. Your vigorous support is required if these actions are to succeed.

We believe that in addition individual countries should take action to impress upon the Soviets the enormity of their action and persuade them to respond satisfactorily to our collective concern for aviation safety. The Canadian action temporarily suspending all Aeroflot air services to Canada seems particularly suitable. (The U.S. suspended Aeroflot's flights to the United States in early 1982, but President Reagan has reaffirmed that suspension in the present context.) Additionally, we feel that other measures would be appropriate. These would include suspending interline arrangements with Aeroflot, the sale of tickets and cargo carriage documents for transportation that would be partly provided by Aeroflot and the honoring within each country's territory of such tickets or cargo carriage documents sold elsewhere by Aeroflot.

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-2-

The civilized nations of the world must act forcefully together to demonstrate the strength of their common concern and, most importantly, to assure the future safety of international commercial aviation. Otherwise, the safety of civil aviation for all of us remains threatened. We believe that the joint initiation of these or similar actions may bring the Soviets to account and accept responsibility for this outrage.

For these reasons, I seek your support and cooperation and I would welcome hearing from you on this matter of world importance.

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STATEMENT FROM BA

Following the instruction by IFALPA to its member associations not to operate commercial flights to Moscow.

BA is therefore unable to operate its service from Friday 9 September.

BA services to other East European countries are not affected.

BA regrets any inconvenience they may cause to passengers and hopes they will appreciate the reasons behind this decision.



SEP 1963



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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

8 September 1983

*The Prime Minister has  
seen.*

*Dear Sir,*

*DA 9/a*

Korean Airliner

I enclose the top copy of the letter from President Reagan to the Prime Minister on the above subject which was delivered by the US Embassy today. I believe you sent a copy by mufax to Chequers this morning.

We will submit a draft reply in due course.

*BFI*

*[Handwritten signature]*

*[Handwritten signature]*

(R B Bone)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT

VCC Master  
Ops



EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
LONDON

September 8, 1983

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T128/83

Dear Prime Minister:

I have been asked to forward to you the enclosed message from President Reagan regarding the Korean Airlines tragedy.

Sincerely,

for John J. Louis, Jr.  
Ambassador

Enclosure:

CONFIDENTIAL

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.,  
Prime Minister,  
10 Downing Street,  
London, S.W.1.

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PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T128/83

Dear Margaret:

The barbaric act by the Soviet Union in shooting down the civilian plane of Korean Airlines and killing 269 innocent people has aroused a worldwide storm of indignation. I am pleased that your government's statements demonstrate that you share my sense of outrage at this utterly indefensible act.

On behalf of the American people, let me express to the British people our sorrow and condolence over the loss of life in this tragic event. I note that residents of Hong Kong also perished. I am shocked and deeply saddened by this dastardly action and I know that this feeling is shared by all my countrymen. Our hearts and prayers go out to the families, friends and loved ones of those who have perished. It is a tragedy for them and for the world that innocent life should be so needlessly and cruelly taken. It should also remind us of the continuing need for cooperation and support among friends in the free world.

The question which faces us now is how, as national leaders and members of the international community, we should respond to this act against the safety of international civil aviation which directly affects all of us.

In my address to the American people, I reported on the conclusions which I had reached as a result of consultations with my key advisers and members of Congress. I made clear that while the United States would take certain measures unilaterally, such as my decision to suspend any extension of our bilateral agreement with the Soviet Union for cooperation in the field of transportation and the continuation of our suspension of Aeroflot flights to the United States, our response would be developed with other concerned countries. I also stressed that this issue was not one between the United States and the Soviet Union but one which involved the relations between the international community, as a whole, and the USSR.

In the period since we learned of this awful tragedy, we have been in close consultation with your government, both here and in London. In these private consultations, we have proposed that our friends and allies join in a suspension of Aeroflot service to their countries for an initial period, perhaps 60-90 days, until the Soviet Union

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US Declassified

responds to our concerns. During this period we should also suspend the so-called "interline" arrangements between our airlines and Aeroflot. I also believe it is essential that we continue to seek Soviet recognition of its responsibility for this egregious act and agreement to make appropriate compensation for the lives and property lost as a result of the Soviet action. A full accounting by the Soviet Union of the events which led up to the tragedy is also essential as well as their cooperation in facilitating the search efforts. Finally, as far as our governments are concerned, we should enhance our common efforts in the UN Security Council and other international organizations, particularly ICAO, both to ensure future flight safety and effectively respond to this brutal Soviet act.

There is one other area of activity underway in our countries which is of considerable importance, namely the private efforts to suspend civil aviation between the Soviet Union and the rest of the world, undertaken by groups such as airline pilots and trade unions representing workers who service aircraft in our countries. To the extent consistent with our laws and policies, I believe such popular manifestations of indignation over the Soviet act should be encouraged.

You will have noted that the Canadian Government has announced that it was suspending Aeroflot flights to Montreal for a period of 60 days and was taking other steps restricting Aeroflot's activities in Canada. We are gratified by this resolute action by the Government of Canada, and I hope that your government will be prepared to adopt analogous measures. As far as the United States is concerned, I am also asking our appropriate authorities to suspend the interline ticketing arrangements between U.S. airline companies and Aeroflot and to close the small Aeroflot office in the U.S.

The Soviet action represents a challenge to the international community. It would be a tragedy if we do not collectively respond in a resolute and clear manner to this action. At the same time, as I stressed in my speech, it is essential that we continue our efforts in the INF negotiations and START talks, and other fora to reach balanced and verifiable agreements with the Soviet Union which reduce the threat of war and contribute to enhanced international security. We will continue to work with you and other allied nations towards these objectives.

Sincerely,

/s/

Ron



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*Mufred (8/a)*

*Has to be an attachment today  
by the Embassy.*

*Noted*

EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
LONDON

September 8, 1983


cc PS  
PS/ Mr. Young  
PS/ Mr. Ritzke  
PS/ Mr. Evans  
Mr. Adams  
Mr. James  
EESD  
MAED  
Legal Att.  
FED  
NAD

*We shall have  
to reply in what  
time we wish  
we would like to  
do it - other  
not*

Dear Prime Minister:

I have been asked to forward to you the enclosed  
message from President Reagan regarding the Korean  
Airlines tragedy.

Sincerely,



*for* John J. Louis, Jr.  
Ambassador

Enclosure:

CONFIDENTIAL

Prime Minister

*This message contains  
nothing new but you  
should be aware of it.*

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.,  
Prime Minister,  
10 Downing Street,  
London, S.W.1.

*A.S.C. 8/9*

CONFIDENTIAL

FCVE SH



10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Principal Private Secretary*

8 September, 1983

Action against Aeroflot

The Prime Minister was grateful for the assessment in Mrs. Chalker's minute of 7 September of the consequences of suspension of air services to the USSR, which she has noted.

pp. F. E. R. Butler

Toby Johns, Esq.,  
Department of Transport

CONFIDENTIAL

PP SEOUL

PP TOKYO

PP UNDEL NATO

PP UKRMS NEW YORK

PP MONTREAL

PP PARIS

PP ROME

PP PEKING

PP OTTAWA

PP MOSCOW

ERS 16U

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FM SORN 081515Z SEP 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 819 OF 01 SEPTEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE UNDEL MADRID

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, SEOUL, TOKYO, UNDEL NATO, UKRMS NEW YORK, MONTREAL (FOR NCAD REPRESENTATIVE), PARIS, ROME, PEKING, OTTAWA, MOSCOW.

NY TELAS 8111 FRG REACTIONS TO SHOOTING OF SOUTH KOREAN AIRLINER

1. WE HAVE CHECKED THE GERMAN VIEW OF THE LEGAL POSITION WITH LIPPE, THE RESPONSIBLE OFFICIAL IN THE AUSWAERTIGES AMT LEGAL DEPARTMENT. LIPPE WAS EMPHATIC THAT THERE WAS NOT THE SLIGHTEST DOUBT THAT MEASURES AGAINST AEROFLOT WOULD BE LAWFUL REPRISALS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW. HE SAID THIS VIEW WAS NOT CONTROVERSIAL WITHIN THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT. BY WAY OF THE SAME POSITION AS THE GERMANS TOOK IN THE CASE OF SANCTIONS AGAINST ALGERIA FOLLOWING THE POW AIR-JACK (THOUGH, AS LIPPE SAID, THE POSITION NOW IS EVEN CLEARER), THE FACT THAT DENUNCIATION OF THE BILATERAL ASA WAS SUBJECT TO ONE YEAR'S NOTICE WAS IN LAW IRRELEVANT.

2. LIPPE EMPHASIZED THAT HE WAS ONLY EXPRESSING THE LEGAL POSITION.

A POLITICAL DECISION NOT TO APPLY SANCTIONS WOULD NOT BE BASED ON LEGAL GROUNDS.

ADVANCE COPY

(Handwritten initials in a circle)

Ps

Ps/lls/llp/llid

Ps/lls

Mr James

Mr Adams

Ps/lls/lls

Cabinet Office

Mr Langley

Mr Stewart

Hof (E-Z-S)

(M A E D)

(E Z D (C))

(W E D)

Legal Adviser

RC

(Handwritten signature)

PP SEOUL

PP TOKYO

PP UNDEL NATO

PP UNDEL NEW YORK

PP MONTREAL

PP PARIS

PP ROME

PP PEKING

PP OTTAWA

PP MOSCOW

ERS 16U

CONFIDENTIAL

FM SOON 091315Z SEP 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 019 OF 01 SEPTEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE UNDEL MADRID

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, SEOUL, TOKYO, UNDEL NATO, UNDEL NEW YORK, MONTREAL (FOR NCAO REPRESENTATIVE), PARIS, ROME, PEKING, OTTAWA, MOSCOW.

NY TEL 091315Z FRG REACTION TO SHOOTING OF SOUTH KOREAN AIRLINER

1. WE HAVE CHECKED THE GERMAN VIEW OF THE LEGAL POSITION WITH LIPPE, THE RESPONSIBLE OFFICIAL IN THE AUSWAERTIGES AMT LEGAL DEPARTMENT. LIPPE WAS EMPHATIC THAT THERE WAS NOT THE SLIGHTEST DOUBT THAT MEASURES AGAINST AEROFLOT WOULD BE LAWFUL REPRISALS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW. HE SAID THIS VIEW WAS NOT CONTROVERSIAL WITHIN THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT. BY THE SAME POSITION AS THE GERMANS TOOK IN THE CASE OF SANCTIONS AGAINST ARABIA FOLLOWING THE PAN AIR JACK (THOUGH, AS LIPPE SAID, THE POSITION NOW IS EVEN CLEARER), THE FACT THAT DENUNCIATION OF THE BILATERAL ASA IS SUBJECT TO ONE YEAR'S NOTICE WAS IN LAW IRRELEVANT.

2. LIPPE EMPHASIZED THAT HE WAS ONLY EXPRESSING THE LEGAL POSITION.

A POLITICAL DECISION NOT TO APPLY SANCTIONS SHOULD NOT BE BASED ON LEGAL GROUNDS.

ADVANCE COPY

(Handwritten initials in a circle)

Ps  
Ps/for Reflected  
Ps/105

Ps/107005  
Cabinet Office  
Mr Langley  
Mr Hunt

Mr James  
Mr Adams  
Hd (E25)  
1 M A E D  
1 E 2 0 (C)  
1 W E D  
1 Legal Advisor  
RC

(Handwritten signature)

*Mufan*

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ZZ UKMIS NEW YORK

OO WASHINGTON

OO OTTAWA

GRS 493

CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO 071320Z SEP83

TO FLASH UKMIS NEW YORK

TELEGRAM NUMBER 428 OF 7 SEPTEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, UKDEL MADRID, SEOUL, TOKYO, CANBERRA,  
OTTAWA, THE HAGUE, PARIS, MONTREAL (FOR ICAO REP OTTAWA PASS),

UKDEL NATO

ROUTINE BONN

YOUR TELNO 777: KOREAN AIRLINER: SECURITY COUNCIL

1. WE AGREE THAT THE DEBATE HAS SO FAR GONE WELL FOR THE WEST,  
AND WE ALSO AGREE WITH YOUR VIEW THAT THE SOONER WE PUT A  
RESOLUTION BEFORE THE COUNCIL THE MORE SUPPORT WE SHALL GET. WE  
ARE THEREFORE GRATEFUL FOR YOUR DRAFT RESOLUTION (WE WERE IN  
FACT ON THE POINT OF SENDING YOU ONE OURSELVES).

2. WE CONSIDER THAT THE BEST OUTCOME FROM THE SECURITY COUNCIL  
IS TO HAVE A MODERATE (AND NON-CONDEMNATORY) RESOLUTION, WHICH  
ATTRACTS THE MAXIMUM POSSIBLE SUPPORT (IE: 12 OR 13 POSITIVE  
VOTES) AND WHICH THE SOVIET UNION ARE NONETHELESS FORCED EITHER  
TO VETO OR, IF THEY BRAZENLY ABSTAIN, THEN SEEN NOT TO COMPLY  
WITH. WE THINK THAT THE LANGUAGE IN THE DRAFT IN YOUR TELNO 778  
MIGHT BE A LITTLE TOO HARSH IN TONE TO ACHIEVE THIS AND WE WOULD  
ACCORDINGLY PROPOSE VARIOUS AMENDMENTS CONTAINED IN MIFT (TO YOU  
AND WASHINGTON ONLY). WE ARE NOT NECESSARILY ATTACHED TO THE  
PRECISE LANGUAGE IN MIFT (NOT TO ALL),  
BUT IT HAS BEEN DRAFTED IN RELATIVELY  
LOW-KEY TERMS IN ORDER TO ENSURE THAT IT IS SUPPORTED BY THE  
MAXIMUM POSSIBLE NUMBER OF VOTES IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL. IT  
WOULD OBVIOUSLY BE A MAJOR SET-BACK IF THE RESOLUTION FAILED TO

*/ATTRACT*

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ATTRACT SUFFICIENT SUPPORT AND THUS SAVED THE SOVIET UNION FROM HAVING TO EXERCISE ITS VETO. WE WOULD SEE THE EXPLANATORY STATEMENTS AS BEING THE APPROPRIATE VEHICLE FOR CONDEMNATION ETC. WE THINK THAT A RESOLUTION SUCH AS THAT IN MSECONDIFT (WHICH IS THE TEXT WE WERE ABOUT TO SEND YOU) IS MORE LIKELY TO ACHIEVE THIS. IT CONTAINS TWO ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS: THE NEED FOR A FULL INVESTIGATION, AND THE NEED FOR EFFECTIVE MEASURES TO PREVENT RECURRENCE OF SUCH A TRAGEDY. WE ARE NOT UNDULY CONCERNED WHETHER OR NOT IT WOULD ATTRACT A SOVIET VETO. IF IT DID, THE SOVIET POSITION WOULD BE SHOWN CLEARLY IN ITS TRUE LIGHT. IF IT DID NOT, AND THE RESOLUTION THUS PASSED WE ASSUME THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD NOT COOPERATE AS REQUIRED IN OUR OPERATIVE PARAGRAPHS AND THAT THERE WOULD BE SCOPE FOR A TOUGHER RESOLUTION WHEN THE SECRETARY-GENERAL REPORTED BACK TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

3. YOU SHOULD DISCUSS BOTH GIFTS (NEITHER TO ALL) IN THE FIRST INSTANCE WITH THE US AND THEREAFTER THE KOREANS AND OTHERS AS YOU THINK FIT. YOU HAVE DISCRETION TO STRENGTHEN WORDING IF IT IS APPARENT THAT IN DOING SO THERE WILL BE NO DANGER OF NON-ALIGNED SLIPPAGE.

4. IT WILL BE APPARENT TO YOU FROM THIS THAT WE WISH TO CONTINUE TO AVOID WESTERN REACTIONS TO THE TRAGEDY BEING SEEN IN AN EAST/WEST CONTEXT. FOR THIS REASON, WE DO NOT CONSIDER THAT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY IS AN APPROPRIATE FORUM FOR DISCUSSION OF THIS SUBJECT. PAST GENERAL ASSEMBLY EXPERIENCE INDICATES THAT THE DESCENT INTO EAST/WEST BICKERING IS ALL TOO DIFFICULT TO AVOID, AND WE DO NOT WISH ICAO TO BECOME POLITICISED BY THE GA.

HOWE

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PS/MR RIFKIND  
PS/FUS  
SIR J BULLARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR GIFFARD  
MR EVANS  
MR JAMES  
MR DONALD  
MR ADAMS  
MR CARTLEDGE

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MR J HUNT ) IAT D/TRANS.VICTORIA ST  
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SIR R ARMSTRONG )  
MR GOODALL )  
MR FACER ) CABINET OFFICE  
MR COLVIN )  
MR WILLIAMSON )

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16225 - 1

OO WASHINGTON

RR UKMIS NEW YORK

RR OTTAWA

RR MONTREAL

GRS 214

CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO 071330Z SEPT 83  
TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1448 OF 7 SEPTEMBER  
INFO ROUTE SEOUL, TOKYO, CANBERRA, OTTAWA, THE HAGUE, PARIS,  
UKDEL MADRID, UKMIS NEW YORK, UKDEL NATO, MOSCOW, MONTREAL (FOR  
ICAO REP)

YOUR TEL NO 2488: KOREAN AIRLINER

1. COUNSELLOR ECONOMIC AT THE AMERICAN EMBASSY CALLED ON  
HEAD OF MARITIME, AVIATION AND ENVIRONMENT DEPT TO DELIVER  
AMERICAN DRAFT OF THE PROPOSED MODEL CLAIM AGAINST THE SOVIET  
UNION. TEXT IS IN MIFT.

2. IN HANDING OVER THE DRAFT, DEAL MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS  
ON INSTRUCTIONS:

(A) THE US WERE STILL CONSIDERING THE POSSIBILITY OF  
USING OTHER FORA FOR PRESENTING THE CLAIM AGAINST THE USSR,  
NOTABLY THE ICJ.

(B) THE AMERICANS WOULD HAVE LIKED TO CALL FOR THE PUNISHMENT  
OF THE INDIVIDUALS INVOLVED BUT FELT THAT THIS WOULD BE  
POINTLESS SINCE THE SOVIET UNION WERE CLEARLY PLAYING THE  
MATTER AS ONE OF STATE ACTION.

(C) THEY WERE STILL CONSIDERING WHETHER TO ASK FOR PUNITIVE  
DAMAGES RATHER THAN PURE COMPENSATION.

(D) THEY HAD DECIDED NOT TO INCLUDE A CALL FOR CORRECTIVE  
MEASURES IN THIS NOTE SINCE THEY FELT THIS WOULD BE BETTER

1

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16225 - 1

DEALT WITH IN ICAO.

GRAY TOOK NOTE AND SAID THAT THE AMERICAN DRAFT WOULD BE DULY CONSIDERED.

3. WE SHALL AIM TO INCLUDE OUR COMMENTS ON THIS PROPOSED TEXT IN OUR GENERAL RESPONSE TO THE AMERICAN NON-PAPER.

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GRS 140

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DESKBY 071600Z

FM DUBLIN 071520Z SEP 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO DESKBY 071600Z

TELEGRAM NUMBER 251 OF 7 SEPTEMBER 1983

INFO IMMEDIATE MOSCOW, WASHINGTON, TOKYO, SEOUL, UKDEL NATO,  
PARIS, BONN, MADRID, UKMIS NEW YORK

INFO SAVING OTHER NATO POSTS

MY TELNO 250 (NOT TO ALL): KOREAN AIRLINER: IRISH REACTION

1. THE DFA HAVE TOLD US THEY HAVE JUST HELD A PRESS BRIEFING  
MAKING THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

- A. THE FOREIGN MINISTER WILL GIVE A TOUGH SPEECH IN MADRID:
- B. THE IRISH DELEGATION IN NEW YORK ARE ARRANGING TO SPEAK IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE:
- C. THE IRISH ARE POSTPONING A MEETING OF THE IRISH-SOVIET JOINT ECONOMIC COMMISSION DUE IN DUBLIN AT THE END OF THE MONTH.

2. THE PRESS HAVE ALSO BEEN TOLD THAT MR BARRY WILL MEET THE

*Cabinet Office*

*Ps / No 10 DS*

*Mr Langley } DT / IAT (Victoria St)*  
*Mr Hunt }*

*Ps*

*Ps / Mr Riplund*

*Ps / PUS*

*Ms James*

*1td / (EE3)*

*1 E2D (E)*

*1 WED*

*1 MAFED*

*1 News 1*

*ms*

2. THE PRESS HAVE ALSO BEEN TOLD THAT MR BARRY WILL MEET THE  
US SECRETARY OF STATE LATER TODAY AT THE REQUEST OF THE US. (THE  
DFA ADDED THAT SHULTZ HAD MET NATO COLLEAGUES THIS MORNING AND  
THE IRISH WERE NOT PART OF THE NNA GROUP HE WOULD BE MEETING  
TOMORROW.)

FCO PLEASE PASS TO SAVING ADDRESSEES

ORR

~

NNNN

SENT AT 07/1530Z AJM

*[Faint handwritten notes and markings, possibly including dates and names, are visible in the lower half of the page.]*

GRS 60

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FM MADRID 071245Z SEPT 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 503 OF 7 SEPTEMBER

INFO PRIORITY ATHENS

INFO ROUTINE UKDEL NATO, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, MOSCOW, SEOUL  
AND EC POSTS.

YOUR TELNO 243 (NOT TO ALL): KOREAN AIRLINER.

FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY.

1. AS A RESULT OF A PERSONAL INTERVENTION BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE WITH THE GREEK FOREIGN MINISTER, FOLLOWED BY A DIFFICULT MEETING OF OFFICIALS WITH THE GREEK POLITICAL DIRECTOR OBLIGED TO REFER EVERYTHING TO ATHENS REPEAT ATHENS, HARALAMBOPOULOS DID FINALLY INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING PASSAGE IN HIS SPEECH ON BEHALF OF THE TEN TO THE CSCE CONCLUDING SESSION:-

MR CHAIRMAN,

OUR GATHERING WAS CLOUDED BY EVENTS WHICH RESULTED IN THE DETERIORATION OF THE CLIMATE OF THE CONFERENCE AND AT TIMES CAST SERIOUS DOUBTS AS TO ITS OUTCOME. THE MOST RECENT OF SUCH EVENTS IS THE DESTRUCTION OF THE KOREAN AIRLINER. IF I SAY NO MORE ON THIS SPECIFIC SUBJECT, IT IS BECAUSE I KNOW THAT MY COLLEAGUES IN THE TEN WILL WISH TO PRESENT THEIR VIEWS IN GREATER DETAIL IN THEIR STATEMENTS.

PARSONS

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GRS 368

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FM FCO 071330Z SEPT 83

TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1449 OF 7 SEPTEMBER

INFO ROUTINE SEOUL, TOKYO, CANBERRA, OTTAWA, THE HAGUE, PARIS, .  
UKDEL MADRID, UKMIS NEW YORK, UKDEL NATO, MOSCOW, MONTREAL (FOR  
ICAO REP)

MIPT: KOREAN AIRLINER

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF THE AMERICAN DRAFT OF THE PROPOSED  
MODEL CLAIM AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION:

BEGINS THE SOVIET UNION'S ACTION IN FIRING UPON AND DESTROYING  
KOREAN AIR LINES FLIGHT NO 007 WAS WRONGFUL UNDER INTERNATIONAL  
LAW AND A DIRECT VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONALLY AGREED PROCEDURES  
TO BE FOLLOWED WHEN AN AIRCRAFT INADVERTENTLY INTRUDES ON A  
STATE'S TERRITORIAL AIRSPACE. KOREAN AIR LINES FLIGHT NO 007  
AT NO TIME REPRESENTED AN ARMED THREAT TO THE TERRITORY OR  
POPULATION OF THE SOVIET UNION. SOVIET AUTHORITIES KNEW, OR  
SHOULD HAVE KNOWN, AT THE TIME OF FIRING THAT THE TARGET  
AIRCRAFT WAS A CIVILIAN AIRLINER AND THAT IT HAD ALREADY  
REENTERED, OR WAS ABOUT TO REENTER, INTERNATIONAL AIRSPACE.  
BEFORE RESORTING TO THE USE OF DEADLY FORCE, SOVIET AUTHORITIES  
SHOULD, IN ANY EVENT, HAVE EXHAUSTED ALL KNOWN WARNING  
PROCEDURES, INCLUDING THOSE SET FORTH IN ANNEX 2 TO THE  
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL AVIATION ORGANISATION AGREEMENT AND  
THOSE PUBLISHED BY THE SOVIET UNION ITSELF IN ITS AERONAUTICAL  
INFORMATION PUBLICATION OF JANUARY 1978. THEY DID NOT DO SO.  
UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, THE SOVIET UNION'S ACTION WAS  
WRONGFUL AND GIVES RISE TO RESPONSIBILITY UNDER INTERNATIONAL  
LAW TO MAKE REPARATION.

THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT THEREFORE DEMANDS THAT THE SOVIET  
UNION PROVIDE PROMPT, ADEQUATE, AND EFFECTIVE COMPENSATION TO  
THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT FOR THE LIVES OF UNITED STATES  
NATIONALS ABOARD KOREAN AIR LINES FLIGHT NO 007 AND FOR ANY  
PROPERTY OR INTEREST IN PROPERTY OF UNITED STATES NATIONALS THAT  
WAS LOST OR ADVERSELY AFFECTED AS A RESULT OF THE SOVIET UNION'S

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WRONGFUL ACTIONS. THE UNITED STATES WILL ADVISE THE SOVIET UNION AT A LATER DATE OF THE SPECIFIC LOSSES FOR WHICH THE UNITED STATES CONSIDERS THE SOVIET UNION RESPONSIBLE UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW.

THIS DEMAND IS IN ADDITION TO ANY OTHER FORM OF REDRESS THAT THE UNITED STATES MAY LAWFULLY REQUIRE FROM THE SOVIET UNION FOR ITS ACTION IN FIRING UPON AND DESTROYING KOREAN AIR LINES FLIGHT NO 007. ENDS

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ZZ UKMIS NEW YORK  
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FM FCO 071225Z SEP 83  
TO FLASH UKMIS NEW YORK  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 430 OF 7 SEPTEMBER  
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON.

KOREAN AIRLINE DISASTER.

1. SEE MIPT. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF OUR PROPOSED DRAFT  
RESOLUTION:

THE SECURITY COUNCIL

DEEPLY DEPLORING THE DESTRUCTION OF THE KAL AIRCRAFT AND THE  
TRAGIC LOSS OF CIVILIAN LIFE THEREIN,

AWARE OF THE NEED FOR A FULL INVESTIGATION OF THE INCIDENT,  
CONVINCED OF THE NEED FOR EFFECTIVE MEASURES TO BE TAKEN TO  
ENSURE THAT SUCH INCIDENTS DO NOT RECUR,

1. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, MAKING USE OF SUCH EXPERT  
ADVICE AS HE DEEMS NECESSARY, TO CONDUCT A FULL INVESTIGATION  
INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE TRAGEDY:

2. FURTHER REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO REPORT HIS  
FINDINGS TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN FOURTEEN DAYS TIME:

3. CALLS UPON ALL STATES TO ASSIST THE SECRETARY-GENERAL BY  
PROVIDING SUCH INFORMATION AS HE MAY REQUIRE EFFECTIVELY TO  
CARRY OUT HIS ENQUIRIES:

4. FURTHER CALLS UPON ALL STATES TO COOPERATE FULLY IN EFFORTS  
TO ESTABLISH PROCEDURES TO ENSURE THAT SUCH INCIDENTS DO NOT  
RECUR:

5. DECIDES TO REMAIN SEIZED OF THE ISSUE.

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FM FCO 071220Z SEP 83

TO FLASH UKMIS NEW YORK

TELEGRAM NUMBER 429 OF 7 SEPTEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

MIPT: KOREAN AIRLINER: SECURITY COUNCIL

1. PLEASE NUMBER THE PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPHS IN YOUR TELNO 778.

PREAMBULAR PARA 1: WE WOULD PREFER TO KEEP THIS SIMPLE, AND SAY MERELY 'HAVING CONSIDERED THE LETTER DATED 1 SEPTEMBER 1983 FROM THE PERMANENT OBSERVER OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA'.

PREAMBULAR PARA 2: WE DO NOT SEE THE NEED FOR THIS KIND OF PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPH. IT SHOULD THEREFORE BE DELETED.

PREAMBULAR PARA 3: SCR 337 (1973) IS NOT STRICTLY RELEVANT, AND WE THEREFORE SEE NO REASON TO REFER TO IT. DID YOU HAVE IN MIND THE DESTRUCTION OF A LIBYAN AIRCRAFT BY THE ISRAELIS IN 1973 ?

PREAMBULAR PARA 4: WE WOULD PREFER TO LINK THIS AND YOUR PREAMBULAR PARA 5 MORE CLOSELY, AND SAY 'DEEPLY DEPLORING THE TRAGIC LOSS OF LIFE INVOLVED IN THE DESTRUCTION OF A CIVIL AIRCRAFT OF KOREAN AIRLINES ON AN INTERNATIONAL FLIGHT ON 1 SEPTEMBER 1983'.

PREAMBULAR PARA 6: WE AGREE THAT SOME REFERENCE TO THE CHICAGO CONVENTION SHOULD BE MADE, BUT IT IS UNFORTUNATE THAT NEITHER THE PROVISIONS OF THE CONVENTION NOR ANNEX 2 GO QUITE AS FAR AS WE WOULD LIKE. PERHAPS DETAILED QUOTATION FROM THE CONVENTION WOULD BE MORE APPROPRIATE FOR ICAO, AND THE COUNCIL SHOULD SAY 'NOTING THE PROVISIONS OF THE CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION OF 7 DECEMBER 1944'.

PREAMBULAR PARA 7: THIS IS UNACCEPTABLE. AS A MATTER OF GENERAL POLICY, WE AND OUR ALLIES USE MILITARY AIRCRAFT TO ESCORT

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OTHERS INCLUDING CIVILIANS OUT OF SENSITIVE AREAS (E G FALKLANDS, PARTS OF NORTH ATLANTIC ETC.) THIS PARAGRAPH SHOULD BE DELETED.

PREAMBULAR PARA 8: AS EXPLAINED IN MIPT WE ARE UNHAPPY ABOUT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY CONSIDERING THIS MATTER, AND WOULD THEREFORE PREFER THIS PARAGRAPH TO BE DELETED AS WELL.

OPERATIVE PARA 1: THIS AGAIN HAS IMPLICATIONS FOR US AS IN PREAMBULAR PARA 7. WE SUGGEST 'CONDEMNS ANY THREAT OR USE OF FORCE CONTRARY TO THE CHARTER AGAINST CIVIL AIRCRAFT'.

OPERATIVE PARA 2: FOR THE REASONS ABOVE, THIS SHOULD BE REDRAFTED AS FOLLOWS: 'CALLS FOR PRACTICAL MEASURES TO BE TAKEN TO ENSURE THAT SUCH INCIDENTS DO NOT RECUR'.

OPERATIVE PARA 3: THIS WOULD BETTER READ: 'CALLS UPON THE INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANISATION TO CONSIDER THE ADOPTION OF FURTHER MEASURES TO SAFEGUARD CIVIL AIRCRAFT AGAINST A RECURRENCE OF SUCH INCIDENTS'.

OPERATIVE PARA 4: FOR THE REASONS IN MIPT, THIS SHOULD BE DELETED.

OPERATIVE PARA 5: THIS COULD ALSO IMPLY THAT THE WEST SHOULD TAKE NO ACTION AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION AS A RESULT OF THIS INCIDENT, AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE DELETED.

OPERATIVE PARA 6: WE SHOULD LIKE TO WORK INTO THE RESOLUTION THE IDEA OF A FULL ENQUIRY, AND THEREFORE SUGGEST THE DELETION OF THIS OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH AND THE INCLUSION BETWEEN YOUR OPERATIVE PARAS 1 AND 2 OF THREE NEW OPERATIVE PARAGRAPHS READING: 'REQUEST THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, MAKING USE OF SUCH EXPERT ADVICE AS HE DEEMS NECESSARY, TO CONDUCT A FULL INVESTIGATION INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE TRAGEDY' AND 'FURTHER REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO REPORT HIS FINDINGS TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN 14 DAYS' TIME' AND 'CALLS UPON ALL STATES TO ASSIST THE SECRETARY-GENERAL BY PROVIDING SUCH INFORMATION AS HE MAY REQUIRE EFFECTIVELY TO CARRY OUT HIS ENQUIRIES'.

WE WOULD ALSO LIKE TO SEE A NEW PREAMBULAR PARA AT THE END: 'DECIDES TO REMAIN SEIZED OF THE ISSUE'.

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ZZ UKMIS NEW YORK

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FM FCO 071320Z SEP83

TO FLASH UKMIS NEW YORK

TELEGRAM NUMBER 428 OF 7 SEPTEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, UKDEL MADRID, SEOUL, TOKYO, CANBERRA,  
OTTAWA, THE HAGUE, PARIS, MONTREAL (FOR ICAO REP OTTAWA PASS),

UKDEL NATO

ROUTINE BONN

YOUR TELNO 777: KOREAN AIRLINER: SECURITY COUNCIL

1. WE AGREE THAT THE DEBATE HAS SO FAR GONE WELL FOR THE WEST,  
AND WE ALSO AGREE WITH YOUR VIEW THAT THE SOONER WE PUT A  
RESOLUTION BEFORE THE COUNCIL THE MORE SUPPORT WE SHALL GET. WE  
ARE THEREFORE GRATEFUL FOR YOUR DRAFT RESOLUTION (WE WERE IN  
FACT ON THE POINT OF SENDING YOU ONE OURSELVES).

2. WE CONSIDER THAT THE BEST OUTCOME FROM THE SECURITY COUNCIL  
IS TO HAVE A MODERATE (AND NON-CONDEMNATORY) RESOLUTION, WHICH  
ATTRACTS THE MAXIMUM POSSIBLE SUPPORT (IE: 12 OR 13 POSITIVE  
VOTES) AND WHICH THE SOVIET UNION ARE NONETHELESS FORCED EITHER  
TO VETO OR, IF THEY BRAZENLY ABSTAIN, THEN SEEN NOT TO COMPLY  
WITH. WE THINK THAT THE LANGUAGE IN THE DRAFT IN YOUR TELNO 778  
MIGHT BE A LITTLE TOO HARSH IN TONE TO ACHIEVE THIS AND WE WOULD  
ACCORDINGLY PROPOSE VARIOUS AMENDMENTS CONTAINED IN MIFT (TO YOU  
AND WASHINGTON ONLY). WE ARE NOT NECESSARILY ATTACHED TO THE  
PRECISE LANGUAGE IN MIFT (NOT TO ALL),

BUT IT HAS BEEN DRAFTED IN RELATIVELY

LOW-KEY TERMS IN ORDER TO ENSURE THAT IT IS SUPPORTED BY THE  
MAXIMUM POSSIBLE NUMBER OF VOTES IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL. IT  
WOULD OBVIOUSLY BE A MAJOR SET-BACK IF THE RESOLUTION FAILED TO

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ATTRACT SUFFICIENT SUPPORT AND THUS SAVED THE SOVIET UNION FROM HAVING TO EXERCISE ITS VETO. WE WOULD SEE THE EXPLANATORY STATEMENTS AS BEING THE APPROPRIATE VEHICLE FOR CONDEMNATION ETC. WE THINK THAT A RESOLUTION SUCH AS THAT IN MSECONDIFT (WHICH IS THE TEXT WE WERE ABOUT TO SEND YOU) IS MORE LIKELY TO ACHIEVE THIS. IT CONTAINS TWO ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS: THE NEED FOR A FULL INVESTIGATION, AND THE NEED FOR EFFECTIVE MEASURES TO PREVENT RECURRENCE OF SUCH A TRAGEDY. WE ARE NOT UNDULY CONCERNED WHETHER OR NOT IT WOULD ATTRACT A SOVIET VETO. IF IT DID, THE SOVIET POSITION WOULD BE SHOWN CLEARLY IN ITS TRUE LIGHT. IF IT DID NOT, AND THE RESOLUTION THUS PASSED WE ASSUME THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD NOT COOPERATE AS REQUIRED IN OUR OPERATIVE PARAGRAPHS AND THAT THERE WOULD BE SCOPE FOR A TOUGHER RESOLUTION WHEN THE SECRETARY-GENERAL REPORTED BACK TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

3. YOU SHOULD DISCUSS BOTH MIFTS (NEITHER TO ALL) IN THE FIRST INSTANCE WITH THE

US AND THEREAFTER THE KOREANS AND OTHERS AS YOU THINK FIT. YOU HAVE DISCRETION TO STRENGTHEN WORDING IF IT IS APPARENT THAT IN DOING SO THERE WILL BE NO DANGER OF NON-ALIGNED SLIPPAGE.

4. IT WILL BE APPARENT TO YOU FROM THIS THAT WE WISH TO CONTINUE TO AVOID WESTERN REACTIONS TO THE TRAGEDY BEING SEEN IN AN EAST/WEST CONTEXT. FOR THIS REASON, WE DO NOT CONSIDER THAT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY IS AN APPROPRIATE FORUM FOR DISCUSSION OF THIS SUBJECT. PAST GENERAL ASSEMBLY EXPERIENCE INDICATES THAT THE DESCENT INTO EAST/WEST BICKERING IS ALL TOO DIFFICULT TO AVOID, AND WE DO NOT WISH ICAO TO BECOME POLITICISED BY THE GA.

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RR MONTREAL  
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FM FCO 071235Z SEPT 83  
TO IMMEDIATE OTTAWA  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 243 OF 7 SEPTEMBER  
INFO WASHINGTON, SEOUL, TOKYO, UKDEL NATO, UKMIS NEW YORK,  
MONTREAL (FOR ICAO REP) UKDEL MADRID, BONN, PARIS, ROME  
PEKING, MOSCOW

KOREAN AIRLINER : CANADIAN ACTION AGAINST AEROFLOT

1. WE UNDERSTAND FROM THE CANADIAN HIGH COMMISSION THAT THE TERMS OF THE BAN ARE THAT QUOTE AEROFLOT'S RIGHTS TO USE MONTREAL (MIRABEL) AIRPORT FOR ITS SCHEDULED AND CHARTERED FLIGHTS HAS BEEN SUSPENDED FOR A PERIOD OF 60 DAYS UNQUOTE.
2. WE TAKE IT THAT THIS IS A ONE-TIME AND FINITE SUSPENSION AND IT IS NOT PROPOSED THAT THE SUSPENSION BE REVIEWED AT THE END OF THE PERIOD (YOU WILL SEE FROM PARA 3 OF WASHINGTON TELNO 2474 THAT THE AMERICAN HAVE PROPOSED SUSPENSION FOR AN INITIAL UNDERLINED PERIOD OF 60-90 DAYS).
3. WE SHOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR YOUR COMMENTS, IF NECESSARY AFTER CONSULTING CANADIANS.

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DD 071300Z UKREP ICAO/MONTREAL

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DESKBY 071300Z

FM FCO 070935Z SEP 83

TO IMMEDIATE UKREP ICAO/MONTREAL

TELEGRAM NUMBER 11 OF 7 SEPTEMBER

RFI UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON, SEOUL, TOKYO, CANBERRA, OTTAWA,  
THE HAGUE, PARIS, UKDEL MADRID, UKDEL NATO, MOSCOW, BONN  
KOREAN AIRLINER

1. MIFT CONTAINS TEXT OF DRAFT RESOLUTION. WE ARE NOT WEDDED TO EITHER THIS EXACT FORMAT OR TO ANY PARTICULAR FORM OF WORDS (THOUGH WE HAVE DRAWN WHERE POSSIBLE IN PREVIOUS RESOLUTIONS E.G. IN 1973). WE DO, HOWEVER, ATTACH IMPORTANCE TO THE TONE OF ANY LANGUAGE USED AND TO THE PACKAGE OF ELEMENTS IN THE DRAFT.
2. WE WANT TO ATTRACT WIDESPREAD COSPONSORSHIP. (GIVEN OUR RECENT PROBLEMS IN ICAO WE WOULD PREFER NOT TO LEAD PUBLICLY ON THIS.) WE ALSO WANT TO ENSURE A MAJORITY, THE BIGGER THE BETTER, CONSISTENT WITH AN EFFECTIVE RESOLUTION. UNNECESSARILY HARSH LANGUAGE OR EXPLICIT CONDEMNATION OF THE SOVIET UNION MIGHT HINDER THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THOSE OBJECTIVES. SUCH LANGUAGE MIGHT BEST BE DEPLOYED IN DELEGATION STATEMENTS.
3. ON THE OTHER HAND, WE DO NOT WANT A RESOLUTION SO EMASCULATED AS TO BE USELESS EITHER AS AN EXPRESSION OF OUR HORROR AT WHAT HAPPENED OR AS A BASIS FOR INVESTIGATIVE ACTION AND STEPS TO ENSURE NO RECCURRENCE. WE WOULD ALSO WANT THE ICAO COUNCIL TO GIVE A STEER TO SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION IN THE ICAO ASSEMBLY. WE THINK WE CAN AND SHOULD GO FURTHER ON SUBSTANCE IN ICAO THAN IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL: THERE CAN BE NO SOVIET VETO IN ICAO SO ANY RESOLUTION PASSED SHOULD NOT BE MERELY DECLARATORY IN INTENT : AND ICAO, AS THE COMPETENT TECHNICAL BODY SHOULD BE PREPARED TO TAKE A MORE DETAILED AND COMMITTED VIEW OF THE ISSUES INVOLVED.
4. YOU SHOULD DISCUSS THE DRAFT WITH AMERICAN AND OTHER LIKE-MINDED STATES AND LET US KNOW THEIR REACTION (WITH ANY SUGGESTIONS ON LANGUAGE) TOGETHER WITH YOUR VIEWS ON ANY

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LOBBYING WHICH MIGHT BE USEFUL ESPECIALLY IN CAPITALS.

5. IN SQUARE BRACKETS FOR WASHINGTON END SQUARE BRACKETS YOU HAVE DISCRETION TO SHOW THE AMERICANS THE LINES ON WHICH WE ARE WORKING AND CHECK WHETHER OUR VIEWS COINCIDE WITH THEIRS IN THE OVERALL HANDLING OF THIS ISSUE.

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FM FCO 071000Z SEP 83

TO IMMEDIATE BONN

TELEGRAM NUMBER 443 OF 7 SEPTEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, SEOUL, TOKYO, CANBERRA, OTTAWA,

THE HAGUE, PARIS, UKDEL MADRID, UKMIS NEW YORK

INFO PRIORITY UKDEL NATO, MOSCOW, MONTREAL (FOR ICAO REP)

KOREAN AIRLINER

1. FISCHER, ECONOMIC DIRECTOR IN THE AUSWAERTIGES AUST, TELEPHONED EVANS ON 6 SEPTEMBER TO ASK HOW WE WOULD REACT TO THE REQUESTS IN THE AMERICAN NON-PAPER (WASHINGTON TELEGRAM NO 2474).

2. EVANS TOLD FISCHER THAT THE SENTIMENT IN THE FCO AT OFFICIAL LEVEL WAS THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT MUST DO SOMETHING IN THE BILATERAL FIELD, AS WELL AS SECONDING ACTION IN ICAO AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL. A RANGE OF OPTIONS HAD BEEN PUT TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE, WHO WAS IN MADRID. BUT IT WAS UNLIKELY THAT DECISIONS WOULD BE TAKEN FOR A DAY OR TWO YET. EVANS GAVE FISCHER AN OUTLINE ACCOUNT OF THE FORM AND CONTENT OF OUR CIVIL AVIATION RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION.

3. IN ANSWER TO QUESTIONS, FISCHER MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

(A) THE FRG HAD AN AIR SERVICES AGREEMENT WITH THE SOVIET UNION WHICH COULD BE DENOUNCED, BUT DENUNCIATION WOULD NOT COME INTO EFFECT IN LESS THAN 12 MONTHS.

(B) AEROFLOT OPERATED 11 FLIGHTS A WEEK TO THE FRG AND LUFTHANSA OPERATED 10 FLIGHTS A WEEK TO THE SOVIET UNION.

(C) AT HIS LEVEL, GERMAN OFFICIALS WERE STRONGLY AGAINST EITHER DENUNCIATION OR THE SUSPENSION OF THE AIR SERVICES AGREEMENT. THEY WERE ALSO AGAINST REVOCATION OF WHAT HE CALLED INTER-LINE AGREEMENTS' ABOUT COMMERCIAL ARRANGEMENTS.

4. FISCHER WENT ON TO SAY THAT HE HOPED ABOVE ALL THAT THE AMERICAN REQUESTS WOULD NOT LEAD TO A ROW AMONG THE ALLIES OF THE KIND WHICH HAD FOLLOWED THE IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS ON THE SOVIET UNION BY THE UNITED STATES IN DECEMBER 1981. HE THOUGHT

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THAT THERE WAS A REAL DANGER OF THIS.

5. FISCHER SAID THAT HE HAD SPOKEN TO PAYE IN PARIS. THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT WERE UNWILLING TO TAKE ACTION OF ANY KIND AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION SO LONG AS THE 'FACTUAL BASIS OF THE INCIDENT REMAINED UNCLEAR'.

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FM MADRID 071553Z SEP 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 504 OF 7 SEPTEMBER

AND TO PRIORITY EC POSTS, NATO POSTS, MOSCOW TOKYO SEOUL PEKING

VIENNA SOFIA PRAGUE HELSINKI EAST BERLIN HOLY SEE BUDAPEST

VALLETTA WARSAW BUCHAREST STOCKHOLM BERNE BELGRADE UKDEL STRASBOURG

CAIRO RABAT ALGIERS TUNIS BEIRUT DAMASCUS TRIPOLI TEL AVIV

~~Ps/No 10~~  
Cabinet Office

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Ps / Mr Roflund  
Ps / PUS  
Mr James  
Hd / EES D  
1 CSCE unit  
1 NATO  
RC

MY TELNO 502: KOREAN AIRLINER

1. AT THE WORKING BREAKFAST WHICH MR SHULTZ GAVE BEFORE THESE DISCUSSIONS, HE GAVE A SHORT ADDRESS TO THE ASSEMBLED MINISTERS AND DELEGATES. THIS WAS AN APPEAL FOR CONTINUED UNITY IN THE WESTERN PURSUIT OF THE CSCE PROCESS BUT CONTAINED NO NEW IDEAS.

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FM SEOUL 070705Z SEP 83

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 167 OF 07 SEPTEMBER 1983

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, UKMIS NEW YORK, UKDEL NATO,  
OTTAWA, PARIS, ROME AND CANBERRA

KOREAN AIRLINER.

1. FOREIGN MINISTER SUMMONED REPRESENTATIVES OF THOSE COUNTRIES WHO HAD LOST PEOPLE IN THE CRASH (EXCEPT JAPAN AND AMERICA WHOM HE HAD SEEN EARLIER) LAST NIGHT TO PROPOSE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A CONSULTATIVE BODY TO BE MADE UP OF THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE COUNTRIES CONCERNED. THIS WOULD ALLOW AN EXCHANGE OF OPINIONS ON SUCH MATTERS AS COMPENSATION AND HELP TO KEEP OTHERS INFORMED OF HOME GOVERNMENTS' POLICY. LEE SAID THAT THE ONLY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE IN EXISTING ARRANGEMENTS WOULD BE THAT A FORMAL BODY WOULD BE IN EXISTENCE. KOREAN AMBASSADORS IN THE COUNTRIES CONCERNED WOULD ALSO APPROACH THEIR HOST GOVERNMENTS ABOUT THIS COMMITTEE.

2. LEE EXPLAINED THAT THE KOREANS WERE CONCERNED THAT THE ACTION HAD NOW SHIFTED FROM SEOUL TO WASHINGTON AND TOKYO. THEY DID NOT WANT THE ROK'S PARAMOUNT INTEREST TO BE FORGOTTEN.

3. THERE WAS SOME DISCUSSION OF THIS PROPOSAL, WHICH CLEARLY DID NOT FIND A GREAT DEAL OF FAVOUR. THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR POINTED OUT THAT THERE WAS MUCH WIDER INTEREST INVOLVED THAN THOSE OF THE COUNTRIES WHOSE NATIONALS HAD BEEN KILLED. ALL AGREED THAT IT WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE TO GO FORWARD AS PROPOSED WITHOUT CONSULTING HOME GOVERNMENTS AND THAT PERHAPS AN INFORMAL BODY WITHOUT A TITLE WOULD BE BETTER. LEE WAS WILLING TO ACCEPT THIS BUT EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT THERE WOULD BE REGULAR MEETINGS CHAIRED EITHER BY HIM OR BY THE VICE-MINISTER.

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4. COMMENT: A PARTIAL EXPLANATION FOR THIS PROPOSAL IS THE KOREAN SENSE OF FRUSTRATION AT THEIR OWN COMPARATIVE IMPOTENCE IN THIS AFFAIR. THEY CANNOT GET AT THE SOVIET UNION DIRECTLY BUT WISH TO KEEP UP THE IMPETUS. THE PROPOSED COMMITTEE SEEMS WELL THOUGHT OUT AND TO HAVE NO PRECISE FUNCTION. I RECOMMEND, HOWEVER, THAT IT SHOULD BE AUTHORIZED TO PARTICIPATE IN ANY SUCH BODY: IT CAN ON PRESENT EVIDENCE DO NO HARM FOR US TO DEMONSTRATE OUR SUPPORT FOR THE KOREANS IN THIS WAY.

SPRECKLEY.

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FM MOSCOW 070558Z SEP 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 980 OF 7 SEP

INFO IMMEDIATE UKDEL MADRID (FOR PS TO S OF S), WASHINGTON,  
UKMIS NEW YORK, SEOUL, TOKYO

INFO PRIORITY BONN, PARIS, UKDEL NATO

INFO SAVING TO OTHER NATO POSTS, SOFIA, BELGRADE, BUCHAREST,  
BUDAPEST, EAST BERLIN, WARSAW, PRAGUE

M IN P T : KOREAN AIRCRAFT : SOVIET GOVT STATEMENT

FOLLOWING IS FULL TEXT :

"THE TASS STATEMENT, PUBLISHED ON SEPTEMBER 2 OF THIS YEAR ON INSTRUCTION OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT, ALREADY REPORTED THE RUDE VIOLATION OF THE STATE FRONTIERS OF THE SOVIET UNION BY A PLANE WHICH ON THE NIGHT OF AUGUST 31 - SEPTEMBER 1 INTRUDED INTO THE AIR SPACE OF THE USSR OVER THE KAMCHATKA PENINSULA AND THEN IN THE COURSE OF TWO HOURS HAD FLOWN OVER THE SEA OF OKHOTSK AND SAKHALIN ISLAND. IT ALSO MENTIONED THE MEASURES TAKEN BY THE ANTI-AIRCRAFT DEFENCES, BOTH GROUND AND AIR ONES, WITH THE AIM OF FORCING THE PLANE TO LAND AT ONE OF THE AIRFIELDS ON SAKHALIN ISLAND. THE SUBSEQUENT INVESTIGATION CONFIRMED THE EARLIER MENTIONED DATA AND SUPPLEMENTED IT.

THE INTRUDER PLANE ENTERED THE AIR SPACE OVER KAMCHATKA IN AN AREA WHERE A MOST IMPORTANT BASE OF THE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES OF THE USSR IS LOCATED. AT THE SAME TIME - AND THIS IS NOW ADMITTED BY THE AMERICAN SIDE - ANOTHER SPY PLANE OF THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE, A RC-135, THAT IS SIMILAR TO IT, WAS IN THE SAME AREA NEAR THE SOVIET BORDER ON THE SAME ALTITUDE.

SEVERAL SOVIET INTERCEPTOR PLANES WERE SENT ALOFT. ONE OF THEM CONTROLLED THE ACTIONS OF THE AMERICAN RC-135 PLANE. A SECOND FLEW INTO THE AREA WHERE THE INTRUDER PLANE WAS AND SIGNALLED TO IT THAT IT HAD INTRUDED INTO THE AIR SPACE OF THE USSR. THE WARNINGS WERE IGNORED.

WHEN IT WAS APPROACHING SAKHALIN ISLAND THE INTRUDER WAS AGAIN INTERCEPTED BY FIGHTER PLANES OF THE ANTI-AIRCRAFT DEFENCES. AND AGAIN ATTEMPTS WERE MADE TO ESTABLISH CONTACT WITH IT, INCLUDING WITH THE HELP OF THE KNOWN GENERAL CALL SIGNAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL EMERGENCY FREQUENCY OF 121.5 MEGACYCLES. CONTRARY TO THE FALSE CONTENTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES PRESIDENT SOVIET ANTI-AIRCRAFT DEFENCE FIGHTER PLANES ARE FITTED OUT WITH COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT IN WHICH THIS FREQUENCY IS FITTED SO THESE SIGNALS HAD TO BE RECEIVED BY THE INTRUDER PLANE, BUT IT DID NOT RESPOND TO THEM. NEITHER DID IT RESPOND, AS IT HAS BEEN SAID EARLIER, ALSO TO OTHER SIGNALS AND ACTIONS OF THE SOVIET FIGHTER PLANES.

THE SOVIET RADIO CONTROL SERVICES PICKED UP SHORT CODED RADIO SIGNALS TRANSMITTED FROM TIME TO TIME, SUCH SIGNALS THAT ARE USUALLY USED IN TRANSMITTING INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION.

THE ANTI-AIRCRAFT FORCES COMMAND OF THE AREA, HAVING ANALYZED THOROUGHLY THE ACTIONS OF THE INTRUDER PLANE...

THE ANTI-AIRCRAFT FORCES COMMAND OF THE AREA, HAVING ANALYZED THOROUGHLY THE ACTIONS OF THE INTRUDER PLANE, ITS ROUTE PASSING ALSO IN THE AREA OF SAKHALIN OVER MILITARY BASES, ARRIVED AT THE CONCLUSION THAT A RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT PERFORMING SPECIAL TASKS WAS IN THE AIR SPACE OF THE USSR. WE ARRIVED AT THIS CONCLUSION ALSO BECAUSE OF THE FACT THAT THE PLANE WAS FLYING OVER STRATEGICALLY IMPORTANT AREAS OF THE SOVIET UNION. THE FIGHTER PLANE MADE WARNING SHOTS WITH TRACER SHELLS ALONG THE ROUTE OF THE INTRUDER PLANE. SUCH A MEASURE IS ENVISAGED BY INTERNATIONAL RULES.

SINCE EVEN AFTER THIS THE INTRUDER PLANE DID NOT OBEY THE DEMAND TO FLY TO A SOVIET AIRFIELD AND TRIED TO EVADE PURSUIT, THE INTERCEPTOR-FIGHTER PLANE OF THE ANTI-AIRCRAFT DEFENCES FULFILLED THE ORDER OF THE COMMAND POST TO STOP THE FLIGHT. SUCH ACTIONS ARE FULLY IN KEEPING WITH THE LAW ON THE STATE BORDER OF THE USSR WHICH HAS BEEN PUBLISHED.

THE SOVIET PILOTS, IN STOPPING THE ACTIONS OF THE INTRUDER PLANE COULD NOT KNOW THAT IT WAS A CIVILIAN AIRCRAFT. IT WAS FLYING WITHOUT NAVIGATION LIGHTS, AT THE HEIGHT OF NIGHT, IN CONDITIONS OF BAD VISIBILITY AND WAS NOT ANSWERING THE SIGNALS. THE ASSERTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES PRESIDENT THAT SOVIET PILOTS KNEW THAT IT WAS A CIVILIAN AIRCRAFT ARE NOT IN KEEPING WITH REALITY.

DOZENS OF INTERNATIONAL AIR ROUTES PASS OVER SOVIET TERRITORY. FOREIGN PLANES HAVE BEEN FLYING THEM FOR MANY YEARS AND NOTHING HAS BEEN HAPPENING TO THEM SO FAR AS THEY OBSERVE THE RULES.

WE WILL CONTINUE TO ACT IN KEEPING WITH OUR LEGISLATION, WHICH IS FULLY IN ACCORD WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATIONS. THIS WHOLLY APPLIES TO THE QUESTION OF ENSURING THE SECURITY OF OUR BORDERS.

IT IS THE SOVEREIGN RIGHT OF EVERY STATE TO PROTECT ITS BORDERS, IN PARTICULAR, ITS AIRSPACE. THIS IS ONE OF THE COMMONLY RECOGNIZED PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ON WHICH RELATIONS BETWEEN STATES REST. SO THE U.S. PRESIDENT MAKES HIMSELF OUT AS AN IGNORAMUS SAYING, AS HE DID IN HIS ADDRESS ON SEPTEMBER 5, THAT THE SOVIET UNION GUARDS ITS BORDERS IN WHAT IT CLAIMS IS ITS AIRSPACE.

BUT THE POINT HERE, OF COURSE, IS NOT THE IGNORANCE OF ONE U.S. OFFICIAL OR ANOTHER. THE POINT IS A DELIBERATE PRE-PLANNED

BUT THE POINT HERE, OF COURSE, IS NOT THE IGNORANCE OF ONE U.S. OFFICIAL OR ANOTHER. THE POINT IS A DELIBERATE PRE-PLANNED ACTION IN AN AREA WHICH IS STRATEGICALLY IMPORTANT TO THE SOVIET UNION. THE INSTIGATORS OF THAT ACTION COULD NOT HELP REALIZING WHAT ITS OUTCOME COULD BE BUT WENT AHEAD WITH A MAJOR INTELLIGENCE OPERATION WITH THE USE, AS IS NOW BECOMING CLEAR, OF A CIVILIAN PLANE, DELIBERATELY EXPOSING ITS PASSENGERS TO MORTAL DANGER.

CAN ANYONE IMAGINE ANYTHING MORE CYNICAL THAN REAGAN'S STATEMENT THAT NO ONE WILL EVER KNOW HOW DATA WAS FED INTO THE PLANE'S COMPUTER WHICH SUBSEQUENTLY DIRECTED THE PLANE INTO SOVIET AIRSPACE TO CARRY OUT ITS SPYING MISSION. IT WAS NOT A TECHNICAL ERROR. THE PLAN WAS TO CARRY OUT WITHOUT A HITCH THE ABOVE INTELLIGENCE OPERATION BUT IF IT WAS STYMIED, TO TURN ALL THIS INTO A MAJOR POLITICAL PROVOCATION AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION.

THIS CONCLUSION IS CONFIRMED BY ALL SUBSEQUENT ACTIONS OF THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION. ITS LEADERS, INCLUDING THE U.S. PRESIDENT IN PERSON, LAUNCHED A MALICIOUS AND HOSTILE ANTI-SOVIET CAMPAIGN OVER A VERY SHORT TIME, CLEARLY USING A PRE-ARRANGED SCRIPT. ITS ESSENCE HAS BEEN REVEALED IN ITS CONCENTRATED FORM IN THE TELEVISED SPEECH OF U.S. PRESIDENT R. REAGAN ON SEPTEMBER 5 - TO TRY AND BLACKEN THE IMAGE OF THE SOVIET UNION AND DISCREDIT ITS SOCIAL SYSTEM, TO PROVOCE A FEELING OF HATRED TOWARD SOVIET PEOPLE, TO PRESENT THE AIMS OF THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE USSR IN A DISTORTED PERSPECTIVE, AND TO DISTURB

ATTENTION FROM ITS PEACE INITIATIVES.

IN A SITUATION WHEN TENSIONS AND ANTI-SOVIET HYSTERIA ARE BEING WHIPPED UP, U.S. LEADERS WOULD LIKE TO EVADE THE SOLUTION OF MAJOR INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS ON WHICH THE DESTINIES OF THE PEOPLES DEPEND. AND THE MOMENT FOR THIS PROVOCATION HAS BEEN CHOSEN PURPOSEFULLY. IT HAS BEEN STAGED PRECISELY NOW AT A TIME WHEN THE QUESTION IS BEING SOLVED WHETHER THE ARMS RACE WILL BE STOPPED AND THE THREAT OF NUCLEAR WAR REMOVED OR THIS THREAT WILL KEEP GROWING. ALL INDICATIONS ARE, INCLUDING THE MENTIONED SPEECH OF THE AMERICAN PRESIDENT, THAT THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION INTENDS TO FOLLOW THE ROAD OF INTENSIFYING CONFRONTATION WITH THE SOVIET UNION. R. REAGAN'S CREDO; TO QUOTE HIM, IS 'PEACE THROUGH STRENGTH'.

NO AMOUNT OF DISCOURSE UPON 'THE MORAL VALUES'. 'THE SPIRIT

NO AMOUNT OF DISCOURSE UPON 'THE MORAL VALUES', 'THE SPIRIT OF HUMANISM', 'THE TRAGEDY OF HUMAN LIFE' CAN COVER UP SUCH A POLICY. CAN THE STATESMEN OF THE COUNTRY WHICH DEPRIVED MILLIONS OF PEOPLE IN INDOCHINA OF THEIR LIVES IN A MOST BRUTAL MANNER, WHICH, AT ONE WITH ISRAELI AGGRESSORS, ARE KILLING THE LEBANESE AND PALESTINIANS, AND WHOSE CONSCIENCE IS BURDENED WITH TENS OF THOUSANDS OF DEATHS OF CHILEAN AND SALVADORAN PATRIOTS SPEAK OF MORALITY AND HUMANISM? THE LIST OF CRIMES COMMITTED BY AMERICAN IMPERIALISM IS A LONG ONE AND CAN BE CONTINUED.

THE PEOPLE ON THE PLANE THAT WAS USED BY AMERICAN SPECIAL SERVICES FOR THEIR DIRTY AIMS FELL VICTIM TO A FRESH CRIME.

THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT EXPRESSES REGRET OVER THE DEATH OF INNOCENT PEOPLE AND SHARES THE SORROW OF THEIR BEREAVED RELATIVES AND FRIENDS. THE ENTIRE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THIS TRAGEDY RESTS WHOLLY AND FULLY WITH THE LEADERS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. ''

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... OF AMERICAN ... DEPRIVED MILLIONS ... INDOCHINA ... LIVES ... BRUTAL MANNER ... ISRAELI AGGRESSORS ... KILLING THE LEBANESE ... PALESTINIANS ... CONSCIENCE BURDENED ... THOUSANDS OF DEATHS ... CHILEAN AND SALVADORAN PATRIOTS ... MORALITY AND HUMANISM ... CRIMES COMMITTED BY AMERICAN IMPERIALISM ...

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 TELEGRAM NUMBER 516 OF 07 SEPTEMBER  
 AND IMMEDIATE MOSCOW WASHINGTON  
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FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

SECRETARY OF STATE'S MEETING WITH GROMYKO, 7 SEPTEMBER

1. THE SECRETARY OF STATE HAD A 45 MINUTE MEETING WITH GROMYKO WHICH CENTRED ON THE KOREAN AIRLINER. MAIN POINTS AS FOLLOWS:

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2. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THE AGREEMENT THAT WE HAD JUST REACHED WAS A SMALL STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION. THE CDE WOULD PROVIDE A FRESH OPPORTUNITY FOR TAKING THE PROCESS FURTHER. BUT IMPLEMENTATION WAS IMPORTANT.

KOREAN AIRLINER  
 =====

3. HE CONTINUED THAT IN THIS CONTEXT HE WANTED TO RAISE THE KAL INCIDENT. HE HAD TO TELL GROMYKO VERY SERIOUSLY THAT THE TASS STATEMENT OF 6 SEPTEMBER WAS AMAZING AND APPALLING, BOTH IN TONE AND IN SUBSTANCE. THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE FOR THE SUGGESTION THAT THE US WAS RESPONSIBLE AND AMPLE EVIDENCE THAT IT WAS A PURELY CIVILIAN FLIGHT. THE WORLD LOOKED FOR A SOVIET EXPLANATION THAT WAS BOTH PROMPT AND CREDIBLE. THERE MUST ALSO BE COMPENSATION FOR THE VICTIMS, AND ABOVE ALL A WILLINGNESS TO TAKE STEPS TO SEE THAT SUCH A THING NEVER REOCCURRED. THE SOVIET UNION'S REPUTATION AND ITS RELATIONS WITH THE UK AND THE REST OF THE WORLD WOULD BE AFFECTED IF THIS WAS NOT SO.

4. GROMYKO REPLIED AT LENGTH. HE STRESSED THAT SOVIET TERRITORY MUST REMAIN INVIOLEABLE. HE CLAIMED THAT THE US WAS BEHIND THIS ACT: THAT THE AIRCRAFT WAS REALLY AMERICAN, NOT KOREAN: THAT IT WAS UNMISTAKEABLY NOT A CIVILIAN AIRCRAFT BUT ON AN ESPIONAGE MISSION. BRITAIN WAS IGNORING WASHINGTON'S ARROGANCE WHEN IT SPOKE OF RUSSIAN BARBARISM. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND SOVIET LAW GOVERNED SUCH CASES. 'OUR PEOPLE' HAD OBEYED BOTH. THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THIS ADMITTEDLY UNPLEASANT INCIDENT LAY WITH THOSE WHO HAD ORGANISED IT.

5. THE SECRETARY OF STATE REPLIED THAT THE EXPLANATION JUST GIVEN CONTAINED SEVERAL INCREDIBLE ASSERTIONS. HE REBUTTED THE



5. THE SECRETARY OF STATE REPLIED THAT THE EXPLANATION JUST GIVEN CONTAINED SEVERAL INCREDIBLE ASSERTIONS. HE REBUTTED THE ESPIONAGE MISSION, THE NON-CIVILIAN NATURE OF THE FLIGHT AND ITS AMERICAN RATHER THAN KOREAN CHARACTER. GROMYKO'S EXPLANATION MUST ADVERSELY AFFECT THE CONFIDENCE WHICH WAS ESSENTIAL FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF OUR RELATIONS.

THE REITMAN CASE  
=====

6. THE SECRETARY OF STATE RAISED THE REITMAN CASE (MOSCOW TEL NO 973). THE EMBASSY IN MOSCOW HAD TODAY (7 SEPTEMBER) RAISED THE CASE WITH THE MFA. GROMYKO SAID HE HAD NOT HEARD OF IT, ASKED FOR DETAILS AND PROMISED TO LOOK INTO IT.

BRITISH AND FRENCH NUCLEAR WEAPONS  
=====

7. GROMYKO INSISTED AT LENGTH THAT BRITISH AND FRENCH NUCLEAR WEAPONS MUST BE INCLUDED IN STRATEGIC ARMS TALKS, AND TOLD AN ANECDOTE PURPORTING TO SHOW THAT PRESIDENT CARTER WHEN IN OFFICE HAD SYMPATHISED WITH THIS VIEW. HE APPEALED FOR COOL JUDGMENT FROM BRITAIN. THE SECRETARY OF STATE ASSURED HIM OF OUR COOLNESS OF JUDGMENT AND REMINDED HIM OF OUR WELL KNOWN POSITION. THERE WAS NO TIME FOR FURTHER DISCUSSION, BUT THE SECRETARY OF STATE HOPED THEY COULD RESUME IT IN NEW YORK.

8. FULL RECORD FOLLOWS BY BAG.

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cc Madris



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cc Transport

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

7 September 1983

Dear Roger,

KOREAN AIRLINER

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary telephoned the Prime Minister from Madrid this afternoon. He explained that he had been discussing with NATO Foreign Ministers today the possible Western responses to the Korean airliner incident. They were somewhat divided but there had been broad agreement on the general principles that we should work for a united response, that we should concentrate on action in the aviation field and that we should make maximum use of ICAO.

But the important point of discussion was the practical action to be taken. There was agreement on the need for an early decision and a feeling that the earlier the decision was made the more countries would back it. The most likely outcome was agreement that for a specified period flights by Aeroflot to NATO countries and by airlines of NATO countries to the Soviet Union should be suspended. Some countries (for example Greece, Switzerland and Finland) would not go along with this but there was a genuine prospect of wide agreement. The main debate was about the period of suspension. Sixty days was the longest period which had been mentioned and was supported by the United States (as well as the airline pilots). At the other end of the scale one week had been mentioned. It was possible that a period of fourteen days might be agreed.

The Prime Minister agreed that speed was important. If we dithered we should be strongly condemned. She believed that the Foreign Secretary should work for the maximum period of suspension which seemed obtainable. One week would be derisory. Fourteen days seemed less than satisfactory. Tactically, we should perhaps argue for one month's suspension hoping to arrive at agreement on a three week period.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that we should of course have to consider carefully the practical implications. The Prime Minister agreed. This would involve consideration of likely Soviet retaliation in respect, for example, of our over-flights. It might be that we should unilaterally suspend our over-flights. She also wondered to what extent our airlines were insured

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against such contingencies.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that the Dutch had been inclined to argue that we should give the period of notice required by the various aviation agreements. But he and Mr. Shultz had argued that when fundamental principles had been violated such legal obligations were hardly relevant. The Prime Minister was inclined to agree with this.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that we should need to work for allied agreement tomorrow so that when he saw the neutral and non-aligned nations on Friday, Mr. Shultz could put an agreed position to them.

Summing up the conversation, the Prime Minister said that the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary should work for the longest period of suspension that he could obtain. Meanwhile, the Department of Transport should produce a most urgent assessment of the implications for our own aviation interests. But the imperative need was for early agreement amongst allied countries in Madrid.

I have conveyed orally to Andrew Melville the gist of this conversation and asked him to be in touch with you direct with a view to letting you have an assessment of the implications which can be telegraphed this evening to our delegation in Madrid. I should be grateful if this could be copied to me so that I can show it to the Prime Minister.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence) and Jonathan Spencer (Department of Trade and Industry).

*John*

*John Gals.*

R.B. Bone, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. 126/83

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

7 September 1983

Your Excellency

Thank you for your message of sympathy about the death of a United Kingdom citizen, Mr. Ian Powrie, on board the Korean Airlines aircraft shot down by a Soviet fighter. I deeply appreciate your gesture at a time when so many citizens of your own country have lost their lives.

I fully share your hope that effective measures will be taken to prevent recurrence of this tragic incident. This should be the concern of the entire international community.

May I convey through you to those citizens of your country who have lost loved ones the deepest sympathy of the British Government and people.

Yours sincerely  
Margaret Thatcher

His Excellency President Chun Doo Hwan.



59

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

7 September 1983

KOREAN AIRCRAFT

Thank you for your letter of 5 September enclosing a message to the Prime Minister from the President of the Republic of Korea about the British subject killed in the Korean aircraft incident.

The Prime Minister has signed the enclosed reply to Mr. Chun Doo Hwan. I should be grateful if you could arrange for the text to be telegraphed and for the signed letter to be delivered in due course.


A. J. COLES

John Holmes, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

HU



October, (there are no UK services before 7 November). We have the power to revoke our permissions on those flights with immediate effect. The Attorney General has advised in the past that this power can only be used for civil aviation purposes and we should have to be ready to resist challenges to the use of this power in the UK courts. HMG might thus face claims from UK tourists or the tour organisers in respect of losses on the grounds that the Government's action was unlawful; such claims could arise both in respect of tourists who became stranded and in respect of tours which could not be begun as a consequence of the ban. It is difficult to assess the potential result as no such cases have been brought in the past. But subject to the Attorney General's view, we believe we have good grounds to successfully resist such cases. Bringing home stranded tourists by alternative air or surface travel will also give rise to grave consular problems. We think that between 1,500 and 2,000 UK tourists may be in the USSR at present, and that up to 6,000 tourists may be involved between now and the end of October. There is a high percentage of students and elderly tourists in these numbers.



(iii) Scheduled Services

BA's four flights per week are likely to be stopped by BALPA for sixty days from 9 September in any case. The loss of BA's flights is reckoned by them to cost about £½ million. If we ban Aeroflot services the USSR will presumably retaliate against BA, but the effect will be no greater than that arising from BALPA action anyway. There would however be a risk of legal action on the same grounds as in the case of charter flights.

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3. Any or all of the above actions would have significant effect if other European countries do the same; but we do not yet know whether other countries will be willing to take such action. If we act on our own, any action we take will be much less effective, since Aeroflot will be able to fly their passengers to nearby points, or avoid UK airspace for overflights.

4. I am copying this minute to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, the Secretary of State for Defence and the Attorney General.



MRS LYNDA CHALKER

7 September 1983

**CONFIDENTIAL**



PARLIAMENTARY UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORT

PRIME MINISTER

ACTION AGAINST AEROFLOT

Prime Minister

*This is the assessment which I requested after your telephone conversation with the Foreign Secretary today. A.S.C. 7/9.*

1. We understand that the Legal Adviser to the Foreign Office considers that we can suspend all air services to the USSR for a limited period on the grounds that UK nationals have been killed as a result of a grave breach of international law by the Soviet Union.

2. I understand that you have asked to know what the consequence of such action would be for UK civil aviation interests. My assessment is as follows:-

(i) Overflight

Aeroflot overflies the UK about fourteen times a week in each direction on services between Moscow and Havana. We have just obtained for BA the right to overfly the USSR on their route to Delhi and Hong Kong and they are proposing to exercise this right from 1 November. We were about to arrange consultations with the Soviet Union to obtain similar rights for Cathay Pacific and British Caledonia. Clearly, if we suspend Aeroflot's overflying rights, and certainly if the suspension is maintained beyond 1 November, BA's right to overfly the Soviet Union will be at risk, and we shall not obtain rights for our other airlines. But we should be able to restore BA's rights and possibly to obtain them for others as the price for resuming Aeroflot overflights of the UK in due course. The Ministry of Defence will need to consider what to do if Aeroflot ignore the ban.

(ii) Charters

We have already approved approximately 40 charter services by Aeroflot only between now and the end of

October, (there are no UK services before 7 November). We have the power to revoke our permission on those flights with immediate effect. The Attorney General has advised in the past that this power can only be used for civil aviation purposes and we should have to be ready to resist challenges to the use of this power in the UK courts. HMG might thus face claims from UK tourists or the tour organisers in respect of losses on the grounds that the Government's action was unlawful: such claims could arise both in respect of tourists who became stranded as a consequence of the ban. It is difficult to assess the potential result as no such cases have been brought in the past. But subject to the Attorney General's view, we believe we have good grounds to successfully resist such cases. Bringing home stranded tourists by alternative air or surface travel will also give rise to grave consular problems. We think that between 1,500 and 2,000 UK tourists may be in the USSR at present, and that up to 6,000 tourists may be involved between now and the end of October. There is a high percentage of students and elderly tourists in these numbers.

(iii) Scheduled Services

BA's four flights per week are likely to be stopped by BALPA for sixty days from 9 September in any case. The loss of BA's flights is reckoned by them to cost about £<sup>3</sup>/<sub>4</sub> million. If we ban Aeroflot services the USSR will presumably retaliate against BA, but the effect will be no greater than that arising from BALPA action anyway. There would however be a risk of legal action on the same grounds as in the case of charter flights.

3. Any or all of the above actions would have significant effect if other European countries do the same; but we do not yet know whether other countries will be willing to take such action. If we act on our own, any action we take will be much less effective, since Aeroflot will be able to fly their passengers to nearby points or avoid UK airspace for overflights.

4. I am copying this minute to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, the Secretary of State for Defence and the Attorney General.

MRS LYNDA CHALKER

7 September 1983

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SIR J BULLARD

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
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*A. J. C. 7/9*

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FM WASHINGTON 062355Z SEPTEMBER, 1983

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2489 OF 6 SEPTEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE UKDEL NATO, MOSCOW, SEOUL, TOKYO, PARIS, BONN, OTTAWA AND UKDEL CSCE MADRID.

SOUTH KOREAN AIRLINER: US MEDIA REACTIONS.

1. THE SHOOTING DOWN OF THE KAL AIRCRAFT HAS DOMINATED THE US MEDIA SINCE LAST THURSDAY. THE UN DEBATE AND SHULTZ'S MEETING WITH GROMYKO WILL PROVIDE A PEG FOR CONTINUING COVERAGE.
2. THE INCIDENT AND THE FAILURE OF THE SOVIET UNION TO ACKNOWLEDGE ITS RESPONSIBILITY EVOKED UNANIMOUS OUTRAGE FROM NEWSPAPERS ACROSS THE POLITICAL SPECTRUM. FOR MOST OF THEM, IT REVEALED THE SOVIET UNION IN ITS TRUE COLOURS AND THE CONTRAST IN STANDARDS OF CIVILISATION BETWEEN EAST AND WEST. THERE WAS CONSIDERABLE COMMENT ON THE CONFUSION AND INCOMPETENCE WHICH SEEMED TO BE REVEALED BY THE FAILURE PROPERLY TO IDENTIFY THE AIRCRAFT: BUT THIS DID NOT DIMINISH THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS LEADERSHIP.

APPROVAL OF THE PRESIDENT'S

3. THERE HAS ALSO BEEN WIDESPREAD APPROVAL OF THE PRESIDENT'S HANDLING OF THE AFFAIR. THE MEDIA HAVE FED ON AND BEEN IMPRESSED BY THE INTELLIGENCE AND THE PREPAREDNESS OF THE ADMINISTRATION TO USE IT. THEY HAVE APPROVED THE PRESIDENT'S FORTHRIGHT CONDEMNATION OF THE EPISODE, AND US LEADERSHIP IN BRINGING THE SOVIET UNION TO ACCOUNT WITHIN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. BOTH THE NEW YORK TIMES AND WASHINGTON POST PRAISE THE PRESIDENT FOR ACTING IN A PRESIDENTIAL MANNER. BUT MOST NEWSPAPERS ALSO THOUGHT HE HAD ACTED WISELY IN LIMITING THE AMERICAN MEASURES IN RESPONSE, AND NOT PUTTING IN JEOPARDY THE IMPORTANT AGENDA OF ARMS CONTROL. THE BALTIMORE SUN OF 2 SEPTEMBER OBSERVED THAT QUOTE THE NATION CANNOT AFFORD TO LET EMOTIONS OF THE MOMENT DETER THE SEARCH FOR PEACEFUL SOLUTIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS.... THE WORK TOWARDS STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION MUST CONTINUE, EVEN WHEN THE HUMANITY ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE TABLE IS IN SERIOUS QUESTION UNQUOTE. ONE OR TWO COMMENTATORS OF THE NEW RIGHT HAVE CRITICISED THE PRESIDENT FOR SPEAKING LOUDLY BUT CARRYING A SMALL TWIG. DON OBERDORFER, IN THE WASHINGTON POST ON THE OTHER HAND, CAUGHT THE MORE GENERAL MOOD WHEN HE WROTE QUOTE THE OUTCRY OVER THE SHOOTING ... WILL MAKE THE RUSSIANS EVEN LESS POPULAR, AT LEAST FOR A WHILE. IT DOES NOT NECESSARILY FOLLOW, HOWEVER, THAT THE TRIGGER HAPPINESS OF SOVIET AIR DEFENCE PERSONNEL WILL ADD TO THE POPULARITY OF CONFRONTATIONAL OR TRIGGER-HAPPY POLICIES IN THE WEST. REAGAN'S MEASURED ACTIONS LAST NIGHT SEEM TO RECOGNISE THE CRUCIAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN SPEAKING IN ANGER AND ACTING IN ANGER, ESPECIALLY IN THE NUCLEAR AGE UNQUOTE.

4. THERE IS A VARIETY OF OPINION ABOUT THE LONG-TERM SIGNIFICANCE OF THE EVENT. THE WALL STREET JOURNAL ARGUES THAT THOSE IN THE WEST TOO OFTEN MAKE THE MISTAKE OF ASSUMING THAT THE RUSSIANS ARE LIKE THEMSELVES. INSTEAD OF DRIFTING BACK TOWARDS THE SEARCH FOR DIALOGUE, WE SHOULD PREPARE OURSELVES PHSYCOLOGICALLY TO FACE UP TO THE REALITY THAT UNLESS WE EXACT A PRICE, SOVIET BARBARISM WILL CONTINUE UNCHECKED. JAMES RESTON BELIEVES THE SENSE OF OUTRAGE WILL TAKE SOME TIME TO DIE, AND IS NOT LIKELY TO BE FORGOTTEN, ESPECIALLY IN THE WHITE HOUSE AND CAPITOL HILL. ANTHONY LEWIS ALSO BELIEVES THAT THE MORE POSITIVE ATMOSPHERE WHICH WAS DEVELOPING IN US/SOVIET RELATIONS IN RECENT WEEKS HAS BEEN SHATTERED BY THE SHOOTING DOWN OF THE AIRCRAFT, AND THAT THE IMMEDIATE EFFECT WILL BE TO STRENGTHEN SUPPORT IN CONGRESS FOR THE PRESIDENT'S PROGRAMME FOR NEW ARMS PROCUREMENT INCLUDING THE MORE QUOTE DUBIOUS UNQUOTE MEASURES OF NERVE GAS, MX, AND WEAPONS IN SPACE. HE CONCLUDES HOWEVER THAT AS WE LIVE ON THE SAME PLANET, ALBEIT AT ODDS WITH THE SOVIET UNION IN FUNDAMENTAL WAYS, THERE IS NO ALTERNATIVE TO THE HARD WORK OF NEGOTIATION. LESLEY GELB, THE NEW YORK TIMES'S SPECIAL CORRESPONDENT, AGREES THAT THE INCIDENT QUOTE LENDS WEIGHT TO MR REAGAN'S PORTRAYAL OF THE SOVIET UNION AS AN EVIL EMPIRE. IT STRENGTHENS HIM

OF THE SOVIET UNION AS AN EVIL EMPIRE. IT STRENGTHENS HIM POLITICALLY ON THE PENTAGON BUDGET AND CENTRAL AMERICA AND DIPLOMATICALLY IN MARSHALLING SUPPORT IN EUROPE FOR DEPLOYING NEW MISSILES. BUT IN THE LONG RUN, THE HARDER MR REAGAN COMES DOWN ON MOSCOW NOW, THE MORE DIFFICULT IT WILL BE TO IMPROVE RELATIONS LATER. BY PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION TIME, HE MAY NEED TO SHOW PROGRESS IN REDUCING THE SOVIET-AMERICAN TENSIONS AND PRODUCING AN ARMS CONTROL TREATY UNQUOTE.

5. CONDEMNATION OF THE INCIDENT BY OTHER ALLIED COUNTRIES INCLUDING THE UK, WAS REPORTED FULLY IN THE MEDIA OVER THE WEEKEND. CANADA'S DECISION TO SUSPEND AEROFLOT FLIGHTS FOR 60 DAYS AND THE POSTPONEMENT OF GROMYKO'S VISIT TO PARIS HAS BEEN PROMINENTLY CARRIED. AS YET, THERE HAS BEEN LITTLE FOCUS ON THE ALLIED RESPONSE TO US PROPOSALS FOR COORDINATED ACTION AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION.

6. IN RESPONSE TO TODAY'S TASS STATEMENT ADMITTING THAT THE SOVIET UNION SHOT THE AIRCRAFT DOWN, THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAVE ISSUED THEIR OWN STATEMENT POINTING OUT THAT THIS ADMISSION WAS BELATED AND CAME ONLY AFTER THE TRUTH HAD BEEN RECOGNISED EVERYWHERE. IN CLAIMING THE RIGHT TO SHOOT THE AIRCRAFT DOWN, THE SOVIETS WERE ASKING THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO ACCEPT THAT THEY WERE NOT BOUND BY THE SAME VALUES AND HUMAN DECENCY AS THE REST OF THE COMMUNITY. THE STATEMENT CHALLENGED CLAIMS THAT THE FIGHTER PILOT ATTEMPTED TO IDENTIFY AND CONTACT THE AIRCRAFT. THE UNITED STATES WAS TIRED OF THE SOVIET UNION'S LIES AND HALF-TRUTHS AND REITERATED ITS DEMAND FOR A FULL ACCOUNT, AN APOLOGY, COMPENSATION AND SOVIET COOPERATION IN INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO INVESTIGATE THE TRAGEDY.

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TO IMMEDIATE MADRID (FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY)

TELEGRAM NUMBER 250 OF 6 SEPTEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON : UKMIS NEW YORK

PRIORITY SEOUL : TOKYO : UKDEL NATO : MONTREAL (FOR ICAO REP) :

BONN : PARIS

ROUTINE PEKING : OTTAWA : MOSCOW

r.a.  
AR 7/9

WASHINGTON TELNO 2473 AND 2474: KOREAN AIRLINER

1. THE FOLLOWING REPRESENTS THINKING AT OFFICIAL LEVEL IN WHITEHALL ON THE POINTS IN THE US NON-PAPER (WASHINGTON TELNO 2474). THE SECRETARY OF STATE MAY WISH TO DRAW ON PARAGRAPHS 2-8 AND 12-19 BELOW IN ANY DISCUSSION AT SHULTZ'S WORKING BREAKFAST ON 7 SEPTEMBER.

GENERAL

2. WELCOME US LEAD AND THEIR DESIRE TO EXCHANGE VIEWS WITH OTHER LIKE-MINDED STATES BEFORE ANNOUNCING COORDINATED ACTION. WE VERY MUCH SHARE PRESIDENT REAGAN'S VIEW THAT WHAT WE WANT IS JUSTICE AND ACTION TO SEE THAT SUCH INCIDENTS NEVER HAPPEN AGAIN.

FULL ACCOUNTING

3. WE FULLY SUPPORT MAINTAINING STRONG PRESSURE ON THE SOVIET UNION TO GIVE A FULL ACCOUNT OF THE INCIDENT AND A THOROUGH INVESTIGATION OF WHAT HAS TRANSPIRED. WE HAVE ALREADY PUT THESE POINTS DIRECTLY TO THE RUSSIANS IN LONDON, AND REINFORCED THEM IN OUR STATEMENT IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

4. IT IS EXTREMELY UNLIKELY HOWEVER, THAT THE RUSSIANS WILL CONSCIENTIOUSLY FULFIL THEIR OBLIGATION UNDER ARTICLE 26 OF THE CHICAGO CONVENTION ('THE STATE IN WHICH THE ACCIDENT OCCURS WILL INSTITUTE AN ENQUIRY INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE ACCIDENT, IN ACCORDANCE, SO FAR AS ITS LAWS PERMIT, WITH THE PROCEDURE WHICH

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MAY BE RECOMMENDED BY THE INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANISATION'). IT IS FOR THIS REASON, SEE PARAGRAPH 14 BELOW, THAT WE ALSO FAVOUR AN ICAO MANDATED INVESTIGATION UNDER ARTICLE 55(E) WHICH WOULD ALLOW THE COUNCIL TO 'INVESTIGATE, AT THE REQUEST OF ANY CONTRACTING STATE, ANY SITUATION WHICH MAY APPEAR TO PRESENT AVOIDABLE OBSTACLES TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL AIR NAVIGATION SEMI-COLON AND, AFTER SUCH INVESTIGATION, ISSUE SUCH REPORTS AS MAY APPEAR TO IT DESIRABLE'.

CLAIMS

5. WE NOTE THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN HAS STATED THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL BE MAKING A CLAIM AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION WITHIN THE NEXT WEEK TO OBTAIN COMPENSATION FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE VICTIMS' SURVIVORS.

6. WE WOULD CERTAINLY BE PREPARED TO ASSIST THOSE CLAIMANTS FOR WHOM WE ARE RESPONSIBLE, IN EVERY WAY. WE WOULD, HOWEVER, BE GRATEFUL FOR A MORE DETAILED EXPLANATION OF HOW THE US GOVERNMENT INTENDS TO PROCEED AND THE ASSUMPTIONS ON WHICH THEY WOULD BASE THEIR ACTION.

7. ALTHOUGH AN INTERNATIONAL CLAIM IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES IS UNLIKELY TO BE AN EFFECTIVE WAY OF OBTAINING COMPENSATION, WE APPRECIATE THE POLITICAL ADVANTAGES OF PRESENTING A CLAIM, AND AT AN EARLY STAGE.

CIVIL AVIATION MEASURES

8. (LINE TO TAKE)

WE ARE URGENTLY CONSIDERING WHAT ACTION MIGHT BE TAKEN IN THE BILATERAL FIELD, INCLUDING THOSE MEASURES SUGGESTED BY THE US. NO DECISIONS HAVE BEEN TAKEN YET.

9. FOR YOUR OWN INFORMATION, SOME OF THE MINOR MEASURES (INTER-LINE ARRANGEMENTS, ETC) LIE OUTSIDE HMG'S POWERS OF DIRECTION. OFFICIALS HAVE CONSIDERED THE FOLLOWING ALTERNATIVES TO SUSPENSION OF AEROFLOT SERVICES FOR AN INITIAL PERIOD OF 60-90 DAYS:

(A) CALL FOR IMMEDIATE CONSULTATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION TO COVER OVER-FLIGHT RIGHTS, SCHEDULED AND CHARTER SERVICES AND OTHER ASPECTS OF CURRENT OPERATIONS, EG SALE OF



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TICKETS, ETC SEMI-COLON

- (B) SERVING NOTICE OF TERMINATION OF THE CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING WHICH IMPLEMENTS THE AIR SERVICES AGREEMENT (EG BY SPECIFYING THE NUMBER OF FLIGHTS A WEEK) AND SEEKING IMMEDIATE CONSULTATIONS SEMI-COLON OR
- (C) SERVING 6 MONTHS' NOTICE OF TERMINATION OF THE AIR SERVICES AGREEMENT.

10. DTP OFFICIALS SAY THAT (A) ABOVE WOULD CAUSE THEM NO PROBLEM. (B) WHICH WOULD HAVE SOME PRESENTATIONAL ADVANTAGES, WOULD NEED TO BE CONSIDERED FURTHER. (C) ALTHOUGH PRESENTATIONALLY ROBUST IN THE SHORT TERM, WOULD HAVE LITTLE IMMEDIATE EFFECT SEMI-COLON CURRENT SERVICES WOULD CONTINUE FOR AT LEAST THE SIX MONTH NOTICE OF TERMINATION, AFTER WHICH WE WOULD HAVE TO NEGOTIATE AN ASA WHICH LOOKED VERY MUCH LIKE THE PRESENT ONE.

11. DTP OFFICIALS ACCEPT THAT NONE OF THESE THREE COURSES HAS THE POLITICAL PRESENTATIONAL IMPACT OF WHAT THE AMERICANS ARE SUGGESTING, AND THEY ARE EXAMINING THE CONSEQUENCES OF A TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF OVERFLYING RIGHTS. BUT THIS WOULD BE COSTLY TO BRITISH AVIATION IN VIEW OF OUR OWN AIRLINES' REQUIREMENTS TO OVERFLY THE USSR ON CERTAIN IMPORTANT ROUTES INCLUDING TO HONG KONG. A SUSPENSION OF AEROFLOT SCHEDULED SERVICES WOULD NO DOUBT LEAD TO RETALIATION AGAINST BA SCHEDULED SERVICES. SUSPENSION OF AEROFLOT CHARTER FLIGHTS WOULD SIMILARLY LEAD TO RETALIATION AGAINST BRITANNIA AIRWAYS AND PROBABLY TO CLAIMS AGAINST HMG FROM THE UK TOURISTS AND TOUR OPERATORS CONCERNED. SINCE ANY ACTION BY OURSELVES IS LIKELY TO INVOLVE CONSIDERABLE COSTS TO OUR AVIATION INTERESTS OUR WILLINGNESS TO TAKE BILATERAL MEASURES IS INEVITABLY DEPENDENT ON THE WILLINGNESS OF OUR ALLIES TO INCUR SIMILAR COSTS. THE POSITION OF THE FRENCH AND GERMANS IS THEREFORE CRUCIAL AND THE DTP WOULD NOT RECOMMEND GOING BEYOND 9(A) UNLESS EUROPEAN PARTNERS WERE TAKING COMPARABLY SEVERE ACTION.

PRIVATE EFFORTS

12. WE HAVE NO PROBLEMS WITH WHAT THE US PROPOSE.  
INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATION

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13. WE SUPPORT ACTION ON THE ICAO COUNCIL ON 15 SEPTEMBER AND ARE READY TO PLAY A FULL PART IN ENLISTING THE SUPPORT OF OTHERS.
14. FOR THE REASONS IN PARAGRAPH 4 ABOVE WE CONSIDER THAT THE ICAO COUNCIL SHOULD SEEK AN INVESTIGATION UNDER ARTICLE 55(E). AS FAR AS POSSIBLE THE RESOLUTION SHOULD FOLLOW THE TERMS OF ANY UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION (EVEN IF VETOED BY THE RUSSIANS). SOME CARE WILL NEED TO BE TAKEN OVER THE LANGUAGE OF CONDEMNATION BOTH IN THE UN AND ICAO IN ORDER NOT TO PUT AT RISK SECURING THE NECESSARY MAJORITIES. WE EXPECT TO CO-SPONSOR BOTH RESOLUTIONS.
15. AS FAR AS THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL REOLUTION IS CONCERNED, WE WILL BE TELEGRAPHING SOME SUGGESTIONS TO UKMIS NEW YORK FOR COORDINATION WITH THE US AND OTHERS THERE.
16. IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO KNOW MORE FROM THE AMERICANS ABOUT THEIR PROPOSED GENERAL ASSEMBLY CONSIDERATION OF THE MATTER. OUR INITIAL REACTION IS THAT THIS WOULD NOT BE HELPFUL, BECAUSE IT MAY BE SEEN AS AN ATTEMPT TO PLACE THE INCIDENT IN AN EAST/WEST CONTEXT, WHICH COULD ALIENATE NON-ALIGNED SUPPORT.
17. AS FAR AS ACTION IN OTHER UN SPECIALISED AGENCIES, SUCH AS UNESCO AND ILO ARE CONCERNED, WE HAVE DOUBTS ABOUT WHAT THE US PROPOSE. THERE HAS ALWAYS BEEN STRONG OPPOSITION IN THESE BODIES TO THEIR USE FOR WHAT MIGHT BE SEEN TO BE EAST/WEST CLASHES. OUR EXPERIENCE IN DEALING WITH POLAND IN THE ILO HAS EXPOSED THE DIFFICULTIES OF SUCH EXERCISES.
18. OUR PRIVATE MEMBER (MR WHITTAKER) IN THE SUB-COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS HAS BEEN FULLY BRIEFED ON HMG'S ATTITUDE TO THE KOREAN AIRLINER INCIDENT.
19. THE UK IS NOT A MEMBER OF THE WORLD TOURISM ORGANISATION. WE CAN MAKE OUR VIEWS KNOWN ONLY INDIRECTLY THROUGH THE EUROPEAN TRAVEL COMMISSION.

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FM WASHINGTON 052002Z

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2474 OF 5 SEPTEMBER 1983

INFO SEOUL, TOKYO, UKDEL NATO, UKMIS NEW YORK, MONTREAL (FOR ICAO REP), UKDEL MADRID, BONN, PARIS, ROME, PEKING, OTTAWA, MOSCOW.

MIPT: KOREAN AIRLINER

1. FOLLIWING IS THE TEXT OF THE US NON-PAPER:

BEGINS

PROPOSED INTERNATIONAL MEASURES IN RESPONSE TO SOVIET DOWNING OF KOREAN AIRLINER

THE SOVIET ATTACK ON THE KAL PASSENGER AIRCRAFT, RESULTING IN THE LOSS OF 269 INNOCENT LIVES, CALLS FOR A UNITED, FIRM AND MEASURED RESPONSE FROM THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. THE SOVIET ACTION CALLS INTO QUESTION THE SAFETY OF INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AIR TRAFFIC, PARTICULARLY IN OR NEAR THE SOVIET UNION. THIS AFFECTS THE INTERESTS OF ALL NATIONS. THE UNITED STATES BELIEVES THAT WORLD REACTIONS SHOULD BE FOCUSED ON BRINGING THE SOVIET UNION TO ACCOUNT FOR THIS TRAGIC INCIDENT AND ON MEASURES WHICH TOGETHER WE CAN TAKE IN THE CIVIL AVIATION FIELD TO SEEM TO ENSURE THAT NO SIMILAR ATTACK OCCURS IN THE FUTURE.

WE HAVE IDENTIFIED THE FOLLOWING FIVE CATEGORIES OF MEASURES FOR WHICH WE SEEK YOUR SUPPORT. WE ALSO ENLIST YOUR VIEWS ON OTHER MEASURES WHICH MIGHT BE TAKEN EFFECTIVELY TO DEMONSTRATE THE SERIOUS CONCERN OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY FOR THE SAFETY OF CIVIL AIR TRAFFIC EVERYWHERE.

1. FULL ACCOUNTING

#### 1. FULL ACCOUNTING

OUR MOST IMMEDIATE REQUIREMENT SHOULD BE TO PRESS THE SOVIETS FOR A FULL ACCOUNTING OF THE INCIDENT, INCLUDING ACCESS TO THE CRASH SITE, RECOVERY OF THE VICTIMS, AND A THOROUGH AND IMPARTIAL INVESTIGATION OF WHAT TRANSPIRED. WE MUST LEAVE NO ROOM FOR DOUBT THAT WE EXPECT THEM TO FULFILL THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES IN THIS REGARD, INCLUDING THEIR SPECIFIC OBLIGATIONS UNDER ARTICLE 26 OF THE CHAICAGO CONVENTION. THUS FAR THEY HAVE NOT EVEN ADMITTED TO SHOOTING DOWN THE PLANE AND HAVE INVENTED LUDICROUS CLAIMS THAT THE KOREAN AIR LINES 747 WAS ON AN INTELLIGENCE MISSION. THE WORLD COMMUNITY CANNOT AFFORD TO REMAIN SILENT AND MUST INSIST ON RESPONSIBLE BEHAVIOR FROM THEM.

#### 2. CLAIMS

THE SOVIET UNION MUST ACCEPT FINANCILA RESPONSIBILITY FOR ITS ACTIONS. THE UNITED STATES WILL BE MAKING A CLAIM AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION WITHIN THE NEXT WEEK TO OBTAIN APPROPRIATE COMPENSATION FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE VICTIMS' SURVIVORS FOR LOSS OF LIFE AND PROPERTY OF U.S. CITIZENS. WE ASSUME THAT OTHER GOVERNMENTS WHOSE CITIZENS LOST THEIR LIVES WILL BE CONSIDERING MAKING SIMILAR INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION. WE BELIEVE THAT IT WOULD BE MOST EFFECTIVE IF WE COULD COORDINATE AND MAKE SIMULTANEOUS PRESENTATIONS. WE WILL PROVIDE A MODEL, INITIAL CLAIM TO THOSE GOVERNMENTS WITHIN THE NEXT FEW DAYS. MORE DETAILED CLAIMS CAN BE PRESENTED LATER.

#### 3. CIVIL AVIATION MEASURES

WE BELIEVE THAT NATIONS AROUND THE WOULD SHOULD IMMEDIATELY TAKE MEASURES TO ISOLATE SOVIET CIVIL AVIATION, I.E. AEROFLOT, FROM INTERNATIONAL AVIATION UNTIL THE SOVIET UNION RESPONDS SATISFACTORILY TO OUR COLLECTIVE CONCERNS FOR AVIATION SAFETY. THE MOST EFFECTIVE DEMONSTRATION OF OUR CONCERNS WOULD BE TO SUSPEND FOR AN INITIAL PERIOD OF 60-90 DAYS AEROFLOT'S OPERATIONS TO AND FROM THEIR TERRITORIES. WE BELIEVE THAT THIS WOULD BE AN APPROPRIATE AND MEASURED RESPONSE. AS YOU KNOW, AEROFLOT FLIGHTS TO THE UNITED STATES HAVE BEEN SUSPENDED SINCE DECEMBER, 1981. IN ADDITION, WE PROPOSE THAT WE EACH TERMINATE INTERLINE ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN OUR RESPECTIVE CARRIERS AND AEROFLOT, PROHIBIT THE SALE OF TICKETS AND ISSURANCE OF SHIPPING DOCUMENTS FOR TRANSPORTATION ANY PART OF WHICH WOULD BE PROVIDED BY AEROFLOT, AND PROHIBIT THE HONORING WITHIN EACH COUNTRY'S TERRITORY OF TICKETS OR SHIPPING DOCUMENTS SOLD ELSEWHERE BY AEROFLOT. OTHER RESTRICTIONS ON SUPPORT SERVICES OR OTHER COMMERCIAL OPPORTUNITIES FOR AEROFLOT WITHIN OUR TERRITORIES MAY BE POSSIBLE. WE WOULD, OF COURSE, NOT WANT TO TAKE ANY MEASURES WHICH COULD IN ANY WAY IMPAIR AIR TRAFFIC SAFETY. WE PROPOSE THESE MEASURES FOR AN INITIAL PERIOD DURING WHICH WE WOULD SUSTAIN OUR JOINT EFFORTS TO BRING THE SOVIETS TO ACCOUNT FOR THEIR ACTIONS AND PRESS TO OBTAIN ASSURANCES FROM THEM FOR THE SAFETY OF CIVILIAN AIR TRAFFIC OVER THEIR TERRITORY. WE ASK YOUR SUPPORT FOR THESE MEASURES AND SEEK YOUR VIEWS ON THESE OR ANY OTHER ACTIONS WHICH YOU MIGHT HAVE IN MIND.

#### 4. PRIVATE EFFORTS

YOU ARE AWARE OF THE SERIOUS CONCERN OF VARIOUS NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PRIVATE TRADE ORGANIZATIONS THAT HAVE REACTED

~~4. PRIVATE EFFORTS~~

~~YOU ARE AWARE OF THE SERIOUS CONCERN OF VARIOUS NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PRIVATE TRADE ORGANIZATIONS THAT HAVE REACTED PUBLICLY TO THE SOVIET ACTION. SUCH GROUPS HAVE TOLD US THAT THEY ARE CONSIDERING MEASURES WHICH THEY MIGHT TAKE TO ISOLATE SOVIET AVIATION. YOU MAY HAVE RECEIVED SIMILAR APPROACHES FROM INTERNATIONAL TRADE GROUPS AND YOUR OWN NATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS CONCERNED WITH CIVIL AVIATION. WE WILL BE MAINTAINING CONTACT WITH SUCH ORGANIZATIONS AND ENCOURAGE YOU TO DO THE SAME, WITH A VIEW TOWARDS SUPPORTING APPROPRIATE EFFORTS THEY MAY WISH TO UNDERTAKE, CONSISTENT WITH OUR RESPECTIVE LAWS AND POLICIES, TO EMPHASIZE THE STRONG PRIVATE AS WELL AS PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL REACTION TO THE SOVIET ATTACK ON A COMMERCIAL AIRLINER. WE SHOULD KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH TO COORDINATE OUR EFFORTS ON THIS FRONT.~~

5. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

WE MUST SUSTAIN THE EFFORTS THAT WE HAVE ALL BEGUN TO OBTAIN APPROPRIATE ACTION IN CONCERNED INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS. URGENT CONSIDERATION OF THE INCIDENT IS UNDER WAY IN THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL, AND WE WILL NEED TO WORK CLOSELY IN THAT FORUM.

WE SHOULD CONSIDER TOGETHER THE BEST MANNER OF ENSURING FULL GENERAL ASSEMBLY CONSIDERATION AND ACTION.

THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA GOVERNMENT HAS CALLED FOR AN EMERGENCY SESSION OF THE ICAO COUNCIL ON SEPTEMBER 15. WE SUPPORT THIS CALL AND ENLIST YOUR ASSISTANCE. WE BELIEVE IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT THE COUNCIL PASS A STRONG RESOLUTION OF CONDEMNATION AND CALL FOR A FULL SOVIET ACCOUNTING AND THOROUGH, IMPARTIAL INVESTIGATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CHICAGO CONVENTION. THERE SHOULD BE A PROMPT REPORT TO THE COUNCIL BY THE ICAO SECRETARY GENERAL. YOUR STRONG SUPPORT IN THESE ACTIONS WILL BE ESSENTIAL IF THEY ARE TO SUCCEED. WE WILL ALSO NEED YOUR HELP IN ENLISTING THE SUPPORT OF OTHERS. WE SHOULD ALSO CONSIDER POSSIBLE ACTIONS IN OTHER INTERNATIONAL FORA SUCH AS UNESCO WHICH COULD INVESTIGATE THE SCIENTIFIC ASPECTS OF THE INCIDENT, THE ILO WHICH COULD ADVOCATE A BOYCOTT OF SOVIET TRANSPORTATION, AND THE SUBCOMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN WHICH OUR RESPECTIVE PRIVATE MEMBERS MIGHT WISH TO EXPRESS THEIR CONDEMNATION OF THE SOVIET ACTION AND THE SOVIET UNION'S RESPONSIBILITY TO PROVIDE A FULL ACCOUNTING, INVESTIGATE AND REPORT TO THE WORLD COMMUNITY, AND PROVIDE COMPENSATION FOR THE LOSS OF LIFE AND PROPERTY WHICH IT HAS CAUSED. WE SHOULD ASK THE WORLD TOURISM ORGANIZATION, WHICH MEETS OCTOBER 3 IN NEW DELHI, TO WEIGH THE SERIOUS EFFECT WHICH ACTS OF BLATANT AGGRESSION ON CIVIL AVIATION AIRCRAFT HAVE ON INTERNATIONAL TOURISM AND CONSIDER MEASURES WHICH MIGHT BE TAKEN AGAINST OFFENDING MEMBERS OF THE ORGANIZATION.

IN ALL OF THESE MEASURES, THE CRITICAL ELEMENT IS THAT WE ACT IN CONCERT TO DEMONSTRATE VISIBLY AND FIRMLY THE UNANIMITY OF REVULSION IN THE CIVILIZED WORLD TO THE SOVIET ACTION AND THE SOVIET UNION'S TOTALLY UNACCEPTABLE EXPLANATIONS OF ITS CONDUCT. THE PARAMOUNT CONCERN OF ALL OF US IS THE GRAVE IMPORT OF THIS INCIDENT FOR THE FUTURE SAFETY OF INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AIR TRAFFIC. THE UNITED STATES DOES NOT VIEW THIS AS A

~~IMPORT OF THIS INCIDENT FOR THE FUTURE SAFETY OF INTERNATIONAL  
CIVIL AIR TRAFFIC. THE UNITED STATES DOES NOT VIEW THIS AS A  
BILATERAL ISSUE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET  
UNION. WHILE IT CANNOT HELP BUT HAVE AN IMPACT ON BILATERAL  
RELATIONS, WE VIEW THIS AS AN INTERNATIONAL ISSUE. IT WAS A  
KOREAN AIRLINER THAT WAS ATTACKED AND NATIONALS OF A NUMBER OF  
COUNTRIES LOST THEIR LIVES. IT COULD HAVE BEEN A CIVIL  
AIRCRAFT FROM ANY ONE OF OUR COUNTRIES. IF WE DO NOT TAKE  
MEASURES TO IMPRESS UPON THE SOVIETS THAT THE WORLD WILL NOT  
ACCEPT THIS KIND OF CONDUCT, NO AIRCRAFT CAN FLY OVER OR NEAR  
SOVIET TERRITORY WITH SECURITY. THUS, WE SEEK YOUR HELP IN  
DEVELOPING AND IMPLEMENTING A MEASURED BUT EFFECTIVE RESPONSE  
BY THE WORLD COMMUNITY AS A WHOLE IN THE INTEREST OF FUTURE AIR  
TRAFFIC SAFETY. WE WELCOME YOUR VIEWS AND SUGGESTIONS.~~

ENDS

WRIGHT

NNNN

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 " INFO  
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RC

MR COLLES, No 10 Downing ST  
 CABINET OFFICE

IMMEDIATE

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CONFIDENTIAL

FM WASHINGTON 052000Z SEP 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2473 OF 5 SEPTEMBER

INFO PRIORITY SEOUL, TOKYO, UKDEL NATO, UKMIS NEW YORK, UKDEL MADRID,  
 MONTREAL (FOR ICAO REP)

ROUTINE BONN, PARIS, PEKING, OTTAWA, MOSCOW, ROME.

YOUR TELNO 1436: KOREAN AIRLINER.

1. AT A MEETING THIS AFTERNOON WITH NATO AND OTHER WESTERN AND ASIAN REPRESENTATIVES BURT DISTRIBUTED A NON-PAPER (TEXT IN MIFT) OUTLINING FIVE AREAS FOR POSSIBLE INTERNATIONAL ACTION. HE ASKED THAT THE PROPOSED CIVIL AVIATION MEASURES SHOULD REMAIN CONFIDENTIAL, THE PRESIDENT WOULD REFER IN HIS BROADCAST THIS EVENING TO ACTION IN THIS FIELD BUT WOULD NOT GIVE DETAILS OF SPECIFIC MEASURES IN DEFERENCE TO THE GENERAL WISH FOR PRIOR CONSULTATION.

2. BURT SAID THAT SHULTZ LOOKED FORWARD TO DISCUSSING THIS ISSUE WITH NATO COLLEAGUES AT THEIR BREAKFAST IN MADRID ON 7 SEPTEMBER. HE HOPED THAT GOVERNMENTS COULD GIVE A RESPONSE TO THE IDEAS IN THE NON-PAPER AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND IN ANY EVENT BY THE END OF THIS WEEK. FURTHER IDEAS WOULD BE WELCOME. IT MIGHT THEN BE APPROPRIATE TO HAVE A FURTHER DISCUSSION IN WASHINGTON. MRS DOLE WOULD ALSO BE IN TOUCH WITH OTHER TRANSPORT MINISTERS.

3. WE DREW ON PARAS 4-7 OF TUR AND ASKED ABOUT THE PRACTICAL EFFECT OF THE PROPOSED US ACTION AGAINST AEROFLOT. BURT CONFIRMED THAT THERE ARE CURRENTLY NO SCHEDULED OR CHARTERED AEROFLOT FLIGHTS TO THE US. HE KNEW OF NO AEROFLOT OVERFLYING RIGHTS. THE US WERE

THEREFORE LOOKING AT A PLAN ON INTERLINING ARRANGEMENTS AND ON TICKET

~~THERE ARE CURRENTLY NO SCHEDULED OR CHARTERED AEROFLOT FLIGHTS TO THE US. HE KNEW OF NO AEROFLOT OVERFLYING RIGHTS. THE US WERE THEREFORE LOOKING AT A BAN ON INTERLINING ARRANGEMENTS AND ON TICKET SALES BY AEROFLOT IN THE US. WE SUBSEQUENTLY CONFIRMED PRIVATELY TO HAASS (BURT'S DEPUTY) YOUR PREFERENCE FOR ACTION IN THE INTERNATIONAL RATHER THAN THE BILATERAL FIELD. HAASS EXPRESSED UNDERSTANDING: HE HOPED THAT WE WOULD BE CONSULTING WITH OUR EUROPEAN PARTNERS ON PARALLEL MEASURES.~~

4. THE AUSTRALIAN SAID THAT HIS GOVERNMENT HAD DECIDED TO MAINTAIN STRONG PRESURE ON THE RUSSIANS FOR COMPENSATION AND TO SUPPORT STRONGLY ACTION AT ICAO. THE POSSIBILITY OF POSTPONING HIGH-LEVEL TRADE TALKS WITH THE RUSSIANS WAS UNDER CONSIDERATION. HE SUGGESTED THAT RUSSIAN STATEMENTS ABOUT THE ISRAELI SHOOTING-DOWN OF THE LIBYAN AIRLINER IN 1973 MIGHT OFFER USEFUL MATERIAL FOR THE ICAO AND UN DEBATES.

5. THE CANADIAN REPORTED THE DECISION TO SUSPEND ALL AEROFLOT LANDING-RIGHTS IN MONTREAL FOR 60 DAYS. THEY WERE TAKING ACTION AS AN AGGRIEVED PARTY BUT HOPED THAT OTHERS WOULD FOLLOW SUIT. (AIR CANADA DOES NOT FLY TO THE SOVIET UNION).

6. IN RESPONSE TO FURTHER QUESTIONS BURT SAID THAT MRS KIRKPATRICK WOULD MAKE PUBLIC MORE INFORMATION ABOUT WHAT HAPPENED WHEN SHE INTERVENED IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE ON 6 SEPTEMBER. THE AMERICANS HAD MADE DEMARCHES IN A LARGE NUMBER OF CAPITALS TO URGE PARTICIPATION IN THE DEBATE, THEY HAD ALSO BEEN IN TOUCH WITH THE CHINESE. BURT REPEATED HIS REQUEST FOR COMMENTS OR SUGGESTIONS ON THE FORM A RESOLUTION MIGHT TAKE.

7. BURT SAID THAT THE RC-135 FLIGHT WAS ONE OF A REGULAR SERIES OF US OPERATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL AIRSPACE OFF THE SOVIET COAST WHOSE PURPOSE WAS TO PROVIDE THE NECESSARY INFORMATION TO VERIFY SOVIET COMPLIANCE WITH STRATEGIC ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS. THE US VIEWED THIS AS PART OF THEIR NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION TO WHICH THE RUSSIANS HAD AGREED BY TREATY. THE RC-135 HAD BEEN IN INTERNATIONAL AIRSPACE THROUGHOUT. IT HAD NOT APPROACHED CLOSER THAN 1200 (1200) MILES TO THE LOCATION OF THE ATTACK ON THE AIRLINER AND HAD BEEN ON THE GROUND AT ITS BASE IN ALASKA AN HOUR BEFORE THE ATTACK. BURT ACKNOWLEDGED A REMOTE POSSIBILITY OF CONFUSION BETWEEN THE RC-135 AND THE KAL 747 IN THE EARLIEST STAGES OF THE INCIDENT. BUT THE RUSSIANS HAD HAD AMPLE TIME AND OPPORTUNITY THEREAFTER TO IDENTIFY THE 747 AS A CIVILIAN AIRLINER.

8. FCO PLEASE ADVANCE THIS AND MIFT TO DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORT FOR KNIGHTON, STEVENS, AND FORTNAM.

WRIGHT

NNNN



SUBJECT

cc Madis  
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T 125/83



PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. 125/83

EMBASSY OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA  
4, PALACE GATE,  
LONDON, W8 5NF

The Rt Hon Sir Geoffrey Howe QC MP  
Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State  
for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs  
London

5th September 1983

Sir,

I have the honour to request that you be so kind as to convey to The Right Honourable Margaret Thatcher MP, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the following telegraphic message from His Excellency, Chun Doo Hwan, President of the Republic of Korea:

"  
YOUR EXCELLENCY,

I AM MOST GRIEVED TO LEARN THAT A BRITISH SUBJECT, MR IAN POWRIE, WAS AMONG THE 269 INTERNATIONAL PASSENGERS WHO WERE KILLED IN THE TRAGIC INCIDENT OF A KOREAN JETLINER WHICH WAS SHOT DOWN BY SOVIET FIGHTERS OFF SAKHALIN ON 1 SEPTEMBER.

ON BEHALF OF THE GOVERNMENT AND THE PEOPLE OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA, I WISH TO EXTEND TO YOUR EXCELLENCY AND TO HIS BEREAVED FAMILY AND FRIENDS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM OUR HEARTFELT CONDOLENCES.

IT IS MY BELIEF THAT THIS UNPROVOKED ATTACK BY THE SOVIET UNION, USING LETHAL MISSILES, AGAINST AN UNARMED COMMERCIAL PASSENGER AIRCRAFT, IS AN INEXCUSABLE ACT OF CRIME AGAINST INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. I RECEIVED YOUR KIND LETTER OF SYMPATHY AND NOTED WITH GRATITUDE THAT YOUR GOVERNMENT HAS LENT ITS MORAL SUPPORT TO THE WORLD-WIDE CONDEMNATION OF THIS ATROCITY.

I HOPE THAT EFFECTIVE MEASURES SHOULD BE TAKEN TO PREVENT ITS RECURRENCE.

ACCEPT, YOUR EXCELLENCY, THE RENEWED ASSURANCES OF MY HIGHEST CONSIDERATION.

CHUN DOO HWAN  
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA."

Please accept, Sir, the assurance of my highest consideration.

*Young Hoon Kang*  
Young Hoon Kang  
Ambassador



PRIME MINISTER

KOREAN AIRLINER

Agree to send the attached message to the Korean President in reply to his message of sympathy about the death of a UK citizen?

A. S. C.

5 September 1983

Yes  
mb



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

5 September 1983

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Jew Sh.

Korean Airliner

- / I enclose the text of a message to the  
Prime Minister from President Chun of South  
Korea expressing sympathy at the death of  
Mr Ian Powrie on board the airliner.  
/ A draft reply is also enclosed.

Yes

(R B Bone)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

Draft message to His Excellency President Chun Doo Hwan,  
President of the Republic of Korea

Your Excellency

Thank you for your <sup>message</sup> ~~expression~~ of sympathy <sup>about</sup> ~~at~~ the death of a United Kingdom citizen, Mr Ian Powrie, on board the Korean Airlines aircraft shot down by a Soviet fighter. I deeply appreciate your ~~taking~~ <sup>gesture</sup> ~~this trouble~~ at a time when so many citizens of your own country have lost their lives.

*I fully share you*

~~Like you, I naturally very much hope that effective~~  
measures <sup>will</sup> ~~can~~ be taken to prevent recurrence of such a tragic incident. This should be the concern of the entire international community.

May I express through you ~~the deepest sympathy of~~  
~~the British people for those who have lost loved~~  
~~ones as a result of this appalling affair~~

*those citizens of your country who have lost loved ones in this tragedy the deepest sympathy of the British government and people.*

SEP 1983

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FROM WASHINGTON 032025Z SEP 83.

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2466 OF 3 SEPTEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE TOKYO, SEOUL, UKDEL NATO, MOSCOW, UKDEL MADRID,  
UKMIS NEW YORK. PRIORITY BONN, PARIS, PEKING, OTTAWA.

MY TELNO 2447: SHOOTING DOWN OF KOREAN AIRLINER.

1. BURT BRIEFED NATO AND OTHER WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES THIS AFTERNOON. NO DECISIONS ON FURTHER US ACTION HAD BEEN TAKEN. OPTION PAPERS, BASED ON YESTERDAY'S 2-HOUR NSC MEETING, WERE BEING PREPARED FOR THE PRESIDENT WHO WAS EXPECTED TO TAKE DECISIONS AFTER CONSULTING CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS TOMORROW.

2. BURT SAID THAT THIS EPISODE WOULD NOT LEAD TO ANY FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE IN US POLICY TOWARDS THE SOVIET UNION; IT MERELY CONFIRMED THE ADMINISTRATION'S VIEW OF THE RUSSIANS. HE RECALLED THAT US POLICY WAS BASED ON STRENGTH, A REALISTIC VIEW OF SOVIET BEHAVIOUR AND WILLINGNESS TO ENGAGE IN DIALOGUE WITH THE RUSSIANS TO REDUCE TENSION AND TO MAKE THEM UNDERSTAND US CONCERNS. EFFORTS TO REACH AGREEMENT WITH THE RUSSIANS ON SECURITY-RELATED ISSUES, INCLUDING START AND INF, WOULD NOT BE ABANDONED.

3. THE US WOULD NEVERTHELESS BE TAKING SOME BILATERAL MEASURES. THE TRANSPORT AGREEMENT WOULD NOT BE RENEWED AND THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION TO BEGIN NEGOTIATIONS ON CONSULAR AND CULTURAL AGREEMENTS WOULD BE PUT ON HOLD. POSSIBLE FURTHER BILATERAL ACTION WAS UNDER REVIEW.

4. BUT THE US BELIEVED VERY STRONGLY THAT THIS EPISODE SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO BE SEEN AS A US/SOVIET COLD WAR DISPUTE. IT WAS A MATTER OF UNIVERSAL CONCERN. THE US WANTED THE FULLEST POSSIBLE CONSULTATION AND EXCHANGE OF IDEAS FOR FURTHER ACTION WITH ITS ALLIES. THE OBJECTIVES SHOULD BE TO EXTRACT A SATISFACTORY RESPONSE FROM THE RUSSIANS AND TO ENSURE THAT THERE WOULD BE NO REPETITION OF THIS TRAGEDY.

5. THE ADMINISTRATION WERE EXAMINING AND WOULD WANT TO DISCUSS A NUMBER OF IDEAS INCLUDING POSSIBLE GOVERNMENTAL ASSISTANCE TO VICTIMS FAMILIES IN BRINGING CLAIMS AGAINST THE USSR, MEASURES IN ICAO AND OTHER CIVIL AVIATION FORA, MEASURES AGAINST AEROFLOT, AND THE POSSIBILITY OF GOVERNMENT BACKING FOR GROUPS LIKE THE AMERICAN AIRLINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION WHO WERE CALLING FOR A BOYCOTT OF AEROFLOT AND OTHER SOVIET TRANSPORT.

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6. NILES (STATE DEPARTMENT) TOLD MINISTER (COMMERCIAL) IN CONFIDENCE (PLEASE PROTECT), THAT THE STATE DEPARTMENT FAVOURED MULTILATERAL ACTION AGAINST THE RUSSIANS IN THE CIVIL AVIATION FIELD BUT NO (NO) WIDER ECONOMIC MEASURES. THE STATE DEPARTMENT WERE RECOMMENDING A SUSPENSION OF AEROFLOT TRAFFIC RIGHTS AND OF INTERLINING TICKETING ARRANGEMENTS WITH AEROFLOT (THIS WOULD BE PRIMARILY A MATTER FOR AIRLINES) AND THE SUSPENSION OF OFFICIAL CIVIL AVIATION TALKS WITH THE USSR EXCEPT WHERE THEY WERE CONCERNED WITH SAFETY. THESE SUSPENSIONS MIGHT LAST FOR 30, 60, OR 90 DAYS, OR UNTIL THE RUSSIANS PRODUCED AN ACCEPTABLE EXPLANATION OF WHAT HAD HAPPENED. THERE MIGHT BE AN EMERGENCY ICAO COUNCIL MEETING NEXT WEEK AND AN ICAO INVESTIGATION OF THE INCIDENT. NILES HOPED THAT WE WOULD BE READY TO USE OUR INFLUENCE WITH OTHERS E.G. INDIA AND PAKISTAN TO JOIN IN TAKING APPROPRIATE MEASURES AND THAT WE COULD LET THE AMERICANS HAVE OUR FURTHER IDEAS. SHULTZ WOULD WANT TO DISCUSS THIS WITH YOU AND OTHER FOREIGN MINISTERS IN MADRID NEXT WEEK. CONSULTATION WOULD CLEARLY BE REQUIRED IN A VARIETY OF FORA: THE AMERICANS DID NOT INTEND TO RAISE THE INCIDENT IN NATO AS JAPANESE INVOLVEMENT WAS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION, NILES SAID THAT HE DID NOT THINK THAT THE AMERICANS HAD CONSIDERED USING THE CIVIL AVIATION CONTACTS DEVELOPED BY THE ECONOMIC SUMMIT SEVEN UNDER THE BONN AGREEMENT, WHICH INCLUDED THE JAPANESE.

7. BURT SAID THAT SHULTZ HAD DECIDED, AFTER CONSULTING THE PRESIDENT, TO GO TO MADRID AND MEET GROMYKO. ~~THE~~ MEETING AND AGENDA WOULD BE SHORTER THAN ORIGINALLY PLANNED: SHULTZ WANTED TO FOCUS ON THE AIRLINER INCIDENT, SOVIET PERFORMANCE ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND 'AMBIGUITIES' OVER SOVIET COMPLIANCE WITH ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS. SHULTZ WOULD MAKE A STRONG REFERENCE TO THE AIRLINER INCIDENT IN HIS STATEMENT ON 9 SEPTEMBER: BURT URGED THAT OTHER MINISTERS SHOULD DO LIKEWISE. POSSIBLE MEASURES AGAINST THE RUSSIANS WOULD NO DOUBT BE DISCUSSED IN THE MARGINS. THE CANADIAN REPEATED HIS GOVERNMENT'S PREFERENCE FOR POSTPONING THE MADRID MEETING: NO ONE ELSE COMMENTED.

8. ON THE SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE, WILLIAMS (STATE DEPARTMENT) SAID THAT MRS KIRKPATRICK WOULD BE CUTTING SHORT HER HOLIDAY TO TAKE PART. THE AMERICANS WOULD BE SEEKING THE MAXIMUM NUMBER OF SPEAKERS. THEY WOULD WELCOME CONSULTATION ON A MEANINGFUL RESOLUTION WHICH MIGHT INCLUDE CONDEMNATION OF THE RUSSIANS, A CALL FOR COMPENSATION, AND A CALL FOR AN ICAO INVESTIGATION. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE RUSSIANS WOULD VETO ANY SUCH RESOLUTION BUT SAW NO HARM IN THE SOVIET UNION THUS MAKING ITSELF AS A PARIAH STATE.

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/9.

# CONFIDENTIAL

9. IN REPLY TO QUESTIONS BURT SAID THAT THE SOVIET MESSAGES TO THE AMERICANS ADDED LITTLE TO THE TASS STATEMENTS. THERE HAD BEEN NO RESPONSE TO A US REQUEST FOR COOPERATION IN THE SEARCH FOR THE AIRLINER. THE AMERICANS HAD MADE IT CLEAR THAT, IF BODIES WERE FOUND, THEY EXPECTED THE RUSSIANS TO HAND THEM OVER PROMPTLY TO THE GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED.

10. PLEASE ADVANCE TO KNIGHTON, STEVENS AND FORTNAM (ALL DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORT).

WRIGHT

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CONS D

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PS

PS/MR RIFKIND

PS/PUS

SIR J BULLARD

MR GIFFARD

MR JAMES — MR WRIGHT

MR DONALD

MR ADAMS

COPIES TO:

MR FORTNAM

MR STEVENS

MR KNIGHTON

} D/TRANSPORT

<sup>3</sup>  
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The PM approved this  
on 2-9 and I authorised Mr.  
Pecher to have it despatched  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office *Perks*

London SW1A 2AH

2-9

The Prime  
Minister approved  
the message as  
2 September 1983  
attached?

*John Taylor*

*AT*

Destruction of Korean Airliner 2

I enclose a self-explanatory draft  
message of condolence which the Prime  
Minister may wish to send to the Korean  
President.

*[Handwritten signature]*

(R B Bone)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:  
Prime Minister

Reference

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO:

Your Reference

- Top Secret
- Secret
- Confidential
- Restricted
- Unclassified

His Excellency President Chun Doo  
Hwan  
President of the Republic of Korea

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

Your Excellency

CAVEAT.....


I have learned with horror and ~~dismay~~ of the shooting down of a Korean Airlines aircraft with many passengers on board by the Soviet air force.

I am deeply shocked at the grave loss of life which has resulted from this <sup>appalling</sup> ~~disgraceful~~ action on the part of the Soviet Union. I should like to assure you, Your Excellency, that Britain will support the Korean Government in the proposed Security Council debate on this affair.

Please accept my profound sympathy and that of the British people.

Enclosures—flag(s).....

**A** The National Archives

DEPARTMENT/SERIES	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM ..... (one piece/item number)	
Extract details:	
<i>Savage to Fall dated 2 September 1983</i>	
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Use black or blue pen to complete form.

Use the card for one piece or for each extract removed from a different place within a piece.

Enter the department and series,  
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FM UKMIS NEW YORK 030046Z SEP 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 773 OF 2 SEPTEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, UKDEL NATO, SEOUL, TOKYO,  
INFO ROUTINE OTHER NATO POSTS AND DUBLIN.

MY TWO IPT'S: KOREAN AIRLINER: SECURITY COUNCIL.

1. THIS TELEGRAM CONTAINS A SUMMARY OF THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE COUNCIL ON 2 SEPTEMBER.

2. IN RESPONSE TO LETTERS FROM THE UNITED STATES, SOUTH KOREA, CANADA, JAPAN AND AUSTRALIA THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL (SINCLAIR, GUYANA) CALLED A MEETING OF THE COUNCIL ON THE AFTERNOON OF 2 SEPTEMBER. SOUTH KOREA WAS INVITED TO PARTICIPATE IN THE COUNCIL AND MADE THE FIRST STATEMENT WHICH INCLUDED THE REQUESTS ALREADY PUT BY SEOUL TO THE SOVIET UNION AND REPEATED BY YOU TO THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN LONDON, PLUS A GUARANTEE OF UNIMPEDED ACCESS TO THE SITE OF THE CRASH FOR REPRESENTATIVES OF IMPARTIAL INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS SUCH AS ICAO, AS WELL AS OF KOREAN AIRLINES AND THE SOUTH KOREAN GOVERNMENT AND AN UNDERTAKING TO RETURN ANY REMAINS OR DEBRIS FOUND.

3. THE UNITED STATES (LICHENSTEIN), HAVING READ OUT THE STATEMENT MADE BY PRESIDENT REAGAN EARLIER TODAY, MADE A HARD-HITTING STATEMENT ATTACKING THE CALCULATED, DELIBERATE AND WANTONLY IRRESPONSIBLE CRIME COMMITTED BY THE SOVIET AUTHORITIES WHICH WAS COMPOUNDED BY THEIR DENIAL OF RESPONSIBILITY. INSTEAD OF ACTING AS A NORMAL RESPONSIBLE CIVILISED GOVERNMENT AND ADMITTING ITS RESPONSIBILITY TOGETHER WITH AN EXPRESSION OF REGRET, AN UNDERTAKING TO INVESTIGATE AND PUNISH AND A PLEDGE NOT TO REPEAT THE INCIDENT, THE SOVIET UNION SHOWED NO TRACE OF CONTRITION AND CONTINUED TO DENY RESPONSIBILITY. IN FACT, THE SOVIET UNION HAD BEHAVED WITH COMPLETE AND CHARACTERISTIC CONTEMPT FOR THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND MINIMAL STANDARDS OF CIVILISED BEHAVIOUR. IT HAD SHOWED ITSELF AS A RUTHLESS, TOTALITARIAN STATE WHICH HAD KILLED AND ENSLAVED MORE PEOPLE THAN ANY STATE IN THE HISTORY OF MANKIND. THE WORLD SHOULD RECOGNISE NOW BEFORE IT WAS TOO LATE THE TRUE NATURE OF SOVIET TOTALITARIANISM AND THE THREAT IT POSED TO ALL PEOPLES.

4. THE SOVIET UNION (OVINNIKOV) SAID THAT THE CONVENING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN CONNECTION WITH SOUTH KOREAN AEROPLANE WAS TOTALLY UNJUSTIFIABLE AND UNNECESSARY. THE SOVIET VIEW WAS TO BE FOUND IN THE TASS STATEMENT (MOSCOW TELNO 957). THE U.S. WAS TRYING TO RAISE A HULLABALOO ABOUT THE PLANE'S DISAPPEARANCE. IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE AIRLINER HAD BEEN TRACKED BY THE AMERICANS THROUGHOUT ITS ROUTE. THIS SHOWED THAT THE FLIGHT WAS /NOT

NOT A NORMAL ONE AND THAT THE AMERICANS COULD HAVE TAKEN STEPS THEMSELVES TO END ITS FLAGRANT VIOLATION OF SOVIET AIRSPACE. THE INTRUSION OF THE AIRLINER, UNDER WHOSE GUISE IT MIGHT HAVE BEEN POSSIBLE TO CARRY OUT A SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE MISSION, COULD ONLY BE REGARDED AS A PRE-PLANNED ACT. THOSE WHO ORGANISED THIS PROVOCATION WERE CLEARLY TRYING TO FURTHER EXACERBATE THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION BY BESMIRCHING THE SOVIET UNION AND CASTING DOUBT ON THE SOVIET UNION'S PEACE-LOVING POLICY. OVINNIKOV QUOTED A FURTHER TASS STATEMENT REGRETTING THE LOSS OF HUMAN LIFE WHICH WAS NOW BEING USED FOR IGHNOMINIOUS POLITICAL GOALS AND WENT ON TO SAY THAT THE AMERICAN REQUEST FOR A COUNCIL MEETING WAS AN OBVIOUS PROPOGANDA PLOY CALCULATED TO PRESENT THE SOVIET UNION IN A FALSE LIGHT AND THEREBY OBTAIN A FURTHER PRETEXT TO JUSTIFY AMERICAN MILITARIST POLICIES. THE AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION WAS DETERMINED TO USE THE MOST SHAMELESS MEANS TO PREVENT AGREEMENT BEING REACHED WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND TO CUT OFF ALL TYPES OF NEGOTIATIONS. THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION WISHED TO OBTAIN YET ANOTHER PRETEXT TO JUSTIFY ITS IRRESPONSIBLE POLICY OF PREPARATION FOR NUCLEAR WAR. THE BASIS FOR THE CALUMNY AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION DRAGGED OUT BY THE UNITED STATES WAS THE ATTEMPT TO JUSTIFY A POLICY OF THERMO-NUCLEAR WORLD WAR.

5. JAPAN REFERRED TO THE APPALLING TRAGEDY AS A WANTON ACT OF VIOLENCE AND A TOTALLY UNJUSTIFIABLE AND INSIDIOUS ASSAULT BY THE SOVIET MILITARY AUTHORITIES ON AN INNOCENT AIRCRAFT WHICH, IF OVERLOOKED, WOULD LEAD TO THE COLLAPSE OF THE SAFETY REGIME FOR CIVIL AVIATION. THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE WERE EXTREMELY ANXIOUS ABOUT THE FATE OF THE MISSING PASSENGERS AND CREW AND HAD BEEN SEEKING THE FULL COOPERATION OF THE SOVIET AUTHORITIES WHICH, DEPLORABLY, HAD NOT BEEN FORTHCOMING. THE SOVIET ATTITUDE WOULD HAVE A SERIOUS EFFECT ON THE PEACE AND STABILITY OF THE WORLD ESPECIALLY IN ASIA AND THE FAR EAST. THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT DEMANDED A FULL REPORT FROM THE SOVIET UNION AND AN UNDERTAKING TO ENSURE THAT THIS SORT OF INCIDENT WOULD NEVER TAKE PLACE AGAIN. THE SECURITY COUNCIL SHOULD URGENTLY MANDATE A FACT-FINDING MISSION BY THE ICAO OR ANOTHER INTERNATIONAL BODY.

6. CANADA ACCUSED THE SOVIET UNION OF NOTHING SHORT OF MURDER. THE SOVIET ACTION HAD BEEN IN TOTAL CONTRAVENTION OF THE PRINCIPLES OF PROPORTIONALITY AND THUS AN INFRINGEMENT OF A BASIC PRINCIPLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT SUGGESTED A THREE-PART PROGRAMME:

- (A) A FULL AND IMPARTIAL ENQUIRY INTO THE INCIDENT BY THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL AS A MATTER OF THE UTMOST URGENCY;
- (B) THE ICAO, IN COOPERATION WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL, SHOULD BE REQUESTED TO CARRY OUT AN URGENT AND THOROUGH INVESTIGATION IN ORDER TO MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ARRANGMENTS WHICH WOULD PRECLUDE THE REPETITION OF SUCH AN INCIDENT:

(C) IMMEDIATE FULL AND GENEROUS SOVIET COMPENSATION TO THE FAMILIES OF THE VICTIMS.

CANADA APPEALED TO THE SOVIET UNION TO COOPERATE WITH THE INVESTIGATION AND NOT TO VETO ANY COUNCIL RESOLUTION.

7. AUSTRALIA DESCRIBED THE DOWNING OF THE KOREAN AIRLINER AS A BARBAROUS EPISODE INCOMPATIBLE WITH DECENT RELATIONS BETWEEN CIVILISED NATIONS. THE MASSACRE IN THE SKY HAD THREATENING IMPLICATIONS FOR THE CIVIL AIRCRAFT OF ALL NATIONS AS WAS A TRAGIC ILLUSTRATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE CONTINUED HOSTILITY ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA. THE EXPLANATIONS GIVEN SO FAR BY MOSCOW WERE ENTIRELY INADEQUATE. IF THE SOVIET AUTHORITIES GAVE IN TO THE INSTINCT TO COVER UP IT WOULD ONLY CONFIRM THE WORST FEARS OF THOSE WHO SUSPECTED THEM MOST, WITH REPERCUSSIONS ACROSS THE SPECTRUM OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS.

8. NETHERLANDS CONDEMNED THE DELIBERATE ATTACK FOR WHICH THERE WAS NO JUSTIFICATION. THE CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH NETHERLANDS WOULD SHOOT DOWN A CIVILIAN AIRCRAFT WERE INCONCEIVABLE. IT WAS CLEAR FROM THE OUTRAGEOUS STORY OF SPYING THAT THE PERPETRATORS OF THE INCIDENT HAD NO UNDERSTANDING FOR ITS GRAVITY.

9. PAKISTAN EXPRESSED DEEP SYMPATHY FOR THE VICTIMS OF THIS INCIDENT, WHICH WAS NOT THE FIRST OF ITS KIND, AND SAID THAT THE WHOLE WORLD WAS WAITING FOR GREATER LIGHT TO BE SHED BY THE SOVIET AUTHORITIES.

10. FRANCE EXPRESSED INDIGNATION AND HORROR AND QUOTED FROM THE STATEMENT ISSUED BY THE QUAI (PARIS TELNO 782). IT WAS INDISPENSABLE THAT THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE TRAGIC EVENT SHOULD BE RAPIDLY AND COMPLETELY CLEARED UP AND RESPONSIBILITIES CLEARLY ESTABLISHED. THE COUNCIL SHOULD ASK THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO GATHER ALL THE INFORMATION AVAILABLE IN ORDER TO REPORT BACK WITHIN 48 HOURS. THE SOVIET UNION SHOULD FACILITATE HIS TASK.

11. CHINA EXPRESSED SHOCK AT THE INCIDENT WHICH IT DEPLORED. IT EXPRESSED SYMPATHY FOR THE VICTIMS WHICH INCLUDED A NUMBER FROM 'CHINA'S TAIWAN PROVINCE AND HONG KONG'.

12. I SPOKE AS INSTRUCTED. TEXT IN MIPT.

13. ZAIRE SAID THAT BARBAROUS AND SHOCKING ACTION OF THE SOVIET UNION SHOULD BE FIRMLY CONDEMNED BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AS A THREAT TO PEACE AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY.

14. NEW ZEALAND JOINED IN THE INTERNATIONAL CONDEMNATION OF THIS OUTRAGEOUS ACT OF INTERNATIONAL LAWLESSNESS. 'SHUFFLING REGRET' FOR HUMAN LOSS WAS NOT ENOUGH. THE WORLD WAS WAITING FOR AN EXPLANATION OF HOW THIS TRAGEDY WAS ALLOWED TO HAPPEN AND WHAT WOULD BE DONE TO PREVENT A RECURRENCE.

15. THE FRG SAID THAT THIS ABOMINABLE ACT, WHICH CONTRAVENED THE PRINCIPLES OF PROPORTIONALITY COULD CAUSE CONSIDERABLE POLITICAL AND MORAL DAMAGE. THE FRG WAS CONCERNED ABOUT ITS POSSIBLE NEGATIVE REPERCUSSIONS ON EAST/WEST RELATIONS AND THE INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE AS A WHOLE. THE SOVIET UNION MUST TAKE ACTION TO LIMIT THE DANGEROUS CONSEQUENCES OF THIS ACT THROUGH INVESTIGATION, COMPENSATION AND ARRANGEMENTS TO PREVENT A RECURRENCE.

16. THE UNITED STATES ASKED FOR THE FLOOR AGAIN TO READ OUT THE STATEMENT MADE BY SECRETARY SHULTZ COMMENTING ON THE TASS STATEMENT. LICHENSTEIN ADDED THAT THE WORLD WAS WAITING FOR THE SOVIET UNION TO TELL THE TRUTH. NO COVER UP, HOWEVER BRAZEN OR HOWEVER ELABORATE, COULD ABSOLVE THE SOVIET UNION.

17. THE PRESIDENT THEN ADJOURNED THE SESSION SAYING THAT THE DATE OF THE NEXT MEETING TO CONTINUE THE CONSIDERATION OF THIS QUESTION WOULD BE FIXED IN CONSULTATION WITH MEMBERS.

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FM UKMIS NEW YORK 030001Z SEP 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 772 OF 2 SEPTEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, UKDEL NATO, SEOUL, TOKYO,  
INFO ROUTINE OTHER NATO POSTS, DUBLIN.

MIPT: KOREAN AIRLINER: SECURITY COUNCIL.

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MY STATEMENT OF 2 SEPTEMBER:

MY GOVERNMENT HAS ALREADY EXPRESSED PUBLICLY THEIR  
CONDOLENCES TO THE FAMILIES OF THE MANY VICTIMS OF THIS  
DISASTER. THEY HAVE ALSO EXPRESSED THEIR GRAVE CONCERN  
AND HORROR AT THE SHOOTING DOWN BY A SOVIET FIGHTER OF AN  
UNARMED KOREAN PASSENGER AIRLINER. THE BRITISH FOREIGN  
SECRETARY SUMMONED THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN LONDON THIS  
MORNING AND CONVEYED BOTH OUR STRONG CONDEMNATION OF THE  
INCIDENT AND A REQUEST FOR A FULL EXPLANATION.

LET ME REITERATE IN THIS FORUM OUR HORROR AT THIS  
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MY GOVERNMENT FULLY SUPPORTS THESE REQUESTS.

MR PRESIDENT, I UNDERSTAND THAT ONE UK NATIONAL AND 13  
HONG KONG RESIDENTS WERE ON THE PLANE WHEN IT WAS SHOT DOWN.  
IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES MY GOVERNMENT RESERVES ITS RIGHT TO  
TAKE ANY APPROPRIATE ACTION IN ACCORDANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL  
LAW.

THIS HORRENDOUS EVENT HAS CONSEQUENCES FOR ALL OF US,  
NOT JUST THOSE UNFORTUNATE ENOUGH TO HAVE NATIONALS ON  
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IMPLICATIONS FOR THE SAFETY OF CIVIL AVIATION IN GENERAL  
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/ / N

IN THE PRESENT TRAGIC AND SERIOUS CIRCUMSTANCES IT APPEARS TO MY GOVERNMENT THAT THE BEST COURSE WOULD BE FOR THE SOVIET UNION TO GIVE THE WORLD A FRANK AND HONEST ACCOUNT OF WHAT REALLY HAPPENED. THIS WOULD DO SOMETHING TO REDUCE THE DAMAGE TO THE INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE. I LISTENED WITH MOUNTING CONCERN AND INDIGNATION TO THE LAST PART OF THE STATEMENT MADE THIS AFTERNOON BY THE DISTINGUISHED REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SOVIET UNION. THE LANGUAGE HE USED WAS EVASIVE, BUT EVEN MORE IMPORTANT, IT WAS NOT CALCULATED TO HELP THE COURSE OF GOOD INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. ALLOW ME TO EXPRESS THE HOPE, MR PRESIDENT, THAT THIS APPALLING ACTION BY THE SOVIET AUTHORITIES WHICH HAS BROUGHT US TOGETHER THIS AFTERNOON WAS NOT INTENDED TO BE A SIGNAL OF THEIR INTENTIONS TOWARDS INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AS A WHOLE. I TRUST WE SHALL RECEIVE AN ASSURANCE ON THIS POINT.

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MR ADAMS

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FM UKMIS NEW YORK 030045Z SEP 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 771 OF 2 SEPTEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, UKDEL NATO, SEOUL, TOKYO,  
INFO ROUTINE OTHER NATO POSTS, DUBLIN

YOUR TELNO 418: KOREAN AIRLINER: SECURITY COUNCIL

SUMMARY

1. THE SECURITY COUNCIL MET FOR FOUR HOURS THIS AFTERNOON 2 SEPTEMBER, AT THE REQUEST OF THE UNITED STATES, SOUTH KOREA, CANADA, JAPAN AND AUSTRALIA, TO CONSIDER THE SHOOTING DOWN OF THE SOUTH KOREAN AIRLINER BY A SOVIET MILITARY AIRCRAFT. STATEMENTS WERE MADE BY SOUTH KOREA, THE UNITED STATES, THE SOVIET UNION, JAPAN, CANADA, AUSTRALIA, NETHERLANDS, PAKISTAN, FRANCE, CHINA, UNITED KINGDOM (TEXT IN MIFT), ZAIRE, NEW ZEALAND AND THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY. WITH THE OBVIOUS EXCEPTION OF THE SOVIET UNION, ALL OF THEM EXPRESSED OUTRAGE AT THE WANTON DESTRUCTION OF A CIVILIAN AIRCRAFT AND CALLED FOR AN EXPLANATION FROM MOSCOW. THE SOVIET UNION STUCK TO THE TASS STATEMENT, REFUSED TO ADMIT THAT THE AIRCRAFT HAD BEEN SHOT DOWN AND ACCUSED THE AMERICANS OF ENGINEERING AND USING THE INCIDENT FOR PROPAGANDA PURPOSES.
2. THE COUNCIL ADJOURNED UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE. IT IS NOT LIKELY TO MEET AGAIN UNTIL THE AFTERNOON OF TUESDAY 6 SEPTEMBER (MONDAY 5 SEPTEMBER BEING A PUBLIC HOLIDAY). THE AMERICANS ARE CONTENT WITH THIS DELAY IN CASE IT ALLOWS THE SOVIETS TO CHANGE THEIR STANCE. FOR THE SAME REASON THE AMERICANS HAVE NOT YET TABLED A RESOLUTION THOUGH THEY ARE WORKING ON A DRAFT. THEY ARE THINKING IN TERMS OF HAVING THE RESOLUTION CO-SPONSORED BY THE COUNTRIES WHOSE NATIONALS WERE ON THE AIRLINER.
3. FOR A SUMMARY ACCOUNT OF THE PROCEEDINGS SEE MY SECOND IFT.

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/ COMMENT

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## COMMENT

4. THE DEBATE HAS ATTRACTED MORE ATTENTION THAN ANYTHING IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN RECENT MONTHS. NO ONE HAS COME TO THE SUPPORT OF THE SOVIETS IN THEIR ATTEMPT TO BRAZEN THIS OUT AND THE SYMPATHIES OF THE NON-ALIGNED ARE IN GENERAL CLEARLY AGAINST THEM. AS THINGS STAND AT PRESENT THE AMERICANS SHOULD HAVE NO DIFFICULTY IN MUSTERING THE NINE VOTES FOR A RESOLUTION. IT MAY REQUIRE SOME SKILL TO KEEP THINGS THIS WAY. THE AMERICANS WILL NEED TO CURB THEIR RHETORIC TO AVOID APPEARING TO EXPLOIT THE DEATHS OF THE INNOCENT FOR PROPAGANDA PURPOSES. IF 'SOBREITY' IS THEIR WATCHWORD THE ENORMITY OF THE SOVIET ACTION WILL BE WIDELY ACCEPTED AND THE SOVIETS WILL BE LEFT WITH RESPONSIBILITY FOR ANY DETERIORATION IN EAST/WEST RELATIONS.

5. SEE MIFT.

THOMSON

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MR GIFFARD

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 772 OF 2 SEPTEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, UKDEL NATO, SEOUL, TOKYO,  
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FROM MOSCOW 011820Z SEPTEMBER

TO FLASH F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 957 OF 1 SEPTEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, TOKYO, SEOUL, UKDEL NATO

MISSING SOUTH KOREAN AIRLINER.

1. TASS AT 1707Z CARRIED THE FOLLOWING REPORT :

MOSCOW SEPTEMBER 1. TASS . AN UNIDENTIFIED PLANE ENTERED THE AIR SPACE OF THE SOVIET UNION OVER THE KAMCHATKA PENINSULA FROM THE DIRECTION OF THE PACIFIC OCEAN AND THEN FOR A SECOND TIME VIOLATED THE AIR SPACE OF THE USSR OVER SAKHALIN ISLAND ON THE NIGHT FROM AUGUST 31 TO SEPTEMBER 1. THE PLANE DID NOT HAVE NAVIGATION LIGHTS , DID NOT RESPOND TO QUERIES AND DID NOT ENTER INTO CONTACT WITH THE DISPATCHER SERVICE.

FIGHTERS OF THE ANTI-AIRCRAFT DEFENCE, WHICH WERE SENT ALOFT TOWARDS THE INTRUDER PLANE, TRIED TO GIVE IT ASSISTANCE IN DIRECTING IT TO THE NEAREST AIRFIELD, BUT THE INTRUDER PLANE DID NOT REACT TO THE SIGNALS AND WARNINGS FROM THE SOVIET FIGHTERS AND CONTINUED ITS FLIGHT IN THE DIRECTION OF THE SEA OF JAPAN. ITEM ENDS.

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

1 September, 1983

*Read to  
Pms party this  
am  
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*Dear Tim,*

Korean Airliner

You will have seen the press reports that a Korean Airlines Boeing 707 has been shot down by a Soviet fighter. There was a US Congressman on board. The Americans have reacted strongly. Mr Shultz has confirmed publicly that a Soviet jet fighter pilot shot down the airliner and spoke of US revulsion and grave concern at the incident. The Soviet Chargé in Washington was called in and asked for a full explanation.

/ Our own News Department have been drawing on the attached statement in Sir Geoffrey Howe's name. It is not yet clear whether any British passport holders were on the plane. There may have been some Hong Kong Chinese on board and there is a report that a British boy was also on board, but we have as yet no confirmation. If it is confirmed that British passport holders were on board, we shall immediately summon the Soviet Chargé here to express our horror directly and to ask for an immediate and full explanation.

*Yours ever  
John Holmes*

(J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary

T Flesher Esq  
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL





Reports that a Korean Airlines Boeing 747 with hundreds of passengers on board has been shot down by a Soviet fighter are profoundly disturbing. If the reports we have received are confirmed there can be no justification for this Soviet act and the British Government wishes to express its grave concern and horror.

# Grey Scale #13



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