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PREM 19/3768

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Confidential Filing

Visit of Franz Josef Strauss to the U.K.

Visits of Dr Max Streibl.

GERMANY

February 1980

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
<del>14.2.80</del>							
<del>20.4.80</del>							
<del>26.4.80</del>							
<del>24.4.80</del>							
<del>6.7.80</del>							
<del>8.6.90</del>							
<del>16.12.91</del>							
<del>8.1.92</del>							
19.2.92							

PREM

19/3768

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SUBJECT  
MASTER

EA  
be PC  
Filed on:

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

19 February 1992

Jean Christophe,

CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER BY DR MAX STREIBL,  
MINISTER PRESIDENT OF BAVARIA: 19 FEBRUARY

Thank you for the briefing which you provided for Dr Streibl's call on the Prime Minister, which took place this afternoon. The discussion centred on the European Community.

Dr Streibl said that the German Constitution gave the Laender far-reaching rights, the idea being to prevent a strong centrally controlled Reich from ever recurring. These powers were replicated in the Bundesrat, on which ratification of the Maastricht Treaty depended. It was against this background that Chancellor Kohl, who held the Prime Minister in very high esteem, was wont to remark that Germany's idea of a Federation was very different from the British conception.

Dr Streibl saw two positive results from Maastricht:

- i. the introduction of subsidiarity;
- ii. the establishment of a regional chamber, to which Germany would send representatives from the Laender, and to which Britain would no doubt send national representatives.

There had also been a useful development in respect of the Council of Ministers. Hitherto, Germany's interests had always been represented by the Federal Government, usually in the form of the Foreign Ministry. In future, it would be Ministers from the Laender who would represent Germany within their spheres of responsibility.

The Prime Minister said that we welcomed the fact that the joint view taken by the British and German Governments on subsidiarity had won through. For other members of the Community it was more a slogan than a reality. We had to make it a reality. Dr Streibl said that he was very happy to hear that. He had in fact heard much the same message from Mitterrand and Delors. France, too, was beginning to centralise and move towards a system closer to that in Germany. There must be further progress towards subsidiarity. What had happened so far was only the start.

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The Prime Minister asked how the regional committee would work. It could be a powerful motif for subsidiarity, or it could be a pressure group for more expenditure, in which case its effect could be the opposite of subsidiarity.

Dr Streibl said that he favoured things being done at the lower level where this was possible. A price had been paid for the decisions taken at Maastricht on a Federal Europe in terms of the powers of the Laender. The fact was that Hamburg and Bavaria, for example, had quite different school systems. These were not matters that could be decided from Brussels. The issues that should be discussed at the centre were those of foreign policy and defence, asylum (a very significant problem) and environment. But no progress could be made on these matters so the European Community had focused on what it could do at lower levels instead. This was not the right way for the Community to go. Bavarians did not want to have to toss the caber, any more than Scots wanted to learn Schuhplattler dancing. Brussels should not get involved in matters of detail. Germany did not want to force her constitution on other people. Equally, he did not want to see a centrally ruled Europe of the kind envisaged by Hitler. Germany did not want to be the strong country at the centre of Europe, but the way the Community was developing was forcing her into that role.

The Prime Minister said that he shared many of Dr Streibl's concerns. We should try to persuade other member states of the same wise policy. Over-centralisation was the cause of the main disharmonies and fractures between Britain and other member states. The only point of difference which the Prime Minister could detect was over defence, which Dr Streibl had mentioned as being a matter for the Community. Our view was that defence should be for NATO. We were not against a European defence identity, but it had to be compatible with NATO. Dr Streibl said that that was a misunderstanding. Europe had to make its contribution within NATO. It would be a disaster to move away from NATO.

The Prime Minister said that Germany was pivotal to the future of Europe - and not just the European Community. Germany had enormous economic strength and political authority and Chancellor Kohl used both very wisely. Because of Germany's immense authority, where there was an alliance of view between Germany and France or the UK, it was probable that alliance would carry the day. There were many areas where we shared the same concerns and he hoped we would continue to work together.

The Prime Minister said that Dr Streibl would know that we had great reservations about the circumstances of when/whether a single currency would come into being. Germany was facing economic difficulties with which she would cope but which were nonetheless real. This only heightened the importance of only moving to a single currency in the right economic circumstances. Germany's influence in all this would be crucial.



Dr Streibl said that he did not feel too bad at all about the fact that Britain had put the brakes on a bit on a single currency. Chancellor Kohl had talked about irreversible steps, but the fact was that the FPD, the CDU and the SPD all had doubts. In practice, the Bundestag would not simply let a single currency happen without having a further say.

Reverting to the issue of subsidiarity, the Prime Minister asked whether other Laender shared Dr Streibl's view. Why did Dr Streibl think that the Community tended always to go for the grand design? Was this a consequence of the size and the scope of the Commission? If so, should we put a stop to that, and how?

Dr Streibl said that once a group of bureaucrats got going things tended to get out of proportion. A farmer in Bavaria who wanted to plant a field of rapeseed had to make nine different declarations covering this or that regulation. Compliance had to be checked and Bavaria had had to set up a special body to do the checking. That should not be what the European Community was all about. Now the Community was getting into consumer protection. Did that mean checking every bread roll or apple? In the case of the farmer growing rapeseed, if one of the Community's conditions had not been met then all Community aid had to be returned, by which time the farmer was probably bankrupt anyway. The way round these problems was for Europe to set the framework but to leave implementation to the individual Laender. It was fine for countries like Germany, Britain and France which had efficient bureaucracies. The same was not true in Italy or Spain. He had talked to people from southern member states about how they implemented these various regulations. Their reaction had been: 'What regulations?'. The Prime Minister agreed, although he said that Maastricht should make a difference to compliance thanks to the introduction of ECJ fines. Dr Streibl reiterated that the Community should set the framework. The framework could be quite a strict one, but Germany wanted to keep her federation as it was. He believed that Germany's federal structure was good for Europe. It prevented the development of an over-mighty bloc.

The Prime Minister agreed that Germany's system had worked well for her and she was right to want to protect it. One problem that was looming large at the centre of Europe was the issue of how the Community financed itself. The financiers of the Community were basically Germany, the UK and France. Apart from one or two others at the margin, most other member states were net beneficiaries. Their interest was to have as much done at the centre as possible because that meant more money distributed to them. Centralisation worked for them. The latest Commission bid was a good example. It meant more money for Spain. Dr Streibl agreed. We had effectively been blackmailed at Maastricht. The Prime Minister said that the remedy lay in our own hands. Germany was the most generous contributor in Europe. The more money we provided the greater centralisation would be. The only solution was to sit on the treasure chest. Dr Streibl agreed. He concluded by saying



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- 4 -

that Herr Waigel sent his regards to the Prime Minister. He saw things in the same way. Germany had enormous expenditure commitments. She had to pay for the new Laender. She was paying for the Soviet Union. She had paid out a large sum for the Gulf war. Waigel saw very clearly that Germany had now come to the end of her financial resources.

I am copying this letter to Jeremy Heywood (HM Treasury), David Rossington (Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

*Jan,*  
*Stephen*  
J S WALL

C N R Prentice Esq  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

RESTRICTED



SC: *not relevant*  
*Went away*  
PRIME MINISTER

*1. Subsidiarity*

CALL BY DR. M. STREIBL, MINISTER PRESIDENT OF BAVARIA

You are seeing Dr. Streibl at 5.00 p.m. this afternoon. He is the Minister President of Bavaria, the strongest party in Bavaria and coalition partner with the CDU in the Federal Government. The CSU is led by the Finance Minister, Dr. Waigel. He and Streibl have a rather uneasy relationship.

The CSU holds four out of twenty Federal Cabinet positions. Its importance has diminished since German unification. (It is effectively a Bavarian-only party.)

The Bavarians tend to be old-fashioned nationalists. The Länder like the idea of subsidiarity as a means of limiting Community encroachment into their affairs. They dislike the extension of Community competence to areas like health, culture and education which are their responsibility under the German Federal system.

Dr. Streibl is keen on the new Committee of the Regions set up by Maastricht, though he may be critical of how little was achieved overall at Maastricht. The Committee of the Regions will effectively be a pressure group for more spending. The Bavarians, and the Länder generally, see it as an opportunity to make their voice (as opposed to the Federal Government's voice) heard within the Community.

Bavaria is a mixture of the highly industrialised (Munich is the hi-tech centre of Germany) and agriculture. You may want to ask Dr. Streibl about:

- the German recession;
- Bavarian attitudes to a single currency;
- subsidiarity and enlargement;
- Eastern Europe/former Soviet Union.

A checklist of points to make on foreign policy issues is attached.

*J. S. Wall*  
J. S. Wall

*G. is printed*

19 February 1992



cc/c  
get upForeign &  
Commonwealth  
Office

18 February 1992

London SW1A 2AH

*Dear Stephen,*

**CALL BY DR MAX STREIBL, MINISTER PRESIDENT OF BAVARIA,  
ON THE PRIME MINISTER: WEDNESDAY 19 FEBRUARY AT 1700**

Dr Streibl, Minister-President of Bavaria, has a strong position in the CSU, which remains an indispensable element in the make-up of the Federal coalition.

The difficulties caused by transformation in eastern Germany, and disillusion in western Germany at the costs and tax increases from Unification caused the CDU/CSU to plunge in popularity in 1991. The CDU/CSU have recovered, but strains on the economy continue. Growth has slowed, interest rates and inflation risen and the public sector deficit has reached 5.2% of GNP. High wage demands will not help reduce inflation. The Government has just won approval for a long dead-locked tax reform package intended to pump more money into the east German economy, a victory for Chancellor Kohl. Another major issue is the problem of immigration and asylum-seekers. The CDU/CSU have announced their intention to seek amendments to the Constitution making it easier, in theory, for the authorities to refuse admission to non-eligible asylum-seekers.

The CSU, still the strongest Party in Bavaria, is led by Party Chairman and Federal Finance Minister Dr Waigel, and Dr Streibl. Streibl achieved a good victory in the October 1990 Bavarian elections and his Government's performance has been workmanlike after an indifferent start. But the CSU's influence has decreased as a result of





unification and they now hold only four of the twenty Federal cabinet positions (down from six).

Due to the strength of its manufacturing base, Bavaria has the highest growth rate of the German Länder, low unemployment and the highest public sector investment and lowest public sector debt. After Luxembourg, it has the highest per capita wealth in Europe.

Scotland has strong links with Bavaria. Mr Lang had a successful visit to Bavaria in September 1991 to develop further commercial links between Scotland and Bavaria. Mr Lang will see Dr Streibl during his visit. A principle topic of their discussion is likely to be regionalism and subsidiarity: the German Länder have powers vis-à-vis the Federal Government and Brussels which the devolutionists envy.

Dr Streibl will be accompanied by HE Baron von Richthofen, German Ambassador and Dr Streibl's Private Secretary. An FCO interpreter will attend as Dr Streibl always uses an interpreter for discussions. We suggest that Tony Blake-Pauley, HM Consul-General Munich (who is accompanying Streibl) also attends.

The Prime Minister has not met Dr Streibl before (Dr Streibl has wanted to call on several previous occasions). I enclose a Personality Note.

#### Yugoslavia

We and our EC partners recognised Croatia and Slovenia on 15 January. Diplomatic relations have been established with Slovenia, but resident missions have not yet been opened. Diplomatic relations will not be established with Croatia until we are sure that Croatia is complying with



Lord Carrington's draft treaty on Yugoslavia, Chapter II, Article 2(c) on "special status" containing stipulations protecting the rights of minorities. The Federal Government take the view that this condition has been met, and already have an Ambassador in Zagreb.

Dr Streibl actively promoted the independence of Croatia and Slovenia and was probably a factor in persuading the Federal Government to take the initiative on recognition.

We are awaiting the results of the Bosnian referendum on 29 February/1 March before taking any further decisions on Bosnia.

The Prime Minister could draw on the following:

- Important to maintain pressure on Tudjman to implement minority rights guarantees as promised to Community before recognition. Germany has considerable influence in Zagreb.
- All parties should cooperate fully with the Carrington Conference and the UN peacekeeping operation: in tandem they remain the only prospect for a lasting peaceful solution.

Developments in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)

The Prime Minister might like to discuss the most recent developments in the former Soviet Union - the CIS Heads of Government Summit in Minsk on 14 February, which discussed mainly military issues - and outline our view of Yeltsin's domestic position and the need for the West to continue to demonstrate its support.





The original CIS documents outlined general principles and areas for common policies. But, it has proved difficult to put flesh on the bones. Temporary agreement has been reached on consultation mechanisms and partial agreement on certain economic issues. But agreement on difficult issues (such as armed forces) has been repeatedly postponed. It seems likely that the Commonwealth will be the framework for controlled disintegration of the Soviet Union rather than any meaningful basis for close future cooperation.

The Summit of CIS leaders on 14 February confirmed existing agreement that nuclear forces would remain under unified command but again failed to reach agreement on the future of conventional forces. Six states agreed on a unified command for a transitional period of two years; Belarus and Uzbekistan appeared to agree but with reservations; and Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova maintained their position of wishing to create their own conventional forces. This is at best a partial and temporary solution: leaders will meet again on 20 March in Kiev. Ukrainian, Moldovan and Azeri insistence on their own armies may yet undermine the resolve of other states to participate in a unified command. The unsatisfactory outcome could increase pressure on Yeltsin to go ahead with the creation of an independent Russian army.

The Prime Minister might like to make the following points:

- Heads of Commonwealth meeting (14 February) failed to reach overall agreement on future of CIS conventional forces.
- This will put further pressure on Yeltsin to go ahead with the creation of an independent Russian army. If he does, division of forces and installations likely to cause serious differences.



- Russia/Ukrainian dispute over Black Sea Fleet also outstanding. Not clear that army will accept any division of Fleet.
  
- Yeltsin's domestic difficulties increasing. Demonstrations against him last weekend did not attract huge support. Yeltsin still has initiative.
  
- But as reforms bite hardships could provoke social unrest. Yeltsin's critics eg Vice-President Rutskoi poised to exploit such developments.
  
- More important than ever that West demonstrates support eg willingness to consider macro-economic support in context of an IMF approved programme.

#### Security in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union

If discussion gets on to security in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, the Prime Minister might say:

- NATO has an important role in promoting peace and stability in East Europe, particularly through the North Atlantic Cooperation Council.
  
- Hope for early entry into force of treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe following NATO discussions with the eight CIS republics concerned (ie those which are wholly or partly west of the Urals).
  
- NATO actively considering problem of nuclear weapons in CIS and ways the West might help. Three issues: eliminating quickly nuclear weapons due for destruction under existing arms control agreements: re-employing redundant nuclear scientists to reduce risks of proliferation; and establishing active export controls





throughout the CIS so as to prevent proliferation of technology.

- As agreed with President Yeltsin in London on 30 January, UK technical team visited Moscow last week. Identified areas where we might help, drawing on particular UK nuclear weapons and safety expertise: storage and transportation of weapons and materials, and reprocessing nuclear materials for civilian use. We will now consider proposals to put to Moscow.
  
- (If raised) no plans for West to purchase CIS weapons for disposal/destruction, as proposed by Austrian Chancellor last month.

#### EC Post-Maastricht

The top priorities for the UK in the aftermath of Maastricht are the completion of the Single Market by the end of 1992 and preparations for enlargement of the Community. The Germans are enthusiastic supporters of enlargement and should support us in attempting to launch enlargement negotiations during our Presidency.

Our Presidency will also be used to prepare the ground for implementing the Maastricht Treaty, ensuring in particular that the Community respects subsidiarity. This will be strongly supported by Streibl, but for regional rather than national reasons. The Länder see subsidiarity as a means of limiting Community encroachment into their affairs (eg the extension of Community competence to include areas such as health, culture and education, which are the responsibilities of each individual German Land). Linked to this will be Dr Streibl's enthusiasm for the Committee of the Regions, through which the Länder hope to make their voice heard, as distinct from that of the Federal Government in Bonn.





The foremost Community issues at present is the future financing package for 1993-97 (the "Delors II Package") unveiled by Delors on 12 February. As expected, he proposed an increase in the Community's Own Resources ceiling from 1.2% of EC GNP in 1992 to 1.37% by 1997 - equivalent to an increase in real terms of 20 billion ecu (£14bn). This would cover increased expenditure on cohesion (£7.7bn more by 1997), support for the competitiveness of European Industry (£2.5bn more) and external policy (£2.5bn more). Delors said nothing about the UK abatement; the Commission is expected to produce a report on this after the General Election. The Germans have shown little enthusiasm for the Delors package thus far. The financial burden of reunification has made them less willing to increase their own net contribution to the EC. They may repeat the attack on the abatement which they launched in 1987-88.

The Prime Minister might wish to make the following points:

- UK will work hard to complete the Single Market this year and will look ahead to the task of making the internal market work after 1992.
- Enlargement is key to next phase of Community's development. Aim to open accession negotiations with EFTAN applicants by early 1993. Important that Community remains outward looking, open and responsive to rest of world.
- Important to establish the necessary machinery for implementation of the Maastricht treaty. Need to ensure the inter-governmental pillars have right institutional under-pinning and that Community activity respects subsidiarity.
- Key test of subsidiarity in the Community centres on the balance of responsibilities between the Community





institutions and national governments. How responsibilities are apportioned within member states should be left to them to decide.

- Welcome establishment of Committee of the Regions. Important to strengthen voice of the regions in the EC. But EC regional policy and institutions need to respect diversity of regional and local government structures within member states.

- Are studying Commission's proposals on future financing (Delors II Package). Not convinced of case for massive increase in EC expenditure.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read 'S L Gass', written in dark ink.

(S L Gass)

Private Secretary

J S Wall Esq CMG LVO  
10 Downing Street



ANNEX A

POINTS TO MAKE

Yugoslavia

- Important to maintain pressure on Tudjman to implement minority rights guarantees as promised to Community before recognition. Germany has considerable influence in Zagreb.
- All parties should cooperate fully with the Carrington Conference and the UN peacekeeping operation: in tandem they remain the only prospect for a lasting peaceful solution.

Developments in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)

- Heads of Commonwealth meeting (14 February) failed to reach overall agreement on future of CIS conventional forces.
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- More important than ever that West demonstrates support eg willingness to consider macro-economic support in context of an IMF approved programme.

Security in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union

- NATO has an important role in promoting peace and stability in East Europe, particularly through the North Atlantic Cooperation Council.
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- NATO actively considering problem of nuclear weapons in CIS and ways the West might help. Three issues: eliminating quickly nuclear weapons due for destruction under existing arms control agreements: re-employing redundant nuclear scientists to reduce risks of proliferation; and establishing active export controls throughout the CIS so as to prevent proliferation of technology.
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EC Post-Maastricht

- UK will work hard to complete the Single Market this year and will look ahead to the task of making the internal market work after 1992.

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- Important to establish the necessary machinery for implementation of the Maastricht treaty. Need to ensure the inter-governmental pillars have right institutional under-pinning and that Community activity respects subsidiarity.

- Key test of subsidiarity in the Community centres on the balance of responsibilities between the Community institutions and national governments. How responsibilities are apportioned within member states should be left to them to decide.


- Welcome establishment of Committee of the Regions. Important to strengthen voice of the regions in the EC. But EC regional policy and institutions need to respect diversity of regional and local government structures within member states.

- Are studying Commission's proposals on future financing (Delors II Package). Not convinced of case for massive increase in EC expenditure.





- (a) **STREIBL, DR MAX**
- (b) Minister-President of Bavaria. Born January 1932, Oberammergau.
- (c)
- |         |  |
|---------|--|
| 1957    | Founder-member of the CSU Junge Union in Bavaria.                                |
| 1960    | Joined the Bavarian Civil Service. Elected Regional Chairman of the Junge Union. |
| 1961    | Entered the Bavarian State Chancellery.  |
| 1962    | Elected member of the Landtag.   |
| 1967-71 | CSU Secretary-General.   |
| 1970    | CSU Regional Chairman in Upper Bavaria.  |
| 1970-77 | Environment Minister, Bavaria.   |
| 1977-88 | Finance Minister, Bavaria.   |
| 1988    | Elected Minister-President, Bavaria.   |
- (d) Although he will never be the international figure that Strauss was, Streibl has proved a worthy successor as Minister-President. He led the CSU to a considerable victory in the 1990 Landtag election and is now firmly in the saddle. His forceful promotion of Bavarian interests includes a commitment to the cause of regionalism in Europe as a central part of the European Community political structure.
- (e) Handsome and agreeable. Strong Atlanticist.
- (f) Married with three children.
- (g) Understands English and can manage small talk. Uses an interpreter for business discussions.





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CCPK

Foreign &  
Commonwealth  
Office

London SW1A 2AH

8 January 1992

noted.  
p.a. S. 8/1.

✓ Sueda tomt

to M:

Dear Stephen,

Visit of Dr Max Streibl, Bavarian Minister - President

~~at trap~~  
I wrote to you on 6 December proposed a reinstated call on the Prime Minister by Dr Streibl on 19 or 20 December. The Prime Minister was unfortunately not able to make these dates.

You then offered 1700 hrs on Wednesday, 19 February 1992. Dr Streibl has accepted this. We will send a briefing letter in due course.

Yours ever,

Christopher Prentice.

(C N R Prentice)  
Private Secretary

J S Wall Esq  
10 Downing Street

GERMANY: visits of  
Max Strebel  
Feb 80





10 DOWNING STREET

Stephen

Stratford cannot  
manage the dams  
We suggested. He  
could come between  
19-21 Feb.

OK to offer Wed  
19 Feb at 1700?

S 16/12

gjs

FCO  
will offer  
this date  
to Stratford.  
P. a. 16/12  
S 16/12

1245 Lunch and Questions Briefing  
 1515 QUESTIONS  
 1540 KEEP FREE FOR MPs  
 RETURN TO NO.10  
 1715 Foreign Secretary + JSW  
 1830 AUDIENCE

Wednesday 12 February

REGIONAL TOUR (WEST MIDLANDS)

Thursday 13 February

0900 Questions Briefing  
 1030 Cabinet  
 1245 Lunch and Questions Briefing  
 1515 QUESTIONS  
 1540 KEEP FREE FOR MPs  
 1900 ADDRESS NATIONAL UNION EXECUTIVE DINNER (BLACK TIE)

Saturday 15 February

?CHEQUERS

Sunday 16 February

?CHEQUERS

Monday 17 February

0915 Sir Robin Butler +AT  
 0945 Week Ahead Meeting  
 1030 Parliamentary Business Managers  
 1230-1315 Host reception for Inter-departmental Group on the Citizen's Charter + AT  
 ? OPEN TATE GALLERY NEW DISPLAYS 1992 + RC

Tuesday 18 February

0800 Breakfast Meeting + SH  
 0900 Questions briefing  
 0930-1015 Keep free for AT  
 1245 Lunch and Questions Briefing  
 1515 QUESTIONS  
 1540 KEEP FREE FOR MPs  
 1715 Foreign Secretary + JSW  
 1830-2030 LOOK IN ON IAN GREER ASSOCIATES 10TH ANNIVERSARY PARTY + MRS MAJOR & GB (NATIONAL PORTRAIT GALLERY)  
 2000 DINNER WITH LORD & LADY YOUNG + MRS. MAJOR LOUNGE SUIT (28 YORK TERRACE WEST)

Wednesday 19 February

0900-0945 Keep free for JSW  
 ADDRESS ASSOCIATION OF COLLEGES FOR FURTHER AND HIGHER EDUCATION

Thursday 20 February

0900 Questions Briefing  
 1030 Cabinet  
 1245 Lunch and Questions Briefing  
 1515 QUESTIONS  
 1540 KEEP FREE FOR MPs  
 1715 Chancellor of the Exchequer +BP  
 ?CONSERVATIVE TREASURERS DINNER





KW  
foreign/streibl

10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

13 December 1991

VISIT OF DR MAX STREIBL, BAVARIAN MINISTER-PRESIDENT

Thank you for your letter of 6 December about the proposed visit of Dr Streibl.

As Sandra Phillips will have explained to you, the only dates we can offer in the near future are 1700 on 27 January or 1500 on 3 February.

J S WALL

C N R Prentice Esq  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

X

O.R. Stephen. Spoke to  
Christopher. Said  
this month  
impossible.  
Could offer  
27 Jan at  
5.00 or 3 Feb  
or 3.00 p.m.



10 DOWNING STREET

(You're right  
Mr Bahaini is  
not coming on 16  
Dec - I pointed  
this out to  
Christopher.)

Sandra

S<sup>9</sup>/12

He'll just have to  
take office. Any  
chance in Jan?

I thought Mr Bahaini  
was not off

An epk to Friedrich 1/2 away

Sandra

1/12.





Foreign &  
Commonwealth  
Office

London SW1A 2AH

6 December 1991

Dear Stephen,

Visit of Dr Max Streibl, Bavarian Minister-President

I wrote to you on 11 April <sup>copies of pps attached</sup> proposing a call on the Prime Minister by Dr Streibl. The Prime Minister could not manage any of the dates which Dr Streibl proposed and you suggested in your reply of 23 April that he might be told that we should need to look for another date, preferably after the summer recess.

Dr Streibl would like to reinstate his visit and has asked for a call on the Prime Minister. He has suggested 19 or 20 December. The Prime Minister is seeing M Balladur, a French Prime Ministerial candidate, on 13 December and the Prime Minister of Bahrain on 16 December.

Dr Streibl remains a valuable interlocutor on a wide range of issues. He holds a strong position in Chancellor Kohl's coalition partner, the CSU. There is also the Conservative Party/ CSU link. Streibl is very keen to see the Prime Minister, and offence would be caused if the Prime Minister appeared unwilling to see him. The timing, however, is awkward and would be impossible, we assume, if the 9/10 December European Council does not settle the IGC negotiations. But, if agreement is reached at Maastricht, the Foreign Secretary hopes that the Prime Minister may be able to find time for a short meeting with Streibl. (If not, can we offer Streibl's office a slot or two in January so as to continue to appear willing?) We could make any reply to Streibl's office before 9 December subject to the outcome at Maastricht.

Yours ever,  
Christopher Prentice

(C N R Prentice)  
Private Secretary

Stephen Wall Esq CMG LVO  
10 Downing Street

AGUMANT, Kelantan PT





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cel



10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

23 April 1991

*Dear Christophe,*

VISIT OF DR. MAX STREIBL, BAVARIAN MINISTER PRESIDENT

Thank you for your letter of 11 April about the possible visit to the UK of Dr. Max Streibl.

I am afraid the Prime Minister cannot manage any of the dates which Dr. Streibl now proposes and I doubt if it will be easy to find new ones before the Summer Recess.

I wonder if Dr. Streibl could be told that we shall need to look for another date. This might be easier after the Summer Recess than before it.

*Yours,*

*J.S. Wall*

(J.S. WALL)

Christopher Prentice, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

*6*

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED



*cepe*

Foreign &  
Commonwealth  
Office

11 April 1991

London SW1A 2AH

*Dear Stephen,*

Visit of Dr Max Streibl, Bavarian Minister President

*at top*  
I wrote to Sir Charles Powell on 12 March proposing calls on the Prime Minister by two Minister-Presidents of German Länder, Professor Biedenkopf and Dr Streibl. The Prime Minister was willing to see Dr Streibl (Charles Powell's reply of 12 March) but in the event Dr Streibl had to turn down the proposed date (8 May) because of involvement in the Hungarian State Visit to Germany.

Dr Streibl now wishes to reinstate his visit and has again asked to call on the Prime Minister. He has suggested coming to London on Friday 31 May, Monday 10 June, or Friday 14 June. He could fly to London the previous evening in each case to be available for a morning appointment if that suited. We understand that only 31 May of these dates is remotely possible in the Prime Minister's diary.

As I said in my earlier letter, Dr Streibl would be a valuable interlocutor on a wide range of European security and economic issues and carries weight within Chancellor Kohl's coalition. There is also a Conservative Party/CSU link. We think it worth making another attempt to arrange a visit.

*Yours ever,*

*Christopher Prentice*

(C N R Prentice)  
Private Secretary

J S Wall Esq CMG  
10 Downing Street

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Office  
London 201 121

Germany: Rel. 46



*J.P.*

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Foreign &  
Commonwealth  
Office

RESTRICTED

12 March 1991

London SW1A 2AH

*Dear Charles,*

Visits by Minister-Presidents of German Länder

We have in prospect visits to London by two of the more active and influential Minister-Presidents of German Länder.

Herr Biedenkopf, CDU Minister-President of Saxony is a distinguished west German politician and the most articulate of the Minister-Presidents of the new Länder, though he is not close to Chancellor Kohl. He will be in London on 12 April.

Dr Streibl has been Minister-President of Bavaria, the largest of the Federal States, since the death of Strauss in 1988. Successful and popular, he is an important west German politician, in regular contact with Chancellor Kohl. Bavaria is booming and has a GDP in excess of five EC countries, including Belgium. The CSU remains the major political force in Bavaria for the foreseeable future and will continue to be a small but effective conservative factor in the Bundestag. Apart from the Conservative Party/CSU link, Herr Streibl is potentially a valuable interlocutor on a wide range of European security and economic issues. He has suggested coming to London on 11-12 April or 8-9 May.

Both Minister-Presidents have asked to call on the Prime Minister. We imagine that other diary pressures will preclude them. But if you decide the Prime Minister has time to see one of them, it would be a choice between a leader of a new Land, Biedenkopf, and the Bavarian with strong links to the Conservative Party, Streibl.

*Yours ever,*

*R. H. T. Gozney*

(R H T Gozney)  
Private Secretary

Sir Charles Powell  
10 Downing Street

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*Margaret*  
*To see*  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
London SW1A 2AH

8 June 1990

*Jean Charles,*

*CRD 10/6.*

Visit of Dr Streibl

Thank you for your letter of 7 June about the visit of Dr Streibl.

Dr Streibl's office are grateful for the invitation to propose alternative dates for a call on the Prime Minister. Unfortunately, they are unable to offer other dates before the Bavarian Land Elections in November. (Dr Streibl will not now visit the UK on 26 and 27 June.)

*Yours ever,*

*Richard Gozney*

(R H T Gozney)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street

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10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

7 June 1990

VISIT OF DR. STREIBL

Thank you for your letter of 5 June about the visit of Dr. Streibl. In normal circumstances the Prime Minister would like to see him, but the dates in question are very difficult, and she simply cannot do it. Would there be any possibility of changing the dates? Otherwise we shall have to say no.

C.D. POWELL

Richard Gozney, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

M



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

5 June 1990

Jan Charles,

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*6/6*

Visit of Dr Max Streibl

Dr Max Streibl, the Minister-President of Bavaria, is visiting the UK between 26-27 June as a COI Category I guest. He has asked whether he could call on the Prime Minister.

Dr Streibl has been Minister-President of Bavaria, the largest of the Federal States, since the death of Strauss in 1988 and has proved successful and popular. He is an important West-German politician and is in regular contact with Chancellor Kohl. Bavaria is enjoying an economic boom and has a GDP in excess of five EC countries, including Belgium.

Although the CSU's overall majority in the Bavarian Parliament and the size of its presence in Bonn is under some threat in the forthcoming elections in November, the Party will remain the major political force in Bavaria for the foreseeable future and will continue to be a small but effective conservative factor in the Bundestag. Chancellor Kohl has to keep the CSU on board during the German unification process, notably on Polish aspects.

Apart from the Conservative Party/CSU link, Herr Streibl is a valuable potential ally sharing HMG's views on a wide range of European security and economic issues. The Foreign Secretary intends to see him, but the Prime Minister may wish to do so too.

*Jan on,*  
*Richard Gozney*

(R H T Gozney)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street



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10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

6 July 1988

Dear Mr.

**PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH HERR STRAUSS**

The Prime Minister had a talk this morning with Herr Strauss, Minister-President of Bavaria. Herr Strauss was accompanied by Herr Peter Schmitt. Mr. Jim Spicer MP was also present. I have recorded separately the discussion of European Airbus and of Tornado for Jordan.

East/West Relations

Herr Strauss talked at some length about his meeting with Mr. Gorbachev last December. He had been surprised to be invited but had found Gorbachev very welcoming and outspoken. He was clearly determined to bring about major changes in Soviet society but had unrealistically high expectations of what he could do. He thought Gorbachev was running a high risk by pushing ahead so fast with reform: he might well be removed from power or even killed. He recalled that Gorbachev had told him that he did not need a war since he had enemies enough at home and was engaged in a constant struggle with conservatives, diehards and others who accused him of trying to abolish Marxism-Leninism when in reality he was trying to implement it more successfully. But although the prospects of Gorbachev succeeding were not that good, he was unleashing a process of emancipation which could probably not be stopped.

Arms Control

The Prime Minister recalled the battle she had fought at the NATO Summit to gain acceptance of the need for NATO to modernize its nuclear weapons and stressed the importance of avoiding a third zero option for short-range nuclear weapons in Europe. Herr Strauss commented that his friendship with Chancellor Kohl had been seriously affected by the decision to abandon the Pershing Is. It had been absolutely unnecessary to make that concession, as Shevardnadze had subsequently told him. The Russians understood firmness and resolve. For instance, he had asked Shevardnadze why the Soviet Union had not insisted on the inclusion of British and French nuclear weapons in the INF negotiations. Shevardnadze had replied that there would never have been an agreement had they tried

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to do this. Strauss continued that he believed that Gorbachev's frenetic pace on the international stage was caused by his need to compensate for the failure of his policies to produce results at home.

### Angola

The Prime Minister thanked Herr Strauss for his message about Angola. She very much shared his concern about the Cuban role and in particular their recent advance towards the Namibian border. Increasingly the Cubans seemed to be acting independently of the Angolan Government. However, we understood that it was agreed that the talks in Washington next week between the Americans, Angolans, Cubans and South Africans would go ahead.

Herr Strauss said that one had to recognise that neither side could win in Angola. There would have to be negotiations leading to a settlement based either on the division of the country or a sharing of power. The Cuban role was indeed a matter of very great concern. It was monstrous that a poor, exhausted and starving country should have to use a large part of its foreign exchange to pay Cuban troops who lived the life of a master-race. He thought that Castro probably preferred to keep the troops in Angola, not least because, according to his information, as many as 50% of them were suffering from AIDS. Herr Strauss added that he understood Mr. Savimbi was in London: he firmly believed that the West should support Savimbi as a means of forcing a settlement. The bright spot on the horizon was the Soviet attitude, which seemed to be changing and coming round to support for a settlement.

### South Africa

The Prime Minister said she was worried about attitudes in the United States towards South Africa which could cause major problems, particularly if Mr. Dukakis were to be elected President. Herr Strauss said that South Africa was virtually the only major subject on which the foreign policy of a Dukakis Administration was likely to differ from current American policy. He added that he very much hoped the Prime Minister would continue to stand firm.

I am copying this letter to Brian Hawtin (Ministry of Defence) and to Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

*Your sincerely,  
C.D. Powell*

(C.D. POWELL)

Lyn Parker, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.





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10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

6 July 1988

*Dear Brian,*

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH HERR STRAUSS: TORNADO

The Prime Minister raised with Herr Strauss this morning the question of credit for the sale of Tornado to Jordan. It was very important that this sale should go through, so that the King did not feel it necessary to turn to the Soviet Union for aircraft. We had gone to great lengths to secure the sale and obtain permission from the United States for release of American equipment. We were providing credit for our share, as were the Italians. But despite her efforts with Chancellor Kohl, the Federal German Government had decided not to extend official credit support. This was most unfortunate. She could see no reason why Germany should not bear its share of the burden. She wondered whether Herr Strauss could induce them to change their minds, or help find some alternative source of support.

Herr Strauss said that he had weighed in heavily to persuade the German Government to lift its objection to the sale of Tornado to Jordan. It had been difficult because of Herr Genscher's very negative role. The problem over credit lay principally with Herr Stoltenberg who looked at it entirely from a book-keeper's point of view. But he, Strauss, was now working hard to get financial guarantees from Hermes and he thought there was a good chance he would succeed.

I am copying this letter to Lyn Parker (Foreign and Commonwealth Office), Neil Thornton (Department of Trade and Industry), Jill Rutter (Chief Secretary's Office) and to Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

*Yours sincerely,  
C.D. Powell*

(C.D. POWELL)

Brian Hawtin, Esq.,  
Ministry of Defence.





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LPC

10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

6 July 1988

*Dear Peter,*

**PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH HERR STRAUSS: EUROPEAN AIRBUS**

The subject of Airbus came up in the Prime Minister's talk with Herr Strauss this morning.

The Prime Minister said that she knew Herr Strauss had already discussed Airbus with Mr. Clarke earlier in the day. The programme was a remarkable technical achievement but had to be turned into a commercial success as well. It was particularly important to establish proper financial control. A report had been produced on the structure of Airbus Industrie which had contained important proposals for improved management and better financial control. These had her full support.

Herr Strauss said that the group of Wise Men had indeed elaborated various concepts. Some of them were realistic, others were wishful thinking. The realistic ones would certainly be put into effect. But it would be wrong to see them as a remedy for the real problems of Airbus. These stemmed above all from the falling dollar. It was very important to maintain an independent European capability to build civil aircraft. At the moment, Boeing had everyone over a barrel particularly when it came to long-range aircraft where they were making a profit of \$35 million on every B747. Herr Strauss continued that it would help to get the management structure right if there were a European Company Statute. He had talked about this to M. Delors who had promised that one would be in place by 1991/2. The Prime Minister said that the trouble was that the Commission wanted to make the Statute too complex. The aim should be a minimum of regulations. But she must repeat that it was vital to get the management structure and financial control right. She was happy to leave Herr Strauss to cope with the problem, but it must be dealt with.


Herr Strauss said that, although it was not really his business, he thought the Prime Minister ought to investigate BAe's financial situation. His impression was that they could not take on the burden of the A330/A340 with the present level

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of launch aid. He saw a real risk that they might pull out of the project. The Federal German Government had agreed to carry the dollar risk for the German share of the A330/A340 up to the year 2000. The Prime Minister said that she noted Herr Strauss' comment and would bear it in mind.

I am copying this letter to Neil Thornton (Department of Trade and Industry), Alex Allan (HM Treasury), Lyn Parker (Foreign and Commonwealth Office), Roy Griffins (Department of Transport) and to Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

*Yours sincerely,*  
  
(C.D. POWELL)

Peter Smith, Esq.,  
Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster's Office.



CCB/SP.

PRIME MINISTER

MEETING WITH HERR FRANZ-JOSEF STRAUSS

You are to see Herr Franz-Josef Strauss tomorrow. Jim Spicer and John Whittingdale will also be present. While the visit is being paid on the party net, it would be useful to deal with one or two points of current business.

Tornado

As you know, the German Government has decided not to oppose the sale of Tornado to Jordan, but equally will not provide official support for the credit arrangements. MBB are having to look to the private sector. You may say to Herr Strauss that we take a pretty dim view of German refusal to participate in the credit arrangements. You may also ask him whether the Bavarian State Government can provide the necessary credit guarantees. It is vital that the sale should not collapse because of Germany's failure to help.

Airbus

Herr Strauss himself is likely to raise this and speak about the importance of providing additional funds for the programme. You will want to say that we have not yet received any firm proposals for additional support from BAe. You might also remind him that such support from any of the Airbus governments would exacerbate the problems we already face with the United States.

You will find in the folder a note by George Guise about the management structure of Airbus. One of the problems is that Herr Strauss himself chairs the Supervisory Board but, because of his other commitments, he declines to allow it to meet very often. The ideal solution would, in George's view, be for Herr Strauss to give up the Chairmanship and hand it on to someone with business expertise. However, the advice of officials at DTI is that there will be little support



elsewhere for an effort to unseat Herr Strauss and that the better solution is to encourage him to play a more active part.

Angola

Herr Strauss has written to you (stimulated by President Botha) about Angola and the threat presented by continued Cuban advances towards the Namibian border. He fears that the South Africans may pull out of the quadripartite talks unless the Cubans are restrained. You can say that we have already urged restraint on the Cubans and Angolans. While you share his concern, it would be a most unfortunate step if the South Africans were now to withdraw from the talks.

Other points you may like to cover are East/West relations and the European Community.

C.D.P?

C. D. POWELL

5 July 1988

BM2BFQ



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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH



5 July 1988

CDI  
6/7

Dear Charles,

Visit to the UK by Herr Strauss, 5 - 6 July

Franz-Josef Strauss, Minister-President of Bavaria and Chairman of the Christian Social Union (CSU), will call on the Prime Minister at 1130 on 6 July after breakfasting with the Foreign Secretary. His visit has been arranged by the Conservative Party.

Strauss, who is now 72, has been involved in German politics since the establishment of the Federal Republic. I enclose a biographical note. As well as the CSU's long-standing hold on power in Bavaria, Strauss still exerts much influence in Bonn, through the CSU participation in the Government and through his own public statements, which are often highly critical of Government policies. This relationship with Bonn in many ways reflects Bavaria's sense of separateness within the Federal Republic (and the relationship between the CSU and CDU). Like many Bavarians, Strauss can behave as if he saw himself as a Bavarian first and a German second.

Strauss has never made any secret of his view that Kohl is inadequate for the Chancellorship. After the 1983 Federal elections Strauss tried unsuccessfully to bully Kohl into giving him a major portfolio. Since then Strauss has directed his energies more at long-range sniping at Kohl (and particularly Genscher, whose party he detests). He has criticised those in the CDU, including its Secretary-General, Geissler, who would like to capture more of the centre ground, on the grounds that they are discouraging traditional right-wing voters. It is easy to understand Strauss' lack of enthusiasm for Genscher and his party. But Kohl has never forgotten - nor can we - that it is Genscher's FDP that has shown itself able to make and break governments in post-war Germany. Particularly after the recent CDU conference (which gave Kohl unenthusiastic support) the Prime Minister may be interested in seeking Strauss' views of the current state of German politics.

Strauss is likely to continue to dominate the Bavarian political stage for some years yet. He is proud of the State's record of economic success. But there are already signs that the succession may be difficult because of his reluctance to open up the CSU to a younger generation. Although it has always retained an absolute majority, the CSU's vote has dropped in every Bavarian election since Strauss became Minister-President in 1978.

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### Tornado

The key British connection with Bavaria today is aerospace collaboration - Tornado, EFA and Airbus. Although Strauss is on the board of MBB, we are not sure how far he has yet been involved in the possible sale of Tornado IDS aircraft to Jordan. We recommend that the Prime Minister raise this with him, stressing the importance of concluding this deal in order to head off the danger of Jordan's turning instead to the Russian MIG 29. The Federal Government have decided not to oppose the sale in principle but not to provide official support for the credit arrangements. We are therefore pressing MBB to say what arrangements they can organise with the private sector (mainly in Bavaria). There will then be the question of how to guarantee any such credit: the Prime Minister might explore with Strauss the option of the Bavarian State Government's providing the necessary guarantees. Our Embassy in Bonn advise that Strauss's influence in all this could be considerable.

### Airbus

We have heard that, as President of Airbus Industrie (AI), Strauss is likely to appeal to the Prime Minister about what he apparently sees as signs of a weakening British Government commitment to the development of the Airbus programme. He is to call at his own request on Mr Kenneth Clarke shortly before he sees the Prime Minister. In the EC/US negotiation there has recently been a hiatus largely attributable to the French elections. Boeing is currently enjoying record sales and McDonnell Douglas remain engaged in talks on possible collaboration with AI. Nevertheless, US pressure for an agreement persists, and the risk of trade action cannot be dismissed. Meanwhile, Airbus profits are suffering from the weak dollar and there is pressure (orchestrated by Strauss) on the FRG Government for additional financial support, as is the case in the UK, although decisions are unlikely before the autumn. If he asks, Strauss could be told that no firm proposals for a specific form of support have been received from BAe; and he could be reminded that any additional Government support would be bound to exacerbate the US problem. If he presses the Prime Minister on Britain's commitment, she could add that since our consideration of the question of further support for BAe is at such an early stage it would be premature to draw any conclusions about the Government's attitude towards the future of the programme.

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### East/West Relations

Since his surprise first visit to Moscow last year Strauss has become something of an enthusiast for Gorbachev's reforms. There are signs of an increasingly active relationship between the USSR and the FRG (Kohl is to visit Moscow in October and Gorbachev will go to Bonn next spring). The Russians may well view West Germany as a relatively "soft touch", in terms of both politics and trade. We recommend that the Prime Minister stress to Herr Strauss the need for calmness and a steady head in responding to change inside the Soviet Union and in East/West relations.

Last week's Party Conference saw the kind of frank and largely public debate unknown in the Soviet Union for over 50 years: criticism of the Party leadership and open divisions within it (Yeltsin); complaints about the continuing shortage of food/consumer goods; genuine disagreements on matters of policy. Full details of what was finally agreed are not yet available, but the proposals to distance the Party from economic management, to make officials more publicly accountable, and to establish a proper, independent judicial system would have radical implications if fully implemented. Real political reform is now openly on the agenda.

Gorbachev has done an immensely skilful job in pushing his ideas through, keeping up the momentum of reform and overcoming the fear to speak out. But most of the party apparatus he has to work through remain reluctant converts, particularly to glasnost as currently practised. And economic reform is still a long way from delivering the goods. It will be a long time before the Gorbachev Revolution (if such it is) can be considered irreversible. The Prime Minister will no doubt have seen Sir Bryan Cartledge's initial assessment (Moscow telno 1144). Further assessment will follow when the Conference documents have been published and some of the dust has settled.

On East/West relations more widely, the Prime Minister could emphasise that progress reflects the fact that the Russians have moved towards us (INF, Afghanistan, human rights). We should continue to seek a worthwhile and constructive dialogue, but not attempt to "help" Gorbachev at the price of sacrificing our fundamental interests or values. There is a very long way to go before the Soviet Union will be a comfortable neighbour for Western Europe (or indeed for Eastern Europe, where developments, notably the Hungary/Romania dispute, must be causing increasing concern in Moscow). The Soviet Union's massive conventional superiority and the continuing activities of the KGB are inevitably of particular concern.

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Angola/Namibia

/ Strauss has just written to the Prime Minister about the clashes between South African and Cuban and Angolan forces at Calueque near the border with Namibia on 27 June. He asks her "to explore every possibility to ensure that irresponsible military actions do not prevent a political solution to the Angolan conflict ....". I enclose a copy of the letter. It repeats almost textually the South African version of events (in a public statement by Pik Botha). This is that SADF forces at the Calueque dam were attacked without provocation by the Cubans. The Cuban version, for which we have some supporting evidence, is that their attack was in retaliation for South African shelling the previous day.

If Strauss raises this, we recommend that the Prime Minister say that we have already urged restraint on the Cubans, South Africans and Angolans. We hope that Strauss will use his links with the South African Government to persuade them not to withdraw from the US-led talks and not to exacerbate the fighting. (Incidentally, Strauss gets it wrong in suggesting that the US took part in the Brazzaville talks.)

EC Issues

If EC issues are raised, the Prime Minister could refer to the progress achieved during the German Presidency on future financing and CAP reform, on the Single Market, and in charting a sensible course for future Community development. Strauss may claim that Bavarian farmers have been called on to make particular sacrifices in the reform of the CAP.

The Prime Minister could draw on the following points:

- welcome agreement reached on major areas of Single Market: liberalisation of capital movements, road haulage, insurance, mutual recognition of diplomas, opening up of public contracts;
- pleased Hanover set priorities for future: financial services (including banking), public purchasing, approximation of standards and intellectual property;
- glad that on social measures the Hanover Council recognised that the key was to create non-inflationary growth and jobs; we must avoid schemes that would increase bureaucracy and cost/burdens on business;

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- (if Strauss raises the German bid to site the Community Trade Marks Office in Munich) We are convinced of the advantages of London (professional infrastructure, centre of communications) and we seek early agreement both on the site and on an appropriate and cost-effective language regime;
- (if Strauss raises monetary cooperation) The UK has a positive and practical approach:
  - abolition of exchange controls;
  - liberalisation of capital movements;
  - pragmatic steps to closer monetary co-operation, including better joint monitoring of monetary developments; greater crossholdings of Community currencies in foreign exchange reserves; and moves to encourage greater use of the private ecu.
- (if Strauss raises agriculture) CAP reform was necessary and overdue. By combining stabilisers with set aside we have ensured that the surpluses will be reduced but the burdens on farmers will remain tolerable.
- We committed ourselves at Toronto to a successful GATT Round. The Mid Term Meeting (MTM) must be more than a simple stocktaking; agriculture is a key issue. The Community must obtain credit for the Brussels CAP reforms, but be prepared to go further, in a multilateral framework.
- We appreciate the difficulty of agricultural reform domestically, but real long term reform and creation of a more market-orientated farm sector are in the Community's own interest.

Finally, Strauss may raise the likely Austrian bid in 1989 for EC accession. If so, the Prime Minister might say that any application would be considered on its merits, in accordance with the EC Treaty, but that we support the Commission view that at least until 1992 the Community should concentrate on "consolidation" rather than enlargement.

I am copying this letter to Peter Smith (DTI) and Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

*Towers, L. Parker*  
(L Parker)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
PS/No 10 Downing Street

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STRAUSS, DR h c FRANZ JOSEF

Minister-President of Bavaria and Chairman of the CSU.

Born 1915 in Munich. Studied law and economics. Received the Maximilaneum Prize as one of the two most brilliant pupils of his year in Bavaria. Served throughout the war reaching the rank of Lieutenant in an anti-aircraft unit. He passed his law examinations during leave from the Army during the war. 1945 POW in American hands. Founder member of the CSU in 1945. Elected to Bundestag in 1949. Appointed Federal Minister without Portfolio in 1953, and Minister for Atomic Affairs in 1955. Minister of Defence 1956-62. Chairman of the CSU since 1961. Minister of Finance 1966-69. 1970 appointed Chairman of the Deutsche Airbus GmbH. Minister-President of Bavaria since 1978, and unsuccessful Chancellor-candidate of the CDU/CSU in the 1980 Election.

As Minister of Defence he produced from fragmentary beginnings an efficient, reasonably popular Bundeswehr. As a result of the "Spiegel" affair in 1962, in which he was instrumental in the arrest of members of "Spiegel" staff while they were in Spain and later attempted to conceal his participation in the affair before the Bundestag, he was obliged to resign. After his fall he went back to Bavaria, gradually to build up his return to the Federal scene in 1966 as Finance Minister.

After the CDU/CSU defeat in 1969, Strauss was the most aggressive spokesman for all-out opposition to the SPD/FDP Coalition. But public distrust of Strauss outside Bavaria, and his attacks on Brandt's popular Ostpolitik, were among the reasons for the CDU/CSU's failure at the 1972 election. He accepted Kohl for whom he has little regard, as Chancellor-candidate of the CDU/CSU for 1976 with bad grace and held him and other CDU moderates responsible for the narrow defeat in the elections of October that year.

His move back to Munich as Minister-President in 1978 did not diminish his influence in Federal politics, and when Kohl decided not to stand as Chancellor-candidate in 1980 the CSU pressed for Strauss to be nominated. He eventually won the nomination over Albrecht. His candidature was not a success. The SPD/FDP made play with his reputation for extremism and unpredictability, and the CDU lost support as a consequence of having thrown in their lot with him. But he continued to aspire to a Federal role, and after the 1983 elections, used his party's good showing in Bavaria to try to bully Kohl to give him a major portfolio in the Government. Kohl, well aware how uncomfortable a colleague Strauss would have been, stood firm and Strauss returned to Munich without having secured his objective. The death of his wife in a road accident in 1984 briefly curtailed his political energies, and since then he has directed them more towards long-range sniping at Kohl and Genscher, becoming more equivocal about his own Federal ambitions. He still bears Genscher a particular grudge for the FDP's role in his 1962 demise and takes any opportunity to interfere in foreign policy. He has good overseas contacts through his various directorships in the arms/aerospace sector and travels widely. He regards himself as an Africa expert and exerts some pull on coalition policy towards his right-wing views. However, his surprise first visit to the Soviet Union in December 1987, when he was received, flattered and impressed by Gorbachev, seems to have taken some of the sharper edges off his opposition to Ostpolitik. In Bavaria, the CSU has maintained an unassailable position under his aegis, to the point where it is difficult for anyone to reach a high position in public service without CSU membership and Strauss' approval. Although he is now past his peak, there is no sign that he is about to retire from politics.



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Strauss' personality, career, appearance and behaviour might well provide an additional chapter to an unabridged version of "Arabian Nights". He has been involved in the past in many scandals, political, financial, sexual and social. He has so far managed to scrape out of the various political and financial escapades; the other two categories do not necessarily do his public standing any harm. He can be loud, aggressive, rude, unkind and uncouth, but can also produce considerable charm. He is a German of a very special Bavarian variety. In the past he has been one of the most adamant "Atlanticists". He is not ill-disposed towards Britain, which he has often visited, but, like many from his part of Germany, he is inclined to view British motives, particularly concerning the EC, with reservation. On the subject of the EC, he is not, like most Union politicians, an idealist. He is anxious to see the CAP milked for all it is worth for the benefit of Bavarian farmers, an important part of his constituency, but tends to disparage the idea of political union. He also had reservations about the proposals for the amendment of the Treaty of Rome, culminating in a successful battle during 1986 to get Land interests taken into account before German ratification of the Single European Act.

He is Catholic, a widower with two sons and a daughter. He speaks fluent English and French. His hobbies are shooting and drinking.



cc/stop

MR POWELL5 July 1988AIRBUS - VISIT OF FRANZ-JOSEF STRAUSS

I visited Airbus on Friday, and talked yesterday with Jeffrey Sterling. The basic recommendation of the 'wise men's report' is that the Airbus organisation should be structured along the lines of a public company with proper accountability for costs incurred and profits made by the four partners.

Such an organisation should have a true Chief Executive to whom all executive officers, including the chief financial officer, report. The present structure is that of a hybrid known technically as a 'Grouping of Economic Interests' (GEI). This is an uneasy partnership between interests which are primarily political, such as those of France and to some extent Germany, and shareholder profitability requirements for British Aerospace.

Neither Sterling nor I believe that a PLC structure for Airbus can be imposed under present arrangements. However a proper reporting structure based on financial accountability with the right choice of people could corral thinking along PLC lines. If a future Airbus were operating in a visibly profitable manner it could eventually adopt PLC status. The fundamental decision making activity must however operating professionally and regularly.

The supervisory board chaired by Strauss holds much of the formal power needed to cause events, but meets irregularly solely because of the many other interests and activities of Strauss. In an ideal world Strauss would delegate the businessman's role of chairmanship while continuing in some honorific role as the 'Grand Old Man' of Airbus.



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Kenneth Clarke got nowhere in suggesting Strauss's retirement to other ministers at Hanover, in May, while Strauss himself is unlikely to take guidance from Kohl or anyone else domestically. Sterling believes one of the few people to whom Strauss might listen would be our Prime Minister. Properly presented the argument could push against an open door for the following reasons:

1. He has outgrown the Chairmanship of Airbus, which should now address the detailed organisational issues for the next stage of its success. His other commitments cannot possibly allow him time to address the details of Airbus management in adequate depth.
2. He is concerned at the level of financial commitment in Airbus and would not wish to be seen walking away. However, a continued involvement as some grand arch-President with detailed business powers delegated to a Chairman known to have his support could make life easier.
3. Strauss is already rather disdainful about the fact that other board members are ministers junior to himself. The board is however soon to be slimmed down.

If possible and appropriate at tomorrow's meeting, it would be helpful for the Prime Minister to venture these ideas. She should emphasise the achievements that have been made under Strauss's leadership in forming one of Europe's great technical successes. She should underline her commitment to see it go on to achieve financial success.

GEORGE GUISE



Annex 1 - Organisation Structure of Airbus


Annex 2 - Kenneth Clarke's brief for Strauss meeting:

9.15 am Wednesday



# Organisation

ANNEX 1





TO: cc PS/Secretary of State  
PS/Mr Atkins  
PS/CHANCELLOR OF THE DUCHY OF LANCASTER PS/Sir Brian Hayes  
Mr Williams  
FROM: Mr Michell, Air  
Mr Guise, No 10  
Mr Hogger, MAED FCO

PAUL LAWRENCE  
Air 2a  
Room 616 Ashdown House  
215 6242

5 July 1988


CHANCELLOR'S MEETING WITH DR ~~FRANZ~~ JOSEF STRAUSS

1 The Chancellor is meeting Dr Strauss to discuss Airbus between 9.15 and 9.50 tomorrow. I attach a short line to take and background note.

Mr Strauss will be accompanied by Mr Amtstretter, from his cabinet, and Mr Schmidt (German Foreign Office). Also with him will be Mr Scharnagl, who, Miss Brydon, has suggested to me may be a prominent Bavarian journalist. If this is indeed the case, and Miss Bryden is checking with the German Embassy, the Chancellor may wish to take a particularly cautious line; but the lines to take are in any case more or less entirely anodyne and repeat well established UK views.

meeting for Air Division.

I will be attending the

  
PAUL LAWRENCE

\* Maria tells me he is  
a journalist with the  
Brian Guise, a Christian  
Democrat Party bulwark.



## CHANCELLOR'S MEETING WITH DR STRAUSS - AIRBUS

## AIMS

To assure Dr Strauss that the UK is committed to profitable, efficient Airbus programmes. To enquire about the future of the German Airbus partner, MBB.

## LINES TO TAKE

- 1 UK Government is fully in favour of a profitable and efficient Airbus Industrie. Welcome agreement on improvements to AI system, including implementation of "wisemen" report. But UK will continue to press publicly for reform until improvements lead to efficient and profitable operation.
- 2 In future, the main AI Government interface will be through AI's Supervisory Board. Hope Mr Strauss will be able to play the active role normally associated with a company president in future AI/Government meetings.
- 3 Aware of possible changes in the status and ownership of MBB. Have any decisions yet been taken? Will MBB receive exchange rate guarantees or similar production supports?
- 4 HMG is in touch with BAE about exchange rate problems; but no firm proposals for any specific form of support have been received from the company.

Cont



5 Must bear in mind the implications for EC/US trade dispute of any decision about additional Government support, particularly for production phases.

## BACKGROUND

### MBB

Recent press reports have focussed on the German Government's moves to restructure the involvement of MBB in AI through the intervention of Daimler-Benz. It appears that the sale of shares in MBB at present owned by three German provincial governments to Daimler may be in prospect. Minister Riedl, a close associate of Mr Strauss, has recently told the British Ambassador in Bonn that, whatever restructuring of MBB occurs, the Federal Government will need to focus upon the effects of the low dollar on Airbus business. An exchange rate guarantee appears to be contemplated. Any such guarantee, of course, runs the risk of being interpreted by the USA as production support, and thus becoming the subject of a trade action.

### HMG COMMITMENT TO AIRBUS

Herr Strauss has from time to time commented upon what he sees as a lesser degree of commitment to Airbus in the UK than in the other three partner countries. Most recently, his close associate Minister Riedl has suggested to our Ambassador in Bonn that it was clear that Germany, France and Spain would all hold fast to the A340 programme, and asked whether it was indeed the case that UK was critically reconsidering the project. While this view does not entirely square with Herr Wolf's comments to the Chancellor at Copenhagen that Germany also has serious doubts about continuing with the A340, Herr Strauss can be expected to seek an assurance of the UK's commitment to the existing programmes. It would appear that Herr Strauss does not favour any collaboration with MacDonalld Douglas which might have the effect of scrapping agreed aircraft.

### HERR STRAUSS AS PRESIDENT OF AI

Officials of the DTI, FCO and No 10 considered yesterday with Sir Jeffrey Sterling whether it would be appropriate during Herr Strauss's visit to raise with him the question of his continued presidency of AI. The Chancellor will recall that, at the Airbus Ministerial meeting in Hanover in May, he suggested to the other Airbus Ministers that perhaps the time had come for Herr Strauss to

Cont



move on. The response, from Ministers and partner companies alike, was almost uniformly hostile. The balance of advantage now may lie in suggesting to Herr Strauss that, with the new, streamlined Supervisory Board playing an active part in the relations between AI and governments, Herr Strauss may need to reconsider the degree of his involvement in AI. Up to now he has been largely a figurehead: now Airbus may need a "hands-on" president.



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ANGOLA: LETTER TO PRIME MINISTER FROM FRANZ JOSEF STRAUSS.

1. FOLLOWING IS OUR TRANSLATION OF A LETTER FROM STRAUSS TO THE PRIME MINISTER. HE WILL NO DOUBT RAISE THE MATTER WHEN HE SEES HER AND YOU IN LONDON ON 6 JULY.

BEGINS:-

THE FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA, MR P. BOTHA, INFORMED ME BY TELEPHONE ON 28 JUNE THAT THERE HAD BEEN A SERIOUS MILITARY ENCOUNTER THE PREVIOUS DAY BETWEEN CUBAN AND ANGOLAN AND SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES IN SOUTHERN ANGOLA. DURING AN INITIAL ATTACK BY CUBAN AND ANGOLAN TROOPS ON THE CALUEQUE/RUACANA ELECTRICITY AND WATER SUPPLY PROJECT, ONE MEMBER OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES AND ABOUT 200 ANGOLAN AND CUBAN SOLDIERS HAD BEEN KILLED. THE ENSUING SECOND ATTACK FROM THE AIR HAD CLAIMED THE LIVES OF 11 SOUTH AFRICAN SOLDIERS.

THE CALUEQUE/RUACANA ELECTRICITY AND WATER SUPPLY PROJECT AND SOUTH AFRICAN ACTIVITIES IN THIS CONTEXT HAD BEEN DISCUSSED IN DETAIL AT HIGH-LEVEL TALKS BETWEEN ANGOLA, THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA HELD IN BRAZZAVILLE ON 13 MAY 1988. FOREIGN MINISTER BOTHA EXPLAINED THEN THAT THIS PROJECT STEMMED FROM AN AGREEMENT CONCLUDED YEARS AGO BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA AND PORTUGAL AND THAT IT WAS OF VITAL IMPORTANCE FOR OVAMBOLAND. SOUTH AFRICAN ACTIVITIES AT CALUEQUE THUS HAD AN EXCLUSIVELY HUMANITARIAN BACKGROUND. FOREIGN MINISTER BOTHA THEREFORE TOLD THE ANGOLAN GOVERNMENT UNEQUIVOCALLY IN BRAZZAVILLE THAT, REGARDLESS OF THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE TWO GOVERNMENTS OVER CALUEQUE, IT SHOULD BE AGREED THAT A MILITARY ENCOUNTER IN THIS AREA WAS TO BE AVOIDED. FOREIGN MINISTER BOTHA THEN REQUESTED MINISTER FRANCA VAN DUNEM TO ENSURE PERSONALLY THAT THE CUBAN COMMANDERS WERE INFORMED ABOUT THE SPECIAL SITUATION AT CALUEQUE. MINISTER VAN DUNEM REACTED POSITIVELY TO THIS AND EXPLAINED HIS UNDERSTANDING FOR THE CIRCUMSTANCES AND THAT HE WOULD BRING THE MATTER TO THE ATTENTION OF



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HIS GOVERNMENT. SOUTH AFRICA HAD TO ASSUME FROM THIS ANGOLAN BEHAVIOUR THAT THEY UNDERSTOOD THE SPECIAL SITUATION WHICH EXISTED AT CALUEQUE AS A RESULT OF HUMANITARIAN NEEDS AND THAT AT LEAST CALUEQUE WOULD NOT BE MADE THE SCENE OF MILITARY ACTION BY CUBAN TROOPS.

THE ATTACK ON CALUEQUE ON 27 JUNE PERMITS ONLY TWO CONCLUSIONS, NAMELY EITHER THAT, CONTRARY TO THE UNDERTAKING GIVEN IN BRAZZAVILLE, THE ANGOLAN GOVERNMENT HAS NOT INFORMED THE CUBAN COMMANDERS ABOUT THE SPECIAL SITUATION AT CALUEQUE CONTRARY TO THE PROMISE IN BRAZZAVILLE OR THAT SUCH INFORMATION HAS BEEN GIVEN BUT THE CUBANS HAVE QUITE DELIBERATELY NOT COMPLIED WITH IT. THIS WOULD MEAN THAT THE CUBAN LEADERSHIP IN ANGOLA IS IGNORING THE ANGOLAN GOVERNMENT IN LUANDA AND ALSO THE POLITICAL REPRESENTATIVES WHO TOOK PART IN THE NEGOTIATIONS IN LONDON, BRAZZAVILLE AND CAIRO TO FIND A POLITICAL SOLUTION TO THE ANGOLAN CONFLICT. IT THEREFORE CAN NOT BE DENIED THAT THE AIM OF THE CUBAN SIDE IS TO USE THE MILITARY PROVOCATION AT CALUEQUE TO OBSTRUCT FURTHER PROGRESS ON THE PATH TO A POLITICAL SOLUTION TO THE ANGOLAN CONFLICT WHICH HAD MOVED CLOSER FOLLOWING THE TALKS IN CAIRO WHICH ALL PARTICIPANTS HAD ASSESSED AS POSITIVE.

A FURTHER ESCALATION OF THE MILITARY CONFLICT WOULD INDEED MOST PROBABLY THWART THE CONTINUATION OF THE TALKS IN WASHINGTON PLANNED FOR JULY. THE CHANCE TO PACIFY SOUTHERN AFRICA, WHICH I AM FIRMLY CONVINCED MUST START WITH ANGOLA, WOULD THUS BE SQUANDERED FOR A LONG TIME. AT THE REQUEST OF FOREIGN MINISTER BOTHA, I ASK YOU MOST URGENTLY, PRIME MINISTER, TO EXPLORE EVERY POSSIBILITY TO ENSURE THAT IRRESPONSIBLE MILITARY ACTIONS DO NOT PREVENT A POLITICAL SOLUTION TO THE ANGOLAN CONFLICT WHICH IS IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE PEOPLE OF ANGOLA AND THE WHOLE OF SOUTHERN AFRICA. | x

ENDS.

2. SIGNED ORIGINAL FOLLOWS BY BAG.

MALLABY

YYYY



RESTRICTED

Gatmann (2)



BRITISH EMBASSY,  
BONN.

29 April 1980

M O'D B Alexander Esq  
No 10 Downing Street

PRIME MINISTER

*Handwritten notes:*  
H. V. ...  
MMP 2/2  
mt

Franz-Josef Strauss

1. I had a brief word with Franz-Josef Strauss at Helmut Kohl's 50th Birthday Party today.
2. He told me that he had been delighted with his visit to London and in particular with his meeting with the Prime Minister. Apparently he had been present when the news of the hostage fiasco had come through and had been most impressed by what he said was the Prime Minister's mixture of toughness and sensitivity in her reactions. He said that he had found himself on the same wavelength over many problems. He also expressed himself satisfied with the other engagements he had had with members of the Conservative Party.

OLIVER WRIGHT

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BRITISH EMBASSY

BOON

0861 AM 7-1



FILE

H8



German

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

26 April 1980

Dear Herr Strauss:

It was a great pleasure to be able to entertain you at lunch here on Friday. I much enjoyed our talk.

Thank you so much for your over generous present. The vase is indeed beautiful and a marvellous example of the craftsmanship for which your home town is so famous.

Yours sincerely  
Margaret Thatcher

Ministerpräsident Franz Josef Strauss

H8



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cc Master  
Extracts Iran - Sik  
Afghanistan - S.H.

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Principal Private Secretary

25 April 1980

Dear George,

VISIT OF HERR FRANZ JOSEPH STRAUSS

Herr Franz Joseph Strauss called upon the Prime Minister for 45 minutes this morning before she entertained him to lunch. By far the greater part of the discussion was devoted to Iran, and at the end of their talk the Prime Minister and Herr Strauss watched President Carter's television broadcast on the abortive American attempt to rescue the hostages.

IRAN

The Prime Minister said that all the British Government's efforts over recent weeks had been devoted to the twin objectives of showing solidarity with the United States, who were the ultimate guarantors of European security, and of securing the release of the hostages unharmed. Throughout this period we had been urging the United States Government to continue to show patience and restraint, but they had repeatedly pointed out that this approach was not bringing about the release of the hostages. When they had asked us what we would do to get the hostages out, we really had no answer to give them other than to continue to suggest that the best course was to sit tight. We had thought that we still had some time available for concerted diplomatic activity aimed at securing the release of the hostages, and the Ambassadors of the Nine, who had been recalled for consultation, had been going to see President Bani-Sadr next week. But everything was now in the melting pot following the unsuccessful American attempt to get the hostages out. The failure of the American action had now put the United States in an exceptionally difficult position both internationally and domestically. There was very little which the British Government was able to say publicly at present, but there would be an opportunity to discuss Iran at the meeting of the European Council on Sunday and Monday.

Herr Strauss said that during his recent visit to Washington Mr. Brzezinski had told him that the Americans envisaged three consecutive steps against Iran - first, economic sanctions, then a blockade and finally military action. In his view President Carter should now give a solemn warning to Iran that if any of the hostages were injured or killed, a part of Iran would be smashed to pieces.

/But there was

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It there was no denying the immense risks involved. Any action against, for example, South Iran, would be a signal to the Soviet Union and to Iraq to move into Iran themselves. There was, however, no point, following the rescue attempt, in thinking any more about economic sanctions. Khomeini's position would now be strengthened immensely inside Iran. He would say that he had appealed to Allah and Allah had defeated President Carter. Khomeini's magical reputation with his primitive people would be enhanced still further. As for the position of the European allies, it would be suicidal if we allowed ourselves to be separated from the United States. He was absolutely against President Giscard's anti-American policies.

The Prime Minister said that she agreed that it was unlikely that economic sanctions would work in the aftermath of the American rescue attempt. The British Government were very worried about the possibility of the Americans taking military action, which in her view included a blockade. Even limited action was fraught with danger. For example, what would the United States do if Iranian ships tried to run a blockade? She was also very worried about the possible use of mines. There were the obvious immediate risks to shipping, but even when the crisis was over, not all of the mines that had been laid might be swept and there might well be a catastrophe involving an oil tanker. She was also concerned that if American aircraft were used to attack Iran, the Iranians might ask the Russians to send fighters to defend them.

Herr Strauss said that he believed the Soviet Union would keep out of any fighting in Iran. They did not want to be directly involved in any conflict with the United States. Rather, their objective was to seize part of Iran. The events of the previous night had humiliated the United States to a point where that country was a ridiculous cartoon figure. If this development was not stopped and reversed, the world would be a permanently different place. There would be only one super power - the Soviet Union -, and the repercussions for European security would be vast.

#### AFGHANISTAN

Herr Strauss said that when he had visited President Carter he had told him that he thought that existing treaties, trade agreements and contracts with the Soviet Union should be observed. Measures against the Soviet Union should not automatically be extended to the Soviet Union's satellites unless those countries were helping the Russians to circumvent the steps taken against them. He believed, however, that the COCOM list should be extended and that the West should reduce and eventually eliminate barter deals with the Soviet Union, since these normally gave the Russians high technology in exchange for basic commodities and allowed them to build up their strategic strength. He had also told President Carter that he thought that NATO, and especially the Federal Republic, must improve its military capability. He thought that Germany should replace its Leopard I tanks with the Leopard II in 1983 rather than 1985 and that they should pass on their Leopard I tanks to Turkey. Germany should also deploy six more anti-

/submarine frigates



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- 3 -

submarine frigates in the Atlantic and improve the arrangements in Germany for receiving US reinforcements. The European allies should also build up a long-range air transport capability which could be used for operations like that in the Congo in 1978. Herr Strauss added that the Federal Government had decided, with total support from the CDU/CSU, that there should be no Government financial support for German athletes who went to the Moscow Olympic Games. In his view there should be no participation whatsoever in the Olympic Games: there should be no ifs and buts about it.

The Prime Minister said that her views on the Olympic Games were well known. There never had been any question of the British Government making money directly available for sportsmen to take part in the Games. Money to support the British participants was being raised privately, but she had now ended her association with the appeal for funds.

I am sending a copy of this letter to David Wright (Cabinet Office).

*Yours now,*

*Mrs. Whitman.*

G.G.H. Walden, Esq.,  
Foreign & Commonwealth Office.

*KRB*

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10 DOWNING STREET

M. Whitmore

Photocall for Her Strasser

There will be 15  
people for this photocall,  
including 4 TV crews  
plus equipment, so I  
strongly recommend we do  
it in the Front Hall  
or Blue Drawing Room.  
Please let me know



which the Am. would  
prefer before 12.00 so  
that I can make  
the arrangements.

Charles. Am

25/4



cc  
PM - G/H

10 DOWNING STREET

PRIME MINISTER

I attach some information on the  
vase you will be receiving from  
Dr. Strauss tomorrow.

*es.*

24 April 1980





*With the Compliments of the*

Conservative Party International Office

32 SMITH SQUARE · LONDON SW1P 3HH

Telephone: 01-222 9000

Cables: Constitute London SW1P 3HH

Sally, Here is a translation of the description of the vase which Dr Skannas will give to the P.M. tomorrow. As I told you, blue & white are the colours of Bavaria, & this piece has been chosen as non-political and appropriate for a lady. Rosemary.



Vase No. 833, Design 892

The vase comes from the well-known Nymphenburg Pearls, or Royal Service, collection, which was created in the years 1792-5 by the famous Nymphenburg designer, Dominikus Jacobus Auliczek, the successor of Franz Anton Bustellis. Before he embarked upon his 30 years of intense artistic activity in the Nymphenburg porcelain factory, Auliczek had studied in Vienna, Rome, Paris and in 1755-6 in London.

The decoration dates from the beginning of the 19th century, when the blue base colour was very fashionable in Nymphenburg. Only the most precious pieces were decorated in this way, because the cobalt blue was hard to handle but above all the difficulty of procuring it made it as expensive as gold.

The strong impression created by the basic blue colour is relieved by the brightly coloured posies in the two oval panels edged with a fine gold border.

Translator's note. The Nymphenburg porcelain factory is an old and famous establishment on the outskirts of Munich near where Dr. Strauss comes from.

RS/CB  
24.4.80

PRIME MINISTER

Lunch for Dr. Franz Josef Strauss  
Friday, 25 April 1980

I attach the list of guests attending your lunch tomorrow for Dr. Strauss, and a draft seating plan.

Ian Gow has seen the seating plan.

Do you agree please?

Sue Goodchild  
—

24 April 1980



*Mr Alexander for information*

LIST OF GUESTS ATTENDING THE LUNCHEON TO BE GIVEN BY THE  
PRIME MINISTER IN HONOUR OF DR. DR. G.C. FRANZ JOSEF STRAUSS,  
MINISTER-PRASIDENT OF BAVARIA AND CHAIRMAN OF THE CSU ON FRIDAY,  
25 APRIL 1980 AT 1.00 PM FOR 1.15 PM

---

The Prime Minister

Dr. Dr. G.C. Franz Josef Strauss

Herr Hans Klein, MDB

Organiser of Dr. Strauss's Election  
Campaign. Former Press Spokesman  
for Olympic Games in Munich 1972

The Rt. Hon. Sir Ian Gilmour, MP

The Rt. Hon. Geoffrey Rippon, MP

The Lord Harris of High Cross

Sir Bernard Braine, MP

Mr. James Scott-Hopkins, MEP

Mr. Robert Conquest

Mr. Alistair McAlpine

Mr. Ian Gow, MP

Mr. Michael Alexander

DRAFT SEATING PLAN FOR LUNCH ON FRIDAY, 25 APRIL

Mr. Ian Gow

Mr. Alistair McAlpine

Sir Bernard Braine

Mr. Robert Conquest

Herr Hans Klein

PRIME MINISTER

THE RT. HON. SIR IAN GILMOUR

DR. DR. G.C. FRANZ JOSEF STRAUSS

The Rt. Hon. Geoffrey Rippon

The Lord Harris of High Cross

Mr. James Scott-Hopkins

Mr. Michael Alexander

ENTRANCE



Mr. Alexander

LIST OF GUESTS ATTENDING THE LUNCHEON TO BE GIVEN BY THE PRIME MINISTER  
IN HONOUR OF DR. DR. G.C. FRANZ JOSEF STRAUSS, MINISTER-PRASIDENT OF  
BAVARIA AND CHAIRMAN OF THE CSU ON FRIDAY, 25 APRIL 1980  
AT 1.00 PM FOR 1.15 PM

---

1. The Prime Minister
2. Dr. Dr. G.C. Franz Josef Strauss
3. one from Dr. Strauss's office (Mr. Hans Klein MDB)
4. The Rt. Hon. Sir Ian Gilmour, MP
5. Lord Harris of High Cross
6. Sir Bernard Braine, MP
7. Mr. James Scott-Hopkins.
8. Mr. Robert Conquest
9. Mr. Alistair McAlpine  
Conservative Central Office
10. Mr. Ian Gow, MP
11. Mr. Michael Alexander  
10 Downing Street
12. The Rt. Hon. Geoffrey Rippon, MP

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

23 April 1980

*Dear Michael,*

Visit by Herr Strauss

As requested I attach a brief for the Prime Minister's use in preparation for the lunch she is giving in honour of Herr Strauss, Chancellor-candidate of the CDU/CSU opposition in the FRG, on Friday, 25 April.

*Yours etc*

*Paul*

(P Lever)  
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq  
No 10 Downing Street  
London

CONFIDENTIAL



22 APR 1980



7





CONFIDENTIAL

*ms*

#### VISIT OF HERR STRAUSS

1. Herr Strauss's visit to the UK was organised through contacts between the political parties in early February. As a courtesy, HM Embassy told Chancellor Schmidt's office that the invitation was being issued. At that time it was not known that the visit would fall so close to the European Council.
2. Herr Strauss has undertaken a number of foreign visits this spring. He was in Paris in February, and visited the United States immediately after Chancellor Schmidt's visit there on 4-5 April. He appears to have made a good impression on some of President Carter's advisers, including Mr Brzezinski. He is also having some success in presenting himself to the FRG electorate as a responsible international statesman, as well qualified to conduct affairs with leaders of both East and Western countries as Chancellor Schmidt.
3. Federal elections take place in the FRG on 5 October. On the basis of present opinion polls it is impossible to predict whether the CDU/CSU opposition will succeed in ousting Chancellor Schmidt's SDP/FDP coalition. Much will depend on how far the Green Party (ecology and environment) succeed in attracting votes from the FDP, the junior party in the coalition. Providing the FDP get more than 5%, and thus qualify for representation in the Bundestag, the odds are on the survival of the present coalition.

/4.

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4. In December 1979 Herr Strauss addressed a letter to the Prime Minister (separate letters went to President Giscard and President Carter) on the subject of the German Nationalstiftung. Following a request by the German representative in the Bonn Group, acting on direct instructions from the Chancellor, a reply to Herr Strauss's letter, signed by HM Ambassador at Bonn, was routed through the Federal Government. This letter was finally passed on, together with the letters from the other two Ambassadors, on 17 March. A second letter from Herr Strauss, which crossed with this reply, was acknowledged by the Private Secretary at No 10. The Prime Minister may like to assure Herr Strauss that no discourtesy was intended by the indirect delivery of the substantive reply but that Herr Strauss's letter raised issues which were under discussion in the Bonn Group and on which we were bound to take advice from the Federal Government of the day. A copy of Herr Strauss's letter and Sir O Wright's reply are attached.

5. A Personality Note on Herr Strauss and a copy of the guest list are attached, together with a submission on Herr Strauss prepared by the Department at the time of his election last July as opposition Chancellor candidate.

The personality note enclosed was done in 1976. The FCO will get me an up-to-date version for thing tomorrow.

CONFIDENTIAL



Mr Fergusson

*R. Burgess*

P.S. *r/l.p.s.* has seen

FRANZ JOSEF STRAUSS

*Mr Hurdstone - to see minutes JB*

- BC 1. I submit Bonn telegrams Nos 358 and 361 and 25 Saving reporting and commenting on the election of Franz Josef Strauss to be the opposition Chancellor candidate for the 1980 Federal elections. (54) (55)
- D I also attach the Leading Personalities Report on Herr Strauss which brings out very well the contradictory elements in Strauss's volatile nature and explains briefly the background to the "Spiegel" affair referred to in para 6 of Bonn telegram No 361. In his telegram of comment, Sir O Wright emphasizes the dangers for the FDP and speculates on the possibility of Herr Strauss becoming Chancellor in 1980.

Background

2. The election of Herr Strauss has galvanised the Federal German political scene and opened up the prospect of the most bitter election campaign in the history of the FRG. His election would have been virtually unthinkable only five years ago.

**THIS IS A COPY. THE ORIGINAL IS  
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3 (4)  
OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT.**

*Temporarily Retained*

4. This mistrust of Herr Strauss, widespread even among Conservatives in Germany, at least outside Bavaria, is at first sight hard to explain. Only committed opponents claim, unconvincingly, that Herr Strauss is a neo-Nazi: he is neither a racialist nor a reactionary. Nor is he unduly nationalistic: although devoted to his native Bavaria, he is not an out-and-out proponent of German reunification. He is rather an Atlanticist and a European. He is further a highly intelligent politician of greater political

/subtlety

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A | subtlety than foreigners - or even many of his own countrymen - customarily give him credit for. He has served twice as a Cabinet Minister with distinction. However, as the LPR brings out, he is also an enemy of moderation, in his private as in his public life. As the French would say, "il manque de goût". He can attract people with his charm but, as easily, repel them with his vulgarity. He is ruthless, relentless, and unscrupulous to a degree hardly matched by any other prominent European politician, though he bears certain resemblances to M Chirac in France and the Rev Ian Paisley. The "Spiegel" affair has left an indelible imprint on the still sensitive fabric of German democracy.

#### Public Opinion

5. This background helps to explain why German press reactions to Herr Strauss's election have been noticeably more reserved than the British. Bonn telegram No.25 Saving summarizes these reactions: "apprehension", "lack of enthusiasm", "more than a little concern", "critical", "resentment" are key phrases that spring to the eye. The commentaries in "Die Zeit" and the "Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung" mentioned in para 3 will carry weight with influential Germans, and will indeed reflect their thinking. The German electorate is not yet sophisticated enough to relish the prospect of an election campaign with no holds barred.

#### The FDP

B | 6. As Sir O Wright rightly points out, the next Federal election could hinge on the fate of the FDP. The disappearance of the FDP would almost certainly guarantee victory for the CDU/CSU. However, I am not sure that Herr Strauss's emergence as the CDU/CSU candidate is necessarily bad news for the FDP. Faced with the choice between two powerful and highly contrasted personalities, a number of voters may well seek refuge in a third, less exciting and more moderate force. In particular, I would expect many former CDU supporters to move back to the FDP (which used to be a right wing party) rather than to the SPD. Such defections from the CDU could more than compensate for the defection of any FDP supporters to the SPD.

/1980



( )

80 Elections

7. It is of course much too early to speculate usefully on the prospects for the 1980 elections. The present coalition could lose the next election through a combination of circumstances - eg a world energy crisis - largely beyond their control. Alternatively, Herr Strauss could by then have frightened or alienated so many Conservative voters that Herr Schmidt won in a landslide. In practice I suspect that, as usual, the outcome will remain in doubt up till the last moment. We must continue to bear in mind the possibility that the next Federal Government will be led by Herr Strauss.

British interests


8. How would British interests be affected by the advent of a Strauss government in Bonn? Herr Strauss is by no means hostile to Britain, but his instincts are to look first to the United States and second to France. In that sense he would not be a natural ally. But he would unquestionably be strong on defence issues and disposed to drive a harder bargain with the Soviet Union than successive SPD/FDP governments have done. He would work hard for a strong European Community but would also fight very hard for Bavarian farming interests within the Community. We could expect a tough ride over the CAP and Community budget if those issues were still topical by then. The Soviet Union, which has dubbed Strauss an "enemy of détente", might well regard his election as potentially destabilising. There could be difficult moments between Moscow and Bonn but, as realists, the Russians would try to deal with Herr Strauss and an effective working relationship might prove possible. It was striking that Mr Brezhnev had a lengthy tête-à-tête with Herr Strauss when he visited Bonn in May 1978. Détente would not come to an end, but Ostpolitik would be pursued with a different emphasis on the German side.

Conclusion

9. On balance, there would be nothing for HMG to fear in a Strauss victory, though in certain areas we would have to be prepared to fight our corner that much harder, especially in the Community.

/As





As it happens, Herr Strauss's right hand man, Herr Stoiber, is visiting the UK as an official guest of HMG from 19 to 23 November and Ministers will have an opportunity of learning more about Herr Strauss and the CSU from him.

*D A S Gladstone*

D A S Gladstone  
Western European Department

12 July 1979

cc EID(I)  
EESD  
Defence Dept  
Planning Staff

*I saw a fine example of Herr Strauss  
in 1957-59 when he was Defence Minister - and  
he was certainly an effective one. And I have  
the impression that his more disagreeable attributes  
were less conspicuous then!*

*E. J. [Signature]*  
13/7

*Mr Gladstone's perceptive insights could form the basis  
for a reply to Sir J. Wright. I agree especially with points  
A, B and C and with the whole of para. 8.*

*Mullart 16/7*



STRAUSS, DR h c FRANZ JOSEF

Minister-President of Bavaria and Chairman of the CSU.  
Chancellor-candidate of the CDU/CSU for the 1980 election.

Born 1915 in Munich. Studied law and economics. Served throughout the war reaching the rank of Lieutenant in an anti-aircraft unit. He passed his law examinations during leave from the Army during the war. 1945 POW in American hands. Founder member of the CSU in 1945. Elected to Bundestag in 1949. Appointed Federal Minister without Portfolio in 1953, and Minister for Atomic Affairs in 1955. Minister of Defence 1956-62. Chairman of the CSU in 1961. Minister of Finance 1966-69. 1970 appointed Chairman of the Deutsche Airbus GmbH.

After his fall as a result of the "Spiegel" affair in 1962, Strauss went back to Bavaria, gradually to build up his return to the Federal scene. In 1966, he threw in the CSU vote on behalf of Kiesinger, thereby guaranteeing his election. Between 1966 and 1969 he again proved his many-sided abilities as Minister.

His move back to Munich as Minister-President in 1978 did not diminish his influence in Federal politics and he eventually won the nomination as Chancellor-candidate when a sufficient proportion of the CDU decided to put its weight behind him rather than the younger Albrecht.

Herr Strauss' career has been marked by many controversial episodes, political, financial and social. He can be loud and aggressive, but can also display considerable charm. He is a German of a very special Bavarian variety. In the past he has been one of the most adamant "Atlanticists". He is not ill-disposed towards Britain which he has often visited, but, like many in his part of Germany, he is inclined to view British motives, particularly concerning the EC, with reservation.

He is Catholic and is married with 2 sons and a daughter. He speaks fluent English and French. His hobbies include shooting and bicycling.



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STRAUSS, FRANZ JOSEF

Chairman of the CSU.

Born Munich 1915. Studied law and economics. Received the Maximilian Prize as one of the two most brilliant boys of his year in Bavaria. Served throughout the war reaching the rank of Lieutenant in an anti-aircraft unit. He passed his law examinations during leave from the Army during the war. 1945 POW in American hands. Founded the CSU in Schongau in 1945. Elected to Bundestag in 1949. Appointed Minister without Portfolio in 1953, and Minister for Atomic Affairs in 1955. Minister of Defence 1956-62. Chairman of the CSU in 1961. Minister of Finance 1966-69. 1970 appointed Chairman of the Deutsche Airbus GmbH.

He performed what at the time was thought by most people to be impossible, namely to produce from more or less nothing an efficient, reasonably popular Bundeswehr. He saw himself as an eventual Federal Chancellor. As a result of the "Spiegel" affair in 1962, in which he was not only involved in the arrest in Spain of Ahlers and of other members of "Spiegel" staff in Germany, but also in attempting to conceal his participation in the affair before the Bundestag, he was obliged to resign. His answers given in the Bundestag were described by the Minister of Justice as being "just outside the bounds of legality". He was later forced to admit to his complicity by Schröder, then Foreign Minister, in a Cabinet meeting. After his fall Strauss returned to Bavaria to sulk, and gradually to build up his return to the Federal scene. His chance came in 1966, when Erhard's government collapsed. He realised that unless a serious claimant to the Chancellorship other than Schröder were to be found, his future would remain baulked. He threw in the CSU vote on behalf of Kiesinger, thereby guaranteeing his election.

Between 1966 and 1969 he again proved his many-sided brilliance as Minister of Finance; at first, in restoring the economic balance together with Schiller; and later, in denigrating the SPD prior to the 1969 Federal election. After the CDU/CSU failure in 1969 Strauss was the most aggressive spokesman for all out opposition to the SPD/FDP Coalition. He supported the election of Dr Barzel as CDU Chairman and Chancellor candidate in 1971, though without enthusiasm. But public distrust of Strauss outside Bavaria, and his attacks on Brandt's popular Ostpolitik, were among the reasons for the CDU/CSU's failure at the 1972 election. He played a part in Barzel's downfall in May 1973 and remains a potent source of trouble for the CDU leadership, especially over Ostpolitik. His success in increasing the CSU's share of the vote in the 1974 Bavarian Land elections to an unprecedented 62 per cent further enlarged his prestige within the CDU, CSU., though his national reputation suffered from his so-called Sonthofen speech, in which he argued that any opposition tactics were justified, which would bring down the Government, even if it meant pushing the country into an economic crisis. But, as often in the past, he has used it obstructively rather than constructively. He accepted Kohl's nomination as Chancellor-candidate of the CDU/CSU for 1976 with bad grace, and for a time seemed to be toying once more with the idea of establishing the CSU as a separate party at the national level.



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TELEGRAM NUMBER 347 OF 23 APRIL

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VISIT BY STRAUSS TO THE UK: 24/25 APRIL

1. FRANS-JOSEF STRAUSS, LEADER OF THE CSU AND OPPOSITION CHANCELLOR-CANDIDATE FOR THE OCTOBER FEDERAL ELECTIONS, IS DUE TO PAY A TWO DAY VISIT TO THE UK STARTING TOMORROW, 24 APRIL. HE WILL BE SEEING SENIOR MINISTERS AND MEMBERS OF THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY, INCLUDING YOURSELF AND THE PRIME MINISTER.
2. IT IS NOW 9 MONTHS SINCE STRAUSS BECAME CDU/CSU CHANCELLOR-CANDIDATE AND LESS THAN 6 MONTHS REMAIN BEFORE THE FEDERAL ELECTIONS. YET HE STILL GIVES THE IMPRESSION OF A MAN WHO IS TRYING HARD BUT SO FAR UNCONVINCINGLY TO CHANGE HIS SPOTS. HIS TRADITIONAL REPUTATION FOR IMPETUOSITY STILL DOGS HIM WHILE HIS ATTEMPTS TO ASSUME A MORE STATESMANLIKE AND BALANCED STANCE HAVE DONE LITTLE SO FAR TO ENHANCE HIS CREDIBILITY OR MAKE AN IMPACT ON THE ELECTORATE. IN PURSUING HIS NEW IMAGE HE APPEARS TO BE RUNNING THE RISK OF LOSING MUCH OF HIS IDENTITY.
3. AS PART OF HIS ATTEMPT TO ENHANCE HIS IMAGE AS A POLITICIAN OF INTERNATIONAL STATUS STRAUSS HAS MADE A NUMBER OF OVERSEAS VISITS. IN RECENT WEEKS HE HAS BEEN TO ROMANIA (WHERE HE TALKED TO CEASESCU), FRANCE (WHERE HE SAW BARRE) AND THE UNITED STATES (WHERE HE WAS RECEIVED BY THE PRESIDENT AND SAW MANY OF THE LEADING MEMBERS OF THE ADMINISTRATION). DESPITE THESE HIGH LEVEL CONTACTS THE VISITS HAVE NOT MADE A MAJOR IMPACT IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC. STRAUSS HAS GENERALLY GIVEN THE IMPRESSION THAT HE IS TREADING IN CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT'S FOOTSTEPS AND WALKING IN HIS SHADOW. IN RECENT WEEKS THERE HAS BEEN NO DEARTH OF THEMES ON WHICH TO TAKE ISSUE WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT - AFGHANISTAN, IRAN, THE CHANCELLOR'S REMARKS ON TNF AND HIS PROSPECTIVE VISIT TO MOSCOW, THE BUDGETARY DEFICIT - BUT STRAUSS'S CRITICISMS HAVE BEEN MUTED AND AMBIVALENT AND HE HAS SO FAR BEEN UNABLE TO CARVE OUT A DISTINCTIVE POSITION FOR HIMSELF OR CAPITALISE ON THE WEAK POINTS IN THE GOVERNMENT'S POLICIES.
4. THERE ARE STILL NEARLY 6 MONTHS REMAINING BEFORE THE FEDERAL ELECTIONS IN OCTOBER. BUT ON PRESENT FORM THE CDU/CSU DOES NOT GIVE THE IMPRESSION OF BEING ABLE TO BRING ABOUT A DECISIVE SHIFT IN THE BALANCE BETWEEN THEM AND THE SPD. BARRING MAJOR UPSETS ON THE INTERNATIONAL SCENE WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY CREATE A RIFT BETWEEN THE TWO COALITION PARTIES, A CHANGE IN GOVERNMENT THIS AUTUMN STILL SEEMS MORE LIKELY TO COME ABOUT (IF AT ALL) AS A RESULT OF INCURSIONS BY THE ENVIRONMENTALISTS (THE GREENS) OR LESS LIKELY BY LOSSES ON THE PART OF THE FDP THAN AS THE RESULT OF A MAJOR BREAK-THROUGH BY THE CDU/CSU (WHO GOT 48.6 PER CENT OF THE TOTAL VOTE LAST TIME).
5. STRAUSS CLEARLY ATTACHES CONSIDERABLE IMPORTANCE TO HIS VISIT TO BRITAIN. IT COMPLETES HIS SERIES OF VISITS TO THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC'S MAJOR ALLIES. STRAUSS HIMSELF HAS AN INSTINCTIVE SYMPATHY FOR HMG'S POLICIES ACROSS A WIDE SPECTRUM OF INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC AFFAIRS, AND A PUBLICLY DECLARED ADMIRATION FOR THE

/PRIME



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PRIME MINISTER AND YOURSELF. HE HAS LET IT BE KNOWN THAT IN GENERAL HE CONSIDERS THAT THE BRITISH REACTION TO AFGHANISTAN HAS STRUCK THE RIGHT NOTE, AND HE HAS BEEN PUBLICLY SYMPATHETIC TO THE UK CASE ON THE COMMUNITY BUDGET.

5. ALTHOUGH HE HAS NOT YET SUCCEEDED IN MOUNTING A DECISIVE CHALLENGE TO THE FEDERAL CHANCELLOR, STRAUSS IS STILL A MOST FORMIDABLE OPPONENT AND THE ONE LEADING OPPOSITION FIGURE WHOM SCHMIDT RESPECTS. SCHMIDT CLEARLY CANNOT (AND DOES NOT) OBJECT TO STRAUSS BEING RECEIVED AT A HIGH LEVEL IN LONDON, BUT THE TIMING IS SLIGHTLY AWKWARD IN RELATION TO THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL AND THE PRESENTATIONAL ASPECTS OF THE VISIT WILL NEED CAUTIOUS HANDLING TO AVOID THE RISK OF ANY OFFENCE BEING TAKEN HERE. THIS DOES NOT MEAN THAT A FIRM STATEMENT BY STRAUSS OF SUPPORT FOR OUR CASE ON THE COMMUNITY BUDGET WOULD BE OTHER THAN HELPFUL.

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# Conservative Party International Office

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## Programme for the Visit of Dr. Franz Josef Strauss

24-25 April 1980

The Chairman of the German CSU Party, Dr. Franz Josef Strauss, will be visiting London at the invitation of the Chairman of the Conservative Party on 24-25 April 1980 for talks with the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary. Dr. Strauss is Minister-Präsident of Bavaria and the CDU/CSU candidate for the Chancellorship in the Federal elections due to take place on 6 October this year.

Dr. Strauss will be accompanied by his wife, who will follow a separate programme, and the following:

- Mr. Hans Klein, Member of the Bundestag, organiser of Dr. Strauss's election campaign.
- Mr. Godel Rosenberg, Press Spokesman for the CSU Party.
- Mr. Dieter Schmidt, Director of CSU International Office.

### 24 April

- 1500 app. Arrive Heathrow airport by private plane. Met by Mr. John Biggs-Davison, MP on behalf of the Conservative Party, Mr. Scott Hamilton and Miss Rosemary Spencer of the Conservative Party International Office, and the German Ambassador; de Havilland Suite.
- 1600 Arrive House of Commons for meeting of Conservative Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs.
- 1800 Meeting with media representatives, Grosvenor House Hotel.
- 2000 Dinner at the German Embassy.



25 April

- 1130 Meeting with the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Foreign Office.
- 1215 Private talks with the Prime Minister, 10 Downing Street.
- 1315 Working lunch with the Prime Minister and others, 10, Downing Street.
- 1430 app. Depart for Grosvenor House Hotel.
- 1530 Press Conference, Grosvenor House Hotel.
- 1900 app. Depart Heathrow.

RS/MB  
23.4.80



CONSERVATIVE RESEARCH DEPARTMENT

24 Old Queen Street, S.W.I.

MEMORANDUM

To Lord Thorneycroft  
cc Alan Howarth  
Scott Hamilton

From Evelyn McDermott

Franz-Josef Strauss

In view of Herr Strauss' visit I thought it might be useful to collect some briefing material on him.

I enclose an article from 'Now' magazine. This is extremely laudatory of Strauss but it does contain informative background facts as well as an interview in which he gives his views on i) East-West relations ii) the mixed economy in Germany iii) relations with the G.D.R.

I also enclose a recent cutting from The Times assessing his election campaign. The article from the New Statesman is a counterblast to the 'Now' piece.

The German Election Campaign

1. Strauss has been keeping a very low profile as he attempts to ensure a strong 'centre' vote. The Times cutting discusses this and makes the obvious point that while keeping Strauss "under wraps" avoids the risk of his making volatile right-wing statements, it does nothing to enhance his image "... Herr Strauss has not yet found the right touch", it concludes.
2. There have been fears among the Social Democrats that there could be increasing support for the Right as a result of the Afghanistan invasion/Iran hostages problems. This view has only partially been confirmed. The government coalition is still ahead in the polls. Die Welt (6th April) claimed the government was increasing in popularity after a dip at the beginning of the year. Polls also give the SPD/FDP coalition a lead of seven points in the forthcoming Westphalia Länder elections on 11th May. One factor in the government's continuing popularity is, no doubt, Schmidt's full awareness of the strong ties felt by West Germans with East Germany and hence his continued contact with the GDR government.
3. The "Green" Party. Until the provincial elections this spring it was predicted that the environmentalist "Green" Party would collect only 4 per cent of votes for the Federal Parliament and thus fail the 5 per cent hurdle. But in March they gained six seats in the Baden-Württemberg elections. The CDU party retained its overall majority but on a slightly smaller vote. The next provincial elections take place at Saarland on Sunday and the final Länder elections this spring are at Westphalia on 11th May. The latter election could give a good hint of what is to come in the general election because of Westphalia's size and make-up. The SPD-FDP coalition is ahead in the polls and the death of the CDU leader there on April 21 (Heinrich Koppler) will not help CDU chances. So far the SPD claim the Greens have taken votes away from them but it will be interesting to see if their increasingly left-wing outlook will hinder their voting success.

P.S. The West German government have today formally recommended their Olympic Team to boycott the Olympic Games.



London visit helps Bonn opposition candidate for Chancellor to build up statesmanlike image

## Herr Strauss woos centre voters

From Patricia Clough  
Bonn, April 21

The spotlight in the West German pre-election scene shifts to London this week when Herr Franz Josef Strauss, the Opposition candidate for the chancellorship, arrives on a two-day visit.

Appearances in foreign capitals are an important ritual for aspiring Germany leaders, giving them stature and possibly votes back home. That applies particularly to Herr Strauss, whose greatest talents lie in foreign affairs.

He has already visited Paris, Washington and Bucharest and a trip to Moscow would be greatly appreciated; but so far no invitation has been forthcoming. Some of the glamour however has been taken from his visits to France, the United States and Britain; each time his rival, Herr Helmut Schmidt, the Chancellor, had been there only a short while before.

Talks with Mrs Thatcher, Lord Carrington, a lecture to the parliamentary foreign affairs committee, interviews and a press conference on Thursday and Friday will certainly do no harm to Herr

Strauss's efforts to build up his image here as a statesman.

For several months Herr Strauss has been cultivating a controlled, thoughtful, moderate style in strong contrast to his usual ebullient, controversial, often extreme and unpredictable ways.

He has avoided the outbursts and outrageous remarks for which he has become famous. To the wonderment of many he has passed up the chance of tearing the Chancellor to pieces over his Afghanistan policy, on the ground that the international situation was too serious to exploit for party political ends.

Thus he has sacrificed what public opinion analysts say are his two main assets, his image as a man for times of crisis and as a foreign policy wizard.

Herr Strauss, since he is unlikely to lose his traditional supporters on the right wing, is seeking to win over voters in the centre, who mistrust him and might be tempted to go over to the coalition parties or simply not to vote.

So far, however, Herr Strauss the statesman has gone over like a lead balloon. Even party supporters in the Baden Württem-

berg and Saarland election campaigns this spring admit that he has made virtually no impact on the public's mind.

Despite his new style, local party leaders there have seen to it that he made only a minimum of appearances, fearing he would frighten away voters.

To the disappointment of the Christian Democrats he appears to be doing no better than the unfortunate Herr Helmut Kohl, whom he somewhat ruthlessly replaced as chancellor-candidate. As yet he is virtually indistinguishable from the general political wallpaper.

To a certain extent Herr Strauss is holding himself back, knowing that a candidate could wear himself and his image out in the long months leading to the elections. Aged 64 and no longer in top form, he may be saving his energy for the final spurt when the campaign begins in September.

But on May 11 there are crucial Land elections in north Rhine-Westphalia where a poor showing for the Christian Democrats would confirm their fears that they will lose in the autumn.

Obviously Herr Strauss has not yet found the right touch.



# THE VINDICATION OF FRANZ-JOSEF STRAUSS

Few Western politicians have been more systematically defamed, yet the uncrowned King of Bavaria could become the next West German Chancellor. **Brian Crozier** traces his stormy career

Will the little old lady's prayer be granted? She, it was, who came up after Franz-Josef Strauss had spoken at a mass rally, and said in hushed tones: "Herr Strauss, every night I pray to God that you will be our next Chancellor."

"Madam," he replied, "you ought instead to pray every night that the situation in Germany will not get so bad that I shall be voted into power."

This is Strauss's own version of a story that circulates in various forms. Here is another, which I provoked myself when I said to him in French after listening to him in full oratorical flight: "Monsieur Strauss, vous êtes une force de la nature." Without pause, he shot back: "Beaucoup de gens disent que je suis une catastrophe de la nature." ("Many people say I'm a catastrophe of nature.")

He has, then, a sense of humour. Indeed, his jovial Bavarian grin is truer to his nature than his scowl in certain news pictures. As with other powerful and controversial personalities, the CDU-CSU candidate in West Germany's Federal elections next October is full of paradoxes. Built like a bull, he looks like the son of a master butcher that he is, but he has a mind of rare subtlety and

brilliance. No other Western politician in modern times has been more systematically defamed. Indeed if a tenth of the allegations against him were true, he would be unfit for high office. Yet time and again, he has taken his enemies to court and emerged clean.

He is accused of dictatorial tendencies and excessive nationalism; yet his record is impeccably democratic, European and Atlanticist. At 64, his hair is still reddish-brown and his energy seems inexhaustible.

He has the aura of a Churchill or a de Gaulle, of one who awaits a national call. The uncrowned King of Bavaria — so different from the mad and decadent King Ludwig — he struck unease into the minds of his followers last November when he accepted the Premiership (as "Minister-President"), foregoing his seat in the Bundestag. Had he dropped his ambition to be Chancellor? Had he lost his self-confidence?

The issue came to a head last May, when the leader of the Christian Democrats Helmut Kohl, nominated another provincial Minister-President, Ernst Albrecht of Lower Saxony, as the party leader of the combined CDU-CSU. Strauss was talked into challenging Albrecht. He won, by 135 votes to 102, after an impassioned debate in

which 92 speakers had their say — a measure of the mixed emotions his name arouses among CDU supporters.

Almost at once the anti-Strauss campaigners sprang into action, just as they have done at crucial points throughout his political career. Why are his enemies so determined and what do they say? One line is that he arouses in Germans the kind of atavistic responses that led to Hitlerism. The smear specialists claim to have unearthed a "Nazi past". One of them, a writer named Bernt Engelmann, in the name of a self-styled "Democratic Initiative Press Service", alleged that Strauss was a member of the National-Socialist Führungsoffizier corps while serving on the Eastern front.

Not so, said a long-time political opponent of Strauss's, the well-known author Hans Helmut Kirst. They had been in uniform together, and far from being a Nazi, Strauss had taken a clear anti-Nazi line, risking his life. Other wartime comrades said the same.

After he was invalided out of active service, he risked his neck by issuing discharge papers to students at his gunnery school so that they could flee the American advance. For the record, the young Strauss did make a token gesture to the Nazis in 1937, when he joined the Nationalsozialistisches Kraftfahrkorps on being told he would never get his degree if he stayed aloof. But the most damaging of the many Strauss "affairs", which led to these accusations, came over the magazine *Der Spiegel* in 1962. It cost him his job as Defence Minister. Today, however, a postscript seems in order. The high-ranking Czech defector, General Sejna, revealed to Western intelligence services years after the event that the *Spiegel* affair was a KGB exercise to discredit Strauss.

Again, as recently as December last year, Erich Mende, leader of the West German Liberal Party who had forced Strauss to step down by threatening to quit Adenauer's coalition, made retrospective amends. In a front-page article in the monthly paper *Student*, Dr Mende entirely cleared Strauss of abuse of his powers. It was a "Spiegel scandal," he declared, not a "Strauss affair."

While the inquiries were going on *Der Spiegel* had had two more digs at Strauss, alleging that Robert Gross, chairman of Lockheed's, had set up an intimate supper for the Defence Minister with the film star Jayne Mansfield. It added that a prominent German businessman, Friedrich Jahn, had

*continued on page 14*

Though a scholar of formidable intellect, Strauss cultivates an outdoors image: RIGHT: Boating with his family  
BELOW: Brakeman on a bob-sleigh  
BOTTOM RIGHT: A hunting trip in his beloved Bavaria



APPI/JULSTEIN









Strauss with his wife, the elegant and intelligent Marianne: A political partner as well as mother to his two sons and one daughter

## Strauss vindicated

*continued from page 10*

found Strauss a call-girl for the night during a stop-over in New York.

There were two flaws in these gutter stories. One was that Jayne Mansfield had never heard of Strauss and pointed out that at the time of the alleged supper she was seven months' pregnant. The other was that Jahn declared that he had met Strauss for the first time five years after the year of the alleg-

ed incident - 1959 - and that neither then nor later had he provided a call-girl.

Of the other "affairs", the one that yielded the most smoke for the least fire was probably the campaign hinting that Strauss as Defence Minister had enriched himself with "cuts" from lucrative defence contracts with the Lockheed Corporation. Although it turned out that he had done no such thing, his opponents leaped at the chance of anti-Strauss copy on the eve of the general elec-

tions of October 1976. Both *Der Spiegel* and *Stern* - another mass circulation magazine - carried stories about "vanished documents" alleged to have been removed by Strauss from the Defence Ministry. A Ministry spokesman told the Press that Strauss, on returning to office as Finance Minister in 1966, had indeed sent for documents from Defence and hinted that they might have related to Lockheed contracts.

When all the smoke dispersed, it was found that Strauss (a) had not removed any documents and (b) had at no time been told officially that documents had vanished - which seemed to indicate that a concern for truth was not a high priority in Bonn a week or so before the elections.

Too brainy to take over the family butcher's business from his father, Franz-Josef graduated in History and Classical Philology. He still reads Latin and ancient Greek for relaxation (and also the occasional thriller).

On the whole, his detractors have left his private life alone. There is little for them to seize on. He enjoys Champagne and dry wine, and good Bavarian cooking. He gave

## Fighting the Soviet military threat

Interviewed at his Bavarian home by Brian Crozier, the former German Defence Minister outlines his plans to strengthen Europe and the Western alliance

*As a former Defence Minister, how would you tackle the problem of Soviet military expansion if you became Chancellor?*

The Soviet Union has expanded its military strength, not only in Europe but globally. The Soviets have achieved strategic parity with the US. The answer must be to restore the validity of the American security guarantee for Europe by deploying medium-range ballistic missiles in Europe itself. For it is absurd to expect the Americans to deter the Russians from using their medium-range missiles in Europe by their own intercontinental missiles alone, thereby risking the destruction of their country, so that the Europeans become hostages and the

Americans are paralysed. There must be an adequate counter-force on European soil.

But there is more to it than that. The tremendous Soviet build-up is designed not so much for a final showdown as for political blackmail, by paralysing the will of the Americans and Europeans while the Soviet Union expands its power in the Middle East, Africa and elsewhere, as now in Afghanistan.

*As a German and a European, are you satisfied with US leadership in recent years?*

Between friends, criticism ought to be offered in private, not in public. But to be more positive, I hope the Americans by now have got over their long-running passion plays we have all witnessed, and overcome the complexes of Vietnam and Watergate. In this context, the ugly events in Tehran may well be helpful, although the price the Americans are paying is high. They are absolutely right to request full solidarity from the Europeans. But on their side, they should always consult the Europeans from the start.

*Chancellor Schmidt, Prime Minister Thatcher and President Giscard have all*

*declared themselves in favour of the SALT II draft treaty, admittedly before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. What is your view of it?*

If I were an American Senator, I would make up my own mind, but I think it was a mistake on the part of Chancellor Schmidt to attempt to influence the Senate vote, because it seemed to hint at a hidden threat to reject any Nato decision on the modernisation of nuclear weapons if the Americans decided not to ratify the draft treaty, but I don't think it is up to us Europeans to interfere in American internal decisions. I refrain therefore from giving advice, as unlike Helmut Schmidt, I have no wish to be a self-appointed adviser to all countries of the world.

*If you become Chancellor, you will inherit a "Social market" economy which has changed very little since the Adenauer government. Will you keep it unchanged?*

I would put it differently. I helped Erhard introduce the social market system as early as June 1948, against the votes of the Communists and Helmut Schmidt's Socialist friends. He was unable to dismantle it, but he inherited it from us.

In fact, on his own past and even recent statements, Mr Schmidt is an opponent of the system. The SPD (Social Democrats) wanted centralised economic planning and advocated the so-called "Deutschland Plan". If they had succeeded, we would



# Pilloried in the Press

Strauss has been the victim of many hostile campaigns over the past 20 years

up smoking 10 years ago. He drives his BMW 600 fast on the unrestricted autobahn — when he can — but has stopped flying solo. His late marriage, at the age of 42, was both a love match and a political partnership. Elegant and intelligent, his wife Marianne is more than wife and mother to their two sons and one daughter.

Best known as a Defence and Finance Minister, Strauss has had a more varied experience of high office than any other German politician, although he still awaits the supreme call. Will he now extend his Bavarian dominance to the rest of Germany? Organised heckling rattles him and the German electoral system works against him. But the "Greens" of the Ecology party could well split the Left vote and give him a big majority.

Certainly recent world events appear to help him. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan confronts Helmut Schmidt, and his political opponents, with the embarrassing need to explain away their policy of "detente", now shown to have little substance. Strauss, on his side, is the man who can claim that "I told you so."

Minister, after allegations that he had misled the Bundestag. In June 1965, charges of treason against Augstein and Ahlers were dropped; and so were inquiries against Strauss for alleged misuse of powers and unlawful detention.

**The Uncle Aloys Affair (1964-66 and 1974):** Dr Aloys Brandenstein, an industrialist, was involved in allegations of corruption over arms deals. Again Strauss took his opponents to court three times and again secured injunctions to prevent the allegations being repeated.

**The Lockheed Affair (1976):** In June Der Spiegel and Stern alleged that Strauss had removed documents from his time as Defence Minister. Bonn spokesmen hinted that the papers may have been related to Lockheed defence contracts. It was later established that Strauss had not, in fact, removed any.

**The Pigsty Affair (1978):** Former Chancellor Willy Brandt was ordered to refrain from repeating a false allegation that Strauss had described the Federal Republic as a pigsty, on penalty of a 500,000 DM fine or six months' jail. The trade union leader, Heinz Oskar Vetter, having declared that the same words "should be stuffed down the swollen throat of the swineherd from Passau" (in other words Strauss), was subsequently fined 5,250 DM.

**The Barth Affair (1961):** Named after the commander of a squadron of West German F-84 Thunderstreak fighter-bombers which lost their way and landed in Berlin. Strauss, then Defence Minister, was accused of risking war.

**The Fibag Affair (1961):** A construction company, Finanzbau-Aktiengesellschaft was involved in a contract for the building of dwellings for US forces and their families. Strauss, although clearly not involved in alleged corruption, had written a letter recommending the architect. Strauss took his opponents to court four times and secured an injunction each time to prevent them repeating the allegations.

**The Spiegel Affair (1962-65):** On Strauss's intervention as Defence Minister, the publisher of Der Spiegel, Rudolf Augstein, managing editor Claus Jacobi and Defence correspondent Conrad Ahlers were all arrested after they had published an article on a Nato exercise, said to have been based on secret official papers. The Liberals (FDP) threatened to leave the coalition and forced Strauss to resign as Defence



RIC GEMMELL

**‘We must rekindle the real values of life in young people and restore a sense of history’**

Chancellor Kiesinger's Grand Coalition), our public debt totalled 14 billion DM for the whole period. During each of Helmut Schmidt's years in power, the public debt grew by more than 150 per cent of our accumulated total. Today, the debt is gigantic. I would not change the social market system, therefore: I would restore it to full efficiency.

*Egon Bahr and Herbert Wehner (respectively, the Secretary General and the parliamentary leader of the SPD) and others in the SPD are said to be advocating "socialist" measures to facilitate reunification with East Germany. Would you comment?*

First, a word about our post-war history. The German Socialists voted against Germany's entry into Nato and against the activation of German forces, on the ground that such steps were incompatible with German reunification. Had the Socialists been elected at that time, the Atlantic Alliance and Europe would not now dispose of Germany's 500,000 armed forces, which are militarily indispensable. Not only would Germany not be in Nato, but the Deutschland Plan, already mentioned, would have meant the complete separation of Germany from Europe and the Atlantic Community. It would have led to a Communist Germany.

This was of course the Soviet aim, but not politicians like Herbert Wehner and Egon

Bahr are coming back to these plans of two decades ago. The conversion of the Socialists to Nato was purely temporary.

*Is Germany sharing in the great wave of conservative feeling shown by the British and European elections?*

I believe so. But I should like to point out that Margaret Thatcher won a majority of about 60 per cent in Parliament with little more than 43 per cent of the voters behind her. That is the way the British electoral system works. In the last elections, we of the CDU-CSU achieved 48.7 per cent of the national vote, and if we had the British system, we would have had a two-thirds majority in the Bundestag.

A final point. I believe the attractiveness of socialistic slogans, of Utopian models and inflated promises, has come to an end. People simply don't swallow this kind of thing any more, and young people in particular. We must not confine our political programmes to promises of more welfare and ever-rising living standards. We must rekindle the real values of life in young people, and restore a sense of history and historical responsibility. Materialism is not enough. Today as the Eighties begin, we face serious risks of energy shortages and threats to sources of raw materials. Only a liberal world economy can guarantee prosperity and progress for all, for the developing countries as well as for the industrialised ones.

have had a confederation with the East German Communists, with poverty and dependence on Moscow as the inevitable consequences.

Over the past 10 years, the State sector of the economy has grown from 37 per cent to 47 per cent. During our 20 years in government (with myself as Finance Minister in



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'THE THOUGHT strikes one', concluded an NS profile of Franz-Joseph Strauss published fifteen years ago, 'that it may not be the Foreign Ministry or even the Chancellorship of West Germany, that Herr Strauss is after, but the Presidency of a United States of Europe in 1980.' Well, 1980 has arrived and Strauss is, after all, the Christian Democratic coalition's candidate for the Chancellorship; yet the 1965 prediction was not so very wrong. Strauss is still the man he always was - a passionate believer in a united, federal Europe, with Germany as the dominant force - and the outcome of his contest against Helmut Schmidt later this year will have enormous significance for both Eastern and Western Europe.

One would not normally consider that residents in the Communist countries of Europe are better informed than Westerners about such an important figure. Compare, however, Brian Crozier's profile of Strauss in *Now!* last month with a thoughtful piece by Adam Krzeminski in a recent issue of the Polish weekly *Polityka*. Crozier's article is a straightforward PR job, lauding Strauss's 'sense of humour', his 'jovial Bavarian grin', his 'mind of rare subtlety and brilliance', his 'impeccably democratic' record, his 'inexhaustible' energy, his 'elegant and intelligent' wife.

Crozier's encomium is undoubtedly the first of many which his co-thinkers will produce during the German election campaign. The New Right always like to have a hero who can be worshipped without reserve, a 'person of destiny' who will build a world fit for Robert Moss. The Shah held this baton for a while before passing it to Milton Friedman, who in turn handed it to Margaret Thatcher. Now we have Strauss: 'He has,' says Crozier, 'the aura of a Churchill or a de Gaulle, of one who awaits a national call.'

The true nature of Strauss's 'national call' is rather different: he does not await it, he inspires it with his atavistic longings for *Reich*. As the article in *Polityka* puts it, he is a demagogue playing on the most dangerous emotions.

IT SHOULD be stressed that the Polish article is not a central committee hand-out: *Polityka* and its editor, Mieczyslaw Rakowski, have a creditable record of independence - refusing, for instance, to sack their Jewish

staff or participate in any way in the anti-semitic purges of 1967-68. The article on Strauss, headed 'Nostalgia for Bismarck', takes as its text a long historical and philosophical essay by Strauss which was published in *Die Welt* last September. Krzeminski comments that 'when a politician begins to write essays on the past, he does not usually do so in order to discover the historical truth, but in order to find in the past a justification for what he is doing in the present.'

Strauss began his essay by reminding his readers that it was exactly forty years since the outbreak of the Second World War. The progression of events from 1914 to 1945 is, to Strauss, obvious: 'In 1914, with the outbreak of the First World War, commenced the decline of Europe from its glorious leading position in the fields of politics, military power, economic predominance and cultural superiority. It reached its tragic nadir at the end of the Second World War, when in April 1945 American and Russian soldiers shook hands at Torgau on the Elbe.' At that point the history of Europe came to an end.

In his search for the causes of the First World War Strauss writes:

Every explanation that the course of events leading to its outbreak became inevitable as a result of the authoritarian structure of the German Reich, the failures of its middle class, the behaviour of the 'right', the weakness of the liberals, their insufficient collaboration with the working-class movement, the special laws limiting the activities of the Socialists - each of these explanations is nonsensical.

Strauss looks to the geopolitics of the nineteenth century for his explanation. Germany's tragedy, he says, was in its central position in Europe. England sided with Prussia at the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian war in 1870 but by the end of it, after the Germans had won and proclaimed the creation of the German Empire, England was already on the side of France. 'Bismarck knew that he had to wrench the Reich, as it were, from the very throats of Germany's neighbours.' The political and military structure of the Reich created by Bismarck resulted from his desire to make it militarily powerful without its armaments policy leading to the creation of a Franco-Russian alliance against the Reich.

Krzeminski's article in *Polityka* challenges



Plus ça change: how the NEW STATESMAN has seen Strauss over the years. Left to right: Vicky 1960; Vicky 1965; Horner 1968; Minnion



to the 19th Century

## airman Strauss

Strauss on all these points. The misfortune of the Germans, he writes, has not been their central position in Europe, but their conviction that the Reich must be wrenched from the throats of Germany's neighbours – to be more precise, that the Reich must be conquered for Prussia. He continues:


The tragedy of the Germans – and Europe – has been in the fact that this powerful European nation was not united by the liberal revolution of 1848 but by the reactionary conservative alliance of the Hohenzollerns, army and bureaucracy. Already in the very proclamation of the Reich at Versailles, after the defeat and humiliation of France, one can discern the seeds of its later defeats. One of the sources of the later catastrophe was Bismarck's foreign policy, which made Wilhelmian Germany quite unsuitable for the role of the 'European Middle State' about which Strauss writes such a great deal.

Fascinated by the eagles of the Reich and 'a Europe of powers', Strauss glosses over the fundamental dichotomy of Bismarck's creation: the contradiction between the autocratic system of Wilhelmian Germany and its social and political reality, in which the majority was made up by socialists and liberals. That, argues Krzeminski, was the real and fatal antimony: a powerful economy on the one hand and on the other a pre-democratic system in which the social democratic opposition was treated not as an essential element in parliamentary control of the rulers but as 'an enemy of the Reich' and 'scoundrels without a homeland'.

A system in which the rulers, instead of discussing with the other elements in the state the need for modernisation, unleashed the *Kulturkampf* and determined from above, as it were, 'the internal enemies' in the shape of socialists, Catholics and the national minorities of Poles and Danes. The result of Bismarck's policies was to destroy the self-confidence of the German middle class, so that it resigned itself to playing a secondary role in the state.

No wonder that Bismarck, that politician for whom Strauss is longing and to whom Kissinger so often refers, was unable to leave a successor who could think for himself.

For Poles, Bismarck's Reich in its role of the German 'Middle State' signified the perpetuation of the *Alvensleben* Convention of 1863, when Prussia offered Russia military assistance against the Poles who had risen in January against their Russian oppressors. Not



1980.

surprisingly, Krzeminski feels rather strongly about this, arguing that it was done in accordance with Bismarck's 'European' principle, which was defined as follows: 'Beat the Poles that they should lose the will to live. I sympathise with their plight, but if we want to survive then we cannot act otherwise than destroy them.' This quote from Strauss's mentor is particularly ominous in view of a remark made by Strauss himself in the course of an interview with Brian Crozier which accompanied the *Now!* profile. Asked how he would tackle the problem of Soviet military expansion, the former defence minister replies:

The answer must be to restore the validity of the American security guarantee for Europe by deploying medium range ballistic missiles in Europe itself.

It is noteworthy that later in the same interview, Strauss mentions that 'we must . . . restore a sense of history and historical responsibility' in young people. As Krzeminski shows, Strauss's own historical sense is a distinctly queer one.

AFTER the First World War, Strauss argues, it was the Social Democrats and the Soviet

### CZECHOSLOVAKIA Christopher Hitchens

IF THE CZECHOSLOVAK security state has one redeeming feature, it is the ability to make a tremendous variety of enemies. The war of nerves between the Prague secret police and Julius Tomin's seminar has thrown this into sharp relief. The latest recruits to the front line of engagement against arbitrary rule are a large group of Western philosophers and a significant number of young working class Czechs.

Last Wednesday there took place a meeting between Dr Anthony Kenny, Master of Balliol College, Oxford, and Dr Telicka, Minister-Counsellor of the Czechoslovak Embassy in London. Dr Kenny, one of whose fellows was recently manhandled in Prague, was asking for clarification about exactly what is and what is not legal for a foreign academic visiting Dr Telicka's fascinating country. Dr Telicka was not, perhaps, as illuminating as he might have been. He failed to enforce a recognisable distinction between the term 'unpopular' and the word 'illegal'. He accused Dr William Newton-Smith (the victim of the manhandling at Tomin's seminar) of 'departing from his prepared text', which raised the insoluble question of how he knew this, and of how it breached the Czechoslovak criminal code. Dr Kenny was unsatisfied, though he was pleased to hear that perhaps the police had been (in the universal language of the total state) 'overzealous'.

Later that same evening, an outbreak of overzealousness infected an entire herd of Czech policemen. Twenty-seven people attending Julius Tomin's seminar were arrested, and eight of these detained for the traditional 48 hours. Among those held were Tomin himself, Professor Radim Palous, Ivan Dejmal (in whose flat the meeting took place), Milos Rejchrt (a spokesman for Charter 77), an industrial worker named Streda and Karel Sling (son of Otto Sling whose show-trial execution in the fifties is now officially regarded as 'a mistake').

The variety of opinions held among this



Union that became the evil spirits in Germany's history, while the conservatives became its only bulwark. If anyone caused the Second World War, it was Stalin: 'It is quite untrue,' Strauss wrote in *Die Welt*, 'that Hitler wanted a second world war. But he did want a victorious war of conquest in the West, the conquest of the West and a great, 1,000-year Reich that would be the greatest centre of power in history.'

Being a supporter of Bismarck, but unwilling to embrace Hitler, Strauss does his best to blame the Social Democrats for what happened in 1933. At the same time, the manner in which he presents Hitler — without mentioning his responsibility for genocide, the concentration camps, and his vision of Europe as a continent of masters and slaves — is such that Hitler has become nothing more than a *Realpolitiker* repairing the evil effects of the Versailles treaty. Strauss adds:

The legend has been deliberately created that Hitler was the executor of Bismarck's will and testament and the continuer of both Bismarck's and Wilhelm II's policies; that he fulfilled the dream of the conservative middle class; that he . . . set out to destroy the Social Democrats who

claimed to be the only champions of social and political democracy.

Not so, says Strauss: for socialist ideas were very strong in the National Socialist Party, and who else but the Social Democrats were responsible for that?

Strauss's essay in *Die Welt* provoked a furore in the West German press. *Der Spiegel* devoted its leading article to a refutation, while *Die Zeit* published a series of articles, the theme of which was that Strauss was trying to turn the victims of Nazism into Nazi collaborators in order to gain the votes of the Right.

Naturally public attention this year will be on the battle for the American presidency — and no one would deny that much depends on the outcome. But even Ronald Reagan wishes to take America back only as far as the 1950s. Should Strauss, a blustering demagogue, succeed in toppling the present technocratic Chancellor of West Germany, his aim will be nothing less than a reversion to the nineteenth century. Do the events of 1914 and 1933 really have to be lived through all over again simply to satisfy one man's 'sense of history'?

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Free

Germany 859

cc: Miss R. Spencer,  
International Office,  
Conservative  
Central Office.

Miss Goodchild

14 February 1980

1) BF 2 29.2.80  
2) BF 11.4.80

Further to your letter to Michael Alexander dated 7 February, I am writing to confirm that the International Office at Conservative Central Office are definitely inviting Herr Strauss to visit this country, and the Prime Minister has offered to give him a lunch here at 10 Downing Street on Friday 25 April.

I would be grateful if you could submit some suggestions for a guest list (12 people only), to be submitted as soon as possible please, as well as a brief, to reach this office by close of play on Friday 11 April.

BF ①  
BFA ②

CAROLINE STEPHENS

Paul Lever, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

KRF





10 DOWNING STREET

PRIME MINISTER

When you entertain Herr Franz Joseph Strauss to lunch on Friday 25 April would you like a lunch of twelve or a lunch of thirty-two. Both Central Office and the Foreign Office will be submitting suggestions for a guest list.

*ej.*

*12*

*over*

13 February 1980





10 DOWNING STREET

MR THATCHER

The lunch for industrialists on 25 April has been cancelled as your wife is entertaining Herr Franz Joseph Strauss from Germany. This will probably be for a lunch of 12 people only so I will be in touch with you about it.

11 February 1980

*Noted*





10 DOWNING STREET

MR ALEXANDER

The Prime Minister has agreed to give lunch to Herr Franz Joseph Strauss on Friday, 25 April. I am getting suggestions for a guest list from International Office at Conservative Central Office, would you like me to:-

- a) do the same from the FCO.
- b) request any briefing from the FCO?

11 February 1980

Miss Stephens : Yes on both  
counts.



vb

Germany

8 February 1980

Possible Invitation to Herr Strauss

The Prime Minister has seen your letter to me of 7 February on this subject. She is content that an invitation should go to Herr Strauss through Party channels. This is in hand.

MICHAEL ALEXANDER

Paul Lever Esq  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

KRE



CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

7 February 1980

*Dear Michael,*

Possible Invitation to Herr Strauss

You asked for advice on the suggestion that the Conservative Party might invite Franz Josef Strauss to visit this country.

A visit by Herr Strauss in an election year in the Federal Republic would pose some problems for the Anglo/German relationship. The Federal Chancellor would presumably prefer that his main rival was denied any gratuitous publicity on the foreign affairs front in the run-up to the elections. However, Herr Strauss will be visiting the United States in the spring and also, we understand, Paris next week, and a visit to London would therefore be quite normal. We have consulted HM Ambassador in Bonn, who advises that there would indeed be advantage in extending an invitation through party channels to Strauss, who has been taking a very statesmanlike attitude over Afghanistan, and that there is certainly no advantage in rebuffing him. He further advises that it would be courteous to inform the Chancellor in advance of any invitation, without in any way making the issue of an invitation dependent on Herr Schmidt's approval. He judges that, while a visit by Herr Strauss might cause Herr Schmidt some irritation, this consideration need not weigh too heavily. On timing, he suggests an invitation for the end of February, i.e. well before the next European Council.

Lord Carrington accepts this advice and feels that the way is thus clear for an invitation to be passed through Party channels to Herr Strauss to pay an early visit to this country. If he came, he would naturally wish to see the Prime Minister, and Lord Carrington recommends that the Prime Minister should see him.


*Yours*

(P Lever)  
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq  
10 Downing Street  
LONDON



8 FEB 1960





# Grey Scale #13



**A**

1

2

3

4

5

6

**M**

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

**B**

17

18

19

Inches

1

2

3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

Centimetres

## Colour Chart #13

Blue

Cyan

Green

Yellow

