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Confidential Felony

Visu by Mr Micheal Manley

JAMAICA

JUNE 1979

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
18.7.79							
20.7.79							
29.10.79		PREM		19/3830			
30.10.79							
15.9.80							
25.6.92							
CLOSED							

Stephen also

1. cc PS/No 10

2. APS/Mr Lennox-Boyd

Thank you. J. J.

[Signature]
25/6

RESTRICTED

From: APS/Mr Lennox-Boyd

Date: 25 June 1992

cc: Mr Denne, Consular Dept
Mr Baker, WIAD

Private Secretary

MR LENNOX-BOYD'S TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH RT HON MICHAEL MANLEY, FORMER PM OF JAMAICA

1. Michael Manley telephoned Mr Lennox-Boyd this morning to discuss the Consular travel advice on Jamaica which is due to issue shortly.
2. In general conversation, Mr Manley said that he would be in the UK for about two months. He was 'sightseeing, relaxing and thinking about writing a book'. Mr Manley asked the Minister to pass his warm regards to the Prime Minister. Mr Lennox-Boyd said he would be happy to do so.
3. Should the Prime Minister wish to respond in any way, Mr Manley is staying at:

? July - August

Hall Place
Seer Green
Beaconsfield
Bucks HP9 2YE

Tel: (0494) 681723

4. I would be grateful if you could pass this information to No 10.

Stephen
Only Chesney lunch in the
office at the moment is that for pm?
Mr Manley on 19 July. Could he
arrange to meet him at pm + Mrs Manley plan to
spend any time at Chesney in August?
[Signature]
SJR

C J R Moore

any Chesney lunch in the period?

RESTRICTED

TG2AEF

[Signature]
1/7





Prime Minister
R. Patterson

(2)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1A 2AH

Jamaica

15 September 1980

h.c.

Dear Michael,

mb.

Jamaican Prime Minister

We understand that Mr Manley is due to arrive in London later today from Algiers. He will spend three days here before departing on Thursday, 18 September at 0930 hours for New York.

We do not know the reason for Mr Manley's visit. The Jamaican High Commission have no information about his programme while in London: you will recall that on similar visits in the past the Jamaicans have sometimes sought an appointment with the Prime Minister at short notice.

yours ever
Roderic Lyne

(R M J Lyne)
Private Secretary

Michael Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street
London

Jamaica

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LXO



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

30 October 1979

Dear George

MEETING WITH MR. MANLEY

As you know the Prime Minister of Jamaica called on the Prime Minister at the House of Commons last night. In view of the sensitivity of at least one part of the discussion and of the likelihood that Mr. Manley may misrepresent what was said, I have recorded the conversation more fully than usual.

The record should, of course, be given a very limited distribution.

Yours ever

Richard Alexander

G. G. H. Walden, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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AS

RECORD OF A MEETING BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE PRIME
MINISTER OF JAMAICA, MR. MICHAEL MANLEY, ON 29 OCTOBER AT
2200 HOURS IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS

Present

The Prime Minister
The Foreign and Commonwealth
Secretary
Mr. M. O'D. B. Alexander

Mr. Michael Manley

* * * * *

After some discussion of Premier Hua's visit, Mr. Manley asked about progress at Lancaster House. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary described recent developments. The counter-proposal for the pre-Independence arrangements put in by the Patriotic Front contradicted the philosophy which had underlain HMG's approach to the problem ever since Lusaka. At Lusaka HMG had been urged to assume responsibility for the problem. Their decision to accept that responsibility had been courageous. The Constitution which had been negotiated was a very reasonable one: in agreeing to it both Bishop Muzorewa and the Patriotic Front had moved a long way from their earlier positions. Britain's interim proposals would, in effect, give the Governor power to do what he liked. Acceptance of the proposals would, again, take both sides on to new ground. The Bishop would have to agree to an Executive Governor in Rhodesia. There had never been an Executive Governor in Rhodesia before. The Patriotic Front would have to accept that a British Governor would be fair and neutral.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary stressed that it had been extremely difficult to bring Bishop Muzorewa as far as he had come. After all, he had been elected by 64 per cent of the people of Rhodesia and had, as a result, a genuine democratic right to be where he was. He was now being asked to surrender power to a Governor. It was not easy for the

/Bishop

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Bishop and would not be easy for Mr. Manley in similar circumstances. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that Mr. Manley, President Kaunda, President Nyerere and others seemed to have difficulty in accepting that Britain was negotiating with two sides. The Lancaster House Conference was not a case of HMG versus the Patriotic Front. A group of people who were in charge of the country and had been elected to their office were also involved. The Bishop had in fact accepted the Constitution and the pre-Independence proposals. This was a considerable achievement. Mr. Manley agreed.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that the task now was to persuade the Patriotic Front to accept the pre-Independence proposals. At present things were not going too well. But the appointment of a Governor was the only way to make people believe that the settlement was fair. No-one would accept as fair a situation in which Bishop Muzorewa was left in charge. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that he accepted there was a sense in which the appointment of a Governor was unfair to both sides. But people would have to trust Britain. The Prime Minister said that the negotiations had made a great deal of progress. The gains must not now be allowed to slip away. Mr. Manley and President Kaunda had been right to say that agreement on a Constitution could be secured but it had been extremely difficult to get Bishop Muzorewa to accept the new Constitution and elections. The problem had to be resolved, and soon. The Conference had been going on for a long time and occasionally had looked like running into the sand. Bishop Muzorewa had been away from his country for a long time, certainly longer than the Prime Minister would have been prepared to absent herself. Moreover, the negotiations were taking up too much of the time of the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and his staff. She therefore felt a considerable sense of urgency.

/Mr. Manley

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Mr. Manley said that his only objective was to be helpful. He had no status in the matter other than that which stemmed from his participation in the Lusaka talks. He had just had a long session with the Patriotic Front. He had the impression that the Prime Minister and the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary were close to pulling off a fantastic achievement. He was speaking not just in narrow political terms but in terms of a benefit to the world as a whole. Precisely because achieving an agreement was so close, he wanted to ask whether HMG's position was still flexible or whether it was now hard and final. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that he had pushed Bishop Muzorewa just about as far as was possible. Politics was the art of the possible. The Bishop had already agreed to give up control of his Government. If he conceded any more he would be regarded as a failure by his electorate. In an ideal situation, further concessions might be made to the position of the Patriotic Front, e.g. the offer of a longer interim period. But if this were agreed, the results would be (a) that the ceasefire would break down and (b) that the jockeying and intrigue among the various political parties would be so prolonged and intense that the election might never take place.

Mr. Manley said that he understood the difficulties of Bishop Muzorewa's position. But he did not think that it would be possible to organise a fair election in two months. The sheer logistical difficulties of getting the refugees back and preparing for the elections would be insurmountable. The interim period might not need to be as long as six months but there was what Mr. Manley described as a genuine feeling in many quarters that two months was too short. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary repeated that of course in an ideal world one might have an interim longer than two months, but it should be borne in mind that:

/(a)

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(a) The two months would start from the onset of the ceasefire.

(b) Full registration would take far longer than six months. It had taken a year in Botswana. With anti-fraud devices and regional lists, a fair, if not ideal, election could be held.

(c) The refugees would have two full months in which to return. Failing this, they could vote where they were. Mr. Nkomo, [redacted] after all, wanted ^{his army} to stay where it was.

The Prime Minister noted that President Machel favoured an interim period of two or three months. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that if the interim period was more than two or three months there would be no election.

Mr. Manley repeated that if the interim was compressed too much the negotiations would collapse. The Patriotic Front were not being intransigent. There was a negotiating element in their present posture. He would be willing to speak strongly to them about the need for speed in the interim and about the need for them to get on with the negotiations. The Prime Minister said this would be very helpful.

Mr. Manley said that it would greatly assist matters if there could be agreement that the Commonwealth Group of Observers could enter Rhodesia as early as possible. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said he was prepared to be flexible on this but that Mr. Ramphal's recent statement had caused a great deal of difficulty. Bishop Muzorewa had regarded it as very unfair and he himself had been much put out. He offered to send Mr. Manley the text of the statement.

/Reverting

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Reverting to the length of the interim period, the Prime Minister repeated that one could not have a Governor with full executive and legislative powers in Rhodesia for very long. If things went wrong as a result of a prolonged interim, the Governor might, for instance, be driven to ask for troops from Britain. This could not be allowed to happen.

Mr. Manley asked about the military position. There were two armies in Rhodesia, neither of which had been defeated. Would it be possible to get a settlement without acknowledging that the two armies had equal status and a similar role in the interim? The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that the idea would be to separate the two armies and bring them under the authority of the Governor. A monitoring unit would be established, including the commanders of the armies. It would report to the Governor's military adviser who would be British. The monitoring unit would be responsible for identifying and dealing with breaches of the ceasefire. Mr. Manley asked whether this meant that Britain would recognise that both armies were military realities, were in the country, and had equal status. Britain would not be saying that Bishop Muzorewa's army was the only force they recognised? The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary repeated that the intention would be to separate the armies and recognise the presence of both. Mr. Manley repeated that this was a critical issue. Britain did not, as he now understood it, envisage "Smith's army" charging up and down the country in jeeps with the Patriotic Front backed up in one corner. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that the negotiations had not got that far. The ceasefire and separation were clearly essential. If they could be achieved, then General Walls and General Tongogara would have to get together under the chairmanship of a British General and talk about the modalities. Both armies would have to come under the Governor's authority. If problems arose,

/the Governor

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the Governor would be responsible for the necessary decisions. Whether the thing would work would depend on the will of both sides to observe a ceasefire.

Mr. Manley asked whether Britain had a rooted objection to a Commonwealth force. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary replied in the affirmative. A Commonwealth force would be like a UN force and would be unable to do anything. There would be no problem about the monitors being drawn from Commonwealth countries. Mr. Manley said that he was much encouraged by what was being said about the position of the two armies. It had been widely believed that "Smith's army" would be the only one recognised by the Governor. But as he now understood it the Governor would acknowledge two armies, there would be a monitoring commission and the Governor might call on elements of one or other of the armies to assist him. There would be no problem about such an arrangement. (Indeed, Mr. Manley described what the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary had been saying as "terrific".) The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that he did not want to deceive Mr. Manley. On the one hand, there would be a formed army, on the other hand a guerrilla army. The difference between them would have to be taken into account. But the principle would be that both were under the command of the Governor. There would be occasions when the Governor would wish to use an element of one or the other or both. But the fact was that while General Walls could control his forces it was much more doubtful whether the Patriotic Front commanders could do so. This was not for reasons of ill-will but because the Patriotic Front's forces were guerrillas. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary stressed that what he had been saying had been the subject of negotiation with no-one. Mr. Manley said that none the less he was feeling much more hopeful.

/Mr. Manley

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Mr. Manley asked whether Britain would have any objection to the establishment of an advisory group under the authority of the Governor to which he could refer and from which he could receive advice. The council would be under the chairmanship of the Governor and might have four representatives of the Patriotic Front and four of the Salisbury regime. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that an advisory council discussing administrative matters would only cause trouble. These would be the responsibility of the Governor. On the other hand, there would be an Electoral Council to supervise the fairness of the elections. The Prime Minister said that the difficulties that would be encountered by anything like an advisory council underlined the need for brevity in the interim. The administration of the country would be on a razor's edge. One could not sit there for long.

Mr. Manley said that what he had heard on the military position and on the Electoral Council seemed to him unlikely to give rise to problems. He liked the way the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary had formulated the position on the two armies. The length of the interim period, however, was likely to prove crucial. The Prime Minister said that two months seemed to her a long time. The Governor would not be able to control the situation for much longer than that. Nor would HMG be prepared to put in troops. As the Viscount incident had shown, there were considerable doubts as to whether the Patriotic Front had adequate control of their forces. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that the issues in the election were already well known: the short period would not prevent any of the participants making their position clear. Mr. Manley repeated that agreement was very close. Six months was no doubt too long, but two months was too short. A compromise on this point might make the difference between triumph and tragedy. The Prime Minister said that if HMG were to show too much flexibility, the negotiations would collapse. The Patriotic Front and the Front Line States should not try to push Britain too far. However, she noted what Mr. Manley had said and undertook to consider the position.

The discussion ended at 2300 hours.
30 October 1979

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Jamaica



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Lg. Ambr

29 October 1979

Dear Michael

Call by Mr Michael Manley on the Prime Minister

/ Further to my letter of this morning I now enclose
/ defensive briefing on aid and Caribbean security for Mr
Manley's call. I also enclose a background note on Jamaica.

yours ever

Roderic Lyne

(R M J Lyne)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street
LONDON

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BRIEF NO 1

UK/JAMAICA RELATIONS

FOR DEFENSIVE USE ONLY

POINTS TO MAKE

Aid

1. (Mr Manley may enquire whether UK aid is likely to be available to Jamaica in 1980). Jamaica is receiving 27.5% of British aid to Caribbean this year. Public expenditure cuts must also affect aid budget.
2. Not yet decided what funds available for aid in next financial year or how funds will be disbursed.

ESSENTIAL FACTS

1. Britain agreed to give £30 million aid to Jamaica since January 1978: £20 million as bilateral programme loan for purchase of UK goods. Two further sums of £5 million each in support of three year Agreement between Jamaica and IMF, signed June 1978. Announcement of British support for third year due May 1980. Even if funds available, further assistance uncertain. Manley's increasing pro-Cuban and Soviet public stance seriously inhibits economic rehabilitation. Western aid helps slow down decline but Jamaican Government have not used opportunity to encourage confidence among investors. However, Manley remains an influential Third World figure and he can continue to be of use to us on important issues such as Rhodesia. There may therefore be a political justification for further British aid.

BRIEF NO 2

SECURITY IN THE CARIBBEAN

POINTS TO MAKE (FOR DEFENSIVE USE ONLY IF SUBJECT RAISED BY MR MANLEY)

ANGLO/US/CANADIAN TALKS ON THE CARIBBEAN

1. We have periodic consultations with the Americans and Canadians to exchange views on the Caribbean generally. The last meeting in this series took place earlier this month. The discussions ranged widely over the Caribbean and neighbouring Latin American countries. The main purpose being to exchange views and information on aid and related matters including measures against drug smuggling.

Security

2. The main conclusion of the meeting was to emphasise the importance of external aid in tackling the chronic economic problems of the region, which are the main cause of instability and thereby a threat to the continued health of democratic institutions in the region. Question of Soviet troops in Cuba, was not raised.

ESSENTIAL FACTS

1. There has been considerable recent publicity about American concern over the Cuban threat and there has been some press speculation that the US/UK and Canada are discussing ways of countering it. There have in fact been a series of tripartite meetings covering all aspects of our mutual policies towards the Caribbean including security but we are most anxious to avoid substantiating speculation about security talks as this would be interpreted as the three powers ganging up against the small states in the Caribbean. The last round of talks chaired by Mr Ridley took place on 18/19 October. Their main conclusion was that the best means of countering Cuban influence was continued external aid to moderate the chronic economic problems which encourage political radicalism and the need for a modest programme to strengthen the capacity of local police and defence forces.

2. Mr Manley has always been a strong critic of interference in the Caribbean by outside powers.

JAMAICA

ESSENTIAL FACTS

GENERAL

1. Jamaica is the third largest island in the Caribbean with a population of two million. The capital is Kingston. Jamaica became an independent member of the Commonwealth in 1962. The Queen remains Head of State and is represented by a Governor General. It has been proposed that Jamaica should become a Republic within the Commonwealth but a decision has not yet been taken. The Constitution provides for a bicameral Legislature. The present Prime Minister is Mr Michael Manley, leader of the social democratic Peoples National Party (PNP). The principal opposition party is the Jamaican Labour Party (which in Jamaican terms is the equivalent of the British Conservative Party). Both parties are closely linked with trade unions as is typical in Caribbean politics.
2. The JLP Opposition are mounting an increasingly strident campaign against Manley and his Cuban connections. Their ally, the "Daily Gleaner" newspaper's recent campaign against Government Ministers has provoked Manley and his colleagues into participating in demonstrations against the newspaper and into denouncing so-called abuses of press freedom. Despite widespread publicity in the world's press about the intelligence background of the new ^{Cuban} Ambassador Estrada which has caused widespread uneasiness in the Caribbean, Manley has vigorously defended him and condoned Estrada's threats against the Gleaner.

ECONOMIC

3. The Jamaican economy developed strongly in the period 1950-1970 with the exploitation of the island's bauxite deposits and development of the tourist industry. Living standards in Jamaica increased considerably and became increasingly dependent on imported goods. The value of agricultural exports such as sugar and bananas declined although sugar is still an important export.
4. Shortly after Mr Manley's PNP came to power in 1972 the oil price rise, world economic problems and the adoption of radical policies combined to slow down Jamaican economic development. These policies have contributed to the stagnation of the agricultural and manufacturing sectors and to a growing uncompetitiveness of Jamaican products in overseas markets.
5. The economic decline led to the Jamaican Government coming to an agreement with the International Monetary Fund in 1977 and 1978 for a loan programme.

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The second agreement was signed with the IMF in June 1978 for the provision of US \$240 million over three years. This amount was not however sufficient to support Jamaica's ailing economy and for the first 12 months of the agreement a group of Western donors under the chairmanship of the UK contributed a further US \$50 million. The UK contributed \$10 million to this amount. The decline in the Jamaican economy is thought by some to have ^{reached} its lowest point. However, with the official inflation figures for 1978 of 35% (unofficial estimated 47%), unemployment at official 25% (estimated 35%), recovery needs to be strong if the endurance of the Jamaican population which has seen its standard of living decline rapidly since 1972, is not to be stretched to breaking point.

TRADE

6. UK exports to Jamaica in 1978 totalled £48.7 million, imports £98.1 million (of which half was alumina).

UK/JAMAICAN RELATIONS (Not For Use)

7. Relations with Jamaica have continued to be close since independence. Traditional constitutional, political, cultural and sporting links together with the presence of a large Jamaican community in the United Kingdom (over 300,000) have contributed to this. The Jamaicans are prominent Third World leaders, eg, they currently lead the Lome renegotiations. With Jamaica's economic problems in recent years, our relations have taken on a somewhat different role. We have expanded our traditional policy of supplying large numbers of technical co-operation advisers to include the provision of capital aid. In January 1978, a £20 million programme loan was signed. This was followed by the provision of the equivalent of \$10 million in support of the Jamaican/IMF agreement in June of the same year.

8. Jamaica is still of importance to the UK as a leading member of the Commonwealth and a member of the Security Council. She could make things difficult over Africa. We have therefore continued this year to contribute to the IMF support operation with a £5 million loan, but we shall be considering Mr Manley's performance very carefully before making any similar commitments next year.

Mexico & Caribbean Department

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

PA has seen

fn. Amis 20/10

29 October 1979

Dear Michael,

Call by the Jamaican Prime Minister: 29 October

In addition to the briefing for Mr Manley's call which we sent yesterday, you may wish to have to hand a copy of the enclosed telegram of 11 August from Maputo. This records the hard line taken by Mr Manley in support of the Patriotic Front when he visited Mozambique, immediately after the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting at Lusaka.

I shall be sending you later today short defensive notes on two non-Rhodesian points which Mr Manley may raise - British aid to Jamaica and the question of Caribbean security.

Yours ever
Roderic Lyne

(R M J Lyne)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street

(41)

TOP COPY 12

13 AUG 1979

GPS 150
UNCLASSIFIED

FM MAPUTO 110320Z AUG 79

TO ROUTINE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 199 OF 11 AUGUST

INFO KINGSTON HAVANA MIRIMBA SALISBURY LUSAKA DAR ES SALAAM

MOZAMBIQUE - TANZANIA

1. PRIME MINISTER MANLEY OF JAMAICA PAID AN OFFICIAL VISIT TO MOZAMBIQUE 8 TO 10 AUGUST.
2. IN THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE AFTERWARDS THEY ' ... CONSIDERED THE KUZOREWA GOVERNMENT ILLEGAL, REPRESENTING A RACIST MINORITY ... EXPRESSED FIRM SOLIDARITY WITH THE ARMED STRUGGLE ... DIRECTED BY THE PATRIOTIC FRONT (PF) THE MAIN INSTRUMENT FOR THE CREATION OF A FREE DEMOCRATIC ZIMBABWE ... WELCOMED THE ... DECISION OF THE OAU TO RECOGNISE THE PF AS THE SOLE LEGITIMATE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PEOPLE OF ZIMBABWE AND WILL STRIVE FOR THE ADMISSION OF THE PF AS A FULL MEMBER OF THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE RECOMMENDATION OF THE COORDINATING BUREAU MEETING IN MAPUTO'.

003LE

FILES

RHOD D	LEGAL ADVISERS
OADS	(MR FREELAND)
NAD	(MR FIFOOT)
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NEWS D	PCD
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MR WILLSON	
MR WILLIAMS	

29 OCT 1978





Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

28 October 1979

M. Alexander Esq
 Prime Minister's Office
 No 10 Downing Street
 London SW1

Dear Michael.

RHODESIA: PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH MR MANLEY

1. The Prime Minister of Jamaica has asked to see the Prime Minister about Rhodesia. The points which follow in this letter reflect our current thinking, but have not yet been cleared with Lord Carrington.
2. As the Prime Minister will recall, Mr Manley played a part in the group of six countries (Britain, Australia, Jamaica, Nigeria, Zambia and Tanzania) which drafted the Lusaka communiqué.
3. Mr Manley is, however, a pretty committed supporter of the Patriotic Front, who have made it clear that they are going to appeal to certain Commonwealth Governments to help them "re-interpret" the Lusaka communiqué. We have stated clearly in the Conference that we are taking action step by step to give effect to the Lusaka agreement; but we shall not be prepared to accept arrangements which go far beyond what was agreed at Lusaka and which would render it impossible for us to carry out our responsibility for Rhodesia in this period.
4. Mr Manley is likely to argue -
 - (a) that an interim period of two months is too short. The Prime Minister may wish to say that Bishop Muzorewa has accepted a British Governor with full executive and legislative authority. It is the British Government which will have to assume direct responsibility for Rhodesia in this period. We will only be prepared to do so under conditions and for a period in which we can be confident that we shall be able to carry out that responsibility. The longer the interim period before the people of Rhodesia have been given the chance to decide their political future for themselves, the greater will be the risk of a breakdown in the cease-fire. We consider that two months is a fully adequate period for all the parties to put their case to the people. (The Patriotic Front already claim to represent all the people of Rhodesia.);

/ (b)



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- (b) that there should be a UN or Commonwealth peace-keeping force. The Prime Minister may wish to say that there is no question of UN involvement in this process. Rhodesia is a British responsibility. It will be for us to supervise the elections. If there is agreement on the general proposals we have made for the interim period, it will then be possible, at the third and final phase of the Conference, to arrange negotiations between the military commanders on both sides on a cease-fire, including effective arrangements for its observance. But it will be much easier to resolve the difficulties that are likely to arise in that phase of the negotiations on the basis of the prior agreement by both sides on the acceptance of British authority and our general proposals for the interim period. [We do not envisage a Commonwealth peace-keeping force; but General Walls has said that he would be prepared to accept some UK/Australian involvement in monitoring a cease-fire.];
- (c) that the Patriotic Front cannot be expected to participate in elections held under the existing security forces and police. The Prime Minister may wish to say that the security forces will have to accept the Governor's authority. The police will act under our supervision. No other arrangements are practicable. There will be complete freedom for the parties to campaign peacefully and put their views to the electorate. Is it suggested that the Patriotic Front will not be given a fair chance in elections under our authority?

5. In general, the Prime Minister may wish to make the point that, since Bishop Muzorewa has accepted the Independence Constitution and has agreed to relinquish power to enable new elections to be held under the authority of a British Governor, there can be no question of the Patriotic Front being allowed to exert a veto over a settlement. It will be for the Patriotic Front to decide whether they are prepared to participate in fair elections under our authority. We hope very much that they will be prepared to participate and that other Commonwealth Governments will urge them to do so.

6. The Prime Minister may wish to make clear that we are not prepared to accept any re-formulation or re-interpretation of the Lusaka communiqué. If necessary, Mr Manley should be very firmly discouraged from any idea that representatives of the six countries who helped to draft the Lusaka communiqué have any special status in this matter or should meet again to consider it. (They would probably seek to conduct such meetings through their High Commissioners in London; and the High Commissioners of Jamaica, Zambia, Tanzania and Nigeria can hardly be regarded as impartial as between Bishop Muzorewa and the Patriotic Front.) There will be a meeting of the Commonwealth Committee on Southern Africa in London on 30 October. We shall be making it clear at that meeting that we will not be prepared to accept new definitions of what was agreed at Lusaka.

/ 7.

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7. Mr Manley may also ask about the lifting of sanctions. The Prime Minister may wish to say in reply that we are intensifying our efforts to make progress in the Conference towards a solution which will enable sanctions to be removed as soon as possible. In our view, once the purpose for which sanctions were adopted has been achieved, the basis for enforcing them will no longer exist. But it will probably be better not to say too much to Mr Manley about our present intentions on a return to legality and the lifting of sanctions, and their timing. (Mr Manley would be likely to try to mobilise pre-emptive action in the Security Council.)

8. I attach a copy of our proposals for the interim arrangements and the relevant extract from the Lusaka communiqué, with a commentary on the action we have taken to give effect to it.

A. Lewis

R M J Lyne

R M J Lyne

CONFIDENTIAL

ARRANGEMENTS FOR IMPLEMENTING THE INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION

1. The British Government puts forward the following proposals for implementing the Independence Constitution.
2. The Independence Constitution ensures that the future government will have the power to carry out the policies on the basis of which it is elected: and that the services of the State will be at its disposal in doing so.
3. The elected government will be chosen by the people in fair elections, in which all the parties will be free to participate. Until it takes office, nothing should be done which prejudices or pre-empts the freedom of choice of the people of Zimbabwe.
4. The election of the House of Assembly, which is the first step in the implementation of the Independence Constitution, will take place under the following conditions:
 - a. the administration of the election will be scrupulously fair and impartial as between all the political parties;
 - b. peaceful political activity will be freely conducted by all the parties to the election; and
 - c. all the parties will have free and uncensored access to all the public media.
5. It will be the constitutional responsibility of the British Government, as recognised in the Lusaka communique, to ensure that these requirements are met.
6. To fulfil this responsibility the British Government are prepared to appoint a Governor, who will be British. The Governor would have executive and legislative authority. All political leaders will commit themselves to the election campaign.

7. To supervise the elections, there will be an Election Commissioner, with supporting staff, appointed by the British Government. His task will be to supervise all aspects of the organisation and conduct of the elections.

8. Commonwealth observers will be present to witness the elections.

9. To enable the parties to satisfy themselves that the elections are fair and impartial, there will be an Election Council. The Council will be chaired by the Election Commissioner and parties taking part in the election will be represented on it. The Council and its individual members will be able to make representations to the Commissioner and to the Governor on any matter concerning the elections.

10. The Governor's instructions will require him to do all things necessary to secure compliance with the conditions for free and fair elections. The Commanders of the security forces will be responsible to him.

11. The Governor will assume authority over the civil police. They will be responsible, under his supervision, for the maintenance of law and order.

12. There will be agreement between the opposing forces regarding a ceasefire and disengagement of their respective forces.

13. As soon as the election results have been declared and a Government has been formed, Zimbabwe will become independent.

EXTRACT FROM LUSAKA COMMUNIQUE: 5 AUGUST 1979

In relation to the situation in Rhodesia, Heads of Government:

- a. Confirmed that they were wholly committed to genuine black majority rule for the people of Zimbabwe [the independence Constitution indisputably provides for genuine majority rule].
- b. Recognised, in this context, that the internal settlement constitution is defective in certain important respects [the independence Constitution corrects this].
- c. Fully accepted that it is the constitutional responsibility of the British Government to grant legal independence to Zimbabwe on the basis of majority rule [the British government is exercising that responsibility].
- d. Recognised that the search for a lasting settlement must involve all parties to the conflict [all the parties engaged in the conflict are participating in the negotiations].
- e. Were deeply conscious of the urgent need to achieve such a settlement and bring peace to the people of Zimbabwe and their neighbours [there has been no lack of urgency on the part of the British government].
- f. Accepted that independence on the basis of majority rule requires the adoption of a democratic constitution including appropriate safeguards for minorities [the independence Constitution contains adequate safeguards].
- g. Acknowledged that the Government formed under such an independence Constitution must be chosen through free and fair elections, properly supervised under British

/Government

Government authority and with Commonwealth observers
[Bishop Muzorewa has accepted elections supervised
under the British Government's authority].

- h. Welcomed the British Government's indication that an appropriate procedure for advancing towards these objectives would be for them to call a Constitutional Conference to which all parties would be invited [the Conference has now been in session for six weeks].
- i. Consequently, accepted that it must be a major objective to bring about a cessation of hostilities and an end to sanctions as part of the process of implementation of a lasting settlement [our efforts are directed towards the achievement of a lasting settlement].

David Smith finds all this
very convincing (he says).

Jamaica 2

CONFIDENTIAL

FM KINGSTON 201445Z JULY 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 185 OF JULY 20.

Prime Minister

MY TEL NO 182, PARAGRAPH 2.

*By
23/7*

MANLEY'S CANCELLED VISIT TO LONDON.

mt

1. BRICE HAS TOLD ME THAT MANLEY'S CANCELLATION OF VISIT WAS DUE TO POLITICAL MANGEUVRINGS GOING ON WITHIN THE PNP. I SUSPECT THAT HE WISHED TO BE IN JAMAICA DURING PATTERSONS ATTENDANCE AT THE CARICOM FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING IN BARBADOS 25-26 JULY. HE MAY ALSO HAVE WISHED TO BE BRIEFED ON THE OUTCOME OF THAT MEETING BEFORE LEAVING FOR LUSAKA.

2. BRICE ALSO THOUGHT THAT MANLEY WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY PASS STRAIGHT THROUGH LONDON ON HIS WAY BACK TO JAMAICA (PARAGRAPH 3 OF MY TEL NO 177) ADDING THAT MANLEY WAS OBVIOUSLY NOT KEEN TO BE OUT OF JAMAICA TOO LONG AT THE PRESENT TIME.

DRINKALL

[COPIES SENT TO NO.10 DOWNING ST]

FILES:
M AND C D
PCD
CCD
PS
PS/LPS
PS/MR RIDLEY
PS/FUS
SIR A. DUFF
SIR A. PARSONS

CONFIDENTIAL

GR 226

CONFIDENTIAL

Jamaica

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM KINGSTON 182015Z JUL

Copied to PM (Trans Abroad) - May 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

(CHGM Admin)

Enter no
19/7

TELEGRAM NUMBER 182 OF 18 JULY 79

YOUR TELNO 100.

MANLEY'S VISIT TO LONDON.

1. YOUR TUR CROSSED MY TELNO 177. I HAVE NOW RECEIVED THE FOLLOWING LETTER DATED 17 JULY FROM BRICE THE PERMANENT SECRETARY IN THE FOREIGN MINISTRY WHO WILL ACCOMPANY MANLEY TO LUSAKA.

BEGINS:

THIS IS TO CONFIRM THAT DUE TO PRESSURE OF OFFICIAL BUSINESS MY PRIME MINISTER HAS REGRETTABLY HAD TO RE-SCHEDULE HIS DEPARTURE FROM JAMAICA AND WILL NOW BE LEAVING FOR THE COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING IN LUSAKA ON OR AROUND THE 29TH OF JULY INSTEAD OF ON THE 24TH OF JULY AS ORIGINALLY SCHEDULED.

THIS MEANS THAT HE HAS HAD TO CANCEL ALL HIS ENGAGEMENTS IN LONDON WHICH HAD BEEN SET UP FOR THE PERIOD 25TH-27TH JULY INCLUDING HIS APPOINTMENT TO MEET WITH YOU PRIME MINISTER.

WE TRUST THAT THIS NEW DEVELOPMENT WILL NOT BE THE CAUSE OF ANY INCONVENIENCE, BUT YOU MAY BE ASSURED THAT PRIME MINISTER MANLEY WILL BE TAKING THE OPPORTUNITIES OFFERED IN LUSAKA TO DISCUSS WITH PRIME MINISTER THATCHER THOSE MATTERS OF MUTUAL INTEREST WHICH WOULD HAVE BEEN ADDRESSED IN THEIR DISCUSSION IN LONDON.

ENDS:

2. I MAY FIND OUT IN DUE COURSE THE NATURE OF THE "PRESSURE OF OFFICIAL BUSINESS" WHICH HAS CAUSED CANCELLATION BUT SHOULD PREFER NOT TO PROBE FURTHER AT THIS STAGE.

[COPY SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST]

DRINKALL

FILES
M + CD
PCD
CCD
PS
PS/LPS

PS/MR RUDLEY
PS/PUS
SIR A DUFF
SIR A PARSONS

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

2

GR 150

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM KINGSTON 171415Z JULY
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 177 OF 17 JULY 79
YOUR TELNO 97.

PS N° 10 ~~A/S~~

- 1. Miss Stephen
- 2. Prime Minister

MANLEY'S VISIT TO LONDON.

1. I HAVE JUST BEEN TOLD THAT MANLEY HAS DECIDED THAT HE MUST CANCEL HIS VISIT TO LONDON. NO REASON GIVEN. HE WILL BE LEAVING MORE OR LESS DIRECT FOR LUSAKA ON 28 OR 29 JULY.
2. AT PRESENT HE IS PLANNING TO GO ON FROM LUSAKA TO MAPUTO ON 9 AUGUST, TO OSLO ON 12 AUGUST AND TO ARRIVE IN LONDON ON 13 AUGUST LEAVING FOR JAMAICA ON 14 AUGUST.
3. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT HE MAY TRY TO RE-SCHEDULE PARTS OF HIS LONDON PROGRAMME FOR ABOUT 14 AUGUST, E.G. HIS LECTURE TO THE THIRD WORLD ORGANIZATION AND A MEETING WITH THE JAMAICAN COMMUNITY, BUT I THINK THIS UNLIKELY. IN ANY CASE HE WOULD PROBABLY NOT MAKE ANY SUCH MOVES UNTIL AFTER HIS ARRIVAL IN LUSAKA.
4. JAMAICAN HIGH COMMISSION IN LONDON ARE BEING INFORMED OF CANCELLATION OF VISIT AND MAY HAVE FURTHER INFORMATION.

18/3

DRINKALL

FILES

MAND CD

PCD

CCD

PS

PS/LPS

PS/MR RIDLEY

PS/PUS

SIR A DUFF

SIR A PARSONS

[Copy sent to PS N° 10 D.S.]

CONFIDENTIAL

January

10 DOWNING STREET

Mr. Cotteridge. Have ^{written} few

Mr. Marley. ^{for} 24/6

Mr. Marley is out of London on Friday 27th July but is available on Saturday 28th — a wife that I particularly want to keep free for the P.M. because of Kusaka. Could we offer him the afternoon of Wednesday 25 July?

E.S.

26/6

Jamaica

BF 20/7/79

cancelled satel 182

22 June 1979 4/18/7

Mr. Michael Manley

Thank you for your letter of 19 June about the forthcoming visit to London of the Jamaican Prime Minister, Mr. Michael Manley.

The Prime Minister has seen your letter and has agreed, in principle, to see Mr. Manley if she can while he is here; provisionally, the Prime Minister could do so on Thursday 26 July, at 1600 in the House of Commons. The Jamaicans should be warned, however, that the Prime Minister's movements during the week of Mr. Manley's visit are still a little uncertain and this arrangement should be regarded as being subject to confirmation nearer the time.

On the assumption that the call will take place, I should be grateful if briefing could be prepared in time to reach me not later than 1700 on Friday 20 July.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

B.G. CARTLEDGE

J.S. Wall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

S L K M



10 DOWNING STREET

Mr. Cartledge.

I have put Mr
Manley in at
16.00 on Thursday
26 July at the
H.C. The P.M.
is possibly going
to be called at
the end of July
to visit a Polaris
base but I have
not been given a
date.

E.J.

21/6.



Prime Minister

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

19 June 1979

Dear Bryan

Would you be willing to see Mr. Manley on 26 July after Questions? He will probably ask for more aid but a talk could be useful in the Rhodesia/Lusaka context. ^{19/6}

The Jamaican High Commission have asked whether the Jamaican Prime Minister, Mr Michael Manley, who plans to be in London at the end of July en route to the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Lusaka, can call on the Prime Minister on either Thursday 26 July or Saturday 28 July. He is apparently not free on Friday 27 July as he has to address a Third World meeting on that day. Lord Carrington recommends that the Prime Minister agree to receive Mr Manley.

By the time Mr Manley arrives the situation over Rhodesia may have become clearer and good use could be made of his call to explain the Government's policy at the highest level. Mr Manley is worth trying to influence. Jamaica has a seat on the UN Security Council for 1979/80. Jamaica will also participate actively in the Non-Aligned Movement's Summit to be held in Havana in September 1979. For all these reasons Mr Manley will no doubt wish to play a leading role in discussion of Rhodesia at the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting at Lusaka in August, and he could prove a dangerous critic. It is important therefore that he should hear our views, and that he should not feel himself to be cold-shouldered in London.

Mr Manley passes through London from time to time and, were it not possible for the Prime Minister to see him on this occasion, another date could no doubt be arranged.

I am copying this letter to Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

Study L on Scotland on 27th returning when? Would prefer to see if it can be merged into it.

Jos even
Stephe

J S Wall
Private Secretary

Bryan Cartledge Esq
10 Downing Street

19 JUN 1978



Grey Scale #13



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