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Confidential filing

Visits of Dr Luns the Secretary  
General of NATO & his successors.  
Birthday Greetings for Dr Luns.

NATO

September 1979

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
<del>28.9.79</del>		6492					
17.10.79		13.5.92					
5.11.79							
<del>9.11.79</del>							
<del>27.8.79</del>							
<del>16.9.81</del>							
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PREM 19 / 3865

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10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

3 June 1992

*Dear Richard,*

PRIME MINISTER'S TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH  
MR LUBBERS: NATO SECRETARY GENERAL

Mr Lubbers began his telephone conversation with the Prime Minister this morning by saying that he had decided to stand down before the next Dutch elections in 1994. This was not an irrevocable decision and he might defer his departure if there were a crisis. But he would have been Prime Minister for 12 years by then and that was enough.

Later in the conversation Mr Lubbers said to the Prime Minister that Manfred Wörner would be leaving NATO when his turn as Secretary General expired next year and that van den Broek been mentioned as a possible successor. Mr Lubbers thought that Mr van den Broek would be well qualified and would have general support apart from Chancellor Kohl who would be lukewarm and President Mitterrand who would object because he regarded Mr van den Broek as being too atlanticist.

Mr Lubbers went on to say that, at Lisbon, a decision would need to be taken on whether to renew M. Delors for a further two year term. He, Lubbers, was in favour. He understood from a previous conversation with the Prime Minister that we were more hesitant.

Mr Lubbers wondered if the Prime Minister could sound Chancellor Kohl out as to whether he thought Wörner would want to stay on. If Wörner did, then obviously Hans van den Broek's candidature would not run. If Chancellor Kohl thought that Wörner wanted to stand down then it might be possible to get Kohl to agree to van den Broek's candidature to succeed Wörner, at the same time as there was a general understanding in the Community that Delors would be reappointed for two years.

The Prime Minister concludes from Mr Lubbers' remarks that Mr Lubbers wants to use us to establish whether Wörner will stand again, in the knowledge that if he did that would knock van den Broek's candidature on the head and open the way for Lubbers to succeed Delors in two years time.

The Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary had a discussion about this this afternoon. They wondered whether it might be possible to get an understanding at Lisbon that if

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Delors was reappointed for two years then Mr Lubbers would succeed him. This would reduce the criticism we would otherwise get at home if M. Delors was reappointed. The Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary concluded that it would probably not be possible to proceed on this basis, not least because it would make both Delors and Lubbers lame ducks.

The Prime Minister had of course seen John Weston's report suggestion that Wörner does want to stay on. I think he probably will ask Chancellor Kohl where things stand when he sees him on Friday but without revealing any of the background.

Peter Hartmann, my German opposite number, telephoned this evening to talk about the agenda for Friday. He asked why the Foreign Secretary had come out publicly against M. Delors' reappointment. I told him what the Foreign Secretary and the Prime Minister had in fact said.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence).

*Jaw,*  
*Steph*

(J.S. WALL)

Richard Gozney, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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I have asked for  
help for Friday

FOLLOWING PERSONAL FOR PUS AND FOR SIR C FRANCE

FUTURE OF SECRETARY GENERAL

SUMMARY

1. KOHL WANTS WOERNER TO REMAIN. WOERNER PROBABLY WOULD STAY FOR THREE MORE YEARS IF THAT WERE THE GENERAL WISH.

DETAIL

2. I OWE YOU AN UPDATE ON THIS, NOW THAT MANFRED WOERNER HAS RETURNED TO HIS DESK AND FOLLOWING A RECENT REPORT (TELECON COWPER-COLES/ROLAND SMITH) FROM BONN ABOUT CHANCELLOR KOHL'S VIEWS.

3. WHEN I WAS SEEING HIM TODAY TETE A TETE ON ANOTHER MATTER, I RAISED WITH WOERNER THE GENERAL QUESTION OF THE SUCCESSION, SAYING THAT I NEEDED TO BE ABLE TO ADVISE LONDON ON RELEVANT PROCEDURES. WOERNER THEN SPOKE TO ME VERY FRANKLY AS FOLLOWS. HE SAID THAT BEFORE HE HAD GONE INTO HOSPITAL FOR HIS OPERATION, KOHL HAD ALREADY SUGGESTED TO HIM THAT HE MIGHT WISH TO EXTEND HIS TERM OF OFFICE FOR A FURTHER 3 YEARS BEYOND JULY 1993, WHEN HE WILL HAVE BEEN SECRETARY GENERAL FOR 5 YEARS. KOHL HAD SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THE EXISTING RULES FOR 4 YEARS PLUS 1 WERE SILLY, AND THAT THE IDEAL TERM SHOULD BE 4 YEARS WITH A ONCE ONLY OPTION TO RENEW FOR A FURTHER 4 YEARS. WOERNER COMMENTED TO ME THAT OF COURSE KOHL HAD HIS OWN POLITICAL REASONS FOR WISHING TO SEE AT LEAST ONE MAJOR INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATION, AND PERHAPS THE ALLIANCE IN PARTICULAR, CONTINUE IN GERMAN HANDS FOR A WHILE. HE (WOERNER) HAD TOLD KOHL HE WOULD REFLECT ON THIS. HE AGREES WITH HIM THAT 4 YEARS PLUS 4 IS THE BEST OBJECTIVE SOLUTION, REGARDLESS OF INCUMBENTS.

4. CONTINUING WOERNER SAID THAT BEING NOW 58 YEARS OLD HE HAD TO KEEP IN MIND THAT THE LATER HE LEFT THINGS THE MORE DIFFICULT IT WOULD BE FOR HIM SUCCESSFULLY TO MAKE ANOTHER CAREER AFTER STEPPING DOWN FROM NATO. HIS DOCTORS HAD HOWEVER NOW GIVEN HIM A COMPLETELY CLEAN BILL OF HEALTH AFTER SUCCESSFUL REMOVAL OF THE CANCER. THEY HAD TOLD HIM THAT HE SHOULD FEEL FREE TO SOLDIER ON IN THIS JOB IF HE WISHED. WOERNER SAID HE WOULD CONTINUE TO DISCHARGE HIS AGENDA (IE ON THE REFORM OF THE NATO ORGANISATION ETC) SO AS TO BE ABLE TO HAND OVER A CLEAN DESK TO A SUCCESSOR AS FROM JULY 1993. IF HE WENT THEN, HE WOULD WANT TO HAVE COMPLETED THE BASIC CHANGES SO THAT ANY SUCCESSOR WAS NOT ENCUMBERED AND COULD COME TO GRIPS WITH THE JOB IN HIS OWN WAY. IN ANY EVENT HE WOULD NOT WISH TO BE INVOLVED IN A COMPETITION IF OTHERS WERE IN THE FIELD.

NEVERTHELESS IF EVERYBODY WANTED IT, HE WOULD IN FACT BE HAPPY AND WILLING TO CONTINUE FOR A FURTHER 3 YEARS. HE HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT KOHL WAS CONTINUING TO TAKE PRIVATE SOUNDINGS ABOUT THIS POSSIBILITY FROM SELECTED ALLIED HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT. HE WOULD NOT BE SURPRISED IF THE CHANCELLOR WERE TO MENTION IT TO THE PRIME MINISTER NEXT WEEK. HE HAD ADVISED KOHL STRONGLY NOT TO SPARK ANY PUBLIC SPECULATION AT THIS STAGE. THE NORMAL MOMENT TO CLEAR THE AIR ON INTENTIONS AND CANDIDATES FOR THE SUCCESSION WOULD BE WHEN BUSINESS RESUMED AFTER THE SUMMER HOLIDAYS, AROUND SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER.

5. WE TALKED ABOUT OTHER CANDIDATES. WOERNER MADE IT PLAIN THAT ALTHOUGH HE CONSIDERS HOLST 'A GOOD MAN', HE DID NOT THINK HE HAD QUITE THE WEIGHT OR STATURE FOR THE JOB. HE KNEW THAT, IF HE HIMSELF WERE TO STEP DOWN, VAN DEN BROEK MIGHT WELL ALSO BE A WILLING VICTIM AND CLEARLY REGARDS HIM AS AN ALTOGETHER MORE CONVINCING AND CREDIBLE CANDIDATE. BUT HE WONDERED ALOUD WHETHER LUBBERS WOULD BE READY TO ALLOW VAN DEN BROEK TO RUN, GIVEN LUBBERS' OWN POSSIBLE INTENTION AS TO THE EC PRESIDENCY. HE WAS CLEARLY OF THE VIEW THAT ALTHOUGH VAN DEN BROEK MIGHT NOT STRICTLY SPEAKING BE BEHOLDEN TO LUBBERS, THE LATTER COULD EFFECTIVELY NEUTRALISE ANY CHANCES OF VAN DEN BROEK SUCCEEDING, IF THE DUTCH FOREIGN MINISTER CHOSE TO TRY TO RUN WITHOUT HIS OWN PRIME MINISTER'S ACTIVE SUPPORT. WOERNER DID NOT REFER TO THE POSSIBILITY OF AN ITALIAN CANDIDATE ENTERING THE FIELD, THOUGH I SEE THAT STEPHEN EGERTON BY NO MEANS EXCLUDES THIS.

COMMENT

6. THIS USEFUL EXCHANGE (I WOULD BE GRATEFUL IF WOERNER'S CONFIDENCE COULD BE RESPECTED) CONFIRMS THE EARLIER RUMOURS, ABOUT WHICH I HAD SPOKEN TO THE DEPARTMENT, THAT KOHL WAS SEEKING TO PERSUADE WOERNER TO EXTEND FOR HIS TERM EVEN BEFORE THE LATTER'S ILLNESS. WHAT IS NEW IS THE PERSONAL CONFIRMATION FROM WOERNER THAT HE DOES NOT SEE HIS OWN HEALTH IS IN ANY WAY PRECLUDING THIS OPTION, AND THAT THE GERMAN CHANCELLOR CONTINUES TO LOBBY OTHERS IN FAVOUR OF IT. INDEED I JUDGE FROM THE CONVERSATION THAT WOERNER WOULD NOW TAKE VERY LITTLE PERSUASION TO STAY ON. AT NO TIME IN OUR CONVERSATION WAS THERE THE SLIGHTEST SUGGESTION (SUCH AS WE HAVE SEEN REPORTED FROM OTHER SOURCES) THAT HE MIGHT WANT TO STEP DOWN AT THE TURN OF THIS YEAR, AS A RESULT OF HIS OPERATION. WOERNER HAS NOW BEEN BACK IN THE DRIVING SEAT FOR TWO WEEKS. HE LOOKS VIGOROUS ENOUGH, DESPITE LOSING ONE AND A HALF STONES IN WEIGHT. ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE MEDICAL ADVICE IS WELL FOUNDED (AND I UNDERSTAND THIS PARTICULAR CONDITION HAS A HIGH RATE OF COMPLETE CURE) NATO IS PROBABLY BETTER OFF CONTINUING WITH WOERNER'S STEADY EYE AND SAFE PAIR OF POLITICAL HANDS THROUGH THE NEXT TWO TO THREE YEARS OF DECISIVE CHANGE THAN CONFRONTING THE ADDITIONAL UNCERTAINTIES OF BRINGING A NEW MAN TO THE HELM. NEEDLESS TO SAY, WOERNER REMAINS EXTREMELY WELL DISPOSED TOWARD THE UK.

7. FCO PLEASE PASS ADVANCE COPY TO PS NUMBER 10.

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**Filed on:**

10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

13 May 1992

*Dear Richard,*

NATO SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Foreign Secretary raised with the Prime Minister this morning the future of the NATO Secretary-General.

The Foreign Secretary said that Hans van den Broek had been told by the Americans that their sources indicated that Manfred Woerner was seriously ill and would have to stand down. The Americans wondered whether van den Broek wanted his name to go forward. Van den Broek had asked for the Foreign Secretary's advice. Mr. van den Broek had emphasised that he did not want any speculation and would do nothing about his possible candidature unless and until it was confirmed that Herr Woerner was not able to carry on.

The Prime Minister said he could not immediately think of anybody better than Mr. van den Broek for the job and thought that to have somebody as Secretary-General who was sound on defence but something of a federalist on other EC issues could be quite helpful to us in sustaining the role of NATO. He assumed that Mr. van den Broek had raised the issue with the Foreign Secretary in order to establish that we would not oppose him or run another candidate against him. The Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary agreed that there was little chance of our getting the job, given that it had been so recently held by Lord Carrington.

The Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary agreed that if Mr. van den Broek became Secretary-General of NATO that would make it more difficult for Mr. Lubbers to secure the Presidency of the EC should he wish to do so. But we should not be deterred by that from supporting Mr. van den Broek.

It was left that the Foreign Secretary, who had told Mr. van den Broek that he would be having a word with the Prime Minister, would get back to Mr. van den Broek with our view.

*Jane,  
Stephe*  
(J.S. WALL)

Richard Gozney, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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ORGANISATION DU TRAITÉ  
DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD



NORTH ATLANTIC  
TREATY ORGANIZATION

LE SECRÉTAIRE GÉNÉRAL  
SECRETARY GENERAL

BOULEVARD LÉOPOLD III  
1110 - BRUXELLES  
TÉL. 728.41.11 - 728.49.17

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① Prime Minister 7th May 1992

Dear Mr. Prime Minister,

Manfred

I was especially pleased to receive your good wishes and sympathy during my stay in hospital. One is particularly receptive to and thankful for such expressions of affection at such times.

Knowing that you were thinking about me and sympathised with me helped to speed my recovery.

Thank you very much indeed.

Yours sincerely,

Manfred Wörner

The Rt. Hon. John Major, MP  
Prime Minister and First Lord of the Treasury  
London



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*Mr Proomfield*  
*Mr Gansler*

*16/4*  
DAVID GILLMORE

FOLLOWING PERSONAL FOR PUS AND FOR SIR MICHAEL QUINLAN, MOD

HEALTH OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

1. IN THE COURSE OF A LUNCH I GAVE TODAY FOR BRIAN FALL, THE SECRETARY-GENERAL LET SLIP TO ME IN AN ASIDE THAT HE IS TO GO INTO HOSPITAL TOMORROW FOR EXTENSIVE EXAMINATION, WHICH MAY LEAD TO SURGERY. AFTER THE MEAL, HE TOLD ME IN A TETE A TETE THAT HE HAS NOT BEEN FEELING TOO WELL AND THAT SOME PRELIMINARY INTERNAL EXAMINATIONS HAD REVEALED A POSSIBLE PROBLEM THAT NEEDED FURTHER INVESTIGATION. AS OF TODAY HE WAS NOT SURE WHETHER HE WOULD HAVE TO CANCEL HIS PROJECTED TRIP TO THE US ON 8 APRIL.

2. I HAVE WONDERED ONCE OR TWICE IN THE LAST WEEK OR TWO WHETHER ALL WAS WELL AND THOUGHT THAT TODAY HE LOOKED ESPECIALLY DRAWN, NO DOUBT AS A RESULT OF THIS DISQUIETING NEWS.

3. IF MANFRED WOERNER IS PUT OUT OF ACTION FOR ANY SIGNIFICANT PERIOD, IT COULD HARDLY COME AT A WORSE TIME. WE ARE ONLY SIX WEEKS FROM THE NATO SPRING MINISTERIALS AND FOR MANY REASONS A FIRM AND SKILFUL POLITICAL HAND AT THE HELM OF ALLIANCE AFFAIRS WILL CONTINUE TO BE NEEDED. OF COURSE THIS MAY PROVE TO BE A PASSING CLOUD, AS WE MUST ALL HOPE. BUT IF NOT AND A MAJOR HIATUS IS FORESEEN, IT WOULD IN MY PERSONAL VIEW BE WORTH CONSIDERING PARACHUTING SOMEONE INTO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S SEAT ON A STOP-GAP BASIS. BRIAN FALL SEEMED TO THINK THAT LORD CARRINGTON HIMSELF MIGHT EVEN BE PERSUADED TO ANSWER SUCH A CALL TO ARMS. THERE IS NO ADEQUATE SUBSTITUTE FOR WOERNER WITHIN HIS STAFF. THE DEPUTY SECRETARY-GENERAL, DE FRANCHIS, WOULD BE MERELY A CYPHER.

4. IF WOERNER IS HOSPITALISED, I RECOMMEND A PERSONAL MESSAGE WISHING HIM A RAPID RECOVERY, WHICH MIGHT GO IN THE JOINT NAMES OF THE PRIME MINISTER, AND THE FOREIGN AND DEFENCE SECRETARIES.

5. WOERNER ASKED ME TO TREAT THESE EXCHANGES IN THE STRICTEST CONFIDENCE.

WESTON

FCO PLEASE PASS TO SIR MICHAEL QUINLAN, PUS, MOD

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**Filed on:**

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10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

24 October 1991

**CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER BY THE  
SECRETARY GENERAL OF NATO: 24 OCTOBER**

Thank you for your letter of 23 October with the revised brief for Herr Woerner's call on the Prime Minister. The brief met our needs very well and there was a good meeting. Sir Michael Alexander and Herr Wegner were present as was Sir Percy Cradock.

The following were the main points.

Relations between NATO and the European Union

This subject took up most of the discussion. The Prime Minister set out our reservations about the Franco-German text. Herr Woerner thought the text was subject to different interpretations by the French and by the Germans. This opened the way for a compromise effort, perhaps by the UK. The Prime Minister hoped that the terms of the Summit declaration might influence what was subsequently agreed at Maastricht. Herr Woerner did not really accept this view. Unless we had been able to move the French and Germans before the NATO summit then NATO would have to stick to the Copenhagen Declaration, though he himself would be happy to go further i.e. by a clearer concept of the European defence identity covering the relationship of WEU, the European Council and NATO.

Herr Woerner made clear that he did not favour what he called the "complete subordination" of the WEU to the European Union. He said that the two organisations should be closely linked, but that the WEU should not be subordinate: it was not a relationship of master and slave. Nor could we subordinate the WEU to NATO. There had to be an organic relationship. He favoured collocation and double hatting and links between the two secretariats. The one thing he did oppose clearly was the use of armed forces for the same purpose i.e. the Franco-German corps should not try to duplicate NATO forces. Any European force should be used where NATO could not act or did not chose to act, e.g. out of area (though he pointed out that there was nothing in

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the Washington Treaty to prevent NATO operating out of area). On that basis assignment arrangements (double assignment as he called it) could be worked out. NATO could then supply equipment and other forms of support. Germany had said that its troops in the Franco-German Corps would be assigned to NATO. The French were not in that position. The fact was that the Germans had tried to do France a favour to get them out of a hole.

The Prime Minister made clear that we opposed any bloc to bloc arrangement involving the WEU and NATO. Herr Woerner said that if we agreed to a European pillar there would be caucusing but this should not be on a take it or leave it basis. He saw the possibility of Britain brokering an interpretation which would be in accordance with NATO views. The Prime Minister said we would try but the Franco-German position would take some shifting. Herr Woerner commented that the French wanted to shift policy away from NATO towards the European Community, the WEU or the CSCE. That was not Chancellor Kohl's concept. Kohl wanted to get the French closer to NATO. He was not sure who would prevail. There would have to be a compromise.

In subsequent conversation it emerged very clearly that Herr Woerner wanted to avoid an argument on the WEU/NATO relationship, and subordination of WEU to the European Union, at the NATO Summit. The Prime Minister said that he could quite see that it would not be helpful to have a row at the NATO Summit which could not be resolved there. He accepted Herr Woerner's view that even if the French were prepared to move they would not, as a matter of principle, move at the NATO Summit. The Prime Minister said that what we must avoid was anything emerging from the NATO Summit that made it easier for the French to argue for the subordination of the WEU to the European Union at a later stage. He hoped we might therefore go beyond the Copenhagen Communique at least to the point of being rather more specific on some of the points which that Communique had covered. Herr Woerner said that we must certainly not allow the NATO Summit to imply any weakening of the Alliance's existing stance. He did not disagree with the idea of greater specificity but he thought it was in practice difficult to go further without knowing more of what European defence integration would mean. The Prime Minister reiterated that unless the NATO Summit spelled out the principles which should apply then those who wanted to give the European Union a higher profile than NATO would take comfort from that fact. Herr Woerner agreed with this approach. We had to have a clear statement of principles but he doubted whether in concrete terms we would be able to nail anything down more precisely.

#### Relations with the countries of Eastern Europe

Herr Woerner described the progress that had been made in this area. Diplomatic liaison already existed and Baker and Genscher had now proposed a council of cooperation with various tiers. Fifteen members of NATO could accept this. The French had not yet accepted it and were going around Europe saying why not use the WEU rather than NATO. But all the countries of Eastern Europe realised that NATO was the organisation which had teeth and which had the Americans in it. They were not interested in the WEU. They wanted security. Hence Havel's

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request in Washington for associate membership of NATO. That could not be granted but if we were really serious, NATO must be the bedrock of stability. Hence the proposal for a more formal relationship on the lines of the Baker/Genscher concept.

The strategic concept

Herr Woerner said that the text on this was agreed but for two or three outstanding points. He did not see major difficulties at Rome. We needed a definition of the new security architecture and to set out our vision of the Euro-Atlantic community and the interlocking institutions which were the basis of it.

Herr Woerner said he did not expect any discussion of nuclear matters. The US had wanted to keep them off the agenda. Herr Woerner hoped to have some mention of conventional arms control with NATO defining some of its views on the future course of conventional arms control.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence) and to Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

(J. S. WALL)

S. L. Gass, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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Foreign &  
Commonwealth  
Office

London SW1A 2AH

23 October 1991

*Dear Stepha,*

Prime Minister  
Good, dear brief - long  
lets worth reading.

Prime Minister's Meeting with the  
Secretary General of NATO, 24 October *3/a*

The Secretary General of NATO, Manfred Wörner, will call on the Prime Minister at 1730 on Thursday 24 October. He will be accompanied by his Private Secretary, Roland Wegener, and Sir Michael Alexander, UK Permanent Representative at NATO.

Wörner will have seen the Foreign Secretary at 1500, and the Defence Secretary at 1630, on 24 October. His visit is part of a tour of NATO capitals in the run-up to the NATO Summit in Rome on Thursday 7 - Friday 8 November.

Manfred Wörner

Wörner was born in Southern Germany in 1934. After mainly legal studies at universities in France and Germany (his doctorate was about defence relations in NATO), he worked in local government in his home State of Baden-Württemberg, before being elected as a Christian Democrat to the Bundestag in 1965. He remained in parliament, specialising in electoral reform and defence, until he was appointed Secretary General of NATO in 1988.

Wörner's political career included spells as the Deputy Chairman of the parliamentary party, and as West Germany's Defence Minister from 1982 to 1988.

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Wörner is an enthusiastic pilot (1200 hours logged so far), and is a Lieutenant Colonel in the Luftwaffe reserve. He is married, with one son by a previous marriage.

Wörner's views on defence are strongly Atlanticist. He has made clear in recent days his view that no European force independent of NATO should be created for the defence of European territory, thereby implicitly criticising Franco-German proposals for a WEU corps which could be used within the NATO area.

#### The Secretary General's Job

Wörner succeeded Lord Carrington as NATO Secretary General on 1 July 1988. He was appointed by consensus among NATO Foreign Ministers for a 4 year term, renewable for one year. He is seeking - apparently without opposition - extension to June 1993.

As Secretary General, Wörner chairs the North Atlantic Council, the Alliance's top political decision-making body. All 16 members of NATO (see below) are represented on the Council by Permanent Representatives (Ambassadors). The British Ambassador, since 1986, is Sir Michael Alexander, who will be succeeded in January by Mr John Weston. The Council meets formally at least once a week (usually on Wednesdays). Ministerial meetings (attended by Foreign Ministers) take place twice a year, in June and December. Summit meetings of the North Atlantic Council, attended by Heads of State and Government, are held at irregular intervals, although there has been a NATO Summit every year since 1988.

The Alliance's highest defence planning body, the Defence Planning Committee, is also chaired by Wörner. It consists of all the NATO countries except France (which does not take part in collective defence planning); it meets at Ambassadorial level less often than the Council, but also meets twice a year at Ministerial level (attended by Defence Ministers), in May/June and December. Defence Ministers also meet twice a year (April and October) to

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discuss nuclear issues: on these occasions they refer to themselves as the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG). A meeting of the NPG took place in Sicily on 17-18 October. In addition NATO has a Military Committee, which is the highest source of military advice to the NAC and the DPC. It meets three times a year at the level of Chiefs of Defence Staff, and weekly with Military Representatives, senior military officers based at NATO HQ. The UK's Military Representative is Admiral Sir Richard Thomas.

### The Alliance: History

There are 16 members of NATO: 11 members of the European Community (minus Ireland), the United States and Canada, plus Turkey, Norway and Iceland. Three members are not members of NATO's Integrated Military Command Structure: France (which withdrew in 1965, though French forces would come under NATO command in the event of war): Spain (which has a series of coordination agreements linking its forces to NATO); and Iceland (which has no armed forces, but which has a number of important NATO bases on its territory).

The Alliance was set up by the Washington Treaty of 1949. Under it, the Allies agree (Article 5) that 'an armed attack against one or more of them' should be considered an attack against all, and that they will assist each other with 'such action as they deem necessary, including the use of armed force'. Under Article 4 of the Treaty, they undertake to consult together whenever the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the members is threatened. Article 6 implicitly confines NATO to the area north of the Tropic of Cancer.

At the heart of NATO is its Integrated Military Command Structure. The strategic area covered by the Washington Treaty is divided into three Major NATO Commands (European, Atlantic and Channel), and a Regional Planning Group for Canada and the United States. The Major NATO Commanders (MNCs) are the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT), an American Admiral, based at Norfolk, Virginia; the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), an American

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General based at the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), at Mons, in Belgium; and the Commander-in-Chief Channel, a British Admiral based at Northwood, Middlesex. The Allied Command Europe is in turn divided into a number of Major Subordinate Commands (MSCs), of which the most important are: Allied Forces Northern Europe (AFNORTH), commanded by a British General based at Kolsaas, Norway; Allied Forces Central Europe (AFCENT), commanded by a German General based at Brunssum in Holland; and Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH), commanded by an American Admiral in Naples.

Apart from France, all allies have subscribed since 1967 to a common military strategy, based on the flexible use of a balanced combination of nuclear and conventional forces, which is known as 'flexible response'. It was, however, clear by the time of the NATO Summit in London in July 1990 that flexible response, which assumed that the threat to NATO would come from a massive simultaneous attack on all fronts by the Warsaw Pact, was no longer valid.

#### The Alliance: Outlook

At the London Summit the Allies issued a Declaration which recognised the enormous changes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, and responded to them in a number of ways.

First, NATO 'extended the hand of friendship' to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, inviting the countries of the Warsaw Pact to establish 'regular diplomatic liaison' with NATO. This involved meetings between the Ambassadors of the Warsaw Pact countries in Brussels and the Secretary General and senior members of his staff, and (later) visits by the Secretary General and his staff to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. A number of Eastern European leaders have also visited NATO HQ or will soon do so. An invitation to President Gorbachev to visit NATO is still on the table.

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Second, the Summit set out the elements of a new strategy, involving smaller and more mobile forces than at present; and reduced reliance on nuclear weapons, making them 'truly weapons of last resort'. It launched a detailed review of military strategy, moving away from 'forward defence' (ie the heavy concentration of forces, particularly in Germany, on the border with the Warsaw Pact) and flexible response.

#### The Rome Summit

The Summit has been called to set the seal on that process. It will do so by issuing two documents: a Summit Declaration (which should offer a clear statement of the Alliance's purpose in the changed security environment of the 1990s), and a new Strategic Concept (which will show how Alliance strategy has been changed to reflect the new realities).

#### The Rome Summit: Key Issues

The key issues for the Rome Summit are:

(a) NATO's relations with Central and Eastern Europe

Since the London Summit, contacts between NATO and the Central and Eastern Europeans and the Soviet Union (the CEEs), have grown rapidly. Some of the CEEs want NATO membership or 'associate membership', or at least some form of security guarantee. But membership or security guarantees would involve commitments to defend the CEEs which the Allies could not possibly fulfil; and 'associate membership' is nonsensical (one is either inside or outside a military alliance). To help reduce Eastern European fears that a 'security vacuum' was developing in their region NATO Foreign Ministers issued a statement at their meeting in Copenhagen in June 1991 which said that the preservation and consolidation of democracy in Europe was of 'direct and material concern to the Alliance'.



This was repeated with emphasis at the special Ministerial meeting of NATO after the Soviet coup attempt.

Since then there has been general agreement in NATO that the Alliance's relationship with the CEEs must be developed. Most nations favour some kind of formal consultative mechanism. The UK has put forward a proposal for periodic Ministerial and Ambassadorial meetings of the Alliance with the CEEs, including the Baltic States. The US and Germany have put forward more far-reaching proposals (the Baker/Genscher Declaration of 2 October), including the opening of NATO Information Offices in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, about which we have doubts (some of the proposals would not be a cost effective way of spreading NATO's message). The French are opposed to almost any development of NATO's relations with the former Warsaw Pact, ostensibly because this dilutes NATO's military function (which it does not). In fact, French opposition most probably reflects their unwillingness to give NATO a new lease of life. Agreement on the development of NATO's relations with the CEEs will be a centrepiece of the Summit, showing clearly that NATO has adapted politically to the changes in the East.

(b) Strategic Concept

Since the London Summit, the review of NATO Strategy has continued, and is now close to completion. The resulting strategy - NATO's Strategic Concept - gives political and military guidance to defence planners. It has the following elements:

- (i) the Strategic Context (changes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, the growth of instability, proliferation and other risks in North Africa and the Middle East);



(ii) the Alliance's Objectives and Security Functions (a restatement of NATO's essential purpose as the safeguard for the freedom and security of its members);

(iii) the Broad Approach to Security (preserving peace through political as well as military means of crisis management);

(iv) Guidelines for Defence (the principles of NATO strategy, the new force posture, the missions and characteristics of NATO forces, including nuclear forces).

The negotiations on the new strategy have been long and hard. Many of the most significant battles have been fought out in a small group, consisting of the UK, US, German and French Ambassadors, which is not generally known about in NATO, though the Secretary General has been kept informed. The current draft is just about acceptable to us, but we would not want anything else taken out.

(c) The European Defence Identity

The declaration issued by the NATO Foreign Ministers' meeting in Copenhagen in June included grudging language on the relationship between NATO and the future European Defence Identity. In the UK view, the Rome Summit should make much clearer what that relationship should be, thereby establishing some sort of guideline for the Maastricht European Council's discussions of European defence. Following the Luxembourg European Council conclusions, we have prompted the Dutch to hold meetings of the Eleven Ambassadors of the Allies who are members of the EC to discuss what the NATO Summit Declaration should say on the European Defence Identity. A British draft has been well received.



*Core Issue  
Sub-  
Concept.*

### Nuclear Issues

President Bush's initiative last month and the decision by NATO Defence Ministers meeting in Sicily to cut by 80% the number of nuclear weapons in Europe assigned to NATO should ensure that there is no need for discussion of nuclear issues at Rome. But the President's initiative has left ambiguous the US commitment to modernisation of its sub-strategic nuclear forces in Europe (that is replacement in due course of the free-fall bomb by a stand-off missile: Tactical Air to Surface Missile). We are keeping our own TASM options open for the moment.

### Meeting with the Secretary General

Against that background, the Prime Minister may like to draw on the following in talking to Wörner:

#### NATO Summit Declaration

*Robert.*  
- c e e relationship  
- Euro. Pillar

- Must try for a short, punchy declaration. NATO has a good story to tell. Should not be lost in bureaucratic verbosity.

#### Strategic Concept

- Strategy stands up well to scrutiny despite changes in the Soviet Union. Yugoslavia, instability in Soviet Union, show that we need an "all-weather" strategy to deal with unpredictable circumstances.

- The Summit must agree on the new strategy: defence planners need guidance, cannot be left in a vacuum.

- Nuclear forces are still an integral part of Alliance strategy: must be included in the new Strategic Concept.



### NATO Relations with CEEs

- Have to respond to changed situation in eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. NATO cannot be confined to defending against a diminishing Soviet threat, or it will soon be seen as obsolete.

*Yes* - Opposed to security guarantees for CEEs: should not take on commitments which we could not fulfil. But much we can do. We favour a formal consultative mechanism. Could launch this by inviting CEE Foreign Ministers to attend December NATO Foreign Ministers' meeting in Brussels.

- Given likely independence of some Soviet republics, we should ensure that there is a "minimum democracy test" for those countries which want a closer relationship with the Alliance (i.e. we do not want closer relations with countries which are not broadly democratic).

*Is this not too negative?* - Much we agree with in the Baker/Genscher declaration, but doubts about NATO information offices in eastern Europe: an expensive way to get our message across.

- French opposition to any extension of NATO's relationship with the CEEs is a problem: do you have views on how to overcome this?

### European Defence Identity

- Like you, believe that any European Defence Identity must be compatible with NATO, since only with transatlantic linkage can European security be guaranteed.

- Worried about some of the ideas in the Franco-German paper: the relationship between their proposed European corps and NATO is very unclear.

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- Anglo-Italian Declaration intended as a basis for discussion primarily among the Twelve, but also in the WEU and NATO. It emphasises the importance of compatibility with NATO. Significant that we were able to agree on so much with the Euromaximalist Italians.

- Hope that the work of the Eleven Ambassadors representing the EC Allies will enable the Rome Summit Declaration to go beyond the language agreed at Copenhagen on the nature of the relationship between NATO and the European defence identity. Important that the Alliance contributes to the debate in the run-up to Maastricht, and is not just a spectator.

Nuclear Issues

- Do not anticipate much if any discussion at Rome.

- Essential to preserve Alliance commitment to modernisation of forces as required; UK TASM options still open.

I am sending copies of this letter to Simon Webb (MOD) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read 'S. L. Gass', written over a circular stamp.

(S. L. Gass)

Private Secretary

Stephen Wall Esq  
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL



SECRETARY OF STATE

CEPC

MO 13/5/32G

21st October 1991

Copy to:  
 PS/Minister(AF)  
 PSO/CDS  
 PS/PUS  
 DUS(P)  
 ACDS(Pol/Nuc)  
 ACDS(OR)(Land)  
 AUS(Pol)  
 PS/No 10  
 PS/FCO  
 FCO (Sec Pol Dept)

Head of Sec(NATO/UK)(P)NPG MEETING: BILATERAL WITH SECRETARY GENERAL

The Defence Secretary had a short bilateral meeting with the Secretary-General of NATO on 18th October in the margins of the NPG at Taormina. Dr Woerner was supported by Ambassador De Franchis and Mr Legge; the Defence Secretary by Sir M Alexander, CDS and DUS(P).

2. Dr Woerner said that he had recently had a chance at last to talk to Chancellor Kohl about the European Defence Identity and the recent Franco-German initiative. It was clear that the Chancellor was trying yet again to draw the French closer into NATO again. He had given assurances that the Franco-German Corps would only have a role outside the NATO area, or at least where NATO did not act. No new forces would be involved and the German troops would be assigned to the Corps as a second priority after assignment to NATO. There was also a good deal of delicate manoeuvring towards changing the German constitution.

3. The Defence Secretary said that, while we understood Chancellor Kohl's motives, there were real dangers inherent in his approach. It was postulated on a withdrawal of US forces, or at least loss of interest in defending Europe. That could too easily become a self-fulfilling prophecy, at a time when there were fresh pressures for reductions of defence spending in the US congress. The concept of putting the WEU under the control of the EC Council was bound to heighten US concerns, as had been apparent from his discussion with Secretary Cheney the previous day. The way that the Franco-German paper was structured suggested that the French were heading towards a much looser military structure than NATO had managed to achieve. Their approach was of association agreements which would come into play only when a crisis loomed. This would not permit the kind of closely integrated training and exercising that had been the foundation of NATO's effectiveness.



RESTRICTED



SECRETARY OF STATE

4. Dr Woerner said that he shared these concerns, particularly the need to do nothing to weaken US links to the defence of Europe and to hold NATO together. At the same time, we needed to address the question of links with the Central and East European countries (especially if the EC expanded) and to think about NATO's role in relation to security problems in that area.

5. Speaking personally, he could see advantages in a more flexible arrangement under which NATO would be the first forum in which a response to a security problem in Eastern Europe would be discussed (allowing a ready way for the US to participate if they wished); if they did not then discussion would move to a more narrowly European forum, such as the WEU or the Council which would then decide whether it wished to act collectively instead.

INTEROPERABILITY

6. Dr Woerner said that he recently received a report from the NATO Director of Standardisation complaining about the UK's decision to buy the Challenger II tank with a rifled-bore gun. He could understand why Mr King had decided to buy British - as a Defence Minister he would probably have had to do the same. But it was very disappointing that so soon after achieving command of the RRC the UK had chosen a gun which offered no interoperability with other tank fleets in Europe. CDS explained the importance of achieving intra-operability within the UK tank fleet.

(S WEBB)  
PS/S of S



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cu

cc PC

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

3 July 1991

**PROPOSED OFFICIAL VISIT TO LONDON  
BY NATO SECRETARY-GENERAL**

Thank you for your letter of 1 July  
about the visit to London of Dr. Wörner.

The Prime Minister can see Dr. Wörner  
from 1730-1830 on Thursday 24 October.

(J.S. WALL)

Simon Gass, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

cu



10 DOWNING STREET

~~Sasha~~ Stephen

for Harry & Ph

6  
The Harvest may  
rise on Thursday 24 Oct for  
Provegation, which  
would give a lot  
more time. But in  
any case Pm would  
manage 1730 - 1830  
Har day. S 3/7



222

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Foreign &  
Commonwealth  
Office

1 July 1991

London SW1 2AH

Dear Stefan


Proposed Official Visit to London by NATO Secretary-General

Your letter of 15 May agreed that we should invite Wörner to London in advance of the NATO Summit.

Wörner has now proposed 24-25 October (he has travel commitments earlier in the month). He would plan to arrive at 1400 hrs on Thursday 24 October and to leave early the next morning. He particularly wishes to meet the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary before the Rome NATO Summit on 7-8 November. He would also welcome the opportunity to see the Defence Secretary.

Although this timing would put the visit closer to the NATO Summit than we had wished, it is the only slot available for Wörner in October. The Foreign Secretary continues to believe that it would be useful to have Wörner to London in the run-up to the Rome Summit, and would be grateful to know whether the Prime Minister could see him on 24 October.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (MOD).

Yours ever,  
  
(S. L. Gass)  
Private Secretary

J S Wall Esq  
10 Downing Street



Faint, illegible text or markings located below the embossed seal.

Notes: visits of sec Gen

Sept 79



KIC

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

15 May 1991

**PROPOSED OFFICIAL VISIT TO LONDON BY  
NATO SECRETARY GENERAL**

Richard Gozney wrote to me on 14 May to suggest that we should agree to a visit to London by the NATO Secretary General and to steer him towards a visit in early October.

The Prime Minister agrees that we should go ahead on this basis.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence).

(J. S. WALL)

Christopher Prentice, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

DA



Foreign &  
Commonwealth  
Office

London SW1A 2AH

14 May 1991

*See*

Prime Minister <sup>(1)</sup>

*Dear Stephen,*

*Agree to a visit by NATO  
Secretary General in the autumn?*

Proposed Official Visit to London by NATO Secretary General

*Steph*

The Secretary General of NATO, Manfred Woerner, has told us that he hopes to visit London as part of a round of visits to all Alliance countries. He particularly wants to meet the Prime Minister before the NATO Summit which is likely to take place in the autumn (my letter of 13 May), as well as seeing the Foreign and Defence Secretaries.

*14/5*

The Foreign Secretary believes that it would be useful to have Woerner to London before the NATO Summit and that we should steer him towards a visit in early October when we can use the visit to influence Woerner's approach to the NATO Summit. If the Prime Minister agrees, he will look at possible dates with Sandra Phillips and then instruct Sir M Alexander to pursue.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb, MOD.

*Yours ever,  
Christopher Franks*

*PP* (R H T Gozney)  
Private Secretary

J S Wall Esq  
10 Downing Street

file  
bcPC  
5(a-b)  
KC

PRIME MINISTER

MEETING WITH NATO SECRETARY-GENERAL

You are having a working lunch tomorrow with Dr. Woerner to discuss the NATO Summit. He will be accompanied by his (American) special assistant. Michael Alexander will also attend.

Handling of the Summit

You will want first to talk about the actual handling of the Summit. The Secretary-General's proposals are that:

- Heads of Government assemble in Lancaster House on Thursday morning.
- you and he both say a few words of welcome while the media are still in the room.
- the Summit then goes into closed session. President Bush, President Mitterrand and you then speak in that order for about 20 minutes each. The others get 10 minutes each.
- there is then a more general discussion on the key issues.
- the second day is devoted to finalising the Declaration.

I imagine none of this will give you any difficulty.

Summit Declaration

The most important aspect will be the drafting of the Summit Declaration. The Americans have now circulated their text (unchanged) to all NATO members and there is to be a discussion in Brussels on Tuesday next week. But it is not envisaged that this will lead to an agreed text. The task of producing this

will be left to NATO Foreign Minister's during the Summit itself, working in a separate room.

Woerner will be familiar with the American text. You will want to get over to him your main concerns about it:

- you accept the need for a striking, positive and imaginative message from the Summit. It will have a crucial role in persuading the Russians to accept German membership of NATO.
- but the starting point must be an assessment of NATO's strategy for the future, and the forces and weapons we need to sustain it.
- we should not appear to be giving up flexible response, at least until we have something to put in its place. That means avoiding references to nuclear weapons as 'weapons of last resort', which only undermines deterrence.
- nor do we want to give an exaggerated picture of how much further we can go down on conventional forces. We can talk about manpower levels. But we must keep the equipment and the forces which we need, not just for NATO but for out of area.
- we must get the overall tone of the Declaration right and avoid proposals which suggest there is no longer any threat from the Soviet Union. The psychology will be very important.

We shall be suggesting changes to the American draft to cover these points. This won't be done in any negative sense, but to ensure the right balance between on the one hand a positive signal to the Soviet Union, and on the other the needs of secure defence. We shall not do ourselves a service if we concentrate everything on the packaging and forget the content.



The Main Substantive Tasks of the Summit

You will want to tell the Secretary-General what we see as the main substantive points for discussion at the Summit. The basic guide is your Turnberry speech. The points are:

- to launch a review of NATO's strategy. Our aim should be to get the key elements - the need for secure and collective defence, the transatlantic link and continued deployment of nuclear weapons in Europe - agreed at the Summit itself. That will limit the scope for future argument.
- to give SACEUR a steer on the structure of forces we envisage to sustain the strategy. There is a link here to our own study of future defence options. If we can get it established at the Summit that large standing armies in Germany will be replaced by smaller, more mobile forces and greater reliance on reserves, our task of reconciling the structure we envisage for our own forces in future with NATO's needs will be made easier.
- to keep discussion of SNF negotiations in a very low key, so as to minimise the risks that the presence of nuclear weapons will become the major issue of the German election campaign. That will mean keeping the question of TASM in an equally low key (although it would still be helpful to have some private assurance from Chancellor Kohl). There will be conflicting pressures on this issue. If the Americans insist on going for eye-catching initiatives such as getting rid of nuclear artillery, it will be that much harder to prevent wider issues about the future of nuclear weapons in Europe from being aired.
- to get the balance right on NATO's future political role. The risk is that the others will want to go too far in this direction, while doing less on defence. We want to see NATO become a forum for transatlantic political discussion: and we envisage some strengthening of the CSCE. But this must not undermine NATO's basic purpose of providing defence.

Under this general heading, we shall also need to discuss the idea of a joint declaration between the members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

- to decide what to say about future conventional force reduction negotiations. The point which the Russians will be looking for is some clear statement about limits on the size of German forces.

#### Bilateral Points

You will want to take advantage of the talk with Woerner to get his assessment of developments in Germany, both in a broad political sense and on the more specific issue of their future dependability on defence and stationing of nuclear weapons. This is vital to NATO's future: it cannot exist without Germany. You might also sound him out on whether he expects France to draw closer to NATO.

#### Your Role

Your role at the Summit will be a central one: first because you are the host: and second because you represent the strongest commitment to preserving the NATO as a viable defence organisation. You will need to avoid being classified by the press as the back-marker and the obstacle to a forward-looking declaration, dragged reluctantly into half-hearted concessions. But your success in striking the most successful and productive relationship with Gorbachev of any NATO leader means that it is demonstrably possible to combine continued commitment to secure defence with a constructive policy towards the Soviet Union.

#### Administrative Points

There are one or two administrative points which Woerner may raise. These are covered in a separate note.

Background papers

You will find in the folder:

- a note by the FCO about the Summit.
- the US draft declaration.
- your message to President Bush.
- the FCO's first draft of a speaking note for the Summit.
- a note on administrative arrangements.

C. D. POWELL

28 June 1990

c:\foreign\nato (kk)



*File to  
c: nato*

10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

2 June 1990

**NATO SECRETARY-GENERAL'S LUNCH WITH THE  
PRIME MINISTER**

*H* Thank you for your letter of 1 June about the lunch for the NATO Secretary-General. Mr. Cunningham and Sir Michael Alexander will both be welcome. I imagine that the lunch will end around 1430-1445.

C.D. POWELL

Richard Gozney, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

*Li*



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

1 June 1990

*Dear Charles,*

NATO Secretary-General's Lunch with Prime Minister: 29 June

The Secretary-General has accepted the Prime Minister's invitation to a pre-Summit lunch on 29 June. Dr Woerner will be flying to Northolt, and on present plans should arrive at Number 10 at about 1 o'clock. What time would you expect the lunch to end?

Dr Woerner will be bringing with him James Cunningham, the Director of his Private Office, who is a US Foreign Service Officer. Dr Woerner would like him to attend the lunch. He has also asked if Sir Michael Alexander could be present. Would this be acceptable? The Foreign Secretary will be out of London that day.


I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (MOD) in case the Defence Secretary would like to try to see Dr Woerner that day.

*Yours ever*

*R. H. T. Gozney*

(R H T Gozney)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street





File 116

205

10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

8 September 1988

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH NATO SECRETARY  
GENERAL

Thank you for your letter of 7 September asking whether the Prime Minister would sign a photograph for Dr. Woerner. She has done so and I should be grateful if you could return it to him.

CHARLES POWELL

Lyn Parker, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

ls

3



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

7 September 1988

Prime Minister  
Agree to sign?  
"To Dr Manfred Woerner  
With warm regards  
Margaret Thatcher"

Dear Charles

CDP  
7/9

Prime Minister's meeting with NATO Secretary-General:  
27 July 1988

/ Dr Woerner has asked if the Prime Minister could sign the enclosed photograph taken of the two of them on the occasion of his visit to the UK on 27 July. If the Prime Minister is willing to do so, we will arrange delivery to Dr Woerner's office.

How ever

L Parker

(L Parker)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
PS/No 10 Downing Street



ORGANISATION DU TRAITÉ  
DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD



NORTH ATLANTIC  
TREATY ORGANIZATION

CEPC

LE SECRÉTAIRE GÉNÉRAL  
SECRETARY GENERAL

BOULEVARD LÉOPOLD III  
1110 - BRUXELLES  
TÉL. 241.00.40 - 241.44.00 - 241.44.90

SG/88/520

16th August 1988

mb

Dear Prime Minister,<sup>4</sup>

*meeting record at Harp*  
I want to express my appreciation for the opportunity we had to talk during my recent visit to London, and to thank you for setting aside the time for our discussion. I am grateful for your insightful comments and advice, and will find them most useful as the Alliance moves ahead. The next year will pose both considerable challenges and opportunities, and I look forward to your counsel and support.

Yours sincerely

M. Wörner

The Rt.Hon. Margaret Thatcher, MP,  
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom,  
London.

NATO: next or sec



General

sept 79

FOR THE ATTENTION OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL

SECRETARY GENERAL  
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

SECRETARY GENERAL  
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

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1 PM 86

● SUBJECT CC MASTER



Misty Record.

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

27 July 1988

Dear Sir,

## PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF NATO

The Prime Minister received the new Secretary-General of NATO for a talk this afternoon. Dr. Woerner was accompanied by his Private Secretary. Sir Michael Alexander was also present.

Dr. Woerner said there were three main issues on which he needed the Prime Minister's support. The first was his determination to keep transatlantic relations sound. This meant agreeing a credible report by the Alliance on burden sharing in time to greet the incoming US Administration. This would need to be accompanied by a clear Alliance position on the whole nexus of security and arms control issues.

The second issue was the need for the Alliance to come forward with conventional arms control proposals so that we did not leave the initiative with the Warsaw Pact. The Prime Minister expressed surprise that there was difficulty over agreeing such proposals. The rest of the Alliance should take a firm line with the French. Dr. Woerner said that the French government agreed that the Alliance should put forward proposals but were creating difficulties over the details. Their difficulties had two aspects. They did not want the proposals to create the impression that France was moving towards re-integration of its forces with NATO; and because their conventional forces were anyway not very strong, they did not want to be constrained to put limits on them. Dr. Woerner added wryly that it had been the French who had been the first to propose conventional force reductions in President Giscard's time.

Dr. Woerner continued that the third main issue was the Comprehensive Concept, embracing also the modernisation of NATO's nuclear forces. He was convinced of the need for modernisation but this meant that the Comprehensive Concept must be ready by the time of the Foreign Ministers meeting in the spring of 1989. It might be better for that meeting to be converted into a Summit. The Prime Minister commented that there was something to be said for Heads of Government

tackling this issue. Dr. Woerner added that some members of NATO were reluctant to accept modernisation. The Prime Minister said that the problem would only get more difficult if it were postponed. If there were further developments in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union which led public opinion to discern less of a threat, then a number of NATO governments would find themselves facing increasing resistance to the need for modernisation. But the United Kingdom would remain very firm on this point. Dr. Woerner commented that he wished the Prime Minister's strong convictions were matched by the rest of NATO.

Dr. Woerner added in an aside that he was much concerned by a remark made by President Mitterrand when they had spoken in Paris recently. The President had said that the Alliance should take the line with the Soviet Union that unless they agreed to negotiate constructively on conventional arms reductions, the Alliance would go ahead with modernisation of its short range nuclear forces. This was in effect a proposal for another dual-track decision, and if made publicly would have a very detrimental effect in Germany.

Dr. Woerner urged the Prime Minister to use the British Presidency of WEU as a means of strengthening NATO. The Prime Minister asked Dr. Woerner to give her ten good reasons why strengthening the WEU would help NATO. Dr. Woerner said that he would restrict himself to three: it would help draw France into closer co-operation with NATO, it would strengthen Europe's influence within NATO, and it would guard against the day when the United States might reduce its defence contribution in Europe. The Prime Minister said that she did not accept any of these arguments. France was not brought closer to NATO by WEU but by an appreciation of the hard reality of the military balance in Europe. She continued to fear the divisive effects of WEU within the Alliance, particularly in respect of Canada. And by focusing on some of the European members of the Alliance whose contribution was already deficient, it would show up the weaknesses rather than the strengths of the European contribution. However, we would use our Presidency constructively in order to help Dr. Woerner.

I am copying this letter to Stephen Wall (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

*your diary,*  
*C. D. Powell*

C. D. POWELL

Brian Hawtin, Esq.,  
Ministry of Defence

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## PRIME MINISTER

## MEETING WITH DR. WOERNER

Dr. Woerner is to pay his official introductory visit to the United Kingdom as Secretary-General of NATO tomorrow. He will have an audience of The Queen, and meetings with you, the Defence Secretary and the Foreign Secretary.

There is only thirty minutes for the meeting. Subjects you will want to cover are:

- you will want to welcome him officially and promise him every support;
- the three main priorities on the NATO agenda are conventional arms reductions, nuclear modernisation and burden-sharing;
- NATO must get a move on in putting together its own proposals for the Conventional Stability talks. If we have to start negotiations on the basis of Warsaw Pact initiatives, we shall be at a real disadvantage. The biggest problem is French reluctance to accept bloc-to-bloc ceilings on forces and weapons. We hope Woerner will help overcome this obstacle;
- on nuclear modernisation, it looks as though the Germans will be ready to agree restructuring measures late next year, provided the famous Comprehensive Concept is agreed by then and the options for further negotiations on short-range nuclear weapons have been examined within NATO. But much could go wrong and you will want to seek Dr. Woerner's views on the prospects and how to help the Germans reach the right conclusions;
- on burden-sharing, the crucial point is to have a credible report ready to greet the incoming US Administration.

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There is one further point you might mention to him. We shall be hosting the NATO Ministerial meeting in the first half of 1989. It will be for consideration whether to make this at Head of Government level, as an opportunity to expose the new President to NATO (as with President Carter in 1977) - he will anyway be coming to the Economic Summit in Paris in July. The fact that it is NATO's 40th Anniversary next year adds weight to this.

edd

(C. D. POWELL)

26 July 1988



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

26 July 1988

CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Charles,

Call on the Prime Minister by the new NATO  
Secretary-General: 27 July

Herr Manfred Woerner, since 1 July Secretary-General of NATO, is to pay his official introductory visit to the United Kingdom on 27 July, and will call on the Prime Minister at 1600. I enclose a programme for his visit. Herr Woerner also attended with his wife the Prime Minister's dinner for Lord Carrington on 7 July.

First indications are that Herr Woerner has made a good start: sound and reliable on the key issues; his own man; ready to give an active lead; aware of the need, as the first German Secretary-General, for tact and sensitivity. What may come less easily is the ability to persuade and cajole Allies in private towards consensus. He will need that if he is to maintain the Alliance's sense of purpose and cohesion in confronting the problems which lie ahead. Our influence at NATO has inevitably been reduced by Lord Carrington's departure; it is therefore welcome that Herr Woerner has seemed ready, in first contacts with Sir Michael Alexander, to seek advice from us; and that he should have wished to make the UK one of the first stops on his introductory round. We should use his visit to encourage this attitude and to convince him that we are ready to put our weight behind his in confronting the Alliance's agenda.

On the arms control side, the problem likely to be at the top of Herr Woerner's agenda is the prospective conventional stability talks (CST). These are our next and perhaps most difficult arms control priority, on which the Russians are sure to keep us on our toes (although the Warsaw Pact Summit Communiqué was surprisingly free of propaganda). The next few days will show whether the CSCE Review Meeting and the CST mandate talks will continue into August. The zone to be covered and the way in which dual-capable systems should be referred to are the only outstanding issues (though for tactical reasons we should continue to take a tough line on the second). But we must continue to make clear to

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the Russians that the CSCE process is not just about military security: the outcome must be balanced overall, even if that means that the conventional stability talks and the parallel negotiations on Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs) cannot start until 1989. The Allies must use whatever time is available to agree the proposals we should put forward when the talks do start. To come to new negotiations empty-handed, and have to start negotiations on the basis of Warsaw Pact initiatives, would put us at a serious disadvantage. A major problem to be overcome is French reluctance to accept bloc-to-bloc equal ceilings. But there are signs that the French might eventually be prepared to modify their position.

?  
On chemical weapons, the Prime Minister might underline the importance of agreement on a CW Convention which will enhance Alliance security (though complex issues remain, making an easy or early conclusion to the negotiations unlikely). In order to maintain Western unity, and counter any Soviet attempts at wedge-driving, Allies will need to consider together whether the security implications are acceptable.

Dr Woerner will have the key role in ensuring that the various elements of NATO work on nuclear modernisation are brought to fruition at the right time. It appears that Chancellor Kohl and Dr Scholz, the German Defence Minister, envisage the Comprehensive Concept being completed by the June 1989 NAC. Providing they are satisfied with the results - and this seems to mean that SNF arms control options should have been explored internally - they would then be prepared to accept a package of nuclear restructuring measures. These would be likely to involve deployment in FRG of a tactical air to surface missile (on Tornado in our case); an upgraded extended range LANCE, F15E aircraft, and the acceptance of assignment to SACEUR of SLCMs. This modernisation would probably be coupled with a significant reduction in artillery shells.

This programme is prey to many uncertainties, not least in the US but especially in Bonn. At this stage, with no decisions imminent, we need to show the Germans that we are ready to work closely with them to enable them to take the necessary decisions in 1989. Our message for Woerner is therefore that we are prepared to

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give the Germans the time they need and to consider with them their concerns on SNF arms control. We are also prepared to give the Comprehensive Concept a fair run. But we are clear that the Alliance's SNF requirements should not be held hostage to arms control.

The other main defence issue on Woerner's mind is likely to be burden-sharing. We have had some success in persuading the Americans that the problem needs to be approached collectively, rather than bilaterally between the US and individual Allies. Defence Ministers have commissioned a NATO report on what is being done to share the burdens, and what more could be done (eg tying down a Spanish military contribution, increasing the French contribution, maximising output from defence resources). This should be ready for the December meeting of the Defence Planning Committee (DPC); and will be designed to help the US Administration resist Congressional pressures either to reduce the US contribution in Europe or to impose punitive measures, eg in the defence trade field, against the Europeans. The Prime Minister might emphasize our readiness to play our part in bringing the NATO Report to a creditable conclusion. She might also remind Woerner of our efforts to encourage those Allies who spend less than the average on defence to increase their contribution: the Secretary-General has an important role here too.

On France, the Prime Minister might brief Woerner on the proposals she made to President Mitterrand for increased practical bilateral cooperation: increased activity by French forces in support of NORTHAG; more exercising of reinforcement routes through France for British Forces Germany (BFG); more joint maritime activity. These proposals are designed to add to rather than subtract from existing collective defence efforts. The new French Defence Minister, M Chevènement, and his CDS, General Schmitt, have recently given encouraging indications to Mr Younger and Admiral Fieldhouse of a willingness to take the proposals forward. Staff are following up.

The Prime Minister might ask Woerner for his thinking on how to mark NATO's Fortieth Anniversary next year. We intend to play our part when we host the Spring NAC Ministerial in June. We have at the back of our minds the possibility (which the Prime Minister may wish

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to explore when she visits Washington in November) of raising the level of the meeting to Heads of Government in order to introduce the new US President to NATO; just as President Carter was introduced in 1977 at the last North Atlantic Council meeting held in London. If this were favoured, we might need to look again at timing, either to bring together the dates of the Council meeting and the Summit Seven, who also meet in June, so that one meeting immediately follows the other, or to separate the two by several months: the new President is unlikely to be able to make two visits to Europe in quick succession.

UKDEL NATO understand that Woerner may wish to ask the Prime Minister about plans for her visit to Poland in October, and about the prospects for a further visit to the UK by Gorbachev. He may also ask about the UK Defence Programme; I attach a note prepared by the Ministry of Defence.

I am sending copies of this letter to Brain Hawtin (MOD) and to Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

*long eyes*  
*L Parker*

(L Parker)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street

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PROGRAMME FOR INTRODUCTORY VISIT OF HERR MANFRED WOERNER,  
NEW NATO SECRETARY-GENERAL TO UK: 27 JULY 1988

- 1005 Arrive Heathrow Airport;
- 1115 Call on Foreign Secretary
- 1230 Audience of Her Majesty The Queen
- 1300 for Lunch hosted by Mrs Lynda Chalker MP,  
1315 FCO Minister of State
- 1500 Call on Defence Secretary
- 1600 Call on Prime Minister
- 1825 Depart from Heathrow Airport

## UK DEFENCE BUDGET

LINES TO TAKE

- 1988-89 Defence Budget is £19.2 Billion. In real terms this is some 6% lower (using a GDP deflator) than the 1985-86 peak, but still remains almost 20% higher in real terms than the 1978-79 level.
- On current forecasts of GDP inflation, the Defence Budget will benefit from a broadly level provision in real terms for the remainder of the current Public Expenditure Survey planning period, that is, until 1990-91.
- Although the proportion of GDP devoted to defence is set to decline, UK's contribution to NATO will remain amongst the most valuable.
- Speculation about a Defence Review unfounded. The benefits of the real growth, together with improvements in efficiency and the transfer of resources from support to front line functions, mean that we shall maintain all our main defence roles.
- Nevertheless difficult choices will have to be made between relative priorities in forward plans, as part of normal planning process. Examples include decisions on Chieftain replacement and on attrition buys of aircraft.

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BACKGROUND NOTE

During the period of the Government's commitment to the NATO target of 3% per annum real growth, the Defence Budget grew in real terms by over 26% using a GDP deflator (or almost 20% using a defence specific deflator). Since the ending of that commitment, in 1985-86, the budget has declined by almost 6% (on GDP, or over 7.5% on defence specific) from its 1985-86 peak to the provision for 1988-89. This is a respectable record and Herr Woerner, as the former German Defence Minister (FRG real growth between 1979 and 1987 was 5%) is not well placed to criticise.

However, at present funding levels - which are broadly level in real terms across the Survey period - the Services would be unable to maintain the UK's present defence policies and commitments. There would be implications for our force declarations to NATO and our response to NATO Force Goals at a time of growing concern over burden-sharing.

The problem is being addressed in the context of the 1988 Public Expenditure Survey, and it would not be appropriate to comment to Herr Woerner on the state of negotiations, beyond acknowledging that spending plans are under consideration as part of the normal planning process. The regular force planning information provided to NATO indicates only marginal reductions in certain areas but a PES outcome which implied any significant change to our defence position would of course need to be made known to NATO at an early date.

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NOTE FOR THE RECORD OF THE DEFENCE SECRETARY'S MEETING  
WITH LORD CARRINGTON, MONTEREY, ON 3RD NOVEMBER 1987 AT 0845AM

Mr Younger had a 40 minute bilateral with Lord Carrington just before the first session of the NPG. CDS, Mr Alexander, Mr Nicholls, the Deputy Secretary General and members of the Secretary General's Private Office were present. The major item of discussion was Lord Carrington's concern at opposition to ratification of an INF treaty; the repercussions of non-ratification in Europe; and the need for Europeans to make clear in the United States their support for a treaty.

INF

2. Lord Carrington said that he was worried that the Senate might not ratify an INF treaty. Twenty Republican Senators were prepared to vote against ratification. There would be tremendous problems in the Alliance if the treaty was not ratified; the Europeans would insist that the withdrawals should proceed notwithstanding. It was important for the Europeans to make clear to the United States and particularly to the Senate that Europe approved of an INF agreement. Haig was saying that Kohl was against, and Mrs Thatcher sceptical. The message had simply not been registered in the United States that the Europeans were solidly in favour of an agreement. Sir Geoffrey Howe and Mr Younger and above all the Prime Minister should make this message as clear as possible. Mr Younger said that he would have opportunities to make the point in speeches later in the week in Los Angeles and Washington. He would also be talking to Senators and members of the House. The Prime Minister had made her support for the US position on INF very clear.

3. Mr Younger said that the British Government favoured a moratorium on deployments after signature. He had put this idea privately and informally to WEU defence Ministers, with the suggestion that there should be a time limit on the moratorium. WEU Ministers had thought it a good approach. He had not yet spoken to Mr Weinberger about it. Lord Carrington said that Mr Weinberger was continuing to advocate the continuation of deployments after signature and before ratification a damaging line to take since the Europeans would never accept it. Nor was it the formal view of the United States Government.

NATO Summit

4. Lord Carrington said that some in the United States were continuing to talk about a Summit shortly after treaty signature, in December or perhaps January. Mr Alexander emphasised that the Prime Minister would not for her part agree to this. If there were to be a Summit it should in her view be later and not linked directly



with the signature of the INF Treaty. Mr Younger endorsed this. Lord Carrington, agreeing, encouraged us to tell the United States this. An INF-related Summit would open up the START issue and this in turn would open up divisions on the SDI.

#### NFR 90

5. In answer to an enquiry from Lord Carrington, Mr Younger said that it was not his intention to pull out of the project, but we were not happy with the mismatch between the ship and weapon systems timescales, which threatened to lead to a procurement disaster; but we had now more or less secured agreement with our partners to tackle the difficulty by means of stated conditions attached to entry into project definition. Treasury objections, however, still had to be overcome.

#### Defence Budget

6. Mr Younger alluded to the Chancellor's Autumn Statement on Public Expenditure, made at about the same time as the meeting was taking place. The settlement on defence achieved a broadly level run in the planning period, some 2% more than in the corresponding years in the previous year's settlement. Lord Carrington welcomed this; it was better news than the Alliance had expected. What projects would now be reprieved? Mr Younger mentioned that he would probably shortly be announcing ~~the~~ additional AWACS purchase. Lord Carrington said that he gathered there was an unresolved difficulty over the back-payment of R&D levy now that the United Kingdom was joining the NATO E3A AWACS force. Mr Younger said that there was no outstanding difficulty on this so far as our negotiations direct with Boeing were concerned.

#### Spain

7. Lord Carrington said that Mr Weinberger was furious with the Spanish over the bases issue. There was not much the rest of NATO could do except help to calm both parties down. The Spanish plan for declaring forces to NATO was a positive one. He foresaw a major row over Gibraltar. CDS wondered whether the Spanish declaration of forces was all that helpful. It was very much directed to the defence of Spain itself. Land forces were not to be deployed outside Spain.

#### Secretary-General

8. Lord Carrington said that the Norwegians were now expecting Mr Vandebroek to be put forward. But there was no way in which NATO could be seen to snub the German candidate however well qualified Mr Vandebroek might be. The sooner the United States came into the open in supporting Dr Woerner's candidature, the better. He saw German SDP machinations behind the prevarication of the Norwegians.



The Gulf

9. Lord Carrington emphasised the "terrific impact" of the European deployment of naval forces to the Gulf. At last the Europeans were seen to be actively involved out of area. Mr Younger explained that the way in which a general WEU imprimatur had been given to the co-ordination of minesweeping was the result of a discussion he had had with M. Giraud in early October.

J. F. Howe

3rd November 1987

(J F HOWE)  
PS/S of S

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NOTE FOR THE RECORD

The Prime Minister saw Lord Carrington for a private talk at Chequers on Sunday, 13 September.

Lord Carrington said that he wanted to warn the Prime Minister about a number of problems in the field of arms control.

It was clear to him that some of the US negotiators in Geneva, dealing with the INF negotiations, felt that they were under political pressure from the White House to rush through the detail on verification, phasing of reductions and other outstanding issues. Given that even a misplaced comma could give rise to future disputes over interpretation, this was very undesirable. The Prime Minister agreed that the devil was in the detail. We would speak to the Americans to remind them that it was important to get an agreement right than to get it quickly. But the President was obviously set on an early Summit.

Lord Carrington said that the new SACEUR had recently returned to Washington to brief the President, the Vice-President and other senior White House officials on the scenario for conducting a battle in Europe in the absence of INF weapons. He had made clear that, at a certain point, he would have to call for the use of nuclear weapons. This had evoked a "very lukewarm" response from the President and the Vice-President. Lord Carrington drew the conclusion that the President's dream of a world without nuclear weapons was influencing his judgement about their current role in the West's defence. It was particularly worrying that Vice-President Bush seemed to share this view. (Lord Carrington also commented that SACEUR had not been very adroit in failing to distinguish between the role of nuclear weapons in preventing war and their actual use in a conflict.)

The Prime Minister shared Lord Carrington's concern, while noting that the President did seem to have firmly in mind the Camp David points about priorities for arms control. These gave him a bearing by which to steer for the remainder of his term. Vice-President Bush's views were no doubt influenced by what he thought would be needed to get elected. She would take the opportunity of his visit at the end of the month to go over the ground with him on the vital role of nuclear weapons in the West's defence.

Lord Carrington said that there were ample signs that, once an INF agreement was concluded, the Germans would begin to press for immediate Alliance consideration of the opening of negotiations on short-range nuclear missiles (SNF). This would give the Soviet Union an obvious opening to propose a further zero option, which would be a major step towards the denuclearisation of Europe. The Prime Minister said that on no account would she consent to this, even if it meant a major row with the Germans. She would consider adding a passage on this point to her speech on East/West relations at the IDU Conference in Berlin. Lord Carrington welcomed the Prime Minister's firm rejection of the idea of early negotiations on SNF, but counselled against too sharp an attack on the German position at this stage, which might only precipitate a major split in NATO.

The Prime Minister raised with Lord Carrington his future as Secretary-State of NATO. She urged him strongly to carry on for a further two years from 1988. Lord Carrington made clear that, on personal grounds, he was not prepared to consider this. It was agreed that Dr. Woerner would probably be the best candidate to succeed him.

Lord Carrington expected the US Congress to revert this autumn to the question of reducing US conventional forces in Europe. This would severely embarrass NATO's position in discussions with the Russians on conventional force reductions.

Lord Carrington said that President Reagan planned to meet NATO Heads of Government in Brussels before any summit with Mr. Gorbachev. The Prime Minister said that she still had it in mind to pay a visit to NATO Headquarters. It might be useful to do so before such a Heads of Government meeting.

CDP

CDP

14 September, 1987.

JD3BCG

NATO file.

FROM JAMES LEE AT RADIO SERVICES, COI.

TRANSCRIPT OF PRESS CONFERENCE BY LORD CARRINGTON AND THE SECRETARY  
OF STATE FOR DEFENCE, MR. GEORGE YOUNGER, AND MR. WEINBERGER  
GLENEAGLES, ON WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 22, 1986.

LORD CARRINGTON:

I am not going to make a long opening statement, because I have found on occasions that they do not serve a very useful purpose either for you or for me.

First of all, could I put on record the thanks of everybody who has been present at this Conference to Mr. Younger and to the British Government for their hospitality and for the really excellent arrangements for this meeting. I do not think, as a matter of fact, I managed to set foot out of the front door, let alone out of the grounds, and if I may say so it is an effective way of squeezing a lot of work out of people in a very short time, to bring them here.

On the substance of the meeting, you will have seen the communique. We did not develop schizophrenia, but it is fair to say that the meeting fell into two broad parts: first of all, we received a very helpful briefing from Secretary Weinberger on the negotiations at Reykjavic, and we had a useful discussion on the prospects for further progress.

Radical measures of nuclear disarmament have been very much a part of the allied position for some time now. Reykjavic confirmed that there is now somebody on the other side who is listening and there is no doubt that we are determined to follow up the possibilities for major progress along the lines that we have been

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advocating, but of course, we are not there yet, and we have to continue not only determined efforts at the negotiating table, but equally determined efforts to ensure that our defences remain adequate and our deterrent remains credible - and that is what the second part of the meeting was really all about, and we were able to deal effectively and I think constructively with the issues which were put before us.

Perhaps I might just ask Mr. Younger whether he has anything, as the host to us all, that he would like to add to any of that.

MR. YOUNGER:

Thank you very much, Secretary-General. Just to say that I am, of course, very pleased at the general expressions of satisfaction of the delegates with the arrangements here at Gleneagles and it reflects a tremendous lot of credit on the staff for the very hard work they have been doing for a long time for this, and I am grateful for that.

From the British Government's point of view, this has been an extremely satisfactory NATO Defence Ministers Meeting, because it has reaffirmed the absolutely clear solidarity of the alliance after Reykjavic and it has given a very good opportunity for us all to exchange viewpoints upon those events and the way ahead through Geneva from now on, so it has been a very satisfactory meeting from the British Government's point of view.

MR. WEINBERGER:

I would certainly share the sentiments about the beauty and wonder of all of the surroundings and the arrangements. They could not have been better and we are most grateful for them.

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As far as the meeting is concerned, I regard it as an extremely successful NATO meeting, with a very high degree of unity, in fact, one of the least contentious of any of the meetings that I have had the privilege of attending, and obviously, we were delighted with the strong endorsement of the President's programme and with our efforts to secure a reduction of armaments as well as tensions between the super-powers, and certainly have endorsed very strongly all of the matters in the communique, so we thought it was a very strong and very helpful session in every way; one that demonstrates the continuing strength of NATO, which is a very vital thing to have with us.

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(END OF OPENING STATEMENTS. QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS TO FOLLOW):

GEOFFREY ARCHER (ITN):

In paragraph 10 of the communique, what are the appropriate provisions concerning constraints on the shorter-range INF systems that are referred to?

If there is, for example, an agreement to eliminate the longer-range systems from Europe, are you saying that there must be a simultaneous agreement to limit the shorter-range systems, or are you simply saying that there must be an agreement to talk about those systems at a later date?

MR. WEINBERGER:

I would say that what we are talking about is very simply this: that it is absolutely vital to maintain deterrents across the whole spectrum of combat and conflict and that it is necessary to maintain credible deterrent equivalent capability, so that the enemy will never feel that they can safely attack with any form of weapon systems, so all kinds of arrangements and all kinds of discussions and all kinds of agreements necessarily must have that as the base, and that would mean that if we are able to take out successfully with thorough verification one set of systems, we have to have in mind as to whether or not there is an equivalent deterrent balance being maintained elsewhere, and that is what I assume the word 'appropriate' means.

JOHN DICKIE (DAILY MAIL):

Lord Carrington, may I ask your views and those of your two colleagues as to whether you believe the escalation of the diplomatic tit-for-tat will make it more difficult to reach the agreements you are seeking with the Soviet Union on arms control?

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LORD CARRINGTON:

*Speaking for myself, I think that the arms control agreements are so important to both parties, to both blocs, both to the Soviet Union and to the United States, that I am quite sure, insofar as the United States and NATO are concerned, that it will make no difference. We shall go on doing what we can.*

MR. WEINBERGER:

*We do not look at it as tit-for-tat. We look at it as an appropriate response for an unjustified expulsion and we also agree that it will be kept, to the extent the Soviets will allow it to be kept, on a totally separate plane and reflect simply the necessary and proper response to the Soviet actions.*

*It has also been vital for a long time that we get the representation in both the consulates at Leningrad and San Francisco and the embassies in Washington and Moscow on an equal basis. It has been unequal for a very long time, and this has afforded the Soviets very much greater opportunity for espionage and those are things that we are getting extremely concerned about.*

*But those actions should have no bearing upon the desirability, the necessity and the importance of arms reduction in a thoroughly verifiable set of agreements.*

DAVID FAIRHALL (THE GUARDIAN):

*Could I ask a question referring to paragraph 4 of the communique?*

*The last sentence says: 'We strongly support the United States exploration of space and defence systems, as is permitted by the ABM Treaty.'*



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I wonder if I could ask Lord Carrington to speak on behalf of all the allies in saying whether NATO regards development and testing work outside the laboratory as being currently permitted by the ABM Treaty or whether it will require some sort of re-interpretation or revision to permit that?

LORD CARRINGTON:

I cannot speak for everybody and how they interpret it. You must ask them how they interpret those words. Those words to me are fairly clear and certainly I interpret what is permitted under the ABM Treaty as that which has been defined by the United States Government.

DAVID FAIRHALL:

Could I ask as a supplementary in that case Mr. Weinberger to say what interpretation the United States Government currently puts on it?

MR. WEINBERGER:

We put the interpretation on it that the research programme, the testing and development associated therewith, is permitted by the ABM Treaty and that that phrase describes the fact that our programme that we are doing is permitted by the ABM Treaty and that obviously involves, clearly, testing outside of laboratories. You have to test to find out whether what you are doing is effective or not, and what we want is an effective deployed system, and we are doing all of the research and all of the work necessary to secure that, and obviously, you have to test the various stages of your research programme to determine the effectiveness of particular

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items of research, particular activities, and the testing that we talk about is the testing that is necessary to complement, supplement or be part of an effective research programme.

PETER HITCHINS (DAILY EXPRESS):

By the time you next meet here it is at least possible that Britain will have a Labour Government.

I wonder if I could ask Lord Carrington if he or the Ministers have been at all worried by the prospect of working with a government with such defence policies as those espoused by the Labour Party?

LORD CARRINGTON:

The Secretary-General of NATO is always worried about the prospects of working with any government, I can tell you, but I have made very clear in speeches long before the Blackpool Conference at which the Labour Party decided on their defence policy, the anxieties that I had about countries changing defence policies without proper consultation with NATO, and that goes not just for Britain; it goes for any other country which is going to make any radical departure from the agreed strategy of NATO to which it has hitherto subscribed.

QUESTION (RAI):

Secretary-General, would it be safe for you to enlarge a little, maybe expand a little, on the general relationship between the two parts of the medium - Reykjavic and adequate defence?

Would it be completely out of question to use the word 'correction'?

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LORD CARRINGTON:

*In what sense?*

QUESTION (SAME MAN):

*Necessity of adequate defences in relation with the Reykjavic issues.*

LORD CARRINGTON:

*I am afraid I am being rather ..... about your question. I wonder if I could just explain what I meant in my original remarks. Perhaps that would clear it up.*

*What I was saying was that there might be those who felt that in the context of Reykjavic we spent our entire time discussing arms control proposals, but of course, there was another side to the meeting, which is we have not reached any agreement on arms control proposals so far, and the policy of the alliance has always been to keep up adequate defences and maintain adequate deterrents until such time as you reach those agreements, and some of the meeting was spent on discussing arms control proposals in Reykjavic; the other half of the meeting was spent in discussing the maintenance of the deterrence and the importance for it.*

MR. WEINBERGER:

*I wonder if I might comment just briefly on that. It would be hard for me to construct any form of the word 'correction' which was used in the question out of a sentence that says 'We fully endorse the President's programme presented in Iceland and stressed that this programme provides the opportunity for historic progress.'*

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QUESTION (TURKEY):

I would like to ask a question on paragraph 9. Have any of the members of NATO voiced opposition to the ... Report on the Implementation of the Montebello Decision? If so, what will be the ways of overcoming these objections?

LORD CARRINGTON:

What has happened so far on the Montebello Decision has been that the Supreme Allied Commander, General Rogers, has made his preliminary plans about how to deal with the reorganisation necessary with Montebello, and he has been round to a number of countries.

One or two countries have not yet agreed to his proposals and have made some objections to some of the proposals that he has made. This is now in a state of negotiation between those countries and the Supreme Allied Commander and he will be reporting in Stavanger in the Spring when we have the next meeting of the NPG.

QUESTION (SCOTTISH TELEVISION):

Mr. Weinberger, given the communique, how would you look forward to working with a future Labour Government committed to unilateral disarmament and the removal of all the American nuclear bases in Britain?

MR. WEINBERGER:

I think I have said everything I care to say on that subject. I was as explicit as I could be, without interfering in the internal affairs of a government, and I think I just refer you back to the statements made in that previous interview.

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QUESTION (SAME MAN):

....work with a British Government run by a Labour Administration?

MR. WEINBERGER:

The interview was quite clear and I would like not to have to get into any revisionism of it. I would just stand on it and refer you back to it. I am sure we could get a transcript for you.

QUESTION:

Mr. Weinberger, going back to the full endorsement of the alliance to the President's programme, would that mean it is also a full endorsement to the total removal of strategic nuclear forces?

MR. WEINBERGER:

I think the sentence speaks for itself. It is fully satisfactory as far as we are concerned. We regard it with great pleasure that the activities, actions, programmes of the President and so on received such a full and unanimous endorsement.

MICHAEL EDMONDS (THE TIMES):

There was some considerable concern expressed yesterday. Mr. Younger himself suggested that if the ballistic missiles were reduced by more than 40% or 50%, then there would have to be some comparable cut in conventional and chemical forces.

Do you agree, Mr. Weinberger, that there should be a comparable reduction in conventional forces?

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MR. WEINBERGER:

I have already said that it seems to be essential that we bear in mind that the way we keep the peace is by having a credible deterrent against any possible threat that could be exercised by the Soviets and it is important that we do that and if we are able to get their agreement to reduce substantially nuclear weapons, then obviously we have to look at the conventional balance and look at whether we have a credible deterrent in other areas, and Mr. Younger said that it would be ideal if we can get a conventional balance with a credible deterrent at much lower levels than we have now by verifiable agreements to make substantial reductions thereto.

What we need to end up with at all times is a credible deterrent and the equations of deterrence have to be calculated and cast all the time and each changing situation requires a new look to make sure that you still have that deterrent maintained, and you certainly would want to try to get the kind of reductions in conventional down to parity on both sides but again, thoroughly verifiable, which has to be the theme that runs through every agreement, and it is mentioned in the communique in a very specific, important way. Then you would certainly try to make your reductions, get your deterrent equation balanced at low level.

MOLLY MOORE (WASHINGTON POST):

Could any of you please expand on the brief reference to Greece's views as noted in number 12 and do they specifically refer to SDI?

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LORD CARRINGTON:

That is the standard thing. I mean, that comes in every communique. It should not come as a surprise to anybody I do not think. The Danish position has been like that for some time.

QUESTION (ABC NEWS):

My question is addressed to Secretary Weinberger.

As I understand it, there was certain confusion - not on the part of the United States but on the part of others who may have been in attendance at this meeting - regarding the specifics of the American position at Reykjavic which you briefed your colleagues on and just to clarify matters for the record, was it the position of the United States at Reykjavic that your Government - my Government - favours a total ban on ballistic missiles after a period of ten years, and is that still the position of the United States that it intends to work for at Geneva?

MR. WEINBERGER:

I have no indication of any change in the United States positions that were presented in Iceland, and I think that there did not seem to be any confusion here. The Ministers were very interested in the briefing and the results you see before you in the communique, but I did not find any confusion, nor am I aware of any change at all in the policy of the United States Government. I hope to get home some time late this afternoon and I will find out if there was anything.

QUESTION:

Is that in fact the position of the United States?

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MR. WEINBERGER:

*That is my understanding, yes.*

HAROLD BRIERLEY (BBC WORLD SERVICE):

*On paragraph 10 again, the phrase 'appropriate provisions' is vague alongside the phrase 'accompanied by'.*

*Can you say whether the United States is willing that all medium-range missiles in Europe - the so-called zero-zero option - should go ahead before there is a reduction in the short-range nuclear missiles the Soviet Union has outnumbering NATO's by 9 to 1, or does the phrase 'accompanied by' mean that it could come later and if you get rid of the medium-range missiles, does that not leave NATO at the mercy of Soviet attack by shorter-range nuclear missiles, which is a concern that has been expressed by NATO's military commanders?*

LORD CARRINGTON:

*It seems to me that at this meeting everybody - not just the Europeans, but the United States and Canada - were very much aware of the problem which the SRNF, the short-range missiles, would cause to the alliance in a zero-zero option, and if you recollect, there was a considerable deployment by the Soviet Union of short-range missiles forward into Eastern Europe as a result of the deployment of the Cruise and Pershing missiles, because the Soviet Union said that these were not in any way to be equated with the SS20s.*

*So, in logic, one of the things that we should ask the Soviet Union to do, and should press them to do, is to remove those missiles which they brought up to Eastern Europe because of the deployment of Cruise and Pershing missiles.*



-14-

If they were to do that, that would obviously reduce the disparity between what NATO has and what the Warsaw Pact has in short-range missiles.

At the same time, as I understand it, what the United States are doing is to say that before any agreement was entered into on the INF missiles there would have to be a freeze - at which particular period of time that freeze would operate from I do not know - but there would have to be a freeze. If it operated from 1982 (sic) then the missiles would be approximately level on each side. If it was at a later date, the United States would leave itself the right, if it wished, to match the numbers of SRINFs to those of the Warsaw Pact.

In addition to that, there would of course be negotiations on the removal and destruction of these missiles to bring them down to a level of nought, in the same way that the INF were brought down to a level of nought. And one of the things that came out of this meeting on which all of us were agreed was that all this has to be thought of in the context of a negotiation on conventional arms, because the disparity between the capacity of the Warsaw Pact and NATO is very striking, and therefore, that would be a very necessary negotiation if we are to achieve all these things.

MR. WEINBERGER:

I would just say, if I might, that the word 'appropriate' in the whole context is simply that we never would want and never could feel we fulfilled our responsibilities if we allowed any particular area of deterrence to be neglected, in the sense that we would not feel we had completed any job if we took out one set of weapons but left the disparity without a counter-balancing deterrent capability to deal with whatever it left.

-15-

We want to get this deterrence at the lowest possible level for all weapon systems. We want the timing of any withdrawal to be appropriately adhered to - other withdrawals, other reductions - so that you end up at all times with a deterrent capability. You are never without a deterrent capability across the whole spectrum.

QUESTION:

May I ask Mr. Younger whether that is different from the British view, which seems to be that you are willing to reach out for the price of getting rid of all medium range weapons without coupling to negotiations to reduce the short-range missiles of the Soviet Union and conventional forces, which you seemed to say to us yesterday. Let us go ahead without coupling it with any other kind of negotiations, which seems to be different from what Mr. Weinberger is saying.

MR. YOUNGER:

I think we are talking partly about short-range and partly about intermediate here, but I entirely subscribe to what Secretary Weinberger has said, which is that all these negotiations have to take into account the widest spread of deterrence in all weapon systems and that applies to all of them. If we can get an agreement on INF alone, well that is fine.

QUESTION:

Mr. Younger can and does Great Britain agree to the removal of the US strategic forces within ten years?

subject CC master

SECRET



CONNECTED 3 V 57510  
issued to 20/10

10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

19 October 1986

**PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH LORD CARRINGTON**

The Prime Minister saw Lord Carrington at Chequers yesterday to discuss the outcome of the Reykjavik meeting. They agreed that the right approach was to welcome the progress which had been made at Reykjavik and press for it to be translated into specific agreements in the first instance, on INF. The linkage sought by the Soviet Union between progress on INF and restrictions on the SDI should be rejected. The reference to the goal of eliminating ballistic missiles and/or nuclear weapons should be heavily qualified by references to the crucial deterrent role of nuclear weapons so long as the imbalance of conventional forces remained heavily in the Soviet Union's favour.

Lord Carrington said that there was bound to be a general discussion of the outcome of Reykjavik at the NPG meeting starting on 20 October. He hoped that this could be managed so as to avoid criticism of the United States by some NATO countries for having made agreement impossible by refusing to accept constraints on the SDI. He would work for a detailed study of the various proposals discussed at Reykjavik within NATO at meetings attended by high level experts from capitals. There might be some resistance on the United States part to this. When he had mentioned it to the United States Ambassador to NATO, Abshire had suggested that it would be better to give time for the United States administration to get its own act together. He believed nonetheless that such study by NATO offered the best way forward.

Lord Carrington made a strong plea for the United Kingdom to support a reasonable compromise on the forum for discussion of conventional arms control, which would be acceptable to both the United States and France. He saw this as being that negotiations would take place under the aegis of the CSCE but participation in them limited to members of the two blocks. The final result will be reported back to the wider CSCE forum though the latter would have no power to vary it.

SECRET

SECRET

2

I should be grateful if the Ministry of Defence Resident Clerk could bring this letter to the attention of the Defence Secretary before the NPG meeting.

I am copying this letter to John Howe (Ministry of Defence) and Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

(CHARLES POWELL)

C. R. Budd, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

MASTER  
'cc Subject

SECRET



0710 411-1  
JAZ ↑ AEP

CEP  
CDP

Subject filed on  
NATO: Visits of  
Secretary - General:  
Sept. 1979

10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

19 October 1986

From the Private Secretary

GA ✓ Done 20.10  
Have some  
corrected version  
CD

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The Prime Minister saw Lord Carrington at Chequers yesterday to discuss the outcome of the Reykjavik meeting. They agreed that the right approach was to welcome the progress which had been made at Reykjavik and press for it to be translated into specific agreements in the first instance, on INF. The linkage sought by the Soviet Union between progress on INF and restrictions on the SDI should be rejected. The reference to the goal of eliminating ballistic missiles and/or nuclear weapons should be heavily qualified by references to the crucial deterrent role of nuclear weapons so long as the imbalance of conventional forces remained heavily in the Soviet Union's favour.

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SECRET

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I am copying this letter to John Howe (Ministry of Defence) and Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

(CHARLES POWELL)

C. R. Budd, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

file ✓

PRIME MINISTER

cc Mr Addison

LORD CARRINGTON

In have arranged with Lord Carrington that he will come across to Chequers at about 1000/1015 a.m. on Sunday for coffee. He can only manage about half an hour or so since his garden is open to the public and needs to be back at 1100 to sell tickets!

Charles Powell

20 June 1986



SECRET

BURNING BUSH

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Prime Minister

You will wish to discuss this with the Foreign Secretary

29 April 1986

Dear Charles,

Prime Minister's Meeting with the Secretary General of NATO

His reaction is like yours. The action is:  
(i) a reference in the summit communiqué to consultation among the seven  
(ii) continued strengthened meetings of the summit seven Foreign Ministers  
(iii) continued Quadripartite Meetings.  
CDD 29/6

The Foreign Secretary has seen your letter of 26 April about the Prime Minister's talk with Lord Carrington at Chequers, in which you asked particularly for advice on whether ideas for strengthening the political role of the Summit Seven could and should be pursued at the forthcoming meeting in Tokyo.

The general question of managing US/European differences over out-of-area issues has, of course, been much in the Foreign Secretary's mind recently. There are two broad points he believes we should not lose sight of:

- the underlying problem has been with us for many years now, with a particularly acute bout since the United States began to emerge from its phase of anti-interventionism following Vietnam. 1979/80 was a specially tricky time, with the series of disputes over Iran, Afghanistan and Poland. But Western solidarity survived and is arguably better now on the central East-West issues than at any time in the past decade. This is not an argument for not taking the present problem seriously, but it does argue for keeping it in proportion and not abandoning without good reason methods that have so far served us well; - but this hasn't
- experience also shows that Allied solidarity is not best served by focusing multilateral (or public) attention on the broadly defined question of "West-West relations", or by putting up front the question of mechanisms (which triggers so many sensitivities in itself). This was the lesson for Kissinger's year of Europe, to which the Prime Minister referred in her talk with Lord Carrington. It is better to start by tackling the specific issues and looking for the maximum of common view and action that can be obtained. Practical achievement of this kind provides the surest foundation, both for getting all concerned to recognise the value of Western consultation as a process (in the Seven or elsewhere) and for preparing to deal more economically with other disputes in future.

/In the

SECRET

BURNING BUSH





In the light of this, the Foreign Secretary shares the Prime Minister's immediate misgivings over any explicit proposal for any further "institutionalisation" of the Summit Seven and would endorse all the points she made to Lord Carrington. The foreign policy underpinning for Summits has, in fact, been strengthened in the last couple of years: not least because of the Foreign Secretary's wish to move towards a foreign policy equivalent of the G.5, the Summit Seven Foreign Ministers have begun to meet regularly each autumn in the margins of the UNGA to review political subjects and the work of experts' groups, and the political agenda and its contents are prepared in some detail before each Summit in meetings of the Seven Political Directors and Personal Representatives. This has been accepted by the French - albeit with some reticence - because it does not purport to take decisions and there is an accepted convention that it does not represent "institutionalisation". The Foreign Secretary does not believe it would be useful to try to go any further down this road. Were we to try to make the annual Summit meeting a more formal occasion for foreign policy discussion and decision-taking, the underpinning (preparation, record-taking, recording of conclusions, follow-up) would need to be further strengthened: leading logically either to a codification of the Chair's duties in the political field, or to some kind of secretariat. The French would see this as a major step in the direction of establishing a "super alliance" of the industrialised countries, under American tutelage. And that is something to which any French Government remains resolutely opposed. There would be a risk that to float such an idea, even bilaterally, during the Summit would merely add a fresh contentious theme to those facing us already and make progress on substance much harder to achieve.

The Foreign Secretary's preference would therefore be to focus our energies at the Summit in the first place on getting the right substantive outcome on Terrorism, the handling of Libya generally, and the management of East-West relations. Once we have agreed on these points, that would be the time to draw attention to the usefulness of the forum for the management of difficult issues among close partners and to put on record a general commitment to make full use of it in the future. The proposed Tokyo Political Declaration already contains (in paragraph 2) a reference to the contribution that "close partnership of Japan, North America and Europe" can make to mastering the world's problems. It would be easy in drafting terms - given the right political atmosphere - to extend this into a commitment to apply that partnership in

/political



SECRET

BURNING BUSH

①  
②  
political as well as economic fields in future. Were this agreed, the practical next steps would be to consider making this autumn's meeting of the Seven Foreign Ministers a more substantial "review" meeting on the political side: and to discuss with the next Summit Presidency (Italy) the more intensive preparations that might be in order for next year's meeting at Rome.

③  
The Prime Minister also mentioned the US/UK/France/FRG Quadripartite consultations on political affairs. Meetings in this format have continued to take place at roughly monthly intervals at Political Director level, and three times a year (in the margins of the two NATO Ministerial meetings and UNGA) at Foreign Minister level. The Foreign Secretary regards these as practically the most useful response to the point that was understandably worrying Lord Carrington. Unfortunately, the most recent Foreign Ministers' meetings have been curtailed in time and scope by scheduling problems within the timetable for the wider Ministerial meetings concerned. We hope to put this right at the next NATO Ministerial meeting at Halifax, Nova Scotia, where a whole evening has been set aside on 28 May for the Four Ministers' discussion and there will be a substantive meeting of the Four Political Directors to prepare it.

Meanwhile, the latest Quadripartite meetings at Political Director level have been genuinely helpful in harmonizing US/European views and managing disputes on a number of East-West issues (including CSCE and SDI). They have also touched on - though not yet dealt in detail with - the wider question of the present tensions in US-European relations. It would be timely for the Four Ministers in Halifax to discuss this in the light of recent experience with Libya and Terrorism. The fact that Mr Shultz will be in the Chair is auspicious: and if the Prime Minister agrees, the Foreign Secretary will talk to him about an appropriate agenda and report back on his experiences of the meeting. (I might add that all our records of Quadripartite discussions are passed, under a special and strictly secret arrangement, to Lord Carrington by the UK Delegation at NATO).

There will, of course, be an opportunity to return to the Summit aspects of all this at the Prime Minister's briefing meeting for Tokyo later in the week. I am copying this letter, like yours, to Sir Robert Armstrong.

Yours ever,  
Colin Budd


(C R Budd)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
PS/10 Downing Street

SECRET

BURNING BUSH

NATO: Views of Sec. Gen. Sep 79



SUBJECT  
cc Master



BRZAKG  
bc PC

BM

10 DOWNING STREET

26 April 1986

From the Private Secretary

Dear Tony.

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF NATO

The Prime Minister had a talk with Lord Carrington at Chequers this morning at his request.

Lord Carrington said that he was very concerned at the effect on NATO of the United States action against Libya. Feelings were running high on both sides of the Atlantic. Indeed he would say that European-American relations were worse than he could ever remember them. If Senator Nunn were to move his amendment to reduce American troops in Europe now, it would go through Congress without difficulty. The basic problem was that the United States felt that Europe was feeble and parochial, and not interested in developments outside the NATO area. He had been casting around for ways to mitigate the problem. What was needed was a forum in which the main European countries and the United States could discuss wider world problems. He did not think that any existing institutions would serve the purpose. Both the European Community and NATO were so exclusively preoccupied with events in their own areas. Moreover, it was important to bring in Japan as well. He had reached the conclusion that the one body which could talk about out-of-area problems was the Economic Summit Seven. Perhaps the moment had come to institutionalise this so that foreign ministers and political directors could meet more frequently. He recognised that France had in the past been opposed to any such institutionalisation of the Economic Summit Seven. But this might be different with the change of government and in the new situation following the United States action against Libya. After all, France had as strong an interest as anyone in maintaining the United States presence in Europe. Lord Carrington indicated that he had mentioned his idea informally to Secretary Shultz and to Ambassador Nitze.

The Prime Minister said that she agreed with much of Lord Carrington's diagnosis of the problem. Some way had to be found to restore United States faith in Europe and to enable Europe to feel that it had a greater degree of influence over American actions. The proposal to institutionalise the Economic Summit Seven was an

interesting one. However, there were difficulties. Any proposal in this sense would need to be explored very carefully and confidentially in advance with the French Government. If the proposal were made publicly and then rejected, it would only cause worse damage to European/United States relations. There would also be problems over the wish of the European Community to be represented at such meetings or to mandate those attending. It would be essential to avoid a repeat of the unfortunate experience of the Year of Europe in 1973. A possible alternative to what Lord Carrington had proposed was to revitalise the Quadripartite meetings between the United States, the United Kingdom, France and Germany. She had the feeling that these were no longer as frequent as before. The difficulty lay in the need to preserve confidentiality about them. She would reflect further on Lord Carrington's proposal.

Lord Carrington said that if there was any future in his idea, it would need to be explored fairly promptly, possibly in the margins of the forthcoming Economic Summit. The Prime Minister commented that it might be possible to lay some groundwork by seeking a reference in the Summit Communiqué to the determination of the Economic Summit Seven to work more closely and systematically together to tackle political and economic problems.

BF/ The Prime Minister would be grateful if Lord Carrington's proposal could be examined together with any alternative ideas for achieving the same goal. She would welcome in particular early advice on whether it might be pursued at the forthcoming Economic Summit and if so in what terms. You will in any event want to have some language ready for possible use in the Economic Summit conclusions.

I am copying this letter to Sir Robert Armstrong.

Yours sincerely,  
*Chris Powell*  
(C.D. POWELL)

A.C. Galsworthy, Esq., C.M.G.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

NOTE FOR THE FILE

I spoke to Sandra at the Foreign Office, and offered Wednesday, 19 March, Wednesday, 18 June or Wednesday, 6 July.

*CR*

CR

27 January, 1986.

*NB: Lord Carrington  
will not be coming  
to see the PM.*

CONFIDENTIAL



ccpc  
CAROLINE

10 DOWNING STREET

24 January 1986

*From the Private Secretary*

OFFICIAL VISIT BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF NATO

Thank you for your letter of 22 January about dates for Lord Carrington's visit.

I regret that 10 February is not possible for the Prime Minister. May I suggest that a negotiation take place between diary secretaries to find a date which all can live with?

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence).

CHARLES POWELL

Colin Budd, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

19 M.  
18 June  
16 July

CONFIDENTIAL

1. MR. WICKS
2. MR. POWELL

*J.P.*  
 I am v. reluctant to lose the talks + lunches especially in present circumstances when PN

OFFICIAL VISIT BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF NATO - LORD CARRINGTON

*Shd. Keep in the closest touch with colleagues. N.C.W. 23.1*

FCO's letter dated 22 January asks whether the Prime Minister could have talks and lunch with Lord Carrington on Monday 10 February - the only date that suits the Foreign Secretary of the ones originally suggested.

The problem with Monday 10 February is that it would mean cancelling the talks and lunch with colleagues. Moreover, there is a major speech to the National Farmers' Union the following evening and, as usual, there is too little time in the diary for speech preparation.

Please liaise with each other and let me know what you decide.

*Mr Powell*

*Mr Wicks*

*I agree  
 NW  
 23-1*

*CP - I think we should go back to the FCO and arrange for alternative dates. cm*

CAROLINE RYDER  
23 January 1986



CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

22 January 1986

*Dear Charles,*

Official Visit by the Secretary-General of NATO

You will know from our letter of 14 January that Lord Carrington was unable to accept our suggestion of 26 February for his official visit to the United Kingdom. Of the alternative dates in the first quarter of this year now suggested by his office (7, 10, 20 February and 4 April) only Monday 10 February would suit the Foreign Secretary, who would be grateful to know whether this would also be convenient for the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for Defence.

It would also be helpful to have your reaction and that of Richard Mottram to the suggestion in our letter of 9 December on the programme for the visit. I would, in particular, be grateful to know whether the Prime Minister would wish to offer an official luncheon. Although we originally suggested that the Secretary of State for Defence might host a reception in the evening jointly with the Foreign Secretary, Lord Carrington will have to leave for Brussels at 4 p.m. on 10 February which precludes a reception. However a luncheon at No.10 together with talks with the Prime Minister and the two Secretaries of State should give the visit sufficient substance, and meet Lord Carrington's wish to avoid elaborate ceremony.

I am copying this letter to the Secretary of State for Defence.

*PS/*  
*Yours ever,*  
*Colin Budd*  
(C R Budd)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
No.10 Downing Street


CONFIDENTIAL

NATO 9/79

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE

VISIT OF SEC GEN NATO

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE



010

cc/c

Foreign and Commonwealth Office



London SW1A 2AH

14 January 1986

Mr. Ryder

CDP14j

Dear Caroline,

Visit of Secretary-General of NATO to London

As I mentioned on the telephone, the Secretary-General's office have informed us that it will not be possible for Lord Carrington to visit London on 26 February. I hope to be in touch shortly to suggest alternative dates.

I am copying this letter to D Brennan Esq., Private Secretary to the Secretary of State, Ministry of Defence.

Yours sincerely,  
S. Phillips

(Sandra Phillips-Miss)  
Assistant Private Secretary

Mrs Caroline Ryder  
No.10 Downing Street

TO ORDER OF THE BANK OF ENGLAND  
LONDON



CONFIDENTIAL



BE MAATH

BM.

cc PC

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

10 December 1985

POSSIBLE OFFICIAL VISIT BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF NATO

Thank you for your letter of 9 December proposing that Lord Carrington be invited to pay an official visit to the United Kingdom as Secretary General of NATO.

The Prime Minister agrees that a formal invitation should be extended to Lord Carrington. Mrs. Ryder will be in touch shortly to propose possible dates.

(C.D. Powell)

Len Appleyard, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL

JG

010

CONFIDENTIAL

① cefk



Prime Minister

Agree in principle

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

to invite Lord Carrington to visit the UK (!) and to give a lunch for him?

London SW1A 2AH

9 December 1985

Dear Charles,

CD 79/12

Yes!

no

Possible Official Visit by the NATO Secretary General

Lord Carrington has recently hinted that he would welcome an invitation to pay an official visit to the UK. He has already made official visits to most other NATO countries. The Foreign Secretary considers this an excellent idea and, if the Prime Minister and Mr Heseltine are content, would propose to convey an invitation on behalf of the Government to Lord Carrington when he calls on him at Brussels on 12 December.

Lord Carrington needs little briefing about the broad aspects of British foreign and defence policy. Sir Geoffrey Howe sees the visit, therefore, as an opportunity to bring him up to date on issues of particular concern to us, for example the handling of British nuclear forces in current nuclear arms control negotiations, armaments cooperation both within Europe and across the Atlantic, and the importance we place on improving the output we obtain from our defence expenditure. We envisage a visit of one day, during which Lord Carrington would call on the Prime Minister, the Defence Secretary and the Foreign Secretary. The Prime Minister might give an official luncheon at No 10, which could be coupled with a reception in the evening given jointly by the Defence and Foreign Secretaries. Lord Carrington might meet defence officials and service chiefs, and we might arrange for him a "seminar" with senior MOD and FCO officials to discuss current NATO business particularly on arms control issues. If time allowed and Lord Carrington were interested, we could seek to arrange for him an opportunity for a public speech at, for example, Chatham House or RUSI.

The principal problem is timing. Lord Carrington's staff have suggested a visit early in the New Year. However, the Foreign Secretary will be away in the Gulf in the middle of January and, I understand, Mr Heseltine will be visiting South Asia towards the end of the month. We have therefore looked at possible dates in February. We have identified two: Friday 14 February (Lord Carrington will be in London on the evening of 13 February to attend a Pilgrim Society dinner); and 24 February. However, we understand that the first of these dates is difficult for Mr Heseltine. In the circumstances, it would be helpful if you could indicate a choice of dates in February and, perhaps, March which would be convenient to the Prime Minister, and which we could subsequently discuss with Mr Heseltine's officials and, thereafter, with Lord Carrington's staff. The first step, however, is to lodge the formal invitation with Lord Carrington.

Yours ever,  
Len Appleyard  
(L V Appleyard)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL



cc Charles Powell

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

MESSAGE TO DR JOSEPH LUNS ON THE OCCASION OF HIS  
RETIREMENT AS SECRETARY-GENERAL OF NATO

I am sorry that I am unable to be with you this evening, but I am delighted to join in saluting Dr Luns for the invaluable contribution he has made to the Atlantic Alliance over the last 13 years. We owe him our gratitude for having done so much to steer NATO through challenging times, during which the Alliance has had to overcome many difficulties and resolve many problems. The fact that it remains strong, united and determined, is due in no small part to the role which he played.

The health of the Atlantic Alliance is fundamental to our freedom and continued prosperity, and so the Secretary General bears an exceptionally heavy burden. The fact that Dr Luns bore that responsibility with such patience and good humour throughout his time in office is a tribute to his statesmanship and humanity. He has left the Alliance in sound shape for his successor, Lord Carrington. The foundations are securely in place, and I know that the new Secretary General will find his job easier because of his predecessor's work.

I should like to join with you all in wishing Dr and Mrs Luns every happiness in the future. They will be greatly missed.

Margaret Thatcher

12th December 1984



cc MASTER SET

fu

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

16 April 1984

See log,

Call by the NATO Secretary General

Dr. Luns called on the Prime Minister at 5 p.m. today. Mrs. Borgmann-Brouwer and Sir John Graham were present.

The conversation which lasted for thirty minutes was of a general nature. The Prime Minister said that she had seen Lord Carrington socially yesterday. The latter had recently returned from a visit to the United States where no-one had suggested to him that the Europeans were not doing enough in the defence field. Dr. Luns commented that Americans tended to make these criticisms only when there were no Europeans present. But they were well aware that the European defence contribution was significant.

A brief discussion of the Prime Minister's forthcoming visit to Portugal led to an exchange of views on the present situation in Southern Africa. Dr. Luns commented that South Africa had made a considerable break-through in its recent agreement with Mozambique.

He said that he was now working on the problem of European armaments and the Western European union. His own attitude was that if a formula for a greater European contribution could be found, NATO should not be worried. The Prime Minister commented that any emphasis on Europe acting as a unit independently of the United States gave her cause for concern. Sir John Graham observed that the United States would be relaxed about schemes for a greater European effort so long as the schemes did not begin to work in practice. But as soon as they did so they would become divisive.

Dr. Luns spoke warmly of the contribution made by the British Forces in Germany. He had rarely seen troops which were so well trained and whose morale was so high.

/With regard



With regard to the European Community, he had told the Germans, the Greeks and the Italians that they should make further moves in order that Britain could accept the outcome of the current negotiations. The Prime Minister said that these problems had to be solved though she was not prepared to surrender. She continued to regret that France was not a full member of NATO.

Dr. Luns stressed that the British action over the Falkland Islands had been of the greatest importance for NATO. The Russians had been very impressed by the technical side of the operation. No country was more sensitive than the Soviet Union to the power factor. If the Russians had carried out a comparable operation, everyone in the West would be demoralised. The Prime Minister thanked Dr. Luns warmly for the attitude he himself had adopted during the conflict with Argentina - and indeed for all his help to Britain during his period as NATO Secretary General.

After a brief reference to Grenada, the Prime Minister stated that close relations between the United States and Europe were absolutely vital to the free world. Agreeing, Dr. Luns said that attempts to equate the two super-powers morally annoyed him greatly.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence).

*John*

*for Luns.*

Roger Bone Esq  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

RESTRICTED

CC/PC



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

13 April 1984

*John Selous*

Dr Luns's Farewell

The Prime Minister has agreed to receive Dr Luns for 30 minutes at 4.30 pm on 16 April. Dr Luns will be accompanied by Sir John Graham, our Permanent Representative in NATO.

I attach a copy of Dr Luns's programme and a personality note. Apart from calling on the Prime Minister, he will have a private lunch with The Queen at Windsor Castle, make a call on Mr Heseltine and attend a dinner given in his honour by the Defence Council. A call on the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary has had to be cancelled because of Sir Geoffrey Howe's trip to the Far East. Sir Geoffrey will however have an opportunity to bid farewell to Dr Luns at the North Atlantic Council in Washington at the end of May.

The call on the Prime Minister will essentially be a courtesy one. Mrs Thatcher will no doubt want to take the opportunity of thanking Dr Luns for his services to the Alliance during almost 13 years as Secretary-General and for his consistently friendly attitude towards the United Kingdom, in particular during the Falklands campaign.

The Prime Minister may wish to draw particular attention to the successful implementation of the INF dual track decision, an issue to which Dr Luns has been personally committed. The maintenance of Alliance cohesion during the initial deployments of INF at the end of last year must have been a source of particular satisfaction to Dr Luns. The task for the Alliance is now to build on this unity of purpose and establish a sound basis for a common overall approach to East/West relations. The East/West study now being prepared

/in NATO,

RESTRICTED



in NATO, and due to be submitted to Foreign Ministers in Washington in May (the last North Atlantic Council under Dr Luns's chairmanship) would have an important role to play in this respect.

Though the Alliance can take satisfaction at the unity it has shown over INF, this is no time to be complacent. The Russians can be expected to continue their divisive tactics and it will be important to maintain and strengthen the links between Europe and North America, another cause to which Dr Luns has been committed. Claims by Dr Kissinger that the Alliance is facing an unprecedented crisis are exaggerated, but there is a danger that statements of this sort and talk of a "continental drift" pulling the United States away from its European allies could develop into self-fulfilling prophecies. It will be important to guard against such tendencies and to reaffirm the centrality of the transatlantic relationship to the security of both Europe and North America. Efforts to improve the European contribution to the common defence must bear this central objective in mind.

The Prime Minister might also wish to draw attention to Dr Luns's unflagging exhortation of nations to make an effective contribution to defence and deterrence in the Alliance. She might refer to the importance of maintaining the credibility of the doctrine of flexible response. This has recently come under attack by Dr Kissinger and others on the grounds that: (a) the conventional component of the triad of forces (conventional, theatre nuclear and strategic nuclear) is too weak; (b) this would confront Western leaders with an early decision on whether to use nuclear weapons; (c) first use of nuclear weapons had lost much of its credibility because of the Russians' own nuclear capability. The Prime Minister might refer to the importance of improving conventional defence and raising the nuclear threshold, pointing out the need for NATO to have a clear sense of priorities as to how this should be done as well as an appreciation of the finite resources available. Emerging technologies undoubtedly have a role to play, but they are no cheap panacea, and there is much that could be done in lower profile areas such as improving the readiness, survivability and sustainability of NATO forces.

/I also

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/ I also attach a copy of the NATO Annual Review for 1983 which may provide some further useful background.

*Yours on*  
*R B Bone*

(R B Bone)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

RESTRICTED

FAREWELL CALLS BY DR LUNS: PROGRAMME FOR VISIT TO THE UK 15-17 APRIL

15 April

12.45

Arrival on flight BA 377, Hounslow Suite, Heathrow Airport. Dr and Mrs Luns and Miss Elizabeth Borgman Brouwer (PS to Dr Luns) to be greeted by the Secretary of State's Special Representative and taken by FCO car to the Dorchester Hotel. (A suite has been booked for Dr and Mrs Luns. Miss Borgman Brouwer will have a double room on the same floor as the suite). The remainder of the day will be free.

16 April

11.50

The morning will be free. Dr and Mrs Luns will be collected at the Dorchester and taken to Windsor Castle. (At Windsor the car should proceed up Castle Hill and just before Queen Victoria Monument, turn left, then next left again into Henry VIII Gate. At the Gate one of the castle police will direct the car to the Equerries' entrance. The car should be there by 13.00 hrs).

13.00

Lunch with HM The Queen. This will be a private lunch for Dr and Mrs Luns only.

14.15 - 14.30

Depart for London. Mrs Luns to be deposited at hotel en route for Ministry of Defence.

15.30 - 16.30

Arrive at Ministry of Defence, North Door. Guard of Honour. Call on Mr Heseltine. Sir J Graham to attend. Car will then take Sir J Graham and Dr Luns to No 10.

16.30 - 17.00

Call on Prime Minister. Car will then take Dr Luns back to the Dorchester.

19.40 -

The car will then return to collect Dr and Mrs Luns, Miss Elizabeth Borgman Brouwer for:-

20.00 -

Dinner hosted by MOD. 1 Carlton Gardens. Car will return party to the Dorchester.

17 April

08.30

Dr and Mrs Luns and Miss Borgman Brouwer will be collected from the Dorchester and taken to the Hounslow Suite Heathrow to catch flight BA 376 etd 10.05 hrs.

Dr Joseph LUNS: Chairman of the North Atlantic Council,  
Secretary General of NATO

Joseph Marie Antoine Hubert LUNS was born at Rotterdam on 28 August, 1911. After attending schools in Amsterdam and Brussels, he read law at Leyden and Amsterdam Universities. He passed his final law examination at Amsterdam University in 1937. He then took a course in political economy at the London School of Economics, and a similar course at the 'Deutsches Institut für Ausländer' at Berlin University.

In 1938 Dr Luns entered the Foreign Service. He rose through the customary grades, his last being that of Counsellor of Embassy (1950). He was posted to Berne (1940-41), Lisbon (1941-43), London - Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands Government in exile (1943-44) and the Embassy (1944-49) - and to New York (United Nations) from 1949-52. He left the Service in 1952 on his appointment as Minister for Foreign Affairs, a portfolio he shared with Mr Beyen until 12 October 1956. After the elections that year, he entered the Lower Chamber of the States General as a member of the Catholic People's Party. Since the offices of Member of Parliament and Minister may not be held by one person for longer than three months, he gave up his seat in the Lower Chamber on his re-appointment as Minister for Foreign Affairs. He stood for Parliament again in 1959, 1963, 1967 and 1971 and was re-elected on all four occasions. Dr Luns retained this portfolio in successive Cabinets but gave it up upon his appointment as Secretary General of NATO.

Having been a signatory of the Treaty of Rome, he

/was

was one of the initiators of the scheme to allow African countries that were not former colonies of member states to establish relations with the European Economic Community.

Dr Luns has been very active during his term of office in NATO matters and has represented his country in the Council meetings at Ministerial level. As President of the Council he presided in 1959 over the celebration of the tenth anniversary of the Alliance in Washington and Norfolk, Virginia.

He is keenly interested in military matters and especially in naval questions. In 1931 he was drafted in the Royal Netherlands Navy as an ordinary seaman and specialised in signalling. He served in the Navy for one year. As Foreign Minister Dr Luns often attended manoeuvres of the Royal Netherlands Navy and of the Allied Navies in the Mediterranean, the Atlantic and the Caribbean. He has published several studies and articles on the Royal Netherlands Navy, on naval matters and international affairs.

Dr Luns was made an honorary GCMG in 1958 when Her Majesty visited the Netherlands and an honorary Companion of Honour in 1971. He is also an Honorary Fellow of the London School of Economics, Doctor honoris causa of the Universities of Harvard and Oxford and of four other Universities in the United States, England and Ireland.

- 3 -

On 4 May 1967 he was awarded the Charlemagne Prize by the City of Aix-la-Chapelle for his work on behalf of European unification. Dr Luns was also awarded the Gustav Stresemann medal for 1968 for promoting the rule of international law. He is 'Membre correspondant' of the 'Institut de France' and Honorary Fellow of the Royal Geographical Society.

On 9 February 1979 he was awarded the 'Joseph Bech Europe Prize 1979 of Luxemburg.'

Mrs Leah Luns: Married to Dr Luns. Born the Baroness Elisabeth van Heemstra. They have one son and one daughter. She is passionately interested in bridge and takes a passing interest in plants.



CONFIDENTIAL

F-2-1

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

DIPLOMATIC REPORT No. 6/84

DPN 014/2

*General/Economic Distribution*

Western Organisations

4 January 1984

NATO: ANNUAL REVIEW FOR 1983

*The United Kingdom Permanent Representative at Brussels to the  
Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs*

SUMMARY

1983 a critical year for the Alliance because of INF, but the debate carried on in nations rather than at NATO. (Paragraph 1)

2. Satisfaction at INF deployment on schedule and decision to reduce nuclear stockpile in Europe to lowest ever level. But East/West relations at low ebb and NATO Ministers reaffirmed need to combine calm fortitude with dialogue. (Paragraph 2-3)

3. Progress on Alliance studies of East-West economic relations and the political situation in the Soviet Union, aided by some softening of US approach. (Paragraph 4)

4. "Out-of-area" problems. Agreement in principle that events may require diversion of US forces, but recognition of difficulties that could pose for Alliance. Realistic acknowledgement that on question of consultation each Government will act unilaterally when national interests are over-riding. Problems of consultation generally within the Alliance: valuable in ensuring that national decisions are reached in knowledge of Allies' views, even if unanimity cannot be achieved. (Paragraphs 5-6)

5. UK defence effort recognised. Concern over Dutch and Belgian defence cuts. No adverse reaction yet to HMG's decision not to extend commitment to 3% real increase in defence expenditure to 1986/87. (Paragraph 7)

6. Graeco-Turkish differences impede NATO's operations. Spain's ambiguous status with the Alliance. (Paragraphs 8-9)

7. Realism over US ideas of using emerging technologies. Opportunity of UK Chairmanship of Eurogroup in 1984 to promote greater European cooperation in defence procurement. Reagan's "star wars" speech continues to cause concern. (Paragraphs 10-11)

8. Difficulties over financing NATO's increasing infrastructure needs. (Paragraph 12)

9. East-West tension will persist in 1984. Importance of CDE. Uncertainties over Andropov's leadership and the US election. The end of the Luns era and his succession by Lord Carrington. (Paragraphs 13-14)

CONFIDENTIAL

Brussels  
4 January 1984

Sir,

I forecast in my last annual review that 1983<sup>(1)</sup> would be a critical year for the Alliance, with attention focussing above all on the nuclear debate. This required no particular clairvoyance and has proved correct. Nevertheless, while the waves of the INF controversy beat upon governments, we at Evere have been at the relatively calm centre of the storm. Thus deployment was a major issue in the general elections in the Federal Republic in the spring and in Britain, and to some extent also in Italy, in the summer. It was a factor also in the parliamentary situations in Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands and Belgium (there is perhaps a lesson to be learned from the different reactions of these Governments to the agitation and their relative success in dealing with it). At Alliance headquarters, however, the business of deployment has proceeded without serious difficulty; and while being closely engaged in nuclear policy through the High Level and Special Consultative Groups and briefings by the American INF and START negotiators, we have been able to concentrate also on other important, though less immediately critical, matters.

2. At the meetings of early December Ministers were able to take sober satisfaction in the successful completion of the first deployments of long-range INF in the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic, with Italy not far behind, and in the continuing overall cohesion of the Alliance (although the defection during the year from the 1979 decision of Denmark in addition to Greece, as a result of the parliamentary manoeuvring to which I have referred, was a blow to that cohesion and a humiliation for the Danish Government). Deployment was also seen as the failure, for the time being at least, of a major Soviet effort to undermine Alliance resolve and divide Europe from the United States by working on public opinion and the anxieties of ordinary people about nuclear war. Some drew the lesson that it had been a mistake to link deployment to negotiations over a limitation. Looking forward, however, Ministers were able to reaffirm the need for calm fortitude and persistence in trying to bring about a reduction of tension. Work on this was commissioned for Ministers to consider at their meeting in Washington next May. This is timely: confidence between East and West and, in particular, between the two super powers, is undeniably at a low ebb, with arms control negotiations suspended and little genuine dialogue. Public anxiety runs high and there is a need for reassurance over both defence policy and East-West relations generally.

3. In October, Defence Ministers in the Nuclear Planning Group decided to reduce the nuclear stockpile in Europe by a further 1400 warheads net, making a total of 2,400 to be removed since 1979. This measure had been thrashed out in the High Level Group against at times strong opposition from SHAPE, and was a remarkable instance of the US accepting the rational arguments of the Europeans, in particular the UK. Discounted by many critics, the decision has nevertheless made some impact on responsible opinion and should be given further publicity as opportunity offers.

4. At the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in December 1982, Ministers had commissioned two studies, of economic relations with the East and the political situation in the Soviet Union after Brezhnev's death. These were seen as ingredients in the

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settlement of the 1982 transatlantic differences, notably over the Siberian pipeline. The studies progressed harmoniously and at their meeting in June, held in Paris for the first time since the Organisation left France in 1967, Ministers agreed wording on economic relations which in essence confirmed current policies but with acceptable references to commercial prudence and safe-guarding technology. Transatlantic differences were also eased by a softening of the American approach in a number of other fields: East/West trade, COCOM, where earlier American ambitions have been modified but difficulties remain, the CSCE where, after some huffing, the US agreed a concluding document in Madrid which, though not ideal, represented substantial gains for Western viewpoints, arms control, and military intervention outside the NATO area. This softening arises, no doubt in part, from the greater experience of the US Administration and the recognition that management of the Europeans calls for greater sensitivity. The approaching American election may also contribute. Nevertheless relations between the US and Europe remain somewhat wary.

5. In the out-of-area discussion, for example, the Alliance has been working to identify the military impact on its defence of a major diversion of US forces to meet a threat, eg in South West Asia; the attempt will now be made to build compensatory measures by individual allies into the defence planning process. A Turkish-Greek dispute over the report on this has temporarily held up work; there is no dispute, however, over the principle of the Rapid Deployment Force's role, despite wrangling over communiqué wording in June and strong warnings from SACEUR and some allies, that full compensation is impossible and commitment of the force could enhance the risks to Europe. Disagreement has been eased by the US scaling down the deployment envisaged. The difficulties of meeting major simultaneous threats within and without the NATO area are now recognised: and while realistically we know that the United States, or any major member of the Alliance, will take its own national decisions without prior consultation when it believes national, rather than Alliance, interests are at stake, there is understanding that the implications of such action should be taken into account and that in principle there should be consultation, since Governments may have to choose between desirable but conflicting courses.

6. This leads me to the general question of consultation. There is no doubt that at present the Alliance often fails as a forum of consultation on the burning issues of the day. Only in East/West relations, the *raison d'être* of the Alliance, does the Council play a full role. During 1983 French and American military actions in Chad were never mentioned here: the Lebanon, the Iran/Iraq war, Grenada and Central America were sometimes touched upon (in the case of Grenada we received a briefing, after the event) but not discussed in depth. The reasons are fairly clear: for the French, who reject discussion in NATO of economic policy, it is axiomatic also that activity outside the NATO area is not a proper concern of the Alliance; for many others, these topics, unlike East/West relations, are too remote and too controversial; and there is a general fear that recrimination may spill over into the other work of the Alliance. Nevertheless such issues affect attitudes, both within the Alliance and in individual states, even if criticisms often remain unvoiced. The Grenada affair is an example, though the American briefing of the Council in November evoked some fairly harsh words about US policy, notably from Spain. The consultation after the shooting down of the Korean airliner, on the other hand, begun fortuitously at an informal meeting of NATO Ministers in Madrid and continued in the Permanent Council, while it produced no formal consensus or decision, did achieve a wide measure of coordinated, if modest, action. This, I believe, was a satisfactory outcome, achieved through not setting our sights too high. We should not feel bound, I suggest, on

CONFIDENTIAL

all occasions to look for unanimity. The Alliance is composed of free sovereign states and provided that we remain united on the essential objectives and avoid undermining each other (as Greece and Denmark do in their attitude to INF), there is much to be said for debating issues, not with a view to reaching binding conclusions, but so that governments may decide policies in the knowledge of their allies' views.

7. I will not deal in detail with the defence aspects of the Alliance's work which have gone very well. In particular the measures taken by Her Majesty's Government to reorganise the British Army of the Rhine and re-equip all three Services have achieved recognition in an almost embarrassingly laudatory chapter in the annual review of the state of the Alliance's forces. Some other nations have not come out so well. There is real cause for concern over the defence cuts to be made by the Netherlands and Belgium (attributable in part to the effects of the strengthening dollar since the F16 purchase was made), despite praise-worthy efforts by both governments to consult and to respond to points made. The inadequacies of the air defence of the Central Region, the lack of a standard aircraft identification system and the shortage of naval escorts and minesweepers are particularly worrying. SACEUR, who continues to call for increased expenditure on conventional defence, gives priority to the provision of larger war stocks, at least up to the NATO minimum requirement of 30 days. Mr Heseltine endorsed this in the Eurogroup and the Defence Planning Committee in December. At the latter, for the first time since its adoption, there was no specific reaffirmation of the commitment to an annual 3% real increase in defence expenditure, although that remains the policy of the Alliance. We have a creditable record here, but we have made it known that the policy, which in our case will have produced a real increase of 21% since 1978, cannot be extended to 1986/87. There has been little or no criticism of this within the Alliance so far: indeed, for many the figure has never been more than a target. As such it has served to prevent an ever poorer performance and is worth retaining.

8. Graeco-Turkish disputes have continued to impede attempts to establish a command structure and the holding of exercises in the Aegean but have had no wider effects. SACEUR is determined to continue his efforts to achieve a *modus vivendi*, but with developments in Cyprus further undermining trust, it is unlikely that a solution can be achieved through NATO, even on the practical plane of joint exercises. We shall probably have to resign ourselves to exercising with either Greece or Turkey, but not both at the same time.

9. Spain continued in its anomalous attendance in all the organs of the Alliance while holding aloof from Alliance policies and from the military structure. Gibraltar, apart from the odd mention, has not been an issue.

10. Throughout the year, the US pressed its initiative for the exploitation of emerging technologies with all that involves, not only for research, development and procurement but for tactical and strategic doctrine. Once again it has been the propensity of the Americans to give headline titles to what most would regard as common-sense, if not standard practice, which has caused much of the difficulty. Stripped of the headlines and with more realistic definitions by the US of what they hope to achieve, work is now proceeding in a sensible fashion to identify areas where new technology could produce improved capability at affordable cost in the short to medium term. Nevertheless if European industry is not to be swamped by American, European nations must achieve much greater cooperation among themselves. This is an area to which the Defence Secretary has indicated that he intends to devote attention. In the capacity of Chairman of

CONFIDENTIAL

the Eurogroup for 1984 he will be well-placed to move his European colleagues away from the platitudes which have tended to symbolise the approach hitherto into areas of practical cooperation.

11. Another concern for the Allies is the proposition put forward by President Reagan in his speech from the White House last March about the need to develop an effective defence against ballistic missiles (DABM), widely known, to American official irritation, as "star wars". This came as a surprise to many in the US Administration as well as in Europe. Nonetheless work on it is going forward in the US and funds have been voted. Explanations that research only is involved, that any defence would cover Europe also and that the deterrent will be maintained, give some but not complete reassurance.

12. Money continues to be short in all members states, not excluding the US. National budgets apart, the infrastructure needs of the Alliance grow faster than the readiness of governments to pay. This effects in particular the important area of command, control and communication.

13. In a brief review it is not possible to do more than pick out a few themes. In 1984 the controversy over nuclear weapons may diminish but anxieties about East-West tension will persist. The Alliance, while avoiding the temptation of running after the Soviet Union, must endeavour to create confidence and contact. In this the CDE is opportune and important, but the health of Andropov and the American election will impart some uncertainty.

14. In closing, I must refer to Dr Luns's decision to retire, conveyed to a private meeting of the Council last May. He will hand over to Lord Carrington, who was unanimously elected to succeed him, on the 25th of June 1984. He has served the Alliance with energy, good humour and distinction over the last 12 years and in particular through the difficult years leading up to INF deployment. He showed himself a staunch friend of Britain during the Falklands war. But it is time for a change, for a new man with fresh ideas and vigour. Lord Carrington could contribute much to the reassurance for which the public looks. His succession is eagerly awaited.

15. I enclose a Calendar of Events in 1983.<sup>(2)</sup>

16. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives in the capitals of all NATO members, Moscow and Tokyo, to the United Kingdom Permanent Representative at the United Nations in New York and to the Heads of the United Kingdom Delegations to the Negotiations on Mutual Reductions in Forces and Armaments in Vienna and to the Conference on Disarmament in Europe at Stockholm.

I am Sir  
Yours faithfully

JOHN GRAHAM

<sup>(2)</sup>Not printed

Ref. para 4 of the POINTS TO MAKE  
of the Brief on UN Expenditure for  
the Prime Minister's meeting with  
the UN Secretary-General at 5.30 pm



A-SC 7/4

h-a.

*With the compliments of*

UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE  
LONDON, SW1A 2AH

16 April 1984

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GRS 120

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FM UKMIS NEW YORK 132011Z APRIL 84

TO ROUTINE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 387 OF 13 APRIL 1984

INFO UKMIS GENEVA, UKDEL UNESCO PARIS, ROME (FOR UKREP FAO),  
UKDEL IAEA VIENNA, UKDEL ICAO MONTREAL, BERNE, WASHINGTON.

YOUR TELNO 182: GENEVA GROUP

1. AFTER SOME US VACILLATION, THE CLM JOINT POLICY STATEMENT WAS DELIVERED AS FOLLOWS. US AMBASSADOR SORZANO AND I SPOKE INFORMALLY TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IN THE MARGINS OF A SECURITY COUNCIL LUNCH ON 12 APRIL, AND TOGETHER CALLED ON 13 APRIL ON HIS SPECIAL ASSISTANT, DE SOTO (IN THE ABSENCE OF BOTH DAYAL AND RUEDAS) TO HAND OVER A COPY OF THE JOINT POLICY STATEMENT. COLLEAGUES IN GENEVA GROUP MISSIONS WERE INFORMED OF THE ACTION PROPOSED.
2. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL EXPRESSED UNDERSTANDING FOR THE GROUP'S BUDGETARY CONCERNS AND SAID THAT HE WOULD STUDY THE STATEMENT BEFORE THE ACC MEETING. DE SOTO, WHO HAD NO COMMENT OF SUBSTANCE, UNDERTOOK TO PASS THE STATEMENT QUICKLY TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND TO RUEDAS. WHILE EMPHASISING THE IMPORTANCE OF THE MATTER, WE EARNED SOME CREDIT FOR MAKING OUR POINT WITHOUT TAKING UP THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S TIME IN A FORMAL CALL DURING A HECTIC PERIOD BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE FOR LONDON.

(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

MARGETSON  
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ESID  
PS/ MR WHITNEY  
MR ADAMS

COPIES TO  
MR ARBUTHNOTT, ODA  
MR MOUNTFIELD, TSY

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act



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

12 April 1984

Dear John,

MR 13/4  
L.A.

United Nations Administrative Committee on Coordination

/ I enclose some speaking notes which the Prime Minister  
might care to use at the dinner she is giving for the  
United Nations Secretary-General and other heads of UN  
/ organisations on 16 April. I also enclose a background note  
about the ACC and some current issues which could arise.

I shall send you separately briefs for Perez de Cuellar's  
call on the Prime Minister in the afternoon of 16 April.

Yours ever,

Peter Ricketts

(P F Ricketts)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

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h.a.

DRAFT SPEAKING NOTES FOR PRIME MINISTER'S USE  
AT DINNER ON MONDAY, 16 APRIL

Happy to have this rare opportunity to invite all the Chiefs of the UN family to Number Ten. Glad to think that London is also one of the UN centres. Proud to have the International Maritime Organisation, your host for this week's meeting of the Administrative Committee on Coordination, in our midst.

Extraordinary range of international activity represented here today: political, economic, developmental, humanitarian, regulatory. Demonstrates the strength and diversity of the effort of the countries of the world today to promote co-operation among themselves for the good of the planet as a whole.

United Kingdom can claim to have played a major role in the creation of virtually every institution represented around this table. We are as keen now as we have ever been to play our full part in the crucial work in which you are engaged.

At a time when all countries are facing economic difficulties, we have had to look to the United Nations to exercise maximum financial restraint. We welcome the responsible attitude that the United Nations organisations have generally shown. Our emphasis on the need for economy and efficiency does not in any way betoken a lessening of support for the ideals of the United Nations family. All human organisations benefit from discipline. Lean and efficient institutions can be more satisfying to work in as well as more cost effective in terms of the benefits conferred upon their Member States.

United Kingdom not intent on pursuing narrow national concerns. Of course we have interests we must protect and promote. There are certainly UK values we are determined to uphold. But history has made us a country which is perhaps



-2-

unique in the strength of its ties with so many other countries in all parts of the world. Their peace and prosperity are vital British concerns. We are as well placed as any country to understand and share the global concerns which must motivate the institutions you lead.

We live in an age in which interdependence is an obvious fact and global co-operation a manifest necessity. The United Nations cannot be a panacea and individual States must bear their own responsibilities. But in such a world, the contribution the United Nations can make is plainly indispensable. I pay tribute to the efforts you have made to promote our common goals in your respective fields. I honour the dedication and commitment of so many international civil servants. I pledge the continued support of the United Kingdom for the ideals of the institutions you represent and wish you all success in the tasks ahead.

[Toast: 'The United Nations family.'  
Perez de Cuellar to respond.]

UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT  
12 APRIL 1984



file  
back

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

24 February 1984

Dr. Luns

Thank you for your letter of 22 February.

The Prime Minister could see Dr. Luns at 1630 on 16 April for 30 minutes. I agree that Sir John Graham should be present.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence).

A. J. DOLES

R.B. Bone, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

RP

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①

Prime Minister.

You could see Dr. Luns  
from 1630 to 1700 on 16  
April. but:-

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

22 February, 1984



- (a) it is the recess
- (b) you have leave de  
canceled that day
- (c) you have to return the next  
day.

Dear John,

Agree to see Dr. Luns ?

Yes no

A.J.C. 23/2.

Dr Luns' Farewell Call

Dr Luns, who is to retire as NATO Secretary-General in June, plans to pay a farewell visit to London on 16 April. He will be having talks with Sir Geoffrey Howe and, we hope, with Mr Heseltine. I understand that Her Majesty The Queen would like to offer him lunch.

I know that the Prime Minister has a particularly busy programme on 16 April. But Dr Luns has had a long and distinguished career of public service, both as Foreign Minister of the Netherlands from 1952 to 1971 and as Secretary-General of NATO since then. He has been a good friend of Britain, particularly during the Falklands crisis. Sir Geoffrey Howe believes that, for these reasons, a farewell call on the Prime Minister would be a very appropriate gesture. The call need not last more than 30 minutes and I should be grateful if you would let me know if the Prime Minister can find the time. If she can, I hope you will agree that it would be appropriate for Dr Luns to be accompanied by Sir J Graham.

I am copying this to Richard Mottram (MOD).

Yours ever,

Peter Ricketts

(R B Bone)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

22 JAN 1984

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With the compliments of  
DEFENCE DEPARTMENT

P J WESTON

*da*  
*Ant*

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE  
LONDON, SW1A 2AH

17/9 *1951*

*Nato*



UNITED KINGDOM PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE  
ON THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL  
OTAN/NATO  
1110 BRUSSELS  
TELEPHONE 241.01.15

*copy*

*PS/SJS*

*PS/MVPH*

*PS/NOTO*

*Rm*

*17/9*

P J Weston Esq  
Defence Department  
FCO

16 September, 1981

*Dear John,*

I enclose replies I have received from the Secretary-General to messages sent to him on the occasion of his 70th birthday by the Prime Minister, Lord Carrington and Mr Nott. I should be grateful if you could pass these on.

*2*

*Clive Rose*

Clive Rose

Enc(1)

Mrs. M. Thatcher  
Prime Minister

I was very touched by your kind and thoughtful birthday message. Your most generous remarks and good wishes are much appreciated.

Joseph Luns

Lord P. Carrington  
Minister of Foreign Affairs

Thank you very much for your warm birthday greetings which I much appreciated.

Joseph Luns

John Nott  
Minister of Defence

Your warm wishes and kind remarks on my 70th birthday were highly appreciated.

Joseph Luns



LINE  
SEP 1981

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Nate

Tom

27 August 1981

Thank you for your letter of 25 August about Dr. Luns's 70th Birthday. The Prime Minister is content to send Dr. Luns the message attached to your letter.

I am sending a copy of this letter to David Omand (Ministry of Defence).

**W. F. S. RICKETT**

F.N. Richards, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.



010  
Prime Minister

Content with the attached message? 1

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

WN  
26/8

Yes not

25 August 1981

Dear Willie,

Dr Luns's 70th Birthday:  
Proposed Message of Congratulations

Dr Joseph Luns, the Secretary General of NATO, is 70 on 28 August. We understand that other members of the Alliance will mark the occasion by sending high level messages of congratulations to Dr Luns and it would therefore be appropriate for us to do the same. Dr Luns has held his present post since 1971 and, before that, was of course Dutch Foreign Minister.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary believes that a message from the Prime Minister would be particularly appreciated and would be simpler than separate messages from Lord Carrington and Mr Nott, which would be the alternative. MOD officials agree. I attach a draft which, if the Prime Minister and Defence Secretary agree, could be sent by telegram to our Delegation to NATO for delivery to Dr Luns.

Yours ever,

(F N Richards)  
Private Secretary

W Rickett Esq  
10 Downing Street

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

25 AUG 1981

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despach/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:

Reference

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO:

Your Reference

- Top Secret
- Secret
- Confidential
- Restricted
- Unclassified

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

Peter Carrington and John Nott join me in sending you our best wishes on the occasion of your 70th birthday. All of us in the Western world have reason to be grateful to you for the contribution you have made to the cause of international understanding throughout your distinguished career. As Secretary General of NATO for almost ten years you have presided over the Alliance during a period of unprecedented challenges to our collective security. The members of the Alliance owe you a debt of gratitude for the part you have played in ensuring that NATO remains vigorous, cohesive and responsive to the changing circumstances of the 1980s.

*MS.*

Enclosures—flag(s).....



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1

Telephone 01-~~XXXXXX~~ 218 2111/3

MO 13/1

26th August 1981

*Dear Willie,*

BIRTHDAY GREETINGS FOR DR LUNS

Francis Richards sent me a copy of his letter of yesterday to you proposing a message from the Prime Minister to Dr Luns. I am sure that my Secretary of State (who is at present in Scotland) would endorse this idea. *W BOM*

A copy of this note goes to Francis Richards (FCO).

*Yours ever,*

*David*


(D B OMAND)

W Rickett Esq

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL (LONDON SW1)



26 AUG 1981



Telephone 01-273 3461

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Nato



cc MOD  
CO  
JS

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

9 November 1979

CALL BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF NATO

As you know, Dr. Luns called on the Prime Minister on 7 November. I enclose a copy of the record of their discussion.

I am sending copies of this letter, and of its enclosure, to Brian Norbury (Ministry of Defence) and Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

Paul Lever, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

PLR



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RECORD OF A DISCUSSION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE  
SECRETARY GENERAL OF NATO, DR. JOSEPH LUNS AT No. 10 DOWNING STREET  
ON 7 NOVEMBER AT 1210 HOURS.

Present

Prime Minister  
Sir Clive Rose  
Mr. M.O'D. Alexander

Dr. Luns  
Dr. Van Campen  
Miss Borgman-Brower

\*\*\*\*\*

TNF Modernisation

The Prime Minister referred to the fact that Mr. Brezhnev had made a further speech clearly intended to try to prevent the Dutch and Belgian Governments accepting modernised theatre nuclear forces on their territory. Dr. Luns said that he was very worried about the possibility that NATO might fail to take the necessary decisions in December. Such a failure would do immense harm. It would leave the impression that the Soviet Union rather than the Members of the Alliance decided what weapons the Alliance should have. It would damage the credibility of NATO's defences generally and of the deterrent in particular. It might result in a serious falling out between the United States and the European Members of NATO.

The Prime Minister recalled that when the Belgian Prime Minister had been in London he and M. Simonet had expressed concern about the effect on Belgian opinion of the wrong decision being taken in the Netherlands. They had stressed the links between the Flemish Socialist Parties and the Dutch. Dr. Luns said that the Belgians were taking a firmer line than the Dutch. Defence issues were not such a live issue in Belgium as they were in the Netherlands: the Belgians had other things to quarrel about - in any case it was possible to exaggerate the strength of the links between the Flemish community and the Dutch. Sir Clive Rose said that it would be wrong to assume that the Belgians would follow suit if the Dutch took the wrong decision. Dr. Luns commented on a recent vote at a meeting of the Atlantic Assembly in Ottawa. The Dutch had put forward a motion proposing that the Alliance should attempt to negotiate an arms control agreement with the Russians before deciding on the deployment of the modernised TNF. The motion had been rejected by 82 votes to 4.

/The Prime Minister

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The Prime Minister commented on the undesirability of establishing a link between the ratification<sup>of</sup>/SALT II and the TNF decision. Sir Clive Rose said that it would of course be wrong to make ratification a pre-condition for the TNF decision. But many members of the Alliance attached importance to arms control negotiations as a means of putting a ceiling on the Soviet Union's deployment of nuclear weapons. Such negotiations could only take place in the context of SALT III. SALT II was a pre-condition for SALT III. Dr. Luns said that this argument was of course reasonable but that even if SALT II was not ratified, the new TNF could be deployed. Sir Clive Rose agreed. The Prime Minister said that she was confident that SALT II would be ratified. The authority of the United States President to conduct negotiations was at issue: this argument would appeal to a sufficient number of senators to ensure that agreement was ratified. She thought that this was true even though President Carter's position had been complicated by the fact that the public was much better informed about the Soviet Union and about its lead in missiles than it had been ten years ago. The Prime Minister commented on the enormous effect that Mr. Solzhenitsyn's pronouncements had had.

The Prime Minister said that two aspects of the SALT II Agreement were of particular concern to the United Kingdom. It was essential that the protocol on cruise missiles should lapse on the due date. It was equally essential for it to be clear that the ~~non~~ circumvention clause should not inhibit the United States from passing to the United Kingdom technology related to the UK deterrent. Sir Clive Rose said that both issues had been taken up in the Senate and the position of the Administration would be confirmed as a result. Dr. Luns said that he was confident the Soviet Union would refrain from making difficulties on either issue. The Prime Minister concluded this part of the discussion by saying that it was essential that the right decisions should be taken on TNF modernisation. Dr. Luns said that next week's meeting of the Nuclear Planning Group would be crucial.

/France and NATO

France and NATO

The Prime Minister asked whether there was any possibility of getting France back into NATO's integrated military structure. Dr. Luns said there was no chance of this but few people were aware of how good military co-operation was between France and NATO. Talks had recently taken place between SACEUR's Chief of Staff and the French Chief of Staff. No written account of the decision had been passed to the civil side of the Alliance but Dr. Luns had read SACEUR's report. It was highly encouraging. The French were also engaged in modernising the deterrent which was more effective than most people realised. France would share the dismay of other members of the Alliance if no decision was taken on TNF modernisation this year.

Greece and NATO

The Prime Minister asked why NATO was making difficulties about Greece's re-entry. Mr. Karamanlis, who had been in London recently, was getting very fed up about the absence of agreement. He had gone out on a limb in asking for readmittance. Unless Greece was accepted, Mr. Karamanlis might be lost altogether. NATO should agree to let the <sup>Greeks</sup> rejoin on the terms on which they had left if they agreed to be reasonable thereafter.

Dr. Luns said the Alliance as a whole had not been making difficulties. Thirteen members were in favour of accepting the terms negotiated by General Haig. But the Turks would not agree. They had a point. The Alliance had been trying for 25 years to reach agreement with Greece on the command structure in the Aegean. The Greeks had been impossible. The Turks would only agree to Greek re-entry if an acceptable command structure had been negotiated. The Greeks would only agree to such a negotiation after re-entry. The Turks were afraid that the Greeks would use their veto once they were full members and, despite hints dropped privately, the Greeks had refused to give any public assurance on the question. The <sup>delayed</sup> meeting between Generals Rogers and Davos would take place shortly. General Rogers would then ask the Greeks again whether or not they intended to use the veto.

/The Prime Minister

The Prime Minister asked whether there was no pressure that could be brought to bear on the Turks. Dr. Luns said that the Turks could not be expected to forgo their rights. Mr. Van Campen said that one should not overlook the danger of losing Turkey. The military forces in Turkey were of great importance to the United States. Dr. Luns said that Turkey was arguably more important militarily than Greece. Their position was strategically vital and their army, albeit poorly equipped, was one of the best in NATO. It was "the last Prussian army".

The Prime Minister expressed concern at the possibility that the position of Mr. Karamanlis would be undermined. A successor of similar stature was unlikely to appear on the scene for many years. Dr. Luns said that Mr. Karamanlis had been a personal friend of his for a long time. But he was not now the man he had been. He was very anxious to become President of Greece. For this he needed the support of Mr. Papandreou and others. He was therefore afraid to offend them. Dr. Luns said that this had affected his own position. The Greek Government took the line that the left wing would be offended if he appeared in Greece. As it was he had not visited the country since 1974: he had visited Ankara three or four times in the same period. When he had last been to Turkey, he had had to fly over Bulgaria because the Greeks would not let him pass through Greek airspace. In general the difficulty was that the suspicion between Greece and Turkey was centuries old. The complexes on the Greek side were if anything more deeply rooted than those on the Turkish side. It was not easy to see the problem being resolved quickly. A recent agreement signed between the Greeks and the Soviet Union to permit the servicing of Soviet vessels in Greek ports had not helped relations between Greece and the Alliance.

The Prime Minister asked whether there was any prospect of NATO's sphere of activity being extended South of the Tropic of Cancer. Such an extension would, in her/<sup>view</sup>, be desirable. Dr. Luns said that there was no chance of such an extension but that NATO did have contingency plans for operating further South in time of war.

/As he was

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As he was leaving Dr. Luns thanked the Prime Minister for the robust line that she had taken on TNF modernisation. The Prime Minister said that NATO could always rely on Britain for firm support.

The meeting ended at 1250.

*Ph.D.*

7 November 1979

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NATO



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

5 November 1979

*Paul*

*Dear Michael,*

Call of the Prime Minister by Dr Luns; 7 November

I enclose a set of the briefs which have been prepared for Dr Luns' visit to London on 7 November. Brief No 1, the Steering Brief, has been prepared primarily for his call on the Prime Minister and contains a suggested line to take.

I am sending another set of the briefs under cover of this letter to Brian Norbury (MOD).

*Yours etc*

*Paul*

(P Lever)  
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq  
10 Downing Street  
LONDON

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BRIEF NO 1        STEERING BRIEF  
BRIEF NO 2        TNF MODERNISATION  
BRIEF NO 3        SALT II/III  
BRIEF NO 4        POLARIS SUCCESSOR  
BRIEF NO 5        DEFENCE SPENDING  
BRIEF NO 6        RHODESIA    (To ISSUE SEPARATELY)  
BRIEF NO 7        NATO SECURITY  
BRIEF NO 8        SOUTHERN FLANK ISSUES  
BRIEF NO 9        DISARMAMENT ISSUES

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

DR JOSEPH M A H LUNS GCMG CH

Born 1911. Educated at LSE. Career diplomat then Foreign Minister 1956/71. One of the main architects of Britain's accession to the EEC. Resigned to take up his present position in 1971.

A powerful personality, an excellent raconteur and a master of the calculated indiscretion. Does not suffer fools gladly and partly on that account he makes enemies easily. A conservative Roman Catholic, he speaks excellent English. Increasingly shows sign of his age and relies heavily on his staff.



STEERING BRIEF : VISIT OF DR LUNS

Suggested Line to Take for the Prime Minister

1. Hope Dr Luns enjoyed Atlantic Treaty Association Annual Assembly in Washington last month. Looking forward to having it here in 1981.

East/West Relations

2. Need for realism and adequate Western strength if arms control and detente are to have constructive results.

Brezhnev Letter

3. TNF modernisation more important than ever because of Soviet political challenge and threats. Alliance has consulted well so far on TNF issues: vital to see it through. NATO's credibility at stake. UK will play full part.

UK Defence Policy

4. Accept 3% target. Planning to average 3% real increases in defence spending over next five years, despite pressure on public expenditure.

Polaris Successor

5. Reinforce Mr Pym's message. (Determined to maintain effectiveness of deterrent. Decisions in next few months.)

NATO Security

6. Reinforce Lord Carrington's message. (Full support for efforts to tighten up security in NATO.)

## STEERING BRIEF : VISIT OF DR LUNS

1. This is Dr Luns' first formal call since the change of government, though he visits the UK regularly and was here for the service on NATO's 30th Anniversary in May. Dr Luns is calling on Mr Pym at 1115 and the Prime Minister at 1200, followed by a lunch given by Lord Carrington. A personality note is attached. He will be accompanied by his Chef du Cabinet, Dr Van Campen, his Secretary, Miss Borgman-Brouwer, and Sir Clive Rose.
2. To get the most out of these calls, Dr Luns has been told that Mr Pym may wish to concentrate on TNF, and defence spending and to refer briefly to the Polaris successor question; and that Lord Carrington may focus on SALT, NATO security and Rhodesia. Briefs on these are attached together with background briefs on Alliance issues and disarmament questions.
3. Suggested points to make during the call on the Prime Minister are attached. Dr Luns would probably be particularly interested to hear Mrs Thatcher's views on East/West relations, following the Brezhnev letter and her visit to Bonn.
5. There are tentative plans for a visit by The Queen to the EEC and NATO next year. Arrangements are in abeyance pending outcome of discussions on the Community budget. Dr Luns is unaware of these plans and it would be better not to inform him at this stage.
5. Finally, Dr Luns may have at the back of his mind the press reports that the Government considered replacing him

/ by

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by Mr Heath in May/June. His reaction at the time was to remind Sir John Killick of his determination to stay on. This appears to be his continuing intention, though is showing signs of his age and has recently been unwell with shingles.

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CALL BY DR LUNS

BRIEF NO. 2

SUBJECT: THEATRE NUCLEAR FORCE MODERNISATION

Points to Make

1. S of S may wish to inform Dr Luns of HMG's decision in principle to accept the basing of US GLCMs in the UK. Dr Luns should however be told that we have not informed all our Allies of our decision and that the information is given to him in strict confidence.
2. Emphasise our wish to see a collective Alliance decision on a TNF modernisation programme and an associated arms control approach on as wide a basis as possible. How does Dr Luns assess the position of other Alliance members?
3. Point out that a wide acceptance of the need for NATO Infrastructure funding should be encouraged for political as well as economic reasons. Does Dr Luns consider other Alliance members will agree?

If raised

4. Requirement for UK-owned long range TNF to replace Vulcan capability being studied in parallel with the wider question of Polaris successor. Decisions on a UK capability not tied to Alliance programme and likely to be in much longer timescale. Does Dr Luns think that this would be valuable for the Alliance, and if so what priority would he give it?
5. We would have no serious objection to the Italian suggestion for a joint Foreign/Defence Ministers meeting earlier than planned. But this is likely to raise problems for others and it might appear that the Alliance was being rushed by the Brezhnev speech. On balance probably preferable to stick to the agreed December timetable.

6. SALT II: see brief No 3

Background

7. Dr Luns is, of course, well aware of the state of play on the HLG/SG discussions. Whilst the NATO Secretary-General has not indicated which subjects he wishes to discuss, it is reasonable to assume that he will hope to be given a clear idea of current UK thinking on TNF modernisation. He may also wish to obtain some idea of the likely UK reaction in the event of an Alliance member rejecting the basing of US GLCMs.

CALL BY DR LUNS

BRIEF NO 3: SALT II/SALTIII

Points to Make  
SALT II

1. SALT II vote is now unlikely this year. Concern that some Allies link TNF modernisation to SALT ratification. Need to persuade them to go along with TNF decisions in anticipation of SALT approval. Case for modernisation is independent of SALT. If SALT II is voted down, we will have to consider whether in such a new situation there is any way of carrying on TNF arms control.

SALT III (if Dr Luns asks about UK participation)

2. Cannot contemplate any restraints in SALT III which might undermine the effectiveness of our strategic forces. Support the principle in the Special Group report that arms control negotiations involving TNF should not include non-US allied systems.

3. Effectiveness of our nuclear deterrent must be preserved. No flexibility on this point. SALT I and II provide sound precedent for exclusion.

4. Contribution of UK and French nuclear forces to deterrence widely recognised (eg 1974 Ottawa Declaration). Second centre of decision increases Soviet uncertainties.

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ESSENTIAL FACTS

SALT II

1. SALT ratification/TNF modernisation linkage dangerous because:

- (i) would delay TNF decision;
- (ii) could therefore cause problems over UK funding of GLCM/Pershing programme;
- (iii) implies no confidence in outcome of ratification debate;
- (iv) UK Government have advised it could also cause adverse reaction from US Senate.

2. SALT II treaty should emerge unscathed from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. "Killer" amendments have all so far failed. But treaty unlikely to be debated by Senate before late November. White House staff(to be protected) have predicted that ratification debate will carry over into January 1980.

3. The Administration still think they are 15 votes short of the two-thirds majority required to pass the Treaty. Senator Byrd told our Ambassador that perhaps a majority of the Senate is still undecided.

SALT III

4. Ministers decided in July that we could not accept any constraints which would undermine the effectiveness of our nuclear forces; but there was no need at that stage for decisions about UK participation or the inclusion of British nuclear forces in SALT III. For the time being it was agreed that we should go along with the planning assumption in NATO that British systems should be excluded.

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CALL BY DR LUNS

BRIEF NO 4.

SUBJECT: POLARIS SUCCESSOR

Points to Make

1. We see our strategic deterrent as a unique and important part of our overall contribution to NATO.
2. As Mrs Thatcher said in her Winston Churchill Memorial Lecture in Luxembourg, we intend to maintain the effectiveness of our strategic deterrent into the 1990s and will take decisions within the next few months to ensure its effectiveness for a long time thereafter.
3. What view does Dr Luns think that the Alliance takes of our strategic deterrent and the need to replace it in the 1990s.

Background

4. S of S will probably not wish to give any detailed exposition of our current thinking on a Polaris successor. Dr Luns may nonetheless appreciate some indication of our present position.

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CALL BY DR LUNS

BRIEF NO 5: DEFENCE SPENDING

Line to take

1. The United Kingdom will be spending about 4% more on defence in 1979/80, in real terms, than in 1978-79, and there will be a further 3% real increase in 1980-81 fractionally more than 3% on NATO definition. Public expenditure plans to 1983/84, will not be announced until the turn of the year, but the Government have consistently supported the NATO 3% aim.
2. UK defence equipment spending continues to be well in excess of 20% of the total budget; the highest percentage in the Alliance by a clear margin.
3. The pay increases awarded this year to the armed forces have been funded over and above the 4% increase at constant prices.



3. As regards the years 1981/82 to 1983/84, Foreign and Commonwealth and Defence Secretaries will be aware of the position reached in Cabinet.

Equipment Spending

4. By NATO definition the UK share of the total budget devoted to equipment procurement in the current year will be about 23 $\frac{1}{2}$ %. The nearest approaches to this level made by other NATO countries are (on latest evidence) as follows:

Netherlands	18.9%
Norway	18.0%
United States	18.0%
Italy	17.3%
Belgium	16.9%
Denmark	16.2%
FRG	13.9%

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CALL BY DR LUNS

BRIEF NO 7 NATO SECURITY

LINE TO TAKE

1. We wish to cooperate closely in measures to improve security and support the steps the Secretary General has taken.
2. Interested to know whether Dr Luns has further plans to improve security.
3. Defensive - Not to be used unless raised by Dr Luns  
Despite some counter-espionage successes the Germans have a unique problem. What are your views?

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RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3 (4)  
OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT.

NATO SECURITY: ESSENTIAL FACTS

OBJECTIVE

1. Dr Luns has been trying to improve NATO security. We wish to encourage him and we also wish to explore his ideas for further action.

LORENZEN SPY CASE

2. A major spy case occurred at NATO in March this year when a German secretary Miss Lorenzen defected to East Germany. She was probably a long-term spy. She was the secretary to the Director of Council operations, Mr Moran, a British member of the NATO international staff. She had access to an extremely wide range of NATO information the compromise of which is serious.

REMEDIAL ACTION

3. The Secretary General has ordered a tightening of physical security measures and closer application of the "need to know" principle. Recommendations are being made by a NATO Working Group to improve personnel security measures. A new, American, Director of NATO Security, Mr Shea, has been appointed and a new will also shortly take up office.

SPECIAL PROBLEMS WITHIN NATO - GERMANY

4. The transmission of information to Germany raises particular problems because of the close links with East Germany and the infiltration of long-term German agents. We are considering whether to discuss this bilaterally with the Americans in Washington. Given German sensitivities any discussion of this issue will be very delicate. It is not suggested that the Secretary of State should raise this with Dr Luns.

CALL BY DR LUNS

BRIEF NO 8: SOUTHERN FLANK ISSUES[

Points to Make

Greece and NATO

1. What news of SACEUR's initiative? Prospects do not seem bright. But we are encouraging the Greeks to continue to look for a solution through contacts at the military level.
2. Mr Karamanlis' position very difficult. When he saw the Prime Minister on 24 October he was clearly concerned at continuing deadlock, but held out no hope of flexibility.

Turkey and Portugal

3. We hope to complete our study of further possible gifts of equipment by December.
4. Very difficult to find extra resources for Allies when UK public expenditure under severe pressure; claims of our own Services come first.
5. [Frigates for Portugal: defensive] Same problem. Seems little prospect of NATO members raising the considerable sums involved. We are looking for other ways of helping.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

2 November 1979

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ESSENTIAL FACTS

Greece and NATO

1. Mr Karamanlis on 24 October expressed impatience with the continuing deadlock. Looked to the other Allies to persuade Turkey to accept the terms for Greek reintegration negotiated with the Greek military authorities by SACEUR in 1978. SACEUR's latest proposals for command and control in the Aegean to be divided between Greece, Turkey and a third-country NATO commander were unacceptable, 'politically, nationally and militarily'; the pre 1974 status quo must be restored.
2. The Turks could apparently accept SACEUR's compromise which represents a substantial move in their direction from the pre-1974 arrangements. They seem unlikely to show further flexibility in their present political circumstances. To escalate negotiations to the political level, as the Greeks have threatened to do, would therefore raise the temperature to no useful purpose.
3. Dr Luns was responsible for mandating SACEUR to look for a compromise on the Aegean issue earlier this year. He is personally inclined to be Turcophile.

Portugal and Turkey

4. Dr Luns' efforts to get the Alliance directly involved in economic aid for Turkey last year failed, though Turkey still uses NATO as a platform for economic demands. NATO continues, however, to look into ways of providing military aid to Portugal and Turkey, and Dr Luns takes a close personal interest in this exercise.
5. We have given about £2m-worth of surplus military equipment to Portugal, but have so far found nothing suitable to give Turkey. MOD are currently conducting a further trawl for surplus items which might interest either country, and it is likely that we shall have something to offer before the December Ministerial Meeting.
6. A particular problem is Portugal's desire to acquire modern

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ocean-going frigates at her Allies' expense. Her initial preference was for the British Type 21 frigate, but when it became clear that nobody would fund a purchase, attention switched to the possibility of building Belgian, Dutch or Italian frigates with contributions in kind as well as in cash from NATO members.

7. Mr Pym has ruled that no UK contribution should be made from MOD funds, and it seems unlikely that there will be enough support for the project to get it off the ground. MOD are at present considering whether to offer the Portuguese a loan of RN-Tribal class frigates as an interim solution; a Ministerial decision is expected in November. Nothing has been said about this in NATO.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

2 November 1979

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CALL BY DR LUNS: 7 NOVEMBER  
BRIEF NO 9: DISARMAMENT ISSUES

Points to make

Brezhnev Speech

1. Brezhnev's speech of 6 October has, if anything, increased Alliance resolve to take difficult TNF decisions. But we can expect further intense Soviet pressure over coming weeks, probably aimed in particular at Dutch and Germans.

MBFR

2. Hope Brezhnev's announcement of unilateral troop and tank withdrawals from the GDR indicates the Russians are now prepared to negotiate seriously for an MBFR agreement. The Alliance too must consider how to regain the initiative in the negotiations. Several useful ideas in the pipeline. (German idea for a modified Phase I agreement, US proposal for the unilateral reduction of 1,000 warheads, Associated Measures). Meanwhile, Western negotiators must continue to press the East on data.

French Proposal for a European Disarmament Conference (EDC)

3. Welcome idea of European conference dealing with CBMs as a follow-up to Madrid CSCE Meeting. Mandate should be agreed at Madrid as part of a balanced outcome including human rights. Useful work now in progress in NATO on acceptability of individual CBMs will help determine shape of Western proposals in this area.

4. Proposals for Phase II of an EDC (reductions in conventional armaments) cause difficulty. National limitation could undermine collectivity of the Alliance.

Defence Department  
2 November 1979

ESSENTIAL FACTSMBFR

1. Western negotiators at Vienna have sought, so far without success, to clarify the link between President Brezhnev's announcement of troop and tank withdrawals and the Eastern position in the MBFR negotiations. They also continue to press the East to co-operate in resolving the discrepancy between tabled Eastern figures and Western estimates for Warsaw Pact forces in the reduction areas.
2. Dr Luns will be aware that the Germans are on the point of circulating within the Alliance new proposals for a package of Soviet and US troop withdrawals. This would be a modified Phase I. If such proposals are to be put forward, the Alliance will need to consider carefully whether allowance should be made for Brezhnev's announced unilateral troop and tank withdrawals. The Alliance is also considering a US proposal to announce between now and mid-December the unilateral withdrawal of up to 1,000 nuclear warheads. The US move is largely designed to facilitate TNF decisions in Netherlands, Belgium etc. But it could be useful in MBFR as a response to Brezhnev. It would also help release the US from the offer to reduce certain US nuclear systems in MBFR (Option III).
3. Western proposals for a package of stabilisation and verification measures (Associated Measures) have been delayed by disagreement in NATO primarily between the FRG and the US on two issues: inspection procedures; and the area within which prior notification and observation of activities by forces outside their normal garrison would apply. The UK has tried to find common ground between the FRG and the US so that the package can be tabled at Vienna as soon as possible.

European Disarmament Conference

4. The conference would involve all 35 CSCE states plus Albania and would be in two phases: Phase I would consist of the adoption of mandatory confidence building measures; Phase II would involve reductions and limitations on conventional armaments. There is a danger that the second phase might have an adverse effect on Alliance flexibility. Through the imposition of national ceilings, it is

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doubtful whether Alliance security requirements could be adequately safeguarded in a Phase II negotiation involving all 35 CSCE states.

5. Provided a satisfactory mandate can be negotiated at the Madrid CSCE Review Conference, there are some attractions in a follow-up conference on CBMs corresponding to Phase I of an EDC. But it should not commit us to proceeding to Phase II.

Defence Department

2 November, 1979

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10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

17 October 1979

Visit to London by the  
Secretary General of Nato

Nick Sanders told you in his letter of 28 September that the Prime Minister would be willing to see Dr. Luns on 7 November. I should be grateful to receive a brief for this meeting by close of play on Monday, 5 November.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

Paul Lever, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

*PL*

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NATO

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10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

28 September 1979

VISIT TO LONDON BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF NATO

The Prime Minister has seen your letter of 27 September to Michael Alexander. She would be glad to see Dr. Luns on 7 November, but will not be able to offer him lunch herself and would be glad if Lord Carrington would do so. Perhaps you will get in touch with me or Caroline Stephens to arrange the details of Dr. Luns' visit to No. 10.

I am copying this letter to Brian Norbury (Ministry of Defence).

N. J. SANDERS

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to be 'N. J. Sanders'.

Paul Lever, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

27 September 1979

*Dear Michael,*

VISIT TO LONDON BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF NATO

Our delegation at NATO have informed us that Dr Luns is hoping to come to London to pay a courtesy call on the Prime Minister. He mentioned this in his message of congratulations of 7 May. He also hopes to see the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Secretary of State for Defence. These would be his first formal calls since the Government took office. He would be accompanied by Mr Van Campen, his Directeur du Cabinet.

Dr Luns would like to make all three calls in a single day. He has suggested 5 November or 7 November as possible dates.

Would either of these dates be suitable for the Prime Minister? Lord Carrington would be available on either day. We understand that Mr Pym could also manage either day. If neither date suits the Prime Minister could you suggest an alternative?

The Prime Minister may also wish to consider whether she would like to invite Dr Luns to lunch on one of these dates. If not Lord Carrington would be free to do so.

I am copying this letter to Brian Norbury (Ministry of Defence).

*Yours* *SEH*

*Paul*

(P Lever)

PRIME MINISTER

*I will see him on 7 Nov. Can Lord C. give him lunch?*

*Would you like to see Dr Luns on 7 November (you are free all day)? And would*

M O'D B Alexander Esq  
10 Downing Street

*you like to give him a working lunch with the Foreign Secretary, Defence Secretary, Chiefs*

27 SEP 1979

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