

CONFIDENTIAL FILING

CALLS ON THE PRIME MINISTER BY
THE SAUDI AMBASSADOR.

SAUDI ARABIA

APRIL 1983

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Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
13.4.83							
26.9.82							
17.9.92							
CLOSED							
PREM 19 3930							

● PART April '83 ends:-

Series closed : Future pps
on Saudi Arabia : Meetings
with the Saudi Government.

~~PART~~

~~begins:-~~

MRM



10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

17 September 1992

John Crook

CALL BY THE NEW SAUDI AMBASSADOR

Thank you for your letter of 7 September proposing a call on the Prime Minister by the new Saudi Ambassador.

The Prime Minister has, of course, already met Dr. Alghosaibi since he came to No.10 with Prince Saud.

I will consult the Prime Minister when a suitable moment occurs but I should be very surprised if the Prime Minister has any time to see the Ambassador before the end of our Presidency.

John

Joseph

J. S. WALL

Christopher Prentice Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

RW



Stephen

10 DOWNING STREET

~~Lands~~

(The Lands)

Have they been
proceeding?

∞

No, but I had
better fit in a call in
mid-October? S 7/9



CRP

Foreign &
Commonwealth
Office

London SW1A 2AH

7 September 1992

Dear Stephen,

Call on the new Saudi Ambassador

As I wrote in my letter of ^{*attached*} 17 July, the Foreign Secretary was grateful that the Prime Minister had agreed, exceptionally, to see the new Saudi Arabian Ambassador briefly on 21 July. Dr Alghosaibi was understanding when the Prime Minister had to cancel the call at very short notice. The Foreign Secretary nevertheless hopes that it may be possible to re-schedule it before too long, despite the extraordinary pressure on the Prime Minister's diary during the UK Presidency.

If the call is delayed further there is a danger that the King could take some personal offence. This could then become a point of friction in our relationship with the Saudis. The Ambassador is more articulate and influential than his predecessor and so far friendly. The Foreign Secretary had considered going to Saudi Arabia (and Bahrain) last weekend after Somalia to thank the King and the Ruler for their help on basing, but decided that this would mean too long an absence abroad. If it were possible to fit in a call on the PM by the Saudi Ambassador fairly soon it could serve the same purpose.

*Yours ever
Christopher Prentice.*

(C N R Prentice)
Private Secretary

J S Wall Esq
10 Downing Street



Meeting

postponed.

CERB
ByForeign &
Commonwealth
Office

London SW1A 2AH

17 July 1992

Dear Stephen,

INTRODUCTORY CALL BY THE NEW SAUDI ARABIAN AMBASSADOR

The Foreign Secretary is glad that the Prime Minister has agreed, exceptionally, to see the new Saudi Arabian Ambassador, His Excellency Dr Ghazi Alghosaibi, at 11.45 am on Tuesday 21 July.

Dr Alghosaibi arrived in London on 27 April. He presented his credentials on 1 July. He accompanied the Saudi Foreign Minister, Prince Saud, for his call on the Prime Minister on Friday 3 July.

The new Saudi Ambassador intends to convey a personal message for the Prime Minister from King Fahd. The message is likely to emphasise the strength of UK/Saudi relations after the election. It may also suggest Dr Alghosaibi as a direct conduit between King Fahd and the Prime Minister and the main channel for high-level contact between the British Government and that of Saudi Arabia. This could include communication on the al-Yamamah project.



Our aims in this meeting are to :

- pass thanks to King Fahd for his message;
- ~~and~~ stress the great value HMG places on our close relationship with Saudi Arabia; and
- state our wish to expand cooperation with Saudi Arabia over a wide range of areas.

In recent high-level contacts the Saudis' main preoccupations have been expressed as concern for the safety of Bosnian Muslims; maintenance of pressure on the Iraqi regime; Iran's regional ambitions and progress on the Bahrain/Qatar dispute (over an island in the Gulf).

Dr Algosaibi is a lively and engaging character, who has adopted a much higher profile in London than his predecessor. We welcome this. His success in securing a donation of £150,000 from King Fahd towards Laura Davies' transplant operation was much applauded in the media. A personality note on Dr Algosaibi is enclosed. You will see from this that he was sacked as Minister of Health by King Fahd for writing a poem considered to be unflattering to the King, though Algosaibi was said to be trying to stamp out corruption in the Saudi health sector. Dr Algosaibi was later sent to Bahrain as Ambassador, a post he held until being appointed to London. His appointment is a bold move by the Saudis and signals his reconciliation with King Fahd.

Yours ever,
Christopher Prentice

(C N R Prentice)
Private Secretary

AL GOSAIBI, DR GHAZI

Ambassador to Bahrain since October 1984. Former Minister of Health. Nominated Ambassador to the UK in November 1991: due to take up his appointment in February/March 1992.

Born 1940 in al Hasa. Member of a prominent Eastern Province merchant family. His father represented Saudi Arabia in Bahrain before the formation of the Saudi Foreign Service. Studied at the Universities of Cairo, Southern California and London (where he gained a PhD in International Relations). Joined the teaching staff of Riyadh University and was Dean of Commerce from 1971-73. While at Riyadh University he was appointed Director General of Saudi Arabian Railways. Appointed to the new post of Minister of Industry and Electricity in October 1975. Early in 1977 he caused a stir by cancelling tenders for a number of major rural electrification projects on the grounds that all the bids, which included some from British companies, were inflated. This action on the rural electrification contracts made him, briefly at least, something of a hero.

Appointed Acting Minister of Health in 1982. Appointed to the post substantively in October 1983, and dropped industry. Sacked in 1984 after publishing a poem unflattering to King Fahd. Appointed Ambassador to Bahrain in October 1984. Appeared frequently on Western media during the Gulf crisis, as well as writing a regular column in the international Arabic daily, Al Sharq al Awsat; an articulate and effective spokesman. In 1990-91 circulated pamphlets attacking the religious hardliners; his doing so caused something of a stir, sparking counterblasts from the Islamists and renewed admiration among the liberals.

Self-assured, pleasant and sociable, if somewhat wayward. A devout but modernising Muslim. Has published poetry in both Arabic and English, in which he takes pride, as well as articles on law, politics and literature. Still a very significant figure, despite his - deliberately - marginal post in Bahrain (a second home to the al Gosaibis).

Married to a German, Sigrid; they have two children. Speaks English.





10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

2 June 1992

bupl
sp.

SAUDI ARABIA

Thank you for your letter of 29 May.

The Prime Minister has commented "rather a cheeky letter from Christopher" - on the basis that you talk of our failure to respond to the Ambassador's request for a call on the Prime Minister but you only wrote to me on 29 May and I am replying on 2 June to tell you that the Prime Minister would be prepared to see the Ambassador. We shall not be able to fix anything before July. Perhaps you could liaise with Sandra Phillips over a possible date.

(J.S. WALL)

Christopher Prentice, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

RW



Foreign & Commonwealth Office

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London SW1A 2AH

29 May 1992

Rather a cheeky letter from Christopher (you ought tell him about, too). OK - July. Prime Minister

*'X' is a bit rich. This letter only arrived
Dear Stephen, this morning so any 'failure' is the fault, not
ours. Perhaps we can fix a call in July.*

Saudi Arabia

Steph 1/6

The new Saudi Ambassador, Dr Ghazi Al Gosaibi, has told the Foreign Secretary that he has instructions from King Fahd to seek a call on the Prime Minister.

The Foreign Secretary recognises that this is unusual. But he believes that there are special circumstances in this case which merit serious consideration of the Saudi Ambassador's request.

Dr Gosaibi has already shown that he is likely to adopt a very different (and much higher) profile than that of any of his predecessors. It has also become clear that he has King Fahd's backing for establishing himself as a channel for high-level contacts between HMG and Saudi Arabia. We have already seen evidence of this. Dr Gosaibi was prominent during the Foreign Secretary's meeting with King Fahd on 16 May, and persuaded the King to donate £150,000 to the Laura Davies appeal. He is a serious interlocutor, who is likely to be used by King Fahd in a similar way to Prince Bandar. This may become relevant to the handling of Al Yamamah business, which remains a vital UK interest in Saudi Arabia.

You will have seen from Washington telno 1193 that the Prime Minister may now be seeing Prince Bandar in Washington on 8 June. News of this is likely to get back to Dr Gosaibi quickly and will sit awkwardly with our failure so far to respond to his own request for a call on the Prime Minister.

Against this background, the Foreign Secretary very much hopes that the Prime Minister's diary will permit a call, which need only be brief. This is unlikely, we would assume, to be possible before the 8 June meeting with Prince Bandar,

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but it would be useful to be able to confirm to Dr Gosaibi before then that a firm date for his call at No 10 had been fixed. This would also meet with the conclusion of your own letter of 14 May to Dr Gosaibi that the Prime Minister looked forward to meeting him before too long.

*Yours ever,
Christopher Prentice.*

(C N R Prentice)
Private Secretary

J S Wall Esq CMG LVO
10 Downing Street

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**AL GOSAIBI, DR GHAZI**

Ambassador to United Kingdom. Former Minister of Industry, and of Health.

Born 1940. Member of a prominent Eastern Province merchant family. Although born in Saudi Arabia he moved to Bahrain at the age of 5 where his father represented Saudi Arabia before the formation of the Saudi foreign service. After taking a degree in Law at the University of Cairo he took an MA in International Relations at the University of Southern California and a PhD in the same subject at London Univeristy. Joined the teaching staff of Riyadh University and was Dean of Commerce from 1971-73. While at Riyadh University he was appointed Director General of Saudi Arabian Railways. Appointed to the new post of Minister of Industry and Electricity in October 1975. Early 1977 became something of a hero by cancelling tenders for a number of major rural electrification projects on the grounds that all the bids were inflated. Was Industry Minister throughout the boom years, and played a very significant part in the development of the Kingdom's infrastructure, including the massive industrial cities of Jubail and Yanbu.

Made acting Minister of Health in 1982. Appointed to the post substantively in October 1983, and dropped Industry. As Health Minister, took (and retains) a particular interest in work for the disabled. Accompanied Crown Prince Abdullah on his official visit to Britain in 1984. Sacked in 1984 after publishing a poem unflattering to King Fahd. Appointed Ambassador to Bahrain in October 1984.

Appeared frequently on Western media during the Gulf crisis, as well as writing a regular column in the international Arab daily, Al Sharq al Awsat; an articulate and effective spokesman. In 1991 published a book in Arabic in London "To Avoid Sedition" attacking Saudi Arabia's new religious hardliners; this caused something of a stir, sparking counterblasts from the Islamists. A further book "The Gulf Crisis: An Attempt to Understand", defending the Kingdom's role in the crisis, but also calling for democratic evolution and individual freedom in the Arab world was published in 1992. Has a strong following among Saudi "liberals". Nominated in December 1991 as Ambassador at the Court of St James. Self-assured, pleasant and sociable. Outspoken by Saudi standards. A devout but modernising Muslim. Has published poetry in both Arabic and English, in which he takes pride, as well as articles on law, politics and literature. A significant figure who should inter alia help to raise the Saudi information profile in the UK and Europe.

Married to a German, Sigrid; they have two children. Speaks English.

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File

Foot



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

13 April 1983

CALL BY THE AMBASSADOR OF SAUDI ARABIA ON THE PRIME MINISTER

Sheikh Nasser called on the Prime Minister this afternoon and delivered the enclosed message from King Fahd about the Iran/Iraq war.

The Ambassador explained that he also had instructions to deliver the same message to the Ambassador of the Soviet Union in London (according to Nasser, this was now the established channel for communications between Saudi Arabia and the Soviet Union). Messages would also be delivered to the other permanent members of the UN Security Council. Saudi Arabia hoped that France would take an initiative to bring the matter to Security Council attention. Iraq now wanted to stop the war but the Iranian attitude was more difficult.

The Prime Minister read the message and promised that we would consider it most carefully and would reply. She said that we were all concerned to bring the war to an end. But the real problem was that Iran seemed impervious to advice or exhortation. Matters were somewhat complicated by the new Iranian military offensive.

We were all agreed on the objective of bringing the war to an end but it was more difficult to establish a means of doing this. The Soviet Union might block Security Council action as they had done in 1980. We had been hoping that the UN Secretary General might by virtue of exercising his good offices over the oil slick problem, acquire a standing in the area which would enable him to take steps to make progress towards a settlement.

Sheikh Nasser said that King Fahd sent his best wishes to the Prime Minister. Saudi Arabia was most grateful for Mr. Pym's recent visit to the area and in particular for the efforts he had made in Jordan.

I should be grateful for a draft reply to King Fahd's message, for signature by the Prime Minister, in due course.

John Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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DSG

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T45A/83

cc MASTER
ops

سَفَارَةُ الْمَمْلَكَةِ الْعَرَبِيَّةِ السُّعُودِيَّةِ
لِللندن

SAUDI ARABIAN EMBASSY
LONDON

UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION

The Rt. Hon. Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, PC, MP,
The Prime Minister of the United Kingdom.

I present to you my greetings and sincere compliments and it gives me great pleasure to address this letter to you in view of the belief and eagerness of all of us to co-operate in preserving world security and peace as an undivided whole, which cannot be separated into individual areas. This mutual concept dictates that stability in the Gulf area is the concern of the international community as much as it is the concern of the states of that region, where their common interests converge. It is our belief that such interests cannot conceivably continue and develop while security and stability are not being enjoyed in our area.

We are, Your Excellency, together with the other leaders of the Council for Co-operation of the Arab Gulf States, watching with grave anxiety the present developments in our area caused by the continuation of the war between Iraq and Iran which is increasingly worsening the state of

peace/.....

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SAUDI ARABIAN EMBASSY
LONDON

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peace and security in this area and which requires an all out international effort to put an end to this war which has already lasted nearly three years without any indication of any imminent solution, but becoming rather more ferocious day by day. It is now not only endangering the states of the area, but in fact posing a direct threat to world peace which is violating the principles of the United Nations Organisation and its charter.

Since the outbreak of that war, we have made unceasing efforts together with the other leaders of the Council for Gulf Co-operation in supporting the good offices carried out by the Islamic Conference Organisation, the non-aligned states movement and the United Nations as well as bilateral contacts made by friendly nations in their search for a way out leading to the ending of this war. However, all these efforts have failed up till now to produce a result which would enable the two parties concerned to cease fire and to start negotiations for a settlement of the conflict by peaceful means. This necessitates making united efforts and resorting to more effective means than

have/.....

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LONDON

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have been applied previously. Undoubtedly, you share with us our appreciation of the gravity of the implications which might possibly lead to the extension of the area of conflict. Since the outcome of the prevailing situation cannot be predicted, we are confident that Your Excellency shares our view that the dangers of this situation now necessitate more than ever before that member states of the Security Council should carry out their special responsibility specified by the charter to preserve international peace and security, to put an end to this ruinous war and to ensure the execution of previous resolutions adopted by the Security Council which asked both parties to cease fire and to enter into peaceful negotiations aimed at arriving at a satisfactory solution which would secure the interests of both parties within a framework of international guarantees.

The said resolutions adopted by the Security Council were never implemented because they lacked any means of pressure upon the two belligerent states. Therefore, you may consider that the present developments require that the next Security Council resolution to be expected on this issue should contain some weight which would induce the

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SAUDI ARABIAN EMBASSY
LONDON

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two warring parties to end hostilities such as a stipulation in that resolution to impose - or at least a threat to impose - sanctions against the party which does not respond to the cease fire call and does not observe the terms of other resolutions.

In this connection, we are confident that the efforts made by your country under your wise leadership will have great significance in expediting the end of this catastrophic war, because of our conviction that you share our view that the continuation of the war and the extension of its threat would result in great damage not only to the states of the area but also, going beyond that, would affect the interests of your own country.

We greatly appreciate the important role now being played by your country as a permanent member of the Security Council and the international weight and prestige carried by your country which impose on you grave responsibilities towards world peace. Therefore, we are confident that your sincere efforts would find their way towards success in achieving that peace.

We/.....



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SAUDI ARABIAN EMBASSY
LONDON

-- 5 --

We look forward to hearing in the near future from Your Excellency the results of such efforts, and trust that our good relations will continue to progress and prosper.

CONQUEROR

(Signed)

Fahd Ibn Abdul Aziz
King of Saudi Arabia.

12th April, 1983.





سَفَارَةُ الْمَمْلَكَةِ الْعَرَبِيَّةِ السُّعُودِيَّةِ
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SAUDI ARABIAN EMBASSY
LONDON

م ١٩٨٣/٤/١٢

صاحبة الدولة السيدة مارجريت تاتشر
رئيسة وزراء المملكة المتحدة

اطيب تحياتي مع اصدق التمنيات .

وبعد يطيب لي ان اتوجهه اليكم برسالتي هذه انطلاقا من ايماننا وحرصنا على التعاون من اجل الحفاظ على الامن والسلم الدوليين باعتبارهما كل لا يتجزء ولا يمكن فصلهما من منطقة الى اخرى ، وانطلاقا من هذا المفهوم المشترك فان استقرار منطقة الخليج يهـم دول المنطقة بقدر ما يهـم الاسرة الدولية من حيث التقاء المصالح المشتركة بينها ، تلك المصالح التي لا يمكن تصور استمرارها ونموها حسب اعتقادنا دون ان تنعم منطقتنا بالامن والاستقرار .

اننا يا صاحبة الدولة . نراقب بقلق بالغ مع قادة مجلس التعاون لدول الخليج العربية التطورات الراهنة في منطقتنا بسبب استمرار الحرب الدائرة بين العراق وايران التي تشكل مزيدا من تدهور الامن والسلم في هذه المنطقة الامر الذي يتطلب تضافر الجهود الدولية لوضع حد لهذه الحرب التي مضى عليها قرابة ثلاثة اعوام . دون ظهور اى دلائل تشير الى قرب ايجاد حل لها وهي تزداد حدة يوما بعد يوم وباتت تهدد ليس دول المنطقة فحسب بل تشكل تهديدا مباشرا للسلم العالمي وبما يتنافى مع ميثاق ومبادئ الامم المتحدة .

يا صاحبة الدولة ،

اننا ومنذ اندلاع تلك الحرب لم تتوقف جهودنا مع قادة مجلس التعاون الخليجي في دعم المساعي الحميدة التي تقوم بها منظمة المؤتمر الاسلامي ودول حركة عدم الانحياز والامم المتحدة وكذلك دعم الاتصالات الثنائية التي تقوم بها الدول الصديقة للبحث عن مخرج لانهاء هذه الحرب ، غير ان هذه الجهود لم تتوصل لحد الان الى نتيجة تمكن الطرفين من وقف اطلاق النار وبدء المفاوضات لحل النزاع بالطرق السلمية ، مما يستتبع بالضرورة - تكاتف الجهود واللجوء الى وسائل اكثر فاعلية وتأثيرا مما اتبع في السابق خصوصا



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لندن

SAUDI ARABIAN EMBASSY
LONDON

وانتم تدركون معنا خطورة المضاعفات التي تترتب على احتمال اتساع رقعة النزاع طالما ان الموقف السائد في الوقت الحاضر لا يمكن التكهن به ولذلك فاننا على ثقة من ان دولتكم تشاركوننا الراى بان مخاطر هذا الوضع اصبحت تتطلب اكثر من اى وقت مضى . ضرورة اضطلاع الدول الاعضاء في مجلس الامن بمسؤولياتها الخاصة بموجب الميثاق تجاه صيانة وحفظ السلام والامن الدوليين ، وممارسة كافة الوسائل التي كفلها لها الميثاق من اجل وضع حد لهذة الحرب المدمرة وتنفيذ قرارات مجلس الامن التي طالبت طرفي النزاع بوقف اطلاق النار والدخول في مفاوضات سلمية والوصول الى الحل الذي يكفل مصالح الطرفين في اطار التعهدات الدولية .

ان تلك القرارات التي صدرت عن مجلس الامن لم توضع موضع التنفيذ لانها جاءت خالية من اى شكل من اشكال الضغط على الدولتين المتحاربتين ، ومن ثم فقد ترون ان تطور الامور يقتضي ان يتضمن القرار المنتظر صدوره من مجلس الامن في هذا الصدد ثقلا يوءدى الى تجاوب طرفى الحرب لوقف الاعمال العدائية وذلك من خلال النص في القرار على فرض عقوبات او التهديد بفرضها على الاقل على الطرف الذى لا يستجيب لاييقاف اطلاق النار وتنفيذ بنود القرارات الاخرى .

وفى هذا المجال فاننا على يقين بان الجهود التي ستبذل من قبل بلدكم بقيادتكم الحكيمة ستكون لها اهميتها البالغة فى المساعدة على التعجيل فى وضع حد لهذة الحرب المدمرة ، انطلاقا من قناعتنا بانكم تشاركوننا الراى بان استمرار هذة الحرب واتساع دائرته مخاطرها سوف يعودان بالضرر البالغ ليس على دول المنطقة فحسب وانما ستتعدى ذلك للمساس بمصلحة بلادكم . اننا نقدر الدور الكبير الذى يلعبه بلدكم بصفته عضوا فى مجلس الامن ، وبما لبلدكم من ثقل دولي ووزن عالمي تقع على عاتقه مسؤوليات جسام تجاه السلام العالمي ، فاننا لعلى ثقة بان جهودكم المخلصة سوف تجد طريقها للنجاح تجاه تحقيق السلام ، متطلعا الى ان اسمع من فخامتكم نتائج هذة الجهود فى المستقبل القريب . راجيا لعلاقاتنا الطيبة اضطراد التقدم والازدهار

فهد بن عبدالعزيز

ملك المملكة العربية السعودية



CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

John Selous

Saudi Ambassador's Call on the
Prime Minister, Wednesday 13
April at 4 pm

/ I enclose briefing, a fact sheet and a personality note for the Saudi Ambassador's call on the Prime Minister tomorrow.

The Saudi Embassy have now told us that the personal message from King Fahd which Sheikh Nasser wishes to deliver concerns the Iran-Iraq War: they have asked that the subject matter of the call should not be revealed to the press.

The message will probably be similar to representations already received from the Amirs of Bahrain, Qatar and Kuwait. The Prime Minister has replied to the Amir of Bahrain's letter; replies to the others are being held until Mr Pym returns from his visit to Saudi Arabia and the UAE. The timing of King Fahd's message, which may be part of similar approaches to the three Western members of the Security Council, was probably dictated by the Iranian offensive which began on 10 April. Preliminary indications are that this is on a small scale, and the Iranians are fighting in their own territory; but the possibility that the Iranians may expand the offensive into Iraq cannot be ruled out.

/ Contingency briefs on other matters of current interest in Anglo/Saudi relations, and on Arab/Israel, are also enclosed. But Sheikh Nasser is unlikely to raise seriously matters of substance other than those covered in King Fahd's letter. He is not kept fully in the picture by Riyadh on Saudi policies (this applies particularly to trade and defence sales subjects) and is unlikely yet to have had a report on Mr Pym's visit to Saudi Arabia.

[Handwritten signature]
(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

SAUDI AMBASSADOR'S CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER: 13 APRIL 1983

ANGLO/SAUDI RELATIONS

POINTS TO MAKE

General

1. Delighted Mr Pym's visit to Saudi Arabia went so well. Our view points are close in many areas, and it is important that there should be frequent exchanges of views at a high level.

Visits

2. Does King Fahd have plans to visit his home in Britain soon? If he does, should be delighted to see him as I did in 1981. Hope Crown Prince Abdullah will be able to set dates for his visit soon, also Prince Naif. Trade and Energy Secretaries very much looking forward to taking up their invitations to the Kingdom soon.

UK Press Treatment of Saudi Arabia [Defensive]

3. Cannot control British media, making fuss only draws attention to negative stories. Delighted Joint Cultural Committee now going ahead. Should do much to foster positive treatment by media.

Saudi Ambassador's complaint about Israeli satellite [Defensive]

4. Our experts are studying your letter to Mr Pym, and will let you have a considered reply shortly. But ITU is a technical body, not a political one.

BACKGROUND

Visits

1. King Fahd, when still Crown Prince, visited London privately in September 1981 and had lunch with the Prime Minister: [not for disclosure: we have heard, in confidence, that he may be planning to come to Britain for medical treatment later this year]. The Private Secretary's report of Mr Pym's visit to Saudi Arabia is attached. The Prime Minister has written to Crown Prince Abdullah, inviting him to pay an official visit to Britain some time this year. The King has accepted, but has yet to suggest dates. The Minister of the Interior, Prince Naif, has a long-standing invitation from the Home Secretary, but again, no dates have yet been agreed. On outward visits, both Lord Cockfield and Mr Lawson have outstanding invitations from their Saudi opposite numbers: Mr Lawson has suggested dates in May, but these are difficult for Shaikh Yamani.

UK Press Treatment of Saudi Arabia


2. Saudis prickly on UK media treatment (although Prince Saud had a rare word of praise for their handling of the Arab/Israel problem when he was here with the Arab League Delegation). Following Death of a Princess row in 1980, we proposed 'Joint Cultural Committee' as a sop. Never really got off the ground, but Saudi Ambassador has revived idea: under pressure from him, remit has now been agreed ('promote public appreciation of Saudi/British relations in the two countries .. encourage exchange of visits .. etc.') and we have agreed to see if Sir I Gilmour will chair Committee.

/Saudi Ambassador's



Saudi Ambassador's complaint about Israeli satellite

3. Shaikh Nasir has written to the Secretary of State concerning an Israeli application to the International Telecommunications Union to reserve an orbit for a communications satellite which the Saudis claim would be too close to that fixed for a proposed Saudi satellite. They believe satellite could also be used for espionage. Have asked us to object to Israeli application. Our reply will probably be on lines that ITU takes its decisions on technical, not political, grounds and we have no standing to interfere.



GRS 580

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FM ABU DHABI 110750Z APRIL 83
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 99 OF 11 APRIL 83

RPTD IMMEDIATE TO MIDDLE EAST POSTS (INCLUDING RIYADH)

WASHINGTON , UKMIS NEW YORK , MOSCOW AND PEKING .

SAVING TO EC POSTS (FCO PSE PASS)

FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

SECRETARY OF STATE'S VISIT TO SAUDI ARABIA

1. THE SECRETARY OF STATE VISITED RIYADH FROM 8 TO 10 APRIL AT THE INVITATION OF PRINCE SAUD, RENEWED DURING THE ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION VISIT TO LONDON ON 18 MARCH . HE HAD TWO GOOD SESSIONS WITH SAUD, A SUBSTANTIAL TALK WITH PRINCE SULTAN (MINISTER OF DEFENCE) AND A LONG AUDIENCE WITH THE KING, AS WELL AS CALLS ON CROWN PRINCE ABDULLAH AND PRINCE NAIF (MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR). THE SAUDIS APPEARED TO GO OUT OF THEIR WAY TO BE FRIENDLY AND ACCOMMODATING AND GAVE MR PYM A WARM RECEPTION. THERE WAS AN IMPRESSIVE TURN-OUT OF MINISTERS AND BUSINESSMEN AT PRINCE SAUD'S DINNER FOR HIM. THE LONG WRANGLE OVER PLO INCLUSION IN THE ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION WAS NOT MENTIONED AT ALL. IT WAS NOTICEABLE THAT SAUD BEGAN THE TALKS BY SAYING HOW SUCCESSFUL THE ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION VISIT HAD BEEN.

2. THE MAIN SUBJECT IN ALL THE DISCUSSIONS WAS, PREDICTABLY, ARAB/ISRAEL. WE HAVE REPORTED SEPARATELY THE VIEWS OF FAHD AND SAUD ON THIS . THEY WERE CLEARLY ANXIOUS THAT KING HUSSEIN WAS ABOUT TO DECLARE A HALT TO HIS NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE PLO AND SAID THEY HAD BEEN ADVISING HIM AGAINST IT, BUT THE NEWS THAT HE HAD DONE SO DID NOT BREAK UNTIL AFTER OUR DEPARTURE FROM RIYADH. THE SECRETARY OF STATE DID NOT GET THE IMPRESSION THAT THE SAUDIS HAD BEEN IN THE SAME CLOSE CONTACT WITH THE PLO OVER THE CRUCIAL PERIOD. IN GENERAL THEY WERE HIGHLY CRITICAL OF WHAT THEY SEE AS THE ONE-SIDED AMERICAN ATTITUDE IN ARAB/ISRAEL AFFAIRS AND POINTED UP THE FAILURE TO GET THE ISRAELIS OUT OF LEBANON AS BEING PARTICULARLY DAMAGING TO AMERICAN CREDIBILITY. THERE WAS SOME INCLINATION TOO TO SAY THAT EUROPEAN STATEMENTS ON THE MIDDLE EAST WERE ALL VERY WELL, BUT THAT WE SHOULD BE DOING MORE TO GET THE AMERICANS TO PUT EFFECTIVE PRESSURE ON THE ISRAELIS.

CONFIDENTIAL

/3.

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3. IRAN/IRAQ WAS DISCUSSED AT SOME LENGTH WITH SAUD (REPORTEDLY SEPARATELY) BUT THE KING DID NOT MENTION IT AND IN THE LIGHT OF WHAT WAS HAPPENING IN AMMAN IT WAS UNDERSTANDABLY NOT THE MAJOR PREOCCUPATION OF THE SAUDIS. SAUD'S ADVOCACY OF THE GCC WISH TO SEE THE SECURITY COUNCIL COUNCIL INVOLVED LACKED REAL CONVICTION. THERE WAS NO SIGN THAT HE HAD THOUGHT THROUGH THIS PROPOSAL AND ITS POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS.

4. ON THE BILATERAL FRONT, IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE VISITS BY LORD COCKFIELD AND MR LAWSON WILL BE WELCOME. ON THE SAUDI SIDE, THE INVITATIONS TO ABDULLAH AND NAIF WERE RENEWED, BUT WE WERE UNABLE TO GET ANY COMMITMENTS OUT OF THOSE CONCERNED AS TO WHEN THEY MIGHT COME IN PRACTICE. AS FAR AS DEFENCE WAS CONCERNED THE TALK WITH SULTAN WAS CHARACTERISED BY PLAIN SPEAKING ON BOTH SIDES. IT WAS CLEAR THAT HE IS COMMITTED TO GULF STANDARDISATION ON AMERICAN EQUIPMENT AND WILL CONTINUE TO CAUSE US TROUBLE OVER TORNADO FOR OMAN BUT HE NEVERTHELESS SHOWED SOME INTEREST IN POSSIBLE PURCHASE OF BRITISH WEAPONS, INCLUDING CHALLENGER (SEPARATE REPORTING TELEGRAMS TO MODUK). THE SECRETARY OF STATE WAS ABLE TO RAISE WITH BOTH SAUD AND NAIF THE THREE CONSULAR CASES CAUSING US MOST CONCERN (CARMICHAEL, HANLEY/CLARK AND ERLICH).

5. ON OIL, THE SAUDIS APPEARED RELIEVED THAT OPEC'S NEW MEASURES SEEMED TO BE HOLDING THE OIL MARKET STEADY AT LEAST FOR THE TIME BEING. KING FAHD DID NOT RAISE THE QUESTION: YAMANI SAID THAT THE SPOT PRICE OF ARABIAN LIGHT WAS NOW ONLY JUST BELOW THE OFFICIAL PRICE AND APPEARED GRATEFUL FOR BNO'S CONTRIBUTION TO MARKET STABILITY.

WALKER

(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

MIDDLE EAST

STANDARD

NENAD	MAED
MED	ESSD
NAD	ERD
SAD	ESID
UND	CONS D
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ECD	MR EGERTON
WED	MR THOMAS
RID	MR HAYES
SEC D	CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE

-2-
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SAUDI AMBASSADOR'S CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER: 13 APRIL 1983

ARAB/ISRAEL

POINTS TO MAKE

1. Jordanian Government statement a setback. PLO may well have missed a crucial opportunity. But we all have an interest in ensuring that this is not the end of the road. Important to keep the Americans engaged.
2. Jordanian statement came after Mr Pym's most useful talks with King Fahd and Prince Saud. Any information on what the PLO now intend to do?



SAUDI AMBASSADOR'S CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER: 13 APRIL 1983

ARAB/ISRAEL

BACKGROUND

1. Abu Dhabi telegram number 99 (attached to Anglo/Saudi relations brief) summarises the Secretary of State's talks in Saudi Arabia. They took place before the release of the Jordanian Government statement announcing that it had not been possible for the PLO to reach agreement on the political course mapped out by Hussein and Arafat. When Mr Pym spoke later on the telephone to Prince Saud, the latter evinced some optimism that the statement might not be King Hussein's last word, and confirmed that the Saudis were urging the Jordanians and the PLO to continue their talks. The Americans believe that the Jordanian statement may have been intended to increase the pressure on Arafat: it left the door open to further exchanges with the PLO if the PLO wished to do so. But the chances of Arafat agreeing to a formula satisfactory to King Hussein and to the US must now be slim. Without Arafat's support, the King cannot move forward.



SAUDI AMBASSADOR'S CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER

SAUDI ARABIA: FACT SHEET

Land Area: 927,000 square miles

Population: 5/6 million Saudis plus up to 2 million expatriates, including 30,000 British subjects.

Oil Production: maximum capacity: up to 11 m.b.p.d.
1982: 6.3 m.b.d.
Present figure: 3.2 m.b.d.

UK exports: 1982 £1,320 million (2% of UK total exports).

Position in UK export table: 9

UK defence sales: 1982 £640 million (figure inflated by renewal of two major support contracts).



SHAIKH NASSER HAMAD ALMANQOUR

Shaikh Nasser Almanqour was born in 1926 in the Sudayr district of Nejd. He is married with children. He graduated in Arts at the University of Cairo in 1951, and worked for eight years in the Ministry of Education including two years as Rector of Riyadh University.

From 1959 to 1964 his public appointments included Minister of State for Prime Ministerial Affairs, and Labour and Social Affairs; and managing the Saudi National Electricity and Cement Companies. He was Ambassador to Japan (accredited also to the Republic of China (Taiwan) and Korea) until 1968, and then Ambassador to Sweden, Denmark, Norway and Spain. Shaikh Nasser has been Ambassador to the United Kingdom since October 1980.

He is an affable, lively man and an experienced and shrewd diplomatist. Recently recovered from an operation on his leg.



SAUDI AMBASSADOR'S CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER: 13 APRIL 1983

IRAN/IRAQ

POINTS TO MAKE

1. We are deeply concerned about the war. European Council Statement on 22 March made this clear.
2. Have studied GCC proposals. Have doubts about effectiveness of UN Security Council.
3. But UN Secretary-General retains some personal standing with Iran and we have discreetly encouraged him to engage in limited mediation to explore, for example, a temporary ceasefire to enable leaking oil well to be capped (see 5 below). This might increase his standing to mediate the wider conflict.

Military Situation

4. Small-scale Iranian offensive (3-4 brigades) launched on 10 April confined so far to attempts to recapture Iranian territory. Although Iranians capable of deploying large numbers of troops, Iraqis well equipped to hold.

Oil Slick

5. Understand your concern. Time is running out if Gulf Coast is not to suffer pollution on large scale. Therefore in Gulf States' interests to persuade Iraqis to soften terms for temporary ceasefire.

[Defensive]

Further Action at the UN

- 6 (a) Do not believe that condemnatory statements, however strong, will be heeded by Iran - they ignored Security Council's mandatory resolution calling for the release of the US Embassy hostages.

(b) A Security Council resolution with teeth would not encourage moderates in Tehran. It would infuriate, and unite all behind extremist policies in face of hostile world opinion.

(c) The Russians would either veto a resolution with teeth as in 1980 (posing as Iran's protector) or, if they approved one, might become dangerously influential in the imposition of a settlement.

(d) What sanctions would be effective? Moratorium on financial assistance? Oil embargo? All very dangerous. Would there be general international support for applying these to Iran alone? Iran is also less isolated now than in 1980.

(e) Have GCC members looked at practical aspects of ending the war, e.g. how to make Iranians bite on compensation offer? With the world oil price tending downward, there would be advantages in Iran's seizing the offer quickly.

(f) Best policy for Arabs is to keep probing Iranians on what they will settle for (instead of promoting acrimonious Security Council debate).



COVERING SECRET

IRAN/IRAQ

ESSENTIAL FACTS

A,B,C, D

1. The Prime Minister has recently received letters from the Amirs of Bahrain, Qatar and Kuwait asking Western permanent members of the Security Council to canvass for mandatory statement. We are promised similar letters from other GCC states. Moderate Arabs believe such action would be a rallying point to peace party within Iran, and that failure to act by the UN would be interpreted in Tehran as an invitation to continue fighting. The Prime Minister's reply to the Amir of Bahrain emphasised our willingness to support all efforts to achieve a negotiated settlement.

EEuropean Council

F

2. Statement issued on 22 March following European Council meeting in Brussels stressed partners' concern at continuation of war and their wish to see an early negotiated settlement.

Military Situation

3. See Attached DIS assessment.

Oil Slick

4. In early March small Nowruz oil field 50 miles northwest of Kharg Island was set alight. It had begun leaking in February. Slick is now very large, drifting south and seems certain to cause problems for Gulf States (particularly if it entered desalination plants). UK specialists standing by to clear Saudi coastline. But Iraqis insist that any ceasefire must be supervised by the UN Security Council. This would be unacceptable to Iranians who have ignored all previous calls by the Security Council for a ceasefire because they say the Security Council failed to consider

/ Iran's



9 Iran's interests when Iraq invaded in September 1980. UN Secretary-General and Cordovez working behind scenes to try to reach a settlement between the two sides. Regional Organisation for Protection of Maritime Environment (ROPME), comprising all States bordering on the Gulf, met in Kuwait in early April to consider problem, but broke up without reaching a solution.

Security Classification ----- 15 spaces ----->

Message Instructions ----- 15 spaces ----->

UK SECRET

MOD Form 140

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Precedences

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TEXT Security Classification

DIG(s) Only

UK SECRET

Special Handling Caveat Only

DIG U2G

IRAN/IRAQ WA R. FROM DI4. ONE. ON 10 APR AT 1930 GMT (2300 IRANIAN TIME) IRANIAN TROOPS
RESUMED THE ATTACK AFTER A PAUSE OF SOME TWO MONTHS. THIS SIGNAL GIVES INITIAL IMPRESSIONS
WHICH MAY HAVE TO BE REVISED WHEN MORE INFORMATION BECOMES AVAILABLE. TWO. IRANIAN
COMMITTED NO MORE THAN THREE OR AT THE MOST FOUR BRIGADES OVER A 20 KM FRONT. THESE WERE
A MIXTURE OF IRANIAN ARMY AND REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS WITH SOME BASIJ. NO INFORMATION ON
STRENGTHS AVAILABLE. THERE ARE INDICATIONS OF TIGHTER CONTROL AND BETTER CO-ORDINATION
THAN IN FEB ATTACKS. IRAQIS ALMOST CERTAINLY AWARE OF IMPENDING ATTACK FROM Ponderous
PREPARATIONS. THREE. THIS ATTACK HAD PROBABLY ONLY LIMITED OBJECTIVES WHICH WERE ACHIEVED
IN MOST CASES. MAJORITY OF FIGHTING SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN INSIDE IRAN WITH ONLY LIMITED
INCURSIONS INTO IRAQ BUT EVIDENCE IS CONFLICTING. PUBLIC CLAIMS BY BOTH SIDES OF THEIR

Special Distribution
See note 9

File Reference

DRAFTER'S NAME
(Block letters)

Extension

Branch

RELEASING OFFICER'S
Signature

Page 1 of 2 Pages

Have you referred to a
classified message ?
(Answer YES or NO in box)

Grade/
Rank

Name
(Block letters)

PRIORITY

~~UK SECRET~~

121510 APR

SUCCESS ~~AND~~ THE NUMBER OF CASUALTIES THEY HAVE INFLECTED ARE AS USUAL GROSS EXAGGERATIONS

AND WE CANNOT YET MAKE ANY ESTIMATES OF TRUE FIGURES. KHOMEINI'S SPEECH ON 10 APR SAYING

THAT IRAN SHOULD COMPEL IRAQI FORCES TO WITHDRAW UNTIL IRANS TOWNS AND CITIES WERE SAFE

FROM ARTILLERY AND MISSILE ATTACK AND TEHRAN RADIOS REPORT OF RENEWED ATTACK EARLY ON 12

APRIL SUGGEST THAT THIS IS ONLY FIRST PHASE OF LARGER ATTACK. MAIN IRANIAN ARMoured

FORMATIONS IN THE AREA WERE NOT COMMITTED IN OPERATIONS ON 10 APR. DOUBTS STILL REMAIN OVER

ABILITY OF IRANIANS TO SUSTAIN ~~OPERATIONS~~ OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS. FOUR BAGHDAD RADIO IN A

PERSIAN LANGUAGE BROADCAST AT 0600 ON 12 APR HAS WARNED IRAN THAT IT WOULD USE QUOTE NEW

MODERN WEAPONS WHICH HAVE NOT BEEN USED BEFORE FOR HUMANITARIAN AND ETHICAL REASONS UNQUOTE.

THIS IS ASSUMED TO REFER TO CHEMICAL WARFARE. THE THREAT MAY BE PART OF IRAQ'S PROPAGANDA

WAR BUT IT COULD ALSO INDICATE A CERTAIN LACK OF CONFIDENCE. FIVE. ON BALANCE WE CONSIDER

THAT IRAN IS UNLIKELY TO ACHIEVE A BREAKTHROUGH.

Special Distribution
See note 9

SODGI NA/DCDS(I) SO/ACDS(I)

File Reference D/DI4C/7/B

SO DDI (ROW) ASSESSMENTS STAFF

DRAFTER'S NAME
(Block letters) H O HUGH SMITH

DEF CTS

Extension 2773 Branch DI 4

RELEASING OFFICER'S
Signature*H O Hugh Smith*Page 2
of
1 PagesHave you referred to a
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(Answer YES or NO in box)

NO

Grade/
Rank LT COLName
(Block letters) H O HUGH SMITH



General Staff Map Section GSGS 11193 Ed 1 - GSGS November 1982

بِسْمِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ



28th February 1983

H E the Hon Margaret Thatcher
Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
London SW1
England
United Kingdom

Madam Prime Minister

We feel sure that Your Excellency will agree with us that the international peace and security of the world is entirely integrated and that one region cannot be isolated from another in this respect. Security, as you are certainly aware, is indivisible. Accordingly, the stability of the Gulf region is as important to the other States of the world as it is to the States of that region by virtue of the many important mutual interests involved. Such mutual interests cannot be preserved and developed unless the States of the region are able to enjoy peace and security, and this peace and security has become seriously threatened by the continuation for approximately the last three years of the war between Iraq and Iran.

Peace cannot be maintained in the Gulf unless an end is put to this war. Hostilities have recently intensified and it has become the urgent duty of all States to discover a more effective means to secure peace than those previously sought by the United Nations, in particular through the Security Council, the Organisation of Islamic Countries and the Organisation of Non-Aligned Countries, and by certain friendly States.

The continuation of the war between Iraq and Iran will generate serious instability in the Gulf region. As long as the current situation remains unpredictable this war will jeopardise both the regional and individual safety of the States of the region and the freedom of navigation in the Gulf. Moreover, it will prejudice international peace and security contrary to the terms of the United Nations Charter.

Your Excellency, it is not unknown to you that the States of the Gulf Cooperation Council have made considerable efforts to find a means to end the Iraq-Iran war, and to arrest the consequent wastage and drain of human and financial resources. We have however, been unable to date to find a way to ensure that the two parties will cease hostilities and will enter into negotiations to solve their dispute by peaceful means.

بِسْمِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ



Page 2

The States which comprise the United Nations Security Council bear a special responsibility under the United Nations Charter to maintain international peace and security. The Charter prescribes the measures to be taken whenever such international peace and security is threatened. We consider that the States of the Security Council have not yet done their utmost to secure an end to the war between Iraq and Iran.

We write to urge you to give further consideration to the possibility of applying the measures contained in the United Nations Charter, in the strongly held belief that the application of such measures will bring an end to a war which has exhausted both countries, destroyed their economic structures and undermined the stability of the entire Gulf region.

We look forward to learning of your views in this connection, and remain confident that you will take the necessary measures to ensure the maintenance of peace in the Gulf region.

Please accept, Your Excellency, the assurance of our highest consideration.

Yours sincerely,

Isa bin Sulman Al-Khalifa
Amir of the State of Bahrain

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FM UKMIS NEW YORK 252345Z MAR 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TEL NO 170 OF 25 MARCH 1983

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30 MAR 1983		
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MIPT: MESSAGE FROM AMIR OF QATAR TO THE PRIME MINISTER

38

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF LETTER DATED 12 MARCH:

MADAM PRIME MINISTER,
AS WE ALL KNOW, IT IS AN ESTABLISHED FACT THAT WORLD PEACE AND SECURITY ARE INTEGRAL, AND THAT THEIR DISTURBANCE IN ANY PART OF THE WORLD AFFECTS ALL OTHER AREAS. IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT NATIONS OF THE WORLD ARE LINKED IN COMMON MAJOR INTERESTS TO THE STATES OF THE GULF REGION, PEACE AND SECURITY IN THIS PARTICULAR REGION ARE OF CONCERN NOT ONLY TO ITS COUNTRIES BUT TO ALL COUNTRIES. IT IS NOT POSSIBLE FOR THESE INTERESTS TO BE MAINTAINED AND DEVELOPED EXCEPT BY PRESERVING PEACE AND SECURITY IN THIS REGION WHICH IS THREATENED BY THE GRAVEST DANGERS OF THE CONTINUING IRAN/IRAQ WAR, NOW IN ITS THIRD YEAR.

THE UNITED NATIONS, PARTICULARLY THE SECURITY COUNCIL, THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE ORGANISATION, THE NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES AND SOME FRIENDLY STATES HAVE ALL TRIED TO END THIS WAR. THESE ATTEMPTS HAVE NOT ONLY BEEN INCONCLUSIVE, BUT THE WAR HAS INTENSIFIED.

YOUR EXCELLENCY ARE AWARE THAT THE MEMBER STATES OF THE GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL HAVE, IN TURN, DEVOTED GREAT EFFORTS TO FIND A WAY OUT OF THIS WAR AND TO PUT AN END TO ITS CONSEQUENT HORRIBLE BLOODSHED AND DESTRUCTION OF HUGE MATERIAL AND HUMAN RESOURCES. THE OUTCOME OF THOSE ATTEMPTS, LIKEWISE, HAS NOT BROUGHT US NEARER TO A CEASEFIRE OR POSSIBLE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO PARTIES CONCERNED TO SETTLE THEIR CONFLICT BY PEACEFUL MEANS.

IN THE FACE OF THIS SERIOUS SITUATION, IT HAS BECOME THE DUTY OF ALL OF US TO SEEK MEANS OTHER THAN THOSE ALREADY PROBED, IN ORDER TO PRESERVE STABILITY AND GUARANTEE FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION IN THE GULF AND SAFEGUARD THE SECURITY OF ITS STATES TO WHICH WORLD PEACE AND SECURITY ARE STRONGLY LINKED.

IF IS MY FIRM BELIEF THAT YOUR EXCELLENCY WOULD AGREE WITH ME THAT THE CONTINUATION OF THIS WAR, AND THE POSSIBLE EXPANSION OF ITS SCOPE, THREATEN WITH A WORLD WAR THAT WOULD EXPOSE MANKIND TO ANNIHILATION. THE UN CHARTER HAS PLACED A SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY ON THE FIVE PERMANENT MEMBER COUNTRIES OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL REGARDING MAINTAINING WORLD PEACE AND SECURITY. FRANKNESS REQUIRES ME TO CONVEY TO YOU THAT WE FEEL, AS FAR AS THE IRAN/IRAQ WAR IS CONCERNED, THE FIVE COUNTRIES HAVE NOT MADE ALL THE EFFORTS THAT CONFORM WITH THAT RESPONSIBILITY. IT IS OUR VIEW THAT THE TIME HAS COME TO LAUNCH GREATER EFFORTS BASED ON MANDATORY EFFECTIVE

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MEANS WHICH ARE PROVIDED FOR IN THE UN CHARTER WHEN WORLD PEACE AND SECURITY ARE ENDANGERED.

MADAM PRIME MINISTER,
WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT YOU FULLY REALISE THE GRAVITY OF THE SITUATION RESULTING FROM THE IRAN/IRAQ WAR. IN FACT, IF CONTINUED, THIS WAR WOULD LEAD TO THE MOST DISASTROUS CONSEQUENCIES NOT ONLY FOR THE TWO BELLIGERENT PARTIES OR THE WHOLE REGION BUT FOR THE WORLD AT LARGE. IT IS, THEREFORE, OUR GREATEST HOPE THAT THE POSSIBLE APPLICATION OF THE MEANS PRESCRIBED BY THE UN CHARTER FOR SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES WOULD RECEIVE YOUR CAREFUL CONSIDERATION. HOWEVER, I AM CONFIDENT THAT YOU WILL DO YOUR UTMOST, UNDER THE CHARTER, TO HELP BRING PEACE IN OUR REGION.

WHILE LOOKING FORWARD TO RECEIVING YOUR VIEWS IN THIS RESPECT, PLEASE ACCEPT, MADAM PRIME MINISTER, THE ASSURANCES OF MY HIGHEST CONSIDERATION.

SIGNED
KHALIFA BIN HAMAD AL-THANI
AMIR OF THE STATE OF QATAR

THOMSON

LIMITED)
MED)
PS
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR J. LEAHY
MR E & ERTON

COPIES SENT TO
No. 10 DOWNING STREET

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CONFIDENTIAL

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ



From Jaber Al-Ahmed Al-Sabah

To Her Excellency Mrs. Margaret Thatcher
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom.

Your Excellency,

It is doubtless that your excellency share with us the realization of the continued and devastating tragedy caused by the continuation of the bleeding armed conflict between Iran and Iraq for these two neighbouring countries and their peoples. The serious menace and harm created by the breakout and continuation of this conflict, not only for the states of this vital area of the world, but also for the maintenance of international peace and security, are too evident to be elaborated.

While joining the whole world in its deep regret for the lack of success of any of the several efforts made so far by various states and international bodies to put an end to this dangerous conflict and find a just solution to all pending questions between the two combating countries, we believe that the international community, represented by the U.N., should not cease for a single moment its efforts to terminate this tragedy which is daily causing great numbers of victims from both peoples. Indeed if the U.N. failed in this domain, it would thus fail to fulfil the essence of its existence and the justification for its continuation, namely the preservation of peace and the promulgation of mutual understanding and cooperation amongst brothers in humanity.

To be more specific, we in Kuwait do not believe that the United Nations, particularly the Security Council, have exhausted all available ways and means in their attempt to find an appropriate solution to stop this destructive war. The efforts made by the U.N. including the Security Council resolutions and the Secretary

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ



- 2 -

General's mediation efforts are highly appreciated. But speaking with frankness made imperative by our deep feelings of, and immediate proximity to, this problem, nevertheless, we believe that these efforts are not sufficient and there is more to be done by the Security Council which bears special responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security as stipulated by the charter.

Accordingly, your excellency, we call upon the Security Council to intensify its efforts and to commence without any delay its direct and continuous tackling of this conflict with the aim of reaching ^{an} the adequate formula to end it. In this endeavour the Security Council should spare none of the practical measures that are within the mandate vested in it by the charter. In this respect we refer to the special responsibilities shouldered by the permanent members of the Security Council. In our opinion the situation in this area no longer requires further resolutions that are merely content with appeals and the display of good will. It is high time to move into what is more positive and effective. Only this we believe would preserve for the U.N. its dignity and justifies the confidence in its viability by all peoples.

Finally, your excellency, we are certain that the entire world will share with Kuwait the due expression of appreciation for the special attention given by the permanent members of the Security Council and for the urgent measures they undertake towards this matter.

Please accept, your excellency, our most sincere wishes coupled with our highest esteem and consideration.

(Sgd.)

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PP UKMIS NEW YORK
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FM FCO 081645Z APR 83

TO IMMEDIATE KUWAIT

TELEGRAM NUMBER 67 OF 8 APRIL

AND TO IMMEDIATE RIYADH (FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY):
INFO PRIORITY TO OTHER GULF POSTS, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK,
MOSCOW, PARIS, BAGHDAD AND TEHRAN

MIPT: IRAN/IRAQ

1. IN HANDING OVER THE MESSAGE, RASHID AL RASHID KEPT TO THE
LINE TAKEN BY HIS FOREIGN MINISTER WITH MR HURD
ON 26 MARCH. KUWAIT ENVISAGES A NEW INITIATIVE BY THE UN
SECRETARY-GENERAL UNDER ARTICLE 99 OF THE CHARTER, THE GROUND
HAVING BEEN CAREFULLY PREPARED IN ADVANCE WITH THE PERMANENT
MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WOULD
THEN VISIT BAGHDAD AND TEHRAN AND REPORT BACK TO THE SECURITY
COUNCIL. IT WOULD THEN BE UP TO THE PERMANENT MEMBERS TO
ENSURE THAT PROGRESS WAS MADE, IF NECESSARY BY INTRODUCING A
RESOLUTION QUOTE WITH TEETH UNQUOTE, ALTHOUGH RASHID WAS UN-
CERTAIN WHAT THIS MIGHT MEAN IN PRACTICE. HE ALSO ADMITTED THAT
THE PRESENT STATE OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE SUPERPOWERS WOULD
MAKE IT MORE DIFFICULT TO COORDINATE IN ADVANCE THE EFFORTS OF
THE PERMANENT MEMBERS.

2. HE HAD JUST COME FROM MOSCOW, WHERE HE CLAIMED THE RUSSIANS
HAD BEEN RECEPTIVE TO HIS APPROACH. HE FLIES ON TO WASHINGTON
ON 10 APRIL, BUT IS FINDING IT HARD TO GET AN APPOINTMENT TO SEE
DE CUELLAR IN NEW YORK. BUT HE CLAIMED THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
HAD INDICATED A GENERAL WILLINGNESS TO OLY BALL WHEN THE
KUWAITI FOREIGN MINISTER DISCUSSED HIS PLAN WITH HIM AT THE NAM
SUMMIT LAST MONTH.

PYM

LIMITED

MED

UND

NEWS

PS

PS/MR HURD

PS/PUS

SIR J LEAHY

SIR J BULLARD

MR EGERTON

CONFIDENTIAL



E A
W15
to help for advice
in solution this
should be sent to
the UN
by the UN in par

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

21 March 1983

NIBBO 21/1	
24 MAR 1983	
[Signature]	

SRJ
PS/Asst
to Sir S. Hea
An Exeter
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Your Highness.

I am grateful for your letter about the urgent need to take steps to secure an early end to the war between Iran and Iraq.

We are very conscious of the enormous loss of human life, the grave suffering of the civilian population, and the material destruction caused by this conflict. We are also aware of the threat to the security of our friends in the Gulf which any expansion of the fighting would cause. In 1982 we supported the two Security Council Resolutions calling on both sides to initiate a ceasefire and withdrawal to internationally recognised frontiers.

It is very unfortunate that the various attempts to reach a settlement have so far proved unsuccessful. I am not sure how much influence we can realistically bring to bear, but we are willing to support any effort, including through the Security Council, which offers hope of bringing an early and negotiated settlement to the conflict. During his brief visit to your country on 23 March, Mr. Pym will be happy to

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explore in detail how in practice the international community might work to end the present conflict.

Please accept, Your Highness, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Yours sincerely
Nargis Dehbra

His Highness Shaikh Isa Bin Sulman Al Khalifah, GCMG

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FOLLOWING ARE EUROPEAN COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS ON MIDDLE EAST

1. THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL DISCUSSED THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST, INCLUDING LEBANON AND THE WAR BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ.

2. THE TEN ARE DEEPLY DISTURBED BY THE CONTINUED LACK OF PROGRESS TOWARDS PEACE BETWEEN ISRAEL AND HER ARAB NEIGHBOURS. THEY ARE CONVINCED THAT ALL PARTIES MUST SEIZE THE PRESENT OPPORTUNITY TO ACHIEVE THE TWO MOST URGENT OBJECTIVES: THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES FROM LEBANON AND A RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS AIMED AT A COMPREHENSIVE PEACE SETTLEMENT.

3. THE TEN REAFFIRM THEIR SUPPORT FOR THE SOVEREIGN AND INDEPENDENT STATE OF LEBANON AND FOR ITS GOVERNMENT, WHICH SHOULD URGENTLY BE ENABLED TO RE-ESTABLISH WITHOUT RESTRICTIONS ITS AUTHORITY OVER THE WHOLE OF ITS TERRITORY. THIS REQUIRES THE PROMPT WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI, SYRIAN AND PLO FORCES. THE TEN SUPPORT THE EFFORTS OF THE UNITED STATES TO ACHIEVE THIS OBJECTIVE. THEY CALL ON ALL CONCERNED TO CONCLUDE NEGOTIATIONS WITHOUT FURTHER DELAY. THEY CONTINUE TO SUPPORT THE PEACEKEEPING ROLE OF UN AND MULTINATIONAL FORCES IN LEBANON.

4. THE PRINCIPLES WHICH UNDERLIE THE TEN'S APPROACH TO WIDER PEACE NEGOTIATIONS, AS SET OUT IN MORE THAN ONE PREVIOUS STATEMENT, REMAIN VALID. -A LASTING PEACE CAN ONLY BE BUILT ON THE RIGHT TO A SECURE EXISTENCE FOR ALL STATES IN THE REGION INCLUDING ISRAEL, AND JUSTICE FOR ALL THE PEOPLES, INCLUDING THE RIGHT OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE TO SELF-DETERMINATION WITH ALL THAT THIS IMPLIES. THESE RIGHTS MUST BE MUTUALLY RECOGNISED BY THE PARTIES THEMSELVES. NEGOTIATIONS WILL HAVE TO EMBRACE ALL THE PARTIES CONCERNED INCLUDING THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE; AND THE PLO WILL HAVE TO BE ASSOCIATED WITH THEM. THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE MUST BE RENOUNCED BY ALL.

5. PRESIDENT REAGAN'S INITIATIVE OF 1 SEPTEMBER 1982 INDICATED A WAY TO PEACE, AND THE ARAB SUMMIT MEETING AT FEZ DEMONSTRATED A READINESS FOR IT. THE TASK NOW IS TO MOVE BEYOND STATEMENTS OF PRINCIPLE AND FIND A MEANS TO RECONCILE AND IMPLEMENT THE VARIOUS PEACE PROPOSALS. THE CONCLUSIONS OF THE RECENT MEETING OF THE PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL CAN AND SHOULD CONTRIBUTE TO THE PEACE PROCESS. THE TEN THEREFORE WELCOME THE DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN JORDAN

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AND THE PLO. THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE AND THE PLO SHOULD SEIZE THE PRESENT OPPORTUNITY BY DECLARING THEMSELVES IN FAVOUR OF PEACE NEGOTIATIONS. THIS WOULD BE A MAJOR STEP FORWARD, TO WHICH THE TEN WOULD EXPECT ALL CONCERNED TO RESPOND CONSTRUCTIVELY.

6. THE TEN LOOK TO THE ARAB STATES TO PLAY THEIR PART BY SUPPORTING THOSE WHO SEEK A SOLUTION TO THE DEMANDS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE BY POLITICAL MEANS.

7. THE EFFORTS OF THE US WILL CONTINUE TO BE INDISPENSABLE TO CREATE THE CONDITIONS IN WHICH NEGOTIATIONS CAN BEGIN.

8. ABOVE ALL THE TIME HAS COME FOR ISRAEL TO SHOW THAT IT STANDS READY FOR GENUINE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE BASIS OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338, IN THE FIRST PLACE BY REFRAINING FROM ENLARGING EXISTING SETTLEMENTS OR CREATING NEW ONES. THESE SETTLEMENTS ARE CONTRARY TO INTERNATIONAL LAW AND A MAJOR AND GROWING OBSTACLE TO PEACE EFFORTS.

9. THE MIDDLE EAST IS A REGION WITH WHICH THE TEN HAVE LONG BEEN CLOSELY ASSOCIATED AND IN WHOSE FUTURE THEY HAVE A DEEP INTEREST. THEY INTEND TO MAINTAIN THEIR CONTACTS WITH ALL THE PARTIES AND TO USE THEIR INFLUENCE TO ENCOURAGE MOVEMENT TOWARDS COMPROMISE AND NEGOTIATED SOLUTIONS. THEY BELIEVE THAT THIS IS IN THE BEST INTEREST OF THE COUNTRIES AND THE PEOPLES OF THE REGION, OF THE TEN THEMSELVES AND OF THEIR MUTUAL RELATIONS.

10. THE TEN EXPRESSED ONCE AGAIN THEIR GROWING CONCERN AT THE CONTINUED CONFLICT BETWEEN IRAQ AND IRAN, WHICH CONSTITUTES AN EVER MORE SERIOUS THREAT TO THE SECURITY AND STABILITY OF THE ENTIRE REGION.

11. THE TEN DEEPLY REGRET THAT NONE OF THE PEACE INITIATIVES ORGANISED HITHERTO HAS SUCCEEDED IN BRINGING THE FIGHTING TO AN END. THEY CALL FOR A CEASE-FIRE, THE CESSATION OF ALL MILITARY OPERATIONS AND THE WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES TO INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNISED FRONTIERS; AND FOR A JUST AND HONOURABLE SETTLEMENT NEGOTIATED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL AND ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH PARTIES.

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FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 042252Z APR 83 10. DOWNING STREET. (2COPIES),
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TELEGRAM NUMBER 219 DATED 4 APRIL 83

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, PARIS, BAGHDAD, TEHRAN

INFO PRIORITY NEW DELHI, MOSCOW, AMMAN, CAIRO, JEDDA, BAHRAIN,
DOHA, ABU DHABI, DUBAI, MUSCAT, KUWAIT.

YOUR TELNO 128: IRAN/IRAQ

1. IT IS HARD TO SEE AT PRESENT ANY ACTION WHICH THE SECURITY COUNCIL WOULD BE LIKELY TO TAKE WHICH WOULD LEAD TO SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS TO END THE WAR. IRANIAN DISTRUST OF THE COUNCIL IS TOO STRONG AND THEIR BASIC ATTITUDE DOES NOT FAVOUR NEGOTIATIONS (CF KHORASSANI'S VIEWS IN SIR JOHN LEAHY'S LETTER TO ME OF 28 MARCH). FOR THE COUNCIL TO PASS FURTHER RESOLUTIONS ON THE LINES OF ITS EARLIER ONES WOULD NOT ONLY HAVE NO EFFECT ON IRAN (OTHER THAN TO INCREASE ITS DISTRUST) BUT WOULD BE GENERALLY DAMAGING TO THE COUNCIL'S PRESTIGE. AT THE SAME TIME I SEE NO DISPOSITION IN THE COUNCIL TO GO FURTHER AND CONSIDER TAKING MEASURES AGAINST IRAN IF IT REFUSES TO NEGOTIATE. (IT WOULD BE INTERESTING TO KNOW WHETHER THE KUWAITIS HAVE SPOKEN TO THE RUSSIANS AND CHINESE AND IF SO WHAT RESPONSE THEY GOT.)

2. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, AS DISTINCT FROM THE SECURITY COUNCIL, PROBABLY RETAINS SOME MEASURE OF IRANIAN TRUST. BUT THE IRANIANS ARE MUCH MORE LIKELY TO BE RECEPTIVE TO HIM IF THEY BELIEVE THAT HE IS ACTING ON HIS OWN INITIATIVE AND NOT AT THE BEHEST OF THE COUNCIL. THIS BEING SO, THE COUNCIL SHOULD BE CAREFUL NOT TO PREJUDICE HIS STANDING.

3. THE ONE NEW DEVELOPMENT IS THE NEED TO DEAL WITH THE OIL SPILL. AS I INDICATED IN MY TELNO 204, THE SECRETARY-GENERAL HAS ALREADY, WITHOUT REFERENCE TO THE COUNCIL, OFFERED HIS GOOD OFFICES. CORDOVEZ, HAS A SLIGHT HOPE THAT THIS INVOLVEMENT IF SUCCESSFUL COULD LEAD TO THE EVENTUAL WIDENING OF ANY LOCAL CEASEFIRE AND EVEN CREATE THE NECESSARY CLIMATE FOR NEGOTIATIONS. HE TOLD ME THIS AFTERNOON (4 APRIL) THAT HE HAD URGED BOTH PARTIES TO AGREE TO PRACTICAL ARRANGEMENTS. THE IRAQIS HAD NOW TOLD HIM THAT THEY WOULD COOPERATE IN A PARTIAL CEASEFIRE, BUT ON THE CONDITION THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL SUPERVISED THE ARRANGEMENT. CORDOVEZ, KNOWING THAT THE IRANIANS WOULD JIB AT THIS CONDITION, HAD ASKED TO BE ALLOWED TO INTERPRET IT FLEXIBLY TO THEM. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL HAD SOME ROOM IN WHICH TO MANOEUVRE BUT ESPECIALLY IF THE ARRANGEMENTS WERE LIKELY TO INVOLVE THE UN IN ANY SIGNIFICANT EXPENSE, HE WOULD HAVE TO SEEK THE SECURITY COUNCIL'S AGREEMENT. WHEN I SAID THAT WE SUPPORTED HIS EFFORTS, HE REMARKED THAT THE UN WAS INTENDING TO ASK A BRITISH COMPANY TO DO THE WORK (HE DID NOT REMEMBER WHICH ONE). THE IRANIAN AMBASSADOR WAS ABOUT TO CALL ON HIM AT HIS OWN REQUEST.

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4. I SEE EVERY ADVANTAGE IN THE SECRETARY-GENERAL DOING ALL HE CAN TO REACH AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES ON THE PROBLEM. WE SHOULD LEAVE IT TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO CALL ON THE COUNCIL FOR ASSISTANCE IF HE NEEDS IT.

5. MY INCLINATION IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES IS TO SUGGEST THAT ANY REPLY TO THE KUWAITIS AND THE OTHER GULF STATES SHOULD CONCENTRATE ON THIS LATEST DEVELOPMENT AND THE POSSIBILITIES WHICH IT OFFERS FOR ENGAGING THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IN AT LEAST A LIMITED MEDIATION BETWEEN THE PARTIES. YOU COULD SAY THAT I HAD SPOKEN TO CORDOVEZ AND ENCOURAGED HIM IN THIS ROLE: THAT WE BELIEVED THAT IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE TO INVOLVE THE COUNCIL AT THIS STAGE UNLESS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL SPECIFICALLY ASKED FOR THIS: AND THAT WHILE IT WOULD BE WRONG TO BE OPTIMISTIC, THE CURRENT MEDIATION EXERCISE IF SUCCESSFUL MIGHT IMPROVE THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S POSITION IN SEEKING TO MEDIATE THE WIDER CONFLICT. YOU COULD ALSO SAY THAT WE INTENDED TO REMAIN IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH THE SECRETARIAT TO ENCOURAGE THEM TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF ANY OPPORTUNITY THAT MIGHT ARISE. THIS COURSE WOULD LEAVE US FREE TO COME BACK TO THE BASIC QUESTION LATER IF THERE SEEMS ADVANTAGE IN DOING SO.

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
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Grey Scale #13



A 1 2 3 4 5 6 **M** 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 **B** 17 18 19



Colour Chart #13

Blue Cyan Green Yellow

