MT

SECRET

Confidential Filing

The Prime Ministers meeting with SACEUR
Call by General Haig a his retirement. Call by General Bernard Rogers following his appointment

NATO

S 1

MAY 1979

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
~~14.6.79~~							
~~3.7.79.~~							
~~25.7.79~~							
~~24.2.~~ 87.							
~~2.4.87~~							
~~9.4.87~~							
~~5.5.87~~							
~~10.5.87~~							
~~15.6.87~~							
~~19.6.87~~							
~~8.12.87~~							
~~10.2.88~~							
~~15.2.88~~							
~~24.6.88~~							
~~30.6.88~~							
~~31.10.88~~							
~~19.4.91~~							
~~19.4.91~~							
~~30.4.92~~							
21.10.93							
PART CLOSED	1.5.97						

PREM 19/4330

Dd 533270 5M 2/78 8362633 JET

SECRET

F/Saceur- UK

bcc RB

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

27 October 1993

Dear John,

SACEUR

Thank you for your letter of 18 October.

I am sure that the Prime Minister would be interested to meet General Joulwan. However, the diary for Wednesday 10 November is already severely clogged. Would it be possible for you to explain to the new SACEUR that the Prime Minister unfortunately cannot see him on that day, but hopes to have a chance of doing so during a future visit by SACEUR to the UK?

Yours ever,

Roderic

RODERIC LYNE

John Pitt-Brooke, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence.

MEA

Rodric o.r.
We could offer
½ hour on Wed
10 Nov at 1100
(surrounded by Hong Kong
- Opening Conference at 0930,
OPD(K) at 1100). To
Sandra,

See X. Does it?
Presumably his open to the NATO.
19/10

Yes
19/10

Diary meeting?

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB
Telephone 071-21 82111/2/3

SECRETARY OF STATE

MO 1/18J

18th October 1993

Dear Rodric,

NEW SACEUR VISITS UK

The Prime Minister will be aware that President Clinton's nomination as Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) to replace Gen John M Shalikashvili, General George A Joulwan, has been accepted by Allies and he formally takes up appointment on 22nd October.

General Joulwan is currently head of US Southern Command based in Panama. He has considerable European experience (a total of 14 years in Germany) culminating in commanding the US 5th Army Corps from 1989-90. He has also worked in joint assignments as special assistant to the President and executive to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

General Joulwan will be in the UK on Wednesday 10th November, when he will be calling on the Defence Secretary and CDS. We believe it would be appropriate for the Prime Minister to meet General Joulwan before the NATO Summit and we would be happy to arrange for him to make a short call on the Prime Minister on 10th November if the Prime Minister's diary permits.


1 X

Yours ever,
Alison

PP (J S PITT-BROOKE)
Private Secretary

R M J Lyne Esq CMG
10 Downing Street

Recycled Paper



CC PC

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB
Telephone 071-21 82111/3

SECRETARY OF STATE

MO 13/1D

30th April 1992

file

Rose Mosse

The new SACEUR - a Pole!
He is very highly regarded by those who know him.
Stephen

Dear Stephen,

I understand that when you spoke to Mr Webb earlier today you asked about the appointment of Lieutenant General John M Shalikashvili as Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). I enclose a copy of his CV.

This nomination was raised with NATO Ambassadors in the Defence Planning Committee (DPC) yesterday afternoon and agreed subject to the silence procedure, which ended this morning at 0800 our time. My Secretary of State was content with the proposed appointment, but we would have wished to have had somewhat longer to consider the proposal.

I am copying this letter to Simon Gass (FCO).

Yours ever,

Cyn.

(MISS J R BINSTEAD) AOD
Private Secretary

J S Wall LVO CMG
No 10 Downing Street

100% Recycled Paper

Lieutenant General John M. Shalikashvili

Lieutenant General Shalikashvili became the Assistant to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff in August 1991. As such, he represents the Chairman in the interagency policymaking process, particularly in issues related to national security policy.

Born in Warsaw, Poland on 27 June 1936, General "Shali" Shalikashvili graduated from Bradley University where he was awarded a degree in Mechanical Engineering and George Washington University from where he holds a Master's Degree in International Affairs. His military education includes completion of the Naval Command and Staff College and the United States Army War College.

Upon graduation from Officer Candidate School in 1959 he was commissioned a second lieutenant in the Artillery. For the next 16 years he served in a variety of command and staff positions in Alaska, the continental United States, Germany, Vietnam and Korea. In 1975 he assumed command of the 1st Battalion, 84th Field Artillery at Fort Lewis. Following command and attendance at the Army War College, he was assigned to Vicenza, Italy as the Assistant Chief of Staff, G3 of the Southern European Task Force. After leaving Italy in 1979, he assumed command of Division Artillery, 1st Armored Division, Germany. Returning from Germany in 1981, he was assigned as the Chief of the Politico-Military Division, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations and Plans, Department of the Army. He was subsequently selected for promotion to Brigadier General and assumed duties as Deputy Director, Strategy, Plans and Policy, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans. In 1984, General Shalikashvili once again returned to Germany and the 1st Armored Division as an Assistant Division Commander and Commander of the Nuernberg Military Community. Selected for promotion to Major General, he returned to the Pentagon as Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (Joint Affairs) and Director, Strategy, Plans and Policy. From June 1987 to August 1989, he served as Commander of the 9th Infantry Division (Motorized) and the Army Development and Employment Agency, Fort Lewis, Washington.

Selected for promotion to Lieutenant General in August 1989, he returned to Germany and assumed duties as Deputy Commander in Chief, United States Army, Europe and 7th Army. Just prior to reporting to the Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Shalikashvili served as the Commander of Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, the relief operation that returned hundreds of thousands of Kurdish refugees to Northern Iraq. He is married to the former Joan E. Zimpleman and they have a son, Brant, who is a student at Washington State University.

30 APR 1
1652
AM92

SUBJECT
MASTER

Filed on:

CONFIDENTIAL

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

3 February 1992

CALL BY GENERAL GALVIN

Thank you for your letter of 31 January with briefing for General Galvin's call on the Prime Minister which took place this morning. General Galvin was accompanied by Field Marshal Vincent.

Arms control

In response to a question from the Prime Minister, General Galvin said that he thought it was the right time to do what we were doing: unilateral initiatives with a response by others. He hoped nonetheless that these measures could be followed up by a protocol to ensure irreversibility. The CFE was a good model.

Security of nuclear weapons

General Galvin said that he was very worried about the security of weapons in the former Soviet Union. There were nuclear weapons in all the republics except for the Baltics and Georgia and four of the smaller republics. He was naturally worried by the Muslim links between Kazakhstan, Pakistan and other Muslim countries. He was not suggesting an international line running from the former Soviet Union through to Iraq or Libya, but there were too many people saying "We Muslims must have the bomb". A mass of nuclear power would be sitting around for a long time to come. One of the advantages of cooperation in the NACC was that it turned people in the former Soviet Union westward rather than southward.

The Prime Minister asked whether Yeltsin and Shaposhnikov had control over the nuclear weapons. General Galvin said that control over the ICBMs was pretty safe but control over tactical nuclear weapons was worrisome. He had seen a report in Newsweek about some journalists who had been to a base holding tactical nuclear weapons. None of the guards were there because they had gone foraging. When Saddam Hussein started talking to Quadhafi about cooperation in the peaceful production of nuclear power, you had to start to worry. It was the weapons that could be taken away in the back of a car that worried him most. There was of course very little that could be done to stop it. We had to keep up pressure on Russia to centralise these weapons. If we continued to let them know that it was our top priority, they might respond.

The CGS pointed out that the Russians were very resistant to any visible role for the West in this process and tended when asked to give bland assurances. General Galvin said that he would willingly subsidise all the nuclear scientists in the CIS, putting them to work on making nuclear power plants safe etc. We could not take over the custodial work of the Russian government, but we could encourage Yeltsin to move all the smaller weapons into Russia by July and help him keep a hand on his scientists.

US forces in Europe

General Galvin said that the President would try to stick with the figure of 150,000. He did not want to reduce by increments. We needed a corps and the kind of air force that could support a corps. We needed a carrier battlegroup and Marines. The 150,000 number had been public for two years. No-one was able to dispute its sense. Nonetheless, there had been two Congressional resolutions which pointed towards a figure of 100,000. General Galvin thought that it would be possible to hold the ring at more than 100,000. He would be adamant that if the US was going to put a force in Europe (and more people than was comfortable were talking about withdrawing altogether) then that force had to be viable for a campaign. He could cut back on logistics, eg he had 250 large warehouses which were expensive in money and manpower. He could cut down on the war reserve and have longer response times. He could have smaller divisions. He thought the US would stay above or at 100,000 and postpone any further review until 1995.

The Prime Minister said that at some stage inexorable pressures would reduce the US presence in Europe. It was important that the reductions should be brought about without feeding the French belief that one day the Americans would not be there at all. That was a matter of presentation as well as substance. If there was a perception that the US presence was simply dribbling away, then we would be straight into a debate on parallel military structures. He was not at all sure that the Franco-German corps would be NATO-friendly. General Galvin said that the corps did not even amount to a division, yet it was now being called the European Army. The French were talking it up. We needed to be frank about what everyone was doing.

The Prime Minister commented that the timing was sensitive. A review of US forces in Europe in 1995 would be very close to the Maastricht review. That would be a bad conjunction.

The CGS described last week's WEU meeting at which the French and Germans had been seen off by their counterparts. The outcome could not have been a firmer rebuff. Admiral Lanxade had been taken aback.

General Galvin said that Admiral Lanxade tended to speak as if he was acting as a moderating influence on Mitterrand. In fact, he was Mitterrand's alterego. The French were trying to confine NATO's role to dealing only with threats from the East in order to make NATO appear anachronistic. Their aim was to lessen the US presence and influence in Europe but without saying so.

The Prime Minister said that, with the French in some political disarray at present, we must press our alternative ideas quickly. We must take the initiative.

General Galvin said that the eight deployments that had been made in 1991 had all come out of NATO. That showed the inherent flexibility of the NATO structure after forty-one years. We should ask other Europeans why they needed some new force working for the WEU. WEU should have a planning cell but there was no need to have any forces assigned to the WEU. The Rapid Reaction Corps could be available for use as necessary. That was the way that made military sense. Any other way was twisting things around.

Follow-up

The FCO wrote some time ago with advice on follow-up to Maastricht in the European defence field. I should be grateful to know what action, if any, we have so far taken. If we have not yet put forward proposals, then the Prime Minister would be grateful to know what ideas we have and what their timescale is. The implication of General Galvin's remarks is that he would be prepared to go less far than we ourselves are envisaging. HM Ambassador Washington has also warned of the difficulty of carrying the Americans with us.

I am copying this letter to Richard Gozney (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and to Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

J. S. WALL

Simon Webb, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence.

CONFIDENTIAL

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB
Telephone 071-21 82111/3

SECRETARY OF STATE

MO 1/18G

31st January 1992

Dear Stephen

CALL BY GENERAL GALVIN

General John Galvin, Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) is due to call on the Prime Minister at 11.15 a.m on 3 February. He will be accompanied by Field Marshal Vincent. The call will be the first stop on a three day official visit to the UK, which will include discussions with the Defence Secretary and the Single Service Chiefs.

The Prime Minister last met General Galvin at the Rome Summit in November. Issues which the Prime Minister might raise include the current situation in the new Commonwealth of Independent States and control of their armed forces and nuclear weapons.

General Galvin is playing a leading role in the implementation of the new Alliance strategy and can report on aspects of the Alliance restructuring affecting his Command. This will include the work underway to streamline the Alliance command structure and future force structures. The latter would also provide a suitable opportunity to discuss future European defence.

As the senior US military officer in Europe, General Galvin will be able to report on the implications of President Bush's budget proposals for future US force levels in Europe.

Nuclear Issues

The UK technical mission offered to President Yeltsin visits Washington first on 6/7th February. There is also need for co-ordination amongst other Allies. We favour a group of experts established under NATO auspices rather than under the North Atlantic Co-operation Council (NACC)(as the Germans have proposed) which would involve the non-nuclear CIS and CEE states. The Russians are themselves unenthusiastic. Marshal Shaposhnikov commented to the Defence Secretary on the need to avoid spreading knowledge of nuclear weapons technology too widely. The Prime Minister may wish to refer to his meeting with President Yeltsin and draw upon the following points:

J S Wall LVO CMG
10 Downing Street

100% Recycled Paper

SECRETARY OF STATE

- Position on Russian control of nuclear weapons reasonably encouraging, although clearly the dismantling of weapons will be a enormous task. We are willing to give technical assistance, for instance over storage of fissile material and conversion to civil use. Need for co-ordination between NATO Allies and perhaps bringing in others, eg Japan. We doubt value of proposal to involve non-nuclear CIS and CEE states.

- Welcome proposals in President Bush's State of Union address. Pleased to see a swift response from Yeltsin, although some aspects of his statement (eg on end to SSBN patrols, ban on testing) are not helpful. Unclear whether it will be possible to reach agreement on giving up multiple warhead ICBMs.

- Important that NATO does not agree to withdraw air-delivered sub-strategic weapons to central storage (as Yeltsin has offered subject to US reciprocation). Must live up to agreement at Taormina Nuclear Planning Group to maintain effective and credible sub-strategic weapons widely based in Europe, especially now that the stockpile is being cut by 80% and restricted to air-delivered weapons.

NATO Command Structure

At their Autumn meetings NATO Defence Ministers agreed a reduction from the present 3 Major NATO Commanders (MNCs) to 2 by downgrading the UK held post of CINCHAN. No consensus was achieved on the exact division of responsibilities between the northern and central commands under SACEUR. A Working Group of the four nations most directly involved (UK, Germany, Denmark, Norway) recommended in December that the UK be included in SACEUR's north west command (AFNORWEST) along with Norway, and Denmark's maritime forces. This option was accepted as the only one which met the political concerns of all four nations (including that of the UK to avoid marginalisation).

Detailed work on the structure was referred to SACEUR, who reported to the Military Committee on 29 January that, although the politically-acceptable solution could be made to work militarily, it was neither the tidiest nor the most cost-effective option (though he can live with it). If General Galvin raises the issue, the Prime Minister might say:

- Need to demonstrate adaptation of NATO through streamlining of Command Structure.

100% Recycled Paper

SECRETARY OF STATE

- Compromise agreed in December inevitably more expensive than other politically unacceptable options but there is no point in pursuing these options. Fully support your efforts to ensure that the new structure is as lean as possible and we should continue to aim for 25 per cent savings.

NATO Force Structures

On future NATO force structures the Prime Minister might make the following points:

- Pleased to see progress achieved so far. Reaction Forces particularly suited to the new security situation.

- UK is fully committed to the ARRC. Adaptation of UK Army to its new role requires considerable effort but confident that it will be achieved.

- Interested to hear General Galvin's views on how US contribution in Europe will develop. In particular, would welcome US participation in ARRC.

NATO Running Costs

Nations are keen to see their contributions to the NATO Budgets decrease with the slimmer NATO. Of particular concern to SACEUR is the pressure nations are exerting on the Military Budget (which funds the running costs of NATO HQs). The UK contribution is set to reduce by 20% by 1994/95. Should General Galvin raise the question of funding, the Prime Minister may wish to say:

- Reasonable to expect reductions in running costs of NATO Military HQs, given the smaller, leaner NATO emerging from the restructuring.

US Force Levels in Europe

The Prime Minister is aware of the main elements in President Bush's State of the Union Address. Following the address, Secretary Cheney stressed the need to maintain US forces abroad indefinitely, including in Europe (he mentioned retaining two Divisions and three Tactical Fighter Wings). Congress is bound to want to cut deeper, but the Administration should be able to mount a robust defence of its insistence on controlled reductions to maintain the armed forces' coherence. The Prime Minister might say:

100% Recycled Paper

SECRETARY OF STATE

- Welcome also comments by Secretary Cheney on the need to maintain US Forces abroad, including in Europe.

- UK attaches considerable importance to continuing, robust and substantial US presence in Europe. Consider this vital for success of new force structures being developed.

- Interested to hear General Galvin's views on how debate will develop for additional defence cuts - especially abroad.

European Security and Defence

General Galvin will be concerned that European defence forces should not undermine his Command. The Prime Minister might draw on the following points:

- Outcome of Maastricht on defence good for Europe and NATO. Remains axiomatic that we do not have duplicate military structures for defence of same Alliance territory.

- Important that we ensure that work on European forces (including Franco-German Corps) is carried forward within the WEU institutional structures, as agreed at Maastricht. UK have been concerned that Franco-German ideas to develop a 'European Corps' may be worked up separately and not prove as NATO-friendly as we would wish.

- European effort should be designed to do what NATO can not or chooses not to do (eg. operate outside Europe under WEU or UN command; or in Eastern Europe, but only after full consultation with NATO).

- What is the mood of senior German military.

Spanish Co-ordination Agreements

It is possible that General Galvin may raise the draft "Coordination Agreement" (CA) between SHAPE and Spain (who are outside NATO's military structure) on operations in the Straits of Gibraltar. The current draft would prejudice our position on Gibraltar sovereignty by not acknowledging Gibraltar/UK territorial waters. We and the Spanish are both discussing with SACEUR's staff how problems over the draft can be resolved and a further official-level meeting between SHAPE, Spain and UK is planned for 11 February. If General Galvin raises the subject, the Prime Minister may wish to draw on the following:

100% Recycled Paper

SECRETARY OF STATE

- UK remains eager to see negotiations satisfactorily concluded: but some difficulties remain. We have responsibilities to Gibraltar, which we must protect. We are not seeking to use any agreement to advance UK position on Gibraltar; trust Spain will not do so either.

- UK ~~remains~~ will work closely with SHAPE on this matter in order to reach a conclusion acceptable to all.


I am sending a copy of this letter to Christopher Prentice (FCO) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely

Simon Webb

(S WEBB)
Private Secretary

100% Recycled Paper



051356
MDADAN 6607

CONFIDENTIAL
FM UKDEL NATO
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 047
OF 301725Z JANUARY 92
AND TO IMMEDIATE MODUK
INFO ROUTINE NATO POSTS

ADVANCE COPY

Prime Minister
You will see General Galvin
on Monday morning
Duty Clerk 1.2

SIC EME

MODUK FOR PS TO SECRETARY OF STATE, CDS, DUS(P), SEC(NATO/UK)(P)

SACEUR'S VISIT TO THE UK

1. GENERAL JOHN GALVIN, SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER EUROPE (SACEUR), IS VISITING THE UK ON 3-5 FEBRUARY AT THE INVITATION OF CDS. HIS CALLS INCLUDE THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE. I HAVE NOT YET PAID MY INITIAL CALL ON SACEUR. BUT IT MAY BE HELPFUL TO HIGHLIGHT SOME OF THE MAIN ISSUES THAT, AS SEEN FROM EVERE, ARE LIKELY TO BE RAISED.

EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE IDENTITY

2. SACEUR'S MAIN CONCERN IS TO ENSURE THAT EFFORTS TO DEVELOP EUROPEAN FORCES AS PART OF THE ENHANCED EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE IDENTITY DO NOT UNDERMINE HIS COMMAND. WE SHOULD TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO STRESS TO SACEUR THAT THE OUTCOME OF MAASTRICHT WAS GOOD FOR NATO AS WELL AS EUROPE IN THAT IT MET THE AIM OF A STRONGER EUROPEAN DEFENCE EFFORT ORGANISED THROUGH THE WEU AND THEREFORE COMPATIBLE WITH NATO. MUCH WILL, HOWEVER, DEPEND ON THE DETAILED PRACTICAL IMPLEMENTATION OVER THE COMING MONTHS AND YEARS. SACEUR SHOULD BE ASSURED THAT THE UK IS WORKING TO ENSURE THAT IMPLEMENTATION OF MAASTRICHT FULLY REFLECTS THE PRINCIPLE OF COMPATIBILITY WITH NATO. THIS WOULD ALSO BE A GOOD OPPORTUNITY TO FLOAT WITH SACEUR OUR IDEAS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF A WEU FORCE DESIGNED TO DO WHAT NATO CANNOT OR CHOOSES NOT TO DO, AND TO EXPLAIN WHY SACEUR DOES NOT NEED TO SEE THESE AS AN ATTACK ON HIS OWN AUTHORITY.

3. WE SHOULD ALSO STRESS THAT OUR THINKING IS NOT INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE FRANCO-GERMAN INITIATIVE AS SUCH. BUT WE NEED TO HIGHLIGHT, AS WE DID TO MR CHENEY, OUR CONCERNS ABOUT THE DANGERS IMPLICIT IF THE FRANCO-GERMAN APPROACH IS INTERPRETED IN SUCH A WAY AS TO LICENCE THE CREATION OF PARALLEL STRUCTURES OUTSIDE THE WEU

AND UNDERMINING THOSE OF NATO. IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF THE US (AND SACEUR) COULD CONTINUE TO MAKE CLEAR TO KEY ALLIES, INCLUDING THE GERMANS, THEIR CONCERN ON THE NEED TO AVOID SEPARATE AND COMPETING STRUCTURES.

US FORCE LEVELS 4. MR CHENEY'S RECENT PUBLIC STATEMENT (WASHINGTON TELNO 209 REFERS) IS WELCOME REASSURANCE THAT THE US PLANS TO MAINTAIN A VIABLE MILITARY PRESENCE IN EUROPE. WE SHOULD WELCOME THIS AND EMPHASISE ONCE AGAIN THE IMPORTANCE WE ATTACH TO A SUBSTANTIAL US MILITARY PRESENCE IN EUROPE BASED ON A ROBUST US CORPS, WHICH FORMS AN ESSENTIAL PART OF NATO'S NEW FORCE STRUCTURE. IT WOULD ALSO BE USEFUL TO SEEK SACEUR'S VIEWS ON HOW THE US CONTRIBUTION IS LIKELY TO DEVELOP, INCLUDING WHETHER THE ADMINISTRATION'S PLANS WILL BE ACCEPTABLE TO CONGRESS.

NATO FORCE STRUCTURES

5. LINKED TO THIS, THE VISIT WILL PROVIDE AN OPPORTUNITY TO ASK SACEUR ABOUT PROGRESS IN ESTABLISHING THE ACE RAPID REACTION CORPS (ARRC) AND ESPECIALLY IN FINDING THE NECESSARY COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT FOR THE ACE RAPID REACTION FORCE, INCLUDING FROM THE US, TO ENABLE IT TO CONDUCT EFFECTIVE SUSTAINED OPERATIONS. THIS WOULD ALSO BE A GOOD CHANCE TO UNDERLINE THE UK'S FULL COMMITMENT TO THE ARRC, AND OUR CONFIDENCE THAT THE ADAPTATION OF THE BRITISH ARMY TO ITS NEW ROLE WILL BE ACHIEVED SATISFACTORILY.

NATO COMMAND STRUCTURES

6. SACEUR HAS ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE SOLUTION TO THE INTERFACE BETWEEN THE NEW AFNORTHWEST COMMAND IN ACE AND THE CENTRAL REGION COMMAND PROPOSED BY THE FOUR NATION WORKING GROUP AND AGREED AT THE AUTUMN 1991 DPC COULD BE MADE TO WORK MILITARILY, ALTHOUGH IN HIS VIEW IT IS NEITHER THE TIDIEST NOR MOST COST-EFFECTIVE OPTION. THIS WILL BE AN IMPORTANT OPPORTUNITY TO STRESS TO HIM THAT THIS OPTION IS THE ONLY ONE ACCEPTABLE POLITICALLY TO THE FOUR MAIN ALLIES CONCERNED (UK, DENMARK, GERMANY AND NORWAY) AND THAT THERE IS NO POINT IN PURSUING OTHER OPTIONS THAT CAPITALS ARE NOT PREPARED TO ACCEPT. WE NEED THEREFORE TO PRESS AHEAD WITH IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT, AND CONTINUE TO AIM FOR SIGNIFICANT SAVINGS.

7. THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT SACEUR'S PROPOSALS FOR THE NATIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF SENIOR COMMAND POSTS IN ACE WILL INVOLVE A MAJOR REDUCTION IN THE UK'S SHARE. SOME REDUCTION IS INEVITABLE BUT WE SHOULD EMPHASISE TO SACEUR THAT WE ARE GIVING UP, VOLUNTARILY, A NUMBER OF KEY POSTS IN NATO, INCLUDING CINCHAN, AND THAT WE EXPECT

HIS PROPOSALS TO REFLECT THIS, TOGETHER WITH OUR CONTINUED MAJOR COMMITMENT TO ALL ELEMENTS OF ALLIED CAPABILITIES.

OTHER ISSUES

8. IN ADDITION, THE VISIT WILL PROVIDE AN OPPORTUNITY FOR A MORE GENERAL TOUR D'HORIZON OF DEVELOPMENTS ON THE EUROPEAN SECURITY SCENE AND THE PROCESS OF REFORMING NATO TO MEET THE NEW CHALLENGES: A PROCESS IN WHICH SACEUR HAS PLAYED A KEY AND CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE. THERE WOULD BE VALUE IN SEEKING SACEUR'S VIEWS ON THE ALLIANCE'S NUCLEAR POSTURE IN THE LIGHT OF THE LATEST US AND RUSSIAN PROPOSALS, DEVELOPMENTS IN THE CIS AND NATO'S ROLE IN THE PROVISION OF HUMANITARIAN AID, AND PROGRESS IN ESTABLISHING A DIALOGUE WITH CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN NATIONS.

WESTON

PLEASE PASS IMMEDIATE TO NO 10
YYYY

DISTRIBUTION 6

ADVANCE 6

.NATO
MR GOULDEN
HD/SECPOL D

MR BOND SECPOL D
PS NO 10.
RESIDENT CLERK

NNNN

Subject cc master

CONFIDENTIAL

file
PC
cc B

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

24 April 1991

Dear Simon,

CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER BY GENERAL GALVIN

Thank you for your letter of 23 April. General Galvin, accompanied by the Chief of the Defence Staff, called on the Prime Minister this morning. The discussion focused on the Kurds and on security and defence in Europe.

The Kurds

General Galvin said that he was on his way to Turkey. He saw three priorities for the present allied effort: (i) survival of the Kurds; (ii) their protection, and (iii) the increasing responsibility for (i) and (ii) by UN agencies. On (iii), (which the Prime Minister described as the most difficult issue) General Galvin saw the possibility of the UN and its agencies taking over the trucking of supplies, the administration of camps and, in the end, the provision of security for the Kurds. The Prime Minister described our dealings with the UN Secretary General. He had not on the whole been very helpful. The letter sent by the Iraqis asking the UN to take over the camps was, however, a very positive development which we should exploit. In particular, we should try to get the Russians and the Chinese to try to urge the Secretary General to take over the administration of the camps.

General Galvin described how he saw the operation of the camps. He envisaged a chequer board layout with the camps being built by the Kurds themselves and ultimately administered by them. He hoped to see security provided at some distance from the camps backed up by helicopters, ie we should not have a daisy chain approach with troops ringing the camps. Security would be a British responsibility, with the United States, Dutch etc working for the British.

The Prime Minister said that one of his fears was that the UN would devote all of their efforts to the Iranian situation, leaving Northern Iraq for us to cope with. General Galvin said he too saw this danger. There had been some signs of movement by Kurds out of the mountains towards the East. But there were also some indications that, given guarantees, some Kurds would return home. We should keep up pressure on Baghdad to discuss these issues with the Kurds.

General Galvin confirmed that the presence of Iraqi "police" near Zakhu had already been sufficient to frighten off the Kurds. There was a risk that, because half the people in the town were Iraqi Arabs the Iraqis would try to insist on their security people being there, not to deal with the Kurds but to deal with other Iraqis. This would not be acceptable. If the Mayor of Zukho wanted to strengthen his staff that was one thing, but you could not have two opposed security forces.

The Prime Minister said that he did not think we would get the Kurds back to their homes in the absence of an agreement on their future and in the presence of observers. Only with such observers on the ground would we be able to relinquish our mission. We should not be too delicate in keeping up pressure on the UN on this issue.

NATO

The Chief of the Defence Staff referred to the need to get a clear picture of the preferred UK contribution, ie in particular the structure and role of the Rapid Reaction Corps, at the forthcoming meeting of the Defence Planning Committee. The Prime Minister said that this was an issue which British Ministers would be discussing the next day. What he wanted to talk about at the meeting with General Galvin was how the US saw its long-term commitment to Europe.

General Galvin described the likely future structure of US forces in Europe, ie they would reduce proportionately in the same way as European forces. He thought the US would retain a competent, respectable force. The Prime Minister stressed the importance of maintaining the US presence in Europe. Even if the Soviet Union broke up, Russia would remain the largest and most heavily armed European military power. That would represent a direct threat to the US. It was right that Europe should proportionately do more for its own defence but the Prime Minister hoped the present discussion in Europe would not encourage Congressional pressure for the US to withdraw altogether.

General Galvin said that he saw a real risk that if the proposed development of the WEU became too institutionalised, voices in the US would say that the Europeans now had their expeditionary force for dealing with problems out of area and that the US did not need to maintain a presence. He hoped WEU could remain an ad hoc organisation. The Prime Minister said that we agreed that we did not want WEU to become a pre-emptive caucus in NATO. Nor did we want the development of the European security dimension to undermine the US commitment to Europe's defence. The French position was based on a long-term assessment that the US would withdraw from Europe but their policy was a self-fulfilling one. The Prime MInister said that it was vital that the US make its views plain. The US would have to lean on some of the other Europeans, particularly the Germans. General Galvin said that the Germans would have to be clear that they wanted the US presence. He had said as much to Chancellor Kohl last week. The Prime Minister reiterated that the Americans should not be too delicate in their approaches.

They would need to be fairly crisp. Part of the problem was that, in the European debate, those who favoured the development of a separate European defence identity sounded perfectly credible in public, emphasising their commitment to NATO and the need for Europe to do more of its own defence. Their arguments were very user-friendly, whereas our own sounded rather negative. Hence the need for the US to make its views clear.

General Galvin commented that these internal NATO discussions were ultimately less important that the issue of pan European security which had not been properly addressed.

I am copying this letter to Richard Gozney (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and to Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

Yours,
Stephen

J. S. WALL

Simon Webb, Esq.
Ministry of Defence

CONFIDENTIAL

CCPC
Bartley.

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

MO 1/18D

TELEPHONE 071-21 89000
DIRECT DIALLING 071-21 82111/3

23 April 1991

Prime Minister

Dear Stephen,

VISIT BY SACEUR

General Jack Galvin, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), is to call on the Prime Minister between 0945 and 1015 am on Wednesday 24th April. He will be accompanied by the Chief of the Defence Staff.

The Prime Minister may wish to discuss lessons of the Gulf and events in Kurdistan. But Mr King recommends that the Prime Minister use this opportunity with SACEUR principally to stress the importance which the UK attaches to the proposed future role of the Army in The Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps (ACE RRC).

As the Prime Minister knows, the planned restructuring of the British Army (and the resultant savings postulated in "Options for Change") is built around the assumption of the RRC role. It is important that SACEUR proposes, and NATO nations support, our proposed role in, and command of, an RRC structured on sensible lines.

It was SACEUR himself who first proposed the concept of a RRC and suggested (at last December's Ministerial Defence Planning Committee meeting in Brussels) that such a force "might be led by the UK". Since then, there has been substantial work done by SACEUR's staff at SHAPE in developing papers on revised NATO Force Structures, including plans for an ACE RRC. These are to be taken at the Ministerial DPC on 28 May 1991. Other nations are beginning to respond positively to the concept of the RRC and to UK leadership, although this will not be made certain until endorsed by Ministers of the allied nations.

Stephen Wall LVO CMG
No 10 Downing Street

Given that these are SACEUR's proposals, which he will have to present to the DPC, General Galvin's role in this issue is clearly central. If his proposals emerge in a way which is satisfactory to the UK, then it will be difficult for others to upset them. At this stage, however, there is German concern about the proposed structure of the RRC and about the proposed UK leadership role. This has been, and continues to be, actively under discussion both bilaterally and multilaterally at SHAPE. One German concern seems to be a perception that UK leadership of the RRC, which will have roles throughout ACE, might lead the one UK armoured division which is to remain in Germany post-Options to be removed in times of crisis for service elsewhere, to the detriment of German defence.

In this context, if General Galvin can be left with a clear view of the importance which the Prime Minister attaches to the UK role in the ACE RRC, then a valuable reinforcement of our position will have been achieved. To do this, it is not necessary to get into, or make assumptions about, the issue of the precise future size of the British Army. Lines to take on this subject, together with defensive material on other topics, are attached.

A copy goes to Richard Gozney (FCO) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely

Janet Binstead

(MISS J R BINSTEAD)
Private Secretary

BRIEF: UK COMMAND OF THE ACE RAPID REACTION CORPS

- UK made known in January its willingness to take on the leadership of the ACE RRC and to contribute substantial corps assets, 2 divisions, and an airmobile brigade to this new force.

- Work on restructuring of the British Army following our proposals set out in Options for Change is built around the assumption that the RRC will be where the UK makes its principal land forces contribution to NATO in the future.

- Therefore very important to the UK that clear way ahead emerges from Ministerial DPC meeting on 28 May. Most grateful for effort General Galvin is making to achieve this. Recent UK experience in the Gulf confirms that, with the professional forces at our disposal we are well placed to take on the RRC role which has been envisaged for the UK.

- See this role as being a central one for NATO. One in which, under UK leadership, a genuinely multinational structure is created. Role and deployment of the RRC would of course be ACE-wide, but continue to have Central Region options which should meet any German concerns.

SACEUR'S MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER

Future NATO structures (If raised)

- Important to maintain integrated structure and transatlantic partnership. Need, however, to recognise pressure for European defence identity. Best channelled through WEU. Some flexibility better than separate development

- Key points will be to agree that all operations in NATO area should be under NATO command and that no actions should be taken which would affect the security of NATO without the agreement of all Allies. WEU role could aid Western defence effort out of area, as seen in Gulf.

Theatre Nuclear Weapons/Short-range Nuclear Forces (SNF)

Need to think out very carefully political strategy for achieving in due course modernisation of NATO TNW. Welcome current work on stockpile reductions [SACEUR looking at residual stockpile of less than 1000, which we support]. If early phasing out of existing missiles (LANCE) and/or artillery is raised - need to look at in relation to SNF Arms Control but happy to consider with open mind.



International Who's Who 1991

GALVIN, Gen. John Rogers, M.A., D.F.C.; American army officer; b. 13 May 1929, Wakefield, Mass.; s. of John James Galvin and Mary Josephine Logan; m. Virginia Lee Brennan 1961; four d.; ed. U.S. Military Acad., Columbia Univ., Univ. of Pennsylvania, Command and Gen. Staff Coll. and Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy; commissioned 2nd Lieut. U.S. Army 1954; Military Asst. and ADC to Sec. of U.S. Army 1968–69; Commdr. 1st Bn. 8th Cavalry 1970; Mil. Asst. to Supreme Allied Command in Europe (SACEUR) 1974–75; Commdr. Div. Support Command 3rd Infantry Div. 1975–77, Chief of Staff 1977–78; Commanding Gen. 24th Infantry Div. 1981–83; VII (U.S.) Corps 1983–85; Commdr.-in-Chief U.S. Southern Command 1985–87; Supreme Allied Cmmdr. Europe and C.-in-C. U.S. European Command 1987–; Defense Distinguished Service Medal, Army Distinguished Service Medal, Silver Star, Legion of Merit (with 2 oak leaf clusters), Soldier's Medal, Bronze Star with 2 oak leaf clusters, Combat Infantry Man Badge, Ranger Tab. *Publications:* The Minute Men 1967, Air Assault 1969, Three Men of Boston 1974. *Leisure interests:* reading, writing and jogging. *Address:* Osaceur, B7010, SHAPE, Belgium.

CF

FILED

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

19 April 1991

General Galvin will be calling on the Prime Minister at 0945 on Wednesday 24 April. I should be grateful if, in consultation with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, you would let me have a brief by lunchtime on Tuesday 23 April.

I am copying this letter to Richard Gozney (Foreign and Commonwealth Office).

(J. S. WALL)

Simon Webb, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence.

Stephen
Confirmed for 0945
on Wed 24 April
for ½ hr. S 17/4

15



10 DOWNING STREET

Stephen

SACEUR, General Galvin, is paying a flying visit to London on Wednesday 24 April. CDS would like to bring him over to meet PM briefly between 9.00 - 1030 am that day.

I attach present prog. Could manage by squeezing Scottish Conference speechwriting mtg + Nigel Wicks/ Jeremy Varcoe mtg on Economic Summit.

What do you think?

S 17/4

NOT TO BE COPIED

COPY NO: 9

1030	Parliamentary Business Managers + GB
1100	Sir Robin Butler + AT
1130	Sir Crispin Tickell + WEC
1200	Host reception for TEC Chairmen
1330	Lunch in flat
1430	Interview with David Frost + GO
1630	Chartered Institute of Bankers + WEC
1700	Diary meeting
1730	Keep free for box
1845	Sir Robin Renwick + SW
1930	Host working supper for South African President de Klerk + Foreign Minister Pik Botha + SW

Tuesday 23 April

0800	Breakfast meeting with Sarah Hogg
0900	Questions briefing
1000	Keep free to change
1030	**LEAVE FOR WINDSOR CASTLE**
1130-1145	**ARRIVE AT THE HOME PARK**
1200	**MEET POLISH PRESIDENT**
1300	Lunch and Questions briefing
1515	**QUESTIONS**
1545	**KEEP FREE FOR MPs**
	RETURN TO NO.10
1700	Keep free for box and prepare for
1815	**DEPART FOR**
1950-2010	**ARRIVE WINDSOR FOR**
2030	**STATE BANQUET FOR POLISH PRESIDENT + MRS MAJOR**

Wednesday 24 April

0800	Press breakfast (Today) + GO
0915	Speechwriting meeting + JC, SH, NT (Scott Th Conference)
1000	Nigel Wicks & Jeremy Varcot + SW
1045	Prepare for
1100	Daily Express interview, Will Stewart, + GO
1145	Prepare for
1210	Talks with State visitor before
1300 for 1330	Host lunch for Polish President + Mrs Major
1455	State visitor leaves
1500	Keep free for box
1600	Mr Nelson Mandela + SW
1700	Foreign Secretary + SW
1730-1900	Ministers meeting + SW
2000 for 2015	Host dinner + Mrs. Major

Thursday 25 April

0900	Questions briefing
0930	Home Secretary + AT
1015	Cabinet photograph
1030	Cabinet
~~1130-1230~~	~~EA(ST)~~
1300	Lunch and Questions Briefing
1515	**QUESTIONS**
1545	**KEEP FREE FOR MPs**
1700	**DEPART H/C FOR NO. 10**

PM2AGN

CC BOP

PRIME MINISTER

MEETING WITH ADMIRAL LEE BAGGETT

You are to see Admiral Lee Baggett briefly tomorrow so that he can pay his farewell call on leaving the post of Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic. It is very much a courtesy call and need not last more than fifteen minutes. He will be accompanied by Sir John Fieldhouse.

You will want to thank him for his work and ask him whether he has any particular points he wants to raise with you. He may express some concern about the number of frigates, expressing the hope that we will maintain at least fifty (our actual figure is 47). Our view is that our current force levels are sufficient.

You may like to ask him how he views developments in the Soviet frigate and submarine capabilities.

You will find in the folder a short note by the MOD together with a biography.

CDP

C.D. POWELL

31 October 1988

CONFIDENTIAL

CCBJP

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB
Telephone 01-218 2111/3

MO 13E

31st October 1988

Dear Charles,

FAREWELL CALL BY SACLANT

Admiral Lee Baggett is paying a farewell call on the Prime Minister before leaving the post of Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic.

The call will provide an opportunity to express the UK's appreciation of Admiral Baggett's contribution to the NATO Alliance, and to stress Britain's full commitment to NATO's maritime strength. There are no particular points of substance which we would wish the Prime Minister to raise, although the attached short briefing note may be of use as an aide memoire on a number of issues which Admiral Baggett himself may raise. The most likely issue is destroyer/frigate numbers, where Admiral Baggett has requested a British contribution of 50 frigates (as opposed to the 47 currently available); and is known to have ambitions for considerably more.

I also enclose a biographical note.

Yours sincerely,

John Colston.

(J P COLSTON)
Private Secretary

Charles Powell Esq
No 10 Downing Street

CALL BY SACLANT ON PRIME MINISTER, 1 NOVEMBER 1988

LINE TO TAKE

- Pleased to have opportunity to express appreciation of Admiral Baggett's work as SACLANT and the large contribution he has made to NATO. Wish him well in retirement.

- We fully understand the importance of the maritime dimension to NATO planning and will continue to make a full contribution. The ability to reinforce Europe is a vital aspect of deterrence.

POINTS TO MAKE (IF RAISED)

Frigate Numbers

- Aware of SACLANT's wish for 50 escorts. We believe current force levels are sufficient, particularly in view of recent improvements in capability and availablity.

Allied Command Atlantic (ACLANT) exercises

- We give ACLANT exercises a high priority, but we must of course, also meet other commitments principally in the Gulf.

NATO Maritime Rules of Engagement (RoE)

[Background. SACLANT has proposed that existing RoE should be amended to give authority for NATO forces to initiate hostilities if they think attack is imminent. This raises questions regarding political control in a crisis, on which the Prime Minister has been consulted, and a compromise is in sight. NATO endorsement is expected shortly.]

- Very pleased that agreement has nearly been reached. Look forward to thorough testing of the RoE in WINTEX.

Maritime Prepositioning Ships

[Background - The US have asked to deploy 4 merchant ships called Maritime Prepositioning Ships (MPS) in UK waters. They carry equipment (all conventional) for the 6th Marine Amphibious Brigade which has NATO and out of area roles. We wish to ensure that HMG would be consulted fully before the ships were used in an emergency. Negotiations continue.]

- We very much favour proposal to station MPS here, but attach great importance to joint agreement on the use of MPS in an emergency. We are negotiating with the US authorities on this.

ANNEX A

ADMIRAL LEE BAGGETT, JR.
UNITED STATES NAVY



Admiral Lee Baggett, Jr., was born in Oxford, Mississippi. He attended the University of Mississippi for two years prior to entering the United States Naval Academy in 1946. He was commissioned an Ensign in June 1950. In 1958, he received a Master's Degree in physics after completing studies at the Naval Postgraduate school and the University of California at Berkeley.

In July 1950, he began his service in destroyers aboard the radar picket destroyer USS FRANK KNOX (DDR 742). In September 1951, he was assigned to duty in the destroyer USS CHARLES J. BADGER (DD 657). He served as commanding officer of the coastal minesweeper USS COURLAN (MSC(0) 44) from 1953 until 1955. He returned to sea duty as executive officer of the destroyer escort USS BRIDGET (DE 1024) in October 1958. In March 1960, he assumed command of the ocean minesweeper USS FIRM (MSO 444).

After attending the Naval War College, he was assigned as Nuclear Test Plans Officer in the Headquarters, Defense Atomic Support Agency, Washington, D.C., from June 1962 until July 1964, when he joined the staff of Commander, Operational Test and Evaluation Force. In October 1966, he was ordered as prospective commanding officer of the guided missile destroyer USS DECATUR (DDG 31), and upon its recommissioning he continued in command until September 1968. From October 1968 to June 1970, he served on the staff of Commander, Carrier Division SEVEN.

From August 1970 until March 1972, he was assigned to the Naval Ordnance Systems Command Headquarters, Washington, serving as Director of the Guided Missile Division. In May 1972, he returned to sea as commanding officer of the guided missile frigate USS REEVES (DLG 24), and from January 1974 to July 1975 he served as Chief of Staff to Commander, U.S. SIXTH Fleet.

In August 1975, he was ordered to duty as Commander, Antisubmarine Systems Project in the Naval Material Command, with additional duty as Director of the Antisubmarine Warfare Division, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. From November 1977 until May 1979, he was Commander, Naval Surface Group Middle Pacific.

On 31 May 1979, he became Commander, Naval Surface Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet. He served as Director, Naval Warfare, in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations from August 1982 to April 1985. Admiral Baggett became Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe and Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Naval Forces Europe on 30 May 1985. He assumed his present duties as Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic and Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command on 27 November 1985.

Admiral Baggett is married to the former Doris Simmons of Enterprise, Alabama.

E

31 A PM 88



From: Commander A Munns Royal Navy
MA/CDS

C/F PPS.

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE Room 6173

Main Building, Whitehall, London SW1A 2HB

Telephone (Direct Dialling) 01-218 2117

(Switchboard) 01-218 9000

PPS.

CDS 3002/6

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street
London
SW1A 2AA

CDN 3/6.

30 June 1988

Dear Mr Powell,

Thank you for your letter dated 24 June 1988. I confirm that Admiral Lee Baggett will call on the Prime Minister at 1700 on Tuesday 1 November 1988.


Yours sincerely,

Admiral Munns.

NATO

PM MTS SACUER

MAY '79



10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

24 June 1988

Thank you for your letter of 23 June about the visit of Admiral Lee Baggett. The Prime Minister could see him at 1700 on Tuesday 1 November.

C. D. POWELL

Commander A. Munns
Ministry of Defence

From: Commander A Munns Royal Navy
Military Assistant to Chief of the Defence Staff

Felix

Can we do this?

CH

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE Room 6173
Main Building, Whitehall, London SW1A 2HB
Telephone (Direct Dialling) 01-218 2117
(Switchboard) 01-218 9000

CDS 3002/6

1700 - 1730
Tues 1 Nov.

C D Powell Esq
Private Secretary to
The Prime Minister
No 10 Downing Street
LONDON SW1

TG
24/6

23 June 1988

Dear Mr Powell,

Admiral Lee Baggett Jr USN will complete his appointment as Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic in November 1988, and during the Autumn he will be making his farewell calls in European capitals. He will be visiting London on the afternoon of Monday 31 October and the morning of Tuesday 1 November.

The Chief of Defence Staff has asked me to enquire whether the Prime Minister would be available to receive a call from Admiral Baggett on 1 November. The Admiral called upon the Prime Minister in March 1986, shortly after assuming his appointment.

You will wish to be aware that an Audience has been sought with Her Majesty The Queen late on the morning of 1 November.

Yours sincerely,

Adrian Munns.

PMAB

CONFIDENTIAL

(2)

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1
Telephone 01-~~930 7022~~ xxxxxxx 01-218 2111/3

MO 1/18V

15 February 1988

Prime Minister
CDP 15/2

Dear Charles,

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH GENERAL GALVIN

Thank you for your letter of 10th February about General Galvin's call on the Prime Minister. CDS has now had an opportunity to speak to the UK Military Representative to NATO and the British Deputy SACEUR about General Galvin's concern at a possible decline in Germany's conventional capability. You will wish to know the outcome before the Prime Minister's visit to NATO.

In general, the NATO assessment of German defence capabilities, based on its annual scrutiny of nations' defence plans, is a favourable one. The FRG maintains large and well equipped armed forces, with high standards of combat effectiveness and readiness. But the NATO Annual Report has drawn attention to the German demographic problem, which is well known, and, to the possibility that continuing budgetary constraints might, in the long term, cast doubt on future equipment plans. (The FRG spends currently only 3% of its GDP on defence). The German Government have, in fact, acknowledged that they are currently engaged in reassessing their defence planning against the need to match resources to requirements, though so far manpower has been more of a problem for them than money. Last year the period of conscription was extended from 15 to 18 months as a measure to ease manpower difficulties. It is also relevant that a junior German Defence Minister (Frau Hurland-Buhning) visited the Ministry of Defence recently to learn more about our experience in employing women in the armed forces.

However, the senior British officers consulted by CDS are unaware of any specific examples of German equipment projects currently at risk. It would appear that General Galvin's remarks were no more than a reflection of the general NATO concerns that I have described above. Under the normal NATO defence planning arrangements, the FRG would be obliged to report to the Alliance any specific decisions affecting force or equipment replacement plans. We will report any such substantive developments or further information that we are able to discover about current German thinking.

Charles Powell Esq
No 10 Downing Street

I am copying this letter to Lyn Parker (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely
Brian Hawtin

(B R HAWTIN)
Private Secretary

NATO: Mtgs with SACEUR, May 79

1

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT cc MASTER

file

JA2AXO
cc PC

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

10 February 1988

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH GENERAL GALVIN

The Prime Minister had a brief meeting this afternoon with General Galvin, Supreme Allied Commander Europe. The Chief of the Defence Staff was also present.

There was a certain amount of discussion of the forthcoming NATO Summit. General Galvin thought that the most difficult problem would be to get the Summit to give the necessary guidance for early decisions on the modernisation of NATO's nuclear weapons. A number of NATO Governments were reluctant to face up to this. The Prime Minister suggested that the Summit should open with an intelligence briefing on Soviet nuclear and conventional strength, and the steps which they were taking to modernise their forces in both areas. This might help convince the waverers. General Galvin said that he would discuss this with Secretary Carlucci and General Powell. The Prime Minister would like the point to be pursued in Brussels.

On conventional force reductions, General Galvin said that he had put in hand a large number of detailed studies. He would like to discuss these with the Prime Minister during her visit to SHAPE.

The Prime Minister referred to the importance of interoperability between NATO forces, particularly in munitions. She was glad that it had been possible to move to the next stage of the NATO frigate project. General Galvin endorsed the Prime Minister's comments. It would be useful if this point could be stressed in the declaration which would issue from the NATO Summit.

General Galvin referred to his concern at the decline in Germany's conventional capability. Although this was partly due to demographic factors, the German Government were failing to take a number of steps which were open to them, for instance improving the equipment of their reserve forces and bringing more women into the armed forces. The Prime Minister asked the CDS to let her have a note about this problem. She

added that she thought the time had come for Germany to take a more active role outside the NATO area. Some way might have to be found to overcome the constitutional limitations of this.

I am copying this letter to Lyn Parker (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and to Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

(CHARLES POWELL)

Brian Hawtin, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence

SRWBGR

PRIME MINISTER

MEETING WITH GENERAL GALVIN

You are to see General Galvin, the new Supreme Allied Commander Europe, tomorrow afternoon. He will be accompanied by CDS. The main purpose is so that you can meet him before you pay your formal visit on 17 February and then go on with him to visit SHAPE in Mons.

You will find a biography of General Galvin in the folder. He is giving a speech at lunchtime to the Royal United Services Institution on "NATO's military developments and prospects".

You will not need any special briefing for the meeting. But the subjects on which you might touch are:

- your visit to NATO next week. You might ask whether there is anything which he wants you to say or do
- the NATO summit on 2/3 March
- the need to modernise NATO's nuclear forces
- his reaction to the proposals which you have put to President Mitterrand for enabling France to expand the scope of its military co-operation with NATO.

C.D.P.

MF

(C. D. POWELL)
9 February 1988

PRESENTATION BY GENERAL JOHN R GALVIN

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER EUROPE

at the

ROYAL UNITED SERVICES INSTITUTE FOR DEFENCE STUDIES

on Wednesday 10 February 1988

at 1.00 pm

General Galvin, Supreme Allied Commander Europe will address the Royal United Services Institute on Wednesday 10 February 1988 at 1.00 pm. His presentation, which is entitled "NATO's Military Developments and Prospects", will form part of the Institute's current main theme study "NATO and the Warsaw Pact: The Next 15 Years".

The INF Treaty has far-reaching implications for Europe and, together with prospects of further developments in Arms Control, for the security of the Alliance as a whole. Despite "Glasnost" and welcome signs of an improvement in East-West relations, the Soviet Union's long-term intentions must remain a prime area of concern for NATO's political and military leaders. Their task will be to ensure sound security policies as a basis for future arms control negotiations in an uncertain world.

General Galvin will address those conditions which he considers to be essential in sustaining NATO's role of deterrence and defence. Critical isues will include the military posture which the Alliance will need to maintain in order to support its position in Arms Control negotiations, the question of how to counter the effect of increasing pressure on defence budgets by making better use of existing defence resources, and the overall need for an agreed Alliance approach to the correlation of Security and Resource Policies.

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1
Telephone 01-930 7022 xxxxxxx 01-218 2111/3

MO 1/18V

9th February 1988

Dear Charles.

CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER BY SACEUR: WEDNESDAY 10TH FEBRUARY

You told me when we spoke on the telephone the other day that the Prime Minister's meeting with the new SACEUR tomorrow is intended as no more than an introductory courtesy call and we do not propose to provide any formal briefing. But you may find it helpful to have the attached CV for General Galvin who is in London to address the RUSI. A copy of the press release issued by the Institute is also attached.

Yours ever,

(I C F ANDREWS)
Private Secretary

Charles Powell Esq
No 10 Downing Street

file Prem
cc: PC

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

8 December 1987

Thank you for your letter of 7 December about the visit of General Galvin. The Prime Minister could see him at 1500 on 10 February. I assume that CDS will accompany him.

C. D. Powell

Commander A. Munns
Ministry of Defence

From: Commander A Munns Royal Navy
MA/CDS

010

cc PC

Charles
✓ 1500 on 10th Feb.
PAB 1st 1/2/88 Embargo?
Can we help?

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE Room 6173
Main Building, Whitehall, London SW1A 2HB
Telephone (Direct Dialling) 01-218 2117
(Switchboard) 01-218 9000

CDS 3002/1

C D Powell Esq
Private Secretary to The Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
LONDON SW1

7 December 1987

Dear Mr Powell,

When the Chief of Defence Staff saw the Prime Minister in November she mentioned that the new SACEUR, General Galvin, had still not called on her. We did try to rectify this when the General made a very brief visit to London last month, but without success.

General Galvin plans to be in London on Wednesday 10 February 1988, to give a lunchtime lecture to the Royal United Services Institute. His programme for the remainder of that day is clear and I should be grateful for your advice on whether it might be possible for the Prime Minister to see General Galvin on this date; perhaps you would ask the diary secretary to ring PA/CDS on MOD MB 6190 to try to fix a time for a call.

Yours sincerely,

Adrian Munns.



CF.

CDP

24/6

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER EUROPE
SHAPE, BELGIUM

19 JUN 1987

PM's 1824

Dear Prime Minister Thatcher:

Thank you for your very kind letter of 15 June and for the picture you included for Mrs. Rogers. Your thoughtfulness is deeply appreciated.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

Bernie Rogers

BERNARD W. ROGERS
General, U.S. Army
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

The Right Honorable Margaret Thatcher, MP
10 Downing Street
London SW1, United Kingdom

File

SH

cc MOD

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

15 June 1987

Dear General Rogers.

I very much enjoyed your visit to Chequers and would like to say once again how deeply grateful we in Britain all are for your outstanding and distinguished leadership as Supreme Allied Commander Europe. I know that you will continue, on your return to the United States, to help explain to the American people something of the European point of view and the very genuine efforts that we in Europe are making to strengthen our contribution to the Alliance.

I send you and your wife my very best wishes.

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher

General Bernard Rogers

PRIME MINISTER

Mrs. Ann Rogers, wife of General Bernard Rogers, has asked through George Younger whether she would be able to have a signed photograph of you.

I should be grateful if you would sign the attached photograph. I suggest you inscribe it:

> "To Ann Rogers, with warm good wishes,
> Margaret Thatcher".

I also attach a short letter to General Rogers for you to sign.

CDP

C. D. POWELL
12 June 1987

SECRET

SUBJECT cc MASTER

File 3

CCPC

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

10 May 1987

Dear Tony,

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER EUROPE AT CHEQUERS ON SUNDAY 10 MAY

The Prime Minister received General Rogers for a farewell call at Chequers this morning. Lord Carrington was also present.

The Prime Minister thanked General Rogers for his outstanding work as SACEUR and the way in which he had stood up for European interests.

Most of the rest of the discussion dealt with the INF negotiations. General Rogers said that he naturally disliked losing Cruise and Pershing IIs. Together with the option of first use of nuclear weapons, they were his principal tools. But he recognised the political facts of life. He agreed with the Prime Minister that the most important point was to establish a floor against further reductions. In military terms, he would prefer to retain some Pershing Is. But if this was not possible - and he understood the political arguments against it - then the floor should be set at missiles with a range of 500 kms. He particularly welcomed the Prime Minister's insistence that SLCMs and more F1-11 dual-capable aircraft should be committed to SACEUR. Lord Carrington added that the SLCMs would need to be based in Europe, to underline the commitment to SACEUR. The Prime Minister acknowledged that this might mean use of the facilities at Holy Loch.

General Rogers said that he was disturbed by the approach being taken in Washington, both on the part of the JCS and the White House, to the INF negotiations. There seemed to be no understanding that the risk in negotiations was borne not by the US but by the European allies; or that, if the United States continued to contemplate a series of reductions in European-based nulcear weapons, Europe would eventually be left vulnerable to Soviet intimidation. The JCS argued that even after an INF agreement, there would still be some 4,500 nuclear warheads in Europe. But this was not the point. There had to be weapons to hit the targets identified by SACEUR; and after an INF agreement, the warheads would be

predominantly on very short-range weapons systems and unable to reach many targets vital to NATO's stragegy.

Lord Carrington said that he had recently visited Washington. He had found that Baker and Carlucci tended to the conclusion that the United States could not turn down Kohl's request for equal ceilings for SRINF at a level of about 80. In his own view, this could raise considerable problems of presentation in Europe since it would be seen as though NATO were rejecting the second zero option . A way to overcome this problem would be to accept the zero option for SRINF while insisting on the exclusion of the German Pershings, with freedom to modernise them. If the Russians then insisted on matching the Germans, it would appear that they were the ones who were moving away from the zero option. The Prime Minister accepted the logic of this, but pointed out that it would depend crucially on whether Chancellor Kohl could get the agreement of his own government to a position in favour of equal ceilings, with all the SRINF concerned deployed in the FRG. If those conditions could be met, then we would not oppose such an outcome. But she remained to be convinced that they could be, particularly since Chancellor Kohl seemed unwilling to argue the case publicly in Germany. The latest opinion poll showing that 77 per cent of Germans favoured a second zero option might also influence him.

Lord Carrington said that he remained very concerned at the failure to reach an agreed NATO position on this issue. The German government bore the main responsibility for this. A decision needed to be worked out between the US, UK, France and Germany in advance of full NATO discussion. It would be a disaster for the Alliance if no decision was reached at the Reykjavik Foreign Minister's meeting. It ought to be much sooner than that. He hoped that the Prime Minister would use her influence with Chancellor Kohl to stimulate the Germans to reach an early decision. The Prime Minister agreed on the need for an early decision. It was impracticable to expect Chancellor Kohl to state his views publicly ahead of the Land elections in Germany on 17 May. She would consider what more she could do to encourage him to move to a rapid decision thereafter.

I am copying this letter to John Howe (Ministry of Defence) and Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,

C. D. POWELL

A. C. Galsworthy, Esq., C.M.G.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

PRIME MINISTER

MEETING WITH GENERAL ROGERS, SATURDAY 9 MAY

Depending on how your Manifesto meeting tomorrow goes, Lord Carrington will be bringing General and Mrs. Rogers over to Chequers for a farewell call at 5 pm. They are fully prepared to be told that it will not be possible, if you find you need more time for the Manifesto. Could you possibly let the Garden Room girl, Liz, know by 4 pm if you wish them to be put off.

You will want to thank General Rogers for his many years of outstanding service as SACEUR. You will want to compare notes about Reykjavik, on which he shares your views. You may also want to discuss the current position in the INF negotiations. As you know, he is not at all keen on a zero LRINF agreement: and has reservations about a further zero option on SRINF. (I attach a note of a talk which he had with Michael Alexander and VCDS.) A point you might particularly tackle him on is the commitment of additional American systems to SACEUR to compensate for the loss of Cruise/Pershing. How many additional systems does he believe SACEUR will need? What would be the best balance between e.g. SLCMs and additional F1-11 aircraft? How does he assess the likelihood of the Administration responding positively?

CDP

(C. D. POWELL)
8 May 1987

GRS 1050

SECRET

20A

SECRET
FM UKDEL NATO
TO DESKBY 270930Z FCO
TELNO 184
OF 270805Z APRIL 87
AND TO DESKBY 270930Z MODUK
INFO IMMEDIATE BONN, PARIS, WASHINGTON

SIC EME
MODUK FOR MR STANLEY (MIN AF)

LRINF/SRINF: SACEUR'S VIEWS

SUMMARY

1. GENERAL ROGERS PRIVATELY AIRS TO VCDS AND PERMREP HIS CONTINUING STRONG DOUBTS ABOUT ANY ZERO-ZERO LRINF DEAL, AND ABOUT SHULZ'S PREFERRED OPTION FOR ELIMINATING SRINF, AND EXPRESSES A WISH THAT THE PRIME MINISTER SHOULD TAKE THE LEAD IN URGING THE PRESIDENT TO SLOW DOWN THIS ARMS CONTROL PROCESS. BUT HE RECOGNISES THE POLITICAL PROBLEMS, AND OUTLINES HIS APPROACH SHOULD MINISTERS NEVERTHELESS DECIDE TO BACK THE PRESENT US LINE.

DETAIL

2. AT HIS REQUEST SACEUR MET VCDS AND MYSELF YESTERDAY EVENING AT THE RESIDENCE OF THE (BRITISH) DEPUTY SACEUR. THE DISCUSSION WAS IN STRICT CONFIDENCE AND LASTED FOR OVER AN HOUR.

3. SACEUR OPENED BY EXPRESSING HIS CONTINUED OPPOSTION ON MILITARY GROUNDS TO ANY ZERO-ZERO LRINF DEAL THAT LEFT THE ALLIANCE WITHOUT ITS MOST SURVIVABLE, EFFECTIVE, AND EUROPEAN BASED MEANS OF HOLDING TARGETS AT RISK IN THE SOVIET UNION. HE WANTED THE HIGHEST POLITICAL CIRCLES TO BE AWARE OF THAT. HIS BASIC PURPOSE NOW WAS TO EXPLORE WHETHER THERE WAS, EVEN AT THIS LATE STAGE, ANY WAY OF SLOWING DOWN THE ARMS CONTROL TRAIN. HE WAS APPROACHING US BECAUSE THE PRIME MINISTER WAS THE MOST EFFECTIVE (HE ALSO USED THE WORDS, THE ONLY) WESTERN LEADER AND ONE WITH A UNIQUE ABILITY TO INFLUENCE THE PRESIDENT. WAS THERE NO WAY, HE ASKED, OF SWITCHING THE ALLIANCE'S POSITION TO ALLOW THE RETENTION OF SOME LRINF, FOR EXAMPLE PICKING UP SENATOR NUNN'S IDEA OF HOLDING BACK THE LAST 20 PER CENT OF LRINF UNTIL THE SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION OF NEGOTIATIONS ON THE CONVENTIONAL IMBALANCE.

4. VCDS AND I IN RESPONE REVIEWED WITH SACEUR THE ARGUMENTS WHICH HAD LED THE ALLIANCE TO BACK ZERO-ZERO AS TABLED BY THE US IN GENEVA, AND THE POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES FOR ALL ALLIANCE COUNTRIES, AS WELL AS THE RISKS FOR ALLIANCE COHESION, OF SWITCHING TRACKS NOW. SACEUR ACKNOWLEDGED THESE REALITIES, AND THAT THE LRINF TRAIN WAS PROBABLY UNSTOPPABLE. HE INDICATED THAT THIS WAS THE ANSWER HE HAD EXPECTED BUT ASKED THAT HIS MILITARY VIEWS NEVERTHELESS BE CONVEYED TO MINISTERS.

SECRET

15

5. TURNING TO SRINF, ABOUT WHICH HIS CONCERNS WERE OF A LESSER ORDER (SINCE THE SYSTEMS IN QUESTION WOULD NOT REACH THE USSR), SACEUR ALSO ASKED WHETHER THERE WAS NO WAY OF LEAVING OPTIONS OPEN TO ALLOW RETAINING A WESTERN RIGHT TO DEPLOY IN THE 500 TO 1000 KM RANGE BAND, EG WITH THE P1B IN A MIX OF ABOUT 48 US AND 72 MODERNISED FRG SYSTEMS, ACCEPTING MATCHING SOVIET DEPLOYMENTS. VCDS AND I CONFINED OURSELVES TO SAYING THAT HMG WAS STILL CONSIDERING THE SHULTZ BRIEFING, AND EMPHASISED THAT CERTAINLY THE VIEWS OF THE NATO MILITRY AUTHORITIES WOULD BE PUT IN FULL TO MINISTERS. WE NOTED THAT IT SEEMED TO US VERY UNLIKELY THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD ALLOW THE P1A TO BE MODERNISED AND THAT IT PROBABLY PLANNED TO CATCH THE GERMAN SYSTEMS THROUGH THE NON-CIRCUMVENTION CLAUSES OF ANY AGREEMENT. WE DISCUSSED THE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ALLIANCE OF SOME EUROPEANS (AND AGAIN SACEUR HAD THE UK IN MIND) STOPPING AND BEING SEEN TO STOP THE US FROM REACHING AN EARLY AND VALID AGREEMENT WITH THE SOVIET UNION. SACEUR WAS REALISTIC ABOUT THE PROBLEMS, AND WENT ON TO OUTLINE HIS VIEWS ON THE OTHER POSSIBLE OPTIONS.

6. IF MINISTERS RULE OUT P1B DEPLOYMENTS, THEN SACEUR WOULD PREFER TO EXTEND THE SRINF ZERO-ZERO TO CAPTURE THE SCUD (IE ZERO OVER 300 TO 1000 KM), AND ESTABLISH A LINK TO REMAINING WARSAW PACT SNF. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THE VERIFICATION PROBLEMS AND THE COMPLICATIONS THAT THIS WOULD BRING TO THE ACHIEVEMENT OF ANY AGREEMENT IN A TIMESCALE ACCEPTABLE TO THE US.

7. IF MINISTERS CONCLUDE THAT THIS IS NOT PRACTICAL POLITICS AND THAT SOME FORM OF THE QUOTE DOUBLE ZERO UNQUOTE OPTION SHOULD BE PURSUED THEN SACEUR SAID THAT HE WOULD ENDORSE AN APPROACH THAT COUPLED ACCEPTANCE WITH THE STRONGEST POSSIBLE ALLIANCE STATEMENT THAT

A. EMPHASISED THE CONTINUING VALIDITY OF NATO STRATEGY OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE SMICLN

B. EXPRESSED THE CONTINUING ROLE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND A DETERMINATION TO AVOID QUOTE DENUCLEARISATION UNQUOTE SMICLN

C. COMMITTED THE ALLIANCE TO THE NECESSARY NUCLEAR MODERNISATION, NOT LEAST INCLUDING SACEUR'S NWRS RECOMMENDATIONS FOR DUAL CAPABLE AIRCRAFT AND A LANCE FOLLOW-ON SYSTEM SMICLN

D. STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF DEALING WITH THE REMAINING IMBALANCES IN SHORTER RANGE LAND BASED NUCLEAR MISSILES, AND THE ALLIANCE'S WILLINGNESS TO SEE THESE NEGOTIATED OVER, ULTIMATELY PERHAPS DOWN TO GLOBAL ZERO, BUT ONLY AFTER SATISFACTORY PROGRESS ON CW AND CONVENTIONAL ARMS.

8. I ASKED SACEUR DIRECTLY FOR HIS VIEW ON THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE COMPLETE ELIMINATION OF ALL LAND-BASED MISSILE SYSTEMS FOR ALLIANCE STRATEGY. HE SUCKED HIS TEETH, AND WOULD NOT COMMIT HIMSELF IN ADVANCE OF FURTHER SHAPE STUDIES. NUCLEAR ARTILLERY AND CURRENT LANCE MISSILES HE COULD CONTEMPLATE GIVING UP UNDER THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES BUT BUT HE DID REFER TO THE CONVENTIONAL REQUIREMENT

/Fax.

FOR FUTURE FOFA SYSTEMS CURRENTLY PLANNED TO BE MET BY TACTICAL MISSILES. WE DISCUSSED THE ADVANTAGES OF REMOVING A FUTURE EXPENSIVE ATBM REQUIREMENT BUT SACEUR NOTED THE PROBLEM POSED BY THE CONCENTRATION OF OTHER FORMS OF WP ATTACK ON THE REMAINING AND CRUCIAL NUCLEAR CAPABLE AIRCRAFT AND RELATED FACILITIES.

COMMENT

9. VCDS AND I WERE IN NO DOUBT THAT SACEUR'S REAL CONCERNS STILL FOCUS ON THE LOSS OF HIS LRINF (GLCM AND PERSHING II) CAPABILITY TO STRIKE SOVIET TERRITORY. HE SENSES THAT HIS OWN INFLUENCE IS EBBING WITH ONLY TWO MONTHS MORE IN OFFICE. HE WILL CONTINUE TO SPEAK HIS MIND, IN PUBLIC WHEN ASKED, BUT HE HAS NO REAL EXPECTATION OF CHANGING EVENTS NOW. IF LRINF ZERO-ZERO HAS TO BE, HE WOULD PREFER POLITICIANS TO ACCEPT NEW DEPLOYMENTS OF AT LEAST THE 750 KM RANGE P1B IN PART COMPENSATION, OR FAILING THAT TO REORDER THE NEGOTIATIONS TO REMOVE THE SCUD AS WELL. BUT HIS BOTTOM LINE IS A PUBLIC COMMITMENT BY THE ALLIES (AND THE US IN PARTICULAR) TO FLEXIBLE RESPONSE, TO THE OTHER NUCLEAR MODERNISATIONS HE HAS LONG CALLED FOR, AND TO LINK FURTHER SHORT RANGE LAND BASED MISSILE REDUCTIONS, PERHAPS DOWN TO ZERO, TO THE OUTCOME OF CW AND CONVENTIONAL NEGOTIATIONS.

10. GENERAL ROGERS ASKED THAT HIS VIEWS BE MADE KNOWN TO UK MINISTERS. NO SPECIFIC REPLY IS CALLED FOR, BUT I RECOMMEND THAT I BRIEF HIM PERSONALY ON OUR POSITION WHEN IT IS CLEAR, PERHAPS IMMEDIATELY AFTER YOUR MEETING AT CHEVENING ON FRIDAY. SACEUR IS DUE TO RETURN TO WASHINGTON IN THE WEEK OF 4 MAY TO BRIEF PRESIDENT REAGAN PERSONALLY ON THE MILITARY IMPLICTIONS FOR THE ALLIANCE OF THE VARIOUS POSSIBLE LRINF/SRINF OUTCOMES (PLEASE PROTECT).

ALEXANDER

YYYY

UBLNAN 1814

US/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS

LIMITED
ACDD
DEFENCE D.
SOVIET D.
NEWS D.
NAD
EED
WED
PLANNING STAFF
RES D.
INFO D.
PUSD
NED
CSCE UNIT
POD
HD/SAD

PS
PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MRS CHALKER
PS/MR RENTON
PS/PUS
MR DEREK THOMAS
MR BOYD
MR RATFORD
MR FALL
MR FEARN
MR BRAITHWAITE
MR SLATER
MR BARRINGTON
MR GILLMORE
MR REEVE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION:
ARMS CONTROL TALKS

COPIES TO:

MR BERMAN, LEGAL ADVSRS

SECRET

SRWAVL

(1)

PRIME MINISTER

GENERAL ROGERS

Lord Carrington telephoned me this morning to say that General Rogers would be staying with him next weekend. He wondered whether there would be any chance of bringing him over to pay a farewell call on you at Chequers on Saturday. He realised that it was not at all a convenient weekend and would not be surprised if you were unable to do it. But he thought he would mention it all the same. I said that I knew you were heavily engaged at the weekend but would find out whether there was likely to be a half-hour interval at some point when he could bring General Rogers over.

Would tea-time on Saturday, for half-an-hour be possible?

I hope so.

CDP

mb

(C. D. POWELL)
5 May 1987

Spoke to Lord Carrington's office.

CDP
6/5

cc PS.

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB
Telephone 01-218 2111/3 (Direct Dialling)
01-218 9000 (Switchboard)

CDP 10/4

MO 14/2

9th April 1987

Dear Charles,

VISIT OF GENERAL ROGERS

Thank you for your letter of 2nd April, in which you offered 1130 on 12th June for General Rogers' farewell call on the Prime Minister. I am grateful to you for finding a slot. I have asked the Department to set work in hand on the brief.


Yours sincerely,

(J F HOWE)
Private Secretary

cancelled.

Charles Powell Esq
No 10 Downing Street

NATO : mtg. with SACEUR : May 79



10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

2 April 1987

We have received a letter (copy attached) from Head of MOD Protocol asking whether General Bernard Rogers could pay a farewell call on the Prime Minister in June.

Assuming this request has the support of the Defence Secretary I could offer a call at 1130 on 12 June, subject to unforeseen events. I should be grateful for briefing by 9 June.

(CHARLES POWELL)

John Howe, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence.

10 DOWNING STREET

(3) CDP
No - have checked with FCO. Definitely 8/9/10 June
Tessa

(1) Charles

Have penciled in 11.30. am. on that day but with a question mark. Is this something she has to do?

Tessa

1/4

Tessa

(2) Won't she be at the Venice Biennale?

(4) NO — see reply

(3) No: the dates I have for Venice are 8/9/10 June

RESTRICTED

① T.G.
② CDP

Protocol Office Room 2254
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
Main Building Whitehall London SW1A 2HB

Telephone 01-218 6608 (Direct Dialling)
01-218 9000 (Switchboard)

The Resident Clerk
10 Downing Street
London SW 1

Your reference

Our reference
D/PROT/609/3/1/3

Date
30th March 1987

General Bernard Rogers USA, Supreme Allied Commander Europe, will be paying his farewell calls in the United Kingdom on Friday 12th June 1987. He has asked whether he could call on the Prime Minister at a time convenient to her.

Your early advice on this request would be appreciated.

J.L. DILLON
Group Captain (Retd)
Head of Protocol

RESTRICTED


AM 8 7
12
3
6
9

(2)

10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

You will want to know that General Bernard Rogers' retirement as SACEUR was announced this afternoon. It is not quite clear what the effective date will be. His successor will be General Galvin.

I expect that you will want to write. I will do a draft. CDP 24/2

CONFIDENTIAL

NATO JT
cc CO
MOD

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

25 July 1979

Dear Paul,

INTRODUCTORY CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER BY THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER, EUROPE, GENERAL BERNARD ROGERS AT 10 DOWNING STREET ON 24 JULY

The new SACEUR, General Rogers, paid his introductory call on the Prime Minister at No. 10 on 24 July at 1800. The following is a summary of the main points which arose during half an hour's relaxed and informal discussion.

The Prime Minister expressed her concern over the lead enjoyed by the Warsaw Pact Forces in standardisation of weaponry and equipment. General Rogers said that he was reasonably optimistic that trends in NATO towards greater standardisation were moving satisfactorily; he agreed, nevertheless, that the Warsaw Pact at present enjoyed a significant advantage. The Prime Minister commented that this advantage extended into every aspect of conventional weaponry and into other fields as well. The momentum of Soviet military expenditure seemed unstoppable. General Rogers told the Prime Minister that all his studies had led him to the conclusion that 1982 would be a critical year for the West. Western vulnerability would be at its greatest, the Soviet Union would have a new leadership and the temptation for this leadership to test the West in some area or other might prove irresistable. The Alliance could not hope, by that time, to have made up all the ground which it had lost; but, General Rogers said, he was hopeful that NATO's cohesion and the determination of its members to make the Alliance work, together with the programme for improving NATO conventional capacity which was already under way, would enable the Alliance to weather this vulnerable period.

The Prime Minister expressed particular concern over the Soviet Union's lead in the field of chemical warfare. General Rogers said that he was hopeful that the United States would decide to go ahead with the production of binary weapons, in order to acquire a deterrent capability in this field which was at present lacking. Moreover, existing stocks of UK chemical weapons were now deteriorating since there had been no restocking for a long period. Unless a decision to resume production were taken quickly, such minimal deterrent capacity as the United States still possessed would have disappeared by the early 1980s.

/General Rogers

5

CONFIDENTIAL

General Rogers went on to say that he could not over-emphasise how vital it was for the future of NATO that a decision on Theatre Nuclear Forces should be taken before the end of 1979. On this issue, the next few months would be crucial and the role of the UK could be decisive. Another field to which General Rogers intended, he said, to give attention was that of intelligence: the Alliance had to decide whether its intelligence machinery was adequate to determine Soviet intentions in good time and provide adequate notice of the need for Alliance reinforcements. General Rogers said that he proposed to examine all these matters and to make early recommendations.

The Prime Minister asked General Rogers how vulnerable, in his view, the Alliance is to Soviet penetration. General Rogers said that he had not yet been able to form a proper assessment of this; it was nevertheless clear that, at least in peace time, the US and the UK should be very careful about what information they released to NATO as a whole.

General Rogers told the Prime Minister that it would, in his view, be wrong to underestimate the economic and demographic problems of the Soviet Union and the impact which these clearly had on the morale of the Soviet armed forces and on that of her allies. He congratulated the Prime Minister on the very favour-able impact which the Government's policies had already produced on the morale of the Armed Services in the UK.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Roger Facer (Ministry of Defence) and Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,

Brian Cartledge.

Paul Lever, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

COVERING SECRET UK EYES A

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1
Telephone 01-~~930 7022~~ 218 2111/3

COVERING SECRET UK EYES A

MO 1/14/1

20th July 1979

P.A. 23/7

Dear Caroline,

I am writing to confirm that General Bernard W Rogers, Supreme Allied Commander Europe, will now call on the Prime Minister at No 10 at 1800 on Tuesday 24th July. He will be calling on Lord Carrington at 1730.

I am enclosing a set of briefs* for this introductory call for the Prime Minister's use.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Margaret Turner (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and to Martin Vile (Cabinet Office - with briefs).

Yours sincerely,

John Gutteridge

(J D GUTTERIDGE)

Miss Caroline Stephens
No 10 Downing Street

* briefs are to be found in the attached folder No 2.

COVERING SECRET
UK EYES A

COVERING SECRET UK EYES A

GENERAL BERNARD W ROGERS

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER EUROPE

18.00HRS

TUESDAY 24 JULY

NO 10.

CONFIDENTIAL

BRIEF NOs	1	UK Commitment to Allied Command Europe (ACE)
	2	UK Defence Budget
	3	TNF Modernisation
	4	Polaris Replacement
	5	SALT
	6	MBFR
	7	Greece, Turkey and NATO
	8	Chemical Warfare
	9	Rapid Reinforcement of ACE

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

INTRODUCTORY CALLS BY GENERAL ROGERS: 24 JULY 1979

STEERING BRIEF

1. General Bernard Rogers, who succeeded General Haig as Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) on 1st July, will be making introductory calls in the UK on Tuesday, 24th July. As well as calling on the Prime Minister, he will meet the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, Secretary of State for Defence, the Chief of Defence Staff and the 3 Service Chiefs of Staff.

2. This is essentially a courtesy visit by General Rogers on taking up his appointment as SACEUR. The call will nevertheless provide a good opportunity to establish a close understanding with General Rogers on matters of mutual concern within the Alliance and to impress on him our recognition that we, and the other allies, must strengthen our defence efforts if the threat posed by the immense growth in military power of the Soviet Union is to be met.

3. Following so closely on from General Haig's farewell visit on 13th June, much of the material provided on that occasion will be relevant to General Rogers' call. Where this has been overtaken by events, however, updated briefs have been prepared. This is the case with both SALT and the negotiations, which General Rogers will now be conducting, aimed at a closer relationship between Greece and NATO's integrated military structure. In addition, briefs are provided on topics for which General Rogers is known to have requested briefing in preparation for his visit to the UK.

4. A short summary of General Rogers' career is attached at Annex A. The briefs enclosed are as follows:

CONFIDENTIAL

SW

BRIEF NO 8

20 July 1979

SECRET UK EYES A

INTRODUCTORY CALLS BY GENERAL ROGERS: 24 JULY 1979

CHEMICAL WARFARE

Points to Make

1. There is a clear Soviet threat in the field of CW to which we must give attention.

2. A treaty banning the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons could, provided that it safeguarded national and NATO security interests, offer the most economic solution to the threat. The US/USSR bilaterals are of central importance in this context, and we hope they can reach a satisfactory conclusion. Adequate verification is clearly crucial.

3. We must ensure that NATO's defensive measures against CW attack are as effective as possible. The Long Term Defence Programme called for improvements: the UK will continue to improve its defensive equipment.

4. NATO needs to consider whether it has adequate means to deter the Soviet use of CW and how it should respond. We need not assume that retaliation in kind is the only appropriate deterrent or response. But the options need to be looked at carefully. The UK is ready to join in any Alliance discussion of these important issues.

5. If General Rogers specifically suggests a UK demarche

General Haig suggested this during his farewell visits, and it is a point to be considered.

SW

CONFIDENTIAL

BRIEF NO 7

20 JULY 1979

INTRODUCTORY CALLS BY GENERAL ROGERS: 24 JULY 1979

GREECE, TURKEY AND NATO

Points to Make

1. Wish General Rogers every success in his efforts to find a compromise which will pave the way for Greece's return to full participation in NATO.

2. Stress the importance that the UK attaches to Greece's return. But we must recognise the deep-seated historical reasons behind Greek/Turkish relations and tread carefully to avoid forcing forcing either side into a corner.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Background

1. The Prime Minister will recall from the briefing provided for General Haig's farewell call on 13 June that agreement on Greece's return to NATO's integrated military structure has been held up by a dispute with Turkey over the command boundaries in the Aegean

2. At the request of the NATO Secretary-General, General Haig had twice this year made contact with the Greek and Turkish authorities in an attempt to break the deadlock. Proposals endorsed by the Turks were presented to the Greeks in May. The Greeks, however, rejected the proposal that operational control over a section of Aegean airspace including many Greek islands should be exercised by a new Allied command at Larissa in Greece and manned by personnel from NATO countries other than Greece and Turkey. News of these exchanges caused a storm in the Greek parliament, where the Opposition accused the Government of endangering the country's territorial integrity of offering excessive concessions. Diplomatic representations complaining about General Haig's handling of his mandate were made by the Greeks to Lord Carrington.

3. Before his departure as SACEUR, General Haig submitted a questionnaire on certain key issues to both the Greek and Turkish military authorities. The Greek reply poses specific technical counter-questions on which a team from SHAPE will shortly be visiting Athens to discuss. The Turks meanwhile are suspending their reply. Dr Luns has undertaken to keep NATO informed of developments and General Haig's role as a negotiator has now been taken on by General Rogers.

CONFIDENTIAL

4. The Americans have recently made diplomatic approaches to the United Kingdom asking that we do all we can to promote Greek reintegration into NATO's military structure. We are as anxious to bring this about as they are, but see little scope for useful action on our part at this stage, and much danger of giving offence to one side or the other by intervening in the particularly complex and sensitive area of Greek/Turkish relations.

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

BRIEF NO 6

20 JULY 1979

INTRODUCTORY CALLS BY GENERAL ROGERS: 24 JULY 1979

MBFR

Points to Make

Important that reductions result in genuine parity, consequently need to continue to press the East on the major discrepancy between tabled figures for their forces and our estimates.

Must avoid restrictions which could undermine the cohesion of Alliance defence.

Any agreement should be subject to adequate verification. We look forward to learning the views of SACEUR on the inspection proposal we have tabled in the Alliance.

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

MBFR

Background Note

Areas of particular current interest within the Alliance are:-

(1) The data dispute: The West has concentrated increasingly on the large discrepancy between NATO and Warsaw Pact figures for Eastern forces in the reductions area. The East are showing signs of discomfiture and in recent bilateral discussion with the Americans the Russians have been exploring the possibilities of bypassing the need to agree on data. At the recent Vienna summit President Carter impressed upon President Brezhnev the importance the West attaches to resolving this issue. The UK believe agreement on data to be a sine qua non of progress towards an MBFR reductions agreement.

(2) "Associated Measures": Since July 1978 the Alliance has been considering the content of a package of Associated Measures (verification and confidence-building measures). The previous SACEUR is apprehensive lest an American proposal to limit the scale of out of garrison activity undermine Alliance flexibility in a period of rising tension. The UK shares some of these misgivings. The Americans have now agreed to defer this measure pending further study. SHAPE shares the

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

opinion of the US and ourselves that any package of AMs should contain adequate verification provisions. The Germans were opposed to the inspection measures discussed in the MBFR working group. Following consultation with the Americans and Germans we tabled on 12 July proposals for an inspection regime. This complements the package of measures tabled simultaneously by the Germans. We hope for early Alliance agreement on the complete package which would enable it to be tabled in Vienna in the Autumn.

(3) "Option III": In December 1975 the West offered to reduce and limit at their post-reduction level numbers of US nuclear warheads and delivery systems (dual-capable F-4s and Pershing ballistic missile launchers). The offer also included a limitation on follow-on models of the same type of system: the West has indicated that all US dual-capable aircraft would be limited, but has not yet defined the scope of limitation on ballistic missile launchers. The East has not yet met the conditions of Option III. The future of the Option III offer is now bound up with current Alliance consideration of TNF modernisation options and the complementary study of possible options for arms control in the "grey area".

CONFIDENTIAL

SW

CONFIDENTIAL

BRIEF NO 5

20 July 1979

INTRODUCTORY CALLS BY GENERAL ROGERS: 24 JULY 1979

SALT

Points to Make

1. (Defensive). Government's view of the SALT II Agreement has been made clear. We have studied the Agreement carefully and welcome it.

2. SALT III will raise issues of more direct concern to the Europeans. There is a need for full and close alliance consultation.

3. (If asked about UK participation in SALT III). It is premature for us to take a firm position on which systems should be included. It is also too soon to decide what role Britain should play in SALT III. But we cannot contemplate any constraints which would undermine the effectiveness of our strategic forces.

CONFIDENTIAL

Background

1. The Government's aim is to avoid further comment on SALT II, but, if pressed, to draw attention to the fact that we have welcomed the Agreement.

2. SALT III negotiations will begin in earnest only when the SALT II Agreement has been ratified. Both sides are committed to seeking further limitations on their strategic systems. The Russians are already demanding limits on US theatre systems capable of striking the Soviet Union, that account should be taken of British and French Forces, and that other nuclear powers should participate. They have however given no indication of their willingness to bring their own theatre systems into the negotiations. The US Administration has stated publicly that any future limitations on US systems designed principally for a theatre role must be accompanied by appropriate limitations on Soviet theatre systems. NATO is studying the feasibility of theatre nuclear arms control in a Special Group set up for this purpose; no decisions have yet been taken, but the Special Group's work will be coordinated with that of the High Level Group in time for NATO Ministerial discussions on theatre nuclear force modernisation, and any arms control approach, by the end of 1979.

SW

CONFIDENTIAL

BRIEF NO 4

20 July 1979

INTRODUCTORY CALLS BY GENERAL ROGERS: 24 JULY 1979

POLARIS REPLACEMENT /Defensive/

Points to Make

1. We are fully committed to the maintenance of an effective United Kingdom strategic deterrent.

2. Our improvement programme for the present Polaris force will ensure that it remains effective into the 1990s.

3. We believe that this capability makes an important contribution to the credibility of NATO.

4. /If pressed/ We have no firm views yet about specific systems to succeed Polaris, and are exploring both ballistic and cruise missiles options.

BACKGROUND

1. Ministers are aware of the consultations shortly to begin at official level with the US on this issue. It would not be appropriate to discuss at this stage with SACEUR the options being considered.

SW

SECRET

BRIEF NO 3

20 July 1979

INTRODUCTORY CALLS BY GENERAL ROGERS: 24 JULY 1979

MODERNISATION OF THEATRE NUCLEAR FORCES

Points to Make

1. We attach great importance to the establishment of an Alliance programme to modernise NATO's long range theatre nuclear forces. We have not taken any decisions on the extent of UK participation in such a programme, although we are actively exploring the options open to us.

2. It will be important to achieve a collective Alliance effort.

3. /Defensive - if asked about "grey area" arms control./

We support the efforts in the Alliance to develop an arms control approach to "grey area" systems in parallel to the work on theatre nuclear force modernisation. But the modernisation programme itself must not be bargained away to the detriment of credible deterrence.

4. /Defensive - if asked about the "Short Term Measures" for modernising NATO's theatre nuclear forces./

We look to the Nuclear Planning Group to monitor progress and to consider any further action recommended by the military authorities.

SECRET

SECRET

BACKGROUND

1. The High Level Group, which is examining theatre nuclear force (TNF) modernisation options, and the Special Group, which is, studying TNF arms control, are intending to produce reports which will enable Alliance Ministers to take decisions on a TNF modernisation programme by the end of the year.

2. Ministers will recall the discussion on the options for UK participation in such a programme in MISC 7 on 10 July. The Defence Secretary discussed these options further with Secretary Brown during his visit to Washington from 15-18 July, but it would not be advisable to go into detail at this stage with the new SACEUR.

3. SACEUR may himself refer to the so-called "Short Term Measures" to improve NATO's TNF. In October 1978 Alliance Ministers at the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) endorsed a report by the NATO Military Authorities recommending a range of improvements to the Alliance's TNF, principally for short range "battlefield" and maritime systems. The measures proposed are complementary but additional to those likely to emerge from the current work on NATO's long range TNF. In the UK's case, they include a variety of improvements to both the performance and the logistic arrangements for our existing short range nuclear capable artillery, and maritime nuclear capability.

4. Alliance Ministers recognised the need to treat each measure on its merits, consistent with such factors as the availability of resources. Some measures are therefore in hand, some (such as the introduction of an enhanced radiation weapon into the forces of the Allaince) have been postponed indefinitely, others await the outcome of the long range TNF issue. No significant problems have arisen over particular measures earmarked for the UK. Defence Ministers in the NPG are responsible for monitoring progress, and the

SECRET

next meeting is scheduled for mid-November. If SACEUR has specific points to make, the NPG would be the appropriate forum in which to do so.

BRIEF NO 2
20 JULY 1979

INTRODUCTORY CALLS BY GENERAL ROGERS: 24 JULY 1979

UK DEFENCE BUDGET

Points to Make

1. The UK has given warm support to the call to continue the aim for 3% real growth in defence spending each year to 1986.

2. This year's Cash Limit increased by over £400 million. Of this, £270 million needed to pay for decision to restore Forces' pay to its proper level immediately; and £100 million required to allow the equipment programme to proceed as planned.

3. Government is committed to reducing public expenditure to reinvigorate the economy, and a start has been made./ Administrative economies will be made wherever possible, including Defence. But Government is also committed to strong defence and will have the 3% growth aim very much in mind when deciding further level of public expenditure later in the year.

4. /DEFENSIVE/ Increases in VAT and oil duties will not lead to cuts in the defence programme. MOD's cash limit will be revised as necessary.

UK DEFENCE BUDGET

Background

1. The Defence Budget for 1979-80 was increased by 3% by the previous Government in accordance with the 1977 NATO agreement to aim for real annual growth in defence expenditure of 3% between 1979 and 1984. The Defence Secretary has warmly supported the new NATO call to extend this aim over the period to 1986.

2. The Defence Cash Limit for 1979-80 has been increased by £408.6 million, made up as follows:

Service Pay	-	£269.5M	
Civilian Pay (non-industrials)	-	£29.1M	(3% deduction for all civilians incorporated)
Equipment programme	-	£100M	(announced by the Chancellor in his Budget statement)
Works carry-in from 1978-89	-	£10M	(bills not paid last year because of industrial action)

The Cash Limit, originally set at £8005, has thus been increased to £8413.6 million. The Defence Budget has been increased from £8557.7 million to £8966.3 at forecast outturn prices.

3. The cost to the Defence Budget of the increase in VAT is estimated at £175 million in 1979-80 (£210 million in 1980-81); increased oil duties will cost a further £3 million. The Defence Cash Limit will be increased again as necessary to ensure that the tax increases do not lead to any cuts in the defence programme.

BRIEF NO 1
20 JULY 1979

INTRODUCTORY CALLS BY GENERAL ROGERS: 24 JULY 1979

UK COMMITMENT TO ALLIED COMMAND EUROPE

Points to Make

1. The United Kingdom Government fully recognises the importance of the forces committed to Allied Command Europe: these constitute, for example, some 70% of our regular and reserve Army and we devote a greater proportion of our resources to ACE than to any other single area. We will do all we can to improve our contribution to this vital area of Alliance defence.

2. /Defensive_7 Urgent steps are being taken to remedy serious manpower shortages and to minimise the effects on our front line forces. The recent pay award should help.

3. /Defensive_7 The force levels in Northern Ireland are under constant review, and everything is being done to reduce the calls on BAOR. In an emergency all the troops in Northern Ireland would be returned to BAOR within 72 hours, and most would be back much sooner.

Background

1. The Central Region of Allied Command Europe is one of the four priority areas to which the UK military efforts are directed.

2. 1st(British) Corps, the combat element of BAOR, forms part of Northern Army Group (NORTHAG) (with Corps from the Netherlands, Germany and Belgium) and is responsible for a front of 65 kilometres along the Inner German Border (IGB), astride one of the main likely lines of thrust into Western Europe. BAOR is equipped with over 600 Chieftain tanks and over 2000 other armoured vehicles, a comprehensive range of artillery, low-level air defence missile systems and tactical nuclear support. Of the planned increase of 6000 in the size of the British Army announced last year, we intend to allocate 3600 to BAOR to improve standards of readiness and training. In time of war, BAOR would be reinforced to more than double its peacetime strength of 55,000 men.

3. RAF Germany forms part of NATO's 2nd Allied Tactical Air Force (2ATAF) to which all its aircraft are assigned. These comprise 12 squadrons of Buccaneer Jaguar, Phantom and Harrier and Wessex helicopters aircraft/which together with air defence missile systems, contribute to Allied Air Forces Central Europe air operations, give air support to NORTHAG, contribute to NATO's nuclear strike power in the Central Region and fulfill UK national obligations to police the IGB.

4. The UK also contributes to the defence of the Northern and Southern Regions of ACE by providing specialist reinforcement forces which can be deployed to these areas in time of crisis.

5. One of the main constraints on the commitment of UK forces

to NATO is the current manpower shortage, particularly in specialist categories, affecting all 3 Services. The shortfall in planned strengths for the Royal Navy is 2300, the Army 10000 and the RAF 3000. NATO has been informed in low key of the main effects of the shortages and of the urgent steps being taken to remedy the situation and minimise consequences for the front line.

6. It is the aim to overcome the shortages, a problem shared by many of our NATO allies, as far as possible by the early 1980s. However, the exceptional loss of trained men in the last 2 years will take time to make good. Recruitment has improved but fell 15% short of the target for the last year. Nonetheless the Services' pay award should improve recruitment and retention rates. Conditions of service are also under examination. Certain measures have in the meanwhile been taken to minimise the operational effects on our defence contribution to NATO and were announced in Parliament by the Defence Secretary on 28 June. The Royal Navy have transferred 6 older ships to the Standby Squadron but they could be made operational again in about 3 weeks. The Army have already placed about 60 Chieftain tanks in light preservation and will now reduce one company of some infantry battalions to cadre strength. Both could be rapidly manned in an emergency. The RAF are concentrating pilots in operational areas where they are most needed but the pilot shortage is a continuing constraint and has precluded the declaration of 4 additional reconnaissance Canberras to SACEUR.

7. In addition, although NATO has not yet been officially informed, SACEUR may be aware that aircrew shortages and production slippages are likely to delay the introduction of Tornado by over a year, thereby creating a gap in our own capability over this period. This problem is shared by the Germans.

8. As well as the constraint of manpower shortages, some 3000 troops are at present on detached duty from BAOR in Northern Ireland. These include four major units and a number of minor units. The length of tour in Northern Ireland is four months with an average gap of 20 months between tours for units based in BAOR. UK-based units are used as much as possible for tours in Northern Ireland but they also have other commitments such as Belize, with the UK forces in Cyprus and in Hong Kong which brings down the average gap between tours for these units to around nine months; in addition many UKLF units have a role on the Continent in war for which they must train. Therefore to confine the Northern Ireland commitment to UK-based units, leaving BAOR untouched would be completely out of the question. In an emergency units serving in Northern Ireland could be returned to BAOR within 72 hours, although many could be returned much more quickly.

SW

SECRET UK EYES A

INTRODUCTORY CALLS BY GENERAL ROGERS: 24 JULY 1979

CHEMICAL WARFARE

Background

1. Information on arms control aspects, on the US retaliatory capability and on the lack of a retaliatory capability committed to NATO is contained in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office Memorandum on chemical weapons of 22 June 1979 (copy attached for ease of reference). Supplementary material on the threat, defensive measures and recent Alliance consideration of the appropriate response to the threat is provided below.

The Threat

2. The Soviet chemical threat to NATO forces is considerable. The Soviet Union has a range of chemical agents which may be delivered by guns, rocket launchers, missiles, aircraft (bombs and spray) and mines. The agents range from hydrogen cyanide to the most modern nerve agents, with varying degrees of persistence, thus giving the Soviet forces a chemical option for most operations. The Soviet forces are well provided with protective equipments and train extensively in their use to enable them to carry out operations in a contaminated environment of their own or of an enemy's making. The Soviet Union regards chemical weapons, like nuclear weapons, as weapons of mass destruction whose use would be subject to political decision at the highest level. Once authority for the initial release of chemical weapons had been given commanders down to divisional level could probably authorise further strikes.

3. There are strong indications that the Soviet Union has been developing new types of chemical agents since 1967 including a binary system. It is suspected that these weapons consist of a nerve agent and a penetrating agent, which can defeat respirators

and other protective clothing, but it is not known if these dual agents are at present deployed.

Defensive Measures

4. Defensive measures for UK service personnel include as appropriate collective protection systems (eg in HM Ships and armoured fighting vehicles), individual equipment (eg respirators, protective clothing) detection and monitoring devices and medical facilities for prophylactic, immediate and resuscitative treatment. Research into defence against chemical warfare is undertaken on a modest scale at the Chemical Defence Establishment at Porton. There are exchanges of information and cooperation with the US and other countries in this area.

5. Home Office policy for the protection of the UK civil population is based on the current assessment that there is no threat of chemical attack on the population as a whole. However a study of the possible need to provide protection for certain defence installations in the UK, as one of the Long Term Defence Programme (LTDP) measures, has been extended to include the position of civilians employed there or living in the vicinity.

Recent Alliance consideration of CW threat

6. Task Force 1 of the LTDP recommended that the question of a NATO retaliatory CW capability should be examined, but as a result of pressure by several Alliance members this controversial recommendation was not pursued. The question of the appropriate NATO response to the threat of use of CW received attention during Exercise WINTEX/CIMEX in March this year, and at the meeting of the Military Committee in Chiefs of Staff Session on 14 May, following a UK presentation on the Soviet CW threat, the US Chief of the Joint Defence Staff argued strongly, as General Rogers is no doubt

aware, that it was militarily desirable that the Alliance should possess retaliatory CW. The Committee agreed that the extant Military Committee Memorandum, which focusses largely on defensive measures, should be updated.

7. The review of CW policy by the Chiefs of Staff, to which reference is made in paragraphs 6 and 16 of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office Memorandum, will consider the military implications of the deterioration of the US retaliatory capability, options for countering the Soviet threat, and the extent to which means other than the possession of a retaliatory CW capability can act as a deterrent; and will make proposals as to future UK policy.

8. During his farewell calls on Ministers on 13 June General Haig suggested that British Ministers might express their concern to the US Administration and other members of the Alliance about the lack of a deterrent capability in NATO. General Rogers may raise the subject in similar terms.

CONFIDENTIAL

COVERING SECRET

26 JUN 1979

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

26/14

22 June 1979

Dear Bryan,

B.86/1013.

Chemical Weapons

I attach a memorandum about the UK draft convention on the banning of chemical weapons, set in the wider context requested in your letter of 7 June.

E8 mo 1/14/1

We have since seen your report on General Haig's call on the Prime Minister (your letter of 13 June) during which Mrs Thatcher expressed concern at Soviet preparations for offensive chemical warfare. We propose to await the results of the current Chiefs-of-Staff review of chemical weapons policy (paragraphs 6 and 16 of the memorandum) before submitting advice on General Haig's proposal that the Prime Minister should take up this matter with other members of the Alliance.

As you will see, we take the view that there is no way of achieving 100% verification of any ban on chemical weapons, but that it would be possible to devise on-site inspection which, coupled with national technical means of verification and with the political incentive of not being caught cheating, should give reasonable prospect of compliance. So far, however, the Russians have refused to accept such intrusive verification. We believe that a properly verified ban, as would be required by the UK draft convention, would still be worth having. We therefore see advantage in allowing the UK draft to remain on the table for negotiation. It need not inhibit us from considering, and if necessary taking steps in acquire, a capacity to use offensive chemical weapons although this of course might be expensive. Indeed it is possible that the Russians will only be prepared to negotiate seriously when they see that the West is serious about improving its capacity to retaliate. Meanwhile, you may have seen that the US and Soviet Governments pledged themselves at the Vienna summit to seek "a general, complete and verifiable prohibition of chemical weapons".

I am sending copies of this letter to Roger Facer (MOD) and Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

S of S circulation 25.6.79
PSO/CDS
PS/PUS Head of DS 17
PS/CSA SECCOS
DUS(P)
ACDS(Pol)
AUS(D Staff)

30/1520

(G G H Walden)

B G Cartledge Esq
10 Downing Street

2/240

DEFENCE POLICY STAFF

		A	B	C	D	
ACDS (POL)	1					
DIRECTORS			X		1	
AD/SEC	1					
/PSO						
TEAM						
FILE	1					

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

CHEMICAL WEAPONS

1. This paper considers the 1976 UK draft convention on the banning of chemical weapons (CW) and the implications of such a convention, particularly with regard to possible evasion by the Soviet Union.

Soviet capability

2. As Sir John Aitken's briefing of the Prime Minister on 6 June indicated, the Warsaw Pact has a very substantial capability in the CW field, and is continuing to improve this capability. They are estimated to have considerable stocks deployed down to regimental level and available for delivery by a variety of aircraft, missiles and artillery. Use of CW is integrated into their war plans at all levels, both conventional and nuclear, although a political decision from Moscow would probably be required before it is used. The capability for widespread and intensive use therefore exists.

Western capability

3. Protection against chemical attack receives a high priority in NATO. The NATO Long Term Defence Programme (LTDP) of 1978 reported that the UK was well provided overall with protective equipment against the effects of nuclear, biological and chemical attack, although some deficiencies, which it is planned to rectify, were identified. Other NATO nations were more heavily criticised for deficiencies and a number of remedial measures were suggested.

4. Although NATO doctrine calls for the retaliatory use of CW if necessary, no such capability is committed to the Alliance. The US, alone among members of the integrated military structure of the Alliance, has declared stocks, although these are not assigned to NATO: their stockpile in Europe remains under national control and would require a Presidential decision for its release. (The French also have some stocks, but their quantity is not known.) Concern has recently been expressed within the US administration about the extent to which this capability is being eroded and its minimal deployment in Europe (only 400 tonnes, in the FRG).

5. The UK has no retaliatory CW capability, and in the last ten years a number of public statements have been made, in the House and elsewhere, to that effect. Decisions on development of a retaliatory UK capability have been deferred several times. In the 1976 review of defence expenditure, it was suggested that economies could be made through the closure of the pilot-scale CW plant at Nancekuke in Cornwall, which had been established to keep open the option of providing a retaliatory capability (although its production capability was never fully developed and would have taken several years to bring into effect). The Ministry of Defence decided that "there was no requirement for the UK to have a capability to produce offensive weapons for deterrent and retaliatory purposes; neither was there a need to retain the potential for resurrecting such a capability". The Nancekuke facility was accordingly closed. An important factor in this decision was the existence of a US national retaliatory capability and the understanding at that time that the US would provide sufficient guarantees of retaliation.

6. Given the erosion of the US stockpile since 1976 however, and the increase in the threat, a further review of CW policy is at present being undertaken by the Chiefs of Staff. Its results will be submitted in the first instance to the Secretary of State for Defence.

Limitation of CW by arms control

7. Since the horrors of the use of gas in the First World War, there has been strong international and domestic pressure to ban chemical and biological weapons. The 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol was the first expression of this. It aimed to prohibit the use in war of chemical and biological weapons. But most of the parties to the Protocol, including the UK, have reserved the right to use such weapons in retaliation for a similar attack.

8. Hence the Protocol is limited in scope, and attention has in recent years been concentrated on the more far-reaching concept of prohibiting the production, development and stockpiling of Chemical and Biological Weapons. The 1972 Biological Weapons (BW) Convention, (which resulted from a British initiative and was

SECRET

signed for the UK by Sir Alec Douglas-Home) came into effect in March 1975. Over 70 states including the US and USSR are now parties to the Convention which requires parties not to "develop, produce stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain" biological weapons. No provisions were made for intrusive verification since BW were not regarded as viable weapons in view of their unpredictability.

9. The BW Convention was seen as a first step to the banning of all chemical/biological weapons - and its Article IX commits parties to "continue negotiations in good faith with a view to reaching early agreement on effective measures for the prohibiton of the development, production and stockpiling of CW and for their destruction".

10. In 1974, the US and USSR agreed to hold negotiations on prohibiting the most lethal CW agents, but these bilateral negotiations stagnated in 1976. Meanwhile, the Russians in 1972 and the Japanese in 1973 had produced draft conventions in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) in Geneva. These were unacceptable because they lacked adequate verification provisions.

The 1976 UK draft convention

11. To meet this deficiency and to provide an arms control means of removing the Soviet CW threat, the UK in 1976 put forward a draft convention. This set out the detailed declarations and intrusive verification which in our view would be necessary to provide reasonable confidence that the prohibition was being observed. The declarations envisaged would cover both stockpiles and production facilities; and the verification would include on-site inspection to ensure as far as possible that:

(a) declared stockpiles were destroyed;

(b) declared production facilities were destroyed, closed, or converted to other uses;

(c) that dual purpose facilities were not clandestinely producing CW agents.

Verification of a CW Convention

12. No matter how intrusive the verification provisions, there could never be 100% assurance that a party to a CW Convention was not cheating. It would be virtually impossible to police the chemical industry of the world to ensure that in some corner CW was not being produced. Still more difficult would be the task of ensuring that stocks were not produced or hidden in remote areas. Binaries* complicate the problem. Thus the best safeguard we could expect from a Convention would be those envisaged in our draft. These would have to be supported by traditional intelligence methods and satellite surveillance. An element of military risk would remain in such a prohibition. This would need to be weighed against the political consequences for a country caught cheating, notably the effect this would have on the continuance of the whole regime of international prohibition.

US/USSR bilaterals

13. US/USSR bilateral negotiation revived following President Carter's election, and nine rounds have now taken place. Some progress has been made but the critical question of verification remains unresolved. The Americans will have to decide soon whether the Russians are serious about an agreement or whether they are playing for time.

State of US capability

14. The US decided in 1976 that no steps should be taken to improve the US stockpile until the negotiations with the USSR were well under way. A review of policy was undertaken in late 1978. By that time stocks had seriously deteriorated. Only 6,500 agent tonnes were in serviceable munitions. It was estimated that by the mid 1980s this figure would have fallen to 2,000 tonnes, and by 1990 to zero. Existing serviceable munitions are regarded by the US Department of Defence as totally inadequate. By contrast, the Americans assessed that the USSR had sufficient CW stocks deployed forward to deliver 1,000 tonnes a day for a 30 day period.

15. We understand that following the review President Carter decided that there should be no funds in the 1980 defence budget for new production or replacement of chemical weapons. Provision was made for improving storage facilities and for research into

new types of binaries*. No further steps towards an active binary production programme were to be taken without "extensive consultation" with the Allies.

Conclusions

16. The gross disparity in CW offensive/retaliatory capability gives the Warsaw Pact decisive military advantage, which could shorten the conventional phase of war and lower the nuclear threshold. For this reason the Chiefs of Staff are reconsidering the military aspect of present CW policy.

17. It is not certain that the USSR would accept verification provisions in a convention adequate to ensure our national security. If they can be persuaded to do so, it could certainly provide the most economic approach to the problem of chemical warfare.

18. Meanwhile, the 1976 UK draft has attracted international support and has distinct value as a clear statement on the international record of the declaration and verification provisions which we regard as vital as a basis for agreement.

19. Moreover the existence of the 1976 draft would not limit our scope for action. Encouragement of the parallel arms control approach would not conflict with any future decision on, for example, developing a retaliatory capability.

Arms Control
and Disarmament Department

15 June 1979

* A binary munition is one filled with 2 relatively non-Toxic chemicals which unite to produce a CW agent only when the munition is being delivered to its target.

Background

General Roger's predecessor consistently pressed for a more rapid reinforcement of 'inplace' forces in Europe. The Rapid Reinforcement Concept was endorsed by the North Atlantic Council in June 1977 and by Heads of Government in May 1978. This led to development of SACEUR's Rapid Reinforcement Plan, the first draft of which was issued to nations for comment in November 1978. Although we were obliged to enter caveats about the proposed deployments of some UK forces, we were able to accept the RRP as a good basis for further detailed planning. SACEUR has not yet initiated bilateral discussions on the force allocations affecting the UK.

(Defensive), Protected source, not for use in discussion with SACEUR)

We have learnt that many of the proposals for US land forces outlined in the RRP are currently unacceptable to the Americans: the US does not accept 'earmarking' of land forces now declared as'other forces for NATO'; the decreased deployment times requested in the RRP; nor the allocation of US land forces to NATO Flanks. SACEUR might wish to resolve these major difficulties with the US before embarking on detailed discussions with the UK over our more limited reservations on specific UK force allocations.

SW

SECRET UK EYES A

BRIEF NO 9

20 July 1979

INTRODUCTORY CALLS BY GENERAL ROGERS: 24 JULY 1979

RAPID REINFROCEMENT OF ACE

Points to Make

1. We fully support both the Rapid Reinforcement Concept and SACEUR's Rapid Reinforcement Plan(RRP).

2. As both a reinforcing and a receiving nation, we recognise the importance of the work that has already been done and would like detailed bilateral and milti-national planning to proceed as swiftly as possible. This is particularly important for trans-atlantic reinforcements staging through the UK, for which extensive Host Nation Assistance will be necessary.

General Bernard Rogers

Born 1921, and studied at Kansas State University and at the United States Military Academy, West Point. After War service, was in Austria as aide to the US High Commissioner 1946 to 1947, before going to Oxford as a Rhodes Scholar from 1947 to 1950 (MA 1954).

Subsequent appointments include the following:

1952	Battalion Commander, Korea
1953-54	Executive Officer to C-in-C, Far East Command, Tokyo
1956-59	Military Assistant to Chief of Staff, US Army
1960-62	24 Infantry Division Augsburg, as Commanding Officer of 1st Battle Group 19th Infantry; and from 1961 as Divisional Chief of Staff.
1962	Chief of Troop Operations Branch, Operations Division, HQ USAREUR
1966-67	Assistant Divisional Commander, 1st Infantry Division, Vietnam.
1967-69	Commandant of Cadets, West Point.
1969-70	Commander of 5th Infantry Division, Colorado
1970-72	Chief of the Army Legislative Liaison Dept.
1972-74	Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel
1974-76	Commanding General, US Army Forces Command, Fort Macpherson,Georgia.
1976-79	Chief of Staff, US Army
July 1979	Appointment SACEUR

General Rogers, who is a Baptist, is married and has three children (a son in the US Army and two daughters). He has received numerous US and Vietnamese decorations.



Manufactured by
The Jet Stationery Co. Ltd.

3/t.
Brefing ordered for 20= July.
C.
12/6.

24 July

10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

General Bernard Rogers is taking over from General Haig, Supreme Allied Commander Europe,

He would like to come and see you on 24 July in the morning. At the moment, the day is pretty free. The request came via Mr. Pym's office, shall I give him half an hour?

Yes pls C.

+ Briefing. duty clerk deadline.

11 July 1979

Nato.

LOOSE MINUTE

D/PROT/609/3/1A

PSO/CDS
MA/CGS
Sec/CNS
PS/CAS
PS/VCAS
MA/ACDS(Pol)
MA/VCDS(P&L)
SECCOS
Hd DS 13
P1(Cer)(RAF)

Copy to:
PS/Prime Minister
PS/Foreign Secretary
APS/S of S
Q Mov 1a
MOD Car Pool

Miss Weekes
for ww.
Gen
Cds.
5/x 4/7

VISIT OF GENERAL BERNARD W. ROGERS SACEUR TO LONDON 24th JULY 1979

1. General Rogers will be paying his calls in London on Tuesday 24th July. He will be accompanied by Mrs Rogers, Major Roe (ADC) and two special agents.

2. The agreed programme is attached.

3. Mrs Rogers would like to spend the day apart from the luncheon in Admiralty House, shopping and attending private engagements. A WRAF escort officer is being provided to accompany her.

4. The helo from Northolt to Battersea will be SACEUR's personal helo.

3 Jul 79

I.J. CONDIE
Commander RN
Assistant Protocol Officer
Room 8336 Ext 6510

PROGRAMME FOR GENERAL ROGERS TUESDAY 24th JULY 1979

0900	Arrive Royal Air Force Northolt. Met by Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir Neil Cameron, Chief of the Defence Staff. Received by Guard of Honour and Band from the Queen's Colour Squadron of the Royal Air Force.
0905	Depart Royal Air Force Northolt for Battersea Heliport by SACEUR helo.
0920	Arrive Battersea Heliport. Depart by car for 10 Downing Street.
0955	Arrive 10 Downing Street.
1000	Call on The Right Honourable Margaret Thatcher, Prime Minister.
1020	Depart 10 Downing Street.
1025	Arrive Ministry of Defence, Horseguards Avenue entrance.
1030	Call on Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir Neil Cameron, Chief of the Defence Staff.
1045-1220	Chiefs of Staff briefing.
1225	Depart Ministry of Defence Horseguards Avenue entrance.
1230	Arrive Admiralty House for luncheon.
1415	Depart Admiralty House.
1420	Arrive Ministry of Defence, Horseguards Avenue entrance.
1425	Call on Air Marshal Sir John Nicholls, Vice Chief of the Air Staff.
1500	Call on The Right Honourable Francis Pym, MP, Secretary of State for Defence.
1530	Call on Admiral Sir Henry Leach, Chief of Naval Staff.
1605	Call on General Sir Edwin Bramall, Chief of the General Staff.
1645	Depart Ministry of Defence, Horseguards Avenue entrance.
1655	Arrive Foreign & Commonwealth Office, Ambassador's entrance.
1700	Call on The Right Honourable Lord Carrington, Foreign Secretary.
1735	Depart Foreign & Commonwealth Office for 20 Grosvenor Square.
1755	Arrive 20 Grosvenor Square for programme as arranged by CINCUSNAVEUR.

3 JUL 1979

SGC(OR)
NATO
P.C.

CONFIDENTIAL

RECORD OF A MEETING BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND GENERAL HAIG, SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER EUROPE: FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE, 13 JUNE

1. General Haig said that he had been much heartened by the new British Government's attitude to defence. The UK played a crucial role within the Alliance. Referring to the North Atlantic Council meeting in the Hague in May, General Haig said that this was the best such meeting in four years. Discussion on African problems and on theatre nuclear force modernisation had been particularly good.

Theatre Nuclear Force (TNF) Modernisation

2. On TNF modernisation Lord Carrington said he foresaw no difficulties as far as HMG were concerned. He understood the German problems and those of the Dutch, but had been pleased by the line taken by the Dutch Foreign Minister at the Hague which had been more robust than the Dutch Defence Minister's. Lord Carrington thought there might be a danger that, if the UK took too forward a line on TNF modernisation, we would encourage others to suggest we should go ahead without involving them. General Haig said that, while HMG should not get too far ahead of its European partners, the British decisions would be the "bedrock" of the Alliance position.

3. Lord Carrington said he was concerned that, even if a decision was made by the end of the year, no practical action might be taken on it. General Haig said that he thought President Carter was now determined to go ahead with TNF modernisation and that a decision in principle would be taken in Washington by July, perhaps after bilateral exchanges with the UK and the FRG. The aim was definitely to reach an Alliance consensus by the end of the year.

4. Referring to a conversation earlier that day with Mr Zemskov, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, Lord Carrington said the Russians had said SALT III negotiations would not start until after ratification of SALT II. This was a good idea. There was little to be gained from starting the SALT III negotiations until decisions had been taken about TNF modernisation. General Haig referred to a recent meeting with the Danish Prime Minister who had suggested that an Alliance decision on arms control should precede decisions on TNF modernisation. After discussion Mr Jørgensen had backed down and General Haig thought it unlikely that his represented a considered Danish position. Lord Carrington said he found the idea of deploying systems simply in order to bargain them away in arms control negotiation inherently unsatisfactory. But he was concerned about the position of the Germans. General Haig thought that the Germans would come out all right in the end. Mr Genscher had been ill at the time of the "Wehner affair", but had now got things back on the rails. General Haig said he hoped there would be agreement on the stationing of long-range Pershing SSMs on the Continent and that the UK and some other countries would agree to take cruise missiles. He thought Washington were inclined to be financially generous and that the Danes and the Norwegians could contribute funds. The Italians might also accept some systems on their soil.

/SALT II

SALT II

5. Asked for his views on the SALT II Agreement, General Haig said that the issues were not as black or as white as made out. The period from 1981 to 1987 would be difficult and dangerous for the West. This only served to emphasize the importance of decisions on TNF modernisation. Lord Carrington said he could not see how Congressional amendments to SALT II could be acceptable to the Russians. General Haig said he thought one or two minor adjustments on insignificant issues could save face. On the substance of the agreement, he thought it less satisfactory than it could or should have been. He was not however opposed to it; the stakes were far too high. There was a danger, however, that the ratification debate would become involved in the 1980 Presidential election campaign. Lord Carrington said that this underlined the importance of getting decisions from Washington by November. General Haig agreed, and said this applied particularly to TNF modernisation. Referring to linkage between SALT and Soviet behaviour elsewhere, he thought there was a good chance that the Soviet Union would not engage in provocative activities during the ratification period.

Chemical Warfare (CW)

6. General Haig said that CW would be discussed at the Vienna Summit. The Prime Minister had told him of her concern about Soviet capabilities which were increasing steadily. General Haig thought it time that the Alliance reviewed its own CW capabilities.

CTB

7. General Haig said it had been a bad mistake to go for a comprehensive ban. A 5 kt threshold would have been better. Lord Carrington said the idea of a three year ban, followed by stockpile testing, was unsatisfactory. He doubted whether the kind of agreement now under discussion would be of much influence on third countries in the non-proliferation context. In addition the suggestion that there should be 10 NSS on UK territory made no sense at all. This was not a proposition which Ministers could defend in Parliament.

General Rogers

8. General Haig ended by recommending his successor, General Rogers, in warm terms. Lord Carrington said he looked forward to a close relationship with General Rogers.

Distribution:

Private Secretary
PS/Lord Privy Seal
PS/Mr Hurd
PS/PUS
Sir A Duff
Sir A Parsons
Mr P Moberly
Mr Gillmore (Defence Department)
Mr Reeve (ACDD)
Mr Cartledge No 10
Mr Facer PS/Sec of State for Defence
Mr Vile (Cabinet Office)
Mr Melhuish NAD

21 JUN 1966

CONFIDENTIAL

2

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Prime Minister

Bill 11/6

p.a. 14 June, 1979

Dear Bryan,

Secretary-General of NATO

When General Haig paid his farewell call on the Secretary of State yesterday afternoon, Lord Carrington asked him privately whether he thought Dr Luns was now over the top and might need to be replaced as Secretary-General of NATO. General Haig replied very emphatically that he thought that Dr Luns was, despite his age, still doing an excellent job: although he was somewhat impatient of detail he had a firm grip on the political side. General Haig added that if Dr Luns was to be replaced it was essential that there should be a clear consensus beforehand within the Alliance on who would replace him. It would be difficult to find a suitable replacement: General Haig did not think that any of the people whose names he had heard mentioned as possible candidates for the job measured up to it or would do it as well as Dr Luns.

I am copying this letter to Roger Facer (MOD).

Yours ever

Paul

P Lever
Private Secretary

B G Cartledge Esq
10 Downing Street
London S W 1

CONFIDENTIAL

14 JUN 1979

SECRET

File 1 SLN

Copied to MASTER
Defence (TNF)
NATO Defence (SALT)

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

13 June 1979

Dear Paul,

General Haig's Farewell Call on the Prime Minister at 10 Downing Street on 13 June 1979 at 1000

The Supreme Allied Commander Europe, General Haig, called on the Prime Minister at No. 10 this morning to say farewell before leaving his appointment. The following is a summary of the main points which arose during half an hour's conversation.

General Haig told the Prime Minister that the arrival in office of the new British Government had been a shot in the arm for NATO. The Prime Minister said that she had been surprised by the reluctance of some of the smaller NATO members to engage in the open discussion of defence matters; she said that a shot in the arm for the Alliance was clearly useful but much would depend on what other Governments were prepared to do. The Prime Minister went on to say that although her initial reaction to her first briefings on the East/West military balance had been one of discouragement, her considered conclusion had been that the West's superiority in human and material resources should enable it to respond to any challenge. General Haig agreed and commented that the Soviet Union would face major problems during the 1980s, both demographic - as a result of the high birth rate among the non-Russian peoples of the Soviet Union - and economic. There would be significant shortfalls in economic growth, industrial productivity and agriculture. The Soviet Union and its empire would also be subjected to strong centrifugal pressures, as the Pope's visit to Poland had demonstrated. General Haig said that he saw the period of the 1980s, and particularly the years between 1981 and 1987, as being one of the greatest danger but also of the greatest promise for the West and, in any event, the most crucial period since the end of the Second World War. The Prime Minister said that much would depend on who succeeded President Brezhnev and on the international climate in which he took office: his policies would be to a large extent determined by the depth of the resolve which he saw in the West.

/ General Haig

SECRET

General Haig told the Prime Minister that the new British Government was making an important contribution in the Nuclear Planning Group, where the positions adopted by the previous Government had been damaging: Chancellor Schmidt had earlier been pushed towards his own left-wing but his resolve was now much strengthened. So far as the problem of the deployment of Theatre Nuclear Weapons was concerned, General Haig thought that in the end the Belgians and the Italians could probably help by accepting such weapons on their territory, possibly with an element of phasing. General Haig described the Danish position, which he had recently discussed with Prime Minister Jorgensen, of insisting on the development of negotiating positions for the dismantlement of TNFs before embarking on a modernisation programme as a recipe for disaster.

The Prime Minister told General Haig that the West had dropped from a position of superiority to one of equivalence with the Warsaw Pact without, apparently, noticing it: her fear was that the West might, in the same way, drop from equivalence to inferiority. General Haig agreed that there was no military area in which the Soviet Union had not surprised the West by the pace of their technological advance: NATO's best estimate had been that the Soviet Union could not develop their new ICBM warheads until 1985; but these warheads would in fact be operational by 1981.

The Prime Minister told General Haig that she was particularly concerned by Soviet preparations for offensive chemical warfare. General Haig agreed that the West was fundamentally deficient in this area and that NATO had no deterrent capacity in the chemical warfare field. He hoped that President Carter would discuss this problem with President Brezhnev at the Vienna Summit, on the basis that if no progress was made in negotiations on chemical warfare the United States would have to develop an offensive system of its own. General Haig said that it would be helpful if the Prime Minister were to express her concern about this problem to other members of the Alliance, including the Americans. His personal view was that it was essential for the West to develop a binary system of chemical weapons.

Turning to the Comprehensive Test Ban negotiations, the Prime Minister said that she had considerable reservations about a CTB Treaty in view of the fact that the Russians could decouple their nuclear test explosions in underground caverns. Scientific opinion was apparently divided: British scientists seemed to agree that decoupling was possible whereas some American scientists thought that it was not. The Prime Minister said that she was also concerned about the problem of stockpile testing. General Haig said that he thought that the majority of US scientists regarded a threshold of 5 kts as the minimum which should be accepted. President Carter,

/ however,

however, had a strong preference for a total ban and had been encouraged in this by the British Labour Government. General Haig said that, in his personal view, a ban was naive and dangerous. He thought that this problem, too, would be discussed in Vienna.

In a discussion of SALT II, the Prime Minister explained that, although the British Government had a number of questions to ask about the Treaty, she had concluded that the political consequences of its non-ratification would be more serious than the defects of the Treaty itself. General Haig said that he thought that the outcome in Congress would be, not a series of amendments which the Soviet Union would never accept, but resolutions criticising parts of the Treaty but which would have no binding force on the President; they would simply be domestic, political face-savers. Several aspects of the SALT II agreement were, he thought, unsatisfactory; these included the protocol and the constraints on what the United States could do in the field of strategic arms development. He thought that the Congressional debate on SALT would continue until the end of 1979 and could well spill over into the Presidential campaign in 1980.

The Prime Minister told General Haig that the Government was at present considering the problem of a successor to the UK's Polaris deterrent; whatever choice was made, the UK would need technology from the United States. General Haig said that he felt very strongly that, in the strategic arms field, quality was more important than numbers; and that, therefore, the UK should go for a successor ballistic missile rather than for the cruise missile.

I should be grateful if you, and the other recipients of this letter, would ensure that it is given a suitably restricted distribution. I am sending a copy of this letter to Roger Facer (Ministry of Defence) and Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,

Bryan Cartledge.

Paul Lever, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

COVERING CONFIDENTIAL

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

7 June 1979

Dear Bryan,

Briefing for Calls by General Haig

Nos 2, 4/7 + 10

I enclose two copies of each of the four briefs which the FCO has been asked to prepare for SACEUR's calls on the Prime Minister, Lord Carrington and Mr Pym on 13 June.

In preparing these briefs, we have borne in mind the fact that General Haig is returning to the United States with the aim of entering politics on the Republican side. For this reason, the briefs (especially on US/UK relations) have been cast in somewhat bland terms, avoiding issues on which General Haig may be tempted to exploit European views in US domestic politics.

Yours ever

Paul

P Lever
Private Secretary

Bryan Cartledge Esq
10 Downing Street

COVERING CONFIDENTIAL

BRIEF No	1	SACEUR - General Haig
	2	US/UK bilateral relationship
	3	Energy
	4	Position and attitudes of the FRG.
	5	TNF Modernisation
	6	Polaris Replacement
	7	SALT II
	8	MBFR
	9	Intelligence Sharing
	10	Greece/Turkey
	11	Military Assistance to Portugal and Turkey
	12	Deployments outside the NATO area
	13	SACEUR's Annual Assessment of Combat Effectiveness
	14	Rapid Reinforcement Concept
	15	UK Defence Budget

5. The FCO will forward Brief Nos 2, 4, 7 and 10 separately.

CONFIDENTIAL

FAREWELL CALLS BY GENERAL HAIG:
13 JUNE 1979

BACKGROUND BRIEF

1. General Haig is visiting the UK on 13 June as part of a farewell tour of NATO capitals. As well as calling on the Prime Minister, he will meet the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, Secretary of State for Defence and, in the absence of the Chief of Defence Staff abroad, the 3 Service Chiefs of Staff.

2. This visit was proposed by General Haig himself last January when he informed the then Prime Minister of his intention to resign as SACEUR with effect from 30 June 1979 and to retire immediately thereafter from active military service. It is understood that General Haig last met the Prime Minister when she was Leader of the Opposition. He is known to favour discussions with a limited audience so that they can be full and frank.

3. We understand from SACEUR's Executive Officer that General Haig wishes to concentrate on 2 main areas in discussion: global and defence issues. Acting on this advice, briefs have been prepared on these themes as well as on other topics in which SACEUR is known to have a particular interest. For example, SACEUR has recently produced a Rapid Reinforcement Plan addressing a critical area of Alliance weakness in view of the enhanced capability of the Warsaw Pact to launch an offensive attack at very short warning at a time and place of its own choosing. General Haig has also shown a keen interest in the question of Alliance assistance to Turkey and has conducted negotiations aimed at a closer relationship between Greece and NATO's integrated military structure.

4. Briefs are provided as follows:

BRIEF NO 1
6 JUNE 1979

FAREWELL CALLS BY GENERAL HAIG: 13 JUNE 1979

SACEUR - GENERAL ALEXANDER HAIG

1. Role of SACEUR. By tradition, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) is a United States Army Officer who also holds the national appointment of Commander in Chief United States Europe Command. The post is filled by a nominee of the US President subject to confirmation by NATO's Defence Planning Committee.

2. SACEUR is responsible for the defence against any attack on the Allied countries situated within his command area (which extends from the North Cape to the North African littoral and from the Atlantic to the Eastern border of Turkey). In peacetime, his function is to advise NATO, and in certain circumstances Defence Ministers and Heads of Government, on all military matters. In particular, he examines national capabilities and makes proposals to improve them.

3. General Haig. General Haig became SACEUR in December 1974 following a period as White House Chief of Staff. Although his tour as SACEUR has been extended from the 2 years originally intended, General Haig's resignation has come somewhat earlier than expected and there has been speculation that he intends to run as a Republican candidate for the US Presidency. General Haig has devoted great energy to the cause of Alliance security and to maintaining and improving its defence capability. He has been concerned about the cohesiveness and effectiveness of the Alliance and has been outspoken in defence of Alliance priorities as opposed to purely national interests, including those of the US. This concern to correct Alliance deficiencies is illustrated by the Flexibility Studies conducted by SACEUR in 1976 which in many respects anticipated the Long Term Defence Programme and recommended a range of measures designed to improve the fighting

effectiveness of Allied Command Europe forces.

4. General Haig's successor as SACEUR will be General Bernard Rogers who has had a distinguished military career and is currently US Army Chief of Staff.

BRIEF NO 2

6 June 1979

FAREWELL CALLS BY GENERAL HAIG

13 JUNE 1979

Brief by Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Line to Take

1. Much enjoyed meeting Secretary Vance when he was here last month. Very useful discussions. Looking forward to seeing President Carter in Tokyo.

2. New British Government fully committed to European Community. But this in no way derogates from our role in the Atlantic Alliance. Commitment to increased defence spending example of this.

3. Equally anxious to continue and sustain close bilateral relationship with US in all fields.

Background

1 A close working partnership between Britain and the US is fundamental to British foreign policy. The Anglo-US dialogue has remained continuous, lively and valuable under President Carter, extending into every significant foreign policy issue. A strong British commitment to the European Community enhances and strengthens the Anglo-US relationship. And our belief in the cohesion and importance of the Atlantic Alliance finds common cause with the US Administration in our support for an annual 3 per cent increase in defence expertise.

2 On his recent visit to London, Mr Vance met the Prime Minister, Mr Pym, Sir Geoffrey Howe, Mr Nott and had eight hours of discussions with Lord Carrington. This provided a useful opportunity for substantive and comprehensive discussions, which concentrated on defence and arms control issues, Southern Africa and the Middle East. We now have a very clear idea of the thinking of the US Administration on international issues and the Americans know where we stand.

3 We are confident that this traditional frank dialogue will continue. Of course there will be some problems and disagreements between us but on the major points we expect a close identity of views.

BRIEF NO 3
6 JUNE 1979

BRIEF FOR THE FAREWELL VISIT OF GENERAL HAIG, SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER.

The World Energy Situation

Essential Facts

A. The Oil Situation

(i) Supply.

Without any demand restraint by consumers, the free-world supply shortfall in 1979 will be about 1.5-2.0 million barrels/day (or 3-4% of demand). Iranian production is now about 3.5mbd (compared with about 5.7mbd before the present crisis). Present need is to rebuild stocks for next winter. Localised product shortages inevitable (mainly light products including motor gasoline).

(ii) Prices.

Increase of over 30% in average OPEC price since end of last year. Further increases (eg at OPEC Ministerial meeting this month) are almost inevitable.

(iii) International Energy Agency (IEA).

IEA countries are committed collectively to reduce their demand for oil on the world market by 2mbd; or about 5% of IEA consumption. HMG believes that it is essential that effective measures are taken by individual countries (especially the US) to fulfill this commitment. UK expects to achieve its share mainly through power station fuel switching (oil to coal) and informal allocation schemes run by oil companies.

(iv) Economic Consequences.

Impact of a further steep oil price rise on the world economy will be serious, particularly on economic growth rates; and on the balance of payments of the US and the smaller OECD countries.

B. Tokyo Summit

E Energy and its impact on the world economy will be a major subject at Tokyo. We will want the Summit to give strong political impetus to short-term oil demand restraint, and to the development of alternative sources and effective conservation in the long term.

C. Producer/Consumer Relations

We believe that it is of considerable long-term importance to promote better contacts and understanding between oil producers and consumers; though we recognise that oil producers will be most reluctant to let their pricing and production policies become a subject for international discussion. The consumers should use opportunities such as the Tokyo Summit to signal their interest in expanded contacts with producers.

Department of Energy
6 June 1979

BRIEF NO 4

6 June 1979

FAREWELL CALLS BY GENERAL HAIG

13 JUNE 1979

THE POSITION AND ATTITUDES OF THE FRG

Brief by Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Line to Take

The visit by Chancellor Schmidt and 2 of his Ministers in the week after the Election brought us up to date on German attitudes to most questions. We intend to keep very close to the Germans on Military-Politico issues (notably TNF modernisation). Relations between Washington and Bonn have caused us some concern, but both sides seem determined to keep differences within bounds. We shall continue to do what we can to help.

[If General Haig refers to alleged evidence of dissension within the SPD leading to independent FRG negotiations with the East]:

Recent Land Elections demonstrate the remarkable stability of the German domestic landscape. Odds at present are on a continuation of the present governing coalition after next year's Federal elections. The FRG has a clear interest in holding to present policies and avoiding ill-considered adventures towards the East. In our view, present German policies across the board are characterised by continuing good sense and caution.

/Background

Background

General Haig is known to have expressed considerable concern recently about the situation within the SPD. He has referred to a highly speculative scenario under which factions within the SPD would follow a line of policy designed to win an absolute majority in the Federal elections. Following this Chancellor Schmidt would be discarded and a new SPD Government would embark on an independent line of negotiation with the East based on the proposition that the border between the 2 Germanys would melt away. General Haig's concern seems to derive from sources other than the actual or predicted policies of the Federal Government, which are of course very different.

Relations between the US and German Governments have deteriorated since Mr Carter assumed office in 1977. Part of the trouble stems from the indifferent personal relationship between the President and the Chancellor. The US administration's handling of a number of important issues has also displeased the Federal Government in varying degree over the past 2 years. These include:

a) US handling of the Human Rights issue

b) US policy of non-proliferation (affecting German nuclear exports)

c) German suspicions of US defence policy in Europe

d) American pressure on the Germans to accept greater responsibility for decisions in the defence field than they as a non-nuclear power feel able to bear, especially over TNF

e) US attempts in 1978 to persuade the Germans to reflate their economy

f) What the Germans see as erratic US leadership and failure to consult their European allies.

For their part, Mr Carter and his administration regard Germany as a (possibly the) most important ally and partner of the US and have gone out of their way to support NATO and the EEC two institutions of vital importance to West Germany.

General Haig's own view of the US/FRG relationship will however have been coloured by his well-publicised differences with Herr Apel, the German Defence Minister, for example over the scale and timing of NATO manoeuvres in Germany last autumn. Herr Apel is here to stay and is indeed a conceivable successor to Helmut Schmidt as Chancellor.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

BRIEF NO 5
6 JUNE 1979

FAREWELL CALLS BY GENERAL HAIG: 13 JUNE 1979

MODERNISATION OF THEATRE NUCLEAR FORCES

LINE TO TAKE

1. We have made it clear that we will not shirk our responsibilities in this important area. But we need to work hard for a collective Alliance effort.

2. What does General Haig regard as the most useful way for the UK to contribute to an Alliance effort?

3. /Defensive - if asked about "grey area" arms control_7
A coherent Western position on "grey area" arms control is important for a number of reasons including facilitating a modernisatio programme. But the modernisation programme itself must not be bargained away to the detriment of credible deterrence.

BACKGROUND

1. The High Level Group, which is examining theatre nuclear force (TNF) modernisation options, and the Special Group, which is studying TNF arms control, are intending to meet jointly in September so as to ensure a common basis for their separate reports to Ministers. The aim is to enable Ministers to take decisions on a TNF modernisation programme by the end of the year.

2. General Haig has firm views on the subject. In February this year he told the Senate Armed Services Committee that a TNF modernisation programme was:

a. essential both for the continued maintenance of the flexible response strategy with "credible deterrence at every potential level of conflict";

b. important as a demonstration of Alliance solidarity; economic burden-sharing is an important feature of this;

c. "a pre-requisite for sound arms control measures and

the only assured basis for restraining the continuing build-up of Soviet forces".

General Haig also stressed that a prompt Alliance consensus was required, and that there was a "positive and unequivocal need" for American leadership. General Haig is known to attach importance to a UK contribution to the effort required.

BRIEF NO 6
6 JUNE 1979

FAREWELL CALLS BY GENERAL HAIG: 13 JUNE 1979

POLARIS REPLACEMENT

LINE TO TAKE

1. We greatly value our continuing close association with the United States in the nuclear field; we were most encouraged by Secretary Vance's visit to London last month.

2. We will need to examine all the military and resource implications, together with the views of the Alliance, before taking a final decision. But in principle we are fully committed to the maintenance of an effective United Kingdom strategic deterrent.

3. How valuable, in General Haig's view, is the contribution made by an independent UK nuclear capability to the Alliance?

4. /Defensive - if pressed_7 We have no firm views yet about systems, and are interested in both the ballistic and cruise missile options.

BACKGROUND

1. Ministers reaffirmed last month their commitment to the maintenance of an effective UK strategic deterrent.

2. General Haig has not recently volunteered views on this issue, but he may well wish to urge upon Ministers the importance of the independent UK capability for the credibility of Alliance deterrence. Ministers will recall that the principal advantage for the Alliance of the present Polaris force is that, by acting as a second centre of nuclear decision-making within NATO, it significantly increases the uncertainties faced by an aggressor. This increases the credibility of deterrence out of all proportion to the numerical size for the force.

BRIEF NO 7
5 JUNE 1979

FAREWELL CALLS BY GENERAL HAIG: 13 JUNE 1979

SALT II

Brief by Foreign and Commonwealth Office

LINE TO TAKE

1. We very much hope that the agreement will be ratified. How do you think the debate will go?

BACKGROUND

2. The Government have taken the following line in reacting to the American announcement of 9 May that the SALT II negotiations had been concluded:

> "We are glad that progress on SALT II has gone far enough to permit the long-awaited summit meeting to take place. We have long supported efforts to achieve strategic arms limitation and welcome the settlement of the major outstanding issues. We hope the the treaty will be ratified".

The Government have also endorsed a reference that "Ministers welcomed the /SALT II/ agreement" in the NATO Ministerial Communique on 31 May.

/3.

3. In view of General Haig's alleged political ambition and his experience as SACEUR he is likely to play a prominent role in the SALT ratification debate. There have been press reports that he is opposed to the SALT II agreement. In a recent interview (US News and World Report 26 February) he suggested that the most important question which had to be answered during the ratification process was whether or not the United States would be better able under SALT II to take steps necessary to maintain strategic parity and equivalence.

BRIEF NO 8
6 JUNE 1979

FAREWELL CALLS BY GENERAL HAIG : 13 JUNE 1979

MUTUAL AND BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS

LINE TO TAKE

1. It is important that reductions result in genuine parity, and we consequently need to continue to press the East on the major discrepancy between tabled figures for their forces and our estimates.

2. We need to avoid restrictions which could undermine the cohesion of Alliance defence.

3. Any agreement should be subject to adequate verification.

BACKGROUND


4. The data dispute: The West has concentrated increasingly on the large discrepancy between NATO and Warsaw Pact figures for Eastern forces in the reductions area. The East are showing signs of discomfiture and in recent bilateral discussion with the Americans the Russians have been exploring the possibilities of bypassing the need to agree on data. General Haig attaches particular importance to the West standing firm on this issue. The UK also believe agreement on data to be a sine qua non of progress towards an MBFR reductions agreement.

5. "Associated Measures": Since July 1978 the Alliance has been considering the content of a package of Associated Measures (verification and confidence-building measures). SACEUR is apprehensive lest an American proposal to limit the scale of out of garrison activity undermine Alliance flexibility in a period of rising tension. The UK shares some of these misgivings. The Americans have now agreed to defer this measure pending further study. SACEUR also wishes the package to contain adequate verification provisions in the face

of German opposition to the inspection measures being discussed in the MBFR Working Group. The UK has proposed to the Americans and Germans a compromise measure. This has been accepted by the Germans; the Americans are seeking to modify it. General Haig is likely to be aware of these trilateral exchanges but not their detail.

6. "Option III": In December 1975 the West offered to reduce and limit at their post-reduction level numbers of US nuclear warheads and delivery systems (dual-capable F-4s and Pershing ballistic missile launchers). The offer also included a limitation on follow-on models of the same type of system: the West has indicated that all US dual-capable aircraft would be limited, but has not yet defined the scope of limitation on ballistic missile launchers. The East has not yet met the conditions of Option III. The future of the Option III offer is now bound up with current Alliance consideration of TNF modernisation options and the complementary study of possible options for arms control in the "grey area".

The National Archives

DEPARTMENT/SERIES PREM 19 PIECE/ITEM 4330 (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract details: Brief No 9 dated 6 June 1979	
CLOSED UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	23/5/18
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	
MISSING AT TRANSFER	
NUMBER NOT USED	
MISSING (TNA USE ONLY)	
DOCUMENT PUT IN PLACE (TNA USE ONLY)	

Instructions for completion of Dummy Card

Use black or blue pen to complete form.

Use the card for one piece or for each extract removed from a different place within a piece.

Enter the department and series,
eg. HO 405, J 82.

Enter the piece and item references, .
eg. 28, 1079, 84/1, 107/3

Enter extract details if it is an extract rather than a whole piece.
This should be an indication of what the extract is,
eg. Folio 28, Indictment 840079, E107, Letter dated 22/11/1995.
Do not enter details of why the extract is sensitive.

If closed under the FOI Act, enter the FOI exemption numbers applying to the closure, eg. 27(1), 40(2).

Sign and date next to the reason why the record is not available to the public ie. Closed under FOI exemption; Retained under section 3(4) of the Public Records Act 1958; Temporarily retained; Missing at transfer or Number not used.

BRIEF NO 10

6 JUNE 1979

FAREWELL CALLS BY GENERAL HAIG : 13 JUNE 1979

GREECE, TURKEY AND NATO

Brief by Foreign and Commonwealth Office

LINE TO TAKE

1. Greece's return to full participation in NATO is vital. We have welcomed SACEUR's efforts to find a compromise. Though both sides have made some concessions, the central issues remain unsolved.

2. What next? Caution will be necessary: there is a danger of pushing the Greeks into a corner.

BACKGROUND

3. In 1974, following Turkey's invasion of Cyprus, Greece withdrew from the military structure of NATO. But in 1978 the Greek Government put forward proposals for Greece's return. These were generally welcomed by NATO countries but agreement has been held up by a dispute over command boundaries in the Aegean. The Greeks have argued for a return to the boundaries which were in effect before 1974 (which run between the eastern-most Greek islands and the Turkish mainland, giving virtually the whole of the Aegean to Greece)

/pending

pending agreement on alternative measures. The Turks claim that the pre-1974 boundaries made military nonsense; that they were never accepted by Turkey; and that new boundaries must be negotiated before Greece can return to the integrated military structure. Acceptance of boundaries less favourable to Greece than those in force before 1974 would be unacceptable to Greece as a price for reintegration. Behind these differences lies the much more important dispute over the Aegean continental shelf, airspace, the militarisation of the Greek islands and the threat that they might become "enclaves" in Turkish waters. Both sides fear compromising their position on this wider issue and the Turks seek to exploit the leverage offered by Greece's application to rejoin the military structure.

4. At the request of the NATO Secretary-General, General Haig has twice this year made contact with the Greek and Turkish authorities in an attempt to break the deadlock. Early in May, he presented proposals to the Greeks, which had been endorsed by the Turks. These the Greeks rejected: though General Haig has yet to report on his mission, it seems that most difficulty was caused by the proposal that the Greeks should relinquish operational control over a section of Aegean air space, including many Greek islands, to a new NATO authority. News of these exchanges leaked in the Greek press on 20 May, setting off a storm in the Greek Parliament, where the Opposition accused the Government of endangering the country's territorial integrity by offering excessive concessions. Mr Karamanlis and the Greek Foreign Minister, Mr Rallis, have both subsequently

/raised

raised the issue in strong terms with Lord Carrington, expressing dissatisfaction with General Haig's handling of his mandate and seeking British support for the Greek position.

7 JUN 1979

CONFIDENTIAL

BRIEF NO 11
6 JUNE 1979

FAREWELL CALLS BY GENERAL HAIG: 13 JUNE 1979

MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO PORTUGAL AND TURKEY

LINE TO TAKE

1. We share the general NATO concern to help these countries and we have pledged ourselves, together with our Allies, to pursue this matter vigorously. We have recently given Portugal defence equipment worth some £2.1M, and we are actively considering what can be done to help the Turkish Armed Forces. We are taking a full part in the current NATO studies of how collectively to provide the Portuguese Navy with the frigates it requires.

2. You will also be aware of the United Kingdom's decision to commit £15M to the economic assistance of Turkey.

BACKGROUND

3. General Haig is very interested in the question of economic aid to Turkey. He claims to have worked hard behind the scenes for a positive American attitude at Guadeloupe, and he has been critical of the US Administration attitude. At the end of his farewell visit to Turkey on 18 May General Haig said that he was impressed with the urgency of providing Turkey with immediate financial assistance. He added that military assistance as well as economic help was necessary. It was his strong view that the recommendation of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to provide $50M supplemental assistance by way of credit was wrong: Turkey needed grant assistance. (In the event, the Senate overrode this proposal and granted the money as military aid).

4. At the Ministerial DPC on 15/16 May, Ministers collectively pledged themselves to assist, and they agreed that a progress report should be prepared for their next meeting. The UK has recently given Portugal - with the approval of Parliament - a package of defence equipment worth some £2.1M, and we are taking an active

part in current NATO studies into means for providing the Portuguese Navy with the three frigates it needs in order to maintain an ocean-going capability. We have not yet been able to identify a worthwhile package of equipment for Turkey however, largely because the mainly US supplied Turkish equipment is incompatible with UK items; we are still investigating what can be done. The Turks have recently suggested to NATO a collective effort for military aid of some $600M a year over 5 years. The Alliance has yet to respond to this suggestion.

BRIEF NO. 12
6 JUNE 1979

FAREWELL CALLS BY GENERAL HAIG: 13 JUNE 1979

DEPLOYMENTS OUTSIDE THE NATO AREA

LINE TO TAKE

While NATO is the first call on our resources, we regard our limited deployments outside the NATO area as an important contribution to the defence of Western interests. They also provide valuable training experience for the Services.

BACKGROUND

1. Our forces retain the ability to deploy world-wide in order to fulfil our residual responsibilities towards dependent territories, to contribute to UN peacekeeping operations, to assist in the evacuation of British communities overseas and to meet unforeseen emergencies.

2. Although virtually all RN ships are assigned to NATO, groups of ships deploy outside the NATO area each year. The maritime Major NATO Commanders generally favour such deployments.

3. In Cyprus, a force of about 3,800 protects and operates important intelligence and defence facilities located in the Sovereign Base Areas. The Treaty of Establishment of the SBAs does not specifically provide for their use by countries other than the UK and care has to be exercised over use by NATO allies. Nevertheless our military presence in Cyprus is of direct value to NATO in contributing to the stability of the Eastern Mediterranean area. The UK also provides about a third of the troops of UNFICYP; and gives logistic support to it and UNIFIL, from the SBA's.

4. In addition, the UK stations forces in Belize, the Falkland Islands, Hong Kong and Brunei to meet national commitments.

5. At the Ministerial DPC in May, the US suggested that the Allies could usefully consult more on matters affecting their interests outside the NATO area.

BRIEF NO 13
[illegible]NE 1979

FAREWELL CALLS BY GENERAL HAIG: 13 JUNE 1979

SACEUR's ANNUAL ASSESSMENT OF COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS

LINE TO TAKE

SACEUR's assessment that the overall conventional capability of the Alliance is improving is most welcome. It is recognised, however, that deficiencies do remain and that the impetus behind NATO's recent initiatives must be maintained. The UK will give high priority to the implementation of the Long Term Defence Programme and has accepted NATO's call to aim for 3% a year real increases in defence spending up to 1986.

BACKGROUND

1. SACEUR produces an annual Combat Effectiveness Report - his personal view of the military effectiveness of his command. In his 1977 report, SACEUR gave credit for the considerable progress made in improving the effectiveness of NATO's forces. He acknowledged that there were encouraging signs in the Alliance of a determination to reverse the adverse trend in the balance with the Warsaw Pact, for example in the early work on the Long Term Defence Programme and the agreement of Ministers to aim for 3% real increases in defence expenditure up to 1984, but his overall conclusions were more sombre. He felt that with the gap in conventional capabilities between NATO forces and the Warsaw Pact continuing to grow, NATO would be hard pressed to sustain a successful conventional defence in the Central Region and that until the various Alliance initiatives produced tangible results the ability of NATO forces to defend, as well as their deterrent value, would be in question.

2. In his 1978 Combat Effectiveness Report SACEUR has noted that deficiencies in conventional capabilities remain, particularly on the NATO Flanks. He pointed to a number of limitations in combat

effectiveness including those arising from manpower shortages; the UK, together with a number of other Allies, was particularly referred to in this context. (The UK is taking remedial measures to rectify these shortages and it is hoped that the recent pay award will have a beneficial effect).

3. Nevertheless, SACEUR noted that there had been a number of improvements in the Alliances conventional capability and gave credit to the UK for the increases in the size of the Army. Of greatest significance over the Alliance as a whole was the high priority that has been given to implementing the LTDP, which recommended measures in 10 priority areas designed to adapt the Alliance's defence posture to meet the needs of the 1980s.

4. SACEUR concluded that overall the improvements in conventional capabilities have been meaningful and, in the case of the Central Region, substantial and that the basis now existed for halting the widening of the gap between NATO and the Warsaw Pact in conventional capabilities. SACEUR felt that nations must continue with their efforts to maintain this progress and commit the necessary resources to the task. He also drew attention to the Soviet build up in theatre nuclear weapons and the need to modernise our own longer range theatre forces so as to maintain NATOs strategy of flexible response (TNF modernisation covered separately in Brief No 5).

BRIEF NO 14
6 JUNE 1979

FAREWELL CALLS BY GENERAL HAIG: 13 JUNE 1979

NATO's RAPID REINFORCEMENT CONCEPT AND SACEUR'S RAPID REINFORCEMENT PLAN

LINE TO TAKE

We fully support the rapid reinforcement concept and SACEUR's RRP. We believe this has highlighted the need for further detailed planning, and we hope that the urgency and momentum which General Haig has imparted to this subject should not falter because of his departure.

BACKGROUND

Throughout his time as SACEUR, General Haig has consistently pressed for a capability to reinforce Europe more rapidly. The Rapid Reinforcement Concept was endorsed by the North Atlantic Council in June 1977 and by Heads of Government in May 1978. This led to development of SACEUR's Rapid Reinforcement Plan (RRP), the first draft of which was issued to nations for comment in November 1978.

UK Reaction to RRP

The UK fully supports both the concept and plan but believes that the latter must be based on credible force levels, movement resources and reception capabilities. The UK contribution to this exercise used actual deployment plans, but the figures used for transatlantic reinforcements are known to be broad brush. We believe that the Nations who have not yet done so (mainly the USA, but also receiving nations in Europe) should begin detailed planning as soon as possible.

CONFIDENTIAL

BRIEF NO 15
6 JUNE 1979

FAREWELL CALLS BY GENERAL HAIG: 13 JUNE 1979

UNITED KINGDOM DEFENCE BUDGET

LINE TO TAKE

1. During their first few weeks in office the Government have given practical demonstration of their commitment to NATO in three ways. First, armed forces pay has increased to its proper level, and the 1979-80 cash limit has been increased correspondingly. Second, in yesterday's Budget the Chancellor of the Exchequer announced an extra £100M for defence this year to meet the cost of re-equipping the forces. Thirdly, at the recent meeting of NATO Defence Ministers we accepted NATO's call to aim for 3% a year real increases in defence spending up to 1986.

2. These decisions have not been easy, given our strategy of reducing public expenditure to reinvigorate the economy. We aim to cut out administrative waste throughout Government, and defence will not be exempt from this - nor should it be. We have not yet taken firm decisions about defence budget levels beyond the current year; this is a task for the coming weeks and months. But what we have done so far shows clearly our commitment to defence.

3. It is of course essential that our Allies, including the USA, should continue to demonstrate their commitment in the same way.

BACKGROUND

1. The £100M increase in the 1979-80 defence budget will have been announced in the Budget the day before the Prime Minister sees General Haig.

CONFIDENTIAL

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1
Telephone 01 ~~XXX XXX~~ 218 2111/3

MO 1/14/1

7th June 1979

Dear Caroline

FAREWELL CALLS BY GENERAL HAIG, SACEUR
13TH JUNE

General Haig will be paying a farewell visit to the Prime Minister at 10 am next Wednesday, 13th June. He will be visiting the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary at 3.45pm and this call will be preceded by a visit to the Defence Secretary at 3pm.

1, 5, 6, // 8, 9, 11-15 - MOD

3 - ENERGY

As requested I enclose two copies of briefing notes covering a number of subjects which it is possible that General Haig will raise. The Department of Energy have submitted a brief on the world energy situation as it was understood from SACEUR's Executive Officer that this subject, although not strictly within SACEUR's brief, could well be raised by him.

I trust the information provided will be satisfactory for your purpose.

Yours sincerely
Marian Stapleton
(M STAPLETON)(Miss)

Miss Caroline Stephens
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

8/F 2-679

Defence

NOTE FOR THE RECORD

I spoke to Mr. Pym's Office, Marion Stapleton, and offered General Haig 1000 on 13 June. I said that if he could not manage that time it was unlikely that we could give him an alternative. I requested that briefing should be sent to me by 7 June, having been cleared by the FCO.

C.J.

24 May 1979

PRIME MINISTER

Mr. Pym's office rang this morning to say that General Haig, who is the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, is retiring and would like to come and say goodbye on 13 June. This is the day after the Budget and your diary is already overcrowded with meetings with Sir Y. K. Pao, meetings with President Moi, lunch with President Moi, sitting in on the Budget Debate in the House, Mr. Garvin, Chairman of Exxon, Audience of the Queen and dinner with the National Union Executive Committee. I have had a word with Bryan Cartledge about this and he says it is by no means essential. General Haig is however a possible Republican Presidential candidate so could you let me know your views, please? Apparently he will only be here for 13 June so we cannot offer him an alternative date.

C.P.

23 May 1979

I shall have to see him.

BRIEF cleared by F.O.