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NATO Ministerial Meetings

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Part 1: May 1979

Part 2: June 1990

Series closed

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PART ONE OF TWO

FOLLOWING IS THE FINAL COMMUNIQUE OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL
MINISTERIAL MEETING IN ATHENS, ON 10 JUNE 1993.

BEGINS

1. OUR MEETING IN ATHENS TAKES PLACE AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF THE MOST VIOLENT CONFLICT THAT OUR CONTINENT HAS WITNESSED IN MORE THAN A GENERATION. THE ONGOING FIGHTING AND CRUELITIES POSE A FORMIDABLE CHALLENGE TO THE WHOLE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. WE HAVE TODAY CONSULTED FIRST AND FOREMOST ON THE SECURITY PROBLEMS OF THE BALKANS - ON WAYS TO BRING PEACE TO THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA AND TO PREVENT SPILLOVER OF CONFLICT INTO OTHER AREAS. WE ARE DETERMINED, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS AN ALLIANCE, TO SUPPORT THE EFFORTS OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND OTHER INSTITUTIONS TO END THIS WAR.

2. IT MUST BE UNDERSTOOD BY ALL CONCERNED THAT SPILLOVER OF THE CONFLICT WOULD HAVE GRAVE CONSEQUENCES. IN THAT CONNECTION, WE SUPPORT PROPOSALS TO INCREASE THE NUMBER OF CSCE MONITORS, PARTICULARLY IN KOSOVO. WE ALSO WELCOME THE US OFFER OF TROOPS TO AUGMENT THE UN CONTINGENT ALREADY IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA.

3. WE SUPPORT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SAFE AREAS IN BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA FOR THE PROTECTION OF THE CIVILIAN POPULATION, AS DEFINED IN UNSC RESOLUTIONS 824 AND 836. IN RESPONSE TO UNSC RESOLUTION 836 AND THE EXPANDED UNPROFOR MANDATE RELATED TO SAFE AREAS, WE OFFER OUR PROTECTIVE AIRPOWER IN CASE OF ATTACK AGAINST UNPROFOR IN THE PERFORMANCE OF ITS OVERALL MANDATE, IF IT SO REQUESTS. WE HAVE ASKED THE NATO MILITARY AUTHORITIES, WHO HAVE ALREADY UNDERTAKEN PRELIMINARY WORK, TO PROCEED RAPIDLY WITH DETAILED PLANNING FOR THE AIR SUPPORT THAT WE ARE READY TO PROVIDE, IN COORDINATION WITH UNPROFOR AND OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF

SAFE AREAS IS A TEMPORARY MEASURE LEADING TOWARDS A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT BASED ON THE PRINCIPLES OF THE VANCE-OWEN PLAN WHICH GUARANTEE THE FULL SOVEREIGNTY, TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE OF THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA. IN THAT CONTEXT, WE ALSO WELCOME THE MEASURES SET FORTH IN THE JOINT ACTION PROGRAMME SIGNED IN WASHINGTON, DC ON 22 MAY 1993. NATO REMAINS READY TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SUCH A SETTLEMENT IN CONCERT WITH OTHERS AND UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL. WE WILL CONTINUE RIGOROUSLY TO ENFORCE UN EMBARGOES IN THE ADRIATIC, TOGETHER WITH THE WEU, AND THE UN-DECLARED NO-FLY ZONE OVER THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA. WE DO NOT EXCLUDE ANY OPTIONS IN SUPPORT OF NEW AND TOUGHER MEASURES DECIDED BY THE UN.

4. IN THE CSCE AREA, OTHER REGIONAL CONFLICTS CONTINUE. THEY THREATEN THE PROCESS OF PEACEFUL CHANGE AND THE EMERGENCE OF A NEW ORDER OF COOPERATIVE SECURITY THAT OUR ALLIANCE IS SEEKING TO ACHIEVE. IN LINE WITH THE CORE FUNCTIONS OF THE ALLIANCE, WE ARE DETERMINED TO CONSULT FULLY WITHIN NATO ON THESE NEW CHALLENGES. CONFLICT PREVENTION, CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND PEACEKEEPING WILL BE CRUCIAL TO ENSURING STABILITY AND SECURITY IN THE EURO-ATLANTIC AREA IN THE YEARS AHEAD. OUR ALLIANCE CONTINUES TO HAVE A KEY ROLE IN THE SECURITY OF EUROPE. WHILE REAFFIRMING THAT THE PRIMARY GOAL OF ALLIANCE MILITARY FORCES IS TO GUARANTEE THE SECURITY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF MEMBER STATES, WE WILL CONTRIBUTE ACTIVELY TO THESE NEW TASKS IN ORDER TO ENHANCE OUR SECURITY AND EUROPEAN STABILITY.

THE TRANSATLANTIC LINK

5. THE TRANSATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP REMAINS VITAL FOR EUROPEAN SECURITY AND STABILITY. THE PROMOTION OF PEACEFUL CHANGE IN EUROPE NEEDS A STRONG AND DYNAMIC ATLANTIC ALLIANCE. THE CHALLENGES WE FACE IN BUILDING DEMOCRACY AND SECURITY BY COOPERATION THROUGHOUT EUROPE CANNOT BE COMPREHENSIVELY ADDRESSED BY EUROPE OR NORTH AMERICA ALONE BUT ONLY THROUGH BROAD AND THOROUGH JOINT EFFORTS. IN ORDER FOR NATO TO FULFIL ITS MISSION OF COLLECTIVE DEFENCE AND ITS NEW TASKS AS REFERRED TO ABOVE, NOT LEAST IN SUPPORT OF PEACEKEEPING, AND TO ENABLE IT TO COOPERATE WITH THE COUNTRIES OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE AND CENTRAL ASIA, A STRONG TRANSATLANTIC DIMENSION IS ESSENTIAL. THE SUBSTANTIAL PRESENCE OF US ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE AND THE CONTINUING POLITICAL AND MILITARY COMMITMENT AND ACTIVE ENGAGEMENT IN EUROPEAN SECURITY OF BOTH THE UNITED STATES AND

CANADA WILL REMAIN INDISPENSABLE.

ALLIANCE'S ROLE IN SUPPORT OF PEACEKEEPING

6. THE ALLIANCE HAS DEMONSTRATED ITS READINESS TO SUPPORT UN OR CSCE PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS, WHICH PLACE NEW DEMANDS ON IT. THE FORCES, INTERNAL STRUCTURES AND PROCEDURES OF THE ALLIANCE ARE BEING ADAPTED TO THE NEW SECURITY ENVIRONMENT. THE ALLIANCE WILL CARRY THIS PROCESS FURTHER TO ENABLE US ALSO TO RESPOND MORE QUICKLY AND EFFECTIVELY TO REQUESTS TO SUPPORT PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS AND FULLY TO INVOLVE ALL ALLIES IN THE ALLIANCE'S NEW ROLE IN PEACEKEEPING, RECOGNISING THAT NATIONAL PARTICIPATION WILL REMAIN SUBJECT TO NATIONAL DECISION. WE UNDERLINE THE IMPORTANCE OF PROVIDING ADEQUATE RESOURCES, BOTH TO MAINTAIN AN EFFECTIVE MILITARY CONTRIBUTION TO THE COMMON DEFENCE AND TO ENSURE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF NATO'S NEW TASKS.

COOPERATION WITH THE COUNTRIES OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE AND CENTRAL ASIA

7. WE ARE DEVELOPING WITH OUR PARTNERS IN THE NORTH ATLANTIC COOPERATION COUNCIL A COMMON UNDERSTANDING ON CONCEPTUAL APPROACHES TO PEACEKEEPING. IN ORDER TO IMPROVE THE ABILITY OF OUR FORCES TO INTERACT EFFECTIVELY WHEN CARRYING OUT PEACEKEEPING TASKS TOGETHER, WE ARE ENHANCING OUR COOPERATION IN THIS FIELD. ASSOCIATING NON-ALLIED COUNTRIES WITH THE ALLIANCE IN THIS WAY UNDERSCORES THE EXTENT OF THE ALLIANCE'S TRANSFORMATION AND WILL BE AN IMPORTANT FACTOR IN BUILDING CONFIDENCE AND COOPERATIVE SECURITY IN EUROPE. THIS EFFORT COMPLEMENTS THAT OF THE CSCE, WHICH HAS BEEN ASSOCIATED IN THIS UNDERTAKING THROUGH SWEDEN AS ITS CHAIRMAN-IN-OFFICE.

8. THE BUILDING OF DURABLE DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS AND THE PURSUIT OF EFFECTIVE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REFORMS IN OUR NORTH ATLANTIC COOPERATION COUNCIL (NACC) PARTNER COUNTRIES REMAIN OF UTMOST IMPORTANCE FOR EUROPEAN STABILITY. IN THIS CONNECTION, WE WELCOME THE RESULTS OF THE RUSSIAN REFERENDUM IN APRIL WHICH HAVE CLEARLY INDICATED THE DESIRE OF THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE TO MOVE AHEAD WITH REFORM AND NOT TO RETURN TO DISCREDITED FORMULAS OF THE PAST. COOPERATION WITH THE COUNTRIES OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE AND CENTRAL ASIA, PARTICULARLY IN THE FRAMEWORK OF NACC, IS A KEY ELEMENT OF THE ALLIANCE'S STRATEGY FOR PROTECTING PEACE AND PROMOTING PROGRESS

THROUGH CONSTRUCTIVE JOINT EFFORT. DEVELOPMENT OF COOPERATION IN PEACEKEEPING IS SUBSTANTIVELY ENHANCING OUR COOPERATIVE ACTIVITIES AND REFLECTS OUR SHARED COMMITMENT TO PEACE. CONCRETE COOPERATION AMONG OUR COUNTRIES IS DEVELOPING FURTHER THROUGH THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 1993 WORK PLAN.

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PART TWO OF TWO

FOLLOWING IS THE FINAL COMMUNIQUE OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL
MINISTERIAL MEETING IN ATHENS, ON 10 JUNE 1993.

COOPERATION WITH OTHER INSTITUTIONS

9. OUR ALLIANCE'S OBJECTIVE OF COPING WITH REGIONAL CONFLICTS
AND OF CONTRIBUTING TO SECURITY AND STABILITY IN EUROPE CAN BE
ACCOMPLISHED ONLY THROUGH CLOSE COOPERATION WITH OTHER
INSTITUTIONS IN THE FRAMEWORK OF OUR CONCEPT OF MUTUALLY
REINFORCING INSTITUTIONS:

- THE CONFLICT IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA HAS GIVEN RISE TO THE
IMPLEMENTATION BY NATO OF A NUMBER OF RESOLUTIONS OF THE UNITED
NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL WHICH HAS THE PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY
FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY. RELATIONS BETWEEN BOTH
ORGANISATIONS HAVE DEVELOPED VERY SUBSTANTIVELY AND EFFECTIVELY.
THE ALLIANCE HAS RESPONDED TO THE INVITATION OF THE SECRETARY
GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS TO SUGGEST WAYS IN WHICH THE
ALLIANCE MIGHT GENERALLY CONTRIBUTE TO THE REALISATION OF THE
CONCEPT DEVELOPED IN HIS QUOTE AGENDA FOR PEACE UNQUOTE. THE
SECRETARIES GENERAL OF THE TWO ORGANISATIONS HAVE ESTABLISHED
DIRECT CONTACT AND WE WOULD WELCOME FURTHER CONTACTS AT VARIOUS
LEVELS. COMMUNICATION AND COORDINATION BETWEEN NATO AND THE
UNITED NATIONS NEED TO BE FURTHER ENHANCED. WE HAVE ASKED THE
SECRETARY GENERAL TO PROPOSE TO THE COUNCIL IN PERMANENT SESSION
APPROPRIATE MEASURES TO THAT END.

- THE WORK OF THE CSCE WILL CONTINUE TO HAVE OUR ACTIVE SUPPORT.
WE LOOK FORWARD TO CONTINUED DISCUSSION OF EUROPEAN SECURITY
ISSUES IN THE CSCE FORUM FOR SECURITY COOPERATION WITH THE GOAL
OF ACHIEVING TIMELY RESULTS IN ALL THE AREAS CURRENTLY UNDER
CONSIDERATION IN THE FORUM. THE CSCE HAS A CENTRAL ROLE TO PLAY
IN PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY. SECURITY AND STABILITY IN EUROPE ARE

DECISIVELY ADVANCED BY THE PREVENTION OF CONFLICTS. WE WELCOME THE IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION OF THE CSCE TO CONFLICT PREVENTION AND EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES. WE ENCOURAGE THE FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF THE CSCE'S CAPACITIES IN THIS AREA. IN THIS RESPECT WE WELCOME DECISIONS TAKEN BY THE CSCE TO STRENGTHEN ITS OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES THROUGH STRUCTURAL REFORMS AND THE APPOINTMENT OF A SECRETARY GENERAL. WE WELCOME THE ARRANGEMENTS WHICH ALLOW NATO TO PARTICIPATE IN THE WORK OF THE CSCE AND TO COOPERATE WITH IT. WE WILL STRIVE TO DEVELOP FURTHER THE INTERACTION AND COOPERATION BETWEEN NATO AND THE CSCE.

- THE WEU'S MOVE TO BRUSSELS HAS CONTRIBUTED TO ENHANCING INTERACTION AND CLOSE DAY-TO-DAY WORKING RELATIONS BETWEEN NATO AND THE WEU IN THE SPIRIT OF TRANSPARENCY AND COMPLEMENTARITY TO WHICH WE ARE BOTH COMMITTED. THE PARTICIPATION OF THE SECRETARIES GENERAL IN RESPECTIVE COUNCIL MEETINGS HAS BEEN VALUABLE. THE TWO ORGANISATIONS HAVE CONTRIBUTED IN CLOSE COOPERATION AND IN A COMPLEMENTARY MANNER TO THE EFFORTS BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO DEAL WITH THE CONFLICT IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA. THIS IS DEMONSTRATED CLEARLY BY THE SHARP GUARD OPERATION IN THE ADRIATIC. THE TWO ORGANISATIONS HAVE DECIDED TO REINFORCE THEIR COOPERATION IN THE ADRIATIC BY FORMING A SINGLE COMMAND STRUCTURE FOR THEIR PARTICIPATING VESSELS, UNDER THE JOINT DIRECTION OF THE COUNCILS OF BOTH ORGANISATIONS. WE WELCOME THE COMMON INITIATIVE OF THE WEU AND RIPARIAN STATES TO STRENGTHEN THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE UNITED NATIONS' SANCTIONS ON THE DANUBE.

REGIONAL ISSUES

10. WE DISCUSSED A NUMBER OF REGIONAL ISSUES, IN PARTICULAR THE CONFLICT BEING DEALT WITH BY THE CSCE CONFERENCE ON NAGORNO-KARABAKH AND OTHER SOURCES OF TENSION ON THE TERRITORY OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION, AS WELL AS THE NEED FOR THE EXPEDITIOUS COMPLETION OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN FORCES FROM THE BALTIC STATES. WE WILL ALSO CONSULT TOMORROW WITH OUR COOPERATION PARTNERS IN THE NORTH ATLANTIC COOPERATION COUNCIL ON ALL THESE ISSUES.

THE MEDITERRANEAN

11. SECURITY IN EUROPE IS GREATLY AFFECTED BY SECURITY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. CONSEQUENTLY, WE ENCOURAGE ALL EFFORTS FOR

DIALOGUE AND COOPERATION WHICH AIM AT STRENGTHENING STABILITY IN THIS REGION. THE EXAMPLE OF OUR IMPROVED UNDERSTANDING AND COOPERATIVE PARTNERSHIP WITH THE COUNTRIES OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE COULD SERVE TO INSPIRE SUCH EFFORTS.

NON-PROLIFERATION, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT

12. WE REMAIN DETERMINED TO PURSUE OUR ARMS CONTROL OBJECTIVES, IN PARTICULAR IN THE FIELD OF NON-PROLIFERATION AND WITH RESPECT TO FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF EXISTING AGREEMENTS. IN THIS REGARD:

- WE REITERATE OUR STRONG SUPPORT FOR THE TREATY ON NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AND FOR ITS UNCONDITIONAL AND INDEFINITE EXTENSION IN 1995. WE SHALL BE WORKING FOR A STRENGTHENED VERIFICATION REGIME. WE WELCOME BELARUS'S DECISION TO ADHERE TO THE TREATY, AND URGE KAZAKHSTAN AND UKRAINE TO FULFIL WITHOUT DELAY THEIR COMMITMENT TO ACCEDE TO IT AS NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES. WE ALSO URGE ALL COUNTRIES THAT HAVE NOT YET DONE SO TO BECOME PARTIES TO THE NPT AS NON-NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES. WE CALL ON NORTH KOREA TO REVOKE ITS STATED INTENTION TO WITHDRAW FROM THIS TREATY, AND TO COMPLY WITH ITS IAEA SAFEGUARDS OBLIGATIONS:
- WE WELCOME THE START II TREATY AND LOOK FORWARD TO THE EARLY RATIFICATION BY ALL PARTIES AND ENTRY INTO FORCE OF BOTH START AGREEMENTS. IN THIS CONTEXT, WE WELCOME THE RATIFICATION OF START I BY BELARUS AND KAZAKHSTAN. WE CALL ON UKRAINE TO RATIFY START I AND TO ALLOW ITS PROVISIONS TO BE IMPLEMENTED, AND FOR START II TO BE RATIFIED AND IMPLEMENTED. WE EXPECT BELARUS, KAZAKHSTAN AND UKRAINE TO IMPLEMENT FULLY THEIR COMMITMENTS TO ELIMINATE ALL NUCLEAR WEAPONS FROM THEIR TERRITORIES AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. THE ALLIES INTEND TO CONTINUE TO OFFER SUPPORT TO ENSURE THE RAPID, SAFE AND SECURE ELIMINATION OF FORMER SOVIET NUCLEAR WEAPONS, IN ACCORDANCE WITH CURRENT AGREEMENTS:
- WE STRESS THE CRITICAL IMPORTANCE OF THE CFE TREATY AND OF ITS FULL IMPLEMENTATION FOR EUROPEAN SECURITY. WE CALL UPON ALL OTHER SIGNATORIES TO COMPLY FULLY WITH THE TREATY'S PROVISIONS. IN PARTICULAR, WE ATTACH GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THE TIMELY FULFILMENT OF REDUCTION OBLIGATIONS, INCLUDING THE PROVISION OF COORDINATED REDUCTION LIABILITY DATA BY THE CFE SUCCESSOR STATES TO THE FORMER SOVIET UNION IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE OSLO FINAL DOCUMENT.

WE INTEND TO CONSULT ON THESE AND OTHER ARMS CONTROL AND
DISARMAMENT ISSUES TOMORROW WITH OUR COOPERATION PARTNERS IN THE
NORTH ATLANTIC COOPERATION COUNCIL.

CONCLUSION

13. THREE YEARS AFTER THE REVOLUTIONARY CHANGES IN EUROPE WE
CAN REGISTER IMPORTANT ACHIEVEMENTS. BUT MORE NEEDS TO BE DONE.
THE ALLIANCE'S LONG-STANDING AND ULTIMATE GOAL OF A JUST AND
LASTING ORDER OF PEACE IN EUROPE REMAINS FAR FROM BEING
REACHED. WE WILL, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS AN ALLIANCE, PURSUE WITH
VIGOUR AND DETERMINATION OUR COMMITMENT TO OVERCOMING THE
RESURGENT QUARRELS AND TO BUILDING MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING, PEACE
AND COOPERATION.

WE THANK THE HELLENIC REPUBLIC FOR ITS GRACIOUS
HOSPITALITY. OUR AUTUMN NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL MEETING WILL BE
HELD IN BRUSSELS ON 2 DECEMBER 1993.

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NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL AND NACC MINISTERIALS: ATHENS: 10/11 JUNE

SUMMARY

1. YUGOSLAVIA WILL OVERSHADOW NAC:

- RE-EMERGENCE OF DOUBTS ABOUT ALLIANCE COHESION AND NATO'S CRISIS MANAGEMENT ROLE: AND ABOUT THE BALANCE OF THE EUROPEAN AND THE TRANSATLANTIC IN THE SECURITY ARENA.

- FOLLOW-THROUGH TO THE JOINT ACTION PROGRAMME. FUTURE NATO ROLE: AIR SUPPORT/PROTECTION FOR SAFE AREAS: EVENTUAL IMPLEMENTATION OF A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT.

2. FIRST NAC FOR NEW US TEAM. NEED TO SHOW CLEARER VISION OF THE WAY AHEAD.

3. NACC MEETING. MAIN BUSINESS: TO SET THE SEAL ON CO-OPERATION IN PEACEKEEPING. REGIONAL ISSUES (INCLUDING YUGOSLAVIA) THE MAIN BALLAST. UKRAINE A POTENTIAL BOAT-ROCKER.

DETAIL

4. THE ANNUAL SPRING MEETING OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL IN MINISTERIAL SESSION WILL BE HELD IN ATHENS ON 10 JUNE. IT WILL BE FOLLOWED BY AN QUOTE EXTRAORDINARY UNQUOTE MEETING OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC CO-OPERATION COUNCIL AT 38 (ALTHOUGH SET FOR ONE MEETING PER YEAR, THE EXCEPTION APPEARS TO HAVE BECOME THE NORM).

NAC

5. EARLIER THIS YEAR NATO HAD A NEW SPRING IN ITS STEP. REAL LIFE - YUGOSLAVIA - HAD BLOWN AWAY SOME OF THE DOCTRINAL DUST AND ALLOWED PROGRESS IN KEY RESPECTS. THE BALANCE LOOKED IMPRESSIVE:

- NATO MILITARY ASSETS SEEING ACTION FOR THE FIRST TIME IN THE ORGANISATION'S HISTORY, AND DISPLAYING MILITARY COMPETENCE.
- FRANCE MOVING CLOSER TO THE MILITARY SIDE OF THE ALLIANCE (WHILE PRESERVING SOME OF HER NATIONAL QUIRKS).
- HUGE STRIDES IN DEVELOPING THE NATO CONTRIBUTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND PEACEKEEPING, WITH IN PARTICULAR NEW LINKS TO THE UN.
- NATO'S ROLE AS THE PRIME MOVER IN EUROPEAN SECURITY REAFFIRMED.

THE ATHENS AGREEMENT ON YUGOSLAVIA APPEARED TO SET NATO AN ACID TEST OF WHETHER IT COULD INDEED DELIVER ON A COMPLEX MILITARY OPERATION BEYOND THE SCOPE OF ANY SINGLE NATION OR ANY OTHER ORGANISATION. NATO WAS PREPARING TO FACE THE CHALLENGE.

6. BUT THE REJECTION BY THE BOSNIAN SERBS OF THE VANCE-OWEN PEACE PLAN, AND THE DEVELOPMENTS THAT FOLLOWED, RE-AWAKENED DOUBTS ABOUT THE ALLIANCE'S ROLE. THESE DOUBTS HAVE BEEN EXACERBATED BY THE VAGARIES OF POLICY-MAKING IN TRANSITION-BOUND WASHINGTON, AND WITH THESE A FEELING OF QUOTE STOP, GO UNQUOTE IN NATO'S INVOLVEMENT. AS CAME THROUGH IN OUR REPORTING OF LAST MONTH'S DEFENCE PLANNING COMMITTEE MEETING, THE JOINT ACTION PROGRAMME (JAP) HAS AROUSED FRESH QUESTIONING OF THE VALUE ATTACHED TO ALLIANCE-WIDE CONSULTATIONS AND ABOUT WHAT, IF ANY, CONTRIBUTION NATO HAS TO MAKE TO CONTAINMENT OF THE CRISIS, WHILE A DEFINITIVE SETTLEMENT REMAINS OUT OF REACH.

7. RELATIONS BETWEEN THE AMERICANS AND THE EUROPEANS HAVE ALSO NOT BEEN HELPED BY AMERICAN IRRITATION WITH SOME OF THE WEU'S PERFORMANCE, INCLUDING UNWISE PUBLIC REMARKS BY VAN EEKELEN. THE RUMPUS OVER THE JOINT ADRIATIC OPERATION HAS NOT HELPED THE ATMOSPHERICS, BUT FORTUNATELY NOW LOOKS SOLVED.

8. THE NATO SECRETARY GENERAL IS CONCERNED AT THE TREND OF DEVELOPMENTS. HE DETECTS A MOOD DEVELOPING IN PUBLIC OPINION PORTRAYING NATO AS DEALING INCONCLUSIVELY WITH THE CRISIS IN BOSNIA. HE HAS STRESSED PUBLICLY THAT NATO IS DOING EVERYTHING IT HAS BEEN ASKED TO DO OVER BOSNIA, AND CANNOT BE BLAMED FOR NOT DOING WHAT IT HAS NOT BEEN ASKED TO DO. BUT ALTHOUGH THIS IS RIGHT, THE MEDIA AND TO SOME EXTENT PUBLIC OPINION ARE BEGINNING TO VIEW BOSNIA AS A TEST CASE FOR THE ALLIANCE THAT COULD HAVE

LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES FOR NATO CREDIBILITY. THE CONCLUSION OF A RECENT DISCUSSION WITH MY COLLEAGUES AND WOERNER WAS THAT ATHENS MIGHT HAVE TO BE MAINLY A DAMAGE LIMITATION EXERCISE, AND THAT YUGOSLAVIA SHOULD IF POSSIBLE BE BALANCED IN DISCUSSION AND IN THE COMMUNIQUE BY OTHER MAJOR THEMES IN THE NATO AGENDA. BUT THIS WILL BE EASIER SAID THAN DONE. IN PRACTICE, YUGOSLAVIA WILL OVERSHADOW EVERYTHING, HOWEVER MUCH WE STRIVE TO BALANCE IT WITH REFERENCES TO OTHER MATTERS OF CONCERN TO THE ALLIANCE.

9. THE IMMEDIATE PRESCRIPTIONS ARE CLEAR: MAINTAIN CURRENT NATO OPERATIONS, ENSURING EFFECTIVE SANCTIONS AND NFZ ENFORCEMENT: ENSURE THAT THE ALLIANCE IS IN A POSITION TO TAKE ON CO-ORDINATION OF ANY AIR SUPPORT/PROTECTION ROLE ARISING FROM THE NEW UNSCR ON SAFE AREAS: KEEP LINES OPEN TO THE UN FOR FUTURE NATO CONTRIBUTIONS: CONTINUE PLANNING FOR FULL-SCALE IMPLEMENTATION OF A PLAN BASED ON VANCE/OWEN: AND MEANWHILE (A FIRM VIEW OF WOERNER'S) KEEP THE LEVEL OF RHETORIC DOWN.

10. THIS WILL BE CHRISTOPHER'S FIRST NAC. HE WILL NEED TO OFFER A MORE COHERENT VISION AND A MORE POSITIVE PRESENTATION THAT ASPIN MANAGED AT THE DPC. THE PERCEIVED DISLOCATION OVER YUGOSLAVIA HAS PROVOKED NEW QUESTIONING OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S COMMITMENT TO THE ALLIANCE (ECHOED IN CHRISTOPHER'S REMARK TO YOU LAST WEEK). THE GERMANS (KINKEL IS NOT EXPECTED TO ATTEND) MAY BE DIFFICULT TO HANDLE: THEY HAVE BEEN CRITICAL OF THE JAP: AND FEEL THAT CRISIS MANAGEMENT TASKS ARE UNDERMINING THE PRIME SECURITY ROLE OF THE ALLIANCE (A THEME ON WHICH THEY ARE NOT ALONE AND WHICH WILL NO DOUBT RECUR IN DISCUSSION).

NACC

11. A GOOD TURN-OUT LOOKS LIKELY, ALTHOUGH THERE WILL BE NO DISGUISSING THE STEADY EMERGENCE OF A TWO-TIER PROCESS, WITH THE CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEANS, THE BALTS, RUSSIA AND UKRAINE BEING ENGAGED FULL TIME, AND THE REST ONLY ON SET-PIECE OCCASIONS. THE US ARE PEDDLING SOME POSSIBLY UNCOMFORTABLE IDEAS TO PEP UP NACC WHICH RISK INVOLVING MAJOR NEW EXPENDITURE AND A MOVE TO SOME QUASI-OPERATIONAL ROLE.

12. THE MAIN BUSINESS WILL BE TO BLESS THE WORK OF THE AD HOC GROUP ON CO-OPERATION IN PEACEKEEPING. THE GROUP'S LENGTHY REPORT (WHICH HAS A FAIR CHANCE OF BEING PUT TO MINISTERS AS AN AGREED TEXT) HAS SOME USEFUL WORK ON POLITICAL ISSUES - BINDING, FOR INSTANCE RUSSIA AND UKRAINE INTO COMMON DEFINITIONS - AND ON

PRACTICAL FOLLOW-UP STEPS (TRAINING AND PREPARATIONS FOR PEACEKEEPING, TO IMPROVE THE ABILITY OF NACC COUNTRIES TO WORK TOGETHER IN FUTURE).

13. THE BALLAST FOR THE DISCUSSION AND FOR THE ROUTINE NACC STATEMENT IS PROVIDED BY THE FULL RANGE OF EUROPEAN REGIONAL ISSUES. ON YUGOSLAVIA, WE CAN TAKE THIS FURTHER OPPORTUNITY TO ADDRESS THE SORT OF CONCERNS WHICH WERE PUT TO YOU RECENTLY IN HUNGARY. ON THE REST (BALKANS, NAGORNO-KARABAKH) THERE WILL BE NO BREAKTHROUGHS, BUT A USEFUL LOW-KEY CONSENSUS-BUILDING APPROACH. THE MAIN WAVES MAY BE CAUSED BY UKRAINE, WHO MAY SEEK TO ASSERT HERSELF ON NUCLEAR MATTERS AND HER BILATERAL DISPUTES WITH RUSSIA.

14. I HAVE COMMENTED SEPARATELY (MY TELNO 296) ON THE NEED FOR CAUTION IN HANDLING THE RUSSIAN REQUEST FOR A 5 PLUS 3 MEETING ON YUGOSLAVIA IN THE MARGINS.

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TELNO 244

OF 071500Z JUNE 91

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NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING, COPENHAGEN: DISCUSSION 7 JUNE

MY TWO IPTS: YUGOSLAVIA

SUMMARY

1. DE MICHELIS BRIEFS ON YUGOSLAVIA.

DETAIL

2. DE MICHELIS (ITALY) SAID THAT YUGOSLAVIA COULD BECOME THE FIRST NEGATIVE EXAMPLE OF DEVELOPMENTS IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE. THE TWELVE HAD BEEN VERY ACTIVE IN DELIVERING THE MESSAGE TO ALL PLAYERS THAT THERE MUST BE A UNITED AND DEMOCRATIC YUGOSLAVIA. THIS MUST MEAN A VERY DIFFERENT YUGOSLAVIA FROM THE INSTITUTIONAL POINT OF VIEW: IT MUST BECOME MORE FEDERAL. THE PROBLEMS WERE:

ETHNIC STRIFE: POLITICAL DIFFERENCES (THE NORTHERN REPUBLICS WERE MORE DEMOCRATIC THAN SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO): AND SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN REPUBLICS. ANY UNILATERAL MOVE BY ANY SIDE MUST BE AVOIDED, OTHERWISE THERE WOULD BE A STRONG DANGER OF CIVIL WAR AND INTERNAL BORDERS WOULD BE PUT IN QUESTION. THE UNILATERAL CESSATION OF SLOVENIA COULD TRIGGER SIMILAR DEVELOPMENTS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND PERHAPS THE USSR. HUNGARY AND AUSTRIA MUST ALSO BE HELPFUL. JUNE WOULD BE A CRITICAL MONTH.

3. DE MICHELIS SAID THAT THE LATEST NEWS WAS ENCOURAGING. AT THE MEETING OF THE SIX PRESIDENTS TWO DAYS AGO THERE HAD BEEN A HELPFUL BOSNIAN/MACEDONIAN PROPOSAL ON A QUOTE CLOSE FEDERATION UNQUOTE AND THE PRESIDENTS HAD AGREED ON AN APPEAL ABOUT THE FEDERAL PRESIDENCY. THE SANTER/DELORS MISSION HAD UNDERLINED EC READINESS TO SUPPORT A UNITED AND DEMOCRATIC YUGOSLAVIA FROM THE ECONOMIC POINT OF VIEW. IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT ALL CSCE COUNTRIES SHOULD TRY TO PERSUADE THE SERBS TO CHANGE THEIR POSITION AND TO DISSUADE THE SLOVENES FROM UNILATERAL SECESSION. THE BERLIN CSCE MEETING WOULD BE VERY IMPORTANT IN TERMS OF DELIVERING A CLEAR MESSAGE TO YUGOSLAVIA. BUT

HE WAS DOUBTFUL ABOUT INVOKING A CSCE MECHANISM: THIS WOULD NEED YUGOSLAV AGREEMENT, AND THE PROCEDURE MIGHT BE TOO SLOW FOR A RAPIDLY EVOLVING SITUATION.

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FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

ADVANCE COPY

SECRETARY OF STATES MEETING WITH NATO SECRETARY GENERAL, COPENHAGEN, 5 JUNE

SUMMARY

1. IN A 30 MINUTE MEETING WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE ON 5 JUNE, THE NATO SECRETARY GENERAL SPOKE MOSTLY ABOUT THE APPROACH OF THE FRENCH TO EUROPEAN DEFENCE.

DETAIL

2. WOERNER SAID THAT IN PARIS ON 4 JUNE HE HAD ASKED DUMAS WHAT THE FRENCH WANTED OF NATO. DUMAS HAD BEEN UNABLE, OR UNWILLING TO SAY. WOERNER HAD TOLD DUMAS THAT THE FRENCH HAD BEEN KEPT FULLY IN THE PICTURE BEFORE THE DPC MINISTERIAL. DUMAS HAD ACKNOWLEDGED THIS, AND ACCEPTED THAT THE FRENCH HAD EVEN PUT FORWARD THEIR FORCE ACTION RAPIDE AS A MODEL FOR A FORCE SUCH AS THE RRC.

3. WOERNER SAID THAT DUMAS HAD MAINTAINED THAT NATO HAD FIRST TO DECIDE THE POLITICAL PRINCIPLES WHICH SHOULD GUIDE FUTURE POLICY, THEN DECIDE THE STRATEGY AND ONLY THEN, AS A THIRD STEP, LOOK AT THE FORCE POSTURE. WOERNER HAD EXPLAINED THAT POLITICAL PRINCIPLES HAD BEEN SET OUT BY THE NATO SUMMIT IN LONDON IN 1990, THAT THE STRATEGY WAS CLEAR AND THAT A NUMBER OF NATO COUNTRIES, INCLUDING BRITAIN, NEEDED URGENTLY TO WORK OUT THEIR FORCE POSTURE AND BUDGETS FOR THEIR ARMED FORCES. THE ALLIANCE COULD NOT WAIT FOR THE FRENCH TO COME UP WITH HE WAS NOT SURE WHAT.

4. WOERNER THOUGHT THERE WAS A LACK OF COMMUNICATION BETWEEN MITTERRAND AND OTHERS IN THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT AND THAT MITTERRAND (BUT NOT OTHERS) MIGHT HAVE BEEN TAKEN BY SUPRISE BY THE DPC MINISTERIAL DECISION - NAD HIS IRRITATION INCREASED BY HIS WISH TO FOCUS INTEREST ON THE FRENCH DISARMAMENT INITIATIVE. WOERNER HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT THE FRENCH AND THE AMERICANS WANTED TO REDUCE THE

HEAT, ALTHOUGH THE DIFFERENCES REMAINED. WOERNER THOUGHT THAT THE FRENCH HAD DEFINITELY DECIDED NOT TO JOIN THE INTEGRATED STRUCTURE AND NOT EVEN TO COME MUCH CLOSER TO THE MILITARY ACTIVITY OF THE ALLIANCE THAN HITHERTO. BUT WOERNER'S INTEREST LAY IN MINIMISING THE GAP BETWEEN THE FRENCH AND THE OTHER ALLIES.

5. THE SECRETARY OF STATE HOPED WOERNER WAS RIGHT THAT THE FRENCH WISHED TO TAKE THE HEAT OUT OF THE ISSUE. HE HAD JUST BEEN IN PARIS ADDRESSING THE WEU WHERE HE HAD BEEN HARASSED BY FRENCHMEN, AMONG OTHERS, WITH ACCUSATIONS THAT THE AMERICANS WERE TRYING TO UNDERCUT THE IGC ON POLITICAL UNION AND THAT THERE WAS AN ANGLO-SAXON PLOT TO DOMINATE THE ALLIANCE.

6. WOERNER SAID HE HAD EMPHASISED TO THE FRENCH THAT THE RRC DID NOT PRECLUDE OTHER INITIATIVES, INCLUDING THE EUROPEAN REACTION FORCE (ERF). IF THE WEU REALLY WANTED TO ESTABLISH AN ERF, THAT WOULD BE FINE BY WOERNER ALTHOUGH HE DID NOT/NOT BELIEVE THAT THE FRENCH NOW REALLY WANTED A EUROPEAN FORCE. THEY SEEMED TO WANT NO MORE THAT ARRANGEMENTS UNDER WHICH FORCES COULD WORK TOGETHER UNDER A EUROPEAN COMMAND IN CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES. IF THIS WAS THEIR INTENTION, THEY SHOULD SAY SO.

7. WOERNER SAID HE HAD ADOPTED SIR MICHAEL ALEXANDER'S PAPER AS HIS OWN. IN PART TO TEST THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT'S REAL INTENTIONS.

8. WOERNER ASKED ABOUT DISCUSSION AMONG EC FOREIGN MINISTERS AT DRESDEN ON 2/3 JUNE. THE SECRETARY OF STATE EXPLAINED THE DEBATE BETWEEN THE PROPONENTS OF THE TREE AND THE TEMPLE MODELS. HE SAID THERE WAS A FEELING AT THE END OF THE DISCUSSION THAT IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO FIND LANGUAGE TO COVER BOTH SETS OF INTERESTS (ALTHOUGH THE LANGUAGE MIGHT NOT GO FAR ENOUGH FOR DELORS HIMSELF). THE DRESDEN DISCUSSION HAD NOT GOT INTO DEFENCE QUESTIONS.

9. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT FACED THE TACTICAL QUESTION OF WHETHER TO CONTINUE THE DEBATE ABOUT "COMMON EUROPEAN DEFENCE POLICY" THROUGH THE AUTUMN, AS THE NATO SUMMIT AND THE MAASTRICHT EUROPEAN COUNCIL APPROACHED. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN ERF WAS NOT AS CRUCIAL A QUESTION AS THE NEED TO RECONCILE WHAT THE TWELVE SAID ABOUT A EUROPEAN DEFENCE IDENTITY AND THE MAINTENANCE OF THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE ALLIANCE. WOERNER THOUGHT IF IMPORTANT TO SOLVE THE QUESTION WITH THE FRENCH AHEAD OF THE NATO SUMMIT.

10. THE SECRETARY OF STATE ASKED ABOUT THE COST OF AN INDEPENDENT

*winning
(free with branches)*

*Separate (temple w.
separate pillars)*

ERF. MAKING IT CLEAR THAT ANY FIGURE WOULD ONLY BE A GUESS, WOERNER SAID THAT THE MAXIMALIST POSITION AS SUGGESTED BY THE FRENCH MIGHT COST 30-40 BILLION DOLLARS, INCLUDING AIR LIFT AND SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS. (COMMENT : THE SECRETARY OF STATE WANTS TO BE ABLE TO QUOTE PUBLICLY A FIGURE FOR THE POSSIBLE COST OF A FULLY INDEPENDENT ERF AND WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR EARLY ADVICE ON THE BEST FIGURE TO USE. HE IS TEMPTED TO USE THIS FIGURE FROM THE SECRETARY GENERAL.)

11. THE SECRETARY OF STATE ASKED WOERNER IF THE PHRASE 'A COMMON EUROPEAN DEFENCE POLICY' ALARMED HIM, AS SOMETHING WHICH MIGHT BE QUOTED LATER AS EVIDENCE OF AGREEMENT THAT THERE SHOULD BE A EUROPEAN DEFENCE POLICY DIFFERENT AND SEPARATE FROM THE ALLIANCE. WOERNER SAID HE WAS WORRIED ABOUT THE AMBIGUITY OF THE PHRASE BUT NOT BY THE PROSPECT OF A COMMON EUROPEAN DEFENCE POLICY AS SUCH, IF A EUROPEAN UNION DEVELOPED, THIS WOULD NECESSARILY INCLUDE A COMMON DEFENCE POLICY. BUT THERE COULD BE NO QUESTION OF DEFENCE FORCES AND STRUCTURES IN EUROPE INDEPENDENT OF THE ALLIANCE AS LONG AS THE AMERICANS REMAINED IN EUROPE. ON THE OTHER HAND, HE DID NOT UNDERSTAND WHY THE AMERICANS REFUSED TO COUNTENANCE POSSIBLE ACTION BY AN ERF IN EASTERN AND CENTRAL EUROPE AFTER CONSULTATION BY THE EUROPEANS WITHIN THE ALLIANCE.

HANDLING OF THE NAC MINISTERIAL

12. WOERNER SAID THE ALLIANCE HAD AGREED MORE THAN HE HAD EXPECTED AND THAT ON 6 JUNE, THE FIRST DAY OF THE MINISTERIAL MEETING, MINISTERS SHOULD BE ABLE TO AGREE THE HLTF STATEMENT ON THE BAKER/BESSMERTNYKH AGREEMENT ON CFE, AND ON PAPER RELATIONS WITH CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE. BOTH PAPERS COULD BE RELEASED TO THE PRESS.

POSSIBLE VISIT BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO LONDON

13. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID HE HOPED THAT WOERNER WOULD BE ABLE TO VISIT LONDON IN OCTOBER.

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NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING, COPENHAGEN: DISCUSSIONS, 6 JUNE

SUMMARY

1. MOST BUSINESS SUCCESSFULLY ACHIEVED ON FIRST DAY. STATEMENTS ON RELATIONS WITH EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AND ON CFE ISSUED. COMMUNIQUE INCLUDING SOME USEFUL LANGUAGE ON EUROPEAN SECURITY IDENTITY AGREED FOR ISSUE, TOGETHER WITH CORE FUNCTIONS PAPER.
2. CONSOLIDATION OF A EUROPE WHOLE AND FREE, AND SUPPORT THROUGH LIASON FOR POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REFORM IN THE FORMER WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES SEEN AS MAIN TASK FOR NATO IN THE PHASE AHEAD. RECOGNITION BY MOST OF NEW RISKS, AS WELL AS THE NEED FOR NATO TO COUNTER-BALANCE SOVIET MILITARY POWER.
3. ADAPTATION OF ALLIANCE SEEN AS ON COURSE FOR COMPLETION BY A NOVEMBER SUMMIT. OPTIMISM ABOUT ABILITY TO RECONCILE AIMS OF POLITICAL UNION TO ACQUIRE A DEFENCE DIMENSION WITH THE RETENTION OF A STRONG AND INDIVISIBLE TRANSATLANTIC ALLIANCE, WHILE RECOGNISING THAT MORE DETAILED WORK WILL BE REQUIRED. FRANCE GOES ALONG WHILE AVOIDING LANGUAGE INCONSISTENT WITH ITS POSITION: WARNS THAT NATO SHOULD NOT TRY TO EXTEND ITS MILITARY ROLE, ENCROACH ON CSCE OR CURTAIL THE ACTIVITIES OF THE EUROPEANS. DE MICHELIS SAYS A COMMON DEFENCE POLICY IS INEVITABLE, BUT IT COULD BE MADE EXPLICIT THAT THE TRANSATLANTIC DIMENSION IS A KEY PART OF IT.

DETAIL

PUBLIC SESSION

4. ELLEMANN-JENSEN, OPENING AS HOST, SAID THAT NATO'S TASK WAS TO HELP CREATE A NEW STABILITY THROUGH COOPERATION AND INTER-ACTION. THE ALLIANCE SHOULD FULLY EXPLOIT THE POTENTIAL OF CSCE AND STRENGTHEN THE CONFLICT PREVENTION CENTRE. NATO AS THE ONLY TRANSATLANTIC STRUCTURE WAS INDISPENSABLE TO ANY FUTURE EUROPEAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE. HE IMPLIED SUPPORT FOR WEU AS A BRIDGE BETWEEN THE

TWELVE AND THE ALLIANCE. PINHEIRO (PRESIDENT D'HONNEUR) STRESSED THE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES (CEES). NATO DID NOT INTEND TO EXPLOIT OR THREATEN ANYONE. ITS TASK WAS TO HELP REFORM AND PROJECT STABILITY OUTSIDE NATO'S OWN BORDERS. WORK ON THE EUROPEAN PILLAR SHOULD LEAD TO AN EQUITABLE AND BALANCED PARTNERSHIP WITH THE NORTH AMERICAN ALLIES. WOERNER (SECRETARY GENERAL) SAID THE ALLIANCE SHOULD BE THE CATALYST IN ACHIEVING A EUROPE WHOLE AND FREE. IT WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO THIS BY REVISING ITS MILITARY STRATEGY: DEVELOPING THE ROLE OF THE CSCE: DEVELOPING DIRECT LINKS WITH THE EASTERN EUROPEANS THROUGH LIASON: ACTIVE PURSUIT OF THE ARMS CONTROL AGENDA BEYOND CFE: AND STRENGTHENING THE EUROPEAN PILLAR IN THE ALLIANCE.

RESTRICTED SESSION

5. THE RESTRICTED SESSION BEGAN WITH THE ADOPTION OF STATEMENTS (TEXTS IN MY TELS NOS 230 AND 219) WELCOMING THE RESOLUTION OF CFE PROBLEMS AND ON RELATIONS WITH THE CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES (THE LATTER AFTER INSERTION OF A PHRASE BY GENSCHER ALLUDING TO THE ECONOMIC, POLITICAL, SOCIAL AND ECOLOGICAL DIMENSIONS OF SECURITY IN ADDITION TO THE INDISPENSABLE MILITARY FUNCTION.)

6. BAKER OPENED SAYING THAT NATO HAD HELPED BUILD THE WESTERN POLITICAL UNITY WHICH CONTRIBUTED TO THE VICTORY AGAINST SADDAM HUSSEIN. ITS INVESTMENT IN COMMON TRAINING, LOGISTICS AND INFRASTRUCTURE HAD BEEN REFLECTED IN COOPERATION BETWEEN THE ALLIED FORCES. THE GULF CRISIS HAD SHOWN A NEW REALITY THAT NON-TRADITIONAL CHALLENGES COULD THREATEN THE VITAL INTERESTS OF ALLIES.

7. HE THEN SET OUT US PRESCRIPTIONS FOR ALLIANCE REFORM, DIPLOMATIC LIAISON WITH EASTERN EUROPE, CSCE AND SUPPORT FOR REFORMS IN THE SOVIET UNION. PROGRESS IN THE STRATEGY REVIEW WAS ENCOURAGING. FINAL RESULTS SHOULD BE POSSIBLE BY NOVEMBER. DECISIONS IN THE DPC HAD REFLECTED THE LONDON SUMMIT COMMITMENT TO MAKE NATO'S FORCES MORE FLEXIBLE, MORE MOBILE AND MORE MULTI-NATIONAL. THE US STOOD READY 'TO SUPPORT THE ARRANGEMENTS WHICH THE EUROPEAN ALLIES DECIDED WERE NECESSARY TO EXPRESS A NEW EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE IDENTITY'. EUROPEAN ALLIES SHOULD 'OPEN THEIR COMMON DEFENCE POLICY DELIBERATIONS TO ALL EUROPEAN MEMBERS OF NATO'. (COMMENT: A SMALL SHIFT FROM EXPRESS SUPPORT FOR A COMMON DEFENCE POLICY AS SUCH, THOUGH ZOELICK COMMENTED THAT PREVIOUS FORMULAE WOULD CONTINUE TO APPEAR IN PUBLIC STATEMENTS.) BOTH NATO AND IGC DEBATES SHOULD RECOGNISE THE PRINCIPLE THAT EUROPE'S SECURITY IS INDIVISIBLE FROM THAT OF NORTH AMERICA, THE US AND CANADA. THE INTEGRATED MILITARY

STRUCTURE SHOULD BE MAINTAINED AND ANY NEW EUROPEAN STRUCTURE MUST REINFORCE, NOT COMPETE WITH, THOSE OF THE ALLIANCE.

8. BAKER HAD FIVE GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR DIPLOMATIC LIASON WITH THE CEES. IT SHOULD IMPROVE UNDERSTANDING OF NATO'S POLICIES, OPERATIONS AND VALUES, AND OF THE SECURITY CONCERNS AND POLICIES OF THE OTHER STATES INVOLVED. IT SHOULD BE ESPECIALLY ACTIVE IN AREAS WHERE NATO AND ITS MEMBERS HAD SPECIAL EXPERTISE. IT SHOULD HAVE THE FLEXIBILITY TO RESPOND TO EVOLVING NEEDS. IT SHOULD COMPLEMENT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE EC, CSCE, THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE, OECD AND WEU. IN PARTICULAR NATO COULD HELP PRESIDENT GORBACHEV AND THE COURSE OF REFORM IN THE SOVIET UNION BY REACHING OUT TO SOME OF THE TRADITIONALISTS.

9. BAKER SAID RESPECT FOR FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS MUST CONTINUE TO GUIDE NATO'S APPROACH TO THE CSCE. THE CONFLICT PREVENTION CENTRE SHOULD BE ENHANCED BY ADDING TO ITS FUNCTIONS AN ACCELERATED CALENDAR OF MEETINGS FOR THE CPC CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE: AGREEMENT TO A FURTHER MILITARY DOCTRINE SEMINAR, AND POSSIBLE USE OF THE CENTRE'S COMMUNICATIONS AS A HOT LINE FOR EMERGENCY CONTACT. THUS, OVER TIME, CPC WOULD BECOME A MORE SIGNIFICANT INSTRUMENT IN ADDRESSING THE SECURITY NEEDS OF CSCE MEMBERS. UNDER THE POLITICAL CONSULTATION PROCESS, THE US SUPPORTED AN EMERGENCY MECHANISM. A FACT FINDING CAPABILITY TO STRENGTHEN ITS ROLE IN THE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED. THE BERLIN MINISTERIAL SHOULD REACH AGREEMENT ON PROCEDURES FOR POST-HELSINKI SECURITY NEGOTIATIONS. WE SHOULD TAKE POSITIONS, AS AN ALLIANCE, ON THE KEY PROCEDURAL ISSUES, AND ON OBJECTIVES FOR NEW NEGOTIATIONS. A NEW APPROACH TO CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL MIGHT FOCUS ON:

EXPANDING REGULAR DIALOGUES ON MILITARY FORCES, FORCE BALANCE, DEFENCE BUDGETS, AND THE MILITARY DOCTRINE: DEVELOPING MECHANISMS FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION AND RESOLUTION, INCLUDING MEASURES AGREED BY CONSENSUS OF ALL CSCE PARTICIPANTS BUT WHICH MAY NOT APPLY TO ALL CSCE MEMBERS: MEASURES TO ENHANCE MILITARY PREDICTABILITY WITH FOCUS ON REGENERATION OF FORCES: BROADENING PARTICIPATION IN NON-PROLIFERATION REGIMES AND FACILITATING THE CONVERSION OF DEFENCE INDUSTRIES.

10. BAKER SAID THE SOVIET COMMUNIST PARTY HAD LOST ITS AUTHORITY WITHOUT GORBACHEV HAVING YET SUCCEEDED IN ESTABLISHING A NEW LEGITIMACY. BAKER SAW SIGNS OF HOPE IN A NEW PLURALISM DEVELOPING AT THE GRASS ROOTS, AND IN THE ONE PLUS NINE AGREEMENT WHICH, IF FOLLOWED THROUGH, COULD BEGIN TO ESTABLISH A NEW POLITICAL ORDER. GORBACHEV NOW SEEMED COMMITTED TO MORE THOROUGH GOING REFORMS. IF THE RUSSIANS EMBRACED A REAL MARKET ECONOMY, THE RULE OF LAW WITH FREE ELECTIONS,

MOVED TO ACCOMMODATE BALTIC ASPIRATIONS, PEACEFULLY CONTINUED THEIR NEW FOREIGN POLICY AND ACCELERATED THEIR EFFORTS TO REDUCE THE WEIGHT OF DEFENCE, NATO SHOULD RESPOND WITH SUPPORT. THE US WOULD CO-ORDINATE WITH ITS ALLIES A STEP BY STEP APPROACH WHICH WOULD TAKE A TIME TO WORK, BUT NATO HAD A LARGE STAKE AND KEY ROLE TO PLAY IN SUPPORTING PERESTROIKA.

11. POOS (LUXEMBOURG) SAID INSTABILITY IN THE GULF AND EASTERN EUROPE SHOWED THE VALUE OF THE ALLIANCE AS A FORUM FOR CONSULTATION ON ALL SECURITY ISSUES. HIS MAIN POINT WAS TO REPORT FROM HIS RECENT MEETING WITH DUMAS, WOERNER AND VAN EEKELEN THAT IT HAD BEEN AGREED THAT THE FUTURE EUROPEAN POLITICAL UNION WOULD IN NO WAY PREJUDICE THE ALLIANCE: THAT THERE COULD BE NO TRUE EUROPEAN UNION UNLESS THE TWELVE PROGRESSIVELY POOLED THEIR FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICIES: THAT CONVERSLY THE TWELVE HAD NEVER IMAGINED THAT ALLIANCE COULD BE A BRAKE ON THE EMERGENCE OF A EUROPEAN POLITICAL UNION. THE WORK OF THE TWELVE COULD NOT BE OTHER THAN TRANSPARENT. THE RENEWAL OF THE ALLIANCE AND THE WORK ON EUROPEAN INTEGRATION WERE COMPLEMENTARY: NEITHER COULD SUCCEED WITHOUT THE OTHER. THE LUXEMBOURG EUROPEAN COUNCIL SHOULD MAKE EUROPEAN INTENTIONS CLEAR, AND THE NATO SUMMIT SHOULD TAKE THOSE CONCLUSIONS INTO ACCOUNT, THE 1990 TRANSATLANTIC DECLARATION HAD BEEN AN UNQUALIFIED SUCCESS. THE YUGOSLAV CRISIS AND THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS HAD SHOWN THAT THE INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY WAS URGENTLY DESIRED BY ALL ALLIANCE PARTNERS.

12. VAN DEN BROEK (NETHERLANDS) EXPRESSED SATISFACTION WITH THE STATEMENT ON CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE, WHICH SHOWED THAT THE FREEDOM OF THE CEE COUNTRIES WAS OF PRIME CONCERN TO THE ALLIANCE BUT THAT WE DID NOT WISH TO UPSET OR MARGINALISE THE SOVIET UNION. BILATERAL CONTACTS WERE CONTRIBUTING TO STABILITY, BUT WE SHOULD KEEP A CLOSE EYE ON 'THE WRONG CLAUSES' IN BILATERAL TREATIES. HE COMMENDED THE PROGRESS MADE IN THE STRATEGY REVIEW AND THE WORK ON THE NEW FORCE STRUCTURES, WHICH WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO A MEANINGFUL NATO SUMMIT. PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES' AGREEMENT ON CORE FUNCTIONS WAS FURTHER SIGNIFICANT ADVANCE, IN RELATION BOTH TO THE ALLIANCE AND TO EUROPEAN CO-OPERATION. THE EUROPEAN DEFENCE IDENTITY SHOULD BE REFLECTED IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF A EUROPEAN PILLAR WITHIN THE ALLIANCE. THE WEU SHOULD BE THE HARD CORE OF THAT PILLAR. IN IT EUROPEANS WOULD DISCUSS ITEMS ON THE ALLIANCE AGENDA, BUT WITH FINAL DECISIONS ONLY BEING REACHED IN ALLIANCE FORA. CONSENSUS ON THIS WAS GROWING. IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO DISCRIMINATION BETWEEN EUROPEAN ALLIES (MEMBERS AND NON-MEMBERS OF WEU). HE DREW ATTENTION TO THE DUTCH PROPOSALS ON A WEU REACTION FORCE. WEU

OPERATIONS OUT OF AREA SHOULD BE UNDERTAKEN AFTER CONSULTATION IN THE ALLIANCE. OPERATIONS IN THE GREY AREA (CEE) COULD BE POSSIBLE ONLY IN AGREEMENT WITH ALL ALLIES.

13. GENSCHER (GERMANY) SAID THE FACT THAT A UNITED GERMANY WAS PARTICIPATING IN THE NAC AS A FULLY SOVEREIGN MEMBER WAS AN ASSURANCE THAT GERMANY'S DESTINY WAS EMBEDDED IN THAT OF EUROPE. THE EXISTENCE OF THE ALLIANCE HAD PLAYED A VERY IMPORTANT ROLE IN THE ACHIEVEMENT OF GERMAN UNITY. THE ALLIANCE AS WIDELY CONSIDERED TO BE A FORCE FOR STABILITY, NOT A THREAT. IT WOULD HAVE TO CONTINUE TO ADAPT. HE WELCOMED PROGRESS INLCFE, AND LOOKED TO PROGRESS IN START. THE ELIMINATION OF SNF SHOULD REMOVE WHAT THE CEE COUNTRIES CONSIDERED A THREAT TO THEIR SECURITY FROM THE SOVIET SIDE. DIPLOMATIC LIAISON GAVE THE NEW CEE DEMOCRACIES THE CHANCE TO ENTER INTO A CLOSER RELATIONSHIP WITH THE ALLIANCE, AND THE ALLIANCE THE CHANCE TO REMOVE HOSTILE PRECONCEPTIONS ABOUT NATO IN PARTS OF THE SOVIET STRUCTURES WHICH HAD NOT YET REALISED THE OPPORTUNITIES FOR CO-OPERATION. THE CSCE HAD A VITAL ROLE TO PLAY AS NATIONALITY QUESTIONS AROSE IN THE NEWLY LIBERATED CEES AND IN THE SOVIET UNION: THESE PROBLEMS POINTED TO THE NEED FOR FEDERAL AND CONFEDERAL STRUCTURES THERE. SOVIET GROUPS WORKING FOR REFORM NEEDED SUPPORT, NOT ONLY OF A FINANCIAL NATURE, BUT ALSO IN THE FIELD OF EXPERTISE.

14. GENSCHER SAID HE WAS GRATEFUL TO BAKER FOR HIS STATEMENT ON THE EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE IDENTITY. EVERY STEP BY THE EC HAD ONLY SERVED TO STRENGTHEN THE TRANSATLANTIC ALLIANCE.

15. FOR THE UK, YOU EXPRESSED SATISFACTION WITH THE NAC STATEMENTS ON CEE AND CFE. YOU AGED WITH GENSCHER THAT THE BERLIN MEETING WOULD BE REGARDED BY THE CEES AS A FIRST OF WHAT OUR ASSURANCES WOULD MEAN IN PRACTICE. THE NEW PROCEDURES FOR POLITICAL CONSULTATION WOULD STRENGTHEN THE ROLE OF THE CSCE IN EUROPE. AGREEMENT ON EMERGENCY PROCEDURES WAS WITHIN SIGHT, AND YOU HOPED THAT THE ONE REMAINING PROBLEM WOULD SOON BE OVERCOME.

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PART ONE OF TWO PARTS

OUR TELNO 001 SAVING: NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL, 25 OCTOBER -
BRAINSTORMING ON FUTURE OF THE ALLIANCE

SUMMARY

1. SPAIN SUGGESTS THAT NATO SHOULD IN EFFECT MOVE ASIDE AND NOT GET IN THE WAY OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF A EUROPEAN DEFENCE IDENTITY BASED ON THE EC. U S EXPRESSES SUPPORT FOR EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND EUROPEANISATION OF THE ALLIANCE, BUT STRESSES THAT THE EUROPEAN PILLAR SHOULD BE DEVELOPED WITHIN THE ATLANTIC PERSPECTIVE, TO THE BENEFIT OF THE ALLIANCE, WITHOUT MARGINALISING NON-EC ALLIES. BELGIUM SUGGESTS DEVELOPING SPECIFICALLY EUROPEAN EFFORTS WITHIN THE ALLIANCE. UK EMPHASISES NEED TO AVOID GAP BETWEEN ALLIANCE AND EC: EUROPEAN DEFENCE IDENTITY SHOULD BE DEVELOPED TO THE BENEFIT OF THE ALLIANCE, AND NOT OUTSIDE IT: MANY QUESTIONS RAISED BY DEBATE ON WEU, BUT WEU BOUND TO WORK IN CLOSE CO-OPERATION WITH NATO. FRANCE CLAIMS WE ARE ALL MISSING THE POINT: WHETHER THE ALLIANCE WOULD PERMIT A EUROPEAN DEFENCE IDENTITY TO DEVELOP. WHY OPERATE AT SIXTEEN WHEN LESS COULD DO THE JOB?

DETAIL

2. OPENING THE THIRD BRAINSTORMING SESSION (FOCUSSING ON TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS: NATO - EC/WEU) CAJAL (SPAIN SAID THE ESSENTIAL NATURE OF THE TRANSATLANTIC ROLE IN THE ALLIANCE'S HANDLING OF DEFENCE MATTERS WAS AS STRONG AS EVER. BUT THE EC WAS AN INCREASING FACTOR. IF EUROPEAN POLITICAL INTEGRATION DEVELOPED FURTHER, WITH EACH MEMBER LOSING NATIONAL COMPETENCES TO THE EC AND TO OTHER INSTITUTIONS, THERE WOULD BE A GROWING CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THE TWELVE ON ALL MATTERS. NATO WOULD NOT BE THE APPROPRIATE FORUM FOR DEALING WITH MATTERS INCREASINGLY UNDER EC PURVIEW. IT WAS IN THE INTEREST OF ALLIES TO ENSURE THE TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP WAS HANDLED HARMONIOUSLY. BUT IN PRACTICE THE ALLIANCE WOULD HAVE TO ACT INCREASINGLY IN FUTURE IN LINE WITH THE EC. THUS NATO DISCUSSIONS SHOULD BE LIMITED INCREASINGLY TO DEFENCE AND SECURITY MATTERS, WHILE A EUROPEAN IDENTITY WOULD ALSO BE DEVELOPING IN THE MILITARY FIELD. WEU HAD BEEN A USEFUL IF INSUFFICIENT INSTRUMENT FOR

CO-ORDINATING MEMBERS' ACTIVITIES IN THE GULF, OUTSIDE THE WASHINGTON TREATY FRAMEWORK.

3. TAFT (U S) SAID CAJAL'S REMARKS LED HIM TO SUGGEST THAT THE TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP MUST BE VIEWED IN AN ATLANTIC PERSPECTIVE IF THE ALLIANCE WERE NOT TO FALL APART. WE WOULD RUN INTO SERIOUS DIFFICULTIES IF THERE WERE DISTINCT EUROPEAN AND NORTH AMERICAN VIEWS ON THE ISSUE. THE ALLIANCE REMAINED A CORE ELEMENT OF U S NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, THOUGH IT HAD NOT ALWAYS BEEN SO HISTORICALLY. THERE WAS NOW A JOINT RECOGNITION THAT NORTH AMERICAN AND EUROPEAN SECURITY INTERESTS OVERLAPPED, UNDERPINNED BY SHARED DEMOCRATIC VALUES. ANY FALSE DIVISION BETWEEN U S AND EUROPEAN INTERESTS WOULD BE DAMAGING. THE U S WAS FIRMLY IN FAVOUR OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION IN POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FIELDS (THROUGH THE EC), AND IN SECURITY MATTERS. THE ALLIANCE'S COLLECTIVE SECURITY EFFORTS WERE FUNDAMENTAL TO EUROPEAN INTEGRATION IN THE FOREIGN POLICY AND SECURITY FIELDS. BUT WHAT WOULD BE THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE ALLIANCE AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION? THE STRATEGY REVIEW HAD TO STRIKE A BALANCE BETWEEN A GREATER EUROPEAN ROLE AND VOICE, AND THE CONTINUING REQUIREMENT WITHIN THE ALLIANCE FOR A GOOD TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP. WAS THE OBJECTIVE TO ENHANCE THE EUROPEAN ROLE, OR THE ROLE OF CERTAIN ORGANISATIONS? IF THE FORMER, HOW DID EC/WEU MEMBERS PROPOSE TO HANDLE THE INTERESTS OF NON-EC EUROPEAN ALLIES? HE WOULD WELCOME EUROPEAN VIEWS. NATO WAS THE RIGHT FORUM FOR THIS DEBATE: THESE ISSUES SHOULD NOT BE RESOLVED ELSEWHERE.

4. TAFT SAID THE U S HAD NO FIRM ANSWERS, BUT THOUGHT SOME PRINCIPLES SHOULD GUIDE DISCUSSION OF THE EUROPEANISATION OF NATO:

- AIM OF EXERCISE SHOULD BE TO ENHANCE THE ALLIANCE'S EFFECTIVENESS IN MANAGING A BROAD RANGE OF SECURITY ISSUES:
- WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO STRESS OUR COMMONALITY OF INTERESTS:
- ANY NEW PROCEDURES SHOULD REAFFIRM THE ABILITY OF THE SIXTEEN TO PARTICIPATE FULLY: NON-EC/WEU MEMBERS SHOULD NOT BE MARGINALISED
- ANY CHANGES SHOULD ENHANCE THE BASIC ALLIANCE PRINCIPLE OF COLLECTIVE EFFORTS IN SELF-DEFENCE: IT WOULD BE ODD IF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION WERE BOUGHT AT THE COST OF ATLANTIC MILITARY INTEGRATION.

HE WANTED A STRONGER EUROPEAN INVOLVEMENT IN THE ALLIANCE, A MORE INTEGRATED APPROACH TO SECURITY ISSUES, BUT TO THE BENEFIT OF THE ALLIANCE, AND NOT JUST IN ORDER TO BENEFIT OTHER INSTITUTIONS.

5. FOSTERVOLL (NORWAY) SAID THAT THE EUROPEAN INTEGRATION PROCESS WAS NOT JUST A MATTER FOR THE EC. THE VIEWS OF NON-EC EUROPEAN ALLIES SHOULD ALSO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT. A EUROPEAN SECURITY DIMENSION ENGAGING ONLY THE TWELVE (OR ELEVEN) WOULD BE INCOMPLETE. THERE WAS SCOPE FOR IMPROVEMENT IN ENSURING THAT ALLIES SUCH AS NORWAY WERE BETTER INFORMED OF EC/EPC DEVELOPMENTS, EG BY BETTER BRIEFINGS IN THE ALLIANCE BOTH BEFORE AND AFTER HIGH-LEVEL EC MEETINGS, AND POSSIBLY BY STRENGTHENING LINKS BETWEEN THE EPC AND WEU SECRETARIATS.

6. UNSAL (TURKEY) SAW NO INCOMPATIBILITY BETWEEN THE ALLIANCE AND THE EC. BUT A DEFENCE ROLE FOR THE EC WAS NOT A REALISTIC OPTION. TURKEY NEEDED NATO AS A FORUM WHERE THESE MATTERS COULD BE HANDLED. IT WOULD BE DISTURBING IF THE EC'S SECURITY POLICY FUNCTION INCREASED, AND DEPRIVED THE ALLIANCE OF ITS SUBSTANTIVE POLICY CONSULTATION PROCESS. WEU'S PRIMARY 'LOYALTY' WAS TO NATO. THE EUROPEAN DEFENCE IDENTITY SHOULD BE DEVELOPED, IN SUPPORT OF THE ALLIANCE.

7. BIERRING (DENMARK) SAID DEFENCE MATTERS COULD ONLY BE HANDLED IN THE ALLIANCE. EUROPEAN ACCEPTANCE OF INCREASED RESPONSIBILITIES IN DEFENCE MUST BE REALISED WITHIN, AND TO THE BENEFIT OF, THE ALLIANCE. A EUROPEAN DEFENCE IDENTITY SHOULD NOT BE ESTABLISHED WITHIN THE EC.

8. THUYSBAERT (BELGIUM) SAID SECURITY IN EUROPE SHOULD BE BORNE BY NATO, EC AND WEU, WHICH SHOULD BE MUTUALLY SUPPORTIVE. THE EUROPEAN DIMENSION IN NATO HAD TO BE INCREASED, BUT WE HAD TO ADDRESS THE FEAR THAT TRANSATLANTIC SOLIDARITY MIGHT SUFFER IN THE PROCESS. AT THIS STAGE, THE EUROPEANS HAD FEW COMMON IDEAS ON HOW TO PROCEED. HE THOUGHT THE WEU MIGHT BE DEVELOPED AS AN INTERMEDIATE STEP BETWEEN THE TWELVE AND THE SIXTEEN. 12/16 LINKS MIGHT BE SYSTEMATISED ON A MORE STRUCTURED BASIS. THE INTERESTS OF NON-EC EUROPEAN MEMBERS HAD TO BE BORNE IN MIND. MIGHT THERE BE SPECIFICALLY EUROPEAN INTERVENTIONS WITHIN THE ALLIANCE TO INDICATE EUROPEAN SUPPORT FOR DECISIONS? MIGHT THERE BE FORCE CAPABILITIES WITHIN NATO, BUT AT A EUROPEAN LEVEL, WHICH WOULD NORMALLY BE INTEGRATED BUT WHICH MIGHT BE MADE AVAILABLE SEPARATELY WHEN NECESSARY FOR WIDER PURPOSES?

9. FOR THE UK SIR M ALEXANDER SAID WE MUST ENSURE THAT DEVELOPMENTS

IN TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS AND THE NATO-EC/WEU RELATIONSHIP WERE MUTUALLY REINFORCING AND NOT MUTUALLY CONTRADICTORY. EVERYONE AGREED THAT THE TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP WAS FUNDAMENTAL FOR ALL PARTNERS AND FOR THE ALLIANCE, THAT WE WANTED U S FORCES TO REMAIN IN EUROPE, AND THAT EXTENDED DETERRENCE WAS VITAL. WE HAD NOTED WITH GREAT CARE TAFT'S POINT THAT THE TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP WAS NOT TO BE TAKEN FOR GRANTED: THE U S MILITARY PRESENCE SHOULD NOT BE SEEN AS THAT OF A 'HIRED GUN' BROUGHT IN TO DEAL WITH A SINGLE PROBLEM. NATO PROVIDED THE FORUM AND MILITARY FRAMEWORK IN WHICH THE TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP COULD FUNCTION. HE DOUBTED THAT IN FUTURE, AS THREATS TO OUR SECURITY BECAME MORE DIVERSE, EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA WOULD CEASE TO HOLD SIMILAR VIEWS AND SHARED INTERESTS.

10. SIR M ALEXANDER SAID EVERYONE ALSO SEEMED TO AGREE THAT A EUROPEAN DEFENCE IDENTITY SHOULD BE DEVELOPED. IT HAD LONG BEEN CLEAR THAT THE BALANCE BETWEEN NORTH AMERICA AND EUROPE WITHIN THE ALLIANCE NEEDED TO BE ADJUSTED. NOTING TAFT'S CLEAR STATEMENT OF U S SUPPORT FOR THE EUROPEANISATION OF THE ALLIANCE, HE HOPED ALL AGREED THAT THE EUROPEAN DEFENCE IDENTITY HAD TO BE DEVELOPED IN SUCH A WAY AS TO STRENGTHEN, NOT WEAKEN, THE ALLIANCE. THE EUROPEANS NEEDED TO DEVELOP A DEFENCE IDENTITY CAPABLE OF PROVIDING, WHERE APPROPRIATE, A SPECIFICALLY EUROPEAN CONTRIBUTION TO THE CONTAINMENT OF CRISES AND OF THREATS TO OUR SECURITY (CF THUYSBAERT'S FINAL POINT PARA 8). THIS MUST NOT TAKE PLACE OUTSIDE OR IN CONTRADICTION TO THE ALLIANCE, THOUGH THE MODALITIES AND PRECISE MEANING OF 'WITHIN THE ALLIANCE' WERE FOR DISCUSSION. IF COLLECTIVE DEFENCE WAS TO REMAIN MEANINGFUL, WE WOULD NEED THE TRANSATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP, A EUROPEAN DEFENCE IDENTITY AND NATIONAL DEFENCE CAPABILITIES.

11. AS THE DEBATE ON 'POLITICAL UNION' DEVELOPED, EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS WOULD NEED TO ENSURE THAT ALLIANCE INTERESTS WERE BORNE IN MIND AND THAT A GAP DID NOT OPEN BETWEEN THE ALLIANCE AND THE EC. MULTINATIONAL FORCES MIGHT PROVIDE A USEFUL WAY BOTH OF REINFORCING THE TRANSATLANTIC LINK AND ENHANCING A SPECIFICALLY EUROPEAN CONTRIBUTION TO THE ALLIANCE. THERE HAD BEEN DAMAGING SPECULATION IN THE MEDIA ABOUT THE NATURE OF MULTINATIONAL FORCES: WE SHOULD DEFINE OUR IDEAS MORE CLEARLY AND AS A MATTER OF URGENCY.

12. QUOTING ARTICLE IV, SIR M ALEXANDER REMINDED COLLEAGUES THAT THE MODIFIED BRUSSELS TREATY MADE IT EXPLICITLY CLEAR THAT WEU WOULD WORK IN CLOSE CO-OPERATION WITH NATO AND WOULD RELY ON NATO ON MILITARY MATTERS. CURRENT IDEAS ABOUT ENHANCING WEU NONETHELESS RAISED MANY QUESTIONS ABOUT THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NATO AND WEU. HE NOTED SOME OF THESE: THE POSITION OF EUROPEAN NON-MEMBERS OF WEU,

IEPG AND EUROGROUP, MEETINGS OF NATO PERMREPS IN THE WEU FORMAT (PREVIOUSLY RAISED BY THUYSBAERT) AND THEREFORE, GIVEN THE NEED TO AVOID DUPLICATION, DOUBLE-HATTING AND THE LOCATION OF WEU, THE IMPLICATIONS (GIVEN ARTICLE IV) FOR MILITARY STRUCTURES, ETC. DETAILED DISCUSSION OF THESE ISSUES WAS STILL PREMATURE. BUT GIVEN THE PACE OF EVENTS, IT SHOULD NOT BE POSTPONED INDEFINITELY. IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT BEFORE NATIONAL POSITIONS WERE FINALISED, THE CONCERNS OF ALL PARTNERS WERE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT. A PRAGMATIC DISCUSSION WAS REQUIRED. THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL WAS THE PLACE TO HAVE IT.

13. FULCI (ITALY) UNDERLINED ITALIAN ATTACHMENT TO THE TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP. IN DEVELOPING EPU, THE TWELVE WOULD BENEFIT THE TRANATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP AND NATO. EPU WOULD INEVITABLY DEVELOP A SECURITY DIMENSION. ITALIAN THINKING WAS AT AN EARLY STAGE: THEY HAD SIMPLY INTENDED TO INITIATE A DEBATE ON EG THE ROLE OF THE WEU (WHICH HAD A CLOSE REALTIONSHIP TO NATO), WHILE EMPHASISING THAT A GREATER EUROPEAN RESPONSIBILITY IN DEFENCE WAS IN THE INTERESTS OF ALL SIXTEEN.

14. BAECHMANN (GERMANY) SAID THE EC WAS A CORE ELEMENT OF EUROPEAN STABILITY. A UNITED EUROPE WOULD BE INCOMPLETE WITHOUT DEFENCE AND SECURITY RESPONSIBILITIES. EPU HAD TO BE DEVELOPED WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THE TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP. ONE POSSIBLE WAY TOWARDS A EUROPEAN DEFENCE IDENTITY MIGHT BE A GRADUAL RAPPROCHMENT BETWEEN EPC AND WEU: BUT THIS WAS A MEDIUM OR LONG TERM PROSPECT.

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PART TWO OF TWO PARTS

15. LYSYSHYN (CANADA) SAID THE REAL ISSUE WAS HOW TO DEVELOP A EUROPEAN DEFENCE IDENTITY WITHOUT DAMAGING THE TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP. WE HAD TO AVOID DEVELOPING A EUROPEAN IDENTITY BASED ON DISTINCTIVENESS OF VIEWS FROM THOSE OF NORTH AMERICA. THE SOLUTION LAY IN OPEN AND FULL CONSULTATION, AND A FLEXIBLE APPROACH. IF NATO CONTINUED TO FUNCTION AS THE PRINCIPLE EMBODIMENT OF THE TRANSATLANTIC LINK, IT MUST RETAIN AN IMPORTANT ROLE AND NOT BE MARGINALISED.

16. GUNNLAUGSSON (ICELAND) SAID ANY MARGINALISATION OF FLANK, NON-EC ALLIES SUCH AS ICELAND WOULD BE DISTURBING. CONSULTATION BETWEEN EC AND NON-EC ALLIES WOULD BE IMPORTANT.

17. FARIA (PORTUGAL) SAID IT WAS PREMATURE TO PRESCRIBE THE NATURE OF A EUROPEAN IDENTITY. WEU COULD PROVIDE A MEANS OF ACHIEVING A BETTER BALANCE BETWEEN THE NORTH AMERICANS AND EUROPEANS.

18. VAN NOUHUYS (NETHERLANDS) SAID EUROPE CONTINUED TO NEED COLLECTIVE DEFENCE. WE SHOULD BE CAUTIOUS ABOUT CONSTRUCTING EXCLUSIVELY EUROPEAN MULTINATIONAL FORCES. NUCLEAR FORCES MUST BE RETAINED IN EUROPE. AS A EUROPEAN, HE WOULD LIKE U S REASSURANCE THAT THE AMERICANS WANTED THE TRANSATLANTIC LINK TO BE MAINTAINED. WHICH EPC SHOULD DEVELOP A SECURITY POLICY DIMENSION, NATO SHOULD RETAIN EXCLUSIVE RESPONSIBILITY FOR DEFENCE STRATEGY: EPC DISCUSSION OF SECURITY POLICY MIGHT PRECEDE, BUT SHOULD NEVER PRE-EMPT, DISCUSSION IN NATO.

19. BOURLOYANNIS-TSANGARIDIS (GREECE) SAID THAT A EUROPEAN DEFENCE IDENTITY SHOULD BE DEVELOPED IN SUCH A WAY AS TO STRENGTHEN THE ALLIANCE. THERE WAS NO COMPETENCE OVERLAP BETWEEN NATO AND WEU.

20. ROBIN (FRANCE) SAID HE HAD CHOSEN TO SPEAK LAST BECAUSE OF HIS DISAPPOINTMENT THAT IN EARLIER SESSIONS, HIS ARGUMENTS HAD NOT BEEN ADDRESSED BY OTHERS. THE PRESENT DEBATE WAS GETTING US NOWHERE. WE WERE LOSING SIGHT OF THE GLOBAL PICTURE. HE SUSPECTED THAT THE AIM

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OF THE DEBATE WAS TO ERASE THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN VIEWS HELD BY FRANCE (AND MAYBE SPAIN) ON THE ONE HAND AND ALL THE OTHER ALLIES ON THE OTHER. HE WOULD NOT INDULGE IN IMPASSIONED WORDS IN SUPPORT OF THE TRANSATLANTIC LINK. THE ISSUE OF THE EUROPEAN PILLAR WAS BEING HANDLED IN SUCH A WAY THAT IT APPEARED THAT EUROPE HAD REPLACED THE SOVIET UNION AS THE MAIN THREAT TO THE ALLIANCE.

21. ROBIN SAID THE KEY QUESTION WAS WHETHER NATO WOULD ALLOW EUROPE TO DEFINE ITS COMMON INTERESTS AND POLICIES AND DEVELOP HER OWN INSTITUTIONAL MEANS. COULD EUROPE REALISTICALLY BE EXPECTED TO DISCUSS SECURITY, BUT NOT DEFENCE? WOULD EUROPE BE ALLOWED TO ESTABLISH ITS OWN DEFENCE ORGANISATION? HE WAS SURPRISED TO HEAR SOME ALLIES SUGGEST THAT EUROPEAN NATIONS SHOULD NOT BE PERMITTED TO ACT TOGETHER. IN THE VERY UNLIKELY EVENT OF A CRISIS ARISING WHICH INVOLVED THE SOVIET UNION, NATO'S RESPONSIBILITIES WOULD BE ENGAGED. FOR THIS EVENTUALITY, THE ALLIANCE MAINTAINED ITS CONSULTATION PROCESS. IN OTHER CASES, THERE WAS NO NEED TO DEPLOY THE NATO SLEDGEHAMMER: A SMALLER TOOL MIGHT SUFFICE. WHY ALWAYS ASK THE SIXTEEN WHEN ONE, OR TWO, OR THEREE COULD ACT TO DEAL WITH THE PROBLEM?

22. SIR M ALEXANDER SAID THAT IN HIS INTERVENTION HE HAD TRIED TO ADDRESS ALL THE MAJOR ISSUES RAISED BY ROBIN. BUT HE HAD TO PICK HIM UP ON ONE PARTICULAR POINT, ROBIN'S REFERENCE TO THE RELEVANCE OF 'SUBSIDIARITY' TO NATO. ROBIN WAS SURELY STARTING FROM A WRONG AND POTENTIALLY EXPLOSIVE ASSUMPTION IF HE THOUGHT THAT DEFENCE AND SECURITY ISSUES SHOULD ONLY BE DECIDED AT 16 IF THEY COULD NOT (NOT) BE DEALT WITH BY A SMALLER NUMBER OF MEMBERS: WE HAD TO MAXIMISE THOSE AREAS WHERE WE COULD FUNCTION AND TAKE DECISIONS AT 16, AND ONLY CONSIDER MOVING DOWN TO SMALLER GROUPINGS IF THAT DID NOT PROVE POSSIBLE. (BOTH WOERNER AND TAFT TANKED SIR M ALEXANDER AFTERWARDS PRIVATELY FOR HAVING INTERVENED ON THIS POINT).

23. WOERNER SAID ROBIN'S INTERVENTION HAD CRYSTALLISED THE DEBATE AND DEMONSTRATED THAT THIS WAS INDEED THE FORUM TO DISCUSS SUCH MATTERS. NO-ONE DISPUTED THE RIGHT OF MEMBERS TO DEVELOP THEIR DEFENCE IDENTITY. THE QUESTION WAS WHETHER SUCH A PROCESS WAS DESIRABLE AND IF SO, HOW THIS COULD BE DONE IN SUCH A WAY AS TO STRENGTHEN, NOT WEAKEN, THE ALLIANCE.

COMMENT

24. THE SUBSTANTIVE DEBATE HAS NOW BEEN JOINED. THE SPECTRUM OF OPINION REMAINS VERY WIDE: THE SPANISH INTERVENTION WAS NOTABLE. THE ITALIAN WAS ONLY TOO OBVIOUSLY KEEPING HIS OPTIONS OPEN. BUT NO-ONE

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IS TRYING TO DEFEND THE STATUS QUO. TAFT'S ENDORSEMENT OF THE NEED TO EUROPEANISE THE ALLIANCE WAS IMPORTANT (HE TOLD SIR M ALEXANDER AFTERWARDS THAT HE HAD HOPED TO GO FURTHER IN PROMOTING THE DEVELOPMENT OF THEE WEU/NATO RELATIONSHIP BUT HAD BEEN PREVENTED FROM DOING SO BY THE EC SPECIALISTS IN STATE (EXCLAM)). ROBIN OVERREACHED HIMSELF, AND WAS SEEN TO DO SO.

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10 DOWNING STREET
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From the Private Secretary

4 July 1990

I enclose the photograph at Turnberry
which the Prime Minister has signed for
Secretary Baker.

Charles Powell

Stephen Wall Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office



10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

12 June 1990

Thank you to you and your crew for flying us so smoothly and safely to Turnberry last Friday despite the appalling weather. It is always very reassuring to know that the Prime Minister and her party can rely on No.72 Squadron.

(C. D. POWELL)

Wing Commander Brian Freeman, R.A.F.

2511 Wessex Helicopter of No 72 Squadron (Northern Ireland)
Wing Commander Brian Freeman Captain (officer commanding No 72 Squadron)
Squadron Leader Dave Maclean Co-Pilot
Master Air loadmaster Adrian Jones Crewman

72 Squadron

R.A.F. Aldergrove

B.F.P.O. 808.

→ Thank you
letter



THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

June 8, 1990

Dear Madam Prime Minister:

On behalf of the U.S. delegation, allow me to thank you, the people of Scotland, and the many in Her Majesty's Government who have gone to such lengths to welcome us to Turnberry and to make this meeting yet another successful step in NATO's effort to build a new Europe.

I particularly welcomed the chance to talk with you about the results of the Washington Summit and to hear your thoughts regarding future developments in East-West relations.

I know I speak for President Bush in wishing you Godspeed in your very important trip to the Soviet Union this week. We will, of course, be most interested in learning the results of your conversations with President Gorbachev and other Soviet leaders as well as your impressions of the general situation in the Soviet Union.

I look forward to seeing you again soon in London.

Sincerely yours

James A. Baker, III

The Right Honorable
Margaret Thatcher, M.P.,
Prime Minister,
London.



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HEADQUARTERS
DIRECTOR ROYAL ARTILLERY
WOOLWICH
LONDON SE18 4BH

GENERAL SIR MARTIN FARNDAL KCB

mf

8 June 90.

Dear Charles,

I write to thank the Prime Minister for including me in her list of guests to lunch at the NATO Council at Balmoral in Scotland on 7 June.

It was a most enjoyable and productive event marking an historical moment in Europe.

I particularly enjoyed my

discussion with Mr. Thatchers.

Again my thanks

Yours faithfully

Montie J. Anderson

Master Surgeon.

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PART TWO OF TWO

(MOSCOW FOR PRIME MINISTER'S PARTY)

NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL MEETING, TURNBERRY: AFTERNOON SESSION

16. LUXEMBOURG (POOS) SAID THAT NATO FACED SOME FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS: SOVIET ATTITUDE TO CFE, GERMANY'S POSITION IN NATO, THE BALTIC CRISIS, AND SOVIET ECONOMIC REFORMS. BAKER'S NINE POINTS PROVIDED A STARTING POINT FOR FINDING SOLUTIONS TO THESE PROBLEMS. HE ARGUED THAT THE EAST/WEST IDEOLOGICAL CONFLICT COULD BE SUPPLANTED BY NORTH/SOUTH CONFRONTATION. HE AGREED WITH FRENCH AND SPANISH VIEWS ON THE ALLIANCE REVIEW. A JOINT NATO/WARSAW PACT DECLARATION SHOULD BE CONSIDERED, AS INDEED SHOULD JOINT DEFENSIVE STRUCTURES WITH THE SOVIET UNION. NATO'S STRATEGIC DOCTRINE SHOULD BE RE-EXAMINED. EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, INCLUDING THE SOVIET UNION, SHOULD BE OFFERED A FULL ROLE IN THE NEW EUROPE.

17. US (BAKER) SAID THAT A THOROUGH EXAMINATION OF THE ALLIANCE'S APPROACH TO CFE FOLLOW-UP WAS ESSENTIAL. THE SOVIET UNION WOULD NOT AGREE TO CFE I UNLESS THEY WERE CLEARER ABOUT FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS, INCLUDING MANPOWER LIMITATIONS IN THE CENTRAL ZONE. HE EXPRESSED SATISFACTION THAT NATO HAD AGREED TO ESTABLISH A VERIFICATION STAFF. THE ALLIANCE SHOULD ALSO EXAMINE ITS FORCE STRUCTURE, IN PARTICULAR HOW BEST TO PROTECT THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF ALL ITS MEMBERS ONCE THE SOVIET UNION HAD WITHDRAWN ALL ITS FORCES TO SOVIET TERRITORY. MULTINATIONAL UNITS MIGHT HAVE AN IMPORTANT ROLE TO PLAY.

18. BAKER SAID THAT A RAPID RE-ASSESSMENT OF NUCLEAR DOCTRINE WAS NECESSARY. SHEVARDNADZE'S REMARKS IN COPENHAGEN WOULD BE THE FIRST OF MANY ATTEMPTS TO RAISE THE PROFILE OF A LOWER LEVEL OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE IN EUROPE. IT WAS VITAL THAT NATO SHOULD BE SEEN TO BE ADAPTING. THE US WANTED THE NUCLEAR RISK SHARED AS WIDELY AS POSSIBLE, BUT AT THE SAME TIME TO RETAIN A REASSURING PUBLIC POSTURE. HE REPEATED HIS VIEW THAT NATO'S FUNDAMENTAL GOAL WAS TO PREVENT WAR AND TO DETER AGGRESSION BY MAINTAINING WESTERN MILITARY AND POLITICAL COHESION.

19. BAKER SAID THAT THE CSCE COULD SERVE BEST AS A FORUM WHERE STATES COULD DISCUSS COMMON PROBLEMS AND CONCERNS. IT COULD ACT AS THE QUOTE CONSCIENCE OF THE CONTINENT UNQUOTE. CSCE'S THREE BASKETS GAVE IT A UNIQUE POSITION TO BUILD CONSENSUS AND ENHANCE EUROPE'S POLITICAL LEGITIMACY, ECONOMIC PROSPERITY AND STRATEGIC STABILITY. THESE AIMS SHOULD BE BUILT ON A BASIS OF FREEDOM, FREE ELECTIONS, DEMOCRATIC PLURALISM AND THE RULE OF LAW. BUT THE FORMAT OF CSCE WITH 35 COUNTRIES HAVING A VETO WAS NOT SUITED TO TAKING DECISIONS ABOUT SAFEGUARDING SECURITY. THE US WAS CONTENT WITH SOME STRENGTHENING AND INSTITUTIONALISATION OF THE CSCE. THE SOVIETS AND OTHERS HAD MADE USEFUL PROPOSALS, WHICH SHOULD BE ASSESSED BY THE CSCE SUMMIT PREPARATORY CONFERENCE. A MORE MEANINGFUL CSCE COULD COMPLEMENT NATO, BUT HE EMPHASIZED THAT IT COULD IN NO WAY SUPPLANT OR SUBSTITUTE ANY FUNCTION OF NATO.

20. BAKER SAID THAT IT WAS NOT ALWAYS EASY TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF NATO, EC AND CSCE. BUT THIS SHOULD NOT BE DISTURBING. INDEED, OVERLAPPING INSTITUTIONS COULD CONTRIBUTE TO RESOLVING COMPLEX PROBLEMS. BUILDING PEACE MEANT REASSURING CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE AND THE SOVIET UNION SHOULD NOT BE LEFT OUT. ONE WAY WAS THROUGH SOLID DIALOGUE AND REGULAR CONSULTATIONS, BOTH POLITICAL AND MILITARY, WHICH DID NOT HAVE TO BE BLOC TO BLOC. THERE MIGHT EVEN BE VIRTUE IN NATO QUOTE REACHING OUT TO THE NEUTRALS AND OTHERS IN EUROPE UNQUOTE.

21. NORWAY (BONDEVIK) WELCOMED PROGRESS MADE AT THE WASHINGTON SUMMIT ON START AND CW. NATO SHOULD ADOPT A BALANCE BETWEEN FIRMNESS AND FLEXIBILITY ON CFE AND GERMAN UNITY. HE SUPPORTED A UNITED GERMANY IN THE IMS, WITH THE ALLIANCE'S GUARANTEE EXTENDED TO ALL GERMAN TERRITORY, BUT WITHOUT NATO FORCES STATIONED IN THE GDR. ANY CONSTRAINTS ON GERMAN SOVEREIGNTY WERE UNACCEPTABLE. BUT THE SOVIET UNION SHOULD BE REASSURED THAT NATO SOUGHT NO UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE. HE AGREED WITH ALL BAKER'S NINE POINTS AND REJECTED SHEVARDNADZE'S PROPOSALS FOR SUBSTITUTING A STRENGTHENED CSCE FOR NATO. SOME SOVIET IDEAS, EG FOR REGULAR POLITICAL CONSULTATION AND A JOINT WARSAW PACT/NATO DECLARATION, SHOULD HOWEVER BE STUDIED. BUT IN FORMING ITS RESPONSE, NATO SHOULD TAKE VIEWS OF INDIVIDUAL WARSAW PACT MEMBERS INTO ACCOUNT.

22. BONDEVIK SAID THAT THE SOVIET UNION SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO EMASCULATE THE CFE TREATY. AIRCRAFT, INCLUDING LBNA, COULD NOT BE DROPPED. BUT THERE MIGHT BE SOME ROOM FOR FLEXIBILITY ON OTHER AIRCRAFT ISSUES, THE INSPECTION REGIME AND THE SUFFICIENCY RULE. HE AGREED WITH DANISH AND ICELANDIC REMARKS ON THE BALTIC STATES.

23. PORTUGAL (PINHEIRO), IN A VERY BRIEF INTERVENTION, WELCOMED THE CONSENSUS ON FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES AND AGREED WITH SPANISH VIEWS ON TASKS FOR THE JULY SUMMIT.

24. I ALSO WELCOMED THE CONSENSUS ON THE GERMAN QUESTION. WE SHOULD TAKE INTO ACCOUNT SOVIET CONCERNS, AND AVOID CREATING RESENTMENT AS AFTER VERSAILLES. THE SOVIET UNION SHOULD NOT BE HUMILIATED JUST BECAUSE IT WAS CURRENTLY WEAK. I WELCOMED THE ENDORSEMENT GIVEN TO BAKER'S NINE POINTS AS THE STARTING POINT FOR DISCUSSION. I AGREED THAT WE SHOULD WAIT FOR THE SOVIET UNION TO COME FORWARD WITH A SPECIFIC PROPOSAL FOR A JOINT NATO/WARSAW PACT DECLARATION RATHER THAN PURSUE IT OURSELVES. A DISTINCTION COULD BE DRAWN BETWEEN A ONE-OFF DECLARATION AND CONTINUING PROCEDURES OR DIALOGUE. I DID NOT EXCLUDE THE LATTER WITH INDIVIDUAL WARSAW PACT MEMBERS, INCLUDING THE SOVIET UNION, BUT A LONG-TERM RELATIONSHIP WITH A CORPSE WAS TO BE AVOIDED.

25. ON THE NATO REVIEW WE SHOULD BE GUIDED BY THE ALLIANCE'S OWN INTERESTS WHILE TAKING ACCOUNT OF SOVIET SENSITIVITIES. THE MILITARY REVIEW ESTABLISHED BY THE OPC SHOULD BE ORGANISED IN SUCH A WAY THAT FRANCE COULD BE ASSOCIATED. REFERRING TO THE PRIME MINISTER'S REMARKS AT LUNCH ON DEVELOPING NATO'S POLITICAL ROLE, I EMPHASIZED THE NEED FOR DIRECT CONTACTS WITH EASTERN EUROPE. DUMAS' POINTS ON AN OVERALL NATO REVIEW WERE WELL TAKEN. THE PROCESS OF ALLIANCE CHANGE WAS COMPREHENSIVE, BUT IT WOULD BE WRONG FOR THE JULY SUMMIT TO GIVE THE IMPRESSION THAT DRAMATIC RESULTS FROM A ONCE FOR ALL EXERCISE WOULD EMERGE IN TWELVE MONTHS' TIME. SETTING A SPECIFIC END TARGET DATE WAS DANGEROUS. WE SHOULD ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THE REVIEW WOULD INVOLVE A CONTINUOUS PROCESS OF CHANGE. THE NAC SHOULD OVERSEE THE REVIEW AND REPORT TO MINISTERS. HEADS OF GOVERNMENT COULD AGREE IN JULY TO MEET AFTER TWELVE MONTHS' TO REVIEW PROGRESS. I HOPED THAT COMPROMISE LANGUAGE ON THIS POINT COULD BE FOUND FOR THE COMMUNIQUE. THE JULY SUMMIT SHOULD PRODUCE DIRECT, SIMPLE AND ELOQUENT LANGUAGE WHICH WOULD EXPLAIN TO THE PUBLIC NATO'S DUAL ROLE AS GUARDIAN AND REFORMER.

26. ON CFE, WHERE AN AGREEMENT MUST PRECEDE A CSCE SUMMIT, THE
RUSSIANS SHOULD KNOW THAT NATO WAS PREPARED TO ENVISAGE FURTHER
FORCE LIMITS IN THE CENTRAL REGION. GERMANY MUST NOT BE
SINGULARISED AND SOVIET FORCES IN ATTU MUST NOT BE LESS
CONSTRAINED THAN WESTERN FORCES. CFE IA NEED NOT WORK TO RIGID
DEADLINES OF MARCH 1992 IF IT NEEDED A FEW EXTRA MONTHS. BEYOND
THAT THE MODALITIES WERE NOT FOR DECISION TODAY, BUT REFLECTION
WAS NEEDED ON WHETHER TO PROCEED AT 35. CSCE
SHOULD BE STRENGTHENED. THE UK AND OTHERS HAD ALREADY
CONTRIBUTED IDEAS. BUT THE SECURITY OF EUROPE'S CITIZENS DID NOT
REST ON PAN-EUROPEAN STRUCTURES. THAT WOULD REMAIN THE TASK OF
NATO.

27. GREECE (BOURLOYANNIS-TSANGARIDIS) AGREED THAT A UNITED
GERMANY IN NATO WOULD STRENGTHEN EUROPEAN STABILITY. BUT AT THE
SAME TIME WE SHOULD FIND A WAY TO REASSURE THE SOVIET UNION THAT
HER LEGITIMATE SECURITY INTERESTS WERE BEING TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.
HE WELCOMED AGREEMENT ON START AND CW AT THE WASHINGTON SUMMIT
AND ARGUED FOR IMMEDIATE CFE FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS AFTER CFE I.
GREECE SUPPORTED THE STRENGTHENING OF CFE WHILST RECOGNISING THAT
NATO WOULD CONTINUE TO BE THE GUARANTOR OF WESTERN EUROPEAN
SECURITY. HE ADDED THAT CSCE INSTITUTIONALISATION SHOULD NOT
DEPRIVE THE HELSINKI ACCORD OF ITS CURRENT FLEXIBILITY, WHICH WAS
A MAJOR STRENGTH.

28. WOERNER ENDED THE SESSION BY READING OUT AN AFP REPORT ON
THE WARSAW PACT SUMMIT IN MOSCOW, WHICH HE SUGGESTED COULD BE
DISCUSSED FURTHER OVER DINNER.

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Storing Message

CONFIDENTIAL

FM ECO

TO IMMEDIATE UKDEL NATO

TELNO 130

OF 081641Z JUNE 90

INFO IMMEDIATE MOSCOW

INFO PRIORITY NATO POSTS, EAST EUROPEAN POSTS, UKDEL VIENNA

INFO PRIORITY UKDIS GENEVA

INFO SAVING HELSINKI, STOCKHOLM, BERNE, CANBERRA, TOKYO

PART ONE OF TWO.

(MOSCOW FOR PRIME MINISTER'S PARTY)

NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL MEETING, TURNBERRY; AFTERNOON SESSION

1. THE SESSION BEGAN WITH A REPORT FROM THE CHAIRMAN OF THE HLTF ON CFE (COPY BY FAX). MANY POLITICAL AND TECHNICAL ISSUES REMAINED TO BE SOLVED, AND THE SOVIET ATTITUDE WAS AMBIVALENT. HOWEVER, THE GOAL OF A TREATY BY YEAR-END WAS STILL THOUGHT ATTAINABLE AND HLTF WERE TRYING TO MOVE THINGS FORWARD AS FAST AS POSSIBLE. THERE WAS NOW A VIRTUALLY COMPLETE WESTERN POSITION IN DRAFT TREATY LANGUAGE. A NEW INSTALMENT OF CSBMS HAS BEEN SENT TO VIENNA. FLEXIBLE POSITIONS HAD BEEN PREPARED ON AIRCRAFT, ARMOUR AND VERIFICATION. ALLIANCE VIEWS WERE STILL DIVIDED ON ISSUES OF SUFFICIENCY AND THE FORMAT OF FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL URGED MEMBERS TO REACH AGREEMENT SO THAT PROGRESS COULD BE MADE AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE.

2. REVERTING TO GENERAL ISSUES, BELGIUM (EYSKENS) SAID SOVIET PROBLEMS WERE PSYCHOLOGICAL, AND THE QUESTION WAS HOW TO SAVE THEIR FACE AND OVERCOME SOVIET FEAR OF MARGINALISATION. THE NATO SUMMIT SHOULD BRING TOGETHER VARIOUS PROPOSALS CURRENTLY ON THE TABLE INTO A COHERENT SCHEME FOR A NEW SECURITY STRUCTURE IN EUROPE. WE SHOULD AVOID WEAKENING EXISTING INSTITUTIONS, AND AVOID DUPLICATION BY MAKING FULL USE OF EXISTING BODIES SUCH AS THE OECD AND COUNCIL OF EUROPE. INSTITUTIONALISATION OR THE CSCE SHOULD BE APPROACHED CAUTIOUSLY, AND WE SHOULD AVOID SETTING UP SECURITY BODIES WITHOUT POWERS OF ENFORCEMENT. BELGIUM THOUGHT THAT FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS COULD BE CONDUCTED IN SEPARATE GROUPS OF 22 OR 35 ACCORDING TO THE SUBJECT. ECONOMIC AND TRADE COOPERATION WERE ALSO IMPORTANT.

3. ITALY (DE MICHELIS) SAID THAT NATO'S MAIN TASK SHOULD BE TO WORK FOR THE CREATION OF A COMMON, SINGLE, PAN-EUROPEAN SECURITY SYSTEM. THE SOVIET COULD NOT BE SINGULARISED ANY MORE THAN GERMANY. OUR POSITION IN NEGOTIATIONS ON CFE, ON FUTURE OF TROOP LEVELS IN GERMANY, START, SNF ETC SHOULD BE GOVERNED BY THIS OBJECTIVE. THERE WAS NO CONTRADICTION BETWEEN THIS AND A CONTINUED FUTURE FOR NATO. NATO WAS IMPORTANT AS AN INSURANCE POLICY FOR OUR DEFENCE AND FOR THE TRANSATLANTIC LINK BUT IT SHOULD ALSO BE A CORNERSTONE FOR BUILDING A NEW SECURITY STRUCTURE FOR EUROPE, AND THIS MEANT CHANGES IN BOTH THE MILITARY STRATEGY AND POLICIES OF NATO. THE SUMMIT COULD GIVE AN IMPORTANT SIGNAL OF UNDERSTANDING TOWARDS THE SOVIET UNION, AND THE US NINE POINTS WERE A GOOD BASIS. BUT IT SHOULD ALSO GIVE A CLEAR MANDATE TO THE NAC TO UPDATE NATO'S PRINCIPLES AND DEMONSTRATE THAT ITS ESSENCE WAS NO LONGER DEFENCE AGAINST THE THREAT FROM THE EAST, BUT THE CONSTRUCTION OF A SINGLE EUROPEAN STRUCTURE. HE HAD AN OPEN MIND ON NATO/WARSAW PACT CONTACTS BUT A NATO/SOVIET RELATIONSHIP WAS ESSENTIAL.

4. THE ITALIAN POSITION ON FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS WAS FIRMLY IN FAVOUR OF A FORUM OF 35, BECAUSE NEGOTIATIONS AT 22/3 WOULD NOT LEAD TO PAN-EUROPEAN CONSTRUCTION.

DENMARK (ELLEMAN JENSEN) THOUGHT THE PRIME MINISTER'S SPEECH TO THE COUNCIL HAD BEEN A REALISTIC AND THOUGHTFUL EXPOSITION ON THE FUTURE OF EUROPEAN SECURITY. AS AT THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA, THERE WAS NOW AN OPPORTUNITY TO CREATE A NEW ORDER WHICH WOULD LAST, BUT THIS DEPENDED ON THERE BEING NO LOSERS. THE SOVIET UNION MUST BE BOUND IN. BUT THIS DID NOT IMPLY PREVARICATION ON GERMAN UNIFICATION. GERMANY IN NATO WOULD BE AN IMPORTANT STABILISING FACTOR, AND MOMENTUM IN THE 2 PLUS 4 SHOULD BE KEPT UP TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE CURRENT EUPHORIA. HE WAS CONFIDENT THE SOVIETS WOULD CHANGE THEIR POSITION ON GERMANY IN NATO TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF TRYING TO EXTRACT MAXIMUM CONCESSIONS. HE AGREED WITH OTHERS THAT THE US NINE POINTS WERE THE RIGHT BASIS FOR A PACKAGE OF MEASURES TO MEET SOVIET NEEDS.

6. HE WAS DISAPPOINTED BY THE WEAK LANGUAGE IN THE COMMUNIQUE ON THE BALTIC STATES. THE RUSSIANS WERE STALLING IN NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN LITHUANIA AND MOSCOW DESPITE THE FULFILLMENT OF THEIR CONDITION OF SUSPENSION OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE. THEY WERE PRESUMABLY HOPING LANDSBERGIS WOULD BE REPLACED BY A MORE AMENABLE GOVERNMENT. BUT THEY HAD ADMITTED THAT THE INCORPORATION OF THE BALTIC STATES INTO THE UNION HAD BEEN ILLEGAL. WE SHOULD SUPPORT THE BALTICS BY STRENGTHENING OUR POLITICAL LINKS AND UNDERLINING OUR SUPPORT FOR THEM TO THE RUSSIANS.

7. ELLEMAN JENSEN ALSO THOUGHT THAT THE SUMMIT SHOULD REDEFINE THE ROLE OF THE ALLIANCE, AND TRY ITSELF TO ANSWER AS MANY OF THE QUESTIONS AS POSSIBLE.

8. SPAIN (FERNANDEZ ORDONEZ) SAID POLITICAL EVENTS HAD OUTSTRIPPED US. NATO NEEDED A NEW MESSAGE, AND A REVIEW OF ITS FUTURE IN DEPTH. HE WAS ENCOURAGED TO HEAR NEW LANGUAGE ON DEFENCE STRATEGY, INCLUDING CONCEPTS SUCH AS SUFFICIENT DEFENCE, PROPORTIONATE RESPONSE, MINIMAL DETERRENCE, AND NO FIRST USE. IN THE POLITICAL FIELD, NATO SHOULD GIVE GREATER EMPHASIS TO ITS DEFENSIVE POSTURE, BY TAKING A LEADING ROLE IN ARMS CONTROL, VERIFICATION AND CONFIDENCE-BUILDING. HE AGREED WITH PROPOSALS FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION MECHANISMS IN CSCE, AND ON THE NEED FOR FLEXIBILITY IN CFE. IT WAS IMPORTANT TO BIND IN THE NON-CFE MEMBERS OF CSCE AND HE THOUGHT THE EAST EUROPEANS WOULD FEEL FREER TO ACT IN A FORUM OF 35 THAN IN ONE OF 23.

9. TURKEY (BOZER) SAID THE JULY SUMMIT WOULD MAKE CRITICAL CHOICES FOR THE COMING DECADE. WE NEEDED TO EXPLAIN TO PUBLIC OPINION WHY NATO WAS ESSENTIAL TO STABILITY, AND WHY THE REGIONALISATION OF DEFENCE POLICIES WOULD BE UNDESIRABLE. MEMBERSHIP OF A UNITED GERMANY AND THE STRENGTH OF THE TRANSATLANTIC LINK WERE VITAL. NATO STRATEGY SHOULD BE ADAPTED, BUT FORWARD DEFENCE AND FLEXIBLE RESPONSE SHOULD BE RETAINED, EVEN IF IMPLEMENTED DIFFERENTLY IN ACCORDANCE WITH EVOLVING CIRCUMSTANCES. HE AGREED WITH OTHERS ON THE IMPORTANCE OF BUILDING UP CSCE WITHOUT INVALIDATING EXISTING INSTITUTIONS.

10. A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION OF CFE WOULD BE THE KEY TO A NEW EUROPEAN ORDER, AND TURKEY WOULD BE A MAJOR BENEFICIARY. AIRCRAFT SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE AGREEMENT. IN THE INTERESTS OF SOLIDARITY, HE WAS PREPARED TO ACCEPT THE US PROPOSAL FOR A COMPROMISE ON ARMoured VEHICLES, BUT WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO PRESS THE SOVIET UNION ON THE ISSUES OF PARAMILITARY FORCES AND REGIONAL APPLICATION.

THE NETHERLANDS (VAN DEN BROEK) SAID THAT THE POSITION ON GERMAN UNITY WAS PARADOXICAL, BUT NATO'S POSITION HAD TO BE UNEQUIVOCAL. FULL MEMBERSHIP, NO SINGULARISATION, AND SIMULTANEOUS RESOLUTION OF INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL ASPECTS WERE CARDINAL POINTS. BUT THERE WAS A DANGER OF THE LATTER BEING DE-LINKED IF THE ISSUE OF THE FUTURE MILITARY STATUS OF GERMANY WAS NOT RESOLVED QUICKLY. THIS SHOULD BE ADDRESSED IN CFE I, WHETHER BY A PROTOCOL OR IN THE TREATY ITSELF. WE SHOULD BE PREPARED TO OFFER OTHER ELEMENTS OF FLEXIBILITY, SUCH AS GRANTING THE GDR SHARE OF EQUIPMENT TO THE EASTERN GROUP OF PARTIES, ADJUSTMENT IN THE SUFFICIENCY RULE, AND WILLINGNESS IN FOLLOW-UP NEGOTIATIONS TO DEAL WITH THE QUESTION OF MANPOWER. EVEN ASSUMING SOVIET COOPERATION, TIME WAS TIGHT FOR CONCLUSION OF A TREATY BY THE END OF THE YEAR. WE MUST THEREFORE INSTRUCT NEGOTIATORS TO ACHIEVE EARLY PROGRESS, BEFORE THE RUSSIANS HAD SECOND THOUGHTS.

12. THE ADJUSTMENT OF NATO STRATEGY SHOULD START FROM THE PREMISE THAT NATO WAS INDISPENSABLE, AND CONTRIBUTED NOT ONLY TO THE SECURITY OF ITS MEMBERS, BUT TO THAT OF OTHERS. IT WAS WORTH RUNNING SOME RISK OF PERPETUATING THE WARSAW PACT TO INVOLVE THEM COLLECTIVELY IN FUTURE DISCUSSIONS OF CSBMS ETC. BENELUX FAVOURED A CAUTIOUS APPROACH TO INSTITUTIONALISATION OF CSCE. OTHER ORGANISATIONS SUCH AS THE OECD WERE RELEVANT, AND OUR MESSAGE SHOULD BE THAT, WHERE SOVIET BLOC INSTITUTIONS WERE FALLING APART, WESTERN ORGANISATIONS WOULD BE PREPARED TO OFFER SUPPORT.

13. ICELAND (HANNIBALSSON) AGREED WITH VAN DEN BROEK'S COMMENTS ON GERMAN UNIFICATION. THE SOVIET UNION HAD NO REASON TO COMPLAIN. GENSCHER HIMSELF WAS THE PERSONIFICATION OF A CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURE. IT SHOULD NOT THEREFORE BE DIFFICULT TO CONVINCE THE SOVIET UNION THAT ANYTHING LESS THAN FULL GERMAN MEMBERSHIP OF NATO WOULD BE DETRIMENTAL TO SOVIET SECURITY. ICELAND SUPPORTED SOME INSTITUTIONALISATION OF CSCE, BUT ONLY AS A COMPLEMENT TO, RATHER THAN A SUBSTITUTE FOR, NATO.

14. HANNIBALSSON ASSOCIATED HIMSELF WITH ELLEMAN JENSEN'S COMMENTS ON THE BALTIC STATES. SHEVARDONADZE'S CONTRIBUTION AT COPENHAGEN HAD BEEN DISAPPOINTING. THE BALTIC STATES SHOULD NOT BE COMPARED WITH OTHER SOVIET REPUBLICS. THEIR INDEPENDENT STATUS HAD BEEN RECOGNISED BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. SOVIET ANNEXATION HAD BEEN ILLEGAL. LITHUANIA'S WILLINGNESS TO FREEZE ITS INDEPENDENCE DECLARATION HAD FULFILLED THE SOVIET'S CONDITIONS FOR OPENING A DIALOGUE. IF THE SOVIET UNION NOW REFUSED TO TALK, NATO WOULD FACE A MAJOR PROBLEM.

15. ON CFE, HANNIBALSSON POINTED OUT THE NAVAL DIMENSION WAS THE ONLY AREA CURRENTLY EXCLUDED FROM ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS. THIS SHOULD BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT WHEN DECIDING A MANDATE FOR FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS. A CFE AGREEMENT WAS A NECESSARY CONDITION FOR HOLDING A CSCE SUMMIT.

END OF PART ONE

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PART 1 OF 2
FOLLOWING RECEIVED BY FACSIMILE FROM TURNBERRY NAC
TO: MS FIONA MOORE, SECURITY POLICY DEPT PM'S PARTY, MOSCOW

PRESS COMMUNIQUE M-1(90)29 FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE 8TH JUNE 1990

MINISTERIAL MEETING OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL AT TURNBERRY,
UNITED KINGDOM 7TH - 8TH JUNE 1990.

MESSAGE FROM TURNBERRY.

WE, THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE ALLIANCE, EXPRESS OUR
DETERMINATION TO SEIZE THE HISTORIC OPPORTUNITIES RESULTING FROM
THE PROFOUND CHANGES IN EUROPE TO HELP BUILD A NEW PEACEFUL ORDER
IN EUROPE, BASED ON FREEDOM, JUSTICE AND DEMOCRACY. IN THIS
SPIRIT, WE EXTEND TO THE SOVIET UNION AND TO ALL OTHER EUROPEAN
COUNTRIES THE HAND OF FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION.

TRUE AND UNDURING SECURITY IN EUROPE WILL BE BEST
ASSURED THROUGH MUTUAL ACKNOWLEDGEMENT AND UNDERSTANDING OF THE
LEGITIMATE SECURITY INTERESTS OF ALL STATES. WE ARE READY TO
CONTRIBUTE ACTIVELY TO BUILDING CONFIDENCE AND CLOSER RELATIONS
BETWEEN ALL EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, INCLUDING THE MEMBERS OF THE TWO
ALLIANCES. WE WELCOME THE STATEMENT ISSUED BY THE MEMBERS OF THE
WARSAW TREATY ORGANIZATION IN MOSCOW ON 7TH JUNE. WE ARE
ENCOURAGED BY THE POSITIVE SPIRIT CONVEYED IN THIS DECLARATION
AND IN PARTICULAR BY THE READINESS ON THE PART OF THE COUNTRIES
ISSUING IT FOR CONSTRUCTIVE COOPERATION.

THE CSCE PROCESS, WHICH WILL BECOME EVEN MORE IMPORTANT
AS AN INSTRUMENT FOR COOPERATION AND SECURITY IN EUROPE, SHOULD
BE STRENGTHENED AND GIVEN EFFECTIVE INSTITUTIONAL FORM. WE ARE
COMMITTED TO WORK FOR A RAPID AND SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION OF THE
VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS ON CONVENTIONAL FORCES. THE ARMS CONTROL
PROCESS MUST BE VIGOROUSLY PURSUED.

WE ARE CONVINCED THAT GERMAN UNIFICATION IS A MAJOR
CONTRIBUTION TO STABILITY IN EUROPE.

RECOGNISING THE EMINENTLY POLITICAL IMPORTANCE OF THESE
TASKS WE ARE READY TO DO OUR UTMOST FOR THEIR ACCOMPLISHMENT.

FINAL COMMUNIQUE

1. THE HISTORIC EVENTS THAT HAVE OCCURRED SINCE WE MET LAST DECEMBER IN BRUSSELS CONFIRM THAT EUROPE IS ENTERING A NEW ERA. THE COUNTRIES OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE ARE TAKING DECISIVE STEPS TO ESTABLISH DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS, HOLD FREE ELECTIONS AND PROMOTE POLITICAL PLURALISM AND MARKET-ORIENTED ECONOMIC POLICIES. GERMANY IS PEACEFULLY AND DEMOCRATICALLY MOVING TOWARDS UNITY. WE WELCOME THE EXPANSION AND DEEPENING OF POLITICAL EXCHANGES AT ALL LEVELS. THE VISITS TO NATO BY THE SOVIET, CZECHOSLOVAK AND POLISH FOREIGN MINISTERS EXEMPLIFY THIS BROADENED DIALOGUE. WE LOOK TO FURTHER SUCH OPPORTUNITIES IN THE FUTURE. A CONTINENT DIVIDED FOR FOUR DECADES IS SEARCHING FOR NEW PATTERNS AND STRUCTURES OF COOPERATION. THESE POSITIVE TRENDS ARE HAVING REPERCUSSIONS BEYOND EUROPE; DEMOCRACY, THE SEARCH FOR PEACEFUL SOLUTIONS AND RESPECT FOR HUMAN VALUES ARE GAINING GROUND IN OTHER PARTS OF THE WORLD AS WELL. OUR ALLIANCE REMAINS VITALLY IMPORTANT AS AN INSTRUMENT BOTH FOR ENSURING THE SECURITY OF ITS MEMBERS AND THE STABILITY OF EUROPE AND AS A KEYSTONE OF OUR EFFORTS TO BUILD A NEW EUROPEAN ORDER OF PEACE. AT THIS MEETING, WE HAVE LOOKED AHEAD TO BOTH CONTINUING AND NEW ALLIANCE TASKS IN SUPPORT OF THE POSITIVE CHANGES IN EUROPE. IN PREPARATION FOR THE DECISIONS TO BE TAKEN BY OUR HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT NEXT MONTH IN LONDON. TO THAT END, WE HAVE CONFIRMED OUR AGREEMENT ON THE FOLLOWING POINTS.

2. WE STRONGLY EMPHASISE THAT WE ATTACH THE HIGHEST PRIORITY TO THE CONCLUSION THIS YEAR OF A CFE TREATY. THIS MUST ENCOMPASS ALL SUBJECTS UNDER NEGOTIATION, AND RESULT IN SUBSTANTIAL, BINDING, VERIFIABLE REDUCTIONS OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE, THUS ELIMINATING DESTABILISING DISPARITIES AND THE CAPABILITY TO LAUNCH A SURPRISE ATTACK OR INITIATE LARGE-SCALE OFFENSIVE ACTION. SUCH A TREATY WOULD BE A DRAMATIC ADVANCE TOWARDS GREATER STABILITY AND SECURITY IN EUROPE. THAT GOAL IS WITHIN SIGHT, AND IT IS NOW IMPERATIVE THAT THE REMAINING OBSTACLES TO ITS ACHIEVEMENT BE REMOVED. WE REMAIN READY TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE STATED INTERESTS OF THE OTHER PARTICIPANTS AND TO EXPLORE ALL OPEN ISSUES ON THE BASIS OF A WILLINGNESS ON ALL SIDES TO MAKE REASONABLE COMPROMISES. WE HAVE THEREFORE INSTRUCTED OUR NEGOTIATORS IN VIENNA TO PURSUE NEW APPROACHES TO MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS, IN PARTICULAR ON AIRCRAFT, ARMOUR AND VERIFICATION. WE CALL ON THE SOVIET UNION TO COOPERATE IN REACHING AGREEMENT ON ALL SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES THIS SUMMER, IN ORDER THAT PROGRESS CAN BE MADE ON THE BROADER AGENDA FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF A NEW EUROPE, INCLUDING A CSCE SUMMIT LATER THIS YEAR.

3. ALLIED GOVERNMENTS WILL CONTINUE TO WORK FOR SUBSTANTIVE RESULTS IN THE CSBM NEGOTIATIONS, IN THE FORM OF AN AGREEMENT LATER THIS YEAR. TO THAT END, ALLIES HAVE RECENTLY PROPOSED A SERIES OF INNOVATIVE COOPERATIVE MEASURES, SUCH AS A MECHANISM FOR DISCUSSION OF UNUSUAL ACTIVITIES OF A MILITARY NATURE AND ANNUAL IMPLEMENTATION ASSESSMENT MEETINGS. WE WILL CONTINUE TO BUILD ON THE CONTRIBUTIONS TO CONFIDENCE-BUILDING FLOWING FROM THE MILITARY DOCTRINE SEMINAR HELD IN JANUARY IN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE CSBM NEGOTIATIONS IN ORDER TO FURTHER EXPAND MILITARY CONTACTS AND EXCHANGES ON MILITARY MATTERS.

4. AS SOON AS A CFE AGREEMENT IS REACHED, ALLIES WILL BE PREPARED TO UNDERTAKE FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS TO FURTHER ENHANCE SECURITY AND STABILITY IN EUROPE. THE OBJECTIVES OF THESE FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, AND OF OUR FURTHER QUEST FOR EUROPEAN SECURITY, INCLUDING THROUGH CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL, WILL BE CONSIDERED AT OUR MEETING OF HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT.

5. WE WELCOME THE PROGRESS ATTAINED AT THE US-SOVIET SUMMIT HELD LAST WEEK AND, IN PARTICULAR, THE AGREEMENT ON MAJOR OUTSTANDING ISSUES GOVERNING A START TREATY THAT WILL RESULT IN DEEP REDUCTIONS IN BOTH SIDES STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND GREATLY EXPAND BILATERAL MILITARY TRANSPARENCY IN THAT AREA, AS WELL AS AGREEMENT TO BEGIN FURTHER TALKS ON STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES SPECIFICALLY DEVOTED TO ACHIEVING A MORE STABLE STRATEGIC BALANCE AFTER THE CURRENT TREATY IS COMPLETED. WE TOOK SPECIAL NOTE OF THE PROGRESS REPRESENTED BY THE SIGNATURE AT THAT SUMMIT MEETING OF VERIFICATION PROTOCOLS FOR TREATIES LIMITING NUCLEAR TESTING AND EXPRESSED OUR SATISFACTION WITH THE BILATERAL AGREEMENT THAT WILL DRASTICALLY REDUCE BOTH SIDES STOCKS OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS.

6. WE BELIEVE THE US-SOVIET AGREEMENT ON REDUCING CHEMICAL WEAPONS STOCKPILES WILL PROVIDE GREAT IMPETUS TOWARDS THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE CONCLUSION OF THE CONVENTION FOR AN EFFECTIVELY VERIFIABLE, GLOBAL AND COMPREHENSIVE BAN ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS NOW BEING NEGOTIATED, WHICH REMAINS OUR GOAL. ALL ALLIES HEREBY STATE THEIR INTENTION TO BE AMONG THE ORIGINAL SIGNATORIES TO THE CONVENTION AND TO PROMOTE ITS EARLY ENTRY INTO FORCE. WE CALL ON ALL OTHER STATES TO UNDERTAKE A SIMILAR COMMITMENT. WE REAFFIRM OUR DETERMINATION TO WORK TO PREVENT THE PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND OF MISSILES CAPABLE OF CARRYING SUCH WEAPONS.

7. WE WILL PURSUE THE "OPEN SKIES" INITIATIVE, CONVINCED THAT SUCH A REGIME WOULD MAKE A SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTION TO THE OPENNESS AND TRANSPARENCY WE WISH TO ENCOURAGE. WE THEREFORE REGRET THAT OUR EFFORTS TO REACH SUCH AN AGREEMENT HAVE THUS FAR NOT BEEN SUCCESSFUL AND LOOK TO THE SOVIET UNION TO JOIN WITH US TO TAKE THE STEPS NECESSARY TO CREATE AN "OPEN SKIES" REGIME THAT WILL INCREASE CALCULABILITY, MUTUAL CONFIDENCE AND THE SECURITY OF ALL PARTICIPANTS.

8. RECOGNISING THAT THE VERIFICATION OF ARMS CONTROL TREATIES IS DESTINED TO BECOME A LONG-TERM TASK FOR THE ALLIANCE WE HAVE DECIDED TO ESTABLISH A COORDINATION MECHANISM FOR THIS PURPOSE.

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Storing Message

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FINAL PART OF TWO

9. WE AGREE ON THE CRUCIAL IMPORTANCE OF THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REFORMS UNDERWAY IN THE STATES OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE AND THE SOVIET UNION. THE CONTINUED PROGRESS OF THESE STATES TOWARDS BECOMING DEMOCRATIC AND ECONOMICALLY PROSPEROUS PARTNERS COOPERATING WITH US WILL BE AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT IN THE FUTURE SECURITY AND STABILITY OF EUROPE. WE ARE PREPARED TO SUPPORT THEIR EFFORTS TO INTEGRATE THEIR ECONOMIES MORE CLOSELY INTO THE WORLD ECONOMY AND TO WIDEN AND DEEPEN THE SCOPE OF OUR COOPERATION WITH THEM AS THEY PROGRESS, THUS CONTRIBUTING TO THE SUCCESS OF THEIR REFORM PROGRAMMES.

10. WE STRONGLY HOPE THAT THE PROCESSES OF ECONOMIC REORIENTATION AND DEVELOPMENT AND OF DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTION-BUILDING IN THESE COUNTRIES, NECESSARILY COMPLICATED AND UNEVEN, WILL SUCCESSFULLY OVERCOME PERIODS OF UNCERTAINTY AND POTENTIAL INSTABILITY. THE HISTORIC CHANGES ALREADY UNDERWAY AND THE PROSPECTS FOR FURTHER POSITIVE DEVELOPMENTS HAVE NOT REMOVED ALL GROUNDS FOR CONCERN ABOUT THE STABILITY AND SECURITY OF EUROPE. MOREOVER, WE CANNOT BE OBLIVIOUS TO THE FACT THAT THE SOVIET UNION WILL RETAIN SUBSTANTIAL MILITARY CAPABILITIES, WHICH IT IS CONTINUING TO MODERNISE AND WHICH HAVE IMPLICATIONS FOR OUR DEFENCE.

11. THE NEED TO MAINTAIN OUR COMMON DEFENCE REMAINS VITAL. THE ALLIANCE'S ROLE IN PREVENTING CONFLICT, PRECLUDING THE USE OR THREAT OF FORCE AGAINST ANY OF ITS MEMBERS AND GUARANTEEING STABILITY WILL CONTINUE TO BE ESSENTIAL. THAT ROLE IS BUILT UPON THE PRINCIPLE OF THE INDIVISIBILITY OF SECURITY FOR ALL MEMBER COUNTRIES AND EMBODIES AN INDISPENSABLE LINK BETWEEN NORTH AMERICA AND EUROPEAN DEMOCRACIES. FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE, THE PREVENTION OF WAR WILL CONTINUE TO REQUIRE AN APPROPRIATE MIX OF SURVIVABLE AND EFFECTIVE CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR FORCES, AT THE LOWEST LEVELS CONSISTENT WITH OUR SECURITY NEEDS. OUR RESOLVE, OUR COMMITMENT TO THE EQUITABLE AND WIDESPREAD SHARING OF RESPONSIBILITIES, AND OUR SOLIDARITY WITH WHICH WE HAVE MAINTAINED ADEQUATE COLLECTIVE DEFENCE ARRANGEMENTS FOR SO LONG, INCLUDING THE PRESENCE OF SIGNIFICANT NORTH AMERICAN CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR FORCES IN EUROPE, WILL CONTINUE TO BE CRUCIAL FACTORS IN THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE IN EUROPE.

12. THE MILITARY RISKS FACING THE ALLIANCE HAVE ALREADY DECREASED SUBSTANTIALLY, AND IMPLEMENTATION OF A SUCCESSFUL CFE AGREEMENT WOULD RESULT IN A FURTHER DRAMATIC IMPROVEMENT. THE PRINCIPLES OF ALLIANCE SECURITY SET OUT IN MAY 1989 IN THE COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPT OF ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ARE THE BASIS FOR OUR FURTHER WORK IN ASSESSING THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE CHANGING SITUATION IN EUROPE FOR OUR STRATEGY. THUS, THOSE GOVERNMENTS AMONG US PARTICIPATING IN THE DEFENCE PLANNING COMMITTEE WELCOME ITS RECENT DECISION TO UNDERTAKE A REVIEW OF NATO'S MILITARY STRATEGY, AND THE MEANS OF IMPLEMENTING IT, IN THE EMERGING CIRCUMSTANCES. THEY ALSO WELCOME THE INVITATION TO THE NATO MILITARY AUTHORITIES TO UNDERTAKE A STUDY OF THE POSSIBILITIES FOR GREATER USE OF MULTI-NATIONAL FORCES. THEY ENDORSE THE US PRESIDENT'S RECENT PROPOSAL THAT NEGOTIATIONS ON US AND SOVIET SHORT-RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPON SYSTEMS IN EUROPE BEGIN SHORTLY AFTER A CFE AGREEMENT IS CONCLUDED.

13. WE SEE THE CSCE PROCESS AS AN IMPORTANT FRAMEWORK FOR
REACHING REFORMS AND STABILITY AND AS A CENTRAL ELEMENT IN
THE CONSTRUCTION OF A NEW EUROPE, ALONG WITH OTHER EUROPEAN
INSTITUTIONS INCLUDING THE ALLIANCE ITSELF. THE FUNCTION OF THE
ALLIANCE WILL BE COMPLEMENTARY TO THAT OF THE ALLIANCE. THE CSCE,
HAVING FROM THE OUTSET SERVED TO EASE THE BURDEN OF THE DIVISION
OF EUROPE, WILL NOW BECOME EVEN MORE VITAL AS AN INSTRUMENT FOR
DEVELOPING STRUCTURES FOR A EUROPE WHOLE AND FREE AND FOR
COOPERATION WITHIN A UNITED CONTINENT. THE ALLIES LOOK FORWARD
TO AN EARLY OUTCOME TO THE CFE NEGOTIATIONS WHICH ARE TAKING
PLACE IN THE CSCE FRAMEWORK AND TO CONTINUED PROGRESS IN THE
TALKS ON CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES, WHICH,
ALONG WITH RESULTS OF CSCE INTER-SESSIONAL ACTIVITIES, WILL LAY
THE NECESSARY BASIS FOR THE CSCE SUMMIT THIS YEAR. THE SUMMIT
SHOULD REFLECT THE NEW ROLE OF THE CSCE AND TAKE APPROPRIATE
DECISIONS. FURTHERMORE, IT IS THE HOPE OF THE ALLIES THAT THE
"2 PLUS 4" PROCESS WILL BE COMPLETED PRIOR TO THE CSCE SUMMIT.
THAT SUMMIT WILL HELP CONSOLIDATE THE CHANGES THAT HAVE TAKEN
PLACE IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE AND PROVIDE SUBSTANTIAL
NEW IMPETUS TO THE CSCE PROCESS IN ALL MAIN AREAS OF THE
HELSINKI FINAL ACT. TO THIS END, IMPLEMENTATION IN LETTER AND
SPIRIT OF ALL CSCE OBLIGATIONS BY ALL CSCE PARTICIPATING STATES
REMAINS ESSENTIAL. MEANWHILE, WE BELIEVE THAT THE TIME HAS NOW
COME TO DETERMINE THE MODALITIES OF INSTITUTIONALISATION
WITHOUT DEPRIVING THE PROCESS OF ITS FLEXIBILITY AND BALANCE.
A NUMBER OF VALUABLE PROPOSALS HAVE BEEN RAISED WITHIN THE
FRAMEWORK OF ALLIANCE CONSULTATIONS FOR THE FURTHER DEVELOPMENT
OF THE CSCE PROCESS AND FOR ENHANCING REGIONAL COOPERATION
EFFORTS. THEY INCLUDE A CONSULTATION MECHANISM ON A HIGH LEVEL
AS WELL AS OTHER ARRANGEMENTS IN SPECIFIC FIELDS OF COOPERATION.
OUR GOVERNMENTS CONTINUE TO DEVELOP THESE IDEAS AS OUR
PREPARATIONS CONTINUE FOR THE CSCE SUMMIT. WE ARE PLEASED THAT
OTHER CSCE PARTICIPANTS ARE EQUALLY DEVELOPING THEIR IDEAS. WE
WELCOME THE DECISION OF THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE 35 CSCE
STATES AT THEIR MEETING IN COPENHAGEN ON 5TH JUNE 1990 TO
ESTABLISH A PREPARATORY COMMITTEE FOR THE SUMMIT, AND FOR
MINISTERS OF THE "35" TO MEET IN THE UNITED STATES THIS
AUTUMN.

14. WELCOMING AGREEMENT AT THE RECENT BONN CONFERENCE ON
ECONOMIC COOPERATION IN EUROPE ON FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES TO
GUIDE THE CONVERSION FROM PLANNED TO MARKET-ORIENTED ECONOMIES,
WE FULLY SUPPORT THE EFFORTS OF THE COPENHAGEN MEETING OF THE
CONFERENCE ON THE HUMAN DIMENSION NOW UNDERWAY TO REINFORCE
AND EXTEND THE PROTECTION AND GUARANTEE OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND
INDIVIDUAL FREEDOMS. ALLIES PLACE PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE ON
RESOLUTIONS CONCERNING THE RIGHT TO FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS
HELD AT REGULAR INTERVALS, A COMMITMENT TO THE RULE OF LAW,
AND RIGHTS OF PERSONS BELONGING TO NATIONAL MINORITIES AMONG
MANY PROPOSALS PUT FORWARD FOR CONSIDERATION AT THE COPENHAGEN
MEETING. WE HOPE THAT THE PALMA DE MALLORCA MEETING ON THE
MEDITERRANEAN WILL CONTRIBUTE TO ENHANCING COOPERATION ALSO
IN THAT REGION. WE ALSO WELCOME THE INTEREST RECENTLY EXPRESSED
BY THE ALBANIAN GOVERNMENT IN ASSOCIATING ITSELF WITH THE
CSCE PROCESS AND THE COMMITMENTS THEREIN. WE LOOK TO THE
ALBANIAN GOVERNMENT TO DEMONSTRATE ITS WILLINGNESS TO COMPLY
WITH ALL EXISTING CSCE COMMITMENTS, INCLUDING THOSE ON HUMAN
RIGHTS.

15. WE NOTE WITH PRIDE THAT AFTER 40 YEARS AS A DIVIDED CITY,
BERLIN IS FINALLY GROWING TOGETHER AGAIN. THE BERLIN WALL
HAS COME DOWN. THIS HERALDS THE LONG-AWAITED ENDING OF THE
POST-WAR ERA AND OF THE DIVISION OF GERMANY AND OF EUROPE.
THE REALISATION OF THE UNITY OF GERMANY HAS ALWAYS BEEN A
PRIMARY GOAL OF OUR ALLIANCE. THEREFORE, ON THE BASIS OF OUR
CLOSE AND CONTINUING CONSULTATIONS WITHIN THE ALLIANCE, WE
ARE UNITED IN ACTIVELY SUPPORTING THE PROGRESS THAT HAS ALREADY
BEEN ACHIEVED IN THE PROCESS OF GERMAN UNIFICATION. SEMI COLON
WE ALSO SUPPORT THE EFFORTS UNDERWAY IN THE "2 PLUS 4" TALKS
TO SEEK A FINAL SETTLEMENT UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW TERMINATING
THE FOUR POWER RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES RELATING TO BERLIN
AND GERMANY AS A WHOLE, AND WITHOUT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF
CONSTRAINTS ON THE SOVEREIGNTY OF GERMANY. A UNITED GERMANY
MUST HAVE THE RIGHT, RECOGNISED IN THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT,
TO CHOOSE TO BE A PARTY TO A TREATY OF ALLIANCE. WE BELIEVE
THAT EUROPEAN STABILITY, AS WELL AS THE WISHES OF THE GERMAN
PEOPLE, REQUIRES THAT A UNIFIED GERMANY BE A FULL MEMBER OF
THIS ALLIANCE, INCLUDING ITS INTEGRATED MILITARY STRUCTURE,
WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO STATED POSITIONS ABOUT NON DEPLOYMENT OF
NATO FORCES ON THE PRESENT CDR TERRITORY. THE SECURITY
GUARANTEE PROVIDED BY ARTICLES 5 AND 6 OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC
TREATY WILL EXTEND TO ALL THE TERRITORY OF A UNITED GERMANY.
WE SEEK NO UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE FROM GERMAN UNITY AND ARE
PREPARED TO DEMONSTRATE THIS, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT LEGITIMATE
SOVIET SECURITY INTERESTS. A FREE AND DEMOCRATIC GERMANY WILL
BE AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF A PEACEFUL ORDER IN EUROPE IN
WHICH NO STATE NEED HARBOUR FEARS FOR ITS SECURITY AGAINST
ITS NEIGHBOURS. WE UNDERLINE THE IMPORTANCE OF THE POINTS ON
GERMAN UNIFICATION DISCUSSED WITH THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP IN
WASHINGTON, WHICH FULLY REFLECT OUR CONSULTATIONS.

16. WE EXPRESS THE WISH THAT THE PROBLEMS ACCOMPANYING THE DIFFICULT INTERNAL TRANSITION OF THE SOVIET UNION BE SOLVED IN A CONSTRUCTIVE MANNER AND TO THE SATISFACTION OF ALL CONCERNED. IN THIS CONTEXT, WE FIRMLY SUPPORT THE EXPECTATIONS AND ASPIRATIONS OF THE BALTIC PEOPLES, IT IS OUR UNDERSTANDING THAT THE LEADERS OF LITHUANIA AND THE SOVIET UNION HAVE INDICATED THEIR WILLINGNESS TO BEGIN A DIALOGUE UPON THE SUSPENSION - AND NOT RETRACTION - BY THE LITHUANIAN LEADERSHIP OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THEIR DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE. WE APPEAL TO ALL PARTIES TO SHOW FLEXIBILITY AND ENTER INTO TRUE DIALOGUE TO REACH AN EARLY SOLUTION.

17. OUR ACTIVITIES IN THE SCIENTIFIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL FIELDS, KNOWN AS NATO'S "THIRD DIMENSION", REMAIN OF MAJOR BENEFIT TO OUR MEMBER NATIONS AND ARE AN EXPRESSION OF THEIR SOLIDARITY. IN THE SPIRIT OF THE 40TH ANNIVERSARY SUMMIT DECLARATION, WE SHALL PURSUE MEASURES TO INVITE SCIENTIFIC EXPERTS FROM CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE TO PARTICIPATE IN WORK ON THE ENVIRONMENT CONNECTED WITH PILOT STUDIES WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE CHALLENGES OF MODERN SOCIETY.

18. THE NATO SUMMIT IN MAY 1989 LAUNCHED A DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS FELLOWSHIP PROGRAMME INTENDED TO HELP QUALIFIED APPLICANTS FROM CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE, AS WELL AS THOSE FROM ALLIANCE COUNTRIES, TO STUDY OUR DEMOCRATIC VALUES AND WAY OF LIFE. WE INTEND TO PURSUE THIS INITIATIVE AND ARE PLEASED WITH THE STRONG RESPONSE IT HAS RECEIVED IN ITS FIRST YEAR.

19. MINDFUL OF THE CONTINUING NEED TO INFORM OUR PUBLICS BETTER ABOUT THE WORK AND OBJECTIVES OF THE ALLIANCE, WE EXPRESSED OUR STRONG SUPPORT FOR THE NETWORK OF ATLANTIC COMMITTEES AND ASSOCIATIONS BROUGHT TOGETHER UNDER THE ATLANTIC TREATY ASSOCIATION.

WE ARE CONVINCED THAT THEY HAVE A VITAL ROLE TO PLAY IN DEEPENING PUBLIC UNDERSTANDING OF THE ROLE OF THE ALLIANCE. WE UNDERLINE THE GREAT VALUE OF THE EXCHANGES OF VIEW IN THE NORTH ATLANTIC ASSEMBLY ON ISSUES FACING THE ALLIANCE.

20. THE DEVELOPMENTS WHICH WE ARE NOW WITNESSING AND OF WHICH WE HAVE BEEN AND WILL CONTINUE TO BE AMONG THE PRINCIPAL ARCHITECTS, ARE PRODUCING FAR-REACHING CHANGES IN THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY FUNDAMENTALS OF EUROPEAN SECURITY, AND CONSEQUENTLY IN THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH OUR ALLIANCE IS REQUIRED TO WORK.

THESE CHANGES CALL INTO QUESTION NEITHER THE NECESSITY FOR MAINTAINING THE ALLIANCE NOR THE PERMANENCE OF ITS FUNDAMENTAL FEATURES. WE WILL KEEP OUR ALLIANCE DYNAMIC AND COHESIVE AND WILL CONTINUE TO FOSTER A SOLID AND FRUITFUL TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NORTH AMERICA AND AN INCREASINGLY UNITED EUROPE. WE WILL REMAIN COGNISANT OF THE NEED FOR INTRA-ALLIANCE COOPERATION AND ASSISTANCE. WE MUST CONTINUE, IN THE FACE OF HISTORIC CHANGE, TO DEEPEN AND STRENGTHEN OUR POLITICAL CONSULTATION AND, WHERE APPROPRIATE, COORDINATION.

THUS, WHILE ENSURING THAT THE PERMANENT PRINCIPLES WHICH FORM THE BASIS OF OUR ALLIANCE AND GUARANTEE ITS EFFECTIVENESS ARE PRESERVED, WE MUST TODAY ADAPT IT TO THE ENORMOUS CHANGES NOW TAKING PLACE.

WE HAVE ALREADY BEGUN THIS PROCESS IN THE POLITICAL AND DEFENCE SPHERES, AS DEMONSTRATED BY OUR MINISTERIAL CONSULTATIONS THIS SPRING. WE HAVE SHOWN OURSELVES READY, THROUGH THE ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS IN WHICH WE ARE PARTICIPATING OR WHICH WE ARE PREPARING TO INITIATE, TO ADJUST THE SIZE OF THE ALLIES' CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR FORCES. WE HAVE NOTED THAT THE DEFENCE MINISTERS WHO PARTICIPATE IN THE NUCLEAR PLANNING GROUP AND THE DEFENCE PLANNING COMMITTEE HAVE DECIDED TO RECONSIDER THEIR STRATEGY. ALTHOUGH THE PREVENTION OF WAR WILL ALWAYS REMAIN OUR FUNDAMENTAL TASK, THE CHANGING EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENT NOW REQUIRES OF US A BROADER APPROACH TO SECURITY BASED AS MUCH ON CONSTRUCTIVE PEACE-BUILDING AS ON PEACE-KEEPING.

21. WE RECOGNISE, AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF THE CHANGES NOW TAKING PLACE IN EUROPE, THAT THE MODIFICATIONS IN CERTAIN ASPECTS OF THE ALLIANCE'S POLICIES AND FUNCTIONING WILL FORM PART OF A BROADER PATTERN OF ADAPTATION WITHIN THE ORGANIZATION. THIS PROCESS SHOULD ENCOMPASS ALL ACTIVITIES OF OUR ALLIANCE AND MUST BE CONSISTENT WITH THE PRINCIPLES WHICH WE HAVE DECLARED TO BE PERMANENT AND WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE NEW ERA UPON WHICH WE ARE EMBARKING. WE HAVE, THEREFORE, INSTRUCTED OUR COUNCIL IN PERMANENT SESSION TO OVERSEE THE WORK IN HAND, WITH A VIEW TO ENSURING THAT IT IS EFFECTIVELY COORDINATED, AND TO REPORT REGULARLY TO US ON THE PROGRESS MADE.

22. WE EXPRESS OUR DEEP APPRECIATION FOR THE WARM HOSPITALITY PROVIDED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM.

HURD

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Storing Message

UNIVERSITY OF NEWCASTLE UPON TYNE

Professor Laurence Martin
Vice-Chancellor



Newcastle upon Tyne NE1 7RU
Telephone 091 222 6064

(4)
P. Martin
CDS

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LWM:amp

7 June, 1990

R11/6

De Prime Minister,

I apologise for the fact that, my having only returned from the United States three or four days ago, it was not possible for me to rearrange my diary so as to make the rather difficult cross-country journey to Turnberry possible.

As a consequence I was compelled to decline your very kind invitation to lunch. I very much regret this and apologise for my inability to attend.

Yours sincerely
Laurence Martin

The Rt. Hon. Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, PC, MP,
Prime Minister and First Lord of the Treasury,
10 Downing Street,
LONDON S.W.1.

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FM COI LONDON
TO IMMEDIATE MOSCOW
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AND TO IMMEDIATE BIS NEW YORK

FOREIGN SECRETARY: PRESS BRIEFING AT NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL MEETING

FOLLOWING IS TRANSCRIPT OF PRESS BRIEFING AT THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL MEETING GIVEN BY THE FOREIGN SECRETARY MR DOUGLAS HURD IN TURNBERRY ON THURSDAY, 7 JUNE 1990:

QUESTION:

THE MOOD OF OPTIMISM OVER THE SOVIET UNION AND A UNITED GERMANY APPEARED TO STRENGTHEN TODAY, SPECIFICALLY THERE APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN MOVEMENT ON CFE AND CENTRAL EUROPEAN FORCES?

FOREIGN SECRETARY:

WE HAVE WORKED OUT 9 WAYS IN WHICH WE THINK WE CAN EVENTUALLY PERSUADE THE SOVIET UNION THAT THE UNITED GERMANY COULD REMAIN IN NATO ACCEPTABLY TO THEM.

QUESTION:

BUT THE MOVEMENT TODAY SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN THAT GERMAN AND PERHAPS BRITISH FORCES COULD BE ON THE NEGOTIATING TABLE THIS AUTUMN?

FOREIGN SECRETARY:

WE WOULD BE WILLING TO SAY TO THE RUSSIANS: 'LOOK, IN ADDITION TO COUNTING YOUR OWN AND THE AMERICAN FORCES, WHICH IS IN THE EXISTING TREATY BEING NEGOTIATED, WE WOULD BE WILLING TO FIND WAYS IN WHICH OTHER FORCES IN THAT CENTRAL ZONE COULD BE COUNTED COULD SHOW, THE AMERICANS HAVE ALREADY SHOWN, THAT WE WOULD BE WILLING TO SIT DOWN AND CONSIDER THAT.

QUESTION:

THE ITALIAN FOREIGN SECRETARY TOLD US THIS AFTERNOON THAT AS FAR AS HE WAS CONCERNED HE THOUGHT THERE WAS NO LONGER A PROBLEM WITH THE SOVIETS OVER GERMANY, DO YOU THINK THAT IS A LITTLE OVER-OPTIMISTIC?

FOREIGN SECRETARY:

THE ITALIANS LIKE TO BE OPTIMISTIC AND THAT IS FINE. NO, THERE IS A PROBLEM, OF COURSE THERE IS, AND I THINK IT WILL TAKE SEVERAL MEETINGS TO IRON OUT. WE HAVE GOT OUR NEXT MEETING WITH THE RUSSIANS IN A FORTNIGHT IN BERLIN.

QUESTION:

THERE WAS ALSO SOME SPECULATION, I SUSPECT MORE OUT THAN INSIDE THE CONFERENCE ROOM, ABOUT NUCLEAR MODERNISATION AND THE IMPLICATION OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S SPEECH, DID YOU DISCUSS THAT AT ALL TODAY?

FOREIGN SECRETARY:

NO, WE DID NOT DISCUSS IT AT ALL AND WE WILL NOT TOMORROW EITHER BECAUSE EVERYBODY AGREES THAT NATO NEEDS A SENSIBLE MIX OF CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS, WHICH IT HAS GOT NOW. AND ONE DAY IN THE MEDIUM FUTURE WE WILL HAVE TO DECIDE WHAT MIX IS GOING TO BE THERE FOR THE FUTURE. BUT IT IS NOT ON OUR AGENDA TODAY.

QUESTION:

MRS THATCHER, IN HER SPEECH HERE, MADE GREAT PLAY OF THE NEED FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS, UP-DATING, ETC, WHICH DOES NOT SEEM VERY A VERY CONCILIATORY NOTE FOR THE RUSSIANS?

FOREIGN SECRETARY:

OH BUT THERE IS NOTHING NEW ABOUT THAT. THIS IS THE SENSIBLE MIX. WE DO NOT BELIEVE IN REMOVING THE NUCLEAR DETERRENT. WE DO NOT KNOW WHO WILL BE RUNNING THE SOVIET UNION IN A FEW YEARS TIME. THE RUSSIANS ARE REALISTS. OF COURSE WE HAVE TO RETAIN SOME KIND OF SECURITY AGAINST CONVENTIONAL AS WELL AS NUCLEAR ATTACK AND THAT IS WHAT THE NUCLEAR DETERRENT PROVIDES.

QUESTION:

THE OTHER POINT THAT SHE MADE ABOUT GERMAN UNITY WITHIN NATO, DOES SHE NOT FACE AN UP-HILL TASK THERE IN CONVINCING MR GORBACHEV?

FOREIGN SECRETARY:

I THINK THE SLOPE UP-HILL IS GETTING A LITTLE LESS STEEP. THERE IS STILL A TASK BUT WE HAVE WORKED OUT AT THIS MEETING 9 DIFFERENT WAYS IN WHICH WE ARE PREPARED TO MEET SOVIET CONCERNS. I HOPE THAT AS THESE IDEAS ARE WORKED OUT IN PRACTICE, AS WE DISCUSS THEM WITH THE RUSSIANS IN OUR NEXT TWO-PLUS-FOUR MEETING IN BERLIN LATER THIS MONTH, WE WILL GRADUALLY BE ABLE TO PERSUADE THEM THAT THERE IS A DEAL THERE. THEY DO NOT HAVE A VETO ON WHAT THE GERMANS DECIDE TO DO IN THE WAY OF JOINING AN ALLIANCE, BUT WE WOULD LIKE THAT TO HAPPEN - UNITED GERMAN MEMBERSHIP OF NATO - IN A WAY WHICH THE RUSSIANS FIND ACCEPTABLE.

QUESTION:

CAN I ASK ABOUT THE INCLUSION OF BRITISH TROOPS IN CONVENTIONAL FORCES TALKS, ON WHAT TERMS WOULD THAT TAKE PLACE?

FOREIGN SECRETARY:

THAT IS NOT BEING WORKED OUT AT ALL. ALL WE ARE SAYING IS THAT WE WOULD BE WILLING, AT THE RIGHT TIME, TO DISCUSS, TO HAVE AS PART OF A GENERAL DISARMAMENT DISCUSSION, HOW ALL FORCES IN THAT CENTRAL ZONE OF EUROPE MIGHT BE COUNTED AND THEREFORE LIMITED.

QUESTION:

AND THAT WOULD INCLUDE BRITISH SOLDIERS IN GERMANY?

FOREIGN SECRETARY:

IT WOULD, AND FRENCH AND AMERICAN AND RUSSIAN. AND OF PARTICULAR INTEREST TO THE RUSSIANS, IT WOULD INCLUDE THE GERMAN ARMY ITSELF, BUT NOT EXCLUSIVELY.

QUESTION:

DO YOU HAVE ANY IMMEDIATE THOUGHTS ON THE NEWS FROM MOSCOW ABOUT THE WARSAW PACT LEADERS TALKING ABOUT SHIFTING THEIR ALLIANCE INTO A MORE POLITICAL ORGANISATION?

FOREIGN SECRETARY:

YES, THEY ARE OBVIOUSLY QUESTIONING THE EXISTING BASIS OF THE WARSAW PACT AND THEY HAVE SET UP A REVIEW TO LOOK AT IT ALL AND COME TO SOME CONCLUSIONS IN THE AUTUMN. I DO NOT THINK IT AFFECTS WHAT WE ARE DOING, IT SIMPLY SHOWS REALLY THAT THE TWO PACTS ARE NOT ON THE SAME BASIS.

QUESTION:

DOES IT INTENSIFY PRESSURE ON NATO TO MOVE MORE QUICKLY TOWARDS BECOMING MORE OF A POLITICAL ORGANISATION?

FOREIGN SECRETARY:

THE SECURITY SIDE OF NATO WILL STAY CRUCIAL - IT IS THAT WHICH KEEPS US SAFE. THE KNOWLEDGE THAT IF ANY OF THE 16 MEMBERS OF NATO IS ATTACKED, THE OTHERS WILL COME TO THEIR HELP. THE CSCE, MAKING NATO POLITICAL AND SO ON, ALL THAT IS IMPORTANT BUT WILL NOT ACTUALLY REMOVE THAT BASIC ROCK OF A FACT. SO WE WANT TO MAKE NATO MORE POLITICAL, THE PRIME MINISTER THREW OUT SOME IDEAS TODAY ON HOW THAT COULD BE DONE. NATO IS REALLY THE PLACE WHERE THE 16 ALLIES WORK OUT THEIR POLICIES ON ALL THESE MATTERS: DISARMAMENT, ARMS CONTROL, TALKING TO THE RUSSIANS AND THE EAST ABOUT THESE SECURITY MATTERS.

UNCL
QUESTION:

JUST BACK FROM THE MIDDLE EAST, YOU HAVE GIVEN SOME WARNINGS ABOUT YOUR ANXIETIES OVER WHAT IS GOING ON THERE, WHAT SPECIFIC ACTION DO YOU THINK SHOULD BE TAKEN TO TRY AND HELP THE SITUATION?

FOREIGN SECRETARY:

I THINK THAT THE AMERICANS OUGHT TO REMAIN ENGAGED IN TRYING TO BRING ABOUT PEACE. I HOPE THAT SOME WAY CAN BE FOUND FOR THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UN TO SEND A REPRESENTATIVE TO THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. I HOPE THAT THE PLO WILL NOT SIMPLY JUST RENOUNCE TERRORISM IN GENERAL BUT BE VERY SPECIFIC IN DEALING WITH TERRORIST INCIDENTS CAUSED BY PALESTINIANS. AND I HOPE THAT THE ISRAELIS WILL PRODUCE A GOVERNMENT WHICH IS AT LAST WILLING TO SIT DOWN IN A

FOREIGN SECRETARY:

DIALOGUE WITH THE PALESTINIANS, WHOSE TERRITORIES THEY OCCUPY.

QUESTION:

IS IT RIGHT THAT YOU HAVE ACTUALLY USED THE OPPORTUNITY OF YOUR TALKS HERE TO ACTUALLY ALARM YOUR COLLEAGUES?

FOREIGN SECRETARY:

ALERT, ALERT TO MY ALARM. I WAS PARTICULARLY KEEN TO TALK TO JIM BAKER. JIM BAKER IS THE AMERICAN SECRETARY OF STATE WHO, AMONG ALL OF THEM IN RECENT YEARS, HAS TAKEN THE MOST CONSTRUCTIVE INTEREST IN THE MIDDLE EAST. THE PEACE PROCESS HAS HAD A SET-BACK IN THE LAST FEW WEEKS, VARIOUS THINGS HAVE HAPPENED WHICH HAVE PUT IT BACK. I WAS VERY ANXIOUS THAT THE AMERICANS, WHO ARE IN A UNIQUE POSITION ON THIS, SHOULD NOT LOSE INTEREST OR FEEL DISCOURAGED OR WALK AWAY. AND I AM ENCOURAGED BY MY TALK WITH JIM BAKER ABOUT THIS, IN THE KNOWLEDGE THAT HE IS STILL FULLY ENGAGED.

QUESTION:

ANY REACTION TO THE NEWS FROM PRETORIA?

FOREIGN SECRETARY:

I HAVE HAD A TALK ON THE TELEPHONE WITH THE SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN MINISTER WHO WANTED TO TELL ME THE BACKGROUND, THAT THEY HAD DECIDED, ALTHOUGH IT IS DIFFICULT, TO LIFT THE STATE OF EMERGENCY IN ALL OF SOUTH AFRICA, EXCEPT NATAL WHERE THERE IS STILL FIGHTING BETWEEN AFRICANS, AND TO LET OUT 48 POLITICAL PRISONERS IN ADVANCE OF THE ARRANGEMENTS THEY ARE MAKING WITH THE ANC.

SO I WAS GLAD TO HAVE THIS BACKGROUND AND OBVIOUSLY WE WERE PLEASED THAT THIS IS A FURTHER STEP WHICH PRESIDENT DE KLERK IS TAKING IN THE PRELIMINARIES TO THE DISMANTLING OF APARTHEID. THERE IS STILL A LONG WAY TO GO FOR HIM AND FOR THE ANC AND MR MANDELA, BUT IT IS A FURTHER STEP AND A WELCOME ONE.

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AND TO PRIORITY COI INFORMATION ITEM ADDRESSEES

FOREIGN SECRETARY; AT NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL MEETING IN TURNBERRY

FOLLOWING IS TRANSCRIPT OF SPEECH GIVEN BY THE FOREIGN SECRETARY, MR. DOUGLAS HURD, AT NATO MEETING AT TURNBERRY, ON THURSDAY, 7 JUNE 1990.

THIS YEAR WILL BE REMEMBERED IN THE HISTORY BOOKS AS THE YEAR WHEN THE OLD BARRIERS CRUMBLED - THE YEAR OF EASTERN EUROPE, THE YEAR OF GERMANY. AT THE NATO SUMMIT LAST MAY, MARGARET THATCHER SAID THAT FOR THE FIRST TIME SINCE THE CREATION OF NATO THERE WAS A SENSE THAT IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO OVERCOME THE POLITICAL DIVISION OF EUROPE. SHE SAID THIS WOULD BE THE GREATEST VINDICATION OF ALL THAT NATO HAS STOOD FOR, BUT NO-ONE COULD HAVE PREDICTED THEN THAT A YEAR LATER WE SHOULD HAVE MADE SUCH GREAT STRIDES TOWARDS THAT GOAL.

SO NOW PEOPLE ASK WHETHER NATO CAN ADAPT TO THE NEW EUROPE OF THE 1990S. INDEED, A FEW ASK WHETHER WE STILL NEED NATO AT ALL AND IT IS AN IMPORTANT QUESTION BECAUSE SO MUCH HAS CHANGED, BUT WE BELIEVE THERE ARE GOOD REASONS FOR REPLYING TO THAT QUESTION WITH AN EMPHATIC 'YES.'.

ALL COUNTRIES NEED TO PROVIDE FOR THEIR DEFENCE AND NATO IS FOR US THE MOST EFFECTIVE WAY OF FULFILLING THIS BASIC TASK OF GOVERNMENT. IT OFFERS AN INSURANCE POLICY AT A TIME OF TRANSITION IN EUROPE, UNCERTAINTY IN THE WIDER WORLD.

BUT HISTORY HAS NOT STOPPED WITH THE REVOLUTIONS OF 1989 OR THE PROGRESS OF 1990. IT WOULD BE FOOLISH AND IT WOULD BE DEEPLY UNHISTORICAL TO SUPPOSE THAT OUR PEOPLES WILL FROM NOW ON LIVE IN SUCH TOTAL ABSOLUTE SECURITY THAT THERE IS NO NEED FOR COLLECTIVE DEFENCE AND THOSE WHO IN THE PAST SUCCUMBED TO THAT ILLUSION DO NOT ENJOY A PARTICULARLY DISTINGUISHED PLACE IN THE HISTORY BOOKS OF THEIR COUNTRIES.

NATO IS MORE THAN A PRODUCT OF THE COLD WAR. THE VERY FIRST LINES OF THE TREATY EXPRESS OUR COMMITMENT TO FREEDOM, DEMOCRACY AND THE RULE OF LAW - THOSE VALUES WHICH ARE NOW BLOSSOMING IN EASTERN EUROPE. THE ALLIANCE HAS AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN SAFEGUARDING THESE VALUES THROUGH THE 1990S.

FAR FROM CLINGING TO THE OLD ORDER, NATO IS AT THE CENTRE OF EFFORTS TO BUILD A NEW SECURITY ORDER IN EUROPE. TO DO THIS, TO MANAGE CHANGE IN EUROPE, TO BUILD A RELIABLE SECURITY FRAMEWORK, WILL NEED NATO AND THE TRANSATLANTIC SOLIDARITY WHICH IT EMBODIES AND SO AT THIS MEETING AND ITS SUCCESSORS. WE SHALL BE DISTINGUISHING CLEARLY BETWEEN THOSE ATTRIBUTES WHICH WILL REMAIN ESSENTIAL EVEN IN THE CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES AND THOSE WHICH NEED TO BE UPDATED.

AMONG THE ESSENTIAL ATTRIBUTES I WOULD LIST IN PARTICULAR A COLLECTIVE DEFENCE EFFORT TO PROVIDE THAT BEDROCK OF SECURITY FOR ALL ALLIES. I WOULD INCLUDE THE STATIONING IN GERMANY OF UNITED STATES AND OTHER ALLIED FORCES, ALBEIT AT REDUCED LEVELS. A SENSIBLE MIX OF NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL FORCES DEPLOYED IN EUROPE. THAT IS WHAT REMAINS.

WHAT CHANGES? A LOT IS ALREADY HAPPENING. THERE IS RIGHTLY MORE EMPHASIS ON NATO'S POLITICAL ROLE IN MANAGING CHANGE IN EUROPE, IN PURSUING ARMS CONTROL AND ITS VERIFICATION, IN DEVELOPING IDEAS FOR STRENGTHENING THE CSCE PROCESS, IN CONSULTING ON SECURITY PROBLEMS WHICH AFFECT EUROPE WHEREVER THEY ARISE.

WE ALSO NEED - AS WE SHALL BE DISCUSSING - TO ADAPT NATO'S MILITARY AND NUCLEAR STRATEGY. PROVIDED THAT THE EVOLUTION IN EUROPE CONTINUES AS WE HOPE WITH THE CFE TREATY SIGNED THIS AUTUMN, THE WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET FORCES FROM EASTERN EUROPE, THEN THERE SHOULD BE SCOPE FOR SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN THE STRUCTURE AND EMPLOYMENT OF NATO'S FORCES AND WE SHALL NEED TO DEVELOP NEW CONCEPTS SUCH AS MINIMUM DETERRENCE BECAUSE OUR LONG-TERM GOAL SHOULD BE TO BUILD UP TRUST AMONG ALL EUROPEANS TO THE LEVEL WHICH NOW EXISTS BETWEEN NATO ALLIES. THAT WILL TAKE A LONG TIME, BUT OUR ALLIANCE IS AT THE FOREFRONT OF THE EFFORTS TO BRING THAT ABOUT.

OF COURSE, A FUNDAMENTAL PART OF ENDING THIS DIVISION OF EUROPE WILL BE ENDING THE DIVISION OF GERMANY. WE NOW HAVE IN PLACE A GOOD FRAMEWORK OF CONSULTATIONS TO ENSURE THAT THOSE ASPECTS OF GERMAN UNITY WHICH CONCERN NATO ARE FULLY CONSIDERED WITHIN NATO AND WE WILL BE CONTINUING THAT PROCESS TODAY.

I WOULD LIKE TO SAY, ON BEHALF OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT, THAT WE ARE PARTICULARLY GRATEFUL TO OUR COLLEAGUE, HANS-DIETRICH GENSCHER, IN ENSURING THAT THE ALLIANCE HAS BEEN KEPT FULLY INFORMED OF DEVELOPMENTS AND I THINK WE CAN ALL MAKE THE EFFORT OF IMAGINATION TO UNDERSTAND THE INTENSE EAGERNESS, THE STRONG EMOTIONS OF GERMANS EAST AND WEST AS THEY WAIT AND WORK FOR THE ENDING OF THAT UNNATURAL DIVISION.

IT IS CLEAR FROM THE FREE CHOICE MADE BY THE GERMAN PEOPLE THAT A UNITED GERMANY WILL CONTINUE TO BE A FULL MEMBER OF NATO AND IF WE ARE TO PRESERVE THE SECURITY AND STABILITY AT THE HEART OF EUROPE, THEN A UNITED GERMANY IN NATO IS ESSENTIAL - THERE IS NO OTHER OPTION FOR THAT PURPOSE - AND THE EAST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES HAVE RECOGNISED THIS.

WE ALL KNOW THAT IT REMAINS A MATTER OF DEEP CONCERN TO THE SOVIET UNION AND WE FULLY ACCEPT THAT UNIFICATION MUST TAKE PLACE IN A WAY WHICH SAFEGUARDS LEGITIMATE SOVIET SECURITY INTERESTS BUT THERE IS MORE TO IT THAN THAT; ALL THOSE WHO VISIT THE SOVIET UNION COME AWAY KNOWING THAT THERE - PERHAPS THERE EVEN MORE VIVIDLY THAN ANYWHERE ELSE - MEMORIES OF THE LAST WAR, OF ITS CASUALTIES AND ITS SUFFERING REMAIN IN THE MINDS NOT JUST OF THE RULERS BUT OF THE PEOPLE. THERE, MEMORIES HAVE A POLITICAL POWER WHICH WE NEED TO UNDERSTAND.

THE PHILOSOPHY, THE REPRESSIVE POLICIES OF COMMUNISM HAVE FAILED AND NO-ONE OWES A DEBT TO THOSE WHO TRIED TO IMPOSE THEM BUT IT DOES NOT FOLLOW FROM THAT THAT WE SHOULD FORGET THE ANXIETIES OF THE PEOPLES OF THE SOVIET UNION AS THEY LOOK BACK UPON THEIR HISTORY. NONE OF US WISHES TO PREJUDICE OR UNDERMINE THE SECURITY WHICH THEY THOUGHT THEY HAD WON WITH 20 MILLION OR MORE OF DEAD.

THE SOVIET UNION HAS NO VETO OVER THE CHOICE OF THE GERMAN PEOPLE TO BELONG TO AN ALLIANCE. BUT I BELIEVE WE ARE ALL AGREED THAT IT IS WORTH WORKING IMAGINATIVELY TO FIND WAYS OF MAKING THAT GERMAN CHOICE ACCEPTABLE TO THE SOVIET UNION, IF WE CAN DO THIS WITHOUT PREJUDICING OUR OWN SUCCESS, OUR OWN SECURITY. THAT IS JUST ONE EXAMPLE OF THE WAY IN WHICH THE REMARKABLE CHANGES OF THE LAST YEAR CALL FOR CREATIVE NEW THINKING ABOUT THE STABILITY OF EUROPE.

IT IS A TRIBUTE TO NATO'S VITALITY THAT THIS WILL BE OUR
THIRD MEETING AT FOREIGN MINISTER LEVEL THIS YEAR AND THAT NEXT
MONTH'S SUMMIT IN LONDON WILL BE THE THIRD MEETING OF HEADS OF
GOVERNMENT IN FOURTEEN MONTHS - AND NATO IS ONLY PART OF THE CROWDED
PAGES OF OUR DIARIES THIS SUMMER, THIS AUTUMN. THERE ARE THE
REGULAR MEETINGS OF THE TWO-PLUS-FOUR MINISTERS TO DISCUSS THE
EXTERNAL ASPECTS OF GERMAN UNIFICATION. WE AIM TO REACH A
SETTLEMENT, WE AIM AT THE TERMINATION OF QUADRIPARTITE RIGHTS AND
RESPONSIBILITIES AND WE WANT TO TELL A CSCE SUMMIT IN THE AUTUMN
ABOUT THE OUTCOME. WE WANT TO USE THAT SUMMIT TO STRENGTHEN THE
CSCE PROCESS SO THAT IT CAN PLAY A CENTRAL PART IN PROMOTING
DEMOCRACY AND THE RULE OF LAW THROUGHOUT EUROPE. PREPARATIONS ARE
ALREADY UNDERWAY IN NATO AND WILL CONTINUE THROUGH THE SUMMER BUT
AS EACH OF THESE PROCESSES IS LINKED TO THE OTHER, THAT CSCE SUMMIT
WILL ONLY BE POSSIBLE IF WE CAN ACHIEVE A CFE TREATY TO PROVIDE A
FIRM BASE ON WHICH TO BUILD A NEW ORDER IN EUROPE AND HERE AGAIN,
NATO STANDS READY FOR INTENSE NEGOTIATIONS IN VIENNA OVER THE COMING
MONTHS. EVERYONE WILL HAVE TO TAKE A CONSTRUCTIVE PART IN THAT IF
WE ARE TO SETTLE THE OUTSTANDING PROBLEMS.

SO IN ALL THESE WAYS, I AM CLEAR THAT NATO WILL RISE TO THE
CHALLENGES OF THE 1990S AS IT HAS RISEN TO ALL OTHER CHALLENGES OVER
THE PAST 40 YEARS. WE HAVE TOGETHER FACED THE DANGERS OF THOSE 40
YEARS AND OVERCOME THEM. I DON'T THINK NOW WE SHALL ALLOW OURSELVES
TO BE DIVIDED, I DON'T THINK WE SHALL ALLOW OURSELVES TO BE
OUTWITTED BY OUR OWN SUCCESS. WE HAVE IN ALL THESE LINKED
DISCUSSIONS WHICH I HAVE BRIEFLY MENTIONED, A FORMIDABLE BURDEN OF
WORK BUT IT IS THE WORK OF CONSTRUCTION, OF BUILDING. AND THEREFORE
IT IS DEEPLY SATISFYING FOR THAT REASON. AS CRAFTSMEN AND
BUILDERS, WE HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY DENIED TO THOSE WHO CAME BEFORE US.
I AM CERTAIN THAT WE CAN CONSTRUCT A BUILDING WORTHY OF THOSE WHO
CAME AFTER.

COI LONDON

CKLNAN 3245

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Timi Bader's 9 points

file

1. Tr. per. in E.C.
2. No movement of NATO frontiers E.C.
3. Renunciation of W. Germany of making or possessing nuclear weapons
4. Limitation of Bundeswehr.
5. CFE agreement this year.
6. Possible further CFE
7. Strengthening CSCE.
8. A greater political role for NATO.
9. The progress of negotiations on INF

Armed &
Sufficing rule

PRESS DIGEST

they have largely failed to prevent discrimination and have left minorities feeling patronised and caused fear and tension among council staff.

Times says the Govt is to risk a rebellion of Tory backbenchers as it tries to reverse its defeat in the Lords over community care funding.

Police are to computer log details of families at risk from violent husbands.

John Poindexter jailed for 6 months over Iran/Contra affair; he appeals.

Shamir wins confidence vote in Israel allowing Rightwing coalition to continue.

PLO makes last minute bid to salvage US peace talks (Times).

Times writer in Morocco after 5 years, reports in the Times on the disenchantment with reforms that failed to deliver.

Mexico and USA to open talks to form an historic free trade agreement (Times).

Thailand faces political turmoil as the powerful deputy Prime Minister and defence minister abruptly resigns amid accusations of corruption and a dispute between military leaders and civilian politicians (Times).

Britain to oppose Venice site for Expo 2000 World Fair amid fears that the city could not support the strain (Independent).

Fears of huge liability claims in the event of an oil spill have prompted Shell to suspend crude oil shipments to US (FT).

SECURITY POLICY DEPARTMENT
TURNBERRY UNIT
K258

Head of Unit

Michael Robinson
270 3471

Liaison with NATO
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PR2ADI

FOLL

FROM

NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL: PRIVATE MEETING OF FOREIGN
MINISTERS

SUM

Ministers agreed to give a constructive response to
the Warsaw Pact communiqué but without implying symmetry
between the two alliances. Ministers also agreed that NATO Summit
is a unique and important way of view. Near view
that the Warsaw Pact must not be allowed to become a
substitute for NATO.

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2. Ministers had before them the text of the Warsaw Pact
communiqué.

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communiqué. The Secretary of State said we should not imply symmetry. We did not want a dialogue with the East. At the heart of the communiqué we should refer in conciliatory terms to the Warsaw Pact statement. This approach was agreed.

BALTIC STATES

3. Womack said this should be discussed privately over dinner rather than in the main meeting because of different views. He asked Baker how far he thought things should be taken. Baker avoided the question and gave the standard briefing on recent developments in the Baltics. Clark said both sides were very close on paper.

We should note their agreement to suspend the declaration of independence and urge them into a dialogue. Baker agreed that we should go for language on these lines in the communiqué.

NATO SUMMIT

4. Womack, in something of a lather, said that time was short. NATO had a duty to prepare, etc. On OPEL, he thought that all members of the Alliance were willing to find a way of showing the Soviets in the context of OPEL that we were willing to go on and find a way of counting forces in the central zone. Genscher agreed. Genscher should not be singled out. Baker said that we needed to operate on the basis of a sufficiency rule. The High Level Task Force should work out the best way of showing the Soviets that we were willing. This was agreed. There was no ~~discussion~~ ^{discussion} as to whether NATO's approach would take the form of a protocol or a text in the existing treaty. But it was clear that we would not be getting into numbers at this stage.

5. On the summit, Womack said the Summit should agree on how to handle the situation. Van den Broek said the position was

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clear, we should enter into negotiations once a CFE agreement was reached. Genscher said that, after the experience at the NATO Summit last year, when debate had been presented by the press as a major Alliance row, the fewer details we had at the Summit the better. We did not want this to become a Summit about CFE. Baker agreed and did the Secretary of State. Warner said the Summit should set up a group which could examine the Alliance's negotiating position on CFE. We need say no more than that. This was agreed.

CSCE

6. Genscher said that he had detected in the discussion anxiety that some phrases used on the CSCE could be taken as meaning that the CSCE would replace NATO. He said (I think) he repeated his point to the European security structure. Genscher said he was better to avoid talking about security in this context. He always spoke of a new peace order. Genscher wanted to find a new word. Varian Fries suggested that we talk about cooperative structures. Warner wanted to avoid mentioning CSCE.

7. Secretary of State said that the Summit needed to set a clear ceiling on the growth of CSCE. It would not replace NATO but the Summit needed to have positive things to say ~~about the CSCE~~. We should draw up a list of things that could be put forward as proper matters for CSCE discussion. Robin Bragg said we also had to decide whether the Paris CSCE Summit would decide matters of a more general nature or whether it would be limited to 1990. He said Paris should take decisions. Warner drew a line at an end of this point.

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FOLLOWING FOR CHARLES POWELL, PS/NO 10 IN MOSCOW
FROM J S WALL, TURNBERRY

**NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL: PRIVATE MEETING OF FOREIGN
MINISTERS**

SUMMARY

1. Ministers agreed to give a constructive response to the Warsaw Pact communique but without implying symmetry between the two alliances. Agreement that NATO Summit should handle SNF in low key procedural way. Clear view that CSCE must not be allowed to become a substitute for NATO.

DETAIL

WARSAW PACT MEETING IN MOSCOW

2. Ministers had before them the text of the Warsaw Pact communique. Genscher thought it represented a good development to which NATO should respond constructively. It showed, in his view, that the smaller Warsaw Pact countries had decided to stay in. Discussion then focused on the nature of NATO's response. Robin (France) questioned whether we wanted to have a direct dialogue with the Warsaw Pact. The Dane favoured an immediate response this evening. That was shot down. Van den Broek thought the text showed signs of being a compromise. It was directed not at NATO but at Europe in general. He accepted the idea of a dialogue. Clark said we should not allow the two alliances to be seen as parallel. We should give a brief welcome to some of the things that the Warsaw Pact had said in our own

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communiqué. The Secretary of State said we should not imply symmetry. We did not want a dialogue with the Pact. At the start of the communiqué, we should refer in conciliatory terms to the Warsaw Pact statement. This approach was agreed.

BALTIC STATES

3. Woerner said this should be discussed privately over dinner rather than in the main meeting because of different views. He asked Baker how far he thought things should be taken. Baker avoided the question and gave his standard briefing on recent discussions on the Baltics. Clark said both sides were very close on paper.

We should note their agreement to suspend the declaration of independence and urge them into a dialogue. Baker agreed that we should go for language on these lines in the communiqué.

NATO SUMMIT

4. Woerner, in something of a lather, said that time was short. NATO had a duty to prepare, etc. On CFE, he thought that all members of the Alliance were willing to find a way of showing the Soviets, in the context of CFEI, that we were willing to go on and find a way of counting forces in the central zone. Genscher agreed. Germany should not be singularised. Baker said that we needed to operate on the basis of a sufficiency rule. The High Level Task Force should work out the best way of showing the Soviets that we were willing. This was agreed. There was no ~~discussion~~ ^{discussion} as to whether NATO's approach would take the form of a protocol or a text in the existing treaty. But it was clear that we would not be getting into numbers at this stage.

5. On SNT, Woerner said the Summit should agree on how to handle the issue. Van den Broek said the position was

3

clear, we should enter into negotiations once a CFE agreement was reached. Genscher said that, after the experience at the NATO Summit last year, when debate had been presented by the press as a major Alliance row, the fewer details we had at the Summit the better. We did not want this to become a Summit about SNF. Baker agreed, as did the Secretary of State. Woerner said the Summit should set up a group which could examine the Alliance's negotiating position on SNF. We need say no more than that. This was agreed.

CSCE

6. Genscher said that he had detected in the discussion anxiety that some phrases used on the CSCE could be taken as meaning that the CSCE would replace NATO. De Michelis (Italy) reiterated his belief in a pan-European security structure. Genscher said it was better to avoid talking about security in this context. He always spoke of a new peace order. Eliemann-Jensen wanted to find a new name. Van den Broek suggested that we talked about cooperative structures. Norway wanted to include environment in the CSCE.

7. The Secretary of State said that the Summit needed to set a clear ceiling on the growth of CSCE. It would not replace NATO but the Summit needed to have positive things to say about the CSCE. We should draw up a list of things that could be put forward as proper matters for CSCE discussion. Robin (France) said we also had to decide whether the Paris CSCE Summit would decide matters of substance or simply set work in hand for Helsinki in 1992. Clark said Paris should take decisions. Woerner drew the meeting to an end at this point.

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SUBJECT cc MASTER

NA

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

7 June 1990

Dear Stephen,

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH SECRETARY BAKER

The Prime Minister had a brief meeting with Secretary Baker at the Turnberry Hotel shortly before her lunch for NATO Foreign Ministers today. Secretary Baker was accompanied by Ambassador Catto and by Mr Ray Seitz. The Foreign Secretary was also present.

The Prime Minister said she would welcome Secretary Baker's personal impressions from the recent US/Soviet Summit. She would also like to hear more about the idea which the Russians had produced for a NATO/Warsaw Pact agreement or understanding. The latter was topical, and might come up in her meetings in Moscow. Mr Baker might like to start with that.

Secretary Baker said that he had resisted engaging in any drafting exercise to put meat on the bones of the Soviet idea. The Americans had already come forward with their nine points, all of which had substance. The Russians kept on throwing out half-considered ideas. It was up to them to say what they meant. Equally, we should not reject the Russian proposals out of hand. They were obviously having a difficult time finding ways in which they could justify accepting a united Germany as a member of NATO.

Secretary Baker continued that he thought there had been some change in the Soviet attitude on Germany and NATO, even since the Washington Summit. Gorbachev had come to Washington with a very hard line on this and had talked of a transition period for German unification, during which Four Power rights would continue. The Russians seemed to think that the East Germans were having a change of heart and were no longer keen on unification by the end of the year. This was a miscalculation, probably based on what they were hearing from the East German Foreign Minister, who was a Social Democrat. When he had seen Shevardnadze in Copenhagen on 5 July, he had taken a more flexible line, both about a transition period and about a CFE agreement. He had said that the Russians would be ready to conclude such an agreement quite rapidly, but could not let German unification go forward until they were satisfied that there would be limits on German forces. He also seemed prepared to postpone the problem of aircraft numbers to CFE II negotiations.

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Secretary Baker continued that the Summit had been very successful in terms of personal relationships. He felt the Russians now had a better understanding that the Americans recognised their political problems over Germany and NATO and their need for cover. He hoped that the Prime Minister, with her particular relationship with Mr Gorbachev, could build on this in Moscow. The United States' number one goal remained to ensure that a united Germany was in NATO.

The Prime Minister said that the Summit had obviously helped to crystalise Soviet thinking. She was not surprised that they were finding it difficult to come forward with clear-cut ideas, given their enormous domestic problems. Nor did she think that Gorbachev was seriously worried about NATO as such. He was focusing on Germany, which was a political problem for him, and we had to help him get over that. She found it hard to judge how worried ordinary people in the Soviet Union were about Germany: some reports which she had received from recent visitors suggested that they were not very concerned.

Secretary Baker said that Gorbachev might raise with the Prime Minister the possibility of co-ordinated Western credit for the Soviet Union. The Russians had talked in Washington of using gold and oil as collateral. The Prime Minister said she did not think credit would do much good in their present economic situation. What they really needed was advice and training of the sort we were providing in Eastern Europe through Know How Funds. Their real problem was that they had not sorted out their constitutional structure. As a result nobody seemed to know what powers belonged to the centre and what to the Republics. Secretary Baker said the Americans had suggested to the Russians that they should go to the individual Republics and ask them what they wanted, so that there was a tailor-made approach for each of them. Gorbachev had said that they would be holding a Federation Council within a month, which would take decisions on the degree of autonomy which the Republics could have. The Prime Minister was sceptical of the idea of leaving it to the Republics: there would have to be a strong lead from the centre. And Gorbachev would have to make up his mind to let the Baltics go. At present the Soviet Union seemed to be moving towards anarchy. Secretary Baker agreed that there was a risk of this. Yeltsin now seemed to be demanding full independence for the Russian Republic.


The Prime Minister asked whether there was anything else she should raise or not raise with Gorbachev. She saw from that morning's Times that she was not supposed to raise Trident. She had not been intending to do so, since there was nothing to talk about. We had always worked with the United States in this field and she was absolutely certain our co-operation would continue. We had received the most categorical guarantees of this. Secretary Baker said he would be rather surprised if Gorbachev were to raise the subject. His main pre-occupation was with Germany and NATO. If the Prime Minister could get across to Gorbachev that the West had no desire to take unilateral advantage of the Soviet Union in its present difficulties or to humiliate or embarrass them over Germany, she would do a great service. Gorbachev needed to be able to show domestically that the Soviet Union was fully involved in the process of changing Europe, and we should be ready to help them.

The meeting had to end at this point, to enable the Prime Minister and Secretary Baker to attend the lunch.

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I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence)
and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely,

/

CHARLES POWELL

J S Wall Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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WARSAW PACT STATEMENT

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ZCZCINA062 3 INF 0266 TASS EF142 E510 EN
WARSAWTREATY-1

.WARSAW TREATY--DECLARATION =1.
(THREE TAKES)
7/6 TASS 121

MOSCOW JUNE 7 TASS A MEETING OF THE POLITICAL CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE OF WARSAW TREATY MEMBER STATES WAS HELD HERE TODAY. IT DISCUSSED PROSPECTS OF THE ALL-EUROPEAN PROCESS AND THE FORMATION OF NEW STRUCTURES OF THE SECURITY AND CONSOLIDATION OF STABILITY IN EUROPE. THE MEETING ADOPTED THE FOLLOWING DECLARATION:

1.

MODERN DEVELOPMENT IN EUROPE CREATES CONDITIONS FOR OVERCOMING A BLOC SECURITY MODEL AND THE DIVISION OF THE CONTINENT. THIS DEVELOPMENT IS BECOMING IRREVERSIBLE. IT MEETS THE INTERESTS OF NATIONS WISHING TO LIVE IN MUTUAL HARMONY, WITHOUT ARTIFICIAL BARRIERS AND IDEOLOGICAL HOSTILITY. PARTICIPANTS IN THE MEETING FAVOUR THE FORMATION OF A NEW, ALL-EUROPEAN SECURITY SYSTEM AND THE CREATION OF A SINGLE EUROPE OF PEACE AND COOPERATION.

THE STATES REPRESENTED AT THE MEETING ARE TAKING AN ACTIVE PART IN THIS PROCESS. THIS IS WHY THEY FIND IT NECESSARY TO RECONSIDER THE CHARACTER AND FUNCTIONS OF THE WARSAW TREATY. THEY ARE SURE THAT ONLY IN THIS CASE THE WARSAW TREATY WILL BE ABLE TO REACH NEW TOPICAL TARGETS DURING THE TRANSITION PERIOD, DEALING WITH DISARMAMENT AND THE CREATION OF AN ALL-EUROPEAN SECURITY SYSTEM.

PARTICIPANTS IN THE MEETING ARE UNANIMOUS IN THEIR OPINION THAT THE IDEOLOGICAL ENEMY IMAGE HAS BEEN OVERCOME BY MUTUAL EFFORTS OF THE EAST AND THE WEST, WHILE THE EAST AND WEST NOTIONS ARE AGAIN ACQUIRING THEIR PURELY GEOGRAPHICAL MEANING. THEY BELIEVE THAT DANGER COULD COME ONLY FROM THOSE WHO WOULD THREATEN THE SECURITY OF COUNTRIES IN ANY FORM, INCLUDING THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE, NO MATTER WHO RESORTS TO IT. CONFRONTATION ELEMENTS CONTAINED IN DOCUMENTS OF THE WARSAW TREATY AND THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANISATION, THAT WERE ADOPTED IN THE PAST, ARE NO LONGER IN LINE WITH THE SPIRIT OF THE TIME.

MORE

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WARSAWTREATY-2

.WARSAW TREATY--DECLARATION =2.
7/6 TASS 121

IN THIS NEW SITUATION THE STATES REPRESENTED AT THE MEETING WILL BEGIN TO REVIEW THE CHARACTER, FUNCTIONS AND ACTIVITIES OF THE WARSAW TREATY, AND WILL START ITS TRANSFORMATION INTO A TREATY OF SOVEREIGN STATES WITH EQUAL RIGHTS, FORMED ON A DEMOCRATIC BASIS. WITH THIS IN VIEW THEY CREATED A PROVISIONAL COMMISSION OF GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES, WHICH WILL PRESENT TO THE POLITICAL CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE PROPOSALS ON THIS SUBJECT BEFORE THE END OF NEXT OCTOBER. THE PROPOSALS WILL BE EXAMINED BY THE POLITICAL CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE BEFORE THE END OF NOVEMBER. WARSAW TREATY MEMBER STATES WANT TO CONTRIBUTE IN THIS WAY TO THE CONSOLIDATION OF PEACE, SECURITY AND STABILITY IN EUROPE AND TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE HELSINKI PROCESS.

THE MEETING REITERATED THE READINESS FOR CONSTRUCTIVE COOPERATION WITH THE NORTH ATLANTIC ALLIANCE, ITS MEMBER STATES, NEUTRAL AND NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES OF THE CONTINENT ON A BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL BASIS IN THE INTERESTS OF EUROPEAN STABILITY AND DISARMAMENT, CONFIDENCE-BUILDING AND THE FIRM ESTABLISHMENT OF THE DEFENCE SUFFICIENCY PRINCIPLE.

PARTICIPANTS IN THE MEETING BELIEVE THAT CONSISTENT AND ALL-ROUND INSTITUTIONALISATION OF THE HELSINKI PROCESS IS AN IMPORTANT STAGE OF THESE DEVELOPMENTS. THIS IS THE PURPOSE OF PROPOSALS SUBMITTED RECENTLY BY SOME COUNTRIES--PARTICIPANTS IN THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE. PARTICIPANTS IN THE MEETING EXPECT THE FIRST IMPORTANT DECISIONS ON THIS PROBLEM TO BE TAKEN AT THE FORTHCOMING SUMMIT OF EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA.

WARSAW TREATY MEMBER STATES POSITIVELY ASSESS SOME OF THE STEPS TAKEN RECENTLY BY NATO. THEY EXPECT THE NEW TREND OF CHANGES IN NATO TO BE ACCELERATED AND DEEPENED AND TO BE MATCHED BY CORRESPONDING CHANGES IN THE ACTIVITIES OF THIS ALLIANCE.
MORE

072140 JUN 90

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WARSAW-TREATY-3

.WARSAW TREATY--DECLARATION =3.
7/6 TASS 121

II.

WARSAW TREATY MEMBER STATES WENT ON RECORD IN FAVOUR OF A SUCCESSFUL TERMINATION OF THE VIENNA TALKS ON CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES AND ON CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES IN EUROPE, SO THAT CORRESPONDING AGREEMENTS COULD BE SIGNED AT A MEETING OF LEADERS OF THE STATES--PARTICIPANTS IN THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE LATE IN 1990.

SO FAR AS EXTERNAL ASPECTS OF GERMANY'S REUNIFICATION ARE CONCERNED, THEY EXPRESSED THEIR UNANIMOUS CONVICTION THAT IT SHOULD BE CARRIED OUT IN THE CONTEXT OF THE ALL-EUROPEAN PROCESS AND ON THE BASIS OF ITS PRINCIPLES, SHOULD STIMULATE AND DEEPEN ITS DEVELOPMENT, TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION LAWFUL SECURITY INTERESTS OF GERMANY'S NEIGHBOURS AND ALL OTHER STATES AND ENSURE FIRM GUARANTEES OF THE INVIOABILITY OF EUROPEAN BORDERS.

THE STATES REPRESENTED AT THE MEETING WILL ACTIVELY PROMOTE THE CREATION OF A EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND LEGAL SPACE, AS WELL AS FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE BASIC HUMAN RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS.

PARTICIPANTS IN THE MEETING POINTED OUT THAT THE AGREEMENTS REACHED AT THE SOVIET-AMERICAN SUMMIT PROMOTE A FURTHER ADVANCE TOWARDS DISARMAMENT AND THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION.

WARSAW TREATY MEMBER STATES EXPRESS THEIR CONVICTION THAT ALL THE STATES--PARTICIPANTS IN THE HELSINKI PROCESS FULLY REALISE THEIR RESPONSIBILITY THAT THE HISTORY-MAKING CHANCE TO CREATE EUROPE WITHOUT BLOCS AND HOSTILITY NOT TO BE MISSED.

ITEM ENDS+++++

072147 JUN 90

ZCZCINA060 2 INF 0241 TASS EF085 E220 EN
GORBACHEV-MAIZIERE

.GORBACHEV MEETS LOTHAR DE MAIZIERE.
7/6 TASS 112

MOSCOW JUNE 7 TASS -- SOVIET PRESIDENT MIKHAIL GORBACHEV TODAY MET LOTHAR DE MAIZIERE, CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC.

GORBACHEV EMPHASISED THAT GERMAN UNIFICATION CAN PROCEED SUCCESSFULLY AS PART OF THE COMMON EUROPEAN PROCESS LEADING TO STRONGER PEACE AND STABILITY ON THE CONTINENT, TO STRUCTURES GUARANTEEING RELIABLE SECURITY IN EUROPE.

THE SOVIET UNION IS NOT GOING TO HINDER THE PROCESS OF GERMAN UNIFICATION. ON THE CONTRARY, THE PRESIDENT STRESSED, THE SOVIET UNION WANTS THE UNIFICATION TO BE GENUINELY SOLID AND RELIABLE, TO INCUR NO ONE'S SUSPICION, AND TO TAKE FULL ACCOUNT OF THE LONG-TERM INTERESTS OF GERMANS THEMSELVES, THEIR NEIGHBOURS, ALL PARTICIPANTS IN THE HELSINKI PROCESS. ONE SHOULD AND CAN FIND SUCH DECISIONS.

ANY OTHER APPROACH TO THE GERMAN UNIFICATION ISSUE WOULD AMOUNT TO UNDERMINING THE NASCENT POSITIVE CHANGES WHICH COULD EVENTUALLY ALLOW EUROPE AND ITS PEOPLES TO LIVE WITHOUT FEAR FOR THEIR FUTURE, IN CONDITIONS OF MUTUAL TRUST AND BROAD, FREE AND FRUITFUL COOPERATION.

LOTHAR DE MAIZIERE SAID HIS GOVERNMENT WANTED TO PUT THE UNIFICATION PROCESSES BETWEEN THE GDR AND THE FRG INTO A REGULATED CHANNEL. THIS WILL MAKE IT POSSIBLE TO TAKE FULLER ACCOUNT OF AND DEFEND THE LEGITIMATE INTERESTS OF GDR CITIZENS, THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR WHICH IS BORNE BY HIS GOVERNMENT.

IT WAS AGREED TO CONTINUE CONSULTATIONS AT VARIOUS LEVELS ON MATTERS RELATING TO THE EXTERNAL ASPECTS OF GERMAN UNIFICATION AND BILATERAL RELATIONS.

THE CONVERSATION PASSED IN A SINCERE AND CONSTRUCTIVE ATMOSPHERE.

ITEM ENDS +++
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WARSAW-PACT-TV

.ROMANIAN, POLISH LEADERS ON WARSAW PACT'S ROLE.
7/6 TASS 147

MOSCOW JUNE 7 TASS - THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE WARSAW PACT SHOULD BE CONSISTENT WITH THE PROCESSES IN EUROPE, ROMANIAN PRESIDENT ION ILIESCU TOLD SOVIET TELEVISION.

HE ATTENDED A MEETING OF THE WARSAW PACT POLITICAL CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE, WHICH ENDED IN MOSCOW ON THURSDAY.

ILIESCU POINTED TO THE NEED TO +LAY THE EMPHASIS ON THE POLITICAL NATURE OF THE PACT'S ACTIVITY.+ HE SAID THE PACT SHOULD +TAKE AN ACTIVE PART IN THE DISARMAMENT PROCESS AND THE ENSURING OF STABILITY AND SECURITY ON THE EUROPEAN CONTINENT.+

POLISH PRESIDENT WOJCIECH JARUZELSKI, WHO ALSO ATTENDED THE MEETING, TOLD SOVIET TELEVISION THAT THE WARSAW PACT +HAS FOR YEARS BEEN AN INSTRUMENT OF CONFRONTATION, BUT NOW CAN BECOME AN INSTRUMENT OF COOPERATION, MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING AND DIALOGUE.+

+IT IS QUITE NATURAL THAT THE PACT SHOULD RESTRUCTURE ITSELF TO REACH THIS GOAL, AND THIS IS WHAT PACT MEMBERS SAID TODAY,+ JARUZELSKI SAID.

ITEM ENDS +++
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10 DOWNING STREET

NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

DECLARATION

NB. Not Final Version



CABINET OFFICE

70 WHITEHALL, LONDON SW1 2AS

SERIAL NO.....005/8.....

DATE 8.6.90

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8th June 1990

DRAFTDTC/8MINISTERIAL MEETING OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL
AT TURNBERRY, UNITED KINGDOM7th-8th June 1990FINAL TO MINISTERSMESSAGE FROM TURNBERRY

We, the Foreign Ministers of the Alliance, express our determination to seize the historic opportunities resulting from the profound changes in Europe to help build a new peaceful order in Europe, based on freedom, justice and democracy. In this spirit, we extend to the Soviet Union and to all other European countries the hand of friendship and cooperation.

True and enduring security in Europe will be best assured through mutual acknowledgement and understanding of the legitimate security interests of all states. We are ready to contribute actively to building confidence and closer relations between all European countries, including the members of the two alliances. We welcome the statement issued by the members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization in Moscow on 7th June. We are encouraged by the positive spirit conveyed in this declaration and in particular by the readiness on the part of the countries issuing it for constructive cooperation.

The CSCE process, which will become even more important as an instrument for cooperation and security in Europe, should be strengthened and given effective institutional form. We are committed to work for a rapid and successful conclusion of the Vienna negotiations on conventional forces. The arms control process must be vigorously pursued.

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Convinced of the eminently political importance of these tasks, we are ready to do our utmost for their accomplishment.

* * *

FINAL COMMUNIQUE

1. The historic events that have occurred since we met last December in Brussels confirm that Europe is entering a new era. The countries of Central and Eastern Europe are taking decisive steps to establish democratic institutions, hold free elections and promote political pluralism and market-oriented economic policies. Germany is peacefully and democratically moving towards unity. We welcome the expansion and deepening of political exchanges at all levels. The visits to NATO by the Soviet, Czechoslovak and Polish Foreign Ministers exemplify this broadened dialogue. We look to further such opportunities in the future. A continent divided for four decades is searching for new patterns and structures of cooperation. These positive trends are having repercussions beyond Europe: democracy, the search for peaceful solutions and respect for human values are gaining ground in other parts of the world as well. Our Alliance remains vitally important as an instrument both for ensuring the security of its members and the stability of Europe and as a keystone of our efforts to build a new European order of peace. At this meeting, we have looked ahead to both continuing and new Alliance tasks in support of the positive changes in Europe, in

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preparation for the decisions to be taken by our Heads of State and Government next month in London. To that end, we have confirmed our agreement on the following points.

2. We strongly emphasise that we attach the highest priority to the conclusion this year of a CFE treaty. This must encompass all subjects under negotiation, and result in substantial, binding, verifiable reductions of conventional forces in Europe, thus eliminating destabilising disparities and the capability to launch a surprise attack or initiate large-scale offensive action. Such a treaty would be a dramatic advance towards greater stability and security in Europe. That goal is within sight, and it is now imperative that the remaining obstacles to its achievement be removed. We remain ready to take account of the stated interests of the other participants and to explore all open issues on the basis of a willingness on all sides to make reasonable compromises. We have therefore instructed our negotiators in Vienna to pursue new approaches to mutually acceptable solutions, in particular on aircraft, armour and verification. We call on the Soviet Union to cooperate in reaching agreement on all substantive issues this Summer, in order that progress can be made on the broader agenda for the construction of a new Europe, including a CSCE Summit later this year.

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3. Allied governments will continue to work for substantive results in the CSBM negotiations, in the form of an agreement later this year. To that end, Allies have recently proposed a series of innovative cooperative measures, such as a mechanism for discussion of unusual activities of a military nature and annual implementation assessment meetings. We will continue to build on the contributions to confidence-building flowing from the Military Doctrine Seminar held in January in the framework of the CSBM negotiations in order to further expand military contacts and exchanges on military matters.

4. As soon as a CFE agreement is reached, Allies will be prepared to undertake follow-on negotiations to further enhance security and stability in Europe. The objectives of these follow-on negotiations, and of our further quest for European security, including through conventional arms control, will be considered at our meeting of Heads of State and Government.

5. We welcome the progress attained at the US-Soviet Summit held last week and, in particular, the agreement on major outstanding issues governing a START treaty that will result in deep reductions in both sides' strategic nuclear weapons and greatly expand bilateral military transparency in that area, as well as agreement to begin further talks on strategic nuclear forces specifically devoted to achieving a more stable strategic balance after the current treaty is completed. We took special

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note of the progress represented by the signature at that Summit meeting of verification protocols for treaties limiting nuclear testing and expressed our satisfaction with the bilateral agreement that will drastically reduce both sides' stocks of chemical weapons.

6. We believe the US-Soviet agreement on reducing chemical weapons stockpiles will provide great impetus towards the earliest possible conclusion of the convention for an effectively verifiable, global and comprehensive ban on chemical weapons now being negotiated, which remains our goal. All Allies hereby state their intention to be among the original signatories to the convention and to promote its early entry into force. We call on all other states to undertake a similar commitment. We reaffirm our determination to work to prevent the proliferation of nuclear and chemical weapons and of missiles capable of carrying such weapons.

7. We will pursue the "Open Skies" initiative, convinced that such a regime would make a significant contribution to the openness and transparency we wish to encourage. We therefore regret that our efforts to reach such an agreement have thus far not been successful and look to the Soviet Union to join with us to take the steps necessary to create an "Open Skies" regime that will increase calculability, mutual confidence and the security of all participants.

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8. Recognising that the verification of arms control treaties is destined to become a long-term task for the Alliance, we have decided to establish a coordination mechanism for this purpose.

9. We agree on the crucial importance of the political and economic reforms underway in the states of Central and Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. The continued progress of these states towards becoming democratic and economically prosperous partners cooperating with us will be an important element in the future security and stability of Europe. We are prepared to support their efforts to integrate their economies more closely into the world economy and to widen and deepen the scope of our cooperation with them as they progress, thus contributing to the success of their reform programmes.

10. We strongly hope that the processes of economic reorientation and development and of democratic institution-building in these countries, necessarily complicated and uneven, will successfully overcome periods of uncertainty and potential instability. The historic changes already underway and the prospects for further positive developments have not removed all grounds for concern about the stability and security of Europe. Moreover, we cannot be oblivious to the fact that the Soviet Union will retain substantial military capabilities, which it is continuing to modernise and which have implications for our defence.

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11. The need to maintain our common defence remains vital. The Alliance's role in preventing conflict, precluding the use or threat of force against any of its members and guaranteeing stability will continue to be essential. That role is built upon the principle of the indivisibility of security for all member countries and embodies an indispensable link between North America and European democracies. For the foreseeable future, the prevention of war will continue to require an appropriate mix of survivable and effective conventional and nuclear forces, at the lowest levels consistent with our security needs. Our resolve, our commitment to the equitable and widespread sharing of responsibilities, and our solidarity with which we have maintained adequate collective defence arrangements for so long, including the presence of significant North American conventional and nuclear forces in Europe, will continue to be crucial factors in the maintenance of peace in Europe.

12. The military risks facing the Alliance have already decreased substantially, and implementation of a successful CFE agreement would result in a further dramatic improvement. The principles of Alliance security set out in May 1989 in the Comprehensive Concept of Arms Control and Disarmament are the basis for our further work in assessing the implications of the changing situation in Europe for our strategy. Thus, those governments among us participating in the Defence Planning

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Committee welcome its recent decision to undertake a review of NATO's military strategy, and the means of implementing it, in the emerging circumstances. They also welcome the invitation to the NATO Military Authorities to undertake a study of the possibilities for greater use of multi-national forces. They endorse the US President's recent proposal that negotiations on US and Soviet short-range nuclear weapon systems in Europe begin shortly after a CFE agreement is concluded. The objectives and scope of these negotiations will be the subject of review at the meeting of Heads of State and Government in London next month.

13. We see the CSCE process as an important framework for far-reaching reforms and stability and as a central element in the construction of a new Europe, along with other European institutions including the Alliance itself. The function of the CSCE will be complementary to that of the Alliance. The CSCE, having from the outset served to ease the burden of the division of Europe, will now become even more vital as an instrument for developing structures for a Europe whole and free and for cooperation within a united continent. The Allies look forward to an early outcome to the CFE negotiations which are taking place in the CSCE framework and to continued progress in the talks on confidence and security-building measures, which, along with results of CSCE inter-sessional activities, will lay the necessary basis for the CSCE Summit this year. The Summit

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should reflect the new role of the CSCE and take appropriate decisions. Furthermore, it is the hope of the Allies that the "2 + 4" process will be completed prior to the CSCE Summit. That Summit will help consolidate the changes that have taken place in Central and Eastern Europe, and provide substantial new impetus to the CSCE process in all main areas of the Helsinki Final Act. To this end, implementation in letter and spirit of all CSCE obligations by all CSCE participating states remains essential. Meanwhile, we believe that the time has now come to determine the modalities of institutionalisation without depriving the process of its flexibility and balance. A number of valuable proposals have been raised within the framework of Alliance consultations for the further development of the CSCE process and for enhancing regional cooperation efforts. [They could include a consultation mechanism among the 35 Foreign Ministers, a conflict prevention and verification centre as well as other arrangements in specific fields of cooperation.] Our governments continue to develop these ideas as our preparations continue for the CSCE Summit. We are pleased that other CSCE participants are equally developing their ideas. We welcome the decision of the Foreign Ministers of the 35 CSCE states at their meeting in Copenhagen on 5th June 1990 to establish a preparatory Committee for the Summit, and for Ministers of the "35" to meet in the United States this Autumn.

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14. Welcoming agreement at the recent Bonn Conference on Economic Cooperation in Europe on fundamental principles to guide the conversion from planned to market-oriented economies, we fully support the efforts of the Copenhagen meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension now underway to reinforce and extend the protection and guarantee of human rights and individual freedoms. Allies place particular importance on resolutions concerning the right to free and fair elections held at regular intervals, a commitment to the rule of law, and rights of persons belonging to national minorities among many proposals put forward for consideration at the Copenhagen meeting. We hope that the Palma de Mallorca meeting on the Mediterranean will contribute to enhancing cooperation also in that region. We also welcome the interest recently expressed by the Albanian Government in associating itself with the CSCE process and the commitments therein. We look to the Albanian Government to demonstrate its willingness to comply with all existing CSCE commitments, including those on human rights.

15. We note with pride that after 40 years as a divided city, Berlin is finally growing together again. The Berlin Wall has come down. This heralds the long-awaited ending of the post-war era and of the division of Germany and of Europe. The realisation of the unity of Germany has always been a primary goal of our Alliance. Therefore, on the basis of our close and

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continuing consultations within the Alliance, we are united in actively supporting the progress that has already been achieved in the process of German unification; we also support the efforts underway in the "2 + 4" talks to seek a final settlement under international law terminating the Four Power rights and responsibilities relating to Berlin and Germany as a whole, and without the establishment of constraints on the sovereignty of Germany. A united Germany must have the right, recognised in the Helsinki Final Act, to choose to be a party to a treaty of alliance. We believe that European stability, as well as the wishes of the German people, requires that a unified Germany be a full member of this Alliance, including its integrated military structure, without prejudice to stated positions about nondeployment of NATO forces on the present GDR territory. The security guarantee provided by Articles 5 and 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty will extend to all the territory of a united Germany. We seek no unilateral advantage from German unity and are prepared to demonstrate this, taking into account legitimate Soviet security interests. A free and democratic Germany will be an essential element of a peaceful order in Europe in which no state need harbour fears for its security against its neighbours.

16. We express the wish that the problems accompanying the difficult internal transition of the Soviet Union be solved in a constructive manner and to the satisfaction of all concerned.

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In this context, we firmly support the expectations and aspirations of the Baltic peoples. It is our understanding that the leaders of Lithuania and the Soviet Union have indicated their willingness to begin a dialogue upon the suspension - and not retraction - by the Lithuanian leadership of the implementation of their declaration of independence. We appeal to all parties to show flexibility and enter into true dialogue to reach an early solution.

17. Our activities in the scientific and environmental fields, known as NATO's "Third Dimension", remain of major benefit to our member nations and are an expression of their solidarity. In the spirit of the 40th Anniversary Summit Declaration, we shall pursue measures to invite scientific experts from Central and Eastern Europe to participate in work on the environment connected with pilot studies within the framework of the Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society.

18. The NATO Summit in May 1989 launched a Democratic Institutions Fellowship programme intended to help qualified applicants from Central and Eastern Europe, as well as those from Alliance countries, to study our democratic values and way of life. We intend to pursue this initiative and are pleased with the strong response it has received in its first year.

19. Mindful of the continuing need to inform our publics better about the work and objectives of the Alliance, we expressed our strong support for the network of Atlantic

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Committees and Associations brought together under the Atlantic Treaty Association. We are convinced that they have a vital role to play in deepening public understanding of the role of the Alliance. We underline the great value of the exchanges of views in the North Atlantic Assembly on issues facing the Alliance.

20. The developments which we are now witnessing and of which we have been and will continue to be among the principal architects, are producing far-reaching changes in the political and military fundamentals of European security, and consequently in the conditions under which our Alliance is required to work.

These changes call into question neither the necessity for maintaining the Alliance nor the permanence of its fundamental features. We will keep our Alliance dynamic and cohesive and will continue to foster a solid and fruitful transatlantic relationship between North America and an increasingly united Europe. We will remain cognisant of the need for intra-Alliance cooperation and assistance. We must continue, in the face of historic change, to deepen and strengthen our political consultation and, where appropriate, coordination.

Thus, while ensuring that the permanent principles which form the basis of our Alliance and guarantee its effectiveness are preserved, we must today adapt it to the enormous changes now taking place.

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We have already begun this process in the political and defence spheres, as demonstrated by our Ministerial consultations this Spring. We have shown ourselves ready, through the arms control negotiations in which we are participating or which we are preparing to initiate, to adjust the size of the Allies' conventional and nuclear forces. We have noted that the Defence Ministers who participate in the Nuclear Planning Group and the Defence Planning Committee have decided to reconsider their strategy. Although the prevention of war will always remain our fundamental task, the changing European environment now requires of us a broader approach to security based as much on constructive peace-building as on peace-keeping.

21. We recognise, against the background of the changes now taking place in Europe, that the modifications in certain aspects of the Alliance's policies and functioning will form part of a broader pattern of adaptation within the Organization. This process must be consistent with the principles which we have declared to be permanent and with the requirements of the new era upon which we are embarking. We have, therefore, instructed our Council in Permanent Session to survey developments, and to report regularly to us on the progress made.

22. We express our deep appreciation for the warm hospitality provided by the Government of the United Kingdom.

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CDP
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From: P J Goulden
cc: PS
PS/Mr Waldegrave
PS/PUS
Mr Weston
Mr Broomfield
Mr Mottram
→ Mr Powell
UKDEL NATO, Brussels

Mr Gomersall

START NON-CIRCUMVENTION

1. I discussed with Dick Clarke during the NAC at Turnberry the US-Soviet exchanges in Washington last week about US/UK nuclear cooperation.

2. I said that we were grateful for the prompt briefing from Washington and for the robust line which the Administration was taking. I thought that the Prime Minister would have no choice but to make clear our position to Gorbachev, if only to show the Russians that we were fully informed and that there was no light between our positions. But we fully accepted the US advice that we should not become embroiled in START: it was clearly for the US to sort the matter out with the Russians. The PM's clear line with Gorbachev would however help to reconcile the Russians to the fact that they would not succeed with this ploy.

3. I asked whether the Americans had any explanation for this change in the Soviet position. Clarke confirmed that it was an unexpected change. There were perhaps two explanations: Soviet leaders were increasingly worried about the attitude of the Supreme Soviet and the Congress: but they also seemed genuinely surprised that we were insisting on keeping open the option of further cooperation after Trident II. They had mentioned the possibility of our acquiring the B2. I said that, if the Soviet Embassy were reporting accurately from London, Moscow must be in no doubt that HMG were not in the business of acquiring extra strategic systems. Clarke agreed. Another argument to be used with the Russians was that Trident II's lifetime would extend well beyond the 15 year life of START. Any hypothetical Trident III would therefore come up after START had expired.

4. Clarke asked whether it would cause a political problem in the UK if non-circumvention became a serious obstacle in the end-game. I said that we had all along wanted to avoid

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
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this - hence our willingness to clear the exchange of US-Soviet texts late last year. But no amount of controversy over non-circumvention in START was likely to change HMG's position of principle on this matter.

5. Clarke asked what arguments we thought should be used to refute the Soviet case that British and French systems should be included in START II. I rehearsed our basic case, underlining that the ratio between UK Trident and Soviet warheads after START would be roughly the same as between Polaris and Soviet systems when it was introduced in 1969.

But the superpower reductions would have to go well below that level before HMG's conditions for considering involvement in strategic arms control began to apply. The better argument to use was that the UK and France operated minimum deterrents and were in a completely different league from the superpowers. There was no reason to expect that we would increase our forces beyond what was planned. But equally there was no reason to think that we could contemplate reducing while the Soviet arsenal was at the levels envisaged for START II.

7 June 1990


R J GOULDEN

Temporarily Retained

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NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL, TURNBERRY: 7 JUNE 1990

OPENING REMARKS BY THE RT HON DOUGLAS HURD CBE MP

1990 will be remembered in the history books as the year the old barriers crumbled, the year of Eastern Europe, the year of Germany. At last May's NATO Summit, Margaret Thatcher said that for the first time since the creation of NATO there was a sense that it might be possible to overcome the political division of Europe. She continued that this would be the greatest vindication of all that NATO has stood for. No-one could have predicted then that a year later we should have made such great strides towards that goal.

Of course, people ask whether NATO can adapt to the new Europe of the 1990s. Indeed, they ask whether we still need NATO at all. This is an important question, given so much has changed. But there are good reasons for replying with an emphatic "yes".

- First, all countries need to provide for their defence. NATO is for us the most effective way of fulfilling this basic task of government. It offers an insurance policy at a time of transition in Europe and uncertainty in the wider world. History has not stopped with the revolutions of 1989 or the further progress in 1990. It would be foolish and deeply unhistorical to suppose that our peoples will from now on live in such total security that there is no need for collective defence. Those who in the past succumbed to that illusion do not have a distinguished place in the history books of their countries.

- Second, NATO is more than a product of the cold war. The very first lines of the North Atlantic Treaty express our commitment to freedom, democracy and the rule of law - values which are now blossoming in Eastern Europe. The Alliance has an important role in safeguarding these values through the 1990s.

- Third, far from clinging to the old order, NATO is at the centre of efforts to build a new security order in Europe. To do this - to manage change in Europe and build a reliable security framework - we will need NATO and the transatlantic solidarity which it embodies.

We must distinguish clearly between those attributes which will remain essential even in the changed circumstances of Europe, and those which need to be updated.

Among the essential attributes, I would list in particular:

- a collective defence effort, to provide the bedrock of security for all Allies;

- the stationing in Germany of US and other Allied forces, albeit at reduced levels;

- a sensible mix of nuclear and conventional forces deployed in Europe.

As for change, a lot is already happening:

- There is now - rightly - more emphasis on NATO's political role: in managing change in Europe, in pursuing arms control and its verification, in developing ideas for strengthening the CSCE process, in consulting on security problems which affect Europe wherever they arise.

- We also need to adapt NATO's military and nuclear strategy. Provided that the evolution in Europe continues as we hope, with a CFE treaty signed this autumn, and the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Eastern Europe, then there should be scope for significant changes in the structure and deployment of NATO's forces. We need to develop new concepts such as minimum deterrence.

- Our long term goal should be to build up trust among all Europeans to the level that now exists between NATO Allies. That will be a long process. But our Alliance is at the forefront of efforts to bring it about.

A fundamental part of building the new Europe will be ending the division of Germany.

We now have in place a good framework of consultations to ensure that those aspects of German unity which concern NATO are fully considered within NATO. We shall be continuing that process today. We are particularly grateful for the careful way in which our colleague Hans Dietrich Genscher is ensuring that the Alliance has been kept fully informed of developments. We can all understand the intense eagerness and strong emotions of Germans East and West as they wait and work for the ending of an unnatural division.

It is clear from the free choice made by the German people that a united Germany will continue to be a full member of NATO. If we are to preserve security and stability at the heart of Europe, then a united Germany in NATO is essential. There is no other option.

The East European countries have recognised this. I know that it remains a matter of deep concern to the Soviet Union, and we fully accept that unification must take place in a way which safeguards legitimate Soviet security interests.

All those who visit the USSR come away knowing that there, perhaps even more vividly than anywhere else, memories of the last war, its casualties and suffering, remain in the minds not just of the rulers but of the people. There, memories have a political power which we have to understand. The philosophy and the repressive policies of Communism have failed and no-one owes a debt to those who sought to impose them. But it does not follow that we should forget the anxieties of the peoples of the Soviet Union as they look back on their history. None of us wishes to prejudice or undermine the security which they thought they had won with twenty million or more

of dead. The Soviet Union has no veto over the choice of the German people to belong to an Alliance; but it is worth working imaginatively to find ways of making that choice acceptable to the Soviet Union if we can do this without prejudicing our own success and our own security.

The remarkable changes of the last year call for creative new thinking about stability in Europe. It is a tribute to NATO's vitality that this will be our third meeting at Foreign Minister level this year, and that next month's Summit in London will be the third meeting of Heads of Government in 14 months.

NATO fills only a part of the crowded pages of our diaries this summer and autumn.

- Ministers are now meeting regularly in the 2+4 framework to discuss the external aspects of German unification. We aim to reach a settlement, and the termination of Quadripartite Rights and Responsibilities. We want to tell a CSCE Summit in the autumn about the outcome.

- we want to use that Summit to strengthen the CSCE process so that it can play a central part in promoting democracy and the rule of law throughout Europe. Preparations are already under way in NATO and will continue over the summer;

- but a CSCE Summit will only be possible if we can achieve a CFE Treaty, to provide a firm base on which to build a new order in Europe. NATO stands ready for intense negotiations in Vienna over the coming months. All participants will have to respond constructively if we are to settle the outstanding problems.

NATO will rise to the challenges of success in the 1990s, as it has risen to all other challenges over the past 40 years. We have faced the dangers of the past forty years and overcome them. I do not think we shall allow ourselves to be divided or outwitted by our own success. We have in all these linked discussions a formidable burden of work. But it is the work of construction, of building, and deeply satisfying for that reason. As craftsmen and builders we have an opportunity denied to those who came before us. I am certain that we can construct a building worthy of those who will come after.



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PRIME MINISTER

The CFE Negotiations

CFE I - General picture

1. There are still large gaps between the Soviet and Western positions on major issues such as aircraft and aerial inspections, and there have been hints of a fundamental reappraisal of their interest in the negotiations. Soviet concerns centre on two main issues:-

(a) lack of balance, now that the Warsaw Pact has collapsed;

(b) the status of Germany (size of Bundeswehr, NATO membership and future of their forces in the GDR).

2. By standing still the Russians are clearly attempting to use their leverage in the 2+4 negotiations to squeeze concessions from NATO in both areas, playing particularly on the German, and to some extent the American, desire for a quick and successful conclusion. We too have an interest in tying up the agreement, to smooth the path of German unity and NATO membership, and convert cuts in Soviet forces into binding agreements while Gorbachev is still able to do so. The Alliance therefore needs (with proper consultation) to think about moves to satisfy

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legitimate Russian concerns and get them to sign the agreement. But we must not compromise our basic objectives of balance, irreversibility and intrusive verification. Furthermore we should not play our major cards until we are sure that they will succeed in causing the Russians to lift their objections to German unity, NATO membership and and CFE signature.

The North Atlantic Council (NAC) Meeting at Turnberry

3. The NAC should:

- take stock and consider our next moves;
- emphasize the link between a CFE agreement and the CSCE Summit and SNF talks;
- explain that NATO's position remains flexible (we have for example agreed a revised position on aircraft to put to the Russians after Turnberry), thus putting the onus upon the Russians to respond.

4. On German unification, we have already indicated our willingness to take into account legitimate Soviet security concerns. Some of the reassurances the Russians are seeking will come outside the CFE (in the 2+4 on Soviet troops in the GDR; in the CSCE on European security; bilaterally on economic agreements). But the central Soviet concern is likely to be their demand for a limitation on the size of the united German armed forces.

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5. Up to now we have thought that while a political commitment on the future size of the Bundeswehr might be given in parallel with CFE I, this could only be formalized in a wider negotiation on manpower in talks which would follow on from CFE I. If the Russians are not prepared to accept this we may have to consider a more binding agreement (at least on German forces) in parallel with CFE I. Herr Genscher and his officials have informally floated a proposal for a national ceiling of 3/400,000 on manpower in Germany, within a central zone. This raises difficult issues: could such a low limit apply to the Soviet Union: what would be the effect on other central countries, notably ourselves and the French: how would the flank countries react? At present we cannot see how Herr Genscher's approach could apply outside the inner CFE zone (Germany, Benelux, Denmark, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland). We have convened the close allies to discuss these issues before Turnberry. The initial read out we have had from the US/Soviet Summit suggests that these issues were not discussed in substance, but the Americans are probably in favour of some such move.

The Summit

6. There may be CFE I issues to be dealt with at the Summit. But in addition, Head of Government should map out the follow-on to CFE in 1991 and what we should prepare for the period after the 1992 Helsinki Summit.

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The follow-on talks

7. The parallel negotiations on confidence building measures (CSBMS) can usefully continue anyway, even if we have secured agreement on a set of CSBMs in time for this year's CSCE Summit. In CFE 1A, as it is now being called, the likeliest substantive issues will be

- the negotiation of manpower ceilings; and
- the adaptation of the CFE I agreement to reflect German unification

Other possibilities will be:-

- any equipment items on which it proved impossible to reach agreement in CFE I (though we are unlikely to get a better result, on aircraft, for example, at a second attempt)
- further stabilising measures, for example, limits on logistical support which would constrain the ability of an armed force to attack

Post-Helsinki

8. All except the Americans, who have not yet decided their position, accept that the CFE framework will be dead by 1992 and that further discussion of European security will have to be in the framework of the 35.

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Some Allies hanker, unrealistically, for further equipment cuts. As we see it, a negotiation among 35 will, because of its disparate membership, centre more on confidence-building than on quantitative measures; preparation for the 1992 negotiation should therefore involve an open discussion on how best to structure the future of European Security. Given the uncertainties, we should aim for a remit from the Summit which does not commit us to further arms cuts.

Conclusion

9. Turnberry will give us an opportunity to take stock of CFE I and consider what further flexibility we should offer depending on the Soviet position. National manpower ceilings are now becoming a central issue: formal negotiation of this element will probably take place in the follow-on talks though a commitment of some kind could become part of the CFE end-game. The NATO Summit should give a further political impetus to conclude the negotiation in time for the CSCE Summit; and set out our objectives for negotiations up to and after the 1992 Helsinki CSCE Review meeting. I will offer detailed advice on this nearer the time.

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10. I am copying this minute to the Defence Secretary and Sir Robin Butler.

DH

(DOUGLAS HURD)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
5 June 1990

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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London SW1A 2AH

5 June 1990

Dear Charles,

North Atlantic Council, Turnberry

It has occurred to the Foreign Secretary that the Prime Minister might wish to be reminded, before her Turnberry visit on 6 June, that most of those present - all except the Canadians, Turks, Norwegians and Icelanders - have been involved this spring in an exercise to improve transatlantic links in parallel to the Alliance. The exercise has been rather successful, and it is possible that others at Turnberry may mention it.

The initiative came from the Americans, and this itself was welcome. It is striking that developments in Eastern and Western Europe have led to a renewed conviction in the United States that good relations with Europe are strongly in the US national interest. No-one there speaks any longer of the merits of concentration on the Pacific Rim. Central to this change in perception was US recognition that the success and prosperity of the European Community had played a role in inspiring the countries of Eastern Europe to break free. This led Secretary Baker in December to launch an initiative for significantly strengthened transatlantic links, specifying that the European leg of the structure should be the Community:

"As Europe moves toward its goal of a common internal market, and as its institutions for political and security cooperation evolve, the link between the United States and the European Community will become even more important."

The President endorsed this aim in a joint statement on EC/US relations issued after his February meeting with Mr Haughey.

Another notable feature is that, in taking the lead in securing a positive EC response to the Baker initiative, we have contrived to overcome the traditional Brussels bureaucratic compartmentalisation of separate EC and EPC business. The Americans asked for a "global dialogue" with the Community and member states, and at the first formal meeting between Baker and the twelve Foreign Ministers on 3 May they got just that: discussion ranged from the GATT Round to the Middle East and Southern Africa, and was genuinely useful. The subordinate structures for Administration contacts with the Commission on strictly EC business, and with member state experts on EPC business, have also been thickened up. That is good, but it is better that

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cc/PL
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2-11-1990

This is an oblique response to the passage in your speech about expanding

transatlantic political dialogue

CB
5/6



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
we have managed to design a single bridging structure for Ministerial contacts covering both areas. Mr Baker has made no secret of his satisfaction.

The Canadians are now seeking parallel EC/Canadian links, and the Foreign Secretary believes we should try to satisfy them, though perhaps with less elaborate arrangements. He has put the Canadian case to his EC colleagues; and it is not inconceivable that they may again register their interest in the Turnberry margins. They are aware of, and grateful for, our advocacy; and the Foreign Secretary hopes to contrive an outcome which pleases them as much as the Community's response to the Baker initiative has pleased the Americans, and one which is no less identifiably UK-led.

Yours,
Stephe Wall
(J S Wall)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

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② CCF



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

5 June 1990

Richard Hunt
CCF
1/6.

Dear Charles,

Prime Minister's lunch for the NATO Foreign
Ministers' meeting: Turnberry, 7 June

You may like a note on what the Turnberry meeting will have done by the time of the Prime Minister's visit.

The Foreign Ministers will have held their first morning session (one and a half hours) in Restricted Session. By lunchtime, on present plans, Mr Baker and Mr Clark will have given accounts of their Heads of Government meetings with President Gorbachev. We expect the main themes for the Restricted Session to be the situation in the Soviet Union including the Baltics; security aspects of German unification; CFE developments; and the state of preparations for the CSCE Summit. Preparations for the NATO Summit will probably not be reviewed until after the Prime Minister has left.

At lunch, the Prime Minister will sit next to the NATO Secretary General and the Norwegian Foreign Minister, Kjell Magne Bondevik, who is President d'Honneur of the North Atlantic Council this year. I enclose a personality note on the latter. When the Prime Minister gives lunch to the Secretary General on 29 June Summit preparations will already be fairly well advanced, so she might use the lunch at Turnberry to set out our views on objectives for the Summit (my letter of 14 May). The Prime Minister could usefully cover the same subject with Mr Bondevik. She might also refer to the Commemoration of the 50th anniversary of Narvik, which the Defence Secretary attended.

The Nordics may be approaching us again soon about their fears of the effects on fishing grounds of the possibility of future reprocessing by UKAEA at Dounreay of spent nuclear fuel from experimental reactors outside the UK. If Mr Bondevik raises this issue, the Prime Minister might say that the protection of North Sea fish stocks is equally important to the United Kingdom and HMG are satisfied that present and future activities at Dounreay pose no threat to them. Stringent conditions will be imposed on transport, temporary storage and

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reprocessing, closely regulated by HM Industrial Pollution Inspectorate and the Health and Safety Executive. Fuel reprocessing has been carried out at Dounreay since 1958 and the safety record is excellent.

The Prime Minister will make her speech when coffee is served. The Secretary General intends to say a few words in reply.

I understand that the Turnberry Unit are in touch with No 10 direct about the detailed administrative arrangements for the Prime Minister's stopover.

Yours,
Stephen Wall
(J S Wall)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

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BONDEVIK, KJELL MAGNE

Minister of Foreign Affairs since October 1989.

Born in 1947. Trained as a priest. A fast-moving political career: State Secretary in the Prime Minister's Office at the age of 25; Christian People's Party (CPP) MP in 1973; Parliamentary Leader of the CPP in 1982; Deputy Prime Minister 1985-86.

A strict teetotaller and devout Lutheran, Bondevik was ordained as a priest in 1979. He is a skilful, energetic and attractive politician whose considerable ambitions have been realised in his appointment as Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Married with three children. A devotee of football.



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*Duty Clerk
Mrs. R. Webb*

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

4 June 1990

*to note new
departure times.*

Dear Charles,

Q

Prime Minister's visit to the North Atlantic
Council, Turnberry

Thank you for your letter to Richard Gozney of 1 June about the Prime Minister's wish to have a bilateral with Mr Baker.

We have now agreed with the Americans that the meeting will take place from 1230-1300 hrs or just after, in the Prime Minister's suite at the hotel. The programme for the Prime Minister's visit would, therefore, be as follows:

1215 hrs approx	Prime Minister and party arrive at the hotel by helicopter (met by Lord Lieutenant since Restricted Session of the NAC will still be in progress) and proceed to suite
1230 hrs	Meeting with Mr Baker in Prime Minister's suite
1300 hrs approx	Join other Ministers for pre-lunch drinks in private room on ground floor (other guests would assemble elsewhere and proceed to restaurant
1315 hrs	Top table take seats in restaurant
1435 hrs approx	Unveiling of plaque for hotel, as planned - during which Foreign Ministers have family portrait on terrace (full press coverage)
1440 hrs approx	Prime Minister joins group on terrace for further photocall and say farewells
1445 hrs	Departure for Prestwick as planned.

X/ This would require the Prime Minister's departure from London to be advanced by 45 minutes.

Yam,
Stephe Wall
(J. S. Wall)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

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NATO: Munster Ltas, Mar 79

FORWARD AND COUNTESSVILLE OFFICE

FORWARD DATA UNIT



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10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

1 June 1990

**PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL,
TURNBERRY**

The Prime Minister has decided she would very much like an hour's meeting with Secretary Baker before lunch at Turnberry on Thursday 7 June, in order to have a full debriefing on the Summit meeting with Mr. Gorbachev. I should be grateful if you could establish as soon as possible, through our Embassy in Washington, whether this would be possible for Secretary Baker. If it is, we shall need to revise the travel arrangements for 7 June to enable the Prime Minister to leave London one hour earlier than planned. She is perfectly ready to do this.

C. D. POWELL

Richard Gozney, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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PART 1 ends:-

FCO to JR 30.5.90
~~Scottham office to CDP 18.5.90~~

PART 2 begins:-

CDP to FCO 1.6.90