

SECRET

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Confidential File

Nelson Mandela's visits to the  
United Kingdom meetings and  
Conversations with M. Mandela

SOUTH AFRICA

March 1990

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CONFIDENTIAL PERSONAL

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TO DESKBY 160800Z PRETORIA  
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CSS020/16

MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT DE KLERK

1. Please pass the following message to President De Klerk from the Prime Minister. A separate message about the Nobel Peace Prize follows.

MESSAGE BEGINS

I had an excellent meeting with Nelson Mandela on 12 October. He was in fine form and relaxed despite his extensive travels.

We discussed the state of the negotiations, particularly the problems posed by the establishment of the Freedom Alliance. He spoke warmly of his relationship with you, and told me that he had talked to you by telephone after your first meeting with the Alliance. He explained his reservations about going for a referendum - the implications for the election timetable, the issue of voting in the homelands, the possible rejection of the result by Buthelezi and the cost. But I was left with the impression that he fully recognised the dangers of this situation and was prepared to do all he could to bring as much of the Alliance as possible on board. He expressed a certain respect for General Viljoen. He also made clear that he would be willing to meet Chief Buthelezi, provided a meeting was properly prepared to produce a positive outcome. I suggested that he might concentrate on reassuring Buthelezi that the Constituent Assembly would not overrule any agreements made in the multi-party negotiations.

While Nelson Mandela was prepared to meet the Freedom Alliance as a group, he was not happy with the idea of a tripartite summit. He feared that this would undermine the multi-party negotiations.

At the end of the meeting Mandela spoke strongly of the need

PAGE 1

CONFIDENTIAL PERSONAL

to involve non-South Africans in the Independent Electoral Commission. He was keen that I should take this up with you. It is, of course, for you and the other parties to decide this issue. I do not wish to interfere. But I pass on his views to you. The matter is clearly important to him, as I am sure you will know.

I am told that the conference on South Africa organised by the Confederation of British Industries was a success, much helped by the speeches of Nelson Mandela and Derek Keys. I hope this will evoke a positive response from British businessmen and investors.

Signed : John Major

MESSAGE ENDS

2. There will be no/no signed original.  
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MR LANKESTER

MR APPELYARD

MR ELLIOTT

MR AINSCOW

MR BONE

MR LEVER

MR ALSTON

MR GOODENOUGH

MR IRETON

MR FREEMAN

Fine. Issue

copy: duty clerk

Prime Minister



CRB  
up to  
stan

Foreign &  
Commonwealth  
Office

London SW1A 2AH

14 October 1993

Content for us  
to telegraph this  
(as amended) over  
the weekend?

Roderic.

Dear Roderic,

South Africa: Message to President de Klerk

As agreed after Nelson Mandela's call on the Prime Minister, I enclose a draft message which the Prime Minister might send to President de Klerk. Tony Reeve will be seeing De Klerk tomorrow and it would be good if he could hand over the message before De Klerk and Mandela meet again, possibly this weekend.

Yours ever,

(J S Smith)

Private Secretary

• Roderic Lyne Esq CMG  
10 Downing Street

Personal & confidential

DRAFT MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT DE KLERK

*an excellent*

I had a ~~good~~ meeting with Nelson Mandela on 12 October. He was in fine form and relaxed despite his extensive travels.

We discussed the state of the negotiations, particularly the problems posed by the establishment of the Freedom Alliance. ~~I found him more flexible and responsive than when I last saw him in May.~~ He spoke warmly of his relationship with you, *and told me that he had talked to you by telephone after,* ~~He told me about your telephone conversation with him on 11 October following your first meeting with the Freedom Alliance.~~ He explained his reservations about going for a referendum - the implications for the election timetable, the issue of voting in the homelands, the possible rejection of the result by Buthelezi and the cost. But I was left with the impression that he fully recognised the dangers of this situation and ~~that he was prepared to do all he could to bring as much of the Alliance as possible on board.~~ He expressed a certain respect for General Viljoen, ~~and, for the first time in my contacts with him, he was open to suggestions that he had a role to play in influencing Buthelezi.~~ *He also made clear that* ~~He implied~~ *Chief Buthelezi* ~~he would be willing to meet him,~~ provided a meeting was properly prepared to produce a positive outcome. I suggested that he might concentrate on reassuring Buthelezi that the Constituent Assembly would not overrule any agreements made in the multi-party negotiations.

*Nelson*

While ~~Mandela~~ *Nelson* was prepared to meet the Freedom Alliance as a group, he was not happy with the idea of a tripartite summit, ~~which he felt~~ *He feared that this* ~~would only undermine the multi-party negotiations.~~

He was keen that I should  
take this up with you.

Spoke strongly of  
At the end of the meeting Mandela urged me to impress on  
you the need to involve non-South Africans in the  
Independent Electoral Commission. I feel it is, for you and  
the other parties to decide this issue, <sup>of course</sup> for yourselves. I  
do not wish to interfere. But I pass on his views to you.  
*The matter is clearly important to him, as I am sure you will know.*  
I think you will find Mandela in a responsive frame of mind  
when you see him. I should also add that, as Derek Keys  
will tell you, he gave an encouraging performance at the  
Confederation of British Industries conference which I hope  
will evoke a positive response from British business.  
Needless to say, Derek Keys' speech also went down  
extremely well.

I am told that the conference on South Africa  
organised by the Confederation of British Industries  
was a success, much helped by the speeches  
of Nelson Mandela and Derek Keys. I hope this  
will evoke a positive response from British  
businessmen and investors.

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VISIT BY NELSON MANDELA

CSS027/2

1. Nelson Mandela visited the UK from 8-12 October. He visited Glasgow to receive the freedom of nine towns and cities and he visited Birmingham. Together with Derek Keys, South African Finance Minister, he addressed a well-attended CBI Conference on South Africa. He had separate meetings with Lady Chalker (on aid) and the Prime Minister.
2. Mandela was relaxed and in good form. The discussion with the Prime Minister focussed on developments since the establishment of the Freedom Alliance. President de Klerk had telephoned him following his meeting with the Alliance on 11 October and had discussed the possibility of calling a national referendum on the Constitutional proposals. Mandela's advice had been against holding a referendum unless there was some assurance from Buthelezi in particular that he would accept the result, that there would be freedom of access and of voting in the homelands, that the Government would shoulder the full cost. He was also concerned about the implications for the election time-table: any delay beyond April would only cause a violent reaction. But he would be seeing de Klerk on his return on 15 October. He spoke warmly of their relationship.
3. Mandela said he was quite willing to meet Buthelezi individually and the Freedom Alliance as a group. But the Tripartite meeting they were calling for risked undermining the multi-party negotiations. He expressed his frustration once again about how to deal with Buthelezi but was noticeably not/not rude about him and went out of his way to be complimentary about the role he had played during the apartheid period. He was at a loss to know what more he might offer him given the considerable

regional powers which the ANC had already conceded. The Prime Minister suggested that he might address Buthelezi's fears that a Constituent Assembly might overrule agreements reached previously. He might offer assurances in a bilateral meeting that the policies he was advocating now would be the policies that he himself would pursue after the elections in the Constituent Assembly. Mandela asked that we send him suggestions on the line he might take with Buthelezi. But he needed some indication that there would be a positive outcome from such a meeting.

4. At the end of the meeting Mandela asked the Prime Minister to urge de Klerk to invite non-South Africans to participate in the independent electoral commission. The Prime Minister took note.

5. Comment: This was a very positive visit. Mandela was clearly moved by the overwhelming reception he had in Glasgow and Birmingham and gave an impressive, reassuring speech at the CBI calling for British companies to invest in a climate of sound economic policies aimed at the development of the Southern African region as a whole. He made a point of saying that South African domination of the region would be avoided: a new government would be sensitive to the concerns of its neighbours. Derek Keys gave Mandela's speech his firm endorsement. In the bilateral talks Mandela was at his most reasonable in discussing

the Freedom Alliance and even Buthelezi, and expressed respect for Viljoen as "a man of integrity". He clearly intends to pursue an intensive bilateral round on his return.

6. Holomisa attended both meetings but at no time was the Transkei raid referred to.

7. Grateful for your advice on

- (a) the message we send Mandela advising him what to say to Buthelezi;
- (b) whether, and if so how, to tip off Buthelezi to ensure that he is receptive to overtures for a meeting.

The Prime Minister will send a brief report of his meeting to de Klerk in which he will, unless you advise otherwise, relay Mandela's request concerning the IEC without giving it his



endorsement.

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CAOFF//MISS NEVILLE-JONES  
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ASSESSMENTS STAFF  
MODUK//D SEC(O)(C)/5/8  
MODUK//DI ROW

PS/PM  
DTI//MR THOMAS XAAA3C  
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**Filed on:**

RECORD OF A CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER BY NELSON MANDELA AT  
NO. 10 DOWNING STREET ON 12 OCTOBER AT 5 PM

Present

Prime Minister  
Lady Chalker  
Mr Lyne  
Mr Goodenough  
Mr Christopher

Nelson Mandela  
Mendi Msimang  
General Holomisa  
Thomas Nkobi  
Manala Manzini

1. The Prime Minister was delayed by a previous meeting. Lady Chalker began the discussion. She asked about the latest developments in South Africa following the establishment of the Freedom Alliance. Mandela said that President de Klerk had telephoned him the previous evening to tell him about his meeting with the Freedom Alliance. All the parties represented in the Alliance wanted the Kempton Park negotiations to cease, a summit meeting of all leaders to take place and further legislation through the South African Parliament to cease. The white right wing wanted self-determination. Mandela said he had asked whether the elections might be postponed. De Klerk had said this was not in his mind but he was considering holding a national referendum. Mandela had asked whether there was any assurance that the Freedom Alliance parties would accept the referendum result. De Klerk has said that Buthelezi had indicated that he would have problems with this. Mandela had asked whether the Government could afford and would pay for a referendum but had received no categorical assurance. He had also asked for guarantees of freedom of access to the homelands. De Klerk had said he had no control within the homelands but could make provision for the inhabitants to vote outside the homeland borders if necessary. Mandela had said that people could be prevented from leaving. He had advised de Klerk against holding a referendum. Apart from the difficulties he was concerned that it might lead to a postponement of the elections which would cause a violent reaction. He would be seeing President de Klerk on his return on 15 October.

2. Lady Chalker suggested that the Freedom Alliance was a reaction to the successful bilateral meetings which General Viljoen had had with the ANC. Mandela said that Viljoen had considerable influence among the Afrikaners. He respected him. He hoped they would still be in touch. The Freedom Alliance had been established without any preparation: the Inkatha leadership had read about it in the press and Hartzenberg did not know about the meeting until he was summoned. Reolf Meyer

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had described it as "grotesque". He had told Ramaphosa that only Viljoen and Hartzenberg had been in good spirits at the meeting with de Klerk: the others had been very depressed. It was a move of desperation. Mandela then expressed his concern about the AWB and described a confrontation he had had in Cape Province. Terre Blanche was "a lunatic" but he accepted that the time would come when he might have to talk to him.

3. At this point the Prime Minister joined the discussion.

4. The Prime Minister asked about the CBI conference and Mandela's visits to Glasgow and Birmingham. Mandela said the conference had been very impressive and the support he had received in Glasgow and Birmingham had surpassed his expectations in warmth and spontaneity.

5. The Prime Minister asked about the prospects for the negotiations. Mandela said that 26 political parties were involved in the multi-party talks; 19 had voted in favour for elections next April. The six parties who had opposed the date had had their court application regarding a "sufficient consensus" dismissed. A committee of the negotiations, which included the IFP, had produced constitutional proposals with unanimous support. When these were tabled the IFP had objected on the grounds that the "form of state" needed to be decided first. Mandela said that Ramaphosa believed that this issue could be resolved, the differences were not insurmountable.

6. Mandela spoke warmly of his relationship with President de Klerk. When necessary they had always been able to reach joint decisions and move the process forward. De Klerk was accommodating and their contact was useful: they could address problems together. The ANC were also having talks with the white right wing. On the eve of the passage of the TEC legislation through Parliament, General Viljoen and Thabo Mbeki had issued a joint statement to the effect that violence was not in the interest of the country or of any one group. Mandela said Viljoen gave the impression of being a man of integrity who was trying to win Afrikaners away from violence. He believed agreement could be reached with him on the Interim Constitution even if Buthelezi and Mangope remained outside.

7. The Prime Minister welcomed the possibility that Viljoen might join any agreement. President de Klerk had asked us to use our influence with Buthelezi. The Foreign Secretary had seen him recently and found him very inflexible. Was this characteristic tactical or endemic? Lady Chalker said that Buthelezi had begun his meeting with the Foreign Secretary in a very negative mood but had eventually agreed that he must negotiate seriously with President de Klerk. She said that Buthelezi felt side-lined and appealed to Mandela to do what he could to urge him back on board, possibly with a meeting on

his return. The Prime Minister said that if Buthelezi remained outside the talks, he would be a magnet for the far right, resulting in a larger and more dangerous block remaining outside. De Klerk, we and others were all doing what we could: Mandela himself was the one who could make the difference.

8. Mandela asked what more he could do. The ANC had already conceded substantial powers to the regions to legislate, impose taxation, have responsibility for housing, health, transport, gambling, town planning, environment, water and electricity. Many people had tried to influence Buthelezi, including Chancellor Kohl - this had ended in confrontation. Mandela said that he was being criticised for conceding too much. He then repeated for the Prime Minister the account of his telephone conversation with President de Klerk, recorded above. He said he would only consider a referendum if there were guarantees that the homelands populations could vote, that costs would be completely covered by the Government and that Buthelezi would accept the results. He was concerned about implications for the election time-table and about the thought of a whites-only referendum which the Government might lose.

9. The Prime Minister agreed that Buthelezi was immensely frustrating. Through his own fault he had boxed himself in. He would not advocate making more concessions to him but he did need help to get out of the predicament he had made for himself. One of his concerns was that the Constituent Assembly might overrule agreements reached in the multi-party talks. The Prime Minister suggested that Buthelezi needed reassurance that Mandela's commitments now would be maintained during and after the elections and in the Constituent Assembly, and appealed to him to meet him with such an assurance in the greater interest of a peaceful transition. Mandela said that he was quite prepared to take such an initiative if he could be assured that Buthelezi would respond. Buthelezi was an insecure man: he could be very courteous but once any meeting was over everything became meaningless. At his last meeting he had offered him a post in government. Afterwards Buthelezi had denounced this. Mandela repeated that he would be quite prepared to make the effort and to see Buthelezi. The Prime Minister wondered whether, if the assurances were made to Buthelezi in the presence of the rest of the Freedom Alliance, it would prevent any later denunciation. Mandela said that he would also be happy to meet the Freedom Alliance as a whole but he was against the tripartite meeting they were demanding which would only undermine the multi-party negotiations. It was clear that Buthelezi was concerned that the ANC might make progress with the extreme right. The first decision that the Freedom Alliance had made was that there should be no independent discussions by any member with either the ANC or the Government. Mandela then gave a complimentary account of the role Buthelezi had played during the apartheid period,

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highlighting his stand on principle that he would not associate himself with the South African Government unless political prisoners were released. Ulundi was now the only homeland capital which he had not visited. He had always planned to go there but Buthelezi was making it clear that such a visit was not a priority. Mandela repeated that he would see Buthelezi and requested the Prime Minister or Lady Chalker send him a note advising him what he might say. He still would need some indication that there would be a positive result.

10. Lady Chalker suggested that more use might be made of the economic arguments by corporate business leaders to bring pressure on Buthelezi by emphasising that he was delaying domestic and foreign investment. Mandela said this was already being done: Oppenheimer was one of those who had made the pilgrimage to Ulundi.

11. At the conclusion of the meeting Mandela expressed his warm gratitude for the assistance that had been provided in the security field. The Prime Minister referred back to their earlier meeting in May and urged Mandela not to hesitate in asking for further follow-up help if required.

12. Finally Mandela asked the Prime Minister to urge de Klerk to agree to invite non-South Africans to participate in the independent electoral commission. The Prime Minister took note.

13. The meeting concluded at 6 pm.

AFRICAN DEPARTMENT (SOUTHERN)

Distribution

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Mr Elliott  
Mr Goodenough  
Mr Ireton, ODA  
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**OPENING STATEMENT - NEWS CONFERENCE, FREEDOM ALLIANCE,  
PRETORIA, OCTOBER 12, 1993.**

Ladies and gentlemen of the media.

I welcome you here today to this historic first media conference of the Freedom Alliance.

Before proceeding with the conference-proper, allow me to introduce you to the leaders of the Freedom Alliance, seated in front of you. They are (from your left to right) Brigadier Joshua Gqozo, Chairman of the Ciskei Council of State and leader of the African Democratic Movement in that country; Dr Ferdi Hartzenberg, leader of the Conservative Party and Chairman of the Afrikaner Volksfront; Dr Mangosuthu Buthelezi, Chief Minister of KwaZulu and President of the Inkatha Freedom Party; Dr Lucas Mangope, President of the Republic of Bophuthatswana and leader of the ruling Christian Democratic Party and General Constand Viljoen, Convenor of the Afrikaner Volksfront.

This historic event stems from the commitment of these leaders, within the parameters of their respective ideologies, policies and political visions, to secure the internationally accepted principle of self-determination for the peoples of southern Africa.

At the outset, the Freedom Alliance reiterates in the strongest terms, its total commitment to constructive and inclusive negotiations, aimed at addressing the realities of the political situation in southern Africa.

The Freedom Alliance is convinced that, with the failure of the Multi-Party negotiations to produce an inclusively-acceptable process, a new and dynamic process has been set in motion which will provide the mechanism to resolve the deep-seated conflicts in our country - conflicts which can only be solved through a summit of leaders.

The leadership here present today pointed out to State President FW de Klerk at their meeting in Cape Town yesterday, that the Record of Understanding between the Government and the ANC/SACP alliance, signed in September last year, had cast the negotiating process into a steel mould which had predetermined the process and agreements at the World Trade Centre. The Record of Understanding had structured the basis of negotiations and basic agreements - and this was why the Kempton Park negotiating process had failed.

In the creation of the Freedom Alliance, we firmly believe that we are providing the vehicle through which millions of southern Africans will finally be able to give expression to their political aspirations.

## FREEDOM ALLIANCE

### MANIFESTO

We, the parties and organisations of the Freedom Alliance, commit ourselves to work within our respective policies, ideologies and political visions and to achieve the goals set forth in this Manifesto to ensure long-lasting peace, freedom and democracy in Southern Africa.

We declare our commitment to the following principles:

- a. The recognition of the guidance of Almighty God in the affairs of men and of nations;
- b. The recognition of the right of self-determination of the peoples of Southern Africa;
- c. The preservation of law, order and constitutionality;
- d. The protection and promotion of free-market enterprise and private ownership and the commitment to eradicate poverty;
- e. The rejection of
  - (i) the notion of a unitary state;
  - (ii) racism, discrimination and sexism;
  - (iii) any form of totalitarianism and tyranny over the freedom of man and society;

And we therefore commit ourselves to achieve the following goals:

1. Free and democratic elections in Southern Africa shall be held only within the parameters of final constitutions which:
  - entrench limits to power of government;
  - entrench checks and balances limiting the power of the state;
  - further individual and collective rights.
2. The political settlement reached in the final constitutional dispensation shall not be repealed or modified, contrary to the provisions contained in the constitution.
3. Southern Africa shall be organised in member states which are primarily responsible for governance of the peoples to express their rights to self-determination.

-2-

4. The power of all governments shall be constitutionally limited to preserve the integrity and pre-eminence of civil society. The constitutional autonomy of social and cultural formations and other institutions of civil society shall be recognised and protected.
5. Constitutionalism and the rule of law shall prevail in Southern Africa. Moreover, rigid guarantees shall be entrenched to ensure the supremacy of constitutionalism and the rule of law.
6. Cultural diversity and the rights of people, both as individuals and as members of the social and cultural formations to which they belong, shall be nurtured and protected.
7. Boundaries of member states shall be determined by the people of such states and not by a centralised process of negotiations.
8. Constitutional problems of Southern Africa shall be resolved through negotiations based on consensus.
9. The use of referenda shall be confined to testing the acceptability to the people of constitutional proposals in respect of which consensus has already been reached on a multi-party basis.
10. Negotiations shall continue until a settlement is reached.
11. Any arrangements and mechanisms must conform to the parameters of the final negotiated constitutional settlement, and shall neither be finalised nor implemented until that final settlement is properly secured.
12. The rights of peoples (individual and collective), their fundamental needs and political aspirations shall not be compromised but shall survive any arbitrary and unilateral attempts to disregard them. The peoples shall preserve their undeniable right of self-determination, which includes the right to challenge, in any internationally acceptable manner, attempts to thwart these inalienable rights.

PRETORIA  
12 OCTOBER 1993  
13h55



BRITISH EMBASSY

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TO R. LYNE (PS/No 10)

FAX NO 71 839 3712

FROM S. CLEARY  
PRETORIA

COPY TO

SUBJECT MEETING WITH MANDELA (PRETORIA TELNO 224  
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NUMBER OF PAGES (incl header) 4



Impotent as they were, the other bears could never help staring at Larry's enormous deer gut.

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*Prime Minister**Later info.**Rugv.*

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*13/10*

MY TELNO 218 (NOT TO ALL): MANDELA'S MEETING WITH THE PRIME  
MINISTER: 12 OCTOBER

## SUMMARY

1. FOLLOWING A MEETING WITH THE 'FREEDOM ALLIANCE' (BUTHELEZI ET AL), DE KLERK SPEAKS OF A CRISIS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS AND SUGGESTS A REFERENDUM TO BREAK THE DEADLOCK. FLEXIBILITY ON THE ANC'S PART WILL BE NECESSARY IF THE EXISTING PROCESS IS TO SURVIVE: RECOMMENDATION THAT THE PRIME MINISTER URGE MANDELA THIS AFTERNOON TO KEEP ALL HIS OPTIONS OPEN.

## DETAIL

2. LEADERS OF THE NEW 'FREEDOM ALLIANCE' (FA - INKATHA, THE WHITE RIGHT WING, BOPHUTHATSWANA, CISKEI) MET PRESIDENT DE KLERK IN CAPE TOWN ON 11 OCTOBER. AT A PARTY MEETING LATER THAT EVENING, DE KLERK SAID THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS WERE APPROACHING A CRISIS. IF OUTSTANDING PROBLEMS COULD NOT BE RESOLVED WITHIN ABOUT FOUR WEEKS, A REFERENDUM ON THE DRAFT INTERIM CONSTITUTION MIGHT BE NECESSARY. I SPOKE EARLY THIS MORNING (12 OCTOBER) TO THE MINISTER OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT FOR AN ACCOUNT OF LATEST DEVELOPMENTS.

3. MEYER SAID THAT THE DISCUSSION IN CAPE TOWN HAD NOT IN ITSELF BEEN 'DESTRUCTIVE' BUT THAT NOTHING HAD RESULTED FROM IT. THE FA HAD TRIED TO SEEK A DELAY IN THE KEMPTON PARK NEGOTIATIONS. THEY WANTED MORE TIME, AND SPECIFICALLY A SUMMIT OF ALL LEADERS, TO TAKE STOCK OF THE OBJECTIVES BEING PURSUED AT KEMPTON PARK. DE KLERK HAD REPLIED THAT TIME WAS OF THE ESSENCE, THOUGH HE WAS PREPARED TO MAKE A 'FEW ADJUSTMENTS'; FOR EXAMPLE THE NEXT SPECIAL PARLIAMENTARY SESSION DUE TO START ON 8 NOVEMBER COULD IF NECESSARY BE DEFERRED BY A COUPLE OF WEEKS. HE WAS NOT NEGATIVE TO THE IDEA OF A SUMMIT OF LEADERS, BUT SUCH A SUMMIT MUST BE ACCEPTABLE TO ALL THE KEY PARTIES. THE FA SAID THAT THEY WOULD NEED TO DISCUSS THEIR

POSITION FURTHER TODAY AND MIGHT ALSO ISSUE A MANIFESTO (THEY ARE HOLDING A PRESS CONFERENCE IN PRETORIA AT 1600 HRS LOCAL TIME).

4. THE GOVERNMENT SIDE ALSO MENTIONED THE POSSIBILITY OF A REFERENDUM IF THE POSITION OF THE FA AND THAT OF THE NEGOTIATORS AT KEMPTON PARK COULD NOT BE RECONCILED. BUTHELEZI SAID HE WOULD OBJECT. DE KLERK RESPONDED THAT THE FIRST CHOICE WAS OBVIOUSLY TO REACH THE BROADEST POSSIBLE AGREEMENT AT LEADERSHIP LEVEL, BUT IF THAT COULD NOT BE ACHIEVED THEN OTHER DEMOCRATIC ROUTES, INCLUDING A REFERENDUM, WOULD NEED TO BE EXPLORED.

5. I ASKED MEYER WHETHER THERE WERE ANY POINTS WHICH THE GOVERNMENT WOULD FIND IT HELPFUL FOR THE PRIME MINISTER TO RAISE WITH MANDELA. HE LISTED FOUR:

- I THE ANC SHOULD BE READY TO NEGOTIATE BILATERALLY WITH THE FA.
- II MANDELA SHOULD KEEP AN OPEN MIND ABOUT A SUMMIT OF LEADERS.
- III MANDELA AND BUTHELEZI SHOULD MEET AGAIN SOON. THE ANC'S POLICY OF SIDELINING INKATHA HAD CONTRIBUTED MUCH TO THE PRESENT IMPASSE.
- IV THE ANC SHOULD NOT DISMISS THE IDEA OF A REFERENDUM OF ALL SOUTH AFRICANS AS A LAST RESORT (MEYER MENTIONED IN CONFIDENCE THAT HE HAD SOUNDED RAMAPHOSA (ANC) LAST NIGHT, WHO HAD RESPONDED POSITIVELY).

#### COMMENT

6. THIS IS THE MOST CRITICAL MOMENT IN THE NEGOTIATIONS SINCE THE COLLAPSE OF CODESA. THE GOVERNMENT ARE LIKELY, FOR THE TIME BEING AT LEAST, TO WORK FOR AN ACCOMMODATION WITH THE FA. BUT THEIR TASK WILL BE COMPLICATED BY DIVISIONS WITHIN THE ALLIANCE ITSELF: INKATHA MIGHT BE SATISFIED BY ENTRENCHED REGIONAL GOVERNMENT, BUT THE WHITE RIGHT WING (TO JUDGE BY A MEETING I HAD THIS MORNING WITH GENERAL VILJOEN) ARE UNLIKELY TO SETTLE FOR ANYTHING LESS THAN CONFEDERALISM. MEANWHILE, AN ACCOMMODATION WITH THE FA WILL REQUIRE CONCESSIONS FROM THE ANC: AND IF THESE ARE NOT FORTHCOMING, THE GOVERNMENT MAY YET BE FORCED TO PURSUE THE REFERENDUM IDEA. IN ANY EVENT, THE EXISTING TIMETABLE LOOKS LIKELY TO SLIP.

7. IT WOULD THEREFORE BE VERY HELPFUL IF THE PRIME MINISTER, IN DISCUSSING THIS LATEST TURN OF EVENTS WITH MANDELA, COULD URGE ON

HIM THE NEED TO KEEP ALL HIS OPTIONS OPEN AND SPECIFICALLY, TO BE MORE FORTHCOMING WITH BUTHELEZI (ESSENTIALLY MEYER'S POINTS I AND III). A REFERENDUM, AS DE KLERK ACKNOWLEDGED, WOULD BE VERY MUCH A LAST RESORT. EVEN IF IT WERE CARRIED BY A HANDSOME MAJORITY (WHICH WOULD SEEM LIKELY) BUTHELEZI AND HIS ALLIES WOULD NEVER ACCEPT THE OUTCOME, AND THUS THE PROSPECTS OF FURTHER VIOLENCE WOULD GREATLY INCREASE. IT WOULD THEREFORE BE MUCH BETTER IF ALL CONCERNED COULD REACH AN AGREEMENT THROUGH NEGOTIATION.

8. MANDELA MAY WELL ARGUE THAT IT IS FOR THE GOVERNMENT TO DELIVER INKATHA: AND HE IS LIKELY TO URGE US, AS THE FOREIGNERS WITH THE MOST INFLUENCE OVER BUTHELEZI, TO PUT PRESSURE ON HIM OURSELVES. BUT THE FACT IS THAT PRESSURE ALONE WILL NOT SHIFT BUTHELEZI. THE ANC WILL NEED TO HELP.

9. DEPENDING ON THE GROUND COVERED WITH MANDELA, THE PRIME MINISTER MAY WISH TO CONSIDER GIVING DE KLERK SOME ACCOUNT OF THE MEETING. IT WILL BE VERY USEFUL AT THIS STAGE TO REGISTER OUR STRONG SUPPORT FOR THE PROCESS.

10. PLEASE ADVANCE TO PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET.

REEVE

YYYY

DISTRIBUTION

ADVANCE

SOUTHERN AFRICA

PS

PS/BARONESS CHALKER

MR GOODENOUGH

AD(S)//HD

AD(S)//MR WYATT

AD(S)//MR WHITEWAY

2 NEWS D//HD

PS/NO 10 DOWNING ST

NNNN



**PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH MR NELSON MANDELA ON  
12 OCTOBER: DRAFT PRESS STATEMENT BY NO 10 PRESS OFFICE**

The Prime Minister and Mr Mandela agreed that a critical point had been reached in the process of moving towards fully representative government.

They noted that the parties in "Freedom Alliance" had withdrawn from the multi-party negotiations; but that these parties were seeking to pursue their objectives through negotiation.

They urged all parties to show understanding and flexibility so that a way could be found to ensure the peace, stability and prosperity which South Africa so badly needed.

Very significant progress had been made in South Africa. Much trust had been established despite uncertainties about the future.

The Prime Minister urged all South Africans to support the difficult transition process and participate fully in country's emerging democratic life. No-one should resort to violence to undermine the democratic process.

Mr Mandela's call for lifting all economic sanctions is being implemented. The Prime Minister welcomed last week's UN General Assembly resolution on the lifting of sanctions.

South Africa urgently needed new investment. Today's CBI Conference, addressed by Mr Mandela and South African Finance Minister Derek Keys, had been very timely. The Prime Minister welcomed Mr Mandela's call to British companies to invest in South Africa and to contribute to the development of the economies of South Africa and the region.

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH NELSON MANDELA, 12 OCTOBER 1993

BACKGROUND

Bilateral Contacts

1. The Prime Minister last met Nelson Mandela on 5 May. The Prime Minister met President de Klerk on 26 September; the Secretary of State saw Chief Buthelezi on 6 September.

Constitutional Negotiations

2. Multi-party negotiations, aimed at preparing for transition to non-racial democracy in South Africa, opened on 1 April 1993. On 7 September agreement was reached by "sufficient consensus" (excluding 6 of the 26 participants, particularly Chief Buthelezi's Inkatha party and the Conservative Party) on the powers and role of the Transitional Executive Council (TEC). On 23 September the South African Parliament passed legislation establishing the TEC. Parliament has also legislated for an Independent Electoral Commission, an Independent Media Commission and Independent Broadcasting Authority. Agreement on the interim constitution which will govern next year's elections is hoped for by end October. The TEC will come into force once this agreement is reached. Legislation will be considered by Parliament in November. The negotiations have also agreed, again by "sufficient consensus", that the first democratic elections in South Africa should be held on 27 April 1994. These will elect both a Constituent Assembly to draw up a final constitution as well as a transitional government of national unity, to last for five years, in which the parties will be represented according to their strength in the new parliament.

3. Inkatha and the Conservative Party have left the talks in protest. Buthelezi does not accept that an elected Constituent Assembly (in which he will be poorly represented) should draw up the final constitution. He is seeking a federal solution to be agreed prior to the elections. Bilateral negotiations with the South African Government are continuing.

4. Mandela sees little scope for further concessions from the ANC and appears to be content for Buthelezi to remain marginalised. At the same time he professes to be deeply concerned at the threat of the white right. De Klerk has suggested that we should try to persuade Mandela that the best way to neutralise the threat from the white right would be to get Buthelezi back on board.

### Violence

5. Political violence is concentrated in Natal and in the townships around Johannesburg, and largely involves ANC and Inkatha supporters. Zulu support is divided about equally between the two parties. Over 1000 people were killed in July and August 1993.

6. The international observers (UN, EC, Commonwealth and OAU) are making a valuable contribution to defusing violence. We have two police officers with the EC mission and one with the Commonwealth mission. There is also a British police officer on the EC team of experts helping the Goldstone Commission. The mandates for the UN, Commonwealth and EC observer teams have been extended until the elections.

### Election Monitoring

7. The ANC have called for a substantial international role in observing South Africa's elections, and Pik Botha has endorsed the need for international participation. This will require a request from the South African Independent Electoral Commission and should be under a UN umbrella. We are likely to participate in an EC group. The EC Commission has a voter education programme worth 20 mecu.

### Westminster/South Africa Liaison Committee (WSLC)

8. The all-party WSLC, in conjunction with the Westminster Foundation, is planning to support the preparations for elections with regional seminars in South Africa on parliamentary democracy aimed at future South African MPs. A delegation from the Liaison Committee, headed by the Committee's Chairman, Mr Peter Temple-Morris MP, visited South Africa from 29 September - 6 October. They called on President de Klerk and Thabo Mbeki.

### Sanctions

9. Nelson Mandela called for the lifting of economic and financial sanctions when he appeared before the UN Committee against Apartheid in New York on 24 September. Commonwealth trade sanctions were lifted on 24 September.

10. The EC has already lifted all trade and economic sanctions. EC Foreign Ministers agreed to lift the bans on security contacts and the accreditation of Defence Attaches, and to abolish reporting requirements by industry under the EC Code of Conduct, at the Foreign Affairs Council on 4 October. The UN arms embargo will remain until the establishment of an elected government in 1994.

11. Equity have balloted their members about lifting the ban on the sale of TV and radio programmes to South Africa. The outcome is not yet known. However, their commitment not to support or represent artists performing in South Africa, which effectively serves as a deterrent and de facto prohibition, remains in force. Lady Chalker plans to urge Mandela to make an early call for lifting the ban.

#### Military Training

12. It is not yet clear how the question of military integration (ie the ANC's military wing, MK, with the SADF) will be addressed. Ministers have endorsed a MoD/FCO paper outlining possible British involvement in the military sector. This recommends a two-stage approach: phase one would involve having a four man combined military/civilian team in place to assist integration, principally in areas of higher management and policy formulation. Phase two would involve assistance with lower level integration, the possible provision of staff at selected South African staff colleges and the inclusion of selected SADF officers on training courses in the UK. The South African Minister of Defence reacted favourably when Sir A Reeve floated these ideas with him on 24 June. MK Commander, Joe Modise also acknowledged the merit of the ideas during his visit in July. The next step will be for MoD officials to discuss the ideas formally with both sides in South Africa - this should happen once the TEC is established.

#### Defence Sales

13. There are now no restrictions on defence sales to South Africa other than that any contracts entered into must link supply specifically to the lifting of sanctions. Prospects are good for BAe's Hawk, and for naval frigates from Swan Hunter. The South Africans are bidding to sell helicopters to the British Army. The SADF recently attended the Royal Navy and Army Equipment Exhibition for the first time.

#### UK Aid/Police Training

14. UK aid now totals over £10 million with a similar sum as Britain's share of European Community aid. It focuses on the education sector as the key to enabling black people to play their full part in a non-racial democratic South Africa, as well as urban and rural development projects. It also allows for other initiatives such as public administration training, small business development and assistance in the health sector. The British Development Division in Southern Africa opened its offices in Pretoria last month, and will enable even better targetting of our aid effort.



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15. With the ODA we have been looking at ways of assisting with police training in South Africa. Given sensitivities about the status and legitimacy of the South African Police, as well as previous EC restrictions on contacts with the police, assistance is initially being limited to helping academics with the development and implementation of training courses for civilian marshals. These are being run by the Community Peace Foundation at the University of Western Cape.

EC/South Africa

16. Debate about the shape of a future EC/South Africa formal relationship is still at an early stage. South African priorities for this are not yet clear, eg whether they would want Lome-type arrangements.

17. Possible trade options for a future relationship include: GSP: a non-reciprocal (mediterranean-type) cooperation agreement: a reciprocal cooperation agreement: - a Lome-like relationship, or full membership of Lome, which however the SAG appear to accept is not a realistic option.

18. The Commission's presence in South Africa is to be upgraded to delegation status. But formal negotiations on a future relationship cannot begin until at least the transitional executive structures are in place. The Positive Measures Programme will be reorientated on the establishment of the TEC to bring it into line with other EC development programmes. But anything more wide-ranging will probably have to await further progress on the political front.

CHOGM

19. Discussion at CHOGM (21-25 October) will cover possible practical assistance for South Africa's transition. The Commonwealth Observer Mission (COMSA) has made a valuable contribution. COMSA III will operate until the elections.

20. No invitations have as yet been issued to South Africans by the Commonwealth Secretariat. There is a tradition that the ANC and PAC are invited to attend CHOGM as observers, but the Secretariat are anxious to broaden the base of attendance. As regards top-level South African attendance, our preference would be for none. Mandela attended the Harare CHOGM and may come again: but the Commonwealth Secretariat are trying to head him off. De Klerk told the Prime Minister he would not be able to attend.

21. Mandela has said publicly that a new government would apply for readmission to the Commonwealth.

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Cellular Telephone Licences

22. On 22 September the South African Cabinet decided to award cellular telephone licences to two consortia, both involving substantial British participation (Cable & Wireless and Vodafone). The ANC and COSATU condemned the award, but on 29 September the ANC and SAG announced a compromise whereby the ANC accepted the deal subject to further discussions taking place.

UN: Membership of Subsidiary Organisations

23. In recent months the South Africans have begun lobbying for readmission to UN organisations. We support the universality of UN membership and have lobbied EC partners to support South African applications. The UN Secretariat believe that South Africa should not be readmitted to either the General Assembly or technical bodies until a new government is in place (ie 1994 at the earliest).

African Department (Southern)  
5 October 1993

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PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH NELSON MANDELA, 12 OCTOBER 1993

POINTS TO MAKE:

Doorstep?  
~~\_\_\_\_\_~~

Stabiny  
\_\_\_\_\_

Introduction

- How was trip to Glasgow/Birmingham? CBI Conference this morning?
- Delighted at passage by the South African Parliament of legislation establishing the TEC, and your call at the United Nations for the lifting of economic sanctions.
- Right and proper to normalise your economic relations with the international community, particularly IFIs, well before the elections. There will be a long lead-time before benefits are felt. If investment is to materialise, Government of National Unity will need to follow sensible economic policies and tackle violence.
- Welcome your emphasis on need for white South Africans to stay. Will encourage those of British origin to play their part after elections.

Negotiations

- Good discussion with President de Klerk two weeks ago. He seemed confident then that the process was on target for elections in April next year, and for agreement on Interim Constitution by end of this month. The establishment of the "Freedom Alliance" in the last few days now seems to threaten this. How seriously do you take it?

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- Rolf Meyer [Minister of Constitutional Development and Government Chief Negotiator] told Tony Reeve this morning that President de Klerk had had a difficult meeting yesterday. It was not in itself destructive, but nothing resulted from it. The Freedom Alliance had tried to delay the Kempton Park negotiations and wanted a summit of all leaders. De Klerk had replied that time was of the essence, although he was prepared to delay the next special parliamentary session by a week or two if absolutely necessary, but he was committed to the April deadline for the elections. Any summit meeting, de Klerk insisted, must be acceptable to all the key parties. The Freedom Alliance said they would discuss their position further and might issue a manifesto at a press conference they are holding this afternoon in Pretoria. Buthelezi objected when de Klerk referred to the possibility of a referendum if the Freedom Alliance could not be reconciled with the Kempton Park negotiations.

- This is the most critical moment in the negotiations since the collapse of CODESA. I understand that de Klerk will continue to work for an accommodation with the Freedom Alliance. If this proves impossible de Klerk may be forced to pursue the referendum idea. This would be very dangerous since, it seems to us, Buthelezi and his allies would never accept the outcome and violence would increase.

- I know you regard Buthelezi as de Klerk's problem. But it is not as simple as that. Pressure alone will not shift Buthelezi.

- Urge you to keep all your options open and to be as flexible as possible. The best outcome must be an agreement through negotiation.

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- Are you prepared to negotiate bilaterally with the Freedom Alliance? Or to meet Buthelezi again? Much of the problem is his sense of being sidelined and you can contribute to resolving that.

- Can you keep an open mind about a summit of leaders?

- Do not dismiss the idea of a referendum of all South Africans as a last resort.

[If necessary]:

- Buthelezi genuinely concerned that constitutional principles (eg on regional powers) might be over-ruled by Constituent Assembly. These fears must be addressed. Of course the Constituent Assembly will have the final say; but in the interests of reassuring those outside the process the international community will increasingly call for the agreements reached in the multi-party talks to be adhered to.

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cc Blup  
RB



ODA

Overseas Development  
Administration

94 Victoria Street, London SW1E 5JL

Telephone 071-917<sup>0419</sup>

From The Private Secretary

Roderic Lyne Esq  
Private Secretary  
10 Downing Street  
London SW1A 2AA

11 October 1993

See para 3

New list

**VISIT BY NELSON MANDELA**

... Lady Chalker has asked me to send you the attached copy of her report to the Foreign Secretary on her recent visit to Washington as a prelude to the Prime Minister's meeting with Nelson Mandela on 12 October.

Yours,

Mark

Mark Lowcock  
Private Secretary to Baroness Chalker



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From: Lynda Chalker  
Date: 11 October 1993  
cc. see attached

Secretary of State

VISIT TO WASHINGTON (30 SEPTEMBER - 2 OCTOBER) AND TOKYO (3 - 7 OCTOBER)

1. In Washington I attended the US-inspired Conference on Aid to the Occupied Territories. I also had meetings with Nelson Mandela and the Managing Director of the IMF. In Japan, I attended the Tokyo International Conference on African Development, and had bilaterals with African Heads of Government and senior ministers, as well as with EC Development Ministers and officials and the US Administration. Outside the Conference, I held bilateral discussions with the Japanese on aid issues and debt.

Washington

2. The Conference on Aid to support the Middle East Peace Process was a success, and was reported as such in the media. The US Administration claimed that pledges for 1994 amounted to \$600 million, and that promises of longer term support meant that the World Bank target figure of \$2.5 billion over 5 years for the Occupied Territories would be reached comfortably. There were tortuous negotiations in the week leading up to the Conference over the arrangements for the coordination of international assistance. While there was no final agreement, there was broad acceptance that the World Bank would take the leading role in fulfilling the Secretariat functions. This work will be overseen by an Ad Hoc Liaison Committee comprising the 6 major donors (including the EC). We were successful in restraining the Commission from pushing ahead too quickly with their expenditure plans: it was made clear that the 500 mecu was a Commission proposal subject to consideration by the Council, and that there was much detailed work to be done before the Council could be expected to take a final decision. Most bilateral donors made multi-year pledges of support. Our not doing so, in company with France and the Netherlands, attracted little attention in the Conference and none in the media. We can consider the scale of our bilateral programme in the normal way once the public expenditure round is complete.

3. Nelson Mandela was in Washington mostly to drum up interest in investment in South Africa and to meet the international financial institutions. It is good that he is devoting attention to the economic agenda: it is not an area that comes naturally to him but, given how precarious a situation he will inherit if he wins the elections next April, he will have to become fully engaged. The economy and what to do about Buthelezi and the IFP are two key themes for our meetings with Mandela.

/4. Michel Camdessus at the IMF briefed me on

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4. Michel Camdessus at the IMF briefed me on progress towards a new phase of the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF). A majority of countries, including a number of middle income developing countries, are apparently ready to contribute to a new ESAF, and Camdessus is hoping to tie up an agreement within the next few weeks. Ken Clarke had told him earlier in the week that, while we would not absolutely rule it out, it was unlikely that we would be able to make a contribution. While saying that he understood our position, Camdessus implied that we could come under pressure in the end game if other contributors (like Germany) insist on a burden-sharing approach (ie decline to contribute unless we do). It seems to me that if approached we should push this firmly to the Treasury: they lead on the IMF; they financed our contribution to ESAF I; and they cannot look to us to raid the bilateral aid programme to pay for a successor. We should not be cornered into accepting that this is an FCO problem: it is a Treasury one.

#### Tokyo

5. The Conference on African Development was intended to demonstrate Japanese political commitment to Africa, partly as a counterweight to their general concentration on Asia (which receives 60 - 70% of Japanese aid). It attracted a better attendance than any conference on Africa in the last decade, with a good number of Heads of Government, and many senior ministers from the continent. A key-note address was given by the Japanese Prime Minister, and there were half a dozen ministers from donor countries as well as top people from the multilateral agencies. In the margins of the Conference, I had a series of African bilaterals which have been reported separately.

6. The content of the Conference closely reflected the ideas we have been pushing for the past two or three years. The recurring themes were the need for political and economic reform (tempered by some of the Africans by a plea for donors to acknowledge that the demands of democratisation can make it more difficult to hold firmly to strong macroeconomic policies); the importance of the private sector as the engine for growth; and the good government agenda. The Japanese introduced one new theme: the relevance of the experience of Asian countries for African development.

7. Overall the Japanese will have been pleased by the outcome: much goodwill towards them from the Africans; a sensible if not earth shattering communique; and no new institutions or dramatic policy changes. Most participants recognised the need to maintain Japan's interest and financial support in Africa and acted accordingly.

8. I pursued the Prime Minister's letter to the Japanese Prime Minister on debt and the

/Trinidad terms both in the Conference and in



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
Trinidad terms both in the Conference and in separate bilaterals with the Japanese. While, as has been reported separately by telegram, we achieved what we sought in the Conference communique and have prevented the Japanese from pulling back from the Tokyo Summit agreement to pursue the Trinidad terms, the bureaucracy in the Japanese Ministry of Finance (who call the shots on the debt issue) look set to continue to resist the practical implementation of the proposals. They had not reacted well to the Chancellor's attempts to single out Japan on the debt question at the IMF/World Bank annual meetings.

9. In bilaterals with the Japanese I was briefed on their aid plans for the next 5 years. Between 1993 and 1997 they expect to provide \$70 - 75 billion in aid, an increase of 40 - 50% over the previous period. Their oda/GNP and aid/public expenditure ratios will both rise steadily. Japan's increase will also more than offset reductions in other donor countries, so that the total volume of oda globally will continue to increase. The Japanese are very keen to coordinate policy with other donor countries, especially in the areas of good government and economic reform. In very many countries, especially in Africa, our views are very close to theirs. It would serve our interests to strengthen policy coordination, both at the country level and through the Embassy in Tokyo. We should also strengthen our collaboration at the operational level: we have co-financed a number of projects with Japan in Asia but done little so far in Africa. Following up the discussions the Prime Minister had during his visit last month, I left the Japanese an aide memoire on possible collaboration in the health and population sectors in Tanzania.

10. One additional area to which the Japanese are paying increasing attention is the link between aid and military expenditure. They are particularly concerned about China, India, Pakistan and Indonesia. They have hinted privately to recipients that the level of Japanese aid is likely to be determined in part by military spending; but I am not yet sure how far they are prepared to take specific action with the worst offenders.

Thanks

11. I am extremely grateful to Robin and Annie Renwick in Washington, and John and Julia Boyd in Tokyo, and their respective teams, both for their hospitality and for the excellent arrangements made for my visit.



BARONESS CHALKER OF WALLASEY

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Distribution

FCO Ministers

Mr Lankester\*

PUS

Mr Ainscow\*

Mr Elliott

Mr Crowe

All ODA Under Secretaries\* and

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Mr Bone

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Mr Chakrabarti\*

Mr Tebbit, ERD

Mrs Kelly\*

Mr Bearpark\*

Sir R Renwick, Washington (personal)

Sir J Boyd, Tokyo (personal)

\* - by e-mail

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alb  
b-up

Foreign &  
Commonwealth  
Office

11 October 1993

London SW1A 2AH

Der Rohvic,

Prime Minister's meeting with Nelson Mandela, 12 October 1993  
at 5 pm

This letter updates the Steering Brief for this meeting contained in my letter of 8 October. There have been important developments.

I On 8 October the Concerned South Africans Group (COSAG), which comprises the white right-wing, some "homeland" governments and Buthelezi's Inkatha Freedom Party, have transformed themselves into the "Freedom Alliance". Inkatha's bilateral meetings with the government will be replaced by meetings between the Government and the Freedom Alliance as a whole. The first of these takes place this afternoon in Cape Town. President de Klerk summoned an emergency Cabinet meeting over the weekend and a further strategy meeting took place this morning. As yet we have no read-out. We shall try to let you have this before the Prime Minister sees Mandela.

The implications of this development could be serious. De Klerk will be faced this afternoon not only by Buthelezi, but by Mangope of Bophuthatswana (who is resisting incorporation of his "homeland" under a new constitution) and General Viljoen, former Commander of the South African Army, who now heads the Afrikaner Volksfront (AVF), which is arguing for an Afrikaner homeland. The leader of the more extreme Conservative Party, Hartzenberg, will also be present. This is potentially a formidable grouping, and reduces the formal multi-party negotiations in Kempton Park (near Johannesburg) effectively to only the Government, the ANC and the PAC. That forum will be unable to undertake serious negotiations on the Interim Constitution while the bilateral negotiations with the Freedom Alliance are taking place in Cape Town. Comprehensive agreement on an Interim Constitution by the end of this month thus appears increasingly unlikely. This will delay the establishment of the Transitional Executive Council (TEC).

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In a further development on 8 October the South African Defence Forces (SADF) raided a house in Transkei suspected of being an APLA base (APLA - Azanian Peoples' Liberation Army - is the military wing of the PAC, which claimed responsibility for recent attacks on whites). The Government of Transkei is allied to the ANC, and its leader, General Holomisa, is accompanying Mandela on his present travels (he will not attend the meeting with the Prime Minister). While the APLA attacks against the white population have been universally condemned, the South African action in invading a supposedly independent country, plus unconfirmed reports that the five who were killed were children, makes this a sensitive issue. It is also possible that the SADF hit the wrong target. If Mandela raises it, the Prime Minister might limit his comments to saying that violence from any quarter was unhelpful to the process. With the press, the Prime Minister might similarly report the general condemnation of violence while declining to comment on this specific incident. A more detailed comment by the Prime Minister would risk provoking an unhelpful one by Mandela.

Following the precedent of his meeting with President de Klerk, the Prime Minister may wish to make a statement to the press after his meeting with Mandela. I enclose a draft.

*Yours ever,*

*Stephen*

(J S Smith)  
Private Secretary

© Roderic Lyne Esq CMG  
10 Downing Street

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However this is issued, it will have to be shorter (much); and in some way to address the future events. RM/2.

**PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH NELSON MANDELA ON 12 OCTOBER:  
PRESS STATEMENT**

Delighted to have had opportunity of good talk with Mr Nelson Mandela today. Saw President de Klerk two weeks ago. Useful to hear about the changes taking place in South Africa, which have our full encouragement and support.

South Africa is on the threshold of a new era. South African Parliament has passed legislation to set up a Transitional Executive Council. First step towards fully representative government.

Nelson Mandela's call for the lifting of all economic sanctions is being implemented. The UN General Assembly lifted all such sanctions last Friday. I welcome this.

Next step will be agreement on an interim constitution governing next year's elections and on a Bill of Rights. These are important issues. It is vital that agreements reached in the present negotiations are adhered to. South Africa needs confidence in the future. I urge all South Africans - particularly those with the responsibility of leadership - to support the process of transition and participate fully in the emerging democratic life of the country. No-one should be tempted to resort to violence to undermine the democratic process.

We discussed how the United Kingdom can support the transitional process. We are already involved in a variety of ways.

We are helping to contain violence by providing the services of senior British police officers serving with the EC and Commonwealth observer groups and the Goldstone task force.

We are seeking through our substantial aid programme to help redress the legacy of apartheid through an extensive education programme and community development projects in the townships and rural areas.

We are running, at the Civil Service College, our third course of Public Administration Training for a cross-section of parties, who are likely to play a role in a future government of South Africa.

We are ready to help with South Africa's first non-racial elections by providing election observers.

With our EC partners we will be seeking a new beneficial trading relationship with South Africa. Next week I shall be discussing with Commonwealth Heads of Government in Cyprus how the Commonwealth can continue to provide practical support for the transitional process.

Above all, South Africa needs new investment to regenerate the South African economy and provide jobs. Today's CBI Conference on South Africa was very timely. I am glad that Mr Mandela and Derek Keys, the South African Minister for Finance, Trade and Industry were able to address the Conference. The scope for cooperation between our two countries is immense. We are already the biggest foreign investor in South Africa; we hope to build on this position.

Nelson Mandela has dedicated his life to the goal of a non-racial, democratic South Africa. That goal is now in sight. This is a great tribute to the courage and determination of South Africa's leaders and a source of satisfaction to South Africa's friends in this country. We shall continue to support South Africa's efforts to create a fully democratic and peaceful society, with prosperity for all its people.

## **SOUTH AFRICA**

### **QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS FOR USE WITH THE PRESS**

#### UK view of progress in negotiations?

- Welcome passing of legislation to establish and empower the Transitional Executive Council (TEC) in the South African Parliament on 23 September. Important step in transition to non-racial democracy. ✓

- Next step is to reach agreement on the interim constitution governing next year's General Election. ✓

#### Sanctions

- Pleased that Mandela's call to lift sanctions is producing a swift response. UNGA lifted all economic sanctions last Friday (8 October). Oil embargo to be lifted when TEC is in place. EC lifted economic sanctions in 1992. Only the arms embargo remains - until after a new government is elected.

#### Prospects for holding of democratic elections?

- Welcome the agreement on 27 April 1994 as the date for elections in South Africa. We urge all South Africans to support the process of transition and to participate fully in the democratic life of their country.

#### How can we help ensure free and fair elections?

- EC ready to help with preparations for election (eg voter education programme) and to provide election observers if requested by the Independent Electoral Commission once it is in place.

Our approach to parties outside the negotiating process?

- We support the multi-party negotiations and believe that all parties should be included in a settlement. Buthelezi visited 6 September; he met Foreign Secretary, who emphasized the international community's support for multi-party negotiation process and its desire to see progress.

Right-wing opposition to negotiations: formation of 'Freedom Alliance'

- Regret that certain parties have suspended their participation in multi-party negotiations. Important that all South Africa's major political leaders play a full role in determining the country's future. Understand the Freedom Alliance is meeting President de Klerk today.

SADF raid on Umtata on 8 October?

No comment. [Circumstances are far from clear.]

Help with violence?

- UK providing services of 4 senior policemen - 2 with EC, 1 with Commonwealth observer teams, 1 with Goldstone Commission's investigating task force. They work in close cooperation with National Peace Accord structures. Also sent a senior policeman to help with investigation of Chris Hani's assassination.

UK Aid to South Africa?

- UK aid is substantial and growing. Spent over £11 million last year, with similar amount as share of EC aid (Positive Measures Programme).

- We have concentrated on supporting and promoting the process of change, but have been careful to keep within the bounds of what the market could bear at any given time.



- Have therefore centred our effort on fundamentals such as education, community development, health and housing. Also trying to make a more tangible contribution to political development with eg public administration and diplomatic training.

- Third course of public administration training taking place at Civil Service College. Diplomatic training taking place now in Birmingham. All courses open to all parties.

- Opened a new regional aid office (Development Division) in Pretoria in June. Should make us better placed to maintain and build upon our programme.

#### Relationship of EC to the new South Africa?

- EC has given some preliminary thought to the nature of its future relationship with the new South Africa. Likely that a future cooperation/assistance programme will have to be tailor-made and there are a number of options.

- Important therefore to establish a dialogue as soon as possible once transitional structures (primarily TEC) are in place.

African Department (Southern)

11 October 1993

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*CRB  
b/p  
A/S*

Foreign &  
Commonwealth  
Office

8 October 1993

London SW1A 2AH

*Dev Roderic*

**PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH NELSON MANDELA,  
12 OCTOBER 1993 AT 5 PM**

STEERING BRIEF

Background

Nelson Mandela is visiting a number of European countries following his visit to Washington and the United Nations where he called for the lifting of economic and financial sanctions.

Before seeing the Prime Minister he will have been to Glasgow, to receive the freedom of the city, and Birmingham. He will address the CBI South Africa conference in the morning of 12 October, alongside Derek Keys, the South African Finance Minister. He will see Lady Chalker on 11 October.

*✓  
✓  
✓*

The Prime Minister last saw Mandela on 5 May 1993 in London, President de Klerk on 26 September and Buthelezi on 30 April.

With the passage by the South African Parliament of the legislation establishing the Transitional Executive Council (TEC) a decisive step has been taken towards transitional government in South Africa. Agreement on an interim constitution under which next year's elections will be held is hoped for by the end of October. The TEC will only then be set up. The outstanding problem remains the incorporation of Chief Buthelezi's Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), and possibly elements of the white right-wing, into the agreement, and their participation in elections.

Buthelezi saw the Foreign Secretary on 6 September; he was at his most intransigent, refusing to accept that an elected Constituent Assembly (in which he will be poorly represented), should draw up South Africa's final constitution and seeking a federal solution to be agreed prior to the elections. Inkatha are boycotting the multi-party negotiations but are conducting intense

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bilateral negotiations with the Government. These started well but have since got bogged down. Meanwhile, there is news today of a transformation of the COSAG Group (Inkatha, Kwazulu, Bophuthatswana, Ciskei, White Right Wing) into a new "Freedom Alliance". Inkatha's bilaterals with the Government will be replaced by meetings between the Government and the "Freedom Alliance" as a whole. It is clear that substantial problems remain to be resolved if all the main parties are to agree on an interim constitution by the end of this month.

President de Klerk would like the Prime Minister to intercede with Mandela over Buthelezi. With Buthelezi's boycott of the multi-party negotiations he is bearing the full burden of the negotiations aimed at getting Buthelezi back on board. The Prime Minister might appeal for Mandela's understanding and support for what de Klerk is doing. He should however be wary about pressing Mandela for further overtures/meetings with Buthelezi personally as Mandela is sensitive on this and regards Buthelezi as de Klerk's problem.

#### Objectives

Our objectives for this meeting are:

- To welcome the normalization of South Africa's economic relations with the international community.
- To welcome the progress achieved so far in the negotiations and to urge Mandela and the ANC to show flexibility over the efforts to find accommodation for Buthelezi and the white right.
- To outline areas of British/South African collaboration in the run-up to the elections (27 April 1994), including efforts to contain the violence.

The Prime Minister might begin by welcoming Mandela's call at the UN for the lifting of economic sanctions before moving on to discuss the negotiations. He might then go on to discuss the elections and ask about the scope for international involvement, the numbers of election observers expected, and how they might relate to domestic monitors and to the independent Election Commission. He might also refer to the anticipated involvement early next year of the Westminster/South Africa Liaison Committee of MPs who will, we hope, offer seminars on parliamentary democracy and procedure for those standing in next year's elections for the first time.

The revival of the South African economy must be a top priority. With sanctions lifted, the way is open to lending from the international financial institutions. The



CBI seminar, which Mandela will have addressed earlier in the day, provides a good opportunity to encourage greater trade and investment. If this investment is to materialise, the Government of National Unity will need to follow sensible economic policies and tackle the issue of violence.

Lady Chalker will have discussed our aid programme with Mandela the previous day. Building on our participation in the present EC and Commonwealth observer missions in South Africa and the three public administration courses we have provided, the Prime Minister might touch on two other areas (apart from the elections) where we intend to contribute: police reform and military integration.

It would be useful also to highlight the impending return of our Defence Attache and the potential for collaboration in the defence sector (the BAe Hawk aircraft and Swan Hunter corvettes are both possibilities), once the arms embargo is lifted after next year's elections.

The Prime Minister might add a word of welcome for the emphasis Mandela has been placing on the need for white South Africans to stay: he could say that we, for our part, will do everything we can to encourage South Africans of British origin to contribute to the rebuilding of the country after the elections.

Mandela attended the last Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting at Harare, but is not, so far, expected to be at Limassol. Neither we nor the Commonwealth Secretary-General are encouraging his participation which would irritate both de Klerk and Buthelezi.

#### Attendance

Mandela will be accompanied by:

Thomas Nkobi, ANC Treasurer-General  
Pallo Jordan, ANC Director of Information and  
Publicity  
Mendi Msimang, ANC Chief Representative in London  
Manala Manzini, Private Secretary

Tito Mboweni, Deputy Head of the ANC Economics Department, may also attend if the CBI conference finishes on time.

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On our side, if you agree, the Foreign Secretary and Lady Chalker would be available to attend, accompanied by Anthony Goodenough. Robin Christopher could take a note if that would be useful.

*Yours ever,*  
*J S Smith*

(J S Smith)  
Private Secretary

Roderic Lyne Esq CMG  
10 Downing Street

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✓ FCO informed. pa on file.  
Delighted he can come. S. 15/9  
Let's judge between (a) and (b)



When we  
see how  
awful the  
day is.

10 DOWNING STREET

Roderic

Probably (b)

R.

Mandela call on  
12 Oct at 1700

FCS would like to  
sit in on this.

He says that:

a) if meeting is only  
 $\frac{1}{2}$  hr, he could  
then take Mandela  
to FCO for a  
further  $\frac{1}{2}$  hr meeting;

b) if meeting is likely  
to last an hour,  
he would like to  
stay throughout.

presumably (b) ?

S. 15/9

File

Tinsby

RECORD OF A CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER BY MR NELSON MANDELA,  
PRESIDENT OF THE ANC, AT NO. 10 DOWNING STREET ON 5 MAY AT 4.15  
PM

Present:

Mr Nelson Mandela  
Mr Aziz Pahad  
Mr Mendi Msimang  
Ms Jessie Duarte

The Prime Minister  
Sir Anthony Reeve  
Sir Rodric Braithwaite  
Ms Sarah Hogg  
Mr Lyne  
Mr Goodenough  
Mr Christopher

1. The Prime Minister expressed condolences for the deaths of Oliver Tambo and Chris Hani. Mr Mandela expressed appreciation for the message which the Prime Minister had sent following Mr Hani's assassination.

2. Mr Mandela said he was grateful for the opportunity at lunch to brief the Foreign Secretary, and now the Prime Minister, on the state of the negotiations in South Africa. There were now 26 political parties involved in the multi-party forum; it was not easy for them to speak with one voice on any issue. The Prime Minister commented that that was sometimes difficult for one party. Mr Mandela said that there had been 20 parties when the process began in November 1991; one had withdrawn and the other 19 had made considerable progress at CODESA. Seven more parties had joined the process since March this year. This was cause for satisfaction.

3. Mr Mandela said that one of the more difficult issues in the negotiations was the question of regionalism, an issue of importance to the South African Government (SAG) and the IFP. There was a danger of ignoring the substance and focussing on labels. On the substance, there was very little difference between the parties. The ANC accepted the principle of devolution of powers to the regions and to local government. The question was who should decide, when, and in what forum? He believed that all structures of government should be democratically elected. The proper body to write the constitution was an elected constituent assembly. The powers of the regions must be decided according to a central framework. The IFP said that the regions should decide their status under the constitution; the ANC said that the constituent assembly should decide such matters. Details of the ANC proposal had been circulated and been given to Sir Anthony Reeve. The ANC had no objection to a regional

government being an opposition party to the national majority at the centre. But certain powers - law and order, justice, land, agriculture and unemployment, income and company tax and VAT - should be centrally controlled. Health, education, transport, telecommunications and local taxation should be controlled at the regional level. There was, of course, flexibility in the ANC position but this did not extend to allowing the regions to decide their own powers for themselves.

4. Mr Mandela continued that he believed that the UK, as the largest outside investor, had an important interest in a democratic government in South Africa. Without a political settlement there could be no hope for the economy. There were already seven million unemployed. The time had come to speed up the process. He had come to the United Kingdom to encourage foreign investment to come to South Africa. The ANC's formal position on sanctions was that they should be retained until elections were held. But unemployment and the level of crime and delinquency had caused the National Executive Committee of the ANC to revise the time-scale. The NEC had now agreed that once a date for the elections had been announced sanctions should be lifted. He expected this to happen at the end of May. He anticipated no difficulty in securing agreement of the ANC as a whole. The ANC's economic policies had been modified, particularly regarding nationalisation, and now offered an inviting climate for foreign investment. This had been welcomed within South Africa.

5. Mr Mandela said that the image of confrontation between the ANC and the IFP as the two major players was incorrect. The ANC and the SAG had been able to solve problems. He could make progress with President de Klerk: "I can confidently sell a position to him". De Klerk was convinced that peace was impossible without the ANC; he saw real progress as impossible without the involvement of the SAG. The ANC and the National Party, not the IFP, would be the two main contestants in the elections. It was the ANC who were saying that any party securing five per cent of the vote should be represented in a government of national unity. The SAG was proposing 10 per cent, a level which might even exclude the IFP.

6. The Prime Minister said he was very pleased that the negotiations had been resumed. This was in large measure due to the leadership demonstrated by Mr Mandela himself in the aftermath of Chris Hani's assassination. History would record that he had been right to make a stand on his commitment to the negotiations. The high level of unemployment in South Africa, combined with zero growth and a three per cent increase in population every year meant that the hardship fell on those least able to protect themselves. In such circumstances responsible politics could become derailed. In the UK



Mr Mandela could rely on strong support from the government and from across the political spectrum. The "relationship of opposites" that Mr Mandela had developed with President de Klerk had taken the peace process further than many had dared to hope. It was a fortunate historical accident that had produced two such leaders. He acknowledged that the ANC and the national party were the two main political parties and would form the heart of the government of national unity. He believed that, with the passage of time some of the smaller parties would merge and their number would be reduced. Nevertheless it was a sign of political virility that there were so many political parties in the field at present.

7. The Prime Minister referred to the violence and asked what more might be done about it. In the context of the discussion of regionalism, he said that he had met Chief Buthelezi the previous week. He wanted to talk to him to persuade him to participate seriously in the negotiations. He had the capability to disrupt them: he had urged him not to do so and had made clear the importance which the British Government attached to them. He did not want to interpose himself in areas of legitimate political debate in South Africa but was very willing to help in any way he could. His position on sanctions was well known: he wanted them lifted. He wished to see investment in South Africa: there was substantial interest on the part of UK companies in returning. He asked how a government of national unity might be formed.

8. Mr Mandela said that the SAG's idea of power-sharing was that any party with ten per cent of the vote should be part of a government of national unity and have the right of veto over government decisions. In th ANC's view any party with over five per cent of the vote should have the right to join the government but the principle of majority rule should apply in the last resort. The majority party would invite other parties to join them and would attempt to govern by consensus. This had worked well in Namibia. But if consensus on some issues was not possible, then the majority party must rule. He anticipated the government of national unity lasting five years. It would provide a guarantee of economic rectitude since the National Party would not accept economic policies such as nationalisation. He foresaw a government of national unity establishing committees of experts to address the problems to be tackled. Priority would have to be to meet the needs of the poor and hitherto disenfranchised but also the genuine fears of minority groups. He wanted all groups involved in government, not just a Troika, and he anticipated government working by consensus.

9. Mr Mandela said the real threat to the negotiations was not the IFP but the Conservative Party. Buthelezi's influence

derived only from the support he received from the government. If the government withdrew that support he would be finished. He must be put in perspective: two white Members of Parliament who had recently joined the IFP had acknowledged that the ANC and IFP had equal support among the Zulu people (he himself believed the ANC had more than the IFP). Buthelezi was a regional leader with no support outside KwaZulu. But the Conservative Party was dangerous because it was not dependent on de Klerk. It had polled 400,000 votes in the last election, about half the Afrikaner population. It commanded support among the security forces and in industry. SASOL had recently told him that more than a third of their shareholders belonged to the Conservative Party. Triernicht had said that if the ANC won an election, the whites would take up arms against them. The AWB was now openly challenging the government. By comparison Buthelezi was a minor figure. He found it strange that the Prime Minister should remain silent about the threat from the far right and speak about Buthelezi. At the ANC's initiative there had been two meetings with the IFP and preparations were in hand for a summit meeting between himself and Buthelezi. Previous initiatives had failed to produce results due to inadequate preparation. The ANC's three concerns were the carrying of weapons, free political activity throughout South Africa, and the fencing of hostels. There had been some progress and he believed Buthelezi was worried that these issues might in fact be resolved. De Klerk was suggesting that Buthelezi should be in a government of national unity: it was not for him (Mandela) to say at this stage who would be the majority party and therefore he could give no commitment. He referred again to the threat from the extreme right and the links which Derby-Lewis had with the Conservative Party.

10. The Prime Minister said that he wished to make clear that Derby-Lewis had no formal connection with the British Conservative Party. His investigations had revealed that he had attempted to join but had been expelled. As regards his meeting with Buthelezi, he had wished to see him because he had a constituency and was participating in the negotiations, and he wished to deliver a clear message to him to participate constructively. But he would not have the South African Conservative Party in No. 10 Downing Street. There was no question of any sympathy whatsoever for the extreme right in South Africa.

11. Mr Mandela said he had been referring to Derby-Lewis's connections with the South African Conservative Party, although he believed that Derby-Lewis did have connections with right-wing groups in the UK. As for Buthelezi, Mr Mandela said he would like to see him in a new government but he was resisting all approaches and simply threatening violence if he

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were sidelined. He would listen to any constructive advice on how to deal with Buthelezi but not simply a directive to meet him. Buthelezi was the only one saying that the negotiations were proceeding too fast; he should stop criticising the ANC on every possible occasion. The Prime Minister said that he believed that there was no difference between his position and what Mr Mandela was asking him to do: his message to Buthelezi had been precisely not to hold up the negotiations. He pointed out, incidentally, that he had not suggested to Mr Mandela that he should meet Buthelezi.

12. Mr Mandela said that he had been attempting to get his message across to the right wing. He had had a fruitful meeting with the leadership of the Dutch Reformed Church. He planned to meet leading generals in the SADF. He had spoken personally with politicians such as Kriel and Coetzee. He acknowledged that the British Government speaking to Buthelezi was helpful but HMG should also be speaking to the South African Conservative Party. He had encouraged the Commonwealth Secretary-General also to speak to them. They must be persuaded to join the peace process. Sir Anthony Reeve said that he had had meetings with the Conservative Party and the Foreign Secretary had met them during the Troika visit last year. The Prime Minister undertook to consider what else might be done.

13. In concluding, Mr Mandela said that he attached importance to the Prime Minister's continuing interest in South Africa. The support of the UK and the British public was a source of great strength. There had been differences in the past over the questions of the arms struggle and sanctions; but on the central issue of democracy we spoke the same language. The British Parliament had always condemned racial oppression. He gave a passing warning about being seen to support the IFP, and concluded by saying that the Prime Minister was regarded as a close friend.

14. The meeting concluded at 5.40 pm.

AFRICAN DEPARTMENT (SOUTHERN)

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**PRIME MINISTER**

**MANDELA**

*Report on lunch:*

*- good atmosphere  
- lengthy discussion of Buthelezi =  
another reason why you can  
treat this lightly.*

*- Mandela may ask you to press  
Buthelezi to join the talks.*

*R. Lyne.*

After discussing the brief with the FCO's specialists this morning, I have revised their speaking notes. The updated version is attached.

Mandela should come to you in a good mood, having had lunch with the Foreign Secretary and with the prospect of a prestigious meeting with members of both Houses of Parliament this evening. He is here as the Government's guest. He is getting some play in the press: I attach the Daily Telegraph's account of his press conference.

However, he is sensitive on one or two points. He was particularly affected by the death of Oliver Tambo, whose funeral he attended before leaving for London, and I have suggested that you refer to this first.

He is also hyper-sensitive about Chief Buthelezi. Their personal relationship is genuinely bad. Mandela does not wish to be treated on a par with Buthelezi. He is therefore not best pleased that you received the Chief last week. Basically, he will be looking for some reassurance that we are not hedging our bets. There is no need to apologise for seeing Buthelezi, or to avoid the subject entirely: that would look defensive. But Tony Reeve suggests that you should touch on it fairly lightly, and I have amended the brief accordingly. For similar reasons, I have suggested a heavy line in compliments for Mandela.

*Roderic Lyne*  
**RODERIC LYNE**

**5 May 1993**

foreign\nelson.kw

*Sarah Hogg is going to join us, as*

*she will be at dinner with Mandela tonight.*

## FOREIGN NEWS

## Mandela seeks British investment for South Africa

NELSON MANDELA, whose African National Congress (ANC) has for years sought to put off foreign investment in South Africa, yesterday set about trying to encourage British businessmen to put money in his country again.

At the start of a visit to London during which he will see Mr Major, the ANC President assured investors their property would not be nationalised and they would be allowed to repatriate dividends and profits.

But Mr Mandela admitted that the violence and predictions of race war would put off British investors, who have traditionally accounted for more than half of total capital inflows.

"As long as violence continues it

is going to be difficult for businessmen to have the necessary confidence," he told a news conference. "It is a matter which can only be addressed when there is a new government which is a popular government."

He also cited competition from Asian countries, where costs are cheaper and the work force better educated.

The ANC intends to end its discouragement of foreign investment as soon as a date for non-racial elections is announced. President de Klerk hopes to name a date this month.

Mr Mandela said the ANC — which is widely predicted to win the elections — intended to form a government of national unity for

By Alan Philips  
Diplomatic Correspondent

the first five years which would try to achieve a consensus, ruling out the Marxist-inspired nationalisations which the ANC had until recently espoused.

Reaction to Mr Mandela's appeal was muted last night. After an upturn in interest a year ago, potential investors have been frightened off by the blood-letting. It is believed that there has been a net outflow of capital from South Africa over the past year, forcing the government to clamp down on South African companies investing abroad.

A spokesman for Barclays Bank, which was forced to withdraw from

South Africa due to pressure from shareholders, said: "We have no plans to return to South Africa. We are waiting until matters are resolved politically."

At his talks today with Mr Major, the ANC leader is likely to ask British help in encouraging the Zulu leader, Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi, to support the peace process. Chief Buthelezi, who visited London last month, is demanding something akin to independence for the Natal.

"I will ask the Prime Minister to support the peace process and ensure that every political organisation without exception moves forward with us," he said. Mr Mandela made clear that he saw the main danger from the Right-wing

extremists who, he said, were entrenched in the civil service and the security forces.

● Christopher Munnion in Johannesburg writes: Politicians in South Africa yesterday endorsed legislation to combat what one MP called the "scourge of the Kalashnikov" — the existence in the country of tens of thousands of AK47 assault rifles in illegal hands.

The weapon was used to kill 495 people, including 30 policemen, and injured 574 others in South Africa last year, parliament in Cape Town was told.

New laws aimed at "removing from society" those found in possession of terrorist weapons have been tabled. They call for sentences of up to 25 years.

## CALL BY NELSON MANDELA

### REVISED POINTS TO MAKE

#### Opening Courtesies

- Condolences: I know this has been a sad time for you. I was shocked at the assassination of Chris Hani, and sorry to hear that you had lost your close friend of many years, Oliver Tambo. He won much respect here and around the world for his dignity during years of exile and his courageous struggle against ill health in the final years.
  
- A great deal has happened since we last spoke on the telephone in December. Delighted that you have been able to come back to London now, despite your many preoccupations at home, as an official guest of the British Government.
  
- Hope the programme meets your requirements and is not overloaded. Have seen reports of your press conference yesterday. Understand that you have just had lunch with the Foreign Secretary, and will be speaking to a joint meeting of members of both Houses of Parliament at 6 pm today.
  
- I believe you met the Commonwealth Secretary General yesterday, and that you envisage South Africa reapplying for Commonwealth membership under a new Government.
  
- Are you thinking of visiting the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting again this autumn?

Gov. in S.A. - 2 -

Investor (Sanctions K/TEC).  
Economy. Im. unempl.

Business

South African Political Situation and Constitutional Negotiations

- Glad to hear the constitutional negotiations began last week. It is thanks to your leadership that they have gone ahead despite the strong emotions caused by Chris Hani's assassination.

2 party coordination.  
Political freedom  
negotiations

- How do you see the prospects for early agreement on dates for elections and the start of the Transitional Executive Council (TEC)?

Ann. end of these months.

- Understand that key issues to be resolved include:

- The powers of the TEC.

- The question of how much power should be reserved for regional rather than central decision making.

final plus a future

- The formation of a post-election Government of National Unity, and the mechanics of power sharing.

15 years

50% in Govt.

- Would be very interested to hear your views on these points.

Help. - How?

Chief Buthelezi

- As you know, Chief Buthelezi was here last week.

- We invited him because we hoped this might help to persuade him to participate in negotiations. It is clearly necessary to have him and his followers on board in order to achieve a lasting and peaceful settlement to South Africa's problems.

- It is not for us to try to involve ourselves in any way in your own relations with Buthelezi. Entirely a matter between you and him. But he

[Handwritten signature]

Elections  
Gov. can do much  
have not  
closed countries

Challenge

left the impression that he did not see the gap on substantive issues as too wide to be bridged.

### Tensions and Violence

- All friends of your country are naturally anxious about the high level of violent deaths, and the pressures stemming especially from the frustration of young and radical people. Without your strong and restraining influence, these tensions would have been yet more acute.
- How difficult will it be to control the problem in the months ahead? Will the ANC's new campaign of "mass action" help to release some of the pressures?
- I hope that the EC, UN, Commonwealth and OAU observers are also having a restraining effect.
- Glad that we have been able to contribute four British policemen to the observer teams and to Judge Goldstone's Commission; plus Commander Churchill-Coleman and a colleague to help investigate the murder of Chris Hani.
- *Do you need any help with your <sup>personal</sup> security?*

### Sanctions

- When we spoke on the telephone in December I promised you our assistance over the lifting of economic sanctions.
- Ready to take further steps in coordination with you when the TEC is in place and a date set for elections.



- In particular, we are pressing the US Administration to be ready to lift the Gramm Amendment at that stage, to allow World Bank and other IFI funds into South Africa.
- Share your concern about the state of the economy, and the importance of attracting new investment and business confidence (emphasised at your press conference yesterday).

#### British and EC Technical Assistance

- UK contributing 16 per cent of the European Community's large programme.
- Separate British bilateral programme of £10 million, mainly on education, training and community projects.
- Public administration training through Civil Service College courses (Jesse Duarte, Mr Mandela's private secretary, who will attend the call, was a beneficiary); training for ANC overseas representatives; looking at ways of providing police training.
- Other areas being considered: voter education and election monitoring; policy formulation for education and agriculture and health.

#### [If raised: Military Training]

- Understand you would like us to help with the integration of the ANC's military wing with the South African Defence Force.
- We have of course had useful and relevant experience with our military

advisory team in Zimbabwe, and are now helping in Mozambique.

- We would be ready to respond, within the limits of our resources, to a joint request from the South African Government and the ANC, e.g. that we should assist in training of the integrated army.

foreign\mandela.kw



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Foreign &  
Commonwealth  
Office

4 May 1993

London SW1A 2AH

Dear Roderic,

**SOUTH AFRICA: PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT OF THE AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS (ANC), MR NELSON MANDELA: 5 MAY**

The Prime Minister will meet Mr Nelson Mandela for talks on Wednesday 5 May at 1615.

Mr Mandela will be accompanied by Mr Aziz Pahad, Deputy Director for International Affairs, Ms Jessie Duarte of his private office, and Mr Mendi Msimang, ANC Representative in London. Tony Reeve and Anthony Goodenough will attend on the UK side. Robin Christopher will take the note.

The visit reinstates the one originally planned for 22 February, which followed the Prime Minister's invitation last year, designed to help counter Mandela's feeling that we were not according him the attention he deserves. Mandela wishes to continue his personal contacts with the Prime Minister. Mr Mandela arrived this morning, and will go on to Switzerland on 6 May. The Foreign Secretary will give him lunch before he calls on the Prime Minister and Mandela will address a joint meeting of representatives of both Houses of Parliament in the Grand Committee Room immediately afterwards. He had originally intended to go to Glasgow, where he is to receive the freedom of a number of local authorities, but has postponed this until later this year. He is here as a guest of HMG.

The Prime Minister last spoke to Mr Mandela on 23 November and 4 December 1992 by telephone (records enclosed). They last met in February 1992. The Prime Minister met Mandela's main black political rival, Chief Buthelezi last week.

#### Political Background

The negotiation process in South Africa remains on course despite the assassination of Chris Hani. Multi-party talks opened on 1 April and agreed on structures and procedures for constitutional negotiations, which began last week. Bilateral meetings have been held between the governing National Party,

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the ANC and Inkatha, to tackle the issues in private before surfacing them at the negotiations. All sides hope for agreement on the establishment of a Transitional Executive Council (TEC), possibly by June or July 1993, to prepare the way for elections to a constitution-making body next year, and a government of national unity which may last for a period of 5-6 years.

The major issues which have to be resolved are:

- the role and powers of the TEC;
- the degree of regional autonomy to be granted under a new constitution, particularly to Chief Buthelezi's region of Natal/KwaZulu;
- the degree to which a constituent assembly will be bound by earlier agreements on constitutional principles;
- the re-integration of Transkei, Venda, Bophuthatswana and Ciskei (the "independent" homelands);
- the disbandment of MK (the ANC's armed wing) and its integration into the South African Defence Forces;
- power-sharing within a government of National Unity after the first democratic elections.

There is a continuing danger that the talks will be dragged off course by escalating violence.

The killing of Chris Hani has put Mandela under strong pressure from his rank and file, particularly the militant youth. He has had a number of difficult public meetings. Half the stadium emptied during Mandela's speech at Hani's funeral. The death of Oliver Tambo, Chairman of the ANC and Mandela's oldest ally and confidante, has also affected him personally. But he has stuck steadfastly to the line that negotiations must be pursued. At the same time the ANC have called for a campaign of mass action in support of their objective of achieving agreement on a date for elections and the start of the TEC. The South African Government are equally keen to reach agreement on this but say that this can only be achieved in multi-party negotiations.

Our objectives for the meeting are to:

- encourage Mr Mandela to pursue the constitutional negotiations vigorously and flexibly;
- show our attention to him at the highest level, and our appreciation of his constructive and restraining influence;

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED



*CRB  
SP*

Foreign &  
Commonwealth  
Office

23 April 1993

London SW1A 2AH

*Der Roderic, Top one*

Visits of Chief Buthelezi and Nelson Mandela

Your letter of 15 March advised that the Prime Minister had agreed to see Chief Buthelezi at 10:45 on 30 April and Nelson Mandela at 16:15 on 5 May. This letter gives details of the visitors' parties and offers advice on who should attend on the UK side. The Foreign Secretary will be offering lunch to both visitors.

Chief Buthelezi will be accompanied by Mr Joe Matthews Chief Executive of the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) and Mr Ben Skosana, the IFP representative in London. We therefore suggest that the UK side be confined to Sir Anthony Reeve and you.

Mr Mandela will be accompanied by Mr Aziz Pahad, Deputy Director for International Relations (and a member of the ANC National Executive Council), Mrs Jessie Duarte (Private Secretary), and Mr Mendi Msimang, ANC Chief Representative in London. We suggest that Sir Anthony Reeve Anthony Goodenough and you attend on the UK side.

Further to our conversation earlier today about messages, we are considering with Tony Reeve whether the Prime Minister might be advised to send a message to President de Klerk, beforehand, which would allow De Klerk to reassure right-wingers in South Africa, that he was in touch with the Prime Minister about these meetings.

*Yours ever,*

(J S Smith)

Private Secretary

Roderic Lyne Esq CMG  
10 Downing Street

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PROGRAMME:

**CHIEF MANGOSUTHU BUTHELEZI**

Chief Buthelezi's Party will comprise -

- Chief Mangosutho Buthelezi
- Mr Amos Ngema (Principal Private Secretary)
- Mr Joe Matthews, Chief Executive, Inkatha  
Freedom Party
- Mr Ben Skosana (IFP Representative in UK)
- Mr Sibiya (Aide)
- Mr Zikhali (Aide)
- Mr Zondi (Aide)

**WEDNESDAY 28 APRIL**

2005 Arrive Heathrow Airport from Rome.

Met by Mr Spurr (OVIS). Drive to The Savoy Hotel.

**THURSDAY 29 APRIL**

1300 Lunch hosted by the Foreign Secretary

**FRIDAY 30 APRIL**

1045 Meeting with the Prime Minister

**SATURDAY 1 MAY**

No programme

**SUNDAY 2 MAY**

2100 Depart Heathrow Airport for Johannesburg.

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PROGRAMME

**MR MANDELA**

Mr Mandela's Party will comprise -

- Mr Nelson Mandela
- Mrs Jessie Duarte (PS)
- Mr Aziz Pahad (Deputy Director for International Relations)
- Two further Aides (Security)

**TUESDAY 4 MAY**

Arrive Heathrow Airport from Lisbon.

To be met at the Airport by Mr Knibbs (OVIS) and Mr Mendi Msimang (ANC Chief Representative in UK).

Drive to Park Lane Hotel.

A dinner with Sir David Frost is tentatively planned for the evening.

**WEDNESDAY 5 MAY**

0900 Call on Leader of the Opposition,  
the Rt Hon. John Smith, MP

1300 Lunch hosted by the Foreign Secretary


1615 Meeting with the Prime Minister

1800 Meeting with Parliamentarians, Grand Committee Room,  
House of Commons, escorted by Mr Lennox-Boyd.

**THURSDAY 6 MAY**

Depart Heathrow Airport.

SOUTH AFRICA Nelson Mandela  
Junk 3/90





RESTRICTED



10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

15 March 1993

K: F / MANDELA . AB .  
cc CO  
hce: Sandra .

Dear Stephen,

VISITS BY NELSON MANDELA AND CHIEF BUTHELEZI

The Prime Minister has seen Cape Town Telno 55 and FCO Telno 23 and your letter of 10 March about Chief Buthelezi's visit.

He is content to see Nelson Mandela on 5 May, if Mandela confirms this revised timing for his visit. We have reserved space at 1615.

The Prime Minister can see Chief Buthelezi for half an hour at 1045 on Friday 30 April.

You will wish to consider how we can play the two visits to the best advantage. If you think that the Prime Minister can engage in bridge-building, should we also consider communicating with President de Klerk before or after the two visits - or possibly both?

I should be grateful to receive briefing for the Buthelezi call by the close on 28 April, and for the Mandela call by noon on 4 May.

I am copying this letter to Melanie Leech (Cabinet Office).

Yours etc,  
Roderic

RODERIC LYNE

Stephen Smith Esq  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

RESTRICTED

AB



10 DOWNING STREET

OK

~~Roderic~~

PM could see  
Mandela at 1615 -  
1715 on Wed 5  
May. S 12/3

Prime Minister

Agree?

He was to have come  
in February.

Politically, this timing could  
be good. You & For. Sec. should  
have seen Chief Buthelezi  
on 30 April. You can tell B. that  
you'll urge Mandela to  
cooperate with him etc. (and  
then perhaps send a message  
to de Klerk (or before and after).

Rm 12. 17-

RESTRICTED  
 FM FCO  
 TO DESKBY 121230Z CAPE TOWN EMBASSY  
 TELNO 23  
 OF 121045Z MARCH 93  
 INFO IMMEDIATE LISBON, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK  
 INFO IMMEDIATE HARARE, LUSAKA, DAR ES SALAAM, GABORONE  
 INFO IMMEDIATE JOHANNESBURG, PRETORIA, DURBAN  
 INFO IMMEDIATE CAPE TOWN CONSULATE

GABORONE FOR GOODENOUGH, VISITING

YOUR TELNO 055: MANDELA'S VISIT TO LONDON

1. At present it looks as though Prime Minister should be able to see Mandela on 5 May, but he will definitely not be available for lunch. Please advise on how firm dates are before we make formal approach to No.10.

2. OVIS are happy to provide services on the basis agreed for the February visit, ie. Transport, Hotel Accommodation and any necessary help in arranging meetings.

HURD

YYYY

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MR ALSTON  
MR GOODENOUGH  
MR HUDSON  
MR KERBY  
MR WILMSHURST  
MR FREEMAN  
MR MUIR

ADDITIONAL 20

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CAOFF//MR ELDON  
ASSESSMENTS STAFF  
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MODUK//DI ROW  
PS/PM

DTI//MR BERG OT4/3A  
HMT//MR WOOD  
BANKE//MR P C HAYWARD  
HOME OFFICE//MR GALE B3 C2 DIV  
ECGD//MR LEEDS

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INFO IMMEDIATE DURBAN, CAPE TOWN CONSULATE

MY TELNO 32 AND YOUR TELNO 9 TO JOHANNESBURG (NOT TO ALL):  
MANDELA'S VISIT TO LONDON

1. THE ANC HAVE CONTACTED US TODAY (11 MARCH) TO PROPOSE THAT  
MANDELA'S VISIT TO LONDON TO SEE THE PRIME MINISTER BE REINSTATED  
FOR 5 MAY.

2. THE PLAN WOULD BE FOR MANDELA TO CARRY OUT A PROGRAMME IN  
EUROPE VERY MUCH ON THE LINES OF HIS ABORTIVE VISIT IN FEBRUARY.  
HE WOULD ARRIVE IN LONDON ON 5 MAY FROM LISBON, LEAVE THAT NIGHT  
FOR GLASGOW, AND RETURN FROM THERE TO JOHANNESBURG ON 7 MAY. HE  
WOULD BE ACCOMPANIED BY PAHAD (DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL  
AFFAIRS), SACHS (CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION) AND DUARTE (PRIVATE  
OFFICE) PLUS TWO SECURITY MEN.

3. I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL TO KNOW, THEREFORE, WHETHER THE PRIME  
MINISTER WOULD BE AVAILABLE ON THE DAY PROPOSED, EITHER FOR A  
MEETING OR FOR LUNCH. IN ADDITION, I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR  
CONFIRMATION THAT THE OVIS ARRANGEMENTS PROPOSED FOR MANDELA'S  
ABORTIVE VISIT IN FEBRUARY CAN BE REPEATED THIS TIME.

4. PLEASE ADVANCE TO PS/NO 10.

REEVE

YYYY

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BANKE//MR P C HAYWARD  
HOME OFFICE//MR GALE B3 C2 DIV  
ECGD//MR LEEDS

NNNN



Foreign &  
Commonwealth  
Office

19 February 1993

London SW1A 2AH

Der <sup>Mr</sup> Stephen, L

South Africa: Message from Nelson Mandela

We have been asked to forward the enclosed faxed letter from Mr Mandela (received here today) expressing regret at the need to cancel his meeting with the Prime Minister.

This has crossed with the Prime Minister's message to Mr Mandela. No reply is therefore needed.

Yours ever,

Stephen Smith

(J S Smith)  
Private Secretary

J S Wall Esq  
10 Downing Street

# African National Congress

51 Plein Street  
Johannesburg 2001  
P.O. Box 61884  
Marshalltown 2107



Tel: (011) 330-7273/7052  
Fax: (011) 333-7739  
Telex: 421252

## OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

The Honourable Prime Minister  
United Kingdom  
Mr John Major

17 February 1993

Dear Mr Prime Minister

I sincerely regret my inability to meet with you on the 22nd of February.

I have been forced to take a fourteen day complete rest. Usually these events are planned formally by my office, but in this instance nature played a hand.

I hope that we can rearrange another date as soon as possible since I believe that I need to share with you the present phase of our negotiations.

Please accept my warmest regards.

Yours sincerely

  
NELSON R MANDELA  
President

tsj/17.93





10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

16 February 1993

Cole M  
k/f/sawes.kk

NELSON MANDELA

The Prime Minister would be grateful if you could arrange for the following message from him to be passed to Nelson Mandela:

"Dear Nelson

I was sorry to hear that you will not be coming to London later this month. I looked forward to having more of a chance than we normally get for a detailed discussion, especially at such a crucial time in your discussions with the South African government. I do however more than understand the reasons. In any case, nothing is more important than the work on which you are engaged, in which you have my strong encouragement and support.

I do hope we can reinstate your visit here before long and, in the meantime, I would welcome the chance to hear from you about how you see progress in your talks.

With best wishes,

John."

J. S. WALL

J. S. Smith, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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INFO IMMEDIATE DURBAN, CAPE TOWN CONSULATE

MANDELA'S VISIT TO LONDON

1. AS WE HAVE WARNED THE DEPARTMENT BY TELEPHONE, THE ANC HAVE JUST CALLED, WITH MUCH APOLOGY, TO SAY THAT MANDELA HAS BEEN ADVISED BY HIS DOCTORS TO CANCEL ALL HIS ENGAGEMENTS FOR THE NEXT TWO WEEKS. THEY HAVE SPECIFICALLY RULED OUT FLYING. MANDELA WILL NOT (NOT) NOW BE VISITING THE UK AND PORTUGAL NEXT WEEK, THEREFORE, AND SO WILL BE UNABLE TO HAVE LUNCH WITH THE PRIME MINISTER ON 22 FEBRUARY.
2. MANDELA'S EXCUSE MAY BE AT LEAST IN PART GENUINE: WE KNOW THAT HIS DOCTORS HAVE BEEN CONCERNED FOR SOME TIME ABOUT THE PRESSURES ON HIM. BUT THERE MAY BE MORE TO IT THAN THAT. A CRITICAL MEETING OF THE ANC'S NATIONAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE IS TAKING PLACE THIS WEEK, AT WHICH THE NEGOTIATORS ARE LIKELY TO COME IN FOR STRONG CRITICISM FROM THE MORE RADICAL ELEMENTS, WHO ARE DEEPLY DISTURBED OVER REPORTS OF A DEAL ON POWER SHARING WITH THE GOVERNMENT. MANDELA - WHO HAS BEEN CRITICISED BEFORE FOR EXCESSIVE JUNKETING OUT OF THE COUNTRY DURING KEY MOMENTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS HERE - MAY WELL HAVE DECIDED THAT THIS WAS AN INOPPORTUNE MOMENT TO TRAVEL.
3. THE ALLEGED BAN ON ALL CONTACTS NOTWITHSTANDING, WE HAVE ASKED MANDELA'S OFFICE FOR A CALL FOR LADY CHALKER IN JOHANNESBURG ON 25 FEBRUARY. THEY HAVE PROMISED TO REVERT.
4. PLEASE ADVANCE TO PS/NO 10.

REEVE

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
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MR GOODENOUGH

AD(S)//HD  
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FCO informed.  
Teller at 1230  
followed by working  
until 1.00.  
P.A. 5/19/1.

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YOUR TELNO 1 AND MY TELECON WITH THE PRIVATE SECRETARY OF 8  
JANUARY: MANDELA'S LUNCH WITH THE PRIME MINISTER

1. MANDELA'S OFFICE HAVE NOW COME BACK TO US TO SAY THAT HE  
ACCEPTS WITH PLEASURE THE PRIME MINISTER'S INVITATION TO LUNCH IN  
LONDON ON 22 FEBRUARY (NOT 8 FEBRUARY, AS HAD EARLIER BEEN  
SUGGESTED). HE PLANS TO TRAVEL FROM THERE TO PORTUGAL FOR A COUPLE  
OF DAYS, RETURNING TO SOUTH AFRICA BY 24 FEBRUARY. WE WILL LET YOU  
HAVE DETAILS OF HIS ITINERARY AS SOON AS WE CAN.
2. PLEASE ADVANCE TO PS/NO 10.

REEVE

YYYY

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AD(S)//HD

PS/NO 10.

NNNN

L. Sanders  
he should go for a 4th  
date for table.  
S

Stephen  
what happened  
to this in  
relation to  
US trip?  
S.

*CAP*

# ● African National Congress

51 Plein Street  
Johannesburg 2001  
P O Box 61884  
Marshalltown 2107



Tel: (011) 330-7000  
Fax: (011) 333-9090  
Telex: 421252

## OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

10th December 1992

The Right Honourable John Major MP  
Prime Minister  
UNITED KINGDOM

**Re: Negotiations between the ANC and the South African Government**

Your Excellency

As you are aware, full-scale bilateral negotiations between the ANC and the South African Government have resumed. The decision to resume negotiations was taken by the ANC's National Executive Committee in the light of the governments positive response at the summit meeting held between ourselves and the government on 26 September 1992 on, inter alia, the following issues: release of political prisoners; the prohibition of the public carrying and display of dangerous weapons; effective security measures at hostels associated with violence; and, the need for an Interim Government of National Unity and an elected Constituent Assembly.

Over the past few weeks the ANC has held bilateral meetings with various parties including the Democratic Party, the Bophuthatswana administration, the Afrikaner Volkstaat Unie (AVU) and the Patriotic Front. These meetings focused mainly on the envisaged resumption of multi-lateral talks and the key blockages in the negotiations process. All these parties have agreed to the need to reconvene CODESA as a matter of urgency.

We also intend holding similar bilateral meetings with all other parties. In preparation for such meetings we are presently in communication with AZAPO, Solidarity, Ximoko Progressive Party, PAC and the Inkatha Freedom Party in this regard.

The purpose of this letter is to inform you about the bilateral meeting held between the ANC and the South African Government/National Party last week.

---

**The People Shall Govern!**

2.

The meeting was held over three days from 2 December 1992 to 4 December 1992. The two sides were represented at a very high level: the ANC delegation, led by Secretary-General Cyril Ramaphosa, included ten members of the National Working Committee; while, the National Party delegation, led by Constitutional Development Minister Roelf Meyer, included ten Cabinet Ministers. The meeting was unable to complete its business and was therefore adjourned on 4 December 1992 and will resume on 20 January 1993.

My overall impressions are that the meeting was productive. The meeting succeeded in identifying the essence of the differences between the ANC and the National Party. Our delegation was left with the impression that significant sections of the government recognise that the establishment of an Interim Government of National Unity is imperative and urgent. The National Party also acknowledged that both it and the ANC shoulder a special responsibility in the negotiations process. Intensive bilateral negotiations between these two parties can serve to facilitate the multi-lateral negotiations and speed-up the transition as a whole.

The two parties committed themselves to the speedy resumption of CODESA and confirmed that they consider themselves bound by all agreements so far reached in CODESA, including the Declaration of Intent. It was further agreed to allow for participation in CODESA to become more representative in keeping with the principle of an inclusive negotiations process.

Significant progress has been made in the discussion on time-frames for the transition. It was agreed that the following would be essential steps in the process:

- Reconvene CODESA;
- Conclude multi-lateral agreements;
- enactment of necessary legislation;
- establishment of the Transitional Executive Council, Independent Media Commission and Independent Electoral Commission;
- the first democratic elections;
- establishment of a Constituent Assembly and the Interim Government of National Unity;
- adoption of final constitution

On the crucial question of a date for the elections, the government delegation has agreed to consider, together with its principals, a proposal that elections be held before the end of 1993.

Discussion was held on voter registration, identification and eligibility and on the composition and role of an Independent Electoral Commission. In this regard both parties are to consider a proposal that has emerged from the meeting. The two parties would begin the process of drafting an Electoral Law which would be the basis of discussion at CODESA when it resumes.

3.

The two parties reiterated their acceptance of the decision already taken at CODESA to establish an Independent Media Commission and an Independent Telecommunications Authority in order to ensure that state controlled media is brought under non-partisan control. In particular, it was agreed that a transparent and representative process should be set in motion for the appointment of the new South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) Board to replace the current board whose term of office expires in March 1993.

The ANC presented to the National Party its proposals on the powers, functions, duties and boundaries of Regional Governments in a new South Africa. It was the first time that a discussion on this topic was held between the two parties.

It was decided to establish a Joint Committee in order to prepare a draft agreement on the Interim Government of National Unity and details of the Constituent Assembly for presentation at the January meeting. A thorny issue here is the National Party's position that the new constitution should entrench a power sharing model.

The first two days of the 20 January 1993 meeting will be devoted to the issues of violence, the role of all armed forces, covert operations, the National Peace Accord, recommendations made by Justice Goldstone and the creation of a climate for free political activity especially in Kwa-Zulu, Bophuthatswana and Ciskei.

May I take this opportunity to express appreciation on behalf of all peace loving South Africans for the support of your government and, in particular, your personal support for peace and democracy in our country.

I wish you and your family a merry Christmas and a happy New Year.

Yours sincerely

  
**NELSON R MANDELA**  
President

CONFIDENTIAL  
FM CAPE TOWN EMBASSY  
TO DESKBY 131015Z FCO  
TELNO 044.  
OF 130900Z FEBRUARY 92  
INFO IMMEDIATE PRETORIA, JOHANNESBURG

YOUR TELNOS 17-19: MR MANDELA'S CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER:  
CONSTITUTIONAL NEGOTIATIONS

## SUMMARY

1. MANDELA CLEARLY ANXIOUS TO AVOID A WHITES ONLY REFERENDUM BECAUSE HE FEARS DE KLERK MIGHT LOSE. LATTER NOT NECESSARILY THE CASE. BUT DE KLERK INESCAPABLY COMMITTED TO CONSULT THE WHITE ELECTORATE ONE WAY OR THE OTHER. SITUATION STILL EVOLVING. SUGGEST WE TAKE STOCK IN TWO WEEKS' TIME: BUT WE SHOULD NOT SEEK TO DEFLECT DE KLERK FROM HIS COMMITMENT TO A REFERENDUM.

## DETAIL

2. MANDELA STARTS FROM THE VIEW THAT DE KLERK SHOULD NOT RISK HOLDING A REFERENDUM IN WHICH THERE WAS A SEPARATE WHITE VOTE WHICH WOULD ALLOW WHITES A VETO ON PROPOSED NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS. IT IS CERTAINLY TRUE, AS I HAVE REPORTED, THAT THERE HAS BEEN A MARKED SHIFT TO THE RIGHT AMONGST WHITE SOUTH AFRICANS FUELLED BY THE POOR PERFORMANCE OF THE ECONOMY, CRIMINAL AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE, THE SEVERE DROUGHT, AND THE DEEP ANXIETIES AMONG MANY WHITES ABOUT WHERE THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS IS LEADING. THUS ALTHOUGH DE KLERK TOOK A SANGUINE VIEW WITH MRS CHALKER HERE, AND WITH THE PRIME MINISTER, ABOUT THE FORTHCOMING BY-ELECTION ON 19 FEBRUARY, OTHERS IN THE PARTY BELIEVE THE NATIONAL PARTY ARE LIKELY TO LOSE HEAVILY. IT IS ALMOST AS IF THEY WERE COMING TO BELIEVE THAT IT WOULD BE SOMETHING OF AN ACHIEVEMENT TO HOLD THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY TO A MAJORITY OF UNDER 1000 VOTES (PREVIOUS NP MAJORITY: 1500 IN A CONSTITUENCY OF 24,000).

3. IF AND WHEN THE CP WIN THE POTCHEFSTROOM BY-ELECTION THEY ARE CERTAIN TO PRESS FOR A GENERAL ELECTION, CLAIMING IT AS FURTHER PROOF THAT THE NATIONAL PARTY NO LONGER ENJOYS THE CONFIDENCE OF THE WHITE ELECTORATE. AND DE KLERK HIMSELF, AFTER THE CP VICTORY IN THE VIRGINIA BY-ELECTION LAST YEAR, RASHLY WENT ON RECORD TO SAY THAT POTCHEFSTROOM WOULD BE A MUCH MORE ACCURATE TEST OF WHITE



## OPINION.

4. BUT IT IS STILL FAR FROM CERTAIN THAT DE KLERK WOULD IN FACT LOSE A REFERENDUM. THE CP SPOKESMAN ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS HAS TOLD US THAT HE HAS SOME DOUBTS ABOUT THIS. ONE OF THE DIFFICULTIES FOR DE KLERK AT THE MOMENT - QUITE APART FROM THE ECONOMY ETC - IS THAT THE CONSTITUTIONAL NEGOTIATIONS HAVE NOT YET MADE SUFFICIENT PROGRESS FOR HIM TO BE ABLE TO DEMONSTRATE RESULTS: THE WHITE ELECTORATE ARE THEREFORE AT THE NADIR OF THEIR UNCERTAINTY. GOING TO A REFERENDUM, HOWEVER, HE WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY AIM TO ENSURE THAT ENOUGH AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REACHED IN CODESA FOR HIM TO BE ABLE TO DEMONSTRATE NOT ONLY SOLID PROGRESS AND ARRANGEMENTS WHICH SHOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE WHITE ELECTORATE BUT ALSO THAT THE CONTINUING PROCESS WAS UNDER CONTROL AND MANAGEABLE SO THAT THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF THE WHITES (IE NATIONAL PARTY) BEING OBLIGED TO SUCCUMB TO SIMPLE MAJORITY RULE. POWER SHARING REMAINS THE NAME OF THE GAME. MUCH, IN ANY CASE, WILL DEPEND ON THE QUESTION DE KLERK CHOOSES TO ASK IN ANY REFERENDUM AND ON HIS READINESS TO GO OUT TO THE CONSTITUENCIES AND CANVAS FOR THE RIGHT RESULT. IF HE DOES THIS, I BELIEVE HE SHOULD BE CAPABLE OF SWINGING MANY CURRENTLY UNCERTAIN WHITE VOTERS BEHIND HIM.

5. TO THAT EXTENT THEREFORE MANDELA AND DE KLERK DO NOT SHARE THE SAME BASIC PREMISE ON A REFERENDUM. BUT THE MORE IMPORTANT POINT IS THAT DE KLERK CANNOT RENEGE ON HIS UNDERTAKING TO GO TO THE ELECTORATE: AS HE PUT IT TO THE PRIME MINISTER ON 1 FEBRUARY HE WAS POLITICALLY DEAD IF HE DID NOT KEEP THAT PROMISE. THE UNDERTAKING GOES BACK TO THE NATIONAL PARTY MANIFESTO FOR THE ELECTION IN SEPTEMBER 1989 WHERE, AT THE VERY BEGINNING, AFTER MENTIONING THE NEED TO NEGOTIATE DETAILS OF A NEW POLITICAL DISPENSATION THE MANIFESTO STATES 'THE NATIONAL PARTY ALSO UNDERTAKES TO PLACE BEFORE THE ELECTORATE ANY NEW CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES BEFORE SUCH PRINCIPLES ARE FINALLY IMPLEMENTED'. DE KLERK HAS SUBSEQUENTLY MADE CLEAR THAT HE INTENDS TO CONSULT ALL SOUTH AFRICANS BUT THAT THE WHITE VOTE WILL BE COUNTED SEPARATELY.

6. THERE IS ABSOLUTELY NO DOUBT THAT THE WHITE VOTERS REGARD THIS AND SUBSEQUENT REAFFIRMATIONS BY DE KLERK AS A BINDING UNDERTAKING AND THAT THEY WOULD EXPECT TO BE CONSULTED BEFORE AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT IS INSTALLED. IF HE DOES NOT HOLD A REFERENDUM AS SUCH HE WILL BE OBLIGED TO FIND A WAY OF CONSULTING THE WHITE ELECTORATE AS A SEPARATE, IDENTIFIABLE GROUP, AND OF SEEKING THEIR SEPARATE APPROVAL FOR ANY ARRANGEMENTS WHICH HAVE BEEN NEGOTIATED. IT IS NOT EASY TO SEE HOW HE COULD DO THIS. MERELY TO CONSULT THE

TRICAMERAL PARLIAMENT, FOR EXAMPLE, WOULD NOT (NOT) BE REGARDED AS DISCHARGING THIS COMMITMENT AND WOULD PROBABLY PROVOKE AN IMMEDIATE AND FIERCE REACTION FROM THE RIGHT WING.

7. IT IS THIS LAST POINT WHICH, IT SEEMS TO ME, MANDELA FAILS TO GIVE SUFFICIENT WEIGHT TO. IF DE KLERK APPEARED TO BE WRIGGLING OUT OF HIS COMMITMENT TO CONSULT THE WHITE ELECTORATE, HE WOULD CERTAINLY BE ACCUSED BY THE RIGHT OF ABANDONING THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS ON WHICH HE HAS SET SUCH STORE: THE EXTREMISTS WOULD BE LIKELY TO ARGUE THAT THIS GAVE THEM OPEN LICENCE TO RESORT TO ANY METHODS THEY LIKED, INCLUDING VIOLENCE, TO SECURE THEIR OWN ENDS AND PROTECT THEIR INTERESTS.

8. THE SITUATION REMAINS FLUID. DESPITE MANDELA'S ANXIETIES, PROGRESS IN THE CODESA WORKING GROUPS CONTINUES TO BE MADE. THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT THE ANC'S POSITION IN THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT FOR EXAMPLE, MIGHT BE MORE FLEXIBLE THAN IT WAS A FEW WEEKS AGO. (FOR EXAMPLE THAT THEY WOULD BE PREPARED TO ACCEPT TWO INTERIM GOVERNMENTS, THE FIRST APPOINTED AND THE SECOND ELECTED, AND THAT THEY MIGHT BE READY TO ACCEPT A GREATER DEGREE OF REGIONALISM AND DEVOLUTION.) DEPENDING ON THE OUTCOME, THE POTCHEFSTROOM BY-ELECTION IS LIKELY TO INFLUENCE THE APPROACH OF BOTH GOVERNMENT AND ANC. DURING THE NEXT TWO WEEKS I SHALL BE DOING A ROUND OF CALLS ON SENIOR MINISTERS, AND ON 21 FEBRUARY I HAVE AN APPOINTMENT WITH TREUERNICHT, THE LEADER OF THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY. I SUGGEST THAT IT WOULD BE BEST TO TAKE STOCK THEREAFTER. AT THAT POINT I COULD ALSO SEEK AN APPOINTMENT WITH DE KLERK WITH A VIEW TO CHECKING ON HIS THINKING. HOWEVER, WE SHOULD NOT, I SUBMIT, TAKE ANY INITIATIVE WHICH MIGHT GIVE THE IMPRESSION THAT WE WERE ENCOURAGING DE KLERK TO DILUTE, OR EVEN RECONSIDER, HIS COMMITMENT TO CONSULT THE WHITE ELECTORATE. TO DO SO WOULD REDUCE OUR CREDIBILITY WITH HIM AND, MORE IMPORTANTLY, WOULD NOT, I BELIEVE, BUDGE HIM FROM HIS PRESENT POSITION.

9. FCO PLEASE PASS PS/NO 10.

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(C: Foreign / Mandela)

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

bc: PC

*From the Private Secretary*

4 February 1992

VISIT OF MR MANDELA

Mr Mandela telephoned me this afternoon from Copenhagen to say that he was due to return to South Africa from Copenhagen on Thursday night but would like to break his journey in London to talk to the Prime Minister about "a very important matter". Although Mr Mandela did not mention it, it was clear that he was talking about Libya.

After consulting the Prime Minister, I have told Mr Mandela that the Prime Minister looks forward to seeing him at 1115 on Friday 7 February. I have explained that there will be a maximum of forty-five minutes available for the meeting.

I have also agreed with Mr Mandela that we can make the visit public nearer the time.

I should be grateful if you could ensure that the ANC office here know of these plans. I should also be grateful if you could let me have briefing, both on Libya and on South African issues, to reach me by Thursday 6 February.

I am copying this letter to Suma Chakrabarti (Overseas Development Administration).

J. S. WALL

Simon Gass, Esq.  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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bc PC

SUBJECT CC MASTER

10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

31 May 1991

*Dear Richard,*

SOUTH AFRICA: TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH MR. MANDELA

Thank you for your letter of 30 May.

The Prime Minister telephoned Mr. Mandela this afternoon. They spoke for about 20 minutes.

Mr. Mandela said that it was good to hear the Prime Minister's voice. He was only sorry that pressing OAU business had cut short his stay in the United Kingdom.

The Prime Minister said that since his last conversation with Mr. Mandela he had had a very interesting meeting with Robert Mugabe. Most of the discussion had been about bilateral matters in CHOGM but they had naturally talked about the situation in South Africa as well. The Prime Minister had been fascinated by Mugabe's description of his negotiations with the Smith regime. He had found that the only way to win through was to keep an eye on central matters, to deal one by one with extraneous issues but always to come back to the central matter. Mr. Mandela would know that Robert Mugabe was very well disposed towards him.

The Prime Minister said that looked at from this distance there had been some very welcome progress in South Africa. Mr. Mandela said that the general public might not be aware of what was happening behind the scenes. He was still in touch with Mr. de Klerk. He had spoken to de Klerk last Sunday after the Multi-Party Conference and he and de Klerk had seen eye to eye on the matter which Mandela had raised with him, so they were still in touch.

The Prime Minister said this was good news. We too had been in touch with the South African Government. We had pressed them on the issue of violence and had asked them to go some way toward meeting the ANC'S concerns. We thought de Klerk had done so. Mr. Mandela said that de Klerk should be persuaded to ban all dangerous weapons, traditional or otherwise, throughout the country. To ban them in certain areas was not enough because the people involved would simply move elsewhere. He could not understand why de Klerk had not imposed an overall ban.

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- 2 -

The Prime Minister said that from a distance, and he recognised that things were often seen in a different perspective from far away, he had the impression that dealing with the violence would require the active political involvement of all the leaders as well as of the Government. We hoped to see the kind of progress that had been made in Natal also made in Transvaal. Mr. Mandela said that he had been in touch with Inkatha - even after the Multi Party meeting. He had spoken to Buthelezi yesterday and again today from Britain. He had also spoken on the telephone to the King of the Zulus. These had been cordial and constructive conversations, and amongst other things he was arranging to meet the King of the Zulus in Ulundi in August. Their respective programmes made it impossible to meet before that. These talks were taking place at his initiative. Indeed, all the initiatives had come from him. Buthelezi had been compelled to acknowledge in a recent newspaper interview that he had not himself taken a single initiative on the violence. It was always he (Mandela) who telephoned Buthelezi, never the other way round. Buthelezi had telephoned de Klerk but not Mandela. The ANC had a very clear record of wanting to end the violence. Buthelezi had no such record. The ANC should not be put on the same level as Inkatha. It was the ANC who had mobilised the country for peace. They were grateful for the support they had had from the British Government.

The Prime Minister welcomed Mr. Mandela's initiative to meet the King of the Zulus. It was right to pursue such initiatives, which added to Mr. Mandela's standing and credibility. We had been in touch with the South African Government about the issue of political prisoners and had done what we could to get them to speed up the process of reviewing all cases. The question of definition could only be agreed between the ANC and the South African Government. We had also urged the South African Government to speed up agreement with the UNHCR on the return of exiles. It would be very helpful if Mr. Mandela could keep him up to date so that he could contact President de Klerk again.

Mr. Mandela welcomed this. The Prime Minister's intervention would have some impact because the South African Government was keen to improve its relations with Britain. Any stand we could take would be appreciated. At his last meeting with Mr. de Klerk he had urged him to simplify the whole process of the release of political prisoners. De Klerk had referred him to Coetzee and Mandela was about to ring him after his telephone call with the Prime Minister. He would recommend that all formalities be scrapped. He had spoken to Coetzee last Friday. Coetzee had asked Mandela to get the hunger strikers to call off their strike and had said that that would help the atmosphere on dealing with the political prisoners. Coetzee had so far been as good as the word he had given in his discussion because he had released eight of the prisoners on hunger strike. So Mandela had no reason to doubt Coetzee's word, if the hunger strike was called off. But Mandela was having some difficulty in persuading his own people to reconsider. The release of the eight prisoners on hunger strike had made people think that the strike was successful. He was trying to persuade them otherwise. The Prime Minister said that we would have to rely on Mr. Mandela's considerable powers of persuasion. Mr. Mandela said that

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- 3 -

unfortunately he would be out of the country until mid-June.

The Prime Minister said that we all had party conferences which could be tricky occasions. It would be very helpful if, once the ANC's conference was successfully concluded, the discussion of constitutional principles at the sort of Multi-Party meeting which Mr. Mandela himself had advocated in January, could get under way. It seemed to us that there was a good deal of common ground on a number of the principles and the Prime Minister listed those given in paragraph 1 of Cape Town Telegram 233. There was therefore a lot to bite on if differences, misunderstandings and frustrations could be dealt with.

The Prime Minister went on to say that Steve Tshwete had made an excellent impression with his work on the integration of sports. The British Sports Minister had met him and we welcomed the way he was moving on selective relaxation of the sports boycott in the case of those sports which had been integrated. Mr. Mandela seemed genuinely pleased to hear this. Tshwete himself, the whole of the National Executive and Mr. Tambo would be happy to know what the Prime Minister said. It would give Tshwete the help he needed to "move other sections of our sportsmen". The Prime Minister said it would be helpful if Mr. Mandela could endorse Mr. Tshwete's position. Very good, said Mr. Mandela. He would certainly act on that.

The Prime Minister said that he would telephone Mr. Mandela again when he got back to South Africa. Mr. Mandela welcomed that. With characteristic courtesy he asked that his regards should be passed to Mr. Hurd and Mrs. Thatcher.

Comment: I think Mr. Mandela was genuinely pleased by the conversation. He seemed in a much less tense and obstinate mood than when the Prime Minister saw him in London. The Prime Minister was struck by the importance which Mr. Mandela clearly attaches to telephone contact. He wants to speak to Mr. Mandela again when the latter gets back to South Africa.

I have given Sir Robin Renwick an oral account of this conversation.



(J. S. WALL)

Richard Gozney, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

As agreed, we will  
initiate the call from here  
at about 1500. The main  
points are those highlighted in  
Röhm Renwick's telegram  
attached.

Frederic

3d



- ① Welcome <sup>HK</sup> - back to work.
- ② Some progress on violence cases  
last are spots. \* Refined.

Pod. prisoners (1000 released)  
 argued he think to speed up  
 review of all cases.

Detraction for you to agree  
Proceedures agreed. 1 for return of exiles  
 Respected - written / SAT audalities  
 - speed up.

(Other  
 to know) Sport  
 'principles of a selective abolition  
 of boycott when sports integrated.'

② Violence \*  
WAY AHEAD [ Mapake / Smith  
(was with?)

cc PC

*John 30/5*



Foreign &  
Commonwealth  
Office

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30 May 1991

London SW1A 2AH

Prime Minister ②

*Sean Stepher,*

*top end*

*X*  
*30w*

**SOUTH AFRICA: VISIT OF MANDELA : TELEPHONE CALL**

Thank you for your letter of 22 May recording the Prime Minister's agreement to telephone Mr Mandela during his private visit to Britain. He will arrive at Heathrow at 0820 on 31 May and be taken by helicopter to the country where he will be joined by Mr and Mrs Oliver Tambo. He will leave for Nigeria and the OAU Conference on Sunday, 2 June at 1300. Mandela would be available for a telephone call at any time from about 1100 on 31 May until 1100 on 2 June. The best time to call might be when he has had a chance to recover from his journey, ie on Friday pm, Saturday or Sunday morning. I should be grateful if you would let me know when the Prime Minister would like to make the call (the telephone number is 089282 2239). Mandela has himself asked to speak to the Prime Minister.

The Prime Minister last spoke to Mandela, by telephone, on 3 May. I enclose a copy of the record of the conversation. I also enclose a copy of Cape Town telegram number 233 from Sir Robin Renwick which covers two points which President de Klerk hopes we might help get across to Mandela.

*T*

On sport, it would be useful if Mandela endorsed the role which Steve Tshwete has been playing and the principle of a selective relaxation of the sports boycott in sports which have been integrated. Such an endorsement would be particularly valuable for discussions with doubters amongst our European partners.

*T*

On political prisoners, the agreement reached between the South African Government and the ANC in Pretoria last August was that political prisoners should be released by 30 April. About a thousand prisoners have been released, but there are still many applications awaiting review, some of which were made just before or even after the deadline. President de Klerk has told us that some of these applications are from people convicted of criminal offences. There are many different estimates of the number of political prisoners: as many in fact as there are definitions of the term "political" prisoner. As Sir Robin Renwick suggests, the Prime Minister may wish to tell Mandela that we have urged the South African Government to speed up the process of reviewing all cases. Definition is a matter for the ANC to agree with the South African Government. We understand that they have agreed on procedures.

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


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The procedures for the return of exiles were earlier agreed with the ANC. However, the programme is suspended pending agreement between the South African Government and UNHCR on the precise modalities of their involvement. We are urging both parties to speed things up.

Although the visit is supposed to be secret, news of it may well leak out. We suggest that our public line in answer to questions should be:

- Mr Mandela is here on a private visit; we understand that he wishes to take a break before attending the OAU summit;
- the Government has helped with arrangements;
- no meetings will be arranged, but the Prime Minister is likely to be/have been in touch by telephone.

Yours ever,  
  
(R H T Gozney)  
Private Secretary

J S Wall Esq  
10 Downing Street

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FM CAPE TOWN EMBASSY  
TO DESKBY 300830Z FCO  
TELNO 233  
OF 291600Z MAY 91

MANDELA

1. WHEN MANDELA VISITS LONDON TO SEE TAMBO ON 31 MAY/1 JUNE, HE IS HOPING THAT IT WILL BE POSSIBLE FOR HIM TO SPEAK ON THE TELEPHONE TO THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE. DE KLERK FOR HIS PART IS HOPING THAT WE MIGHT USE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO HELP GET ACROSS TO MANDELA THAT:

*process.*

A) DEALING WITH THE VIOLENCE WILL REQUIRE THE ACTIVE INVOLVEMENT OF THE POLITICAL LEADERS AS WELL AS OF THE GOVERNMENT. ZUMA (ANC) AND MDLALOSE (INKATHA) HAVE MADE REAL PROGRESS IN TALKS TO DEAL WITH THE VIOLENCE IN NATAL. A SIMILAR EFFORT IS NEEDED IN THE TRANSVAAL. (IT MAY BE WORTH ADDING THAT WE HAVE PRESSED THE GOVERNMENT TO GO A GOOD WAY TOWARDS MEETING ANC DEMANDS EG ON THE CARRYING OF SPEARS BY INKATHA SUPPORTERS AND THE OFFER TO ESTABLISH A PERMANENT COMMISSION OF INQUIRY. THERE HAS BEEN SOME DECLINE IN THE VIOLENCE DURING THE PAST FEW DAYS, THOUGH SPORADIC INCIDENTS ARE CONTINUING BETWEEN INKATHA AND ANC SUPPORTERS).

*way ahead*

B) THERE IS A NEED AFTER THE ANC CONFERENCE IN JULY TO MOVE ON TO THE SORT OF MULTI-PARTY MEETING ADVOCATED BY MANDELA IN JANUARY AND TO GET DOWN TO DISCUSSION OF CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES. THE ANC HAVE PUT FORWARD DRAFT PRINCIPLES AND THERE IS A GOOD DEAL OF COMMON GROUND BETWEEN THEM AND THE GOVERNMENT ON SOME OF THE KEY ISSUES (COMMITMENT TO A MULTI-PARTY DEMOCRACY, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY, JUSTICIABLE BILL OF RIGHTS, BI-CAMERAL PARLIAMENT ETC). IF PROGRESS CAN BE MADE ON THESE ESSENTIAL CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES, IT WILL BE EASIER TO CONTAIN THE VIOLENCE.

2. BY WAY OF BACKGROUND, DE KLERK WILL NOT AGREE TO ANC DEMANDS FOR AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT OR A CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY, BOTH OF WHICH WOULD ENTAIL A STRAIGHTFORWARD TRANSFER OF POWER. DE KLERK IS PREPARED TO TRY TO WORK OUT WITH THE ANC TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS WHICH WOULD GIVE THEM AND THE OTHER BLACK POLITICAL LEADERS A MAJOR ROLE IN THE RUNNING OF THE COUNTRY DURING THE TRANSITION. SOME ANC LEADERS LIKE MBEKI FAVOUR THIS. BUT THE COMMUNISTS AND OTHERS SEE IT AS A FORM OF CO-OPTION. ON A CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY, THE SAG ARE DETERMINED TO REACH

AGREEMENT ON THE BASIC ELEMENTS OF A NEW CONSTITUTION FIRST. IF THIS CAN BE AGREED, NOT ALL THE DETAILS NEED TO BE WORKED OUT BEFORE A NEW PARLIAMENT MIGHT BE ELECTED WHICH COULD ITSELF ENACT THE NEW CONSTITUTION. IF THERE IS A POLITICAL WILL TO DO SO, IT IS POSSIBLE TO FIND A WAY THROUGH ON BOTH THESE POINTS. BUT AT THE MOMENT THE MODERATE NEGOTIATING FACTION IN THE ANC ARE HAVING DIFFICULTY WITH A ALLIANCE BETWEEN THE RADICAL YOUTH AND THE HARD LINE WHITE COMMUNIST AND MANDELA HAS BEEN LEANING TOWARDS THE RADICAL WING IN THE RUN UP TO THE CONFERENCE. THIS, PROBABLY, IS PARTLY TACTICAL (THOUGH IT ALS REFLECTS THE INFLUENCE OF HIS WIFE). AN ESPOUSAL BY THE ANC OF PAC DEMANDS FOR THE ELECTION OF A CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY BEFORE ANYTHING ELSE HAPPENS WOULD LEAD TO DEADLOCK. THE KEY TO ACHIEVING FURTHER PROGRESS IS TO GET MANDELA BACK TOWARDS THE POSITION HE ADOPTED IN JANUARY. AS IN NAMIBIA AND ZIMBABWE, THE TRANSITIONAL PROBLEMS WILL BE EASIER TO DEAL WITH IF THERE IS PROGRESS ON THE CONSTITUTION.

3. MANDELA MAY RAISE THE ISSUE OF POLITICAL PRISONERS. SEVERAL HUNDRED HAVE ALREADY BEEN RELEASED. A LOT MORE HAVE APPLIED FOR RELEASE BUT A GOOD MANY OF THESE WOULD APPEAR TO BE CRIMINAL CASES. WE HAVE URGED THE GOVERNMENT TO SPEED UP THE PROCESS OF REVIEWING ALL THESE CASES.

4. FINALLY, IT MAY BE WORTH MENTIONING TO MANDELA THE CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE TSHWETE HAS BEEN PLAYING IN ACHIEVING UNIFIED GOVERNING BODIES IN THE MAJOR SPORTS. I HAVE MADE CLEAR TO MANDELA THAT WE FAVOUR A SELECTIVE RELAXATION OF THE SPORT BOYCOTT IN THE CASES OF THOSE SPORTS WHICH HAVE BEEN INTEGRATED.

FCO PLEASE ADVANCE TO PRIVATE SECRETARY AND PS/NO.10.

RENWICK

YYYY

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SOUTH AFRICA: VISITS of Mandela  
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10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

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M. D. J. CSAD (117)  
B  
PS / Woolley  
PS / 1005  
Mr. Fairweather  
Mr. Weston  
Mr. Hemans  
Sp Adv  
New  
3 May 1991

Dear Sir,

*J. G.*  
3  
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PHONE CALL BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND  
NELSON MANDELA

Nelson Mandela telephoned the Prime Minister this evening. He started the conversation by apologising to the Prime Minister for adding to his work hours. The Prime Minister said that, on the contrary, he was glad that Mr. Mandela had rung. He was, however, very sorry to hear of the death of Mr. Mandela's relatives in Soweto this week. The extent of the fighting was very distressing. Mr. Mandela said the death of his relatives had been very sad. They were close (at a later point in the conversation he said they were nephews). He had wanted to phone the Prime Minister to say that Mr. de Klerk had made three important policy statements in Parliament. He had hoped that Mr. de Klerk would go a long way to meeting the ANC demands because he, Mandela, wanted the negotiating process to remain on track. But there had been very little in what de Klerk had said that responded to the ANC's demands. If the Government failed to respond to the ANC's demands before 9 May the ANC would have no alternative but not to take part in the All Party congress which they hoped would otherwise meet to agree a way forward on the violence. They would also have to stop discussions on the future constitution of the country. This would be a tragedy. He had tried to create a proper atmosphere for negotiations but the failure of the Government to stop the violence (10,000 dead since 1984) was unacceptable. The Government could put an end to the violence. The ANC's demands were the best way to save peace and stop the slaughter but they had not had the response they wanted. The country was headed for tragedy. The ANC would not be able to talk to the Government after 9 May. Mr. Mandela was telling the Prime Minister because he knew his interest and his wish to make a contribution.

The Prime Minister said he was very sorry to hear how Mr. Mandela felt. We had used our influence with the South African Government continuously to get them to take steps to deal with violence. They had responded e.g. with the offer of a permanent judicial commission. And we would of course go on talking to them. It would be very worrying if the peace process was stalled, particularly after all the hard work and qualities




of leadership which Mandela and de Klerk had shown. It would be a tragedy if the negotiations were not carried forward and the Prime Minister was concerned at how the international community would react if the ANC broke off the dialogue. He hoped that some way could be found to keep talks going. To end the violence and to reach a constitutional settlement the best way forward was through multi-party talks on the violence and through constitutional talks.

Mr. Mandela said that he had studied Mr. de Klerk's speech, and the speech he had made in February. He had spoken generally about some of the ANC's demands but not in a tangible way. He had referred, for example, to the single men's hostels but had not undertaken to phase them out. The ANC wanted an early undertaking on that. The police must use acceptable methods of crowd control. It was not acceptable that they use live ammunition against blacks.

The Prime Minister said that he thought that Mr. de Klerk had gone further in the areas which Mr. Mandela mentioned, e.g. suspending police involved in the deaths of Mr. Mandela's relatives and on the carrying of weapons and the use of live ammunition. Mr. Mandela said there were indeed reports that those police had been suspended but this had not appeared in Mr. de Klerk's speech. On other issues like a ban on carrying weapons at public gatherings or the issue of live ammunition these were not covered in the speech. The Prime Minister said that he had not seen the text of the speech and would certainly study it.

After the phone call I spoke to our Embassy in Cape Town and to Sir Robin Renwick. We agreed that Robin Renwick would talk to Mr. Mandela to remove any misunderstanding over what was, or was not, in de Klerk's speech and to reiterate the Prime Minister's basic point that President de Klerk was trying to meet the ANC's concerns and to urge that the ANC keep up the dialogue with the South African Government.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'Jans', followed by a second signature that appears to be 'J. S. Wall'.

(J. S. WALL)

S. L. Gass, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL  
FM CAPE TOWN EMBASSY  
TO DESKBY 300830Z FCO  
TELNO 233  
OF 291600Z MAY 91

ADVANCE COPY ✓

MANDELA

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AGREEMENT ON THE BASIC ELEMENTS OF A NEW CONSTITUTION FIRST. IF THIS CAN BE AGREED, NOT ALL THE DETAILS NEED TO BE WORKED OUT BEFORE A NEW PARLIAMENT MIGHT BE ELECTED WHICH COULD ITSELF ENACT THE NEW CONSTITUTION. IF THERE IS A POLITICAL WILL TO DO SO, IT IS POSSIBLE TO FIND A WAY THROUGH ON BOTH THESE POINTS. BUT AT THE MOMENT THE MODERATE NEGOTIATING FACTION IN THE ANC ARE HAVING DIFFICULTY WITH AN ALLIANCE BETWEEN THE RADICAL YOUTH AND THE HARD LINE WHITE COMMUNISTS AND MANDELA HAS BEEN LEANING TOWARDS THE RADICAL WING IN THE RUN UP TO THE CONFERENCE. THIS, PROBABLY, IS PARTLY TACTICAL (THOUGH IT ALSO REFLECTS THE INFLUENCE OF HIS WIFE). AN ESPOUSAL BY THE ANC OF PAC DEMANDS FOR THE ELECTION OF A CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY BEFORE ANYTHING ELSE HAPPENS WOULD LEAD TO DEADLOCK. THE KEY TO ACHIEVING FURTHER PROGRESS IS TO GET MANDELA BACK TOWARDS THE POSITION HE ADOPTED IN JANUARY. AS IN NAMIBIA AND ZIMBABWE, THE TRANSITIONAL PROBLEMS WILL BE EASIER TO DEAL WITH IF THERE IS PROGRESS ON THE CONSTITUTION.

3. MANDELA MAY RAISE THE ISSUE OF POLITICAL PRISONERS. SEVERAL HUNDRED HAVE ALREADY BEEN RELEASED. A LOT MORE HAVE APPLIED FOR RELEASE BUT A GOOD MANY OF THESE WOULD APPEAR TO BE CRIMINAL CASES. WE HAVE URGED THE GOVERNMENT TO SPEED UP THE PROCESS OF REVIEWING ALL THESE CASES.

4. FINALLY, IT MAY BE WORTH MENTIONING TO MANDELA THE CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE TSHWETE HAS BEEN PLAYING IN ACHIEVING UNIFIED GOVERNING BODIES IN THE MAJOR SPORTS. I HAVE MADE CLEAR TO MANDELA THAT WE FAVOUR A SELECTIVE RELAXATION OF THE SPORT BOYCOTT IN THE CASES OF THOSE SPORTS WHICH HAVE BEEN INTEGRATED.

FCO PLEASE ADVANCE TO PRIVATE SECRETARY AND PS/NO.10.

RENWICK


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PIECE/ITEM ..... (one piece/item number)	4454	
Extract details:	Letter from Penfold to Wall dated 24 May 1991	X
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10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

22 May 1991

*Dear Sir,*

**NELSON MANDELA**


I am writing to confirm that the Prime Minister would be very willing to have a telephone conversation with Nelson Mandela if Mr. Mandela passes through Britain next week. Perhaps you could let me know dates and times. It would also be useful to have a brief for the call.


*J. S. Wall*  
(J. S. WALL)

S. L. Gass, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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DEPARTMENT/SERIES ..... <i>PREM 19</i> ..... PIECE/ITEM ..... <i>4454</i> ..... (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract details:  <i>Manuscript note from Wall to Prime Minister dated 21 May 1991</i>	
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Extract details:  <i>Minute from Cradock to Wall dated 21 May 1991</i>	
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SUBJECT cc MASTER



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10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

3 May 1991

Dear Sima,

PHONE CALL BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND  
NELSON MANDELA

Nelson Mandela telephoned the Prime Minister this evening. He started the conversation by apologising to the Prime Minister for adding to his work hours. The Prime Minister said that, on the contrary, he was glad that Mr. Mandela had rung. He was, however, very sorry to hear of the death of Mr. Mandela's relatives in Soweto this week. The extent of the fighting was very distressing. Mr. Mandela said the death of his relatives had been very sad. They were close (at a later point in the conversation he said they were nephews). He had wanted to phone the Prime Minister to say that Mr. de Klerk had made three important policy statements in Parliament. He had hoped that Mr. de Klerk would go a long way to meeting the ANC demands because he, Mandela, wanted the negotiating process to remain on track. But there had been very little in what de Klerk had said that responded to the ANC's demands. If the Government failed to respond to the ANC's demands before 9 May the ANC would have no alternative but not to take part in the All Party congress which they hoped would otherwise meet to agree a way forward on the violence. They would also have to stop discussions on the future constitution of the country. This would be a tragedy. He had tried to create a proper atmosphere for negotiations but the failure of the Government to stop the violence (10,000 dead since 1984) was unacceptable. The Government could put an end to the violence. The ANC's demands were the best way to save peace and stop the slaughter but they had not had the response they wanted. The country was headed for tragedy. The ANC would not be able to talk to the Government after 9 May. Mr. Mandela was telling the Prime Minister because he knew his interest and his wish to make a contribution.

The Prime Minister said he was very sorry to hear how Mr. Mandela felt. We had used our influence with the South African Government continuously to get them to take steps to deal with violence. They had responded e.g. with the offer of a permanent judicial commission. And we would of course go on talking to them. It would be very worrying if the peace process was stalled, particularly after all the hard work and qualities




of leadership which Mandela and de Klerk had shown. It would be a tragedy if the negotiations were not carried forward and the Prime Minister was concerned at how the international community would react if the ANC broke off the dialogue. He hoped that some way could be found to keep talks going. To end the violence and to reach a constitutional settlement the best way forward was through multi-party talks on the violence and through constitutional talks.

Mr. Mandela said that he had studied Mr. de Klerk's speech, and the speech he had made in February. He had spoken generally about some of the ANC's demands but not in a tangible way. He had referred, for example, to the single men's hostels but had not undertaken to phase them out. The ANC wanted an early undertaking on that. The police must use acceptable methods of crowd control. It was not acceptable that they use live ammunition against blacks.

The Prime Minister said that he thought that Mr. de Klerk had gone further in the areas which Mr. Mandela mentioned, e.g. suspending police involved in the deaths of Mr. Mandela's relatives and on the carrying of weapons and the use of live ammunition. Mr. Mandela said there were indeed reports that those police had been suspended but this had not appeared in Mr. de Klerk's speech. On other issues like a ban on carrying weapons at public gatherings or the issue of live ammunition these were not covered in the speech. The Prime Minister said that he had not seen the text of the speech and would certainly study it.

After the phone call I spoke to our Embassy in Cape Town and to Sir Robin Renwick. We agreed that Robin Renwick would talk to Mr. Mandela to remove any misunderstanding over what was, or was not, in de Klerk's speech and to reiterate the Prime Minister's basic point that President de Klerk was trying to meet the ANC's concerns and to urge that the ANC keep up the dialogue with the South African Government.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'Jans', followed by a second signature that appears to be 'J. S. Wall'.

(J. S. WALL)

S. L. Gass, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

PRIME MINISTER

SOUTH AFRICA: PHONE CALL FROM NELSON MANDELA

Nelson Mandela will ring at 12 noon today.

You may want to start by expressing sympathy for the death of two of his relatives in the fighting in Soweto this week. About 80 people have been killed in the last 3-4 days in ANC/INKATHA fighting. The fighting started with the murder by the MK (the military wing of the ANC) of an INKATHA Soweto Mayor called Kumalo.

In his speech yesterday in Parliament de Klerk went quite a long way towards meeting the ANC's demands. He has

- suspended police involved in two incidents where ANC supporters were killed (including suspending two black policemen who failed to intervene when Mr. Mandela's relatives were killed);
- imposed a ban on the carrying of weapons at public gatherings;
- imposed a ban on the issue of live ammunition to police at such events;
- announced the phasing out of single sex township hospitals.
- ordered independent <sup>Judicial Commission</sup> inquiries into complaints against the security forces of misconduct.

De Klerk has said that he will go ahead with all-party talks on May 24 or 25 about ways to end the violence, with or without the ANC. The ANC are talking about trying to get the talks arranged, not under the auspices of the Government, but under those of the South African Council of Churches. But the SACC supports the ANC so this is unlikely to work: Inkatha would not attend.

You may want to say to Mandela:

we have used our influence with the South African Government continuously to get them to take steps to deal with the violence. They have responded. We shall go on talking to them;

- but there are three parties involved, not just the South African Government, but the ANC and INKATHA as well;
- the ANC and INKATHA must meet, at whatever level is necessary, to curb the violence. Understand that last night local ANC/INKATHA leaders in Soweto did arrange a truce;
- however strong Mandela's feelings, the international community will not understand if he breaks off the dialogue;
- multi-party talks about the violence must be the right way forward. Important that the ANC do not break off constitutional talks.

The ANC have publicly appealed to the international community to pressurise de Klerk. If you say to Mandela that you will speak to de Klerk you may want to add that you will do so privately, not publicly. Robin Renwick's advice is that if you do speak to de Klerk (and he sees no objections), you should not publicise the fact at this stage.

You should be aware that Hani (the leader of MK, the ANC's military wing) is in the United States at present, speaking in fairly extreme terms eg "stability in South Africa is not in the ANCs interests". When in South Africa Hani is living in the Mandela house.

You asked about Mrs. Mandela's trial. It has some way to go. She has an alibi which could be enough to secure her acquittal. If not acquitted, there will be appeals all the way to the Chief Justice and it is unlikely that she will end up in jail. The South African Government certainly do not want her in jail. Meanwhile, she failed to be elected as President of the ANC's Women's Wing last week. She has been rumbled by her own people.

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FM CAPE TOWN EMBASSY

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

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YOUR TELNO 159 (NOT TO ALL): PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH MANDELA

SUMMARY

## 1. DISCUSSION WITH MBEKI ABOUT ANC'S POSITION.

DETAIL

2. AS I TRAVELLED BACK TO JOHANNESBURG WITH THABO MBEKI, I SAID THAT IT WAS A PITY THAT MANDELA HAD PUT UP A PRETTY RIGID AND DOGMATIC PERFORMANCE IN HIS MEETING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER. WE HOPED THAT THE ANC WOULD NOT GO ON PAINTING ITSELF INTO A CORNER. MBEKI SAID THAT THE 9 MAY 'ULTIMATUM' HAD BEEN PUSHED THROUGH THE NATIONAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE ANC BY MANDELA PERSONALLY, WITH SOME HELP FROM SLOVO AND THE RADICALS ON THE COMMITTEE. IT WAS HIS PERSONAL INITIATIVE. THERE WAS NO CHANCE OF ACHIEVING THE DISMISSAL OF MALAN AND VLOK IN RESPONSE TO SUCH AN 'ULTIMATUM'. MANDELA WAS NOW SAYING THAT THE ANC'S ATTITUDE WOULD DEPEND ON THE TOTALITY OF THE GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSE.

3. I SAID THAT THE GOVERNMENT WAS NOT GOING TO BE ABLE TO DO A GREAT DEAL MORE THAN IT HAD NOW OFFERED. WE HAD HELPED TO PUSH THEM INTO SUGGESTING AN ALL PARTY CONFERENCE TO DISCUSS THE VIOLENCE AND INTO AGREEING TO ESTABLISH A PERMANENT COMMISSION OF INQUIRY HEADED BY A JUDGE. MANDELA SEEMED TO BELIEVE THAT MOST OF THE VIOLENCE WAS ATTRIBUTABLE TO A 'THIRD FORCE'. THAT WAS NOT OUR ASSESSMENT, NOR THAT OF THE INTERNATIONAL PRESS HERE. THERE COULD WELL BE SOME RIGHT WING INVOLVEMENT IN SUPPLYING ARMS TO ANTI-ANC GROUPS. BUT THE CLASHES WERE TAKING PLACE BETWEEN RIVAL BLACK GROUPS COMPETING FOR POWER. WHILE MANDELA AND MBEKI KEPT ON CALLING FOR PEACE OTHER ANC LEADERS DOWN THE LINE LIKE GWALA IN NATAL, MOKABA (HEAD OF THE YOUTH LEAGUE) AND MAYEKISO IN ALEXANDRA CONTINUED TO MAKE EXTREMELY AGGRESSIVE STATEMENTS ABOUT INKATHA AND ANY OTHER ANC OPPONENTS.

4. MBEKI AGREED THAT MOKABA'S PERFORMANCE WAS BAD. BUT HE SAID THAT HE WAS HIMSELF CONVINCED THAT THE POLICE COULD DO MORE TO STOP THE

VIOLENCE BY CONTROLLING MORE EFFECTIVELY ACCESS TO THE HOSTELS AND ENSURING THAT ARMS WERE NOT TAKEN INTO OR OUT OF THEM. THE POLICE ALSO SHOULD DO MORE TO STOP INKATHA SUPPORTERS CARRYING SO-CALLED ''CULTURAL'' WEAPONS, ESPECIALLY SPEARS. THE ANC BELIEVED THAT THERE WAS A LEAKAGE OF WEAPONS FROM THE SECURITY FORCES TO SOME OF THESE GROUPS. I SAID THAT THE GOVERNMENT ALREADY HAD ANNOUNCED SOME MEASURES TO LIMIT THE CARRYING OF ''CULTURAL'' WEAPONS. INKATHA, IN RESPONSE TO THE KIND OF DEMANDS MBEKI WAS MAKING, WERE LIKELY TO POINT OUT THAT ANC ARMS CACHES IN THE TOWNSHIPS REMAINED UNDISCLOSED.

5. I SAID THAT THE ANC WOULD WRONG-FOOT THEMSELVES BADLY IF THEY DID NOT RESPOND TO DE KLERK'S OFFER TO PARTICIPATE IN THE JUDICIAL COMMISSION ON VIOLENCE. IF THEY HAD EVIDENCE OF NEGLIGENCE BY OR INVOLVEMENT OF THE SECURITY FORCES, THIS SHOULD BE SUBMITTED TO THE COMMISSION AND INVESTIGATED. DE KLERK KEPT SAYING THAT HE WAS PREPARED TO TAKE ACTION AGAINST ANY POLICE OFFICERS INVOLVED, BUT THERE HAD TO BE PROOF AGAINST THEM. THE ANC WOULD PUT THEMSELVES IN THE WRONG IF THEY SOUGHT TO SUSPEND NEGOTIATIONS. THERE WOULD BE VERY LITTLE SYMPATHY FOR THAT EVEN AMONG PEOPLE NORMALLY SYMPATHETIC TO THEM. MANDELA KEPT INSISTING THAT HE STILL DID NOT HAVE THE VOTE, BUT THE ANC WERE THEMSELVES PROPOSING TO DEFER DISCUSSION ON A NEW CONSTITUTION.

6. ON THE POLITICAL PRISONERS, THE ANC CONTENDED THAT THERE HAD BEEN 1200 OR SO POLITICAL PRISONERS WHO HAD NOT BEEN DEALT WITH UNDER THE AMNESTY. BUT THE GOVERNMENT WAS NOW ACCELERATING THE PROCESS. OVER 690 ''POLITICAL'' PRISONERS ALREADY HAD BEEN RELEASED AND A GOOD MANY MORE WERE DUE TO BE RELEASED SHORTLY. IF THE ANC BELIEVED THAT SOME PRISONERS WHOSE CRIMES WERE PRIMARILY POLITICAL WERE NOT GOING TO BE RELEASED, THEY MUST PROVIDE NAMES AND DETAILS OF THE OFFENCES FOR WHICH THEY WERE CONVICTED. MBEKI SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THAT GOOD PROGRESS WAS BEING MADE IN DEALING WITH THIS PROBLEM, THOUGH THERE REMAINED PEOPLE THE ANC REGARDED AS POLITICAL PRISONERS IN BOPHUTHATSWANA.

7. MBEKI SAID THAT HE STILL HOPED THAT A WAY COULD BE FOUND TO GET DISCUSSION OF CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES UNDERWAY BEFORE OR AFTER THE ANC CONFERENCE. BUT AS I WOULD REALISE, ALL THE ANC LEADERS WERE PRE-OCCUPIED WITH THE PREPARATIONS FOR THEIR CONFERENCE, DUE TO BE HELD IN DURBAN FROM 2 TO 6 JULY. I SAID THAT WE HOPED THAT THE ANC LEADERS WOULD NOT COME OUT OF THE CONFERENCE WITH THEIR HANDS TIED BEHIND THEIR BACKS.

8. I CALLED ON TAMBO IN LONDON AND WENT THROUGH MOST OF THESE POINTS

WITH HIM. TAMBO, WHO REMAINS VERY FRAIL BUT HAS MADE A PARTIAL RECOVERY FROM HIS STROKE, REITERATED THE ANC'S SUSPICIONS ABOUT THE POLICE INVOLVEMENT IN THE VIOLENCE BUT APPEARED TO ACKNOWLEDGE THE NEED TO TRY TO FIND SOME WAY OF CARRYING FORWARD NEGOTIATIONS.

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RENEWICK

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- encourage him to continue to show strong leadership in the face of pressure from radicals;
- welcome the ANC's call for the removal of remaining economic sanctions at the start of the transition.
- emphasise our willingness to continue to help in any way and identify particular areas.

Mandela's objectives are likely to be:

- to build on his personal relationship with the Prime Minister;
- to secure understanding of the difficulty he faces with his radicals;
- to get support for the proposition that there should be early agreement on dates for elections and the start of the TEC.
- (possibly) to request financial support for the ANC.

#### Constitutional negotiations

Mr Mandela's meeting with President de Klerk last September signalled the resumption of contacts following the break-down of the constitutional talks (CODESA) in April 1992, the Boipatong massacre and the ANC's four-month campaign of "mass action". Since then a series of bilateral meetings between all parties have led to the resumption of multi-party constitutional negotiations which began last week.

The South African Government and the ANC differ over the powers of the Transitional Executive Council and its four sub-councils for regional and local government, finance, law and order, and security, defence and foreign affairs. The ANC want it to have executive powers, or at least the power of veto. Both the South African Government and Inkatha are opposed.

The constitutional negotiations themselves are dominated by the issue of federalism/regionalism. The South African Government shares Buthelezi's desire for a federal constitution under which regional decision-making should not be overruled by an ANC-dominated central government. The ANC has moved away from its insistence on a unitary state and has had productive talks with the SAG on this issue. Buthelezi last week indicated that bilateral talks between ANC/IFP were expected.

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A Government of National Unity is now envisaged by the SAG/ANC following the first elections. There are signs of agreement between them that entrenched power sharing under an interim constitution could last for up to 5-6 years. This would represent concessions on both sides with the ANC making a political commitment to extended power sharing and the SAG dropping their insistence on power sharing being entrenched in the final constitution. The mechanics for power-sharing in the Government of National Unity have yet to be agreed and Buthelezi last week was sensitive to the possibility that Mandela might rule out his participation.

Mandela told Sir Anthony Reeve on 22 April that the process of transition was now "irreversible" and he seemed confident that the ANC and the Government could reach an agreement on outstanding issues (Cape Town telno 92 enclosed). Both he and de Klerk are under pressure to produce results quickly. However Buthelezi will need to be accommodated and he is in no hurry. The antipathy between Mandela and Buthelezi remains strong; they have not met since 1991. Mandela is highly sensitive on the subject, Sir A Reeve told him that the Prime Minister would like to hear his views on Buthelezi. He suggests that the Prime Minister might offer some reflections on Buthelezi's visit last week and not address directly the subject of a Mandela/Buthelezi meeting.

#### UK involvement

The visit by the EC Troika last September, led by the Foreign Secretary, set the seal on the sending of 15 EC observers to join the UN, Commonwealth and OAU teams (in total around 100) in helping to reduce the violence. The UK has four policemen serving as observers: two with the EC, one with the Commonwealth team and one with Judge Goldstone's Commission. At the invitation of the South African National Peace Secretariat, reflecting a request from the ANC, we sent Commander Churchill-Coleman, former head of the Metropolitan Police anti-terrorism branch, and one other policeman, to assist with the investigation of the murder of Chris Hani.

Our aid programme for black South Africans - over £10 million in 1992/93 rising to £15 million through the transition - concentrates on education and training. In developing the programme we have worked with black community leaders although we do not fund the ANC or other parties directly. The two Civil Service College courses for potential black civil servants contained mainly ANC nominees (including Jessie Duarte, Mandela's Private Secretary) and are highly regarded. We will fund another later this year if there are sufficient good candidates. We are also funding policy advice for black political parties in education, land reform and agriculture. Through the transition we hope to develop projects in police training and voter education.

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The ANC have been pressing to involve us in the integration of the ANC's military wing (MK) with the South Africa Defence Force. We have said that we would be ready to respond to a joint request with the South African Government (eg for training to assist integration). The Government has up to now taken the line that outside involvement will not be necessary but there have been recent indications that they might soften this stance.

#### The economy

The South African economy is in its fourth year of recession, made worse by the severity of last year's drought. Black urban unemployment is estimated at around 40%. The resources needed to redress present inequalities are enormous. Economic growth in excess of the present annual population increase of 2.8% is required but investment decisions, domestic as well as foreign, are awaiting a settlement. Much will then depend upon pragmatic policies from the new Government and a positive decision on IMF and IBRD lending to South Africa.

In February 1993 the ANC announced that it would withdraw its objections to the lifting of economic and financial sanctions once the Transitional Executive Council was in place and a date set for elections. This should pave the way for access to lending from the IBRD and the IMF.

#### POINTS TO MAKE

Against this background the Prime Minister might say:

##### Opening remarks

- condolences on the deaths of Oliver Tambo and Chris Hani (the former, in particular, was a close friend and Mandela attended his funeral the day before leaving for London);
- appreciate your strong line on the need to continue with negotiations after the assassination of Chris Hani. Full support of the international community in this. Hope you will be able to keep the radical Youth in line.
- Glad that we were able to respond to request for help in the investigation of Chris Hani's murder by sending Commander Churchill-Coleman;
- Your assessment of progress in the constitutional negotiations?

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The negotiations

- As you know I saw Chief Buthelezi last week. We invited him here because we believe this is the best way to persuade him to participate seriously in these negotiations. A peaceful settlement to South Africa's problems is impossible without him on board.
- Do not wish to become involved in your personal differences with him. But on the issues under discussion we notice three areas of concern to him:
  - the powers of the Transitional Executive Council (TEC): how close are you to agreement with the SAG?
  - constitutional powers for the regions (Buthelezi's main concern): no prospect for peace unless this issue is resolved to the satisfaction of all parties. How is ANC thinking developing?
  - the post-election government of national unity: how will it be formed?
- Overall impression of talks with Buthelezi:
  - positive message on the substance of the negotiations - nothing unbridgeable.
  - negative message on the political climate of violence - 275 IFP leaders killed.

UK involvement (Mandela may ask for financial assistance)

- We are already making a major contribution:
  - EC Troika visit last September - UK led - resulted in EC observers being sent. Recently extended for six months.
  - UK support for Goldstone Commission and most recently for the investigation into Chris Hani's assassination.
  - Largest EC bilateral programme anywhere. UK contribution 16%. Working with EC partners on our response to TEC.
  - In addition UK bilateral programme of £10 million, mainly on education, training and community projects.
  - Public administration training through Civil Service College courses [Jesse Duarte, his private Secretary, who will attend the call, was a beneficiary]; training for ANC overseas representatives; looking at ways of providing police training.

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- Other areas being considered: voter education and election monitoring; policy formulation for education and agriculture and health.
- Pressing US Administration to lift the Gramm Amendment to allow World Bank and other IFI funds into South Africa once TEC is in place. The World Bank will be your main source of funds provided sound economic policies are followed.

The economy

- Recognise your concern about the economy; welcome your call for the lifting of remaining sanctions at the start of the transition: the sooner the better.

*Yours ever,*

(R J Sawers)  
Private Secretary

Roderic Lyne Esq CMG  
10 Downing Street

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**SOUTH AFRICA: PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT OF  
THE AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS, MR NELSON MANDELA, 5 MAY**

[ Points to Make ]

*Now updated.*

[ Opening remarks ]

- condolences on the deaths of Oliver Tambo and Chris Hani (the former, in particular, was a close friend and Mandela attended his funeral the day before leaving for London);
- appreciate your strong line on the need to continue with negotiations after the assassination of Chris Hani. Full support of the international community in this. Hope you will be able to keep the radical Youth in line.
- Glad that we were able to respond to request for help in the investigation of Chris Hani's murder by sending Commander Churchill-Coleman;
- Your assessment of progress in the constitutional negotiations?

The negotiations

- As you know I saw Chief Buthelezi last week. We invited him here because we believe this is the best way to persuade him to participate seriously in these negotiations. A peaceful settlement to South Africa's problems is impossible without him on board.
- Do not wish to become involved in your personal differences with him. But on the issues under discussion we notice three areas of concern to him:
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  - the post-election government of national unity: how will it be formed?

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  - Other areas being considered: voter education and election monitoring; policy formulation for education and agriculture and health.
  - Pressing US Administration to lift the Gramm Amendment to allow World Bank and other IFI funds into South Africa once TEC is in place. The World Bank will be your main source of funds provided sound economic policies are followed.

The economy

- Recognise your concern about the economy; welcome your call for the lifting of remaining sanctions at the start of the transition: the sooner the better.

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RECORD OF A CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER AT NO 10 DOWNING STREET  
BY CHIEF BUTHELEZI, LEADER OF THE INKATHA FREEDOM PARTY (IFP)  
AND CHIEF MINISTER OF KWAZULU ON 30 APRIL AT 10.45 AM

Present:

Chief Buthelezi  
Mr Joe Matthews  
Mr Ben Skosana  
Mr Amos Ngema

The Prime Minister  
Sir Anthony Reeve  
Sir Roderic  
Braithwaite  
Mr Goodenough  
Mr Christopher  
Mr Lyne

1. The Prime Minister said that the UK had gone through two and a half years of recession: in South Africa the constitutional negotiations were taking place against a background of four years of recession and a growing population. He invited Chief Buthelezi to say how he saw the situation.

2. Chief Buthelezi said that violence had become the major obstacle to reconciliation. It was in part the result of the economic situation which the Prime Minister had described but there was also the political violence between the ANC and the IFP. At the opening of the multi-party talks the IFP had said that violence must top the agenda. The economic situation would only continue to decline in the present climate: no investment decisions would be taken. He had made various attempts to get together with Nelson Mandela over the violence. But Mandela had taken the issue to the UN Security Council in July 1992, describing the IFP as a "surrogate of the South African Government". This was unacceptable. Former President Kaunda had been invited to adjudicate between the ANC and the IFP: he had declined to do so but had agreed to mediate. The Chairman of the Peace Accord had then proposed the start of bilateral meetings between the two parties. These had begun but there had still been no meeting between himself and Mandela. He believed that if they could stand together against the violence they would have some impact. But Mandela's record of walking out of CODESA, initiating the mass action campaign and the bilateral agreement in September with President de Klerk made an rapprochement very difficult. In February representatives of the Government (Delport and Meyer) had visited Ulundi to speak to the IFP Central Committee. It was clear that the Government had, in its agreements with the ANC, had gone back on the principles agreed at CODESA without consulting others. They now advocated an elected constituent assembly. For his part, Buthelezi said, he did not see the need for any transitional arrangements. The multi-party negotiations should agree a constitution and South Africa should proceed to elections on a new government, as had happened in independence negotiations for most of Britain's colonies.

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3. The Prime Minister said that he was glad that Chief Buthelezi was back in the negotiations (Buthelezi interjected that he had never withdrawn). The Prime Minister said he attached importance to his being there. Both he and Nelson Mandela were men of importance to South Africa. There were advantages to having transitional arrangements; first they would provide an opportunity for international sanctions to be lifted at an early stage (something which the United Kingdom had long advocated); secondly they would allow for a period of fluidity in a rapidly changing political environment. Mr Matthews said that the so-called "transitional period" often caused confusion. There were two elements: the idea of the Transitional Executive Council, which would be the trigger for lifting international sanctions and would prepare the ground for elections, caused the IFP no problems. But a long period of transition involving a government of national unity until the end of the century was objectionable; it was a recipe for continued instability. The Prime Minister questioned this. Mr Matthews said that South Africa did not need a temporary constitution for six years but a commitment to a solid constitutional future. There was no historical precedence for a prolonged period of constitution-making other than for India where the constituent assembly had remained in place for a period of 3 years. Sir Anthony Reeve said that the uncertainties should be resolved quickly. The best way to tackle the violence was for all parties to work together and reach agreement on the outstanding constitutional issues and for the election to be held next year.

4. Chief Buthelezi said that Mandela had said during his call on President Clinton that his idea of a government of national unity after the elections was for him, as leader of the majority, to invite others to participate in his government. He had said that he was under pressure to include Buthelezi but that he would not do so. In any case there could be no question of elections unless MK was disbanded. The Prime Minister referred to the dangers of misunderstanding the positions of others on the basis of public statements. Leaders had to be thick-skinned. Chief Buthelezi said that he could not be thick-skinned about his people being killed: the Prime Minister should put himself in his shoes. The Prime Minister said he would put himself in the shoes of those being killed and the many South African's who were waiting for a positive result from the negotiations.

5. The Prime Minister asked Chief Buthelezi how he saw the process being carried forward. Buthelezi referred back to his proposal for a constitution drafted by the multi-party negotiations and a group of "wise men". Mr Matthews said there was a proposal that there should be bilateral talks between the ANC and IFP on constitutional issues. But for Chris Hani's death this would already have taken place.

The ANC negotiators had spoken of a "pleasant surprise" which he took to mean that they were moving towards the IFP on the issue of federalism. Ultimately it came down to a list of powers for the regions. The Prime Minister commented that this sounded like his negotiations with Brussels - subsidiarity. Mr Matthews said the word was in constant use in the negotiations.

6. Mr Matthews said that passionate debate over whether South Africa should be a unitary state or a federation should not be necessary. He drew a distinction between the substance of the negotiations and the political environment of violence in which they were taking place. There was a relentless campaign of attacks on IFP office holders by MK. This was undermining the IFP leadership. A big fuss was made about the killing of Chris Hani but not about the systematic killing of 275 IFP leaders (a list was circulated). Sir Anthony Reeve said that in South Africa there were up to 20,000 murders a year, between 3 and 4,000 of which could be described as political. He confirmed that IFP office holders appeared to be particularly targeted. The Prime Minister asked what was being done. Sir Anthony Reeve described the Peace Accord and its regional extensions, the additional provision of police and the role of international observers.

7. Chief Buthelezi said that when the IFP had raised this issue in negotiations, Meyer, the government negotiator, had described it as "premature". It was not premature; it had to be tackled. At his recent meeting with the UN Secretary General in Rome Boutros Ghali had been "at his wit's end" about what to do. Mr Matthews said that it was primarily a matter of law and order and therefore the responsibility of the South African Government but they were treating it in a cavalier fashion. It had taken the assassination of Chris Hani to convince them that political assassinations posed a serious threat to the negotiations. Buthelezi described the political violence and the ANC's mass action campaign as a "Sword of Damocles" hanging over the negotiations. The Prime Minister said that he had not realised the scale of the killings. He would take the matter up with President De Klerk. Sir Anthony Reeve said that ultimately the solution to the violence was through negotiation.

8. The Prime Minister said that he was pleased to have a clearer idea of Chief Buthelezi's concerns and pleased also that he would be meeting Mr Mandela. He wanted to have a clearer grasp of the areas of concern of each of the parties.



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9. The meeting concluded at 11.30 am.

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INFO IMMEDIATE CAPE TOWN CONSULATEMIPT: VISITS TO LONDON BY CHIEF BUTHELEZI (29/30 APRIL) AND NELSON  
MANDELA (5 MAY)

## SUMMARY

1. CRITICAL PERIOD IN SOUTH AFRICA. NEGOTIATIONS ON TRACK, BUT ISSUE OF CENTRAL VERSUS FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IS BUTHELEZI'S MAIN CONCERN AND REMAINS UNRESOLVED. POINTS TO MAKE TO BUTHELEZI AND MANDELA.

## DETAIL

2. THESE TWO VISITS COINCIDE WITH A TENSE AND CRITICAL PERIOD IN SOUTH AFRICA. MULTI-PARTY NEGOTIATIONS HAVE RESUMED, BUT THE COUNTRY HAS BEEN ROCKED BY CHRIS HANI'S ASSASSINATION (10 APRIL) WHICH HAS EXPOSED THE HOSTILITY OF MANY YOUNG BLACKS TO NEGOTIATIONS AIMED AT POWER-SHARING. WHITES ARE DEEPLY CONCERNED ABOUT THEIR FUTURE IN A SOCIETY WHICH APPEARS TO OFFER THEM ONLY MORE VIOLENCE AND LESS SECURITY, BOTH PHYSICAL AND FINANCIAL.

3. IN PREPARATION FOR THESE VISITS, I SAW BUTHELEZI, MANDELA AND DE KLERK BETWEEN 21 AND 23 APRIL. WHAT FOLLOWS DRAWS ON MY IMPRESSIONS OF THESE DISCUSSIONS. I AM SENDING A SEPARATE TELEGRAM ABOUT DE KLERK'S CONCERNS OVER THE PUBLIC PRESENTATION OF MANDELA'S VISIT.

4. FOR OUR ASSESSMENT OF THE PROSPECTS FOR NEGOTIATIONS, AND FOR THE PROBLEMS FACING A GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY, MINISTERS MAY WISH TO READ THE SUMMARIES ONLY OF MY TELNOS 82 AND 91.

## BUTHELEZI

5. WHATEVER THE ANC AND ITS ALLIES MAY SAY, BUTHELEZI IS INDISPENSABLE TO A DURABLE SETTLEMENT. NATIONALLY, HIS SUPPORT IS WEAK, BUT IN KWAZULU/NATAL (WHICH CONSTITUTES 25% OF THE POPULATION) HE WILL BE A POWERFUL, PROBABLY A DOMINANT FORCE. HE FEELS BITTER ABOUT THE GOVERNMENT'S 'DEAL' WITH THE ANC AND IS INCREASINGLY VITRIOLIC ABOUT MANDELA AND HIS LIEUTENANTS (THE

FEELING IS MUTUAL). HE TOLD ME THAT HIS CHIEF CONCERN IS THAT REGIONAL (HE WOULD SAY FEDERAL) POWERS ACCEPTABLE TO HIM SHOULD BE AGREED IN NEGOTIATIONS BEFORE ANY ELECTION TAKES PLACE. THE GOVERNMENT SUPPORTS HIM IN THIS, AND DE KLERK SUGGESTED TO ME THAT THE PRIME MINISTER SHOULD DO LIKEWISE: I EXPLAINED TO HIM WHY WE HAVE ALWAYS AVOIDED BEING PRESCRIPTIVE. DE KLERK ALSO ASKED THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESS BUTHELEZI ON THE NEED FOR RAPID PROGRESS. BUT AS THE LATEST HICCUP IN THE NEGOTIATIONS (REPORTED SEPARATELY) DEMONSTRATES, INKATHA ARE SIMPLY NOT PREPARED TO FALL IN WITH AN EARLY DEAL ON ELECTIONS IF THAT MEANS ABANDONING THEIR KEY OBJECTIVE OF FEDERALISM. IN THE LIGHT OF THIS, I THINK IT WOULD BE TACTICALLY BETTER NOT TO PRESS BUTHELEZI ON TIMING BUT INSTEAD TO FOCUS ON HIS CONCERNS.

6. I HOPE I HAVE PERSUADED BUTHELEZI TO REFRAIN FROM READING OUT HIS USUAL PREPARED TEXT TO THE PRIME MINISTER ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT HE WILL SEND ONE TO NUMBER 10 IN ADVANCE.

MANDELA

7. MANDELA NOW APPEARS CONFIDENT THAT THE ANC AND THE GOVERNMENT CAN REACH AN AGREEMENT ON OUTSTANDING ISSUES. HE TOLD ME THAT THE PROCESS IS NOW 'IRREVERSIBLE'. HE ALSO BELIEVES THAT THE LATEST MASS ACTION CAMPAIGN, SANCTIONED BY THE ANC AFTER HANI'S KILLING, CAN BE SUCCESSFULLY CONTROLLED. BOTH MANDELA AND DE KLERK ARE ANXIOUS TO PRESS AHEAD QUICKLY, SINCE BOTH ARE UNDER PRESSURE TO PRODUCE RESULTS: BUT DE KLERK HAS THE UNENVIABLE TASK OF COAXING HIS PARTY FROM A POSITION OF MONOPOLY ON POWER TO ONE OF MINORITY SHARE-HOLDERS IN A COALITION GOVERNMENT. IN THE PROCESS, HE MUST ALSO KEEP BUTHELEZI IN PLAY: OTHERWISE HIS OWN WHITE CONSTITUENCY IS LIKELY TO SPLIT. BUTHELEZI HAS CONSIDERABLE WHITE SUPPORT.

8. DESPITE THE CONTINUING VIOLENCE BETWEEN ANC AND INKATHA FACTIONS, MANDELA HAS REFUSED A FORMAL MEETING WITH BUTHELEZI FOR OVER TWO YEARS. HE CLAIMS THAT ANY SUCH MEETING WILL NEED TO BE CAREFULLY PREPARED IF IT IS NOT TO FAIL: WHICH MAY BE TRUE, BUT THE PREPARATORY WORK IS PROCEEDING AT A SNAIL'S PACE. MANDELA ASKED ME TO REQUEST THAT BUTHELEZI SHOULD BE 'REMOVED FROM THE AGENDA' FOR HIS TALKS WITH THE PRIME MINISTER. I TOLD HIM THAT THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF MR MAJOR TRYING TO BROKER A DEAL BETWEEN MANDELA AND BUTHELEZI BUT THAT THE PRIME MINISTER WOULD NO DOUBT WELCOME HIS VIEWS ON BUTHELEZI. MANDELA APPEARED CONTENT WITH THIS. I AM SURE IT WOULD BE BETTER TO AVOID THE SUBJECT OF A MANDELA/BUTHELEZI MEETING, ON WHICH MANDELA IS NOT SUSCEPTIBLE TO RATIONAL ARGUMENT.

9. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND, I SUGGEST THAT THE PRIME MINISTER AND YOU MAKE THE FOLLOWING POINTS.

WITH BUTHELEZI:

- VERY GLAD YOU ARE AT THE NEGOTIATING TABLE. LONG HISTORY OF BRITISH INVOLVEMENT IN NATAL/KWAZULU AND CONCERN FOR YOUR INTERESTS. NO POSSIBILITY OF A STABLE SETTLEMENT WHICH DOES NOT INCLUDE YOU.
- YOUR VIEWS ON PROSPECTS? UNDERSTAND YOUR CONCERN TO SEE EXTENSIVE DEVOLUTION OF POWERS TO THE REGIONS. HAVE IMPRESSION THAT NATIONAL PARTY STRONGLY SUPPORTS YOU ON THIS AND THAT ANC HAVE SHIFTED SOME WAY TO MEET YOU.
- LABELS (EG 'FEDERAL' OR 'UNITARY' SYSTEM) LESS IMPORTANT THAN FINAL OUTCOME OF NEGOTIATIONS OVER CENTRAL/REGIONAL POWER BALANCE.
- SHARE YOUR CONCERN ABOUT VIOLENCE AND KNOW YOU HAVE LOST MANY SENIOR PEOPLE. INTERNATIONAL MONITORS ARE HELPING AND WE WILL CONTRIBUTE MORE FOR ELECTIONS. KNOW YOU WILL DO YOUR BEST TO CREATE RIGHT CLIMATE FOR FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS.

WITH MANDELA:

- COMMISERATION ON HANI AND TAMBO (WE HAVE SECONDED CHURCHILL-COLEMAN TO HANI INVESTIGATION).
- YOUR ASSESSMENT OF NEGOTIATIONS? TIMESCALE?
- KNOW YOU ARE WORRIED ABOUT THE ECONOMY. WELCOME YOUR READINESS TO SEE REMAINING ECONOMIC SANCTIONS LIFTED AT THE START OF THE TRANSITION.
- NO DESIRE TO GET INVOLVED IN YOUR PERSONAL DIFFERENCES WITH BUTHELEZI. BUT WOULD WELCOME YOUR VIEW ON HIS MAIN CONCERN - NEED FOR ASSURANCES ON REGIONAL POWERS IN ADVANCE OF ELECTION? DEPLOY ANY OTHER POINTS MADE BY BUTHELEZI AS APPROPRIATE

10. PLEASE PASS PS/NO 10.

11. SEE MIFT (TO FCO ONLY)

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*newly*

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10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

4 December 1992

*From the Private Secretary*

*DEAR MR. SMITH,*

**PRIME MINISTER'S TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH  
NELSON MANDELA: FRIDAY, 4 DECEMBER**

The Prime Minister and Mr. Nelson Mandela spoke on the telephone this evening. The conversation was entirely amiable, was conducted on first name terms, and lasted for ten minutes or so.

Mr. Mandela apologised for taking up the Prime Minister's time when he was so busy but he said he wanted to brief him on the bilateral talks between the South African Government and the ANC which had ended today. A compromise had been reached about the time-frame whereby an unelected interim Government would be instituted before the end of 1993. This was good news because the economy had taken a deep dive. (At this point the line became bad and the Prime Minister was then briefly cut off. But I think Mr. Mandela was saying something about the need for businessmen and the ANC to co-operate, and that to wait until the elections before lifting international sanctions would damage the economy even more.)

The Prime Minister said that he would be happy to do anything he could to persuade the international community to lift sanctions and to do anything helpful in terms of the international financial community.

Mr. Mandela accepted the Prime Minister's offer gratefully. He was very concerned at the damage being done to the economy by the delays to the peace process.

The Prime Minister said that he would go into bat on behalf of South Africa as soon as Mr. Mandela asked him to.

Mr. Mandela then turned to Chief Buthelezi's statement about Kwazulu/Natal. President de Klerk had issued a strong statement criticising Buthelezi which to a very large extent created a feeling of hope. As the Head of Government, de Klerk needed to be very clear about the way forward. His stand had restored a bit of credibility in him because it showed clearly that he was opposed to unilateral action by any of the players. He, Mr. Mandela, was very happy about it.

Mr. Mandela went on to say that he did not think Buthelezi's attitude created a national crisis. It would be possible to contain in due course all the forces which sought

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to undermine the peace process. He thought that Buthelezi was not seeking to undermine the process deliberately but that was the effect. He would not want people to be over-anxious about Buthelezi's statement. The forces of peace were stronger than those wanting to disrupt the peace process.

The Prime Minister said that he found this assessment very reassuring. The Kwazulu/Natal announcement was a complicating factor but he shared the view that this would not stop the peace process.

Mr. Mandela said that the Commonwealth team and the UN observers had been very helpful. Their mere presence put pressure on all the politicians not to undermine the peace process, although violence still erupted. The presence of international observers was a very good development. Anthony Reeve had been doing a great deal of work. He, Nelson Mandela, had met him twice in the last few days and would meet him formally on Tuesday. Reeve was using all his ability and expertise to see that the peace process was got back on track.

The Prime Minister said that he was delighted that discussions with de Klerk seemed to have made good progress. If there was anything the UK could do, Nelson Mandela only had to ask. He sent many congratulations on the movement that had occurred.

The conversation ended with Mr. Mandela saying again how busy he knew the Prime Minister was; the Prime Minister saying what a very great pleasure it was to talk to Mr. Mandela; and Mr. Mandela sending his best regards to Mr. Douglas Hurd.

Follow-up

X / Following our subsequent telephone conversations, the Prime Minister agreed that it would be inappropriate for him to write to President de Klerk and Chief Buthelezi. He would, however, be grateful to see as soon as possible the assessment, and any collateral, from Tony Reeve which I requested.

Yours sincerely

Sarah Box  
(Duty Clerk)

PP WILLIAM CHAPMAN

Stephen Smith, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

24 November 1992

*From the Private Secretary*

*Dear Stephen,*

**SOUTH AFRICA: PRIME MINISTER'S TELEPHONE  
CONVERSATION WITH NELSON MANDELA**

Thank you for your letter of 23 November.

The Prime Minister telephoned Mr. Mandela this morning. There was no trace of any umbrage on Mr. Mandela's part. Quite the contrary. The Prime Minister and Mr. Mandela were straightaway back on first name terms and Mr. Mandela opened the conversation by saying that he wished the Prime Minister strength and success. The Prime Minister was in his thoughts and he looked forward to seeing him in London in February. The Prime Minister said that he hoped that Mr. Mandela could fix a date soon and come and have a meal with him. Mr. Mandela said he would consult Mbeke and put Mbeke in touch with Ambassador Reeve.

Mr. Mandela said that he was having some problems, a few of them very serious indeed, and likely to delay the move forward in the search for peace. On 26 September the Government and the ANC had made a breakthrough in three important areas: the release of political prisoners, the banning of dangerous weapons in public and the fencing off of hostels. The ANC had been very excited about those agreements. The ANC's approach throughout had been to sit down with the Government and to report the decisions taken to CODESA in the form of recommendations from both the ANC and the Government. They had had some very impressive successes on that basis. However, a "third party" had raised objections, claiming that the ANC and the Government were presenting them and other parties with hard decisions. That was not the case. The ANC's practice had always been one of persuasion.

Mr. Mandela added that he was not over-concerned about that. He believed he would be in a position to sort out these problems. He was working for the next bilateral with the government before the end of the year. Because he had inadvertently caused problems by announcing a date before, he was keeping quiet this time but he could tell the Prime Minister privately that the next meeting with the government would be on 2 December. The Prime Minister warmly welcomed this.

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Mr. Mandela said the number one priority for the ANC was to set a date for the installation of an interim government of national unity. Even the business community wanted that. That was now the main issue and he wanted an announcement to be made. That was the only way that hope and vision could be given to the people. It was also possible that in those circumstances he could go back to the ANC on the lifting of sanctions even before the interim government took office. There were seven million unemployed in South Africa which compounded the country's problems. If business would agree to re-employ half that number within the next three to six months, he could persuade the ANC and Cosatu to accept a proposal designed to lift sanctions immediately. So he approached the future with hope and confidence. With the Prime Minister's support, it should be possible to move forward swiftly.

The Prime Minister said he was delighted to hear of the progress that had been made. He had impressed on President de Klerk the need to do everything to curb the violence. We were particularly shocked by the murder of Mr. Hadebe. The Prime Minister had also impressed on de Klerk the desirability of multi-party talks getting back on track as soon as possible. President de Klerk had taken the force of those arguments. We would try to produce any helpful external pressure we could towards a settlement. The Prime Minister had also pressed President de Klerk on how bilateral talks could be transformed into the resumption of multi-party talks, elections and a new government. It was clear that this had to be within the time-frame of the present parliament and as soon as possible.

Mr. Mandela said that this was his position precisely. He was in touch with President de Klerk by telephone. President de Klerk had serious difficulties within his own party. The hardliners in his Cabinet were in the ascendency and de Klerk found it difficult to do what he wanted to do. Being aware of his problems, the ANC were doing everything in their power to work for a peaceful solution. It was absolutely essential for de Klerk to be decisive. And Mr. Mandela had a feeling that President de Klerk was not being decisive. He had to accept that he could never win right-wing support. What he must not do was squander the support of the democratic forces in South Africa and his commitment to western democracy.

The Prime Minister said that President de Klerk had told him in terms that he would not fight another election which did not include the majority population and that he accepted the need for transitional arrangements. Mr. Mandela was obviously pleased to hear this but said that President de Klerk had also made clear that he was against majority rule. During his visit to London, de Klerk had attacked the ANC, saying that he was prepared to cling to power until the ANC changed. This was unfortunate, but his policy was to ignore such statements. The problem was carrying his own followers

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- 3 -

in those circumstances because it looked as if President de Klerk had a double agenda.

Mr. Mandela said that with the Prime Minister's help and that of Tony Reeve, it should be possible to move forward quickly. He was happy to note that the Prime Minister's interest was just as strong and that gave him a great deal of strength and hope. He was sure he would manage.

The Prime Minister said that we wanted to help. The sooner a settlement was reached, the better. He looked forward to meeting Mr. Mandela again in February and Mr. Mandela should not hesitate to telephone him meanwhile should he wish to do so. Mr. Mandela welcomed this.

Follow Up

It would be helpful if you could now identify, with Sandra Phillips, possible dates which could be offered to Mr. Mandela for a lunch with the Prime Minister in February.

*Yours,  
Joseph*

J. S. WALL

Stephen Smith, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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SOUTH AFRICA: PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT OF THE AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS, MR NELSON MANDELA, 5 MAY

Points to Make

Opening remarks

- condolences on the deaths of Oliver Tambo and Chris Hanu (the former, in particular, was a close friend and Mandela attended his funeral the day before leaving for London);
- appreciate your strong line on the need to continue with negotiations after the assassination of Chris Hanu. Full support of the international community in this. Hope you will be able to keep the radical Youth in line.
- Glad that we were able to request for help in the investigation of Chris Hanu's murder by sending Commander Churchill-Coleman;
- Your assessment of progress in the constitutional negotiations?

The negotiations

- As you know I saw Chief Buthelezi last week. We invited him here because we believe this is the best way to persuade him to participate seriously in these negotiations. A peaceful settlement to South Africa's problems is impossible without him on board.
- Do not wish to become involved in your personal differences with him. But on the issues under discussion we notice three areas of concern to him:
  - the powers of the Transitional Executive Council (TEC): how close are you to agreement with the SAG?
  - constitutional powers for the regions (Buthelezi's main concern): no prospect for peace unless this issue is resolved to the satisfaction of all parties. How is ANC thinking developing?
  - the post-election government of national unity: how will it be formed?

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- Overall impression of talks with Buthelezi:
  - positive message on the substance of the negotiations - nothing unbridgeable.
  - negative message on the political climate of violence - 275 IFP leaders killed.

UK involvement (Mandela may ask for financial assistance)

- We are already making a major contribution:
  - EC Troika visit last September - UK led - resulted in EC observers being sent. Recently extended for six months.
  - UK support for Goldstone Commission and most recently for the investigation into Chris Hani's assassination.
  - Largest EC bilateral programme anywhere. UK contribution 16%. Working with EC partners on our response to TEC.
  - In addition UK bilateral programme of £10 million, mainly on education, training and community projects.
  - Public administration training through Civil Service College courses [Jesse Duarte, his private Secretary, who will attend the call, was a beneficiary]; training for AN overseas representatives; looking at ways of providing police training.
  - Other areas being considered: voter education and election monitoring; policy formulation for education and agriculture and health.
  - Pressing US Administration to lift the Gramm Amendment to allow World Bank and other IFI funds into South Africa once TEC is in place. The World Bank will be your main source of funds provided sound economic policies are followed.

The economy

- Recognise your concern about the economy; welcome your call for the lifting of remaining sanctions at the start of the transition: the sooner the better.

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K: F / SMITH. AB



10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

26 April 1993

**VISITS OF CHIEF BUTHELEZI AND NELSON MANDELA**

Thank you for your letter of 23 April.

I am happy to agree to the attendance at both meetings proposed in your letter. However, we could also accommodate the Head or Assistant Head of the Department as note-taker.

**RODERIC LYNE**

Stephen Smith Esq  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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SUBJECT CC MASTER.

10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

24 April 1991

*Jean Lima.*

**MEETING BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND NELSON MANDELA**

Thank you for your letter of 23 April with briefing for the Prime Minister's meeting with Nelson Mandela.

Mr Mandela called this afternoon accompanied by Messrs Mbeki, Jordan and Msimang. The meeting was scheduled to last for an hour but in the event lasted for nearly an hour and a half. I am sorry that this squeezed out the Foreign Secretary's bilateral but Mr Mandela was in full cry and the meeting could not easily be brought to a close. The meeting was not an easy one. It was perfectly friendly but Mr Mandela was quite wound up about the behaviour of the South African Government and was in a pretty uncompromising mood.

The meeting started with Mr Mandela paying a warm tribute to Robin Renwick. Indeed it has been striking how equally warm tributes have been paid this week by President de Klerk and by Mr Mandela from their different perspectives. The Prime Minister warmly endorsed Mr Mandela's tribute. He thought that Mr Mandela might find Sir Robin Renwick even more valuable in his new role as Ambassador in Washington. Mr Mandela clearly liked this idea and I anticipate something of a hotline between Soweto and Massachusetts Avenue.

The Prime Minister said that we were intensely interested in what was going on in South Africa. Astonishing progress had been made. Dialogue had been established, largely thanks to the courage and leadership shown by Mr Mandela and President de Klerk. We wanted to see this process through to a successful conclusion. How likely was that?

Mr Mandela, with characteristic courtesy and formality, said he was grateful for the Prime Minister's invitation. He attached much importance to the ANC's relationship with the British Government. In many respects Britain was closer to South Africa than countries on South Africa's own borders. He wanted to do everything possible to ensure that ANC/HMG relations remained strong. He had in the past thanked Mrs Thatcher for Britain's support for the struggle against apartheid and for our contribution to the campaign for the release of political prisoners. The whole initiative to start the peace process had been launched by the ANC. The South African Government had responded, albeit reluctantly, to their pressure. The initiative for last year's talks had come from the ANC.

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The ANC had been obliged to have resort to the arms struggle because a people without rights had to deploy the methods chosen by their oppressors. The ANC had only used force when all other channels had been closed to it. However, the ANC had been sensitive to international concern about violence and, even before the fulfilment of the conditions in the Harare Document, had suspended the armed struggle, not least to give President de Klerk some achievement to take back to his own electorate. The reality was that the ANC had made significant moves towards a settlement but the government had failed to honour its part of the bargain. For example, the South African Government had not honoured the agreement reached on political prisoners, the return of exiles and an end to political trials. The ANC had put its reputation on the line and had presented de Klerk to its own followers as a man of integrity. Mandela still believed de Klerk was an honest man but a whole range of issues showed him in a different light. The National Party was still the party of apartheid and de Klerk was the one man who could move them. He had been very brave for a white and an Afrikaner but had not gone far enough. Three main pieces of apartheid legislation were to be repealed but equally important was the legislation which would take their place. The repeal of the legislation was a less sensational development for blacks than it was for whites. The repeal of the legislation was of no advantage to blacks unless they were given the necessary resources. There had to be an equitable distribution, including of land. As regards the violence, even from his prison Mr Mandela had appealed to President de Klerk to stop the violence. He had told him he could do it within two days if he wanted to. He had warned him then that failure to stop the violence would derail the peace process.

The Prime Minister said there was no disagreement between us on our objectives: we wanted to see an end to apartheid and the introduction of a democratic non-racial system of government. We felt that strongly and wanted to encourage the negotiating process. The repeal of the three pieces of apartheid legislation, which was not in doubt, was an essential precondition of the achievement of our agreed objectives even if it was not enough on its own. Progress would depend upon the rapport between Mandela and de Klerk, on their leadership, and on de Klerk's ability to keep the right wing at bay. The crucial development in achieving Mr Mandela's objectives was legislation on a constitution. As external observers, it seemed to us that there was common ground on that. We could not stress too highly the importance of the talks continuing, leading to an agreement on the constitution which was satisfactory to the majority and the minority in South Africa. We understood the problem of political prisoners but hoped that would not be overriding.

The Prime Minister said that he understood that the South African population was growing at three per cent a year while economic growth was zilch. This would cause great hardship. There had to be economic growth to match population growth. South Africa could attract investment on a large scale but that would depend upon a constitutional agreement. What did Mr Mandela see as a satisfactory outcome - and on what timescale?

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Mr Mandela said that he first wanted to talk about political prisoners and then gave an account of the ANC's grievances on this score on familiar lines, the main point being that the Government's failure to endorse the ANC's nominees for the panel to be set up to judge grey area cases (in line with an agreement reached last August) meant that there was no hope of those people being released by 30 April.

As far as constitutional talks were concerned, Mr Mandela said that the main obstacle was the violence. 10,000 "of our people" had been lost since 1984. He acknowledged that there was an element of faction fighting but it was also true that many of those killed had been killed by a third force. Unacceptable police methods were connived at by the Government. Police methods that would not be tolerated if whites were killed were regarded as acceptable when it was black lives that were at stake. This was an unacceptable situation. Hence the demands made by the ANC and their decision to suspend discussions if their demands had not been met by 9 May.

As far as the constitution was concerned the ANC had published its constitutional principles. Indeed it had set them out as early as 1955. Their principles were based on one person one vote and majority rule but there would be a Bill of Rights to guarantee the rights of every individual with the right of appeal to a court of law. On the ANC's initiative they had told the South African Government that they were ready to assure whites that there would not be black domination. They were prepared to negotiate about the nature of the structural guarantees in this regard. They would not, however, accept reserved seats on the lines negotiated in the Zimbabwe Constitution. The ANC would guarantee that each group would retain its own culture, history, language and religion. The South African Government in all this was moving towards the position of the ANC. One thing the ANC was demanding was the redistribution of land. Blacks should not have to pay anything for land from which they had been dispossessed in the first place.

X Mr Mandela said that he agreed about the importance of economic stability. The ANC had published a policy document. They favoured a mixed economy with public and private ownership and cooperatives. Blacks were the ones who suffered most from sanctions and the ANC wanted them reviewed as soon as possible. But sanctions were introduced for a purpose - to induce the Government to grant the masses the right to vote and determine their own future. They were still a long way from the demise of apartheid. The European Community and the British Government had been too hasty in calling for a review of sanctions. We should have adopted the same policy as the United States. President Bush stood head and shoulders above other leaders in this respect. He had consulted the ANC, personally telephoning Mr Mandela three times. He had explained that if certain conditions were fulfilled he would be obliged to review the United States' comprehensive anti-apartheid legislation. Mr Mandela might not agree with President Bush but the important thing was that President Bush was not dictating to the ANC. He was consulting them. He was not thinking only of the interest of

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the whites but of the blacks as well. When the British Government acted unilaterally they were thinking only of rewarding de Klerk. Mr Mandela wanted better relations between the ANC and the British Government but his followers were saying to him: what type of friends are these who take decisions without even consulting you? Lifting sanctions now only delayed a settlement. If agreement had been reached on the principles of a constitution that would have created an atmosphere in which sanctions could have been reviewed.

The Prime Minister said that it was means and not ends that were in dispute. He did not know the Ministers for whose dismissal Mr Mandela had called. Maybe they were bad Ministers. But Mr Mandela should imagine himself in a situation in which President de Klerk called for the dismissal of Mr Mbeki and other colleagues (much mirth at this point on the part of Mbeki). Mr Mandela had effectively created a road block. The only way to achieve his objectives was through constitutional talks. Delay only postponed the day when Mr Mandela would have the authority to put things right. As regards sanctions, the Prime Minister said, with some force, that we had never talked about lifting all sanctions straightaway. We were not seeking to reward de Klerk. But de Klerk had to operate in the real world of politics where his actions were being checked by pressure from the right. We had to make a limited response in order to push de Klerk towards further reforms. Mr Mandela had mistaken our motives on sanctions.

As regards high level talks this had been Mr Major's first opportunity to meet Mandela. He would welcome keeping in touch by 'phone. Mr Mandela must feel free to visit him at any time. Our aim was to end apartheid. In that regard we welcomed the development of integrated sports in South Africa.

I think Mr Mandela was convinced of the genuineness of the Prime Minister's response. He paused briefly to claim responsibility for the progress made on sports integration but then reverted to his grievances against the South African Government. He defended the demands he had made for the dismissal of the two Ministers. He had discussed these matters confidentially with President de Klerk a year ago. Demands had been made in parliament for the dismissal of these men. How could President de Klerk resist? The Prime Minister commented that if he responded every time a Member of Parliament demanded the dismissal of himself or a member of the government there would be no government left.

Mr Mandela said that de Klerk sometimes accused him of attacking him in public whereas he, de Klerk, never attacked Mandela. Mandela had justified his position: De Klerk was safely ensconced in the Union Buildings or in the Town House. He, Mandela, was at the heart of Soweto seeing people murdered around him every day. Either the Government addressed the ANC's demands or there would be no way forward. The Government was taking advantage of the ANC and trying to weaken it. The ANC was bending over backwards to have successful negotiations. But there was now a crisis. De Klerk would listen to Britain if Britain put pressure on him. The ANC was playing its part in

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trying to curb the violence, e.g. through talks with Buthelezi, but the ANC could not control the violence of the security forces.

Mr Mandela concluded by thanking Mr Major for the help Britain was providing for the ANC and in the townships. There might be some debate about whether it was enough but he readily acknowledged the role Britain was playing in the welfare of his people.

The Prime Minister then suggested that he and Mr Mandela should have a few minutes on their own. During that private discussion the visits of the Foreign Secretary and Mrs Thatcher to South Africa were discussed. Mr Mandela said that the formal position of the ANC was that there should be no foreign visits to South Africa because this implied acknowledgement of the legality of the South African Government. That said, he would be very happy to see the Foreign Secretary when he went to South Africa.


Mr Mandela said he would try to make Mrs Thatcher's visit a success. He was considering inviting her to his own home and would consult his colleagues about it.

*Jans.*  
*Steph*

(J.S. WALL)

Simon Gass, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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DEPARTMENT/SERIES	PREM 19	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM (one piece/item number)	4454	
Extract details:	Minute from Cradock to Wall dated 24 April 1991	
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PRIME MINISTER

CALL BY NELSON MANDELA: WEDNESDAY 24 APRIL

Nelson Mandela will call on you tomorrow at 1600 for an hour. Robin Renwick will be here on our side. Mandela will be accompanied by Thabo Mbeki (whom you will remember narrowly not meeting in Kuala Lumpur) and Pallo Jordan. Mbeki has turned out to be good news (a realistic negotiator). Jordan is bad news. you may want to have five minutes on your own with Mandela at the end of the meeting.

Mandela was sent to prison in 1963. He is now 74. He has a remarkable lack of bitterness but his view of the world is coloured by the fact that when he went to prison Britain was still a colonial power and intervention economics were fashionable. Mandela has enormous dignity and has borne considerable hardship with great resilience. His mind is not closed to fresh ideas but he can be obstinate and, as de Klerk told you yesterday, his organisation is if anything too democratic.

Mr. Mandela will doubtless make a plea to us not to lift any more sanctions. He will say that if he is to persuade his people to abandon the armed struggle they have to know there is some continuing means of pressure on the Government: sanctions is that pressure. You can point to the fact that there is no wholesale lifting of sanctions but that if de Klerk fell pray to the White Right the whole process of negotiation could grind to a halt. He has to have something to show for the enormous strides he has made. Moving on issues like sporting contacts is not a concession to the whites against the interests of the blacks. On the contrary, it is a mixture of pressure and incentive and contacts will only be resumed where sports are integrated.

I have no doubt that Mandela will tell you that his own wish for better relations with Buthelezi (to whom he is grateful for support during his time in jail) fell foul of grassroots ANC opposition in Natal. His conviction that the South African Security Forces and Buthelezi's Inkatha movement are at the root of the Township violence is sincere. You will want to hear him

G. failed to honor agreement - 2 - pol. prisoners  
exiles. G. att. conditions 30/4  
Still abroad.

Issues portrayed here differently.

out. There are then a few key points that you can make in reply. If Mandela goes away thinking you are a sympathetic friend then I think our influence over him will be increased.

Key points to get across are:

old rel., urgent progress

- our objectives and his are the same: an end to apartheid and a non-racial democratic system of Government;

- although the South African Government has responded to internal and international pressures, and although de Klerk's commitment is irreversible, the process could be scuppered by the white electorate;

Local Areas  
Cp. Areas Act  
Pop. Reg. Act

(Violence)

our aim is therefore to encourage the negotiating process and see it succeed;

- Affirmation  
Legislation

had seemed to us that there was a lot of common ground on the constitution. Hope that Mandela can avoid getting stuck on the hook of a constituent assembly. Important thing is to agree constitutional principles;

Right to vote

- on the violence we have pressed the SAG to respond. Believe de Klerk has moved a long way in proposing standing commission headed by a judge and multi-party conference on the violence.

More detailed briefing is in the attached FCO letter.

In private with Mr. Mandela you might say to him that it is very clear to outsiders that in Mandela and de Klerk South Africa has two outstanding leaders and a unique opportunity to achieve in peace everything that Mr. Mandela has devoted his life to. Both sides have their constituencies, and both Mandela and de Klerk have been able to represent them without being a prisoner of them. Vital that continues. Hence the importance of not abandoning the path of constitutional negotiation.

*J. S. Wall*

J. S. WALL

23 April 1991

c:\foreign\mandela (kk)

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MANDELA, NELSON ROLIHLAHLA

Deputy President of the African National Congress (ANC), since March 1990.

1918 born Transkei, son of a prominent Tembu chief. Educated at Fort Hare University. Left without completing his degree. Later studied law at Wits University. Joined ANC 1944 and was a founder of ANC Youth League. In 1952 founded his own firm of attorneys in partnership with Oliver Tambo (qv). Deputy National President of ANC and Transvaal President 1952. Accused in 1956-61 treason trial but acquitted. After banning of ANC went underground in 1961 and became leader of ANC's military wing. 1962 toured African capitals and underwent short guerilla course in Algeria before returning to South Africa: captured and sentenced to five years' imprisonment. In jail when ANC colleagues were arrested at Rivonia in 1963: he stood trial with them for offences committed before his own arrest. 1964 given a life sentence on charges of plotting violent revolution.

Released on 11 February 1990, after having long discussions with President De Klerk and other Cabinet Ministers while in prison.

Married 1958 to Winnie Mandela (qv). Two daughters (his second marriage - he also has two children from his first marriage to Evelyn Ntoko, a nurse).

Rather old-fashioned and rather wooden in manner and a poor public speaker who nevertheless picks his words skilfully. On the nationalist/Africanist wing of the ANC - loyal to, but much more moderate than, overtly socialist/SACP elements. Is striving not altogether successfully to exert control over the broad Charterist camp. If his health holds and negotiations conclude successfully is likely to become South Africa's first black State President.



*C. B. B.*  
*Badly.*

Foreign &  
Commonwealth  
Office

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London SW1A 2AH

23 April 1991

*Dear Stephen,*

Prime Minister's Meeting with Mr Mandela : 24 April

My letter of 23 April provided briefing for the Prime Minister's meeting on 24 April with Nelson Mandela. There are two points on which the letter needs up-dating.

Interim Government

It is reported today that the ANC has renewed its call for an Interim Government to take charge of South Africa while a Constituent Assembly, elected by the entire population, reaches agreement on a new Constitution. For reasons set out in my earlier letter, both the Constituent Assembly and an Interim Government are politically unworkable, unless they follow negotiations and agreement on the essentials of a new Constitution. There have been signs that Mandela and other members of the ANC leadership understood this. The renewed call for Interim Government seems to have been prompted by the PAC and is a further example of the way that the public position of the ANC is being radicalised through contact with the PAC in the approach to the ANC's Congress in June.

Foreign Secretary's Visit to South Africa

An ANC spokesman is reported to have reacted angrily to the announcement that the Foreign Secretary proposes to visit South Africa in the summer, complaining that the ANC ought to have been consulted. It is possible that Mandela may mention this to the Prime Minister. We are clearly under no obligation whatsoever to consult the ANC, or anyone else, in deciding on Ministerial visits. The Prime Minister may wish to tell Mandela :

- that we see the Foreign Secretary's visit as a natural part of our efforts to encourage the South African Government to continue the process of change towards a non-racial, democratic South Africa;

/- that

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*the key point is that it would have been brave not to refer to it.*



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- that the visit will enable the Foreign Secretary to listen to the widest possible spectrum of opinion in South Africa;
- that the Foreign Secretary hopes to see Mr Mandela to hear from him first-hand about the decisions of the ANC Congress and the steps which will follow;
- that the visit will help us to take stock once the repeal of statutory apartheid legislation is complete.

*Answer,*  
*S. L. Gass*

(S L Gass)  
Private Secretary

Stephen Wall Esq CMG LVO  
10 Downing Street

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Foreign &  
Commonwealth  
Office

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23 April 1991

London SW1A 2AH

Dear Stephen,

Visit of Mr Nelson Mandela: 24-25 April

Mr Nelson Mandela, Deputy President of the African National Congress (ANC), will call on the Prime Minister at 4.00 pm on 24 April. Mr Mandela will be accompanied by Mr Thabo Mbeki, ANC Secretary for International Affairs and Mr Pallo Jordan, ANC Secretary for Information and Publicity.

Mr Mandela is passing through London on his way back to South Africa from Japan. He leaves London on 25 April, after a call on Mr Kinnock and a visit to Madame Tussaud's to unveil a wax figure of himself.

Objectives

The Prime Minister has not met Mr Mandela before. Our objectives are:

- to urge Mr Mandela to maintain the momentum towards constitutional negotiations, and to emphasise our view that communal violence should not impede the dialogue.
- to explore ANC thinking on the way negotiations might be organised and to discourage ideas which suggest that a negotiation with the SAG can be avoided (eg constituent assembly).
- in discussion of South Africa's economic prospects, to point out that the ANC's clinging to sanctions is damaging confidence in South Africa's future, and - since sanctions will continue to be lifted - damaging the standing of the ANC.

Political Developments

Until recently the process of moving towards negotiations on a new Constitution seemed on track. The ANC and the SAG were agreed that a multi-party conference should discuss the modalities of negotiations and try to agree on the principles of a new Constitution. Communal violence, though serious, was not being allowed by the ANC leadership to divert them from the process nor to disrupt the private meetings between Mandela and de Klerk.

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On 5 April the ANC issued an open letter, accusing the SAG of complicity in township violence and of giving support to Buthelezi's Inkatha Freedom Party. The ANC threatened to suspend talks with the government unless various demands were met by 9 May. These demands included a ban on the carrying of traditional weapons (aimed at Inkatha Zulus), an enquiry into police activities, and the dismissal from the Government of the Ministers of Law & Order (Vlok) and Defence (Malan). Mandela has subsequently tried to back-track - saying that an extension of the deadline could be considered - but has again renewed his threats. Sir R Renwick believes that his attitude is much affected by the trial of his wife, which is not going well for her.

The reasons for it are manifold: social and economic deprivation, ethnic rivalry, crime - but, above all, political rivalries. However, Mandela is convinced that the SAG is involved in tolerating or encouraging violence in order to undermine the ANC. He speaks of a "third force". It cannot be excluded that some right wing whites have fomented violence, nor that the police use excessive armed force. But the SAG has no interest in fomenting violence, which only discredits their policies and serves the interests of the extremists on right and left.

President de Klerk has tried to meet those demands in the ANC's letter which are reasonable. He has proposed for a summit next month to discuss violence and to establish a Commission of Enquiry. Meanwhile a ban has been imposed on the carrying of traditional weapons at rallies. This offers Mandela a ladder down which to climb. Whether he will use it will depend largely on internal ANC considerations.

Perhaps the main reason for the change of mood is the approach of the ANC Congress, scheduled for June. Many leadership figures, including Mandela himself, face a threat to their election chances from radicals. This has led to some playing to the gallery and juggling for position among leading ANC figures. There has been a hardening of lines on policy issues. It is interesting in context that Mandela is accompanied to No.10 by representatives of both the moderate wing (Mbeki) and radicals (Jordan).

All this makes it unlikely that a multi-party conference could be convened before August. At this conference significant political groupings could try to agree on the principles of a new Constitution as well as on the modalities for negotiation. Agreement on constitutional principles will not be too difficult, as there is already much common ground,

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such as a bi-cameral parliament, a multi-party system, proportional representation, an individual judiciary, and a Bill of Rights to protect individual liberties. With our encouragement, the ANC have published constitutional proposals which contain all these elements (but not protection for minorities).

Although Mandela himself supported the idea of a conference, there have been recent signs of backtracking. A multi-party conference would outflank those radicals in the ANC and elsewhere who demand an elected Constituent Assembly to "negotiate" a Constitution. This would effectively require whites to accept majority rule before they knew the shape of a new Constitution. After the meeting of the ANC and PAC at Harare on 15/16 April, it was announced that a Constituent Assembly was the only way forward and that the two organisations rejected the concept of a multi-party conference. It will be interesting to know how Mandela reconciles this statement with his earlier call for a conference.

Another potential obstacle to progress, the release of political prisoners and the return of exiles, should be removed by the end of April - the deadline set in the "Pretoria Minute" last August. Mandela and de Klerk met on 12 February to resolve an impasse and reached a detailed agreement on the modalities for the releases and on the question of indemnity for returnees. The release of prisoners and the return of exiles have since gathered pace. There is, however, scope for disagreement over how to apply the definition of political prisoner in the Pretoria Minute. Moreover, the UNHCR and the SAG have yet to reach agreement on the conditions under which the UNHCR will help with the return of exiles. It is worth recording that ANC are, themselves, holding disaffected ANC supporters in detention camps in Angola and Tanzania. The ANC has pledged to release them only by the end of this year, ie not by the 30 April deadline set for the release of prisoners by the SAG.

The Prime Minister may wish:

- to stress that we entirely share the ANC's objective of the replacement of apartheid with a non-racial democratic system of government. Our efforts whether political, economic or in aid to black South Africans are directed towards this goal.

- to express concern at the continuing violence in South Africa. Stress that violence is not in the interests of the SAG: the only beneficiaries are those on the political extremes. Violence is no reason to delay negotiations, rather it makes them more urgent.

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- to welcome Mandela's meetings with Buthelezi and urge him to play his part in ending the violence. Will the ANC accept an invitation to attend the summit on violence proposed by President de Klerk?

- to stress that there is no alternative to negotiations. Unrealistic demands (open letter) can only delay negotiations and expose ANC to charges from the right wing that it cannot be taken seriously.

- to ask about the proposed multi-party conference and to explain the political impracticality of having a Constituent Assembly draw up a Constitution unless principles are first negotiated. Does the Harare meeting with the PAC mean that ANC have abandoned a multi-party conference?

- to ask about the plans for the ANC Conference in June. Does Mandela think that it will facilitate constitutional negotiations with the SAG or delay them?

Economic issues/Sanctions

The South African economy was in recession last year (-1% growth). Tight monetary controls to protect the balance of payments and finance debt repayments have kept the economy flat this year. At the same time, the population is growing at a rate of nearly a million people per annum; job-seekers by 250,000 per annum. The inevitable result has been unemployment on a massive scale. Gold-mining alone shed 40,000 jobs last year and is set to lose 40,000 more this year. Unemployment in some townships is estimated at over 50%, and in the rural areas 84% of the population live below the poverty line. As Mandela himself told the SADCC Conference in February, political changes will not inspire hope among the people until they begin to see material benefits.

The SAG have made a start: the 1991/2 budget envisages a 20% cut in defence spending to make way for black education, housing, health and pensions. But South Africa's severe inequalities of wealth and opportunity can not be resolved until growth is restored to the economy. Individual members of the ANC, including Mandela, accept this analysis, but not the policy consequences. These are that they should help restore business confidence and attract investment (both domestic and foreign). Violence is a major disincentive. Uncertainty about ANC economic policies is another (they have moved a long way from calls for nationalisation but still

/hanker

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
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hanker after a command economy). Continued calls for sanctions make things worse. The ANC's joint meeting with the PAC at Harare (15/16 April) produced a very hardline statement on sanctions. In the run-up to the ANC's June Congress, the prospects for a change of policy look bleak. The Prime Minister may wish to say :

- agree with you on need to restore economic growth in South Africa. Another reason to tackle violence. Important to adopt economic policies which attract investment.

- disappointed by your call (at Harare) for maintenance of sanctions. EC will continue to lift economic sanctions, in the knowledge that no political settlement in South Africa will survive without growth. (Military sanctions will stay until the end of the reform process.) US will also lift sanctions within months. ANC should seize initiative and welcome these moves.

/ I enclose Sir Robin Renwick's report of his latest meeting with Mandela (Cape Town telno 162).

*Answers*  
  
(S L Gass)  
Private Secretary

J S Wall Esq  
10 Downing Street

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10 DOWNING STREET

Charles

An hour's meeting  
could be fitted in  
at either 1100-1200  
(immediately before  
talks with Polish  
President followed by  
lunch), or 1600-1700  
(day reorganizing the  
afternoon).

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Sandra  
Let her  
we do  
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CCPC

Foreign &  
Commonwealth  
Office

London SW1A 2AH

20 March 1991

Dear Charles,

South Africa : Visit of Nelson Mandela, 24 April

The ANC Representative in London has just told us that Nelson Mandela will be passing through London on 24 April on his way back to South Africa from Japan. The ANC representative referred to the Prime Minister's invitation conveyed by Mrs Chalker to Mandela last month to talks when he was next in London. He asked if a meeting could be arranged on 24 April.

The Foreign Secretary hopes that a meeting will be possible, on the assumption that it can be fitted in with the Polish State Visit. The Prime Minister will be entertaining President de Klerk to a working supper on 22 April. A meeting with Mandela two days later would be good presentationally and would provide an excellent opportunity to press home our points on sanctions and the next steps in South Africa before a multi-party conference (perhaps in May) and the ANC's Congress (provisionally set for June).

Mandela arrives at Heathrow at 0930 on 24 April, and leaves at 2000. I should be grateful to know if there were a time during that day when the Prime Minister would be able to see him.

Yours ever,

Christopher Prentice.

(C N R Prentice)  
Private Secretary

Sir Charles Powell KCMG  
10 Downing Street

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me  
call

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

SUBJECT cc Mather

*From the Private Secretary*

4 July 1990

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH MR. MANDELA

The Prime Minister spent some three hours today talking to Mr. Mandela, who was accompanied by Mr. Mbeki. Sir Robin Renwick was also present throughout.

It was a successful meeting with an excellent atmosphere. The Prime Minister was already conscious of Mr. Mandela's natural dignity, which comes over very clearly on television. Meeting him in person, I think she was impressed by his courtliness and obvious sincerity. Mr. Mandela's impressions will no doubt become clear at his press conference. But he must feel that he was given a very full opportunity to explain his point of view (his initial comments lasted over 50 minutes uninterrupted: possibly a record). Generally, he expressed his views on the main issues in conciliatory terms, implying that the commitment to armed struggle could be given up quite soon: that lifting of sanctions could follow agreement on constitutional principles: and that state participation in industry was simply an option. Although there were occasionally signs of naivety or dogma, they were relatively rare. He did not himself raise the IRA, but the Prime Minister dealt with the issue briskly and with finality. At the end of the lunch, Mr. Mandela said that he would very much like to contact the Prime Minister directly from time to time: the Prime Minister agreed willingly to this. Mr. Mandela's final comment was that he hoped one day that he and President De Klerk might come together to No.10 Downing Street.

Once he was settled, Mr. Mandela said that he had very much looked forward to the opportunity to meet the Prime Minister at last. It was an honour and privilege to come to No.10. He thanked the Prime Minister for the role she has played in securing his release and that of his colleagues, also for her part in securing Zimbabwe's independence. There were historic, political, trade and cultural ties between Britain and South Africa which he wanted to see continue. He knew that the Prime Minister was utterly opposed to apartheid: that was clear beyond all reasonable doubt. There might be some difference between her and the ANC on methods for dealing with the problem. But they had no doubt of her integrity and sincerity.

Mr. Mandela continued that he would like to brief the Prime Minister on political developments in South Africa. He had been

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urging the South African government to sit down and talk since the middle of 1986. It had not been an easy job under P.W. Botha. Things had changed with De Klerk, and he had been struck immediately by De Klerk's sincerity and strong personality. For his part, he accepted that white South Africans feared the consequences of one man one vote and wanted guarantees of their rights. After three meetings with De Klerk, he believed that they had similar objectives for South Africa. They had already made great progress together, and with the report of the sub-committee on political prisoners, the main obstacles to negotiations had now been removed. The next step was to identify those who should be at the negotiating table, and what sort of body should be established to draw up a new constitution. Those taking part in negotiations must be people who enjoyed legitimacy and credibility. The Government was trying to pack the negotiations with representatives of obscure or newly-created organisations, so as to leave the ANC in a minority. The ANC could not accept that and wanted non-racial elections to choose those who should negotiate. The ANC did not claim to be the sole representative of black South Africans, but there was no doubt that it enjoyed massive support.

Mr. Mandela continued that the ANC were aware of the risk to De Klerk from the extreme right, which was gaining in strength. They would do what they could to sustain him. One of the charges made against De Klerk by the extreme right was that he was giving in to pressure from the United Kingdom and the United States. That was one reason to be careful about lifting sanctions. On sanctions, he could understand that the Prime Minister did not want to see South Africa's economy damaged. Nor did the ANC. After all, it was their people who suffered most. Their aim was therefore an early political settlement which would enable sanctions to be lifted. This could happen before a final settlement, perhaps when there was agreement on constitutional principles. The international community should leave the timing of lifting sanctions to the ANC. He repeated that he appreciated the Prime Minister's concern about continued sanctions and the damage which they did.

Mandela continued that he was also addressing the question of black unity, urging people to forget the past and mobilise for peace. He had been successful with most of the homeland leaders, but it was proving more difficult to involve Chief Buthelezi. Personally, he enjoyed a good relationship with Buthelezi and was grateful for the principled stand which he had taken in refusing to talk to the South African government while he (Mandela) remained in prison. South Africa's problems could not be solved without his participation. But in practical terms it was not possible for the ANC to sit down with him at this juncture. Inkatha was clearly directly responsible for the violence in Natal: and the situation had been further exploited by the police and the army. The South African government could stop the violence in Natal if they wished, but they saw it as serving their purpose. The hostility felt by ANC supporters to Buthelezi was very great indeed, and made it impractical for the ANC to cooperate with him at this juncture. But he emphasised that he wanted to find a way to settle the problems with Buthelezi. He still had a lot of respect for him, although Buthelezi's

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political support was being severely corroded.

Mandela concluded that the ANC faced a number of practical problems, in particular with repatriation of exiles. They were also playing a major role in bringing about a peaceful solution in South Africa but needed to be on the same level of preparedness as the government. He hoped that the British Government would consider giving them financial support.

The Prime Minister said there was absolutely no difference between her and Mandela that apartheid must go. It was wrong, immoral and contrary to the dignity of man. She believed that many white people in South Africa now realised that and wanted apartheid to go. On sanctions, she could never accept the logic that we should be asked to relieve poverty and starvation where they existed in Africa, while at the same time being pressed to cause poverty, starvation and unemployment in South Africa. The South African population was increasing rapidly, and the only way to meet people's aspirations was economic growth. That required trade and investment. We would continue with that, while at the same time providing generous aid for black South Africans. There was a lot of insincerity in the talk about sanctions, and anyway they were of diminishing relevance. The arms embargo imposed through the United Nations would continue, but other sanctions were being eroded. The reason for this was a positive one. People could see that President De Klerk and Mr. Mandela were coming together to create a new future for South Africa, a future which they could believe in. They were therefore beginning to have confidence in that future and to invest in South Africa.

The Prime Minister recalled that she had reminded Mandela, when they had talked on the telephone, that Britain had been at the receiving end of armed struggle. On the IRA, to get that out of the way, the essential difference between the situation in Northern Ireland and South Africa was that everyone in Northern Ireland had a vote. The IRA resorted to violence because they did not like the result. We would never talk to people who used terrorism to oust democracy. Similarly, the ANC's commitment to armed struggle was wrong because you could never justify killing other people to pursue your objectives.

The Prime Minister said that she was troubled by the emphasis given in Mandela's remarks since his release to negative aspects such as sanctions, armed struggle and nationalisation. South Africa was entering a period of hope. It was time to lay aside the hatred, as Mr. Mandela himself had done and lead people towards a vision, a land of hope. South Africa had the strongest economy in Africa and therefore an excellent foundation on which to build. With his great wisdom, Mr. Mandela should avoid harping on the negative aspects and concentrate on explaining his vision for the future.

Turning to constitutional issues, the Prime Minister said that she did not see how there could be a Constituent Assembly, to which power would be transferred. The right way to proceed was to agree on constitutional principles. That was skilled work for experts, not for an assembly. There were many different

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constitutional variations to be considered and assessed. She hoped that Mr. Mandela would throw himself into these issues immediately on his return. She wanted to make one final point about President De Klerk. The essence of political leadership was to know how far ahead of your people you could afford to be. You should never be too far ahead. She sensed a growing concern in South Africa that results from De Klerk's policies were too slow in coming and this could put his position at risk. That was another reason why she urged Mandela to get down to negotiations immediately on his return.

Mandela said that he had listened with interest to the Prime Minister's remarks. Things were never the same once you started to exchange views candidly and honestly. Their differences were not important so long as they agreed on the main goal of getting rid of apartheid. They disagreed on sanctions: the ANC thought that sanctions had been crucial in persuading the South African government to talk. Easing them too soon might derail the peace process. But he respected the Prime Minister's concern about the damage which sanctions did. That was why he was so keen for a settlement. He believed that the obstacles to negotiations had now virtually been removed. They could start as soon as the participants had been selected. He would be meeting President De Klerk to confirm this immediately upon his return to South Africa. He recognised that there could not be a Constituent Assembly before the new constitution was agreed, and that constitution-drafting was a matter for experts. He understood the Prime Minister's position on armed struggle. He would only recall the conditions under which the ANC had resorted to violence. In 1986 they had decided to scale down armed struggle. Now that the obstacles to negotiations were virtually removed, there was no reason why the ANC could not address the issue of ending the armed struggle.

Mandela continued that the ANC recognised the importance of successful economic policies and were in touch with South African businessmen. At present, virtually all the resources of South Africa were owned by a tiny minority of the white minority. The great mass of black people were experiencing poverty, hunger, illiteracy and unemployment. Unless this inequitable distribution could be rectified, it would not be possible to get democracy to function. The ANC were looking at various options for raising the capital which would be needed for economic development. State participation in industry was an option, but only one. If there were alternatives, it would not be needed. Taxation was not the answer in South Africa's situation, because business needed to be able to reinvest its profits. He wanted to stress that the ANC had not decided on nationalisation: they hoped that viable alternatives could be found. They had seen the mistakes made by others in Africa, and it would be foolhardy to ignore them. He might also quote the example of Mr. Gorbachev, who had had the courage to say that the system to which he devoted his life was seriously deficient. The ANC were not going to adopt a system that was seriously deficient. They wanted to work with South Africa's business community. The Prime Minister stressed the importance of an open economy, in order to attract investment and create growth. People had to be taught that prosperity did not drop from the sky, and that you could not put

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distribution of wealth ahead of the creation of wealth. South Africa would find itself in a world in which competition for foreign investment was intense. Sir Robin Renwick added that a multi-party system would be very important for creating the right climate to attract foreign investment to South Africa.

There were brief exchanges about the situation in South Africa, and Mr. Mandela referred also to the Prime Minister's role in the discovery of Mr. Gorbachev, and bringing the Soviet Union and the United States closer to each other. He also spoke with appreciation of the work done by Mr. Justice Steyn and the Urban Foundation.

The Prime Minister concluded by saying that South Africa was very fortunate to have President De Klerk and Mr. Mandela at this juncture. Mr. Mandela said that he would like to be able to get in touch with the Prime Minister directly from time to time: the Prime Minister agreed willingly to this. As we rose from the table, Mr. Mandela said that he hoped that one day he and President De Klerk would be able to come to No. 10 Downing Street.

I am copying this letter to John Gieve (H.M. Treasury), Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence), Martin Stanley (Department of Trade and Industry), Myles Wickstead (Overseas Development Administration) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

C. D. POWELL

J.S. Wall, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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PS TO PRIME MINISTER  
NO 18 DOWNING ST

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SOUTH AFRICA: MEETING WITH MANDELA

## SUMMARY

1. DISCUSSION WITH MANDELA OF THE ANC'S 'ULTIMATUM' TO THE GOVERNMENT. I MADE CLEAR THAT DE KLERK WOULD NOT DISMISS THE TWO MINISTERS AND THE ANC WOULD PUT THEMSELVES IN THE WRONG IF THEY SOUGHT TO SUSPEND NEGOTIATIONS. MANDELA CONVINCED THAT RIGHT WING ELEMENTS ARE BEHIND SOME OF THE VIOLENCE. INSISTS THAT THE GOVERNMENT MUST DO MORE TO STOP IT. ON THE ANC DEMAND FOR A CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY, I SAID THAT WE THOUGHT THE WAY FORWARD WAS TO REACH AGREEMENT FIRST ON CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES. ON SPORT, THE ANC APPEAR TO FAVOUR SELECTIVE RELAXATION OF THE BOYCOTT, AS SPORTS UNITY IN INDIVIDUAL SPORTS IS ACHIEVED.

## DETAIL

2. I HAD LUNCH WITH MANDELA IN JOHANNESBURG YESTERDAY. HE HAD SPENT THE MORNING ATTENDING THE TRIAL OF HIS WIFE.

## BLACK UNITY

3. I ASKED HIM ABOUT THE MEETING WITH THE PAN AFRICANIST CONGRESS IN HARARE. MANDELA SAID HE GOT ON WELL PERSONALLY WITH MAKWETU. BUT THERE WERE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE TWO PARTIES ON VARIOUS ISSUES (INTER ALIA THE PAC DO NOT SUPPORT THE ANC'S DEMAND FOR AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT). MANDELA AGREED THAT THE PAC STANCE ON NEGOTIATIONS WAS UNREALISTIC. THEY PRETENDED NOT TO BE IN CONTACT WITH THE GOVERNMENT BUT WERE IN FACT INDIRECTLY DISCUSSING THINGS WITH THEM. THEY WERE AGREED ON THE DEMAND FOR A CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY. THE TWO PARTIES HAD AGREED TO ATTEND A 'PATRIOTIC CONGRESS' IN SOUTH AFRICA IN AUGUST. I ASKED IF INKATHA WOULD BE INVITED TO THAT. MANDELA SAID THAT IT WOULD. I SAID THAT, FOLLOWING THE DEPARTURE OF THEIR PRESIDENT (MOSALA) TO BRITAIN, I THOUGHT THAT AZAPO SCARCELY COUNTED ANY MORE.

MANDELA AGREED.

**VIOLENCE**

4. MANDELA SAID THAT INKATHA WERE CAUSING A LOT OF PROBLEMS FOR THE ANC. INKATHA SUPPORTERS IN THE HOSTELS AND THE TOWNSHIPS IN THE TRANSVAAL WERE ACTING VERY AGGRESSIVELY. ANC SUPPORTERS HAD BEEN DRIVEN OUT OF THE ZONKISIZWE SQUATTER CAMP. THE POLICE WERE CONNIVING AT ALL THIS. HE WAS CONSTANTLY BEING CALLED AT HOME AT NIGHT BY ANC SUPPORTERS REPORTING ACTS OF VIOLENCE AGAINST THEM AND THE POLICE OFTEN DID NOT REACT. HE HAD JUST SEEN A MAN WHO HAD BEEN SHOT BY THE POLICE QUITE UNJUSTIFIABLY.

5. I SAID THAT INKATHA SUPPORTERS ESPECIALLY IN THE HOSTELS HAD BEEN ACTING AGGRESSIVELY, BUT THE VIOLENCE WAS COMING FROM ALL SIDES AND THE POLICE WERE FINDING IT VERY DIFFICULT TO COPE. WHEN I SAW BUTHELEZI ON 3 APRIL HE HAD BEEN PLEASED BY HIS MEETING WITH MANDELA. BUT THAT HAD BEEN FOLLOWED BY THE ATTACK ON INKATHA IN THE ANC 'ULTIMATUM' TO THE GOVERNMENT. BUTHELEZI HAD BEEN UNDERSTANDABLY ANNOYED AND I WAS GLAD THAT MANDELA HAD TELEPHONED HIM TO TRY TO RESTORE RELATIONS WITH HIM. MANDELA SAID THAT BUTHELEZI WAS VERY AUTHORITARIAN. HIS COLLEAGUES WERE AFRAID OF HIM AND DID NOT STAND UP TO HIM. I SAID THAT THE PEACE TALKS WITH INKATHA MUST CONTINUE. I DID NOT BELIEVE THAT IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO END ALL THE VIOLENCE. BUT THE FACT THAT THEIR LEADERS WERE MEETING AND THE ORGANISATIONS WERE IN CONTACT DID HELP TO CONTAIN IT. MANDELA SAID THAT THE ANC/INKATHA TALKS WOULD CONTINUE BUT WAS EVASIVE ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF JOINT VISITS BY HIM AND BUTHELEZI TO THE VIOLENCE-AFFECTED AREAS.

6. WE THEN DISCUSSED THE ANC'S 'ULTIMATUM' TO THE GOVERNMENT. I SAID THAT IT HAD BEEN A MISTAKE TO CALL ON DE KLERK TO DISMISS TWO OF HIS MINISTERS (MALAN AND VLOK) BY A GIVEN DEADLINE. NO GOVERNMENT COULD ACCEPT BEING DICTATED TO IN THAT WAY. VLOK AND MALAN WERE DIFFERENT ANYWAY. I ADDED THAT AT HIS BRIEFING THE OTHER EC REPRESENTATIVES HAD BEEN TOO POLITE TO TELL HIM THIS, BUT NO WESTERN GOVERNMENT WOULD SUPPORT THE IDEA OF BREAKING OFF NEGOTIATIONS.

7. MANDELA SAID THAT HE AND ALL HIS COLLEAGUES WERE ABSOLUTELY CONVINCED THAT MUCH OF THE VIOLENCE WAS BEING ENCOURAGED BY RIGHT WING ELEMENTS IN THE POLICE. HE HAD ACCEPTED OUR ADVICE AND HAD SAID PUBLICLY THAT FACTION FIGHTING ALSO WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR MANY OF THE DEATHS. BUT THE ANC BELIEVED THAT WEAPONS WERE BEING DISTRIBUTED TO SOME OF THOSE GROUPS TO ENCOURAGE THEM TO ATTACK THE ANC 'COMRADES'.

8. I SAID THAT WE ACCEPTED THAT THERE COULD BE SOME RIGHT WING INVOLVEMENT. ONE AWB MEMBERS HAD JUST BEEN SENTENCED TO DEATH FOR SHOOTING BLACK PEOPLE IN A BUS NEAR DURBAN. THERE MIGHT BE INCIDENTS IN WHICH ARMS WERE BEING GIVEN TO ANTI-ANC GROUPS. BUT IT WAS QUITE WRONG TO BELIEVE OR TO SUGGEST PUBLICLY THAT DE KLERK HAD ANY INTEREST IN ENCOURAGING THE VIOLENCE. ON THE CONTRARY, IT WAS HAVING THE WORST POSSIBLE EFFECT AMONG HIS OWN SUPPORTERS.

9. MANDELA ACKNOWLEDGED THIS AND THAT THE SAME WENT FOR DE KLERK'S CLOSEST MINISTERIAL COLLEAGUES (VILJOEN, BAREND DU PLESSIS ETC). BUT MANDELA REMAINED ADAMANT THAT THE GOVERNMENT MUST DO SOMETHING TO STOP THE VIOLENCE. I SAID THAT WE HAD ENCOURAGED THE GOVERNMENT TO MAKE THEIR STATEMENT OFFERING A MULTI-PARTY CONFERENCE TO DISCUSS THE VIOLENCE. WE DID NOT REGARD THAT AS JUST A PROPAGANDA PLOY. VLOK ALSO HAD ANNOUNCED ACTION TO CURTAIL THE CARRYING OF ''TRADITIONAL'' WEAPONS. DE KLERK KEPT TELLING US THAT HE WAS PREPARED TO TAKE ACTION AGAINST ANY MISCONDUCT BY THE SECURITY FORCES IF THE ANC COULD PRODUCE HARD EVIDENCE. MANDELA SAID THAT IT OFTEN WAS DIFFICULT TO DO THIS.

10. I ASKED IF MANDELA WAS PREPARED TO SEE DE KLERK TO DISCUSS THE ANC MEMORANDUM IN DETAIL WITH HIM. MANDELA SAID THAT DE KLERK HAD OFFERED A DISCUSSION THROUGH THE JUSTICE MINISTER, COETSEE, BUT HAD NOT DONE SO DIRECTLY. BUT HE HAD RAISED ALL THESE ISSUES IN PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS WITH DE KLERK, WHO SIMPLY REFERRED THEM TO VLOK, AND NOTHING THEN HAPPENED. I SAID THAT WE HOPED THAT ON THEIR RETURN FROM THEIR OVERSEAS VISITS, DE KLERK AND MANDELA WOULD MEET AND GO THROUGH ALL THE ISSUES IN DETAIL. MANDELA HEDGED ON THIS. I HOPED ALSO THAT THE ANC WOULD NOT MAKE THE DISMISSAL OF THE TWO MINISTERS A PRE-CONDITION FOR CONTINUING NEGOTIATIONS, THEY WERE NOT GOING TO ACHIEVE THAT. AFTER SOME DISCUSSION, MANDELA GAVE SOME GROUND, SAYING THAT THE ANC VIEW ON THAT WOULD DEPEND ON THE TOTALITY OF THE GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSE.

#### CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY

11. I SAID THAT IF PROGRESS COULD BE MADE TOWARDS AGREEMENT ON A NEW CONSTITUTION BASED ON UNIVERSAL SUFFRAGE, ALL THE TRANSITIONAL PROBLEMS WOULD BECOME EASIER TO MANAGE. THAT WAS WHY WE HAD ENCOURAGED THE ANC TO PUT FORWARD THEIR PROPOSED CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES, AS THEY HAD NOW DONE. THE GOVERNMENT HAD PUBLISHED BROAD PRINCIPLES ON 1 FEBRUARY AND THERE WAS A DEGREE OF CONVERGENCE BETWEEN THEM. THE TWO SIDES WERE AGREED INTER ALIA ON A MULTI-PARTY

DEMOCRACY, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY, JUSTICIABLE BILL OF RIGHTS, BI-CAMERAL PARLIAMENT AND SOME ELEMENT OF REGIONALISM. THE MAIN ARGUMENT WAS LIKELY TO TURN ON THE COMPOSITION AND POWERS OF THE UPPER HOUSE. WE HAD TOLD THE GOVERNMENT THAT WE WOULD NOT SUPPORT ANY RACIALLY-BASED VETO AND I ALSO HAD SOUGHT TO DISSUADE THEM FROM PROPOSING MINORITY REPRESENTATION ON A RACIAL BASIS. THEY HAD MOVED AWAY FROM THAT CONCEPT. MANDELA ACKNOWLEDGED THE DEGREE OF CONVERGENCE ON CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES.

12. I SAID THAT, APART FROM THE GOVERNMENT'S FUNDAMENTAL OBJECTION (THAT A CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY WOULD MEAN MAJORITY RULE BEFORE NEGOTIATIONS TOOK PLACE) IT WOULD TAKE A YEAR OR EIGHTEEN MONTHS TO ORGANISE ELECTIONS IN WHICH ALL SOUTH AFRICANS INCLUDING THOSE IN THE HOMELANDS, COULD PARTICIPATE. THE VOTING ARRANGEMENTS (PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION, CONSTITUENCY OR SOME MIX OF THE TWO) WOULD HAVE TO BE NEGOTIATED. DE KLERK WOULD CONTINUE TO INSIST THAT THE EXISTING CONSTITUTION MUST BE CHANGED CONSTITUTIONALLY IE THAT THE PRESENT PARLIAMENT MUST VOTE ITSELF OUT OF POWER, AND IT COULD ONLY DO THAT WHEN THERE WAS AGREEMENT AT ANY RATE ON THE BASIC ELEMENTS OF THE NEW CONSTITUTION. THAT CONSTITUTION MIGHT THEN FINALLY BE ENACTED BY THE NEW PARLIAMENT. IN OTHER WORDS, A 'CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY' MIGHT BE POSSIBLE AT A LATER STAGE IN THE PROCESS, BUT CERTAINLY NOT AT THE BEGINNING. THIS WAS WHY WE KEPT URGING THE ANC AND THE GOVERNMENT TO GET INTO MULTI-PARTY DISCUSSION OF CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES. THAT IDEA WAS EMBODIED IN THE HARARE DECLARATION AND IN THE STATEMENT MANDELA HIMSELF HAD MADE IN JANUARY.

13. MANDELA SEEMED INTERESTED IN THIS. HE SAID THAT ALTHOUGH THE FRONT LINE STATES CONTINUED TO SUPPORT IT PUBLICLY, THEY WERE NOT ALL KEEN ON THE IDEA OF A CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY. IN HARARE, MUGABE HAD SUGGESTED THAT PROGRESS MIGHT BE MADE BY OTHER MEANS. I SAID THAT NO DOUBT REFLECTED MUGABE'S OWN EXPERIENCE AT LANCASTER HOUSE.

#### SPORT AND SANCTIONS

14. MANDELA DID NOT RAISE THAT LIFTING OF THE EC BAN ON IRON AND STEEL. I SAID THAT WHEN HE SAW THE PRIME MINISTER, MR MAJOR WOULD WANT TO ASK AMONG OTHER THINGS ABOUT THE ANC'S ATTITUDE ON THE QUESTION OF SPORT. WE WANTED TO SEE THE LIFTING OF THE SPORTS BOYCOTT IN CASES WHERE SPORTS UNITY HAD BEEN ACHIEVED AND GENUINELY NON-RACIAL STRUCTURES HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED. WE DID NOT WANT THIS TO APPEAR AS A DEFEAT FOR THE ANC. IN FACT THEY COULD CLAIM A GOOD DEAL OF THE CREDIT AS THE ANC LEADER RESPONSIBLE FOR SPORT, STEVE TSHWETE, HAD PLAYED A LEADING ROLE IN PROMOTING UNITY IN CRICKET AND RUGBY.



MANDELA SAID THAT HE SUPPORTED THE POSITION OF THE INTERNATIONAL OLYMPIC COMMITTEE ON THE RE-ADMISSION OF SOUTH AFRICA TO INTERNATIONAL SPORT. TSHWETE CONSIDERED THAT SELECTIVE LIFTING OF THE SPORTS BOYCOTT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE AS UNITY WAS ACHIEVED. MBEKI POINTED OUT THAT SOCCER WAS LIKELY TO BE THE FIRST IN THE QUEUE AND CONTACTS WERE NOW BEING MADE WITH THE ALL-AFRICAN GOVERNING BODY FOR SOCCER. I SAID THAT SPORT WAS IMPORTANT TO ORDINARY PEOPLE. MANDELA FROM TIME TO TIME SAID THAT 'NOTHING HAD CHANGED' IN THE TOWNSHIPS AND IT WAS TRUE THAT ECONOMIC CONDITIONS WERE CONTINUING TO DETERIORATE. THE ENDING OF THE SPORTS BOYCOTT IN SOCCER WOULD BE POPULAR WITH BLACK SOUTH AFRICANS. RENEWED INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION IN CRICKET AND RUGBY WOULD HELP DE KLERK VIS-A-VIS THE RIGHT WING.

MRS THATCHER

15. THERE WAS A BRIEF DISCUSSION OF MRS THATCHER'S VISIT. MANDELA SAID THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO SEE HER WHILE SHE IS HERE (BUT THIS SHOULD BE PROTECTED AS THAT WILL NOT BE THE VIEW OF ALL MEMBERS OF THE ANC). HE ASKED IF SHE WAS GOING TO SEE DR TREURNICHT. PRESSURE NEEDED TO BE PUT ON THE RIGHT WING PARTIES TO JOIN IN NEGOTIATIONS.

16. MANDELA CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT HE WAS GRATEFUL FOR THE HELP WE HAD PROVIDED THROUGH THE POLITICAL AID FUND FOR EQUIPMENT FOR THE ANC NEGOTIATING TEAM AND FOR OTHER ASSISTANCE WE HAD GIVEN. HE LOOKED FORWARD TO HIS MEETING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER ON 24 APRIL.

RENWICK

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10 DOWNING STREET  
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*From the Private Secretary*

21 March 1991

SOUTH AFRICA: VISIT OF NELSON MANDELA

I am sure the Prime Minister would be ready to see Nelson Mandela on 24 April. The best time would be between 1600-1700. No doubt Sir Robin Renwick will still be here, having come over for the meeting with President de Klerk.

CHARLES POWELL

Christopher Prentice Esq  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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ATS

Confederation of British Industry  
Centre Point  
103 New Oxford Street  
London WC1A 1DU  
Telephone 071-379 7400  
Facsimile 071-240 1578  
Telex 21332

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Date: 4.7.90

To: CHARLES POWELL Esq.

From: LORNA BOWDEN  
CBI  
Tel: 01-379 7400

Message:

Mandela's speech and answers to  
questions from this morning's meeting.

LB.

GH.

PREPARED QUESTIONSVISIT BY MR NELSON MANDELA  
DEPUTY PRESIDENT OF THE ANC

Question to be put by  
Sir Keith Stuart  
Chairman, United Kingdom South Africa Trade Association

Mr Mandela, as you know, countries of the EEC are moving quite rapidly now towards the establishment of a single European market in 1992. At the same time, the countries of the Eastern European bloc, are becoming the source of exciting new markets for investment and trade with Western Europe. It does seem to be that there is a danger now that for countries outside Europe such as South Africa, the problems of being able to compete in Europe and with other European countries for investment and for trade are going to get more difficult. How do you react to the point that continued pressure for sanctions and disinvestment and trade embargoes could lead to a position where for South Africa there may be an irreversible decline in the countries ability to compete within Europe and with other European countries for investment.

## ANSWER

The formation of a common market in Europe is undoubtedly a very progressive step which is in the interest, not only of Europe, but of the greater part of the world. We also appreciate the assistance which Europe and especially the common market which is given to the Eastern countries in their problems but of course there is a contradiction because the investments of large amounts of capital in Eastern Europe, might, as you say, affect investments in our own country and we hope we will be able to discuss these issues and find ways and means of overcoming them. But as far as the question of economic sanctions we have no doubt whatsoever that it is in the interest of a peaceful solution in South Africa that they should be maintained. This view is not only that of the African National Congress, it is the view of other sections of the liberation movement, it is the view of the largest black labour federation in the country, the Congress of South African Trade Unions. It is the view of the South African Churches through the South African Council of Churches which is an umbrella body which invites almost all the churches of the country it is the view of academics, lawyers, doctors, medical associations, progressive medical associations, it is the view of lecturers in universities and so on. Not only that it is a view now that is supported by the frontline states by the Organisation of African Unity by the non-aligned movement and by the General Assemblée of the Arctic Nations it is also as you know the view of the EEC, the European Parliament voted recently by 177 votes only to 47 against in favour of the maintenance of sanctions. All

document which was published way back in 1955, we clearly stated that we will consider state participation in the mines, banks and other financial institutions and in monopoly industries. We did this because in our view, and having studied our situation we came to the conclusion that there is no other solution, no other option which will enable us to command enough resources to address the question of imbalance in the ownership of the resources of the country. The existing position of which we have stated, is that the entire resources of the country is owned by a minority among the white minority of the country. We have no intention of allowing that situation to continue and it will be our first preoccupation to put an end to that imbalance and the question that faces us is how this should be done. In this regard we are looking at various options and state participation in any economic centre is just one of the options and in this regard we have contented ourselves by stating the general policy. We have not gone into details at all. The details will be gone into if and when it is necessary to resort to that option and if anybody can

show us another option, which will enable us to command sufficient resources to redress the imbalance, to which I have referred in my speech we will examine that option most carefully and if it is a better option that state participation there will be no need for us to use this option. We have had a number of discussions with businessmen in our country. The last one was at the end of May when we addressed about 400 leading businessmen in our country. That country was addressed by Mr Gavin Reilly who had just retired as Managing Director of Anglo-American, the biggest mining group in the country and by me. It was a conference that lasted from 10 o'clock in the morning to 8pm and it was a conference in which we probed very carefully the whole question of economic restructuring in post-apartheid society. It was a fruitful meeting but at the central point was what option do we adopt in order to ratify this imbalance? And we pointedly asked the businessmen to provide us with this alternative. It was clear to us as it is now that this matter has not received attention amongst businessmen. One of the options that has been put forward is that of taxation and that by means of taxation we will be able to command sufficient resources to redress this imbalance. We disagree. Taxation must be within certain limits if businessmen are going to have to be assured of a safe return on their investment if they are going to have reasonable profits to ensure the growth of their business and we cannot by means of taxation alone be able to address these problems and to us the options of state participation the only one so far that is available but we are not dogmatic about this matter. We are using no blue prints whatsoever except that in our country state participation in certain sectors of industry is something well known and well established as I have pointed out on countless occasions. The railways, the airways, the electricity and hospital services are state owned in our country and therefore it is nothing unique for us to demand that there should be state participation in certain sectors of the economy which will ensure us sufficient resources to restructure our economy. But of course

of the mistakes that have been committed elsewhere in

we are aware of the mistakes that have been made in this regard and we are therefore, we will use this option if we are forced to do so and if you provide us with no alternative. This is the only option which must be accepted. But even when we adopt this option at a suitable time, at an appropriate time, we will have to be extremely careful and to be guided solely, and solely by experts in this field, not necessarily those who share our political point of view. It may well be that state participation will be as high as 51%. It is possible that it might be 49%. It is possible that it might be 30%. We will discuss this matter very carefully with business interests and we want to do it together with business people and we are not prepared to take any unilateral action that will undermine co-operation between ourselves and the business community both inside and outside the country. It is for this reason in my whole visit to the continent of Europe and America I have made it a point that in every city I should be able to address businessmen because we want the co-operation of business interests both internally and internationally. Thank you.

STATEMENT OF THE DEPUTY PRESIDENT OF THE AFRICAN NATIONAL  
CONGRESS, NELSON MANDELA, TO THE CONFEDERATION OF BRITISH  
INDUSTRY: LONDON: JULY 4, 1990.

MR CHAIRMAN,

LEADERS OF THE BRITISH BUSINESS COMMUNITY,

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN:

WE ARE INDEED VERY PLEASED TO HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO SPEND THESE  
FEW MOMENTS WITH YOU. WE ARE GRATEFUL TO YOU ALL THAT YOU COULD  
MAKE AVAILABLE SOME OF YOUR TIME TO ATTEND THIS ALL TOO BRIEF  
MEETING. WE WOULD LIKE TO THANK THE LEADERSHIP OF THE CBI  
FOR CONVENING THIS IMPORTANT MEETING, WHICH, AS YOU KNOW, IS BY  
NO MEANS THE FIRST BETWEEN THE ANC AND YOURSELVES AND HOPEFULLY  
WILL NOT BE THE LAST.

YOUR ECONOMIC INTEREST IN SOUTH AFRICA IS SUBSTANTIAL, BOTH IN  
TERMS OF TRADE AS WELL AS DIRECT AND INDIRECT INVESTMENT. THIS  
VERY FACT IMPOSES ON ALL OF US AN OBLIGATION TO KEEP UP OUR  
DIALOGUE AND PROVIDES US WITH THE BASIS FOR A SHARED HOPE FOR,  
AND A DEEP INTEREST IN THE SMOOTH TRANSITION OF OUR COUNTRY TO A  
FULL DEMOCRACY WITH A THRIVING AND ADVANCING ECONOMY.

THE MESSAGE WE BRING TO YOU TODAY IS A SIMPLE ONE. IT IS THAT WE  
LOOK FORWARD TO THE TIME WHEN YOU WILL JOIN HANDS WITH OUR PEOPLE  
TO FORM A PARTNERSHIP OF FREEDOM AND PROSPERITY FOR THE PEOPLES  
OF SOUTH AFRICA AND THE UNITED KINGDOM. WE HOPE THAT THIS MEETING



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WILL CONSOLIDATE THE PROCESS OF REAL CONSULTATION AMONG OURSELVES TO DETERMINE WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE IN ORDER TO TURN THAT PARTNERSHIP INTO A REALITY.

YOU ALL KNOW THAT OUR LIFE'S WORK IS NOT YET DONE. WE HAVE STILL NOT ATTAINED OUR OBJECTIVE OF TRANSFORMING SOUTH AFRICA INTO A UNITED, DEMOCRATIC, NON-RACIAL AND NON-SEXIST COUNTRY. OUR STRUGGLE THEREFORE CONTINUES AND WILL CONTINUE UNTIL FREEDOM DAWNS.

THE KIND OF FREEDOM WE SEEK IS NOT DIFFICULT TO DEFINE. ITS FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES ARE NO DIFFERENT FROM THOSE WHICH YOU HOLD DEAR IN THIS COUNTRY. WE WANT TO SEE EVERYBODY ENJOYING THE RIGHT TO VOTE. THE BASIC HUMAN RIGHTS OF ALL OUR CITIZENS HAVE TO BE PROTECTED AND GUARANTEED, TO ENSURE THE GENUINE LIBERTY OF EVERY INDIVIDUAL. THE LAW, BEFORE WHICH ALL SHOULD BE EQUAL, SHOULD RULE SUPREME.

THE RACIAL AND ETHNIC DIVISIONS AND DISCRIMINATORY PRACTICES THAT CONSTITUTE THE APARTHEID SYSTEM HAVE TO BE ENDED COMPLETELY AND WITHOUT QUALIFICATION. WE WANT TO SEE THE MILLIONS OF OUR PEOPLE BUILD ONE SOUTH AFRICAN NATION WHOSE INTEGRITY WILL BE SECURED BY THE FACT OF THE FREEDOM OF ALL ITS MEMBERS TO DECIDE THEIR DESTINY, SPEAK THE LANGUAGE OF THEIR CHOICE, ENJOY THEIR CULTURE AND ENGAGE IN ANY RELIGIOUS PRACTICE ACCORDING TO THEIR CONSCIENCE.

WE CANNOT SAY WITH ANY PRECISION HOW SOON WE WILL BRING THIS DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY INTO BEING. WHAT HOWEVER SEEMS CLEAR IS THAT

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THE ROAD WE STILL HAVE TO TRAVEL IS IMMEASURABLY SHORTER THAN THE PART WE HAD TO COVER TO ARRIVE AT THE POINT WHERE WE ARE TODAY. WE ARE CERTAIN THAT THE VICTORY OF THE DEMOCRATIC CAUSE IS AT HAND.

LET ME ALSO SAY THAT NONE OF US SHOULD SEEK TO IGNORE OR UNDERESTIMATE THE FACT THAT IF TODAY WE SPEAK OF VICTORY BEING IN SIGHT, AS WE DO, IT IS BECAUSE OUR PEOPLE HAVE WAGED A HARD AND LONG STRUGGLE TO END THE SYSTEM OF APARTHEID. THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY HAS ALSO MADE AN IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION TO THIS STRUGGLE, NOT LEAST THROUGH THE IMPOSITION OF ECONOMIC AND OTHER SANCTIONS. IT IS COMMON CAUSE THAT SOUTH AFRICA'S DIFFICULTIES OF ACCESS TO THE WORLD CAPITAL AND LOAN MARKETS HAS PLAYED A DECISIVE ROLE IN PERSUADING PRETORIA THAT FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE MUST TAKE PLACE.

WE BELIEVE, AND TRUST THAT YOU WILL AGREE WITH US, THAT SINCE WE HAVE NOT AS YET ACHIEVED THE DEMOCRATIC TRANSFORMATION WE ALL DESIRE, THEN PRESSURE MUST BE MAINTAINED, BOTH INTERNALLY AND INTERNATIONALLY, TO BRING ABOUT THIS RESULT. AT THE SAME TIME WE WOULD LIKE TO ASSURE YOU THAT WE TOO ARE VERY KEEN TO SEE SANCTIONS ENDED AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE, BUT IN THE CONTEXT OF ENDING THE INHUMAN SYSTEM WHICH MADE THESE SANCTIONS NECESSARY IN THE FIRST INSTANCE.

THE PROCESS LEADING TO A JUST AND LASTING POLITICAL SETTLEMENT HAS STARTED. AT THE MEETING WE HELD AT THE BEGINNING OF LAST MONTH WITH PRESIDENT DE KLERK AND HIS COLLEAGUES, IT WAS AGREED THAT THE OBSTACLES TO NEGOTIATIONS THAT WE HAD IDENTIFIED WOULD

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BE REMOVED. WE BELIEVE THAT THESE WILL INDEED BE REMOVED. IT WILL THEN BE POSSIBLE TO TAKE THE PROCESS FURTHER ON, TO IDENTIFY THE PARTIES TO THE NEGOTIATIONS AND ULTIMATELY TO DRAW UP A NEW, DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION AND A BILL OF RIGHTS THAT WOULD BE ENTRENCHED AND JUSTICIABLE.

WE DO NOT, OF COURSE, UNDERESTIMATE THE DIFFICULTIES THAT STILL LIE AHEAD OF US. WE ARE FULLY CONSCIOUS OF THE FACT THAT OUR INTERLOCUTORS, THE RULING NATIONAL PARTY, HAVE UP TO NOW BEEN A PARTY OF RACISM, WHOSE REASON FOR EXISTENCE WAS TO ADVANCE THE INTERESTS OF THE AFRIKANERS SPECIFICALLY AND THE WHITES IN GENERAL, AT THE EXPENSE OF THE BLACK MAJORITY.

EVEN NOW, AS IT TALKS OF A NON-RACIAL DEMOCRACY, THIS PARTY HAS NOT AS YET FULLY ABANDONED THE NOTION THAT THE SOUTH AFRICAN POPULATION SHOULD BE DIVIDED INTO SEPARATE RACIAL AND ETHNIC POLITICAL COMPARTMENTS. IT IS STILL TOYING AROUND WITH THE IDEA OF A WHITE VETO OR A CONSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENT WHICH WOULD GIVE THE WHITE MINORITY EXCLUSIVE POWER OVER VARIOUS ELEMENTS OF SOCIAL ACTIVITY.

IN ADDITION, THERE ARE MANY AMONG OUR WHITE COMPATRIOTS WHO ARE OPPOSED TO DEMOCRATIC CHANGE, EITHER BECAUSE OF OUTRIGHT ADHERENCE TO RAW AND UNBRIDLED RACISM OR BECAUSE THEY FEAR DEMOCRATIC MAJORITY RULE. SOME OF THESE ARE ARMED. THEY ARE TO BE FOUND WITHIN BOTH THE ARMY AND THE POLICE.

OUTSIDE OF THESE STATE AGENCIES, OTHER WHITES ARE WORKING FRANTICALLY TO ESTABLISH PARA-MILITARY GROUPS WHOSE STATED AND

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SPECIFIC AIM IS PHYSICALLY TO LIQUIDATE THE ANC, ITS LEADERSHIP AND MEMBERSHIP, AS WELL AS OTHER PERSONS OR FORMATIONS WHICH THESE RIGHT-WING TERRORIST GROUPS SEE AS A THREAT TO THE CONTINUED EXISTENCE OF THE SYSTEM OF WHITE MINORITY DOMINATION.

DESPITE ALL THESE NEGATIVE AND WORRYING FACTORS, WE ARE STILL OF THE VIEW THAT CHANGE WILL COME SOONER RATHER THAN LATER. THE OVERWHELMING MAJORITY OF OUR PEOPLE, INCLUDING THE WHITES, ARE IN FAVOUR OF CHANGE. THE INTERNAL AND INTERNATIONAL COST OF MAINTAINING THE APARTHEID SYSTEM HAS BECOME TOO HIGH.

PRESIDENT DE KLERK AND HIS COLLEAGUES IN THE LEADERSHIP OF THE NATIONAL PARTY, HAVE UNDERSTOOD THAT THEY MUST ACT TOGETHER WITH US AND ALL OTHER REPRESENTATIVE POLITICAL FORCES, TO BRING ABOUT A NEW REALITY. WE BELIEVE THAT THEY HOLD THIS VIEW HONESTLY AND ARE READY TO IMPLEMENT SUCH AGREEMENTS AS MAY BE ARRIVED AT DEMOCRATICALLY.

THE POLITICAL SETTLEMENT WE HAVE BEEN SPEAKING OF WILL NOT, HOWEVER, AND BY ITSELF, END THE MASSIVE POVERTY TO WHICH OUR PEOPLE ARE HEIR. I AM CERTAIN THAT ALL OF US PRESENT HERE WILL BE FAMILIAR WITH THE CATASTROPHE OF MISERY WHICH IS THE LOT OF MILLIONS OF OUR PEOPLE. I DO NOT HAVE TO LIST FOR YOU THE ENORMOUS NEEDS WE ARE FACED WITH IN TERMS OF JOBS, HOUSING, EDUCATION, NUTRITION, HEALTH CARE, PENSIONS AND SOCIAL SECURITY AND A LIVING WAGE FOR ALL OUR WORKING PEOPLE.

NATURALLY AND CORRECTLY, OUR PEOPLE EXPECT THAT THE DEMOCRATIC STATE WILL TAKE ALL NECESSARY MEASURES TO ADDRESS THESE ISSUES AS

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A MATTER OF URGENCY. THE VERY FACT THAT THESE MASSES WILL HAVE POLITICAL POWER IN THEIR HANDS WILL INCREASE THE PRESSURE ON THE GOVERNMENT, AT ALL LEVELS, TO MEET THESE EXPECTATIONS.

INDEED, BECAUSE THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC HAVES ARE WHITE AND THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC HAVE-NOTS ARE BLACK, THE VERY STABILITY OF THE POLITICAL SETTLEMENT DEPENDS ON RAPID AND VISIBLE PROGRESS BEING MADE TO IMPROVE THE QUALITY OF LIFE OF ALL THE PEOPLE.

PRIVATE CAPITAL, BOTH DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL, WILL HAVE A VITAL CONTRIBUTION TO MAKE TO THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RECONSTRUCTION OF SOUTH AFRICA AFTER APARTHEID. IT WILL BE CRITICAL THAT THE ECONOMY GROWS RAPIDLY AND AT RATES THAT SUPERCEDE POPULATION GROWTH. THIS CANNOT HAPPEN WITHOUT LARGE INFLOWS OF FOREIGN CAPITAL, INCLUDING BRITISH CAPITAL.

WE WILL ALSO HAVE TO ENSURE THAT WE ACHIEVE LEVELS OF PRODUCTIVITY WHICH WILL ENABLE US TO ATTAIN HIGH PER CAPITA GROWTH RATES AND TO COMPETE ON THE INTERNATIONAL MARKETS SUCCESSFULLY. AS YOU KNOW, AN IMPORTANT REQUIREMENT TO ENABLE US TO ACHIEVE THIS, IS THAT WE MUST HAVE ACCESS TO THE MANAGEMENT SKILLS, THE BODY OF TECHNOLOGY AND THE RISK CAPITAL WHICH MAKE FOR THE SUCCESS OF YOUR OWN CORPORATIONS IN BOTH THE DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL MARKETS.

WE ARE SENSITIVE TO THE FACT THAT AS INVESTORS IN A POST-APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA, YOU WILL NEED TO BE CONFIDENT ABOUT THE SECURITY OF YOUR INVESTMENTS, AN ADEQUATE AND EQUITABLE

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RETURN ON YOUR CAPITAL AND A GENERAL CLIMATE OF PEACE AND STABILITY. THAT IS WHY WE SHARE THE COMMON OBJECTIVES OF THE TOTAL ABOLITION OF THE APARTHEID SYSTEM AND THE INSTITUTION OF A GENUINELY DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM IN AN OPEN SOCIETY.

FURTHER TO THIS, IT IS ALSO IN OUR INTEREST THAT ALL INVESTORS, LIKE OUR OWN PEOPLE AS A WHOLE, SHOULD HAVE CONFIDENCE IN THE STABILITY OF THE SOCIETY WE WILL SEEK TO BUILD. THEY SHOULD KNOW IT AS A MATTER OF FACT THAT WHATEVER INVESTMENT THEY MAKE TODAY, IS NOT LIKELY TO VANISH TOMORROW, BECAUSE OF SOME ARBITRARY GOVERNMENT ACTION OR A POPULAR UPHEAVAL GENERATED BY CONTINUING SOCIAL INJUSTICE.

WE DO NOT HAVE TIME TO ADDRESS OTHER QUESTIONS RELATING TO OUR BROAD VIEWS ABOUT THE FUTURE SOUTH AFRICAN ECONOMY. WE BELIEVE THAT IT WILL BE A MIXED ECONOMY, THOUGH WE HAVE NO BLUEPRINT AS TO THE MAKE-UP OF THAT MIX. WE SHOULD HOWEVER MAKE THE POINT THAT THE MARKET IN SOUTH AFRICA DOES NOT HAVE A SELF-REGULATING MECHANISM THAT WOULD ENSURE GROWTH WITH EQUITY.

CLEARLY, A SPONTANEOUS TRICKLE DOWN EFFECT WOULD NEVER BE SUFFICIENT TO REDRESS THE GROSS IMBALANCES THAT ARE EMBEDDED IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN ECONOMY, INCLUDING THE ALMOST EXCLUSIVE CONTROL OF LAND AND OTHER PRODUCTIVE RESOURCES BY A SMALL MINORITY EVEN AMONG THE WHITES. THE INTERVENTION OF THE DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT, ACTING THROUGH AN ELECTED PARLIAMENT, WILL THEREFORE BE NECESSARY AND INEVITABLE. THE TRADE UNIONS WILL ALSO ENJOY THE RIGHT TO COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND OTHER PRIVILEGES THAT ARE NORMAL IN ANY

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DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY.

WE ARE CONVINCED THAT THIS ECONOMY WILL HAVE TO BE RESTRUCTURED, SO THAT IT IS ABLE TO SERVE THE MATERIAL INTERESTS OF ALL OUR PEOPLE, AND NOT JUST THE WHITE MINORITY. IT IS CLEAR EVEN TODAY THAT THE MAJORITY OF THE PEOPLE ARE TOO POOR TO PROVIDE A GROWING MARKET EVEN FOR THE PRODUCTIVE POTENTIAL THAT ALREADY EXISTS. OURS WILL ALSO REMAIN AN OPEN ECONOMY, LINKED TO THE WORLD ECONOMY IN ALL ITS ELEMENTS.

ECOLOGICAL ISSUES WILL ALSO HAVE TO BE ATTENDED TO, AMONG OTHER THINGS, TO END THE DEGRADATION OF THE SOIL, AS HAS HAPPENED IN MANY PARTS OF THE COUNTRY, AND THE POLLUTION OF THE ATMOSPHERE AROUND MANY BLACK URBAN TOWNSHIPS. WE FORESEE THE SOUTH AFRICAN ECONOMY PLAYING AN IMPORTANT PART IN THE REGENERATION AND EXPANSION OF THE ECONOMY OF SOUTHERN AFRICA AS A WHOLE, OF WHICH IT IS AN INTEGRAL PART.

WE SEE THIS REGIONAL ECONOMY, SO WELL ENDOWED WITH HUMAN AND NATURAL RESOURCES, AS AN OUTSTANDING GROWTH POINT IN THE WORLD ECONOMY. ITS GOOD HEALTH WOULD HELP TO FOCUS INTERNATIONAL OPINION ON THE NEED FOR THE REST OF THE WORLD TO JOIN HANDS WITH THE PEOPLES OF AFRICA AS A WHOLE TO ADDRESS THE URGENT NEEDS FACING THE MILLIONS OF PEOPLE OF OUR CONTINENT.

IN SUMMARY, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, WE COUNT ON YOU TO TAKE THE DECISION THAT YOU WILL BECOME AN EVEN MORE IMPORTANT PART OF THE FUTURE SOUTH AFRICAN ECONOMY. TO REITERATE WHAT WE SAID AT THE BEGINNING, WE HOPE THIS MEETING WILL STRENGTHEN THE DIALOGUE

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AMONG OURSELVES ABOUT THE SYSTEM OF COOPERATION WE NEED TO  
IMPROVE THE LIVES OF THE PEOPLES OF BOTH OUR COUNTRIES.

IMMEDIATELY, WE BELIEVE THAT THERE ARE SOME OTHER THINGS THAT YOU  
SHOULD AND CAN DO.

YOU SHOULD CONTINUE TO ISOLATE APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA. YOU SHOULD  
REFLECT ON WHAT FURTHER CONTRIBUTION YOU CAN MAKE TO ENCOURAGE  
THE PEACEFUL PROCESS LEADING TO THE TRANSFORMATION OF SOUTH  
AFRICA INTO A DEMOCRATIC COUNTRY. YOU SHOULD HELP US WITH THE  
MATERIAL RESOURCES WHICH WILL ENABLE US TO REPATRIATE AND  
RESETTLE OUR COMPATRIOTS WHOM THE APARTHEID SYSTEM FORCED INTO  
EXILE.

YOU SHOULD HELP US WITH THE RESOURCES WHICH WILL ENABLE US TO  
CARRY OUT THE EDUCATIONAL WORK AMONG ALL OUR PEOPLE WHICH WILL  
ENCOURAGE AND ENABLE THEM TO PARTICIPATE IN THE PROCESS OF  
NEGOTIATIONS. YOU SHOULD HELP US TO TRAIN SIGNIFICANT NUMBERS  
ESPECIALLY OF BLACK MANAGERS, BOTH IN BUSINESS SCHOOLS AND AT THE  
WORK PLACE. TOGETHER WE SHOULD DECIDE HOW TO CONTINUE OUR  
DIALOGUE INTENDED TO DEFINE THE CONTENT AND PARAMETERS OF OUR  
PARTNERSHIP FOR DEMOCRACY AND PROSPERITY IN SOUTH AFRICA.  
TOGETHER, WE MUST BEGIN TO PLAN FOR THE FUTURE.

WE APOLOGISE FOR SPEAKING LONGER THAN SCHEDULED, AND THEREFORE  
THANK YOU FOR YOUR INDULGENCE AND YOUR ATTENTION. WE TRUST THAT  
YOU WILL BE KIND ENOUGH TO CONSIDER THE ISSUES WE HAVE RAISED, AT  
YOUR LEISURE, BEARING IN MIND THAT THEY REFLECT THE VIEWS OF WHAT  
IS ACCEPTED TO BE ONE OF THE PRINCIPAL POLITICAL FORCES IN OUR



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COUNTRY, WITHOUT WHICH NO SOLUTION IS POSSIBLE.

WE ARE VERY INTERESTED TO DISCUSS OUR COMMON FUTURE WITH YOU,  
APPROACHING ALL ISSUES IN A SPIRIT OF GIVE AND TAKE, BUT BEARING  
IN MIND THAT OUR PEOPLE, AS MUCH AS YOURS, VALUE THEIR FREEDOM  
AND INDEPENDENCE. BUT, OF COURSE, WE ALSO KNOW THAT THAT FREEDOM  
AND INDEPENDENCE CAN ONLY BE EXERCISED, AND CAN ONLY HAVE TRUE  
MEANING, IN THE CONTEXT OF AN INTERDEPENDENT WORLD.

WE THANK YOU FOR YOUR ATTENTION.



File 1

10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

3 July 1990


Dear Kenneth

Thank you very much for your note about South Africa:  
wonderfully concise and to the point, and very helpful briefing  
for my talk with Mr Mandela.

Yours  
Margaret

Kenneth Warren, Esq., M.P.

hr

DEPARTMENT/SERIES ..... <i>PREM 19</i> ..... PIECE/ITEM ..... <i>H454</i> ..... (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract details:  <i>Letter from Wood to Powell dated          3 July 1990</i>	
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 103 New Oxford Street  
 London WC1A 1DU  
 Telephone 071-379 7400  
 Facsimile 071-240 1578  
 Telex 21332

Director-General  
 John M M Banham

Deputy Director-General and Secretary  
 Maurice Hunt

**CBI**  
 Silver Jubilee  
 1965-1990

BY DOCFAX

URGENT - PLEASE PASS  
 QUICKLY

3 July 1990

Charles Powell Esq  
 Private Secretary for Foreign Affairs  
 Office of the Prime Minister

*CP.*

Dear Mr Powell

VISIT OF NELSON MANDELA TO CBI, WEDNESDAY 4 JULY 1990

Our Director General, Mr John Banham, has requested that we send you an advance copy of our President's speech for the above meeting, together with a copy of Mr Mandela's speech. Unfortunately, the latter has not yet arrived from the ANC, but we will send it through as soon as possible.

I hope you find this material of use.

Yours sincerely

*L. Bowden*

Lorna Bowden  
 Assistant, Middle East and Africa Department  
 International Affairs Directorate

VISIT TO CBI BY MR NELSON MANDELA

DEPUTY PRESIDENT OF THE ANC

Wednesday 4 July 1990

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS BY SIR BRIAN CORBY

PRESIDENT OF THE CBI

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LADIES AND GENTLEMEN

DURING THE LAST YEAR, WE AT THE CBI HAVE BEEN HONOURED TO RECEIVE AS OUR GUESTS A NUMBER OF INTERNATIONALLY KNOWN FIGURES. THEY HAVE HAD A VARIETY OF MESSAGES FOR THE UK BUSINESS COMMUNITY. OUR VISITORS HAVE INCLUDED PRESIDENT BENAZIR BHUTTO, OF PAKISTAN, PRESIDENT CARLOS SALINAS DE GORTARI OF MEXICO AND PRESIDENT ROH TAE WOO OF SOUTH KOREA, PRESIDENT HAVEL OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, MRS ALEXANDRA BIRYUKOVA, DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER OF THE USSR, DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER KEATING OF AUSTRALIA, AND LECH WALESZA. IT IS A DISTINGUISHED LIST. WE ARE NOW WELL-PRACTISED IN THE ART OF WELCOMING ALL OUR VISITORS, WHETHER OR NOT THEIR VIEWS DIFFER FROM OUR OWN. WE ARE ALWAYS GRATEFUL FOR THE OPPORTUNITY TO HEAR THEM SPEAK, AND FOR THE OPPORTUNITY TO PUT TO THEM THE VIEWPOINT OF THE UK BUSINESS COMMUNITY.

TODAY WE HAVE THE PLEASURE OF WELCOMING ANOTHER INTERNATIONAL FIGURE, MR NELSON MANDELA, DEPUTY PRESIDENT OF THE AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS.

IN THE LAST EIGHTEEN MONTHS WE HAVE SEEN CHANGES IN THE WORLD. MANY OF THESE WERE NOT ONLY TOTALLY UNPREDICTED BUT ALSO OF THE GREATEST SIGNIFICANCE. I AM THINKING OF THE EVENTS IN EASTERN EUROPE, AND OF COURSE OF THE CHANGES IN SOUTH AFRICA IN WHICH YOU, SIR, ARE PLAYING SUCH A KEY ROLE.

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MR MANDELA, ON BEHALF OF THE CBI AND EVERYONE HERE TODAY, I BID YOU WELCOME.

CBI POLICY

BEFORE MR MANDELA TAKES THE STAND, I THINK THAT IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO SET OUT THE CBI'S POLICY ON SOUTH AFRICA:

- FIRSTLY, THE CBI IS TOTALLY OPPOSED TO APARTHEID AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION; IT ACKNOWLEDGES THE PROGRESS THAT HAS BEEN MADE, ESPECIALLY SINCE THE ELECTION OF MR DE KLERK AS PRESIDENT, IN DISMANTLING THE SYSTEM, AND BELIEVES THAT APARTHEID SHOULD BE ABOLISHED AS SOON AS IS PRACTICABLE.

- SECONDLY, THE CBI IS FULLY COMMITTED AGAINST ANY FORM OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS WHICH WOULD HAVE THE AFFECT OF DELAYING THE REFORM PROCESS AND ALSO SERIOUSLY UNDERMINING THE ECONOMIC ADVANCEMENT OF SIGNIFICANT SECTIONS OF THE NON-WHITE POPULATION IN SOUTH AFRICA;

- AND THIRDLY, THE CBI RECOGNISES THE CONSTRUCTIVE, POSITIVE ROLE PLAYED BY BRITISH COMPANIES WHICH CONTRIBUTE TO THE WELL-BEING OF THE COMMUNITY BY PROVIDING GOOD EMPLOYMENT AND SOCIAL PRACTICES.

BY CONTRIBUTING TO THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT OF SOUTH AFRICA, ALL ITS PEOPLES WILL BENEFIT AND THE IMPORTANT FORWARD MOMENTUM NOW ACHIEVED IN THE REFORM PROCESS WILL BE MAINTAINED.

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THIS POLICY - WHICH HAS BEEN FULLY ENDORSED BY CBI MEMBERS - IS PART OF OUR APPROACH TO THE BROADER ISSUES AFFECTING GLOBAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT. THE CBI BELIEVES THAT COMPANIES MUST BE FREE TO PURSUE THEIR LEGITIMATE CORPORATE INTERESTS.

UK TRADE AND INVESTMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA

PERHAPS I COULD PUT THE UK'S BUSINESS INTERESTS IN SOUTH AFRICA INTO PERSPECTIVE: UK INVESTMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA FORMS 50% OF THE TOTAL FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN YOUR COUNTRY. FURTHER, OUR TOTAL TRADE IN 1989 WAS WORTH JUST OVER £1.8 BILLION, MAKING THE UK ONE OF SOUTH AFRICA'S LARGEST TRADING ASSOCIATES. SOUTH AFRICA IS A HIGHLY VALUED BUSINESS PARTNER AND WE WOULD LIKE TO SEE OUR RELATIONS WITH YOU STRENGTHEN STILL FURTHER - SUCH LINKS ADD TO THE PROSPERITY OF ALL SOUTH AFRICA'S PEOPLES. THE PRESENCE OF UK COMPANIES, IN ENCOURAGING EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING, AND GOOD BUSINESS PRACTICE, CAN ONLY BE BENEFICIAL AND MUST BE INCREASED.

IMPROVING THE ECONOMY

WE RECOGNISE THE ENORMITY OF SOUTH AFRICA'S PROBLEMS, PARTICULARLY WITH REGARD TO THE DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH AND THE NEED TO IMPROVE THE ENVIRONMENT - A RECENT SURVEY CONCLUDED THAT MORE THAN 50% OF BLACK HOUSEHOLDS HAVE AN INCOME OF LESS THAN £90 (R400) PER MONTH, AND A FURTHER 40% HAVE AN INCOME OF LESS THAN £270 (R1,200) PER MONTH.



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OBVIOUSLY THIS MUST CHANGE AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE, BUT WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT NATIONALISATION OR EXCESSIVE DIRIGISME WILL PROVIDE THE ANSWER: THE UK HAS TRIED THAT METHOD, AND LEARNED FROM EXPERIENCE THAT IT DOES NOT WORK. YOU HAVE ONLY TO OBSERVE THE DEVASTATION WROUGHT IN THE COMMAND ECONOMIES OF EASTERN EUROPE TO REALISE THAT THIS IS NOT THE WAY TO MOVE FORWARD.

WE WOULD HOPE THAT THE ROUTE THAT SOUTH AFRICA WILL TAKE IS THAT OF ENCOURAGING ENTERPRISE WITHIN THE BLACK COMMUNITY, AND OVERALL FOR THE GOVERNMENT - WITH THE HELP OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY - TO TAKE POSITIVE ACTION TO ADVANCE NON-WHITES TO MANAGERIAL POSITIONS IN BOTH THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTORS. THIS CAN ONLY BE ACHIEVED BY CAREFUL AND CONCENTRATED DISCUSSION AND NEGOTIATION BETWEEN YOURSELVES, THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT AND OTHER INTERESTED PARTIES IN SOUTH AFRICA.

#### RELATIONS WITH SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

REACHING BEYOND ITS OWN BORDERS, AND LOOKING TO THE FUTURE, IT IS CLEAR THAT A DYNAMIC SOUTH AFRICA MOVING FORWARD ON A HARMONIOUS BASIS COULD ACT AS A STIMULUS FOR CHANGE IN THE FORTUNES OF ALL THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN COUNTRIES.

\* \* \*

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MR MANDELA, I APPRECIATE THAT YOU WILL NOT BE IN AGREEMENT WITH ALL THAT I HAVE SAID, BUT I AM SURE THAT THERE ARE MANY POINTS ON WHICH WE ARE AGREED. OF ONE THING I AM CERTAIN: OUR COMMON AIM IS TO SEE A PEACEFUL, DEMOCRATICALLY GOVERNED, AND PROSPEROUS SOUTH AFRICA FOR ALL SOUTH AFRICANS.

MR MANDELA, WE LOOK FORWARD TO HEARING YOUR ADDRESS.



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL London SW1A 2AH

② *uk*

3 July 1990  
Prime Minister

*Dear Charles,*

*You may find it helpful to see what Mandela said to the foreign*

Nelson Mandela

The Foreign Secretary had talks with Nelson Mandela this morning. I enclose a copy of the record.

Everything that has been said about Mr Mandela's dignity and presence holds good. If he is at all frail, it did not show. He was very alert but his tone on matters of policy was harder and tougher than expected. But there were signs of a changing position on some issues:

*Secretary. CAP 3/7*

Nationalisation

This is clearly receding as an issue. Mr Mandela said that the problem was the unfair distribution of resources and that he was looking for ways of rectifying this. He was meeting business leaders and asking them to suggest solutions. Government participation was only one option. Businessmen should come up with alternatives to nationalisation.

Sanctions

As the Foreign Secretary said, there is an element of shadow boxing in all this. Mr Mandela does not want sanctions lifted until it is clear to him that apartheid is being dismantled, but he has modified his position to the extent of being ready to see sanctions lifted when the commitment to change is made clear, in a declaration, rather than waiting for the new constitution to be in place. He and the Foreign Secretary did not spend much time on this issue since it is no longer in practice very central.

Armed struggle

The gist of what Mr Mandela said was to the effect that, with negotiations under way, the armed struggle need not be actively pursued.

Elections

Mr Mandela argued that there must be elections to decide who will sit at the negotiating table. He would not accept that the white electorate has already voted since that would mean a blacks-only election. But he did recognise that an election now could spell defeat for President de Klerk. Mr Mandela talked of compromise on the issue. He may be trying to



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exercise leverage on the South African Government whom he suspects of trying to 'stack' the negotiation table with small, unrepresentative black parties so that the ANC would be in a minority.

Continuing contacts

In his speech at lunch, Mr Mandela described his visit to London as the climax of his tour. He attaches importance to our influence. He told the Foreign Secretary he would keep in touch with Robin Renwick but hoped he could telephone the Prime Minister on occasion.

Yours,  
Stephen Wall

(J S Wall)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street

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INFO PRIORITY JOHANNESBURG, LUSAKA, HARARE, DAR ES SALAAM  
INFO PRIORITY LAGOS, ADDIS ABABA, KAMPALA, CAIRO, EC POSTS  
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, UKMIS NEW YORK, OTTAWA  
INFO PRIORITY CANBERRA, WELLINGTON, TOKYO  
INFO ROUTINE MASERU, GABORONE, MBABANE, WINDHOEK, NAIROBI

FROM SAFD.

VISIT OF NELSON MANDELA: TALKS WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE.  
SUMMARY.

1. Mandela spoke without notes. His tone at the plenary session was quite tough on substance and his manner single-minded. The atmosphere throughout was friendly. He raised all the obvious issues, including the next steps in the negotiating process, the armed struggle, sanctions and economic issues. At lunch, he spoke of his visit to Britain as being the climax of his tour.

DETAIL

2. Mandela had talks with the Secretary of State on 3 July at 1 Carlton Gardens. The plenary session lasted about an hour. This was preceded by half an hour tete-a-tete and followed by a lunch.

3. Mandela referred to South Africa's historical ties with

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Britain and to the special role this gave Britain. For this reason he wished to give the government a full briefing. He referred to the Cape Town talks and listed the obstacles to negotiation (return of exiles, political prisoners, political trials, the State of Emergency and repeal of repressive legislation). He said that the ANC had studied the report of the working party established at Cape Town. It was clear that satisfactory progress had been made and that the removal of the remaining obstacles was a mere formality. On repressive legislation, a start had been made and he accepted de Klerk's assurances that what had not already been done would be done in the next legislative session. Mandela had been prepared for the next round of talks with the SAG to take place in his absence abroad. But he appreciated de Klerk's wish not to hold the next meeting until he (Mandela) was back.

4. The key question was now to decide who should sit at the negotiating table. The SAG said elected leaders must be involved, including those of the homelands, town councils and a host of other organisations. Their intention appeared to be to ensure that the ANC would be in a minority. The ANC argued that in these cases elections had taken place when the ANC was banned. There had to be elections on a non-racial basis to decide who should sit at the negotiating table. The government could not be exempted. Those whose legitimacy was thus established would decide on the constitution. However, he also made it clear that compromise was possible and said that he was worried at the possibility that de Klerk might lose any election. He said too that he was not advocating a constituent assembly as such. It was for those elected to attend the negotiating process to decide the body which would draw up a new constitution. (Comment: It was not clear whether the insistence on elections was a negotiating position to counter that of the SAG.)

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5. On the issue of minority rights, Mandela was firm in rejecting any suggestion of a right of veto for whites or indeed of any minority over the majority. He referred to Judge Olivier's recommendations for a Bill of Rights enforceable by an independent judiciary and to his opinion that such protection of individual rights should be enough. The problem was to build up white confidence. He said that in March 1989 he had sent a memorandum to the SAG on the need to remove white fears of domination by the blacks and hence for structural guarantees. Mandela said he was confident that these issues could be resolved by discussion, that the ANC had ideas (not elaborated) but could not compromise on the principle of one person one vote.
6. In this discussion, as in several other points in the talks, he referred to President de Klerk's integrity and to his confidence that he and de Klerk could work together to resolve the problems. He also repeatedly stressed his sense of urgency. He confirmed that negotiations need not be delayed by the ANC Congress in December: they could begin as soon as agreement was reached on who should participate.
7. Mandela introduced the subject of the armed struggle by saying that the ANC had first proposed talks with the SAG in 1986, pointing out that there was no sense in the continuing slaughter. The fact was that the methods of political action were determined by the oppressor. If channels of communication were kept open, there was no need for violence. Western countries had appeared to take more account of the violence of the oppressed than that of the oppressor. It was the ANC who had taken the initiative to scale down violence and to propose talks to remove the obstacles to negotiation. The Harare Declaration promised a cessation of violence before negotiations began. Meanwhile, in South Africa police violence continued and right-wing extremists were arming themselves with apparent

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impunity. How could the ANC call off the armed struggle in such circumstances and leave themselves unable to defend their people? It was for the SAG to create the conditions in which the armed struggle could be called off.

8. The Secretary of State emphasized that HMG had not been slow to condemn the violence of apartheid. Channels of communication were now opened. The ANC should make use of that and point out that the need for armed struggle had gone.

9. Mandela said that the ANC was addressing economic questions in meetings with South African businessmen. They wanted the support of business for their programme of economic reform. The Secretary of State asked if this included nationalisation. Mandela replied that state ownership was well known in South Africa and was nothing new. The problem was an unfair distribution of resources. There were various options to rectify this. Government participation was one. The ANC would consider any other solution. South African business should come forward with ideas. He was meeting business leaders on his foreign trip in order to correct misconceptions. (He addresses the CBI on 4 July.) Decisions would not be forced down people's throats in South Africa. A commission would be appointed to consider possible solutions and in particular how to encourage new investment.

10. Mandela said that one purpose of his tour was to ask the international community to maintain sanctions. In this he had succeeded. Mandela argued that the decision to call for sanctions had been made by the ANC and they could only be called off by decision of its Congress. Nevertheless, he was concerned at the harm sanctions were doing to the economy. Sanctions were the price to be paid for the end of apartheid. At present they helped de Klerk resist the right wing, who portrayed him as a puppet of the UK and US. They added to the sense of urgency on both sides to reach a settlement before damage to the economy



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became irretrievable. He claimed a favourable response in Europe and the US, quoting the vote of the European Parliament. He suggested that even the Bush administration had come round to his point of view. The ANC hoped soon to reach the stage when they could call for a review. The commitment to irreversible change in the UN Declaration was the key, but he did not interpret this as suggesting that sanctions could not be lifted until a new constitution was in place. When sufficient mutual trust had been established with the SAG, the ANC would be content with a declaration of commitment to change.

11. The Secretary of State countered that the argument about sanctions was to some extent shadow-boxing. As Mandela had said, the key issue for the future was investment. This was not to be turned on and off by governments. Decisions were taken by firms. Apartheid discouraged investment. But it was not something that would suddenly begin to flow when apartheid was dismantled. The Secretary of State added that at the Dublin Council opinion had been confused, but there was a general view that the time was approaching when a relaxation would be appropriate. Several countries were already discreetly relaxing sanctions.

12. Mandela offered to explain how he had become embroiled in controversy over the IRA. He had been drawn into making a statement of general principle that he favoured peaceful solutions to conflict. There could be no justification for slaughter. He had declined to take a view of the specific issue. The Secretary of State emphasized that all in Ireland had access to elections. Friends of the IRA had put themselves forward and had been rejected by the electorate.

13. On the question on Inkatha and Natal, Mandela said that the ANC were addressing the question of black unity. Five of the six homelands were now working with the ANC. Inkatha/ANC rivalry was no longer the issue. The SAG had been using the

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differences in an attempt to try to eliminate the ANC. Why else had the SAG failed to use its strength to suppress the conflict? He suggested that the SAG had created a monster which they could not now control. He claimed that Chief Buthelezi had no significant political force behind him and provoked hostility even among Zulus. He hoped to be able to talk to him, but present circumstances made this impossible. When he had proposed a meeting at a rally in Durban, it had provoked uproar. He suggested that Oscar Dhloomo had resigned as Secretary-General of Inkatha because of his failure to persuade Buthelezi of the need to talk to the ANC. In his earlier, private, talk with the Foreign Secretary, Mandela spoke less harshly of Buthelezi. He was a friend. He was grateful to him for refusing to negotiate with the SAG while Mandela was still in prison. But Buthelezi was making it impossible for him to conduct a dialogue with Inkatha.

14. As the meeting was about to end, Mandela asked for financial help, not simply to cope with the return of exiles but also to rebuild the ANC: a budget had been prepared to give to HMG which would be handed over later. The ANC had set up a trust to which such funds could be paid. The Board included prominent South Africans such as van Zyl Slabbert, Franklin Sonn and Maponya. Donors would have a right to be represented on the trust to ensure their funds were properly used. A number of African countries had already made generous promises. The Nigerians had already given 5 million dollars. The Secretary of State replied that the Dublin Council had agreed that the European Community would consider help for exiles. He mentioned UK aid with nation-building. We would await the document promised on the ANC's request for aid.

HURD

file  
Seeby

Mr. Powell

I attach a check list for the meeting with Mandela.  
This should be read with my telno. 126 (attached).

2. I attach also a list of all the South African companies  
in which the state already has control or a major interest.  
The Prime Minister might like to glance at this - or even  
hand it over to Mandela.

3. Mandela shows his age. His attention wanders during  
long statements. It is better to go for short exchanges  
and to keep drawing him out.

Robin Renwick

(Robin Renwick)

MANDELA: CHECK LIST

- Welcome.
- Glad to see Mandela's statement in Strasbourg that he has no doubt of HMG's determination to put an end to apartheid: disagreements solely about means.
- Have worked hard to help secure Mandela's release, unbanning of ANC, freeing of political activity so negotiations can take place to work out fully democratic constitution.
- Mandela has said he believes he can reach agreement with De Klerk. How does he see this developing?
- On constitution, must be based on one person, one vote. Mandela also has talked of need for "structural guarantees" to reassure white minority. That will be necessary to persuade minority to relinquish power: also to ensure real freedom later. ANC are agreed on multi-party system, independent judiciary, free press, Bill of Rights. Should seek to reach agreement with De Klerk first on Constitutional principles. We do not regard protection for minority rights as incompatible with genuinely democratic constitution. Possibility of two chamber system, President/Prime Minister. Protection for minorities in Indian, New Zealand, Belgian and Swiss constitutions.
- On ANC demand for Constituent Assembly, that will not be

attainable before main elements of constitution agreed (as in Zimbabwe and Namibia). It would mean majority rule before negotiations take place.

That will not be agreed. Need to reach agreement on main points of constitution first: then referendum and one person, one vote elections.

- On obstacles to negotiations, hope ANC will reach agreement on basis of joint working group on definition and release of political prisoners.
- On armed struggle, (understand Mandela's situation at time of Verwoerd when no negotiations possible. But now must stop talking about violence.) Not being asked to dis-arm his people. But to suspend "armed struggle" while negotiations take place.
- De Klerk facing strong right wing opposition. International response weak. The most effective help Mandela can give De Klerk is to stop talking about violence.
- On Natal, violence not coming only from Inkatha. Buthelezi held out for Mandela's release, unbanning of ANC. He also will have role in negotiations. Need for leaders to talk to each other.
- On nationalisation, real issue is distribution of wealth. We are urging repeal of Land and Group Areas Acts and affirmative action to help black South Africans get access to agricultural land and equal opportunities generally. Investment desperately needed, Population increase 1 million per annum. Need for external help with black education and housing. Look at

rest of Africa, e.g. Zambia.

- Sum up: will support on fully democratic constitution, one person, one vote and repeal of all remaining apartheid legislation Form of protection for minorities will have to be negotiated between black and white leaders. Hope will not try to insist on Constituent Assembly: that would block negotiations. Reach agreement on principles first. Stop talking about armed struggle. Agree to disagree on sanctions: but arms embargo will remain. Will help with black education and housing. Have worked for real democracy everywhere else in world: agreements between us more important than disagreements. Future will depend on agreement between Mandela and De Klerk.

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PRIME MINISTER

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MEETING WITH MR MANDELA

You are to meet Mr Mandela tomorrow. He comes at 1200 for an hour's talks, followed by lunch. He is due to leave at around 1400. He will be accompanied by Mr Mbeki, the ANC's Director of International Relations, seen by many as Mandela's eventual successor.

Sir Robin Renwick will also attend. I have asked him to come at 1140 to brief you.

You will find abundant briefing in the folder, including some notes by Robin Renwick. The main issues which you will want to cover are:

- your overall approach to South Africa;
- your view of de Klerk, who deserves support;
- the need for the ANC to give up armed struggle;
- the importance of getting into negotiations soon;
- constitutional issues and the need for protection for minority rights;
- the absurdity of nationalisation;
- relaxation of sanctions will continue;
- our positive measures of help;
- your eventual visit to South Africa;
- the IRA point. On this, Mandela must realise he has made a major error of judgment: I would let him wriggle rather than take him to task.

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The impression we want to emerge from the meeting is of some courteous straight-talking - of which Mandela will have heard regrettably little elsewhere, agreement to disagree on sanctions, but recognition by Mandela of your very considerable influence on events in South Africa and his wish to see you play a major part there.

By all accounts he responds better to charm and a reasoned approach than to confrontational tactics.

You will find in the folder:

- some notes by Robin Renwick;
- his telegrams;
- a fuller brief by the FCO;
- the record of your telephone conversation with Mandela;
- his programme.

C DP

CHARLES POWELL

3 July 1990

P.S. He has just cancelled his meeting with the CBI in order to rearr before his meeting with you.

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL London SW1A 2AH

2 July 1990

Dear Charles,

Visit of Nelson Mandela

Mr Nelson Mandela, Deputy President of the African National Congress, will call on the Prime Minister at 12.00 am on 4 July for talks followed by lunch. We expect Mr Mandela to be accompanied by Mr Thabo Mbeki, ANC Director for International Affairs.

Mr Mandela's visit is formally in response to the Prime Minister's invitation issued at the time of his release from prison on 11 February. He will be a guest of the FCO while in Britain, and will have talks and lunch with the Foreign Secretary on 3 July. Before the meeting with the Prime Minister, he will have addressed a special meeting of the CBI. Details of Mr Mandela's visit programme are attached.

Objectives

Our objectives for this visit are:

- to ensure that Mr Mandela is clear that UK policy has been directed towards persuading those in power in South Africa to end apartheid and negotiate a new constitution;
- to persuade Mr Mandela to move quickly with President de Klerk to get negotiations under way: in particular by ending the rhetoric of armed struggle;
- to explore his thinking on how the negotiations will be organised and to discourage ideas which suggest that a negotiation with the SAG can be avoided (eg by the device of a constituent assembly);
- to encourage recognition that a growing economy is essential to the success of the process of change and will require sensible economic policies which encourage investment.

Mr Mandela's objectives are likely to be :

- to ensure that the UK's special position of influence is exercised to the advantage of the ANC;
- to argue against further relaxation of sanctions;

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- to advise the Prime Minister not to visit South Africa for the present.
- to obtain moral and financial support for the ANC, including help with the return of exiles.

Mr Mandela and the ANC

Mr Mandela's international tour has been successful. Mr Mandela has been given a hero's welcome in the United States. Those who meet him are impressed by his personal qualities. A man who can emerge from 27 years in jail with his personality evidently unscathed and be able to win the confidence of the South African President is clearly remarkable. But Mr Mandela's adjustment is far from complete. His continuing espousal of sanctions may be negotiating tactics but his public praise in the United States for Cuba and Qadhafi sounds like time-warped jargon and the idea he put forward in the United States for a nationwide election prior to constitutional negotiations was, as the Americans told him, unworkable. There are some signs that economic realities are beginning to impinge, with less talk of wholesale nationalisation but the process of education will take time. The more contact Mr Mandela can have with leading industrialists - and with bodies like the World Bank whose analysis of bad economic management in Africa has been pretty devastating, the better. Mr Mandela remains the key to the peaceful process of ending apartheid. The relationship he has established with President de Klerk is crucial to the success of the dialogue we have sought to promote. For his part, Mr Mandela recognises that the Prime Minister has a special position of influence on President de Klerk.

The following is a check-list of the subjects the Prime Minister may wish to cover. They are further elaborated upon in Sir Robin Renwick's telegrams (enclosed).

Opening Remarks

The Prime Minister might stress that we entirely share the ANC's objective of the replacement of apartheid with a non-racial democratic system of government. Our efforts have been directed towards persuading the SAG that it is in their interests to release Mandela and engage in dialogue.

Obstacles to Negotiation

- The way ahead depends on the ANC. President de Klerk has already lifted the State of Emergency (except in Natal) and agreed to the recommendations of the joint SAG/ANC Working Party on political prisoners and the return of exiles. When will Mandela do the same? Mr Mandela told President de Klerk that he would not reply until mid-July, when he returns to South Africa. According to press interviews in the US,

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Mr Mandela regards agreement with the SAG on these points as settled. If so, why can he not inform de Klerk? Hope no new obstacles arising.

- Rhetoric of armed struggle is also an obstacle. The ANC have committed themselves with the SAG to "stability and a peaceful process of negotiations" (Groote Schuur minute). Continuance of rhetoric is inconsistent with this. It complicates de Klerk's problems on his right. It also incites youth in townships to violence. Not the way to encourage dialogue. Should not leave President de Klerk seeming to make all the concessions.

### Natal

- The continuing violence between supporters of ANC and Inkatha is contrary to the new spirit of co-operation within South Africa. It is important that Mr Mandela and Chief Buthelezi start a dialogue which can lay the foundations for peace. Chief Buthelezi's support among rural Zulus means that he cannot be excluded from the negotiations ahead.

### Negotiations

- President de Klerk says that 1991 would be the year of negotiations. He understands that the ANC need time to reorganise inside South Africa and have a congress due in December.

- Next important decision is who will participate in the negotiations. De Klerk has an open mind, but he will not return to the white electorate before negotiations end with a new constitution. This would be political suicide.

- Concept of an elected Constituent Assembly (one-person, one-vote on a common voters' roll) to agree the new Constitution, is clearly unworkable. The transition to majority rule will have to be negotiated with the minority government: that is the reality of power in South Africa and the text of the ANC's negotiating skill. They are not alone. They will have the support of the international community in pressing for an end to apartheid and the development of a democratic constitution.

### Constitution

- We want to see a new constitution acceptable to all South Africans. It is not for outsiders to prescribe the outcome, but we do not see how a new constitution will work if it is not based on one-person one-vote on the one hand and on the other protection for minorities. Many constitutional models have these provisions. A matter of checks and balances;

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- We do not consider ourselves to be mediators or arbitrators of South Africa's constitutional future, but we are willing to use our close contacts with all sides to help resolve misunderstandings.

### Economic Policy

- Economic policies lie at the heart of a successful political solution. Positive action will be required to rectify imbalances. Equally, the whites will have to be assured that they too have a future. It is no good simply planning to share out existing wealth; that will go nowhere. New wealth must be created. This will require economic policies to foster growth and attract investment;

- Nationalisation not the answer. Experience world-wide, especially in Africa and in Eastern Europe, shows the damage which can be wrought by excessive state intervention. ANC may want to talk to eg World Bank who have enormous experience of Africa's economic problems.

### Sanctions

- Investment cannot be turned on and off like a tap. South Africa competing with re-building economies in Eastern Europe and indeed in Africa. Continued call for sanctions will not help. (Mr Mandela thinks that once the ANC calls for the lifting of sanctions, investment will flood back in to South Africa).

- Our influence with SAG would have been destroyed if we had gone further down the sanctions road. Now that President de Klerk is doing what we asked of him, we must acknowledge that. He needs to show to his supporters that his policies are recognised.

### UK Aid

- We are stepping up our aid programme for black South Africans. We shall spend £7m this year in addition to the £4m we contribute to the European Community programme. We are concentrating on education (1000 students this year) and on community projects. This is intended not only to provide essential aid, but also as a political signal of our support for those who suffer from the apartheid system.

### Aid for the ANC (Defensive)

- The return and resettlement of exiles is primarily a matter for the South African Government. If the return is organised internationally UNHCR will be called in. If they need our help they will no doubt ask. At Dublin the European Council recognised that the resettlement of exiles in South Africa might be a task for the EC Positive Measures Programme. Any

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aid would of course have to be non-discriminatory and could not be restricted to the ANC alone.

- Political aid is another matter. Most Western governments find it difficult to give money direct to political parties. The ANC have already benefitted from our small scale scheme to give practical help on a non-discriminatory basis to black opposition groups.

*Yours,  
Stephen Wall*

(J S Wall)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street

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**TUESDAY 3RD JULY 1990: MORNING:**

- 
- 7.25                               **AT HOTEL**
- 7.30 to 8.15                       **BLACK COMMUNITY**                               45 mins  
Address: Park Lane Hotel, Piccadilly, W.1 - Ballroom  
Contact: Lawson Naidoo
- 8.15 to 8.45                       //////////////////// REST //////////////////////                               30 mins
- 8.45 to 9.05                       **Paddy ASHDOWN Leader of the SLD and Sir David STEEL**  
**Former President of Anti-Apartheid Movement**                               20 mins  
Address: Park Lane Hotel, Piccadilly, London W.1  
Telephone: 071-499-6321  
Contact: Beryl Baker
- 9.10 to 9.40                       **INTERVIEW WITH "NEWSNIGHT" BBC**                               30 mins  
Address: Park Lane Hotel, Piccadilly, London W.1  
Telephone: 071-499-6321  
Contact: Beryl Baker
- 9.40 to 9.55                       //////////////////// BREAK //////////////////////                               15 mins
- 
- 9.55 to to 10.05   Proceed to:                               15 mins  
(35)
- 10.05 to 10.45   **ALL-PARTY PARLIAMENTARY GROUP**                               40 mins  
Address: House of Commons,  
Telephone: 071 219-4211 Contact: Richard Caborn
- 
- 10.50 to 11.10   Proceed to:                               20 mins
- 11.15 to 14.30   **Meeting with the Rt. Hon. DOUGLAS HURD MP,**   3 hr.15 mins  
**Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs**  
Address: 1 Carlton Gardens, London SW1Y 5JH  
Telephone: 071 839 3411  
Contact: Tim Dowse
-

**TUESDAY 3RD JULY 1990 .. continued: AFTERNOON:**

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14.35 to 14.45	<b>Proceed to Hotel</b>	10 mins
14.45 to 15.45	////////////////// REST //////////////////	1 hr

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15.50 to 16.00	<b>Proceed to:</b>	10 mins
16.00 to 17.00	<b>AAM NATIONAL COMMITTEES</b>	1 hr

Address: Westminster Central Hall  
Telephone: 071 222-8010  
Contact: Mike Terry

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17.10 to 17.25	<b>Proceed to:</b>	15 mins
17.30 to 18.30	<b>ANC MEMBERSHIP</b>	1 hr (less)

Address: TUC  
Telephone: 071 636 4030  
Contact: Lawson Naidoo

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18.30 to 18.45	<b>Proceed to Hotel</b>	15 mins
18.45 to 19.40	<b>BRIEFING TO EDITORS</b>	45 mins

Address: Park Lane Hotel, Piccadilly, W. 1 - Balcony Suite  
Telephone: 071 499-6321  
Contact: Frene Ginwala

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**EVENING:**

19.45 to 19.55	<b>Proceed to:</b>	10 mins
20.00 to 22.00	<b>Business Dinner hosted by H.E. CHIEF EMEKA ANYAOKU</b>	2 hrs

Address: Commonwealth House, 18 Northumberland Avenue, WC2  
Telephone: 071-839-3411  
Contact: Mary Mackie

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22.15	<b>PROCEED TO HOTEL FOR THE NIGHT</b>	15 mins
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WEDNESDAY 4TH JULY 1990: MORNING:

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7.15 AT HOTEL

7.30 to 7.45 Lemkin Video Promotion "Viva Mandela"  
Canon Collins Trust 15 mins

7.45 to 8.00 Dr Vassos Lyssarides, President of EDEK  
and Mr Charilaos Costa. 15 mins

8.00 to 8.15 Religious TV "Visions" Programme interview 15 mins

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8.15 to 8.45 //////////////// BREAK //////////////// 30 mins

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8.45 to 9.15 Proceed to: 30 mins

9.15 to 9.20 Arrive at CBI - Welcomed by SIR BRIAN CORBY  
CBI President 5 mins

Address: Centre Point, Tottenham Court Road Junction, Downstairs

Telephone: 071 497-2596

Contact: Mendi Msimang

9.20 to 9.40 Address by MR NELSON MANDELA 20 mins

9.40 to 10.00 Question and Answer Session 20 mins

10.00 to 10.15 //////////////// BREAK //////////////// 15 mins

10.15 to 10.45 Private Meeting with CBI President  
and 6 to 8 Senior Representatives of companies 30 mins

10.45 to 11.35 //////////////// REST //////////////// ? J CBI 50 mins

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11.35 to 11.45 Proceed to: 10 mins

11.55 to 14.00 PRIME MINISTER - Rt.Hon. MARGARET THATCHER 2.hr.5.mins

Address: 10 Downing Street, London SW1

Telephone: 071 930-4433

Contact: Peter Bean (Press Officer) ask for Mendi Msimang

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**WEDNESDAY 4TH JULY 1990 .. continued: AFTERNOON:**

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14.00 to 14.10	Proceed to Hotel	10 mins
14.10 to 14.40	//////////////////// REST //////////////////////	30 mins

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14.45 to 14.55	Proceed to:	5 mins
15.00 to 15.20	<b>Rt. Hon. NEIL KINNOCK M.P.</b>	20 mins
	Address: House of Commons, Shadow Cabinet Room	
	Telephone: 071 219-4211	
	Contact: Richard Caborn	

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15.30 to 15.45	Proceed to:	15 mins
15.45 to 17.00	<b>PRESS CONFERENCE</b>	1.hr.15.mins
	Address: Royal Commonwealth Society, Northumberland Avenue, WC1	
	Telephone: 071 930 6733	
	Contact: Frene Ginwala	

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17.00 to 17.10	Proceed to Hotel	10 mins
17.10 to 17.35	//////////////////// FRESHEN UP //////////////////////	25 mins

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17.40	<b>LEAVE HOTEL FOR AIRPORT</b>	50 mins
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18.30	<b>VIP LOUNGE AIRPORT</b>	45 mins
19.15	<b>DEPARTURE</b>	

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HOUSE OF COMMONS  
LONDON SW1A 0AA

1 July 1990

CONFIDENTIAL

*My dear Margaret.*

Meeting with Mr Nelson Mandela 4.7.90

Recently I visited South Africa to meet politicians and businessmen. I hope this synopsis will assist you on Wednesday. My comments relate to my discussions, not to others' opinions.

1. The general atmosphere, except amongst minorities of Boers and Blacks, is of belief that a peaceful multi-racial nation can be established in the 1990s. All gave hard evidence of the hurt sanctions have caused to the poor. You are widely admired for your supportive attitude. (See 4). This admiration ranges from the President through business and political groups. The black Mayor of Dobsonville said: 'Please bring Mrs Thatcher here. My people want to greet her'.

2. The ANC has a high profile, but is low on understanding political realities. Representatives still mouth Marxism, but fail to equate the changes in Eastern Europe with its failure. They spout 'nationalisation', but are astounded when its cost is detailed from our experience.

Mandela has a big hand of cards, but does not recognise few are trumps.

3. The Zulus watch Mandela talking his way around the world, but will not let him pose as the spokesman of the Blacks. They want a seat at the negotiating table when President de Klerk starts serious negotiations. (as do the Coloureds and Indians).

4. The Coloureds are particularly resentful at the loss of jobs in the fruit and wool industries because of sanctions. Migration to the towns to seek work has swamped schools. They know education is the only way their people can climb upwards. They do not trust Mandela because 'times have changed since he knew what was going on.'

5. The Indian community is vigorous and prospering but wants to live where they choose (-particularly when many



own property in white areas under 'white fronts'). They marvel at Mandela's international acceptance compared with the ANC's incoherent domestic policies.

6. The Whites, other than the extreme Conservatives, are prudent in their expectations, but generally optimistic. Many contrasted your confidence in South Africa with the small, but, to them, symbolic emigration of some British businesses. 'If Mercedes can stay, why can't Barclays?'

Lastly, may I offer you an unusual opinion as a guide to handling Mr Mandela. He reminds me of Yuri Gagarin who, on returning to earth, could never deal with the adulation. Nobody actually helped.

*Gause*

*Kenneth Warren*

Kenneth Warren

The Rt Hon Margaret Thatcher MP  
The Prime Minister  
10 Downing Street  
London SW1

cf?



Charles

**With Compliments**

I range widely  
Hope this helps.  
*Ken*

KENNETH WARREN, M.P.

2/7

HOUSE OF COMMONS  
LONDON, SW1A 0AA

1 July 1990

CONFIDENTIAL

*My dear Margaret,*

Meeting with Mr Nelson Mandela 4.7.90

Recently I visited South Africa to meet politicians and businessmen. I hope this synopsis will assist you on Wednesday. My comments relate to my discussions, not to others' opinions.

1. The general atmosphere, except amongst minorities of Boers and Blacks, is of belief that a peaceful multi-racial nation can be established in the 1990s. All gave hard evidence of the hurt sanctions have caused to the poor. You are widely admired for your supportive attitude. (See 4). This admiration ranges from the President through business and political groups. The black Mayor of Dobsonville said: 'Please bring Mrs Thatcher here. My people want to greet her'.

2. The ANC has a high profile, but is low on understanding political realities. Representatives still mouth Marxism, but fail to equate the changes in Eastern Europe with its failure. They spout 'nationalisation', but are astounded when its cost is detailed from our experience.

Mandela has a big hand of cards, but does not recognise few are trumps.

3. The Zulus watch Mandela talking his way around the world, but will not let him pose as the spokesman of the Blacks. They want a seat at the negotiating table when President de Klerk starts serious negotiations. (as do the Coloureds and Indians).

4. The Coloureds are particularly resentful at the loss of jobs in the fruit and wool industries because of sanctions. Migration to the towns to seek work has swamped schools. They know education is the only way their people can climb upwards. They do not trust Mandela because 'times have changed since he knew what was going on.'


5. The Indian community is vigorous and prospering but wants to live where they choose (-particularly when many

MEABG

own property in white areas under 'white fronts'). They marvel at Mandela's international acceptance compared with the ANC's incoherent domestic policies.

6. The Whites, other than the extreme Conservatives, are prudent in their expectations, but generally optimistic. Many contrasted your confidence in South Africa with the small, but, to them, symbolic emigration of some British businesses. 'If Mercedes can stay, why can't Barclays?'

Lastly, may I offer you an unusual opinion as a guide to handling Mr Mandela. He reminds me of Yuri Gagarin who, on returning to earth, could never deal with the adulation. Nobody actually helped.

*Yours ever.*  


Kenneth Warren

The Rt Hon Margaret Thatcher MP  
The Prime Minister  
10 Downing Street  
London London SW1

27 CHELSEA TOWERS  
CHELSEA MANOR GARDENS  
LONDON SW3 5PN

27 July 1990

June 29, 1990

Prime Minister  
This arrived yesterday. He  
does not expect any reply.  
You will probably not  
have time to read it  
carefully, but I have  
highlighted certain bits

MB 3/7/90

My Dear Margaret,

This is a copy of a letter I have written to someone who insists on remaining nameless, but he is a remarkable man and very close to de Klerk and is my own link with de Klerk.

It is unfortunately long because even with him I am confronted with the South African problem, which is part of the world problem - amnesia of history. But I thought, long as it is, it might be helpful when you see Nelson Mandela.

It is for you only: a glimpse into a private dialogue between two people who care passionately about the future of Africa - but in my case this is less only than I care about you and what you are doing for Britain and the world.

Yours ever,

Laurens VAN DER POST.

All lasting solutions are grown solutions

There are no shortcuts left for  
solving the problems that  
confront us

Law rooted in civility is essential for orderly progression  
to the future


There is a new generation not caught up  
in the outdated Marxist mythology of the  
1960s. And there is a prominent & committed  
middle class

Nevertheless, judging his own abandonment  
of the field

'Gentlemen I think you are going  
the wrong way - The energy is over there

European institutions of a non-political judiciary  
non-political civil service and police non-political army  
there are in the blood & spirit of the European cannot  
be maintained without this



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## ORGANISATIONS IN WHICH THE STATE HAS A INTEREST

NAME OF ORGANISATION	CAPITAL	SHARE HOLDERS	PERCT.	PERSONNEL
INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT CORP.	4382000000	STATE	100	500
ATLANTIS DIESEL ENGINE (PTY) LTD		IDC	100	2162
ALUSAF (PTY) LTD		IDC GENCOR	30,7 69,3	2907
ATLANTIS ALUMINIUM (PTY) LTD		IDC		60
INDUSTRIAL SELECTIONS LTD.		IDC	100	
HTP MARKETING AND MANUFACTURING		IDC	100	
KANGWANE ECONOMIC DEV.CORP.		IDC		150
NATIONAL SELECTIONS LTD.		IDC		
NATIONAL SORGHUM BEER BREWERIES		IDC		4500
PHOSPHATE DEVELOPMENT CORP.		IDC		3000
FOSKEM (PTY) LTD		PH.DEV.CORP.		
QWAQWA DEVELOPMENT CORP.LTD		IDC		150
SAPEKOE (PTY)LTD		IDC		20000
SMALL BUSINESS DEV.CORP.		IDC/ PRIV.SECTOR		600
SOEKOR (PTY)LTD		IDC		220
FINDEVCO (PTY)LTD		IDC	100	
KONOIL (PTY)LTD		IDC	100	
IMPOFIN (PTY)LTD		IDC	100	
MOSSGAS AND MOSSREF				
ARMAMENTS CORPORATION OF S.A.		STATE		2000
ATLAS AIRCRAFT CORP.		ARMSCOR		
ELOPTRA (PTY)LTD		ARMSCOR		500
INFOPLAN (PTY)LTD		ARMSCOR		
KONCHEM (PTY)LTD		ARMSCOR		

## ORGANISATIONS IN WHICH THE STATE HAS A INTEREST

NAME OF ORGANISATION	CAPITAL	SHARE HOLDERS	PERCT.	PERSONNEL
LYTTELTON ENGINEERING WORKS		ARMSCOR		2000
MUSGRAVE MANUFACTURES		ARMSCOR		160
PRETORIA METAL PRESSINGS (PTY)LTD		ARMSCOR		
NASCHEM (PTY)LTD		ARMSCOR		
SWARTKLIP PRODUCTS (PTY)LTD		ARMSCOR		
TECNETICS (PTY)LTD		ARMSCOR		
SASOL LTD.		STATE/ PRIV. SECTOR		33000 /
ALLIED TAR AND ACID REFINERY		SASOL		
FELBITEM (PTY)LTD		SASOL		
HWH INVESTMENTS (PTY)LTD		SASOL		
INSPAN INVESTMENTS (PTY)LTD		SASOL		30
LESLIE COAL DEVELOPMENT (PTY)LTD		SASOL		
NATIONAL PETROL REFINERIES		SASOL		878
SA GAS DISTRIBUTORS (PTY)LTD		SASOL		30
SASOL EXPLOSIVES (PTY)LTD		SASOL		
SASOL FERTILIZER (PTY)LTD		SASOL		
SASOL FUELS MARKETING CO.(PTY)LTD		SASOL		
SASOL INDUSTRIES		SASOL		
SASOL TECHNOLOGY		SASOL		
SASOL THREE (PTY)LTD		SASOL		
SASOL TOWNSHIPS LTD.		SASOL		
SASOLCHEM (PTY)LTD		SASOL		
SECUNDA COLLIERIES		SASOL		
TOSAS (PTY)LTD		SASOL		134
TOSAS HOLDINGS (PTY)LTD		TOSAS	100	0

## ORGANISATIONS IN WHICH THE STATE HAS A INTEREST

NAME OF ORGANISATION	CAPITAL	SHARE HOLDERS	PERCT.	PERSONNEL
TWENTE WOONSTELLE (PTY)LTD		SASOL		
AFRICAN METAL CORPORATION LTD.		STATE		143
ESCOM		STATE		60000
S.A.BROADCASTING CORP.		STATE		6200
SFF ASSOCIATION		STATE		615
SA INVENTIONS DEV. CORP.		STATE/CSIR		4740
SA BANKNOTE CO (PTY)LTD		STATE		450
ALEXCOR		STATE		
TRANSNET (SATS)		STATE		221730
DEPT.OF POST&TELECOMMUNICATIONS		STATE		98000
SOUTH ATLANTIC CABEL CO.(PTY)		POST & TELEC.		
THAMES WIRE AND CABLE (PTY)LTD		POST & TELEC.		
DEPT. OF TRANSPORT		STATE		3700
STATE PRINTER		STATE		
DEPT. OF FORESTRY		STATE		
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF SA		STATE		700
LANDBANK OF SA		STATE		1000
SA RESERVE BANK		STATE		2462
COUNCIL FOR MINERAL TECHNOLOGY		STATE		650
COUNCIL FOR SCIENTIFIC AND INDUSTRIAL RESEARCH (CSIR)		STATE		4808
HUMAN SCIENCE RESEARCH COUNCIL		STATE		
SA BUREAU OF STANDARDS		STATE		2000
SA TOURISM BOARD		STATE		200
NATAL PARKS BOARD		STATE		
NATIONAL PARKS BOARD		STATE		

## ORGANISATIONS IN WHICH THE STATE HAS A INTEREST

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ABBATOIR CORP. (ABCORP)		STATE		

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MIPT (NOT TO ALL): MANDELA

1. ALL THOSE WHO VISITED MANDELA IN PRISON WERE STRUCK BY HIS COURAGE AND DIGNITY. JAN STEYN AND HELEN SUZMAN, WHO GOT TO KNOW HIM BEST, WERE IMPRESSED BY THE QUALITY OF THE MAN AND HIS LACK OF BITTERNESS. MY OWN EXPERIENCE IS THE SAME. MANDELA HAS A NATURAL DIGNITY AND AUTHORITY. HE IS NOT AS INTELLIGENT AS MUGABE, BUT A GREAT DEAL NICER.
2. NOT SURPRISINGLY AFTER TWENTY YEARS IN PRISON, ALL HIS ATTITUDES ARE AFFECTED BY THE CIRCUMSTANCES THAT TOOK HIM THERE. HE STATED ON BEING SENTENCED TO LIFE IMPRISONMENT THAT IF THE GOVERNMENT CONTINUED TO SUPPRESS ALL FORMS OF PEACEFUL OPPOSITION FROM THE BLACK COMMUNITY, THE COUNTRY FACED A VIOLENT FUTURE, BUT THE MAJORITY WOULD IN THE END PREVAIL. HE CONSIDERS THAT, CONFRONTED BY VERWOERD AND HIS PLANS PERMANENTLY TO DIS-ENFRANCHISE THE BLACK MAJORITY, HE HAD NO OPTION BUT TO TAKE UP THE 'ARMED STRUGGLE', THOUGH IN MANDELA'S DAY THIS CONSISTED OF ACTS OF SABOTAGE AND NOT BOMBS IN THE STREET OR SUPERMARKETS. WHEN TACKLED ON THIS SUBJECT HE CONTENTS THAT A GREAT DEAL MORE VIOLENCE WAS USED BY THE APARTHEID GOVERNMENT AND THAT POLICE VIOLENCE IS STILL CONTINUING DESPITE DE KLERK'S EFFORTS TO STOP IT. THIS EXTENDS TO TRYING TO BLAME THE VIOLENCE IN NATAL MAINLY ON THE GOVERNMENT OR AT ANY RATE THE KWAZULU POLICE.
3. MANDELA'S CONDUCT SINCE LEAVING PRISON HAS BEEN DESIGNED TO CONSOLIDATE HIS POSITION AS LEADER OF THE ANC WHO ARE LIKELY TO ELECT HIM PRESIDENT AT THEIR CONGRESS IN DECEMBER. HIS PUBLIC STATEMENTS ARE INTENDED TO RETAIN AND MOBILISE BLACK SUPPORT RATHER THAN TO PLEASE WHITE AUDIENCES. AT ONE MOMENT HE IS RIGID AND DOGMATIC, AT THE NEXT MORE STATESMANLIKE. THE HARSH PUBLIC RHETORIC ALTERNATES WITH MORE REASONED APPEALS. HE HAS URGED THE CHILDREN WHO WERE BOYCOTTING CLASSES TO GO BACK TO SCHOOL - ONLY TO FIND THAT HE THEN HAD TO URGE THE TEACHERS WHO ALSO WERE ON STRIKE TO GO BACK AS WELL. HE HAS INSISTED THAT PROTEST MARCHES AND DEMONSTRATIONS MUST BE ALLOWED TO TAKE PLACE BUT HAS CONDEMNED THE MINDLESS VIOLENCE, LOOTING AND ARSON WHICH HAS ACCOMPANIED SOME OF THESE MARCHES. HE CONSISTENTLY HAS DESCRIBED DE KLERK AS A MAN OF INTEGRITY WITH WHOM

HE BELIEVES HE CAN HELP TO WORK OUT A SOLUTION TO SOUTH AFRICA'S PROBLEMS.

4. YET IN THE SAME BREATH HE TALKS ABOUT CONTINUANCE OF THE "ARMED STRUGGLE" EVEN THOUGH, EFFECTIVELY, IT HAS BEEN SUSPENDED: THERE HAVE BEEN NO MORE BOMBS OR ATTACKS IN ANY OF THE WHITE AREAS, THOUGH INTRA-BLACK VIOLENCE CONTINUES. HE CULTIVATES AN ALMOST SLAVISH LOYALTY TO THE ORGANISATION TO WHICH HE HAS DEVOTED HIS ENTIRE POLITICAL LIFE AND BELIEVES ALL THE INFORMATION THEY FEED HIM. HE NEVER MAKES A MOVE WITHOUT TRYING TO ENSURE THAT HIS OWN SUPPORTERS WILL FOLLOW HIM FAILING WHICH, AS HE SAID TO ME, IT WOULD REMAIN ONLY FOR HIM TO WRITE HIS MEMOIRS. HE CANNOT AFFORD TO BE LABELLED A MODERATE. YET HE REGARDS HIMSELF AS BEING ONE WHERE IT MATTERS: HIS AUTHORITY HAS BEEN EXERTED IN PUSHING THE ANC TOWARDS NEGOTIATIONS AND DE FACTO COOPERATION WITH DE KLERK.

5. ON THE ECONOMY, HIS INITIAL STATEMENTS ABOUT NATIONALISATION BROUGHT A BARRAGE OF CRITICISM AND HE HAS BEEN MORE CAREFUL SINCE. INSOFAR AS MANDELA UNDERSTANDS ANYTHING ABOUT ECONOMICS, HIS IDEAS WERE FORMED IN THE 1950'S. HE IS AN OLD-FASHIONED SOCIALIST, BUT HAS NEVER BEEN A COMMUNIST. HIS CONCERN REALLY IS WITH THE DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH AND THE PRESENT INIQUITOUS SYSTEM WHEREBY, THROUGH THE LAND ACTS, A VERY HIGH PROPORTION OF GOOD AGRICULTURAL LAND IN SOUTH AFRICA IS RESERVED FOR THE WHITES. BUT THE ANC'S DOCUMENT ON "THE ECONOMY BEYOND APARTHEID" IS FULL OF THE KIND OF IDEAS ABOUT THE ROLE OF THE STATE THAT HAVE BEEN DISCREDITED AND PROVED DISASTROUS ELSEWHERE IN AFRICA.

6. ON SANCTIONS MANDELA IS A TRUE BELIEVER. HE HAS GIVEN UP CALLING FOR GENERAL SANCTIONS BUT WILL GO ON URGING THAT THOSE ALREADY IN PLACE SHOULD REMAIN UNTIL THE PROCESS IS "IRREVERSIBLE". HE IS CONCERNED ABOUT THE PROBLEMS IN BLACK EDUCATION AND HOUSING. BUT THERE STILL IS A NAIVE BELIEF THAT INVESTMENT WILL BE EASY TO ATTRACT, AFTER "LIBERATION".

7. MANDELA'S STANDING IN THE POPULATION AT LARGE IS MUCH HIGHER THAN THAT OF ANY OTHER SOUTH AFRICAN LEADER, AND THAT IS BORNE OUT BY ALL THE POLLS. BUTHELEZI IS THE NEXT MOST IMPORTANT BLACK LEADER, BUT HIS SUPPORT IS REGIONAL AND NUMERICALLY INFERIOR. ON A FUTURE CONSTITUTION, MANDELA HAS SHOWN HIMSELF MORE FLEXIBLE THAN OTHER ANC LEADERS IN ACKNOWLEDGING THE NEED TO WORK OUT "STRUCTURAL GUARANTEES" FOR THE WHITE MINORITY.

8. IT HAS COME AS A REAL SHOCK TO MANDELA AND THE ANC - WHEN THEY ARE

BEING HONEST - TO DISCOVER THAT THEY ARE NOT FINDING IT EASY TO CONTROL THE YOUTH WHO THEY HAVE REGARDED AS THE BACKBONE OF THEIR SUPPORT. IN THE TOWNSHIPS THEY ARE BEING CHALLENGED ON THE LEFT BY THE PAC AND AZAPO, DENOUNCING THEM AS COLLABORATORS. WITHIN THE ANC THERE ARE MANY WHO ARE CONVINCED THAT MANDELA AND MBEKI ARE BEING LED INTO ACCEPTING DE FACTO CO-RESPONSIBILITY WITH DE KLERK AND HENCE INTO POWER-SHARING RATHER THAN A TRANSFER OF POWER.

9. DE KLERK HAS ACTED SKILFULLY IN TRAPPING THE ANC INTO NEGOTIATIONS. IT IS AN OPTION FOR THEM TO BREAK OFF THE TALKS AND GO BACK INTO EXILE AND TO THE 'ARMED STRUGGLE', BUT THEY WOULD NEED TO FIND AN EXTREMELY GOOD PRETEXT ON WHICH TO DO SO: AND IF THEY DID, THEY WOULD BE LIKELY TO GET MUCH SHORTER SHRIFT FROM THE SOVIET UNION AND NO SUPPORT FROM EASTERN EUROPE. THE RESULT WOULD BE A DEADLOCK IN WHICH THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT COULD MAKE NO REAL PROGRESS INTERNALLY AND WOULD BE FORCED BACK INTO A STATE OF SIEGE, WHILE THE ANC WOULD BE UNABLE TO OVERTHROW THEM.

10. GIVEN THE CONFLICTING PRESSURES FROM THEIR RESPECTIVE CONTITUENCIES IT WILL BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT FOR MANDELA AND DE KLERK TO FIND A WAY THROUGH. BUT MANDELA DOES REALISE THE CONSEQUENCES OF FAILURE AND THAT THE OPPORTUNITY WILL NOT ARISE AGAIN. HE IS ATTEMPTING TO WALK A TIGHTROPE, AS IS DE KLERK. HE HAS SUFFERED GREATLY FOR HIS CAUSE AND, NOT SURPRISINGLY, HAS A BURNING SENSE OF THE INJUSTICES THE BLACK POPULATION HAVE SUFFERED. THE MAN HIMSELF IS MUCH MORE IMPRESSIVE THAN HIS PUBLIC UTTERANCES. MANDELA'S DIGNITY GIVES HIM A REAL CHARISMA, FELT EVEN BY HIS OPPONENTS, BY VIRTUALLY ALL BLACK SOUTH AFRICANS AND BY MANY OF THE WHITES WHO ARE MOST STRONGLY OPPOSED TO HIM. AS NEGOTIATIONS DEVELOP HE WILL HAVE TO SHOW THE SAME KIND OF LEADERSHIP VIS A VIS THE ANC DE KLERK HAS SHOWN TOWARDS HIS SUPPORTERS IF THERE IS TO BE A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME. IT HAS YET TO BE SEEN WHETHER MANDELA WILL PROVE CAPABLE OF THIS. HE RELIES HEAVILY ON MBEKI AND MBEKI'S INFLUENCE WILL BE ALMOST AS IMPORTANT IN DECIDING THE ANC'S APPROACH TO NEGOTIATIONS.

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MANDELA

## SUMMARY

1. MANDELA WANTS A NEGOTIATED OUTCOME. HE BELIEVES THAT, WITH DE KLERK, HE CAN GET IT. HE UNDER-ESTIMATES THE CONTINUING STRENGTH OF WHITE RESISTANCE, THE POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES DE KLERK IS GOING TO FACE AS HE GOES FURTHER DOWN THIS ROAD AND THE EXTENT OF THE COMPROMISES THAT ARE GOING TO BE NECESSARY TO PERSUADE THE WHITES TO RELINQUISH POWER VOLUNTARILY. THE MEETINGS IN LONDON ARE NOT GOING TO OVERCOME DIFFERENCES WITH THE ANC ON SANCTIONS. IF MANDELA WANTS TO HELP DE KLERK VIS A VIS THE RIGHT WING, THE MOST EFFECTIVE WAY OF DOING SO WILL BE TO STOP TALKING ABOUT THE ARMED STRUGGLE. IT ALREADY HAS BEEN SUSPENDED DE FACTO. MANDELA SHOULD BE WARNED AGAINST NAILING HIS COLOURS TO THE DEMAND FOR A CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY BEFORE THE MAIN ELEMENTS OF A NEW CONSTITUTION ARE AGREED. THAT WILL NOT BE ATTAINABLE. MANDELA SAYS THAT HE ACCEPTS THAT, WHATEVER OUR DIFFERENCES OVER METHODS, WE ARE EQUALLY COMMITTED TO AN END TO APARTHEID AND A FULLY DEMOCRATIC NON-RACIAL CONSTITUTION. WE SHOULD AIM TO CONSOLIDATE THAT UNDERSTANDING WITH HIM.

## DETAIL

2. MANDELA ATTACHES A LOT OF IMPORTANCE TO HIS MEETING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER. HE IS ANXIOUS TO TRY TO ESTABLISH SOME KIND OF PERSONAL RAPPORT (WHICH SHOULD NOT BE DIFFICULT, GIVEN THE CHARACTER OF THE MAN) AND TO ACHIEVE A DEGREE OF SUPPORT AND UNDERSTANDING, NOTWITHSTANDING THE POLITICAL DIFFERENCES. HE REFERS CONSTANTLY TO THE PRIME MINISTER'S MEETINGS WITH GORBACHEV AND CLEARLY HOPES TO FIND HIMSELF BEING CAST, ON MORE DIRECT ACQUAINTANCE, AS ALSO THE KIND OF PERSON WE CAN DO BUSINESS WITH. A SHORT TETE A TETE CONVERSATION AT THE BEGINNING MIGHT BE A GOOD IDEA. BUT IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE TO EXCLUDE MBEKI FOR TOO LONG AS HE IS THE CROWN PRINCE AND THE OTHER MOST IMPORTANT ANC LEADER AND HE ALSO IS COMMITTED TO NEGOTIATIONS. MANDELA WILL VERY MUCH WANT TO HAVE THE CHANCE TO TELL HIS SIDE OF THE STORY.

3. IT WILL BE WORTH RECALLING WHAT WE HAVE TRIED TO ACHIEVE IN OUR EXCHANGES WITH DE KLERK - MANDELA'S OWN UNCONDITIONAL RELEASE AND THAT OF SISULU AND OTHERS, THE UNBANNING OF THE ANC AND PAC, NAMIBIAN INDEPENDENCE, AN END TO CROSS-BORDER RAIDS, THE REPEAL OF THE SEPARATE AMENITIES ACT AND, NEXT, OF THE GROUP AREAS AND LAND ACTS, THE LIFTING OF THE STATE OF EMERGENCY ETC. THE WHOLE PURPOSE HAS BEEN TO HELP CREATE THE CONDITIONS, FOR THE FIRST TIME IN SOUTH AFRICA'S HISTORY, FOR NEGOTIATIONS TO ACHIEVE A GENUINELY DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION.

4. THE NEXT KEY ISSUES ARE AGREEMENT ON THE RETURN OF THE ANC EXILES AND THE RELEASE OF POLITICAL PRISONERS. THE ANC AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT REACHED AGREEMENT IN THE JOINT WORKING GROUP ON THE DEFINITION OF POLITICALLY MOTIVATED CRIMES AND THE RELEASE OF PRISONERS. THERE WERE, SUBSEQUENTLY, SUGGESTIONS FROM SOME ANC SPOKESMEN THAT THERE MIGHT STILL BE DIFFICULTIES. WE WERE GLAD TO SEE MANDELA'S STATEMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES THAT HE BELIEVES THAT THIS ISSUE CAN BE RESOLVED ON THE BASIS OF THE WORKING GROUP'S REPORT. WE WANT TO SEE MOVEMENT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO NEGOTIATIONS ON A NEW CONSTITUTION.

5. THE PRIME MINISTER WILL WANT TO EXPLORE WITH MANDELA HOW HE BELIEVES HE CAN REACH AGREEMENT WITH DE KLERK. WE AGREE THAT THE NEW CONSTITUTION MUST BE BASED ON ONE PERSON ONE VOTE, MUST BE APPROVED BY THE MAJORITY OF ALL SOUTH AFRICANS AND MUST MAKE PROVISION FOR GOVERNMENT BY THE MAJORITY. MANDELA HAS SPOKEN OF THE NEED ALSO TO WORK OUT "STRUCTURAL GUARANTEES" TO RE-ASSURE THE WHITE MINORITY. THAT IS GOING TO BE NECESSARY TO GIVE THE MINORITY WHO ARE IN POWER NOW THE INCENTIVE TO AGREE TO A PEACEFUL TRANSITION. IT ALSO IS DESIRABLE ON WIDER GROUNDS, IN TERMS OF GENUINE POLITICAL FREEDOM, PROVIDED MINORITY RIGHTS ARE SAFEGUARDED IN WAYS WHICH MODERATE AND DO NOT SIMPLY FRUSTRATE MAJORITY GOVERNMENT. THE FORM SUCH PROTECTION WILL TAKE WILL HAVE TO BE NEGOTIATED BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND THE BLACK POLITICAL LEADERS. A BILL OF RIGHTS WILL BE AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT IN THIS: SO WILL A GENUINELY INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY AND FREEDOM OF THE PRESS. THESE ARE ALL POINTS ON WHICH THE ANC AGREE AND EFFORTS COULD AND SHOULD BE MADE TO REACH AGREEMENT ON CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES EVEN BEFORE FORMAL NEGOTIATIONS BEGIN. THERE ARE ASPECTS OF THE US CONSTITUTION THAT COULD BE RELEVANT, INCLUDING THE SEPARATION OF POWERS AND BI-CAMERAL LEGISLATURE. THE IDEA OF DIVIDING THE OFFICES OF PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER ALSO COULD BE HELPFUL. WE WILL NOT SUPPORT ANY BIASED SYSTEM BUT THERE ARE OTHER CONSTITUTIONS (EG IN BELGIUM, SWITZERLAND, INDIA AND NEW ZEALAND) WHICH MAKE PROVISION FOR MINORITY RIGHTS. ATTITUDES ARE GOING TO BE AFFECTED BY

THE EXPERIENCE IN THE REST OF AFRICA WHERE, IN MANY CASES, CONSTITUTIONS WHICH EMBODY ALL THESE PRINCIPLES HAVE SIMPLY BEEN SET ASIDE - AS WELL AS BY THE BLACK MAJORITY'S EXPERIENCE OF DECADES OF HAVING THEIR RIGHTS AND INTERESTS TRAMPLED UNDERFOOT. BUT MANDELA SHOULD BE ASSURED THAT WE WILL NOT SUPPORT ANY OUTCOME THAT DOES NOT GENUINELY PROVIDE FOR GOVERNMENT BY THE MAJORITY.

6. ON THE DEMAND FOR A CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY, THE ANC'S ARGUMENT IS THAT THEY NEED TO LEGITIMISE THE PROCESS AND SHOW WHO HAS REAL POPULAR SUPPORT. OBVIOUSLY, HOWEVER, THE GOVERNMENT ARE NOT GOING TO AGREE TO A CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY BEFORE NEGOTIATIONS TAKE PLACE. THE ANC HAVE REJECTED ELECTIONS IN WHICH BLACK SOUTH AFRICANS ONLY WOULD VOTE TO DECIDE WHO SHOULD REPRESENT THEM. THE GOVERNMENT WILL NOT AGREE TO A NEW ROUND OF VOTING BY THE WHITE COMMUNITY UNTIL DE KLERK HAS SOME BASIS ON WHICH HE CAN GO BACK TO HIS OWN CONSTITUENCY. THE ONLY WAY THROUGH IS TO REACH AGREEMENT ON THE MAIN ELEMENTS OF THE CONSTITUTION AT LEAST BEFORE A GENERAL REFERENDUM IS HELD AND A NEW LEGISLATURE ELECTED (AT LANCASTER HOUSE AGREEMENT WAS REACHED FIRST ON THE CONSTITUTION BEFORE ONE PERSON ONE VOTE ELECTIONS WERE HELD: IN NAMIBIA AGREEMENT WAS REACHED FIRST ON CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES).

7. ON THE "ARMED STRUGGLE", THE PRIME MINISTER MAY WISH TO REFER TO MANDELA'S STATEMENT TO HER THAT HE WAS READY TO REACH AGREEMENT WITH DE KLERK ON THIS. TO A LARGE EXTENT IT ALREADY HAS BEEN SUSPENDED DE FACTO. THE ANC DELEGATION AGREED WITH DE KLERK ON 4 MAY THE GROOTE SCHUUR MINUTE IN WHICH THEY STATED: "THE GOVERNMENT AND THE ANC AGREE ON A COMMON COMMITMENT TOWARDS THE RESOLUTION OF THE EXISTING CLIMATE OF VIOLENCE AND INTIMIDATION FROM WHATEVER QUARTER AS WELL AS A COMMITMENT TO STABILITY AND TO A PEACEFUL PROCESS OF NEGOTIATIONS" AS THE OBSTACLES TO NEGOTIATIONS ARE REMOVED, THE ANC LEADERS MUST STOP TALKING ABOUT CONTINUANCE OF THE ARMED STRUGGLE.

8. DE KLERK, HAVING TRIED TO UNDO A GREAT MANY OF THE MISTAKES OF THE PAST, DOES NOT HAVE A GREAT DEAL TO SHOW FOR HIS EFFORTS. THE RESPONSE FROM THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY HAS BEEN WEAK. SINCE DE KLERK HAS ABANDONED TRADITIONAL NATIONAL PARTY POLICIES THE GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN LOSING SUPPORT TO THE RIGHT WING. WE TAKE THE RIGHT WING THREAT SERIOUSLY AND BELIEVE THAT DE KLERK DESERVES AND NEEDS HELP IN DEALING WITH IT. MANDELA WILL SAY THAT HE HAS CALLED ON WHITE SOUTH AFRICANS TO SUPPORT DE KLERK AND IS TRYING TO TALK TO THE RIGHT WING. BUT SO LONG AS HE CONTINUES TO TALK ABOUT "ORGANISED VIOLENCE" THAT WILL NOT HELP IN THE LEAST. WHEN THE ANC LEADERS STOP TALKING ABOUT THE ARMED STRUGGLE OR ANNOUNCE ITS SUSPENSION WHILE NEGOTIATIONS TAKE PLACE, THAT WILL BE THE MOST EFFECTIVE SINGLE

STEP IN HELPING TO CONTAIN THE RIGHT WING.

9. ON NATAL, MANDELA BLAMES THE VIOLENCE ON THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT, INKATHA AND THE KWAZULU POLICE. THERE HAS BEEN VIOLENCE BY INKATHA AND KWAZULU POLICE. THERE HAS BEEN VIOLENCE ALSO FROM THE ANC 'COMRADES' AND IT IS ABSURD TO SUGGEST THAT DE KLERK WANTS THE VIOLENCE TO CONTINUE. WE DO NOT SEE HOW CONDITIONS OF GREATER PEACE WILL BE ACHIEVED WITHOUT A CONCERTED EFFORT BY THE POLITICAL LEADERS ON BOTH SIDES: AND WE ARE TAKING THIS UP ALSO WITH BUTHELEZI. HE REFUSED TO NEGOTIATE UNTIL MANDELA WAS RELEASED AND THE ANC WERE UNBANNED AND HE TOO WILL HAVE A ROLE IN NEGOTIATIONS.

10. ON NATIONALISATION, WE UNDERSTAND THE ANC'S CONCERN WITH THE DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH AND MECHANISMS WILL INDEED HAVE TO BE FOUND TO HELP BLACK SOUTH AFRICANS GAIN MUCH GREATER ACCESS TO AGRICULTURAL LAND AND ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES GENERALLY. NEARLY ALL THE PUBLIC UTILITIES IN SOUTH AFRICA ALREADY ARE IN PUBLIC OWNERSHIP (WATER, ELECTRICITY, GAS, AIR AND RAIL TRANSPORT, POSTS AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND THROUGH SASOL A LARGE PART OF THE OIL BUSINESS: THE STATE ALSO HAS LARGE HOLDINGS THROUGH THE INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION IN MANY OTHER COMPANIES). THE IDEA THAT NATIONALISING THE BANKS, MINES AND 'MONOPOLY INDUSTRY' CAN HELP TO RE-DISTRIBUTE WEALTH HAS PROVED A SHORT CUT TO DISASTER WHEREVER IT HAS BEEN TRIED.

11. ON INVESTMENT THE PRIME MINISTER MAY WISH TO POINT OUT THAT WE SAY WHAT WE ARE DOING WHILE OTHERS LET THEIR COMPANIES DO AS THEY WISH WHILE STILL PRETENDING THAT THEY ARE 'DISCOURAGING' INVESTMENT (MERCEDES AND BMW ARE EXPANDING THEIR OPERATIONS AND TOTAL HAS JUST STARTED UP A NEW RAND 500 MILLION VENTURE WITH JCI IN COAL-MINING WHILE THE FRENCH STILL PURPORT TO BE OPERATING A BAN ON SOUTH AFRICAN COAL). MANDELA MUST BE AWARE OF THE ECONOMIC CRISIS IN MUCH OF THE REST OF AFRICA, WHICH GENERAL OBASANJO HAS DESCRIBED AS A CONTINENT IN DECLINE. THIS CANNOT BE BLAMED, THIRTY YEARS LATER, ON THE FORMER COLONIAL POWERS (AS MANDELA TRIED TO DO IN A RECENT INTERVIEW).

12. SOUTH AFRICA UNDER A TRULY DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT CAN AVOID THAT FATE - PROVIDED A GENUINE MULTI-PARTY SYSTEM IS MAINTAINED AND A FREE ECONOMY IS PERMITTED TO FUNCTION WHILE THE DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH IS ALTERED THROUGH TAXATION AND THE DIRECTION OF GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE. WITH THE POPULATION INCREASING BY NEARLY ONE MILLION PER ANNUM, THE URBAN POPULATION BY OVER 750,000 PER ANNUM AND THE SCHOOL POPULATION BY 3-4,000 PER ANNUM, THERE ARE A QUARTER OF A MILLION EXTRA PEOPLE SEEKING JOBS EVERY YEAR. THE ANC BELIEVE THAT INVESTMENT CAN BE

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SWITCHED OFF NOW BUT SWITCHED ON LATER. THAT IS NOT OUR EXPERIENCE IN THE REST OF AFRICA. MANDELA WANTS PRESSURE ON THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT MAINTAINED TO GET RID OF ALL REMAINING APARTHEID LEGISLATION AND TO MOVE TO A FULLY DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION. OUR PRESSURE HAS NOT BEEN THE LEAST EFFECTIVE AND WE WILL MAINTAIN IT. BUT EXTERNAL SUPPORT IS NEEDED IN HELPING TO TACKLE THE PROBLEMS OF BLACK EDUCATION AND HOUSING. OTHERWISE THE PROBLEMS RISK OVERWHELMING ANY FUTURE GOVERNMENT. THE PRIME MINISTER WILL FIND MANDELA APPRECIATIVE OF OUR EFFORTS IN EDUCATION. MBEKI, HAVING LIVED FOR MANY YEARS IN ZAMBIA, SHOULD BE WELL PLACED TO UNDERSTAND THE IMPORTANCE OF AVOIDING ANOTHER ECONOMIC CATASTROPHE HERE.

PLEASE SEE MIFT  
FCO PLEASE ADVANCE TO NO. 10

RENWICK

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File

10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

19 June 1990

Dear Stephen,

NELSON MANDELA

The Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary had a word this evening about the Prime Minister's conversation at the weekend with Nelson Mandela. The Prime Minister repeated that she had been rather disappointed in him.

The Foreign Secretary reported on the discussion on South Africa in the European Community on 18 June. A number of Member States were still opposed to any easing of sanctions. The German government was reserving its position for the European Council itself and it might be helpful if I were to speak to Herr Teltschik beforehand to encourage them to support some step by the Community or individual Member States to relax sanctions. He thought the balance of probability was against unanimous agreement on action. The Prime Minister suggested that we might propose a statement which said that each Member State would decide on the appropriate national steps in relation to sanctions, to provide encouragement for the South African government's policies.

Yours sincerely,

(C. D. POWELL)

Stephen Wall, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

17 June 1990

Dear Resident Clerk,

**PRIME MINISTER'S TALK WITH NELSON MANDELA**

Nelson Mandela telephoned me at home shortly before midnight last night, having obtained my number from Anthony Sampson. His main purpose was to ask whether there was any possibility of his seeing the Prime Minister early this morning before his departure for Canada. He had seen a number of European Heads of Government over the past week or so, and was rather concerned about what might happen on sanctions at the forthcoming meeting of the European Council. He would very much like to have an opportunity to put his case to the Prime Minister before then. This was not in any way a substitute for their planned meeting on 4 July: he would restrict himself to this one matter. I explained that a meeting was really not possible since he was near Tunbridge Wells and the Prime Minister was out at Chequers, but promised to arrange for him to speak to the Prime Minister on the telephone early today.

The conversation took place at 0730 this morning. Mr. Mandela opened with a few courteous remarks and said how much he was looking forward to his meeting with the Prime Minister on 4 July. The Prime Minister said that we were very concerned that Mr. Mandela was taking on too much, with all his foreign travels. He had a great and historic task ahead in South Africa, and he must be fresh and ready for it. He would need perseverance and will. Mr. Mandela said that the British Government's help in bringing him to the UK for a brief rest was very much appreciated. He had spent a lovely day and felt much refreshed.

Mr. Mandela continued that he would want to brief the Prime Minister fully on political developments in South Africa when they met on 4 July. His immediate concern was to discuss the attitude which the British Government would take on South Africa at the forthcoming European Council in Dublin. He supposed that the Prime Minister would take the approach that sanctions should be eased. There were certain considerations which he would like to lay before her which might affect that view. He appreciated the Prime Minister's concern for all people in South Africa who were adversely affected by the application of sanctions. He was also sure that she could play an important role in facilitating the process of negotiations in South Africa. He hoped very much

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she would do this, but the action which she took over sanctions would have a bearing on her ability to do so. He could understand that the Prime Minister would want to put her own view to her European colleagues that sanctions should be eased. All he would ask her was not to press other Governments to lift sanctions, before he had been able to discuss the situation more fully with her.

Mr. Mandela went on that he was very aware of the threat to President de Klerk from the right wing in South Africa and the ANC were addressing that. They were calling on the white community to support de Klerk. He would brief the Prime Minister on this but could not do so until after the European Council. He repeated that he was well aware of the Prime Minister's position on sanctions and of her concern for South Africa. But the timing of action would be very important if it was not to be counter-productive. The Prime Minister had played a great part in securing his release and that of his colleagues, and ensuring that the South African government would sit down and talk to them. He was very anxious that her influence should be preserved.

The Prime Minister said that Mr. Mandela must understand that we had concerns too, for instance the ANC's continued support for the armed struggle. We had experience of armed struggle in what we ourselves suffered at the hands of the IRA. We had very much hoped that the ANC would agree to suspend it by now. Mr. Mandela said that he had held very confidential talks with President de Klerk the day before he had left South Africa covering these matters. The problem was that the South African government seemed unable to restrain the police. He would be able to give the Prime Minister details of police activities against the ANC: the action being taken by vigilante groups: and the threats of the right wing to destroy the ANC and hang Nelson Mandela. This was not an easy background against which he could persuade the ANC to end the armed struggle. But he wanted to assure the Prime Minister of his good faith about negotiations. The ANC had taken the initiative in sitting down to talk with the South African government. He had been working on this since 1986. It was "my baby" and he was keen that it should succeed. He would be able to give the Prime Minister much more information when they were able to meet face to face.

The Prime Minister agreed that it would be better to have a much longer talk on 4 July without any time pressure. She knew that Mr. Mandela felt very strongly on certain issues, and so did she. The armed struggle was a particular concern to us and she must urge Mr. Mandela to suspend it at the earliest possible opportunity. Mr. Mandela said that he was ready to accommodate President de Klerk in this regard. The ANC would take the first opportunity to move away from the armed struggle once the armed forces and the police were restrained. He would urge "let's call off violence" as soon as there was an atmosphere conducive to peace. It was very likely that he and President de Klerk would succeed in removing the obstacles to negotiations, in which case the ANC would announce the end of hostilities.

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The Prime Minister said that President de Klerk had gone a long way to meet the ANC, and it was vital that he should receive some support from the international community. She would be blunt with Mr. Mandela: sooner or later one had to say publicly what one was prepared to say privately, otherwise there would be no progress. Mr. Mandela said that he appreciated that, adding that he would very much like to have been present when the Prime Minister met President de Klerk. The Prime Minister continued that she was not insensitive to the ANC's troubles. She had told President de Klerk that it would not be right for her to visit South Africa for the time being, because it would probably lead to demonstrations with the risk that the police would use force. She did not want to do anything to set back the process of negotiations on which Mr. Mandela had embarked. Mr. Mandela said he would like to talk to the Prime Minister about a visit. He hoped that she would come, but it must be fruitful. The Prime Minister said she thought the day would come, but it was not now.

Mr. Mandela said that he just hoped that at the European Council the Prime Minister would limit herself to indicating her own view on sanctions, but would not press others to lift them until after he had been able to brief her. He and the Prime Minister looked at the problem from different angles, but had the common aim of dismantling apartheid and allowing every South African to determine his or her own future. The Prime Minister said there was no question of lifting the major United Nations sanctions. But the most important thing for South Africa in the present situation was investment. Action by the European Community and others to discourage investment had not been enshrined in law and it had been left to every Government to decide what to do. She saw investment as the only way to increase the standard of living of everyone in South Africa. That was why we had ended our voluntary sanctions on investment. She would certainly want the European Council to give some encouragement to President de Klerk and she would not be alone in that. She could not change her stance on sanctions. In practice quite a number of countries were covertly ignoring their obligations in this field, while we were perfectly open about our views and actions. Mr. Mandela said that he very much wanted to preserve the British Government's role in achieving a peaceful solution in South Africa. The ANC were the people best able to help President de Klerk. He understood the Prime Minister's wish to see de Klerk rewarded, but she should avoid action which would be counter-productive in the South African situation. The right wing were putting out feelers to the ANC because they wanted to be involved in discussions about the future. It would be a mistake to let them think that all international pressure was off South Africa.

Mr. Mandela concluded that he was well satisfied with their talk and would leave the matter in the Prime Minister's hands. The Prime Minister said that Mr. Mandela must understand how concerned we were by the ANC's failure to suspend violence, and that we could not alter our position on sanctions. She could not, at this stage, say what might emerge from the European Council. She wished Mr. Mandela every success in his visits to Canada and the United States, and looked forward to seeing him on 4 July.

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The Prime Minister commented to me afterwards that she was a bit disappointed with Mandela, who seemed to have rather a closed mind. For his part, he will now have experienced first hand the Prime Minister's strong views on the armed struggle and on sanctions, and this will no doubt influence his approach to the meeting on 4 July. It is also clear that his visits around Europe have left him distinctly nervous about the likelihood that the European Community will now start to ease sanctions. The Prime Minister hopes that the Foreign Secretary will make clear to his European colleagues that we do indeed believe that the right course for the Community is to start the process of easing sanctions, as a signal of support for de Klerk's efforts.

We are not proposing to tell the press about this discussion. But if Mandela himself speaks to the press, either at Heathrow or in Canada, we shall confirm that the talk took place and give our own account of it.

You will want to make sure that the Foreign Secretary sees this record during the weekend. I should also be grateful if you could arrange for it to be sent by the quickest possible means to Sir Robin Renwick.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence) and to Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

*Yours sincerely,*  
*Chris Patten*

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(C. D. POWELL)

The Resident Clerk,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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PRIME MINISTER

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Nelson Mandela telephoned me out of the blue at about a quarter to midnight tonight. He is resting here briefly before travelling on to Canada. He said that he was very anxious to see you before leaving. He had seen many other European Heads of Government and there were some important points he wished to put to you. This was without prejudice to your meeting on 4 July. He wondered whether you could see him at 0800 tomorrow morning. He was extremely apologetic for the appearance of discourtesy in suggesting it at such short notice.

I discovered that he was somewhere near Tunbridge Wells and has to be at Heathrow at about 1000-1030 tomorrow morning. I explained this really seemed to me to rule out a meeting. But I thought you might be prepared to speak to him on the telephone. He said that you might find this discourteous on his behalf. I said that I was sure that this would not be a problem, but I did not think a meeting was physically possible in the time concerned. If necessary I would be happy to travel out very early tomorrow morning to Tunbridge Wells or Heathrow to take a message on your behalf. He was rather insistent that he should speak to you directly.


I left it that I would put the idea of a telephone call to you and let him have an answer at about 0800 tomorrow morning. A call might take place at about 0830-0845.

I hope this is all right. If you see this note, it would be very kind if you could alert the switchboard before 0800 as to whether you would be prepared to take a call, in which case I will arrange it.

C. D. POWELL  
16 June 1990

*Pembury*

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MIPT: MANDELA

PART I

1. I SAID THAT I HOPED THAT MANDELA WOULD BEAR IN MIND, FOR HIS MEETING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER, THAT NO FOREIGN LEADER HAD WORKED HARDER FOR HIS RELEASE AND THE UNBANNING OF THE ANC. FOLLOWING DE KLERK'S SPEECH ON 2 FEBRUARY, SHOTS HAD BEEN FIRED AT THE EMBASSY IN PRETORIA BY RIGHT-WING EXTREMISTS BECAUSE THEY CONSIDERED THAT THE PRIME MINISTER HAD INFLUENCED DE KLERK TO TAKE THESE STEPS AND THEY WERE ABSOLUTELY RIGHT IN THAT. GOVERNMENTS OF COUNTRIES LIKE SWEDEN AND CANADA WHICH WERE UNCONDITIONAL SUPPORTERS OF THE ANC HAD VERY LITTLE INFLUENCE ON THE SITUATION HERE. MANDELA SAID THAT HE UNDERSTOOD AND APPRECIATED WHAT THE PRIME MINISTER HAD DONE. HE WANTED THE MEETING TO LEAD TO AN IMPROVEMENT IN RELATIONS. WHAT ISSUES WOULD YOU AND THE PRIME MINISTER WANT TO DISCUSS?

2. I SAID THAT I WOULD NOT GO OVER ALL THE POINTS ON WHICH WE AGREED. THE MAIN POINTS OF DIFFICULTY WERE:

(I) THE ARMED STRUGGLE. I UNDERSTOOD THAT THE ANC HAD FELT THAT UNDER VERWOERD AND HIS SUCCESSORS, THEY HAD LITTLE OPTION BUT TO FIGHT FOR THE VOTE. BUT, WITH THE REMAINING OBSTACLES TO NEGOTIATIONS ABOUT TO BE REMOVED BY DE KLERK, WE WOULD GO ON PRESSING THE ANC TO STOP TALKING ABOUT THE CONTINUATION OF THE ARMED STRUGGLE. THAT COULD ONLY STRENGTHEN THE RIGHT-WING REACTION HERE.

(II) ON NATIONALISATION I SAID THAT I DID NOT PERSONALLY BELIEVE THAT AS AND WHEN THE ANC GOT TO THE POINT OF PARTICIPATING IN GOVERNMENT, THEY WOULD END UP NATIONALISING ANYTHING. WE HAD JUST BEEN THROUGH ALL THIS WITH SWAPO WHO HAD ENDED UP REALISING THAT NOWHERE ELSE IN THE WORLD WAS ANYONE INTERESTED ANY LONGER IN NATIONALISATION. ALL THE MAJOR UTILITIES HERE ALREADY WERE IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR. I HAD BEEN GLAD TO SEE MANDELA'S RECENT MORE CAUTIOUS STATEMENTS ON THIS SUBJECT. AS I UNDERSTOOD IT, THE KEY ISSUE FOR HIM WAS NOT NATIONALISATION BUT THE DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH.

(III) ON THE VIOLENCE IN NATAL, I UNDERSTOOD THE INTENSE RESISTANCE HE HAD ENCOUNTERED IN THE ANC TO MEETING BUTHELEZI. BUT BUTHELEZI HAD REFUSED TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE GOVERNMENT UNTIL MANDELA WAS RELEASED AND THE ANC UNBANNED. IT WAS NOT ONLY THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE GOVERNMENT TO HELP END THE VIOLENCE. I HOPED THAT MANDELA WOULD NOT RULE OUT A FUTURE MEETING WITH BUTHELEZI.

(IV) WE BELIEVED THAT DE KLERK DESERVED ENCOURAGEMENT FOR THE DECISIONS HE HAD TAKEN. WE HAD RESPONDED OURSELVES TO ENCOURAGE HIM TO GO FURTHER, AS HE WAS DOING. IT WAS NOW FOR OTHER EC GOVERNMENTS TO DECIDE HOW TO RESPOND. WE BELIEVED IT QUITE WRONG TO TREAT DE

KLERK AS IF HE WERE P W BOTHA AND WE TOOK VERY SERIOUSLY THE CHALLENGE HE WAS FACING FROM THE RIGHT WING.

3. MANDELA SAID THAT HE HAD JUST HAD A VERY IMPORTANT MEETING WITH DE KLERK. DE KLERK HAD ASSURED HIM THAT HE WAS ABOUT TO MOVE AHEAD ON THE RELEASE OF PRISONERS AND LIFTING THE STATE OF EMERGENCY. HE HAD BEEN VERY ENCOURAGED BY THE MEETING. DE KLERK HAD TOLD HIM THAT HE, DE KLERK, HAD NOT ATTACKED MANDELA OR CRITICISED THE ANC DURING HIS VISIT TO EUROPE AND HE CONSIDERED IT WRONG FOR THE TWO OF THEM TO CRITICISE EACH OTHER PUBLICLY. MANDELA SAID THAT HE PERHAPS HAD REACTED TOO SHARPLY TO THE REPORTS REACHING HIM HERE ABOUT DE KLERK'S VISIT TO EUROPE. HE WOULD GO ON CALLING FOR SANCTIONS TO BE MAINTAINED TO EXERT PRESSURE ON THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT TO WORK OUT A NEW, FULLY DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION. HE WOULD HAVE TO RE-STATE WELL KNOWN ANC POSITIONS. HE WOULD CONSULT HIS ANC COLLEAGUES. BUT HIS OWN DISPOSITION WAS TO WANT TO DO THIS IN WAYS THAT WOULD NOT BE CONFRONTATIONAL VIS-A-VIS DE KLERK. I SAID THAT DE KLERK HAD SPOKEN VERY POSITIVELY TO THE PRIME MINISTER ABOUT HIS RELATIONS WITH MANDELA AND HAD INDEED NOT CRITICISED HIM AT ANY POINT DURING HIS EUROPEAN TOUR.

#### ARMED STRUGGLE

4. ON ENDING THE ARMED STRUGGLE, MANDELA SAID THAT HE HAD TOLD DE KLERK THAT HE SHOULD NOT INSIST ON COMPLETE SATISFACTION ON THIS. THE ANC WERE EXERTING THEIR INFLUENCE AGAINST VIOLENCE AND THE GOVERNMENT KNEW THIS. INKATHA WERE ENGAGED IN FAR MORE VIOLENCE THAN THE ANC. HE HAD JUST DENOUNCED UNDISCIPLINED ANC YOUTHS WHO ENGAGED IN VIOLENCE. THERE WERE PROBLEMS ABOUT FORMAL RENUNCIATION OF THE QUOTE ARMED STRUGGLE UNQUOTE. THE AIM OF THE STRUGGLE - A FULLY DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION - HAD NOT YET BEEN ATTAINED. ANC MEMBERS WERE BEING ATTACKED BY RIGHT-WING ELEMENTS IN TOWNS LIKE WELKOM IN THE FREE STATE AND THERE HAD BEEN POLICE SHOOTINGS, WHICH DE KLERK HIMSELF REGARDED AS INDEFENSIBLE, IN WHICH TWENTY PEOPLE HAD BEEN KILLED IN SEBOKENG AND NOW THABONG. HE WAS CONCERNED ABOUT THE WEAKNESS OF THE GOVERNMENT REACTION TO RIGHT-WING VIOLENCE. THE ANC WAS MAKING A MAJOR COMMITMENT BY ENTERING INTO NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE GOVERNMENT. HE HAD PROMISED DE KLERK THAT THEY WOULD DO NOTHING TO UPSET THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS.

5. I SAID THAT IN THE GROOTE SCHUUR AGREEMENT THE ANC HAD COMMITTED THEMSELVES TO PEACEFUL NEGOTIATIONS. I UNDERSTOOD THAT THEY WOULD RETAIN THE RIGHT TO DEFEND THEMSELVES IF THEY WERE ATTACKED. THEY WERE NOT BEING ASKED TO QUOTE RENOUNCE UNQUOTE VIOLENCE BUT TO SUSPEND IT. THEY WERE THEMSELVES TALKING OF A CEASEFIRE AND AT GROOTE SCHUUR THEY HAD COMMITTED THEMSELVES TO RECONSIDERING THIS WHOLE ISSUE AS THE NEGOTIATING OBSTACLES WERE REMOVED. MANDELA SAID THAT HE STOOD BY THE GROOTE SCHUUR AGREEMENT. I SAID THAT WE WANTED TO SEE THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS CONSOLIDATED. AS THE OBSTACLES TO NEGOTIATION WERE REMOVED, I HOPED THE ANC WOULD COMMIT THEMSELVES TO SOME KIND OF TRUCE.

#### NATIONALISATION

6. ON NATIONALISATION, MANDELA SPOKE POSITIVELY ABOUT HIS MEETING LAST WEEK WITH GAVIN RELLY AND OTHER SENIOR BUSINESSMEN. THE KEY POINT FOR THE ANC WAS INDEED THE DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH. SOUTH AFRICA COULD NOT GO ON WITH A SITUATION IN WHICH WHITES OWNED EIGHTY-SEVEN PER CENT OF THE LAND. I SAID THAT WE HAD PRESSED THE GOVERNMENT TO REPEAL THE LAND ACTS WHICH THEY WERE NOW GOING TO DO. APART FROM

REMOVING THE LEGISLATIVE IMPEDIMENTS, WE WERE URGING THEM TO HELP BLACK FARMERS GAIN ACCESS TO WORTHWHILE AGRICULTURAL LAND, E.G. THROUGH THE CREATION OF A LAND BANK TO HELP BLACK COMMERCIAL FARMERS IN THE SAME WAY AS POOR AFRIKANER FARMERS HAD BEEN HELPED. MANDELA SHOWED INTEREST IN THIS IDEA. MANDELA ALSO REFERRED TO MONOPOLIES, BUT SAID THAT HE AGREED THAT THE ANC HAD MUCH TO LEARN FROM THE ANTI-TRUST LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE MONOPOLIES LEGISLATION IN BRITAIN.


#### NATAL

7. ON BUTHELEZI, MANDELA SAID THAT BUTHELEZI HAD INDEED CALLED FOR HIS RELEASE BEFORE NEGOTIATIONS WERE ENGAGED AND MANDELA PERSONALLY HAD THANKED HIM FOR THIS. HE HAD WANTED TO MEET BUTHELEZI BUT AS HE HAD BEEN ABOUT TO GO TO NATAL, TERRIBLE FIGHTING HAD BROKEN OUT IN THE TOWNSHIPS THERE. THIS WAS DESPITE THE FACT THAT IN HIS SPEECH IN DURBAN, HE HAD URGED HIS SUPPORTERS TO THROW THEIR WEAPONS INTO THE SEA. IN THE FIRST MEETING HE HAD ADDRESSED IN NATAL, HE TOLD THE CROWD THAT HE INTENDED TO MEET BUTHELEZI. THIS HAD NEARLY PROVOKED A RIOT AND HIS SUPPORTERS HAD REVOLTED. HE COULD NOT ACHIEVE ANYTHING WITHOUT CARRYING HIS ORGANISATION WITH HIM. I SAID THAT I UNDERSTOOD THAT BUT WE DID NOT THINK THAT POLITICAL PEACE COULD BE RESTORED WITHOUT THE LEADERS MEETING.

8. MANDELA SAID THAT HE WANTED TO GET TO THE POINT WHERE HE COULD MEET BUTHELEZI. BUT A LOT OF SPADEWORK WOULD HAVE TO BE DONE FIRST. THE KWA ZULU POLICE SIMPLY ACTED AS AGENTS OF INKATHA AS DID THE KWA ZULU POLICE COMMISSIONER. HE HELD THE GOVERNMENT RESPONSIBLE FOR TOLERATING THIS INTRA-BLACK VIOLENCE FOR FAR TOO LONG. I SAID THAT WHILE THAT MIGHT HAVE BEEN TRUE OF P W BOTHA, IT CERTAINLY WAS NOT TRUE OF DE KLERK. WHILE WE BELIEVED THAT THE SADF SHOULD BE WITHDRAWN FROM OTHER TOWNSHIPS (WHERE THEIR PRESENCE NOW IS MINIMAL), A CONTINUED SADF PRESENCE WAS NECESSARY IN THE TOWNSHIPS IN NATAL. MANDELA SAID THAT HE AGREED THAT THIS MIGHT BE NECESSARY, PROVIDED THE SADF ACTED AS GUARDIANS OF LAW AND ORDER AND NOT AS AN ARMY OF OCCUPATION. PLEASE SEE MIFT.

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MANDELA

1. I HAD A TALK WITH MANDELA YESTERDAY IN THE CLINIC WHERE HE HAS BEEN RECOVERING FROM HIS OPERATION (FOR THE REMOVAL OF A BENIGN CYST). HE WAS FIT AND ALERT AND THE MEETING WAS A VERY FRIENDLY ONE.
2. I CONGRATULATED HIM ON MAKING A VERY GOOD RECOVERY. HE SAID THAT THE DOCTORS HAD PASSED HIM FULLY FIT FOR HIS OVERSEAS TOUR. I SAID THAT WE WERE CONCERNED ABOUT THE PUNISHING SCHEDULE HE WAS GOING TO HAVE TO UNDERTAKE. HE EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR THE ARRANGEMENTS WHICH ARE BEING MADE TO ENABLE HIM TO HAVE A REST IN BRITAIN BEFORE GOING ON TO CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES. I SAID THAT WE WERE GLAD TO HELP OVER THIS. WE REMAINED CONCERNED ABOUT HIS SCHEDULE IN THE UNITED STATES, WHERE THE ORGANISERS WERE PLANNING TO MAKE HIM VISIT EIGHT CITIES IN TEN DAYS. MANDELA INDICATED THAT HE REALISED THAT HE WAS LIABLE TO BE ASKED TO DO THE IMPOSSIBLE AND WAS HIMSELF TRYING TO DO SOMETHING ABOUT THIS.
3. MANDELA SAID THAT HE WOULD BE ACCOMPANIED BY HIS WIFE. HIS TWO SENIOR ADVISERS ON THE TRIP WOULD BE THABO MBEKI AND ZWELAKHE SISULU. HE WOULD ALSO BE ACCOMPANIED BY FAROUK MEER (AN INDIAN ANC LEADER FROM NATAL) AND SOME OTHERS FROM THE ANC'S LONDON OFFICE.
4. I SAID THAT YOU WERE LOOKING FORWARD TO TALKS WITH HIM AND TO OFFERING HIM LUNCH ON 3 JULY. HIS WIFE AND THE SENIOR ANC REPRESENTATIVES ACCOMPANYING HIM WOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE LUNCH, AS WELL AS A NUMBER OF DISTINGUISHED NON-GOVERNMENTAL FIGURES. MANDELA WELCOMED THIS. I EXPLAINED THAT THE FORMAT FOR THE MEETING AND LUNCH WITH THE PRIME MINISTER WOULD BE ONE PLUS ONE. MANDELA SAID THAT HE APPRECIATED THAT THE PRIME MINISTER WOULD WANT A PRIVATE DISCUSSION. AT NO. 10 HE WOULD BE ACCOMPANIED BY MBEKI OR SISULU. PLEASE SEE MIFT.

RENWICK

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SAFD 6  
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(EAM) C: WPS/25 (FOREIGN) MANDALA

Th W



cc Bingham

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

27 April 1990

Mr. Mandela


I have had a word with the Prime Minister about Mr. Mandela's visit. She has decided she would like to err if anything on the side of generosity and invite him to a talk followed by a working lunch. She would envisage this taking place on Wednesday 4 July, with the talk at 1200 hours and lunch at 1300. She would much prefer participation to be very restricted indeed: ideally Mr. Mandela plus one.

I should be grateful if this proposal could now be put to Mr. Mandela.

CHARLES POWELL

J.S. Wall, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

RESTRICTED

DEPARTMENT/SERIES ..... <i>PREM 19</i> ..... PIECE/ITEM ..... <i>4454</i> ..... (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
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