

Part 1

Confidential filing

US Bases in the UK

DEFENCE

Part 1 : oct 1980

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
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10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

20 December 1994

Dear Tim

RAF ALCONBURY

Thank you for your letter of 30 November about alternative sites to be used when transporting the Prime Minister to and from his constituency when RAF ALCONBURY closes.

In order for us to assess which airfields we are most likely to wish to make use of, it would be helpful to know precisely what facilities each can offer particularly in terms of night-time flying and seven day a week coverage including holidays. Our preliminary view is that we would prefer RAF WITTERING for fixed wing and RAF BRAMPTON for helicopter flights, but particularly in the case of helicopter flights we would need to be sure that the RAF would be content to take private aircraft which the Prime Minister uses from time to time, particularly on Party occasions.

It would be helpful in addition to have the names of the relevant airfield Commanders so that the protection team and I can make contact with a view to visiting the sites in the New Year to establish which most closely meets our needs.

Tim

Rachael

RACHAEL REYNOLDS

Commander Timothy Laurence RN
Ministry of Defence

2

cc Tecs

I need to get

back to MOD about

From: Rachael Reynolds

Date : 12 December 1994

which airfields you would propose
to use for a) helicopters
b) fixed wing.

PRIME MINISTER

CLOSURE OF RAF ALCONBURY

so they can gear up. Do you
need to reccy them?

Rachael

13/12

This is to forewarn you of the likely closure of the airfield at RAF Alconbury during the early part of 1995.

As you know, the United States Air Force decided in May 1993 that they would withdraw from Alconbury in 1995. This is now likely to take place on 31 March. Once the USAF cease flying, the RAF will also be unable to continue and the site will be offered for disposal as surplus to requirements. Residential facilities will remain until the site is finally sold.

Loss of flying facilities at Alconbury is not too great a problem for helicopter flights since you will be able to use RAF Wyton and RAF Brampton with very little increase in distance. The problem arises with fixed wing flights. There are two options - RAF Wittering and the civilian airfield at Cambridge. Both, I am told, about 17 miles away. A map is attached.

You do not make too many flights into Alconbury - less than 10 per year so it is not too awful. It does mean, however, an extra annoying but unavoidable half hour at the end of long trips.

Rachael

RE-17



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB
Telephone 071-21 82111/2/3

SECRETARY OF STATE

*cc Mr Allan
Mrs Powell
Ms Warburton
Tecs*

30th November 1994

MO 25/16M

To security meeting file

Dear Rachael,

RAF ALCONBURY

You asked for advice on the future of RAF Alconbury. You may remember that the United States Air Force decided in May last year to withdraw from Alconbury in 1995. The RAF have indicated that they will continue to use the airfield as long as they are able to, but this will probably only be until 31 March 1995, the date when the USAF are expected to cease flying operations there. It is almost certain that the site will then become surplus to military requirements, and will be offered for disposal.

We have been giving some thought to alternative sites to be used when transporting the Prime Minister to and from his constituency. RAF Wyton and RAF Brampton would still be able to accommodate helicopter flights, but the airfield at Wyton also closes next year ruling out the use of fixed wing aircraft. The next closest fixed wing airfield is RAF Wittering some 17 miles away, and the civilian airfield at Cambridge is about the same distance in the opposite direction. I attach a map which gives an idea of the distances involved.

Could you perhaps let me know which is (are) the most popular option(s), and I will then ask the RAF to provide advice on practicalities.

*TJWS,
Tim*

(T J H LAURENCE)
Commander Royal Navy
Private Secretary

Rachael Reynolds
10 Downing Street



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
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MINISTER OF STATE FOR
THE ARMED FORCES

D/MIN(AF)/NS/6/1/4

12 August 1994

Dear Prime Minister

I am writing to let you know that on 18 August 1994 at 1700 pm the US Department of Defense will announce that they have decided to retain the RAF Upwood Medical Clinic, which last year they announced they would hand back to MOD control by the end of September 1995 together with the rest of the contingency hospital. The Clinic will be retained until no later than September 1997, and 28 of the 221 Married Quarters (MQ's) will be kept indefinitely. The US will also be announcing the retention of 101 privately leased houses at the Yaxley Housing Annex, RAF Alconbury.

The reason for the US retaining the MQ's and leased housing is that numbers of USAF personnel at RAF Molesworth are increasing and there is a need to continue housing the 352nd Special Operations Group even though it will be relocating to RAF Mildenhall in March 1995. Medical Clinic personnel will also continue to be housed at Upwood.

There are currently 39 MOD employees at Upwood, of whom 5 will be retained for the Medical Clinic and a number of others will be transferred to Alconbury, Molesworth or the RAF Logistics Command Headquarters at Brampton/Wyton. It may not, however, be possible to find alternative employment for a handful of staff; where redundancies are unavoidable staff will be eligible for the Department's Redundancy Counselling and Outplacement Service.

I would be grateful if you could treat this as in confidence until the announcement is made.

John Major
Nicholas Soames

THE HON NICHOLAS SOAMES MP

Rt Hon John Major, MP



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20

SECRET



**10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA**

From the Private Secretary

24 January 1994

AMERICAN BASE CLOSURE

The Prime Minister was grateful for your letter of 17 January. He would like to continue to be kept informed in the way that you indicate.

RODERIC LYNE

Peter Ryan Esq
Ministry of Defence

SECRET



From: Miss Oona Muirhead, Private Secretary to the
 Minister of State (Armed Forces)
 MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
 MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

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MINISTER OF STATE FOR
 THE ARMED FORCES

D/MIN(AF)/JH/6/1/4

DC
~~Be. point out to Oona~~
~~✓ Mr. Mark Chicksands~~ 22 February 1994

Dear Roderic

*is resident in my constituency
 near the PM's (it is in
 Bedfordshire, near Ampthurb).
 RmyL.*

?!

Peter Ryan wrote to you on 17 January to let you know that the US Department of Defence was to announce its decision to withdraw the US Air Force from RAF Chicksands in your constituency and return the site to full Ministry of Defence control. The provisional date the US DOD had set for the announcement was 27 January, although that was expected to slip as a result of the 'freeze' in Washington and the change of US Defence Secretary.

As Peter said in his letter, this will affect some 1800 US personnel, 143 Ministry of Defence employees at the station, and 97 UK civilians directly employed by the US Air Force. All 413 married quarters used by personnel at RAF Chicksands will also be handed back. For our part, we will do our best to find alternative employment for MOD civilians but I fear that redundancies may be inevitable. We will in the normal way be looking to see if there is any alternative defence requirement for the site. If not, we would sell it.

The announcement has been slightly delayed but the US DOD have now decided to make it at 1400 hours on Thursday 24 February.

I am copying this letter to Dugald Sandeman (Lord President's Office), Peter Smith (DTI), David Russell (Employment), Murdo Maclean (Chief Whip's Office) and to Melanie Leech (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,

R M J Lyne Esq CMG
 10 Downing Street



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SECRET
(Until Announcement)

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB
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SECRETARY OF STATE

Prime Minister ④

MO 14/2/5G

Final
17/1

17 January 1994

Dear Rodric

AMERICAN BASE CLOSURE

The Prime Minister may wish to know of the US plans to announce later this month their next round of base closures. One base in this country (the Communications Centre at RAF Chicksands in Bedfordshire) is affected. The provisional announcement date is 27th January, though this may slip, given the forthcoming change of US Defense Secretary.

Some 1,800 US personnel, together with 143 MOD civilians and 97 directly involved staff will be affected by the closure of RAF Chicksands, which is due to begin in October and be completed within a year. Some redundancies are inevitable, though obviously we will try to redeploy MOD staff wherever possible. The local constituency MP (Sir Nicholas Lyell) will be advised in confidence 24 hours before the announcement is made by the Americans' HQ 3rd Air Force at RAF Mildenhall. At this stage, it is too early to say whether there will be a continuing defence requirement for RAF Chicksands, though we are of course examining this option. Should no defence requirement be identified, then the site would be made available for disposal in the normal way.

This announcement forms part of the 14th round of the US base realignment programme. The Americans have already started work on round 15. The potential for affecting the UK further is now relatively limited, since the Americans are probably close to their core requirement in this country. However, we understand that RAF Edzell in North East Scotland may be affected if further closures are required.

We had also promised to keep you in touch with developments affecting RAF Alconbury, in the Prime Minister's constituency. When I wrote to you on 18th June last year, we had envisaged as few as 100 MOD employees being required. The latest indications are that the US might wish to utilise some 300. However, this remains unconfirmed at present. I will, of course let you have further information on RAF Alconbury as this becomes available.

R M J Lyne Esq CMG
10 Downing Street

(Until Announcement)
SECRET



SECRET
(Until Announcement)

I am copying this letter to Dugald Sandeman (Lord President's Office), Peter Smith (DTI), David Russell (Employment), Murdon Maclean (Chief Whip's Office) and to Melanie Leech (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever
Peter

(P RYAN)
Private Secretary

(Until Announcement)
SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL



MINISTER OF STATE FOR THE ARMED FORCES

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
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shown PM)
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B/F to Mr. Jm
Renn

20 October 1993

D/MIN(AF)/JH/6/1/4

Dear Prime Minister,

Prap

In Archie Hamilton's letter to you of 6 May 1993, he advised you that the US Department of Defense were to announce the decision to partially close RAF Alconbury. This announcement took place on 7 May. I am writing to let you know that there has now been a slight change to the plans for withdrawal of aircraft from the base.

As you know, RAF Alconbury is a main operating base for US Air Force U-2 reconnaissance aircraft. These were due to return to the United States by the end of September 1993. The H-53 and C-130 aircraft of the Special Operations Group also based at Alconbury are not due to relocate to RAF Mildenhall until the end of March 1995.

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OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT

The USAF advise us that they still intend to close the runway at the base by the end of March 1995, which means that if the U-2 missions are still required the Squadron will move elsewhere. This will not therefore affect the overall drawdown plan for Alconbury, and the move of the Special Operations Group to RAF Mildenhall will take place as originally planned.

We separately (Peter Ryan's letter to Roderic Lyne of 18 June) undertook to keep you informed about the size of the administrative enclave at Alconbury. The Americans more detailed planning meetings are now scheduled to begin next month and we expect to hear of the USAF's initial proposals early in November. That should enable us to establish more accurately how employment at the base may be affected.

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We will keep you informed about developments, both in respect of the U-2 commitment, and the administrative enclave and implications for local employment.

Yours sincerely,
Jeremy Hanley

JEREMY HANLEY MP

The Rt Hon John Major, MP

CONFIDENTIAL



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DEFENCE US Bases in the UK, Oct 80

RESTRICTED

From: Miss Oona Muirhead, Private Secretary to the Minister of State for the Armed Forces



MINISTER OF STATE FOR
THE ARMED FORCES

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

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cc-PU
press

WTC

D/MIN(AF)/JH/6/1/4

19 October 1993

Dear David

I am writing to let you know that at 1400 on 22 October the US Department of Defense will be announcing that two US facilities already scheduled for closure will be handed back to MOD earlier than previously announced. These are the United States Naval Facility at RAF Brawdy in Dyfed, and RAF Little Rissington in Gloucestershire.

It was announced on 7 May 1993 that the US Navy would withdraw from its facility (the NAVFAC) at RAF Brawdy by the end of September 1996. The facility will now be returned to MOD control by the end of September 1995. There are currently 82 MOD civilians and 16 directly employed UK civilians at RAF Brawdy.

On 3 December 1992, it was announced that RAF Little Rissington would be returned to MOD control by the end of September 1994. This will now be brought forward slightly to the end of June 1994. There are currently 18 MOD civilians and 16 MOD Police officers employed at Little Rissington, although MOD Police numbers are in any case being reduced to 11 from next month.

As always, every effort will be made to find alternative MOD employment for the civil servants and MOD Police officers employed at the sites. However, we are unable to make such a commitment to personnel directly employed by the US, who is responsible for all severance payments to this category of staff.

We do not yet know whether there will be an alternative defence use for any of the sites once they are returned.

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I am copying this letter to Roderic Lyne (No 10), Elizabeth Jones (DTI), Judith Simpson (Welsh Office) and Melanie Leech (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,

David Russell

David Russell Esq
PS/Secretary of State for Employment
Caxton House
Tothill Street
London SW1H 9NF

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MINISTER OF STATE FOR
THE ARMED FORCES

D/MIN(AF)/JH/6/1/4

Prime Minister

copy
RB

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1st
July 1993

Dear Prime Minister, at first

In Archie Hamilton's letter to you of 6 May, he notified you that as part of the latest round of US Department of Defense realignment plans, the Contingency Hospital and some 44 Married Quarters at RAF Upwood would be returned to MOD control.

You will wish to be aware that the US Department of Defense is today announcing the next round of defence realignments in Europe. This will be followed in early July by announcements affecting realignment plans for the US. Part of the European announcement will be a minor, tidying up measure concerning the return of the remaining Married Quarters at RAF Upwood, some 177 units. We will, of course, be looking to see whether there will be a requirement for these returned Quarters.

I attach a copy of the press release which details this and the other measures also announced today by the US Department of Defense.

Do let me know if you need further information.

Yours ever,
Jeremy

JEREMY HANLEY MP

The Rt Hon John Major MP



DRAWDOWN OF US FORCES IN THE UK - ROUND 12

Following consultation with the British Government, the United States Department of Defense has today announced the deployment to RAF Lakenheath of a squadron of F-15C aircraft from Germany starting January 1994, the return to MOD control of a US Navy Communications Site at Forss, Scotland, by September 1994 and the return of all Married Quarters at RAF Upwood by September 1995. There are no staff implications at either Forss or RAF Upwood.

In addition the US will be reviewing the role of the 100 Regional Support Group in the UK which forms part of US War Reserve Structure in the UK. The 100 Regional Support Group has three units in the UK, situated at RAF Chilwell, RAF Mildenhall, and RAF Upper Heyford. There are 59 MOD personnel employed at the three sites. As this review is just starting, it is too early to say what the implications will be for staff.

This announcement forms part of a programme of announcements made by the US covering their base realignment plans in Europe, resulting from the easing of tension between East and West and will not affect the US commitment to NATO.

DEFENSE:

US bases on 30

RESTRICTED



RAF Alconbury, mfi

**10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA**

From the Private Secretary

30 June 1993

RAF ALCONBURY

The Prime Minister was most grateful for the further information in your letter of 18 June. Thank you for agreeing to keep us posted.

RODERIC LYNE

Peter Ryan Esq
Ministry of Defence

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Prime Minister

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB
Telephone 071-21 82111/2/3

The point here is that -
Although we won't know

SECRETARY OF STATE

for a while - B/F 25/11
there may be

Crnd /

MO 14/2/5J

fewer job losses at

18 June 1993

Alconbury than was originally

Dea Roderic expected, as the "administrative
enclave" will remain as a
substantial unit.

RAF ALCONBURY

Thank you for your letter of 2 June. I am sorry not to have replied earlier.

We discussed the administrative enclave at RAF Alconbury (in support of RAF Molesworth) which the United States Air Force intends to retain. As you observed, we did not make much of this either in briefing for you or in public statements. We have, of course, long been aware of US plans for RAF Molesworth; as you will recall, John Pitt-Brooke touched on this in his letter to you of 5 March, as did Mr Hamilton in his letter of 6 May to the Prime Minister. The Joint Analysis Centre (JAC) at Molesworth currently comprises about 500 US personnel. By 1995 there could be some 800 there. At present, almost all support staff (cleaners, dining room attendants, sales staff) are provided by the US community. By 1995, there may be some opportunities for UK citizens, but at this stage we are unable to estimate how many.

Similarly, although there will be a residual staff requirement for the administrative site at Alconbury, we do not know - and we have been unable to find out - how many UK civilian employees will be retained at RAF Alconbury. This information will become available only when the Americans have completed their second, more detailed, phase of planning. In the case of RAF Alconbury, this will be after a series of meetings planned to take place in mid-September.

Until the Americans have completed this process, and we know the precise numbers, timescale etc involved, we are adopting a cautious approach. Experience with the Americans elsewhere gives us good grounds for this caution. That said, our best guess is that some 150 support type jobs may be generated for UK citizens. This is many fewer than at present. We do not believe that current employment levels (or anything like them) can be sustained.

R M J Lyne Esq CMG
10 Downing Street

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Unsatisfactory though it may be, our judgement is that we should refrain from speculating publicly at this stage about possible "good news" at Alconbury until the Americans give us firm grounds for doing so. We will, of course, keep closely in touch with the Americans so that at the earliest possible stage we will be able to give you further, substantive advice. Meanwhile, we are already discussing with the Americans initial proposals to achieve a smooth transition between posts lost at Alconbury and the creation of jobs at Brampton/Wyton (stemming from the formation of the new RAF Logistics Command at RAF Brampton and RAF Wyton). This is at least something concrete we are getting on with.


Finally, the material you sent us had already been provided to MOD (albeit in an earlier draft). This did, of course, become declassified upon announcement.

I will write to you again as soon as possible.

Yours ever
Peter

(PETER RYAN)
Private Secretary

DEFENCE : US Bases Oct 80

DEPARTMENT/SERIES <i>PREM 19</i> PIECE/ITEM <i>4613</i> (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract details: <i>Letter from Lyne to Ryan dated 2 June 1993</i>	
CLOSED UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	<i>8/10/18</i> <i>M. W.</i>
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Seen by
pm.

PRIME MINISTER

cc Mr. O'Donnell

Mr. Allan


Mr. Haslam

YOUR CONSTITUENCY DAY: ALCONBURY ANNOUNCEMENT

The USAF decision to phase out use of RAF Alconbury by September 1995 will be announced at 1400 tomorrow, Friday 7 May. Staff at the base will be informed an hour beforehand by the Station Commander.

I attach a line which you could take (or release as a press statement); and background information from the MoD, including the text of the American press statement.

The blow should be softened by the news that the RAF will give Alconbury staff priority in allocating new jobs at the Logistics Command Headquarters at Wyton and Brampton. However, it is too soon to tell how many Alconbury staff will benefit from this. It will depend on their qualifications and the nature of the new jobs. A large number of the 1200 additional posts at Wyton/Brampton will be filled by specialist staff being re-located from other RAF logistics bases, especially Harrogate.



RODERIC LYNE

6 May 1993

foreign\alconbury.sr

DRAFT PRESS STATEMENT OR LINE TO TAKE

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE ANNOUNCEMENT ABOUT WITHDRAWAL FROM RAF ALCONBURY

The United States Air Force has announced today that it will be carrying out a phased withdrawal of its units from RAF Alconbury between July 1993 and September 1995.

This decision is part of the restructuring of American forces following the end of the Cold War. The restructuring has included decisions to close many bases in the USA, as well as to withdraw or regroup units in Britain and elsewhere.

The American authorities are working closely with our own Ministry of Defence on this question. They have not yet decided exactly how the run down of Alconbury will be phased over the next two years. However, I would stress a number of important points:

- The Ministry of Defence intend to keep redundancies to a minimum. So far as possible, they will use natural wastage to help the run down.
- MOD will look for alternative MOD employment for as many as possible of the approximately 580 civilians whom they and the United States authorities employ at Alconbury.
- In particular, MOD expect to be increasing civilian employment at RAF Wyton and RAF Brampton by about 1200 over the next few years, while they are establishing the new Logistics Command Headquarters there. Staff from RAF Alconbury who are suitably qualified will be given priority for new jobs at Wyton and Brampton.

- All staff affected at Alconbury will be offered personal interviews to discuss their future employment.

- The Department of Employment, Department of Trade and Industry and the Training and Enterprise Council have been contacted by MOD so that their services can be made available without delay.

- If the Ministry of Defence decides that it has no alternative use for the site of RAF Alconbury, it expects to discuss non-defence uses with the local authority, and to make the land available for sale.

I shall keep closely in touch with the Ministry of Defence and the other Departments concerned as the run down takes effect.

I welcome the fact that the individuals concerned and the local community are being given plenty of notice of the changes which will take place between now and the autumn of 1995. With the other steps outlined by the Ministry of Defence, this should help us to keep job losses to a minimum.

DEPARTMENT/SERIES	Prem 19	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM (one piece/item number)	4613	
Extract details:	Briefing dated 3 May 1993	X
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cc RB/
f. ss
WSEMINISTRY OF DEFENCE
WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB
Telephone 071-21 82111/2/3

SECRETARY OF STATE

MO 14/2/5M

6 May 1993

*Dear Madam*AMERICAN BASES IN EUROPE

You will be aware from our earlier exchanges on this subject that the next tranche of US military base closures in the UK will be announced on Friday. I am now writing to bring you up to date with the proposals and to cover how they will be handled.

The proposals are as set out in my earlier letters, and covered in the attached US Air Force statement. The major strands of the announcement are as follows:

- Withdrawal from RAF Alconbury by September 1995 with the loss of about 580 jobs.
- Withdrawal from RAF Upper Heyford by September 1994 with the loss of about 525 jobs. (We had previously assumed a move to stand-by status which would have retained about 200 of these posts).
- Withdrawal from RAF Brawdy by September 1996 with the loss of about 75 jobs.
- Withdrawal from RAF Caerwent earlier than expected, by December 1993 rather than Summer 1995.

I should make clear that these figures for job losses cover only staff directly employed either by the US Department of Defense or by the MOD. They do not include personnel employed full time by contractors on the bases (the earlier figure we provided for job losses at Alconbury was higher because it included these contractors' jobs). It must be unlikely that contractors' personnel will be able to move immediately to other work in these circumstances. Our practice is however not to include them in the

R M J Lyne Esq CMG
10 Downing Street

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

total number of jobs that we say will be affected by the decision. At Alconbury the number of directly employed personnel affected will be 479 MOD civil servants and 97 employees of the United States DOD.

The prospects for staff at the bases are as follows:

- The run down will be managed over a period of up to three years, depending on the base. This will give us the opportunity to manage the cut backs as far as possible through natural wastage. Some redundancies are inevitable, particularly among industrial (blue collar) grades.
- Much will depend on the phasing of the run down over the period. The Americans have still not decided how this will be done, but it is highly unlikely that there will be many redundancies in the short term.
- As staff become surplus to requirement we shall seek alternative MOD employment. Mobile grades (Executive Officers and above) will be expected to move if necessary, and financial help will be available for this. But the great majority of those concerned will be non-mobile grades, who will only be eligible for jobs in the immediate travel to work area. Given the contraction of the MOD the possibility of finding such jobs must be slim, with one exception.
- The exception is Alconbury, where the run down should take place over more or less the same timescale as the build up of the new Logistics Command Headquarters at nearby Wyton and Brampton. This new headquarters will create some 1,200 new jobs, in addition to absorbing those civilian posts affected by the move of flying units out of Wyton. Some of these will be filled by staff transferred from Harrogate, but there should nevertheless be sufficient new opportunities either to transfer personnel directly from Alconbury, or (in the case of those who have had to be made redundant) to give priority to former Alconbury staff when recruiting for the new organisation (ie. we shall go to former Alconbury people before we advertise publicly). We shall try to ensure that as far as possible staff are given the opportunity to transfer directly, but this depends on the speed of the American run down and how quickly we build up our own work-force.
- I should also mention that the local effect of the closure of RAF Caerwent will in due course be balanced by the positive impact of housing an infantry battalion at Chepstow.

At all bases affected, all staff will be given personal interviews where their individual preferences will be noted and they will be advised of the options likely to be available to them within the MOD. Those whom we cannot employ will be eligible for our

Redundancy Counselling Service which will give advice on how to find further employment. We have also notified the Department of Employment and the Department of Trade and Industry about the announcement, and we are working with the Training and Enterprise Councils so that their services are made available without delay.


All this assumes that the MOD itself will not find alternative use for the sites. We are currently looking at this, though the chances of finding such a use are slim. A possible exception is RAF Brawdy where we are looking carefully at options for its use by the Army. But our examination is at an early stage and we cannot say anything in public. As a sensible precautionary measure (and our experience is that local authorities welcome this) we shall immediately open negotiations with the councils and others about possible non-defence use for the land.

The news will be conveyed to staff at all sites through meetings addressed by the station commander (or the US base commander in respect of their people) at 1-00pm on Friday. This will be followed by an announcement by the United States Air Force at 2-00pm. We shall not be issuing a Press Release in the MOD, but in briefing we shall draw on the following:

- This is a decision taken by the American Government, and is part of a world-wide reduction in the US Armed Forces. (Other countries affected more than the UK). All countries reducing defence expenditure.
- We were consulted about the proposals and will work closely with the Americans during the implementation period.
- We are looking for alternative MOD uses for the sites, but if no such uses are identified we will proceed quickly with the sale of the land, and in the meantime we will be in close touch with local authorities about non-defence uses.
- If closure is inevitable we will use the time between now and the closures to manage the run down as sympathetically as possible, keep redundancies to a minimum, and find alternative MOD jobs.
- At Alconbury in particular there will be the prospect of 1,200 new jobs at nearby Wyton and Brampton over the next few years, and staff who have served us well at Alconbury will be given priority for these jobs.

Mr Hamilton will be writing to all the MPs concerned tomorrow with details of how the proposals affect their constituency.

I am sending a copy of this letter to John Sawers (FCO), Dugald Sandeman (Lord Presidents Office), David Russell (Employment), Judith Simpson (Welsh Office) and to Melanie Leech (Cabinet Office).

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to be 'J S Pitt-Brooke', written in a cursive style.

(J S PITT-BROOKE)
Private Secretary

MO 14/2/5M

US PRESS STATEMENT

RAF Mildenhall, England -- The United States Air Force in Europe announced today several force structure changes affecting United States military units in the United Kingdom.

RAF Alconbury will be partially returned to the UK Ministry of Defence, September 1995. As a result, the 352nd Special Operations Group will move from RAF Alconbury to RAF Mildenhall beginning October 1994. The 95th Reconnaissance Squadron, also located at RAF Alconbury, will return to the United States in July 1993. Additionally, the designated UK Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force (INF) Treaty port of entry will also move to RAF Mildenhall, April 1995.

RAF Upper Heyford, originally scheduled to be placed on standby status, will now be returned to the Ministry of Defence in September 1994. RAF High Wycombe, previously announced for return to the MOD, will now be retained by the U.S. Navy. The previously announced return of RAF Caerwent in the summer of 1995 has also been changed. RAF Caerwent is now scheduled for return to the MOD by the end of 1993.

RAF Brawdy, a U.S. Navy operated facility, is scheduled to begin return actions April 1, 1996 with final return to MOD by September 30, 1996.

Other changes announced are the return of USAF housing units at Upwood Farm Close, Wittering, Yaxley, Long Hanborough, and Wantage; and the return of the RAF Upper Heywood waste annex.

These announcements are part of larger U.S. closure actions throughout Europe resulting from the easing of tension between East and West. Closure actions will not affect the U.S. commitments to the NATO alliance nor to maintaining a substantial military presence in Europe.



Faxed to PM 1100 hours 7/5 CC/B
cc: Gina Heam
Jordan Hill
Pres.

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
 MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB
 Telephone 071-218 2216 (Direct Dialling)
 071-218 9000 (Switchboard)

MINISTER OF STATE FOR
 THE ARMED FORCES
 D/MIN(AF)/AH/6/1/4

File Ann

6th May 1993

Dear Prime Minister

I am writing to let you know that on Friday 7 May at 1400 hours UK time the US Department of Defense will announce its decision partially to close RAF Alconbury. As you know, RAF Alconbury is a main operating base for US Air Force U-2 reconnaissance aircraft, which will return to the United States by the end of September 1993, and H-53 and C-130 aircraft of the Special Operations Wing, which will relocate to RAF Mildenhall by the end of March 1995.

The US wishes to retain an administrative enclave at the station, but the remainder of the site will be returned to MOD control no later than the end of September 1995. The US also wishes to close and return the contingency hospital at RAF Upwood and will be returning some of the Married Quarters allocated to RAF Alconbury. This includes 253 at RAF Wittering and 44 at RAF Upwood. In addition, the US will be leaving 101 leased houses at Yaxley. This decision by the American Government is part of a world-wide reduction in the US Armed Forces and indeed other countries are affected more than the UK.

There are currently 479 Ministry of Defence civilians (including 11 MOD Police officers) and 97 UK civilians directly employed by the US Air Force at RAF Alconbury. Staff will be advised of the US plans for the station slightly earlier than the public announcement, at 1300 hours on Friday.

It is not yet clear how many UK civilian positions will be required in support of the retained administrative enclave at RAF Alconbury. For those who are not so required, there is the prospect of 1,200 new jobs at nearby Wyton and Brampton at the new RAF Logistics Command which will be formed there over the next couple of years and we will be giving priority to MOD staff, including of course at Alconbury, for those jobs. All MOD staff affected by this decision will be given personal interviews where individual preferences will be carefully and sympathetically considered. Where necessary we will, of course, make every effort to find alternative non-defence employment for MOD civilians.

While MOD employees will be eligible for the Department's Redundancy Counselling and Outplacement Service and for mobile staff, the Department's Relocation Scheme, I





am afraid we cannot make such a commitment to UK civilians directly employed by the US, who is responsible for all severance payments to this category of staff. We will however work very closely with the Americans during the implementation period and will be in close touch with local Training and Enterprise Councils who are being advised of the details of the announcement, including the number of staff affected.

We will, of course, be looking to see if there are any alternative defence uses for the site but it is too early to say whether any will be found. Given our own reductions, I have to say that I do not hold out much hope. If closure is inevitable, we will use the time between now and 1995 to manage the run-down as sympathetically as possible and as a sensible precautionary measure, discussions with the Local Authorities on the future use of the returned site will commence immediately. Our experience is that they welcome this.

I would be grateful if you could treat this information as in confidence until the announcement is made. I am sorry this will be disappointing news both for you and those of your constituents who are affected.

Yours etc
Archie

ARCHIE HAMILTON

The Rt Hon John Major MP



MR ALLAN

cc Mr O'Donnell
Mr Lyne
Mrs Francis
Mr Adams
Mr Bird

PRIME MINISTER'S CONSTITUENCY DAY - REDUNDANCY
ANNOUNCEMENTS

I thought I should alert you to two particular announcements which are likely to become public on Friday.

In the first instance we are anticipating an announcement from the United States about a reduction of about 13-1400 in their forces based in the UK. Alconbury will be severely affected. I have asked MOD to make sure that a note is prepared and sent to us by Thursday.

In addition there is a possibility of some 4,000 mining redundancies to come out on that day. I have asked DTI to see if this could be put off, but they are not optimistic.

I should take this opportunity to reflect concern from the Scottish Office that Hoover is in difficulty and there could be dire news from the whole of the Hoover operation to come forward sometime in the next few weeks. Presumably Mrs Francis will already be aware of this prospect.

Mr Bird will be accompanying the Prime Minister on the constituency day.



JONATHAN HASLAM
5 May 1993

PERSONAL

cc ~~PS~~



~~27 F 14 April~~

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB
Telephone 071-21 82111/2/3

Run.
87 in

SECRETARY OF STATE

MO 14/2/5G

8M April 1993

Dear Roderic,

AMERICAN BASE CLOSURES IN EUROPE

We have discussed further with the US the timing of the next tranche of base closure announcements. It seems that the possibility of an announcement on 16th April is now more remote; the Pentagon has not yet taken a decision on timing. We have made clear how unsatisfactory we would find such short notice; but in any case, it would seem to fall foul of the Americans' own target of providing us with four working days' notice. Initial US reaction to the idea of staggering the announcements has been unenthusiastic. We have therefore emphasised the strong political support here for our second option (an announcement on 7th May).

We will write again shortly with more detailed proposals on presentational handling (and, of course, if we hear anything firm from the US on timing).

cc : Gus
William

Yours ever,

(G A LESTER)
Private Secretary

Mod say 7 May still
the expected date. They
will send more detail
for the weekend box.

Roderic.
26 in

R M J Lyne Esq CMG
10 Downing Street

PERSONAL



Recycled Paper



10 DOWNING STREET

Alex

✓ Thanks.

Peter Ryan rang from the MOD, re the announcements for the closures of U.S. bases. The Americans will not stagger the announcements as was hoped. It is likely that the announcement about all the closures will be made on 16 April. (Apparently the Prime Minister wanted to be in Huntingdon when the announcement was made. Peter Ryan will send a minute.

ScrCh
5.4.93



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB
Telephone 071-21 82111/2/3

SECRETARY OF STATE

MO 14/2J

5 April 1993

Dear Roderic

AMERICAN BASE CLOSURES IN EUROPE

Further to your letter of 30 March and our conversation about timing, the latest indications from the United States are that the Americans will wish to announce the latest round of base closures on Friday 16 April. Although we have been successful in getting a delay until then, it does not seem that they will be willing to agree to any further delays. We have not yet had a decision from the Americans, so if this date causes unacceptable difficulties to the Prime Minister, we could still make urgent representations to that effect. It would be helpful to have a response on this point as early as possible.

Separately, we can certainly assure the Prime Minister that the American announcement will be accompanied by as much positive material as possible.

I am copying this letter to John Sawers (FCO), Dugald Sandeman (Lord President's Office), Peter Wanless (Chief Secretary's Office), David Russell (Employment), Judith Simpson (Welsh Office), Murdo Maclean (Chief Whip's Office) and to Melanie Leech (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever
Peter

(P RYAN)
Private Secretary

R M J Lyne Esq CMG
10 Downing Street



Recycled Paper

PERSONAL



10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

30 March 1993

File
MFJ
cc RB

Dear John,

AMERICAN BASE CLOSURES IN EUROPE

Thank you for your letter of 26 March. The Prime Minister found this most helpful.

The Prime Minister hopes that the American announcement about the closure of the bases in England will be accompanied by positive statements on the future availability of the sites concerned for development.

I have had a word on the telephone about timing considerations.

*yours etc,
Roderic*

RODERIC LYNE

John Pitt-Brooke, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence.

PERSONAL

da



Pl. notes
? delay?
7/52

10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

The shock to Alconbury will be mitigated by 2½ years' notice. Nevertheless there will be a shock effect in the local community, I assume.

What are your thoughts on timing?

- Week of 5 April not a good idea? Easter hol. coming up. You will be travelling (5th-7th).

- Delay to about 16 or 23 April? Time to prepare? Do you want to be in the constituency when the news comes out?

Robert Lyso.
26/4

PERSONAL

CC RB
✓



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB
Telephone 071-21 82111/2/3

SECRETARY OF STATE

MO 14/2/5G

All @ once (or progressively) ?

26 March 1993

Dear Roderic,

AMERICAN BASE CLOSURES IN EUROPE

We spoke about this last night and I agreed I would write bringing you up to date.

The position is that since I wrote on 10th March we have been using the extension of the consultation period to talk to the Americans about the detail of their announcements. This has allowed us to prepare better for the presentation of the news; and also to consider in greater depth the possibility of the RAF using the bases once they are vacated.

The proposals themselves remain precisely as set out in my earlier letters: withdrawal from Upper Heyford by September 1994 with the loss of about 500 jobs; withdrawal from Alconbury by September 1995 with the loss of about 1,000 jobs; and withdrawal from Brawdy by September 1996 with the loss of about 75 jobs.

I am afraid that it looks unlikely that we will be able to identify any alternative RAF use for the sites. We will come to a final decision on this early next week: if we are still unable to identify an RAF task we shall at the appropriate time move towards the disposal of the sites.

The formal period of consultation ends on 31st March and the Americans will be keen to make an announcement. They have suggested to us that we should propose a date for the announcement which is suitable to us. There is an indication that the week beginning 5th April could be convenient for their purposes - though there are of course limits to our influence as the announcement will also include German bases. On the chosen day we will co-ordinate with the Americans the informing of the workforce at the various stations, having advised appropriate Members of Parliament in advance.

R M J Lyne Esq CMG
10 Downing Street

PERSONAL



PERSONAL

I wondered if you had any thoughts on timing. Perhaps we could have a word, after which I will write to you with our proposals for handling more fully set out.


Yours


(J S PITT-BROOKE)
Private Secretary

PERSONAL

cc US Bureau
file

PRIME MINISTER



At to Mr. Alexander
(Rufus here)
Can we help?

MESSAGE FROM ROD LYNE

1. There has been a series of bomb blasts in Bombay. 185 people have been killed. The Press Office are making a statement to express your sympathy and condolences and to say that you will be writing to the Indian Prime Minister (see attached minute).

2. American bases in Europe. The Americans are making a statement in Washington about changes in armed forces at about 5pm our time today (see letter attached). What it will say about Europe is the following:

- the Department of Defence is also reviewing an additional 32 sites in Europe for return or partial return to host governments. These will involve a further draw-down of about 4575 military, 680 US civilian employees and 665 local nationals.

Comment

The figure of 665 strikes the MOD as wrong or misleading, because it is very different from the figures that we had earlier, as you know. Let us not draw any conclusions from that figure at the moment.

MOD have been told that the American consultation period with host nations, ie, the UK and Germany, will now extend until 31 March, so that in early April they will make further announcements about precisely what cuts they are going to make overseas.

3. Bosnia. The situation in Bosnia is getting a little worse in that the Serbs have now been shelling the Moslems who have been surrounding the 11 British soldiers. One shell fell within about 50 metres of the British UN group. No casualties. They were not actually being targeted. In the shelling, however, two Moslems were killed and 9 injured. The shelling has now stopped and the latest news is that the British Major in charge is now said to be pulling out. (However, so far, there are no British casualties.)



PAM

12 March 1993

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CCRB
Press



(26)

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

Telephone 071-21 82111/2/3

Prime Minister (by fax) 11 4 50 pm

SECRETARY OF STATE

MO 14/2J

12 March 1993
Run. m

Dear Roderic,

AMERICAN BASES IN EUROPE

Further to our last conversations, I am now able to give you final details about what the Americans will be saying today.

There will be a statement at 5pm our time along the following lines:

"The Department of Defense is also reviewing an additional 32 sites in Europe for return or partial return to host Governments. This would involve a further drawdown of about 4575 military, 680 US civilian employees, and 665 local nationals."

(We do not recognise the figure of 665. This is of course much lower than the figure for the UK alone quoted in my earlier letters. It certainly does not include the number of MOD civil servants now working for US forces who, although technically 'returned', will in fact be unlikely to be found alternative employment).

As I explained the US decision has been made to allow a longer period of consultation with host nations. We have now been told that this process will end by 31 March with a view to making detailed announcements (along the lines set out in my earlier letters) in early April. We may be able to influence the timing to some limited extent.

|| We shall use this period to think about whether there is anything we can do to lessen the impact of the proposals, and to ensure that they are presented in the best possible way.

We will keep you closely in touch with this work.

R M J Lyne Esq CMG
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL



Recycled Paper

CONFIDENTIAL

I am copying this letter to John Sawers (FCO), Dugald Sandeman (Lord President's Office) Judith Simpson (Welsh Office) and to Melanie Leech (Cabinet Office).

A handwritten signature in black ink, consisting of a stylized 'J' followed by 'S' and a large, sweeping flourish that extends to the right.

(J S PITT-BROOKE)
Private Secretary

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

copy to Louis

cc RJB
pu



Prime Minister

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

Telephone 071-21 82111/2/3

SECRETARY OF STATE

MO 14/2J

If accurate, the slightly better news. A softer landing, and [don't let's count on it] my to 2 1/2 years before Alcoutbury closes.

10 March 1993

Roderic Lyne

Dear Roderic,

top of file

AMERICAN BASE CLOSURES IN EUROPE

Thank you for your letter of earlier today. As I explained when we spoke, we have just heard from the Americans that they have changed their plans (both we and the Germans had registered our unhappiness about the way this was being handled, and it seems that they have responded to our views).

I am afraid that the American intentions are still not precisely clear, but what we understand they are now proposing to say on Friday, when they announce the closures in the United States, is that other bases in Europe (some 32 in number) are being considered for closure, and that any announcement will be held in abeyance pending the completion of the necessary consultation.

The announcement will include specific reference to the closure of a couple of US Navy communication sites in Scotland, but there are no employment implications.

In practice, this will make no difference to the proposals set out in my earlier letters concerning the particular bases in the UK, but it does mean that we will have a little more time to consult and prepare. We do not yet know when the more detailed announcement will come, but we expect to get more notice of this than we have had this week. Depending on the precise terms of what the Americans say, there may well be speculation about which bases will close (the options are fairly obvious). We shall have to deal with this by promising the fullest possible consultation as soon as we have detailed proposals.

Before we heard this, we had been given more detailed information about the date of the final withdrawal of US forces from the bases concerned. The proposed dates are as follows:

R M J Lyne Esq CMG
10 Downing Street

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
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Upper Heyford - end September 1994
Alconbury - September 1995 (a few Americans will remain)
Brawdy - end September 1996

It is unlikely that these dates, or the total numbers of jobs lost set out in my earlier letter, will change.

On balance, we believe this is a welcome change which will give us time to prepare properly for the detailed announcement when it comes. But I should also say that US policy on this matter has been changing so quickly over the last 48 hours that we may still not have heard the last of it.

I am copying this letter to John Sawers (FCO), Dugald Sandeman (Lord President's Office), Peter Wanless (Chief Secretary's Office), David Russell (Employment), Alan Fraser (Scottish Office), Judith Simpson (Welsh Office) and to Melanie Leech (Cabinet Office).



(J S PITT-BROOKE)
Private Secretary

Defence - US Bases

Oct 80

CONFIDENTIAL

f/brooke.pmg



10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

10 March 1993

Dear John,

AMERICAN BASE CLOSURES IN EUROPE

Thank you for your letter of 9 March. I would be grateful if you could continue to keep me closely informed. In particular, it would be helpful to know:

- when we shall see a text of the American statement;
- how soon the closures and job losses to be announced on Friday are likely to take effect. Are we looking at redundancies within a matter of weeks, or of months? Will there be scope to negotiate a timetable which allows a soft-landing for those concerned, and improves the chances of re-employment?
- what form of public reaction your Ministry is proposing to make. It is not clear to me how the MOD press office can "repeat" the American statement "possibly a few hours" before the Americans make it. Could you please send me your draft press line by the close on Thursday 11 March.

I am copying this letter to John Sawers (Foreign and Commonwealth Office), Dugald Sandeman (Lord President's Office), David Russell (Department of Employment), Judith Simpson (Welsh Office) and Melanie Leech (Cabinet Office).

yours etc,
Roderic

RODERIC LYNE

John Pitt-Brooke, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence.

CONFIDENTIAL

as

cc RB



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB
Telephone 071-21 82111/2/3

- 1) copy to lans.
- 2) Prime Minister

SECRETARY OF STATE

MO 14/2J

Axe to fall on Friday evening.
 Much more severe in US &
 Germany.
 Much more nuclear - e.g. how
 soon the jobs will go after
 the announcement.

9 March 1993

Roderic Lys. g/l

Dear Roderic,

AMERICAN BASE CLOSURES IN EUROPE

Thank you for your letter of 8 March. We now have more information from the US Embassy. It is still not absolutely certain that they will proceed as we discussed, though I have to say that nothing we have been told indicates any softening of the position set out in my earlier letter. Our latest understanding is as follows:

Renwick says it firm.

We have still not been told a precise time for the announcement; our latest understanding is there will be a formal statement at 12 noon on Friday Washington time (5pm our time). This is unsatisfactory from the point of view of informing our people, many of whom will have left work by then. We therefore propose to tell those who will be affected during the day on Friday.

The actual announcement to MOD staff will be made by the RAF Station Commanders, probably through a meeting or meetings with all staff in attendance. The US Base Commander will make a similar statement to the directly employed civilian personnel. The trade unions will also be told formally during the course of Friday.

Pre-redundancy measures are immediately initiated for MOD staff. Every effort is made to find alternative employment and to minimize MOD civilian redundancies, though I have to say that it is unlikely that we will be able to find such employment for more than a few staff. Where redundancies are unavoidable, we will make the appropriate payments under the Civil Service Pension Scheme - these will be funded by contributions made by the Americans under the terms of their Agreement with us. All MOD staff are eligible for the Department's Redundancy Counselling and Outplacement Service. The US is responsible for all severance payments for directly employed civilians.

R M J Lyne Esq CMG
10 Downing Street



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Our Embassy in Washington advise that the overall announcement will include extensive US domestic base closures, with some 30 major bases closing and 150 smaller locations consolidated or reduced. Many tens of thousands of US military and civilian jobs will be lost over the next few years. UK and Germany are the only other countries with base closures. We understand Germany's cuts are more extensive than ours and mainly concern the US Army: they include some 18 barracks, training areas and storage complexes, together with a number of housing areas. Numbers of German employees affected by the cuts are not available.

The FCO will approach Washington for advice on further US withdrawals from Europe and reiteration of America's continuing commitment to NATO. I will let you have further advice on this point.

*Robin
Reynolds says
they'll stick
to the existing
100,000
baseline.*

The statement will not be made by Ambassador Seitz. As is the normal practice regarding US base realignment plans, HQ Third Air Force (at Mildenhall) will release a statement for the press. This will be repeated by the MOD press office, possibly a few hours earlier because of the considerations set out above.


*!?
bizarre.*

All MPs whose constituencies are affected will be advised by letter from a MOD Minister 24 hours ^{in advance - i.e.} on Thursday on an in confidence basis. Local Authorities are notified immediately after the announcement.

It is most unlikely that the RAF would have an interest in any of the three Stations. An announcement of the withdrawal of RAF flying training from Brawdy was made on 31 August 92. In the case of the latter, consideration is currently being given to the possibility that the Army should occupy the base. The recent announcement of the retention of additional regiments has created further pressure for this move. The future of the other two sites will have to be considered but it is likely that they will be made available for disposal if no alternative defence use is identified.

I will let you have further information as it becomes available.

I am sending a copy of this letter to John Sawers (FCO), Dugald Sandeman (Lord President's Office), David Russell (Employment), Judith Simpson (Welsh Office) and to Melanie Leech (Cabinet Office).

Yours 

(J S PITT-BROOKE)
Private Secretary

CONFIDENTIAL

DEFENCE : US Bases in UK Oct '80.

CONFIDENTIAL



10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

C - Pl.
ensure know the
incoming letter
CCLB

is properly filed in
No. 10

8 March 1993

Dear John,

AMERICAN BASE CLOSURES IN EUROPE

Thank you for your letter of 5 March.

The Prime Minister has taken note, and looks forward to receiving further information. As the American decision on RAF Alconbury affects his constituency, he wishes it to be clear that no action should be taken which might be viewed as special pleading for the constituency: the question must be handled on its merits, and to do this we need more information. As much of the rationale for Alconbury doubtless related to the now-departed Soviet threat, the American decision is not altogether surprising. We too are realigning our defence policy, for similar reasons.

To deal now with the broad substance of the American proposals, the way in which the overall decision is presented will be important to us. This affects Upper Heyford and Brawdy as much as Alconbury. I should therefore be grateful if the following steps could be put in hand:

- (i) can you find out as soon as possible when the Americans will be making their announcement (i.e. the hour of day on 12 March, in Washington and London times); and who will be making it. Can we be shown an advance text of the announcement as a whole? If not, can we be briefed as fully as possible on the overall programme of closures? Will the USA and Germany be taking proportionately heavier cuts than the UK? Are bases in any other countries affected?
- (ii) in the course of their announcement, which may well be represented in some quarters as the beginnings of a new policy of withdrawal from Europe by the Clinton Administration, we will obviously wish the Americans to reiterate their commitment to Europe and to NATO. Do they intend to do this? If not, can we persuade them?

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

- (iii) what steps will the Americans be taking to present their decision in this country? For example, will Ambassador Seitz be making statements and giving interviews? On what lines?
- (iv) what plans do you or the Americans have to give advance information - on a private but unclassified basis - to all of the MPs whose constituencies are affected, and to the relevant local authorities?
- (v) how will the British employees (and their unions) be informed?
- (vi) what plans are the RAF formulating for the three RAF stations concerned? Will they be put to alternative military use? If not, will they be made available for housing/agriculture/industry? Are there other ways in which the effect of the American decision upon the local economies can be offset?

I note that the Americans gave you this information on the afternoon of Friday 5 March, expressing the wish to complete what they call "consultations" by 8 March - i.e. by the next working day. As their timescale has not given the Government time to reach a formed view on their proposal, and indeed they have not given us sufficient information on which to base one, I imagine that you will not be able to make a detailed response. It would be helpful if you could let me know in what terms you propose to reply to the Americans. In so doing, I am sure that you will wish to take account of the points in this letter; but I would ask you not to attribute them to the Prime Minister, for the reason given at the outset. They are points, subject to your views and those of other recipients, which will be of general concern to us all.

I assume that the FCO will ensure that our Embassy in Washington is briefed.

I am sending a copy of this letter to John Sawers (Foreign and Commonwealth Office), Dugald Sandeman (Lord President's Office), David Russell (Department of Employment), Judith Simpson (Welsh Office) and Melanie Leech (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,
Roderic Lyne

RODERIC LYNE

John Pitt-Brooke, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence.

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIME MINISTER

cc Mr. Allan

File

Handwritten: It will be a thought -
at least with me or
(it) he doesn't + should have. Either way, words of.

Mr. O'Donnell

AMERICAN PROPOSAL FOR PARTIAL CLOSURE OF ALCONBURY

Handwritten: Pl. Reber Monday 7.3

I attach the MoD's Friday night bomb-shell - but this time they are innocent parties.

As you will see, the Americans are "consulting" us between now and Monday 8 of their intention to announce a raft of defence closures (in the US, Germany and the UK) on 12 March including: Upper Heyford, Brawdy and Alconbury. Most of the 1000 odd British employees at Alconbury would stand to lose their jobs. Sorry to be the bearer of bad news.

Unprompted by us, MoD have pointed out the politics of Alconbury to the US Embassy, who have in turn signalled the Pentagon.

At this late stage, the American decision must be almost set in concrete. Their "consultation" may be little more than a fiction. If they are winding up a major announcement on base closures on their domestic market, they will be reluctant to have the dog wagged by a British tail.

That said:

- we could try to discuss this in a more direct way than MoD have with the Americans
- there might be a little flexibility in the timing
- conceivably, but perhaps even less likely, there might be some flexibility in the substance
- failing that, you will wish to consider local political handling.

You may wish to discuss on Monday morning, or by phone over the weekend.

Handwritten signature: Roderic Lyne

RODERIC LYNE

5 March 1993 foreign\alconbury.sr

PRIME MINISTER

cc Mr. Allan

M Whyne
It would be helpful
if the announcement came
on Budget day, but if that's not
 possible I would at least like
early notice of the timing. *Cons 8/3.*

Mr. O'Donnell**AMERICAN PROPOSAL FOR PARTIAL CLOSURE OF ALCONBURY**

I attach the MoD's Friday night bomb-shell - but this time they are innocent parties.

As you will see, the Americans are "consulting" us between now and Monday 8 of their intention to announce a raft of defence closures (in the US, Germany and the UK) on 12 March including: Upper Heyford, Brawdy and Alconbury. Most of the 1000 odd British employees at Alconbury would stand to lose their jobs. Sorry to be the bearer of bad news.

Unprompted by us, MoD have pointed out the politics of Alconbury to the US Embassy, who have in turn signalled the Pentagon.

At this late stage, the American decision must be almost set in concrete. Their "consultation" may be little more than a fiction. If they are winding up a major announcement on base closures on their domestic market, they will be reluctant to have the dog wagged by a British tail.

That said:

- we could try to discuss this in a more direct way than MoD have with the Americans
- there might be a little flexibility in the timing
- conceivably, but perhaps even less likely, there might be some flexibility in the substance
- failing that, you will wish to consider local political handling.

You may wish to discuss on Monday morning, or by phone over the weekend.

Roderic Lyne

RODERIC LYNE

5 March 1993 foreign\alconbury.sr

SECRET

CCRP



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB
Telephone 071-21 82111/2/3

SECRETARY OF STATE

MO 14/2/5J

5 March 1993

Dear Roderic

AMERICAN BASE CLOSURES IN EUROPE

You should be aware that we have just been notified that next week the US Administration intends to make a further announcement on military base closures in the UK. The proposals cut much deeper than the previous plans that had been put to us.

We have been told by the Embassy that they wish to complete consultations by 8 March to enable an announcement to be made on 12 March. The US authorities are aware of the very short notice (the Embassy were particularly apologetic - they had only heard themselves this morning). But wish to include the UK proposals (and even larger proposals concerning bases in Germany) in an overall announcement on defence closures in the US which will take place on the same day.

The major bases concerned are RAF Upper Heyford (462 MOD personnel and 87 directly employed UK nationals stand to lose their jobs), the US Naval facility at RAF Brawdy (74 MOD personnel), and RAF Alconbury where the proposals include partial closure which we understand to be a withdrawal of operational units leaving only an administrative enclave (judged at this stage to be 472 MOD employees and 542 directly UK nationals). In other words, the number of UK civilians and UK employees affected will be in excess of 1600: it is likely that the great majority of these will have to be made redundant.

We are talking to the Americans as a matter of urgency to get a better idea of the detail of their plans, in particular on the timing of the actual closures, and on the future of RAF Alconbury where the proposals will leave a major base with only a small presence. I will of course keep you closely in touch with this and will report as soon as I know more. But we have been given no indication that there is any prospect of delay in the announcement;

R M J Lyne Esq CMG
10 Downing Street

SECRET



Recycled Paper

and I fear that on past experience there will be little we can do to prevent this happening.

I am sending a copy of this letter to John Sawers (FCO), Dugald Sandeman (Lord President's Office), David Russell (Employment), Judith Simpson (Welsh Office) and to Melanie Leech (Cabinet Office).

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'J S Pitt-Brooke', written in a cursive style.

(J S PITT-BROOKE)
Private Secretary

SECRET

CCRP
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MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB
Telephone 071-21 82111/2/3

SECRETARY OF STATE

MO 14/2/5J

5 March 1993

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R M J Lyne Esq CMG
10 Downing Street


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Recycled Paper

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(J S PITT-BROOKE)
Private Secretary

Defence Oct 80
~~At~~ US bases



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

Telephone 071-218 2216 (Direct Dialling)
071-218 9000 (Switchboard)

MINISTER OF STATE FOR
THE ARMED FORCES

D/MIN(AF)/AH/9/15

✓ 19 December 1991 *fl*

Prime Minister to see X
[Signature]

Dear Dominic,

The US Embassy has asked for our agreement to a further round of redeployments involving US forces in the UK, specifically at RAF Greenham Common and the Thurso Naval Communications Station. My Minister is content with the US proposals, and wishes to inform colleagues before the US announcement next month.

X Greenham Common. Since the departure of the last cruise missiles earlier this year, Greenham Common has reverted to its former role as a US standby base. The US have now informed us that they wish to withdraw from the base in the Autumn of 1992. This raises two issues related to the INF Treaty. Firstly, Greenham Common is the designated point of entry (POE) for Soviet inspection teams wishing to visit the former GLCM facilities on the base and at Molesworth. In the light of their withdrawal from Greenham Common the US have suggested RAF Alconbury (near Molesworth) as the new POE, and this seems sensible. The procedure to effect the change would be for the FCO (representing the former basing country) to send a diplomatic note to the US, who in turn would notify the Soviet Union (or its successors). The US are required to give the Soviet Union at least five months' notice of the change, and they would hope to do this before the public announcement in January.

Under the INF Treaty, Greenham Common also remains subject to short notice inspection until 2001. This might prove inconvenient to us, particularly if we decided to dispose of the site for commercial development. We therefore intend to ask the Americans to explore with the Soviet Union under what conditions future inspections might be waived after the US withdrawal.

Thurso. This re-organisation involves a contraction of US Navy communications activities in the Thurso area. A small site at Murkle will be relinquished in September 1992 and the





main operation at Forss reduced by the end of that year. However, it is not yet clear how the residual task will be managed; one possibility is that the US will retain the site, contracturise its maintenance, and run it remotely from Edzell. The US Navy employ some 70 UK civilians in the area, and redundancies are inevitable.

I am copying this letter to Ken Thompson (Scottish Office); and to Dominic Morris (10 Downing Street) because of the Prime Minister's constituency interest in RAF Alconbury, and to Tim Sutton (Lord President's office).

Yours,

J A Miller

J A MILLER
Private Secretary

The Hon Dominic Asquith
PS/Minister of State
Foreign and Commonwealth Office



DEF: Mildenhall



L

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

24 February 1991

The Prime Minister was grateful for the Defence Secretary's letter of 21 February about the decision to agree the deployment of six F16 aircraft from Germany to RAF Alconbury in March to carry out air weapons training. He is content with this.

(C. D. POWELL)

Simon Webb, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence.

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copy

(2)



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB
Telephone 071-21 82111/3

SECRETARY OF STATE

John Major

*CGO
2242*

MO 6/17/15/1J

21st February 1991

*Content.
Thanks f23.2*

John,

I am writing to let you know that the United States Air Force have requested and I have agreed to the deployment of six F16 aircraft from Germany to RAF Alconbury between 4th and 28th March, to carry out air weapons training in the UK.

This training is normally conducted from air bases in Spain and Turkey but activity there in support of Operation Desert Storm has prevented this. There would be no low flying in the UK, other than within range areas, and flying will not take place either at weekends or during silent hours.

I hope that your constituents will not be unduly disturbed by this training activity.

Tom King

Tom King

The Rt Hon John Major MP



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TELNO 205
OF 260415Z JANUARY 90
AND TO IMMEDIATE MODUK
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SIC EME

MODUK FOR HEAD S9 (AIR)
HEAD SEC (NATO/UK)(P)
D NUC POL/SY
MY TELNO 204:
US BASE CLOSURES

mt

1. FOLLOWING MY MEETING WITH HIM THIS AFTERNOON (MIPT),
BARTHOLOMEW TELEPHONED TO ME THIS EVENING TO SAY THAT HE HAD NOW
HAD IT FROM CHENEY PERSONALLY THAT THERE WOULD BE NO MENTION OF
UPPER HEYFORD IN THE ANNOUNCEMENT. STATE WOULD BE SENDING A
MESSAGE TO THIS EFFECT TO CATTO OVERNIGHT, AND CHENEY MIGHT TRY
TO CALL MR KING. BUT BARTHOLOMEW WANTED US TO BE IN NO DOUBT:
THERE WOULD BE NO MENTION OF UPPER HEYFORD.

COMMENT

2. BARTHOLOMEW WAS CATEGORIC. BUT, CHENEY IS UNDER INTENSE
DOMESTICE PRESSURE TO SPREAD THE BURDEN OF DEFENCE CUTS ABROAD
AS WELL AS AT HOME. SO, IN ADVANCE OF MR KING'S VISIT HERE NEXT
WEEK, IT COULD DO NO HARM FOR HIM TO RING CHENEY ON 26 JANUARY
TO THANK HIM FOR TAKING OUR CONCERNS INTO ACCOUNT.

ACLAND

YYYY

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MR BEAMISH
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MR KIDD SEC POL

PAGE 1
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MR WESTON
MR GILLMORE

CABINET OFFICE
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MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB
Telephone 01-218 2111/3

CDP 26/1

MO 14/2/5S

26 January 1990

Dear Charles,

US BASES IN THE UK

attached

Ambassador Catto telephoned the Defence Secretary this morning to follow-up their discussion the previous afternoon (recorded in my second letter to you of 25th January). The Ambassador said that his reporting to Washington of that meeting had resulted in Mr Cheney deciding personally to omit any mention of Upper Heyford in the announcement of the US Defence Budget; the rest of the package of measures affecting US bases would be announced as indicated in Mr Cheney's letter. The Defence Secretary said that he was very grateful, but reminded the Ambassador that the UK Government had also yet to agree the F15E deployment (it was unclear whether this is or is not likely to be mentioned in the announcement).

Mr King asked the Ambassador whether it would be helpful for him to telephone Mr Cheney himself to offer his thanks, but Mr Catto thought this would be "gilding the lily". He offered instead to pass on a message, pending Mr King's arrival in Washington.

Yours sincerely,

John Webb

(S WEBB)
Private Secretary

Charles Powell Esq
No 10 Downing Street

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FM UKDEL NATO
TO DESKBY 251845Z FCO
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OF 251820Z JANUARY 90
AND TO IMMEDIATE MODUK
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, BONN, PARIS

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MODUK FOR HEAD S9(AIR), HEAD SEC(NATO/UK)(P) AND D NUC POL/SY

U S BASE CLOSURES
SUMMARY

1. U S MISSION GIVES ADVANCE BRIEFING ON CLOSURE OF CERTAIN BASES IN UK. SIMILAR BRIEFING BEING GIVEN IN LONDON. COUNCIL TO BE INFORMED TOMORROW. EMBARGO REQUESTED UNTIL MONDAY.

DETAIL

2. THE U S MISSION THIS AFTERNOON PASSED TO US A COPY OF A LETTER TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL (FAXED TO FCO AND MOD) INFORMING HIM IN GENERAL TERMS OF CLOSURES IN GERMANY, GREECE, TURKEY AND THE UK, AS WELL AS KOREA, THE PHILIPPINES AND THE U S ITSELF, WHICH WILL BE ANNOUNCED BY SECRETARY CHENEY TO A PRESS BRIEFING ON SATURDAY AND TO CONGRESS NEXT MONDAY. DETAILS OF EUROPEAN CLOSURES WOULD NOT BE MADE PUBLIC UNTIL MONDAY AND AN EMBARGO WAS REQUESTED UNTIL THEN. THE LETTER CONTAINS DETAILS OF HOW U S BASES IN THE UK WILL BE AFFECTED. THE U S WILL FOLLOW UP THE LETTER, WHICH WE UNDERSTAND HAS ALREADY BEEN PASSED TO THE MOD IN LONDON, WITH A STATEMENT IN THE NAC TOMORROW.

3. THE BASE CLOSURES AND CONSOLIDATIONS ARE JUSTIFIED ON THE GROUNDS OF REDUCING DEFENCE EXPENDITURE THROUGH EFFICIENCIES. IT IS STRESSED THAT MOST MAJOR BASE REALIGNMENTS IN EUROPE ARE BEING DEFERRED UNTIL CFE IS CONCLUDED, AND THAT THE U S COMMITMENT TO EUROPE REMAINS UNCHANGED.

4. MAIN CHANGES IN THE UK ARE NO FOLLOW-ON USE FOR GREENHAM COMMON AND REMOVAL OF 13 TANKER AIRCRAFT FROM FAIRFORD TO MILDENHALL. BOTH GREENHAM COMMON AND FAIRFORD WILL REVERT TO STAND-BY STATUS. THE AGGRESSOR SQUADRON AT BENTWATERS IS TO BE WITHDRAWN BUT OTHER ACTIVITIES AT BENTWATERS (INCLUDING THE PLANNED DEPLOYMENT OF F15ES) WILL CONTINUE. WEATHERSFIELD IS TO CLOSE. ALL OF THESE CHANGES WILL BE COMPLETED BY SEPTEMBER 1991. UPPER HEYFORD IS TO CLOSE IN 1994

PAGE 1
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AND THE SUBSEQUENT DISPOSITION OF ITS F111S WILL BE DECIDED IN THE CONTEXT OF CFE. FINALLY, THE U S NAVAL BASE IN BERMUDA WILL REDUCED TO STAND-BY STATUS DURING 1991.

5. IN DISCUSSION WITH THE DELEGATION, THE U S DEPUTY DEFENCE ADVISER FOCUSED PRIMARILY ON UPPER HEYFORD. HE EMPHASISED THAT THE AIRCRAFT CONCERNED WERE OLD AND POSED AN ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEM FOR THE UK. THE DEPLOYMENT OF F15ES WOULD ENSURE THAT THE USAF'S OVERALL CAPABILITY (ESPECIALLY IN THE NUCLEAR ROLE) WAS MAINTAINED AND EVEN ENHANCED. SOME F111S FROM UPPER HEYFORD WOULD PROBABLY BE REDEPLOYED TO LAKENHEATH. HE STRESSED THAT BECAUSE THIS MOVE (UNLIKE THE OTHERS) WAS BEING UNDERTAKEN IN THE CONTEXT OF CFE, THE DECISION WOULD NOT BE TAKEN UNILATERALLY.

6. THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE AGGRESSOR SQUADRON WAS PUT IN TERMS OF THE USAF CUTTING ALL UNITS OF THIS KIND TOGETHER WITH ALL OTHER SPECIALISED OPERATIONAL TRAINING UNITS, AND MOVING TO A SYSTEM BASED ON OPERATIONAL TRAINING BEING CONDUCTED AT SQUADRON LEVEL.

7. NO DETAILS WERE FORTHCOMING ON OTHER BASE CLOSURES IN NATO COUNTRIES, EXCEPT THAT CROTONE WOULD NOT BE AFFECTED.

ALEXANDER

YYYY

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
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PAGE 2
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CCP



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
 MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB
 Telephone 01-218 2111/3

MO 14/2/5S

25 January 1990

Dear Charles;

US BASES IN THE UK

The United States Ambassador called on the Defence Secretary this afternoon to deliver the letter from Mr Cheney on changes to US bases in the UK. Mr Catto was accompanied by Mr Hurd from the Embassy; the Minister (Armed Forces), the Vice Chief of Defence Staff and the DUS (Policy) were present with Mr King.

The Ambassador took as read the terms of the letter and his notes which we received earlier in the day (and forwarded to you with my letter). He said that the US authorities would be anxious to be helpful about the public affairs side, in particular local presentation.

Mr King said he was grateful to have advance notice of the proposed announcement but the notification was none too soon if these were to be handled effectively in the UK. It would be important to ensure that announcements and public lines were carefully co-ordinated. In particular UK public opinion would want to be reassured that the changes were not part of a major pull-out by the US and that there was a continuing commitment both to NATO and to Europe.

On the detailed proposals, most of them gave no particular difficulty. It would be important where the USAF were leaving bases to refer not to "closing" RAF Stations but to "vacating" them. It was possible that the UK might wish to use some of them for its own Armed Forces. We had not, of course, yet agreed to FISE deployments and had raised the questions last October

The part of the letter that gave us real difficulty was the proposed announcement of withdrawal from Upper Heyford in 1994. It was unclear what would happen to the F-111s based there (which form nearly half of the US strike aircraft in the UK, and a sizeable proportion of NATO's overall intermediate range assets). Questions would be raised to which we had no answers yet. The manpower reductions would also be sizeable, some 4500 compared to 1500 at

Charles Powell Esq
 No 10 Downing Street



all the other bases put together. DUS(Policy) commented that under prospective CFE arrangements, if there were aircraft still in the UK in 1994, the Treaty rules might require them to be destroyed. It was not at all clear how this proposal related to CFE. The Vice Chief of Defence Staff added that it was also unclear how this proposal related to the planned deployment of 36 F-15Es to Bentwater. There was a risk of significant reductions in NATO's nuclear assets.

Concluding this part of the discussion, Mr King asked Mr Catto to report to his authorities the concerns of the UK Government and their hopes that specific references to Upper Heyford could be avoided in the Budget Announcement, whatever the US Government's private plans. At this point Mr King had to leave for another appointment and Mr Hamilton continued discussions about handling the US announcement.

A firm line on Upper Heyford was taken in consort with the FCO who are instructing the Embassy in Washington similarly. We and they would advise that the Prime Minister takes the same line with President Bush if he calls.

A copy of this letter goes to Stephen Wall (FCO).

Yours sincerely,

John Webb

(S WEBB)
Private Secretary

SECRET

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17a-d



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB
Telephone 01-218 2111/3

MO 14/2L

25 January 1990

Dear Charles

with
copy?

Stephen Wall has already forwarded to you a brief on the effect on the UK of likely US Defence Budget cuts in his letter of 25th January.

Ambassador Catto has asked to call on the Defence Secretary this afternoon to delivery a letter from Mr Cheney to Mr King on this subject. We have managed to elicit a advanced copy together with the Ambassador's speaking notes, of which a copy is enclosed. There are a few details which are different from the picture set out in Stephen Wall's letter:

- a) The likely closure of US Air Force base at Upper Heyford in 1994;
- b) Putting into standby the US Naval Base in Bermuda;
- c) Making public the move of F16 aircraft from Bentwaters;
- d) but, on the plus side, confirmation of plans to deploy F15Es to RAF Bentwaters (though these have yet to be firmly approved by the UK, of course)

I expect that the news about RAF Upper Heyford will cause Mr King to express even more concern that the CFE process should not be undermined prematurely. We are making plans for handling the public relations side of this issue in the UK. In Mr King's absence, the Minister(AF), will be overseeing these arrangements.

I am copying this letter to Stephen Wall, (FCO).

Yours truly, Simon Webb

(S WEBB)
Private Secretary

Charles Powell
No 10 Downing Street

SECRET

Dear Colleague:

As part of the worldwide force structure adjustments necessitated by budget restraints, we are planning actions that will affect the disposition of certain U.S. Forces stationed in the United Kingdom. I wanted to take this opportunity to alert you to these planned changes.

Specifically, RAF Fairford would be placed into standby status and maintained by a caretaker force starting in October 1990. Unit inactivation would begin in mid 1990 with the 11th Strategic Group and 13 (rotational) KC135's relocated to RAF Mildenhall. The 527th Aggressor Squadron at RAF Bentwaters would be inactivated on 30 September 1990, and RAF Wethersfield would close in April 1991 with unit inactivation scheduled to begin in October 1990. Finally, the Air Force plans to close Upper Heyford in 1994. The disposition of forces there will be contingent on a CFE agreement.

The U.S. Navy plans to put the naval base in Bermuda into standby status in early FY 1991. We will plan careful consultations with the Bermuda Government and all interested parties on any difficulties imposed by this change and on how we can best manage this transition.

With regard to RAF Greenham Common, the U.S. Air Force has cancelled its plans for follow-on use of the base and plans to place it in standby status in September 1991. Unit inactivation and personnel drawdown to caretaker force are already in progress in accordance with the INF Treaty. Given our substantial construction costs, however, we maintain a residual interest in RAF Greenham Common and would be available to discuss residual value compensation should you desire to use those facilities in the future.

In order to facilitate this planning and to minimize the impact on all concerned, we plan to announce these changes next week. The Commander, U.S. Air Forces in Europe, and his designated representatives will work closely with your Ministry to effect the implementation of these changes.

I am looking forward to our discussions in Washington later this month, and wish you a safe trip.

Sincerely,

/s/
Richard Cheney

SECRET

SECRET

PLANNED U.S. BASE CLOSURES

-- The United States has completed a review of its military base structure and has decided that it should close or reduce the size of a number of military facilities in the U.S. and worldwide, repeat worldwide. We are therefore initiating consultations with you, as appropriate, and intend to follow up as rapidly as possible.

-- The major reason for the adjustments which we plan to take this year is to reduce defense expenditures through efficiencies. Functions would be consolidated, modernization would permit efficiencies, and units with older equipment would be deactivated.

-- Most of the closures will be at military bases in the U.S. Some are planned at overseas facilities. We are deferring most major base realignments in Europe until CFE is concluded.

-- The U.S. commitment to a robust forward military presence in partnership with our Allies remains unchanged.

-- We want to work closely with you on a plan to implement these adjustments and to hand over the facilities to your forces, where appropriate.

-- The announcement of these planned adjustments and consultations will be made in Washington on Monday. We would appreciate it if you did not make any public statements or comments until then and kept this information closely held until that time.

-- We would like to consolidate our Air Force presence that is now spread over several RAF facilities. A number of bases would be affected.

-- First, we have determined that we have no follow-on use for the GLCM base at Greenham Common. We would like to place it in standby status by September 1991.

-- Second, we would like to consolidate the activities at RAF Mildenhall, moving the 13 rotational tankers and the 11th Strategic Group from RAF Fairford.

-- Thus, the third base involved, RAF Fairford would be put into standby status beginning this October.

-- Fourth, the Aggressor Squadron at Bentwaters would be deactivated by this September, but other activities at Bentwaters would remain.

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-- Fifth, RAF Wethersfield would be deactivated beginning this October and fully closed by April 1991.

-- In addition, we would plan to close RAF Upper Heyford in 1994. The disposition of its forces would be decided in the context of CFE.

-- We would continue to plan the deployment of F-15Es, as we have discussed, to RAF Bentwaters.

-- Also, we would place the U.S. Naval Base in Bermuda on a standby status during fiscal year 1991.

-- Secretary Baker and FM Hurd will meet Monday, January 29 and can discuss this matter, and the Secretary of Defense will discuss this matter in greater detail with Minister King during their meeting in Washington next week.

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

(Today copy follows)

CC PC



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

Telephone 01-218 2111/3

MO 14/2/55

25 January 1990

Dear Charles,

US BASES IN THE UK

The United States Ambassador called on the Defence Secretary this afternoon to deliver the letter from Mr Cheney on changes to US bases in the UK. Mr Catto was accompanied by Mr Hurd from the Embassy; the Minister (Armed Forces), the Vice Chief of Defence Staff and the DUS (Policy) were present with Mr King.

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Charles Powell Esq
No 10 Downing Street

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1500 at all the other bases put together. DUS(Policy) added that if there were any prospective CFE arrangements for aircraft still in the UK in 1994, the Treaty rules might require them to be destroyed. It was not at all clear how this proposal related to CFE. The Vice Chief of Defence Staff added that it was also unclear how this proposal related to the planned deployment of 36 F-15Es to Bentwater. There was a risk of significant reductions in NATO's nuclear assets. Concluding this part of the discussion, Mr King asked Mr Catto to report to his authorities the concerns of the UK Government and their hopes that specific references to Upper Heyford could be avoided in the Budget Announcement, whatever the US Government's private plans. At this point Mr King had to leave for another appointment and Mr Hamilton continued discussions about handling the US announcement.

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A copy of this letter goes to Stephen Wall (FCO).

Ym
Sm

(S WEBB)
Private Secretary

cape



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
 MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB
 Telephone 01-218 2111/3

MO 14/2/5L

Prime Minister

20th May 1988

COP 2075

mf

Dear General,

DEPLOYMENT OF USAF F-16 AIRCRAFT TO RAF BENTWATERS

The Prime Minister will wish to be aware that the Defence Secretary has agreed to a request from the United States authorities for approval to replace a squadron of 18 F-5 fighter aircraft (which are rapidly becoming obsolescent) currently based at RAF Alconbury in Cambridgeshire with an equal number of modern F-16 single-seat aircraft to be based at RAF Bentwaters in Suffolk. The reason for the change in location is to enable the USAF to concentrate some of its latest aircraft types at Bentwaters, which has the appropriate facilities.

The role of the present squadron of F-5s, which was established in 1976, is to provide "Aggressor" air combat training by simulating hostile aircraft, but it is also available for the air defence of the United Kingdom in war. This commitment will continue, and is valued highly by the Royal Air Force. So too is the training experience provided by the aircraft, particularly since the facility is unique in Europe.

The F-16 has not previously been based in the United Kingdom and it is very likely that the arrival of the aircraft will give rise to some public comment since it is widely known that, unlike the F-5, the F-16 is dual capable. Indeed, F-16s deployed in Continental Europe are included in public presentations of the nuclear balance such as our own recent White Paper. But we shall make clear that the F-16s are being deployed here simply as one-for-one replacements for the ageing F-5s in the air combat training role, and that the aircrew involved are trained for precisely that role. We shall similarly be prepared to refute any suggestion that the F-16s represent an early manifestation of Alliance adjustments to the NATO nuclear stockpile post-INF. Nor does the arrival of F-16s here have any direct connection with the re-location of the F-16s presently based in Spain, although we understand that 5 of the aircraft will be drawn from the pool of reserve airframes presently used to sustain the Torrejon wing.

Charles Powell Esq
 10 Downing Street



The local MPs, Mr Gummer for Bentwaters and Mr Major for Alconbury, are being informed of the changes and Mr Younger proposes to make a low key announcement next week.

I am sending copies of this letter to Lyn Parker (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read "I C F Andrews". The signature is written in a cursive style with a large initial "I" and a long horizontal stroke.

(I C F ANDREWS)
Private Secretary

Jp 0502

MR POWELL

CSP
29/2Security at Menwith Hill

We spoke about possible US anxieties over the state of security at Menwith Hill Station. I have made enquiries and am assured that there is no present concern either locally or in NSA. Peter Marychurch is content present arrangements are satisfactory.

2. The story may have arisen as a result of anxieties over the effect of the US attack on Libya in 1986. Following that attack the then Chief of Station at Menwith Hill asked for increased security measures. He was particularly concerned about large Muslim communities in the area, not least in Leeds. In June 1986 a car containing three men "of Middle East appearance" particularly worried him. They turned out to be anti-Qadhafi Libyans, who were doing nothing particularly sinister. As a result, however, various improvements to security were made at the station. The then Chief of Station tended to be alarmist and it is possible that highly coloured accounts of the situation filtered back to Washington. But all is in order now.



PERCY CRADOCK

26 February 1988

ACDS(Pol/Nuc)394/86

21 July 1986

APS/Minister(AF)

Copy to:

→ PS/SofS

PS/Minister(DP)

PS/USofS(AF)

PSO/CDS

MA/VCDS

PS/DUS(P)

D Nuc Pol/Sy

S9(Air)

D Nuc Systems

D Air Plans


D Air Eng 2(RAF)

WEAPON STORAGE VAULTS

Reference: ACDS(Pol/Nuc)369/86 dated 14 July 1986

*Pa Case
No Strong?*

1. I undertook to advise Minister(AF) on whether the Secretary of State should be advised to raise the unfortunate disclosure to Congress of USAF plans for the installation of Weapon Storage and Security Systems at bases in the United Kingdom with Secretary Weinberger. As this is now "water under the bridge", I do not recommend further action.



J C K SLATER
Rear Adm
ACDS(Pol/Nuc)

SECRET



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

20 May 1986

PQ BY MR DAFYDD WIGLEY

Thank you for your letter of 19 May about the answer to Mr Dafydd Wigley's PQ.

I agree that the reply proposed in paragraph 7 of Mr Nicholls' submission would be appropriate.

Charles Powell

John Howe Esq
Ministry of Defence

SECRET



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1

Telephone 01-930 7022

MO 11/2/2L

19th May 1986

Dear Charles,

PQ BY MR DAFYDD WIGLEY: TO ASK THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
DEFENCE, WHETHER HE WILL PUBLISH THE TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT
GOVERNING THE USE BY THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA OF
CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS BASED IN THE UNITED KINGDOM

/ I attach a submission to Mr Stanley about which I consulted you on the telephone this evening. Would you let me know as soon as practicable whether the formulation in Mr Nicholls' paragraph 7 raises any problems? As you will see from Mr Nicholls' minute, the Cabinet Office and the FCO are content.

*Yours sincerely,
John Howe*

(J F HOWE)

Charles Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

4920 75 Mr Dafydd Elis Thomas (Meirionnydd Nant Conwy): To ask the Prime Minister, if she will describe the rôle of each department concerned in the United Kingdom nuclear weapons programme.
m(bd) 6th MAY '86 6/5

4921 14 Mr Dafydd Wigley (Caernarfon): To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, whether he will publish the terms of the agreement governing the use by the United States of America of conventional weapons based in the United Kingdom.
m(AF) 7th MAY '86 7/5

4922 89 Mr Eric Deakins (Walthamstow): To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, if he will seek to ensure that the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation gives a public commitment to no first use of chemical weapons; and if he will make a statement.
m(AF) 3/5

4923 126 Mr Stefan Terlezki (Cardiff West): To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, if there is any evidence that ships of the Royal Navy, at present in the Mediterranean, have been affected by the nuclear explosion in Chernobyl in the Ukraine; and if he will make a statement.
m(AF) 8/5

4924 204 Mr George Foulkes (Carrick, Cumnock and Doon Valley): To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, when he was informed by the United States authorities of the incident in March when USS 'Nathaniel Greene' ran aground in the Irish Sea; whether there was any damage to the nuclear propulsion unit or if the Poseidon missiles aboard were armed; what action he took as a result; and if he will make a statement.
m(AF) 9/5

4925 255 Mr Austin Mitchell (Great Grimsby): To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, whether he has received representations from or held consultations with the fishing industry about the siting of dumps to contain the waste from nuclear submarines.
m(bd) 8th MAY '86 9/5

4926 142 Mr Gavin Strang (Edinburgh East): To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, by what method the Government assesses the amount of chemical warfare agent in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics' stockpile.
m(AF) 12/5

4927 163 Mr Gavin Strang (Edinburgh East): To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what is Her Majesty's Government's policy on the production of chemical weapons, or chemical weapons components, by British firms.
m(AF) 14/5

4928 INFO FOR THIS QUESTION TIME:
COBAN'S GUARDIAN ARTICLE: TRAFICHER 'MISLEAD MRS ON F1-11'S USE IN BANG'
m(bd)

4929 DEBATE ON THE MOTION ON THE WHITSUN ADJOURNMENT.

SECRET

AUS(DS) (293/86)

16 May 1986

APS/Minister(AF)

Copies to:

APS/S of S
PS/PUS
CPR
D Nuc Pol Sy
Head of Sec(O)(C)
Head of S9(Air)
Head of Sec(NATO/UK)(C)
Head of Sec(AS)

PQ 4921: MR DAFYDD WIGLEY - US BASES IN UK

1. In your minute of 15 May, you asked for my views on Minister(AF)'s proposed reply to Mr Dafydd Wigley's Question.
2. I am afraid that the Minister's proposed answer could raise more questions than it solves. There are, in essence, two types of document in the House of Commons Library quoting from the Churchill/Truman Communique of January 1952:-
 - a. a reproduction of the complete text in Keesing's Contemporary Archives. A copy of the relevant page is attached; the paragraph in question is to be found in the left-hand column. It would, however, look a little odd to refer the MP to a non-Government publication; worse, it might raise questions as to the precise status of the agreement;
 - b. a number of Hansard references, copies of which are attached, commencing on 6 December 1951 (sic) in which Mr Churchill (as he then was) either used the form of words in question or referred to the 1952 understanding. The difficulty here is that, as will be seen, every such statement was set in the nuclear context. In other words, the implication would be that the understanding related solely to nuclear, as opposed to conventional, use of the bases. It is true that one of the group of three Questions put to Mr Churchill on 23 March 1954 did not refer specifically to nuclear use, unlike the other two; but in his answer, Mr Churchill refers to "atomic and hydrogen development". This is not to say that the terms of the agreement are in fact limited merely to nuclear use; indeed, the fact

/ that ...

SECRET

that the US President sought HMG's agreement to the recent strike against Libya and that it has subsequently been confirmed that the Americans acknowledge that they would have to seek permission for a repeat operation, confirms that the Americans, like us, regard the understanding as applicable to both conventional and nuclear use. But to point to these particular answers would, because they were used in answer to questions about nuclear use, suggest that the agreement excludes conventional use.*

3. A great deal of research has been carried out by the Cabinet Office, FCO and ourselves over the past few weeks into the background to the publication of the Communique in January 1952. No copy has yet been found of an original text, at least in the form of a self-standing document. Nor has any trace so far been found of a separate, official document (whether classified or unclassified) of which the Communique is a public reflection. All indications are that the Communique itself constitutes the agreement.

4. As I understand it, Minister(AF) feels that, now that the Prime Minister has used a formula different to the Communique wording in answer to Mr Onslow's recent Question (Hansard extract attached), this latest form of words should be regarded, when it comes to public presentation, as effectively superseding the original 1952 wording. The fact remains, however, that the 1952 wording still stands, representing as it does the UK's formal agreement with the US Government on this issue.

5. The purpose of the reply to Mr Onslow's Question was two-fold: to answer his Question as put which, we suspect unwittingly, could have been interpreted as covering NATO as well as United States planned operations using aircraft based in this country; and to produce a rendering which was more readily intelligible than the wording of the original 1952 agreement (with its delphic reference to "in an emergency"). In explaining, in reply to Mr Onslow, the Churchill/Truman words "in an emergency" as "military operations planned by the United States", the answer drew on a previously agreed supplementary to be used in response to direct questions about the coverage of Churchill/Truman:

"This arrangement applies to operational use:
other understandings cover routine training".

Subsequently, No 10 have made it clear when approving the supplementaries attached to the Cabinet Office minute of 12 May, (relevant page attached) that they accept officials' view that the Churchill/Truman Communique remains the basic document underlying the arrangements governing operational use by the United States of bases in the UK.

/ As ...

* It is true that Lord Belstead, in his attached answer in 1983, stated that "This understanding applies to the bases for all United States forces in this country, both conventional and nuclear", but it would be strange to refer the MP to a statement of such recent vintage.

SECRET

- 2 -


6. As I said in my minute to PS/S of S of 13 May, the force of the reply to Mr Onslow is the same as that of the Communique; and this point can, of course, be made in answer to any request for the difference to be explained. The fact that the Secretary of State cited the formula used in answer to Mr Onslow in his reply on 13 May does not invalidate this.

7. The wording of Mr Wigley's Question is such that it would be inappropriate to use the more recent formulation, since Mr Wigley is asking about the terms of the 1952 agreement. That said, I believe that the wording of the reply proposed by S9(Air) might be altered slightly to bring out the point in Minister(AF)'s alternative reply, that is, that the agreement was published in the form of the Communique. The Answer might thus read as follows:

"I refer the Hon Member to the relevant section of the Communique published on the conclusion of the talks between the then British Prime Minister (Mr Churchill) and US President (Mr Truman) in January 1952. The section reads as follows:

"Under arrangements made for the common defence, the United States has the use of certain bases in the United Kingdom. We reaffirm the understanding that the use of these bases in an emergency would be a matter for joint decision by Her Majesty's Government and the United States Government in the light of the circumstances prevailing at the time."

8. I have discussed this with the Cabinet Office and FCO, who are both entirely content. PS/S of S is separately confirming with No 10 that they are, too.


N H NICHOLLS
AUS(DS)

SECRET

JANUARY 12—19, 1952

A. UNITED KINGDOM - UNITED STATES - CANADA. — British Cabinet Mission in Washington and Ottawa. — Mr. Churchill's Conversations with President Truman and Mr. St. Laurent. — Joint Churchill-Truman Communiqué. — Eden-Acheson Discussions. — Mr. Eden's Address to Columbia University.

Mr. Winston Churchill, accompanied by Mr. Eden, Lord Ismay, Lord Cherwell, and their civilian and military advisers, arrived at New York on Jan. 5 on board the *Queen Mary* and flew the same day to Washington, where they were greeted by President Truman and Administration leaders. After preliminary conversations with Mr. Truman on the Presidential yacht *Williamsburg*, the Anglo-American discussions were held at the White House on Jan. 7-8, four meetings taking place during the two days. Among those taking part on the American side were, in addition to President Truman, Mr. Dean Acheson (Secretary of State), Mr. Snyder (Secretary of the Treasury), Mr. Lovett (Secretary of Defense), Mr. Averell Harriman (Administrator of the Mutual Security Agency), Mr. Charles Wilson (Director of Defense Mobilization), General Omar N. Bradley (chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff), and Mr. Walter Gifford (Ambassador in London). The British representatives, in addition to Mr. Churchill, Mr. Eden, and Lord Ismay and Cherwell, included Field-Marshal Sir William Slim (Chief of Imperial General Staff), Admiral Sir Rhoderick McGrigor (First Sea Lord), Air Chief Marshal Sir William Elliot (chairman of the British Joint Services Mission in the U.S.A.), and Sir Oliver Franks (Ambassador in Washington).

The following communiqué (cross-headings inserted) was issued jointly by President Truman and Mr. Churchill on Jan. 9 at the conclusion of the conversations:

Collaboration for Peace. "During the last two days we have been able to talk over, on an intimate and personal basis, the problems of this critical time. Our discussions have been conducted in mutual friendship, respect, and confidence. Each of our Governments has thereby gained a better understanding of the thoughts and aims of the other. The two countries of the world are resolved to unite their strength and purpose to ensure peace and security. We affirm the determination of our Governments and peoples to further this resolve, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the U.N. Charter. The strong ties which unite our two countries are a massive contribution to the building of the strength of the free world.

U.S. Bases in Britain. Under arrangements made for the common defence, the United States has the use of certain bases in the United Kingdom. We reaffirm the understanding that the use of these bases in an emergency would be a matter for joint decision by H.M. Government and the U.S. Government in the light of the circumstances prevailing at the time.

Maintenance of World Peace. We share the hope and the determination that war, with all its modern weapons, shall not again be visited on mankind. We will remain in close consultation on the developments which might increase danger to the maintenance of world peace. We do not believe that war is inevitable. This is the basis of our policies. We are willing at any time to explore all reasonable means of resolving the issues which now threaten the peace of the world.

The European Defence Community. The U.S. Government is in full accord with the views expressed in the joint statement issued in Paris on Dec. 18, 1951, at the conclusion of the Anglo-French discussions (see 11912 B). Our two Governments will continue to give their full support to the efforts now being made to establish a European Defence Community, and will lend all assistance in their power in bringing it to fruition. We believe that this is the best means of bringing a democratic Germany as a full and equal partner into a purely defensive organization for European security. The defence of the free world will be strengthened and solidified by the creation of a European Defence Community as an element in a constantly developing Atlantic community.

The Middle East. Our Governments are resolved to promote the stability, powerful development, and prosperity of the countries of the Middle East. We have found a complete identity of aims between us in this part of the world, and the two Secretaries of State will continue to work out together agreed policies to give effect to this aim. We think it essential for the furtherance of our common purposes that an Allied Middle East Command should be set up as soon as possible. As regards Egypt, we are confident that the four-Power approach offers the best prospect of relieving the present tension. We both hope that the initiative taken by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development will lead to a solution of the Persian oil problem acceptable to all the interests concerned.

The Far East. We have discussed the many grave problems affecting our two countries in the Far East. A broad harmony of view has emerged from these discussions, for we recognize that the overriding need to counter the Communist threat in that area transcends such divergences as there are in our policy towards China. We will continue to give full support for U.N. measures against aggression in Korea until peace and security are restored there. We are glad that the Chiefs of Staff of the U.S.A., the U.K., and France will be meeting in the next few days to consider specific measures to strengthen the security of South-East Asia.

Mutual Supply of Scarce Materials. We have considered how our two countries could best help one another in the supply of scarce materials important to their defence programmes and their economic stability. The need of the United Kingdom for additional supplies of steel from the United States, and the need of the U.S.A. for supplies of other materials, including aluminium and tin, were examined. Good progress was made. The discussions will be continued and we hope that agreement may be announced shortly.

The N.A.T.O. We have reviewed the question of standardization of rifles and ammunition in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Neither country thinks it wise at this critical time to take the momentous step of changing its rifle. In the interest of economy, both in time and money, we have agreed that the United States and the United Kingdom will continue to rely upon rifles and ammunition now in stock and currently being produced. In the interest, however, of eventual standardization we have also agreed that both countries will produce their new rifles and ammunition only on an experimental scale, with a common effort to make to devise a rifle and ammunition suitable for future standardization.

The question of the Atlantic Command is still under discussion. Throughout our talks we have been impressed by the need to strengthen the N.A.T.O. by every means in our power and in full accord with our fellow members. We are resolved to build an Atlantic community, not only for immediate defence but for enduring progress.

Whilst Mr. Churchill left for New York on Jan. 9 for a two-day visit to Mr. Bernard Baruch, one of his oldest friends (their friendship had begun during the 1914-18 war, when Mr. Churchill was Minister of Munitions and Mr. Baruch was chairman of the American War Industries Board), Mr. Eden remained in Washington for further discussions on the international situation with Mr. Acheson at the State Department.

After these discussions had ended, Mr. Eden travelled to New York to receive the honorary degree of Doctor of Laws from Columbia University, where on Jan. 11 he made an important speech on the international situation. During the course of his speech, which is summarized below, the Foreign Secretary expressed the opinion that the danger of a world war was less than a year or two ago; spoke of Britain's solidarity with Western Europe, while at the same time explaining why she could not commit herself to joining a European federation; and dwelt on the situation which would be created if Communist China launched a forcible intervention in South-East Asia as she had done in Korea.

"For 25 years," said Mr. Eden, "I have been concerned with international problems. I have taken some part in the search for peace in responsible years of office, as well as in those of greater freedom and less responsibility in Opposition. In the 20th century peace has been precarious and elusive. After the first World War we tried to establish it through the League of Nations. I was always a believer in the League and in the principles which it set out to establish. I still am. I was therefore convinced that after the second World War we must dare to do more and do better. . . Unfortunately, the first principle on which the U.N. was based—co-operation between the four great Powers—has not yet been realized. The hope that one world would accept and abide by the rule of law has failed us. All who consider foreign affairs ask with anxiety what is now the goal; how, in so much tangle and turmoil, can peace be secured? . . .

The human crisis today is not primarily a material one; it is a crisis of the mind and the spirit. Our mastery over nature and our control of physical power have so far outstripped our self-control that we have become very dangerous animals. . . Some may fear that events are sweeping mankind towards unknown and perhaps catastrophic ends. They doubt their ability to control or direct their destiny. This sense of political fatalism is a symptom of the fever from which the world is suffering. It opens the door to those forces which prey on the moral weakness of men and reduce the individual to servitude. These doubts and fears are multiplied by the pace and tension of modern life. . .

Traditional common beliefs, long-held loyalties, articles of faith, and the ties of age, history, or interest; these are the natural forces which bind men together. But in the modern age many of them have been loosened by the upheavals of war and the strains of economic change. Some of them have been discarded altogether. And in their place are new voices, new ventures, new ideas. It is a formidable task to blend these voices together in some sensible harmony. Yet that is what we have to do. For the enemy stands at the gates, ready to take advantage of our discord, playing upon the lonely and isolated minds of men and attempting by every means to herd them together in droves where independent thought can have no play. . . If we can understand the nature of the crisis we have to face, we shall be less afraid of it and more able to deal with it. The contest is between the generous faith of Western civilization and the bitter doctrine of Communist imperialism.

But, apart from Communism, we are confronted with another problem. The sentiment of nationalism is usually good. When it is genuine we all respect and wish to encourage it. But this sentiment can also find expression in an unbridled frenzy, which is none the less formidable to deal with because it is often a cloak for domestic failure. Where standards of life are falling when they should be rising the temptation is strong to divert attention from home politics and to foster anti-foreign hatreds. This is conspicuously true in the Middle East.

knew that his alleged offence was wrong, he will, by circular, remind juvenile court magistrates of this provision of the law.

Sir D. Maxwell Fyfe: No, I am not aware that juvenile courts fail to satisfy themselves on this point or that their practice has been criticised by the higher courts.

WHIST DRIVES AND BRIDGE CLUBS

Mr. Swingler asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department what general advice he and his predecessors have given to the police on the subject of the prosecution of promoters of whist drives and bridge clubs; and on what dates this advice was given.

Sir D. Maxwell Fyfe: On 26th July, 1937, the Secretary of State caused a circular letter to be sent to chief constables in the following terms:

"Whist Drives

I am directed by the Secretary of State to refer to the Home Office Circulars on the subject of whist drives dated 18th June, 1928, and 20th February, 1930, and to forward for your information the appended copy of a recent Question and Answer in the House of Commons on the subject.

I am, Sir,

Your obedient Servant,

F. A. NEWSAM

The Chief Constable.

SIR COOPER RAWSON asked the Home Secretary whether any discrimination is shown in police prosecutions in respect of whist drives between those run for personal profit and the normal drives organised by various clubs and associations; and will he make some clear pronouncement on the subject to allay the existing disquiet?

SIR S. HOARE: There have been a number of judicial decisions to the effect that whist drives held under certain conditions are unlawful. It has, however, always been recognised that, as ordinarily conducted, whist drives are an innocuous form of amusement and free from the element of mischief which accompanies gambling. Accordingly, while the Home Secretary has no authority to give instructions to the police on a matter relating to the enforcement of the law, chief constables have been advised by the Home Office to the effect that, in the view of the Secretary of State, the police should not institute proceedings except where there is reason to believe that a whist drive is a cloak for gambling or for profit-making out of gambling, that the police should limit their interference to cases where they have reason to think that actual harm is being done, and that whist drives held as a purely incidental

part of their various social activities by members of bona fide clubs or institutions would not usually come within the mischiefs aimed at by the law. I have no doubt that the police generally are guided by this advice."

U.S. BASES, UNITED KINGDOM

48. Mr. S. Silverman asked the Prime Minister whether the agreement under which United States atom-bomb Forces are permitted to use bases in this country contains the usual provision for their withdrawal in the case that the United States become involved in any war in which the United Kingdom did not wish to be involved.

The Prime Minister: The use of these bases in an emergency would be a matter for joint decision by His Majesty's Government and the United States Government in the light of the circumstances prevailing at the time.

BRITISH ARMY (GENERAL ELECTION VOTING)

Mr. Beswick asked the Minister of Defence the number of those entitled to be registered on the Services electoral register; and the number actually listed during the last Election.

The Prime Minister pursuant to his reply [OFFICIAL REPORT, 30th November, 1951; Vol. 494, c. 180] circulated the following:

The number of Service men and women who were eligible for inclusion in the current, i.e. spring, 1951, register was about 412,000. The number of Service men and women actually included is estimated at about 311,000.

AGRICULTURE

Marginal Land

49. Mr. Steward asked the Minister of Agriculture what steps he is proposing to take to ensure that the many acres of unproductive land in Great Britain are reclaimed for agricultural use, particularly in moorland and hill districts; and if he will give consideration to the use of every possible scientific aid to assist in this matter.

Sir T. Dugdale: This relates to Great Britain. The Secretary of State has asked me to associate myself with the reply. Various schemes are being considered for operation for developing marginal agricultural land. It is expected that the results would be reasonably good. It is hoped that any arrangements that are made will be made to say that a considerable number of scientists of all kinds are being employed and we intend to make full use of them.

Afforestation Scheme in Upper Tav

50. Mr. Watkins asked the Secretary of State for Agriculture whether he has received the report of the chairman of the local inquiry into the Upton scheme; and whether he will make a statement about the scheme.

Sir T. Dugdale: The report was received on 20th November. I will make a statement at the earliest possible moment.

Woodland, Dorset

51. Mr. Crouch asked the Secretary of State for Agriculture how many acres there are in Dorset which are being managed by the Forestry Commission; how many acres have been planted during the years 1949-50; and what program is being carried out for the present plantings.

Sir T. Dugdale: There are 1,000 acres of woodland in Dorset, of which 500 acres are managed by the Forestry Commission. The Forestry Commission planted 248 acres in the 1949-50 season, 580 acres in 1950-51. Their total planting in the present season is 840 acres.

Livestock (Spray Treatment)

52. Mr. Hurd asked the Secretary of State for Agriculture what progress has been made with trials to test the efficacy of the spray treatment of sheep rather than dipping as a means of destroying animal parasites.

Sir T. Dugdale: Trials have been carried out this year by a commercial

[MR. MORRISON.]

This was on the eve of the Election, at the beginning of the Election campaign. I said:

"I do not say that, and I advise you not to say that, because it would not be fair and it would not be true. But it is their temperament, it is the background of their mental outlook, the old imperialist outlook. It is the semi-hysteria"—

[HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."] And here it is again—

"of the bulk of those Tory back benches that really alarms one as to what a Tory Government would do if a Tory Government were put in. Therefore, if the country wants peace it had better vote for the people who can most surely be relied upon to preserve peace, and, if I may say so, are most competent to frame principles and proposals for the peace and well-being of the world."

Those people sit upon these benches. I have shown by the evidence which I have put to the House that the Prime Minister has tendencies which are contrary to modern understanding and the cause of peace, and that he is out-of-date. I say that what I said to the Labour Party Conference was then true, that what we said in a similar vein throughout the Election was true—and we say today that what we said at the beginning of the Election and during the Election has been proved to be true by the actions to which I have drawn attention today.

5.0 p.m.

The Prime Minister (Mr. Winston Churchill): When I learned the text of the Motion which has been put upon the Order Paper and saw that it took the unusual form of a personal Vote of Censure upon me I am bound to say that I did expect that some more serious attempt to frame and sustain charges would have been made than we have heard from the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Lewisham, South (Mr. H. Morrison). I have hardly ever listened—from a skilled Parliamentarian—to such a weak, vague, wandering harangue which at no point touched the realities or which was so largely composed of quotations of all kinds, some of his own, and none selected with a view to proving or sustaining any effective case.

I shall in due course—I hope I shall not too long detain the House—deal with the attack which is made upon me today, but if I had to confine myself

to those aspects of it which have been dealt on by the right hon. Gentleman I am bound to say I should find myself very short of material with which to reply.

I wish, first of all, to draw the attention of the House to the agreement we reached in Washington about the atomic bomb. We reached an agreement about its not being used from the East Anglian base without British consent. This agreement states in a formal and public manner what had already been reached as a verbal understanding between the late Prime Minister and President Truman.

We felt, however, that it would be an improvement if the position were made public and formal, and I expect that will be the general opinion. A much more important atomic development is now before us. I was not aware until I took office that not only had the Socialist Government made the atomic bomb as a matter of research, but that they had created at the expense of many scores of millions of pounds the important plant necessary for its regular production. This weapon will be tested in the course of the present year by agreement with the Australian Government at some suitable place in that continent.

This achievement is certainly a real advantage to us and when I informed the Americans in Washington of the position which had been reached quite a new atmosphere was created on this subject. I was interested to read in the newspapers on Monday week the following statement by Senator MacMahon, the author of the MacMahon Act of 1946 which, under extreme penalties, forbade all sharing of secrets with Great Britain or other countries:

"The achievement of an atomic explosion by Great Britain, when an accomplished fact, will contribute to the keeping of the peace because it will add to the free world's total deterring power.

This event is likely to raise in still sharper focus the problem of atomic co-operation between ourselves and Great Britain. The British contributed heavily to our own war-time atomic project. But due to a series of unfortunate circumstances the nature of the agreements which made this contribution possible was not disclosed to me and my colleagues at the Senate special atomic energy committee at the time we framed the law in 1946. Now we may consider rethinking the entire situation with all the facts in front of us."

This is a very important document. We must now await the result of the experiment in Australia. While credit to the late Government scientists for the action which I must, as an old Parliamentarian, express my surprise that a full statement was not made of this Parliament, especially in view of the immense sums of money which were taken by this House without their clear appreciation of what was done. There was no reason why the Government in time of peace should not have been made fully aware, not only of the technical details, but of the scale of new departure in policy on so grave a matter.

The Conservative opposition certainly have supported the Government as we did on so many other measures of defence, and their would no doubt have been overruled. Nevertheless, they preferred to this vast operation and its financial scrutiny of the House; not obtaining a vote on the principle, while, at the same time, with Mr. Hanart, keeping open the advantage of accusing their opponents of blabbering.

Mr. C. R. Attlee (Walthamstow): I really cannot let those statements be carried on precisely in this policy on the advice of our expert advisers with regard to the public these atomic matters. I was surprised to see the right hon. Gentleman and I always understood that I was confident, Lord Cherwell, was informed of all these matters. I know why he had not told me and as for the Americans not what we were doing, we were to do every possible thing in order to co-operation.

The Prime Minister: The right hon. Gentleman will no doubt have opportunities of making full use of upon all this topic, but it does seem that some of the late Government's followers hardly relished their position in this sphere. I notice, indeed, a sense of disappointment with the statement that the achievement which had been made could not be attributed to us. Indeed, the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition is in the position of one who

U.S. BASES, EAST ANGLIA

47. Mr. A. Henderson asked the Prime Minister whether Her Majesty's Government intend to continue the Anglo-American bases in East Anglia, in view of the fact that their presence renders this country specially liable for the counter attention of the other side.

The Prime Minister: As I stated in the House on 21st November, 1951, certain bases and facilities in the United Kingdom were made available by the late Government to the United States Air Force for the common defence of the United Kingdom and the other countries who are parties to the North Atlantic Treaty. This arrangement will continue so long as it is needed in the general interest of world peace and security.

Mr. Henderson: In view of the Prime Minister's reply, can he say why he persistently reiterates that the responsibility for establishing these bases rests upon the late Government, while, in the same context, drawing attention to the additional dangers involved in the retention of these air bases? Is the Prime Minister not aware of the risk of increasing alarm and despondency in order to score a cheap party point off the Opposition?

The Prime Minister: I have repeatedly said that we supported the late Government in the decision which they took, and we shall certainly stand by our share of the risks. It is only when the Opposition appear to show signs of total irresponsibility in regard to these matters that it is sometimes necessary to remind them of the serious position of the country.

Mr. J. Paton: Is the Prime Minister aware that the people of East Anglia would be very glad to see the last of these arrangements?

The Prime Minister: That is a view which is held by an important section of the Opposition below the Gangway, but it is not the policy which the Labour Government pursued in office nor, I believe, is it the policy which its responsible Members will pursue even though they are now in opposition.

Mr. Noel-Baker: In other words, may we assume that the Prime Minister fully supports the policy of the late Government in building up collective security by

the exchange of defence requirements as the basic method of preventing war and thereby ensuring the safety of all peoples?

The Prime Minister: That is all very nicely put, and I do not dissent from anything in it. At the same time, I think people should face facts, and that is all I have assisted them to do.

Major Legge-Bourke: Will the Prime Minister bear in mind that the right hon. and learned Gentleman who put down the Question himself went to one of these aerodromes and welcomed the bombers?

Mr. A. Henderson: Is not the Prime Minister fully aware that I did not put down the Question because I have changed my view, but because I thought he has unnecessarily reproached the late Government for doing something of which he approved?

The Prime Minister: I assure the right hon. and learned Gentleman that I did not mean to reproach. I meant to inculcate upon the Opposition the feeling that they also have a continuing responsibility.

HOUSE OF COMMONS
(CATERING)

48. Mr. Chapman asked the hon. Member for Woolwich, West, as Chairman of the Kitchen Committee, why, apart from one or two main dishes, the *à la carte* menu served in the Strangers' Dining Room is so monotonous.

Mr. Steward: On each day last week, Members and their guests taking meals in the Strangers' dining rooms, had a choice of 4 fish dishes, 5 to 6 entrees (all of which varied daily) and 5 items from the cold table. In addition, there were dishes to order consisting of 11 fish items, 7 entrees and 13 omelettes and savouries. However, I will see what can be done to vary the items on the "To Order" side of the menu.

Mr. Chapman: Is the hon. Gentleman aware that one can repeat almost off by heart the list on the menu on the right-hand page, because it does not vary from

day to day, and the looking at the face opposite for a few hours variety in the Dining

Mr. Steward: There every first-class cater London is not vari only a limited number can only put on wh

Lieut.-Colonel B looking at the face is met by the taxpay

Mr. Steward: I s notice of that questio

TRANSPORT
(ANNUAL

49. Mr. D. Jones of Transport when report of the British sion will be availab by hon. Members.

Mr. Lennox-Boyd hope that the report the early part of July

Mr. Jones: Is it majority of the import to this Report are alter the right hon. Gentle Is he holding them t policy?

Mr. Lennox-Boyd: usual practice in case wait until the Commis

Lieut.-Colonel Lipt back of this Report r by the Minister in c promised reduction of area?

Mr. Lennox-Boyd: hope that the Report this year and that it sooner than it has e before.

Mr. Ernest Davies possible to publish a sur before the full Report practice followed by panies?

there will be fewer estimates.

Is the Chancellor optimistic about the place he is going

reason: In view of the state-
ment of the Chancellor that there will be
no increase in this Survey than ever
before, I ask whether that is con-
sistent with the fact that he knows where he

is: Under the previous
forecasts were uniformly
not attained.

Supply Agency (Grants)

Mr. Williams asked the Chan-
cellor what grants the
Supply Agency Limited has
made or indirectly from his
losses from lobsters.

Mr. Butler: Interest-free repay-
ment totalling £23,000 have
been made since June, 1948, from the
fund to the Scottish Agri-
cultural Society on behalf

of the Supply Agency, to meet
the need and to provide work-
connection with a scheme
for the sale and marketing. In
1951 from the Development
Fund £8,776 18s. 6d. have been
made to meet deficiencies
of losses sustained in the
scheme during the three
months ending 31st May, 1951. A
decision in respect of the two
schemes is now being considered.

Mr. Williams: In view of the con-
clusion of this enterprise, would
the Government have any good
idea to stop wasting
money on unsuccessful lobster

Everything that falls from
the table is considered, but I do
not think I would be right to take
any action on the evidence at
present.

Mr. Thomson: Is the Chan-
cellor's service is most
widely appreciated in the

TECHNOLOGICAL STUDENTS (RECRUITMENT)

43. Mr. Malcolm MacPherson asked
the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether
he is aware that recruitment of students
for technological courses in universities
and technical colleges is flagging; and
by what means he proposes to stimulate
it, bearing in mind the continuing need
to increase the numbers of students
taking such courses.

Mr. R. A. Butler: In the universities,
the number of full-time students taking
technological courses (other than archi-
tecture) in October last was the same as
in October, 1952. The additional assist-
ance which I propose to give for the
development of further facilities will, I
hope, help to stimulate recruitment. In
the technical colleges, there has been no
significant change. The Ministers con-
cerned are fully aware of the importance
of the hon. Member's Question.

Mr. MacPherson: Is the right hon.
Gentleman aware that at a recent con-
ference the head of one of the most im-
portant technical colleges used this
phrase: "Recruitment of students for
technological courses is flagging," and
will the right hon. Gentleman see that
more effort is put behind this programme
than in the past year?

Mr. Butler: I certainly think it is right
to put every effort behind the programme
and to pay attention to any observations
made by the head of any such college.

Mr. L. M. Lever: Is the right hon.
Gentleman aware that the position indi-
cated in the Question does not apply to
Manchester?

COLONIAL OFFICE (MINISTERS)

45. Mr. J. Johnson asked the Prime
Minister if he will consider recommend-
ing the appointment of an additional
Minister of State for the Colonies.

The Prime Minister (Sir Winston
Churchill): It is not proposed at present
to make any additional Ministerial
appointments.

Mr. Johnson: Is the Prime Minister
not aware of the feeling on both sides
of the House that colonial affairs are

becoming so vast that they need more
than two Ministers in this Chamber? Is
he also aware that the Secretary of State
for the Colonies has become so peri-
patetic lately that this, combined with the
unfortunate absence of his colleague the
Minister of State, has meant that for
weeks on end we have had no Minister
from that Department at the Box to
answer Questions, which is unfortunate
both for this House and for the Empire?
Will the Prime Minister not think again
on this matter, which after all is a non-
party matter?

The Prime Minister: We should be
chary of creating new Ministerial
appointments.

ATOMIC WEAPONS (ANGLO- AMERICAN CONSULTATION)

47. Mr. A. Henderson asked the Prime
Minister what machinery exists for con-
sultation between President Eisenhower
and himself as to the use of atomic
bombs in the event of war involving both
countries.

49. Mr. Wyatt asked the Prime Min-
ister whether he will seek an assurance
from Mr. Eisenhower, as President and
Commander-in-Chief of the United States
of America, that in the event of an out-
break of war in Europe the United States
of America will not use atomic weapons
without prior consultation with the
United Kingdom.

46. Mr. Warbey asked the Prime Min-
ister whether he will make a statement
on the arrangements for consultation be-
tween Her Majesty's Government and the
United States Government regarding the
use of United States retaliatory air power
in the event of a hostile attack on an ally
of the United States in circumstances
which might involve this country in war.

The Prime Minister: So far as con-
cerns the bases used by the Americans
in this country, I would remind hon.
Members of the communiqué agreed with
the United States Government and issued
on 9th January, 1952, when my
right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary
and I visited Washington:

"Under arrangements made for the common
defence, the United States has the use of certain
bases in the United Kingdom. We reaffirm the
understanding"—

that was the one arrived at by the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition—

"that the use of these bases in an emergency would be a matter for joint decision by Her Majesty's Government and the United States Government in the light of the circumstances prevailing at the time."

Mr. Dulles' recent statements have been in full accord with this understanding.

On the general question of consultation with President Eisenhower and the United States Government, smooth and friendly arrangements exist for dealing with these matters as with any others of major importance. There is a constant interchange of ideas between Her Majesty's Government and the United States Government, both direct and through the channels of N.A.T.O. I have had intimate correspondence and conversations on these and many other questions with President Eisenhower in the past, and our relationship continues.

I cannot of course foretell the circumstances in which the use of the United States retaliatory air power might be suggested, and, as Mr. Dulles has said, each case would have to be considered in the light of the facts. Speaking generally, I do not consider that any change in our procedure is called for at the moment, nor can I think of one that would be helpful.

Let me assure the House that there is nothing in the whole world of affairs that dominates our thoughts more than the group of stupendous problems and perils comprised in the sphere of atomic and hydrogen developments.

Mr. Henderson: Has the Prime Minister's attention been drawn to the statement by Mr. Lester Pearson, who said in his view consultations should now take place between the various Governments concerned in N.A.T.O. on the problem, and that it should not be left until a unilateral decision might possibly have to be taken when an emergency had arisen? Would he say whether the Government are in accord with Mr. Lester Pearson's views?

The Prime Minister: The statement which I have made was concerted after considerable discussion and thought with my colleagues. We had before us the statements made by Mr. Dulles and by Mr. Lester Pearson. All was taken

into consideration, and I should not wish at the moment to add to what I have said.

Viscount Hinchingsbrooke: Would my right hon. Friend agree that, in so far as there is any anxiety on this subject, it would appear to apply less to Europe, where there is close and constant diplomatic contact between Europe and the United States, than to some other parts of the world where, for example, there might be a Communist insurrection of insignificant proportions resulting in an atomic riposte by the United States which would be quite unwarrantable?

The Prime Minister: I carefully considered all that aspect and I do not think there would be any great advantage in trying during Question time to go in detail into all the contingencies. I do not think it would be a good thing to have this matter strenuously debated. I do not think so. If I did, I should not hesitate to suggest that the House should devote itself to it. It is remarkable the restraint with which the Press have treated all these matters. I only hope and trust that the nation, and thinking people in it, will not in any way underrate the overwhelming consequence of the developments which are taking place. They fill my mind out of all comparison with anything else.

SERVICE ESTIMATES (EXAMINATION)

48. Mr. Beswick asked the Prime Minister, in view of the increasing difficulty experienced by the House in subjecting the Service Estimates to adequate examination, if he will move to appoint a Select Committee responsible for the detailed consideration of these Estimates.

The Prime Minister: I can see no useful function for such a committee beyond that already entrusted to the Select Committee on Estimates which is appointed at the beginning of each Session.

Mr. Beswick: Would not the Prime Minister agree that almost all the arguments which have been advanced by his Government for a standing Select Committee to consider the affairs of the publicly-owned industries apply with even greater force to the Service Estimates? In view of the difficulties of getting not

only time but informal present arrangements, would that there is a case for a Committee to discuss before they appear before the Select Committee on Est

The Prime Minister: custom for the examination Estimates has grown up and steadily over a long covering, in fact, the vit House of Commons. Gentlemen opposite were or seven years they did the procedure in any fit The fact that arguments about nationalised industries coming under review stand a different place because are much more recent d

HYDROGEN I DEVELOPMENT

50. Mr. Proctor asked the Minister if, in view of the President Eisenhower power of the hydrogen agree to the appointment Commons Committee to s upon our whole defence

The Prime Minister: Government cannot divest their responsibility for c way. I wish they could.

Mr. Proctor: Does the Minister think that the s by the President that the force which he, as Commence across the Channel to 1944 would be of no use war, is something which a the whole House could pr in relation to our defence he not think that a prop as this might supply him v join E.D.C. as a full memb atomic knowledge and pr that of Europe, to unite a on a Continental basis a Russia the only security the—the good will of a united

The Prime Minister: The is indicating the conclusion would like the commit before I have even been

ENERGY

Renewable Energy Sources

Mr. Baldry asked the Secretary of State for Energy what initiatives the Government are undertaking, and what research they are sponsoring into renewable sources of energy supply.

Mr. David Hunt: The Government have identified the most promising renewable energy technologies for exploitation in the United Kingdom, and substantial support is being given to their development through my Department's research, development and demonstration programmes. A detailed account of the content of these programmes and the prospects for the exploitation of renewable energy sources in the United Kingdom, is given in ETSU publications R28, R30 and N3/85. Copies of these documents are in the Libraries of both Houses. The Government seek international collaboration in this area whenever it is of benefit to the United Kingdom.

Energy Efficiency

Mr. Evans asked the Secretary of State for Energy (1) if he has made any estimates of the potential savings to the United Kingdom's energy bill which will be gained during Energy Efficiency Year in each region of the United Kingdom;

(2) if he will list the total proposed savings during Energy Efficiency Year by sector; and, in each case, what these savings represent as a percentage of (a) total savings in the United Kingdom and (b) the United Kingdom's annual energy bill.

Mr. David Hunt: Energy Efficiency Year is part of a continuing campaign by Government to persuade the nation to save the £7 billion it wastes each year by using energy inefficiently. Savings stimulated by the campaign will accrue over different timescales, depending on the measures undertaken. I regret that there is no satisfactory regional breakdown of total energy consumption. The sectoral breakdown of the nation's energy bill is as follows:

Energy consumption by sector—£ million

	1984
Domestic	9,620
Industry, commerce and public services	11,980
Transport	15,040

Nuclear Waste

Mr. Austin Mitchell asked the Secretary of State for Energy (1) what percentage of imported spent oxide fuel has been kept in the United Kingdom without having been reprocessed since 1979;

(2) what has been the tonnage of spent oxide fuel imported from overseas since 1979.

Mr. Goodlad: From 1 January 1979 to 31 December 1985 approximately, 1,230 teu of spent oxide fuel was imported from overseas. Of this about 14 tonnes were temporarily held in the United Kingdom while in transit to other countries. The balance is stored at Sellafield pending reprocessing in the thermal oxide reprocessing plant which is presently under construction.

Since 1976 BNFL's contracts for the reprocessing of overseas spent fuel have contained options for the return

of wastes. As I said in my answer to the hon. Member on 2 May at columns 502-503, the Government intend that the options should be exercised and that the wastes should be returned.

Nuclear Power Industry

Mr. Chris Smith asked the Secretary of State for Energy what benefits he expects to follow for Britain's nuclear industry from his recent visit to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Mr. Peter Walker: It is too early to say what benefits might flow from my visit, but I noted strong interest in British expertise in the handling and reprocessing of nuclear waste. Any trade in nuclear materials and technology will, of course, be subject to our international obligations in this area.

PRIME MINISTER

Japan (Visit)

Mr. Parry asked the Prime Minister if she will make a statement on her recent visit to Japan.

Mr. Biffen: I have been asked to reply.

My right hon. Friend hopes to make a statement to the House about the economic summit in Tokyo.

United States Aircraft (Military Operations)

Mr. Onslow asked the Prime Minister whether there are any circumstances in which United States aircraft based in the United Kingdom can be used in military operations without the consent of Her Majesty's Government; and if she will make a statement.

The Prime Minister [pursuant to the answer, 6 May 1986, c. 3].: Under the Churchill—Truman arrangements, there are no circumstances in which American aircraft based in this country may be used without our consent in military operations planned by the United States.

NATIONAL FINANCE

Building Societies Bill

Mr. Cash asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer what representations he has had on the Building Societies Bill; and if he will make a statement.

Mr. Ian Stewart: The Government have received a number of further representations from societies and others, particularly concerning conversion to company status, obstructed mergers and the provision of pensions.

Conversion to Company Status

The transfer of a society's business to a company will be subject to certain minimum statutory requirements and to confirmation by the Building Societies Commission that the requisite procedures have been complied with. These requirements will ensure that the rights of members are fully safeguarded on conversion, that it is only undertaken with the active participation and support of members, and that the process will not cause unacceptable discontinuity in the institution concerned.

United Kingdom during defensive operations.... against Libya on 14 April", and said that the use of F-111s had "substantially reduced the risk to American servicemen ...".

WITHDRAWAL OF F-111s TO
THE UNITED STATES

The basing of United States F-111 aircraft in the United Kingdom is part of the United States contribution to our common defence in NATO. The United States contribution remains essential to the security of the Western world.

ARE THERE AGREEMENTS
GOVERNING THE DEPLOYMENT
OF UNITED STATES AIRCRAFT
TO THE UNITED KINGDOM?

Operational use of United Kingdom bases by the United States is covered by the Churchill/Truman understanding. It applies to all United States military aircraft, whether permanently based or temporarily deployed here.

[If pressed on agreements on deployment of aircraft rather than use of bases]

Under the arrangements concerning the bases, significant increases in the numbers of United States aircraft present in this country are subject to British agreement.

[If pressed to confirm that additional tanker aircraft were deployed to the United Kingdom]

Additional tanker aircraft were deployed by the United States to this country

[LORD JENKINS OF PUTNEY.]

admitted to the existence of over 70. How does the Minister justify this figure, first arriving at 12 and then finishing up with something approaching 100? Is it not the case that since the Government have been inaccurate in the past we can reasonably expect them to be inaccurate in the present?

Lord Belstead: My Lords, I can easily answer that question. How delightful it is to take part in a debate when it is easy to answer a question. The answer to the noble Lord is, no. Turning to the second part of the noble Lord's Question as to operational control over United States nuclear weapons based in this country, this is a matter to which all post-war British Governments have directed their attention. This, I accept, is a matter of concern to noble Lords and I shall try to give answers to the questions which have been put. Arrangements for the control of American forces based in the United Kingdom were first agreed by Mr. Attlee and President Truman in 1951. As your Lordships know, that agreement was endorsed by Mr. Churchill and President Truman in further discussions in 1952. The understanding which these two leaders reached was summarised in a joint communiqué published at the time. The text reads as follows:

"Under arrangements made for the common defence, the United States has the use of certain bases in the United Kingdom. We reaffirm the understanding that the use of these bases in an emergency would be a matter for joint decision by Her Majesty's Government and the United States Government in the light of the circumstances at the time".

This understanding has applied, although of course it has been looked at every time a new Prime Minister or a new President has taken office, throughout the period from 1951 and applies with equal force today.

All successive Prime Ministers and Presidents have reaffirmed the understanding, all judging it to be satisfactory. Most recently the arrangement has been reviewed by the Prime Minister and President Reagan in February 1981. The Prime Minister has said in another place that she is satisfied that these arrangements are effective. The understanding applies to the bases for all United States forces in this country, both conventional and nuclear, and it will apply to the 160 United States ground-launched cruise missiles, the first of which are due to be deployed here from the end of 1983 if there is no prior agreement in Geneva to abolish this class of missile.

If I may say this to the noble Lord, Lord Bishopston, who revealed that he was particularly concerned about it, this understanding means in effect that the use of nuclear weapons is subject to joint decision. The noble Lord, Lord Jenkins, made great play with the distinction he drew between political and operational control. It would be a matter for the elected Governments involved to make decisions of such awesome importance. That is why this Government, like its predecessors, believe that this understanding between the two Governments is of overriding importance.

Had we so chosen, cruise missiles could have been deployed here on a dual key system, whereby we bought and operated the missiles while the United States retained custody of the warhead. Previous Governments have not considered such measures necessary for the physical control of the United States Air Force F111's, which have, of course, been

operating from this country for many years, and during the whole time of the two Labour Governments. I would emphasise that there is no precedent for a dual key system except on the basis of ownership. The noble Lord, Lord Mayhew, and the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, raised this point recently and again this evening. I have to repeat to both noble Lords that a dual key system is the basis on which we operate the Lance missile and nuclear-capable artillery deployed with our army in Germany. It was the basis on which we operated the Thor missile system, which was stationed in this country in the early 1960s. But it is done on the basis of ownership of the launchers.

Against the background of our relationship with the United States and our confidence in the long-established arrangements governing the use of United States forces based in this country, we concluded that to apply different arrangements from those which already existed, which I have just outlined, would add nothing to the effectiveness of the cruise missiles as a deterrent force, and would divert substantial resources from the enhancement of our conventional and independent nuclear capabilities.

Lord Bishopston: My Lords, I appreciate the noble Lord giving way. I was about to intervene to make the point the noble Lord made, that under the 1952 agreement there was dual control of the Thor missile. Now, of course, the Minister says you cannot expect it on cruise because it is not owned by us but jointly owned. Surely, if we are allies working together in any emergency there is just as much case for us to have dual control in the present situation as there was previously in the case of Thor!

Lord Belstead: My Lords, with respect, I do not think that the noble Lord has perhaps quite added to the light which is being shed on this subject, which is not an entirely easy subject. The 1952 agreement is the agreement which I have read out, and that in effect gives joint political decision. The arrangement with the Thor missiles, with respect to the noble Lord, was an arrangement for full dual key, because the Thor launchers were owned by the United Kingdom. What I have just been saying is that that is the arrangement for full dual key, and only that arrangement, based on ownership, has always been accepted both by the United States and those who are the allies of the United States. For that reason, unless we were prepared to purchase the cruise missiles, we should not be able to claim full dual key. We felt that this would divert substantial resources from money which we should otherwise be spending on our conventional and other nuclear capabilities. In these circumstances, the Government decided that the arrangements summarised in the 1952 communiqué should apply to the cruise missile force.

The 1952 understanding is of long standing; it is firmly founded in the close co-operation which we share with our staunch NATO ally. It has stood the test of time; it has provided a framework which successive Governments of both parties have found entirely satisfactory. And it is a symbol to a potential aggressor of the strength and cohesion of NATO measured by the mutual trust which exists between Britain and the



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

MR. MALLABY

CABINET OFFICE

US USE OF BASES IN THE UNITED KINGDOM

Thank you for your minute of 12 May enclosing a revised and consolidated text on US use of bases in the United Kingdom which can be drawn on to deal with questions in Parliament and more widely. I agree with this as revised. I also agree that we should, so far as possible, avoid answering questions about the additional tanker aircraft employed in the recent action against Libya. In any event, we should not use the last sentence of paragraph 3 of your minute which is open to misinterpretation.

I am copying this minute to the Private Secretaries to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Defence Secretary.

CHARLES POWELL
13 May 1986

CP

SECRET

B.07424

MR POWELL

cc Mr Galsworthy, FCO
Mr Howe, MoD

US use of bases in the United Kingdom

With reference to your letter of 9 May to Colin Budd in the FCO, officials of the Cabinet Office, Ministry of Defence and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office have produced a consolidated text for use in reply to questions in Parliament and more widely. I attach it.

2. The first answer is designed to meet the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's suggestion of "an additional, pithy statement on the use of the bases". (Colin Budd's letter of 1 May.) It adapts part of the Prime Minister's recent reply to Mr Cranley Onslow, so as to apply it to US use of bases in this country, rather than only to American aircraft based here. The rest of the first answer is based closely on the text in the penultimate paragraph of John Howe's letter of 8 May. The remainder of the attachment is a consolidation of the material submitted with my two minutes of 8 May. But I have added a reply for use if Ministers were asked about Dr Kissinger's article in yesterday's "Observer", in which he argued that F-111s should be withdrawn to the United States. (As part of a general review of commitments, the United States plans to withdraw next year seven of the 140 F-111s based in this country.)
3. Although the US Embassy have said that there would be no objection to our revealing, if necessary, that additional tanker aircraft were deployed to the United Kingdom for the operation against Libya and that there were 22 of them, officials believe that we should not give this additional information if

Prime Minister 11
You will wish to see the first of the answers attached. It is close to your reply to Cranley Onslow, but goes slightly wider. It is intended to become our basic text.

Agree?

CDP

12/5

attached

SECRET

we can avoid doing so. As I argued in my previous minute, to confirm this now would provoke difficult questions. We might be asked, for instance, whether we agreed to the additional tanker aircraft coming here (see my previous minute). We might also be asked about the timing of the tankers' arrival in relation to the timing, which we have not revealed, of the Government's decision to allow the United States to use bases in this country. The attached material offers a line, for use if pressed, on consultation arrangements regarding deployment of United States aircraft in this country. There are working arrangements, rather than specific agreements, on this aspect. They vary in relation to the various bases but, in general, deployments are subject to British agreement when more than five additional aircraft are involved.

4. I attach an extract from the transcript of the press conference on 17 April by the chief press spokesman of the US Department of Defense, referred to in the second draft answer attached.

5. Officials are preparing a paper setting out clearly all the various agreements and arrangements for the use by the United States or NATO of bases in this country.

6. I am sending copies of this minute to Tony Galsworthy (FCO) and John Howe (MoD) who will no doubt let you have urgently any comments by their Secretaries of State.



C L G Mallaby

12 May 1986

SECRET

FILE

CAJ

10



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

9 May 1986

Dear Col.

USE BY THE UNITED STATES OF BASES IN THE UNITED KINGDOM

I wrote to you on 7 May, to comment on your letter of 1 May to John Howe. I have now seen his letter to you of 8 May.

What we now need is a consolidated text to be put to the Prime Minister for approval. My own view is that she would be unlikely to agree to the first sentence proposed in John Howe's letter, on the grounds that it would be disingenuous.

I am copying this letter to John Howe (Ministry of Defence) and to Michael Stark (Cabinet Office).

*Yours sincerely,
Charles Powell*

CHARLES POWELL

CP

Temporarily Retained

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OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT

C. R. Budd, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

B.07417

MR POWELL *CP*

cc Mr Galsworthy, FCO
Mr Howe, MoD

American use of United Kingdom Bases

I attach material for the Prime Minister to draw on in responding to any questions arising in Parliament this afternoon from the article in today's Guardian which draws on allegations made in articles in the 21 April edition of "Aviation Week and Space Technology".

2. The attached material concentrates on the two main issues raised in the Guardian article, based on Mr Tam Dalyell's assertions that -

(a) two Aviation Week articles (both attached) challenge the Prime Minister's previous answer to the House that the President assured her that the use of F-111 aircraft from bases in the United Kingdom was essential in order to reduce casualties;

(b) United States tanker aircraft were flown to this country before the Prime Minister agreed to the use of bases in the United Kingdom.

Regarding (b) above, a total of 22 United States tanker aircraft were flown to the United Kingdom between Friday 11 April and Monday 14 April (i.e. after the Prime Minister's message agreeing to the use of bases had been despatched on 10 April). Deployment of tankers to this country is governed by separate bilateral arrangements. Under these, the total of tankers at Fairford is limited to 15 at any time. Provided the United States does not exceed this limit, our permission to bring in

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tankers is not needed. At Mildenhall, there is no upper limit but under an informal arrangement the United States should tell us if more than 5 tankers, in addition to the ones normally based there, are present for over 24 hours. The United States failed through an internal misunderstanding to inform us on this occasion of the additional deployment of 15 tankers to Mildenhall. However, none of this alters the key point that the operational use of the aircraft from this country requires the Government's permission.

3. The first question and answer in the attached material is somewhat wider in scope than the Prime Minister's written answer to Mr Cranley Onslow MP of 7 May (which refers just to aircraft). It is a version of the formula suggested in Mr Budd's letter to Mr Howe of 1 May.

4. The Government have not so far said publicly that additional tanker aircraft came to the United Kingdom before the United States operation. We are checking whether the US Administration have stated this publicly. To reveal now that additional tankers came could provoke difficult questions about timing: for instance, whether the aircraft came before or after the Government gave permission for the use of bases in this country. That could lead to pressure to reveal when the Government gave that permission, which in turn would be embarrassing vis-a-vis European Community partners among others. It is therefore preferable to avoid answering questions on whether or when additional United States tankers came to the United Kingdom. However, we are seeking urgently to check whether the Americans would object to our revealing if necessary that additional tankers came and that there were 22 of them.

5. The Resolution of the United States House of Representatives also said that the use of F-111s had "significantly contributed to the success of the mission" against Libya. I attach the Washington telegram reporting the Resolution.

UNITED KINGDOM RIGHTS UNDER
CHURCHILL/TRUMAN.

The use of British bases by the United States, whether for conventional or nuclear operations, requires the consent of HMG. In each case we have the right to say no. In particular, no nuclear weapons may be fired or launched from British territory without the explicit agreement of the British Prime Minister.

REASONS FOR USING F111s.

The Government agreed to support a United States operation against specific targets in Libya demonstrably involved in the conduct and support of terrorist activities. We agreed to the use in that operation of F111 aircraft based in Britain because they provided the best equipped means of achieving these particular objectives with the lowest possible risk both of civilian casualties in Libya and of casualties among United States service personnel.

The United States House of Representatives on 5 May unanimously adopted a resolution expressing the "gratitude of the American people for the assistance provided by the Government and people of the United Kingdom during defensive

operations ... against Libya on 14 April", and said that the use of F111s had "substantially reduced the risk to American servicemen..".

ARE THERE AGREEMENTS GOVERNING THE DEPLOYMENT OF UNITED STATES AIRCRAFT TO THE UNITED KINGDOM?

Operational use of United Kingdom bases by the United States is covered by long standing arrangements. This applies to all United States military aircraft, whether permanently based or temporarily deployed here.

[If pressed on prior consultation about the deployment of tankers] My exchanges with President Reagan prior to the United States military action on 14 April were confidential, and I am not prepared to go into detail but, of course, all operational use of British bases by the United States is a matter for joint decision.

ACCURACY OF AVIATION WEEK ARTICLE.

I am not prepared to comment on the accuracy of allegations in press articles.

Thatcher 'misled MPs on F-111 use in raid'

By Paul Brown

Evidence from the Pentagon about the United States' reasons for wanting to use British bases for the bombing raid on Libya show that Mrs Thatcher misled the House of Commons, Mr Tam Dalyell, Labour MP for Linlithgow said last night.

He challenged Mrs Thatcher's explanation that the F-111s were used for "humanitarian reasons" because greater bombing accuracy caused fewer civilian casualties. This had not occurred to the Pentagon, he said.

Mr Dalyell said he was relying on information from the authoritative US magazine, Aviation Week, which in a detailed account of the raid quotes the Pentagon as saying equally accurate bombers from the US fleet could have completed the

raid without help from British bases.

"Mrs Thatcher is guilty of hypocrisy of a very tall order. It is clear that F-111s are not more accurate than carrier-borne aircraft. The Pentagon wanted to tie in the British for political reasons," he said.

Pentagon sources reveal that planning for the Libyan raid began a week before Mrs Thatcher gave permission. Back-up tanker planes used in the operation had already been brought into British bases.

The article also revealed that US plans for British-based F-111s extend beyond Nato deployment, and are for use in the Middle East.

In a frank comment a senior military official said that the Navy's carriers could have hit all the Libyan targets at the same time, but they would

have had very little spare capacity.

"There were a lot of good reasons to include the Air Force F-111s. In most of the contingency planning for large air strikes by the Sixth Fleet, the F-111s from Britain are to be used.

"The Libyan attack provided a good proving ground for the F-111s to be flown in the Mediterranean. Understandably, after all the Navy action in Libya previously, the Air Force wanted a piece of the action.

"The fact that the Defence Department budget is under consideration — and here was an opportunity to show how well the money is being spent on aircraft and weapons — was not overlooked by both services as a side benefit to the mission.

"Another reason to include

the F-111s in the operations was that it showed the support of Great Britain for our anti-terrorist activities."

The American military was particularly keen to test new technology added since the Vietnam war. Three EF-111 strike and electronic warfare aircraft from Upper Heyford in Oxfordshire, which would be deployed ahead of a nuclear strike, were used in the Libyan raid.

A fleet of 28 tanker aircraft were used to refuel the strike force, some of which were flown in some days before Mrs Thatcher gave permission.

The EF-111s and 18 F-111s were refuelled four times on the flight to Libya and twice on the return.

The F-111s struck three targets: The Al Azziziyah Barracks, the home of Colonel Gadafy and alleged headquarter

of international terrorist attacks; the Sidi Bilal port facility, and Tripoli airport.

The Navy was assigned to two targets in and near Benghazi: a barracks which serves as an alternative headquarters and Benina airfield.

The article reveals that the Libyans fired back with Russian-made surface-to-air missiles. The US carrier aircraft hit back with a dozen Shrike missiles and 30 Harm missiles at sites in Tripoli and Benghazi.

Most of the F-111s were equipped with four 2,000lb bombs dropped from 400 feet at more than 500 miles an hour. Some carried 12 500lb bombs. Some bombs had to be dumped when they were not released over the targets.

The Navy planes used 1,000 lb bombs and cluster bombs. Both sets of planes used radar


and laser targeting systems. Navy and air force pilots were briefed not to drop their bombs unless they had a positive identification and a perfect approach on their low-level run to their target.

Some of the aircraft crews could not meet the stringent release requirements and did not drop their weapons on the target areas. Five F-111s and two A-6Es did not complete their bombing mission.

Mr Dalyell said he would press Mrs Thatcher to make a Commons statement on the contrast between her views and those of the Pentagon on why the F-111s were used.

Speaking to Christchurch Labour party in Ferndown, Hampshire, he said the principal reason for their use seemed to be to tie the British into the operation.

U.S. Demonstrates Advanced Weapons Technology in Libya



Eighteen General Dynamics F-111Fs took part in the raid on targets in Tripoli (map above). The F-111Fs carried 500- and 2,000-lb. laser-guided bombs. The USS America launched six Grumman A-6Es and the Coral Sea launched eight A-6Es for the strike on Benghazi targets. Six McDonnell Douglas F/A-18s from the Coral Sea and six LTV Aerospace A-7Es from the America were used for surface-to-air weapon suppression at both targets. Combat air patrol over the Gulf of Sidra was provided by Grumman E-2Cs controlling F/A-18s and Grumman F-14s. Three General Dynamics EF-111As and Navy/Grumman EA-6Bs were used to jam the missile sites and communications in the two target areas. Twenty-eight McDonnell Douglas KC-10s and Boeing KC-135s took off from bases in England to provide four refuelings to the F-111Fs during the trip to the Libya targets (map at right). The flight distance to Libya was approximately 2,500 naut. mi. A direct route over France to the strike area would have been close to 1,300 naut. mi.

Washington—Demonstration of air power staged by U.S. forces last week against suspected terrorist training and bivouac sites in Libya provided the first opportunity for U.S. air forces to apply many of the technologies incorporated since the end of the Vietnam War.

Approximately 100 aircraft were involved in the coordinated Navy/Air Force strike on the Libyan sites, in which advanced night vision systems, a new generation of precision laser-guided weapons and the capability to conduct successful long-range, low-altitude night strike missions in a high-threat environment were effectively demonstrated.

The USAF/General Dynamics F-111F and EF-111 strike and electronic warfare

aircraft, denied permission by the French government¹² to overfly France, were obliged to follow a circuitous 2,500-naut.-mi. route from Britain around the west coasts of France, Spain and Portugal, over the Strait of Gibraltar into the Mediterranean, and around the northern tip of Africa before reaching Tripoli. The route across France would have reduced the one-way distance to about 1,300 naut. mi.


The additional distance required the Air Force pilots to fly a 13-14 hr. mission compared to the 6-7 hr. they would otherwise have flown. The additional distance also required aerial refueling support from a fleet of 28 tanker aircraft.

Planning for the strike began the week of Apr. 7, when the two services started

evaluating their target options and what forces would be used in the strike. The final Libyan targets were selected and the actual numbers and mix of aircraft for the night attack were decided two to three days prior to the strike.

"The Navy's carrier aircraft could have hit all the Libyan targets at the same time, but they would have been tight on assets. There were a lot of good reasons to include the Air Force F-111s," a senior military official said. "In most of the contingency planning for large air strikes by the Sixth Fleet, the F-111s from Britain are factored into the operation.

"The Libyan attack provided a good proving ground for the F-111s to be flown in the Mediterranean," he said. "The abil-



ity to fly over France would have helped this mission considerably.

"Understandably, after the all-Navy action in Libya last month, the Air Force wanted a piece of the action," the official added. "The fact that the Defense Dept. budget is under consideration—and here was an opportunity to show how well the money is being spent on aircraft and weapons—was not overlooked by both services as a side benefit to the mission. Another reason to include the F-111s in the operation was that it showed the support of Great Britain for our antiterrorist activities."

Approval to operate the F-111s and McDonnell Douglas KC-10s and Boeing KC-135s from British airfields was given

by Britain's Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. Agreements over the use of bases in England require approval for non-North Atlantic Treaty Organization operations. Both France and Spain declined permission for the Air Force to fly over their countries during the raid.

"The value of carrier aviation was clearly indicated in this operation," a high ranking Navy official said. "The Air Force participation was perfect and they did a good job hitting their assigned targets. The point is, however, that even though we received permission to operate the F-111s from Britain, it has caused a large controversy in that country. You need no permission from another country to launch aircraft from a carrier."

The coordinated attack started with the launch of the Air Force aircraft from Great Britain in the early evening of Apr. 14. Included in the strike group were 24 F-111Fs from the 48th Tactical Fighter Wing, stationed at RAF Lakenheath. Six F-111Fs returned to the base after the initial refueling as spare aircraft. Five General Dynamics/Grumman Aerospace EF-111As were launched from RAF Upper Heyford by the 42nd Electronics Combat Squadron, with three planned to take part in the attack.

Tanker Fleet

Joining the F-111s on the more than 5-hr. flight from Britain to Libya were 28 KC-10 and KC-135 tankers. The majority of the tankers were flown from RAF Mildenhall and the other nine staged from RAF Fairford. The majority of the KC-10s are stationed in the U.S., and had been flown to Britain to participate in a planned exercise prior to the attack.

The EF-111As and F-111Fs were refueled four times on the flight to Libya and twice on the return flight. Some of the inbound flight legs to Libya were flown at low level by the F-111s, and they returned to Britain at a higher, more fuel-efficient cruise altitude.


Targets in the Tripoli area assigned to the Air Force F-111Fs were:

- Al Azzizyah barracks—The main headquarters for Libyan planning and direction of overseas terrorist attacks. Libyan leader Col. Muammar Qaddafi uses the barracks as his home and headquarters.
- Sidi Bilal port facility—Training facilities for a maritime terrorist diver unit.
- Tripoli Airport—Military side of the commercial airport is used by Soviet-built Ilyushin IL-76 transports to provide military support worldwide.

Early Warning Aircraft

Prior to the arrival of the Air Force F-111Fs, the Navy launched Grumman Aerospace E-2Cs to provide control and command for the strike activities. The early warning aircraft also were used to detect Libyan MIG fighters that might have been launched against the U.S. aircraft. No Libyan aircraft activity was recorded by the E-2Cs during the attack.

The E-2Cs are equipped with either General Electric AN/APS-125 or an improved APS-138 long-range, digital radar. The radars have automatic acquisition and tracking capability and have been upgraded to include an increased antijam capability. The aircraft can send data link target information to the combat air pa-



U. S. Air Force/General Dynamics F-111F strike fighter equipped with a Ford Aerospace Pave Tack laser designator/ranger pod beneath the fuselage centerline and four 2,000-lb. GBU-10 Paveway 2 laser-guided bombs under its wings banks over RAF Lakenheath,

England, on a training flight prior to the Apr. 15 raid on suspected terrorist installations in Libya. Several of the F-111s participating in the Libyan raid were configured in this manner for the 2,500-naut.-mi. flight from Britain to Tripoli.

trol aircraft or the Navy Tactical Data System on board the carriers. The E-2Cs also were launched to provide control of any search and rescue missions that may have been required.

The Navy was assigned two targets in and near Benghazi. These were the Al Jumahiyya barracks, which serve as an alternate command post to the Al Azziziyah barracks in Tripoli, and the Benina military airfield. Libyan fighters and bomber aircraft are stationed at the airfield, approximately 2 mi. from Benghazi.

The combat air patrol cover for the raid comprised Grumman F-14s equipped with long-range Hughes Phoenix air-to-air missiles and a combination of AIM-9 Sidewinder missiles and AIM-7 Sparrow air-to-air missiles. McDonnell Douglas F/A-18s also were used to provide fighter cover with Sidewinders and Sparrows. Two Marine Corps F/A-18 squadrons are assigned to the aircraft carrier Coral Sea on its current Mediterranean deployment.

Prior to the actual attack, the Air Force EF-111A Ravens and Navy/Grumman EA-6B Prowlers were used in the defense suppression role. Both electronic warfare aircraft are equipped with similar jamming systems. The ALQ-99 jammers, used against microwave radars associated with Soviet-built anti-aircraft weapons such as the SA-5, are produced by Raytheon's Electromagnetic Systems Div., Goleta, Calif.

Lower frequency jammers, which can be used against enemy communications and low-frequency radars, are built by the American Electronics Laboratory.

The EA-6B jammers are carried in wing pods, enabling the electronic countermeasures to be tailored to the specific threat, while the EF-111A carries its ECM system internally. The EF-111A has a single electronic warfare officer and the EA-6B Prowler carries two EWOs. The Grumman EA-6Bs were used to provide jamming support for the Navy fleet at Benghazi, as well as support for the Air Force raid on Tripoli.

F/A-18s and Navy/LTV Aerospace A-7Es provided strike capability against the Libyan radar-equipped air defense systems. The A-7E is capable of firing both the Texas Instrument/Sperry AGM-45 Shrike and the Texas Instrument AGM-88A high-speed antiradiation missile (HARM). The F/A-18 is equipped with

the HARM system but has not been retrofitted with the earlier Shrike system.

The attacking aircraft encountered heavy surface-to-air missile activity near Tripoli and at the one downtown target near Benghazi. The activity included SA-2, SA-3, SA-6 and SA-8 missiles. The SA-5 missile site at Sirte, attacked during the Navy raid in March, was activated as the aircraft were leaving the targets, but no missiles were fired from this site, and no HARM or Shrike missiles were fired against it by U. S. forces.


The A-7s fired more than a dozen Shrike missiles against radar sites in Tripoli and Benghazi. The shorter range of the Shrike, about 10 mi., prompted a variety of launch envelopes to be used by the Navy aircraft for missile delivery. The Navy fired approximately 30 of the more capable HARMs against Libyan radars. The newer missile has a 25 mi. range and can be fired in the vicinity of a known radar emitter, and the missile will attack when lock-on is achieved.

Both the F-111Fs and the A-6Es used radars and infrared systems to acquire targets and fly a low-level approach. The F-111F is equipped with a Ford Aerospace AN/AVQ-26 Pave Tack laser designator/ranger system that provides the capability to acquire, track and designate ground targets at night for laser, infrared and electro-optically guided weapons.

The majority of the F-111Fs were equipped with 2,000-lb. Texas Instruments GBU-10 Paveway 2 laser-guided bombs. The Tripoli targets were initially acquired and designated by the F-111F

Libyan Coverage

Coverage of the U. S. air strikes against Libyan military and terrorist installations was coordinated from AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY's Washington bureau by Bureau Chief Robert R. Ropelowski. Editors involved include David M. North, senior military editor; Paul Mann, senior congressional editor; James Ott, senior transport editor; Cecilia Preble, transport editor; and Paul Proctor, business flying editor. European reaction was covered by bureau chiefs David A. Brown, London; Michael Feazel, Brussels; and Jeffrey M. Lenorovitz, Paris. Copy desk and picture editing in New York was supervised by David Quast, assistant managing editor.



U. S. Air Force/Texas Instruments Paveway 2 laser-guided bomb of the type dropped by USAF/General Dynamics F-111F strike fighters on Libyan targets last week is based on a conventional Mk. 84 2,000-lb. bomb modified with a laser seeker, control fins, a computer control section and four small wings. The laser seeker detects a target

designated by a separate laser designator, and the computer control section moves the fins to control the trajectory of the bomb as it falls toward that target. The weapon has no propulsion system. A 500-lb. version of the Paveway 2 also was carried by the F-111s that attacked Libya.

radar and then passed off to the Pave Tack infrared imaging system as the aircraft approached the target at above 500 kt. and 400 ft. Once the bombs were released automatically on the laser-designated targets, the F-111Fs were able to take evasive action. Their electronic warfare officers continued to designate the targets through data-link to the weapon. The F-111Fs carried four 2,000-lb. Paveway 2 bombs each and some carried 12 500-lb. bombs.

Navy A-6Es used much the same tactics to strike targets in the Benghazi area. The two-seat aircraft were equipped with Mk. 82 Mod 1 retarded-delivery Snakeye

bombs and Mk. 20. Rockeye cluster bombs. The 1,000-lb. Snakeye and the multiple projectile Rockeye bombs would normally be released close to 450 kt. at 200 ft. on a standard bombing run. The A-6Es used Norden AN/APQ-148 multimode search radars to acquire the target and then handed off the target location information to the aircraft's Hughes Aircraft Co. AN/AAS-33 target recognition attack multisensor (TRAM) system. Both the Snakeye and Rockeye are conventionally released with no guidance, but the TRAM system's laser provides accurate range information for automatic release.

Navy and Air Force pilots were briefed

not to drop their ordnance unless they had a positive identification and a perfect approach on their low-level run to their target. Some of the aircraft crews were not able to meet the stringent release requirements, and did not drop their weapons in the target areas. For various reasons, five F-111Fs and two A-6Es did not complete the bombing mission.

Defense Dept. officials said that the success of the raid was attributed to surprise, electronic jamming, missile suppression, low-level attack tactics and the cover of night.

The bomb damage assessment was continuing last week, but cloud cover over Libya delayed a complete assessment. The barracks in Tripoli were damaged and three to five Il-76s were destroyed at the Tripoli airport. The Navy destroyed at least four MiG-23s, two Mi-8 helicopters and two Fokker F-27s in their attack on the Benina airfield. The capability of the F-111F Pave Tack and the A-6E chin-mounted TRAM turret to swivel to the rear helped to attain bomb damage information.

The other targets in Benghazi and Tripoli sustained some damage. Defense Dept. officials are attempting to determine whether damage to other than planned targets was due to the U.S. attack or misfired Libyan ordnance.

One F-111F was lost in the raid. The aircraft did not show up for its rendezvous with the tankers after the mission. □

Libyan Transport Pilots Train in Britain

LONDON—Ten flight crewmen from Libyan Arab Airlines are continuing to receive training at Oxford Air Training School, located a few miles from the U.S. air base at Upper Heyford.

The 10 crewmen—three pilots and seven flight engineers—are the latest in a large number of Libyan airline pilots who have trained at Oxford School, which is a division of CSE Aviation.

Pilots for the Libyan air carrier receive their initial training at Oxford and progress to their instrument rating. The normal sequence is for them then to go to the Fokker school in Amsterdam for type-rating instruction on the F-27 before returning to Libya to become F-27 flight crewmen.

Before the recent U. S. raid on Libya, an apparent practical joker notified authorities that one or more of the students had contemplated a suicide dive into the base. Officials at the school said that all of the students were investigated and cleared after an anonymous caller, posing as one of the Libyans, called police and threatened the suicide flight.

Reagan Ordered Air Strikes To Preempt Libyan Terrorists

Washington—President Reagan ordered last week's air strikes against Libya to preempt far-reaching terrorist attacks that U. S. intelligence officials said have been planned since the first of the year by Libyan leader Col. Muammar Qaddafi and "key lieutenants" on 30-35 American installations worldwide, including U. S. international air carriers in Latin America.

U. S. aircraft struck five targets in simultaneous night raids Apr. 15 on Tripoli and Benghazi. The targets were purported terrorist installations comprising command and control systems and training, logistics, intelligence and communications facilities.

Two days after the strikes, the State Dept. assailed both the Soviet Union and East Germany for their alleged complicity in Libyan terrorism and for contributing to the chain of events that led up to last week's U. S. air strikes. The department alleged that the Soviets and the East Germans turned a deaf ear to U. S. pleas in late March to restrain Libyan terrorist planning against U. S. citizens and interests in West Berlin, which lies inside East

Germany. The death of a U. S. serviceman in a subsequent West Berlin nightclub bombing helped provoke last week's U. S. raid.

"This entire cycle of events would have been avoided" if the Soviets and East Germans had restrained the Libyans, the State Dept. said.

It also rebuked the Soviets for refusing to heed U. S. warnings that Soviet supply of its SA-5 Gammon surface-to-air missiles to Libya might encourage Qaddafi to take risks that would force the U. S. to respond.

The day after the U. S. attack on Libya, a member of the U. S. embassy staff in Khartoum, the Sudan, was shot in the head and critically wounded by an unknown assailant. A senior Administration official said the Khartoum assault bore the marks of a Libyan operation and he disclosed that Khartoum is one of the 30-35 targets for which "we had particularly hard evidence that there was a major push on the part of the Libyans to single out Americans and to zero in on Khartoum. Qaddafi has caused a considerable amount

of trouble in the Sudan over the last several years."

This official also cautioned that although President Reagan will not hesitate to repeat last week's air strikes, future attacks will not be triggered automatically by incidents like the Khartoum shooting, even if they arouse suspicions of Libyan complicity. The Administration's main goal is preemption rather than retaliation, he said, and each terrorist incident will be evaluated case by case.

Half of last week's U. S. raid was mounted from Great Britain by the Air Force, which hit three targets around Tripoli using 18 General Dynamics F-111F fighter bombers, one of which was lost, and three Grumman Aerospace/General Dynamics electronic warfare EF-111As.

Carrier Aircraft

The other half, against Benghazi, involved 15 Navy/Grumman Aerospace A-6E and LTV Aerospace A-7E attack aircraft, launched from the carriers Coral Sea and America, which were in the Mediterranean north of the Libyan coast.

Asked why two-thirds of the Navy attack aircraft left behind on the carriers were not used to strike Tripoli as well as Benghazi, Pentagon official Robert B. Sims said the mission as carried out "was the best way to do it."

Had the raid depended exclusively on Navy aircraft, he said, two consecutive missions would have been necessary instead of a single simultaneous one. Accordingly there was a military need for both services to take part in the mission, "or we could not have conducted a coordinated, simultaneous strike on five targets," he said.

Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger said targets were chosen to minimize civilian damage.

To date, the U. S. has established no direct evidence linking Qaddafi to the explosion that killed four people on a Trans World Airlines Boeing 727 on approach for landing Apr. 2 near Athens airport (AW&ST Apr. 7, p. 32).


In that connection, however, Larry Speakes, the White House deputy press secretary, said last week the U. S. government is in possession of "highly reliable intelligence" that Libya is planning attacks on U. S. citizens and facilities in Europe, Latin America, Africa and the Middle East.

Libya allegedly has undertaken:

- Targeting of U. S. diplomats and their dependents in Latin America, as well as threatening strikes against U. S. com-



Libyan News Agency claimed that the wreckage shown in the photograph was from a downed U. S. aircraft during the Apr. 15 raid. The Defense Dept. identified the wreckage as the booster stage of a Soviet-built SA-3 Goa surface-to-air missile. The Libyans had available SA-2, SA-3, SA-6 and SA-8 missiles in the target areas to fire at the attacking U. S. aircraft.



Navy launched 14 Grumman A-6Es to perform the strike against the barracks and airfield targets in Benghazi. The A-6E is equipped with a small ball under the aircraft's nose. The IRAM's laser ranging and infrared imaging sensor were used to pinpoint the release for the target recognition and multisensor (TRAM) system housed in the retarded and cluster bombs used in the strike.

mercial interests in that part of the world, including U.S. international air carriers.

Assignment, in the second week of April, of three agents to an African state to prepare for the bombing of the U.S. embassy and chancellery and the kidnaping of the U.S. ambassador. All told Libya allegedly has under surveillance, and is planning attacks against, U.S. facilities in 10 African nations.

Attack planning aimed at several U.S. Middle East embassies and encouragement of other terrorist groups to pursue parallel actions.

Plans in Motion

In some instances, Speakes said, execution of these attack plans would require further instructions from Qaddafi, but in others the plans had been set in motion and would not require a direct order to proceed. Which ones now are in motion is guesswork, he said.

Despite the Administration's emphasis on preemption, last week's 12-min. air strike was retaliatory as well. The White House charged that Libya bore direct responsibility for the Apr. 5 bombing of the West Berlin nightclub in which the U.S. Army sergeant was killed and 230 other people injured, among them about 50 American military personnel.

In a nationwide telecast announcing his decision to attack Libya, President Reagan declared, "Today we have done what we had to do. If necessary, we shall do it again."

In a subsequent speech, he acknowledged that the attack would not end terrorism, stating: "What is required is for

Libya to end its pursuit of terror for political goals. The choice is theirs."

The President said the U.S. had obtained conclusive evidence that the terrorist attack in Berlin had been "planned and executed under the direct orders of the Libyan regime." He cited intercepted message traffic in late March and early April between Tripoli and the Libyan People's Bureau in East Berlin indicating plans "to conduct a terrorist attack against Americans to cause maximum and indiscriminate casualties." U.S. officials missed alerting the nightclub by 15 min.

The President said U.S. evidence regarding Berlin was direct, precise and irrefutable and that there was solid evidence of other attacks Qaddafi has planned against United States installations and diplomats, "and even American tourists." He said allied assistance had helped thwart some of those attacks and singled out French aid in aborting what the President characterized as "a planned massacre, using grenades and small arms, of civilians waiting in line for visas at an American embassy."

Nevertheless, the French closed their airspace to the U.S. attack, forcing Air Force pilots to fly from Great Britain to Libya along a circuitous route west of Spain that took them about 1,200 naut. mi. out of their way.

France's embassy in Libya was damaged, but the White House said France had lodged no protests with Washington.

Regarding British consent to launch half the U.S. mission from British bases, Weinberger said Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher had raised many questions and

concerns but, upon hearing U.S. responses, granted permission.

Three days after the U.S. attack, the bodies of three westerners were found in the mountains above Beirut, Lebanon. Speakes said U.S. government sources indicated the dead were three British citizens.

"We do not know who is responsible," he said, "but this bears the marks of the type of activity undertaken by Abu Nidal," a maverick international terrorist with ties to fringe elements of the Palestinian nationalist cause.


Informing Soviets

Because Libya is a Soviet client, U.S. officials waited until last week's air strikes were under way before informing the Soviet government of them. Secretary of State George P. Shultz said the Soviet charge d'affaires here was called in, told of the operation, apprised of the evidence of Libyan terrorism and assured that the U.S. attack was in no way directed against the Soviet Union.

Nevertheless, U.S./Soviet diplomatic relations were one of the early casualties of the attack. The Soviets reacted the next day, advising it was impossible to proceed with a planned meeting between Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze that was to have laid the groundwork for a second summit conference later this year between Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail S. Gorbachev.

Speakes said the U.S. remains committed to the summit, but the State Dept., in a subsequent statement, said if the Soviets do not wish to meet, "so be it." □

British Approval of U. S. Action Prompts Debate in Parliament



Four General Dynamics F-111 attack aircraft of the 48th Tactical Fighter Wing make a formation takeoff shortly after 7 p. m. London time Apr. 14 from the U. S. air base at Lakenheath, England, en route to targets in Libya. In addition to weapons under the aircraft's variable-geometry wing, some of the F-111s carried laser-guided bombs internally. Note afterburners on all four aircraft.

London—British government came under strong fire both from political opponents and some supporters last week for agreeing to allow the U. S. to launch aircraft from British bases to bomb Libyan targets.

The British action provoked Parliament to hold an emergency one-day debate on the entire Libyan situation and the British part in the U. S. response to it.

There also were demonstrations in London and other major European cities, both against the U. S. action and against the British for assisting in it.

British decision to permit U. S. use of the bases, which was granted by Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher on Apr. 12, after a briefing by Gen. Vernon Walters, President Reagan's special envoy, was defended by her and most of her Conservative Party members in the debate on the grounds that the U. S. was justified in striking back at Libya and that more deaths would have been likely if the attacks had been launched from the U. S. Sixth Fleet's carriers only.

The U. S. masked its preparations for the strike from Britain, to a degree, by saying that the increased activity at the U. S. bases and the large number of tanker aircraft flown in from U. S. bases were part of a planned NATO exercise.

About 30 tankers, mostly McDonnell Douglas KC-10s, but also including some Boeing KC-135s, were moved into U. S. bases at Fairford and Mildenhall, England, several days before the attack. Since France and Spain both denied the U. S. force overflight clearance, the total distance to the Libyan targets was more

than 2,800 naut. mi., which necessitated several in-flight refuelings.

Strike aircraft that operated from Britain included 18 General Dynamics F-111Fs of the 48th Tactical Fighter Wing based at Lakenheath, England, and three Grumman EF-111A Raven electronic warfare aircraft from the 42nd Electronic Combat Squadron based at Upper Heyford, England.

Pave Tack System

The F-111F aircraft operated by the 48th TFW were selected for the mission because they are the only F-111s in Europe equipped with the Ford Aerodynamic AN/AVQ-26 Pave Tack electro-optical target-acquisition and weapon-aiming system (AW&ST Sept. 6, 1982, p. 200).

The EF-111As only recently became operational with U. S. 17th Air Force (AW&ST Aug. 5, 1985, p. 44). The F-111Fs are controlled by U. S. Third Air Force, headquartered in Britain.

After the attack, direct airline service between Britain and Libya was suspended, and there was no indication late last week when it would be resumed. British Caledonian formerly operated three flights per week to Tripoli.

Diplomatic relations between Britain and Libya were broken by Britain in 1984 after a policewoman was shot and killed by someone inside the Libyan People's Bureau (embassy) in London. Britain expelled all the diplomats in the embassy and has never restored relations.

In the debate in Parliament last week, Thatcher said President Reagan asked for

British assistance and support. "He sought our support under the consultative arrangements which have continued under successive governments for over 30 years," she said. "He also sought our agreement to the use of U. S. aircraft based in this country. Our agreement was necessary.

"We had to consider the wider implications, including our relations with other countries, and we had to weigh the importance for our security of our alliance with the U. S. and the American role in the defense of Europe."

She said Reagan assured her that only clearly defined targets having a relation to terrorist activities would be hit, and noted that there were no other F-111s based anywhere in Europe that could be used in the attack.

"Had Britain refused permission for the use of these aircraft, the American operation would still have taken place, but more lives would probably have been lost on the ground and in the air," she said, referring to the probable use of Boeing B-52 aircraft if the F-111s had not been available.

Thatcher also noted that the U. S. has said that further strikes might be ordered if Libyan terrorists continue their activity. She said she had notified the U. S. that Britain was reserving its position on "any question of further action which might be more general or less clearly directed against terrorism."

"It is clearly understood between President Reagan and myself that if there was any question of using U. S. aircraft based in this country in a further action, that

GRS 320

LR

UNCLASSIFIED
FM WASHINGTON
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 1185
OF 052320Z MAY 86
INFO IMMEDIATE TOKYO

TOKYO FOR PM'S PARTY

US/LIBYA: CONGRESSIONAL RESOLUTION ON UK SUPPORT

1. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ON 5 MAY UNANIMOUSLY ADOPTED A RESOLUTION (TEXT BY FAX TO NAD) EXPRESSING THE QUOTE GRATITUDE OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE FOR THE ASSISTANCE PROVIDED BY THE GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE OF THE UNITED KINGDOM DURING DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS ... AGAINST LIBYA ON 14 APRIL UNQUOTE. THE RESOLUTION PLACES THE US ACTION IN THE CONTEXT OF ARTICLE 51 OF THE UN CHARTER, AND APPLAUDS THE PRIME MINISTER'S AGREEMENT TO THE USE OF THE F-111'S WHICH QUOTE SUBSTANTIALLY REDUCED THE RISK TO AMERICAN SERVICEMEN AND SIGNIFICANTLY CONTRIBUTED TO THE SUCCESS OF THE MISSION UNQUOTE.
2. THE RESOLUTION'S TWO PRINCIPAL CO-SPONSORS, CONGRESSMEN SKELTON (D-MISSOURI) AND ROWLAND (R-CONNECTICUT), ARE CALLING ON ME NEXT WEEK IN ORDER FORMALLY TO HAND OVER THE RESOLUTION TOGETHER WITH A COVERING LETTER TO THE PRIME MINISTER TO RECOMMEND THAT SHE SHOULD IN DUE COURSE REPLY, BUT CLEARLY NO ACTION IS REQUIRED AT THIS STAGE.
3. NO FORMAL RESOLUTION HAS BEEN ADOPTED IN THE SENATE. BUT I UNDERSTAND THAT ABOUT 35 SENATORS HAVE SIGNED A LETTER OF GRATITUDE TO THE PRIME MINISTER WHICH IS BEING TRANSMITTED VIA THE US EMBASSY IN LONDON.

WRIGHT

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

LIBYA CRISIS
LIMITED
NENAD
NAD
MED
SED
SOVIET D
WED
NEWS D
INFO D
MAED
DEF D
SCD
CONS D
SEC D
PLANNING STAFF
UND
PUSD
ECD(E)
POD
PROTOCOL D

PS
PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR RENTON
PS/MR EGGAR
PS/PUS
CHIEF CLERK
MR FERGUSSON
MR DEREK THOMAS
MR GOODALL
SIR W HARDING
SIR D MIERS
MR DAVID THOMAS
MR RATFORD
MR O'NEILL
MR BARRINGTON
MR DAUNT
MR LONG
MR RENWICK
MR HUDSON(ODA)

COPIES TO:-
ASSESSMENTS STAFF
CABINET OFFICE
MR MALLABY CABINET OFFICE
PS/ S OF S/DEFENCE
PS/NO 10 DOWNING ST.
SIR R ARMSTRONG
CABINET OFFICE
SIR J FREELAND LEGAL ADVSRS
MR FIFOOT LEGAL ADVISERS
DIC/MOD.

WELFAR@ SECTION POD
AUS(DS) MOD
SEC(O/C) MOD



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
 MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1
 Telephone 01-930 7022

9

MO 11/2/2C

temporarily retained

8M May 1986

THIS IS A COPY. THE ORIGINAL IS
 RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3 (4)
 OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT

Dec 6/86

USE BY THE UNITED STATES OF BASES IN THE UK

Thank you for your letter of 1st May, which the Defence Secretary has seen on his return to this country.

Mr Younger agrees that it would be useful to have a crisp, authoritative statement of the position governing US use of bases in the UK. He is generally content with the thrust of the Foreign Secretary's formulation and agrees, in particular, that it is important to avoid any suggestion that the bases in question belong to the US.

He is, however, a little unhappy with the first sentence of the proposed passage which is technically incorrect,

Mr Younger would therefore prefer to rephrase the opening sentence in such a way as to relate it to US national use, as follows:

"The use of British bases by the United States, whether for conventional or nuclear operations, requires the consent of HMG."

This formula is along similar lines to, though wider in scope than, the Prime Minister's reply yesterday to Mr Cranley Onslow's Question, which referred solely to aircraft.

Mr Younger would also favour a stronger formulation to deal with the possible use of nuclear weapons, along the lines of the standard wording, on which Ministers have previously drawn, on this point.

C R Budd Esq
 Foreign and Commonwealth Office



I am copying this letter to Charles Powell and to Michael Stark.

*Yours ever,
John Howe*

(J F HOWE)
Private Secretary

Temporarily Retained

THIS IS A COPY. THE ORIGINAL IS
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3 (4)
OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT

ENERGY

Renewable Energy Sources

Mr. Baldry asked the Secretary of State for Energy what initiatives the Government are undertaking, and what research they are sponsoring into renewable sources of energy supply.

Mr. David Hunt: The Government have identified the most promising renewable energy technologies for exploitation in the United Kingdom, and substantial support is being given to their development through my Department's research, development and demonstration programmes. A detailed account of the content of these programmes and the prospects for the exploitation of renewable energy sources in the United Kingdom, is given in ETSU publications R28, R30 and N3/85. Copies of these documents are in the Libraries of both Houses. The Government seek international collaboration in this area whenever it is of benefit to the United Kingdom.

Energy Efficiency

Mr. Evans asked the Secretary of State for Energy (1) if he has made any estimates of the potential savings to the United Kingdom's energy bill which will be gained during Energy Efficiency Year in each region of the United Kingdom;

(2) if he will list the total proposed savings during Energy Efficiency Year by sector; and, in each case, what these savings represent as a percentage of (a) total savings in the United Kingdom and (b) the United Kingdom's annual energy bill.

Mr. David Hunt: Energy Efficiency Year is part of a continuing campaign by Government to persuade the nation to save the £7 billion it wastes each year by using energy inefficiently. Savings stimulated by the campaign will accrue over different timescales, depending on the measures undertaken. I regret that there is no satisfactory regional breakdown of total energy consumption. The sectoral breakdown of the nation's energy bill is as follows:

Energy consumption by sector—£ million

	1984
Domestic	9,620
Industry, commerce and public services	11,980
Transport	15,040

Nuclear Waste

Mr. Austin Mitchell asked the Secretary of State for Energy (1) what percentage of imported spent oxide fuel has been kept in the United Kingdom without having been reprocessed since 1979;

(2) what has been the tonnage of spent oxide fuel imported from overseas since 1979.

Mr. Goodlad: From 1 January 1979 to 31 December 1985 approximately, 1,230 teu of spent oxide fuel was imported from overseas. Of this about 14 tonnes were temporarily held in the United Kingdom while in transit to other countries. The balance is stored at Sellafield pending reprocessing in the thermal oxide reprocessing plant which is presently under construction.

Since 1976 BNFL's contracts for the reprocessing of overseas spent fuel have contained options for the return

of wastes. As I said in my answer to the hon. Member on 2 May at columns 502-503, the Government intend that the options should be exercised and that the wastes should be returned.

Nuclear Power Industry

Mr. Chris Smith asked the Secretary of State for Energy what benefits he expects to follow for Britain's nuclear industry from his recent visit to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Mr. Peter Walker: It is too early to say what benefits might flow from my visit, but I noted strong interest in British expertise in the handling and reprocessing of nuclear waste. Any trade in nuclear materials and technology will, of course, be subject to our international obligations in this area.

PRIME MINISTER

Japan (Visit)

Mr. Parry asked the Prime Minister if she will make a statement on her recent visit to Japan.

Mr. Biffen: I have been asked to reply.

My right hon. Friend hopes to make a statement to the House about the economic summit in Tokyo.

United States Aircraft (Military Operations)

Mr. Onslow asked the Prime Minister whether there are any circumstances in which United States aircraft based in the United Kingdom can be used in military operations without the consent of Her Majesty's Government; and if she will make a statement.

The Prime Minister [*pursuant to the answer, 6 May 1986, c. 3*].: Under the Churchill—Truman arrangements, there are no circumstances in which American aircraft based in this country may be used without our consent in military operations planned by the United States.

NATIONAL FINANCE

Building Societies Bill

Mr. Cash asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer what representations he has had on the Building Societies Bill; and if he will make a statement.

Mr. Ian Stewart: The Government have received a number of further representations from societies and others, particularly concerning conversion to company status, obstructed mergers and the provision of pensions.

Conversion to Company Status

The transfer of a society's business to a company will be subject to certain minimum statutory requirements and to confirmation by the Building Societies Commission that the requisite procedures have been complied with. These requirements will ensure that the rights of members are fully safeguarded on conversion, that it is only undertaken with the active participation and support of members, and that the process will not cause unacceptable discontinuity in the institution concerned.



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

7 May 1986

Dear Col:-,

USE BY THE UNITED STATES OF BASES IN THE UNITED KINGDOM

The Prime Minister has seen a copy of your letter to John Howe in the Ministry of Defence proposing a line for Ministers to take on use by the United States of bases in the United Kingdom. The Prime Minister would prefer to stick to the formula which has been agreed for use in reply to a Parliamentary Question from Mr. Cranley Onslow MP which is no doubt available to you.

I am copying this letter to Michael Stark (Cabinet Office) and to John Howe (Ministry of Defence).

temporarily retained

THIS IS A COPY. THE ORIGINAL IS
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3 (4)
OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT

Yours truly
Charles Powell

(Charles Powell)

Colin Budd, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

1 May 1986

No. - (MS) and my office have been checked this morning. We have a formal word with the Prime Minister

Dear John, ^{MS} content with the form of words proposed by the Foreign Secretary? MEA 1/5

Use by United States of Bases in the UK

The Foreign Secretary is concerned that the Opposition have been able to exploit slight discrepancies in Government statements about the use by the US of bases in this country and the arrangements governing this. The material prepared on 23 April by the Cabinet Office and circulated under minutes from Christopher Mallaby and David Jago to Charles Powell is, in the Foreign Secretary's view, excellent and provides a firm basis for future Government statements on the issue.

However, the Foreign Secretary believes that there would be advantage in having an additional, pithy statement on the use of the bases, and in particular the nuclear aspect, which could be circulated to all Ministers (not just those directly concerned with the issue) and possibly also to backbench MPs. He has in mind a text on the following lines:

"The operational use of British bases by US forces, whether conventional or nuclear, requires the consent of HMG. Under long-standing arrangements nuclear weapons would not be used without the explicit agreement of the British Government. In each case we have the right to say no."

The Foreign Secretary suggests that if the Defence Secretary and the Prime Minister are content, this formula, together with the material produced by the Cabinet Office, should be circulated to Ministers with guidance to the effect that they should use the short formula whenever possible, drawing on the more extensive material as necessary. The formula might also be passed to backbench MPs.

Finally, the Foreign Secretary believes that we should avoid the use of the terms 'American bases' or 'US bases', which could be exploited by those who wish to imply that the

/presence

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presence of US forces here entails some derogation of British sovereignty. We should instead use the terms 'the US forces based in the UK'. We believe this would be in line with Ministry of Defence usage in formal correspondence.

I am copying this letter to Charles Powell in No 10 and Michael Stark in the Cabinet Office.

Yours Sincerely,
Colin Budd

(C R Budd)
Private Secretary

J F Howe Esq
PS/MOD

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24/6.

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MR POWELL

Mr Heath's alleged refusal of use of
United States bases in 1973

In the Commons debate on 16 April, Mr Heath suggested that the use of bases in this country had been denied to the Americans during the Yom Kippur war in 1973. His statement was as follows:

"We had to deal with an equally difficult question during the Yom Kippur war in the Middle East in 1973. We were asked for the use of bases, including those in Cyprus. The reply which my Government sent to the United States was no."

As you know, research has been undertaken in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Ministry of Defence and Cabinet Office in order to establish the facts on this issue. You too are searching the No 10 files for evidence.

2. The broad picture which has emerged suggests that no formal request by the United States for use of its bases in the United Kingdom was directly refused in 1973. We have identified two relevant occasions in 1973 -

a. an oral request was made on 10 October 1973 (under the specific arrangements for reconnaissance flights) for agreement to use their facilities at Mildenhall for SR71 reconnaissance flights over the area of conflict in the Middle East. Agreement was notified to the United States at 8.00 p.m. that evening, subject to certain conditions:

- i. that each flight should be approved individually;
- ii. that flights should only be undertaken when there was an urgent and important reason;

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iii. that the product should be given to us but no one else (e.g. the Israelis).

It appears that the Americans considered the conditions so stringent that they amounted to "a refusal in disguise" (Kissinger quoted by HM Ambassador, Washington). Therefore, although the conditions set by the British Government evidently angered the American Administration, there is no basis for contending that we actually refused an American request.

b. It is clear from the files that the United States had a pressing interest in using bases in the United Kingdom and probably elsewhere in Western Europe for re-supply of the Israeli forces in the Yom Kippur war. Foreign and Commonwealth Office records show that, following a Government decision on 15 October 1973, the United States Embassy was to be informed that we assumed that the Americans would not be using their facilities in this country to re-supply Israel. The evidence suggests that the Americans took the point and that no formal request was made. Foreign and Commonwealth Office papers in the following month record the clear view that criticism that the United Kingdom had denied facilities to the United States for the supply of Israel during the war was untrue; that the Americans did not ask us for such facilities either in this country or at bases overseas; and that we did not therefore deny them any.

It is perhaps not surprising that officials can find no written exchanges between the two Governments since the British approach at the time was so oblique. Nor have we traced any evidence of

SECRET

of any telephone conversations between the President and the Prime Minister at the time; some might be recorded on your files, although the evident distance between the two Governments may have militated against such personal contact.

3. As to the bearing of this research on the handling of any future questions about events in 1973, I believe that it would be unwise to challenge Mr Heath directly -

a. our approach in 1973 was clearly intended to head-off a formal request but this does not rule out the possibility that more tentative approaches were made by the Americans which Mr Heath might claim were met with a response tantamount to a refusal. We could not publish documents which would disprove his claims.

b. Further controversy on this issue might provoke greater questioning about our ability to assert control over the bases.

c. Unhelpful comparisons might be drawn between the allegedly independent approach of 1973 with the present case.

It is recommended, therefore, that in response to any further questions on events in 1973 Ministers should not be drawn into a direct refutation of Mr Heath's statement but respond on the attached lines.

4. I am sending copies of this minute to the Private Secretaries to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, the Defence Secretary and Sir Robert Armstrong.

24 April 1986

3
SECRET

W. J. G. J. G.
for C L G Mallaby



Defence
file B 5

bc Mr Rickett

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

14 December 1982

Arrangements for Joint Decision on the Use by the U.S.
of UK Bases in an Emergency

Your Department supplied some briefing on this question for use by the Prime Minister at Question time today. In the event, the Prime Minister did not make use of it.

Mrs Thatcher would now be grateful for a fuller note on the arrangements for joint decision. I should be grateful if you could let me have the basic texts and any comments you wish to offer on their meaning.

It would be helpful if this could reach me by tomorrow night since the matter could be raised at Question time on Thursday.

I am copying this letter to Brian Fall (Foreign and Commonwealth Office).

A. J. COLES

Richard Mottram, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence.

SECRET

Defence 4



MINISTER OF STATE FOR DEFENCE

WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

Telephone 01-218 2216 (Direct Dialling)
01-218 9000 (Switchboard)

D/MIN(AF)/PB/10/4

9th July, 1981

Dear Douglas,

*NACM.
N
W*

WARTIME BASING OF B-52s AT RAF FAIRFORD

Peter Carrington wrote to John Nott on 25th June suggesting that we should consider whether we might put forward to the Americans alternative locations for the wartime basing of B-52s in the United Kingdom.

This presents a very real difficulty. The B-52 aircraft requires a strong runway and extensive hard-standings. Because of the outriggers on the aircraft's wings it also requires strong taxi-ways at least 200 feet wide. There are only two airfields in the UK which meet these physical characteristics. These are RAF Fairford and RAF Greenham Common.

RAF Greenham Common is already earmarked in wartime for other tasks. Equally importantly, however, there would be a sharp public reaction if Greenham Common were selected; not least because of the recent Ministerial assurances which have been given in the context of the GLCM deployment about the continuing future status of the base as a 'standby' airfield. In my view, even if Greenham Common were not already earmarked for other tasks in wartime, it would be unwise in the light of this to select it for the B-52 deployment.

This leaves RAF Fairford as the only base which is both suitable and available in wartime for the B-52 force. I do not underestimate the potential difficulties, but I believe that public presentation of the decision should be manageable. It would be wrong to imply that the possibility of additional wartime use of the base was in any way debarred by what was said at the time of the decision to base KC135s there. The statements made then did not, and clearly could not, preclude the use or development of Fairford as a wartime base, and even those relating to peacetime use were left open.
... I enclose a summary of the statements which were made.

/We might

Hon Douglas Hurd, CBE, MP.

SECRET

SECRET

We might need to say something about our decision in the spring of next year at the earliest. We should be positive about the military reasons for the decision. We should stress the operational and strategic benefits to the Alliance, in particular that the B-52D force will be performing a conventional, not a nuclear, role. We should reiterate that RAF Fairford will be a permanent peacetime base only for KC135s; B-52s will continue to be deployed there for one annual exercise and in periods of tension or war, though temporary deployments of B-52s to other bases in the UK would continue as at present.

John Nott hopes very much, therefore, that Peter Carrington will feel able to withdraw his objection to Fairford. If so I shall ask my officials to keep closely in touch with yours and with their American counterparts to ensure that the terms of a public announcement either here or in the US, when made, will be jointly agreed and that such a statement should be delayed as long as practicably possible. We shall be stressing the fact that any statement must be jointly agreed in the Exchange of Letters between the two Governments agreeing to the US request, which I would also propose should be set in hand.

I am sending copies of this minute to Number 10, the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster and Sir Robert Armstrong.

Yours truly,
Peter

PETER BLAKER

SECRET

SUMMARY OF PUBLIC STATEMENTS ON FUTURE DEPLOYMENTS TO RAF FAIRFORD

1. Most of the undertakings made at the time of the decision to allow the USAF to base KC135s at RAF Fairford were to the effect that there were at present no plans to station more aircraft there in peacetime than the 15 tankers. A subsequent statement at the time of a temporary deployment of B-52s to Fairford in June 1980 stated that there were no proposals to station B-52s permanently at Fairford in peacetime.

2. As to Statements on the future development of the base, in the announcement in the House on 2 November 1978 of the final decision it was stated:

"I can assure the Hon Member that at present the Government has no plans for further development of the base".

This was repeated in a letter to Mr Nicholas Ridley, on 16 November 1978, the local Member:

"I can confirm, as I explained in my reply to your question, that there are no plans for undertaking any development at the base beyond the works referred to in paragraph 47 of the MOD Memorandum of last July"

3. The Memorandum issued to the public implies that no further development at Fairford was foreseen beyond the immediate refurbishment of domestic and technical accommodation and the longer term replacement of some of the older buildings on the station. However, no undertaking was given that further development of the base beyond that required for the 15 KC135s would be ruled out.



Copy to Mr. Spence.

Defence 25/6
Prime Minister

3

MS
 25/6

FCS/81/85

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE

MS

Wartime Basing of B52S at RAF Fairford

1. Thank you for your minute of 16 June.
2. I am sorry not to have commented before your visit to Washington. I agree that against the background of our Defence Review, as well as for other reasons, there is advantage in showing the Americans now that we are prepared to cooperate with them on requests of this sort when the reasons for doing so in defence terms are good ones.
3. But, while I am in principle in favour of agreeing to the American proposal, the domestic difficulties in this particular case are very considerable. As you know, when the USAF proposed to use Fairford for KC135s, there was considerable opposition in the area. This has only recently subsided. At the time the USAF gave an assurance that Fairford would not be used for any other, or increased, US military aircraft activity. This assurance was a crucial element in the efforts to defuse the local outcry. I fear therefore that, although the B52s would only go to Fairford in wartime, this new request will again provoke intense local opposition with the protesters now able to claim that the USAF have broken their word.

/4.



4. I have now seen your Private Secretary's letter of 22 June in which you report your conversation with Caspar Weinberger last weekend. I hope you will agree that, in the light of the local difficulties, Peter Blaker and Douglas Hurd could consider whether we might suggest alternative bases for the B52s (as well as tackling the presentational issues as you suggest) before we go back to the Americans on this issue.

5. I am sending copies of this minute to the Prime Minister and the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

C

(CARRINGTON)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

25 June 1981

SECRET



MO 11/2/2

2
Defence

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
 MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1
 Telephone 01-938X022X 218 2111/3

22nd June 1981

N.B.M.

Dear Brian,

M

25m

WAR-TIME BASING OF B52s AT RAF FAIRFORD

My Secretary of State minuted the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary on 16th June on this subject; and Clive Whitmore recorded the Prime Minister's views on his proposals in his letter to me of 18th June.

When he saw Mr Weinberger in Washington this weekend, Mr Nott told him that the UK were willing in principle to agree to the American proposition that they should use RAF Fairford as a wartime Forward Operating Base for forty-two B52D aircraft operating in a conventional role. But he made it clear that this agreement in principle was subject to the satisfactory resolution of a number of practical points; and must, given domestic sensitivities, be kept confidential for a significant period.

If the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary is content, perhaps our officials could now consult about an appropriate consequential approach to the Americans?

I am sending copies of this letter to Clive Whitmore; and to David Heyhoe (Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster's Office), and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely
 Brian Nott

(B M NORBURY)

B J P Fall Esq



ltb

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

18 June, 1981

War-Time Basing of B52s at RAF Fairford

The Prime Minister has seen your Secretary of State's minute of 16 June to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary about the United States Government's proposal that they should use RAF Fairford as a war-time Forward Operating Base for B52D aircraft operating in a conventional role.

She is content for Mr Nott to proceed as he proposes in paragraph 4 of his minute, subject to the views of the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary.

I am sending copies of this letter to Brian Fall, (FCO), David Heyhoe (Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster's Office) and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

C. A. WHITMORE

Brian Norbury, Esq
Ministry of Defence

SECRET

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010

Copy to N. [unclear]

SECRET

1. Prime Minister.

Agree to N. NSK's
proposals (paragraph 4 below), subject
to how Commission's views?

Agreed
no

MO 11/2/2

HW
6m

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY

WAR-TIME BASING OF B52s AT RAF FAIRFORD

As you know, the United States Government would like our agreement to their use of RAF Fairford as a wartime Forward Operating Base for forty-two B52D aircraft operating in a conventional role. The aircraft would not be based here in peacetime.

2. The military and diplomatic arguments are clearly, I think, in favour of our agreement to this proposition. The wartime use of this force in Europe would enhance NATO's capabilities significantly in a number of areas. The B52D is modified to carry large quantities of conventional munitions and can be used in a variety of roles, such as bombing or mine laying and maritime reconnaissance and surveillance tasks. Far greater benefit can be gained from a B52D force in terms of speed of reaction and the number of sorties which they could mount if they operate from a fully equipped Forward Operating Base in Europe than if they fly their missions from the United States; their deployment to Fairford in wartime would make a powerful contribution to the Alliance's conventional bombing or maritime surveillance capability. Not only could they provide a valuable addition to the Alliance's limited Central Region all-weather rapid reaction forces, but they also could be used as a much needed means of rapidly laying minefields (for example to protect the UK's Polaris and trans-Atlantic ports) and as a replacement for No 27 Squadron when it is disbanded in its



wide-ranging maritime surveillance roles. A force of 42 aircraft based at Fairford could fly some 2100 sorties in a 30 day period compared to only 800 sorties if based in the US. A B52 sortie from a base in the US would require 3 air refuellings to cover the same area in Europe as one unrefuelled B52 operating from a European Forward Operating Base.

3. Domestic political arguments (on which, since it is in his constituency, you may wish to turn initially to Nicholas Ridley for advice) are, however, probably against our agreement. The development of Fairford to handle KC135 tankers was strongly opposed on environmental grounds in 1978. Statements were made in Parliament in 1978 to the effect that there were no plans at present for future development of the base. There is also the difficulty that although the aircraft will be intended only for conventional missions, and we could say this in public, CND sympathisers would almost certainly point out that they are nuclear-capable and the deployment might, therefore, become linked in the public mind with other deployments - particularly, perhaps, the basing of Cruise Missiles in the United Kingdom. But a public announcement about our plans would not need to be made until about the time when congressional approval for the project is sought, probably early in 1982; and we could think further about presentation.

4. I propose, therefore, that we should agree to the United States request, and there would be obvious advantage in my being able to say so to Caspar Weinberger when I see him this weekend. I should be very glad, therefore, if I could have by the end of this week your concurrence that:



- a. I should tell the US Secretary of Defense that we are content, in principle, to accept the proposal;
- b. we should, in subsequent discussion at official level with the Americans seek to safeguard our position on a number of detailed points (of which your officials are aware); and
- c. Peter Blaker should work out, in consultation with the appropriate FCO Minister, a suitable presentational campaign.
5. I am sending copies of this minute to the Prime Minister and the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster; and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

FW

Ministry of Defence

16th June 1981

*New statesmen
article*

NEW STATESMEN ARTICLE - US BASES IN THE UK 10

The one petrol pump in the Edgware Road is owned and run by ESSO for the sole use of US Servicemen who have (tax-free) fuel coupons.

"fuel supply"

PA
- CF file
MS
22/4/81

James Callaghan
1976

LINE TO TAKE

1. Much of the article TV programme dealt with matters affecting national security and purported to cover areas on which it has been Her Majesty's Government's long standing policy not to comment. I do not propose to change that policy now.

2. [/If pressed on whether the House was misled about the number of US bases in the UK/]

I cannot accept that, in any normal use of the word, there are over 100 US bases in this country. I would not, for example, describe a petrol pump in the Edgware Road in the New Statesman article as a base. My Right Hon Friend, the Secretary of State for Defence made it clear in his replies to the Hon Member for Keighley that in addition to the bases and facilities he had listed, the US forces would, in times of tension or war, make use of bases or facilities occupied in peacetime by UK forces. I would not describe these as 'US bases'.

3. [/If pressed on nuclear targetting/]

The economic, political and industrial importance of the UK is such that a great many military and industrial targets could be chosen. If there is a war involving the use of nuclear weapons, the sad truth is that there is no part of this country which would be safe from danger. The whole point of ~~our~~ defence strategy is to be strong enough to ensure that no potential enemy would ever risk an attack because of the appalling consequences he would himself face. This is the whole point of deterrence, and the US forces in this country are here as allies in furtherance of this strategy.

4. ∟If pressed on why Greenham Common and Molesworth were targets in the recent Square Leg Exercise∟

The fact that a location was depicted as a target in an exercise does not mean that we expect it to be one in the event of a war involving the use of nuclear weapons. ∟In time of tension or an emergency the cruise missiles would disperse well away from their peacetime bases and these locations would not therefore be priority targets.∟

BACKGROUND NOTE

1. Both the 'TV Eye' programme on 30 October and the article by Duncan Campbell in the New Statesman published the same day made three main allegations:

a. that the public had been kept in the dark, and the House of Commons deliberately misled, about the number of US bases in the UK;

b. that the US bases in this country were not primarily for the defence of the UK, but are instruments of US policy, enabling the US to pursue her own ends at the expense of the UK;

c. that the presence of US bases in this country made the UK a prime nuclear target.

2. In June, July and August Mr Bob Cryer^{MP} put down a series of questions asking for lists of bases and facilities used by the US forces in the UK (copies attached). Added together, the facilities listed came to 54 in number compared with the 103 allegedly identified by Duncan Campbell and TV Eye. Both the TV programme and the article made play of this apparent discrepancy and insinuated that it resulted from a deliberate attempt by the Government to play down the US forces' involvement in the UK. In fact the differences can be fully explained by the very broad interpretation that the New Statesman/TV Eye programme gave to the word base. Minor, and largely unmanned facilities such as communications aerials were not listed because they are not by any stretch bases; nor were transportation terminals at UK ports or airports. UK bases or facilities which are occupied by our

our forces in peacetime but which could be made available to US forces in times of tension or war (these were alluded to in Mr Pym's reply of 8 August) were not listed. These facilities include the ten Co-located Operating Bases which would be shared by the RAF and USAF in wartime.

3. The article and TV programme also compared the distribution of US bases and facilities with the target list for Exercise 'Square Leg' and with an alleged Russian target list from a military journal, the suggestion being that the three maps tied-up to show that US bases and facilities are prime targets. Special attention was drawn to Greenham Common and Molesworth these points are dealt with in the Line to Take.

OFFICIAL REPORT
HOUSE OF COMMONS

VOL. 988... DATE. 7/7/80... COL 54-55.

~~ORAL~~/WRITTEN

United States Forces

Mr. Cryer asked the Secretary of State for Defence, pursuant to the reply to the hon. Member for Keighley on 18 June, if he will list the sites occupied by United States forces for housing, storage, logistic support, administration and communications.

Mr. Pym: The United States forces have storage facilities at Molesworth, Ridgewell, Upwood, Framlingham, Feltwell, Watton, Bicester, Burtonwood, Hythe Marchwood and Poole. There are logistic support facilities at Welford and Caerwent, and at Bramley and Broughton Moor which are both operated by the United Kingdom solely on behalf of the United States forces. Administrative offices exist in central London and at Eastcote, Ruislip and High Wycombe. There are communications facilities at

Barkway, Daventry, Great Bromley, Martlesham Heath, Mormond Hill, Botley Hill, Bovingdon, Coldblow, Croughton, Dunkirk, Chicksands, Swingate, Uxbridge, Barford St. John, Wincombe, Christmas Common, St. Mawgan, Menwith Hill, Edzell and Thurso, and a shared facility at Fylingdales. A number of housing sites exist near most locations from which United States forces operate.

OFFICIAL REPORT
HOUSE OF COMMONS

VOL. 988... DATE 7/7/80. COL 55...

ORAL/WITTEN

Mr. Cryer asked the Secretary of State for Defence how many United States Service personnel are stationed in the United Kingdom.

Mr. Pym : Some 24,500 at present.

OFFICIAL REPORT
HOUSE OF COMMONS

VOL. 990... DATE 8/8/80. COL 481...

~~ORAL~~/WRITTEN \

United States Bases

Mr. Cryer asked the Secretary of State for Defence whether there are any United States bases, facilities, housing, storage, logistic support, administration and communications sites used by or reserved for United States forces in the United Kingdom not included in his replies to the hon. Member for Keighley, *Official Report*, 7 July, c. 54, and *Official Report*, 18 July, c. 587; and if he will list them.

Mr. Pym : The answers of 18 June and 7 July, to which the hon. Gentleman refers, listed the bases, storage, logistic support, administration and communications sites now made available for use by the United States forces in this country. They also have facilities at Brawdy, Machrihanish and Felixstowe. In a time of tension or war, they would additionally make use of various bases and facilities occupied in peacetime by United Kingdom Forces.

OFFICIAL REPORT
HOUSE OF COMMONS

VOL. 986 DATE, 18/6/80 COL 587-588

~~ORAL~~/WRITTEN

United States Bases

Mr Cryer asked the Secretary of State for Defence if he will list the total number of bases operated in whole or part, by the United States forces in the United Kingdom.

Mr. Pym : The United States Air Force has main operating bases at RAF Alconbury, RAF Bentwaters, RAF Fairford, RAF Lakenheath, RAF Mildenhall, RAF Upper Heyford and RAF Woodbridge, and standby deployment bases at RAF Greenham Common, RAF Sculthorpe and RAF Wethersfield. The United States Navy has a base at Holy Loch. The United States forces also occupy a number of sites, including RAF Molesworth to which I referred in the statement which I made yesterday, which are used for purposes such as housing, storage, logistic support, administration and communications.

NEW STATESMAN

31 October 1980

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TARGET BRITAIN

Guess how many US bases there are here? Answer, page 6

FOR THE THIRD TIME since World War II, Britain's role as aircraft carrier for US forces is about to escalate, dramatically, with the imminent introduction of cruise missiles. But how much do campaigners for the removal of nuclear weapons bases and facilities know about the scale of military involvement in Britain; How much can MPs find out?

There are not merely a dozen or two bases, as is popularly supposed. In a joint enquiry with the Thames Television TV EYE programme*, we unearthed over 100 military facilities. The US Air Force alone has 101 sites in its British property list, including housing estates.

We also discovered a plethora of little-known information about US military activities in Britain, using mostly openly available US — and even Russian — sources.

- US European military commanders will control the course of European warfare from airborne battle stations, based in East Anglia.
- A 'facility' tucked away in Wales is the US's largest underwater surveillance centre.
- Five spy planes are permanently based in Britain. Another base is the headquarters for recovering film capsules from spy satellites.
- The spy satellites are controlled from at least four major British stations — one set up by the CIA. The network of US intelligence bases in Britain — many in the 'front line' because of the information they get — is much greater than hitherto realised.
- Much of the US's 7000-warhead European nuclear stockpile is in a network of British depots. Some Army and Marine units have complete stores stockpiled.

Some of these facilities are secret. But many are not. Yet, even after MPs asked the Ministry of Defence three times, they could only list a nevertheless surprising 56 bases. DUNCAN CAMPBELL documents the might of the US military in Britain.

THE SCALE OF US MILITARY involvement in Britain is immense. Apart from Soviet forces in Eastern Europe, and the US in Germany and Japan, no other country has such a large foreign military presence. Discovering the scale — and significance — of Britain's uses for the US is not, however, straightforward.

In June this year, Bob Cryer MP asked Defence Secretary Francis Pym to provide a 'total' list of US bases. Pym obliged with a list as long as most people would expect, a round dozen — eleven air bases and the Holy Loch base on the Clyde for Poseidon submarines. There were also, a throwaway line implied, a few other sites for 'storage, logistic support, administration and communications'.

Just how 'few' sites were involved was revealed in a second answer during July, when Pym was asked to list the bases in these categories. The list of US bases now swelled from 12 to 53 — and it still wasn't complete. In August, Pym was asked to list any omission from his two earlier lists. He now listed a further three bases — one of them, an underwater surveillance base in Wales, probably the most important of them all.

After three attempts, the Ministry of Defence had managed to find 56 US bases in Britain. We have found 103, whose locations and functions are detailed on the map (opposite).

'First strike' facility

Besides airbases normally in US hands, a host of other airfields, some now used by the RAF, are earmarked and stocked up for US crisis or war use. Not one US base is directly committed in any way to the defence of Britain — indeed, quite the contrary, as Britain is obliged under NATO agreements to provide the 'area' defences for US bases on our soil.

It is customary for this burden to be defended with references to the value of NATO as a deterrent alliance, in whose support the US acts. It is not, however, widely appreciated that the US maintains separate lines of command and control from NATO, and is ready, willing and equipped to operate entirely on its

*The TV Eye documentary 'Target Britain' is being transmitted on Thursday 30th November at 8.30pm.

own, as US interests require. Alert orders sent to US forces may, or may not, be communicated to NATO allies. Although British bases and facilities were alerted and used in the Nixon-ordered 1973 Middle East war alert, and again this year during the abortive hostage rescue operation in Iran, no notification was given to Britain or NATO.

The Pentagon calls this style of operating its 'global options'. It relies on unquestioning non-interference with what the US does with its bases and facilities. It also relies on the technological complexities of modern weaponry, which can make it extremely hard to unravel a complex web of plans and potential operations open to any particular facility.

In Britain, the US forces have at least 21 airbases used or reserved for them, 9 transportation terminals, 17 weapon dumps and stores, 7 nuclear weapons stores, 38 communications facilities, 10 intelligence bases, and 3 radar and sonar surveillance sites. Of these, the majority clearly contribute at least as much to strategic global 'US only' options as to the options for defending Europe.

These too are scarcely 'options' we should find attractive: Rear Admiral Gene LaRoque, a former Pentagon strategic planner now running the Washington Centre for Defence Information, had this to say:

We fought World War I in Europe, we fought World War II in Europe and if you dummies let us, we'll fight World War III in Europe...

THE COST WILL BE HIGH. Although the exact course of any 'World War III' can only be a matter of informed speculation we have obtained the target lists drawn up by two sources — one Russian, the other British. The British target list, published in the *New Statesman* this month, was used during the recent *Crusader* and *Square Leg* exercises (NS 3 October 1980). The Russian target list comes from a limited circulation military staff journal, *Zurybeznoe Voennoe Obozrenie* (5, 1980). In an article on Britain's 'infrastructure', Colonel V Leskov identified in a scarcely disguised fashion the targets of Soviet interest:

The Pentagon maintains a ramified network of



Last Sunday's nuclear disarmament demo

bases, stores of nuclear and conventional weapons, headquarters, communications centres, intelligence centres and other installations.

Clearly drawing on intelligence data, Leskov listed nuclear weapons stores and provided an astonishing map of Britain with dozens of key locations and airbases marked or mentioned.

Leskov's map identified four communications centres, all American; three alleged nuclear weapons dumps, all American; the joint early warning radar station at Fylingdales; and identified 21 airfields used solely or jointly by the US, as well as 8 further US communications or other bases.

Similarly, in the Ministry of Defence's plans for the anticipated nuclear attack on Britain used during *Square Leg*, 13 attacks were against US bases. These included the first two bases to be attacked, Greenham Common near Newbury and Boscombe Down (a 'colocated' base). Greenham Common and Molesworth (near Northampton) are of course to be sites for the 160 GLCM (ground launched cruise missiles) that are presently due to be installed by 1983. Both bases were on both target lists — already. Besides the well-known airbases, Britain's role in providing US 'infrastructure' is immense. Some of the most important locations are among the least known. In southern England, the US Air Force has installed a network of communications bases making it completely independent, if need be, of Post Office or MoD links. The US Navy has a similar chain in Scotland, running from Thurso to Ayr, and across to Northern Ireland. The US Navy base at Thurso is the primary communications link to Polaris nuclear submarines in the Norwegian sea area, for which purpose the station was built in 1963. Until 1977 it shared this job with a similar US Navy station near Derry in Northern Ireland.

The US's largest underwater surveillance station is also located in Britain, at Brawdy on St Davids Bay, in remote southwest Wales. This station is the largest of the 22 in the SOSUS (Sonar Surveillance System) network. The Brawdy 'naval facility', where more than 300 sonar specialists work round the clock, is of key importance to the strategic 'balance', and to the US's first strike ability. Quite simp-

position of the (remarkably few) Soviet submarines in the Atlantic, the Brawdy station means that the Soviets cannot rely on these forces for a deterrent second strike. Until President Carter's recent promulgation of President Directive 59, for planning for limited nuclear war, previous doctrines of deterrence relied critically on both sides' submarines being substantially immune to detection. This advantage is available to the US; it is not available to the Soviet Union, as Soviet planners well know.

From Brawdy, long submarine cables traverse the continental shelf to a platform two to three hundred miles west of southern Ireland, where an array of hydrophones detect tiny surges and faint noises across a thousand mile tract of ocean.

Brawdy's computers are not intended to protect Britain, although they enormously enhance our vulnerability. The station was completed in 1973, to cover the movements of Soviet 'Charlie' class nuclear submarines, whose longer range missiles meant they could attack the US from our side of the Atlantic. (Europe was vulnerable anyway).

We asked both the US Navy and the Ministry of Defence about the purpose of the Brawdy base. Both claimed it was merely an 'oceanographic research facility'. This is untrue, and the truth isn't even secret. In 1977, the US House of Representatives Appropriations Committee reported on Defence Procurement for the year. Page 1255 of their report noted an upgrading of Brawdy's facilities for Project CAESAR, which is the general title for the SOSUS system:


CAESAR: Shore Electronics/Assembly SDC-2 (Shore electronics will be installed at US Naval Facility, Brawdy, Wales. The associated array and cable will be located in international waters.)

Britain also supports the means by which Brawdy's information would be used. At least three British airfields, — Stornoway in the Hebrides, Machrihanish near Campbeltown in Scotland, and St Mawgan in Cornwall — would be used by forces of US Orion anti-submarine aircraft deployed from the US. At two of these bases, St Mawgan and Machrihanish, we have established that stocks of nuclear depth charges and other nuclear weapons are already in position, and have been for some years. The nuclear stores are known as 'Naval Aviation Weapons Facilities'. The dumps are guarded by US Marines — at Machrihanish, the Marines man watchtowers around a barbed wire camp.

Nuclear dumps

Nuclear weapons are also stored throughout Britain for use by the US Air Force. The main depot is at Welford, where a railway siding takes these and other consignments into the underground dump. Welford's facilities are so sensitive that Ordnance Survey maps have been erased of anything other than ground contours in the area. This ironically, makes its position rather more noticeable by the absence of usual map features. Welford is the base of the 7234th Ammunition Support Squadron and has been storing USAF weapons since 1954. Although the base provides almost 700,000 square feet of weapons storage and cost the US government over \$5 million to build, it is usually omitted from lists of US bases in Britain.

Besides Welford, there are also nuclear



U2R Electronic spy aircraft fortuitously filmed by Thames TV at Mildenhall

weapons facilities at Upper Heyford, Oxfordshire, and near Mildenhall and Lakenheath. One of these stores is said to be removed from the actual airfield — probably at Felwell, a US storage base a few miles north. (Lakenheath itself was the scene of a near catastrophic 1956 incident when a crashed bomber went on fire beside the nuclear weapons store.)

Colonel Leskor's article observed that: nuclear weapons are stored in the vicinity of airbases at Bentwaters, Brize Norton, Wethersfield, Woodbridge, Greenham Common, Lakenheath, Marham, Sculthorpe and Fairford.

The giant US Army store at Burtonwood near Warrington is the probable site for the US Army's reserve stocks of theatre nuclear weapons. Six hundred servicemen work on the 3,300 acre site adjacent to the M6 motorway. Official US publications acknowledge that it is one of two UK sites holding complete stocks of every item of equipment for military units, facilities known as 'Pomcus'.

A further 'Pomcus' depot network is based in Dorset and Hampshire, where there is a US Marine Fleet HQ at Hythe, near Southampton. Two Marine Supply Depots are at Poole and Marchwood.

Warheads for the ten Poseidon submarines based at the Holy Loch, near Dunoon, are stored in hills to the north. The MoD has confirmed that a NATO funded depot at Glen Douglas is available to the US Navy from the 'host government'.

Besides these stores of nuclear and conventional weapons, the US has 8 other weapons dumps in Britain. Two of them are run entirely by British servicemen, although their stock is American. These two are at Bramley, Hants and at Broughton Moor in Cumbria. Stocks at the Broughton Moor 'Royal Naval' Armament Depot are intended to back up the US Navy in the Norwegian Sea.

Sky spying

Spy planes are based here permanently too, although their presence is denied. The main spy plane base is Mildenhall, where five secret reconnaissance aircraft are now permanently located. During recent filming by Thames TV, US officials at Mildenhall were visibly embarrassed when a U2 suddenly wafted elegantly down from the clouds. The base had denied that U2 aircraft were stationed there. Within two minutes of its arrival the U2 had been hidden away in a special hangar.

The US Air Force's claim not to have other than occasional 'visitors' among these controversial aircraft is paper thin. The official *Air Force* magazine lists amongst Mildenhall's complement the 66-person 6954th Electronic

Security Squadron, which provides the personnel to operate electronic intelligence gathering equipment whilst the planes fly high over or alongside Warsaw Pact borders.

The five aircraft — two U2s, one SR71 which flies at three times the speed of sound and two RC135, converted Boeing 707s packed out with surveillance equipment — are well established Mildenhall aircraft. Aircraft spotters, who maintain a methodical vigil around all airfields, can provide details of their permanent presence as complete as the firm numbers and the locations of their hangars at the airfield. (The U2s in question being no 10332 and 10339).

A recent interview in *Air Force* magazine by the Chief of the US Strategic Air Command General R H Ellis, explained the highly active nature of this intelligence-gathering operation

it is possible to operate these systems in a way that induces the 'other fellow' to react in a way that tells us things we want to know...

Flying War Rooms

The power of the 170 F-111 nuclear and tactical strike aircraft based at Lakenheath and Upper Heyford is reasonably well-known as is the presence of six Thunderbolt attack squadrons with their controversial depleted uranium ammunition. But what is not known at all is an operation of over-riding strategic importance: in time of war, or crisis, the US European Command, using facilities code-named 'Silk Purse', will be lifted into the air above the chaos of Europe's nuclear battlefields.

'Silk Purse' is based at Mildenhall, and has four special Boeing 707 EC 135s on continuous alert. These are flying war-rooms, with equipment for in-flight refuelling of escort planes. An official map, details of which have been obtained through the International Institute for Strategic Studies, shows that during the most recent — and transient — of the nuclear-attack false-alarms, sent out on 6 June, five critical overseas bases were alerted before the alert could be cancelled. Mildenhall was one, suggesting that the need to get the 'Silk Purse' aircraft off the ground is given vast priority by Pentagon planners.

Third Air Force spokesmen still deny that any British base was alerted during the false alarms. But this should be measured against the evidence of villagers near the US tanker-base at Fairford, near Swindon, who on 3 June, also a false-alarm day, saw aircraft taking off in rapid succession on emergency power. Calls to the base were abruptly terminated with the words: 'It's an emergency'. Fairford will soon have 15 tankers, complementing 15 at Mildenhall: their task being to re-fuel strike aircraft en route to Warsaw

astride this Youre is valuable to Strategic Air Command, which in time of crisis would deploy to 'forward operating bases' including Marham, Boscombe Down and Brize Norton. The latter two are amongst a group of ten peacetime RAF bases which are earmarked to be given to the USAF in crises; these were agreed under an unannounced 1974 Memorandum of Understanding, and are designated 'Colocated Operating Bases'. A list of COBs was provided to us this week by the Ministry of Defence after some delay. None of the COBs was listed in the answers given to Bob Cryer MP, although recent US congressional testimony has listed USAF property at several of the sites.

Spy bases

US bases in Britain control and track spy satellites, and fly missions to catch the film capsules sent back from photographic satellites. The bases also include centres for aircraft which have been proven to have been overflying Warsaw Pact territory.

One such reconnaissance unit is based at Alconbury, near Huntingdown. The *New York Times* reported in 1977 that its RF4 Phantom aircraft 'gather intelligence over East Germany'. Routine USAF denials of this are not very convincing. In March 1964 an RB66 reconnaissance plane from the same base, was shot down inside East Germany long after the famous disaster to Gary Powers' U2. Four years ago, a U2 from Britain crashed in West Germany close to the eastern border.

Further connections with the spying business can be traced through the 47th Aerospace Rescue & Recovery Squadron, based at Woodbridge in Suffolk: their job, in addition to retrieving downed aircrew, is to hook-up capsules of photographic film which are ejected periodically by spy-satellites and parachuted into the atmosphere. Although Colonel Alan Schreihofner admitted that release of the satellite capsules is controlled from Woodbridge, he claimed that the catching was done by aircraft based more conveniently in Pensacola, Florida. But during filming two weeks ago at nearby Mildenhall, two dark-painted C-130 aircraft were photographed with satellite-capsule catching and tracking equipment in place. And examination of USAF base lists shows that Pensacola is merely an operating location from Woodbridge.

But spy-planes and satellite-catchers are only a small part of the American intelligence 'infrastructure' in Britain. The major part is the system of ground-based listening-posts run by the National Security Agency (NSA), and aimed at communications in Warsaw Pact countries and Western Europe.

A large US contingent works at Britain's GCHQ intelligence centre in Cheltenham. Known as SUSLO (Special Intelligence US Liaison Office), they also have a large London office taking up an entire floor of the US Navy building in Grosvenor Square. Benson L. Bufham, former deputy-director of the NSA is in charge of SUSLO, and is listed as an 'attache' at the US Embassy.

The major listening-posts are Chicksands, Bedfordshire and Edzell, Tayside — and of course Menwith Hill, Yorkshire, where international phone-tapping function was revealed in the *NS* on 18 July. But Menwith Hill appears to have a further role, which places it squarely in the strategic front-line.

with Hill site, pointed most of the time towards US satellites operating in the unique 'Molniya orbit': originally devised by the Russians themselves, this permits long periods of 'hovering' in northerly latitudes. (Ordinary satellites can only hover over the equator: a problem to US intelligence, because most of Russia is northerly.) Observation suggests that Menwith Hill is the receiving terminal for the only US satellites functioning in this orbit — the super-secret Satellite Data System (SDS) about which nothing is published.

But there are certainly three other terminals in Britain for intelligence satellites.

Morwenstow, near Bude in Cornwall, is a British GCHQ station still part paid-for by the CIA. According to a senior ex-CIA man, ground facilities for a satellite system called RHYOLITE were installed in England in 1970. His description exactly matches the Cornish site. Morwenstow appears to be a sister-station in the RHYOLITE system to the controversial CIA site at Pine Gap in Central Australia.

Oakhanger in Hampshire is ostensibly an RAF station. But US Congressional testimony lists Oakhanger as one of ten or so stations in a worldwide Satellite Control Facility for US military satellites. The local telephone directory does indeed list a US navy unit there. A recent report from the US Navy Research Laboratory reveals Oakhanger's exotic capacities: in conjunction with a station in Virginia it has been used to spy on the USSR by 'moonbounce', which is listening to communications reflected off the moon. *Croughton*, a major USAF communications centre near Banbury was filmed for 'Target Britain', and officers explained that three of its four satellite dishes were used by an unspecified 'civilian agency'. *Croughton* corresponds well to descriptions of a CIA station 'near Banbury' which was to have been included in a book by two former US government officials, *The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence* — until the CIA censored it. The satellites to which these terminals link use very wide, unfurling antennae to collect faint signals from the ground: although the USSR is the main target, material from 'friendly' or 'neutral' countries gets scooped up as well by accident and by design.

Some of the intelligence gathered is put to use in Britain, notably at Spadeadam in Cumbria where, according to the Washington journal *Aviation Week*, a 'Warsaw Pact surface-to-air missile radar replica' has been created. Its purpose (there is another in Nevada) is to enable strike aircraft to practice evasion of Soviet defences: naturally, the range, together with a comparable electronic-warfare centre near Dumfries, constitute a focus of interest for Soviet spy trawlers and the like.

The Spadeadam electronic warfare range is partnered by a special squadron of aircraft at Alconbury, which are disguised to look like Russian MiG fighters. Other NATO air forces stage simulated dog fights with these so-called Aggressor aircraft (in fact they usually take the role of airspace defenders).

Special roles

Britain's location is unique. The US bases here are consequently critical to the deployment of many far flung parts of the US military. The communications systems which run through Britain are intrinsic to the 'global options' of US strategy. AUTOVON is the

US military, and it has major centres at Martlesham Heath, Suffolk and Hillingdown, near London. *Croughton*, mentioned earlier, is a switching-centre for the AUTODIN network which links-up computers — including those of the now rather-discredited Worldwide Command and Control System ('Wimex'), which caused the last two false alerts. One of the Wimex computers so tied in is at US Naval Headquarters in Grosvenor Square.

Croughton is also of major importance to US missile targeting. Its Automated Digital Weather Centre co-ordinates meteorological information from Europe, Africa and the USSR — feeding it back to SAC computers in Nebraska, which reallocate suitable warheads to targets according to the prevailing winds and weather. It even intercepts the Russians own data to get up-to-the-minute information.

American defence planners can scarcely be blamed for pursuing their own convenience — especially if they get used to having it uncritically accepted. But not all members of the Western alliance have chosen quite such an open-ended commitment to the US. Norway, although a NATO member, has declined to have either nuclear weapons or foreign troops based on its territory, and in recent years there has been substantial debate about the degree to which Norwegian navigation and communications systems might effectively support US employment of nuclear weapons. Denmark also has declined to have nuclear weapons on its soil in peacetime, and in Belgium and Holland there has been effective resistance to the deployment of cruise missiles. France, of course, withdrew from NATO in 1967, and all US bases and facilities were dispensed with — links with NATO are maintained.

A military relationship as massive, as complex and as artfully-shrouded as that between Britain and the United States is not one likely to be modified in simple, dramatic movements. But the first requirement, long overdue, is to understand its structure, so that the alternative models can be tested against it.

Altogether, this adds up to some 27,000 operatives and 31,000 dependants, and a massive amount of property; the USAF say that each of their chief bases would cost about \$1 billion to replace. Such figures demonstrate no small performance in a 'special relationship' which actually began in July 1948 with a 30-day stay on the part of several B-29 squadrons, later extended to 60 days. The stay was only temporary; the USAF, it was supposed had left Britain entirely early in 1946. But in November 1948 the Air Ministry discreetly informed the US that this 'temporary' presence might become 'long term'.



Throughout the long, subsequent period of entrenchment, the US public has consistently been told more about the process than any British administration has chosen to vouchsafe to its citizens. Not only has the massive size of the commitment passed so far largely unknown and undebated: so has its essential character as a set of options for American military activity which may or may not contribute to the defence of this country, and may well actively contribute to the dangers we face.

Apology


An article in the *NS* of 15 August wrongly stated that Terry Duffy, general secretary of the Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers, spoke at a Campaign for the Defence of the Motor Vehicle rally in Luton. Our apologies to Mr Duffy.

...stations accuracy of Loren radio naviga-
 tion system for nuclear submarines. Another US
 Navy base in Shetland is UK terminal of sonar
 underwater detection chain across Greenland-
 Iceland-UK gap; **Thurso, Aberdeen, Inverbernie,**
Kinnaber,raigowl Hill, East Lomond, Kirk
O'Shotts,jeantlaw, Brown Carrick Hill: all US
 Navy microwave communications link stations;
Mormond Hill, near Peterhead, major US Navy and
 Air Force long range communications station; **Stor-**
noway, on Isle of Lewis, wartime or crisis base for
 US P3 Orion antisubmarine aircraft; **Holy Loch,** US
 Navy Poseidon nuclear missile submarine squadron
 HQ; **Glen Douglas,** NATO nuclear and other
 weapons store for HolyLoch; nuclear and other
 weapons store for HolyLoch; nuclear and other
 weapons store; **Grangemouth,**
Greenock, Glasgow, normally unmanned US Army
 and Navy transportation terminals
 installed; **Prestwick,** base for USAF Military Airlift
 Command and US Navy transport operations;
Broughton Moor, Cumbria, US Navy depot run by
 Royal Navy; **Spadeadam,** bombing range equipped
 by USAF simulates Warsaw Pact radars remote
 valley; **Fylingdales,** Ballistic Missile Early Warning
 Station; **Liverpool,** major terminal at docks;
Burtonwood, gigantic US Army store and
 helicopter base; **Menwith Hill,** super-secret in-
 telligence base run by National Security Agency tap-
 ping international phone lines and controls satellites;
Leeming, Finningley, Coltishall, Waddington
Wittering, Co-located Operating Bases (COBs) with
 RAF; **Brady,** US Navy sonar surveillance centre;
Upper Heyford, Alconbury, Mildenhall, Laken-
heath, Bentwaters, Woodbridge, Sculthorpe,
Wethersfield, Fairford, Greenham Common, cur-
 rent major USAF airfields; **Marham, B52 forward**
base; Upwood, Moleworth, Faltwell,
Ridgwell, Watton, Framlingham, USAF storage
 sites, may include nuclear weapons; **Hillingdon,**
Croughton (Northants), Barford St John, major
 communications centres; **Daventry, Chelveston,**
Barkway, Great Bromley, Bovington, microwave
 communications link stations; **Chicksands,**
 monitoring base run by USAF Electronic Security
 Command for the NSA; **Welford, Bramley,**
Bicester, munitions and stores depots - Welford
 Holds US Air Force tactical nuclear weapons stocks;
High Wycombe, West Ruislip, South Ruislip,
Lancaster Gate, Eastcote, US Forces offices and
 storage sites; **Grosvener Square,** US Navy Head-
 quarters and Sixth Fleet Fleet control centre; also
 houses 'SUSLO' intelligence offices and com-
 munications centre, **Northolt,** RAF base used jointly
 for communications aircraft; **St Johns Wood, US**
Marine Barracks, Edgware Road, fuel supply; **North-**
wood, US Navy based with NATO East Atlantic
 HQ; CIA Weapons dump is alleged to be in Britain,
 also a CIA radio station near Banbury; **Christmas**
Common, Botley Hill Farm, Coldblow Lane,
Dunkirk, Swingate (Dover), USAF microwave
 communications link stations; **Winkfield,** satellite
 tracking station run by British civilians is used for US
 satellite control; **Oakhanger,** US Satellite Control
 Facility and US Navy satellite communications centre;
Cheltenham, very large US contingent from
 NSA; **Caerwent,** a major US Army munitions
 dump; **Abingdon, Benson, Odiham, Brize Norton,**
 Colocated Operating Bases **Boscombe Down,**
 USAF 'classified' unit is based here, and B52
 bombers would use it in war; **Southampton,**
 transportation terminal; **Hythe,** US Marine Fleet HQ;
Marchwood, Poole, US Marine Depots;
Wincombe, GCHQ monitoring station near
 Shaftesbury listed by MoD as a US 'communication'
 station; **Morwenstow, GCHQ** run station was paid
 for by the CIA and operates and controls CIA spy
 listening satellites; **St Mawgan,** USAF communica-
 tions centre and US Navy nuclear weapons store.
Cushendall, Silevenorra, Dungiven, US Navy
 communications link stations in Northern Ireland
 (not shown).


One hundred American bases




Nuclear watchtower, Machrihanish



Listening aerial, Chicksands



EC135 airborne 'war room', Mildenhall



'Red Flag' simulated Soviet radar - Spadeadam