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FILE TITLE: Relations / Internal Sit		SERIES NORTH KOREA
		PART: 1
PART BEGINS: August 1981	PART ENDS: September 1994	CAB ONE: 

							
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PART

CLOSED

*File Series closed - merged with
South Korea.*

Foreign and Commonwealth Office documents

Reference: DD 1994/106 DESPATCH FEK 014/2

Description: North Korea: Annual Review for 1993

Date 20 January 1994

The above FCO documents, which were enclosed on this file have been removed and destroyed.

Such documents are the responsibility of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. When released they are available in the appropriate FCO CLASSES.

Signed _____

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PREM Records Team

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Foreign &
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05 September 1994

London SW1A 2AH

Dear Philippa,

North Korean Mission to the IMO

Thank you for your letter of 31 August enclosing a letter which the Prime Minister has received from the North Korean Mission to the IMO. You asked if we would arrange for a suitable reply to be sent to the Mission. I have been reminded by the Department that we have no diplomatic relations with the DPRK, and a response to the letter would therefore be inappropriate.

Yours ever,

SJS

(S J Sharpe)
Private Secretary

Ms Philippa Leslie-Jones
10 Downing Street

From: Philippa Leslie-Jones
Date: 18 August 1994

PRIME MINISTER

FOREIGN AFFAIRS ROUND-UP

There is a separate note in your box on Bosnia. Apart from this, there is not a great deal to report.

HAITI

The Americans have not yet decided on their timing for intervention. They are still canvassing for contributions to their multinational force. So far, Jamaica, The Bahamas, Argentina and Belize seem to have agreed to take part. Others (including the Canadians, French and Dutch) are still hivering. The Americans have now turned to us for help with the multinational force (as opposed to the later UN mission, where we have promised support), and Clinton has written to you. FCO advice and a reply (agreeing a relatively modest contribution) is in the box.

RWANDA

Most of the British force is now deployed north-west of Kigali. They are moving down to the south-west in support of the UN mission as the French pull out. The French have decided to leave by 22 August, although they might contemplate a short delay if a tragedy looked imminent. There is some concern that French withdrawal will prompt a further exodus of refugees to Zaire, where the camps are full. The new government is trying to instil confidence, but the situation is still volatile. Concern is growing about Burundi, where the same kind of Hutu-Tutsi trouble is brewing.

NORTH KOREA

The Americans have persuaded the North Koreans to freeze their nuclear


activity and refrain from reprocessing the spent fuel rods in return for help in supplying light water reactors. North Korea have also agreed in principle to remain in the NPT and accept safeguards. The main incentive has been US promises to reduce trade and economic restrictions. The immediate crisis has been averted. But the Americans still have to tie down the detail and the timing and doubts remain about North Korea's readiness to honour the agreement.

CAMBODIA

You may be aware that three tourists, including a British citizen, Mark Slater, were abducted by the Khmer Rouge from a train in southern Cambodia in late July. The Cambodians established early contact with the KR group, and this week promised to pay a \$150,000 ransom, leading to speculation that the detainees would be released. However, the Cambodians have also surrounded the KR camp with soldiers. Although they have promised not to intervene without prior consultation, it is pretty clear that they will go in and clean up as soon as the detainees are out, so the prospects for release must be uncertain.

MALAYSIA

The Malaysian cabinet decided earlier this week to allow British companies to compete for public sector tenders, effectively lifting the trade ban. But they are reluctant to announce the decision because of loss of face. They say they are thinking about a low-key announcement "in the near future" - we shall see.



PHILIPPA LESLIE-JONES

plj\round.pmg

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FCO FOR RESIDENT CLERK

DTI FOR AGRELL, XNP DIVISION

SUBJECT: NORTH KOREA NUCLEAR: LAST DAY OF US/DPRK TALKS
MY TELNO 064

SUMMARY

1. Talks conclude on 12 August with an agreed statement, issued to the press, setting out main areas of agreement. Bilateral expert-level talks to be held in advance of resumption of Third Round on 23 September.

DETAIL

2. The US/DPRK delegations met for a fourth day of talks on 12 August and agreed to recess until 23 September in Geneva. Gallucci (US) and Kang (DPRK) issued a short agreed statement at a joint press conference at about 1 am on 13 August. Gallucci then held a separate press conference: copies of the agreed statement and transcripts of both press conferences are being sent by fax to NPD. Wulf (Deputy Assistant Director, ACDA) briefed the P5 and other western missions early on 13 August.

3. At his press conference, Gallucci characterised this as a productive week of talks. The agreed statement captured elements which it had been agreed would form part of the final settlement of the nuclear issue. These are essentially as reported in my telnos 063 and 064 but, to summarise, the agreed steps, and their phasing, appear to be as follows:

(a) Between now and the 23 September talks:

(i) DPRK: to continue the freeze on its nuclear activity and maintain the continuity of safeguards. In particular, it will not/not reprocess the spent fuel rods nor reload the 5MW reactor: Wulf reiterated that the US had made quite clear that any such reprocessing or reloading would result in future talks being cancelled and US steps in the Security Council to impose sanctions. The US said that they remained ready to send a team of experts to try to prolong the storage life of the fuel rods, but the DPRK side had not responded.

(ii) US: will pursue arrangements to be able to provide assurances on the provision of light water reactors (LWRs), in talks with interested countries. Wulf said that countries in the region would be asked to pay the lion's share.

(iii) Both sides: it has been agreed to hold expert-level talks on four issues: the provision of LWRs, the safe storage and disposal of the spent fuel, the provision of alternative energy supplies and the establishment of liaison officers. No specific dates or venues have been set for these talks.

(b) On receipt of US assurances on the provision of LWRs and interim energy arrangements, the DPRK will:

(i) forego reprocessing of the spent fuel and seal, and allow IAEA monitoring of, their reprocessing facilities:

(ii) cease construction of the two new graphite reactors.

4. There remain a number of key issues on which there is agreement in principle but not yet on the timing:

(a) Most important, in the US view, is the section of the agreed statement (para 4) which reads quote The DPRK is prepared to remain a party to the NPT and to allow implementation of its safeguards agreement...unquote. The US interprets this as DPRK acceptance of the principle that

Special Inspections, and indeed any other IAEA work necessary to establish the DPRK's nuclear history, will be allowed to take place. But the timing remains unresolved. The US remained firm that no construction of LWRs could begin without full, unambiguous NPT membership and IAEA safeguards, although the timing of the Special Inspections need not be so critical.

(b) Establishment of mutual diplomatic representation and reduction of trade and economic restrictions.

(c) US assurances against the the threat or use of nuclear weapons, and DPRK readiness to implement the North-South Joint Declaration on the Denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula.

5. Summing up, Wulf said that the agreed statement represented an important first step, but no more than that. There was greater evidence than hitherto that the DPRK wanted to make a deal. But there was still a long way to go. It would be a bumpy road, with a lot of potential for upsets. Neither side had much confidence in the other: each side wanted to see the other commit to irreversible steps first. Wulf doubted whether it would be possible to reach a final agreement at the next talks in late September. But the Americans hoped that the expert talks could keep the momentum going in the meantime and begin to lay the groundwork for resolving the key outstanding issues.

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10 DOWNING STREET
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From the Private Secretary

15 July 1994

NORTH KOREA: DEATH OF KIM IL SUNG

We spoke about the enclosed letter which was faxed to us today by the DPRK Ambassador to the IMO asking the Prime Minister to send a message of condolence to Kim Jung Il.

This is clearly out of the question. You might wish to arrange a reply to Ambassador Kim Hyong Sun.

MS PHILIPPA LESLIE-JONES

J.S. Smith, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

PW / NORTH, Tm

A handwritten signature in the bottom right corner of the page.



THE MISSION OF DPR OF
KOREA TO IMO
(The United Nations)
14 Allandale Ave.
London N3 3PJ

Tel;081 346 9733
Fax;081 346 9733
Telex;911793

Our Ref; 05/07/DPK
Your Ref; Date 15/7/1994
Page
To; Secretariat to Prime Minister 1
Attention; Private Secretary to Prime Minister
From; Ambassador to IMO
Subject; Condolence Message

Dear Sir.


I have the honour to inform you that President of DPR of Korea, H.E. Kim Il Sung passed away to our great sorrow at 02.00 on 8 July, 1994.

In this connection, Mr. Clinton, President of U.S.A. as well as Japanese Prime Minister have expressed their condolence to the dear leader Kim Jong Il, successor of Kim Il Sung.

If possible to send condolence message to H.E. Kim Jong Il with writing or verbal let me know that so that we may pass it to the dear leader Kim Jong Il.

I look forward to see your reply as soon as possible.

Yours Sincerely

Kim Hyong Sun 
Ambassador of DPRK to IMO

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SUBJECT: NORTH KOREA NUCLEAR: RUSSIAN VIEWS

SUMMARY

1. RUSSIANS DO NOT BELIEVE THAT NORTH KOREA IS CLOSE TO HAVING A NUCLEAR WEAPON. STUDYING THE POSSIBILITY OF STORING NORTH KOREAN FUEL ELEMENTS AND OF SUPPLYING LIGHT WATER REACTORS. UNDERLINE IMPORTANCE OF IAEA DETERMINING HOW SAFE-GUARDS AGREEMENTS SHOULD BE FULFILLED.

DETAIL

2. I DISCUSSED WITH KISLYAK (DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL COOPERATION DEPT, MFA) ON 8 JULY RUSSIAN VIEWS ON THE NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR ISSUE, IN THE LIGHT OF THE VISIT TO RUSSIA BY IAEA DIRECTOR-GENERAL BLIX ON 26 JUNE-2 JULY, DURING WHICH THE SUBJECT HAD BEEN DISCUSSED.

3. KISLYAK SAID THAT THERE HAD BEEN LITTLE NEW IN THE DISCUSSIONS WITH BLIX. THE RUSSIANS WERE KEEN THAT POLITICAL CONTACTS WITH NORTH KOREA SHOULD CONTINUE AND THAT THE PRESENCE OF IAEA INSPECTORS IN NORTH KOREA SHOULD BE PROLONGED. IN THE RUSSIAN VIEW, THE SCOPE FOR ESTABLISHING THE HISTORY OF THE 5MW REACTOR HAD BEEN ALMOST, BUT NOT ENTIRELY, LOST: IT COULD BE RECOVERED WITH GOODWILL FROM THE NORTH KOREANS.

4. I ASKED KISLYAK ABOUT THE RUSSIAN ASSESSMENT OF HOW FAR THE NORTH KOREAN WEAPONS PROGRAMME HAD GONE. KISLYAK SAID THAT HE COULD NOT GIVE A FIGURE FOR THE AMOUNT OF PLUTONIUM PRODUCED, BUT "THE COMPETENT ORGANS" SAID THAT THERE WAS NO NUCLEAR WEAPON IN NORTH KOREA NOW; AND THE RUSSIANS DID NOT BELIEVE THAT THE NORTH KOREANS HAD ENOUGH PLUTONIUM TO BUILD A WEAPON. IN ANY CASE, TAKING ACCOUNT OF THE DPRK'S ECONOMIC AND SCIENTIFIC SITUATION, AND THE NEED FOR MACHINERY, TECHNOLOGY, KNOW-HOW AND SOPHISTICATED CONVENTIONAL EXPLOSIVES, THE RUSSIANS DID NOT BELIEVE THAT THE

NORTH KOREANS COULD BUILD A WARHEAD IN THE NEAR FUTURE (HE DECLINED TO BE MORE PRECISE). THE RUSSIANS BELIEVED THAT WHAT THE NORTH KOREANS HAD WANTED TO HIDE FROM THE IAEA WAS A PAST PROGRAMME WHICH HAD BEEN STOPPED BEFORE ACHIEVING RESULTS.

5. KISLYAK SAID THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE STUDYING THE POSSIBILITY OF LOOKING AFTER THE FUEL ELEMENTS REMOVED FROM THE 5MW REACTOR, BUT RUSSIAN LAW BANNED STORAGE OF OTHER COUNTRIES' NUCLEAR WASTE. ONE WAY ROUND THIS WOULD BE TO REPROCESS THE ELEMENTS AND RETURN THEM TO NORTH KOREA. A SECOND QUESTION WAS WHO WOULD PAY: THERE WERE SOME PROBLEMS WITH THE TRILATERAL AGREEMENT WITH THE UKRAINE AND US OVER REPROCESSING FIRMS WHICH HAD NOT BEEN PAID FOR FUEL ELEMENTS. BUT THE RUSSIANS WOULD DO WHAT THEY COULD TO HELP, GIVEN THEIR INTEREST IN PREVENTING THE EMERGENCE OF ANOTHER NUCLEAR POWER ON THEIR BORDERS.

6. KISLYAK SAID THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE ALSO CONSIDERING SUPPLYING LIGHT WATER REACTORS TO NORTH KOREA TO REPLACE THEIR GRAPHITE-MODERATED REACTORS; BUT THIS COULD ONLY GO AHEAD ONCE THE DPRK WAS IN COMPLIANCE WITH ITS FULL-SCOPE SAFE-GUARDS AGREEMENT. PROBLEMS WOULD STILL REMAIN, BECAUSE THE FACILITIES OF THE PAST PROGRAMME WOULD NEED TO BE LIQUIDATED UNDER IAEA SUPERVISION (WHICH WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR THE NORTH KOREANS TO ACCEPT).

7. FINALLY, KISLYAK VOICED CONCERN THAT, WHILE THE RUSSIANS GENERALLY SUPPORTED THE US/NORTH KOREAN BILATERAL DIALOGUE, THE IMPRESSION WAS GROWING THAT SAFEGUARDS WERE A SUBJECT FOR BILATERAL NEGOTIATION. IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT DETERMINING HOW SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS SHOULD BE IMPLEMENTED SHOULD BE A MATTER FOR THE IAEA, SPEAKING ON BEHALF OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, AND NOT FOR THE US IN BILATERAL TALKS WITH THE DPRK. THE RUSSIANS HAD RAISED THIS WITH THE AMERICANS.

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~~KL~~

Foreign &
Commonwealth
Office

Prime Minister

11 July 1994

file

Kim Jong-il makes
N. Korea even less
predictable. There may
yet be a power struggle.

London SW1A 2AH

py 11/vii

Dear Philipina,

Not good

NORTH KOREA

You may like an assessment, based on the scarce information available, of the implications of Kim Il-sung's death.

The succession

First indications are that Kim Il-sung's son, Kim Jong-il, has quickly grasped power, probably as planned by his father. He has been named Chairman of the Funeral Committee, and Pyongyang Radio has been whipping up support for him. There is a meeting of the Korean Workers Party Central Committee and People's Assembly today, probably to confirm him as General Secretary and perhaps President. There has been little immediate sign of any decision-making vacuum. There have been no unusual military movements in the North, and Kim's death has not dramatically changed the risk of North Korean military action against the South, although South Korean forces have been placed on alert as a precaution. It is too soon to know whether Kim Jong-il will be able to consolidate his position for the longer term, or even whether he will face any significant challenge. But the transition so far seems to have been orderly.

What little we know of Kim Jong-il is not reassuring. Over the last two years, he has officially inherited responsibility from his father for large areas of government, though it is unclear how much real authority he has wielded. We do not know how far he has been involved in the central areas of policy-making related to North Korea's nuclear programme and to relations with the South. He has been inaccessible to foreign visitors. He has a reputation for wild personal behaviour, which may suggest that he will not find it congenial to follow his father's patient tenacity in pursuit of his objectives. His wildness has in the past spilt over into his politics too: he is widely believed to have been responsible for the attack on the South Korean Cabinet in Rangoon in 1983, in which several Korean Ministers died, and for the bombing of

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a KAL airliner in 1987, in which 115 people died. He has not found it easy to win respect from the military or more widely, and he lacks his father's charisma and revolutionary authority. This may make it difficult for him, initially at least, to turn away from policy directions laid down by his father. But it could tempt him to pursue more adventurous policies to try to establish his credentials.

North Korea - watching is an inexact science. However, we may get some indication of Kim Jong-il's attitudes from those who seem to come closest behind him in the new pecking order, perhaps as early as the funeral on 17 July. A prominent role for the Prime Minister, Kang Song-sang, might suggest a more flexible approach to the South; continued prominence by the Minister of Defence, Marshal O Jin-U, or the Army Chief of Staff, Vice Marshal Choi Gwan, could suggest the opposite. (Even if they are not visibly close to the new leader, the latter two will continue to wield significant power by virtue of controlling the armed forces.) If Kim Jong-il's stepmother, Kim Song-ae, or half-brother, Kim Pyong-il, are much in evidence, that may suggest that Kim Il-sung's family are not united behind him.

The future

The third round of US/DPRK talks to pursue a solution of the North Korea nuclear issue started on 8 July, probably after Kim Il-sung was already dead; but has since been suspended. The Summit with the South Korean President set for 25-27 July has also been put off. If new dates are set soon for these two meetings, that will suggest maintenance of existing policies, at least for the short term, or even possibly an increased enthusiasm for settling the issues which have kept North Korea starved of international funds. If nuclear policy is to become harder, steps against the IAEA inspectors still in North Korea might be a first indication. Whatever his attitude to the nuclear issue or to relations with the South, Kim Jong-il will still have to grapple with the sharply declining economic situation, and the difficulty against that background of maintaining public commitment to the regime. Internal affairs, and bolstering his own position, are likely to be his first priority.

Reactions in the region

First reactions in Seoul have been to maintain an air of "business as usual", and to avoid any reaction to the death which the North might see as threatening. But Seoul will be keen to use any opportunity to get to know more about Kim Jong-il. In Japan, there is anxiety about the implications of Kim's death; and North Korea is not an

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issue on which the new coalition government are likely to find it easy to take difficult decisions. The Chinese response will be particularly important. Public statements so far, while fulsome about Kim Il-sung, have failed to show much enthusiasm for the younger Kim, who will not be able to rely in his dealings with China on the same sympathy for a fellow veteran as his father. China's economic dealings with South Korea are set to continue expanding. All this means a further weakening of China's influence on North Korea.

I am copying this letter to John Pitt-Brooke (MOD) and Melanie Leech (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever
J S Smith
(J S Smith)
Private Secretary

Ms Philippa Leslie-Jones
10 Downing Street

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FOLLOWING FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY TO PRIME MINISTER AND
PRIVATE SECRETARY TO FOREIGN SECRETARY

SUBJECT: OUR TELNO 258: NORTH KOREA: DEATH OF KIM IL SUNG

SUMMARY

1. ROK security forces on alert but no sign of abnormal military movements in DPRK. ROK likely to respond favourably to any DPRK proposals to go ahead with summit but no messages yet received from DPRK.
2. Consideration of UK statement.

DETAIL

3. The ROK Ministry of National Defence has announced that the ROK Armed Forces have been placed on emergency alert following the announcement of Kim Il Sung's death, as a 'usual precaution against contingencies'. Soldiers on leave have been ordered to return to their units. Riot police briefly took up protective positions round public buildings in Seoul (as they do frequently) but have now stood down. Park Jin, of the President's Press Office, has told us unofficially that there have been no reports of unusual troop movements by the DPRK.
4. Local broadcast reports now say that Kim died early on 8 July (not 2 am local time on 9 July as first reported). The funeral will apparently be held on 17 July, with no foreign guests invited. Kim Jong Il has now been named Chairman of the funeral committee and has been referred to as the continuation of the revolutionary movement (according to Pyongyang Radio, monitored by NHK). The South Korean media are reporting that Pyongyang streets are almost empty except for a few people sobbing.
5. President Kim Young Sam (KYS) is chairing a meeting of the National Security Council now. Park Jin has told us that there are three agenda items:

- Attempting to establish what is going on in the DPRK. Despite the early MFA informal briefing reported in TUR, the ROK are now

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being extremely cautious about speculating on possible unnatural causes of Kim Il Sung's sudden death. They are apparently worried about possible misinterpretation by the DPRK. In any case, the ROK has no evidence that anything untoward occurred. The official causes of death are apparently arteriosclerosis and myocardial infarction. Their private doubts are based on the circumstances: that former President Carter reported Kim Il Sung as vigorous three weeks ago and that he has died just before his meeting with KYS.

- What should the ROK do next? The ROK has not yet received any message from Pyongyang and meanwhile will make no approach to the DPRK about where the summit plans stand. The MFA is following up a press report that unspecified senior DPRK officials spoke to a Hong Kong journalist and said that the summit was likely to go ahead, but on a different date. According to Park, the ROK would very much like the Summit to go ahead in some form if circumstances allowed. If the DPRK interlocutor were Kim Jong Il, they would want to find out a good deal more about his views on North/South relations if at all possible: they are acutely aware that, mysterious though his father was, even fewer foreign visitors have met Kim Jong Il.

- The NSC will also review the indications in recent days that the US and Japan might consider opening liaison offices in Pyongyang. This is clearly overshadowed by Kim Il Sung's death. It may be an attempt to demonstrate business as usual.

6. Kartman (DCM, US Embassy) said that there had been a routine meeting of DPRK and UN Command Duty Officers at Panmunjom on the morning of 9 July, shortly before Kim's death was publicly announced. The meeting's atmosphere was relaxed.

COMMENT

7. Kartman added that the ROK had appeared worried that the US might make a statement which could wilfully be interpreted by the DPRK as flattering Kim Il Sung. They were considering a possible message of regret to the people of North Korea (CNN is now reporting such a message from President Clinton and that former President Carter has expressed regret and the hope that the peace process will continue). I recommend that the Foreign Secretary might make a statement wishing the people of North Korea well and hoping that there is now an opportunity to develop peaceful relations between the DPRK and its neighbours on a basis of respect for international law. On no account should we express condolences for a man who has much blood on his hands. Any British reaction should be measured and low-key. There is intense South Korean interest in the international reaction to this event.

8. The revised timing of Kim Il Sung's death means that the third round of US/DPRK talks in Geneva took place after it had taken place. It is likely that the North Korean delegation were simply kept in the dark by Pyongyang. We understand that the North Korean representative has now been summoned back from Geneva and that the talks are cancelled for the present.

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SUBJECT: OUR TELNO 260: DEATH OF KIM IL SUNG

1. The Secretary of State may also find it helpful to have the following summary notes on some of the other players on the DPRK stage.
2. After Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il, the longstanding number 3 in the hierarchy up to now has been Marshal O Jin-U, Minister of the People's Armed Forces. He is seen as one of Kim Il Sung's old guard. There have been rumours of tension between him and the younger group round Kim Jong Il and was mainly known for his personal loyalty to Kim Il Sung. He is closely associated with Vice Marshal Choi Gwan (ranked 10), the Army Chief of Staff. Choi was purged in the 1960s, returning to favour in 1988 he is known as a hard liner in his own right. He spoke publicly in December 1993 of the possibility of invading the ROK. He visited Peking in early June amid a public show of Chinese/DPRK solidarity when, by several accounts, he was also given a tougher time by the Chinese in private on the nuclear issue.
3. The survival or otherwise of these two, if Kim Jung Il succeeds, could be a useful indicator of the younger Kim's confidence in the army's loyalty. If O and Choi achieve greater prominence in the coming days, it will be a sign that the hard line is ascendent.
4. Prime Minister Kang Song Sang (ranked 4) has a reputation as a relative reformer. He was reappointed to his post in late-1992. During an earlier period as Prime Minister in 1984/86 there was an advance in North/South dialogue, with a successful agreement on meetings of divided families. Shortly after his reappointment he disappeared for some months amid rumours of a rift with Kim Jong Il. On his reappearance he made a hard line speech in April 1993 on North/South relations, perhaps the price of rehabilitation.
5. Kang was promoted with two other relative reformers, Kim Dal-Hyon and Kim Young-Soon, both of whom were demoted towards the end of 1993. Kim Dal-Hyon, as Chairman of the External Economic Affairs Commission was in charge of overseas trade (visiting Seoul in July 1992) and subsequently became Chairman of the State Planning

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Commission. He was seen here as a refreshing realist but sacked for allegedly taking bribes. He also took the blame, probably unfairly, for the North's catastrophic economic performance. Kim Young-Soon, who has extensive international experience, was made Party Secretary for International Affairs. Though demoted late last year, he has survived as Party Secretary for Reunification policy. He has a reputation for skill in straddling the divide between Kim Il Sung's group and that of Kim Jon-Il.

6. Pyongyang politics are notoriously opaque. At the risk of great simplification, Kang's survival as Prime Minister and promotions for Kim Dal-Hyon or Kim Young-Soon could be markers for more flexible policies by the DPRK.

HARRIS

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FOLLOWING FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY TO PRIME MINISTER AND PRIVATE
SECRETARY TO FOREIGN SECRETARY

SUBJECT: TELCON PS/SOS/DHM: DEATH OF KIM IL SUNG

1. I understand that you would welcome more background material on possible factions within the family of Kim Il Sung and on the present state of the North Korean economy:

a. Although the DPRK is the most secretive of regimes, close observers have noticed in recent months some unusual movements within the family. Until recently, the succession appeared to be firmly within the grip of the first son, Kim Jong Il. His mother died in childbirth in 1949 but his step-mother, Kim Il Sung's second wife, Kim Song-Ae, was kept firmly in the background. For example, when a South Korean Womens' Delegation visited Pyongyang in 1992, the ostensible Chairwoman of the Democratic Womens' Union remained out of sight. There was, therefore, very considerable interest when Kim Song-Ae took a prominent and public role during the recent visit to Pyongyang of ex-President Carter and his wife. Kim Song-Ae is nominally powerful in her own right. She is a member of the Party Conference and of the Central Committee.

Importance has also been attached to the recall to Pyongyang in March of her son, Kim Pyong Il, who had effectively been exiled hitherto in a series of ostensibly diplomatic postings, the most recent of which was as DPRK Ambassador to Finland. Some believe that Kim Pyong Il and his mother are firmly opposed to the 'Great Leader', Kim Jong Il. There has always been speculation that Kim Jong Il would have difficulties securing or holding onto the succession to his father because he both lacked his father's revolutionary charisma and because he has a reputation for womanising, fast cars and wild behaviour.

b. Recent South Korean estimates suggest that, while the North Korean economy continues to be in very bad shape (with frequent reports of serious food shortages) the sharp declines in economic activity seen in recent years may have begun to bottom out. Last year GNP fell by 4.3 per cent according to the Bank of Korea (following declines of 3.7 per cent in 1990, 5.2 per cent in 1991 and 7.6 per cent in 1992). Overall GNP in 1993 is estimated to

have been about US dollars 20.5 billion (or less than this year's growth, alone, in the South Korean economy). A Korean trade organisation has just reported however that North Korean trade in 1993 declined by 'only' 2 per cent compared with the more precipitous declines which followed the cut-off of Soviet credits. The trade deficit in 1993 is estimated to have been about US dollars 630 million compared to US dollars 2.93 billion in 1990: both exports and imports having roughly halved over the last 4 years.

Per capita income in 1993 is estimated to be US dollars 904 compared with US dollars 943 in 1992. Indeed light industry actually grew by 5 per cent in 1993 compared with falls of 9.7 per cent for utilities, 8.7 per cent for agriculture and 4.2 per cent for heavy industry.

2. We will send you shortly information on some of the other main players in the DPRK.

HARRIS

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SIC A3A

DTI FOR AGRELL, XNP DIVISION

SUBJECT: SECRETARY OF STATE'S VISIT: NORTH KOREA NUCLEAR

SUMMARY

1. Americans encouraged by North Korean acceptance of their conditions for a third round of talks.

DETAIL

2. Talbott (Acting Secretary of State) told the Foreign Secretary this afternoon that he had just heard that the DPRK Deputy Foreign Minister had accepted the three US conditions for a third round of talks. These would take place on 6 or 8 July, Gallucci leading on the American side. The Americans were "not yet out of the wood", but the prospects for a resolution on the crisis were looking brighter. Communications during ex-President Carter's "unusual" visit had been less than perfect, but it was now clear that the end effect had been positive. The North Koreans seemed to have felt able to make concessions to him which they could not make to the U.S. Government. The threat of UN sanctions had also contributed to the North Korean change of attitude. — *US sanctions effort suspended for no time being.*

3. The Secretary of State welcomed this news and complimented Talbott on the U.S. approach to the North Korean problem. They had to be prevented from developing a nuclear weapons capability, one way or another. It had been right to try persuasion first.

4. See MIFT.

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FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

SUBJECT : FOREIGN SECRETARY'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON, 21 JUNE :
NORTH KOREA

SUMMARY

1. ADMINISTRATION TRYING TO KEEP THEIR OPTIONS OPEN ON NORTH KOREA, BY PINNING DOWN THE NORTH ON THE OFFER REPORTED BY PRESIDENT CARTER WHILE CONTINUING TO TAKE FORWARD WORK ON SANCTIONS.

DETAIL

2. VICE PRESIDENT GORE AND TARNOFF (STATE) BRIEFED THE SECRETARY OF STATE ON THE LATEST DEVELOPMENTS. THE ADMINISTRATION HAD WRITTEN TO THE NORTH KOREANS LATE LAST NIGHT TO TRY TO PIN THEM DOWN ON THE OFFER PRESIDENT CARTER HAD REPORTED, NAMELY THAT THEY WOULD STOP REPROCESSING, STOP REFUELLING AND ALLOW THE INSPECTORS TO STAY AND CONTINUE TO FUNCTION. THEY WERE WAITING FOR A REPLY. IF IT WERE POSITIVE, THEN THE THIRD ROUND OF U.S./NORTH KOREAN TALKS COULD GO AHEAD. GORE CONFIRMED THAT ANY FURTHER TALKS WOULD DEAL WITH NORTH KOREA'S PAST NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES AS WELL AS THE FUTURE THOUGH HE ATTACHED MORE IMPORTANCE TO THE LATTER.

3. THE FOREIGN SECRETARY TOLD BOTH GORE AND LAKE THAT WE SUPPORTED THE U.S. APPROACH. IT WAS A DEVILISHLY DIFFICULT PROBLEM, AND WE THOUGHT THEY HAD HANDLED IT WELL. ALTHOUGH THERE WAS SOME SANCTIONS FATIGUE IN THE UK, IT WAS RECOGNISED AMONG HIS MINISTERIAL COLLEAGUES THAT NORTH KOREA WAS OF A DIFFERENT ORDER. AS LONG AS THE UNITED STATES KEPT US INFORMED AND THERE WERE NO SURPRISES, WE WOULD CONTINUE TO BE ABLE TO SUPPORT THE U.S. APPROACH, INCLUDING ON SANCTIONS.

4. BOTH GORE AND LAKE WELCOMED UK SUPPORT FOR THEIR POLICY. LAKE UNDERLINED THAT THE CAUTIOUS APPROACH ADOPTED WITH THE NORTH KOREANS AND THE ATTEMPT TO TIE THEM DOWN WAS IN NO WAY AN ALTERNATIVE TO PURSUING SANCTIONS. INDEED, IF NORTH KOREA PREVARICATED, THAT WOULD PROVIDE A FURTHER ARGUMENT IN FAVOUR OF SANCTIONS.

COMMENT

5. THERE WAS SOME UNCERTAINTY IN WASHINGTON (AND IN THE FOREIGN SECRETARY'S OWN MIND) ABOUT THE RUSSIAN POSITION. MRS ALBRIGHT THIS MORNING SAID THAT THE PLAN WOULD BE TO AGREE A SANCTIONS RESOLUTION WITH A THIRTY DAY TRIGGER CLAUSE AND FOR A RUSSIAN SPONSORED INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE TO TAKE PLACE AFTER THE PASSING OF THE RESOLUTION, BUT BEFORE THE 30 DAY PERIOD ELAPSED. HOWEVER, THE RUSSIANS NOW SEEM TO HAVE REJECTED THIS APPROACH. IT IS ALSO NOT CLEAR WHO WOULD PARTICIPATE IN THE PROPOSED RUSSIAN CONFERENCE. THE FOREIGN SECRETARY ATTACHES IMPORTANCE TO US (AND THE FRENCH) BEING THERE AS PART OF THE P5.

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


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20 June 1994

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Dear Douglas,

RWJL

NORTH KOREA

I am grateful for the updates on the Korean situation in your minute to the Prime Minister of 9 June, and in your Private Secretary's note of 17 June. I am also aware that, following ex-President Carter's visit to Korea, the situation has moved on again, but that it is much too early to say that the problem is solved.

In the event that North Korea continues to develop its nuclear programme without IAEA safeguards I agree that the Security Council must act firmly, and that the imposition of sanctions in stages will then be the only practicable way ahead. Western logic would indicate that despite the sabre rattling, a military reaction to any sanctions by North Korea would be unlikely, but we should not ignore the possibility that the North Koreans might see things differently.

I am conscious of the moral and political pressure to contribute to an international response to hostilities, and note the analogy you drew with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. It is true, however, as you pointed out in your minute, that our direct interest in Korea is much

The Rt Hon Douglas Hurd CBE MP
Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary



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less than it was in the case of Kuwait. Ministers will collectively need to assess the desirability and implications of any military involvement, whether it be in embargo operations or in direct intervention, in the light of the circumstances at the time.

I am sending a copy of this letter to OPD colleagues and to the Cabinet Secretary.

Yours ever,
Malcolm Rifkind

Malcolm Rifkind

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SIC A3A

DTI FOR AGRELL, XNP DIVISION

SUBJECT: NORTH KOREA NUCLEAR

SUMMARY

1. State downbeat about Carter's visit and pessimistic about likelihood of ROK/DPRK summit. Planning to seek clarification of Kim Il-Sung's remarks on nuclear issue via New York channel. No decisions yet on military reinforcements or evacuation plans.

DETAIL

2. Quinones (Korea Desk, State) briefed us on 20 June on Carter's visit. His assessment was downbeat. Carter had just not been up to speed when dealing with the crafty Kim Il-Sung.
3. Probably the most concrete accomplishment of the trip (whether or not it would lead to any concrete results) was the proposed ROK/DPRK summit. This idea had been put to Carter's State Dept aide by staff from the U.S. Embassy in Seoul at a meeting at Panmunjom between Carter's two encounters with Kim Il-Sung. The idea had been to come up with a balancing gesture to the ROK after Carter's "embrace" of the DPRK and to defuse the livid Kim Young-Sam. By that stage Carter had been conscious of the difficulties he had created for himself by "placing himself in the middle" (against the advice of his pre-trip State briefers).
4. Kim Il-Sung's acceptance had been a masterful way of

seizing the initiative while giving nothing away. If the 28 June preparatory meeting took place (and Quinones believed the DPRK would accept the ROK's proposed time and place) then a major difficulty would be agreeing the agenda for the summit. The South would probably insist on the nuclear issue topping the agenda, while the North would say the overriding need was to create the appropriate atmosphere for a successful summit. There had been no detailed thinking on how to tackle such problems. If the procedural meeting took place, Kim Il-Sung would come up with some way to put the blame on the South for why the summit could not go ahead. The North had already put a shot across the ROK's bows by its false accusation over the weekend that South Korea had moved troops into the DMZ.

5. Carter had brought back nothing new in terms of real DPRK commitment to finding a resolution to the nuclear issue itself. If there was anything new it was the opportunity both sides now had to exploit the appearance of a possible return to dialogue. Carter's State Department aide's note of Carter's first meeting with Kim Il-Sung recorded Kim as providing a personal commitment to freeze the DPRK nuclear programme in anticipation of the Third Round, and indicating that by this he meant that the North would not reload the reactor nor further degrade IAEA safeguards. Gallucci's 16 June statement (para 3 of my telno 1483) had been a careful attempt to spell out what the Americans interpreted Kim Il-Sung's statement to mean. Although both the Russians and the Chinese had been asked to check the DPRK's position, they had not responded to the Americans. Latest U.S. thinking on how to pursue clarification of Kim Il-Sung's remarks was to ask the DPRK via the New York channel. If Clinton gave his approval, a message would go to the North Koreans late on 20 June. If in the next 24 to 48 hours the North Koreans confirmed that Gallucci's interpretation was correct, then the Third Round of U.S./DPRK talks could be scheduled in the next week to ten days. It was not at all clear how a Third Round would be synchronised with a (however unlikely) DPRK/ROK summit.

6. If the North Koreans did not provide the necessary clarification, then the U.S. would proceed to seek sanctions. In the meantime work on the draft resolution would continue. The next step was the Christopher/Kozyrev meeting on 21 June. Quinones was relatively confident that the Russians would not cause major problems. They had been miffed that others had

seen the draft before them and had wanted to put down a marker that the Americans would not get anywhere without their cooperation.

7. Decisions on U.S. military deployments (my telno 1477) would probably be taken by the end of the month if passage of a sanctions resolution did not highlight the need for an earlier decision. The Americans were reviewing possible rapid measures such as reinforcing (from Pearl Harbour) their naval forces in the area or bringing up to strength by a brigade the division already in South Korea. Patriot reinforcements were also under review, as was the possible quickening of the schedule e.g. for deploying Apaches. Nor had decisions yet been taken on evacuation plans. Once the current review was completed (probably next week) the Americans would consult close allies. The Americans were not now thinking of advising any voluntary evacuation/extended leave of non-government personnel before sanctions were adopted.

8. Gallucci will not now be in London on 22 June. He will travel to Brussels in Christopher's party (where he will give a North Korea briefing at NATO). He will then proceed to Vienna on 22 June to meet Blix.

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DTI FOR AGRELL XNP DIVISION

FCO FOR RESIDENT CLERK

SUBJECT: NORTH KOREA NUCLEAR: CARTER VISIT

SUMMARY

1. US EMBASSY HERE BELIEVE THAT CARTER/ DPRK TALKS MAY HAVE PRODUCED BASIS OF AGREEMENT. US TRYING TO GET CONFIRMATION OF DPRK POSITION. CARTER DEBRIEFS TO ROK GOVERNMENT WHO REMAIN SCEPTICAL.

DETAIL

2. EX PRESIDENT CARTER RETURNED TO SEOUL ON THE MORNING OF 18 JUNE FROM PYONGYANG. HE HAD A DEBRIEFING MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER HAN AND LUNCH WITH PRESIDENT KIM YOUNG SAM (KYS). BEFORE RETURNING TO THE US THIS AFTERNOON, HE GAVE A PRESS CONFERENCE.
3. CARTER CONFIRMED THAT WHAT WAS ON OFFER TO THE DPRK WAS THAT IF THEY COMPLIED WITH THE IAEA'S REQUIREMENTS THE SANCTIONS RESOLUTION COULD BE PUT IN ABEYANCE. THE US EMBASSY HAVE TOLD US THAT CARTER CLEARLY MIS-SPOKE ON CNN. WHAT HE SAID DURING HIS SUBSEQUENT MEETINGS WITH KIM IL SUNG SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN PROPERLY IN TUNE WITH US POLICY.
4. BY CARTER'S ACCOUNT, THE DPRK HAS ACCEPTED IN PRINCIPLE THE THREE CONDITIONS SET OUT BY GALLUCCI FOR THE RESUMPTION OF THE THIRD ROUND OF DPRK/US TALKS (COMPLIANCE WITH IAEA SAFEGUARDS AND INSPECTION REQUIREMENTS, NO REPROCESSING, AND NO REFUELLING WITHOUT IAEA SURVEILLANCE). THEY HAVE SAID THAT THEY EXPECT GENERAL US SUPPORT, NOT NECESSARILY FINANCIAL, TO INTRODUCE LIGHT WATER TECHNOLOGY, AND WILL AGREE TO TOTAL TRANSPARENCY OF THEIR

NUCLEAR PROGRAMME.

5. CARTER HAS TOLD KYS THAT KIM IL SUNG WILL PICK UP KYS' OFFER TO MEET HIM AND WANTS TO DO SO AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. KYS' OFFICE IS CONSIDERING HOW TO RESPOND.

6. AFTER THE CONFUSION OF THE LAST THIRTY SIX HOURS THE NEXT STEP IS TO CONFIRM THAT THE DPRK POSITION GENUINELY IS AS REPORTED. THE AMERICANS ARE APPARENTLY ASKING THE RUSSIANS AND THE CHINESE TO SEEK CLARIFICATION. (WASHINGTON TELNO 1483 REFERS: IT APPEARS THAT THIS CLARIFICATION WAS NOT FORTHCOMING BEFORE CARTER'S SECOND MEETING WITH KIM IL SUNG ON 17 JUNE).

7. THE US EMBASSY BELIEVES THAT ON BALANCE THE DEADLOCK OF EARLIER IN THE WEEK HAS BEEN THOROUGHLY SHAKEN AND NOW SHOWS SIGNS OF LOOSENING UP, WITH TEMPORARY LOSS OF AMERICAN FACE (FOR WASHINGTON TO SORT OUT, ACCORDING TO OUR RELIEVED US EMBASSY CONTACT) BUT NO WEAKENING ON ESSENTIALS.

8. THE ROK MFA IS MORE SCEPTICAL. CHO BYUNG-JAE, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, NORTH AMERICA DIVISION, TOLD US THAT THEY ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE CARTER VISIT HAD EASED FOR THE MOMENT THE SENSE OF CRISIS AND CONFRONTATION. BUT THEY FEAR THAT CARTER HAS TOUCHED ON AREAS OF THE IAEA'S AUTHORITY, LOST THE MOMENTUM WHICH HAD BEEN ACHIEVED AT THE UNSC, AND LEFT THE SITUATION MORE COMPLICATED THAN BEFORE. IT HAD ALSO CREATED AWKWARD IMPRESSIONS OF DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE US AND THE ROK. THERE COULD BE A POSITIVE OUTCOME YET BUT THE ROK WANTED TO SEE THE DPRK'S APPARENT POSITION CONFIRMED THROUGH MORE ORTHODOX CHANNELS BEFORE IT COULD GIVE IT ANY WELCOME.

9. CARTER HAD TOLD FOREIGN MINISTER HAN THAT KIM IL SUNG SEEMED VERY MUCH IN CHARGE WITH NO SIGN OF SERIOUS HEALTH PROBLEMS OR SENILITY.

COMMENT

10. THE US GOVERNMENT HANDLING OF THE CARTER VISIT HAS LEFT THE ROK GOVERNMENT LOOKING THOROUGHLY IMPOTENT IN THE EYES OF THEIR OWN PEOPLE. HAVING MARCHED THEIR TROOPS TO THE TOP OF THE UN SANCTIONS HILL, THERE IS A DISTINCT AIR OF IRRITATION THAT THE ROK MAY BE ABOUT TO BE ASKED TO MARCH THEM BACK DOWN AGAIN. THE US WOULD BE WELL ADVISED NOT TO FORGET THE ROK/DPRK DIMENSION.

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DTI FOR AGRELL XNP DIVISION

SUBJECT: WASHINGTON TELNOS 1483 AND 1492: NORTH KOREA NUCLEAR

SUMMARY

1. ROK WORRIED BY THE SIGNS OF DISARRAY IN WASHINGTON RESULTING FROM CARTER VISIT AND THE SIGNALS FROM MOSCOW THAT THEY MAY NOT COOPERATE OVER THE US SANCTIONS RESOLUTION.
2. BRIEFING FOR DIPLOMATIC CORPS REVEALS PLAN TO MOVE SEAT OF GOVERNMENT IN THE EVENT OF HOSTILITIES.
3. NO NEED YET TO CHANGE TRAVEL ADVICE.

DETAIL

4. THE SERIES OF CONFLICTING STATEMENTS ISSUED BY FORMER PRESIDENT CARTER IN PYONGYANG AND BY THE USG IN WASHINGTON ON 16 AND 17 JUNE HAVE DONE NOTHING TO BOLSTER CONFIDENCE IN SEOUL. FOREIGN MINISTER HAN TELEPHONED WARREN CHRISTOPHER 3 TIMES ON 17 JUNE TO EXPRESS CONCERN AT REPORTS THAT THE US HAD STOPPED SANCTIONS ACTIVITY IN RETURN FOR VAGUE DPRK PROMISES OF A NUCLEAR FREEZE. THE WHOLE EPISODE HAS SIMPLY CONFIRMED EARLIER ROK FEARS THAT THE CARTER VISIT WOULD SEND MISLEADING SIGNALS TO PYONGYANG ABOUT THE RESOLVE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO PRESS AHEAD WITH SANCTIONS. PARK JIN (PRESIDENTIAL AIDE, BLUE HOUSE) TOLD ME LAST NIGHT THAT AT THE VERY LEAST THE KOREANS (WHO WENT TO SOME LENGTHS TO BRIEF CARTER) HAD HOPED THAT THE AMERICANS WOULD SAY NOTHING PUBLICLY UNTIL CARTER HAD RETURNED TO SEOUL FOR A DETAILED DEBRIEFING ON THE RESULTS OF HIS VISIT. THE KOREANS HAD BEEN STARTLED BY CLINTONS STATEMENT THAT CARTERS VISIT MIGHT PRODUCE ENOUGH FOR A THIRD ROUND. AS IT WAS, THE AMERICANS APPEARED TO BE

SENDING MIXED SIGNALS TO THE DPRK WHICH KIM IL SUNG WOULD SIMPLY EXPLOIT. OFFICIAL ROK SPOKESMAN REFUSED TO BE DRAWN ON THE VARIOUS STATEMENTS FROM WASHINGTON UNTIL CARTER RETURNS TO SEOUL LATER TODAY.

5. THE SOUTH KOREANS ARE ALSO DEEPLY CONCERNED BY THE REPORTS FROM MOSCOW (MOSCOW TELNO 914) THAT THE RUSSIANS MAY NOT BE PREPARED TO COOPERATE WITH THE US DRAFT SANCTIONS RESOLUTION. TOLORAYA (DHM RUSSIAN EMBASSY) IS ADAMANT THAT CLINTON PROMISED YELTSIN THAT THE US AND RUSSIA WOULD COOPERATE IN THE PREPARATION OF A NEW RESOLUTION AND THAT THIS WOULD BE THE SUBJECT OF A PRIOR MEETING BETWEEN WARREN CHRISTOPHER AND KOZYREV. TOLARAYA SAID THAT MOSCOW FELT STRONGLY THAT A PROMISE HAD BEEN BROKEN BY THE MANNER IN WHICH THE US DRAFT HAD NOT BEEN SHOWN TO THE RUSSIANS IN ADVANCE OF CIRCULATION TO THE P5 ON 16 JUNE (UKMIS TELNO 2140). THEY NO LONGER FELT BOUND TO SUPPORT SANCTIONS WHICH WOULD, IN ANY CASE, DRIVE KIM IL SUNG OUT OF THE NPT AND WORSEN THE SITUATION. HE SAID THAT DETAILS OF A RUSSIAN ALTERNATIVE FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE HAD BEEN DELIVERED IN CAPITALS OF THE P5, SOUTH AND NORTH KOREA, AND JAPAN ON 16 JUNE. IN SEOUL THEY HAD BEEN HANDED TO FOREIGN MINISTER HAN.

6. MEANWHILE AS PART OF THE CONTINUING EFFORTS TO REDUCE ALARM CHOI (ASSISTANT MINISTER FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS, MFA) BRIEFED THE DIPLOMATIC CORPS ON 17 JUNE. THE MAIN POINTS TO EMERGE WERE:

- A. THE US AND ROK HAD STEPPED UP THEIR SURVEILLANCE OF THE DPRK AND WERE MONITORING 260 DIFFERENT INDICATORS OF POSSIBLE HOSTILITIES AROUND THE CLOCK. THERE WERE STILL NO SIGNS OF PROVOCATIVE MILITARY MOVES. THERE HAD BEEN ONE COMBINED NAVAL/AIR EXERCISE ON 27 MAY PRESUMED TO CHECK DEFENCE CAPABILITIES IN THE EVENT OF AN ATTACK ON YONGBYONG.
- B. THE ROK DID NOT BELIEVE THE DPRK WOULD SERIOUSLY CONTEMPLATE HOSTILITIES. PYONGYANG'S RHETORIC WAS SIMPLY DESIGNED TO WEAKEN INTERNATIONAL RESOLVE.
- C. NEVERTHELESS PRECAUTIONS HAD BEEN TAKEN AGAINST THE POSSIBILITY OF SMALL SCALE MILITARY OPERATIONS EG. ALONG THE DMZ OR OTHER STEPS DESIGNED TO CREATE PANIC IN THE ROK. THESE INCLUDED BEEFING UP COUNTER ARTILLERY AND NIGHT FIGHTING CAPABILITIES. CAUTION WAS ALSO BEING EXERCISED TO REFRAIN FROM MILITARY ACTION WHICH COULD AS A PRETEXT FOR A DPRK MILITARY RESPONSE.

D. IN THE EVENT OF WAR, THE DEFENCE OF SEOUL WOULD BE THE FIRST PRIORITY. ACTION WAS NOW BEING TAKEN TO REDUCE THE RESPONSE TIME IN CASE OF A SURPRISE ATTACK BY REDEPLOYING AIRCRAFT AND US CARRIERS. THE COMBAT CAPABILITY OF US FORCES HAD BEEN STRENGTHENED BY THE SUPPLY OF BRADLEY APV'S, APACHE HELICOPTERS, PATRIOT MISSILES AND THE PREPOSITIONING OF AMMUNITION AND STORES. (WE HAVE BEEN TOLD SEPARATELY BY US SOURCES THAT THE MUCH LARGER REINFORCEMENT MENTIONED IN WASHINGTON TELNO 1469 HAS BEEN PUT ON HOLD FOR THE PRESENT).

E. DPRK PROPAGANDA WAS DESIGNED TO INTIMIDATE BUT IT COULD NOT BE RULED OUT THAT THE NORTH WOULD WITHDRAW FROM THE NPT AND START REPROCESSING THE FUEL RODS NOW IN THE COOLING TANKS. IF THE DPRK ESCALATED THE CRISIS, THE UNSC SHOULD TAKE STRONGER MEASURES.

F. THE ROK HAD CONTINGENCY PLANS FOR EVACUATION OF THE SEAT OF GOVERNMENT IN THE EVENT OF A DPRK ATTACK AND THE DIPLOMATIC CORPS WOULD BE BRIEFED ON THESE ARRANGEMENTS SHOULD THE NEED EVER ARISE. CHOI STRESSED HOWEVER THAT MEANWHILE IT WAS BUSINESS AS USUAL.

7. SUBSEQUENT QUESTIONING OF CHOI REVEALED AN EMBARRASSING PREOCCUPATION AMONG COLLEAGUES WITH CONTINGENCY PLANNING FOR THEIR OWN EVACUATION IN THE EVENT OF WAR AND THE RISK OF DPRK TERRORIST ACTIVITIES IN SEOUL. CHOI REASSURED THEM THAT ALL POSSIBLE SECURITY MEASURES HAD BEEN TAKEN.

COMMENT.

8. THE ROK GOVERNMENT HAS A DIFFICULT BALANCING ACT TO PERFORM. IT NEEDS TO ALERT ITS POPULATION TO THE OBVIOUS RISKS INHERENT IN A FIRM POLICY FOR SUPPORT FOR SANCTIONS, WHILE AT THE SAME TIME NOT PROVOKING PANIC. FORTUNATELY THE SOUTH KOREAN PEOPLE ARE SHOWING CONSIDERABLE MATURITY AND SANG-FROID AND BETRAY NO SIGNS OF BEING ALARMED BY THE RHETORIC FROM THE NORTH. APART FROM SOME LIMITED PURCHASING OF DRIED FOODS (A NATURAL REFLEX ACTION BY THOSE WHO REMEMBER THE KOREAN WAR) LIFE IN EVERY OTHER RESPECT HAS CONTINUED AS NORMAL IN SEOUL. THERE IS CONSIDERABLE RESENTMENT HER AT THE ALARMIST COVERAGE BEING GIVEN BY SOME FOREIGN MEDIA. CNN, IN PARTICULAR, HAS NOW BEEN ASKED BY THE ROK MINISTRY OF INFORMATION TO TONE DOWN ITS PRESENTATION OF THE STORY. THE SOUTH KOREANS BLAME THE FOREIGN MEDIA FOR THE ODD SITUATION IN WHICH THERE APPEARS TO BE MORE CONCERN ABROAD ABOUT POSSIBLE HOSTILITIES THAN WITHIN THE ROK.

9. ALONG WITH ALL OTHER EMBASSIES, WE HAVE NOT CHANGED OUR TRAVEL ADVICE TO THE BRITISH COMMUNITY. MANY EXPATRIATES IN ANY CASE LEAVE KOREA AT THIS TIME OF YEAR WITH THE END OF THE SCHOOL TERM. WE SHALL, OF COURSE, NEED TO REVIEW THIS ADVICE WERE THE US, AS SUGGESTED IN WASHINGTON TELNO 1469, TO REVISE THEIR OWN ADVICE. FOR THE MOMENT, HOWEVER, THERE WAS NO NEED TO DISSUADE THOSE WISHING TO COME HERE FROM DOING SO. WE HAVE JUST HAD A HIGHLY SUCCESSFUL SERIES OF TRADE PROMOTION EVENTS IN PUSAN AND SEOUL CULMINATING IN A STANDING ROOM ONLY INWARD INVESTMENT CONFERENCE. APART FROM THE WORLD CUP, LIFE HERE CONTINUES HERE LARGELY AS NORMAL.

HARRIS

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285

Prime Minister

Foreign &
Commonwealth
Office

17 June 1994

Carter's visit may
have produced
a breathing space,
but as US will revert
to sanctions track if talks fail.
North Koreans remain as unapproachable as ever.

London SW1A 2AH

Dear Robin,

NORTH KOREA NUCLEAR: UPDATE

Work on a sanctions resolution at the UN is proceeding slowly. Our aim (which is shared by the US and France) is to devise a package expressing international concern about North Korea's refusal to disclose past nuclear activities, while at the same time trying to avoid provoking North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT or, worse, North Korean military action. The US have produced a draft resolution which envisages imposition of a modest sanctions package in the first instance. Financial sanctions would follow only if North Korea took further steps, such as withdrawing from the NPT.

We and the French have no problems of principle with the US draft, although we will want to look carefully at the detail. But the Russians are upset that they were not involved in detailed discussion with the US about the text, and that their proposal for an international conference on Korea has not been given greater priority. They would like a conference to take place at the same time as the Security Council discusses a sanctions package. Differences between the US and Russia are unlikely to be resolved until next week when Kozyrev and Christopher are expected to meet in Brussels. We have no objection of principle to the concept of an international conference, but its timing will need careful consideration if it is not to be used by the North Koreans as an excuse for further delay in complying with IAEA safeguards. We would also want to take part in any such conference.

Meanwhile the US Administration have been encouraged by reports coming out of President Carter's visit to Pyongyang that North Korea might be prepared to freeze its nuclear programme in return for resumption of high-level talks with the US. Although such an offer would not in itself solve the important problem of establishing what North Korea has done in the past, it would have the advantage of maintaining safeguards on North Korea's present nuclear activity. If talks looked like bearing fruit the US would probably put work

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on a Security Council Resolution on hold. US officials have told us that the objective of any resumed dialogue would be to promote North Korea's full compliance with safeguards.

The attitude of the Chinese is difficult to judge. They maintain that sanctions are not the best way to resolve the crisis. But they have not said that they would veto a Security Council Resolution. Encouragingly, they abstained on the IAEA vote last week to suspend technical help to North Korea.

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[REDACTED]

Neither we nor the US think it necessary at present to issue travel advice for South Korea, but this too is being kept under review.

I am copying this to John Pitt-Brooke (MOD) and Melanie Leech (Cabinet Office), to Peter Smith (DTI) and to Nick Macpherson (HMT).

Yours ever,

J S Smith

(J S Smith)

Private Secretary

Roderic Lyne Esq CMG
10 Downing Street

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SIC ACA

DTI FOR AGRELL, XNP DIVISION

MY TELNO 2140 AND YOUR TELNO 793

SUBJECT: NORTH KOREA NUCLEAR

SUMMARY

1. In the event P5 Ambassadors did not meet on 16 June. Both our US and Russian colleagues made it clear that they did not expect the differences between them on the draft resolution to be resolved before a meeting between Christopher and Kozyrev on 21 June. The US briefed the non-permanent members of the Council, but did not circulate a text. Late in the day the US Permanent Representative confirmed to me that the Administration was now looking for more time, not least to establish whether the North Koreans had, in fact, said anything radically new to President Carter. For the next few days the US would be making haste slowly here.
2. Russian non-paper states that it is their intention that all of the P5 should be invited to the proposed international conference.

DETAIL

3. The P5 consultations foreshadowed in my TUR did not take place on 16 June. The US Permanent Representative was in Washington much of the day. The US Mission were preoccupied with the negative reaction in Moscow to the draft resolution. Our Russian colleagues told us that there was considerable unhappiness in Moscow that the US had produced a draft without detailed prior consultation with the Russians. They made play with the fact that North Korea was "in Russia's backyard" and claimed that the US draft did not reflect

an exchange that had taken place between Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin. They said they envisaged a resolution which set up an international conference and provided for a working group or committee of the Security Council to look at possible sanctions. Nonetheless they thought the difference between them and the Americans was bridgeable. A "compromise" could be found. A meeting scheduled to take place between Christopher and Kozyrev in Brussels on 21 June would be crucial. Our US colleagues told us that they too believed the gap bridgeable, but that it would take time to fix and that they did not anticipate further substantive action on the resolution here until Christopher and Kozyrev had met.

4. Separately our Russian colleagues gave us a copy of a non-paper setting out in detail Russian ideas for the international conference (by fax to MPD and Washington). The paper states that all of the P5 would participate in the conference.

5. Albright returned to New York late on 16 June, and held the postponed briefing of non-permanent Council members. She reportedly described the main elements in the US draft resolution but did not distribute the text. She acknowledged that the US had shared a text with the P5 the previous day. A number of changes were being made to take account of comments received and recent developments. The Russians had a different approach on the international conference and this was now being discussed at the highest level.

6. Albright telephoned me after she had spoken to the non-permanent members. She said that she had been in direct touch with President Clinton during the day as to how to handle the news coming out of Pyongyang about President Carter's visit. It was too soon yet to say whether the North Koreans had put anything genuinely new to Carter. It was impossible to discuss things properly on an open telephone line to Pyongyang. Time was needed to consider what the North Koreans had said.

7. Albright said that President Clinton had instructed her to continue consultations in New York. But she would do in slow time. She added that the non-permanent ten had been astonishingly supportive at her meeting with them. Albright said there would be no group meetings on the text on 17 June (another P3 would only rattle the Russians further, and if there were a P4 the Russians would feel compelled to put forward their own counter to the US

draft).

8. We gave the gist of your comments on the US draft to our US and French colleagues during the course of 16 June (until quite late in the day it seemed likely that there might be a P3 or P4 meeting before the end of it). When I spoke to her, Albright asked that we feed in our comments in full to the US Mission bilaterally. This we will do on 17 June. I went over with her the main point in your TUR, the undesirability at this stage of setting out in detail the full provisions for the second stage of sanctions. Albright said that the US had deliberately chosen to go for financial measures in the second stage because they knew a trade embargo would be enormously confrontational and difficult for the Chinese. Our sensitivity about financial measures was well understood. She would go back to Washington, and report our arguments in favour of a more flexible approach to the second stage. She warned, however, that at the end of the day the Americans might look for our cooperation in supporting inclusion in this resolution of their detailed second stage package.

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DTI FOR AGRELL, XNP DIVISION

UKMIS NEW YORK TELNOS 214D AND 214I

SUBJECT: NORTH KOREA NUCLEAR: RUSSIAN VIEWS

SUMMARY

1. Russians irritated by substance and circulation of US draft sanctions resolution. Signs of further backing away from sanctions. Suggestion from Ministry of Atomic Energy that North Korea does not have any nuclear weapons.

DETAIL

2. Kozyrev told reporters on 16 June that he was confused by the fact that US diplomats had circulated in New York a draft Resolution containing a concrete list of sanctions. This was contrary to the agreement reached during a telephone conversation between Yeltsin and Clinton that the US and Russia would draft a Resolution jointly and not launch unilateral initiatives.
3. Kozyrev implied that Russia might refuse to consider the US draft and would not support a package of sanctions proposed without prior Russian agreement. He said that the Russians had already sent the Americans proposals for a draft Resolution, including an international conference: sanctions and the conference should be given equal weight in the draft.
4. Kozyrev said that Yeltsin and Clinton had agreed that he and Christopher should meet to discuss North Korea. The US Embassy say that this meeting is now fixed for the afternoon of 21 June in Brussels. Kozyrev is likely to sign Partnership for Peace on the same visit.

5. The Americans say that they and the Russians have a different understanding of what the two Presidents agreed: the Americans believed that the Russians had accepted the idea of sanctions in return for the inclusion of an international conference in a draft Resolution to be worked up by the Americans (consulting the Russians as necessary). The Russians believed that the Presidents had agreed that the two countries should table a joint draft Resolution in the Security Council. The US Embassy are uncertain, however, whether this is a genuine misunderstanding, whether the Russians want to grumble again about the general problem of lack of prior consultation with the Americans or whether they are reluctant to move forward on sanctions and are merely using this procedural issue to delay progress. Bilateral discussions with the Russians to iron out the disagreement are continuing.

6. Some evidence for the view that the Russians wish to postpone sanctions was provided by Deputy Foreign Minister Panov on 17 June when he said that North Korea's decision to withdraw from the IAEA and the NPT did not give grounds for sanctions to be applied: any country had the right to withdraw from a treaty. Panov renewed the call for an international conference, and claimed that the idea was gaining support. When we spoke to Konashkov (International Scientific and Technical Co-operation Dept, MFA) today he said that the Russian concept of the draft Resolution was that it should propose an international conference if North Korea met its obligations, and sanctions if it did not; but it should not set out the details of the sanctions, which should come later.

7. Separately, Mikhailov (Minister for Atomic Energy) has said that he is "sure" that there are no nuclear weapons in North Korea today: making an atomic bomb is too complicated a technical process. He implied, however, that North Korea might have enough plutonium to make a bomb. He argued against isolating North Korea.

COMMENT

8. Kozyrev's outburst may in part have been prompted by a genuine feeling that once again the Americans had bounced him by circulating a draft in New York without prior consultation; his irritation may have been heightened because the Russians thought that they had an agreement between the two Presidents that this would not happen. Nonetheless, they must also recognise that this sign of disunity within the P5 will probably encourage the North Koreans to dig in their heels. According to Konashkov, the

Russians are now working on the next steps; he assured us that the P5 would be fully consulted in New York.

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SUBJECT: YOUR TELNOS 2140 AND 2141: NORTH KOREA
NUCLEAR

SIC ACA

Summary

1. Agree we should be supportive of the US draft. But should suggest that the current text should not seek to define the exact terms of the second stage sanctions, both on the merits of the case and because the current framing of the assets provisions (although not the principle) causes us difficulties. Other minor amendments suggested.

Detail

2. We agree fully with TURs that the US draft text reflects our preference for a two stage approach to imposing sanctions on the DPRK. We should clearly be as supportive as possible. Our main reserve is whether it is necessary or useful at this stage to set out in paragraph 19 in exact detail the full provisions for second stage sanctions. While this may help to make clear to the DPRK the full extent of the threatened sanctions which they face if they continue to ignore international concerns, defining the additional measures so closely at this stage also ties the Council to a particular course of action before we know whether that action will be appropriate (it will also, of course, allow the Koreans to know in advance what they will be faced with and to take pre-emptive measures to minimise the effect). You should suggest to the Americans that in our view para 19 should not go into such detail at present. Additional measures could not be imposed without an additional SCR. We retain flexibility by not seeking to frame second stage sanctions so precisely until that additional SCR proves necessary.

3. An additional benefit in deferring the detailing of additional measures is that it will give more time to reach agreement on what is likely to be the most difficult provision for many states. It is the section that causes us the most problems. It would therefore suit us very well if negotiation on the details of the measures in para 19 could be deferred. For your information, the Chancellor has agreed that in the particular circumstances of the serious threat posed by the DPRK, the UK should support financial sanctions provided that they are workable in practice. Paragraph 19 as currently drafted is, in our view, flawed. We will send you fuller comments on para 19, including a possible redraft, in due course. But the best outcome in the interim would be if the debate over the financial provisions could be postponed by agreeing to make para 19 less specific.

4. We have a few more minor comments on the text, as follows:

PPB and passim: it seems unnecessary to refer to the NPT Treaty when NPT would suffice;

PPK: the first line should refer to the implication of DPRK actions for global non-proliferation. The penultimate line might read more clearly as quote is not diverted to the manufacture of nuclear weapons unquote;

PPM: this para constitutes the basis for Chapter VII action and should be worded accordingly. It should therefore begin quote Determining that in these circumstances DPRK violations... unquote. Furthermore, we support the Japanese suggestions in Tokyo telno 293. DPRK violations of the safeguards agreement may not in themselves be sufficient to constitute a threat to peace and security;

OP1: this might read better as quote urges the DPRK to honour unconditionally its obligations under the NPT unquote;

OP3: we agree that it would be useful, not least in achieving Chinese acquiescence, to incorporate a reference making clear that we would welcome resumption of dialogue between the DPRK and US, though the conditions already specified by the US would need to be met. The para might begin quote Underlines the value of dialogue between member states in this context and expresses... unquote;

OP5 and 7: it would be very difficult in practice to determine whether goods or services destined for DPRK were being legitimately exported, or whether they were prohibited under these provisions. The purpose of these provisions is unclear to us. We assume they are meant to refer to government to government aid, but if so better drafting would be required;

OP10: This is our main point of concern (other than OP19). The reference to dual use items in both sections of this para is meaningless. Unless the UN can provide an accompanying list of all those products which fall within the definition of dual-use, it will be impossible for us and others to implement the measure in practice. We have little room to be flexible on this matter. We cannot agree to a mandatory measure which is unimplementable by States. We also have definitional problems with references to materials and supplies. Retention of language referring to dual use items would also have implications for EU implementation. There is no EU precedent on which to base the implementing Regulation;

OP11A: we would prefer to revert to SCR 787 language and merely to authorise quote measures commensurate with the specific circumstances unquote. We recognise the seriousness of the current situation, but have no wish for authorisation of the use of force to be included in sanctions resolutions as a matter of course;

OP19: in addition to the reservations set out above, we also doubt whether have difficulty with the current formulation of the preamble which implies that NPT withdrawal in itself would threaten international peace and security. We would suggest a redraft from the second line as follows, quote international peace and security, in particular further developing its nuclear capabilities as evidenced by withdrawal from the NPT,...unquote.

5. We would be grateful if you could ensure that all future telegrams relating to DPRK sanctions, or indeed any new sanctions measures, are copied to UKRep Brussels,

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NORTH KOREA

The Prime Minister met the Chancellor alone this afternoon, mainly for a discussion of domestic issues. He also raised the subject of North Korea, on which he has given me the following de-brief.

The Prime Minister told the Chancellor that he was very worried about the position on North Korea. The Americans might ask us for assistance at some stage, such as contributing a troop presence in South Korea as a deterrent. He personally believed we should agree to this.

The Chancellor said he agreed that, if asked, the UK could and should provide assistance in South Korea.

MF

MARY FRANCIS

15 June 1994

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[my note of 14 June
to PM for Jm. Sec.
bilateral]

Treasury Chambers, Parliament
071-270

COVID 24G

cc: Sir T Burns
Sir N Wicks
Mr Robson
Mr Mortimer
Ms Perkins
Ms Young
Mr Devereux
Mr Richardson
Ms Catchpole
Mr Romberg
Mr Guest

FOREIGN SECRETARY

D. Douglas

Ms Henderson - TSol

UN SANCTIONS: NORTH KOREA AND HAITI

Thank you for your minute of 7 June. I fully recognise the serious threat posed by North Korea and the importance of a firm response from the international community. As you know, I believe that sanctions in general are usually a useless tool in achieving their objectives. Over Libya, for example, the two Lockerbie suspects remain untried, while sanctions on Serbia have stiffened popular support for the Government there and did not avoid the need for UN military involvement. Nevertheless, in the particular circumstances of this case I am prepared to accept that a package of sanctions against North Korea could include financial measures so that reservations about sanctions cannot be interpreted as failure to support a strong international response to Korean behaviour.

2. But we must ensure that any financial sanctions proposed are workable in practice. In particular, we will need to consider how the EU will interpret any measures and the implications and practicability of applying measures to private individuals. I would therefore wish my officials to be closely engaged with yours in the discussions of both a possible Security Council Resolution and any EC regulation that may prove necessary.

RESTRICTED**Haiti**

3. In my opinion, this is likely to prove another case of sanctions proving to be an empty political gesture. I am less sanguine than you about the outcome in Brussels. We are now left with an international obligation under the Common Position which we have no powers to implement under EC or UK domestic law. Since we have no powers we are unable to take either legal or regulatory measures. All we can legitimately do by way of administrative measures is to draw the existence of the Security Council Resolution and the Common Position to the attention of financial institutions. We cannot however assert that there is any legal obligation on them to take any action. If we did, this would bring the risk of compensation claims if institutions took action and were sued by their clients. This sort of measure may not be enough to persuade the Commission that there is no need for them to bring forward new proposals. The best means of notifying institutions is under consideration by my officials.

4. The lesson I draw from this sorry episode is that we cannot rely on the EU to understand or interpret the intentions of the UN Security Council when formulating EC legislation. We must take that fully into account when deciding our line in New York.

5. I am copying this minute to the Prime Minister, the Secretaries of State for Defence and Transport, the President of the Board of Trade, and to Sir Robin Butler.

*L.*13 June 1994

[K.C.]

of pps please



The Rt. Hon. Michael Heseltine MP RESTRICTED
President of the Board of Trade

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Secretary of State
**Department of
Trade and Industry**

Ashdown House
123 Victoria Street
London SW1E 6RB

Direct line
071-215 4440

DTI Enquiries
071-215 5000

The Rt Hon Douglas Hurd CBE MP
Secretary of State for Foreign
and Commonwealth Affairs
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
King Charles Street
LONDON
SW1A 2AH

13 June 1994

De Douglas

NORTH KOREA

Thank you for copying to me your minute of 9 June to the Prime Minister and 7 June to the Chancellor of the Exchequer. I have also seen the No 10 Private Secretary letter of 8 June.

I endorse your assessment of the seriousness of the problem. We should support the Americans in their efforts to secure appropriate sanctions against North Korea, and a phased approach generally on the lines you suggest seems the best way forward. There may well be merit at the right stage in an international conference, as the Russians are advocating, but it should not be one that can be spun out, nor should acceptance of one lead to an impression of indecision in the international response to the serious situation the North Koreans have created.

It would be regrettable if the Chinese vetoed a sanctions resolution but I do not think we should be deterred by this possibility. I agree with your view that the North Korean breach of safeguards is so flagrant that the Security Council must take action. One might otherwise wonder what the purpose was of having such safeguards. If the worst did come to the worst, however, I would not be in favour of the deployment or involvement of UK ground forces in Korea.

Copies of this letter go to the Prime Minister, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Defence Secretary, the Secretary of State for Transport and to Sir Robin Butler.

*you see
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PRIME MINISTER

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North Korea

1. The long-running problem over North Korea's nuclear activities is coming to something of a head. No decisions are yet needed, but you and colleagues may find useful a brief outline of the issues involved.

2. On conclusion of its safeguards agreement with the IAEA in 1992 the North Koreans made a declaration that they had produced a small amount of plutonium. Subsequent IAEA analysis of samples indicated that the North Koreans might have produced more than they had declared. Suspensions were increased by the identification of two suspect nuclear waste sites which the North Koreans had not declared to the IAEA. When the IAEA asked for access to these sites North Korea announced that it would withdraw from the Non Proliferation Treaty. In June 1993, the North Koreans suspended withdrawal as part of a deal with the US which provided for continuation of the US/North Korean dialogue on improving relations.

3. In May 1994 North Korea began unloading fuel from its 5MW reactor. The IAEA had sought access to this fuel during unloading in order to obtain an accurate picture of North Korea's past plutonium production. But the North Koreans went ahead without adequate IAEA supervision. Within a few weeks virtually all the fuel had been removed. On 3 June Blix, Director-General of the IAEA, reported to the UN Security Council that the Agency's ability to establish during unloading whether any nuclear material from the 5MW reactor had been diverted in the past had been lost. The US announced that

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there was no prospect of further formal talks with North Korea until the reactor history could be established, although they have not excluded lower level informal talks.

4. The Security Council are considering how to respond. There is widespread support for imposing sanctions in stages, although the details are still being worked out. The US are likely to propose an ambitious first phase of sanctions including a ban on arms exports, an assets freeze, and action on remittances. We are arguing for a more measured approach including in the first phase a ban on nuclear co-operation, cutting scientific and technical contacts, and restrictions on air and maritime links. We may succeed in obtaining agreement that trade and financial sanctions should be left to a second stage resolution. But one of the most important pressure points is likely to be restrictions on the substantial hard currency remittances from Japan to North Korea, which we should not get ourselves into the position of opposing. I wrote to Ken Clarke on 7 June about this aspect and your Private Secretary set out your views in his letter of 8 June.

5. There is a risk that the Chinese will veto a sanctions resolution: they have consistently argued that sanctions would not help secure North Korea's compliance with safeguards. But, historically, they have been reluctant to use their veto, and may well abstain.

6. It is difficult to predict how the North Koreans will react to the imposition of sanctions. They might at the very least withdraw from the NPT - which would mean losing the legal basis for IAEA safeguards on their present and future nuclear activities. They have, however, said that they would regard sanctions as "a declaration of war". Over the past few years they have concentrated forces close to the border with South Korea, and spoken of seeking reunification of the Peninsula by



force in 1995. Much of this may be sabre-rattling. But they have the military capability to launch a major attack with virtually no warning. A JIC assessment on this is issuing separately. Such an attack would of course at once create an international crisis comparable to that produced by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Our own direct interest in Korea is less than in Kuwait, but a comparable response from the international community would be expected, not least by the US.

11 Attached

7. The US Administration and the French Government, as well as our other main allies, agree that North Korea's breach of safeguards is so flagrant that the Security Council must take action. I agree. The aim is, through the threat of sanctions and if necessary their phased implementation to avert an over-reaction by North Korea and to bring them back into compliance with their non-proliferation obligations.

8. I am copying this minute to OPD colleagues and to Sir Robin Butler.

Stephen Smith
PP DOUGLAS HURD

(Approved by the
Foreign Secretary and
signed by the
Private Secretary in
his absence overseas)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
9 June 1994

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10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

8 June 1994

Dear John,

UN SANCTIONS: NORTH KOREA AND HAITI

The Prime Minister has seen the Foreign Secretary's minute of 7 June to the Chancellor.

The Prime Minister agrees that we should take North Korea's non-compliance with NPT Inspections very seriously, and said as much in his meeting with President Clinton last Saturday and in their joint press appearance afterwards. He agrees with the phased approach. He notes that trade and financial sanctions might well be left to a second stage resolution. He also notes that financial sanctions against North Korea would have virtually no practical impact on the City of London, but that restrictions on remittances from Japan to North Korea could be one of the most important pressure points. He therefore considers that it would be right to agree to financial sanctions if we reached that stage of the phased process.

I am copying this letter to Nick MacPherson (HM Treasury), John Pitt-Brooke (Ministry of Defence), Paul Coby (Department of Transport), Peter Smith (Department of Trade and Industry), and Paul Lever and Melanie Leech (Cabinet Office).

Yours etc
R Lyne

RODERIC LYNE

R J Sawers Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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FCS/94/141

CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER

Prime Minister

Financial sanctions on N. Korea
would not hurt the City.

✓ Yes/

If push comes to shove
(paras. 5/6), we should agree
to them. *Redmond.*

UN Sanctions: North Korea and Haiti

7/11

North Korea

1. We are rapidly approaching a turning point on North Korea, because it refuses to comply with its non-proliferation obligations. This has become serious and urgent.

2. The Non Proliferation Treaty is the cornerstone of international efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation. Following the discovery of Iraq's illicit programme there has been growing pressure to ensure that the IAEA (which has the authority under the NPT to inspect nuclear facilities) develops a more rigorous inspection regime. North Korea is the first test case since Iraq. Any suggestion that we are not prepared to be tough would send the wrong signal to those who already have illicit nuclear programmes (particularly Pakistan and India) and those who would like to acquire them (ie Iran).

3. If we are not seen to be taking action against North Korea the implication will be that we are prepared to tolerate continued uncertainty about whether North Korea has acquired enough plutonium to make an atomic weapon. This uncertainty could fuel pressure in South Korea and Japan to develop their own indigenous nuclear weapons programme. At the least it would undermine their commitment to the NPT.



4. It is particularly important to be seen to be upholding the NPT regime in the run-up to the 1995 Review Conference, where we are arguing for indefinite and unconditional extension of the NPT. This by no means enjoys universal support: some countries argue that the regime is unfair and that it discriminates between the five declared nuclear weapon states and the rest. They want the nuclear weapons states to do more to promote nuclear disarmament, and the transfer of nuclear technology. Any sign that we are not prepared to support the regime would strengthen the hand of those pressing for a review of the Treaty's provisions in 1995.

5. The Americans see North Korea as their most pressing international security problem. They are actively canvassing sanctions against North Korea. In discussions with the Americans and others in the Security Council, we shall argue for a phased approach to sanctions. Under such an approach, a first stage sanctions resolution might include elements such as suspension of nuclear cooperation; an embargo on arms exports and imports; cutting of scientific and technical contacts; and restrictions on aviation and/or maritime transport to North Korea. Trade and financial sanctions might then be left to a second stage sanctions resolution. However, since one of the few genuinely effective means of putting pressure on the North Koreans will be to block their access to hard currency, the Americans are likely soon to press for a freeze on remittances to North Korea, an assets freeze, or both. Remittances from North Koreans living in Japan are one of North Korea's main sources of hard currency - about \$400 million per year.



6. We need to show strength of purpose with the Americans in responding to continued North Korean intransigence. In the case of North Korea financial sanctions will have virtually no practical impact on the city of London. It would not be understood in Washington if we held back purely on a point of principle.

7. In the light of your minute of 27 May, I recognise that these developments on North Korea will not be welcome. Nonetheless, there are major issues of security at stake, and I see no alternative to moving ahead with a sanctions regime including the elements outlined above.

Haiti

8. Your minute of 27 May discussed implementation of the Haiti Security Council Resolution in the form of an EC regulation in Brussels. Even our best efforts in New York do not always produce results which meet the needs of European law. This was the case over Iraqi performance bonds. Security Council Resolutions by their nature are compromises and it is not always clear cut what role the EC should play in implementing them. That is no reason for EU Partners or, worse, the Commission to seek to change understandings arrived at in New York either by limiting sanctions resolutions as in the case of Libya or by seeking to extend their scope as in the case of Haiti. But (as para 5 of UKRep Brussels telno 1244 makes clear) the outcome in the draft regulation in Brussels includes no obligation to present or future legal action. It leaves Member States to choose whether to implement the common position by legal, regulatory or administrative means. It was the best outcome attainable for the UK at the time. Light administrative measures also reduce the risk of the Commission making new proposals to implement the assets freeze under Article 73G, which can be agreed by qualified majority with no need for a new CFSP common position (which would have to be agreed by unanimity).



9. I agree with you that sanctions can be a blunt instrument of policy. We are looking again at their overall impact. They are, however, a powerful tool. The alternative, military action, is usually more dangerous and expensive. In all such cases we need to get the best outcome possible in New York and follow it through effectively, nationally or in Brussels. We also wish to ensure that language in New York is standardised to the extent possible to help this process. My officials will be writing separately with some ideas to make sure this happens in future.

10. I am copying this minute to the Prime Minister, the Defence Secretary, the Secretary of State for Transport and the President of the Board of Trade and to Sir Robin Butler.

JH

(DOUGLAS HURD)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
7 June 1994

R194

File



The Rt. Hon. Michael Heseltine MP **CONFIDENTIAL**
President of the Board of Trade

Stephen Smith Esq
Private Secretary to the
Secretary of State for Foreign and
Commonwealth Affairs
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
King Charles Street
LONDON
SW1A 2AH

Secretary of State
**Department of
Trade and Industry**

Ashdown House
123 Victoria Street
London SW1E 6RB

Direct line
071-215 4440

DTI Enquiries
071-215 5000

18 April 1994

Dear Stephen,

NORTH KOREA

Thank you for copying to me your letter of 22 March to Roderic Lyne. The President has read this with interest and we have since discussed subsequent developments.

You explained that the Chinese had eventually produced their own statement for the President of the Security Council which had been accepted by all Security Council members. The Director General of the IAEA, Dr Blix, had subsequently written to the North Koreans proposing that the IAEA should recommence its inspection. In addition, the South Koreans had agreed last week that an exchange of envoys with the North should no longer be a pre-condition of a resumption of negotiations between the US and North Korea.

The President regards these developments as encouraging while recognising that in practice they may not alter the position significantly. In view of the recent agreement by the South Koreans not to insist on an exchange of envoys, the President hopes that we will take the opportunity to press the Chinese and, insofar as possible, the North Koreans to respond favourably to the latest approach by Dr Blix.

More generally, the President remains extremely concerned over the fragile state of affairs which still exists. In his view we should do all that we can to help the US take a firm stance. The President appreciates the concerns expressed by Japan and South Korea, and their preference for a "softly softly" approach. He is not proposing any specific action

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the department for Enterprise



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that would run counter to this but he believes that in the longer term the only way of securing a real change of approach by North Korea will be by standing firm.

I am copying this letter to Roderic Lyne, Nicholas Macpherson, John Pitt-Brooke and Melanie Leech.

Yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read 'Peter'.

P J SMITH
Principal Private Secretary

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the department for Enterprise

5



SECRET

Foreign &
Commonwealth
Office

Prime Minister

22 March 1994

London SW1A 2AH

*Hum.
22*

Dear Rohan,

NORTH KOREA'S NUCLEAR PROGRAMME: UPDATE

The United States has been trying since May 1993 to persuade the North Koreans to dispel international concern about their nuclear programme by allowing IAEA inspectors access to all their nuclear sites, as they are obliged to under their IAEA safeguards agreement.

IAEA inspectors finally went to Pyongyang earlier this month. They had previously agreed with the North Koreans on a range of inspection activities necessary to ensure that nuclear material had not been diverted from peaceful use since their last thorough inspection a year ago. This would have stopped short of establishing what the North Koreans had been up to before then (which lies at the heart of this dispute). But the Americans, and we, judged that it would be a worthwhile first step.

However even this proved too much for the North Koreans, who refused to allow the inspection team to complete crucial parts of its work. The IAEA Governing Board therefore met in special session on 21 March. The Director General of the IAEA, Dr Blix, told them he could give no assurance of non-diversion of nuclear material to weapons use. The Board instructed him to report this to the Security Council.

In a separate strand of the negotiations between the Americans and North Koreans the North was also expected to reach agreement with South Korea on an exchange of special envoys. The US had said that, once the inspection and the envoys agreement had been satisfactorily concluded, it would be ready to stage a further round of formal discussions with the North to pursue a "broader settlement" between them. This had been tentively scheduled for 21 March. But the North broke off the negotiations with the South on 19 March, after news had leaked of the inspectors' dissatisfaction, threatening that Seoul would "turn into a sea of fire".

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The US therefore cancelled the planned meeting and announced on 21 March that deployment of Patriot missiles to the ROK would go ahead. Exercise Team Spirit (a joint US/South Korean affair) has been re-scheduled for some time later this year. (It had been postponed as a gesture of goodwill to the North.) There were press reports over the weekend of a US armada of 30 warships heading for the Korean coast. Washington has dismissed these as alarmist, stating that there has been no out of the ordinary naval activity in the region.

The Americans are now keen to move fast on a first Security Council resolution and have circulated a draft. Their aim is a hortatory resolution urging the North Koreans to allow the IAEA inspectors to return and to resume their negotiations with the South. The draft is couched in mild terms, making no mention of sanctions and setting no deadlines, in the hope that it will win Chinese support. Despite strong talk from some quarters in Washington, this is much as we expected and we can support it. South Korea and Japan are uncomfortable with proposing sanctions at this stage, and the Chinese continue to oppose sanctions. The South Koreans would prefer to pursue dialogue, and if that does not work, to use means of pressure over which they have some more direct control, such as Team Spirit.

Dr Blix is expected to brief the Security Council later this week, and the US hope to see a resolution passed at the end of the week or early next. Action in the Council, however mild, may nevertheless cause the North Koreans to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty, as they threatened to do a year ago.

The North Koreans' gameplan remains a mystery. Ambiguity about their nuclear programme is in their interests. It gives the North bargaining power with the United States and we can expect them to sustain it. Our most recent assessment is that the North Koreans will not be prepared to bargain away their nuclear weapons programme, and the IAEA inspectors have reported that they are continuing to improve their nuclear capabilities. There are therefore ample grounds for concern. On the other hand there is no evidence of a current intention to attack the South. The alert status of the North's defence forces have been raised recently. But this is normal at this time of year when the Team Spirit exercise usually takes place. We judge that the measures are defensive in nature, although the transition from defence to offence could be made quickly and we would get only minimal warning of North Korean aggression. The American attempts to restart negotiations still seem the best way forward. But the process is likely to be long and drawn out and the

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possibility of reckless action by the North Koreans cannot be ruled out.

I am copying this letter to Peter Smith (DTI), John Pitt-Brooke (MOD), Nicholas Macpherson (HMT) and Melanie Leech (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,
Stephen

(J S Smith)
Private Secretary

Roderic Lyne Esq CMG
10 Downing Street

SECRET

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Foreign &
Commonwealth
Office

London SW1A 2AH

28 January 1994

Prime Minister

Andrew Yellin

by: [unclear]

29/1

Dear Robert,

NORTH KOREA'S NUCLEAR PROGRAMME

Your letter of 19 January asked for a **sitrep.**

Negotiations involving the United States, the International Atomic Energy Agency and the North Koreans are still going on. In November the US offered the North Koreans a third round of bilateral talks on two conditions: the satisfactory completion of routine inspections of North Korea's seven declared nuclear sites and the re-establishment of dialogue with the South. The US would then cancel its annual military exercise (Team Spirit) with the South Koreans in 1994. The interpretation of this package is proving difficult. There is no prospect of North Korea allowing the IAEA access to the two undeclared sites which the IAEA demanded to see last year and which triggered the dispute. But the US and IAEA now aim to re-establish, as a first step, the inspections necessary to ensure the continuity of safeguards at the declared sites and keep open the door for further progress.

The North Koreans have shown little enthusiasm for talking to the South, maintaining that the issue is between themselves and the US only. They have agreed to some inspection of all seven declared sites, but they are not yet prepared to allow the IAEA to have full access to the two most sensitive of these, which could provide evidence of illicit reprocessing activity. Detailed discussions with the IAEA are continuing. The North Koreans are showing some flexibility, but the IAEA are insisting on full access. The IAEA are confident of an agreement before the IAEA Board of Governors meet in February.

The IAEA Board meeting is seen as the last chance for a display of cooperation from North Korea. Otherwise there will be pressure on the US from many countries to suspend the dialogue, and seek further Security Council action. The US also see the February meeting as a deadline of sorts. If the issue goes back to the Council, we and the Americans are thinking in terms of a gradual ratchetting up of pressure with a further exhortatory resolution followed, shortly afterwards, by a **sanctions package.**

Even if conditions for the routine inspections have been agreed, some Board members, in particular France, may press for early Security Council consideration of the

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matter. Such a move would be undesirable: it might derail the negotiations and lead North Korea to go back on earlier undertakings. We shall try to maintain a common front with the US and France.

French impatience is understandable: North Korea has given no indication that it will ever accept IAEA special inspections ie access to the undeclared sites (and information on other channels suggests that it will not). It has also won time to work on its nuclear weapons (if that is what it is doing). It has successfully engaged the US in talks and may secure the cancellation of Team Spirit at the mere cost of allowing the IAEA to carry out routine inspections. The US Administration has received press criticism on similar grounds.

However, the US performance has to be measured against the extremely limited alternatives. In June, when they began bilateral negotiations, we faced the prospect of no inspections at all and a probable breakdown of communications if North Korea had pulled out of the NPT definitively. The Security Council might have tried to impose sanctions then, but a Chinese veto would have been likely. Even if sanctions had been agreed over a Chinese abstention their effect would at best have been limited.

Furthermore both South Korea and Japan are concerned that sanctions might provoke an extreme reaction from the North. They, like the Chinese, have urged the US to be patient and to negotiate. No-one has seriously suggested that military action, or threat of it, might be a sensible way forward. It is frustrating that the North Koreans appear to be winning concessions while continuing to fail to meet their international obligations. But the North Koreans made clear in May that they would only talk to the Americans. US willingness to negotiate has helped reduce the risk of a Chinese veto, if the issue comes back to the Security Council. The Americans have also retained the confidence of the regional states whose support will be essential. A satisfactory outcome is still some way off. But the game has been worth playing and the the US continue to deserve our support.

I am copying this letter to John Pitt-Brooke (Ministry of Defence) and Melanie Leech (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,

(J S Smith)
Private Secretary

Roderic Lyne Esq CMG
10 Downing Street

NORTH KOREA : Internal SVL Aug 81.

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f/galsworthy, kw



10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

19 January 1994

Dear Tony,

NORTH KOREA

Many thanks for tipping me off in your minute of 18 January. The upshot is in my attached letter to the FCO and MOD - which carefully does not finger you as the source of my information!

yours ever,

Roderic

RODERIC LYNE

A C Galsworthy Esq
Cabinet Office

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AS

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file

f/korea. kw



bcc WEC
PLJ
Galsworthy

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

19 January 1994

Jean Stephen,

NORTH KOREA

I understand that the House of Commons Defence Committee was given a confidential briefing by the Defence Intelligence Staff on North Korea on 18 January; and that Winston Churchill MP, in particular, wanted to be assured that the Prime Minister was being kept abreast of the worrying situation there.

It is possible that the briefing will stimulate a question to the Prime Minister at Prime Minister's Questions tomorrow or next week. The Prime Minister has therefore asked for an updated line for his PMQ briefing, taking account of any concerns which the DIS briefing might have raised in the minds of MPs. I should be grateful if the FCO and MOD could ensure that appropriate material, including a background note, is sent to William Chapman in the usual way for PMQs on 20 January.

In terms of substance, the last report on North Korea seen by the Prime Minister was the JIC paper of 2 December. He would like to be kept informed of action over North Korea, and in particular of any steps in which we might be involved in the Security Council, the IAEA or with the United States and regional powers in Asia. Could you send me a further sitrep by the end of this month?

I imagine that this is a subject which might feature on the agenda for the Prime Minister's talks in Washington, and perhaps also in Moscow. You will doubtless already have it in mind for his briefing.

I am copying this letter to John Pitt-Brooke (Ministry of Defence) and Melanie Leech (Cabinet Office).

*yours ever,
Roderic*

RODERIC LYNE

J S Smith Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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
MR LYNE

cc Sir Robin Butler
Miss Neville-Jones

NORTH KOREA

I attended a briefing given by DIS on North Korea this morning. Despite our best endeavours I had been unable to find out before going what the genesis of the briefing was. It turned out to be a briefing for the Commons Defence Committee. It covered the ground well on the military side, and highlighted in particular North Korean nuclear and missile proliferation, and the gradual build up in offensive posture of the N Korean forces which has been going on for the last few years. I thought it was rather more superficial on the political side, though it did cover these areas too.

2. Not surprisingly the briefing impressed the committee members, who asked a lot of questions about the possibility of the UK being called on to play a role in any eventual conflict. Winston Churchill MP in particular asked if the PM had attended this briefing. On being told that he had not, he said that he thought this was the most alarming fact he had heard that morning. I hastened to assure all concerned that the PM had received a JIC assessment recently on the subject and that we would be revisiting it regularly. I don't think they were entirely satisfied, and I should not be surprised if they were to take it up with the Prime Minister. You may like to be forewarned. *There is in fact nothing to add at present to the last JIC assessment.*



A C GALSWORTHY
Chief of the Assessments Staff

18 January 1994

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RB

File

Foreign &
Commonwealth
Office

08 November 1993

London SW1A 2AH

Dear Robert,

US/North Korea

The British press over the weekend carried a number of reports of heightened tensions in the Korean peninsula, including a reinforcement of North Korean troops on the border with South Korea. They also quoted President Clinton's comments at a weekend press conference that any attack on South Korea would be an attack on the US. He also said that "North Korea could not be allowed to develop a nuclear bomb". When asked whether the US would consider a pre-emptive strike on North Korea's nuclear installations, the President answered simply that "this is a very grave issue for the US". You may like some background.

The North Koreans have had around 70% of their troops stationed near the border for several years. This theoretically gives them the possibility of mounting at least a limited military strike at fairly short notice. The US Secretary for Defence has told Robin Renwick that the Americans do not believe that the North Koreans are planning a conventional attack, but that there has been some recent reinforcement of the North Korean forces near the border which has caused concern, particularly in the South Korean Government. Apart from Secretary Aspin's comment, however, we have no evidence of a significant recent reinforcement of North Korean troops, or any significant change in their disposition or alert status.

The immediate purpose of President Clinton's remarks was therefore to reassure the South Koreans of continued US support. They also reflect American frustration with the state of the continuing negotiations over North Korea's nuclear programme. The Americans stress that the North Koreans may have briefly converted a nuclear reactor into a reprocessing facility, and may perhaps have

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generated enough fissile material to make a nuclear device. Reprocessing seems to have stopped, but the North Korean block on inspections leads to continuing concern. In a statement to the UN General Assembly on 1 November, the Americans declared that unless North Korea allowed IAEA Inspectors access to its nuclear facilities so as to maintain the continuity of safeguards information, the Security Council would have to return to the matter. In our latest contacts, the State Department have suggested that the deadline for this might be 23 November.

As Aspin made clear to Robin Renwick however, if the North Koreans do continue to block all inspection of their sensitive facilities, the next step envisaged by the US would be UN sanctions. Aspin said that he could not conceive at present of circumstances in which the US might undertake a pre-emptive attack, both because of the difficulties of finding the right targets and on wider grounds. (Aspin particularly asked for his confidence to be respected.)

The President's public statements therefore represent a firm presentation of US policy, but the policy itself has not substantially changed. The Americans are engaged in a complex diplomatic effort, mixing carrots and sticks, to try to persuade North Korea to fulfil its Non-Proliferation Treaty obligations. Our own position is one of full support for those efforts, although we have been willing to leave the US and the South Koreans to take the lead on the tactical handling. The Embassy in Washington will seek further information on the latest American thinking from others in the administration tomorrow.

I am copying this letter to John Pitt-Brooke (Ministry of Defence), and Melanie Leech (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,

(J S Smith)
Private Secretary

Roderic Lyne Esq CMG
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL
FM WASHINGTON
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 2496
OF 042322Z NOVEMBER 93
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, UKMIS VIENNA, SEOUL, ACTOR
INFO PRIORITY TOKYO, PEKING, MOSCOW, DTI

DTI FOR AGRELL, AE DIVISION

MY TELNO 2443: NORTH KOREA: NUCLEAR

SUMMARY

1. LATEST CONTACTS WITH DPRK PRODUCE NO PROGRESS. U.S. CONSIDERING SEEKING SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION AFTER KIM YOUNG-SAM'S VISIT TO THE U.S. ON 23 NOVEMBER. CONCERN THAT CHINESE SHOULD HAVE NO EXCUSE TO VETO ANY RESOLUTION.

DETAIL

2. STATE (QUINONES, OFFICE OF KOREAN AFFAIRS) BRIEFED US ON 4 NOVEMBER ON DEVELOPMENTS FOLLOWING THE UNSUCCESSFUL U.S./DPRK MEETING ON 27 OCTOBER (TUR) AND BLIX'S STATEMENT TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF 1 NOVEMBER.

3. QUINONES SAID THE NORTH KOREANS HAD SENT A FURTHER MESSAGE TO VIENNA THIS WEEK, SUGGESTING THAT THE IAEA MIGHT BEGIN A MINIMALIST PROGRAMME OF INSPECTIONS ON THE LINES THEY HAD PROPOSED TO THE AMERICANS IN NEW YORK. THEY HAD ADDED THAT THIS MIGHT BE EXPANDED, DEPENDING ON PROGRESS IN THE DPRK/U.S. DIALOGUE. THIS TRANSPARENT PLOY HAD NOT BEEN ATTRACTIVE TO THE IAEA OR THE U.S.

4. SUBSEQUENTLY, THE NORTH KOREANS HAD CALLED OFF THE NORTH-SOUTH MEETING PLANNED FOR 3 NOVEMBER, IN RESPONSE TO AN INCAUTIOUS STATEMENT BY THE ROK DEFENCE MINISTER ON 2 NOVEMBER. QUINONES COMMENTED THAT THERE WAS A DEGREE OF POSTURING ON BOTH SIDES. THE TALKS HAD BEEN CANCELLED PUBLICLY BY THE DPRK VICE-MINISTER OF DEFENCE. BUT A PRIVATE MESSAGE FROM THE DPRK FOREIGN MINISTRY TO THE SOUTH KOREAN MFA HAD LEFT OPEN THE POSSIBILITY OF A RE-SCHEDULED SESSION LATER IN NOVEMBER. THE ROK FOREIGN MINISTER WAS INCLINED TO SEE THIS AS AN ENCOURAGING SIGN.

5. QUINONES SAID THAT FOLLOWING ASPIN'S TALKS IN TOKYO AND SEOUL,


THE U.S. COULD SAY THERE WAS FULL AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE U.S., JAPAN AND THE ROK THAT EVERY EFFORT SHOULD CONTINUE TO RESOLVE THE NUCLEAR ISSUE THROUGH DIPLOMACY. THE U.S. STOOD READY TO PURSUE A THIRD ROUND OF TALKS WITH THE DPRK (WHICH COULD EXTEND TO WIDER QUESTIONS OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS) WHEN A SUBSTANTIVE NORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE HAD BEEN OPENED, AND THE IAEA WAS SATISFIED THAT IT WAS ABLE TO CONDUCT THE INSPECTIONS NECESSARY TO MAINTAIN THE CONTINUITY OF SAFEGUARDS. ON THE OTHER HAND, IF CONTINUITY OF SAFEGUARDS WAS NOT MAINTAINED, THE U.S. WOULD NOT SEEK TO CONTINUE BILATERAL TALKS AND WOULD BE FORCED TO PURSUE THE ISSUE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL. THE DPRK WAS THEREFORE FACED WITH A CLEAR CHOICE BETWEEN CARROT AND STICK.



6. QUINONES SAID THERE WOULD BE INTER-AGENCY DISCUSSION OF NEXT STEPS ON 5 NOVEMBER, FOLLOWED BY A DEPUTIES' MEETING ON 8 OR 9 NOVEMBER. THE AMERICANS WOULD THEN PROBABLY SOUND OUT THE SOUTH KOREANS AND JAPANESE ONCE MORE, BEFORE STARTING INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS WITH THE P5 LATE IN THE WEEK IN NEW YORK. SUBJECT TO P5 VIEWS AND ANY DEVELOPMENTS ON THE GROUND, THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD PLAN TO USE THE VISIT OF KIM YOUNG-SAM ON 23 NOVEMBER AS THE OCCASION FOR A QUOTE POINTED STATEMENT UNQUOTE (PERHAPS SETTING A DEADLINE FOR DPRK COMPLIANCE) BEFORE GOING FORMALLY TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL. THE AIM WAS TO DEMONSTRATE BEYOND ARGUMENT TO THE CHINESE THAT THE U.S., IAEA AND ROK HAD GONE THE EXTRA MILE TO ACCOMMODATE THE DPRK.

7. QUINONES SAID HE WAS NOT OPTIMISTIC THAT A SHOW-DOWN COULD BE AVOIDED. THERE WAS UNDOUBTEDLY A FACTION IN PYONGYANG WHICH WANTED TO KEEP THE DOOR OPEN TO DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS. BUT THEY SEEMED TO BE LESS STRONG THAN SOME HAD THOUGHT. THE NORTH KOREANS HAD NOW PAINTED THEMSELVES INTO A CORNER: QUINONES COMMENTED THAT IT WAS A KOREAN TRAIT TO FAIL TO SEE THE BRICK WALL UNTIL YOU WALKED INTO IT.

RENWICK

YYYY

DEPARTMENT/SERIES <i>PREM 19</i> PIECE/ITEM <i>4801</i> (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
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INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, PARIS, PEKING, ACTOR

FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

SECRETARY OF STATE'S TALKS WITH RUSSIAN FOREIGN MINISTER, 2 APRIL
NORTH KOREA/NON PROLIFERATION TREATY

SUMMARY

1. KOZYREV CONCERNED ABOUT EFFECT OF NORTH KOREAN WITHDRAWAL ON FUTURE OF NPT. HE BELIEVES, HOWEVER, THAT INTERNATIONAL ACTION IS ON THE RIGHT LINES, AND THAT CHINA MAY EVENTUALLY BRING INFLUENCE TO BEAR.

DETAIL

2. KOZYREV SAID THAT HE WAS VERY WORRIED ABOUT NORTH KOREA'S WITHDRAWAL FROM THE NON PROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT). IT WAS NOT CLEAR HOW MUCH THE NORTH KOREANS HAD TO CONCEAL, PROBABLY NOT MUCH. BUT THIS SET A BAD PRECEDENT FOR THE FUTURE OF THE NPT. RUSSIA HAD OF COURSE PARTICULAR CONCERNS ABOUT THE UKRAINIAN DIMENSION.

3. DESPITE THIS, KOZYREV THOUGHT THAT INTERNATIONAL ACTION WAS BASICALLY ON THE RIGHT TRACK. WE NEEDED TO TAKE A CALM, BUT FORCEFUL, APPROACH. RUSSIA HAD LIMITED INFLUENCE ON THE NORTH KOREANS. THE CHINESE WERE THE ONLY ONES WITH INFLUENCE, ALTHOUGH IT WAS NOT CLEAR WHETHER THEY WERE PREPARED TO EXERCISE IT.

4. KOZYREV NEVERTHELESS TOOK A MODERATELY OPTIMISTIC VIEW OF THE CHINESE STANCE AT THE IAEA. HE THOUGHT THE CHINESE MIGHT BE TAKING A SUPPORTIVE LINE OF NORTH KOREA IN ORDER TO BE ABLE TO EXERCISE LEVERAGE ON THEM. IT WAS GOOD THAT QIAN QICHEN AND LI PENG HAD REMAINED IN OFFICE. THEY WERE BOTH PRAGMATISTS.

IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE PRESENT STATE OF AFFAIRS WAS AGAINST CHINESE INTERESTS. HE THOUGHT THE CHINESE WOULD RECOGNISE THIS AND LOOK FOR A PRAGMATIC SOLUTION, NOT ONE BASE ON TRADITIONAL SOLIDARITY.

5. FCO PLEASE ADVANCE TO PS/NUMBER 10.

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

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10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

24 July 1991

Dear Simon,

NORTH KOREA

Thank you for your letter of 22 July which the Prime Minister has seen.

The Prime Minister agrees that we should recognise North Korea when North Korea becomes a member of the United Nations. He also agrees that we should not establish diplomatic relations with North Korea.

The Prime Minister also agrees that we should announce the change in policy either through an Inspired PQ if Parliament is in session or through an answer to a press enquiry during the Recess.

Jans
Stephen
J. S. WALL

Simon Gass, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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Prime Minister ①



efc

Foreign &
Commonwealth
Office

London SW1 2AH

oko
● This proposes that we recognise N. Korea
when she joins the U.N. in the autumn but

do not establish diplomatic relations. *Agree?*

22 July 1991

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Pear Stephen,

Prophet
-1/3

North Korea

North Korea, which HMG does not recognise, applied to join the United Nations on 8 July. North Korean entry into the UN will probably be in mid-September, simultaneously with South Korean entry. We have argued in the past that all Koreans should enjoy the benefits of UN membership, and therefore propose to support both applications. But because only states can join the United Nations as full members, any vote by us in the North's favour would automatically imply recognition.

Our policy since 1980 has been to recognise states in accordance with common international doctrine. North Korea has long satisfied all the generally recognised criteria for the existence of a state in international law. Our continued non-recognition has been on political, not legal, grounds. We have sought to rationalise it by referring to exceptional circumstances, which have been explained in the past as arising in part from the involvement of the United Nations and the Korean question. But our practice is an anomaly in our overall policy on recognition.

The Foreign Secretary believes that North Korean entry into the United Nations would be the most natural opportunity to correct this anomaly. Recognition does not in itself lead to the establishment of diplomatic relations. That would be a political favour that we would not want to give the North in the absence of responsible international policies, or of a more constructive attitude towards the reunification of the peninsula. Our Ambassador in Seoul has advised that the South Koreans are unlikely to complain about our recognising North Korea, and that recognition should be seen as a necessary step on the road to establishing more

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official contacts as and when the peninsula comes closer to reunification. We would also be broadly in line with our EC partners. The Danes and Portuguese have relations with North Korea, the French do not recognise North Korea but allow the North Koreans to maintain an unofficial representative office in Paris, the Germans and North Koreans have maintained an Interests Section in each other's capital since German unification. The Americans appear to have no objection to what we propose: they have made it clear that even if they were to recognise North Korea as a state, they would not recognise the North Korean Government or open diplomatic relations.

The Foreign Secretary proposes that the change in our policy should be confirmed after North and South Korea join the UN, through a response to an Inspired Parliamentary Question or (since Parliament will be in recess in September) in reply to a press enquiry. Until that time we shall continue to respond to questions by saying that our policy of not recognising North Korea is a result of the special circumstances on the Korean peninsula and will be reviewed in the light of any change in those circumstances.

(S L Gass)
Private Secretary

Stephen Wall Esq CMG LVO
10 Downing Street

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en

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

22 November 1990

Idea Perry

Thank you for your letter of 13 November enclosing a letter from the North Korean delegation in Paris proposing informal talks as a step towards normalising UK/North Korean relations.

As you know the UK has never recognised North Korea and has never had relations with North Korea. Since the change of policy in 1980 to recognise states rather than governments, our refusal to recognise North Korea (which frankly fulfils all the criteria for recognition as a state) has been political. We have said that it would be wrong to recognise North Korea while "exceptional circumstances" - a state of war - exist on the peninsula. We continue to believe that any formal recognition of North Korea at this point would send the wrong signal at a time when the South are working for eventual reunification and require our full support.

Our Legal Advisers' view is that to avoid implying recognition of North Korea, you would have to reply to the North Koreans in a "personal capacity" and state that you were not presenting Government views. Even then, the North Koreans would doubtless exploit a letter received from the Prime Minister's Foreign Affairs Adviser. We should prefer to avoid giving them such an opportunity.

But we do not want to be seen to reject the North Korean overtures, however much they are motivated by increasing political isolation and economic self-interest. We have an interest in supporting South Korean efforts to coax the North in from the cold. We have recently decided that limited contacts with North Korea can take place directly between our delegations in New York (where much of the discussion of eventual UN membership for the Koreans is being undertaken). We have told the Chinese Mission in New York this.

We therefore suggest that the UK Mission in New York respond to Mr Paik's letter to you, as and when the North Koreans make contact with them, indicating that we would be content to have a limited discussion with them in New York - essentially on the future of the Korean peninsula, including UN membership.

I am copying this letter to Charles Powell.

Yours
Stephen Wall
(J S Wall)
Private Secretary

Sir Percy Cradock GCMG
10 Downing Street



10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

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CDJ
13/4

Stephen Wall Esq
Private Secretary
to Foreign Secretary
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Whitehall
LONDON SW1

13 November 1990

Dear Stephen,

NORTH KOREA

I enclose a copy of a letter I have received from the North Korean Counsellor in Paris, proposing informal talks with me to help normalise UK/North Korean relations.

I should be grateful for advice on the terms of my reply.

Yours truly

Percy

PERCY CRADOCK

cc: Robin McLaren, DUS, FCO
Hugh Davies, Hd, FE Dept,
FCO
Charles Powell, No 10



*Délégation Générale
de la République Populaire Démocratique
de Corée en France*

Paris, 6th November 1990

Sir Percy Craddock
Advisor to the Prime Minister
N° 10 Downing Street
London, SW1

Dear Mr. Percy Craddock,

I am pleased to write to you who have keen interest in the situation in Asia, particularly in the Far East.

As you are well aware, the situation in the Far East is closely related to that on the Korean peninsula whose division is always a source of tension in this region.

These days, however, one can see encouraging developments in Korea which could lead to detente and peaceful reunification in Korea as well as peace in Asia and the rest of the world. For the first time since the division of Korea in 1945, the north-south high-level talks in which Premiers of the two sides took part were held; the first round in Seoul in September and the second round in Pyongyang in October. The third round of such talks is due to take place in Seoul in December. And there were also reunification football matches between the two parts in Pyongyang and Seoul according to the agreement between the sports delegations of the north and south. Besides, a pan-national concert for reunification was held in Pyongyang on October 18-23 with the participation of Korean artists from the north, south and overseas.

Good neighbourly relations are also being promoted. As you know, Japan has so far followed a hostile policy towards our country. But Japan which has made a careful study of the Korean question could not but pay deep attention to recent developments on the Korean peninsula and keenly felt the necessity to improve relations with our country.

Japanese Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu wrote a letter to President Kim Il Sung, in which he apologized the unfortunate past imposed upon the Korean people by Japan (Korea was a colony of Japan from 1910 to 1945) and expressed his desire to normalize the Korea-Japan relations. As a matter of fact, there

.../...

have been no contacts at all between the two countries and their relations have been ice-cold due to the historical background as well as geo-political factors. The Japanese Liberal Democratic Party and the Japan Socialist Party published on 28th September together with the Workers' Party of Korea a joint declaration in which they agreed to start the inter-governmental negotiation for the establishment of diplomatic relations. According to this agreement, the first preliminary contact between department directors of the Korean and Japanese Foreign Ministries was held in Beijing on November 3-4.

The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, too, showed interest in establishing diplomatic relations with our country. Negotiations are now under way in this respect between the two governments.

I am very pleased to hear in this regard the growing interest of the British Government in the peaceful reunification of Korea. It is said that Mr. Sainsbury, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, said last July at the House of Commons: "We have consistently supported efforts to achieve the peaceful reunification of Korea." And Mr. Mark Lennox-Boyd, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, also said on 24th October at the House of Commons: "We shall continue our consistent support for efforts to achieve the peaceful reunification of Korea. We welcome the recent high-level meeting between North and South Korea as a contribution to this process".

In view of positive developments in Korea and Asia and the current international trend to detente and harmony among peoples, the present relationship between our two countries is abnormal. I do not think there is any historical background or condition whatever which prevents us from developing bilateral relations between the two countries at present. It is right time, I believe, to normalize relations between our two countries. In fact both Koreans and Britons want to establish friendly relations between themselves as it is expressed in the existence of friendship organizations in the two countries.


As you worked as the British Ambassador to China in 1970's, you must know very well that it is beneficial for Britain to have good relations with all countries in North-East Asia and that it is particularly important to do so in the prevailing situation.

I understand, of course, there are many problems to be discussed and settled beforehand. To this end, I am very interested in an informal and open-hearted discussion with you on the ways and means to the promotion of bilateral relations between our two countries. You could give, I do believe, valuable and constructive advices to the Prime Minister in this regard and it will contribute to deepening friendship and mutual understanding between the Korean and British peoples. Pyongyang attaches great importance to this contact which is closely connected, under the present rapidly-changing circumstances, with the present

situation in Asia as well as the future inter-governmental relations between countries. I shall be at your disposal at any time and place.

Looking forward to hearing from you soon, I wish you good health and every success in your responsible work.

Yours sincerely,



Paik Soun Haing
Counsellor

P.S. Please find enclosed a copy of the Joint Declaration of the Workers' Party of Korea, Japanese Liberal Democratic Party and the Japan Socialist Party on Korea-Japan relations.

FIRST PRELIMINARY TALKS FOR OPENING OF
DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN KOREA AND JAPAN

Pyongyang November 5 (KCNA) -- Preliminary talks at department director level of the Foreign Ministries of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Japan were held in Beijing on November 3 and 4 as part of the inter-governmental negotiation for the opening of diplomatic relations between the D.P.R. of Korea and Japan.

Present at the talks on our side was a delegation of the DPRK Foreign Ministry led by its Department Director Chu Jin Guk, and on the Japanese side was a delegation of the Japanese Foreign Ministry headed by its Director of the Asian Affairs Department Sakutaro Tanino.

Discussed at the talks were the date, venue, agenda and other matters for the full-scale inter-governmental talks.

The two sides showed eagerness there and exchanged their views in a sincere atmosphere.

They agreed to have further discussion on some problems in the future.

They agreed to hold the second preliminary talks in mid-November in Beijing. -0-

JOINT DECLARATION OF THE WORKERS' PARTY OF KOREA,
THE LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY AND THE SOCIALIST
PARTY OF JAPAN ON KOREA-JAPAN RELATIONS

Delegations of the LDP and the JSP visited the Democratic People's Republic of Korea from September 24 to 28, 1990.

President Kim Il Sung, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea, received the delegations.

On the occasion, Shin Kanemaru and Makoto Tanabe who were heading the delegations conveyed personal letters of President of the LDP Toshiki Kaifu and Chairwoman of the Central Executive Committee of the JSP Takako Toi to President Kim Il Sung, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea.

During the visit, a series of joint talks were held between the WPK delegation led by Secretary of the Party Central Committee Kim Yong Sun, the LDP delegation led by Member of the House of Representatives Shin Kanemaru and the JSP delegation led by Vice-Chairman of the Central Executive Committee Makoto Tanabe.

Considering that to normalize and develop Korea-Japan relations on the basis of the idea of independence, peace and friendship confirms to the interests of the peoples of the two countries and would contribute to peace and prosperity of a new Asia and the world, the delegations of the three parties declare as follows:

1. The three parties consider that Japan should officially apology and fully compensate to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for the enormous misfortunes and miseries imposed upon the Korean people for 36 years and the losses inflicted upon the Korean people in the ensuing 45 years after the war. In his personal letter to President Kim Il Sung, President Toshiki Kaifu of the LDP admitted that there was an unfortunate past imposed by Japan upon Korea and expressed the hope to improve the DPRK-Japan relations, saying: "Former Prime Minister Takeshita expressed deep remorse and regret over such unfortunate past at the Diet in March last year. I, as Prime Minister, share his view".

Head of the delegation of the LDP Shin Kanemaru, Member of the House of Representatives, too, expressed the same apology for the Japan's past colonial rule over the Korean people.

The three parties consider that in connection with the establishment of the diplomatic relations, full

compensation should be made by the Japanese Government for the past 36-year-long colonial rule and the losses inflicted upon the DPRK people in the ensuing 45 years.

2. The three parties consider that the abnormal state between the DPRK and Japan must be eliminated and diplomatic relations be established as soon as possible.
3. The three parties consider that, for the improvement of the relations between DPRK and Japan, it is necessary to develop exchanges between them in various domains including politics, economy and culture and, for the present, to use satellite communications and open direct air services between the two countries.
4. The three parties consider that the Koreans in Japan must not be discriminated against, their human rights and all national rights and legal status be respected and the Japanese Government should guarantee them by law.

The three parties regard it necessary for the Japanese authorities to remove the entries made in the Japanese passport as regards the DPRK.


5. The three parties consider that Korea is one and that the peaceful reunification through north-south dialogue accords with the national interests of the Korean people.
6. The three parties consider that it is necessary for them to make joint efforts for the building of a peaceful and free Asia and eliminate nuclear threats from all regions on the globe.
7. The three parties agreed to strongly recommend the start of inter-governmental negotiation for the realisation of the establishment of diplomatic relations and the solution of all the outstanding problems within November 1990.
8. The three parties agreed to strengthen party relations and further develop mutual cooperation between the WPK and the LDP and between the WPK and the JSP in conformity with the desire of the two peoples and in the interest of peace in Asia and the world.



Pyongyang, September 28, 1990

Kim Yong Sun
On behalf of
the WPK

Shin Kanemaru
On behalf of
the LDP

Makoto Tanabe
On behalf of
the JSP

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NORTH KOREAN ATTACK ON US RECONNAISSANCE PLANE.

1. AS THE PRESS HAVE REPORTED, ON 26 AUGUST, A NORTH KOREAN SURFACE TO AIR MISSILE WAS FIRED AT AN UNARMED SR71 QUOTE BLACKBIRD UNQUOTE US RECONNAISSANCE PLANE NEAR THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE BUT OUTSIDE NORTH KOREAN AIR SPACE. THE MISSILE EXPLODED SEVERAL MILES FROM THE AIRCRAFT, WHICH RETURNED SAFELY TO OKINAWA. THE NEW YORK TIMES NOTES THAT THE NORTH KOREAN GOVERNMENT COMPLAINED IN A RADIO BROADCAST ON 31 JULY THAT AN SR71 PLANE HAD VIOLATED THEIR AIRSPACE, THE NINETEENTH ALLEGED VIOLATION SINCE THE MIDDLE OF JUNE AND WARNED THAT THE US WOULD HAVE TO QUOTE BEAR RESPONSIBILITY UNQUOTE FOR THE CONSEQUENCES.

2. THE STATE DEPARTMENT TELL US THAT AT THE TIME OF THE INCIDENT NORTH KOREAN RADAR WAS TRAINED ON THE US PLANE AND THE US AIR FORCE ARE CERTAIN THAT AN ATTACK WAS INTENDED. HOWEVER, THE FACT THAT THE SR71 CAN FLY AT THREE TIMES THE SPEED OF SOUND AND AT MORE THAN 80 THOUSAND FEET MAKES IT A DIFFICULT TARGET. THE AMERICANS HAVE CALLED FOR WHAT WILL BE THE 407TH MEETING OF THE MILITARY ARMISTICE COMMISSION FOR 1100 HOURS LOCAL TIME ON 29 AUGUST TO PROTEST. ON PAST FORM, THEY EXPECT THE NORTH KOREANS TO STALL FOR A FEW DAYS AND WHEN THE MEETING EVENTUALLY TAKES PLACE, TO MAKE COUNTER ACCUSATIONS THAT THE AMERICANS VIOLATED THEIR AIRSPACE.

THOMAS

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