PREM 19/4858

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PART 1

SECRET

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Appointment of Secretary General of NATO. Possible appointments of Lord Soames and Lord Carrington.

NATO

Part 1:
September 1980

PREM 19/4858

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
25.9.80.		30/11/83					
4-2-81.		13/3/84.					
		24/2/84					
13-11-80		18.5.84					
8.6.82		23.5.84					
21.6.83		24.5.84					
24.6.83							
27.6.83							
30.6.83							
4.7.83							
18.7.83		24.9.87					
28.7.83		30.11.87					
8.8.83		22.2.88					
2/9/83		15.9.92					
21.9.83		25.6.93					
22/9/83		15/2/94					
3.10.83		1.6.94					
25/10/83							
7.11.83		CLOSED					
17.11.83							
22.11.83							

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB
Telephone 071-21 82111/2/3

SECRETARY OF STATE

MO 1/17M

June 1994

Dear Rodric

SENIOR APPOINTMENTS TO INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS

I am sorry to be late in giving you the Defence Secretary's comments on the Foreign Secretary's minute to the Prime Minister of 19 May.

On the question of the Secretary-General of NATO, the Defence Secretary believes that Lubbers would be acceptable. It is very unlikely indeed that Ruhe would be available - he recently told the Defence Secretary that he saw his future in German politics, whatever the outcome of the election. In any event the Defence Secretary believes that, although Ruhe is a convinced Atlanticist, his style and personality would be quite unsuitable for a NATO Secretary-General.

As to British candidates, the Defence Secretary believes that Lord Owen would not be suitable, and that Lord Howe is probably now too old. Sir Leon Brittan might be worth considering, although his lack of defence background would be a serious problem.

I am sending copies of this letter to John Sawers, Peter Smith, Joan MacNaughton, Dugald Sandeman, and Melanie Leech.

Yours

(J S PITT-BROOKE)
Private Secretary

R M J Lyne Esq CMG
10 Downing Street

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Foreign & Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Prime Minister

An interim report only.

18 April 1994

Ring.

Dear Roderic,

NATO Secretary-General

In his letter of 15 February Stephen Smith promised to keep you in touch with developments on the possible succession to Woerner as NATO Secretary-General. Woerner himself has continued to meet the key requirements of his post but on 4 April had another intestinal operation, which will force him to take it easy until later in the month. He has now undergone surgery five times within two years.

Meanwhile, we have consulted in confidence our Heads of Mission at NATO and in Allied countries about possible candidates should Woerner's job become vacant. The results - summary attached - are frankly rather thin. Van den Broek, the only person considered last time round who is still available, does not fill us with enthusiasm and anyway may be blocked by the French. We clearly need to delve a bit deeper and, among other things, consider whether there is a convincing UK candidate we would want to put forward. The Foreign Secretary has therefore asked FCO officials, in cooperation with MOD but in a discreet and closely-held fashion, to carry work forward on three fronts:

- ask Sir J Weston and other Heads of Mission directly involved for further ideas and comments on candidates from those countries who our first survey suggests are more seriously in the running (especially the Netherlands, Norway, Germany, Italy and perhaps Denmark and Belgium);

- consider whether any candidates under discussion for other top jobs, especially in the EU and OECD, might come into the picture for NATO if they fail to get those jobs. (This part of the work, and any consideration of linkages, will of course be coordinated with the general Cabinet Office exercise on senior appointments);

- compile an annotated list of potential UK candidates who deserve consideration. The Defence Secretary has mentioned Lord Howe, a possibility which the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary have briefly discussed though without conclusion.

Any consideration of candidates would need to take account of possible linkage with other top jobs. In taking this whole matter forward we must continue to tread delicately given the sensitivity vis-a-vis Woerner himself.

I am copying this to John Pitt-Brooke at the MOD.

Yours ever,

John

(R J Sawers)
Principal Private Secretary

Roderic Lyne Esq CMG
10 Downing Street

SUCCESSION TO SECRETARY-GENERAL OF NATO

1) Countries which may be ruled out in principle:	Views of HM Ambassadors
Canada	Agree, especially because of military cutbacks. But they want CSCE Chairmanship 1995-6
Portugal	Agree
Turkey	Agree
Iceland	Agree
Greece	Agree
Luxembourg	(Poos too lightweight)
US (i.a. because of SACEUR)	Agree

2) Countries very unlikely, unless change of policy and/or outstanding candidate:	
Spain	Not to be ruled out. Solana has been mentioned. Gonzales and Serra also possible. Would prefer a Southerner of some kind.
France (at least before 1996)	Agree
Denmark	Ellemann-Jensen might have hopes if fails to become PM at next Danish election (end-94). Otherwise Denmark might support Van den Broek
Belgium	Claes mentioned as possible stop-gap.
Germany	Would depend i.a. on success in other posts (OECD, EU) and possible availability of strong candidates after elections. Otherwise might support Van den Broek.

3) More eligible countries:	
Norway	Willoch and Stoltenberg too old? Gro Harlem Brundtland a possibility if she steps down as PM.
Italy	Keen to offset "Northward drift" but none of names mentioned yet (Andreotti, de Michelis, Ando, Fabbri, Rognoni if he fails at WEU) is convincing. NATO Deputy Secretary-General Balanzino would not do badly as a stop-gap.
Netherlands	Signs that Van den Broek wants job and would be credible candidate, but only feasible if Lubbers does not get Commission. French PermRep has said he is unacceptable to Paris.


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Foreign & Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Prime Minister

I imagine the Americans would veto David Owen; and we had the job last time. RH

15 February 1994

Dear Roderic,

NATO Secretary-General

You asked about Manfred Wörner's state of health. Wörner decided to chair last week's NAC meeting on Bosnia against his doctors' advice, while recovering from an operation he underwent on 14 January for an intestinal blockage. In his letter of 27 January, which I am now copying to you, Sir John Weston explains further and comes to the judgement - which we share - that Wörner's ability to serve out his full term to June 1996 must be in doubt.

Premature and open speculation on this matter could clearly be damaging, but we need to start putting our ideas in order. The Foreign Secretary has therefore asked our Ambassadors in NATO posts, and Sir John Weston and Sir John Kerr at Brussels, to contribute any personal knowledge they have (without consulting host Governments) of candidates who might come forward from other countries to replace Wörner. We do not yet have the results. Of those identified in an earlier similar survey, only Hans van den Broek of the Netherlands is still in principle available, although he has other responsibilities as the EU's foreign affairs Commissioner. We and MOD are not aware of any obvious British candidate whom we might support.

We will keep you informed of the initial results of these soundings. We are also in touch with those responsible for the new Cabinet Office mechanism for reviewing British representation in top international posts, with a view to any eventual scope for trade-offs.

I am copying this to John Pitt-Brooke (MOD).

Yours ever

(J S Smith)
Private Secretary

Roderic Lyne Esq CMG
10 Downing Street

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(4)

United Kingdom
Permanent Representative
on the North Atlantic Council

OTAN / NATO
1110 Brussels
Telephone: (02) 242 67 75
Facsimile: (02) 245 23 47

27 January 1994

Sir Timothy Daunt KCMG
DUSS
FCO

Dear Timothy,

NATO SECRETARY GENERAL

1. I have kept the Department informed periodically about Manfred Wörner's health. This is to recapitulate recent developments.

2. We learned at the PermReps' lunch on 18 January that as soon as the NATO Summit was over Wörner went into hospital again and had a further operation on Friday 14 January to deal with an intestinal blockage which had been causing discomfort (I understand he was feeling this quite badly during the NATO Summit itself). We are told that this complication was not a manifestation of the cancer. At this week's PermReps' lunch the Deputy Secretary General, who had spoken to Wörner on the phone, said that the Secretary General is once again recovering well from the surgery; should be out of hospital again shortly and thereafter intends to take some leave.

3. This latest stroke of bad luck over Wörner's health has come at an awkward time in that the Deputy Secretary General, Amedeo de Franchis, had been due to leave Brussels this week to take up his new job as Political Director in Rome. His successor, Ambassador Balanzino is already here, but is very much the new boy and has no previous experience of NATO. De Franchis is therefore staying on until around 4 February to help with continuity. But thereafter we face a gap of uncertain duration until Wörner returns from his convalescence leave (this could be a further 2 - 3 weeks). During this time Balanzino will be "Acting Secretary General", but will have to rely very heavily on his Assistant Secretaries General as well as on the Danish Ambassador as Dean of the Corps. This is obviously far from ideal at a time when there is so much to be getting on with and so much complex post-Summit business to steer through.

4. A third bout of stomach surgery within a period of 18 months would be likely to knock the stuffing out of most people of Manfred Wörner's age. He is a man of exceptional physical and moral stamina, and his capacity to bounce back should therefore not be underestimated. He will certainly want to do so if humanly possible. Nevertheless realistically we must recognise that this latest development somewhat lengthens the odds against his being able to complete his full mandate and carry on to June 1996. While it would be invidious to fuel speculation about a premature succession, which we have every interest in avoiding, it may also be prudent to be thinking rather more actively about how the Alliance should cope if suddenly faced with that. The untimely death of Holst has removed one obvious candidate successor from the field. I do not know what the latest indications are about the movements of Hans van den Broek, who was the other identified runner if Wörner had not been extended last time.

Yours ever
John

John Weston

cc: PS/PUS, FCO
PS/Secretary of State, FCO
D B Omand Esq, DUS(P), MOD
PS/Mr Rifkind, MOD
S J Gomersall Esq, Sec Pol D, FCO
D B C Logan Esq CMG, AUSS, FCO

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MY TELNO 328: NATO SECRETARY GENERAL

1. I SPOKE TO WOERNER'S PRIVATE OFFICE THIS MORNING. HIS CHEF DE CABINET, ROLAND WEGENER REPORTS THAT THE SURGERY WAS CARRIED OUT YESTERDAY AND WENT WELL. A FURTHER LOCALISED CANCEROUS TUMOUR WAS REMOVED FROM HIS STOMACH. THE SIGNS ARE THAT THERE HAS BEEN NO FURTHER METASTASIS, THOUGH A FINAL ASSESSMENT ON THE TESTS WILL NOT BE AVAILABLE UNTIL NEXT WEEK. WOERNER WILL REMAIN IN THE AACHEN HOSPITAL FOR SOME TIME YET BEFORE RETURNING TO THE SAME PLACE AS LAST YEAR IN SOUTHERN GERMANY FOR CONVALESCENCE AND RETURN TO FULL STRENGTH.

2. THE PRIVATE OFFICE SAY THEY SEE NO NEED FOR THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO STRIVE TO MAKE A TOKEN APPEARANCE BACK HERE BEFORE THE SUMMER BREAK. THE AIM IS TO HAVE HIM FULLY FIT BY SEPTEMBER, THOUGH IF THERE WERE AN URGENT NEED FOR HIS HAND ON THE TILLER DURING AUGUST BECAUSE OF SOME NEW EMERGENCY EG IN YUGOSLAVIA, HIS COMMUNICATIONS IN SOUTHERN GERMANY WOULD EQUIP HIM TO DO THIS.

3. HAVING SHOWN LAST YEAR HOW RESILIENT HE WAS IN BOUNCING BACK, THE SECRETARY GENERAL HAS GENERATED OPTIMISTIC EXPECTATIONS THAT HE CAN REPEAT THIS. HE MAY WELL DO SO, AT LEAST IN THE SHORT RUN. BUT TO MY MIND IT DOES PUT A SLIGHT QUESTION MARK OVER WHETHER HE WILL BE ABLE TO CONTINUE UNTIL THE EXPIRY OF HIS RENEWED TENURE IN JUNE 1996. WE WOULD DO WELL TO BEAR THAT DOUBT IN MIND. FOR EXAMPLE, SHOULD VAN DEN BROEK BE DISLODGED FROM THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION AT THE END OF NEXT YEAR I ASSUME THAT BOTH HE AND HOLST WOULD AGAIN BE POTENTIAL RUNNERS, IF FOR ANY COMBINATION OF REASONS WOERNER DECIDED ON REFLECTION TO STEP DOWN BEFORE 1996.

4. I HAVE BEEN IN TOUCH BY PHONE WITH THE PRIVATE SECRETARY ABOUT A MESSAGE OF GOOD WISHES FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE, AND FROM MR RIFKIND, WHICH I RECOMMEND.

WESTON

SINGLE COPIES

YYYY

SIR T DAUNT.
MR LEVER.
MR LYNE (NO 10)

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NATO SECRETARY GENERAL

1. AT THE END OF THE PERMREPS' LUNCH TODAY, WHICH I HOSTED, MANFRED WOERNER TOLD NATO AMBASSADORS HE WOULD HAVE TO RETURN TO HOSPITAL ON THURSDAY 24 JUNE FOR ANOTHER OPERATION ON HIS STOMACH. HE TOLD ME PRIVATELY THAT TESTS HAD REVEALED A REPETITION OF THE PROBLEM A YEAR AGO WHICH WOULD REQUIRE A SIMILAR OPERATION. IT IS SOME 12 MONTHS SINCE WOERNER UNDERWENT SURGERY TO REMOVE A CANCEROUS GROWTH IN HIS STOMACH. UP TO NOW HE HAS SEEMED IN GOOD FORM AND ONLY A FEW DAYS AGO WAS DANCING VIGOROUSLY IN NORFOLK VIRGINIA AND FLYING AN F15 THERE. HIS RECENT PERFORMANCE HAS BEEN FULL OF STAMINA, DESPITE OCCASIONAL SIGNS OF FATIGUE AND OTHER MINOR SYMPTOMS.

2. IF WOERNER CAN RETURN FROM MEDICAL TREATMENT AS GAMELY AS HE DID LAST YEAR, ALL MAY BE WELL, GIVEN THE INTERVAL OF THE SUMMER BREAK TO RECUPERATE. BUT THE RECURRENCE OF HIS HEALTH PROBLEM CASTS AN INEVITABLE SHADOW, AND COULD COMPLICATE SEVERELY PREPARATIONS FOR THE NATO SUMMIT. ABSENT WOERNER, THE DEPUTY SECRETARY GENERAL IS HARDLY UP TO IT, AND THE NEW US AMBASSADOR TO NATO IS PROBABLY STILL A MONTH AWAY.

WESTON

NNNN

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file
K:\woerner.sm
cc MOD

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

21 September 1992

EXTENSION OF DR WOERNER'S MANDATE

Thank you for your letter of 17 September about the extension of Dr Woerner's mandate as NATO Secretary-General.

The Prime Minister is content for us to support the extension of Woerner's term of office by a further three years, to end in June 1996.

I am copying this letter to John Pitt-Brooke (Ministry of Defence).

J S WALL

Richard Gozney Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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Foreign &
Commonwealth
Office

London SW1A 2AH

Poulett

17 September 1992

Prime Minister

Dear Stephen,

Since you told Kohl when you last met that you would approach an extension for Woerner I don't think we can go back now – even if there was a tactical gain in doing so, and I don't think there is.

Stephen
17/9

EXTENSION OF WOERNER'S MANDATE

The Germans have formally proposed extending Manfred Woerner's term of office as NATO Secretary General by a further three years, to end in June 1996. This follows the soundings which Chancellor Kohl has been taking among his colleagues (he spoke to the Prime Minister about this when they met on 5 June). I should be grateful for confirmation that the Prime Minister is content for us to support this proposal.

The extension of Woerner's mandate is to be discussed by Permanent Representatives to NATO on 21 September. If, as we expect, there is consensus, we believe the press should be told straight away that Foreign Ministers will take the formal decision to extend Woerner's term of office at the North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting in December. This would dispel press speculation about other more or less publicly declared candidates (van den Broek, Holst and Eyskens).

Chancellor Kohl and Prime Minister Lubbers have both raised the question of the length of term of future Secretaries General with the Prime Minister. Chancellor Kohl favours a four-year term renewable once for four years. Prime Minister Lubbers favours a four-year term renewable twice for two years. Chancellor Kohl's

proposal may have run into difficulties with others: when the Germans made the formal proposal to extend Woerner's term of office, they said that after him, the practice should revert to that agreed in Lord Carrington's time, namely a four-year mandate with a possible one year extension by mutual agreement. The Foreign Secretary believes we can join a consensus on any of these formulae. The important thing is that we should not go back to the kind of open-ended mandate which Dr Luns had in the 70's.

The Foreign Secretary has considered whether there is anything to be gained tactically in present circumstances by holding up consideration of this German candidate for the time being. But Woerner has proved himself a good Secretary-General, and it is essential that NATO have a Secretary-General of high quality and experience during the next few years.

I am copying this letter to John Pitt-Brooke (Ministry of Defence).

Yours ever,

R. Gozney

(R H T Gozney)
Private Secretary

J S Wall Esq
10 Downing Street

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MODUK FOR DUS(P) AND PRIVATE SECRETARY

NATO SECRETARY GENERAL: PROLONGATION OF WOERNER'S MANDATE

SUMMARY

1. GERMANS FORMALLY PROPOSE EXTENDING WOERNER'S TERM BY A FURTHER THREE YEARS TO END JUNE 1996. CONSENSUS IN FAVOUR CLEARLY EMERGING. SOME FEELING THAT THIS SHOULD BE A ONE-OFF EXCEPTION, WITH PROCEDURE REVERTING TO FOUR YEARS PLUS OPTIONAL ONE YEAR THEREAFTER. PUBLIC HANDLING NEEDS FURTHER THOUGHT. INSTRUCTIONS REQUIRED FOR PERMREPS' LUNCH ON 22 SEPTEMBER.

DETAIL

2. AT THE END OF TODAY'S PERMREPS' LUNCH WOERNER LEFT AND ROBIN (FRANCE) AS DEAN RECALLED THAT IT HAD BEEN AGREED TO RETURN AFTER THE SUMMER HOLIDAYS TO THE QUESTION OF THE FUTURE OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL. NO DECISION WAS REQUIRED TODAY, BUT HE INVITED VON PLOETZ (GERMANY) TO SET OUT THE LATEST POSITION.

3. VON PLOETZ (WHO HAD TOLD ME EARLIER THIS MORNING HE INTENDED TO RAISE THIS ON INSTRUCTIONS) SAID HIS GOVERNMENT WISHED TO PROPOSE AN ADDITIONAL THREE YEARS FOR WOERNER AS SECRETARY GENERAL FROM HIS PRESENT EXPIRY DATE OF 30 JUNE 1993, WHICH WOULD TAKE HIM TO 30 JUNE 1996. THE MAJOR FACTORS WERE WOERNER'S MANIFEST QUALITIES AS SECRETARY GENERAL AND THE ADVANTAGES OF NOT CHANGING HORSES IN MID-STREAM DURING A MAJOR TRANSITIONAL PHASE FOR THE ALLIANCE. NUMEROUS CONTACTS AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL HAD SHOWN THAT THERE WAS GENERAL SUPPORT IN CAPITALS FOR THIS VIEW. IT WOULD ALSO NEED TO BE CLEAR THAT WOERNER WOULD STEP DOWN FINALLY AT THAT POINT: AND THAT THIS ARRANGEMENT WAS SUI GENERIS TO HIM, WITH THE PRACTICE THEREAFTER REVERTING TO WHAT HAD BEEN AGREED IN LORD CARRINGTON'S TIME, NAMELY A FOUR YEAR MANDATE WITH A POSSIBILITY OF ONE YEAR'S EXTENSION WITH MUTUAL AGREEMENT. PLOETZ SAID THAT ONE NEWSAGENCY HAD ALREADY GOT WIND OF THIS. IT WAS THEREFORE IMPORTANT TO PROCEED RAPIDLY TO THE PREPARATION OF A DECISION BY MINISTERS.

MDHIA 8179

4. IN THE SUBSEQUENT TOUR DE TABLE NO-ONE TOOK ISSUE WITH THE PROPOSAL, THOUGH IT WAS CLEAR THAT ONE OR TWO OF THE PERMREPS HAD NOT BEEN FULLY INFORMED ABOUT PREVIOUS HIGH LEVEL BILATERAL CONTACTS WITH THEIR MINISTERS ON THIS SUBJECT. BARTHOLOMEW (US) SAID THERE WAS SUPPORT AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL IN WASHINGTON FOR WOERNER'S EXTENSION. I SAID I HAD EVERY REASON TO BELIEVE THAT THIS PROPOSAL WAS WELCOME IN LONDON. ROBIN DID NOT VOLUNTEER A POSITION BUT UNDER PRESSURE SAID THAT WHILE THERE WAS SYMPATHY IN PARIS FOR HOLST, FRANCE WAS READY TO RALLY TO CONSENSUS FOR WOERNER. KRISTVIK (NORWAY) SAID HOLST HAD PUT FORWARD HIS CANDIDACY ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THERE WAS A VACANCY, WHICH APPEARED NOW NOT TO BE THE CASE. BUT THE PROPOSAL REMAINED ON THE TABLE WHEN A VACANCY EVENTUALLY APPEARED, AND NORWAY'S VIEW REMAINED THAT NATO SHOULD ROTATE THE JOB AMONG THE SMALLER NATIONS. NONE OF THE NORDIC COUNTRIES HAD YET HAD A TURN. THAT SAID NORWAY WOULD GO WITH THE CONSENSUS.

5. THERE WAS SOME DISCUSSION HOW TO HANDLE MATTERS IF IN TWO WEEKS' TIME (WHEN THE PERMREPS' LUNCH WOULD RETURN TO THIS SUBJECT) ALL WERE ABLE TO SAY ON INSTRUCTIONS THAT THEY AGREED ON WOERNER'S EXTENSION. BARTHOLOMEW, THUYSBAERT AND I ALL ARGUED THAT THERE WOULD BE ADVANTAGE IN PUTTING AN END TO PUBLIC SPECULATION. THIS MIGHT BEST BE DONE BY ALLOWING IT TO BECOME KNOWN THAT THERE WOULD BE ONLY ONE PROPOSAL ON THE TABLE FOR MINISTERS TO ENDORSE AT THE NAC MINISTERIAL IN DECEMBER (IF INDEED THE FORMAL DECISION SHOULD BE DELAYED UNTIL THEN) NAMELY WOERNER'S EXTENSION BY THREE YEARS. ROBIN SEEMED LESS SURE ABOUT THIS, AND WAS DISPOSED TO ARGUE THAT THIS MIGHT AMOUNT TO PRESENTING MINISTERS WITH A FAIT ACCOMPLI. BUT MOST OTHER PERMREPS THOUGHT HIM UNREALISTIC. MIRANDA (SPAIN) ASKED WHY IT WAS THOUGHT THAT AN EXTENSION OF THREE YEARS WAS NECESSARY TO BRIDGE NATO'S TRANSITION AND JACOBOVITS (NETHERLANDS) ALSO SEEMED TO SHARE THE VIEW THAT NOT TOO MUCH WEIGHT SHOULD BE PUT ON THIS ARGUMENT PUBLICLY.

COMMENT

6. ALTHOUGH SOME OF US WERE A BIT TAKEN BY SURPRISE THAT THE TOPIC SHOULD COME UP SO SUDDENLY TODAY, THE SUBJECT WAS BASICALLY UNCONTENTIOUS. THE ONLY POINT OUTSTANDING IS HOW TO HANDLE MATTERS PUBLICLY IF THE PERMREPS LUNCH ON 22 SEPTEMBER REGISTERS FORMALLY CONSENSUS ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM CAPITALS. I SHALL NEED GUIDANCE ON THAT, AND LOOK FORWARD TO DISCUSSING WITH THE DEPARTMENT WHEN I AM IN LONDON ON 11 SEPTEMBER. IT MAY BE THAT SINCE THE FINAL DECISION IS FOR MINISTERS, REPRESENTING INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES, RATHER THAN

FOR THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL AS SUCH (WHICH OF COURSE THE SECRETARY GENERAL HIMSELF CHAIRS), EVEN THE FINAL FORMALITIES DO NOT NEED TO BE DELAYED AS LONG AS DECEMBER.

WESTON

YYYY

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NNNN

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

22 February 1988

DEPARTURE OF NATO SECRETARY-GENERAL

Thank you for your letter of 18 February about a farewell visit by Lord Carrington before his retirement as NATO Secretary-General. The Prime Minister would indeed wish to give a dinner for him. I should be grateful if you would discuss dates with Mrs Gaisman.

Charles Powell

Lyn Parker, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

Prime Minister
Would you wish to host
a farewell lunch or dinner
for Lord Carrington in the summer:
Or perhaps Douglas to do so?

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1A 2AH

18 February 1988

Dear Charles,

Departure of NATO Secretary-General

Lord Carrington is beginning a round of farewell visits to all NATO capitals before he hands over the Secretary-Generalship in July. London should be included in this round of visits; but a visit to London would necessarily have a rather different character from the others. It will not offer in the same way as elsewhere a last opportunity for Lord Carrington to make substantive points ex officio to Allied governments; and it would be inappropriate to offer him the sort of ceremonial reception which might be right for a foreign visitor (especially since his office confirm that he is not a lover of pomp and ceremony).

The Foreign Secretary believes that the right solution might be a short visit built around a lunch or dinner in honour of Lord Carrington, on the same lines as the dinner which the Prime Minister is to give for Weinberger. The Foreign Secretary would be ready to host such an occasion, unless the Prime Minister would wish to do so herself.

Yours ever,

(L Parker)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

PO6AAC

With the compliments of

SECURITY POLICY DEPARTMENT

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
LONDON SW1A 2AH

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cc MR Powell
No 10

SIC ACA

OSLO TELNO 210: SUCCESSION TO LORD CARRINGTON

SUMMARY
1. CONSENSUS FOR WOERNER.

DETAIL
2. BEREG (NORWAY) TOLD ME LATE THIS AFTERNOON THAT AFTER HIS VISIT TO OSLO LAST FRIDAY THE NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT TODAY DECIDED TO WITHDRAW WILLOCH'S CANDIDATURE, IN ORDER NOT TO BLOCK ALLIANCE CONSENSUS.

ALEXANDER

YYYY

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24 September 1987

Mr. Charles Powell
Private Secretary to the
Prime Minister
10 Downing Street

L o n d o n

Dear Mr. Powell,

I have the honour to transmit to you the original of a letter from Herr Kohl, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, to the Prime Minister, the translation of which was already transmitted by a letter of the Chargé d´Affaires a.i. of 21 September 1987.

Yours sincerely,

Eike E. Bracklo.

Dr. Eike E. Bracklo
Minister Counsellor

BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND
DER BUNDESKANZLER

Bonn, den 17. September 1987

Ihrer Exzellenz
Frau Margaret Thatcher, MP
Premierminister des
Vereinigten Königreichs
Großbritannien und Nordirland
L o n d o n

Sehr geehrte Frau Premierminister, liebe Margaret,

mit meinem Schreiben vom 26. August 1987 habe ich Ihnen den Bundesminister der Verteidigung, Dr. Manfred Wörner, als Kandidaten für die Nachfolge für NATO-Generalsekretär Lord Carrington benannt.

Ich möchte mir erlauben, Ihnen nochmals meine Gründe für diese Nominierung im einzelnen darzulegen:

Dr. Wörner ist ein außerordentlich erfahrener und befähigter Sicherheitspolitiker, der in den Mitgliedstaaten der Allianz hohes Ansehen genießt.

Aufgrund seiner langjährigen Erfahrungen und seiner umfassenden Kenntnisse zu Fragen des Bündnisses wäre er in hohem Maße geeignet, die transatlantische Partnerschaft und Solidarität zu stärken, und weiter auszubauen.

Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland ist durch ihre geopolitische Lage innerhalb des Bündnisgebietes in besonderer Weise exponiert. Mein Land stellt die stärkste konventionelle Streitkraft der NATO in Westeuropa und ist das wichtigste Stationierungs- und Übungsland des Bündnisses. Die Bevölkerung der Bundesrepublik

Deutschland trägt die damit verbundenen Belastungen - wie sich bei den derzeitigen großen Herbstmanövern zeigt - mit großem Verständnis.

Angesichts dieser Situation würde die Wahl eines Deutschen zum NATO-Generalsekretär in meinem Lande als politisches Signal verstanden, daß unser Beitrag zur Verteidigungsbereitschaft des Westens von den Mitgliedstaaten der Allianz gewürdigt wird.

Schließlich hat die Bundesrepublik Deutschland seit den schwierigen Anfängen ihrer Mitgliedschaft im Atlantischen Bündnis vor 32 Jahren noch nie den Generalsekretär gestellt. In Anbetracht des seither erbrachten Beitrags meines Landes zu den Aufgaben und Lasten der Allianz sowie des ausgezeichneten Kandidaten, den wir präsentieren können, hielte ich die Wahl von Dr. Wörner zum neuen Generalsekretär der NATO für eine gute Wahl im Interesse der Allianz.

Ich möchte Ihnen versichern, daß ich die persönliche Qualifikation des von der norwegischen Regierung benannten Kandidaten, den ich persönlich kenne und schätze, in keiner Weise in Zweifel ziehen möchte.

Da Ihre Regierung bisher noch keine Entscheidung über die Nachfolgefrage getroffen hat, wäre ich für eine wohlwollende Prüfung dankbar und bitte Sie um die Unterstützung der Kandidatur von Dr. Wörner.

Ich würde mich freuen, wenn wir dieses Thema anläßlich unseres bereits vereinbarten Gesprächs am Rande des IDU-Treffens in Berlin am 25. September 1987 besprechen könnten.

Mit freundlichen Grüßen

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

23 September 1987

Secretary General, NATO

The Prime Minister has written to Chancellor Kohl informing him of our decision to support Dr. Woerner as successor to Lord Carrington. I enclose the text of her letter and should be grateful if it could be telegraphed to Bonn for delivery this evening if possible.

(CHARLES POWELL)

Lyn Parker, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SUBJECT
cc OPS
MASTER

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. 176A/87

Filed on:
NATO: Appt of
Secretary General Sep 1980.

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

22 September 1987

Dear Helmut.

Thank you for your further message explaining in greater detail the reasons for your nomination of Dr. Woerner to succeed Lord Carrington as NATO Secretary-General. I have no doubt that Dr. Woerner's ability and experience would suit him very well for the post of Secretary-General; and the United Kingdom greatly appreciates the German contribution to the defence of the West. I am happy to be able to tell you that we have now formally decided to support Dr. Woerner's candidature.

I look forward to seeing you in Berlin on 23 September.

Yours ever

Margaret

His Excellency Dr. Helmut Kohl

VC

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

22 September 1987

CDP 22/9

Dear Charles,

NATO Secretary-General

Thank you for your letter of 21 September. Sir Geoffrey Howe was told by M. Raimond last night that the French had now decided to support Dr Woerner's candidature. President Mitterrand has written to Chancellor Kohl giving this commitment. Mr Shultz separately told Sir Geoffrey and the French that the Americans had also concluded that they should support Dr Woerner. Mr Shultz gave Herr Genscher an assurance to that effect yesterday. We knew already that the Italians and Turks had indicated their support for Dr Woerner and the signs are that the Belgians and Dutch also favour him. Only the Danes and Icelanders have indicated support for Mr Willoch.

Now that the Americans and French have made up their minds, Sir Geoffrey thinks the time has come to give the Germans an assurance that we will support Dr Woerner. The Prime Minister will no doubt wish to do this in reply to Chancellor Kohl's latest message, before she sees him at the IDU meeting on 25 September. I enclose a draft.

Sir Geoffrey would like to mention our decision when he sees Herr Genscher at dinner on 23 September. I would be grateful to know whether the Prime Minister would be content for him to do so.

Yours ever,

Lyn Parker

(L Parker)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
PS/No 10 Downing Street

DSR 11 (Revised Sept 85)

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1 +

FROM:
PRIME MINISTER

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

BUILDING:

ROOM NO:

Reference

Your Reference

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret
Secret
Confidential
Restricted
Unclassified

PRIVACY MARKING

..... In Confidence

CAVEAT .....

Enclosures flag(s) .....

TO:
CHANCELLOR KOHL

Copies to:

SUBJECT:

Thank you for your further message explaining in greater detail the reasons for your nomination of Dr Woerner to succeed Lord Carrington as NATO Secretary-General. I have no doubt that Dr Woerner's ability and experience would suit him very well for the post of Secretary-General. The United Kingdom greatly appreciates the German contribution to the defence of the West. I am happy to be able to tell you that we have now formally decided to support Dr Woerner's candidature.

I look forward to seeing you ~~at the IDU meeting~~ in Berlin on 23 September.

MT

10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

Secretary General of NATO

The Americans, French and Italians are all going to support Woerner. I have told the FCO that we really must sign on, otherwise we shall just irritate the Germans for no good reason. If you agree:

"Herr Helmut"

CDP 22/9

CONFIDENTIAL

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

21 September 1987

SECRETARY-GENERAL OF NATO

I enclose a copy of a further message to the Prime Minister from Chancellor Kohl, pressing Dr. Woerner's claims to be Secretary-General of NATO. As you will see, Chancellor Kohl proposes to talk to the Prime Minister about it on Friday.

I should be grateful to know whether this further letter affects the advice, in the briefing already provided for the meeting, that the Prime Minister should still not commit us to support Dr. Woerner. Do we actually have any alternative candidate in mind?

I am copying this letter and enclosure to John Howe (Ministry of Defence).

C. D. POWELL

Lyn Parker, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL

cc/PC

DER BOTSCHAFTER
DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND
Dr. Eike E. Bracklo

Chargé d'Affaires a.i.

21 September 1987

Dear Prime Minister,

I have the honour to transmit the enclosed message from
Herr Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany.

The original of the letter will be transmitted as soon as it is received by this Embassy.

I am, dear Prime Minister,
Yours sincerely,
Eike E. Bracklo.

Her Excellency
The Rt.Hon. Margaret Thatcher, MP
Her Majesty's Prime Minister and
First Lord of the Treasury
L o n d o n

Filed On: SUBJECT cc OPS MASTER.
NATO: Appt of Secretary General
Sep 1980.

PRIME MINISTER'S PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. 175B/87

Translation

The Rt. Hon.
Mrs Margaret Thatcher, M.P.,
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,
London

17 September 1987

Dear Prime Minister, Dear Margaret,

On 26 August 1987 I wrote to you proposing Dr Manfred Wörner, Federal Minister of Defence, as a candidate to succeed NATO Secretary-General Lord Carrington.

Allow me to explain again in greater detail the reasons for this nomination. Dr Wörner is an extremely capable politician who has wide experience in defence matters and is highly respected in the countries members of the Alliance.

Owing to his long experience and extensive knowledge of the Alliance and its problems, he would be highly qualified to strengthen and further develop transatlantic partnership and solidarity.

The Federal Republic of Germany is particularly exposed on account of its geopolitical position within the NATO area. My country provides the largest contingent of conventional NATO forces in Western Europe. It is also host to the biggest contingent of non-German allied forces and is the Alliance's main location for military exercises. The people of the Federal Republic of Germany accept the burdens this entails, as during the current large-scale autumn manoeuvres, with great understanding.

In view of this situation, the election of a German as NATO Secretary-General would be seen in my country as a political signal that our contribution to the West's defence preparedness is appreciated by the members of the Alliance.

Moreover, since becoming a member of the Atlantic Alliance under difficult circumstances 32 years ago, the Federal Republic of Germany has never filled the post of Secretary-General. Considering my country's contribution in fulfilling the Alliance's mission and carrying its burdens, and considering that we are able to present an excellent candidate, I feel that the election of Dr Wörner as new Secretary-General of NATO would be a good choice in the interest of the Alliance.

Let me assure you that I in no way wish to cast doubt on the qualifications of the candidate nominated by the Norwegian Government, whom I know and hold in high esteem.

As your Government has not yet taken a decision on the question of the Secretary-General's successor, I would be grateful if you would give the matter your sympathetic consideration and support Dr Wörner's candidature.

I would be glad if we could discuss this matter in our talks on the fringe of the IDU meeting in Berlin on 25 September.

Yours sincerely,
(sgd.) Helmut Kohl

T e l e g r a m

from

Herr Helmut Kohl

Federal Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany

to

Her Excellency The Rt Hon Margaret Thatcher, MP

Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

Dear Prime Minister,
dear Margaret,

On 26 August 1987 I wrote to you proposing Dr. Manfred Wörner, Federal Minister of Defence, as a candidate to succeed NATO Secretary-General Lord Carrington.

Allow me to explain again in greater detail the reasons for this nomination. Dr. Wörner is an extremely capable politician who has wide experience in defence matters and is highly respected in the countries members of the Alliance.

Owing to his long experience and extensive knowledge of the Alliance and its problems, he would be highly qualified to strengthen and further develop transatlantic partnership and solidarity.

The Federal Republic of Germany is particularly exposed on account of its geopolitical position within the NATO area. My country provides the largest contingent of conventional NATO forces in Western Europe. It is also host to the biggest contingent of non-German allied forces and is the Alliance´s main location for military exercises. The people of the Federal Republic of Germany accept the burdens this entails, as during the current large-scale autumn manoeuvres, with great understanding.

/2

In view of this situation, the election of a German as NATO Secretary-General would be seen in my country as a political signal that our contribution to the West´s defence preparedness is appreciated by the members of the Alliance.

Moreover, since becoming a member of the Atlantic Alliance under difficult circumstances 32 years ago, the Federal Republic of Germany has never filled the post of Secretary-General. Considering my country´s contribution in fulfilling the Alliance´s mission and carrying its burdens, and considering that we are able to present an excellent candidate, I feel that the election of Dr. Wörner as new Secretary-General of NATO would be a good choice in the interest of the Alliance.

Let me assure you that I in no way wish to cast doubt on the qualifications of the candidate nominated by the Norwegian government whom I know and hold in high esteem.

As your Government has not yet taken a decision on the question of the Secretary-General´s successor, I would be grateful if you would give the matter your sympathetic consideration and support Dr. Wörner´s candidature.

I would be glad if we could discuss this matter in our talks on the fringe of the IDU-Meeting in Berlin on 25 September.

Yours sincerely,

(sgd.) Helmut Kohl



File

SRW
cc FCO

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

16 September 1987

Dear Helmut,

Thank you for your message announcing that your Government has presented Manfred Woerner as a candidate to succeed Peter Carrington as Secretary-General of NATO. Dr. Woerner's distinguished service as the Federal Republic's Defence Minister has demonstrated how well qualified he would be for the position, and we shall give his candidacy very careful consideration.

Kind regards.

Yours ever

Margaret

OA

His Excellency Dr. Helmut Kohl

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

11 September 1987

Dear Charles,

Secretary General of NATO

Thank you for your letter of 27 August.

The Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary have already had some discussion about the succession to Lord Carrington. Since then we have established that Lord Carrington himself regards Woerner as an excellent choice.

The game is however still at an early stage. There have been conflicting indications about how the Americans are likely to view Woerner. Other well-qualified candidates may yet enter the field. For the time being the Foreign Secretary considers that we need to reply to Chancellor Kohl in terms which, while paying tribute to Dr Woerner's abilities, stop short of committing us to support of his candidature. I enclose a draft.

Yours ever,

(L Parker)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street



DSR 11 (Revised Sept 85)

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1 +

FROM:
Prime Minister
DEPARTMENT:
TEL. NO:
BUILDING:
ROOM NO:

Reference

Your Reference

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret
Secret
Confidential
Restricted
Unclassified

PRIVACY MARKING

..... In Confidence

CAVEAT .....

Enclosures flag(s) .....

TO:
Chancellor Kohl

Copies to:

SUBJECT:

Thank you for your message announcing that your Government has presented Manfred Woerner as a candidate to succeed Peter Carrington as Secretary-General of NATO. Dr Woerner's distinguished service as the Federal Republic's Defence Minister has demonstrated how well qualified he would be for the position, and we shall give his candidacy very careful consideration.

CDP

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

27 August, 1987.

I enclose a copy of a message to the Prime Minister from Chancellor Kohl about his intention to nominate Dr. Woerner as a candidate for the post of Secretary General of NATO. The Prime Minister will need to reply in due course.

I am sending copies of this letter and enclosure to John Howe (Ministry of Defence) and Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

(C.D. Powell)

R.N. Culshaw, Esq., MVO,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CCPC

DER BOTSCHAFTER
DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND
Baron Hans von Stein

Chargé d'Affaires a.i.

26 August 1987

Dear Prime Minister,

I have the honour to transmit to you the enclosed message from Herr Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany.

A courtesy translation is attached.

Yours sincerely,

Hans v. Stein

Her Excellency
The Rt.Hon. Margaret Thatcher, MP
Her Majesty`s Prime Minister and
First Lord of the Treasury
L o n d o n

T e l e g r a m m

von

Herrn Helmut Kohl

Bundeskanzler der Bundesrepublik Deutschland

an

Ihre Exzellenz

Frau Margaret Thatcher

Premierminister des Vereinigten Königreichs

Grossbritannien und Nordirland

Sehr verehrte Frau Premierminister, liebe Margaret,

die Entscheidung von Lord Carrington, sich als Generalsekretär der NATO nur noch bis zum Ablauf seiner jetzigen Dienstzeit zur Verfügung zu stellen, zwingt das Bündnis zur Suche nach einem Nachfolger.

Die Regierung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland hat sich entschlossen, den Regierungen der Bündnisstaaten Herrn Dr. Manfred Woerner, Bundesminister der Verteidigung, für die Nachfolge im Amt des Generalsekretärs der NATO vorzuschlagen.

Dr. Manfred Woerner hat sich für die Nachfolge in vielfältiger Weise qualifiziert: Er gehört seit 1982 als Verteidigungsminister der Bundesregierung an; davor war er Vorsitzender des Verteidigungsausschusses des Deutschen Bundestages und sicherheitspolitischer Sprecher der Christlich-Demokratischen Union. Er ist seit Jahrzehnten mit den zentralen Fragen des Bündnisses aufs engste vertraut und ist allen Bündnispartnern persönlich bekannt.

Die Regierung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland bittet Sie um Ihre Unterstützung für die Kandidatur von Dr. Manfred Woerner.

Mit freundlichen Grüssen,

gez. Helmut Kohl

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T 166/87

26.8.87

SUBJECT CCOPS
MASTER

Telegram

from

Herr Helmut Kohl

Federal Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany

to

Her Excellency The Rt Hon Margaret Thatcher, MP

Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

Dear Prime Minister,
dear Margaret,

The decision by Lord Carrington not to seek re-election as NATO Secretary-General upon expiry of his current term of office makes it necessary for the Alliance to seek a successor.

The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany has decided to propose to the governments of the other member of the Alliance that Dr. Manfred Woerner, Federal Minister of Defence, be chosen as successor.

Dr. Manfred Woerner is qualified in many ways for the post of NATO Secretary-General: He has been Federal Minister of Defence since 1982. Before that he was chairman of the Defence Committee of the German Bundestag and security spokesman of the Christian Democratic Union. He has for decades now been closely acquainted with central issues of the Alliance and is personally known to all members of the Alliance.

The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany would appreciate it if you could lend the candidature of Dr. Manfred Woerner your valuable support.

Yours sincerely,

(sgd.) Helmut Kohl

Translation

Curriculum Vitae

Dr. Manfred Woerner

Federal Minister of Defence

24 September 1934 born in Stuttgart,
School-leaving examination, Stuttgart,
Read law in Heidelberg, Paris and Munich

1957	1st final examination in law in Munich
1961	2nd final examination in Stuttgart
	Doctorate at Munich University
	Thesis on "the stationing of foreign forces in friendly countries".
	Higher executive officer in Baden-Wuerttemberg Ministry of the Interior
1962 - 1964	Adviser to Baden-Wuerttemberg Parliament
1965	entered German Parliament (Bundestag)
1976 - 1980	Chairman of Bundestag Defence Committee
	Vice-Chairman of CDU/CSU Parliamentary Group
4 October 1982	Federal Minister of Defence
8 June 1985	Honorary Doctorate in law from Troy State University, Alabama

Dr. Manfred Woerner is a Lieutenant-Colonel of the reserve.
He is also an enthusiastic leisure-time pilot, hiker and skier.

003273
MDADAN 0185

Prime Minister (2)
MEA 21/8

CONFIDENTIAL
FM BONN
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 645
OF 250830Z AUGUST 87
INFO IMMEDIATE UKDEL NATO, WASHINGTON, PARIS, OSLO

NATO SECRETARY-GENERALSHIP

1. TELTSCHIK HAS JUST TELEPHONED ME TO GIVE US ADVANCE WARNING THAT THE FEDERAL CHANCELLOR WILL ANNOUNCE AT HIS PRESS CONFERENCE TOMORROW, 26 AUGUST, THAT THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IS NOMINATING WOERNER FOR THE SUCCESSION TO LORD CARRINGTON. PLEASE PROTECT MEANWHILE. KOHL IS WRITING TO THE PRIME MINISTER.

2. FCO PLEASE ADVANCE TO NUMBER TEN.

WILLIAMS

YYYY

DISTRIBUTION 1

ADVANCE 1

NUMBER 10 DOWNING ST

NNNN

Cabinet / Cabinet Committee Document

The following document, which was enclosed on this file, has been removed and destroyed. Such documents are the responsibility of the Cabinet Office. When released they are available in the appropriate **CAB** (CABINET OFFICE) CLASSES.

Reference: OD(84) 7th Meeting, Minutes

Date: 24 May 1984

Signed A Wayland Date 9/10/18

PREM Records Team

MR COLES

NATO

1. I am glad Ministers are taking time to look at the state of Nato as Lord Carrington takes over as Secretary General. I offer some thoughts as footnotes to the Foreign Secretary's memorandum of 18 May.

The Political Environment and Nato's image

2. Nato now operates in a much less propitious political environment than in the past. In the West the broad consensus on East/West security issues which used to exist, cutting across party lines, has been broken: alternative Governments, eg in Germany and the UK, would take a very different line on defence. Some existing Governments are by no means solid - Denmark, Netherlands and Italy.

3. The Soviet Government will do nothing to assist the re-election of President Reagan; but we must also consider the possibility of a period of bad US/Soviet relations extending well beyond November 1984, with the Russians refusing to budge and continuing to exert pressure on Western public opinion via the Peace Movement. A sustained freeze of this kind might not only appeal to Soviet instinct; it could also be strategically attractive from their point of view: the freeze would seriously worry the West and encourage the weaker brethren to break ranks; the thaw when it came could provoke an indiscriminate rush for detente.

4. All this will call for great resolution and cohesion on the part of the Alliance and a fine balance between defence on the one hand and search for arms control agreements on the other, both for the sake of substance and for appearance - Nato's public image.

Nato Strategy

5. If we put aside the Peace Movement and other incorrigibles, there remains a large section of public opinion that in an unthinking way is well disposed towards Nato. But among the better informed there are many who are troubled about Alliance strategy. The doubts centre on a possible decoupling of the US nuclear guarantee from European defence (ie would the US be prepared to fight a l'outrance for Western Europe) and on what is seen as Nato's over-reliance on nuclear weapons, which in turn casts doubt on the credibility of the Nato deterrent. Most people wish to see an increase in the Alliance conventional forces,

but are unwilling to face the consequential increases in expenditure. Some argue that it is possible to square this circle by resort to "Emerging Technologies" (ET), ie precision-guided munitions which would greatly improve Nato's defence capacities at tolerable cost. The benefits of ET are probably exaggerated and the risks under-estimated; it is also too lightly assumed that the new technologies will remain a monopoly of the Alliance and will not be picked up by the Russians. Nevertheless, Dr Owen is probably right in saying that conventional defence is the first question on the Nato agenda. The Alliance strategy needs thinking through and re-expounding.

US/European Relationship

6. To take first the Treaty area, there could be US/European strains over the Alliance's reaction to US/Soviet relations as forecast in paragraph 3 above, particularly if President Reagan is disposed to persist in a hard line after re-election. There will be a tendency for Europe to offer itself as the honest broker. In any event there will be US pressure on Europe to contribute more to the burden of the Alliance and as a means of ensuring a continuing US guarantee, a European response has to be made. One way of meeting these problems will be by pursuing European consumer procurement and collaborative manufacturing projects, difficult though these have proved themselves in the past. Another will be greater European consultation on defence questions generally, not just in the existing fora, the Eurogroup and IEPG, but also perhaps in WEU. It will not be easy, but we have somehow to bring together our wishes to strengthen Nato and at the same time to develop a European identity in security matters.

Out of Area

7. Super power caution in the central zone of confrontation, Third World instability and Soviet probing and opportunism are likely to mean that most of our crises remain out of area. Arab/Israel, the Gulf and Central America seem safe bets. There will be differing US and European perceptions of these issues and no doubt US dissatisfaction with European understanding and response. I doubt whether a new philosophy can be evolved on this; but at the least the Americans will want some sign of political understanding from Nato. For the rest, UK and French deployments out of area, eg our ships available for the Gulf and our garrison in Belize, will assume disproportionate importance.

PERCY CRADOCK

B.06757

PRIME MINISTER

c: Sir Robert Armstrong

OD: NATO Secretary-General

BACKGROUND

Lord Carrington takes over as NATO Secretary-General in late June. His new appointment makes it timely for Ministers to review the health of the Alliance as a whole, and to consider whether in the informal consultations Lord Carrington will have with Ministers before taking up his appointment, they should attempt to steer him towards concentrating his efforts (at least initially) towards certain key areas.

FLAG A

2. The attachment to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's minute to you of 18 May suggests that high on Lord Carrington's agenda will be the effective management of United States/European relations within the Alliance; the Alliances's approach to East/West relations; the handling of the strategic debate and the management of defence resources. The paper notes that while the Secretary-General has few formal powers, his office provides him with considerable scope for initiative; it is a major platform for articulating major issues before the Alliance and moving its members in the desired direction. The Secretary-General also has available to him in tackling the issues the extensive institutional machinery of the Alliance and the under-used expertise of the International Staff.

3. The paper goes on to suggest that the Secretary-General has considerable scope for improving the effectiveness of Alliance consultation; for easing the passage of business, and for ensuring better co-ordination and integration of the Alliance's work. And he can make a significant contribution to the crucial tasks of maintaining public confidence in the Alliance's policies, particularly in the fundamental importance of the transatlantic link. To have maximum impact both publicly and in his work within the Alliance, Lord Carrington will need to develop relationships of confidence with the major capitals,

including in particular Paris. Lord Carrington's Ministerial experience provides him with an ideal foundation upon which to build.

4. The paper is against the suggestion that Lord Carrington's arrival provides an opportunity for a major review of the Alliance and its operation by a group of "wise men", since this might lend credence to the view that the Alliance is indeed in crisis; but it favours an internal review carried out by Lord Carrington himself: our aim should be to encourage initiative and more purposeful management by the new Secretary-General, while letting him be his own man. The paper recommends that, in discussion with Lord Carrington, Ministers should emphasize the importance the United Kingdom places on the objectives set out in the Annex.

5. The Lord Privy Seal is unable to attend the meeting because of unavoidable commitments in the House following his weekly business statement.

HANDLING

6. You should invite the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary to introduce the discussion. The Defence Secretary might then be invited to comment. Points to establish in discussion are:-

(a) The paper gives a broadly reassuring picture of the state of the Alliance and implies that no radical changes of structure or direction are called for. Does the Committee endorse this view?

(b) Does the paper correctly identify the main problem areas on which Lord Carrington will wish to concentrate?

(c) There is some evidence (including Dr Kissinger's article in "Time Magazine" and the debate sparked off by it) of growing public concern in Western Europe that NATO's strategy of flexible response is out of date, that the US nuclear guarantee can no longer be relied on with complete confidence, that the commitment of the present US Administration to arms control is less than whole-hearted, and that the European pillar of the Alliance needs strengthening (cf the Franco-German initiative on WEU).

There is also growing impatience on the part of the Americans with the Europeans. Is sufficient account taken of these considerations in the statement of objectives?

(d) Is sufficient emphasis given in paragraph 3 of the Statement of Objectives to the continuing need to make more of a reality of the two-way street? In paragraph 4 should there be a reference to renewing attempts to broaden the vision of our European partners on out-of-area matters for its own sake and as a means of improving US/European understanding?

(e) Does the Committee agree that the idea of setting up a "wise man" enquiry into the state of Alliance might send the wrong signals in public, and that if there is to be a review, an internal review is to be preferred?

CONCLUSION

7. Subject to the points made in discussion, the Committee might be guided to endorse the statement of objectives for Ministers' discussions with Lord Carrington set out in the Annex to the attachment to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's minute.

David Goodall

A D S GOODALL

23 May 1984

20 MAY 1994

(2)

Prime Minister.

You may like to read over the weekend.

A.J.C. 18/5

PM/84/79

PRIME MINISTER

NATO Secretary General

1. We agreed that there should be a discussion in OD about the opportunities provided by Lord Carrington's take-over as NATO Secretary-General in late June.

2. I now attach an annex which could serve as a basis for our discussion next week: its contents have been agreed with the Secretary of State for Defence.

3. I am copying this minute and its annex to the Secretary of State for Defence, to other members of OD and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

GEOFFREY HOWE

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

18 May, 1984

ANNEX 1

NATO SECRETARY GENERAL

1. The Alliance finished 1983 in better shape than many would have predicted at the beginning of the year. Its cohesion was reaffirmed by the successful deployment of INF in the face of a barrage of Soviet propaganda. On economic matters it showed significant success in fashioning a broad consensus on policy towards the Soviet Union and other East European countries, in the aftermath of the Siberian pipeline saga. Its record of consultation on nuclear and conventional arms control has been particularly successful.

2. Against this background, claims that the Alliance finds itself in an unprecedented crisis, such as that made by Dr Kissinger in an article in Time Magazine at the beginning of March, are wide of the mark. Nevertheless, the Alliance does face major political and military challenges. The arrival of a new Secretary General offers a timely opportunity to consider ways of managing the Alliance and its affairs to better purpose.

3. Four major areas will be high on Lord Carrington's agenda. These are:

(a) The effective management of US/European relations within the Alliance The transatlantic relationship and the commitment of the US to the defence of Europe are central to the Alliance. We thus have an interest in ensuring that the Alliance, and European attitudes within it, are responsive to American policy requirements and perceptions or, where this is not possible, in reducing the areas of potential friction. The basic issues which will determine the state of US/European relations in the Alliance are the ability to evolve a broad consensus on East/West relations, including economic relations, the handling of 'out of area' issues, the European share of the common defence burden and public perceptions of the US in Europe (and vice versa).

(b) The Alliance approach of East/West relations The management of East/West relations should provide the framework for both aspects of the Alliance's security policy - defence and arms control.

Consultation in the Alliance is extensive and there have been practical results. There is considerable scope for exacerbating transatlantic tensions if the handling of East/West relations is mismanaged. There is consequently a need for sustained attention and room for improving the quality of discussion;

(c) The Strategic Debate It will be important to maintain the credibility of NATO's deterrent strategy, which has been the subject of a growing public debate. While the need for a nuclear deterrent remains, the doctrine of flexible response will remain valid. But within the triad of forces, a high priority must be given to improving the quality of the Alliance's conventional forces. Dr Owen has recently written to the Secretary General describing conventional defence as the first question on the Alliance's agenda. The Alliance will need to ensure public support, particularly for modernisation efforts by simultaneously pursuing effective arms control agreements.

(d) The management of defence resources With a number of European allies finding it increasingly difficult to meet NATO's 3% annual real growth target, there is a need to make better use of the resources available to the Alliance. It must get better value for money. There is a need for more coordinated (and longer term) planning to cover not only force planning, but also areas such as infrastructure, armaments cooperation and greater specialisation of defence tasks (provided this does not lead simply to the abandonment of important tasks to ease budgetary problems).

The Role of the Secretary General

4. The Secretary General has few formal powers, but considerable scope for initiative. His office provides a major platform (both public and private) for articulating major issues before the Alliance and moving its members in the desired direction. Though, as the servant of member Governments, he is constrained by the restrictive attitudes of some of these, he can make use of the extensive institutional machinery of the Alliance and the under-used expertise of the International Staff in tackling the issues.

5. There is considerable scope for improving the effectiveness of Alliance consultation; for example by making sure that discussion at both official and Ministerial level is better prepared and structured, and by providing firm leadership from the Chair to ensure that, when possible or appropriate, firm conclusions are reached on major issues. When formal Alliance procedures prove sluggish or intractable, he must look for the innovative or informal ways through. The Secretary General can also help ensure that proper guidance on key issues is given to subordinate bodies; that tasks remitted to them are pursued vigorously; that there is the necessary coordination between various aspects of the Alliance's work; and that there is a better integration of the Alliance's political and military authorities.

6. The health of the Alliance will depend to a large extent on its ability to secure popular support for its policies. There is a strong need for effective public presentation and reassurance covering all the major issues listed above but especially transatlantic relations and defence. Public opinion must be persuaded that the Atlantic Alliance and the transatlantic link remain essential to European security, that the Alliance is pursuing constructive and stable East/West relations, that Alliance strategy remains credible in present circumstances, and that the best value is obtained for the substantial resources devoted to defence. This task falls mainly to individual governments. But the Secretary General, as spokesman for the Alliance, can also make an important contribution, not least by setting the tone for the public debate. Presenting Alliance policies in a convincing way will be one of Lord Carrington's most important tasks. To have maximum impact, both in his public role, and in his work within the Alliance, it will be important for the new Secretary General to develop relationships of confidence with the major capitals, including in particular Paris.

Conclusions

7. The picture which emerges from the major issues discussed above is varied. While the Alliance is now devoting close attention to the management of East/West relations, there is scope for

improving that of European/American relations and, on the defence side, the credibility of Alliance strategy (particularly with respect to conventional defence), management of resources and the coordination of defence planning. Much of the responsibility for improvement rests with Governments: in some cases, such as the European contribution to the common defence, almost exclusively so. But work is already in hand in the Alliance on questions that fall within its competence. Subject always to the adequate provision of resources for defence, the major requirements are better organisation, coordination and motivation. Particularly in the case of the handling of out of area questions may new machinery be required.

8. It has been suggested that the arrival of Lord Carrington provides an opportunty for a major review by a group of 'wise men' of the Alliance and its operation. But this would risk lending credence to the view that there is indeed a crisis. The analysis above suggests that this is not the case. Without under-estimating the role that nations can play in overcoming them, to the extent that the problems are largely organisational they fall very much within the Secretary General's sphere. This makes more attractive the idea that terms of reference might be drawn up for an internal review, perhaps to be conducted by Lord Carrington himself when he assumes office. He will certainly wish to take a long hard look at the operation of the Alliance and its machinery. But there is an atmosphere of anticipation in Brussels and it is in our interests to encourage initiative and more purposeful management by the new Secretary General. If he is to display these qualities convincingly he must clearly be his own man. Even if we wanted to, we could not tie his hands with precise instructions in advance.

9. This does not mean that we (and other allies) should not share with him privately our thoughts on the major issues the Alliance needs to focus on. But presentationally it will be important to allow any initiative to come from him and to give him time to form his own views. We recommend therefore that when Lord Carrington calls on Ministers in London before taking up his appointment, we should set out our own ideas on the main issues and encourage him to contribute to their resolution on the lines of paragraphs 5 and 6 above, and summarised in the attached Statement of Objectives.

STATEMENT OF OBJECTIVES

1. Re-establish as far as possible the public consensus that NATO has no realistic or affordable alternative to a deterrent strategy of forward defence and flexible response. Within this framework, demonstrate that every possible effort is being made to strengthen deterrence at the conventional level.

2. Maintain a firm and consistent approach to the political management of East/West relations, both for its own sake and to sustain wider support for NATO's security policy. The East/West Study to be presented to Ministers in Washington at end May should provide a new basis for this. Unflagging efforts in arms control across the board will also continue to be necessary.

3. Strive for better management and use of existing defence resources. This means streamlining NATO's force planning mechanisms, and putting new political momentum into the harmonisation of operational requirements, joint procurement and armaments collaboration, and (possibly) greater specialisation of military roles and functions. The European allies will have to convince the United States that they take their responsibilities within the Alliance seriously. Closer defence relations with France will be important in this context.

4. Of other potential causes of friction in intra-Alliance relations, the handling of Western security interests outside the NATO area has the greatest potential for mischief. Apart from the complex defence planning implications of the US RDF, the Americans look above all for political support from the Allies when they address out of area problems which directly threaten Western interests. We should therefore seek to ensure that NATO consultative procedures are made more effective in coping with this challenge.

5. Tighten up and improve the preparation and conduct of formal NATO business, with greater concentration on key policy priorities for Ministers. Improve the quality and output of the NATO staffs.

NATO. Appt of Sec-Gen
Septfo

BF 23/5/84

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PRIME MINISTER

On Thursday of next week OD are to discuss, as you asked earlier, the opportunities offered by the arrival of a British NATO Secretary-General for shaping the Alliance and its affairs to better purpose.

You said earlier that you would like to see Lord Carrington before this meeting. Before making an appointment, I should like to be sure that you would prefer to see him before, rather than after, the meeting. Before?

Yes please

A.J.C.

arranged for 15.45 on Thursday 24th HMC

CR 17/5

16 May 1984

CONFIDENTIAL

cc Sir P Cradock

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

26 March 1984

NATO Secretary General

The Prime Minister has seen your letter of 22 March and its enclosures.

Mrs. Thatcher accepts the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's proposal that there should be a Ministerial meeting in May to discuss the opportunities offered by the arrival of a new British Secretary General for shaping the Alliance and its affairs to better purpose. She wishes this discussion to take place in OD on the basis of a suitable paper. I should be grateful if Richard Hatfield could take steps to arrange a meeting of OD.

The Prime Minister proposes to have a brief discussion herself with Lord Carrington before the OD meeting.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

A. J. COLES

Roger Bone Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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Prime Minister.

Agree an OD discussion in May on basis of a paper about what we should seek to achieve in NATO during Lord Carrington's appointment?

Yes but (I should like personally to see Peter Carrington first)

A.J.C. 23/3

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

22 March, 1984

Dear John,

NATO Secretary General

In your letter of 13 March you asked for the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's comments about how to take advantage of Lord Carrington's appointment as NATO Secretary-General to further the British interest.

Sir Geoffrey Howe has already arranged for Lord Carrington to be briefed in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office by FCO and MOD officials as well as by Sir J Graham. The aim was to ensure that Lord Carrington was fully conversant with British thinking on major Alliance political and defence planning priorities, before undertaking his initial round of NATO capitals. The areas covered were those indicated at Annex A to this letter. Lord Carrington said afterwards that he had found this half-day teach-in and the earlier supply of written background material very useful. He also said he assumed that anything that was good for NATO would be good for Britain and vice versa.

In Sir Geoffrey's view the arrival of a new, British, Secretary-General does indeed offer new opportunities for shaping the Alliance and its affairs to better purpose. He agrees that it would be useful to have some Ministerial discussion of this in due course. He believes it will be sensible for this discussion to take place in May, when the North Atlantic Council in Washington will also be under active consideration. The major areas on which we need to reflect would in his opinion include:

(a) the effective management of US/Europe relations within the Alliance;

(b) the need to ensure that NATO's deterrence strategy is in good trim and is matched by a vigorous approach to arms control;

(c) how to make better use of existing defence resources; and

(d) an overall Alliance approach to East/West relations that can stand the test of time and meet the requirement of public re-assurance and support.

Some first thoughts from the UK angle are set out in three recent despatches from Sir J Graham, copies of which I enclose.

It would in Sir Geoffrey's view be particularly valuable for senior Ministers to see Lord Carrington after he has had the benefit of taking views at the political level in other Allied capitals, since this will help us to identify how far British thinking accords with that of our major Allies, as to the opportunities that a change of Secretary General presents. At the same time we must presumably allow a certain period after his appointment for Lord Carrington to gain the confidence of the NATO organisation and the Alliance as a whole, if he is to make the successful impact which in the longer term it is also in the British interest that he should achieve.

I am copying this to Richard Mottram (MOD).

Yours ever

Roger Bone

(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

NEW DIRECTIONS FOR NATO: POLITICAL COHESION

SUMMARY

1. Consultation between Allies has been neglected. There is general malaise in NATO. Widespread hope that the new Secretary General will remedy it enabling NATO to adjust to the changed circumstances of the 1980s, including US impatience with "euro-centric" allies. (Paragraphs 1 - 3).

2. NATO's purpose, so far successfully met, remains defence and the preservation of freedom in Western Europe and North America. They are a common interest of all allied Governments. To preserve it, closer and more systematic Alliance consultation, centred on East-West relations, is essential. An overall and consistent approach is needed. (Paragraphs 4 - 9).

3. Inevitable difficulties with the US over out-of-area problems can best be met by distinguishing between those which involve the Soviet Union, and hence require NATO consultation, and those which do not. No need always to seek decisions which require unanimity: mere discussion is useful. (Paragraphs 10 - 11).

4. Lord Carrington could achieve a lot through oiling the consultation procedures, structuring Council discussions and institutionalising the groups of senior defence and foreign policy officials from capitals which have handled the nuclear issues since 1979. (Paragraphs 12 - 13). Conclusions summed up. (Paragraph 14).

UNITED KINGDOM PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
ON THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL
OTAN NATO
BRUSSELS
TELEPHONE 3426775

29 February 1984

The Rt Hon Sir Geoffrey Howe QC MP
LONDON

Sir,

NEW DIRECTIONS FOR NATO: POLITICAL COHESION

1. "Animus in Consulendo Liber", so runs the motto inscribed behind the chair in the main meeting hall of the North Atlantic Council at Evere. It may have epitomised the work of the Council in the Alliance's early years but cannot in all honesty be said to apply today. NATO allies seem indeed to have forgotten that "an Alliance in which the members ignore each other's interests, or engage in political or economic conflict, or harbour suspicions of each other, cannot be effective either for deterrence or defence" (1956 report of the Three Wise Men). The failure to consult, and the open row, over the Siberian oil and gas pipelines, and now the persistent American criticism of European failure either to contribute proportionately to defence in Europe or to face up to the world-wide nature of the Soviet challenge to Western security have threatened NATO's cohesion. The habit and practice of consultation are all too obviously in poor shape (we do not address here the Middle East or the Iran-Iraq war at all). There is an evident malaise. The Alliance is widely perceived to be ticking over efficiently enough at a routine military level, but to have lost political purpose, to lack inspiration. There is a widespread.

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if incoherent, hope that the new Secretary General will somehow produce a cure: but little disposition so to adjust policies that it might be easier for him to do so. In this despatch I shall examine the extent to which this is a true picture and how things might be improved, short of wholesale restructuring. In separate despatches I shall look at defence aspects and at public perceptions of the Alliance.

2. In retrospect it is clear that the Alliance has not yet adjusted successfully to the dramatic changes in circumstances within its own ranks since 1949. Whilst the United States remain militarily predominant, their relative economic position has altered radically, as has the psychological climate. Western Europe now enjoys per capita incomes to match and surpass those of North America. France, having settled her colonial problems, has recovered her self-confidence and in a spirit of perverse independence has withdrawn from the joint military apparatus, has ejected the Alliance from her soil and misses few opportunities to distance herself from anything that smacks of joint endeavour. Germany is once more a power on the European and world scene, committed to the West but conscious of links of language, kinship, culture and religion with Eastern Europe. The European Community provides a focus, however flawed, for the European identity for which many Europeans hanker, capturing the loyalty and energies of the smaller members of the Alliance who tend increasingly to fret under the American yoke.

3. On the United States side, there is evident irritation that the once subservient Europeans, their economies

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restored by Marshall Aid and massive American trade deficits, not only exhibit signs or latent anti-Americanism but are now less willing to take American judgements on trust and more ready to adopt an independent stand, albeit without the unity or staying-power to give it effect and see it through. It is symptomatic of NATO's problems that the Europeans should have been irritated, even shocked, by Mr Eagleburger's thoughtful discussion of the issues at a conference in Washington on the 31st of January, when he remarked that "in NATO we are always talking about something: it keeps that dialogue going and it tends on occasion ... to mislead us a bit in(to) believing that our basic interests have not begun to diverge. Yet I think it is also true that Western Europeans, at least now, are increasingly less interested in dealing with the stability of the world and far more interested in dealing with stability in and around their particular geographic area". For the United States, which are almost a continent in themselves and look West across the Pacific as well as East across the Atlantic, Europe is not the be-all and end-all. Indeed US Administrations have come over the years to see Western Europe less as partners in a joint enterprise and more as only another area of the world to be "managed", in the interest of projecting American influence. For the reasons then, which Mr Eagleburger gives, as well as for those at which I have hinted above, I myself believe that he is right, that there has been a shift of the kind that he describes. But in contemplating washing their hands of Europe, he and many other Americans draw the wrong conclusion.

4. First, it cannot be sensible, even in terms of projecting American influence, to cast aside the solid positions established in Western Europe in favour of less secure and more costly bases in other parts of the world (and, as Mr Perle

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reminded a conference in Oslo two weeks ago, Diego Garcia is no nearer the Persian Gulf than is Dublin). The American garrisons in Western Europe are, if nothing more, essential links in the American Eastabout reinforcement chain. In any case, the Alliance was not formed to "deal with the stability of the world". Even in 1949 that was left to individual members, and French and British efforts to play a role received little sympathy or support from the US. Indeed, the geographic limits written into the Treaty at American instance were intended to limit the application of the commitment to mutual defence, precisely so that the US would not get involved in European colonial undertakings and none of us would be involved through the operation of the Treaty in the instabilities of the newly emerging independent states. The purpose of the Alliance was to draw a line under Soviet expansion in Europe, in order to preserve the countries of Western Europe and North America as the homelands of the democratic freedoms enshrined in the Atlantic Charter.

5. It has been triumphantly successful in that purpose; and the purpose stands. It is important to remind its members that we all participate in the Alliance in our own interests. Britain maintains forces in Germany and plans the reinforcement of Norway and Denmark in a crisis in Britain's own interests; our frontier is on the Elbe and the Weser. For Americans this may be less obvious, but is nonetheless the truth. American politicians need to be reminded of it and urged to proclaim the necessity, if deterrence is to be effective, of maintaining the politico-military link through the nuclear spectrum between conventional defence in Europe and the American strategic weapons. If deterrence fails it will not be Western Europe only that suffers.

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6. If it is true that there has been a secular change in attitudes, it is the case also that behind current transatlantic sniping lurk further potentially divisive issues common to all the allies in varying degree: the nuclear debate; the questioning of NATO's traditional strategy of flexible response; the growing superiority of Soviet over NATO conventional strength and the wish to harness emerging technology in order to narrow the gap; the chronic frictions between Greece and Turkey; the anomalous positions of Spain and of France; the waverings of Denmark and the Netherlands, not to mention Greece; the relationship with the European Community and, if French and German hopes for its reinvigoration are realised, the Western European Alliance. The present conjuncture, however, is by no means uniformly unfavourable. There is a widespread, if belated, recognition of the need, now that the first stages of INF deployment are safely behind us, to re-establish a dialogue with the Soviet Union, which could go far to ease the anxieties underlying the nuclear debate. The new Soviet leadership is likely to be cautious but may not be entirely unresponsive. Depending on the US election in October, there is a fair prospect of unusual political stability and continuity in the main NATO countries.

7. The East-West relationship lies at the heart of Alliance cohesion. The way in which the Allies manage it is the central focus of political consultation here. Despite the public perception of failure in this field, I am struck, looking back over the past two years, by the extent to which the consultative process has quietly achieved agreement on a number of key East-West issues - INF, CSCE/CDE, martial law in Poland, to name a few. The Siberian pipeline was the most notorious failure. But, although the Alliance took the blame, that was one issue not debated here until after the damage

/had

had been done. It was through consultation within the Alliance that harmony was restored, the Alliance's economic study serving as a vehicle for compromise through a process of mutual education about the nature of the problem and the acceptable limits to useful action. The trouble was that consultation was undertaken only belatedly. And there is always a risk, as in the case of policy towards Poland, that guidelines achieved through painful compromise tend to become the law of the Medes and Persians. Consultation must be a continuing process.

8. A start has been made, on the basis of a Ministerial decision last December, on an appraisal of East-West relations which might form a medium-term framework for Allies' policy towards the various states comprising "the East". The result of textual negotiation between sixteen Governments will be much less clear and punchy than many commentators (and even bureaucrats) desire. It can nonetheless be used to concentrate discussion of East-West relationships on the middle ground where British interests lie. A decision will be needed by Ministers at the end of May about what should be said in public.

9. In the field of arms control the consultative process already works well. The Special Consultative Group (SCG) of senior Foreign Ministry officials under American chairmanship (Mr Richard Burt), having concentrated on implementation of the 1979 INF decisions and kept the Alliance informed about the Geneva talks, is beginning to address possible options following the Soviet walkout, including the possibility of amalgamation with START. The High Level Group (HLG) of senior defence officials continues. Also under an American chairman (Mr Richard Perle), it was responsible for the preparation of last November's Montebello decision on the withdrawal of

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1400 battlefield nuclear warheads and will be looking at the further implications for nuclear tactics of advances in conventional armaments. There will be a need in the next year or two, both for negotiating purposes and to reassure public opinion, to draw our various positions together in an overall approach consistent with the broad policy on East/West relations.

10. Even if effective consultation on the core issues of East-West relations can be achieved, there would remain the concerns raised by Mr Eagleburger at the widening gap between the two sides of the Atlantic and at lack of Alliance solidarity over US policy - and particularly military activity - beyond the NATO area. I doubt whether they can be fully met, although they can, I believe, be kept to manageable proportions. These issues will continue to be approached differently from those I have described as the core ones, precisely because they relate to the world outside the formal NATO area. France will insist on the distinction for doctrinal reasons. And reluctance on the part of many other European Allies to become involved outside Europe will not easily be overcome; nor will US impatience with this narrow perspective. A partial solution may lie in distinguishing cases in which the Soviet Union is, or is likely to become, directly involved (Afghanistan, the Middle East) and others in which that is not so (the Falklands, the Philippines, and indeed Grenada). In the former case it is clear that action taken by one ally, albeit beyond the Treaty area, can have important implications for the Alliance and for deterrence within the Treaty area; and consequently requires close consultation. Nonetheless some issues will remain too sensitive for one or more Governments, or simply too intractable, to allow for discussion in NATO between sixteen nations. It is a limitation, and a potential threat to cohesion, which we have little option but to accept.

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11. Consultation is in any case not a panacea. Like a marriage it demands effort and mutual forebearance. The machinery at Evere is cumbersome and the return on effort often seems slender. The temptation to favour bilateral contacts and to work exclusively through other bodies is strong but should be resisted. The judgement of NATO's Three Wise Men (paragraph 1 above) remains valid and provides a compelling reason for continuing effort to make political consultation here work better. I have a few practical suggestions. First, while full agreement will always be the ideal, it is only realistic to recognise that, in the changed circumstances of the mid-1980s, it will often prove unobtainable between sixteen democracies. To erect it as an invariable objective merely ensures that real but controversial issues are kept out of the consultative machinery. We need to expand and exploit the very large areas of common ground, not concentrate on the divergences, and to discuss problems without necessarily requiring that discussion must lead to unanimity. We can with profit exchange information and debate options so that individual Allied Governments may reach national decisions in the knowledge of their partners' views. The practice of transparency and the establishment of mutual confidence are worthwhile aims within the Alliance as well, not just between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Given these more limited objectives, there is a strong case for more frequent preparatory work and contingency planning. It is a process which has worked well in the preparation for the Conference on Disarmament in Europe in Stockholm and could contribute to allied solidarity in other bodies, for example the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.

12. Mechanisms can also play a part. The Secretary General has few formal powers but he has considerable scope for

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initiative and he has, in the International Staff, an under-used body of expertise to support him. He could play a particular role in structuring discussion, especially in the North Atlantic Council/Defence Planning Committee, where the threads of all the interacting issues facing the Alliance come together. Nevertheless the Council/DPC, the organ through which in a crisis member Governments will have to act, is designed primarily as a formal decision-taking body, working on instructions: it is less well adapted to the informal discussion on which improved political cohesion may well depend. Such informal discussion could perhaps be structured by means of steering papers on the Secretary General's responsibility. An enhanced and more systematic involvement of principals from capitals could play a valuable part. You, Sir, and your colleagues could obtain more benefit - and in the process give NATO consultation more direction and more value - if the Secretary General were to give greater structure to your discussions in the twice yearly "super restricted sessions". There might also then be seen to be advantage in periodic informal gatherings between these fixed points in the calendar, although demands on Ministers' time has increased and probably ought to be diminished. Political Directors, whose role has become crucial to the political cooperation of the Ten, have never had a role in NATO. As the key advisers of Foreign Ministers, their occasional involvement in consultations should be sought. Other key officials are already harnessed into the nuclear planning and arms control processes, through the HLG and the SCG. They have made a striking contribution to the achievement of agreed policies on some of the central issues facing us. If an acceptable framework could be defined for the French, the SCG might develop a broader role in relation to arms control strategy. With somewhat different membership it

/might

might even address policies in other areas. (Could the Council reconstitute the SCG, already chaired by the American Political Director, as an advisory body in which political directors could meet to exchange views on an irregular basis? I suspect that such a medium might be more fruitful than reinforced meetings of the Council.) This would be potentially the most effective way of preparing strategic issues for the Council and for Ministers, as the HLG prepared the Montebello decision.

13. In Alliance terms these modest suggestions would constitute substantial changes. A new Secretary General could not achieve them, or the objectives they would be designed to secure, without the goodwill of the major Allies. American support would be essential: French acquiescence hardly less so, and not easily obtained. The French position, selectively applied depending on French interest in the particular issue raised, seems to be that, while the Council may be used for the exchange of information, it is not an appropriate body for the taking of decisions outside the purposes of the Alliance, strictly defined. They will not surrender their opposition to bloc-to-bloc policies, to expansion (even implicitly) of the NATO area or to an "economic NATO". They are potentially the greatest single brake upon a more effective political Alliance. Yet they are amongst the firmest of the Allies on the main East/West security issues. If President Mitterrand's interest could be engaged, French support for limited reform along the lines suggested is not to be despaired of. The French problem might in any case be finessed through use of the Alliance machinery for thorough discussion of problems rather than the achievement of binding decisions, as I have suggested in paragraph 11.

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14. I conclude that for the next few years we should concentrate the main Alliance effort in the political field on the management of East-West relations and arms control. We should strive for better understanding of out-of-area issues but not necessarily through unanimous decisions, and should define how we would consult over activities which, though physically beyond the area of the Treaty, have implications for its defence and for deterrence. We need in the process to bear in mind and manage the United States' concerns over an excessively "Eurocentric" approach by its European Allies. New machinery is not needed. NATO consultation should merely be thickened: more of it and more use of home-grown ingredients to prepare the product for the Council, allied to a recognition that firm Alliance decisions are not always necessary. The mechanism will never be perfect but as a habit it is healthy and serves to underpin the real cement that binds us together, the common need to defend our way of life.

15. I am sending copies of this despatch and of the two companion despatches to the Secretary of State for Defence, to Her Majesty's Representatives in all NATO capitals, to HM Ambassador in Moscow and to the Permanent Representatives to the United Nations in New York, to the European Community, the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, the Negotiations on Mutual Reductions in Forces and Armaments in Vienna and to the Conference on Disarmament in Europe at Stockholm.

I am Sir
yours faithfully

JOHN GRAHAM

NEW DIRECTIONS FOR NATO: PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS

SUMMARY

1. Popular support for NATO has weakened; indeed its nuclear policies are widely unpopular. Widespread concern over early use of nuclear weapons. Some tendency in Europe to equate the two super-powers. (Paragraphs 1 - 4).

2. A new exercise in reassurance is needed. Serious pursuit of stable East/West relations and of arms control agreements is an essential element. The roles of the US and FRG are crucial and the particular sensitivities of both must be taken care of. (Paragraphs 5 - 7). The limits of public support will constrain military decisions. (Paragraph 8).

3. Alliance policies must be convincingly projected. Individual nations must play the main part but NATO itself has a coordinating role and the new Secretary General can set the tone. (Paragraphs 9 - 10).

CONFIDENTIAL

UNITED KINGDOM PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
ON THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL
OTAN NATO
UKC BRUSSELS
TELEPHONE 2426775

29 February 1984

The Rt Hon Sir Geoffrey Howe QC MP
LONDON

Sir,

NEW DIRECTIONS FOR NATO: PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS

1. The Alliance itself is habitually blamed when its members quarrel on whatever topic. It is frequently said that after thirty-five years it must be out of date. And its military posture has come under increasing public challenge. These pressures are not going to subside. They are a major factor not only in the way the Alliance presents its policies but in their content. The present Secretary General has been a tireless and forceful defender of the Alliance position. However, he has never reconciled himself to the thought that the changed public environment is here to stay. For the new Secretary General the Alliance's ability to develop both diplomatic and defence policies which will once again enjoy overwhelming majority popular support in Europe is likely to be one of the keys to whether he can leave the Alliance in a healthier state than he finds it.

2. The present situation reflects the erosion, in Professor Michael Howard's words, of "reassurance", that is of public confidence that the policies adopted by Governments will in fact increase security. Neither the objective threat nor the logic of the Alliance's concepts of deterrence and

/flexible

flexible response have changed. What has changed is public perception of the reality of Soviet expansionism and the willingness in Europe to live with a strategy which, because of what are generally held as inadequate conventional forces, depends to an excessive degree for its effectiveness as a deterrent on the early use of nuclear weapons, weapons moreover which are principally in the hands, not of their own Governments, but of the US.

3. The position is not critical. The main Allied Governments have parliamentary support for present policies. Initial INF deployment took place without the political upheavals many predicted. But the problem remains: the tide has ebbed but will probably flow again. It is too soon to be confident that future high waters will not breach the bank. At the very least we must take precautions to make this less probable. The apparent continuing support in the opinion polls for NATO itself but not for its fundamental military strategy is both inconsistent and a worrying sign, because without that strategy the all-important US commitment to the Alliance would be extremely difficult to maintain. The aim must be to build once again the strong, largely bipartisan, consensus behind the Alliance's policies which existed in most European countries in the 1960s and 1970s. The foundations are sound: the structure needs maintenance.

4. A number of different elements in public attitudes have to be distinguished, and tackled as parts of a consistent overall approach. The younger generation is naturally more questioning than its elders about the

/intellectual

intellectual and political roots of an Alliance formed before many of them were born. There are very few active supporters of the Soviet Union in the West, probably fewer than there were 20-30 years ago, but many have doubts about the threat that it presents and just how aggressive or expansionist Soviet intentions are. US leadership is seen as having been dangerously inconsistent over the past 15 years and the rhetoric of the early phase of the present US Administration still leaves its mark in the tendency among some political leaders and many members of the public to equate the two super powers, in a way which a few years ago would have been greeted with derision. European and American views of the world sometimes differ alarmingly. Above all, a new generation of nuclear weapons has re-awakened more powerfully than ever the natural moral and emotional reactions which have been present in the past but had lain dormant since the mid 1960s.

5. An exercise in reassurance by the Alliance similar to that successfully undertaken in the 1950s and 1960s will need to include several elements. The nature of the threat and the risk of war must be kept rigorously in perspective. Alliance Governments must visibly and seriously pursue the maintenance of stable East-West relations. Arms limitation and reductions - particularly nuclear-must be tenaciously pursued. Nuclear tasks and inventories should be reduced where possible, and any further nuclear modernisation be handled very carefully. A decision to abandon the short range battlefield nuclear weapons, whose military justification must be greatly diminished by the possibility of introducing longer range weapons such as Lance, or an improved Lance, would make a major contribution to public acceptance of the strategy. In the field of chemical warfare, success at Geneva in the

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negotiation of a complete ban would of course be a major prize. Failing that, any steps towards the modernisation of the Alliance's out-of-date retaliatory capability will need to be as carefully handled and explained as any of the nuclear decisions. The credibility of deterrence, and with it the reduced risk of war, whether conventional or nuclear, must be stressed. Ways of reducing the Alliance's apparent dependence on early use of nuclear weapons by improved conventional defences (including advanced conventional armaments) must be pursued, in parallel with the enhancement of public awareness that this trend will call for greater, not less, defence expenditure.

6. Two Allied nations in particular have a critical role to play. The US commitment to defend Europe remains at the heart of the Alliance. Europe has no alternative in the short or medium term and would not be willing to pay for the defence forces which might conceivably substitute. Decline in understanding of, and confidence in, the American role - as symbolised in the scale of popular rejection of new US missiles - is one of the most worrying features of the present scene. It is of little surprise that this attitude leaves American opinion bewildered. Views of the nature of the Soviet threat and of the global nature of security also differ. While that is so, there will remain a real, if not an immediate, threat to the continuing stability of the Alliance. This has to be tackled on both sides of the Atlantic and in public as well as through improved inter-governmental understanding. The revitalisation of transatlantic understanding and of the sense of common values and purpose, particularly amongst young people, is an issue of major importance to the

/Alliance

Alliance. It is in the contribution which they can bring to this sense of a shared transatlantic culture that the non-defence related activities of the Alliance (science, environment, culture) have a role to play.

7. The other main key to Alliance health is Germany. It is there that the problem has developed most acutely, and there that the stakes are highest. Other Allied Governments, and particularly the US, need to recognise this in setting objectives for the Alliance. The reconstitution of the German consensus on security policy, one of the key elements of Alliance stability for 20 years, should be a major objective for the Alliance as a whole. This will affect in particular the evolving debate on strategy, the enhancement of conventional forces and the raising of the nuclear threshold. There has evidently been a change in German political opinion in the past year or so; talk of a higher nuclear threshold, a delay in the resort to nuclear weapons, does not now so easily produce the counter-argument that it would increase the likelihood of a conventional battle on German soil. However, sensitivities are still high and will need to be constantly borne in mind as the defence planning work of the Alliance continues.

8. I conclude therefore that the Alliance must have greater care, in working out policies, to take into account public opinion, as well as the military and diplomatic imperatives. In some cases the limits of public support will have to be accepted as constraints on militarily sensible options. The mutual perception by the public in Europe and the US of the specific role of the other deserves more attention.

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9. Secondly, the policies of the Alliance must be forcefully and efficiently put across. This needs to be done across the whole range of issues, not the nuclear ones alone, and will need a sustained effort by Ministers throughout the Alliance. (The extent to which General Rogers has monopolised the public debate in the past two years is striking). This is less a matter of "NATO information" than of national effort. The French will in any case block any significant expansion of NATO's information work. National programmes will be the main vehicle and political speeches, information material and non-governmental organisations must all be involved. The Allies must pull effectively in the same direction. NATO's role is in coordinating the efforts.

10. In all this a heavy burden will fall on Lord Carrington, nonetheless difficult because he can only work indirectly through Governments. He can, however, help to forge policies which will reassure. He can coordinate the consultation process. He can make NATO Headquarters a more effective outlet than it is now. His own public statements will set the tone of the debate. But the policies in the end will be the policies of Governments, and I hope that Her Majesty's Government will take a lead in helping the Alliance to move forward collectively in the directions I have suggested.

11. I am copying this despatch to the Secretary of State for Defence, Her Majesty's Representatives in the capitals of all NATO members and Moscow, the United Kingdom

/Permanent

Permanent Representatives to the European Community and the United Nations, and to the Heads of the United Kingdom Delegations to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, the Negotiations on Mutual Reductions in Forces and Armaments in Vienna and to the Conference on Disarmament in Europe at Stockholm.

I am Sir
yours faithfully

JOHN GRAHAM

NEW DIRECTIONS FOR NATO: DEFENCE PLANNING

SUMMARY

1. The policy of 3% real increase per annum in defence expenditure is running out of steam, though not ~~desolate~~. The Weinberger initiative over Emerging Technologies to modernise conventional forces is the new nostrum. (Paragraphs 1 - 3). The concepts involved are not new, but the initiative has stimulated fresh military thinking in NATO, particularly in relation to the nuclear threshold. Despite exaggerated claims, the strategy of flexible response and forward defence, with the link to the American strategic deterrent, remains valid. (Paragraphs 4 - 5).

2. The urgent problems are sustainability and readiness. Importance of infrastructure. We must exploit what we have. (Paragraphs 6 - 8).

3. Major constraints on role-specialisation will continue but there must be greater effort to achieve a more sensible distribution of tasks. To affect national decisions, NATO's planning time-frame should be longer than six years. The whole planning system should be simplified and should aim to identify clear priorities. (Paragraphs 9 - 12).

4. A fresh attempt is needed to make a reality of the two-way street in arms procurement. A political impulse is needed both in the US and in Europe. In the long term, reduction of US conventional forces in Europe seems inevitable. The process must be managed and Europe remains "coupled" with the US nuclear guarantee. (Paragraphs 13 - 15).

5. The UK: enormous contribution and detached attitude. (Paragraph 16).

6. Recommendations. (Paragraph 17).

CONFIDENTIAL

UNITED KINGDOM PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
ON THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL
OTAN NATO
1110 BRUSSELS
TELEPHONE 2428775

29 February 1984

The Rt Hon Sir Geoffrey Howe QC MP
LONDON

Sir,

NEW DIRECTIONS FOR NATO: DEFENCE PLANNING

1. Just as the political basis for the Alliance has come under challenge, so its strategies are being questioned in the light of changes in the military balance. The Soviet Union has achieved strategic nuclear parity; it has overwhelming superiority in intermediate-range systems; and the Warsaw Pact has continued to out-strip NATO in conventional capability. There is mounting concern that this process brings with it too great a reliance on the first, or at any rate the early, use of nuclear weapons. Such concern is felt by many who fall well short of arguing that there could never be circumstances when NATO would have to use its nuclear weapons first, but who question the credibility of the strategy of flexible response, either on the grounds that the devastation of Europe at an early stage in the conflict is not a credible option or that the conventional part of the strategy has been allowed to become too weak. Such people argue that the credibility of the Alliance's deterrent posture can only be restored by improving and enlarging its conventional capability. It is on this contention that I shall concentrate in this despatch although conventional and nuclear defence cannot be wholly separated.

2. For years the emphasis of defence planning in NATO has been on greater effort. The policy of 3% real increase

per year in defence expenditure, introduced together with the Long-Term Defence Programme (LTDP) in 1977, has been the lynch-pin of NATO planning and the yardstick by which successive annual Defence Reviews and biennial Force Goals exercises have been conducted. The LTDP has now run its course, some 70% of the programme having been implemented and the unfulfilled balance having been merged into NATO's regular planning processes. As economic pressures have mounted, 3% has become a clarion call of diminishing effectiveness, and Her Majesty's Government for one have announced that they will not extend into 1986-7 their commitment to meet the aim. NATO has yet to find a new theme, if not to replace, at least to supplement the 3% policy.

3. The theme most prominently on offer is the bundle of concepts labelled "new technology". The launching by Mr Weinberger at the Defence Planning Committee in December 1982, of a study of the military application of emerging technologies, is closely related in substance to General Rogers's ideas for the modernisation of conventional forces, in order to prolong defence by conventional means and put off the fateful decision to resort to nuclear weapons. It finds an echo in a public debate stimulated by a number of recent studies including the European Security Study (ESECS Report) and the British Atlantic Committee's booklet by Lord Cameron and others. By exploiting new technologies, it is argued, we can acquire the capacity to deliver conventional munitions over long distances with great accuracy and thus enable military commanders to achieve by conventional means objectives similar to those which hitherto could be realised only by nuclear weapons. The American advocates of the new technology see in it

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also a means of demonstrating to Congress that NATO is actively addressing its problems and that the Europeans are bearing their fair share of the burden. The sceptics point to the costs of the new weaponry; to the unavoidable inflexibility of national programmes in the short or medium term; to the danger that new or emerging technology may become simply a shopping list of US weaponry; to the risks of ambiguity inherent in missiles normally associated with nuclear warheads being used in the conventional role; and, finally, though this is not an argument against the proposal, to the fact that at the conceptual level there is little that is new about attack on follow-on forces, counter-air operations, or the emphasis on command, control and communications.

4. The new ideas have undoubtedly acted as a stimulus to fresh military thinking within the Alliance. SHAPE, in particular, is devoting more effort to conceptual work and new impetus has been given to long term planning. This is welcome in itself, and it is also of political and presentational value that the allies should be seen to be addressing imaginatively and seriously the possibility of advances in conventional defence and their implications for nuclear tactics. Nevertheless the concept of "raising the nuclear threshold" may be more elusive than specialists sometimes assume, and there is a risk that expectations will be generated which cannot be fulfilled either quickly or within manageable cost. The main criticism of General Rogers's crusade is that there is no prospect of transforming conventional defence in the way he envisages for a mere 4% real increase in expenditure per annum, a sum which is anyhow in practical terms beyond reach, if the Alliance's experience with the 3% target is any guide. Furthermore, although attention is rightly turning to the effect that advanced conventional armaments may have on nuclear requirements, there is no foreseeable prospect

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that conventional improvements will justify a fundamental change in our nuclear strategy, including the link to the US strategic deterrent. The substitution of conventional means for certain nuclear tasks will not transform the nuclear debate (although the abandonment of the whole category of very short-range battlefield nuclear weapons, for which I personally see a strong case but which is not in immediate prospect, could be another matter).

5. In advocating a review of NATO strategy, as some proponents of new thinking are apt to do, they oversell their wares. The new concepts arising out of the application of new technology are tactical and do not in themselves put in question the strategy. Moreover, the basic framework of flexible response and forward defence accommodates national positions and sensitivities which are as current today as they were in 1967, when they were evolved. Above all, the Germans are understandably hostile to any change which might suggest that conventional war is more tolerable than nuclear war and can be fought, and won, on their soil. Within the strategic framework, on the other hand, their inflexibility is not absolute. They take a sensible rather than "Maginot Line" view of what forward defence entails, as their last Defence White Paper makes clear. While Dr Woerner, like his predecessor, has firmly rejected the suggestion that conventional force improvements may make the no-first-use (NOFUN) debate academic, he argued at the recent Wehrkunde Conference, and found a wide measure of support, that the dependence of our strategy on the early use of nuclear weapons must be reduced as soon as possible, a distinction which encapsulates the boundary of the debate.

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6. Be all this as it may, the most pressing problems of conventional defence are not in the area of modernisation, which will in any case take time and is a continuing process, or of new concepts, but in sustainability and readiness and in other ways, in General Rogers's phrase, of improving what we have. This is partly a matter of increasing investment in certain areas of weakness which undermine the value of investment in other areas. War reserve stocks are the prime example; this is an area of critical weakness which threatens to undermine the value of the Alliance's conventional forces and to put a term to theperiod of conventional defence regardless of improvements to weaponry. Another blatant example is the lack, because the main user nations cannot agree on a common technical solution, of an adequate identification system for distinguishing enemy from friendly air forces. In a conflict, we stand to shoot down a high proportion of our own aircraft. Progress towards a long-term, high- technology solution is proving painfully slow. During the lengthy transition phase before a NATO system is fully implemented, there is an urgent need to take steps to remedy the existing incompatibilities. It will cost money, but to do nothing is wasteful and even dangerous.

7. Infrastructure is yet another example. It is generally recognised that infrastructure-funding is inadequate and that the resulting gaps, for example in communications and data-handling, are damaging. Ideally Governments should be persuaded to dip their hands a little deeper into their pockets, to find what in terms of their defence expenditure overall are relatively small sums, in order to obtain a disproportionate enhancement of capability. Failing that there may be a need to re-define, more restrictively, the scope of the common infrastructure programme. But that would be an unwelcome necessity and some facilities, notably common communications, can be provided only on a common basis.

8. Exploiting what we have is also, and more generally, a matter of securing the maximum value from the resources at the Alliance's disposal. This is a theme which the United Kingdom has taken the lead in emphasising and which has been firmly written into NATO documents from the Bonn Summit of 1982 onwards. The Warsaw Pact achieves a much bigger output from an input of resources that is no bigger than NATO's. To the extent that it is nations, and not NATO headquarters, that manage programmes and administer forces, the means of achieving better value for money rest with nations and not in some Alliance master-plan. But NATO does have a role, notably in planning for the best possible use to be made of civil resources in support of military operations, and in encouraging standardisation and specialisation.

9. The United Kingdom has in the past received no encouragement from allies to pursue the theme of specialisation, not only industrially but in role (some may suspect that we might prefer to "specialise" in the maritime role and withdraw from the Continent). The subject has now however become a matter of more open discussion, following significant Belgian and Dutch defence cuts. Belgium has effectively opted out of one major role (participation in the air defence missile belt) without making arrangements for somebody else to take it on (though they are talking to the US and some solution may emerge). There will, however, continue to be major constraints on any large-scale role-specialisation; and specialisation can, as in the Belgian case, all too easily turn into a pretext for burden-shedding. Conversely, governments will understandably hesitate to expose themselves to the risk of failure by others to provide essential elements of national defence. Political, industrial and employment factors will loom large. But the obstacles do not mean that the effort to achieve a more rational distribution of tasks is

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not worth undertaking. The objective should be to work towards the best possible complementarity of national forces. A start has already been made, for example, in the purchase by the USAF of Rapier to be manned by the RAF Regiment and in the recent agreement between the US and the FRG for the reciprocal purchase of Patriot and Roland. In a longer timescale, it ought to be possible to move towards greater harmonisation of national contributions, achieving a measure of specialisation through adjustments rather than revolutionary change. It is an issue of particular relevance to the Europeans, both as neighbours and fellow-members, for the most part, of the European community, and because the US, as a super-power, will not contemplate abandoning any role. NATO can play a part: in particular the Alliance's medium-term planning time-frame, now based primarily on the five to six year force goal cycle, will need to be extended to a period in which national decisions, including broad decisions on the weight of national effort such as those in the White Paper of 1981, "The Way Forward" (Cmnd 8288), are still open to influence.

10. The Belgian and Dutch changes also underline the need for NATO to manage changes in national defence programmes more rationally. Ideally, member states should be prepared to engage in genuine consultation when confronted by the need to change their defence programmes, and NATO must be capable of giving sensible, practical and speedy answers. The recent Belgian experience illustrates NATO's failure on all three counts. Even if the procedure can be improved, however, the main snag will remain, that the major powers, notably the US, the FRG and the UK, are in my judgement unlikely to be willing to submit their defence planning decisions to real rather than proforma scrutiny.

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11. NATO's defence planning process, including the biennial force goals exercise and the annual defence review, provides the principal means for the Major NATO Commanders (MNCs) to put their operational requirements to Governments. That they must be able to do; but the mechanism is now highly elaborate and follows a fixed cycle which produces lengthy reports to Defence Ministers at meetings of the Defence Planning Committee. There is a tendency for NATO planners to seek solutions to real-life problems in bureaucratic terms, ie in more and better planning. It is open to question whether the present procedure exercises any real influence on national decisions by the larger nations. The element of "challenge" in it, normally interpreted as being the financial margin by which the force goals exceed national plans, is open to misunderstanding. NATO planners succumb too readily to the institutional tendency of the system to exaggerate the threat, understate real improvements achieved, and prescribe more effort all round rather than identifying manageable priorities. Moreover the allocation of a force goal by the MNC's to one nation rather than another, can only be based on crude historical precedent.

12. These flaws were recognised at NATO's annual defence planning symposium at Oberammergau in January. It was acknowledged that the planning system has become over-elaborate and that there is a need for change, not to the framework but to the way in which the framework is used. The aim of any reform should be a clearer identification of priorities, less bureaucratic detail, and the extension of the planning time-frame, without making the system altogether too cumbersome. Debate on these measures has already begun.

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13. The health of the Alliance is not to be measured only in terms of what is politically visible. In the area of support, be it logistic, civil emergency planning or the exchange of information, the most useful work is the least visible. An array of working groups exists to harmonise requirements, exchange technical information, and work towards standardisation and - less ambiguously and more successfully - interoperability. Glamorous successes, in terms of multilateral collaboration, are few. Of their nature projects are seldom practicable on more than a bi- or at most tri-lateral basis. But armaments cooperation covers a wider field than collaboration, and there is new emphasis on transatlantic armaments cooperation and on making the "two-way street" work. The new US Permanent Representative has made it a major theme that there needs to be a "more rational Alliance resources strategy", although he has not as yet developed this into practical proposals. The Germans and Dutch have emphasised the need to activate the two-way street if the Europeans are to respond adequately to the US initiative on emerging technology. Mr Heseltine has spoken in the Defence Planning Committee and in EUROGROUP of the need for a political impulse to be given to this work and for the difficult decisions it will involve, to be faced. The Dutch have ambitions for the Independent European Programme Group, which they currently chair. As with role specialisation, it can never be easy for democratic governments to opt out of areas of research or production, but it is of key importance that the Europeans should develop a framework for cooperation, which will enable Europe to hold its own in a real two-way cooperation with the US.

14. The shift in US interest away from Europe towards South-West Asia and the Pacific, their impatience with Eurocentric allies and their desire to manage security and

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stability on a world scale have profound implications for defence policy in addition to those inthe political field which I have discussed in a companion despatch. The trend in US attitudes is almost certainly a secular one and in the long run irreversible. The US convey the impression in NATO, when out-of-area issues, emerging technology, or any subject with a burden-sharing tinge to it is discussed, that if Europe supports the American line, that will be welcomed; if it does not, then the US will not be seriously deflected and will draw its own conclusions. The waving of the burden-sharing stick, the threat of reduction in the US presence in Europe, does not march wholly logically with constant US reminders of the potency of the Soviet threat. It is a source of disharmony that the US, with a global perspective, have a different sense of the threat from most Europeans who, for all the well-known disparities in forces, do not feel the military threat in Europe to be imminent and are reluctant to agree that a military response to the threat posed by the Soviet Union beyond the Treaty area is necessarily and always right.

15. I have suggested in my companion despatch some ways in which this disharmony may perhaps be controlled. Although with good luck and good management changes will be slow and undramatic, in the long term the Europeans cannot rely on the maintenance by the US of conventional forces in Europe on the present scale. Such political pressures as will operate from time to time in the US for change will operate in one direction only: downwards. (With this slow change, may come an end to the unacknowledged tendency for the US Administration, after wielding the burden-sharing stick, to connive with the Europeans in piecing together for the benefit of Congress and the American public a colourable account of European efforts. The current

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history of the out-of-area issue may be an example). But the process must be managed in such a way that "coupling" with the US nuclear guarantee is preserved; and coupling requires that whatever reductions may take place, a significant US presence remains in Europe in both the conventional and nuclear fields. There is no foreseeable substitute for the US nuclear guarantee, although there are some European Governments and, even more, political parties, who behave as though there were (or at least as though the abandonment by smaller members of significant commitments does not have a potentially destructive effect on collective positions). It is vital that this delusion be contained and exposed. A future US Administration could conceivably be persuaded that it had the option of withdrawing the nuclear guarantee without impairing crucially its own security. Europeans must not discover too late that this is not an alternative which is open to them.

16. What of the UK? We make an enormous contribution to all three MNCs and received an excellent end of term report in last autumn's NATO Review. We have a more detached attitude than most other Europeans. We are sceptical about NATO's planning processes. Sharing some American concerns we are more in tune with their thinking over out-of-area issues. We tend to think of ourselves as occupying, on almost any issue, a position somewhere on a scale which has the US at one end and the Europeans at the other. This can be a damaging habit of mind. Unlike most other Europeans, above all the Germans and the Dutch, for all our massive contribution to the integrated military structure, we are perhaps instinctively closer to the French in not, in our hearts, thinking of the performance of other European members of the Alliance, or of the Alliance machine as a whole, as contributing significantly to our own security. To this extent we do not seem to our allies entirely to believe, or to act on, our constantly reiterated affirmation that NATO

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is the lynch-pin of our security. We do not always therefore contribute as much as we might to such general debates as there are within NATO on defence planning issues.

17. To sum up, then:

(i) the Europeans should not leave all new military thinking to the US. The efforts of the MNCs to produce new concepts and new long-term guidelines should be supported and the results properly debated; and the MNCs should be encouraged to be specific in proposing practical priorities.

(ii) "Flexible response" remains a valid strategy for the Alliance, though new conventional developments may make possible changes in tactics and, I would hope, some further reductions of the nuclear stockpile. The link to the American strategic deterrent remains vital.

(iii) Specialisation, in role as well as industrially, may be a distant and elusive goal, not to be achieved through a master-plan. But the logic of scarce resources points in this direction. NATO should be a forum for the harmonisation of long-term national plans so that, in the long run, national programmes are increasingly complementary.

(iv) NATO should be used to ensure that changes in national plans take account of Alliance strategy and needs, through real consultation in which NATO gives early responses and practical guidance on priorities.

(v) There is a need to improve the debates at the Defence Planning Committee's meetings, both at Permanent Representative and Ministerial levels. This will entail

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resistance to the demands of the NATO bureaucracy, and simplification of the planning procedures and papers which dominate agenda. It would be aided by a revival of the role and authority of the Military Committee under its new Chairman and the new Secretary General can give it impetus.

(vi) The debate in NATO should be informed by a realistic view of the threat and of allied capabilities. Alarmist assessments weaken the case for continued efforts by governments and the public, and undermine deterrence by selling our capabilities short, particularly in relation to such unquantifiable aspects as training, professionalism, resolve.

(vii) The theme of better value for money should receive continued emphasis. Although the remedies lie largely in the hands of nations, NATO itself can contribute. The shift in emphasis in NATO planning towards measures of output is to be welcomed.

(viii) The provision of adequate resources nevertheless remains vital. There is as yet no substitute for the 3% standard, even if in three years' time the United Kingdom will be among those who cannot implment it.

18. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Secretary of State for Defence, Her Majesty's Representatives in the capitals of all NATO members and Moscow, the United Kingdom Permanent Representatives to the European Community and the United Nations, and to the Heads of the

/United

United Kingdom Delegations to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, the Negotiations on Mutual Reductions in Forces and Armaments in Vienna and to the Conference on Disarmament in Europe at Stockholm.

I am Sir
yours faithfully

JOHN GRAHAM

NATO Sec General
Sept 80

22 MAR 1994

CONFIDENTIAL

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

13 March 1984

NATO SECRETARY GENERAL

The Prime Minister said recently that she thought that we ought to consider the extent to which it would be possible to take advantage of Lord Carrington's appointment as NATO Secretary General to secure progress within NATO on matters of interest to Britain. Mrs. Thatcher has as yet given me no indication of the precise questions which she has in mind but I think that they include matters relating to NATO's military strategy as well as issues such as equipment standardisation.

The Prime Minister may well wish to hold a Ministerial meeting some time in advance of the date when Lord Carrington takes up his post in order to refine our thinking further - and as a prelude to a discussion with Lord Carrington himself.

At this stage it would be very helpful to have the comments of the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Secretary of State for Defence both on the general proposition that we should take advantage of Lord Carrington's appointment in this way and on the specific questions which we might consider putting to him. I should be grateful for advice in due course.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence).

A. J. COLES

Brian Fall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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PS/No 10 Downing St

D E D I P

CONFIDENTIAL
FM UKDEL NATO 301434Z NOV 80
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 303 OF 30 NOVEMBER

FOLLOWING FOR HEAD OF DEFENCE DEPARTMENT
NATO SECRETARY GENERAL

1. AT A MEETING OF PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES THIS MORNING THE DEAN INFORMED US THAT LUNS AND CARRINGTON HAD AGREED ON A HAND-OVER DATE OF 25 JUNE 1984 (THIS CONFIRMS WHAT DAUNT HAS TOLD YOU). ALTHOUGH I HAVE REASON TO THINK THAT SOME GOVERNMENTS ARE UNHAPPY ABOUT THIS LONG DELAY, THE GENERAL FEELING CLEARLY IS THAT WE HAVE TO FALL IN WITH LUNS'S WISHES AND NO CONCERN WAS VOICED AT THE MEETING.

2. MERILLON (FRANCE) INFORMED US OF M. CHEYSSON'S QUOTE PROBABLE UNQUOTE CONDUCT OF THE ELECTION PROCEDURE. IN ORDER TO ENSURE THAT MATTERS WENT QUICKLY AND SIMPLY AT THE PLENARY MEETING, CHEYSSON WOULD CANVAS THE OPINION OF HIS COLLEAGUES ON CARRINGTON'S NAME AND ON THE DATE, EITHER BEFORE OR AFTER THE MINISTERS' LUNCH ON THURSDAY 8 DECEMBER (PROBABLY AT THE END OF THE SUPER RESTRICTED SESSION WHEN MINISTERS MIGHT BE ASKED TO REMAIN BEHIND). CHEYSSON WILL ASSUME THAT THE SECRETARY OF STATE WILL BE IN A POSITION TO CONVEY LORD CARRINGTON'S FORMAL ACCEPTANCE OF THE APPOINTMENT. THE MATTER WOULD THEN BE TAKEN IN THE PLENARY AS THE PENULTINATE ITEM ON THE WAC AGENDA, IMMEDIATELY BEFORE THE COMMUNIQUE. AT THAT POINT THE SECRETARIAT WOULD PRODUCE A DRAFT PARAGRAPH FOR THE COMMUNIQUE.

3. IN THE FORMAL MEETING OF THE COUNCIL THIS MORNING TO CONSIDER THE AGENDA OF THE MINISTERIAL MEETING IT WAS AGREED THAT, WHILE THE NORMAL PRACTICE OF GIVING THE ITEM HEADINGS OF THE AGENDA TO THE PRESS SHOULD BE FOLLOWED, THERE SHOULD BE NO REFERENCE TO THE QUOTE HOUSEKEEPING ITEMS UNQUOTE, IE ITEM 6 (DATE AND PLACE OF NEXT MEETING), 7 (ANY OTHER BUSINESS), 8 (APPOINTMENT OF A NEW SECRETARY GENERAL) AND 9 (COMMUNIQUE), IN AN ATTEMPT TO LIMIT PREMATURE SPECULATION.

4. AT THE MEETING OF PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES IT WAS ALSO AGREED THAT THE EX GRATIA PAYMENT TO BE MADE TO LUNS SHOULD BE ONE YEAR'S SALARY CALCULATED ON THE BASIS OF BASIC SALARY PLUS HOUSEHOLD ALLOWANCES AT THE RATES CURRENT WHEN HE RETIRES, THIS SUM TO BE TRANSFERRED FROM THIS YEAR'S BUDGET TO NEXT. THE POINT WAS MADE THAT THIS SHOULD NOT NECESSARILY BE A PRECEDENT FOR THE FUTURE SINCE SOME GOVERNMENTS WILL WISH TO REVIEW THE WHOLE QUESTION OF EX GRATIA PAYMENTS OF THIS KIND. THE FIGURE AT PRESENT RATES AMOUNTS TO BF 3,304,752 AND IS THEREFORE WITHIN THE ORIGINAL APPROXIMATE FIGURE TO WHICH WE AGREED OF BF 4 MILLION.

5. IMMEDIATE ACTION REQUIRED IS THE FURNISHING OF SOME COMMUNICATION FROM CARRINGTON TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE. I SUGGEST THAT A MESSAGE SHOULD BE SENT TO HIM CARE OF THE HIGH COMMISSION, WELLINGTON, WHICH HE REACHES ON 4 DEC, WITH A DRAFT REPLY WHICH CAN BE TELEGRAPHED FROM WELLINGTON FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO USE ON 8/9 DECEMBER.
THE DRAFT MIGHT READ:
QUOTE I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD CONFIRM TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL, SHOULD THE MINISTERS HONOUR ME BY FORMALLY INVITING ME TO SERVE AS THE NEXT SECRETARY GENERAL TO NATO, THAT I SHOULD BE PROUD TO ACCEPT UNQUOTE.
6. THERE REMAINS THE DIFFICULT MATTER OF TERMS OF SERVICE AND ALSO OF THE DIRECTEUR DU CABINET. I FORESEE NO PROBLEM ABOUT LORD CARRINGTON'S PREFERENCE FOR A 4 YEAR TERM. HE WILL NEED TO MAKE CERTAIN DECISIONS ABOUT THE PENSION SCHEME BUT AGAIN THAT SHOULD NOT PROVE DIFFICULT. EVERYBODY HAS ACCEPTED HIS WISH TO VISIT CAPITALS, WHICH MAKES THE MORE SENSE GIVEN THE LATE DATE OF HANDOVER AND THERE IS MONEY FOR SUCH VISITS IN THE BUDGET. THE ONLY REAL DIFFICULTY IS TRANSPORT TO THE UK AT WEEKENDS. I WILL WRITE SEPARATELY ABOUT THIS. AS FOR THE DIRECTEUR, IT WOULD ASSIST THE PRESENT INCUMBENT (WHOSE HELP IN THIS PERIOD OF TAKE-OVER COULD BE QUITE USEFUL) IF LORD CARRINGTON COULD WRITE TO LUNS SAYING THAT HE WILL WISH TO BRING HIS OWN DIRECTEUR DU CABINET WITH HIM. I HAVE OFFERED TO LORD CARRINGTON TO COME TO LONDON TO DISCUSS THESE AND ANY OTHER POINTS THAT MAY ARISE WITH HIM IN THE WEEK AFTER THE COUNCIL.
7. GRATEFUL TO KNOW IF THERE ARE ANY PLANS FOR LORD CARRINGTON TO SEE THE PRESS ON THE AFTERNOON OF 9 DEC.

GRAHAM

LIMITED

HEAD/DEFENCE D
PS
PS/PUS
SIR J BULLARD
MR WRIGHT
MR CARTLEDGE

COPIES TO:

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MR ~~BULLOCK~~ Bellod, DUSP, MOD

GR 400

CONFIDENTIAL

Ps/No 10 Downing St

D E D I P

CONFIDENTIAL
FM UKDEL NATO 221645Z NOV 83
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 288 OF 22 NOVEMBER
INFO IMMEDIATE KUALA LUMPUR (PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR, FOR LORD CARRINGTON) NEW DELHI (FOLLOWING FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY TO SECRETARY OF STATE)

Pa Downs 23/11

M I P T: NATO SECRETARY GENERAL

1. I HAVE HAD A PRELIMINARY DISCUSSION WITH LOPPENTHIEN, THE HEAD OF ADMINISTRATION. THERE ARE A NUMBER OF RELATIVELY MINOR MATTERS SUCH AS WHETHER LORD CARRINGTON WOULD WISH TO PARTICIPATE IN NATO'S PENSION SCHEME, THE STATUS OF LORD CARRINGTON AND HIS IMMEDIATE STAFF WHEN HE MAKES HIS VISITS TO CAPITALS BEFORE THE HANDOVER (FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF LIABILITY IN THE CASE OF ACCIDENT AND SO ON, AS WELL AS SALARY - I PRESUME LORD CARRINGTON WOULD LOOK ONLY FOR EXPENSES AND THAT HMG WOULD RETAIN THE STAFF ON THEIR PAY ROLL UNTIL THE FORMAL SECONDMENT TAKE PLACE).

2. THE AIRCRAFT FOR FREQUENT VISITS TO THE UK IS A MUCH MORE DIFFICULT ISSUE AS I THINK LORD CARRINGTON AND YOU HAVE RECOGNISED. TO BEGIN WITH IT IS AN OLD PROBLEM AND HITHERTO THE COUNCIL HAS REFUSED ALL REQUEST FROM THE SECRETARY GENERAL FOR A PRIVATE AIRCRAFT. MOREOVER THERE IS NO MONEY IN NEXT YEARS BUDGET TO ACCOMMODATE A CHARGE OF THIS KIND. THE 1985 BUDGET WOULD BE A NEW QUESTION. THE PRESENT PRACTICE WHEN THE SECRETARY GENERAL TRAVELS IS FOR LUNS TO BE DRIVEN DIRECT ON TO THE TARMAC TO AN ORDINARY COMMERCIAL AIRCRAFT WHERE HE IS GIVEN A SPECIAL SEAT AND FROM WHICH HE DISEMBARKS FIRST. ALTHOUGH THIS ARRANGEMENT LACKS THE FLEXIBILITY OF A PRIVATE AIRCRAFT IT COULD WELL BE AS QUICK, DOOR TO DOOR, (GIVEN THAT FEW CHARTER AIRCRAFT FLY AS FAST) AND A GOOD DEAL MORE SAFE AND RELIABLE, SINCE BRUSSELS, FROM NEXT SPRING, WILL BE FITTED WITH SYSTEMS PERMITTING CIVIL AIRLINES TO LAND IN REDUCED VISIBILITY. HOWEVER, I AM OBTAINING COSTS ON A COMPARATITIVE BASIS. IF I AM TO CARRY THIS FORWARD, HOWEVER, I WOULD NEED TO KNOW WHETHER, ON THE BASIS OF THE FIGURES I GAVE HIM IN MY LETTER OF 12 OCTOBER, LORD CARRINGTON WOULD BE WILLING TO MAKE SOME CONTRIBUTION TO HIS TRAVEL EXPENSES. WOULD HE, FOR EXAMPLE, BE ABLE TO SET SOME TRAVEL EXPENSES OFF AGAINST TAX IF THEY WERE PAID FROM TAXED INCOME?

3. I ALSO NEED TO KNOW IN ORDER TO NEGOTIATE ON BEHALF OF LORD CARRINGTON A DATE OF HANDOVER WHETHER HE COULD EITHER AUTHORISE ME TO AGREE TO A DATE IN THE FIRST HALF OF JUNE OR WHETHER HE WOULD BE ABLE TO SPEAK TO LUNS ON THE TELEPHONE BEFORE 8 DECEMBER, IF I COULD SET IT UP, ONCE WE KNOW THE AMERICANS' POSITION ON THE SPRING COUNCIL MEETING.

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MR WRIGHT
MR CARTLEDGE

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Dmb
23/11

D E D I P

CONFIDENTIAL
FM UKDEL NATO 221625Z NOV 83
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 287 OF 22 NOVEMBER
INFO IMMEDIATE KUALA LUMPUR (PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR, FOR LORD CARRINGTON) NEW DELHI (FOLLOWING FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY TO SECRETARY OF STATE)

YOUR TELNO 246: NATO SECRETARY GENERAL

1. AFTER DISCUSSING THESE POINTS WITH THE NORWEGIAN PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE, I WROTE HIM A LETTER IN TERMS OF PARAGRAPH 2 (TEXT BY BAG TO HEAD OF DEFENCE DEPARTMENT).

2. VIBE READ THIS LETTER OUT AT THE START OF THE MEETING OF PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES WHICH HE HAD CALLED FOR THIS MORNING. AFTER A LONG, SOMEWHAT CONFUSED AND AT TIMES ALMOST ACRIMONIOUS DISCUSSION (DUE LARGELY TO THE ATTITUDE OF MERILLON (FRANCE) WHO CHOSE TO GET ON HIS HIGH HORSE AND TO READ US A LECTURE ABOUT THE COURTESY DUE TO THE PRESIDENT OF HONOUR WHO, UNFORTUNATELY, FOR THIS YEAR, IS CHEYSSON) AGREEMENT WAS REACHED ON THE FOLLOWING POINTS WHICH ARE LARGELY DRAWN FROM VIBE'S LETTER OF 16 NOVEMBER ENCLOSED WITH MINE OF 17 NOVEMBER TO WESTON:

1) THAT THE NEW SECRETARY GENERAL WILL BE ELECTED AT THE NAC MINISTERIAL MEETING IN DECEMBER.

2) THAT THE PROCEDURE APPLIED WHEN DR. LUNS SUCCEEDED MR BROSIO SHALL BE APPLIED MUTATIS MUTANDIS.

3) THAT THE BRITISH FOREIGN SECRETARY WOULD BE AUTHORIZED IN ADVANCE BY LORD CARRINGTON TO ACCEPT THE ELECTION ON HIS BEHALF.

4) THAT SECRETARY GENERAL LUNS WOULD ALSO PRESIDE OVER THE SPRING MINISTERIAL MEETINGS (NAC AND DPC) AND THAT FARE-WELL SPEECHES WOULD CONSEQUENTLY BE POSTPONED UNTIL THAT TIME.

5) THAT A FIRM DATE FOR THE HANDOVER SHOULD BE STIPULATED IN THE COMMUNIQUE. (IN THIS CONTEXT A DECISION, BEFORE THE DECEMBER MEETING, ON THE TIME AND PLACE FOR THE SPRING MINISTERIAL MEETING IS DESIRABLE).

6) (A NEW POINT ADDED AT THE REQUEST OF A NUMBER OF PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES) THAT THE BRITISH PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE SHOULD COMMUNICATE TO LORD CARRINGTON ALL INFORMATION RELEVANT TO THE POST OF SECRETARY GENERAL, SUCH AS SALARY, ALLOWANCES, PENSION ARRANGEMENTS, HOUSING, STAFF AND TRAVEL COSTS ETC, IT BEING UNDERSTOOD THAT LORD CARRINGTON WILL RESPOND WITH HIS COMMENTS IN DUE COURSE. HE WILL ALSO BE TOLD THAT HIS PREFERENCE FOR THE TERM OF OFFICE IS NOT LIKELY TO MEET WITH ANY OBJECTION (NONE OF MY COLLEAGUES HAD INSTRUCTIONS BUT NONE SAW ANY PROBLEMS). SUBSEQUENTLY THE ARRANGEMENTS AGREED WILL BE SUBMITTED TO THE COUNCIL FOR FORMAL APPROVAL.

7) (ANOTHER NEW POINT) THAT THE SUCCESSION TO DR LUNS SHOULD APPEAR AS AN ITEM ON THE AGENDA OF THE PLENARY MINISTERIAL MEETING OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL AT THE END, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PRECEDENT OF BROSIO'S DEPARTURE (SEE ENCLOSURE TO VIBE'S LETTER OF 16 NOVEMBER). CONFIDENTIAL

3.

3. IN DISCUSSION IT WAS AGREED THAT I SHOULD ACT AS AN INTERMEDIARY BETWEEN LORD CARRINGTON AND THE ADMINISTRATION AND THAT AS A FIRST STEP I SHOULD SEND HIM A STATEMENT AS IN 2(6) ABOVE ACTING THROUGHOUT IN CONSULTATION WITH VIBE, AND CIRCULATING A COPY OF THIS LETTER AND OF LORD CARRINGTON'S REPLY TO THE OTHER PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES. I THOUGHT IT RIGHT IN THE DISCUSSION ON THIS MATTER TO MENTION THAT ONE QUESTION IN LORD CARRINGTON'S MIND WAS TRAVEL SINCE I BELIEVE THAT IF I WERE TO OMIT ALL REFERENCE TO THIS AND SPRING ON MY COLLEAGUES SUCH A MAJOR ISSUE AS THE AIRCRAFT FOR WEEKEND TRAVEL AT A LATER STAGE, THEY MIGHT BE LESS WILLING TO BE HELPFUL. I TOOK THE LINE THAT THE REFERENCE TO TERMS AND CONDITIONS WAS MERELY A MATTER OF CAUTION AND PRUDENCE.

4. I RAISED THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THE RESTRICTED TERM OF OFFICE SHOULD BE ANNOUNCED BY NATO. IT WAS FELT GENERALLY THAT THIS WOULD COME BEST FROM LORD CARRINGTON WHEN HE SEES THE PRESS.

5. THERE WAS SOME DISCUSSION OF PROCEDURE AT THE MINISTERIAL MEETING OF THE COUNCIL IN DECEMBER. MERILLON (FRANCE) SAID THAT CHEYSSON WOULD WANT TO BE ABLE TO CANVASS THE OPINION OF HIS COLLEAGUES INFORMALLY, EG AT THE END OF THE MINISTERIAL LUNCH ON THE FIRST DAY, ABOUT TWO QUESTIONS: ONE, THE SUCCESSION ITSELF, AND TWO, THE DATE OF THE HANDOVER, AS A PRELIMINARY TO THE FORMAL ITEM ON THE AGENDA THE NEXT DAY. SINCE MERILLON KEPT REFERRING TO THE DECISION ON THE SUCCESSION AS AD REFERENDUM I, AND OTHERS, NOTABLY WIECK (FRG), MADE CLEAR THAT THE DECISION ON THE SUCCESSION WAS FINAL, AS FAR AS OUR GOVERNMENTS WERE CONCERNED, TO BE QUOTE CONSECRATED OR CONFIRMED UNQUOTE BY MINISTERS. SUBSEQUENTLY I CHECKED WITH MERILLON THAT HE DOES NOT DISSENT FROM THIS OR FROM THE PROPOSITION THAT WE SHOULD AGREE THE DATE FOR THE HANDOVER IN ADVANCE OF THE MINISTERIAL MEETING IF WE CAN.

6. THERE WAS GENERAL AGREEMENT THAT IT WOULD MAKE SENSE FOR LORD CARRINGTON TO VISIT CAPITALS BEFORE HE TOOK OFFICE, PROVIDED THAT THIS COULD BE MANAGED WITHOUT TREADING ON LUNS'S TOES. THERE IS MONEY IN THE BUDGET FOR THE INCOMING SECRETARY GENERAL PLUS HIS DIRECTEUR TO MAKE SUCH A ROUND AND FROM THAT POINT OF VIEW THERE IS NO DIFFERENCE BETWEEN A ROUND BEFORE OR AFTER HE TAKES OVER.

7. THERE WAS SOME DISCUSSION OF THE DATE OF HANDOVER WHICH ALL AGREED DEPENDED ON THE DATE OF THE SPRING NAC. BY COMMON CONSENT, THIS IN TURN OUGHT TO COME AFTER THE DPC. ABSHIRE (US) HAS PROMISED TO SEEK A FIRM AND EARLY PROPOSAL FROM HIS GOVERNMENT FOR A MEETING OF THE MINISTERIAL COUNCIL IN WASHINGTON IN MAY, PREFERABLY ABOUT THE MIDDLE OF THE MONTH. WE WOULD THEN AIM TO WORK FOR A MEETING OF THE DPC IN THE FIRST HALF OF MAY AND FOR A HANDOVER DATE A WEEK OR TWO AFTER THE NAC, IE ABOUT 4 JUNE WHICH IS WHAT WE BELIEVE LUNS HAS IN MIND.

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

21 November 1983

NATO SECRETARY GENERAL

As you know, the Prime Minister agreed to contact Lord Weinstock, asking him to be as helpful as possible about releasing Lord Carrington from his post with GEC.

Mrs. Thatcher wrote to Lord Weinstock on Saturday in these terms.

A. J. COLES

Brian Fall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

Posted Monday 21st.

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

Saturday
19 Nov 83

Dear Arnold.

You will know and will have seen in the press that there is very strong support indeed for Peter to become Secretary General of N.A.T.O. There just isn't anyone else to touch him in sheer ability. This is just to say that I do hope there will be no difficulty about

releasing him. You do have a way of choosing the best and will not therefore be surprised if he is also in demand for this very top international job.

Yours ever

Margaret

(1).

10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister.

Just to remind.

15.
11

(1).

PRIME MINISTER

Lord Carrington

You agreed with Sir Geoffrey Howe this morning that you would ring Lord Weinstock and ask him to be as helpful as possible about releasing Lord Carrington from his job with GEC so that he could take up his appointment as NATO Secretary General.

It would be helpful if you could find a moment to ring Lord Weinstock before you leave for India.

A. J-C.

No. a brief note would be welcome

17 November 1983

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

7 November, 1983

Dear John,

NATO Secretary-General

Our Embassy in Bonn have suggested that it would be appropriate if the Prime Minister were able to find an opportunity in the margins of the Anglo-German Summit to express again personally to Chancellor Kohl our gratitude for German support for Lord Carrington as successor to Dr Luns. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary hopes that the Prime Minister will be able to do this.

The consensus within the Alliance in favour of Lord Carrington now appears to be practically complete. The Portuguese candidate has told us that he is withdrawing and that Portugal will back Lord Carrington. It is also clear that the tentative interest expressed in the post by Tindemans has now faded. Spain, up to now the only other hesitating voice, has also indicated informally that she will join the consensus in favour of Lord Carrington. According to Sir J Graham, the Danish Permanent Representative in NATO (who is currently in the Chair) is likely to call a meeting of NATO Permanent Representatives next week to finalise a formal consensus. When Sir J Graham has reported to this effect, it will then be for HMG to secure a firm indication from Lord Carrington that he will accept if invited by Ministers in December to take the job. Sir J Graham belives that Dr Luns will finally bow out in May/June 1984, which we understand would be an acceptable timetable for Lord Carrington. It therefore seems that, barring accidents, the British bid to secure the Secretary General of NATO has been successful.

Yours ever,

(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL

(2)

pa

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

25 October 1983

Prime Minister

MAFC. 27/10.

Dear Richard,

NATO Secretary General

We thought that it would be useful to bring you up to date on the position of other allies on the succession to Dr Luns, since there may well be discussion of this in the margins of the Nuclear Planning Group meeting which Mr Heseltine is attending in Canada on 27/28 October.

It has become clear at informal meetings of NATO Permanent Representatives in the last few weeks that support for Lord Carrington is almost complete. All the main allies have now indicated support. The only ones who have not yet done so are:

The Portuguese continue to maintain the candidature of their ex-Foreign Minister Futscher-Pereira. Latest reports suggest that they will take a decision immediately after the NPG meeting on whether to withdraw him. It appears very likely that they will do so.

The Spanish, whose failure to indicate support we had earlier assumed to be for Gibraltar reasons, are now claiming to us privately that their attitude rests only on the need to maintain a common front with Portugal and that they have nothing against Lord Carrington.

The Belgians also claim that their position is dictated by the need to "let the Spanish down lightly". But as you know Tindemans has maintained some interest in the position (without putting up as a candidate) and the likely real explanation of the Belgian position is that he will not finally decide that his name should not go forward until he is certain that Futscher-Pereira has withdrawn (ie he is unlikely to stand against Lord Carrington but might want his name to go forward as a compromise candidate if for any reason Lord Carrington does not obtain consensus support).

We would suggest that in any conversation in the margins of the NPG meeting Mr Heseltine might take the following line with his Ministerial colleagues:

/Lord

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

- Lord Carrington is prepared to accept the position if there is a consensus among the allies that he should be offered it; and of course he has HMG's full support;

- our understanding is that most of the Allies have taken the decision to support him;

- it is important that the Allies begin to move towards a decision quickly as delay will lead to further press speculation about divisions between them. We hope than an informal decision can be reached in the next few days.

In any discussion with the Portuguese, Belgians and Spaniards, it is important for us not to be seen to be hustling them. It seems clear that the Portuguese are looking for a graceful exit and Mr Heseltine might like to encourage them gently in this direction.

I am copying this letter to John Coles at No 10.

Yours ever,

(B J P Fall)
Private Secretary

Richard Mottram Esq
Private Secretary
Ministry of Defence

CONFIDENTIAL

HL

3 October 1983

NATO Secretary-General

I enclose a copy of a letter which the Prime Minister has received from Mr. Trudeau expressing Canada's support for Lord Carrington as successor to Mr. Luns. The Prime Minister was of course aware of this letter when she saw Mr. Trudeau in Ottawa last week and thanked him for his support. I therefore doubt whether any reply is needed.

JOHN COLES

Brian Fall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T 1376/83

CONFIDENTIAL

CC MASTER
OPS

PRIME MINISTER • PREMIER MINISTRE

OTTAWA, K1A 0A2

September 24, 1983

Dear Margaret,

I am writing to express Canada's support for Lord Carrington should you put forward his name as Joseph Luns' successor.

As I understand it, Lord Carrington would respond positively to an indication of Allied consensus on his behalf, but would not wish to become involved in a contested election. If my information is correct, a consensus does appear to be developing since the United States, France, and the Federal Republic feel, as we do, that Peter Carrington is eminently well qualified to succeed Mr. Luns.

Indeed, I believe his qualifications are of sufficient weight to elicit the support of all our allies, but it will be important to be sensitive to their concerns so as to avoid any last minute problems. I am thinking, in particular, of the Portugese who have already been in touch with us regarding their own candidate. Please let me know if you feel that Canada can be of further assistance in this process.

I am sending a brief note to Ronald Reagan to let him know where we stand, and Allan MacEachen will be writing to Sir Geoffrey Howe and George Shultz.

I am looking forward very much to receiving you in Ottawa next week, and travelling with you to Toronto and Edmonton. It will be a particularly valuable opportunity to discuss at length some of the issues that most concern us both.

Yours sincerely,

The Right Honourable Margaret Thatcher, M.P.
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom
10 Downing Street
London, England

- 5 OCT 1985

CONFIDENTIAL

cc AJC
FERD

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

A.J.C. 23/9

22 September 1983

Dear John,

NATO Secretary-General: Succession to Dr Luns

I wrote yesterday with some suggestions for what the Prime Minister might say if the question of the succession of Dr Luns comes up in her discussions this afternoon with the Portuguese Foreign Minister.

We have also been considering what line the Prime Minister might take during her forthcoming visit to North America. The Foreign Secretary would like to suggest the following:

United States

The Prime Minister might thank the President for his personal support for Lord Carrington which came at a timely moment and has been instrumental in swinging other allies on to Lord Carrington's side. The prospects for Lord Carrington's appointment are now good. The Germans, French and Italians have declared support for him. Of the smaller allies most are favourably disposed and none opposed. We are reasonably confident that the two others who have an interest in the job (Futscher-Pereira of Portugal and Tindemans of Belgium) will not press their candidature against Lord Carrington. Our hope is that NATO will aim at a decision soon and in any case before the ministerial meetings in November/December.

Canada

The Canadian High Commission confirmed yesterday that when Mr Trudeau meets the Prime Minister he will indicate his firm support for Lord Carrington (and may send a message to this effect in advance). He may urge us however not to ignore the sensitivities of smaller allies. In thanking Mr Trudeau, the Prime Minister might describe present levels of support for Lord Carrington and our preferred timetable in the same terms as in the paragraph above.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram.

Yours ever

(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

22 SEP 1983

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

21 September, 1983

Dear Tim,

NATO Secretary General: the Succession to Dr Luns

The Prime Minister is receiving the Portuguese Foreign Minister on 22 September. Although this is only a courtesy call it is possible that Dr Gama will mention the succession to Dr Luns.

The candidature of the Portuguese ex-Foreign Minister, Mr Futscher-Pereira remains the only one on the table apart from Lord Carrington. But the Portuguese have made it clear to us that if a consensus emerged in favour of Lord Carrington Futscher-Pereira would withdraw and Portugal would then readily support Lord Carrington. Dr Gama has arranged a private discussion with Lord Carrington on the evening of 21 September. It is possible that following this discussion the Portuguese might tell us that Futscher-Pereira has withdrawn.

If the subject does come up during the Prime Minister's meeting she might draw on the following:

- Lord Carrington has increasingly strong support including that of the major allies (US, France, FRG, Italy)

- we still strongly favour Lord Carrington as undoubtedly the best available candidate and share his belief that a contested election would be a bad thing for the Alliance.

- NATO should aim at a decision soon and in any case before the ministerial meetings in November/December.

- We would not expect Mr Tindemans to stand against Lord Carrington.

I shall be submitting a copy of this letter to the Foreign Secretary this evening, as background for his own talks with Dr Gama tomorrow. I am also copying this letter to Richard Mottram (Dr Gama is calling on Mr Heseltine at 1700 tomorrow).

Yours ever

(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

SECRET AND PERSONAL

MFT

cc MOD

12 Copy 3 of 3 copies

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

21 September 1983

Dear Brian,

NATO Secretary General

You should know that on 21 September Chancellor Kohl confirmed to the Prime Minister that Germany would support Lord Carrington's candidature for this post.

On 20 September the Prime Minister, who was of course aware of Herr Genscher's talk with Sir Geoffrey Howe on this matter, urged the Netherlands Prime Minister to support Lord Carrington and gave an account of the present position. Mr. Lubbers took note but was non-committal.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence).

Yours ever

Charles.

Brian Fall Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

SECRET AND PERSONAL

PRIME MINISTER

NATO SECRETARY GENERAL

I suggest you raise this during lunch.

Mr. Tindemans told Geoffrey Howe last night that he was relaxed about this matter. He admired Peter Carrington and would not wish to stand out against him if it was clear that Peter was the front runner and had over-whelming support. On the other hand Tindemans would not drop out if the situation was unclear and the Portuguese were still in the field.

You could say to Mr. Lubbers:

a) Lord Carrington will accept the post if the Alliance as a whole wishes him to take it.

b) He has impressive support. The United States, Italy, Denmark and Greece fully support him. We have had favourable indications but no firm commitment from Canada, Iceland, Luxembourg and Norway. We think that France will support him.

c) We believe that the Portuguese candidate will withdraw if it becomes clear that Lord Carrington has over-whelming support. Tindemans position seems to be similar.

d) Carrington is the best available candidate. But we must avoid a contested election which will be bad for NATO.

e) NATO should decide soon.

f) Hope you will support him.

A.J.C.

19 September 1983

With the compliments of

THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

h.a.
A.J.L. 7/9.

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
SW1A 2AH

Position at 5 September

NATO SECRETARY GENERAL: SUCCESSION TO DR LUNS

The following are the positions as we know them of other allies on Lord Carrington's candidature.

Belgium

No reply has been received from Mr Tindemans to the Secretary of State's message of 4 August confirming Lord Carrington's position. Mr Tindemans has not formally presented himself as a candidate.

Canada

The Foreign Minister sent a non-committal reply on 22 August to the Secretary of State's message. Athens has since reported that Mr Trudeau spoke up on Lord Carrington's behalf in conversation with Papandreou last week.

Denmark

Support Lord Carrington.

France

M. Cheysson's personal commitment to Lord Carrington not yet confirmed by the Elysée and he gave a not entirely satisfactory answer to the Secretary of State's probe in the margins of the Special Council meeting on 30 August.

Germany

No commitment. We still await Chancellor Kohl's response. Some reports suggest that he would prefer a small country and therefore would support Tindemans.

Greece

Unconditional and enthusiastic support from Papandreou.

Iceland

No formal commitment but should fall in with Danish and Norwegian support.

Italy

Support Lord Carrington and are lobbying discreetly (eg with the Germans) but could run Colombo as a compromise candidate if Lord Carrington failed to achieve consensus.

Luxembourg

No commitment although Foreign Minister personally in favour. Might have to support Tindemans as Benelux candidate.

/Netherlands

Netherlands

Mr Lubbers told the Prime Minister he thought Lord Carrington was extremely well qualified but gave no firm commitment. The Dutch too might feel they have to support Tindemans if he stood.

Norway

Foreign Minister gave strong support but commitment not quite formal.

Portugal

Futscher Pereira remains a candidate but Portuguese clearly expect to withdraw him if consensus goes in favour of Lord Carrington.

Spain

No commitment. Might try to make difficulties for Gibraltar reasons but given their current position within NATO the Spanish are hardly in a position to block consensus.

Turkey

Non-committal. Initial preference for a small country.

United States

President Reagan supports Lord Carrington and Americans have done some discreet lobbying.

CONFIDENTIAL

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

8 August 1983

This is to record that the Prime Minister spoke to the Netherlands Prime Minister on the telephone today, about the post of NATO Secretary-General. Mrs. Thatcher stressed that there was general agreement that Lord Carrington was the outstanding candidate for the post but that the possibility of a candidate from a smaller country had been floated. One name which had been mentioned was that of Mr. Tindemans. The Prime Minister thought that the priority was to choose the best possible candidate. Mr. Lubbers said that he was unaware of any candidate other than Lord Carrington, who he regarded as extremely well qualified.

Mr. Lubbers undertook to look into the position but, as far as he was aware, Mr. Tindemans had not indicated any interest in the post. An early decision was needed and he hoped to be able to discuss the matter again with the Prime Minister on her forthcoming visit to the Netherlands.

John Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

(1)

Now fixed for 0930 on Monday 8 August D.

PRIME MINISTER

NATO SECRETARY GENERAL

You told the Foreign Secretary yesterday that you would consider ringing Dr. Lubbers to press the candidature of Lord Carrington.

You could say to him that you are very much looking forward to seeing him in The Hague on 19 September, but there is one matter that will not wait until then. You mentioned to him in Stuttgart that Lord Carrington would be willing to take over from Dr. Luns provided there was no contested election. In confidence, President Reagan has agreed to support Lord Carrington and you have discussed the matter with Chancellor Kohl who seems well disposed. Would Dr. Lubbers also support him?

Could Tim Flesher arrange a call early next week when I am on leave? Yes MT

A. J. C.

28 July 1983

SUBJECT

CONFIDENTIAL

AJC SA

cc master

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

27 July, 1983

NATO Secretary-General

Your letter of 26 July was discussed when Sir Geoffrey Howe called on the Prime Minister today.

It was agreed that:

a) the Prime Minister would consider ringing Dr. Lubbers to press the candidature of Lord Carrington;

b) the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary would contact the Canadian Foreign Minister;

c) otherwise representations would be made by our Ambassadors in the relevant capitals.

A. J. COLES

B. Fall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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PRIME MINISTER

Call by the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary

I believe that he wishes to discuss the following matters:

(a) NATO Secretary General (see attached letter).

(b) CHOGM. (He may have to leave Delhi early in order to attend an EC meeting.)

(c) Hong Kong. We have arranged a meeting for 5 September for you to review policy with Percy Cradock and Teddy Youde. There is also a question of what kind of briefing should be given to Mr. Heath who, I understand, is going to China in the near future.

(d) Mehdi Tajir.

(e) Central America. I have suggested that the Foreign Secretary should briefly give you his impressions of the situation.

(f) Council of Europe Convention on ~~Exchange~~ Repatriation of Prisoners.

A.J.C.

26 July, 1983

CONFIDENTIAL

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

26 July 1983

Dear John,

NATO Secretary-General

In your letter of 11 July you recorded the Prime Minister's comments that we should take more vigorous and immediate action in support of Lord Carrington's candidature. As you know, since then we have learnt of President Reagan's support for Lord Carrington and the Prime Minister made use of this in her telephone call to Chancellor Kohl on 18 July (your letter of the same date). Sir Antony Acland spoke to Lord Carrington on 21 July to bring him up-to-date on the position. Lord Carrington confirmed that if approached he would take on the job. Sir Antony Acland explained to him that we would now be telling other members of the Alliance that if an Alliance consensus were to emerge in favour of Lord Carrington we thought he would be willing to be drafted.

We shall not know Herr Kohl's final word until after the summer holidays. But in Sir Geoffrey Howe's view it would be wise to take some further action now with smaller Allies so that the ground may be prepared so far as possible for the emergence of a consensus in September. We have had a word with Dr Luns, who welcomed the fact that President Reagan was in favour of the appointment of Lord Carrington.

It would now seem appropriate for Ministers to have a personal word with each of the other smaller NATO Allies. Dr Luns would welcome this. The purpose would be to dispel lingering uncertainty and to catalyse support for Lord Carrington. The key point we need to get across (apart from Lord Carrington's obvious qualifications for the job) is that we now know Lord Carrington would take on the job of NATO Secretary-General, if the Alliance as a whole wished him to do so.

/Sir Geoffrey

CONFIDENTIAL

Sir Geoffrey Howe would be happy to speak to at least some of his counterparts accordingly, but would welcome a chance to discuss tactics with the Prime Minister. Some Allies might best be approached at her level. (In the case of the Netherlands, for example, it would be natural for the Prime Minister to follow up her earlier word with Prime Minister Lubbers at Stuttgart; and with Belgium there is the possible complication of Mr Tindemans standing as a candidate.) Others could perhaps as well be approached by Ambassadors acting on specific instructions from Sir G Howe.

/ I enclose a checklist.

Yours ever,

(B J P Fall)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

	PRIME MINISTER	FOREIGN MINISTER
BELGIUM	Wilfred Martens	Leo Tindemans
CANADA	Pierre Trudeau	Alan MacEachen
DENMARK	Poul Schluter	Uffe Ellemann-Jensen
GREECE	Andreas Papandreou	Ioannis Haralambopoulos
ICELAND	Steingrimur Hermannsson	Geir Hallgrimsson
ITALY	*	
LUXEMBOURG	Pierre Werner	Colette Flesch (Madame)
NETHERLANDS	Dr. Ruud Lubbers	Hans Van Den Broek
NORWAY	Kare Willoch	Sven Stray
PORTUGAL	Dr Mario Soares	Jami Gama
SPAIN	Felipe Gonzalez	Fernando Moran
TURKEY	Bulend Ulusu	Ilter Turkmen

* (Bettino Craxi, the leader of the Italian Socialist Party hopes to form a government next week).

Nrato : Ant Sec - Seeral 9/80

26 JUL 1988

SECRET AND PERSONAL

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

18 July 1983

NATO Secretary General

The Prime Minister telephoned Chancellor Kohl this afternoon. She said that it was most important that the successor to Dr. Luns should be a capable and effective personality with an international reputation. Lord Carrington was prepared to fill the post, provided his nomination was not contested. She could tell Chancellor Kohl, for his personal and confidential information, that President Reagan had promised his support for Lord Carrington.

Chancellor Kohl asked when it would be necessary to take a decision. The Prime Minister said that since discreet lobbying had already started, the sooner a decision was taken the better. Chancellor Kohl agreed - a decision should be taken as soon as possible after the summer holidays. A long discussion of the issue would be very harmful and might lead Dr. Luns to believe that he should stay in the job. Germany had no definite position, but he was clear that under no circumstances would it be right for a German to succeed Dr. Luns. There was apparently some misunderstanding about this in NATO circles. This position did not mean that he was disinterested in the matter. He simply felt that given Germany's special position vis-à-vis the Warsaw Pact it would not be right for a German to take the job.

At present there were only two candidates in the field. Lord Carrington certainly fulfilled all the requirements. The other candidate was Mr. Tindemans. It was not clear that Tindemans was strongly interested in the post. When he had spoken to him two weeks ago about a quite different matter, this issue had arisen and Tindemans' comment had been "Yes, but ...".

We should certainly do everything we could to avoid a contested election. If the Prime Minister agreed, he would try to find out whether the Benelux countries intended to nominate Tindemans. He had the impression that the Dutch were more inclined to support Lord Carrington. The Prime Minister said that the difficulty about putting this question to the Benelux countries was that they might say that they did intend to run Tindemans. She did not think he would be suitable for the post in question.

/ Chancellor

SECRET AND PERSONAL

Chancellor Kohl explained that he would not advocate the candidature of Tindemans. His purpose in speaking to the Benelux countries would simply be to clear an obstacle out of the way. The Prime Minister commented that it would be a great help if we could so arrange things that Lord Carrington was the only effective candidate. She had no doubt that he had all the right qualities. Chancellor Kohl said that the Prime Minister did not have to convince him on this point but the links between his own party and Mr. Tindemans' party were such that he needed to explore the ground. He would let the Prime Minister know the results of his enquiries but it was unlikely that he would be in a position to do so until after the holidays since so many people were now not available.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence).

A. J. COLES

Brian Fall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

John Coles
NO10

With the compliments of

THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

A.J.C. 15/7

Roger Bone.

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
SW1A 2AH

NOVEMBER

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0655

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VIZ/=(+5,/,/WONFO 034/15

IMMEDIATE

00 FCO

00 UKDEL NATO

00 BONN

ADVANCE COPY HD/DEFD

NEWBIGIN

GR 150
SECRET
DEDIP
FM WASHINGTON 150320Z JUL 83
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1986 OF 15 JULY
INFO IMMEDIATE (PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADORS) UKDEL NATO AND BONN

SECRETARY GENERAL OF NATO

1. IN A TETE-A-TETE DISCUSSION WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE THIS MORNING, SHULTZ SAID THAT HE HAD PUT TO THE PRESIDENT THE IDEA OF LORD CARRINGTON AS SECRETARY GENERAL OF NATO, AND THAT HE HAD AGREED SHULTZ EXPLAINED THAT THE US WERE NOT PROPOSING TO ADVERTISE THIS DECISION, AS IT MIGHT PROVE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE. BUT WE COULD MAKE USE PRIVATELY OF THE US VIEW. THEY WANTED AN EFFECTIVE NATO SECRETARY GENERAL.

2. EAGLEBURGER SUBSEQUENTLY TOOK FALL ASIDE TO EMPHASISE THAT REAGA HAD TAKEN THIS DECISION WITHOUT HESITATION.

WRIGHT

10A

GRS 75
SECRET
DEDIP
FM BONN 151020Z JUL 83
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 720OF 015JULY
INFO ROUTINE WASHINGTON UKDEL NATO

SECRET

MR 15/7
h.a.

SECRETARY GENERAL OF NATO

1. THE NEWS IN WASHINGTON TELNO 1986 IS LIKELY TO HAVE A VERY POSITIVE INFLUENCE ON KOHL'S VIEWS, GIVEN HIS CONSTANT WISH TO AVOID DIFFERENCES WITH THE AMERICANS. IF THE PRIME MINISTER IS GOING TO TELEPHONE THE CHANCELLOR ABOUT THIS MATTER, SHE WILL NO DOUBT WISH TO USE THE AMERICAN POINT. IF SHE HAS ALREADY SPOKEN TO HIM, OR DECIDES NOT TO DO SO, I RECOMMEND THAT I SHOULD BE AUTHORISED TO INFORM TELTSCHIK IN STRICT CONFIDENCE OF THE US POSITION.

TAYLOR

LIMITED
HD/DEFD
PS
PS/PUS
SIR J BULLARD
MR WRIGHT
MR CARTLEDGE

SECRET

PRIME MINISTER

NATO Secretary General

You agreed to telephone Chancellor Kohl about Lord Carrington's candidature. We have arranged for the telephone call to take place at 1700 on Monday.

There is a new development. George Shultz told the Foreign Secretary in Washington this week that President Reagan had readily agreed that Lord Carrington should be the next Secretary General. Shultz explained that the Americans were not proposing to advertise this decision as it might prove counter-productive. But we could make use privately of the American view. They wanted an effective NATO Secretary General.

When you speak to Chancellor Kohl, I suggest that you refer to the message which you sent him on 1 July (text attached). You might then say that you think it very important that the next Secretary General is a capable and effective person. Peter Carrington is prepared to do the job provided that his nomination is not contested. Chancellor Kohl should know, for his personal and confidential information, that President Reagan has told us that he supports Lord Carrington.

It would be very helpful to know if Chancellor Kohl is also in agreement.

If he asks what the French view is you could say that Cheysson has told us that he is strongly in favour of Lord Carrington.

A. J. C.

15 July 1983

See T98A/83
Tel. No. 346 of 30/6
to Bonn.

MESSAGE TO CHANCELLOR KOHL

I had hoped to raise with you personally, either in Stuttgart or in London, the question of the succession to Dr. Luns as NATO Secretary General. Since that did not in the event prove possible, I am asking Sir Jock Taylor to give you this personal message instead.

As you know, Joseph Luns has indicated that he wishes to stand down next year and the question of who should succeed him is already under active consideration. You may already have heard informally that Peter Carrington has said he would be willing to succeed Dr. Luns as NATO Secretary-General if it were to be the general wish of the Alliance that he should do so and on the understanding that his nomination would therefore not be contested. I should like you to know that in my view Peter Carrington is indeed the best candidate and I hope that he will obtain the post. It is obviously important at this juncture that the Alliance should continue to have for its Secretary-General a person of wide political experience of Alliance affairs and of a stature and reputation that commands general respect. I believe that Peter Carrington admirably fits this requirement. I very much hope that you will be able to tell me that he would enjoy the support of the Federal Government. I should be most grateful if you could let me have an indication of your thinking on this fairly soon, so that we may proceed to the wider consultations within the Alliance that will be necessary.

M Thatcher

21st Sept. - Bonn
Bilateral 9th Nov

DSR 11 (Revised)

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:
PRIME MINISTER

Reference

DEPARTMENT: TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret
Secret
Confidential
Restricted
Unclassified

PRIVACY MARKING

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

Enclosures—flag(s).....

TO:

Your Reference

Copies to:

PRESIDENT REAGAN

please file papers on Nato Security - general. This message will now not be sent. MT 15.7

SUBJECT:

As you know Joseph Luns is retiring from the post of NATO Secretary General next year. We have already mentioned separately to Vice President Bush as well as to George Shultz and Cap Weinberger that Peter Carrington has said he would be willing to succeed him, if that were to be the general wish of the Alliance. I myself have no doubt that Peter Carrington is the best candidate in the field and I very much hope that he will obtain the post. The Alliance certainly needs as its Secretary-General someone who combines wide political experience with the stature and reputation that will command general support and respect. However, before proceeding to wider consultations on this matter, I should like to be confident that the proposal would have the firm support of the US Administration, as indeed it already does that of the French and German Governments.

PS | No 10 Downing Street

10

GRS 200

SECRET

SECRET

DEDIP

FM BONN 121105Z JULY

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 702 OF 12 JULY

YOUR TEL NO 346: NATO SECRETARY GENERAL

Prime Minister

If we cannot get Kohl's support the cause is hopeless. You have already sent him a written message. Would you be prepared to ring him?

A.J.C. 12/7

1. I ASKED TELTSCHIK TODAY WHETHER THE CHANCELLOR WAS NOW IN A POSITION TO REPLY TO THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE OF 30 JUNE. TELTSCHIK SAID THAT KOHL DID NOT WISH TO CAST A VOTE IN THIS MATTER. HE WOULD LIKE TO DISCUSS IT PERSONALLY WITH THE PRIME MINISTER WHEN NEXT THEY MET.

Yes MT

2. IN REPLY TO QUESTIONS, TELTSCHIK SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THAT KOHL WOULD NOT SEE THE PRIME MINISTER AGAIN BEFORE THE NEXT ANGLO-GERMAN SUMMIT, FOR WHICH THE GERMANS HAVE PROPOSED THE DATES OF 9-10 NOVEMBER. TELTSCHIK INDICATED THAT KOHL'S RETICENCE IN THE MATTER WAS CAUSED BY THE EXPECTED CANDIDACY OF TINDEMANS. HE IMPLIED THAT THE CHANCELLOR WISHED TO AVOID SNUBBING TINDEMANS RATHER THAN TINDEMANS WAS HIS PREFERRED CANDIDATE.

h.a. AR 13/7.

3. I ARGUED THAT THINGS OF THIS NATURE COULD GO BADLY WRONG UNLESS AGREEMENT WAS REACHED BY THE PRINCIPAL GOVERNMENTS VERY EARLY IN THE GAME. I DID NOT THINK THAT THE PRIME MINISTER WOULD WISH TO WAIT UNTIL NOVEMBER BEFORE KNOWING THE GERMAN POSITION. TELTSCHIK AGREED THAT THE BEST COURSE MIGHT BE FOR THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE CHANCELLOR TO HAVE A WORD BY TELEPHONE. HE SUGGESTED THAT, IF MRS THATCHER WISHED TO DO THIS, COLES SHOULD TELEPHONE HIM TO ARRANGE A TIME WHEN THE CHANCELLOR WOULD BE AVAILABLE. IT SHOULD BE THIS WEEK OR NEXT, BEFORE THE CHANCELLOR GOES OFF ON LEAVE FOR FOUR WEEKS.

MALLABY

LIMITED
HD/DEFD
PS
PS/PUS
SIR J BULLARD
MR WRIGHT
MR CARTLEDGE

COPIES TO:-
MR COLES
PS/NO 10 DOWNING ST.

SECRET

SECRET

6
9

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

11 July 1983

Secretary General of NATO

The Prime Minister saw over the weekend Lisbon telegram no. 118 of 1 July. She commented "We must now take more vigorous and immediate action in support of Lord Carrington's candidature".

I telephoned Mr. Teltschik in Chancellor Kohl's office this morning to enquire whether the Chancellor was yet able to reply to the message which Sir Jock Taylor delivered on 1 July. Teltschik said that the Chancellor was aware of the matter but, owing to his visit to Moscow, had not yet had time to consider his response. However Teltschik hoped that he would be able to speak to the Chancellor about it today or tomorrow and let us have a reaction.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence).

A.J. COLES

Brian Fall Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

SECRET

NF

CONFIDENTIAL

GRS 390
CONFIDENTIAL
FM LISBON 011700Z JUL 83
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 118 OF 1 JULY 1983
INFO PRIORITY UKDEL NATO,WASHINGTON,BONN,PARIS,THE HAGUE
INFO SAVING REMAINING NATO CAPITALS

TOP COPY

(33)

MY LETTER OF 15 JUNE TO SIR JULIAN BULLARD: NATO SECRETARY GENERAL

IN COMPANY WITH ALL OTHER NATO AMBASSADORS I WAS SUMMONED AT SHORT NOTICE TO SEE PORTUGUESE FOREIGN MINISTER ON AFTERNOON OF 1 JULY.

2. DR GAMA HANDED ME A LETTER FOR YOU (FOLLOWING BY BAG) WHICH STATES THAT ''MR JOSEF LUNS,SECRETARY-GENERAL OF NATO HAS RECENTLY INDICATED THAT HE INTENDED TO ABANDON HIS PRESENT POST IN 1984. STRICTLY SPEAKING,AND TAKEN AS AN INFORMAL, PERSONAL AND SECRET INFORMATION,THIS ANNOUNCEMENT BY MR LUNS HAS NOT YET RAISED OFFICIALLY THE PROBLEM OF HIS SUCCESSOR. INEVITABLY,HOWEVER,THE QUESTION IMMEDIATELY ATTRACTED THE ATTENTION OF GOVERNMENTS AND POLITICAL CIRCLES INTERESTED IN THE UNITY AND IN THE FUTURE OF THE ALLIANCE.....''

3. ''AN AMBIGUOUS SITUATION HAS UNDOUBTEDLY ARISEN AS A RESULT OF THAT ANNOUNCEMENT,SINCE THE POST OF SECRETARY-GENERAL HAS NOT BECOME VACANT,BUT THERE ARE REASONS TO BELIEVE THAT THE PROBLEM OF MR LUNS' SUCCESSION HAS ALREADY GIVEN RISE TO CONSULTATIONS AMONG SOME ALLIES. UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES I WOULD LIKE YOU TO KNOW,ALSO INFORMALLY, THAT - SHOULD MR LUNS' INTENTION PROVE TO BE IRREVERSIBLE - PORTUGAL WOULD LIKE TO SEE HER OWN CANDIDATE OCCUPY THE POST OF SECRETARY-GENERAL OF NATO''

3. THE LETTER GOES ON TO SAY.....'' PORTUGAL TRUSTS THAT THE MEMBER STATES OF THE ALLIANCE WILL BE WILLING TO CONSIDER AMBASSADOR VASCO FUTSCHER PEREIRA AS A POSSIBLE FUTURE CANDIDATE TO THE POST OF SECRETARY-GENERAL'' AND TO ASK FOR HMG'S SUPPORT.

4. IN HANDING OVER HIS LETTER GAMA SAID HE HAD NOTED SOME PRESS SPECULATION ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF ''A PARTICULAPLY DISTINGUISHED BRITISH CANDIDATE,ALSO A FORMER FOREIGN MINISTER''. HE DID NOT KNOW WHAT MIGHT BE THE POSITION ON THAT COUNT, BUT HOPED THAT YOU WOULD FEEL ABLE TO CONSIDER HIS LETTER CAREFULLY.I UNDERTOOK TO TRANSMIT.

5. MY IMPRESSION FROM COLLEAGUES IS THAT APPEAL HAS BEEN MADE IN BROADLY SIMILAR TERMS TO ALL,ALTHOUGH THERE MAY HAVE BEEN SOME CONSULTATION PREVIOUSLY IN WASHINGTON.

6. FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING ADDRESSEES.

BYATT

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

LIMITED
DEFENCE D
SED
NEWS D
PS
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS

SIR J BULLARD
MR WRIGHT
MR CARTLEDGE
MR JAMES

CONFIDENTIAL

8

PS/No10 Downing Street

SECRET

GRS 40
SECRET
DEDIP
FM BONN 011025Z JUL 83
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 670 OF 1 JULY
INFO ROUTINE MODUK (PS/S OF S)

AR 1/2

YOUR TELNO 346. SECRETARY-GENERAL OF NATO.

1. KOHL IS IN FREIBURG TODAY AND WILL NOT RETURN TO BONN BEFORE HIS TRIP TO MOSCOW. MESSAGE THEREFORE DELIVERED TO TELTSCHIK, HIS DIPLOMATIC ADVISER, WHO UNDERTOOK TO PASS IT ON URGENTLY.

TAYLOR

LIMITED
HD/DEF D
PS
PS/PUS
SIR J BULLARD
MR WRIGHT
MR GILLMORE

COPIES TO
PS/No10 D ST.

THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED

SECRET

PS/NO 10 Downing Street

Subject

SECRET DEDIP

1846 - 1

OO BONN

cc Master OPS

7

GRS 293
SECRET
DEDIP
FM FCO 301400Z JUN 83
TO IMMEDIATE BONN
TELEGRAM NUMBER 346 OF 30 JUNE
INFO MODUK (PS/SOFS)

PRIME MINISTER'S PERSONAL MESSAGE SERIAL No. T98A/83

SECRETARY-GENERAL OF NATO
FOLLOWING PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR/MINISTER

1. PLEASE PASS URGENTLY TO CHANCELLOR KOHL THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER:

BEGINS.

''DEAR CHANCELLOR KOHL, I HAD HOPED TO RAISE WITH YOU PERSONALLY, EITHER IN STUTTGART OR IN LONDON, THE QUESTION OF THE SUCCESSION TO DR LUNS AS NATO SECRETARY-GENERAL. SINCE THAT DID NOT IN THE EVENT PROVE POSSIBLE, I AM ASKING SIR JOCK TAYLOR TO GIVE YOU THIS PERSONAL MESSAGE INSTEAD.

AS YOU KNOW, JOSEPH LUNS HAS INDICATED THAT HE WISHES TO STAND DOWN NEXT YEAR AND THE QUESTION OF WHO SHOULD SUCCEED HIM IS ALREADY UNDER ACTIVE CONSIDERATION. YOU MAY ALREADY HAVE HEARD INFORMALLY THAT PETER CARRINGTON HAS SAID HE WOULD BE WILLING TO SUCCEED DR LUNS AS NATO SECRETARY-GENERAL IF IT WERE TO BE THE GENERAL WISH OF THE ALLIANCE THAT HE SHOULD DO SO AND ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT HIS NOMINATION WOULD THEREFORE NOT BE CONTESTED. I SHOULD LIKE YOU TO KNOW THAT IN MY VIEW PETER CARRINGTON IS INDEED THE BEST CANDIDATE AND I HOPE THAT HE WILL OBTAIN THE POST. IT IS OBVIOUSLY IMPORTANT AT THIS JUNCTURE THAT THE ALLIANCE SHOULD CONTINUE TO HAVE FOR ITS SECRETARY-GENERAL A PERSON OF WIDE POLITICAL EXPERIENCE OF ALLIANCE AFFAIRS AND OF A STATURE AND REPUTATION THAT COMMANDS GENERAL RESPECT. I BELIEVE THAT PETER CARRINGTON ADMIRABLY FITS THIS REQUIREMENT. I VERY MUCH HOPE THAT YOU WILL BE ABLE TO

TELL ME THAT HE WOULD ENJOY THE SUPPORT OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. I SHOULD BE MOST GRATEFUL IF YOU COULD LET ME HAVE AN INDICATION OF YOUR THINKING ON THIS FAIRLY SOON, SO THAT WE MAY PROCEED TO THE WIDER CONSULTATIONS WITHIN THE ALLIANCE THAT WILL BE NECESSARY.
SINCERELY, MARGARET THATCHER''
ENDS.

HOWE

NNNN
DISTRIBUTION:-
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HD/DEF DEPT
PS
PS/PUS
SIR J BULLARD
MR WRIGHT
MR GILLMORE

COPIES TO:
PS/NO 10

SECRET

6

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

30 June 1983

NATO Secretary-General

Thank you for your letter of 29 June.

The Prime Minister has approved the proposed message to Chancellor Kohl with only minor changes. I enclose the revised version with this letter and should be grateful if you would arrange for it to be delivered.

We can consider the proposed message to President Reagan on the same subject in the light of Chancellor Kohl's response.

May I leave it to you to bring this correspondence to the attention of the Ministry of Defence if you think that necessary.

A. J. COLES

Brian Fall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SECRET

MESSAGE TO CHANCELLOR KOHL

I had hoped to raise with you personally, either in Stuttgart or in London, the question of the succession to Dr. Luns as NATO Secretary General. Since that did not in the event prove possible, I am asking Sir Jock Taylor to give you this personal message instead.

As you know, Joseph Luns has indicated that he wishes to stand down next year and the question of who should succeed him is already under active consideration. You may already have heard informally that Peter Carrington has said he would be willing to succeed Dr. Luns as NATO Secretary-General if it were to be the general wish of the Alliance that he should do so and on the understanding that his nomination would therefore not be contested. I should like you to know that in my view Peter Carrington is indeed the best candidate and I hope that he will obtain the post. It is obviously important at this juncture that the Alliance should continue to have for its Secretary-General a person of wide political experience of Alliance affairs and of a stature and reputation that commands general respect. I believe that Peter Carrington admirably fits this requirement. I very much hope that you will be able to tell me that he would enjoy the support of the Federal Government. I should be most grateful if you could let me have an indication of your thinking on this fairly soon, so that we may proceed to the wider consultations within the Alliance that will be necessary.

SECRET

5

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

29 June 1983

Prime Minister

Agree message to Chancellor Kohl?

A.J.C. 29/6.

Dear John.

NATO Secretary-General

In your letter of 24 June you asked for a draft message for the Prime Minister to send to President Reagan about Lord Carrington as successor to Dr Luns. In your letter of 27 June you also asked us to consider whether a personal message to Chancellor Kohl would be advisable.

In our view the next step should ideally be to secure German support. Ministers have now raised Lord Carrington's name on recent separate occasions with Vice President Bush, Mr Shultz and with Mr Weinberger. But the US Administration have so far avoided committing themselves; and we know that there are one or two lingering reservations in some quarters of the US bureaucracy at official level. It will very much ease matters in bringing President Reagan to declare the American Administration's position on this if we are first able to demonstrate that the three main European Allies are unambiguously in favour of Lord Carrington. If the Prime Minister writes straightaway to President Reagan there is a risk that he will merely prevaricate until Chancellor Kohl's attitude is known.

// It follows that although we are enclosing with this letter two draft messages as requested, we would recommend that the message to President Reagan should not be sent until we have a response from Chancellor Kohl. It would be helpful if we could get a response from Kohl before he leaves for Moscow on 4 July: there is inevitably a danger that the longer we allow matters to run on, the more likely that other candidates for the job will emerge and that a fairly rapid outcome in favour of Lord Carrington will therefore elude us.

/Sir G Howe

SECRET

Sir G Howe has not yet seen the draft messages, but has agreeed that I should send them to you now in case the Prime Minister would like to have a word when he sees her this afternoon.

Yours ever,

(B J P Fall)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

DSR 11 (Revised)

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:

PRIME MINISTER

DEPARTMENT: TEL. NO:

Reference

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret
Secret
Confidential
Restricted
Unclassified

TO:

HERR KOHL

Your Reference

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

SUBJECT:

I had hoped to raise with you personally, either in Stuttgart or in London, the question of the succession to Dr Luns as NATO Secretary General. Since that did not in the event prove possible, I am asking Sir Jock Taylor to give you this ~~written~~ personal message instead.

As you know, Joseph Luns has indicated that he wishes to ~~bow out from his present responsibilities~~ stand down next year and the question of who should succeed him is already under active consideration. You may already have heard informally that Peter Carrington has said he would be willing to succeed Dr Luns as NATO Secretary General if it were to be the general wish of the Alliance that he should do so and on the understanding that his nomination would therefore not be contested. I should like you to know that in my view Peter Carrington is indeed the best candidate and I hope that he will obtain the post. It is obviously important at this juncture that the Alliance

Enclosures—flag(s).....

/should

should continue to have for its Secretary-General a person of wide political experience of Alliance affairs and of a stature and reputation that commands ~~our~~ general respect. I believe that Peter Carrington admirably fits this requirement. I very much hope that you will be able to tell me that he would enjoy the support of the Federal Government. I should be most grateful if you could let me have an indication of your thinking on this fairly soon, so that we may proceed to the wider consultations within the Alliance that will be necessary.

MT

SECRET AND PERSONAL

FCE 544

4

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

27 June, 1983

NATO Secretary General

My letter of 24 June described the Prime Minister's talk with Vice-President Bush about this matter.

As you know, the plan had been for the Prime Minister to discuss it with Chancellor Kohl at the dinner which they both attended on Friday night. But in the event Mrs. Thatcher thought it more important to concentrate on the problem of the German position on INF which was described in your letter of 24 June to which I have replied separately. She did not, therefore, raise with the German Chancellor the question of Lord Carrington's candidature for this post.

You may care to consider whether the Prime Minister should now be advised to send a personal message to Chancellor Kohl about Lord Carrington's candidature.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence).

A. J. COLES

B. Fall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

SECRET AND PERSONAL

SECRET

3

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

24 June 1983

NATO Secretary-General

You told me this morning of the American suggestion that it would be helpful if the Prime Minister raised with Vice President Bush today the question of who should succeed Dr. Luns.

At the end of her talk with Mr. Bush, the Prime Minister said that we understood that Dr. Luns would be leaving the post of NATO Secretary-General. Lord Carrington was willing to succeed him, provided the appointment was not contested. She had no doubt that he was the best candidate and she hoped that he would obtain the post.

Mr. Bush suggested that the Prime Minister should send a personal message to President Reagan about the matter. There had been discussion of it in the White House but the United States had not yet taken a position. While they respected Luns they did not want him to serve again. There was respect for Lord Carrington. There was also some respect for Tindemans. The President had not yet focused on the issue. He was sure that the President would find useful a letter from the Prime Minister.

Mrs. Thatcher agreed to write to President Reagan. I should be grateful if you could let me have a draft as soon as possible.

A. J. COLES

Brian Fall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

MR

SECRET

HL

cc MASTER SGT

cc MOD

2

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

21 June 1983

NATO Secretary-General: the succession to Dr. Luns

Thank you for your letter of 16 June. As I told you on the telephone, the Prime Minister did not think that it would be wise to raise this issue with Chancellor Kohl at Stuttgart since, owing to the way the meeting developed, he was pre-occupied with other matters. I think that the Prime Minister will, however, try to speak to him about the matter when he is in London later this week for the meeting of the European Democratic Union.

Meanwhile, the Prime Minister took advantage of Mr. Weinberger's call today to draw his attention to the fact that Dr. Luns appeared to wish to give up the Secretary-General-ship at the beginning of May next year and to say that Lord Carrington would like to be a candidate provided his candidature was not contested. Mrs. Thatcher added that he was of course superbly qualified for the job.

Mr. Weinberger said that Lord Carrington was indeed very knowledgeable and very respected. He was aware that Dr. Luns had said that he would retire but he was still not fully convinced that he would do so.

The discussion rapidly moved on to other subjects. It is hard to interpret Mr. Weinberger's response but I did not get the impression that he was ready, at least at this stage, to offer American support for Lord Carrington's candidature.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence).

A. J. COLES

Brian Fall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

NR

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

16 June 1983

Will do nos.

Dear John,

NATO Secretary-General: the Succession to Dr Luns

We have not included in the Prime Minister's brief for Stuttgart any mention of the succession to Dr Luns, as the question remains a sensitive one. But we should like to suggest that the Prime Minister raise the issue with Chancellor Kohl; and she may, in any case, find it useful to have the following background in case the Chancellor or other Heads of Government raise it with her.

Dr Luns told a private meeting of the NATO Permanent Representatives on 22 April that he intended to give up the Secretary-Generalship at the beginning of May next year. He urged secrecy on this and said that if there was a leak he would deny that he had any intention of resigning. (In the event he has not gone as far as this in response to various press reports that he will retire.)

Lord Carrington has spoken privately with Mr Pym and with senior officials here on his willingness to succeed Luns. It seems now to be clear that he would accept the position if it were offered to him, but that he would not be willing to become a candidate in a contested election. There are some difficulties for him in the length of the delay before Luns' final departure and he is anxious that the issue be resolved one way or another as soon as possible.

No candidates from elsewhere are yet formally in the field. Tindemans and Davignon have been talked of and are evidently interested; the Portuguese have mentioned the Foreign Minister in their last Government (Futscher-Pereira),

/while

while acknowledging that he would not stand a chance against Lord Carrington.

Sir Geoffrey Howe is in no doubt that Lord Carrington's appointment would be very much in British interests as well as those of the Alliance as a whole. No comparable British potential candidate has emerged. At a difficult time for relations within the Alliance, as well as for East/West relations, a man of Lord Carrington's stature could play an invaluable role in co-ordinating effective and timely responses by NATO to East/West problems. The increasingly ineffective performance of Luns in this respect has been a factor in the Alliance's failures in the past to present a united front on contentious political issues.

There has been discussion of Lord Carrington's possible succession with our main Allies. Mr Pym had been in touch with Cheysson, Shultz and Genscher, and views were exchanged at a 'Berlin' meeting of Foreign Ministers in Paris (where Julian Bullard represented HMG) in the margins of the North Atlantic Council meeting in Paris last week. Cheysson says he is strongly in favour of Lord Carrington and is against a disputed election. The American position is more complex. Shultz himself is apparently in favour as, on the evidence available, is Weinberger and senior officials in the White House. But there is a problem over the attitudes of some senior Pentagon officials who are less well disposed: they would probably prefer a Secretary-General more susceptible to their influence (some have spoken of the possibility of Tindemans and even of Luns being asked to stay on). Shultz is therefore anxious not to be seen at this stage to be supporting Lord Carrington and would prefer to wait for a European consensus to emerge. The German view is not fully clear. They have no candidate of their own. Genscher seemed to be in favour at the Paris meeting, but undertook to consult Chancellor Kohl. He mentioned the possibility of discussion in the margins of Stuttgart.

The indications from smaller Allies (from conversations based on press reports of Lord Carrington's interest) are that the Norwegians and Danes would strongly support Lord Carrington and our assumption is that most of the other smaller Allies would also do so.

The Germans' position is therefore crucial. If they were to come out in support, Shultz would be able to argue in Washington that Lord Carrington has strong European support and this should be sufficient to override any objections from the Pentagon. We would therefore suggest that the Prime Minister might, if opportunity arises, tackle Chancellor Kohl in private on this subject. She might make the following points:

(a)

(a) Lord Carrington's obvious qualifications for the post;

(b) the fact that he is only interested if he should emerge as a unanimous choice;

(c) the influence of German support on the decisions of other Allies including the Americans.

The issue is likely to come up during Mr Weinberger's visit to London on 21 June, when he is due to call on the Prime Minister and the Defence Secretary. I would propose that we should be in touch with each other on 20 June to check on what happened at Stuttgart before we make recommendations on what might be said to Weinberger.

If the Prime Minister is approached in Stuttgart by partners other than the French and Germans, we would recommend that she should say that Lord Carrington is not a candidate in the sense that he would wish his name to go forward in a contested election, but our understanding is that he would be willing to take the job on if it was the clear desire of the Alliance that he should do so.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (with the request that we continue to restrict access on these papers as tightly as possible).

Yours ever,

(B J P Fall)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

NATO

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

8 June 1982

Dear Clive

Succession to Luns

We spoke yesterday about the Prime Minister's conversation with Chancellor Schmidt. I attach a copy of a self-explanatory minute recording a talk this morning between Mr Pym and Mr Haig.

Prime Minister.

I did not receive your brief exchange with Chancellor Schmidt about Luns Succession but I understand it was left to the Foreign Secretary.

Yours ever

(B J P Fall)
Private Secretary

I also attach the brief about the chairmanship of the NATO Military Committee which you sent earlier.

C A Whitmore Esq
10 Downing Street

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Mr Weston - Defence Department

Succession to Luns

The Secretary of State decided, in the light of the Prime Minister's conversation with Chancellor Schmidt at Versailles, that he should have a word with Mr Haig. He duly did so this morning during a brief meeting tete-a-tete.

The Secretary of State mentioned the possibility of Lord Carrington as a successor to Luns, but added that he did not know whether Lord Carrington would be prepared to take the job on if approached. Haig replied that he had not previously thought of the idea of Lord Carrington, but he could not think of anybody who would do the job better. In the course of further conversation he said that the Americans would back Lord Carrington for the job and that things ought to be so organised as to leave him the field to himself.

It may be worth recording also that Haig mentioned Tindemans as someone interested in the job. Haig noted his qualities, but implied that the fact that he came from a small country with no nuclear involvement would stand against him in American eyes. Haig added that the Canadian Foreign Minister MacGuigan was actively interested. Haig liked him, but thought him unsuitable (probably more a comment on the Canadian role in NATO than on MacGuigan personally).

Finally Haig mentioned that the Germans wanted General Brant as Chairman of the Military Committee. Haig thought that he ought to have the job, and suggested that we might bear this in mind when we 'played the Carrington card' with the Germans.

(B J P Fall)
Private Secretary

8 June 1982

cc: PS
PS/PUS
Mr Bullard
Mr Wright
Mr Gillmore

APPOINTMENTS IN CONFIDENCE
PERSONAL

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1
Telephone 01-~~XXXXXX~~ 218 2111/3

MO 1/1

3rd June 1982

MT

Prime Minister.

Dear Clive,

CHAIRMAN OF THE MILITARY COMMITTEE

In the margins of the Summit meeting next week, it is possible that Chancellor Schmidt may seek the Prime Minister's support for the appointment of General Brandt to succeed Admiral Falls as Chairman of NATO's Military Committee in July 1983. You will recall that with the Prime Minister's agreement Admiral Eberle was put forward as a UK candidate but this did not find widespread support because he had not served as a Chief of Defence Staff.

If the subject is raised with the Prime Minister we suggest that she declines to be drawn into supporting the German candidate. The reasons for this recommendation can be briefly summarised as follows:

a. A postal ballot to elect the Chairman of the Military Committee (CMC) (designate), conducted by the President of the Military Committee (General Hamre, Chief of Defence Norway), has already been concluded.

b. The result of the postal ballot (communicated by General Hamre to his Military Committee colleagues on 26 April 1982) showed that General de Jager, Chief of Defence Netherlands, had received a majority of votes in the selection of a successor to Admiral Falls.

c. Both Queen Beatrix and the Netherlands Government have assented to the proposed appointment of General de Jager as CMC (designate); therefore a belated attempt to change the outcome of the Military Committee's postal ballot would be offensive to the Netherlands.

d. General de Jager was elected by a democratic process and there is no reason to tamper with the result of the ballot - it would not be in the best interests of NATO so to do.

e. The CMC must be seen as the freely chosen impartial representative of the NATO Chiefs of Defence who will express the collective military judgement of the Military Committee without fear or favour - or reference to political influence.

C A Whitmore Esq

f. If General Brandt's candidature should succeed through political pressure, the influence of the Military Committee would be degraded and the best interests of the FR of Germany would not be served in the process.

A detailed background brief produced by the Chief of Defence Staff is attached. I am copying this letter to Brian Fall (FCO).

Yours ever,

(D B OMAND)

PERSONAL IN CONFIDENCE

THE APPOINTMENT OF CMC (DESIGNATE)

1. The present Chairman of the Military Committee (CMC), Admiral R H Falls, Canadian Armed Forces, is due to be replaced in July 1983. It is customary to nominate the new CMC (designate) about a year before he takes Office. Selection of the CMC (designate) is in the hands of the members of the Military Committee in Chiefs of Staff Session (MC/CS), namely the Chiefs of Defence of those nations which comprise the NATO Military Alliance. The selection process is conducted by the President of the Military Committee; each nation takes its turn in alphabetical order to provide the President for a one-year term in Office. The current President of the Military Committee is General Hamre, Chief of Defence, Norway; he will be succeeded in July 1982 by General de Melo Egidio, Chief of Defence, Portugal.

2. The discussion about the selection of the CMC (designate) started in the margins of the Military Committee in September 1981. At the 78th MC/CS last December it emerged that there were three candidates: General de Jager (Chief of Defence Netherlands), General Brandt (Chief of Defence FR of Germany) and Admiral Eberle (ex-CINCHAN, UK). Each Chief of Defence was invited by General Hamre to express a view on the point of principle that the CMC should invariably be chosen from amongst the serving Chiefs of Defence, and to vote for one of the three candidates.

3. This was done by postal ballot, and the outcome was that General de Jager received a majority of the votes, General Brandt was second and Admiral Eberle third. Most members of the Military Committee considered that the CMC should have served as a Chief of Defence.

4. On 26th April 1982 General Hamre informed his colleagues by signal about the result of the ballot stating that he intended to propose the appointment of General de Jager as CMC (designate) for ratification at the 79th MC/CS on 5th May. Acting upon this information, General de Jager sought permission from both Queen Beatrix and the Netherlands Government to accept the appointment.

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5. Immediately on receipt of General Hamre's message, the FR of Germany authorities initiated an intense political/military lobby designed to over-turn the appointment of General de Jager. In almost all NATO capitals Foreign Ministers and senior officials were approached by the FR of Germany Ambassador; Ministers of Defence and other senior Ministry of Defence officials were approached by the FR of Germany Defence/Military Attache. Whilst visiting Bonn, General Jones, the Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, was summoned to see Chancellor Schmidt who told him that the selection of the Netherlands Chief of Defence in preference to General Brandt was unacceptable to the FRG and that US support for General de Jager's appointment would exacerbate the differences of opinion which exist between the FRG and the US.

6. On 5th May 1982 the Military Committee met in Private Session (without both General de Jager and General Brandt) to consider the appointment of a CMC designate. In the light of the political pressures, which had been brought to bear upon all NATO nations, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Terence Lewin suggested that the result of the ballot announced by General Hamre on 26th April should stand: General de Jager had been elected by democratic process and there was no reason to tamper with the result of the ballot. Admiral Lewin added that he objected most strongly to the projection of political influence into the internal affairs of the Military Committee; the selection of a new Chairman of the Military Committee must remain the sole province of the members of the Military Committee because the role of the Military Committee was to provide independent military advice and it was incumbent upon the CMC to represent the collective view of the Military Committee without reference to any political influence. Following a long, inconclusive discussion in which it appeared that neither General de Jager nor General Brandt was now acceptable to the majority of members, Admiral Lewin proposed Admiral Eberle as a compromise candidate, but the issue was not resolved and it was agreed that the subject should be raised again for discussion at the 80th MC/CS in September 1982.

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7. During the last few weeks it is apparent that the FR of Germany lobby in support of General Brandt's candidature continues unabated in the capitals of NATO. In view of the strong political feelings amongst senior FRG authorities, it is possible that General Brandt's candidature for the CMC appointment may be raised at Chancellor/Prime Minister level in the margins of the Summit Meeting in Bonn.

3 Jun 82

Nato

Prime Minister (2)

You will wish to be aware of Lord Carrington's cautious line.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SWIA 2AH

13 November 1981

Dear Johnny

13/XI

Succession to the Secretary-General at OECD and Nato

The present Secretary-General of the OECD, Mr van Lennep, retires on 31 March 1982. The search for a successor to him is, therefore, far advanced. There are at least six candidates in the field - from Italy, France, Germany, Sweden, Denmark and Belgium - and we would like to have the choice made by the end of the year. Our suggestion that Finance Ministers would wish to consider this question at the ECOFIN Council on 17 November did not receive a very good reception in COREPER (UKREP telegram No 4178 of 11 November). Lord Carrington notes the general preference that Foreign Ministers should handle this. But there will be little time to do so at the Foreign Affairs Council on 16/17 November, and the Chancellor may wish to have some informal discussion with his colleagues on 17 November - you will have seen from Bonn telegram No 889 that Graf Lambsdorff has already said that he hopes for a bilateral talk with the Chancellor then. If necessary Foreign Ministers could consider the question again in December.

There is a related question of which Sir Geoffrey Howe will wish to be aware. We expect Dr Luns may announce at the NATO Ministerial Meeting on 9/10 December that he will retire as NATO Secretary-General at the end of 1982. If he does, Lord Soames is a candidate for the succession. He should be a strong candidate, in Lord Carrington's view, and is already beginning to gather support.

There is no link in practice between OECD and NATO posts. It is not in our interests to suggest a link, since the NATO decision comes so much later than the OECD one. But the two subjects could come up together, as they did during the Anglo-Italian Summit. Lord Carrington referred to the candidature of Lord Soames and Signor Colombo said that he was aware of it. He and Spadolini subsequently lobbied in support of Signor Pandolfi for the OECD post. The same could happen at the Anglo-German Summit next week.

I think it is widely agreed between us that Sr Pandolfi and M Ripert (France) are the strongest runners for the OECD post on the current list. My impression is that the Prime Minister, Lord Carrington and the Chancellor are all inclined to favour Signor Pandolfi: and it is true that there are certain difficulties about the appointment of a French Secretary-General. But Lord Carrington believes that at the Council meetings next week we

/should

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should be cautious about expressing preferences for any candidates for the OECD post. If we give strong backing now to any one candidate, we must disappoint the countries backing others; this could affect subsequent attitudes towards Lord Soames, and be thought by others to jeopardize the Presidency role. Lord Carrington suggests that at the present stage we should invite discussion among our partners, so as to satisfy those who believe that the Community should put forward a single candidate (an unlikely outcome), and to begin the process of whittling down their number (perhaps by eliminating the Belgian and Danish candidates).

You should also know that the French may have spoken about the OECD and NATO posts in such a way as to suggest that they may have it in mind to create a link (they would support us in NATO in return for our support in OECD). But it is by no means clear that they will do so; and as I have mentioned above, there are difficulties over the French suggestion. But that possibility too needs to be borne in mind.

I am copying this letter to Michael Alexander (No 10).

Yours ever.

(F N Richards)
Private Secretary

J O Kerr Esq
PS/Chancellor of the Exchequer

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FM UKREP BRUSSELS 111232Z NOV 81
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 4178 OF 11 NOVEMBER
INFO ROUTINE UKDEL OECD

OECD SECRETARY-GENERAL
SUMMARY

1. AT AN INFORMAL MEETING OF PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES ALL AGREED THAT QUESTION WHETHER COMMUNITY SHOULD TRY TO PUT FORWARD A SINGLE CANDIDATE SHOULD BE DISCUSSED, BUT MOST ARGUED THAT THIS SHOULD BE BY FOREIGN MINISTERS NOT FINANCE MINISTERS.

DETAIL

2. AS INSTRUCTED, I INVITED MY COLLEAGUES TO AN INFORMAL MEETING. I SAID THAT THE PRESIDENCY HAD RECEIVED INFORMAL APPROACHES FROM A NUMBER OF MEMBER STATES WHO THOUGHT THE COMMUNITY SHOULD AGREE TO SUPPORT A SINGLE CANDIDATE. THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER WOULD BE READY TO DISCUSS THIS WITH HIS COLLEAGUES AT LUNCH ON 17 NOVEMBER, TO SEE IF A WAY SHOULD BE FOUND FOR THE MEMBER STATES TO LEND THEIR SUPPORT TO A SINGLE CANDIDATE. IF MINISTERS AGREED THAT THIS WAS DESIRABLE. A SINGLE CANDIDATE FROM A COMMUNITY MEMBER STATE HAD A STRONG CHANCE OF BEING SELECTED. THE PRESIDENCY, WHO HAD NO CANDIDATE TO OFFER, WAS PREPARED TO OFFER ITS GOOD OFFICES. SPEAKING PERSONALLY I DOUBTED WHETHER MINISTERS WOULD WISH TO DISCUSS NAMES: SOME DISCREET WAY OF INDICATING PREFERENCES COULD BE EVOLVED AT A LATER STAGE AND A LOWER LEVEL.

3. RUTTEN (NETHERLANDS) SAID THAT THE NETHERLANDS SUPPORTED THE IDEA OF A SINGLE COMMUNITY CANDIDATE. HOWEVER, SINCE THIS WAS A MATTER DEALT WITH BY HIS FOREIGN MINISTER, THE ECOFIN COUNCIL WOULD NOT BE THE RIGHT FORUM. MOST OTHERS AGREED: NONE EXPRESSED A CONTRARY VIEW. I EXPLAINED THAT IN THE UK THE CHANCELLOR TOOK THE LEAD ON THIS MATTER, BUT IN THE LIGHT OF THE DIFFICULTIES AN ECOFIN DISCUSSION WOULD CAUSE TO MOST OF OUR PARTNERS I WOULD RECOMMEND TO YOU THAT FOREIGN MINISTERS SHOULD DISCUSS THIS OVER LUNCH ON MONDAY ON 16 NOVEMBER.

/4.

4. POENSGEN (FRG) HOPED MINISTERS WOULD NOT WASTE TIME ON THIS: THEY HAD MORE IMPORTANT THINGS TO DISCUSS. HE DOUBTED WHETHER IT WAS AN APPROPRIATE SUBJECT FOR DISCUSSION IN BRUSSELS. O'ROURKE (IRELAND) HOPED THAT MINISTERS WOULD AGREE TO INSTRUCT AMBASSADORS TO THE OECD TO TAKE ANY FOLLOW-UP ACTION. I THEREFORE UNDERTOOK TO RECOMMEND SUCH A PROVISIONAL CONCLUSION, IF MINISTERS AGREED IN PRINCIPLE THAT THERE SHOULD BE A COMMUNITY CANDIDATE. TO AVOID SPENDING TOO MUCH TIME ON THE POINT, I WOULD ALSO SUGGEST THAT YOU SHOULD RAISE THE SUBJECT ONLY AT THE END OF LUNCH.

FCO COPY TO:

FCO - PS BRIDGES DE FONBLANQUE ECD(I) GREEN (ERD)
CAB - ELLIOTT
TSY - HANCOCK
BUTLER

THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED

LIMITED
ERD
ECD(I)
PS
PS/LPS
PS/PUS

LORD BRIDGES
MR BULLARD
MR HANNAY
MR EVANS

COPIES TO:

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GPR 130 CONFIDENTIAL

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DESKBY 120830Z

FM BONN 111830Z NOV 81

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 889 OF 11 NOVEMBER

INFO ROUTINE UKREP BRUSSELS

FOLLOWING FOR FRANKLIN (CABINET OFFICE) FROM BEAMISH: SUCCESSOR TO VAN LENNEP: COMMUNITY CONSULTATIONS

1. MUELLER-THUNS WAS UNABLE TO REACH YOU BY TELEPHONE TODAY. THE GERMAN RESPONSE TO THE SUGGESTION THAT THERE SHOULD BE DISCUSSION A DIX OVER LUNCH AT ECOFIN WITH A VIEW TO AGREEING A COMMUNITY CANDIDATE IS DISTINCTLY NEGATIVE. THEY DO NOT BELIEVE THE MATTER IS YET RIPE AND CONSIDER THAT AN ATTEMPT ON THE LINES PROPOSED COULD BE COUNTER PRODUCTIVE. BEFORE ANY DISCUSSION IN THE TEN THEY WOULD MUCH PREFER A BILATERAL CONSULTATION AND HOPE THAT SIR G HOWE WILL BE ABLE TO AGREE AND THAT HE AND GRAF LAMBSDORFF WILL HAVE A CHANCE TO TACKLE THE SUBJECT DURING THE ANGLO/GERMAN CONSULTATIONS NEXT WEEK.

FCO PSE ADVANCE COPIES TO:

WENTWORTH - CAB OFFICE

BAYNE - FCO

BOTTRILL - TREASURY

[ADVANCED AS REQUESTED]

GOODALL

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MR BULLARD
MR EVANS
MR FERGUSSON
MR HAYES
MR HANNAY

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MR BOTTRILL H M TREASURY
MR WENTWORTH CABINET OFFICE

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ПЕРЕЗВОНИТЕ ЗА ЗАКАЗОМ

Mr Gillmore - Defence Dept

Secretary-General of NATO

During the private discussions which preceded the main session of talks this morning, Lord Carrington reaffirmed Lord Soames' candidacy to succeed Dr Luns. Mr Haig said that he liked this idea, and was very much opposed to M. Simonet's candidacy. His main concern however was that Dr Luns should be allowed to retire in his own time.

(G G H Walden)
Private Secretary

10 April 1981

cc: PS
PS/LPS
PS/Mr Hurd
PS/PUS
Sir A Acland
Mr P Moberly

Mr Alexander, No. 10

NATO

UNITED KINGDOM PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
ON THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL
OTAN/NATO
1110 BRUSSELS
TELEPHONE 241.01.15

(2)

Prime Minister

Unhelpful. It looks as tho' all this may end rather messily.

Sir Antony Acland KCVO CMG
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London S W 1

4 February, 1981

Dear Antony,

SECRETARY - GENERAL

At yesterday's PermReps lunch, Luns said there had been a number of articles in British newspapers and periodicals since last November suggesting that it was time he retired. He mentioned the Economist Foreign Report in November, The Times, Financial Times, Daily Telegraph (30 January) and again the latest Economist Foreign Report. He said the last, about which you warned me but which I have not seen, was particularly unpleasant. Several of these articles had mentioned the same British name as his likely successor, Lord Soames. Luns said he did not know what was behind these reports but they all ignored the basic constitutional point, which was that he had not retired and the appointment was therefore not vacant.

2. Luns warned me in advance that he was going to speak as above and said that he had been urged by several very senior people in NATO countries to stay on. He did not say what countries or what sort of people. Tap Bennett commented to me privately after lunch that, if this was an inspired campaign, he thought we were going about it rather clumsily and the effect was likely to be the opposite of what was intended. Inspired or not (and I assured him not) I fear he may be right

Yours ever,

Clive

Clive Rose

P.S. My Norwegian colleague has since told me that, in a private conversation after the lunch, Luns said with considerable emphasis that not only was there no vacancy but that the Press seemed to have overlooked the requirement that the Secretary General should give a year's notice of his retirement. There is of course no such requirement, but this gives the impression that, unless some positive action is taken, it will be later rather than sooner.

Prime Minister

NATO

26/x

TWO MORE

O

0808

PS/PUS

Nicholas Lever

2. CC. Sarah Personal Copy Please
PS
PS/Mr Lyon
Sir R. Armstrong
Sir P. Cooper
Mr Wiggins

1 PUS

3. Sir A Acland

PS/PUS

24.9

26/9

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~~PP F C O~~

~~DEDIP~~

GPS110

DEDIP

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~PERSONAL~~

FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 260052Z SEP 80

TO PRIORITY F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1381 OF 25 SEPTEMBER

FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY FOR PS/PUS AND LEVER.
SECRETARY GENERAL OF NATO

1. THE SECRETARY OF STATE DISCUSSED THIS WITH MUSKIE THIS EVENING. HE SAID THAT LUNS WAS NEARLY SEVENTY, AND IT MIGHT SOON BE TIME FOR HIM TO RETIRE. IT WAS A LONG TIME SINCE THE UK HAD HELD THE JOB. BUT WE WERE ONLY PUTTING FORWARD A CANDIDATE NOW BECAUSE WE HAD SOMEONE WHO WAS FIRST RATE. CHRISTOPHER SOAMES HAD EUROPEAN EXPERIENCE, AS WELL AS HAVING BEEN AN UNDER SECRETARY FOR THE NAVY AND AIRFORCE. HE ALSO HAD WORLD STANDING AFTER HIS RHODESIAN EXPLOITS. HE WOULD LIKE MUSKIE TO REFLECT ON THIS. MUSKIE'S ONLY COMMENT WAS THAT HE WOULD DO SO.

2. LORD CARRINGTON WILL SPEAK TO GENSCHER ON THE SAME LINES.

PARSONS