

Confidential Filing

Calls on the Prime Minister by the  
Chairman of the NATO military Cttee

NATO

5  
4

March 1980

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
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<p>PART CLOSED</p> <p>PREM 19 / 4860</p>							

**PART**

**CLOSED**

See NATO Policy

MS PHILIPPA LESLIE-JONES

John P. Brooks, Esq.,  
Ministry of Defence.



*Phil Brooke - pmg.*

10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

18 May 1994

**VISIT TO LONDON BY NATO MILITARY COMMITTEE**

Thank you for your letter of 16 May.

I am sorry to say it will not be possible to use No.10 for the NATO Chiefs of Defence Staff reception in the Prime Minister's absence abroad. Receptions are only held here in the Prime Minister's absence in very exceptional cases. I hope you will be able to find a suitable venue for the reception.

**MS PHILIPPA LESLIE-JONES**

John Pitt-Brooke, Esq.,  
Ministry of Defence.

CF pps. R17/5



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

Telephone 071-21 82111/2/3

SECRETARY OF STATE

MO 13/1G

16 May 1994

*16*  
*Handwritten notes and signatures*

*Dear Philippa*

**VISIT TO LONDON BY NATO MILITARY COMMITTEE**

You wrote to me on 4th March (in response to my letter of 24th February) saying that the Prime Minister is likely to be overseas at the time of the tour so will not be able to offer a reception.

Sir Patrick Mayhew has now very kindly said he will act as host for the reception on Tuesday 20th September, and I wondered if it may be possible to use No.10 for this purpose. I know that it would be very much appreciated by the Chiefs of Defence Staff of all NATO nations.

If you are able to agree to this request it would be helpful if you could nominate someone as a point of contact.

*Yes*

(J S PITT-BROOKE)  
Private Secretary

Philippa Leslie-Jones  
10 Downing Street



Recycled Paper



file  
P41 NATO. AS

10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

4 March 1994

**VISIT TO LONDON BY NATO MILITARY COMMITTEE**

Thank you for your letter of 24 February to Roderic Lyne, suggesting that the Prime Minister might meet the visiting NATO Military Committee in September.

Unfortunately the Prime Minister is likely to be on an overseas visit at the time of the Committee's tour. I am afraid this means it will not be possible to offer a reception for the Committee this time round.

**MS PHILIPPA LESLIE-JONES**

J. Pitt-Brooke, Esq.,  
Ministry of Defence.

(J. PITT-BROOKE)  
Private Secretary



10 DOWNING STREET

~~Good!~~

Philipps

Do you have  
top copy? Let's  
use (possible) hand  
as a reason to  
say no, sorry.

Possible

that

PM can be on R.

overseas visit

that week -

we must sit

down and catch

up with each

other before too  $\Delta \frac{5}{3}$   
long as on these things!!



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
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Telephone 071-21 82111/2/3

SECRETARY OF STATE

MO 13/1G

24 February 1994

Dear Rod,

VISIT TO LONDON BY NATO MILITARY COMMITTEE

Each September the Chiefs of Defence Staff from all NATO nations, along with senior NATO commanders, visit a couple of NATO countries for extensive briefing on military capability. This year they shall be visiting the United Kingdom and Germany.

When this group last visited the United Kingdom in September 1988 the then Prime Minister hosted a reception for them at No.10. This was, as you can understand, greatly appreciated by everyone and was considered to be the highlight of the visit.

It would I know, be similarly welcomed if it were possible to arrange such a function for the 1994 tour. The Chiefs of Staff will be in London from Sunday 18th September to Wednesday 21st September (when they leave for Germany where they will attend a function hosted by Chancellor Kohl).

I know how difficult it is to fit these things in, but if it were possible for the Prime Minister to meet the Committee on, say, Tuesday 20th September, this would be very greatly appreciated.


(J S PITT-BROOKE)  
Private Secretary

R M J Lyne Esq CMG  
10 Downing Street



Recycled Paper

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
WHITE HALL LONDON SW1A 2JH



REPORT TO THE COMMISSIONER OF THE ROYAL CANAL

With reference to the report of the Commission of Enquiry into the  
collapse of the bridge over the canal at ... on the 24th of December 1994,  
I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 24th  
inst. in relation to the above mentioned bridge.

When this case first came to my attention, I was advised that the  
bridge was in a state of disrepair and that it was unsafe for use.  
I have since conducted a thorough inspection of the bridge and  
found that the structure is in a state of severe disrepair and  
is unsafe for use.

I would be pleased to discuss the matter in more detail if you  
require. I would also be pleased to provide you with a copy of the  
report of the Commission of Enquiry into the collapse of the bridge  
if you so desire.

I have no doubt that you will be satisfied with the results of  
the investigation and the steps taken to ensure the safety of the  
bridge. I would be pleased to discuss the matter in more detail if  
you require.

*[Handwritten signature]*



10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

F/Prooks. sh  
**SUBJECT  
MASTER** sc. 25

**Filed on:**

From the Private Secretary

2 July 1993

*Dear John,*

**CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER BY THE CHAIRMAN OF THE  
NATO MILITARY COMMITTEE, 1 JULY 1993**

Field Marshal Sir Richard Vincent called on the Prime Minister for half an hour on 1 July. Sir Rodric Braithwaite was also present.

For the most part, Sir Richard and the Prime Minister had an informal chat about the former's impressions of his first half year at NATO. I need not record the details. However, it is worth mentioning one or two of the salient points made by the Field Marshal:

- Sir Richard Vincent did not see peacekeeping as the prime justification for NATO's future existence. This would be putting the cart before the horse. The four points of the Rome Declaration were still valid.
- He gave particular emphasis to the importance of anchoring the more advanced of the former Warsaw Pact states. Even in places like Hungary, there was growing nervousness about future stability. Article 5 guarantees could of course not be extended. But we should try to devise a framework which locked these states into peace, as NATO had locked its members into the avoidance of war over the past 43 years.
- He had found leading Americans - Christopher, Aspen, Powell etc - to be pretty robust in their attitudes towards the Alliance. They had assured him that the US would keep at least 100,000 troops in Europe for as long as he remained at the Military Committee. The Prime Minister observed that the Field Marshal had only been appointed for three years, and expressed some concern about the general American attitude to remaining in Europe.

*2,*

- Sir Richard said that he had worked hard to try to help NATO to bind in the French. The French of course retained a schizophrenic attitude towards the Alliance. However, their participation in a unified chain of command in Bosnia was a significant development.
- The UN was overloaded, and debating far too many resolutions without proper forethought. It was following a flawed strategy.

In discussion on Bosnia, Sir Richard said that he had been pretty sceptical about the chances of ever implementing the Vance/Owen plan. But he thought it quite likely that NATO might be asked to take on some sort of role in the situation which was now emerging.

I am copying this letter to Stephen Smith (Foreign and Commonwealth Office), Melanie Leech and Pauline Neville-Jones (Cabinet Office).

*Yours etc,  
Roderic*

**RODERIC LYNE**

John Pitt-Brooke Esq  
Ministry of Defence



## 10 DOWNING STREET

### Prime Minister

This is all very dense for a half-hour chat with Dick Vincent. I suggest that you ignore the fact-heavy MOD letter, and do no more than glance at Pauline's note. Dick V. will come with his own agenda.

To me, the main points are:

1. Impressions after your first six (?) months?
2. Views on Bosnia?
3. " " future of NATO peacekeeping?  
Including NATO/UN relationship.
4. Views on overall future of NATO, and on European defence?
5. NATO Summit?
6. Anything to be said to Clinton in Tokyo?

Roderic.

Ref: B.O1417

MR LYNE

cc Sir Robin Butler  
Sir Rodric Braithwaite

**CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER BY CHAIRMAN OF  
NATO's MILITARY COMMITTEE**

The Prime Minister may find it helpful to have a line to take on some of the points in John Pitt-Brooke's letter of 29 June. This brief should be read in conjunction with his letter and follows the order of the points therein. In most cases I have simply given a line to take based on the material in the letter. In one or two instances, where I think there are additional points to make (notably on implementation of Owen/Stoltenberg and roulement of the UK battalion), the line to take incorporates John Pitt-Brooke's as well.

**NATO/WEU maritime operation in the Adriatic**

2. Material contained in the letter is purely background.  
No points to make.

**NATO Enforcement of the No Fly Zone and Air Support for Safe Areas**

**Line to Take (if asked)**

3. Air support for safe areas is a capability of last resort for the protection of UNPROFOR forces. The UN Secretary General should be involved on the first occasion air support is requested. Thereafter, it should be established that local commanders have the authority to respond quickly to operational demands.

**Implementation of Owen/Stoltenberg**

4. The letter touches on the need for NATO to undertake planning in due course for the implementation of any agreement for a tripartite division of Bosnia which might emerge from the Geneva process (final paragraph on page 2). The lessons of the VOPP experience need to be taken on board.

Line to Take

5. Last time round the size of the manpower assessments made by NATO for VOPP implementation were a major factor in the conclusion that the VOPP was not implementable. Too many troops and too costly. NATO planners need to bear this in mind when working on any new implementation operation. While any force must be capable of carrying out its allotted tasks and defending itself, **imagination needs to be used about the ways in which limited manpower is put to good use.** Real risk otherwise that NATO's wider role in support of UN operations will not develop beyond small support operations, eg the enforcement of the NFZ.

Roulement of UK Battalion

6. The decision on whether or not to replace the Prince of Wales' Own regiment when it finishes its tour of duty in November may be messier than the letter suggests (first paragraph on page 3). The British battalion was deployed to fulfil the humanitarian mandate in SCR 770. But UNPROFOR's mandate has since been extended by SCR 836 to the protection of safe areas. Although we have made clear that we will not be contributing additional troops to implement SCR 836 we do, of course, have a detachment in Tuzla, one of the designated safe areas and **the mission of our troops has implicitly, even if in only a limited way, been extended.** If, in due course, the resolution lifting the arms embargo is passed, Mrs Ogata had said that she does not see the UNHCR operation continuing. The safe areas would also be vitiated. In such circumstances, there would be little argument about UNPROFOR withdrawal. A more difficult situation could arise if, without the arms embargo having been lifted, the situation on the ground became too bad for UNHCR to continue operations, but there was pressure to continue to sustain the safe areas. The Prime Minister will need to avoid any commitment to sustain the safe areas which is separate from the commitment to protect UNHCR convoys.

Line to Take

7. Next UK roulement would not be due until November. Decision would depend on whether UNPROFOR/UNHCR operation were still in progress; on the embargo not having been lifted and on the contribution of others. No UK intention to stay in Bosnia indefinitely. Principle of rotation has to be made to work.

Reinforcement of the UK BattalionLine to Take (if asked)

8. Reinforcement forces have been earmarked for the additional protection of BRITFOR should this be necessary. They would not be sent for the purposes of a new mandate. We recognise that the UN would need to be consulted about any national reinforcement.

NATO and the UN

9. Field Marshal Vincent is known to have two particular concerns: first that the UN, when contemplating military operations that it wants NATO to fulfil, fails to consult NATO at an early enough stage. Better co-ordination is the solution here. The second is the danger of the NATO military authorities, in particular the Military Committee, becoming sidelined in the conduct of UN operations. Here flexibility will be the key word. NATO's command arrangements will have to be adapted to the (varying) demands of modern peacekeeping. The Military Committee should be able to retain a role, but being rigid will be a mistake.

Line to Take

10. Institutions with an interest in crisis management and conflict resolution need to work increasingly closer together. A good start has already been made between NATO and CSCE and NATO and the UN. Well aware that working with the UN is not friction free. UN needs NATO for modern peacekeeping and NATO therefore in a strong position. But will need to show flexibility in establishing its role.

NATO Summit

Line to Take

11. Thinking here and in the US is at a very early stage. It is already clear that for Washington the Summit will be central to the effort to persuade Congress of NATO's continuing relevance in the changed world, and hence of the importance of the US military presence in Europe. Chance to focus the Administration on the importance to the US of stability in Europe. Charting the course of the Alliance in this way will also provide a framework for the subsequent work in European capitals in the run-up to the 1996 IGC.

Miss L P NEVILLE-JONES

30 June 1993



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
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 Telephone 071-21 82111/2/3

SECRETARY OF STATE

MO 13/1M

29 June 1993

*Dear Norman*

CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER BY CHAIRMAN OF NATO'S MILITARY COMMITTEE

The Chairman of NATO's Military Committee (CMC), Field Marshal Sir Richard Vincent, will be calling on the Prime Minister for 45 30 minutes on 1 July. We expect Sir Richard to concentrate on the former Yugoslavia, and the Prime Minister might find the following points helpful. Some points on other current NATO issues which Sir Richard may raise - the NATO/UN relationship and the NATO Summit later this year - are also included below.

Former Yugoslavia

The UK is a full participant in all the current NATO operations in support of the UN in, or relating to, the former Yugoslavia.

In the now combined NATO/WEU maritime operation in the Adriatic to enforce the trade sanctions against FRY and the arms embargo, we have provided a ship (currently HMS CARDIFF) from the outset; in addition, RAF Nimrod Maritime Patrol Aircraft have deployed at regular intervals (2 aircraft for two 2-week periods every 3 months) to provide monitoring support. The powers conferred by UN SCR 820 of 17 April 1993, including the ability to operate in Montenegrin territorial waters, have assisted the efficacy of the operation but have increased the potential threat of Serb retaliation. As a result SACEUR undertook a review of the Rules of Engagement and of the assets he required to conduct the mission. Following the consequent NATO decision to involve the Standing Naval Force Atlantic (STANAVFORLANT), HMS BIRMINGHAM is also now involved; and in response to a recent request from SACEUR we are providing a specialist RM boarding party on a rotational basis with other nations. Aircraft of the ARK ROYAL Task Group, and the Task Group Duty Frigate (alternately an RN ship, currently HMS BROADSWORD, and a Dutch ship) are also being made available to assist the

R M J Lyne Esq CMG  
 10 Downing Street



enforcement operation. Conventional and nuclear submarines continue to undertake periodic patrols as part of the operation.

RAF early warning radar aircraft participate full time in NATO air monitoring in support of Adriatic operations and in support of the No Fly Zone, for which 8 RAF Tornado F3 aircraft and tanker support are also deployed, based in Italy. Violations of the NFZ have continued, but at a lower level since enforcement action began. For air support of safe areas we have offered a squadron of 12 RAF Jaguar aircraft, together with the 6 RN Sea Harriers embarked in ARK ROYAL and 42 ground personnel for an Air Support Operations Centre and four Tactical Air Control Parties. Formal acceptance of national offers is likely to await nations' endorsement of the NATO concept for the operation, at the end of June. We are of course keen to make progress with the deployment of the Jaguars in case circumstances arise in which air support for the British contingent, not in connection with safe areas, had to be contemplated.

Sir Richard may enquire about UK's attitude to the use of air power. We see it as a last resort in the protection of UNPROFOR personnel because it is a blunt instrument; and its use may provoke retaliation. General Cot, the UN Force Commander designate, may be less cautious about the use of air support than General Wahlgren was known to be. We support the UN Secretary General's wish to be involved in decisions on the first occasion air support is requested and to consult members of the Security Council, consistent with the requirement for rapid decisions.

For the UNPROFOR deployment in Bosnia, NATO initially provided the bulk of the personnel for the 2-star Bosnia headquarters. Naturally we still seek to capitalise on UK manpower serving in NATO posts to provide the bulk of UK's contribution to the HQ, thus utilising their multinational experience and easing the burden on other commands.

At the UN's invitation, NATO has also conducted detailed planning for an operation to assist the parties to implement the Vance/Owen Peace Plan (VOPP). The latter has been overtaken by recent events in Geneva and Copenhagen, but any partition likely to be agreed among the parties can be expected to require an international policing operation. It is too early for any assessment to be made of the potential requirement, but we are anxious that, as negotiations proceed, the manpower implications should be assessed in parallel (by NATO, so that the Americans are engaged). In the long run a tri-partite division may be simpler than the VOPP with its 10 provinces, but it can be expected that there would be a difficult and possibly protracted initial period in which large population movements would have to be conducted. The UK (in common with other NATO partners) has made no commitments to take part in any peace settlement implementation operation. In the context of VOPP, with its estimated requirement for an implementation force of 75,000, we were aware that SACEUR hoped for a UK contribution of HQ ARRC, a skeleton divisional HQ and one brigade.

Sir Richard may enquire about the prospects for a further roulement of the Op GRAPPLE battalion group in Bosnia, beyond the 12 months, ending in November, to which UK initially committed itself. The Defence Secretary will bring forward proposals to OPD colleagues in due course; he takes the view that if the UNPROFOR/UNHCR operation is still in progress the UK should continue to contribute a battalion group (i.e. the Prince of Wales Regiment would be replaced). Whether the humanitarian operation is able to continue will depend on conditions on the ground, particularly on events in the safe areas and the extent to which the Muslims are prepared to continue to fight to hold or regain territory; and on the outcome of calls for the lifting of the arms embargo. The Prime Minister may wish to reflect these points.

Our ability to reinforce the battalion group may also be raised. In addition to the ARK ROYAL Task Group, light guns and M109 heavy artillery, Chinook helicopters and a squadron of Jaguars have been earmarked for this role since January. The provision of close air support will now be subsumed in the NATO planning for safe areas. On 10 June we announced that a number of Army units and individuals were being prepared for possible deployment. These would be drawn on selectively, but potentially would enable the current British contingent of some 2400 to be increased to a small brigade sized force of 6500. The augmentation options include armoured reconnaissance, infantry in wheeled APCs (SAXON), artillery, and anti-tank helicopters. The possible need for more WARRIOR and for tanks is being kept under review. The purpose of these augmentation forces would be to provide additional protection for our forces should the need arise, not to enable the battalion group to fulfil a new mandate (in particular, not the implementation of the safe areas concept). Any national reinforcement would be conducted in consultation with the UN.


#### NATO and the UN

During the past year, working relationships between NATO and WEU on the one hand and the UN and CSCE on the other have improved as each has defined more closely its role in crisis management. The UN's central role in the former Yugoslavia has highlighted the importance of these links. Following last year's agreement by NATO Ministers that support for UN and CSCE peacekeeping should be included among the missions of NATO forces and headquarters, there have been a number of exchanges of information and visits both ways between NATO and the UN. The CMC is known to be keen to develop this relationship. If the subject is raised, the Prime Minister might reflect on the importance of ensuring that institutions with an interest in conflict resolution and crisis management work together under the UN umbrella to produce an effective range of instruments for crisis management and peacekeeping operations.

NATO Summit

The Prime Minister will be aware of the proposal made at the NAC Ministerial in Athens on 11 June, by US Secretary of State Christopher, for a NATO Summit later this year. Officials are presently considering what ground a summit could usefully cover. If Sir Richard raises the issue, the Prime Minister might welcome the idea as an excellent opportunity to take stock of how the Alliance is adapting to the new security environment, and to chart a course for its development over the next few years and in particular in the run-up to the 1996 Inter-Governmental Conference.

I am sending a copy of this letter to John Sawers (Foreign Office), Melanie Leech and Pauline Neville-Jones (Cabinet Office).



(J S PITT-BROOKE)  
Private Secretary



K: F/WULF. AB

10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

15 March 1993

**VISIT OF THE CHAIRMAN OF THE NATO MILITARY COMMITTEE**

Thank you for your letter of 11 March about Sir Richard Vincent's visit to London on 1 July.

The Prime Minister would like to see Sir Richard. We have booked a slot in the diary at 5.15pm. At this range, I of course cannot promise that the time will not change; but we should use it as our target for planning purposes.

If there are any particular points on which it would be useful for the Prime Minister to have a short brief ahead of the call, I should be grateful if you could send me a note by **29 June**.

**RODERIC LYNE**

Lieutenant Colonel R A Hulf KOSB

AB



10 DOWNING STREET

Yes

Roderic

Thursday 1 July  
is a Cabinet +  
Questions Day.

The earliest the PM  
could see Sir  
Richard is at 1715  
(for 1/2 hr?).

S 12/3

Prime Minister

Offer him 5:15, or  
perhaps a drink at 6:00/6:30?

Not essential: he'll come  
at intervals. Put it in  
the diary, and bump if  
life gets bad? 12/7/73

From Lieutenant Colonel R A Hulf KOSB

Sandra

Obs?

Rmn.

Ministry of Defence  
Protocol Office  
Room 2254  
Main Building  
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London  
SW1A 2HB

Tel 071 218 7227  
Fax 071 218 6049

Roderic Lyne  
Private Secretary  
10 Downing Street  
London, SW1A 2AA

11 March 1993

Dear Roderic,

VISIT TO THE UNITED KINGDOM BY THE CHAIRMAN OF THE NATO MILITARY COMMITTEE: FIELD MARSHAL SIR RICHARD VINCENT GBE, KCB, DSO

What's  
your  
mean?!

On 1 July 1993 PM Sir Richard Vincent is to make his first official visit to the UK since his appointment in January this year as Chairman of the NATO Military Committee. Sir Richard knows the Prime Minister well and would like to call on him during that day if it possible. The Secretary of State for Defence supports this request for an office call.

A call either late morning or early afternoon would be desirable from our point of view, but I wait to hear from you.

Your sincerely,

Robert Hulf

Copy to PS/S of S

SUBJECT  
cc MASTER

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file

PM



a: Foreign Eide

10 DOWNING STREET

bc PC

LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

22 January 1990

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH GENERAL EIDE

The Prime Minister had a meeting this afternoon with General Eide, the new Chairman of the NATO Military Committee. The Chief of the Defence Staff was also present.

The Prime Minister said that the pace of developments in Eastern Europe seemed bound to require a review of NATO's strategy, or at least the way we implemented it. There were many factors to take into account - the outcome of the CFE negotiations, the possibility of German reunification which would alter NATO's existing front line, the likely impossibility of securing agreement on a successor to LANCE, and the growing problems with public opinion in Germany over low-flying and other military training. The basic doctrine of deterrence and flexible response would certainly remain valid, and it would be vital to keep United States' forces and nuclear weapons in Europe. General Eide agreed that we might need to re-evaluate NATO's capacity to carry out flexible response and forward defence. It would be vital to keep the territory of the Federal Republic within NATO and to continue to station American and British forces there, although the forces themselves might well be smaller. It had been helpful that President Bush had undertaken to keep "significant" American forces in Europe. The Prime Minister commented that this was actually a euphemism for saying that there would be fewer American forces than envisaged in the outcome of the CFE negotiations. General Eide continued that he thought the Germans would be ready to see American and British forces remain and that Mr. Gorbachev would also see advantage in this. The Prime Minister said that she foresaw a very difficult period ahead. We would need to think through the options very carefully. She thought that General Eide would face more troublesome times than had his predecessor. General Eide said that the Military Committee would do its best to provide NATO with sound military advice.

General Eide said that he would like to raise the question of the CFE negotiations. Some people seemed to be saying that political developments were now running ahead of CFE. For his part, he continued to think the negotiations were important. The Prime Minister said that a CFE agreement would take a long time to implement, particularly when it came to the destruction of tanks and chemical weapons. At the same time, she rather

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- 2 -

wondered whether Mr. Gorbachev would want to make any further reductions in conventional forces after a CFE agreement, given the current troubles with the nationalities and the prospect of German reunification. General Eide agreed that destruction of equipment would be a constraint. The Russians would have to destroy 40,000 tanks: if that number were parked nose-to-tail, they would stretch from Paris to Bonn. The Prime Minister said she had originally hoped that we could draw a line under reductions envisaged in the CFE negotiations and pause before considering anything further. For countries like the UK which had out-of-area responsibilities, it would be difficult anyway to make substantial reductions. We had to be prepared for any eventuality. She was determined to keep a strong defence, based on Trident, a replacement for our free-fall nuclear bombs and strong and well-armed conventional forces. General Eide asked whether the Prime Minister excluded an early commitment to a further round of CFE negotiations. The Prime Minister commented that there was clearly going to be pressure for this, particularly from the Americans and Germans. But in the short term, she was more worried about the sharing of reductions under the CFE agreement currently being negotiated. She feared this could lead to NATO's strategy being undermined. The Chief of Defence Staff referred to constant Soviet interest in naval arms control. The Prime Minister said that she was strongly opposed to this: the sea was our highway. General Eide said that, as a Norwegian, he strongly agreed with this.

I am copying this letter to Stephen Wall (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

C. D. POWELL

Simon Webb, Esq.,  
Ministry of Defence.

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PRIME MINISTER

MEETING WITH GENERAL EIDE

You are to see the new Chairman of NATO Military Committee, General Eide, on Monday. He has succeeded General Altenburg of whom you greatly approved. General Eide is Norwegian and thus inevitably his experience is somewhat more limited. I think you may have met him during your visit to Norway in 1986 but have not been able to verify this.

There is a detailed brief by the MoD in the folder, more detailed than you really need. It seems to me that the one real important point to get over to General Eide is the need for a strong and clear military voice to be heard in discussions of arms control issues. At present the field is being held by politicians and civil servants and there is a danger that the expert military view on our real defence needs will simply not be properly registered. You hope that General Eide and his colleagues on the Military Committee will ensure that military advice is available to all NATO governments on the implications of some of the arms control proposals which will be before them - and in particular the consequences for our security of further reductions in conventional forces after a CFE Agreement.

It would also be helpful to raise NATO's continuing need for nuclear weapons, in order to maintain a policy of deterrence. You are very alarmed by reports that it is only a matter of time before the Germans ask for the removal of all nuclear weapons from their territory. The argument that short-range weapons can only hit Germans is absurd. Their purpose is to deter attack by Soviet forces through East Germany and Czechoslovakia, and the possibility of their use would only arise in those circumstances. Again it would be valuable if the military voice could be heard loud and clear on the need for continuing nuclear deterrence.

Finally you may like to draw him out on the implications of American defence cuts.

C D P  
(C. D. POWELL)

19 January 1990

a:/foreign/Eide (srw)

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*ccf*  
*Bkup*



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB  
Telephone 01-218 2111/3

MO 13/1L

19th January 1990

Dear Charles,

CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER BY THE CHAIRMAN OF THE  
MILITARY COMMITTEE

You asked for briefing for General Vigeik Eide's introductory call on the Prime Minister. He will also be calling on my Secretary of State and the CDS. His visit to the UK follows similar introductory calls in Paris and Bonn. A personality note on General Eide is attached.

It is likely that General Eide will raise three subjects: arms control and the possibilities of reductions beyond those proposed in CFE; the role of the Military Committee; and the need to preserve the nuclear element in NATO's forces.

CFE and Deeper Cuts (background note attached)

On CFE, the Prime Minister could make the following points:

- Welcome recent progress; draft treaties tabled by both sides (14th December 1989) shows extent to which the East has moved our way.
- Prospects for agreement in 1990 look good. UK committed to early progress
- But must be sure that we get result which safeguards and enhances security.

[if raised]

- Aircraft. Clear signs that East is moving our way on definitions. But they are still proposing an unrealistically narrow definition. Must remain robust.
- Helicopters. Need to resolve Western problems over definition very soon.

Charles Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL



- Personnel. Must resist pressure to include more than just US and Soviet stationed manpower.

The Prime Minister might like to make the following points on apportionment of cuts:

- Must reach early agreement on apportionment of cuts. Important to resolve this before CFE treaty is finalised.
- Essential that clear military voice continues to be influential. Welcome constructive role of Military Committee in consultation process.
- Agree that harmonisation should have equitable pro-rata basis initially, with flexibility to reflect military judgement and national preferences.
- UK expects to take share of reductions in line with that of our European allies.
- [If appropriate] Support MC line in resisting cuts beyond the levels envisaged by the current CFE negotiations, until full implications for security have been examined.

On the possibilities of deeper cuts, the Prime Minister could say:

- Important thing at this stage is to concentrate on successful conclusion of current CFE negotiations. Existing proposals will take some years to implement.
- Further cuts would raise major problems which will require further study, eg of strategic, procurement and political implications.
- Must avoid premature decisions on future force structure and programmes; and take account of changing political landscape in Europe.

#### The Role of the Military Committee

The Military Committee (MC) provides military advice to the DPC. Because of the need for speed in the CFE negotiating process the MC now meets regularly (about every 2 weeks) in private, uninstructed session to avoid the protracted delays associated with seeking formal advice from Capitals. This system will be tested by the extent the MC is able to influence SACEUR's 'strawman' proposals for the allocation of Treaty Limited Equipment (TLEs), due to be



presented to the HLTF(R) on 9 Feb. The aim is to inject timely, agreed military advice. So far the system of MC/PS Private sessions seems to be working well.

*Mander*  
Matters

General Eide may argue that, notwithstanding progress in START and CFE, and the real prospect for conventional parity, there remains a need to preserve a mix of nuclear armaments. The Prime Minister will wish to endorse this, recalling that for the foreseeable future, there is no alternative to deterrence based on an appropriate mix of adequate and effective nuclear and conventional forces; and that, where nuclear forces are concerned, land-, sea-, and air-based systems, including ground-based missiles, would be needed in Europe.

In discussion, the Prime Minister could make the following points:

- Possession of nuclear weapons and of a credible philosophy for their use remains only sure way of deterring aggression.
- Developments in Eastern Europe will make it more difficult to retain support for flexible response.
- Nevertheless, continuing need for range of nuclear options, including sub-strategic nuclear weapons, and for these to have a European character.

Future of the Alliance

The Prime Minister may wish to seek General Eide's views on developments in Eastern Europe and East/West relations and how they might affect the future of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Recent Ministerial meetings have emphasised the need for stability in a time of change and have drawn attention to the close ties that bind NATO. At the same time, in his Berlin speech on 12th December, James Baker proposed an increased political role for NATO.

The Prime Minister could draw on the following in discussion:

- Time of change and opportunity; but also uncertainty: potential for instability in Eastern Europe well illustrated by violent overthrow of Ceausescu and destruction of Security Police HQ in East Berlin.

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- Vital continuing role for NATO as guarantor of stability and security.
- Allies must continue to maintain effective, modern forces, reflecting continuing Soviet capability.
- Essential to retain significant US presence in Europe to ensure continuing stability.
- Warsaw Pact has role, e.g. as reassurance for Soviet Union during period of change.
- Future of Warsaw Pact a matter for its members.

I attach some additional background material which you might find useful.

*I am copying this letter to Stephen Wall (FCO).*

*Yours sincerely*  
*I. M. Woodman*

(I M WOODMAN)  
Private Secretary

CONFIDENTIAL

**BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES**  
**ON**  
**GENERAL VIGLEIK EIDE**

General Vagleik Eide was appointed Chief of Defence, Norway, from 31 August 1987. He previously served as Commander Allied Forces North Norway from 30 July 1986 in the rank of Lieutenant General.

General Eide was born 4 December 1933. Following his matriculation degree in 1953, he passed Infantry Officer Cadet School 1954, Military Academy 1955 - 57, Army Staff College 1968, Führungsakademie der Bundeswehr, Hamburg 1970 - 72 and NATO Defense College, Rome 1983. He also had various Scholarships for studies abroad, and studied Defense Management in Hamburg and Monterey (USA).

General Eide initially served with Infantry in training and command positions. He served as Instructor and Company Commander at the Infantry Training Center No 1 1957 - 60, and as an Instructor at the School of Infantry 1960 - 62. After a Staff appointment at Finnmark Land Defence 1962 - 64 he served as Company Commander, 2 Battalion/Brigade North 1964 - 65. During the subsequent staff appointments at the Army Staff 1965 - 67 and 1968 - 70 he was engaged in Officer Training and Long Term Planning, and was Head of Long Term Planning at Army Staff 1969 - 70. He was a member of the Directing Staff at Army Staff College 1972 - 75. He was appointed Commanding Officer of the Garrison in Porsanger in 1975 and commanded this Battalion Group until he assumed the appointment as Commandant of the Army Staff College in 1978. He served as ACOS Organization Division at the Army Staff 1980 - 83. In this period he also served as Commander Brigade 14, a reserve formation which was called up for training and exercise in 1981. In 1983 he was appointed Chief of Army Staff in the rank of Brigadier. He subsequently served as Commanding General District Command Vestlandet, 1985 - 86 until his appointment as Commander Allied Forces North Norway.

General Eide is married to the former Aase Nyhuus, and they have two daughters.

Dec 1988

BACKGROUND NOTE ON CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL

CFE

1. The East have accepted Western proposals for MBT and ATC ceilings of 20,000 and 28,000 respectively. Debate now centres on definitions: the West tabled revised definition for tanks and armoured combat vehicles on 11 December, the East on 16 January. Both sides in agreement on artillery definitions. The gap between the proposed Western ceiling of 16,500 and the East's 24,000 should narrow - (the East are likely to propose a ceiling of 20,000 in the near future). Both sides tabled draft treaties on 14 December 1989, but there is still a great deal of work to be done.

2. The two sides are still considerable further apart on aircraft and helicopters. The West has proposed ceilings of 5,700 and 1,900 respectively, the East 4,700 and 1,900. The East still wishes to exclude air defence and naval aircraft. On helicopters, becoming clear that the alliance definition adopted in July will capture many more NATO helicopters than originally thought, and reductions would be correspondingly greater. HLTF is re-examining the problem, UK playing leading role.

3. Manpower. The East has tabled an overall ceiling for each alliance of 1.35 million, with a limit of 350,000 (now 300,000) for stationed troops. The West has proposed a ceiling of 275,000 US and Soviet stationed manpower.

4. On 21st September 1989, NATO tabled a package of measures on information exchange, stabilisation, verification and non-circumvention. (Known collectively as Chapter III of the expanded Alliance proposal of 13th July 1989). The Warsaw Pact tabled very similar proposals on 19th October 1989 on information Exchange, Verification and Stabilisation. Inevitably there are differences, all reflecting familiar Eastern preoccupations which should prove manageable in negotiating terms.

APPORTIONMENT OF CUTS

5. The Secretary of State will recall the discussion at the last DPC, following which SACEUR has started work on the apportionment of CFE cuts between NATO nations. First proposals will be put to the Military Committee (MC) on 1st February, and then to the 16-member HLTF(R) on 9th February. The MC has an important role in scrutinising the SHAPE proposals and providing timely military advice to the HLTF(R) in support of SACEUR, maintaining a broad view of the implications of CFE for defence planning and Alliance security.

6. Some uncertainties remain in treaty definitions and rules, but the harmonisation principles need to be agreed before the CFE treaty is finalised. Hard negotiations are likely over national shares of cuts, and over procedures for equipment transfers (cascading). In particular, Flank nations - especially Turkey, Portugal and Norway -


may favour harmonisation methodologies which preserve their current force levels at the expense of the Central Region. Broadly, SACEUR will apply CFE rules pro-rata and then propose adjustments to reflect military judgement and national preferences. Agreed cuts will be implemented through the NATO force planning mechanism, over an anticipated period of 3-5 years after treaty signature.

DEEPER CUTS BEYOND CFE

7. After successful conclusion of current negotiations, we shall have to examine the feasibility of deeper cuts. Suggestions have been made, particularly in the US, that these might go down to 50% of current NATO levels. Recent public pronouncements by FRG Foreign and Defence Ministers have also emphasised the need for further conventional negotiations to follow the conclusion of CFE, focusing on the prospect of further reductions of US and Soviet stationed forces below 275,000 each.

8. A good deal of further work will be required before we can be certain what further cuts could prudently be made without prejudicing forward defence and the security of Europe. That is not to say that we should not consider the issues (indeed we must); only that we cannot yet judge what can be done, nor when.

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9. Significant reductions would make it difficult to meet any Warsaw Pact forward concentrations; it would also (on a thinned out battlefield) remove some of the present logistic constraints on the WP. They would certainly affect the desirable mix of weapon systems.

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filed

cc Sir PC



10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

25 October 1989

Thank you for your letter of 10 October about the visit of General Eide next year. The Prime Minister could see him at 1430 on 22 January.

CHARLES POWELL

Commander John Davis.

EA

no CDP  
9/2

1430 on

ape

22 Jan

Amends

4 the PM  
wants to do  
it

On we merge  
Eme  
OH

From: Commander John Davis Royal Navy

AP 17/10

Ministry of Defence  
Room 2254  
Main Building  
Whitehall  
London SW1A 2HB  
(01-218-6510/7227)

D/PROT/609/3/5/7

Mr C D Powell  
Private Secretary for Foreign Affairs  
No 10 Downing Street  
London SW1A 2AA

10 October 1989

Dear Mr Powell,

VISIT OF GENERAL V EIDE - CHAIRMAN OF THE MILITARY COMMITTEE  
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANISATION

General Eide will be in London on 22 January 1990 as a guest of the Chief of the Defence Staff. This will be his first formal visit to the United Kingdom since taking over as CMC/NATO and he has asked whether it would be possible for him to call on the Prime Minister.

His programme for the day is flexible with only 2 events provisionally arranged: a Guard of Honour outside the MOD at 0945 - 1000 and Lunch at Admiralty House from 1245 - 1415.

Yours Sincerely  
John Davis

Copy to: DPSO/CDS

CONFIDENTIAL

*CR*  
*hacks*



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

Telephone 01-218 2111/3

MO 13/1E

2nd June 1989

*Prime Minister*

*You saw General  
Altenberg at the  
NATO Summit.*

Dear Charles,

CALL BY GENERAL ALTENBERG

*CR*  
*4/16*

General Wolfgang Altenberg, the Chairman of NATO's Military Committee, is paying a farewell call on the Prime Minister on 5th June. His programme for the remainder of his visit includes calls on Her Majesty The Queen and the Defence Secretary. He is paying similar farewell visits to other NATO capitals. General Altenberg took up his present post in October 1986, having previously served as the Chief of Staff of the Federal German Republic.

The Prime Minister may wish to thank General Altenberg for his efforts in the Military Committee, which has grown in stature under his chairmanship - largely as a result of his determination and independence. In particular, she might wish to refer to his even handed approach to problems affecting the Alliance, especially where the Federal Republic has been involved; his clear, unambiguous military advice to Defence Ministers in the Defence Planning Committee; the robust line he has taken on the bilateral disputes between Greece and Turkey, and his contribution to the revision of NATO's Conceptual Military Framework, which is now a meaningful and effective document for long-term planning.

General Altenberg can be expected to raise the main issues arising from this week's NATO Summit. On President Bush's announcement of new arms control measures, the Prime Minister might wish to reiterate her welcome for the proposals, which have seized the initiative from the Warsaw Pact and which seem to have caught the public's imagination; but to observe that the military and political implications will need considerable analysis before we can reach final decisions on the timescale for implementation. The Prime Minister might wish to confirm that the Summit documentation represents a very satisfactory outcome: a reaffirmation of NATO strategy; an agreement that sub-strategic forces (including specifically ground-launched missiles) have an essential contribution to make to Alliance security for the foreseeable future, and will therefore need to be kept up to date; a rejection

Charles Powell Esq  
No 10 Downing Street

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of the third zero, even in the event of conventional balance; and a supportive reference to the US development of a follow-on to Lance. The Summit provides a sound basis for NATO to continue its work on refining detailed nuclear requirements, as agreed by Defence Ministers at last month's Nuclear Planning Group meeting, so that we are ready to take deployment decisions when the time comes. The Comprehensive Concept agreed at the Summit also provides the wider political framework within which an agreed step-by-step approach to the restructuring and modernisation of NATO's theatre nuclear forces, following the INF agreement, can be pursued.

It is also possible that General Altenberg will raise the question of Allied exercises in the Federal Republic. The Germans are concerned at the burden they shoulder and the adverse effects of low flying and manoeuvre damage and have taken unilateral action to reduce their own training. The US has expressed some support for the German move and there is a danger that we will be seen as being inflexible. The Prime Minister may like to stress that we understand the German concerns and are determined to do all we can to keep the burden to a minimum, but that it must be recognised that training is essential if the effectiveness of our forces is to be maintained; training is a complex matter and clearly the differing circumstances of Allies' armies must be taken into account in assessing the way ahead.

*Yours sincerely*

*John Colston.*

(J P COLSTON)  
Private Secretary

CONFIDENTIAL



COMMERCIAL

M

LOOSE MINUTE


D/PROT/609/3/5/7

15 May 1989

Office of the Defence Services Secretary  
No 10 Downing Street (for the Resident Clerk)  
Private Secretary to S of S

VISIT OF GENERAL W ALTENBURG CHAIRMAN OF THE MILITARY COMMITTEE  
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANISATION 4 - 6 JUNE 1989

The draft programme for the above visit is forwarded for information and comment/correction if necessary,



John DAVIS  
Commander Royal Navy  
APO-1  
MB 2255 6510 MB

Enclosure: Draft programme for the visit of General Altenburg.

VISIT OF

GENERAL W ALTENBURG

Chairman of the Military Committee  
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

to the  
United Kingdom

Sunday 4th June - Tuesday 6th June 1989

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## BIOGRAPHY

### GENERAL WOLFGANG ALTENBURG

General Altenburg was born in Schneidemuhl on 24 June 1928.

After vocational training which included a course at a hotel management college, he became Chief of Supply and Food Services, Labour Service, Land of Bremen and was visiting lecturer at an American Technical Training College.

In 1956 he joined the Bundeswehr. After training, he was commissioned in the Artillery and served in various appointments, including the command of an Honest John battery.

As a Major, from 1962 to 1964 he attended the Federal Armed Forces Command and Staff College in Hamburg and subsequently held various staff appointments.

Promoted to Lieutenant Colonel, he commanded 61 Field Artillery Battalion and served as Assistant to the Army Chief of Staff.

Promoted Colonel in October 1971, he served at SHAPE as Deputy Chief Nuclear Policy Section, and as the Head of the Politico-Military Principles Section on the Federal Armed Forces Staff before being appointed Commander of the 7th Armoured Infantry Brigade in Hamburg in 1975.

Promoted to Brigadier General in October 1976, General Altenburg served as Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff III (Military Policy and Operations) on the Armed Forces Staff before being promoted to Major General in April 1978 and moving on to become the Assistant Chief of Staff of the same office.

On his promotion to Lieutenant General in January 1979, General Altenburg became the German Military Representative to the NATO Military Committee until his appointment in October 1980 to command III(GE) Corps in Koblenz.

On 1 April 1983, General Altenburg was promoted General and appointed Chief of Staff of the Federal Armed Forces

On 1 October 1986, he assumed the appointment of Chairman of the Military Committee.

General Altenburg is married.

VISITORS AND ADMINISTRATION

Visitors

General W Altenburg  
Chairman of the Military Committee  
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

Frau Ursula Altenburg

Lieutenant Colonel R A Stewart  
Military Assistant

In Attendance

Commander John Davis Royal Navy  
Protocol Officer Ministry of Defence

General Altenburg will also be accompanied by a  
Personal Protection Officer

Administration

Arrangements for the visit are being handled by the  
Protocol Office, Room 2254, Ministry of Defence  
Main Building, Whitehall, London SW1A 2HB.  
(Telephone: 01-218-6510)

Accommodation

The party will stay at the  
Hyde Park Hotel  
Knightsbridge London SW1Y 7LA  
( Telephone:01-235-2000 )

PROGRAMME FOR GENERAL ALTENBURG

SUNDAY , 4th June, 1989

Dress: Plain Clothes

(All times are local)

- 1545 Arrive London Heathrow Airport by Military Aircraft from Brussel. Met by Commander John Davis Royal Navy.
- 1600 Leave by car for the Hyde Park Hotel due to arrive at 1640.
- Evening No official engagements. A car will be available if required.

MONDAY 5th June 1989

Dress: Non-Ceremonial Day Uniform

- 1055 Leave hotel for the Ministry of Defence Horseguards Avenue Entrance due to arrive at 1110
- 1115 Call on Chief of the Defence Staff, Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir David Craig
- 1150 Leave CDS office on foot for No 10 Downing St via Richmond Terrace Entrance to the Ministry of Defence
- 1155 Arrive No 10 Downing Street
- 1200 Call on the Prime Minister The Right Honourable Margaret Thatcher MP
- 1230 Leave No 10 Downing Street for private luncheon at the Hyde Park Hotel.
- 1440 Leave the hotel for the Horseguards Avenue Entrance of the Ministry of Defence due to

arrive at 1455.

1500 Call on the Secretary of State for Defence  
The Right Honourable George Younger MP.

1530 Leave the Ministry of Defence by the  
Horseguards Avenue Entrance for the hotel.

Evening

Dress: Black Tie

1925 Leave the hotel for 18 Kingston House  
North, the Residence of Sir David and  
Lady Craig.

1930 for 2000 Dinner hosted by Sir David and Lady Craig.

Later Leave Kingston House North for the hotel.

TUESDAY 6th JUNE 1989

Dress: Non Ceremonial Day Dress with Aiguillettes

1210 Leave the Hotel accompanied by Frau  
Altenburg for Buckingham Palace due to  
arrive at the Grand Entrance at 1220.

1220 Arrive at the Grand Entrance to  
Buckingham Palace. Met by Rear Admiral  
David Allan Defence Services Secretary.

1240 Audience with Her Majesty the Queen.

1300 (approx) Depart Buckingham Palace for private  
luncheon at the Hyde Park Hotel.

1415

Leave the Hyde Park Hotel for RAF  
Northolt due to arrive at 1450.  
(dress: Plain Clothes)

1500

Depart RAF Northolt for Brussels  
accompanied by the Chief of the Defence  
Staff and Commander in Chief Channel.

## Directory

Ministry of Defence Protocol Office	01-218-6510
London Heathrow Airport	01-745-7518
Ministry of Defence Exchange	01-218-9000
RAF Northolt	01-845-2300
Hyde Park Hotel	01-235-2000
Office of the Chief of the Defence Staff	01-218-3353
No 10 Downing Street	01-270-3000
Office of the Secretary of State for Defence	01-218-2111
Office of the Defence Services Secretary	01-218-6186
18 Kingston House North	01-218-2650

Information Services

Weather Service/ London Area	0898 333399
London Tourist Information	01-730-3488
City of London Information Centre	01-606-3030
Time	123
Air Delays	01-246-8033



1200  
Mon  
5 June

10 DOWNING STREET

~~Charles~~

~~Davis to  
Coxon~~

It looks as tho' we  
cannot put Altenburg  
off. Shall I look for  
a suitable 1/2 hr slot?

DM

AP

All right.  
A

← York  
but there  
it is.

Dr  
-



MO 1/18V

CAF  
Has samples to take into State  
has 2 of 2 from surgery  
do you want to take  
with it

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB  
Telephone 01-218 2111/3

28th February 1989

Dear Dominic

FAREWELL BY GENERAL ALTENBERG

attached

Thank you for your letter of 26th January to Dawn Faulkner. I am sorry that it has taken a little time to reply but we have been seeking information via our delegation to NATO about what calls General Altenburg is making in other countries, in order to gauge his treatment elsewhere.

I understand that the General is planning to pay farewell calls on all NATO Heads of Government before his departure and is apparently particularly keen to see the Prime Minister. His office have further confirmed that he is willing to come to the UK for such a call at any date that is convenient.


In view of this we cannot reasonably claim diary considerations as a reason for not arranging such a call, and we would not advise that a request from such a senior Alliance Military Officer should be turned down flat. I would be grateful therefore if you would consider the possibility of Altenburg's call taking place at a time more convenient to the Prime Minister. If you are able to give us a selection of dates, we will confirm one quickly with his office.

Yours ever  
  
(S MCCARTHY)  
Private Secretary

Dominic Morris Esq  
No 10 Downing Street

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
MAIN BUILDING WITTHAM, LONDON SW14 5NS

Form No. 04-28 2/57



CONDUCTOR

103

General ALTENBURG

14/2



File mem  
for CF  
file

① 24/2

② 28/2

10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

31 January 1989

Thank you for your letter of 26 January about the possibility of General Altenburg bidding a farewell call. As I mentioned to you, the 6th and 7th of June are difficult from the diary point of view. You agreed to consider again whether the visit was necessary.

(DOMINIC MORRIS)

Mrs. Dawn Faulkner,  
Ministry of Defence.

DW



MO 1/18L

NOT really  
receiving. Try  
resisting, for a while. *all*

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB  
Telephone 01-218 2111/3

26th January 1989

*Checks*  
*Is this someone PM. and see? It is Euro-elections the  
following week but we can make time on 6/6 if needs be.*

*DM*

Dear Dominic,

General Altenburg, the Chairman of the Military Committee, will be visiting London on Tuesday 6th and Wednesday 7th June in order to make his farewell calls. He will be having an audience with HM The Queen and calling on the Secretary of State on Wednesday 7th June.


I should be grateful if you would advise whether there would be an opportunity for the Prime Minister to see General Altenberg on Tuesday 6th June, preferably in the afternoon.

*Yours sincerely,*  
*Dawn Faulkner*


(DAWN FAULKNER)  
Private Secretary

Dominic Morris Esq  
10 Downing Street

Nato Call on PM by Chan Noto cita  
March 80



COPIED



PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

*ccf*



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB  
Telephone 01-218 2111/3

MO 13/1L

20th September 1988

*OD 239*

*Dear Stephen*

CHAIRMAN OF THE MILITARY COMMITTEE

I wrote to you on 6th September to record the position reached over the succession to General Altenburg as Chairman of the NATO Military Committee. Since then, and particularly in the past week which the national Chiefs of Defence Staff have spent together on the annual tour, matters have developed in an unexpected and untidy manner. Mr Younger thinks the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary will wish to know how matters stand.

Having spoken to General Altenburg as I recorded in the third paragraph of my earlier letter, Sir John Fieldhouse remained entirely passive in the informal exchanges. He became keenly aware, however, of a considerable groundswell of unease from some of his Military Committee colleagues about the prospect of having Admiral Porta as their Chairman. The Netherlands and Danish CDSs were particularly active in expressing this to other colleagues (and General Altenburg, who shares the unease though he has no vote, may well also have taken a hand).

Against this background, Sir John Fieldhouse judged - entirely rightly, in Mr Younger's view - that it would be wrong to insist on a refusal to serve and his name therefore remained informally on the table when the Military Committee came to address the matter at the session on 17th September when it had been planned to take a decision. It became evident that no outcome would yet command a clear majority of the committee, though the edge probably remains with Admiral Porta. The best informal assessment we can make is that Porta has the support of the US, FRG, Spain, Portugal and Turkey; the Greek representative was absent; we believe that as between Belgium and Luxembourg one is for Porta and one against, but we do not know which is which; and the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway and Canada would prefer Sir John Fieldhouse. It was left that the decision must be deferred until the Committee in Chiefs-of-Staff session can next meet, which will be in the margin of the Nuclear Planning Group meeting in late October.

Stephen Wall Esq  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL



We have detected signs, on other channels, that some in Washington suspect that the US may have backed the wrong horse. But it must of course be taken as hugely difficult for them to shift ground now; and nothing the UK could do would be likely to induce or help them in that direction. In Mr Younger's view, there is no alternative but to await developments and to take stock again nearer the NPG date.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Charles Powell (No 10).

*Your sincerely,  
Brian Hawtin*

(B R HAWTIN)  
Private Secretary

Mar 80



We have detected signs, on other channels, that some in Washington suspect that the US may have backed the wrong horse. But if most of course be taken as hugely difficult for them to shift ground now; and noting the UK could be likely to induce or help them in that direction. In Mr Younger's view, there is an alternative but to await developments and to take stock again nearer the US data.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Charles Powell (No 10).

*Very sincerely,  
David Butler*

(S E HAWKIN)  
Private Secretary





MO 13/1L

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

Telephone 01-218 2111/3

*Ria Hawtin*  
You will wish to be  
aware that Admiral Fieldhouse 6 September 1988  
will not after all get this  
job. We were let down  
by the Americans. CAP 6/9.

Dear Stephen,

CHAIRMAN OF THE MILITARY COMMITTEE

My Secretary of State has now seen and considered Mr Carlucci's letter of 23rd August indicating that the US Administration have given their support to Admiral Porta's candidacy as the next Chairman of the Military Committee. He has also seen Kevin Tebbit's helpful background letter of 24th August.

Mr Younger considers that it is clear that, unfortunately, the American decision was taken on political grounds, not on merit. He does not believe, however, that further lobbying at this stage for Admiral Sir John Fieldhouse would serve any useful purpose; and that it would run a real risk of antagonising a number of countries, including the US and Italy. He believes, albeit reluctantly, that we should now accept the position with good grace and fall in behind Admiral Porta.

Mr Younger has discussed the position and way ahead with Admiral Fieldhouse, who entirely understands the difficulties and has taken the news well. I understand that Admiral Fieldhouse has already spoken to the present Chairman of the Military Committee to say that he has withdrawn his candidacy and will be supporting that of Admiral Porta.

It is regrettable that the Americans did not consult us before committing themselves to Admiral Porta; this is not how we and they normally reckon to do business together in the Alliance. Mr Younger intends to take an early opportunity to speak to Ambassador Price, informally and in fairly low key, to register disappointment on that score. In the meantime, he has decided to send the attached brief acknowledgement to Mr Carlucci's letter; I should be grateful if you would arrange for this to be forwarded in the normal way.

I am copying this letter and the previous correspondence, for information, to Charles Powell, No 10.

*Your sincerely*  
*Brian Hawtin*

(B R HAWTIN)  
Private Secretary

Stephen Wall Esc  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HS

Telephone 01-26 2115



September 1958

*Dear Sir,*  
*Mr. [Name] will write to you on the subject of the [Name] Fellowship.*  
*We are sorry to hear that you are unable to accept the position with good grace and fall in behind [Name].*  
*It would have been very kind of you to have accepted a number of conditions.*  
*It is clear that, unfortunately, the American decision was taken on political grounds, not on merit. As a result, however, that further lobbying at this stage for [Name] would serve no useful purpose, and that [Name] would have to be considered as a number of conditions.*  
*It would have been very kind of you to have accepted a number of conditions, including the US and Italy. We believe, albeit reluctantly, that we should now accept the position with good grace and fall in behind [Name].*

By Secretary of Grace has now seen and considered Mr. Carucci's letter of 17th August indicating that the US Administration have given their support to [Name]'s candidature as the next Chairman of the Military Committee. He has also seen Kevin Tobin's proposal for [Name] as the next Chairman of the Military Committee. It is clear that, unfortunately, the American decision was taken on political grounds, not on merit. As a result, however, that further lobbying at this stage for [Name] would serve no useful purpose, and that [Name] would have to be considered as a number of conditions.

Mr. Younger considers that it is clear that, unfortunately, the American decision was taken on political grounds, not on merit. As a result, however, that further lobbying at this stage for [Name] would serve no useful purpose, and that [Name] would have to be considered as a number of conditions. It would have been very kind of you to have accepted a number of conditions, including the US and Italy. We believe, albeit reluctantly, that we should now accept the position with good grace and fall in behind [Name].

Mr. Younger has discussed the position and way ahead with [Name] and has taken [Name] into account. [Name] has already indicated that [Name] has already spoken to the present Chairman of the Military Committee to say that he would support [Name]'s candidature and will be supporting that of [Name].

It is regrettable that the Americans did not consult us before committing themselves to [Name] for this is not how we and they normally reckon to do business together in the Alliance. Mr. Younger intends to take an early opportunity to speak to [Name] privately and in a friendly way, to register disappointment on that score. In the meantime, he has decided to send the attached draft acknowledgment to Mr. Carucci's letter; I would be grateful if you would arrange for this to be forwarded in the normal way.

I am copying this letter and the previous correspondence, for information, to Charles Howell, so is.

*Yours sincerely,*  
*[Signature]*  
[Name]  
Private Secretary



Stephen Wall Ltd  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE WHITEHALL LONDON SW1 2HB

MO 13/1L

TELEPHONE 01-218 9000  
DIRECT DIALLING 01-218 2111/3

6 September 1988

Dear Frank,

I have seen your letter to Archie Hamilton of 23rd August indicating that you have committed your support to Admiral Porta as the next Chairman of the Military Committee.

We naturally regret that you felt unable to support John Fieldhouse's candidacy, though I appreciate the broader political considerations that you had in mind. I am particularly sorry that we were unable to discuss the matter together before you made your commitment. In the circumstances, however, we will not be pursuing Admiral Fieldhouse's candidacy; and we will be prepared to join a consensus in favour of Admiral Porta.

Yours sincerely,  
George Younger.

George Younger

The Honorable Frank Carlucci



PS PUS

no circulate / show  
as it's issued

DN

30/8

David Nicholls Esq  
DUS (P)  
MOD  
Main Building

BRITISH EMBASSY,  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

24 August 1988

CC Ps/SqS

Dear Mr Nicholls,  
DN 30/8

## CHAIRMANSHIP, NATO MILITARY COMMITTEE

1. I understand that by now replies will have been received in both the MOD and the Foreign Office to the Ministerial messages requesting support for Admiral Fieldhouse's candidature (Carlucci's certainly went a couple of days ago and State Department tell me that a similar one from Whitehead on behalf of Shultz to the Foreign Secretary has now issued). They are said to include the rationale for a decision to back the Italian instead (we do not have copies), but you might find it helpful to have some more background from here.
2. Contacts in the Pentagon and State Department acknowledge that the decision was not based on individual merit. Admiral Fieldhouse enjoys an enormously high reputation here, particularly with people like Admiral Crowe and the Pentagon make no secret of having put aside personalities in the final verdict.
3. At the same time they stress that this is not simply a case of the Italians having cashed in their INF and 401 Wing chips, with the Americans acquiescing any low dealing. As put to me by John Woodworth the main considerations were that this is:-
  - a) an opportunity to counter the impression that the top jobs are a carve up between the big boys (we hand over as Secretary General to the Germans; they hand over to us as CMC chairman);
  - b) the right time to encourage the Italians further in their new role as one of the "heavy hitters" in the Alliance;
  - c) a time when the Southern region is looking particularly flakey and likely therefore to benefit from chairmanship by a country that traditionally puts most effort into binding in both ends of the Mediterranean.

~~BA~~ o/r  
Embassy of the United States of America

London

August 23, 1988

The Hon. A. G. Hamilton, M.P.  
Minister of State for  
the Armed Forces  
Ministry of Defense  
Room 6121  
Main Building  
Whitehall

Copy given to DUS (P)

Aug 23/88

Dear Mr. Hamilton:

Thank you for your letter of August 2 asking for our support for the candidacy of Admiral Sir John Fieldhouse as Chairman of the Military Committee. As you are aware, Italy has also put forward a candidate -- Admiral Mario Porta -- and has requested our support. We believe Admiral Porta to be eminently well qualified and have agreed to support his candidacy.

It is not often that we have two such outstanding candidates for the chairmanship as we have in Admiral Fieldhouse and Admiral Mario Porta. As you so cogently point out, Admiral Fieldhouse has excellent credentials and I am sure he would do an outstanding job as the Chairman of the Military Committee.

I agree that NATO's current agenda is a particularly complex and challenging one, but as you know, the issues involved are especially critical on the southern flank. I think you would agree that there is no question that a competent person from that region would be extremely beneficial for the Alliance in understanding and addressing those problems. It is fortuitous that at this time of pressing need we have a superior candidate from the region and we should take advantage of the opportunity this affords us to appoint the first-ever chairman from the southern flank.

Although I know you will be disappointed that we cannot support the candidacy of Admiral Fieldhouse, I hope you will understand that we have made a commitment to the Italians. I also hope that you will be able to join with us in a consensus for the candidacy of Admiral Porta.

Sincerely,

/s/

Frank Carlucci  
Secretary of Defense



4. None of this provides new reasons for the American decision beyond those known to you already; perhaps it puts a slightly better gloss on them.

*A Kemigan*  
for K R Tebbit

cc: P Lever Esq, Security Policy Department  
FCO

SUBJECT CC MASTER

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efp



10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

10 February, 1987.

From the Private Secretary

Dear John,

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH GENERAL ALTENBERG

The Prime Minister saw General Altenberg, Chairman of the NATO Military Committee, for a talk yesterday afternoon. The Chief of the Defence Staff was also present.

Discussion centred on the implications of the US/Soviet meeting at Reykjavik for Western Europe. General Altenberg saw Reykjavik both as opening a new dimension of arms control possibilities and as symptomatic of a growing tendency on the part of the United States to pay less attention to European concerns. To his mind, this increased the urgency of strengthening the European contribution to conventional defence on two counts: to prove to the Americans that Europe was doing its share; and to offset the damage done by Reykjavik to the credibility of the United States' nuclear guarantee to Europe. General Altenberg added that if he had been asked a year ago whether he - in his NATO role - attached greater priority to the United Kingdom's independent deterrent or to further strengthening of Europe's conventional capability, he would have at least hesitated. Now he had no doubt in saying that maintenance of the United Kingdom deterrent was the more important, because of insidious doubts about United States reliability.

The Prime Minister said that she shared many of General Altenberg's doubts, and wondered how far the Americans fully understood the difficulties which Reykjavik created for the Europeans. There were those in the Administration who continued to beaver away at the proposals for eliminating strategic ballistic missiles, though their motives were sometimes obscure. The Joint Chiefs were evidently torn between military and political considerations in reaching conclusions on the adequacy of a deterrent based on air-breathing systems. She cautioned against believing that an increase in conventional strength could compensate for weakening or loss of the United States nuclear guarantee. That was why she was totally committed to maintaining the United Kingdom's nuclear deterrent. When it came to

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strengthening conventional capabilities, it was for others in NATO to match the United Kingdom's performance in strengthening its contribution over the past seven years.

General Altenberg expressed concern over the increased vulnerability of Western Europe to Soviet SRINF if agreement was reached on zero LRINF. The Prime Minister agreed, and regretted that the Alliance had not been able to agree a firmer linkage between agreement on zero LRINF and elimination of the vast imbalance of SRINF in the Soviet Union's favour.

I am copying this letter to Lyn Parker (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and to Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely  
Charles Powell

C.D. Powell

John Howe, Esq.,  
Ministry of Defence.

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PRIME MINISTER

MEETING WITH GENERAL ALTENBERG

You are to see General Altenberg, the new Chairman of the NATO Military Committee, for a courtesy call on Monday. He will be accompanied by John Fieldhouse.

General Altenberg is German and was formerly Chief of Staff to the German Armed Forces.

There is no specific business. But topics you might discuss are:

- (i) The effects on an Alliance strategy of the elimination of LRINF;
- (ii) the weakness of the northern flank;
- (iii) arms control prospects post-Reykjavik and your visit to Moscow;
- (iv) improved collaboration in the procurement of defence equipment.

C.D.P.

CHARLES POWELL

6 February 1987

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CCPC  
CB/ep



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1  
Telephone 01-~~9307022~~ 218 2111/3

MO 25/3/4E

5th February 1987

*Dear General*

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH GENERAL ALTENBURG

I understand that General Altenburg, the newly appointed Chairman of the NATO Military Committee, is to call on the Prime Minister on Monday 9th February. I attach a brief which has been agreed with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

I am sending a copy of this letter and enclosure to Lyn Parker in Sir Geoffrey Howe's Office.

*Yours sincerely*  
*I C F Andrews*

(I C F ANDREWS)

Charles Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street

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BRIEF FOR THE PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH GENERAL WOLFGANG ALTENBURG  
(CHAIRMAN OF THE MILITARY COMMITTEE) - 9 FEB.

Our Objectives

- a. To underline our continued commitment to defence in the Alliance.
- b. To emphasise need to maintain effective deterrence, based on a mix of systems.

Arguments to use

- a. Unprecedented 20% real growth in UK defence budget between 78/79 and 85/86. Most of this increase spent on equipment. Now in period of consolidation, but forces will continue to benefit from this higher level of provision. See no need for any change in our main defence posture.
- b. If pressed. Small decline in future provision after sizeable increase in earlier years. Task now to get greater value for money for cash available.
- c. Vast majority of forces and some 95% of our defence budget devoted to NATO. Higher proportion of GDP spent on defence than any other major European NATO nation.
- d. Public support within the Alliance for progress made at Reykjavik. More radical steps such as complete elimination of whole categories of strategic weapons pose complex problems and not welcome to HMG.
- e. Arms control priorities agreed with President at Camp David last November and endorsed in NAC/DPC Communiques last

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December. Reaffirmation of NATO deterrence strategy based on mix of systems. Recognition that nuclear weapons cannot be dealt with in isolation; need also to address conventional imbalance.

f. UK firmly committed to procurement of Trident II to replace Polaris. Trident, on schedule for introduction into service in 1994, will be committed, like Polaris, to SACEUR.

g. If pressed. Programme long been planned to make room for increasing Trident expenditure. In any case Trident only takes an average of 3% of defence budget, and 6% of equipment budget over its 20 year period of procurement.

h. Spain/Gibraltar (if raised) Hope Spain can play as full a role as possible in NATO. We do not want Gibraltar to be an issue, but cannot allow Spain to make it a "no go" area.

Background

1. UK Defence Programme

There has been concern in NATO that the UK cannot sustain its future programme. UK has made clear that no defence review is planned but has acknowledged that the annual Long Term Costing (LTC) of the defence programme will involve difficult choices of priorities.

2. Examples of equipment brought into service in last year or so and equipment recently ordered are at annex.

3. European reactions to Reykjavik were similar to our own. European leaders have expressed general satisfaction with the

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statement agreed with President Reagan at Camp David on 15 November; agreed priorities were subsequently included (at UK's insistence) in the recent NAC and DPC Communiques. It would be useful, however, to press these points home.

4. Spain/NATO. Spanish referendum confirmed membership of NATO, but outside integrated military structure. Proposals for future involvement are now being discussed between Spain and NATO international staff. Spain is looking for opportunities to make Gibraltar an issue - e.g. fuss over SACEUR's visit, exercises. UK has not ruled out British NATO commanders on Rock coming under Spanish NATO Commander -if Spain joined military structure, but meanwhile Gibraltar has established position in NATO.

5. Personality Note

General Altenburg was commissioned as an Artillery Officer in 1956. He served in a wide range of MOD posts and army commands before his appointment as Chief of Staff of the Federal German Armed Forces in April 1983. General Altenburg is married.


5. General Altenburg's programme in the UK includes calls/briefings in MOD and visits to HQ UKLF, HQ UKAIR and HQ CINCHAN.

Examples of equipment brought into service in the last year or so:

13 warships (plus other smaller vessels)  
21 naval aircraft  
Regiment of Challenger tanks  
2 battalions Saxon armoured personnel carriers  
4 batteries air defence missiles  
48 RAF aircraft  
plus much more - from small arms to Sea Eagle missiles

Examples of equipment recently ordered:

4 major and 3 other warships  
16 naval aircraft  
further regiment of Challenger tanks  
6 regiments' worth Challenger armoured repair and recovery  
vehicles  
18 battalions Warrior and Saxon armoured personnel carriers  
3 regiments MLRS  
130 RAF trainer aircraft



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10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

30 September 1986

65  
Thank you for your letter of 29 September. At present we could manage any of the weeks you mention. Could you check if any particular one is now convenient at your end and give me a ring to go firm on one?

↓ 9-2-87

P.A. Bearpark

Miss Carolyn Whitehouse  
Ministry of Defence



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10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

30 September 1986

651  
Thank you for your letter of  
29 September. At present we could  
manage any of the weeks you mention.  
Could you check if any particular one  
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me a ring to go firm on one?

↓ 9-2-87

P.A. Bearpark

Miss Carolyn Whitehouse  
Ministry of Defence

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MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1

Telephone 01-930 7022

MO 25/8E

29th September 1986

*CDD*  
*Agree? Yes*

*AB*  
*Any ideas on what would be best?*  
*any will do.*

*OR*

*Dear Andy*

The Chief of the Defence Staff is hoping to invite General Altenburg to visit the UK as Chairman of the NATO Military Committee early in the New Year.

General Altenburg takes post on 1st October and it was hoped that, for his initial visit to the UK, the General could pay a courtesy call on the Prime Minister.

The Chief of the Defence Staff was considering inviting General Altenburg for one of the following weeks:

- a. the week commencing 12th January;
- b. the week commencing 26th January;
- c. the week commencing 2nd February;
- d. the week commencing 9th February.

I should be grateful if you would ascertain whether the Prime Minister would be prepared to receive a courtesy call during one of these weeks.

*Yours sincerely*

*Carolyn Whitehouse*

(CAROLYN WHITEHOUSE)  
Private Secretary

Andy Bearpark Esq  
10 Downing Street

Nato

vb

13 March 1980

Thank you for your letter of 13 March about General Zeiner Gundersen who wishes to pay a farewell call on the Prime Minister on Tuesday 29 April.

I am afraid this is not going to be possible. Her diary for that day is extremely overcrowded and it would be difficult to find even 10 minutes. Added to that, however, the Prime Minister has had an extensive NATO briefing in the fairly recent past so I hope that your Department will not consider it too serious for the Prime Minister not to agree to see him.

C.S.

Miss S. Ambler-Edwards,  
Ministry of Defence.

TUR



10 DOWNING STREET

Mr. Alexander

This would be  
fitted in if you  
insist.

ed.

13/3

Miss Stephens.

The Prime Minister has had  
an extensive NATO briefing in  
the fairly recent past. I would not  
have thought this a particularly  
valuable investment of her time.

And



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1  
Telephone 01-~~235 8500~~ 218 2111/3

MO 25/8

13th March 1980

*Dear Caroline,*

General Zeiner Gundersen, the outgoing Chairman of the NATO Military Committee will be visiting the Ministry of Defence in order to pay his farewell calls on Tuesday 29th April.

The Military Committee of which General Gundersen has been Chairman since 1977 is NATO's highest military authority. During his farewell tours of the capitals of all NATO countries, General Gundersen will call on Defence Ministers - my Secretary of State has agreed to receive him at 10.30 on 29th April - and in some cases Prime Ministers.

It is thought by the Ministry of Defence and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office that the Prime Minister might wish to consider receiving a call from General Gundersen. Such a call would probably be of the nature of a tour d'horizon for which, of course, a brief would be provided by this office.

*Yours sincerely,*

*Sue Ambler-Edwards*

(SUSAN AMBLER-EDWARDS) (MISS)

Miss Caroline Stephens

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
MAIN BUILDING, WITTEBALL, LONDON SW1

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