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Relations / Internal Situation	RWANDA
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PART

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Baroness Chalker of Wallasey

HOUSE OF LORDS
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P. file.

25. viii. 94

STRICTLY PERSONAL

Dear John.

Thank you so much for your personal minute of 8 August, which I saw on my return from a week in France. I was extremely touched that you should have so written.

I leave on Monday for Burundi and then to Rwanda & Uganda again. This time I have to get the politicians in Bujumbura and Kigali to address the issue of making the country more stable. I shall see BRITCOM - UNAMIR, the UNSG's Special Representative and the NGOs. I will try to report on this before I do the Berlin & Cairo conferences (5-10. ix) and then look forward to seeing you & showing you our work in South Africa.

My thanks again Love Lynda

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SUBJECT: RWANDA: OPERATION TURQUOISE

SUMMARY

1. French more than satisfied: all public and some private objectives achieved, no French casualties and withdrawal on time. Critical of lack of Western backing, excluding UK. Next time they may focus more on getting concrete international support.

DETAIL

2. Now that the threat of a catastrophic exodus provoked by the French withdrawal is past, the French profess to be deeply satisfied with Operation Turquoise. Ministers, officials and military have all spoken of it , privately and publicly, as a success. According to Juppe, France has emerged with its international status enhanced.

3. The joint Matignon/Elysee communique on 19 August announcing final withdrawal (full text at the time to AD(E) and New York) said that the mission had achieved its objective: an end to the massacres. The communique played up the international legitimacy and humanitarian nature of the operation, the participation of other countries (Senegal, Chad, Congo, Guinea Bissau, Niger, Mauritania and Egypt) and the efforts the French had made to ensure that disaster did not follow their withdrawal.

4. Speaking to us and others, the French put their success down to meticulous planning, top quality troops, an enormous budget, intense diplomatic effort to keep stable the difficult relations with the RPF and, some officials admit, a dose of luck. They were acutely aware of the risks of the operation, and some,

particularly in the defence establishment, were opposed to it at the start.

5. Despite their public emphasis on the participation of other nations, the French have felt very isolated over Operaton Turquoise. Their approach and planning recognised (and possibly encouraged) this possibility from the start. The Juppe Cabinet have readily admitted to us that, without the Secretary General's support, they would have had serious difficulties pressing on with the operation. They have also told us, in confidence, that French Ministers felt seriously let down by most of their western allies (European participation was, at one stage, one of the stated conditions for the operation to go ahead). They specifically excluded the UK from this, recognising that we had other preoccupations, although the French media have occasionallly portrayed our intervention as late and limited by comparison with their own.

6. The Juppe Cabinet singled out the following countries for particular criticism:

- Belgians: pathetic; no shouldering of responsibilities;
- Italians: on again/off again with no result;
- Dutch: as always, hostile to French;
- Americans: good on supportive words, less so on action.

7. Media and political comment on Operation Turquoise this week has been largely positive, verging on the euphoric in the case of the right wing Le Figaro. The criticism from some NGOs of the "premature" French departure has been seen off by caustic remarks about these being the very people who told the French not to go in the first place. The French have been stung by some of the criticism in the foreign, notably British, Press. Their self-congratulation is nonetheless somewhat mitigated by an awareness that the French intervention, while it saved lives, did not resolve the basic problems in Rwanda and that Burundi faces many of the same difficulties.

8. As for the operation's unstated objectives, the outcome is mixed:

- status enhancement, in particular as Permanent UNSC Member: the French feel they have once again demonstrated their power projection capacity. But

they are conscious of the far from unanimous nature of the international community's reaction.

- demonstration of continued commitment to Africa: while demonstrating commitment, Turquoise was not a public relations success in Africa. Criticism from the OAU and Mandela hurt, and all but the staunchest French allies were slow to mobilise in favour. Turquoise looked like too much of a throw-back to earlier French practices and a crusade to protect Francophonie.

- countering accusations of having supported murderous regime: the French can now argue that they saved lives. But the genocide is still a focus for public attention, and France's role in the lead-up to it has not been obscured.

- profile for Juppe: a success; his initiative carried the day in the face of caution from others and it worked. In the process he has assumed a strong position on the important dossier of French Africa policy, where he, and his Ministry, were seen as weak players.

9. Will the outcome of Operation Turquoise impact on future French decisions about military adventures overseas? Clearly a disaster would have been a major discouragement. However, the success of Turquoise may not be the reverse. It is of course unlikely that the conditions in which it took place will be repeated (humanitarian disaster with French in moral firing line). In the future, the French will probably want to be much more certain of whole-hearted international, including western, support and appreciation than was the case for Turquoise. However, they have once again proved to their own (rather smug) satisfaction that, when it comes to Africa operations, they have what it takes (contrast the US in Somalia).

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Foreign &
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London SW1A 2AH

19 August 1994

Dear Philippa,

Rwanda

You may welcome an update on the situation in Rwanda.

British Assistance

The deployment of the British contingent to UNAMIR is under way. About 500 of the 615-strong force are in place. Elements of the Field Ambulance and Royal Engineers have been deployed in the north to help encourage the return of refugees from Zaire. Some British units are also being deployed in the south west. The US Airlift has experienced difficulties, including serious technical problems with the fleet of US C5 heavy transport aircraft. This has led to delays in the British deployment which is now expected to be complete on or around 21 August.

Our commitment of bilateral emergency aid to those affected by the civil war in Rwanda now stands at £33 million. This includes £10 million announced by Baroness Chalker in Rwanda on 26 July and £5 million announced on 2 August. The UK share of EU emergency aid comes to a further £27 million. An ODA mission revisited the region from 7-12 August. We have opened a temporary office in Kigali staffed by a Diplomatic Service officer. They will be joined next week by two members of the ODA.

Refugees in Zaire

There has been no significant return of refugees for neighbouring countries though UNHCR report the population of Goma and Zaire is now down to 850,000 with 25,000 having died and 115,000 having returned to Rwanda. Many have had to leave surreptitiously to avoid intimidation by Hutu leaders.

There is concern that elements of the armed forces of the former Rwanda government may regroup in eastern Zaire where many of those responsible for atrocities have also taken refuge. We have yet to see whether the Zairean authorities are able or willing to deal with this problem.

The South West

Attention is now focused on the south west. The French withdrawal, due to be completed by 21 August, is well underway. Their place is being taken by Ghanaians who are largely in position, and Ethiopian troops now starting to arrive. The new government in Kigali has agreed that the Senegalese and other African elements in Operation Turquoise may also be absorbed into UNAMIR.

However there are fears that even if the Turquoise/UNAMIR handover proceeds smoothly there may yet be a mass exodus by the Hutu population fearful of reprisals by the Rwanda Popular Front (RPF) authorities in Kigali. There is already some movement within the southwest (where the total population is about 1.5m), and in recent days several thousand refugees have crossed the border into the Bakavu region of Zaire.

The government in Kigali have been urged to take practical steps to reassure the civilian population in the south west and at the initiative of the UN Secretary General's Special Representative, RPF ministers have visited the region to talk to the inhabitants. The UN are also strengthening their humanitarian presence, including feeding programmes, in the south west and encouraging international NGOs to do likewise. We have supported proposals by the UN to deploy civilian monitors in all areas of Rwanda and the ODA are giving financial help for this. The UN Commission of Experts set up by the Security Council in July to look into war crimes is also visiting Rwanda to collect evidence of atrocities. We are in close touch with the UN about setting up a broadcasting service which could also have a role in providing reassurance to the population.

Nevertheless the UN Special Representative is resigned to the possibility that large numbers of Rwandans will leave the south west. The next few days are likely to be critical. Some contingency planning is in hand though the Bukavu region is inhospitable and it will be difficult to mount an effective large scale relief operation.

War Crimes Trials

Although the Commission of Experts has not yet made any recommendations on possible forms of jurisdiction, the Americans, Russians, French and most other Security Council partners have come out in favour of expanding the Yugoslav War Crimes Tribunal to try cases on Rwanda. (The US think rapid action on this may help encourage the return of refugees). The RPF having initially talked of trying war criminals inside Rwanda have now also called for an international tribunal. Our mission in New York have been instructed to go along with the consensus while working for the most practical and cost effective arrangement that can be negotiated.

Burundi

There is growing concern about events in Burundi where there has been an increase in inter-ethnic killing. The search for a new President is complicated by wrangling between Hutu and Tutsi political groups with elements of the Tutsi-controlled army also unhelpfully engaged. A Security Council Mission has just visited Bujumbura and the Secretary General has been asked to make proposals for a more active UN involvement.

Baroness Chalker plans to visit Rwanda and Burundi at the end of the month and this will give us an opportunity to reassess the situation.

Yours ever,

Sam

(S J Sharpe)
Private Secretary

Miss Philippa Leslie-Jones
10 Downing Street

From: Philippa Leslie-Jones
Date: 18 August 1994

PRIME MINISTER

FOREIGN AFFAIRS ROUND-UP

There is a separate note in your box on Bosnia. Apart from this, there is not a great deal to report.

HAITI

The Americans have not yet decided on their timing for intervention. They are still canvassing for contributions to their multinational force. So far, Jamaica, The Bahamas, Argentina and Belize seem to have agreed to take part. Others (including the Canadians, French and Dutch) are still havering. The Americans have now turned to us for help with the multinational force (as opposed to the later UN mission, where we have promised support), and Clinton has written to you. FCO advice and a reply (agreeing a relatively modest contribution) is in the box.

RWANDA

Most of the British force is now deployed north-west of Kigali. They are moving down to the south-west in support of the UN mission as the French pull out. The French have decided to leave by 22 August, although they might contemplate a short delay if a tragedy looked imminent. There is some concern that French withdrawal will prompt a further exodus of refugees to Zaire, where the camps are full. The new government is trying to instil confidence, but the situation is still volatile. Concern is growing about Burundi, where the same kind of Hutu-Tutsi trouble is brewing.

NORTH KOREA

The Americans have persuaded the North Koreans to freeze their nuclear

activity and refrain from reprocessing the spent fuel rods in return for help in supplying light water reactors. North Korea have also agreed in principle to remain in the NPT and accept safeguards. The main incentive has been US promises to reduce trade and economic restrictions. The immediate crisis has been averted. But the Americans still have to tie down the detail and the timing and doubts remain about North Korea's readiness to honour the agreement.

CAMBODIA

You may be aware that three tourists, including a British citizen, Mark Slater, were abducted by the Khmer Rouge from a train in southern Cambodia in late July. The Cambodians established early contact with the KR group, and this week promised to pay a $150,000 ransom, leading to speculation that the detainees would be released. However, the Cambodians have also surrounded the KR camp with soldiers. Although they have promised not to intervene without prior consultation, it is pretty clear that they will go in and clean up as soon as the detainees are out, so the prospects for release must be uncertain.

MALAYSIA

The Malaysian cabinet decided earlier this week to allow British companies to compete for public sector tenders, effectively lifting the trade ban. But they are reluctant to announce the decision because of loss of face. They say they are thinking about a low-key announcement "in the near future" - we shall see.

PHILIPPA LESLIE-JONES

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SUBJECT: RWANDA

SUMMARY

1. Despite conflicting indications, French decision is to leave Rwanda on 22 August. If it looked at the last minute as though this would cause a tragedy, France might consider a short delay in departure.

DETAIL

2. Following the different indications by French officials on whether the French forces would stay in Rwanda beyond 22 August, I asked Montferrand, Balladur's Diplomatic Adviser, for an authoritative statement of the French position. He said Mitterrand and the Government had decided that French forces should leave by 22 August. For them to stay longer the Rwandan Government would have to request this, UN legal cover would be needed and arrangements on the ground would need re-scrambling. These steps were not being taken. It looked as though the expanded UNAMIR would be in place in time, including the Ethiopians. France might take further humanitarian measures in the south western zone, as the forces departed. Some forces would stay beyond the border in Zaire.

3. Montferrand concluded that, if it became clear that a tragedy would follow French departure, France would no doubt be obliged to re-consider the question of staying a few more days. But at present that was a hypothetical possibility only.

4. The Quai and FMOD spoke to us today in compatible terms, the

former adding that it was inconceivable that the Government of Rwanda would ask the French forces to stay.

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ORIGINATOR'S CORRECTION
SIC 19B

SUBJECT : RWANDA

PART ONE OF TWO

REFERENCE MY TELNO 246

SUMMARY

SUMMARY
1. Discussions in Kigali covering:

- future of UNAMIR;
- prospects for UNAMIR's takeover of French Protection Zone;
- character of new government;
- government policy on revenge killings, and;
- on trial of those responsible for massacres following 6 April;
- humanitarian relief effort;
- missing Britons, and next week's official British delegation.

DETAIL

2. I visited Kigali on 4 and 5 August to call on members of the new government in Kigali, UNAMIR, the pre-advance elements of BRITCON, SCF and other NGOs, to discuss the issues above and to assess the situation in at least the north of Rwanda including Kigali. In the event I paid calls on President Bizimungu, Minister for Rehabilitation (Bihozagara), Minister for Justice (Nkubito). A lapse in communications with them prevented me from seeing the Minister of Foreign Affairs, but I left messages with Nkubito and a former Secretary General of the MFA who was performing an unofficial advisory role to the new team. I also called on the deputy SRSG (Dr Kabia of Sierra Leone) in the absence of Sharyar

Khan, the Force Commander (Dallaire) and his deputy (Anyidoho, of Ghana), the US Ambassador, WFP, the ICRC, SCF, and met the new UNHCR representative and a visiting Japanese government inter-ministerial delegation (here to assess what help, in terms of personnel, material and finance, Japan could give to the humanitarian effort). I also visited Col Wharmby and his staff of the nascent BRITCON, digging in in their second and temporary, tented base and preparing to deploy as soon as their equipment materialises.

UNAMIR

3. The arrival of BRITCON is genuinely welcomed, not only by UNAMIR - for itself and as an encouragement to others - but also by NGOs, who see the possibilities of tying in some of their efforts with those of BRITCON. The contingent has identified its first medical and engineering tasks and is keen to get into business as soon as their equipment can be assembled. The medical component will operate from the hospital in Ruhengeri, providing an important service to refugees returning from the Goma region and north of it.

4. UNAMIR is increasingly confident that it will get the forces it needs. They have promises of an Ethiopian battalion, 600 Tunisians, a build up of the Ghanaians to battalion strength and the African troops (now 200 but to be increased to 800) from the French protection zone. Dallaire's main worry (my TUR) is that the humanitarian effort is not exploiting fully the opportunities offered by the operation of Kigali airport to get the refugees home.

5. This turned out to be my farewell talk with Dallaire. I had not know he was to leave, but it seems he will depart on 20 August, to be deputy Army Commander in Canada. His successor will be Guy Tousignan. There had been a proposal that Anyidoho, Dallaire's deputy, should succeed, and the latter had been asked by the UN to sound out his government. The clumsy way in which the UN had then changed their mind about the succession had left Anyidoho embarrassed, but philosophical. He intends to continue as deputy. Both he and Dallaire have been courageous, and their complementary talents have served the force well.

FRENCH PROTECTION ZONE

6. Dallaire and Bizimungu confirmed the grounds for Kabia's optimism that UNAMIR would be able to effect a smooth takeover of the French zone when French troops left: namely, that the new

Rwandan government had changed their earlier stance and would consider favourably a request from the UNSG that African troops now serving with the French could be re-badged to UNAMIR. The Rwandans remain keen to see the French stick to the date of 21 August for their departure. Bizimungu was still complaining over the fact that representatives of the Rwandan government had not been admitted to the French zone, yet the French Prime Minister had been. (Dallaire thought this complaint was now losing its potency and he was full of praise for the French conduct within their zone. The fact remains that few if any NGOs, including French ones, are at work there, so the humanitarian effort is at best handicapped.)

7. Bizimungu spoke strongly of his hope that the world would not be complacent about allowing Rwandan refugees to cultivate hatred in neighbouring countries.

NEW GOVERNMENT

8. This lacks cohesion and coherence, and above all people to execute its policy. Everything is done in person, by Ministers themselves (in the absence of civil servants) and in conditions of chaos. Most live in the Hotel Meridien, with its bullet holes, low lights, overcrowded rooms and general squalor. Bizimungu, on the other hand, saw me in the palace of his late predecessor, with its Louis Farouk furnishings and elephants' feet pedestals for our coffee table. Bizimungu is the leading Hutu and, according to my US colleague, some sort of cousin of Habyarimana who fell out with him. He may not carry all that much weight with the Hutu community, who see him as a renegade, but the UN believe Kagame respects him. It is, nevertheless, the latter who is the real power behind the government.

9. The government now has ministers appointed to all its portfolios except Plans. It remains broadly-based in terms of parties other than MRND. The government have moderated their earlier anathema on all those people associated with the MRND. While refusing to have anything to do with the party as such, they have invited five individuals of the old regime to join the new government. All had declined (in Ambassador Kanyarushoke's case, according to David Rawson, because of reluctance on the part of his wife).

10. The other parties were beginning to assert themselves against the RPF. The government's change of mind on accepting the re-badging of Turquoise troops was a victory for them over the RPF.

The latter had, however, prevailed in a public disagreement over how long the period of transition should last before elections: the Prime Minister said 22 months but the government had backed the President's preference for five years.

11. Comment: the RPF's claim, while they were fighting Habyarimana's regime, that they were a movement of national opposition always seemed exaggerated. They have yet to prove their sincerity in seeking national reconciliation by really campaigning for it, and by stamping out the abuses - confiscation of property, including by the leaders, and individual acts of revenge - which have occurred since their victory. David Rawson (US) regrets the casual way the US slipped into recognition: they have had much property which survived the war looted by the RPF. He is waiting for the new government to prove itself. We, too, should regard them sceptically: it is likely that their arrogance, fed by victory, will make them difficult to deal with, and unreliable. Humanitarian relief is one thing, but we should not allow the inevitable argument to prevail that, having sustained well beyond its deserts one corrupt regime in Rwanda, we owe its RPF-led successor an easy ride.

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SIC 19B

SUBJECT : RWANDA

PART TWO OF TWO

REVENGE KILLINGS

12. On the morning of 5 August I heard the BBC report (also carried by an unidentified French station) of revenge killings of some returning Hutus by Tutsis in the south-east. I tackled Bihozagara and Bizimungu about these, having also in mind the alleged shootings reported in Dar es Salaam telno 216. Kabia (deputy SRSG) was clear there had been such incidents reported, in which people were summarily killed, but the UN had heard of fewer than a dozen. They had taken them up with Kagame who said such reprisals were against RPF policy, might be understandable but would be punished. Bihozagara was, surprisingly, dismissive of the BBC report. When I asked how the government proposed to satisfy a critical world public who would not accept that the BBC were easily duped, he said they would invite journalists, NGOs and others to join the government in investigating such reports. Bizimungu was more measured in his response: in the circumstances of the recent fighting and genocide, such reprisals were inevitable, and the government could not be held responsible for all such individual acts. The public authorities must nevertheless do their best to enforce discipline among their followers, apply the law and encourage a spirit of forgiveness among the victims of the recent massacres. (The ICRC are sceptical of the RPF's determination to stop extra-judicial killings - but concede there is no direct evidence that they are taking place.)

TRIAL OF THOSE ACCUSED OF CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY.

13. All three members of the government I saw confirmed that their approach was to give the judicial mechanism for these trials a domestic and international dimension. Primacy would be given to the role of the domestic courts, with the international element assuring the proper conduct of investigations and the transparency of the whole process. Bizimungu said the fundamental aims of prosecuting alleged organisers of genocide would be to:

- avoid fostering a cult of impunity among wrongdoers;
- reassure victims that the guilty would be punished;
- prevent further acts of individual retribution;
- educate people in the notion that killing your neighbours is wrong.

Justice on this basis would be the first step towards reconciliation. He acknowledged that the government might at some stage have to temper the requirements of justice in the interests of reconciliation. Their capacity for conducting these trials would be impeded by a shortage of judges: they had so far found only 5 of the former 60.

HUMANITARIAN RELIEF

14. My TUR describes the sketchy, varying but discouraging estimates of refugees returning to Rwanda. There seems no doubt that there has been no effective means of countering the intimidation and hate propaganda prevailing in the refugee camps outside Rwanda. The government have made more of their grievance against the French for not letting them go and preach reconciliation in the protection zone than of their efforts to preach that message more generally: more evidence of their sincerity and determination is needed. Bizimungu also thought this was primarily a job for the international community. In fact, there is now more sign of energy on the government's part, with plans to send delegations to Goma and elsewhere in Zaire and in Burundi to contact refugees in those countries and invite them back.

15. Kabia (deputy SRSG) reminded me of our alleged support for the idea of establishing a UN radio station. He also said technical help was also needed to restore the state radio so that the government could use it. Do you have any guidance for me on these ideas, which also arose in the Minister of State's discussion with Dallaire on 26 July?

16. Bihozagara confirmed that the estimate of 100,000 orphans remained the best available. The ICRC have a major exercise afoot to make a register of unaccompanied children, while SCF plan a separate project to establish a tracing service to help reunite unaccompanied children with their families as well as counselling.

17. Comment: Work in this area is necessarily long term: although the problem of orphanage arises from the recent emergency, it will require handling until the children reach adulthood, at least. I recommend that we look at ways of assisting projects to care for such children on a basis longer than we would normally contemplate, perhaps making this the special field to which we would devote the ring-fenced sum suggested in para 15 of my telno 229.

BRITISH AFFAIRS

18. I sought the help of UNAMIR, ICRC, and the MFA in looking for our two missing Britons (in fact, Cooksey was found, virtually destitute but intact, by our honorary consul, who also visited Kigali on 5 August).

19. I visited - before his return - both the home of our Honorary Consul, now looted and occupied by soldiers, and the premises of Rwandex, where he conducted his business, also looted and under guard. I impressed on Bihozagara and Bizimungu the need for the properties to be returned to their owners. There seems to be some evidence, in fact, that commercial premises have not been attacked in the same way as private properties. Bihozagara acknowledged the problem and the need to stop this pillage. But it is widespread, has already happened and involves too many senior people to be reversed. It will be even more difficult to settle the competing claims of long-exiled Rwandans who return to reassert their rights to property.

20. Tony Wood, our Honorary Consul, has subsequently received assurances about how keen the government are to see business life resume, and he himself is keen to start buying coffee. That will help as much as anything to draw farmers back. The business requires both funding and power, however, and the banking system is even more broken down than the power network. Meantime, not only the Belgians but the hardier spirits in the British business community are sniffing around the prospects in Kigali against the expected rehabilitation of the country's infrastructure.

21. I told the President and Ministers I saw of next week's planned delegation, and of our plan to maintain a pretty constant DS presence in Kigali over the coming few months. They welcomed our interest and promised all cooperation to Dr Kapila and his colleagues. They reminded me of their intention to open an embassy in London, and seemed to imply we might reciprocate.

22. I also trailed the possibility of a further visit, this time to Kigali, by the Minister of State, at the end of the month. This, too, would be very welcome.

COMMENT

23. The RPF have some talented people at their disposal, as leaders. They have few executives to rely on of any age or experience. They may have won the war with an army of boy soldiers, but their real problems are just beginning. Their approach to solving them will not always be to our taste, but we have assets to deploy in seeking to influence their conduct. These include our massive contributions to humanitarian relief, BRITCON, and our relationship with Museveni. (The latter's influence may, however, decline further now that the RPF have achieved their victory.) These will serve us well in the immediate future. In the longer term, we and other donors will need to attach rigorous conditions about human rights, and economic and political reform to our collective aid if we are to influence this government's conduct. For the British government, the question will arise of how deeply we want to be involved in the restructuring of Rwanda, and at what cost.

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MY TELNO 2776 AND YOUR TELNO 1025

SUBJECT: RWANDA

SUMMARY

1. French give details of their withdrawal plan, which depends on early acceptance of Francophone African troops for UNAMIR, and early deployment of the Ethiopians. Secretariat brief on situation. Rate of return of refugees now reduced: less than 5000 per day.

2. Council members agree on need for a Presidential Statement rather than a resolution. Council President to prepare draft for discussion on 9 or 10 August.

DETAIL

3. Council members discussed Rwanda during informal consultations on 8 August. Ladsous (France) gave a short briefing on withdrawal plans for Operation Turquoise. The first phase was the withdrawal from Gikongoro which would take place between 8 and 17 August. Ghanaian UNAMIR troops would replace the French in this area. The second phase was the withdrawal from Kibuye which would take place from 11 to 15 August. The inter-African battalion currently with Turquoise would move to UNAMIR command and replace the French in this area. The final withdrawal would take place from Cyangugu on 21 August. The Ethiopian battalion would replace the French there. Ladsous said he was relieved that the Government of Rwanda (GOR) seemed to have given in principle agreement to the inter-African battalion deploying but he urged the Secretariat to obtain written assurances to this effect. He also urged that the process of deploying the Ethiopian battalion be speeded up. He underlined

again French support for the early deployment of civilian observers to verify events in Rwanda.

4. Ladsous said that, as far as the response to Secretary-General's report was concerned, France supported a presidential statement which should take up a number of the political messages on which the Council had decided in its recent deliberations. The first would be to the new government urging it to do all in its power to promote the return of refugees. This would involve the GOR establishing a clear and unequivocal position on how it would treat returning refugees. The GOR also needed to give a clear indication of its support for an international tribunal. The second message was to troop contributors: the deployment of the expanded UNAMIR must be speeded up to allow it to fulfil its tasks and in particular to take over from the French in the south west secure area. The third message would be to the donor community. There was a desperate need to ensure that sufficient aid was both made available and distributed to those in need.

5. Gharekhan (Secretary-General's Special Political Adviser) then gave a short briefing. He confirmed that the GOR had given its agreement in principle to the inter-African battalion currently with Operation Turquoise deploying to UNAMIR. But this decision had not yet been conveyed in writing, as it must be, given past confusion. Within the south west secure area a 240 strong Ghanaian contingent was carrying out daily and nightly patrols. The chief Military Observer, along with a team of UNMOS, had been to Gitarama, Butare and Gikongoro to assess the situation. The UK contingent was now beginning to arrive in Kigali. The Canadians had deployed part of their signal squadron.

6. Gharekhan said the situation in Goma had slightly improved and refugees continued to return home, but UNHCR estimated that the rate of voluntary return had peaked between 26 and 28 July when around 15,000 per day had returned. Thereafter it had declined and was now stable at a rate of less than 5000 per day. A total of about 100,000 refugees were estimated to have returned. Gharekhan also said that the Secretary-General's Special Representative had made contact with the Prime Minister to discuss the question of GOR attitudes on the need for trials in Rwanda. Twagiramungu had denied that the GOR advocated mass trials in Rwanda. He had also denied the existence of any hit list of individuals wanted by the GOR.

7. Gharekhan said the High Commissioner for Human Rights (HCHR) was very anxious to deploy human rights monitors. He envisaged two in each of the ten Rwandan prefectures supported by local staff. 2.1m dollars were needed to set up this initial monitoring presence. The US had informed the HCHR that they could give up to $1m to this appeal.

8. Keating (New Zealand) said the Secretary-General's report required a short term political response and a longer term practical one. As far as the latter was concerned, New Zealand believed it would be necessary to adopt a resolution to ensure that UNAMIR's mandate and its operational tasks were consistent with each other, but this could be dealt with in slightly slower time. But a clear political statement along the lines described by Ladous was needed sooner rather than later. He endorsed all Ladsous' points, particularly as to the 3 elements which needed to be covered in the statement.

9. Most other Council members spoke along similar lines. The Council should make a statement covering the elements raised by the French. In addition Cardenas (Argentina) drew attention to the important role of the OAU and neighbouring countries, particularly in ensuring that their territories did not become a launching point for future military action in Rwanda. This was endorsed by subsequent speakers. Albright (US) also raised the question of coordination raised in the Secretary-General's report. All US forces in Rwanda were closely coordinated with the Secretary-General's Special Representative and would continue to be so coordinated. The US Government saw no need for any changes to the mechanisms currently being used.

10. I said that the discussion showed broad agreement on the part of Council members to the steps we should take. I agreed with New Zealand that immediate need was for a statement rather than to get into the detail of the mandate, given the speed with which the situation was changing. But a number of points should be stressed now, including the need for speedy deployment of UNAMIR. In this context I was pleased to inform Council members that the main body of the UK contingent had begun deploying over the weekend and should be fully deployed by the end of the week. There was also a need to emphasise to the Government its responsibility for creating a climate conducive to the return of refugees. An unbiased source of information would be important for the confidence building

process. A UN radio station was needed to enable the UN to transmit objective information. (See MIFT for a report of my discussion with the Secretariat on this point.) There was also a need to recall the Arusha agreement. This was the best available framework for securing a lasting political settlement in Rwanda. While parts of it might now be overtaken, there was a need for the new government, the OAU and neighbouring countries to establish a process which would enable a return to the Arusha framework. Given the enormous demands on the new government, it was not practical to push too hard on this in the short term but it would be an important part of the confidence building process to reassure people that a process was in train aimed at a broader based political settlement.

11. It was agreed that the Council President, in consultation with the Secretariat should produce a draft statement for discussion by Council members on 9 or 10 August (text follows to UND and AD(E) as soon as available).

12. See MIFT.

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10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

Explanation in Lynda Chalker's notes below, which make a gripping & nightmarish story.

Rodric

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THE PRIME MINISTER

Personal Minute

No 19

MINISTER OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS AND MINISTER FOR OVERSEAS DEVELOPMENT

Douglas Hurd has sent me copies of your reports on your trip to Uganda, Rwanda and Goma.

Thank you for making this arduous, and at one moment dangerous, journey. I am appalled at your brush with near disaster at the Kidepo airstrip, though you make light of it; and I am sorry to hear that our High Commissioner was injured. I hope the Foreign Office will send my sympathies. I am sure you are right in saying that we should avoid the airstrip in future.

You, ODA and MoD have taken action over Rwanda which seems to me exactly right, and which has brought justified credit to the United Kingdom. This is an horrific situation, by any standards. The thought of 100,000 children being lost in the African countryside, on top of the recent slaughter and the continuing, daily death toll is hard even to grasp, whatever disasters may have befallen Africa, for those who have not seen the situation for themselves.

Hen

To go into this inferno takes nerves of steel and compassion. I am profoundly grateful to you, and to all those who are involved in different facets of the relief effort. It is essential for it to continue, and we should take a sympathetic attitude to further requests for help.

I am sending copies of this minute to the Foreign Secretary, the Defence Secretary, the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Cabinet Secretary. Could those responsible please draw on it to convey my views more widely.

John M.

8 August 1994

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MIPT
SUBJECT: RWANDA: SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REPORT

SUMMARY

1. Secretary-General's report gives an update of the political and humanitarian situation, as well as a revised operational plan for UNAMIR. Within limited resources available UNAMIR already beginning to implement revised plan, which focuses on ensuring stability and security in North West and South West and stabilising the situation more generally in order to encourage the return of refugees. Concern about coordination, particularly of military forces under different commands. If not part of UNAMIR such troops should be authorised by the Security Council.

DETAIL

2. The Secretary-General's report on the situation in Rwanda requested in SCRs 925 and 929 was circulated on 5 August (faxed to UND and AD(E)).

3. The report begins with a factual account of developments on the ground since 4 July, including the RPF military victory and the establishment of the humanitarian secure area in the South West. The international community had to meet 4 basic challenges: respond to the immediate needs of refugees; facilitate the early return of refugees; restore basic infrastructure in Rwanda; and ensure a smooth transition from French control in the South West secure area. These tasks needed to be pursued simultaneously. Boutros-Ghali outlines action by the UN system, under the coordination of the UN Rwanda Emergency Office established by the DHA to respond to these needs.

4. There follow details of the revised operational plans drawn up for UNAMIR in the light of the altered circumstances on the ground

but within the framework of the mandate established by SCR 925. UNAMIR's principal tasks are now to ensure stability and security in the North Western and South Western regions of Rwanda; to stabilise and monitor the situation in all regions of Rwanda in order to encourage the return of refugees and the displaced population; to provide security and support for humanitarian assistance operations inside Rwanda as humanitarian organisations arrange the return of refugees; and to promote, through mediation and good offices, national reconciliation. In the expectation that UNAMIR would eventually receive the 5,500 troops authorised by the Council the Force Commander had planned deployment in 5 sectors of the country with the largest number being deployed in sector 4 (the South West) and sector 5 (the North West). In the South West the need was to avert possible outbreaks of violence and in the North West to help resettle returning refugees.

5. The section of the report on political aspects is primarily a summary of information already made available to Council members. Boutros-Ghali notes that the highest priority is the resolution of the massive humanitarian crisis caused by refugees and displaced persons and the establishment of conditions of security and stability to encourage and enable them to return home. But if longer term stability was to be assured, there would need to be early discussion between the new Government and moderate elements of the MRND.

6. In his concluding observations Boutros-Ghali notes that the agony of Rwanda had been made all the more tragic by the fact that the international community hesitated for so long to intervene despite the fact that most of its Member States had signed the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. To make amends the international community must at the very least ensure, through the efforts of the Commission on Human Rights, the High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Commission of Experts, that those individuals responsible in their personal and official capacities for the disaster were brought to justice. The Commission of Experts would be looking at the question of the jurisdiction, international or national, before which such persons should be brought to trial. It was also incumbent upon the international community to alleviate the appalling human suffering in the refugee camps in Zaire, Tanzania, Uganda and Burundi and to enable refugees and the displaced to return home. The recent response by many countries to the humanitarian needs was welcome but problems of coordination will arise if several forces under national command are working alongside UNAMIR and the forces loyal to the new Government.

Ideally all foreign forces engaged in support of the humanitarian effort should be part of UNAMIR. If that is not possible then their deployment should be authorised by the Security Council and formal liaison arrangements be established with UNAMIR. As well as humanitarian assistance, there is an urgent need for reconstruction and rehabilitation.

7. Boutros-Ghali underlines the responsibility of the new Government in bringing about national reconciliation. It should not allow its military success to create desire for permanent dominance. It must install an equitable and transparent system of justice to try those suspected of instigating or participating in massacres. These were all enormous tasks for a Government already facing enormous challenges. The international community would need to help Rwanda in particular with re-establishing systems of administration, justice, police, finance, education and health. It would only be possible to carry out these tasks if the Government committed itself to genuine and full reconciliation.

8. The ultimate political aim must be the installation of a broad-based system of Government that would give all elements of society, irrespective of ethnic origin or social level a sense of security and a stake in the country. The Arusha agreement still provided the principles in a broad frame-work for establishing such a system. The OAU and neighbouring countries would have a special role to play. In particular they would need to ensure that their territories were not used for further destabilisation.

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SUBJECT: RWANDA
YOUR TELNO 315

SUMMARY

1. French still hoping and preparing to leave by 22 August, but accept that they might be in for a longer stay, only at request of UNSC. Reported agreement on demilitarisation of secure zone after French departure.

DETAIL

2. We have drawn on TUR in speaking to Montferrand, Balladur's Diplomatic Adviser, Vidal, Mitterrand's Diplomatic Adviser, and Germanos, FMoD Director of Operations. All were clear that the French still hoped to hand over to UNAMIR by 22 August if possible. The decision to withdraw then had all but been taken. The French nonetheless recognised that humanitarian realities might prevent withdrawal on this timescale. However, Germanos expressed guarded optimism that UNAMIR would be in a position to take over. Once transport had been arranged by the US for the Ethiopian contingent, the last impediment to a French withdrawal would be removed. But there was no sign of when the Americans would act on this.

3. Montferrand said that the French could not, in any case, stay without a new resolution of the Security Council and the acquiescence of the RPF. Germanos said that Balladur had made it clear that the French would only stay if specifically asked to by the Security Council: two more months would be their maximum. But Montferrand indicated that the French would continue to keep up the pressure on others to join UNAMIR by threatening

departure, while recognising that, as time passed, flat statements that France would depart could precipitate a rush of emigration from South Western Rwanda into Zaire.

4. On the specifics of the French withdrawal plan, a French government spokesman said today that several hundred more French troops would leave Rwanda with the arrival in the secure zone of the Ghanaian troops now on their way from Kigali. Germanos said that the French had asked the Americans for help with the withdrawal of their heavy equipment but had had no response. Montferrand confirmed, as has Balladur in public, that the French envisaged leaving a logistic support force for UNAMIR in Zaire.

5. In talking to the French, we argued for the importance of French contacts with the GoR. Vidal said that there were contacts, but at a modest level. The trouble was that the new Government was not well organised and anyway might prove ephemeral. Germanos said that the RPF had asked the French to leave. This was partly why the French would need an explicit request from the international community if they were to stay. The French were bitter that not only the RPF but others in the region were still suspicious of French motives. For their part, the French were sceptical about the assurances being given by the Tutsis. The French expected, despite GoR assurances, that there would be extensive revenge killing.

6. Contrary to Germanos' comments about RPF views on the French presence, President Bizimungu is quoted in the French press as accepting that the French might have to reconsider their date of departure. However, he is also reported to have threatened a renewal of military activity if the French do not allow GoR representatives into the secure zone.

7. The French press also report an agreement to the UN proposal that the secure zone should be demilitarised and put under UNAMIR control on 22 August. A French military spokesman said that the GoR had accepted that RPF troops would only enter the zone unarmed. He also said that the GoR had lifted their objection to the participation in UNAMIR of the African forces engaged in Operation Turquoise.

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SUBJECT: RWANDA: UN/DHA PLEDGING CONFERENCE, 2 AUGUST

SUMMARY

1. More than 60 speakers address Pledging Conference on Rwanda, but less than half required amount raised for the UN agencies. Total amount going towards Rwanda's needs including through NGOs more encouraging. Many of the new pledges come from non-traditional donors and considerable sums being raised in the private sector.

DETAIL

DEPARTMENT OF HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS (DHA)

2. Peter Hansen, Under Secretary General in the Department of Humanitarian Affairs chaired the UN pledging conference on Rwanda on 2 August. Comparing the Kigali he had seen in April with the Kigali he saw last week, he said there was clearly light dawning in Rwanda. His meetings with the government of Rwanda had also been cause for optimism. He listed the assurances they had given on the non-screening of returning refugees, freedom of movement of refugees, displaced persons and humanitarian aid workers, and their endorsement of the deployment of human rights monitors. The government had also been adamant about its endorsement of the rule of law: that those who had committed crimes would be prosecuted based on accepted judicial process developed with the assistance of the international community. Property would be restored to its rightful owners.

3. Acknowledging that the international community had

responded swiftly to the crisis, Hansen stressed the importance of maintaining the momentum and of ensuring focussed targetting of resources. He outlines three areas of focus: a) meeting immediate life-saving needs; b) facilitating and establishing sustainable conditions for return; and c) ensuring a smooth transition in the humanitarian protection zone. In implementing these he was concerned to ensure an overall system-wide approach. To this end, he was preparing, and planning to update regularly, a matrix showing exactly who is doing what where in Rwanda and what the needs and priorities were. A phased deployment of personnel to cover the different regions was also planned.

UNHCR

4. Mrs Ogata, High Commissioner for Refugees, characterised the situation as still bad but no longer desperate. Voluntary repatriation was the best and only solution but the reasons for the refugees' flight would have to be addressed. She outlined four key areas of activity: a) immediate help for returning refugees and recent arrivals; b) objective information by radio broadcasts (UNHCR broadcasts were starting on 2 August); c) careful planning of return for refugees, displaced persons and minorities; and d) confidence building measures. UNHCR's specific activities were currently focussed on assisting and protecting refugees outside Rwanda's borders, preventing further displacements and encouraging voluntary repatriation.

WFP

5. Mrs Bertini, Executive Director of WFP, reported on WFP's activities and funding shortfall of $82 million. She also appealed for funds to set up a communications network in Nairobi similar to the one that had been so effective during the southern Africa drought emergency.

UNICEF

6. Mrs Sham Poo, Deputy Executive Director of UNICEF, highlighted the plight of the more than 200,000 unaccompanied children, and the need to help the thousands of traumatised children. UNICEF's share of the appeal had been set at $37 million, but a more recent assessment estimated needs at $55

million.

WHO

7. Dr Jardel, Assistant Director General of WHO, stressed the importance of clean water and adequate food to prevent deaths from diseases such as cholera, dysentery, measles and malaria. He welcomed the contributions of a few governments including the UK.

FAO

8. Dr Hjort, Deputy Director General of FAO, also acknowledged the timely UK contribution in his statement, in which he appealed for bean and vegetable seeds and hoes for the September planting season to avoid having to provide food aid later.

CENTRE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

9. Fall, ASG in the Centre for Human Rights, speaking on behalf of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, stressed the need to increase the number of human rights monitors to promote human rights at the grass roots level in all prefectures. Additional extra-budgetary resources would be needed to cover this.

OTHER AGENCIES

10. UNDP, UNV, UNESCO, ICRC and IOM all spoke of their activities and their need for funds.

DELEGATION STATEMENTS

11. Most delegations were headed by Geneva mission ambassadors. Only two delegations fielded ministers: France (Mrs Michaux-Chevry) and Ireland (Tom Kitt), while half a dozen fielded senior officials from capitals: USA (McCall, USAID), Germany (Holderbaum), Finland, Norway, Sweden and Russia.

12. 52 countries spoke (copies of major statements and list of pledges by fax to EMAD ODA and UND FCO). Most of the major donors restated contributions and pledges already made, though

new contributions were announced by Norway (NK10 million to UNHCR and UNICEF), Spain $7.5 million (part of which will go to UN agencies), Ireland (#750,000 for UNHCR, UNICEF and ICRC) and Finland ($1 million to UNICEF). I spoke as instructed (Ms Douglas EMAD ODA's fax of 29 July).

13. Most of the other new pledges were from non-traditional donors. Those giving cash were: Thailand ($80,000), Korea ($100,000), Malta ($50,000), Gabon (FCFA 30 million), Oman ($50,000), Malaysia ($100,000) and Namibia ($500,000). Those making in-kind contributions, mostly in the form of medicines and medical equipment, were Tunisia, Egypt, Russia, Mexico, Croatia, China, Czech Republic, Algeria, Argentina, Uruguay and India. Jamaica (Kingston telno 217 refers) was not present. Cameroun offered to take a number of orphans. The surprising sums raised from the private sector both for the UN agencies and NGOs were mentioned in some statements: Malta ($150,000), Netherlands ($3 million), South Africa ($100,000), Gabon (FCFA12.5 million), Norway and Spain. Many delegations, including the US and Canada, said that decisions on further contributions were still awaited. (The US confirmed on 3 August that the Senate had approved a further contribution of $50 million in addition to the costs of maintaining the services they were providing.)

14. Other common themes were the need to address the root causes, the need for returns to occur but for them to be voluntary and in a climate of safety and dignity, and the need for resources to be most effectively used, given the massive needs and shortage of time. Some delegations commented on the trial of criminals: Switzerland favoured an international tribunal while Ireland suggested that a permanent court be established to try the perpetrators of genocide.

15. Finland and Germany complained about the conflicting information coming from different agencies and the latter also chose to criticise DHA for failing publicly and swiftly to voice support for Mrs Ogata when UNHCR moved into action in Goma. The Germans also said that in the search for an efficient equilibrium between bilateral contributions, activities of international organisations and NGOs, and peace-keeping activities DHA should be providing guidance.

WORLD BANK

16. The World Bank representative said that a grant proposal of $20 million was to be put to the board soon. This was to fund UN agencies and NGOs in the water, healthcare and sanitation sectors. It was an exceptional initiative to respond to an exceptional need. Normal funding for Rwanda had been suspended both because of the chaos and because it had fallen into arrears, but an assessment mission would be visiting Rwanda soon to see what could be done.

HANSEN'S SUMMING-UP

17. Hansen responded at the end of the conference with an upbeat assessment. He thought the conference had been a step in the right direction towards sustaining the international relief effort, but stressed the need for resources to continue to flow. The preliminary estimate was that $137 million had been raised in direct response to the target figure of $434 million in the consolidated appeal. Taking into account additional contributions such as to service packages and NGOs, the total pledged towards Rwanda's overall needs was in the region of $437 million. This showed that the international community felt, as one speaker had put it, that "Everyone shares a border with Rwanda".

COMMENT

18. While Hansen was upbeat in his concluding remarks to the conference, he told me afterwards that he was disappointed with the response to the UN appeal, ie the agency needs, even though the response to overall needs in Rwanda had been good. He said that one reason for this was that some UN agencies, eg UNHCR, issued interim emergency appeals to which donors responded before the consolidated appeal could be issued. This had strengthened his view that the CERF should be increased to give it the capacity to tide agencies over the immediate emergency phase until the consolidated appeal could be issued so that the donor response could be more coherent.

19. At a meeting of the Humanitarian Liaison Working Group on 3 August I asked again about assessments of the conference, particularly in the light of the BBC report which quoted the High Commissioner's spokesman as saying Mrs Ogata had been deeply disappointed at the international response to

the appeal. Hansen explained the difficulties of calculating which pledges were in direct response to the appeal and the exact value of in-kind contributions. He was optimistic, having looked over the conference papers again, that the actual amount raised was closer to 50% of the target and that more would be forthcoming. He would obviously have preferred it if 100% had been reached, but that was never the case; 50% was very good going. He said he had not had time to have a post mortem with agency colleagues, and left Gerald Walzer, Deputy High Commissioner, to respond on UNHCR's reaction.

20. Walzer said that media reporting tended to pick out only a small part of what was said on any subject. Echoing a sentiment expressed by Hansen about the importance of not discouraging the donors by criticising their performance publicly, he said that UNHCR was very grateful for the response donors had given to the appeal, and the in kind contributions had made an enormous difference. But the first analysis of the conference had produced little new money for UNHCR, perhaps $5 million, while their shortfall, not counting any funds they would have to raise if the service packages were not picked up, was still $61 million. They remained very concerned that their donor base was so narrow and that they might face a crisis of funding very soon.

WILLIAMS

YYYY

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NNNN

Prime Minister

Foreign &
Commonwealth
Office

London SW1A 2AH

03 August 1994

Dear Roderic,

Baroness Chalker's Visit to Rwanda

The Secretary of State thought that the Prime Minister might be interested to see the attached minutes from Baroness Chalker. The Secretary of State regards this as a notable and courageous visit. He agrees with Lady Chalker's views on the way forward.

The minute on the Kidepo aircraft incident records Lady Chalker's miraculous escape in a nasty accident in President Museveni's plane.

I am copying this letter to Mark Lowcock.

Yours sincerely,

Sam

(S J Sharpe)
Private Secretary

Roderic Lyne Esq CMG
10 Downing Street

Foreign &
Commonwealth
Office

London SW1A 2AH

2 August 1994

Dear Rodric,

RWANDA : BRITISH CONTRIBUTION

You may like an update on the British contribution in Rwanda.

UNAMIR

As the Foreign Secretary mentioned in his minute of 27 July, the key to tackling the humanitarian crisis lies in creating the conditions inside Rwanda which will attract refugees and displaced persons back to their homes. General Dallaire, the UNAMIR Force Commander, has been spearheading efforts to achieve this and the British contribution will be a major injection to strengthen this capability.

The British contingent will be deployed largely in the North West and the North East of the country and will play an important part in facilitating the return of refugees from Goma and elsewhere to their homes inside Rwanda. A total of about 633 men and women are deploying, with elements from 23 Parachute Field Ambulance, Royal Engineers, Royal Signals and Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers, together with logistic support, security and unloading units.

A Pre-Advance Party of 59 personnel plus equipment and vehicles commenced deployment by RAF C130 on 1 August, and will be fully deployed by 3 August. Arrangements are being concluded for American heavy lift to take the rest of the British contingent and our 50 trucks over the next fortnight. Through our Mission in New York, we are in parallel tying up financial arrangements with the UN with a view to maximising the reimbursement we receive when the UN have sufficient funds to pay.

Other contributors to UNAMIR are now mobilising. The Ghanaian contingent is now deploying in full; the Canadians, Australians and Zimbabweans are now also deploying, although the Ethiopians still require vehicles and other equipment.

As regards bilateral efforts, the US bilateral humanitarian and military operations, which are on a larger scale than any other, are focussed chiefly on assistance to refugees outside Rwanda's borders (out of more than 2000 US military personnel in the region under 100 are based in Kigali).

Typical! cf Bosnia.

The French Operation Turquoise is focussed on the South West of the country, and is due to be wound up by 21 August. The situation in the South West continues to give cause for concern. The French are anxious to get out by the deadline. So far, however, there is no sign of an agreement between the French, the UN and the new government in Kigali to ensure a smooth handover. We are encouraging the parties involved to do everything possible to minimise the risk of further atrocities or a mass exodus when the French withdraw.

The United Nations welcome the UK response to their call for assistance in Rwanda. We understand that the Secretary-General in particular welcomes our decision to deploy in support of the UN operation rather than through a bilateral operation on the French and US model. The speed with which the Ministry of Defence and the Joint Headquarters have responded following last Thursday's ministerial decision has earned widespread admiration.

Humanitarian Aid

[plus our share of EU aid]

On the humanitarian front, we have pledged £28 million in bilateral aid since the beginning of April this year. This includes £10 million announced by Baroness Chalker during her visit to Rwanda last week. £5 million of this will go directly to the UN Inter-agency Appeal, for which a Pledging Conference is being held in Geneva today. We were one of the first countries to send an assessment mission to the region and are planning a third mission for the beginning of next week. Our most recent contributions have included:

- the provision of 2 aircraft handling teams at Goma and Entebbe for UNHCR;

- 2 chartered aircraft for UNHCR's use in the region for an initial period of 1 month;

- the transfer of surplus water tankers from Zagreb to Goma;

- and 5 relief flights carrying priority supplies for the Goma refugees.

A substantial proportion of our latest contribution will go towards projects in Rwanda to support returning refugees. It will provide health care, seeds and tools to enable them to grow their crops and help towards rehabilitating basic infrastructure including water supplies.

I am copying this letter to Private Secretaries to members of OPD.

Yours ever,

Sam

(S J Sharpe)
Private Secretary

Roderic Lyne Esq CMG
10 Downing Street

From: Baroness Chalker

Date: 1 August 1994

cc. see attached

We visited.
A notable and courageous visit.
D 2/8.

Secretary of State

FOUR DAY VISIT TO UGANDA, RWANDA AND GOMA IN ZAIRE: 25 - 28 JULY 1994

SUMMARY

1. A horrendous but worthwhile visit with Uganda a clearly improving haven of stability in a deeply troubled area. Mission must have working high frequency radio system.

2. In all my years of visiting the sick, starving and dying I have never seen anything as bad as Goma, despite the most valiant efforts of many NGOs and now the US army. The press and NGOs gave ODA great praise for its speed and flexibility of action which made possible the NGO effort.

3. North west Rwanda through which returnees must pass from Goma needs careful preparation by UNAMIR for which planned UK forces are very suitable. Political calm has to be created and maintained to save lives of returnees. The south west zone could be a further blood bath if the French leave before UNAMIR are sufficiently operational to maintain law and order and prevent further intimidation. Uganda is very sensitive to the plight in Rwanda and greatly exercised that UK should be positively engaged there. Museveni regards our involvement as very appropriate and highly supportive of the region's needs.

4. I propose a short follow up visit late this month to Kigali and Kampala.

DETAIL

Uganda

5. This visit, first planned 5 months ago, could not have been more timely in providing a coordination point for our further work for Rwanda. Sadly this meant a very rushed programme around Uganda and a logistics nightmare for staff at the British High Commission. They coped magnificently.

6. Museveni remains as radical and down to earth as ever, but with strong guidance from us, the IMF and IBRD, as well as his own Finance Minister, Jehoash Mayanji-Nkangi, will stay on course economically. As ever he and his Ministers expressed gratitude repeatedly for Britain's efforts. There is a mountain of work still to be done. Our successes in education, health, water, environment, taxation reform and engineering make Britain's efforts seem even greater in Ugandan eyes.

7. Because of Rwandan needs, I failed to see the Consultative Assembly on Thursday as planned. I hope to rectify this by a day or so's stopover when I visit Kigali shortly, if you so agree. However I had two good talks with the Speaker and Chairman of the Consultative Assembly, James Wapakhabulo about the future democracy. The Assembly members are extremely anxious to continue the limited discussion we had at other events.

8. My political discussion with President Museveni eventually took place at 2230 on Thursday. The High Commissioner has reported separately by telegram. Museveni gave great emphasis to his need for additional infrastructure. Whilst his current ideas are over ambitious, I believe the World Bank would do well to assist with some road projects. Above all an improvement to telecommunications would enable business to take off. There is steadily growing wealth among the business groups, and it will be well invested if deployed by adding value to products for European and other markets. Makerere University continues to produce quality graduates.

9. Museveni had returned from his meeting with Rwandan President Bizimungu deeply concerned at the prospects of peace in the south west when the French leave and critically concerned about French/Hutu/Zairois plans. He was delighted to hear British engineers are to be deployed to assist the return from Goma and other border camps.

Meetings and Events

10. I handed over the rehabilitated Kibuli Police College and presented communications equipment. There is much police training to be done in other urban areas also, but a real improvement is now evident. I opened the British Council exhibition on women's roles in development based on Intermediate Technology (Development Group) (ITDG) research worldwide. We celebrated Save the Children

Fund's 75th birthday with a garden party at the Residence. The High Commissioner entertained Foreign Minister Paul Ssemogerere and others to dinner. I met Noerine Kaleeba, The Aids Support Organisation (TASO) on Ugandan Aids Support and discussed the possibility of a Mildmay teaching and referral centre for Uganda. In Gulu district, I visited the Koch Goma Health Centre and opened the Pabwo dispensary and clinic. I launched tree planting for all Gulu centres; local women have already planted over 3,000 trees around the 8 major centres. By the end of 1994 we shall have built or rehabilitated 22 centres.

11. We had been unable to reach Kidepo on Tuesday afternoon, as absence of fuel at Entebbe on Tuesday morning had delayed our departure to Rwanda by 3½ hours. So the President insisted that we flew on from Gulu to Kidepo (far north east corner) close to the Sudan border. We were shown the need for mud made valley dams in this almost deserted Karamoja area to encourage farming and also a fine game park. My visit to Mbarara and the President's town must await another visit.

12. On a lighter note, I recorded Ugandan Capital Radio's Desert Island Discs on Monday, which will be rather different for them. Bach, Debussy, Scott Joplin and Chris de Burgh gave them new insight into Ministerial taste. The interspersed political discussion was positive, but helpful in telling a wide range of Ugandans the facts of economic and political life. I hope I'll hear a tape one day.

13. A very varied programme crammed into 2½ days by the superb organisation of the High Commission in Kampala. My thanks in particular go to Edward Clay, Mick Frost and Caroline Cross. I have visited Uganda often, but the morale of the office is better now than ever before thanks to Edward Clay's sound management and thus the product is better in political and aid terms. But there is one major resource lacking which hampers their efforts: this is a working high frequency radio system between all vehicles, homes and the High Commission which allows contact and assists safety. If the RMP Protection team (who are excellent) are to be withdrawn, a first class HF radio system must first be fully operational.

Rwanda

14. Our delayed visit on 26 July by UNAMIR helicopter to Gatuna and then by road to Byumba enabled us to meet the Minister for Rehabilitation, the Byumba Préfet and officials, visit an orphanage of 600 and discuss the necessities required to encourage the return from Goma. About 10,000 refugees have returned to live on their small farms in the demilitarised zone around Byumba. So far 30,000 abandoned children have been identified countrywide. At a conservative estimate there are 80,000 and more likely over 100,000. Save the Children Fund (UK) are working with UNDHA and we should assist them further.

15. General Dallaire (c/o UNAMIR) drove me himself to Gatuna and we flew back to Entebbe. Colonel Joscelyn (MOD UK) met him with me at Gatuna before proceeding to Kigali. With Dallaire on Tuesday I met the US General, and on Thursday the UK Recce team met me in Entebbe and then Dallaire in Kigali.

16. As you know Dallaire was delighted and relieved with the UK offer. Our judgement on the needs of north west Rwanda fitted closely with his. We hope the team can deploy as soon after 1 August as possible. By creating temporary way stations, water supplies, bridge mending/building and supplying through Kigali for the returnees, the UNAMIR action must act as a magnet. The outstanding need is for a UN radio station to broadcast in Kirwandese to all Rwanda and neighbouring border camps to persuade refugees and displaced people to return home. The new Minister for Rehabilitation (Dr Jacques Bihozagara) told me that 60% of teachers and more than 50% of health workers have been murdered by the Hutu, because of their middle class professions. To overcome this deficiency will require a major UN effort.

Goma (28 July)

17. This volcanic land is already a hell on earth. Two volcanos are showing clear signs of new activity. Eruption is usually every three years. The last was in 1991.

18. Along every roadside the corpses lay waiting for collection. In the camps the stench was indescribable. MSF (Holland and France), Red Cross, Care, Oxfam, Goal and a host of other NGOs are doing fine work to provide clean water, food, medicine, shelter and with Zairois Boy Scouts to collect and bury the dead. Without the US army help now arriving on a massive scale the horrors would take tens of

thousands more. There are several field hospitals but about half the victims die en route. At one MSF hospital 300 new cholera cases are being treated each day. I saw masses of fine work being done, but found the workers stressed beyond endurance. Our ODA handling teams - the only ones with equipment at Goma airport so far were also very stressed after 2 weeks of horror and I have asked for more frequent rotation of our teams.

Yours ever

Lynda

BARONESS CHALKER OF WALLASEY

Distribution

PS/Ministers
PS/Mr Rifkind
PS/PUS
PS/Mr Vereker
Mr Ainscow
Mr Wright
Mr Ireton
Mr Manning
Mr MacLennan AD(E)
Mr Bearpark
Mrs Kelly
Mr Burton
Mr Wickstead BDDEA
HC Kampala

From: Baroness Chalker

Date: 1 August

cc. see attached

Secretary of State

RWANDA REPORT

1. The situation has evolved rapidly and dramatically over this past week. The Americans, having at last become engaged, are as usual about to deploy substantial resources at Kigali - which will become the hub of the relief operation along with Goma and Entebbe. (The airports of the region are full of heavy lift aircraft and fuel is in very short supply.)

2. UNAMIR suddenly finds itself with substantial offers of support. Our own assistance fits well with the Force Commander's needs. By deploying in the north west, Britain's army effort will be on the main route for those returning from Goma. Our three month limit of our engagement fits in well with UNAMIR's own concept. Dallaire told us that if all went well in the south west and UNAMIR replaced the French without hitch (by no means a foregone conclusion), then within three months the emphasis should have shifted from humanitarian relief to rehabilitation and a different (and possibly smaller) UNAMIR force would be needed. But this presupposes the capacity of the new Rwandan Government to divide guilty Hutus from innocent ones, and bring them to justice, to stop the threatening behaviour of certain Hutus, and so get refugees to return.

3. Everyone now seems to accept the importance of building up the relief operation within Rwanda itself in order to provide support and encouragement to returnees. Dallaire's concept of "way stations" seems exactly right, and our contribution to UNAMIR fits in well with this. So too will the activities of our NGOs who are making firm proposals for activities within Rwanda itself. Save the Children Fund is already at work there.

4. Goma is a vision of hell, but its awfulness is such that few will willingly remain there. People will start to move back in increasing numbers when they are assured that it is safe to do so. An effective humanitarian operation under UNAMIR protection is the best assurance. But we shall also have to do more to counter the insidious propaganda of the Hutu extremists who are well installed within the camps

in Goma and in Tanzania. Radio will have an important part to play in this. We must try to get effective and rapid action to set up a UN broadcasting facility to counter the remaining threatening Rwandan Radio based in south west and in Goma. French and US efforts should be deployed to stop this Rwanda National Radio station.

5. The RPF leaders that I talked with seemed moderate and reasonable. They understand the need to work for a restoration of Hutu confidence. But the noises being made by some RPF leaders about no new elections for five years are hardly encouraging. There will also have to be action to ensure that there is no land grabbing - of which there are some worrying reports. It is important that we and our partners should continue to urge the RPF to create a broad based administration commanding the widest possible support. Room will have to be found for at least some of the elements of the MRND if long term peace is to be established.

6. The situation in the south west remains worrying. Whilst the French intervention may have saved lives in the short term, it has complicated the task of UNAMIR and the new government. If there is any hiatus between the French withdrawal and the deployment of UNAMIR, further attacks on Tutsis are possible. The attitudes of the French to the new government is at best ambiguous. I was troubled to hear from Museveni that the Rwandan President told him that the French had refused to allow the new government to enter their Zone in order to reassure the population there. Moreover as a result of Operation Turquoise, Zaire is now engaged and Mobutu may well be tempted to play a spoiling role. Many members of the old government have taken refuge in eastern Zaire, where they may regroup and seek to plot an eventual return.

UK Role

7. It is clear that Rwanda is going to occupy our attention for some time, though the nature of our involvement should evolve as the situation stabilises. We must avoid becoming committed long-term to UNAMIR. We should take stock of our role before the end of our initial 3 month involvement. We should support multilateral assistance for reconstruction. We should also continue to give priority to NGO projects through the Joint Funding Scheme. I see less case for a bilateral programme, other than perhaps a modest allocation to encourage good government and national reconciliation. I understand that a Diplomatic Wing candidate is now being considered for a temporary presence in Kigali. It is important that this person should be deployed as soon as practicable. We will supplement the diplomatic

presence by an aid coordinator with extensive NGO and medical experience for a few weeks. He will be in place by the end of next week, probably based in Kigali but travelling more widely.

Yours ever

Lynda

BARONESS CHALKER OF WALLASEY

Distribution

PS/Ministers
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PS/PUS
PS/Mr Vereker
Mr Ainscow
Mr Wright
Mr Ireton
Mr Manning
Mr MacLennan AD(E)
Mr Bearpark
Mrs Kelly
Mr Burton
Mr Wickstead BDDEA
HC Kampala

From: Baroness Chalker

Date: 1 August 1994

Secretary of State

Shirawlow.
Prime Minister
fyi.
I agree new lead.
DRH.

KIDEPO AIRCRAFT INCIDENT

1. Weather in Kidepo area varied from strong local wind and rain and some thunder to weak sunshine on the afternoon of 27 July. My team landed in our AMREF Cessna piloted by Joe McCran in bumpy conditions on a narrow earth runway between high grasses without excessive difficulty.

2. After our brief visit to the camp, viewing of the need for valley earth dams and some wildlife, President Museveni asked Edward Clay and I to fly with him direct to Mbarara to save time, whilst the rest of our party (MacLennan AD(E), Wickstead (BDDEA), Speller (APS) and 2 from Ugandan MFA) flew with McCran via Entebbe for fuel.

3. On take off, we were about ten feet off the ground being dragged to port by grasses caught on the wing fuel tank when the Captain thankfully cut power and fuel and so prevented disaster. The President climbed out the top of the door, and fortunately the Captain lowered the steps for the rest of us. The High Commissioner, his RMP bodyguard (who was superb) and I then flew on to Entebbe by Ugandan army helicopter: never again! Weather conditions thank goodness forced us to abort any further flying plans to Mbarara. The President was driven there in 4½ hours, and then went to his farm to meet President Bizimungu of Rwanda. Museveni had intended me to be present: my visit to Goma prevented this.

4. There were several components to the quote aborted take-off unquote. First, the runway has very tall grass close in on either side, and has a slight kink in it, and there are a few short trees nearby - now minus one. Second, the apron is on soft ground and thus parked planes are close to the runway. Third, the pilots were hurrying due to bad weather and failing light. All this caused the co-pilot to fail to keep clear enough of the runway edge. With wing tip fuel tanks and grass of unusual tensile strength, once it built up on the port wing tank, it gathered into a mass and was binding the propeller in no time. We could see it on the wing. The Captain's action (power and fuel cut) saved us from tipping over, and caused us to land from about 10 feet with an almighty thud. We lost a wheel and its housing,

part of the tail and part of the wing. Our AMREF pilot (Joe McCran) who saw our aborted take off, whilst clearing his plane from the mud on the apron, considers that the pilot did not allow for the kink in the runway and was too far to port on the runway in his attempt to be clear of the apron. Wickstead (BDDEA), MacLennan (AD(E)) and Speller (my APS) agree.

5. Museveni was in a centre seat and appears to have no injuries. I shielded him from the fuselage. Edward Clay has a broken rib and we are both bruised. We were very lucky indeed.

6. I recommend that unless Kidepo runway is widened and straightened and the apron strengthened, we should not use this airstrip again. We might also consider assisting Museveni in the air safety field, not least for his own personal travel arrangements.

Yours ever

Lynda

BARONESS CHALKER OF WALLASEY

AMREF - African Medical Relief (& Emergency Fund) Foundation.

Distribution

PS/Mr Vereker
PS/PUS

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE NEWS RELEASE

Issued by: Public Relations (Centre), Ministry of Defence, Main Building, Whitehall, London, SW1A 2HB. Tel: 071-21 87924/87931

114/94

30 July 1994

RWANDA: BRITISH TROOPS DEPLOYED

Over 600 British troops will be offered to the United Nations to assist the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), Malcolm Rifkind, Secretary of State for Defence announced today.

This follows the recommendations from the British Army recce party which was deployed to Rwanda last Wednesday.

Included will be troops from the Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers (REME), a Royal Engineer Field Squadron a Field Ambulance and logistic elements.

The British troops will provide logistic support. This will enable UNAMIR to assist in tackling the humanitarian crisis by deploying its peacekeeping forces to create the conditions within Rwanda necessary to attract refugees and displaced persons back to their homes.

Their tasks will include assisting UNAMIR in getting its vehicles and equipment operational as soon as possible, undertaking the repair of bridges, minor roads and electrical installations and providing a range of medical support.

The advance party of about 60 people and 11 vehicles and trailers is due to depart early Monday morning. All deployment could be complete within two weeks.

NOTES TO EDITORS

The units involved will be elements of 23 Para Field Ambulance, 9 Para Squadron - Royal Engineers, 5 Airborne Logistic Battalion, Royal Signals, RAF, an infantry Platoon from Princess of Wales Royal Regiment and 10 Airborne Workshops REME.

The majority of units are based in Aldershot. For press facilities, contact Capt Bob Phillips on 0252 349432 after 1800hrs today.

Filming facilities will be arranged for the departure of troops from RAF Lyneham and further facilities to demonstrate the kind of tasks the troops will undertake.

cc Bup
cM

Ref: B.01620

Agreed
Rmn

PRIME MINISTER

cc Sir Robin Butler

OPD Meeting, 28 July: Rwanda

Rwanda is not on the agenda of the OPD meeting tomorrow, but it is possible that members will wish to raise it at the end of the meeting.

2. The Foreign Secretary has minuted you as attached about --- proposals which he and the Defence Secretary have agreed to provide assistance to the UN operation (UNAMIR) in Rwanda. The main components would be first line logistical support, a field engineer squadron and a field ambulance (a total of up to 500 personnel). The deployment would be for a period of three months to plug the gap before the arrival of commercial contractors (Brown and Root). The Foreign Secretary proposes to make a claim on the reserve to meet the cost, about half of which would be reimbursed by the UN.

3. Other OPD Ministers have not previously had an opportunity to consider these proposals, and the Foreign Secretary suggests that the meeting tomorrow would be a convenient opportunity for any comments to be made. Subject to colleagues' agreement, he proposes that an announcement should be made tomorrow afternoon by the Defence Secretary and publicised by Lady Chalker who is visiting Rwanda and adjacent countries.

4. The proposals would no doubt be welcomed publicly and they appear realistic. Given that the deployment would be time-limited and the nature of the contribution would be basically technical, there should be few concerns on policy grounds about the proposals. Unless the Chancellor has difficulties over the funding, it should be possible for the Committee to agree to them.

PAUL LEVER

27 July 1994

PM/94/051

PRIME MINISTER

CABINET OFFICE
N 1094
27 JUL 1994
FILING INSTRUCTIONS
FILE No.

Rwanda : British Contribution to UNAMIR

1. We have through ODA made a rapid and effective contribution to international efforts to assist Rwandan refugees in Zaire. There is general agreement internationally that the key to tackling the humanitarian crisis lies in creating conditions inside Rwanda which will attract the refugees and displaced persons back to their homes. ODA is planning further support within Rwanda. But the role of the UN peacekeeping force, UNAMIR, in creating conditions of security inside the country is crucial. The Force Commander, General Dallaire, has advised the UN Secretary General that the requirement for UNAMIR to deploy in full is even more urgent than before.

2. Regrettably, since the passage of Resolution 918 expanding the force to 5500, and despite the urgent appeals of UN headquarters, UNAMIR has been slow to build up. Member states have not been willing to provide the logistic support necessary to help the largely African battalions deploy effectively. We have already offered 50 trucks to carry UNAMIR personnel. In addition, the UN have now asked us for first line logistic support to enable UNAMIR to get its vehicles and equipment operational as soon as possible and have also said they would welcome a field engineer squadron to undertake, for example, repair of bridges, minor roads, electrical installation etc and a field ambulance. The Ministry of Defence are able to make these units available to the UN in response to the UN's request for a three month

period. After this time, logistic support from the force will be taken over by the commercial contractors Brown and Root. The UN both in New York and Rwanda have confirmed that if a decision is taken to send these units, they will provide the operational lifeline for UNAMIR.

3. I welcome the despatch of a recce party to Rwanda and the Defence Secretary's decision to authorise the refurbishment of the trucks. Malcolm Rifkind and I believe the units and the trucks should deploy as rapidly as possible to meet the urgent need. I understand the advance party of a British military logistic contingent could be ready to travel to Rwanda early next week, and the remainder, up to a total of about 450-500, depending on the recommendations of the recce party, within the following twelve days or so. I regard Malcolm Rifkind's proposals as a substantial response to the urgent need to help UNAMIR.

4. The UN have accepted financial responsibility for the trucks. They will reimburse us for their cost of £400,000 plus transport, although the timing will depend on the availability of funds. We do not yet have a definitive figure for the costs of the deployment and maintenance of up to 500 men for a three month period. The MOD's preliminary assessment is that the extra costs will be of the order of £15 million, including the cost of the trucks. About half of this will fall to be reimbursed by the UN, although we can only expect troop costs to be reimbursed this financial year. I have no provision for such costs within my budget, and would therefore propose to make a claim on the Reserve under the Armstrong formula.

5. Unless there is objection to these proposals, I propose that we should confirm to the UN that a British military logistics contingent will deploy to Rwanda as swiftly as possible for a three month period, with an announcement to be

made on the afternoon of 28 July by the Defence Secretary in London and publicised by Lynda Chalker during her visit to the region. The announcement would say that an advance party will travel within days; and that the precise composition of the remainder, which is likely to include REME, Royal Engineers and medical support, will depend on the recommendations of the recce party now in Rwanda. If colleagues have any comments, we might discuss this briefly at OPD on 28 July.

6. I am copying this letter to Kenneth Clarke, Michael Heseltine, Malcolm Rifkind, David Hunt, Sir Nicholas Lyell and Jonathan Aitken and to Sir Robin Butler.

DH.

(DOUGLAS HURD)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
27 July 1994

Prime Minister Agreed. Tdk Rwn

Another copy is in your box. It would be good to announce this tomorrow (Thursday). The net cost (£7½ million?) pales in comparison to the disaster.

Rodric. 27/iv

PM/94/051

PRIME MINISTER

Rwanda : British Contribution to UNAMIR

1. We have through ODA made a rapid and effective contribution to international efforts to assist Rwandan refugees in Zaire. There is general agreement internationally that the key to tackling the humanitarian crisis lies in creating conditions inside Rwanda which will attract the refugees and displaced persons back to their homes. ODA is planning further support within Rwanda. But the role of the UN peacekeeping force, UNAMIR, in creating conditions of security inside the country is crucial. The Force Commander, General Dallaire, has advised the UN Secretary General that the requirement for UNAMIR to deploy in full is even more urgent than before.

2. Regrettably, since the passage of Resolution 918 expanding the force to 5500, and despite the urgent appeals of UN headquarters, UNAMIR has been slow to build up. Member states have not been willing to provide the logistic support necessary to help the largely African battalions deploy effectively. We have already offered 50 trucks to carry UNAMIR personnel. In addition, the UN have now asked us for first line logistic support to enable UNAMIR to get its vehicles and equipment operational as soon as possible and have also said they would welcome a field engineer squadron to undertake, for example, repair of bridges, minor roads, electrical installation etc and a field ambulance. The Ministry of Defence are able to make these units available to the UN in response to the UN's request for a three month

period. After this time, logistic support from the force will be taken over by the commercial contractors Brown and Root. The UN both in New York and Rwanda have confirmed that if a decision is taken to send these units, they will provide the operational lifeline for UNAMIR.

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DH.

(DOUGLAS HURD)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
27 July 1994

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RWANDA: HUMANITARIAN RELIEF
SUMMARY
1. Minister of State's visit to Northern Rwanda. Recommendations.

2. The Minister of State visited Northern Rwanda under the auspices of UNAMIR on 26 July. She was accompanied by MacLennan (AD(E)), Wickstead (BDDEA), Frost, Colonel Joscelyne (UK MOD) and me.

3. The Minister's plans were disrupted by a delayed departure from Kampala caused by a shortage of aviation fuel (due to the heavy demand from relief freights). She nevertheless had substantive discussions with Bihozagara (RPF Minister of Rehabilitation) and the provisional local prefect in Byumba ; and with General Dallaire (UNAMIR Force Commander). She met representatives of British NGOs and visited an orphanage and feeding centre.

4. In the course of the day, the Minister also gave six press/radio/newspaper interviews. Her visit was covered by a number of British media.

5. The Minister was very warmly received. The Rwandans expressed their gratitude for Britain's role in Security Council deliberations over Rwanda, and for Britain's contribution to humanitarian relief. They expressed their intention of opening an embassy in London. They hoped we would welcome this. They clearly have high hopes of our long-term interest in Rwanda.

6. The new government intends to take Rwanda's seat on the Security Council (within a week or two according to Bihozagara).

They intend to purge their cadre of ambassadors (though the former Ambassador to Paris, an MDR supporter, will head the Foreign Ministry).

7. The area she visited - Byumba - is on the edge of the former DMZ, which has been partly depopulated for up to 3 years. Of the area's former 800,000 inhabitants, perhaps 80,000 are back. The totals in Byumba include 11,000 orphans, most of whom have been orphaned in the recent fighting. The numbers of displaced were already falling: from 200,000 to 30,000.

8. The Minister put across our message that the urgent priorities were to create the conditions which would encourage Rwandans who had fled to return home. That would require a massive relief effort, and a sustained campaign by the government to create the confidence which would bring them back. In fact, the ICRC feeding station which we briefly visited - with a catchment of some 300,000 - had a larger Hutu clientele at the time of our visit.

9. There is going to be a major problem of orphans. So far 30,000 have been identified but Bihozagara believes they have almost 100,000 abandoned in some way. He said that 60% of teachers and probably half the health workers had been massacred because they had been targeted. Thus the child support problem would last for a long while.

10. The Minister described our present relief efforts, and promised further resources, in response to the appeal by the UNHCR, to concentrate on the urgent requirements for water, field hospitals and food. We would concentrate and organise our efforts through Kigali. (Comment: the pattern of activity is changing fast, as people move home. The British NGOs are moving their efforts in response. They are now looking to Kigali instead of Kabale as their centre of operations in Rwanda.)

11. General Dallaire responded warmly to our offers of help to UNAMIR. He welcomes REME support, and the despatch by air of our 50 trucks. In fact his needs cover the whole of our possible package except the RAF team, which he no longer needs as the US army will run Kigali airport. He also asked for a security company and 10-15 UN military observers. Colonel Joscelyne has gone on to UNAMIR HQ to pursue his remit there. Dallaire did not refer again to night vision aids. The requirement for a UN radio station remains important. Although quote Mille Collines unquote has been

silenced, there remains another station putting out similar propaganda.

12. The British troops will need to be entirely self-sufficient. UNAMIR are short of equipment, water, fuel, accommodation and food at present.

COMMENT

13. A successful visit in terms of asserting publicly our strong support to the humanitarian and peace-keeping operations in Rwanda. While the immediate requirements in Goma must be met, our own efforts should increasingly be directed to Rwanda, working through the UN agencies and, above all, the NGOs now beginning to establish themselves in strength. A further visit by Troy and Kapila specifically to Kigali will be valuable. Rapid action will be needed by the MOD once their recce team has sized up the situation. Pending restoration to full operational effectiveness of Kigali airport, we can count on full cooperation from the Ugandan authorities if we route our own operations through Entebbe. Minister considers our troops should go straight in to Kigali.

14. We shall need a good solo operator in Kigali for some weeks. The High Commission in Kampala is too stretched to deploy someone. An HEO/DS7, with French and UN and/or African experience, from either wing, could do an invaluable job. He/she would need a satellite telephone and the skills to handle NGOs, the British and UN military, and the Rwandan government, trying to cope in chaotic conditions.

15. We need carefully to consider how to respond effectively and generously to the immediate need without getting hooked on long-term commitments of aid to Rwanda. The department considered in March, before the crisis, that our interests were minimal. We need to re-examine our commitment and meantime dampen Ugandan and Rwandan expectations of indefinite and large scale support. One way of ring-passing any long-term commitment, and avoiding pressure for a substantive government to government programme would be to say we would be ready (once the emergency phase is over) to make funds (say 1 million) available to be channelled through NGOs for rehabilitation activities.

16. The Minister and a smaller party plan to visit Goma on 28 July.

CLAY

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MOD//SEC(O)(C)BARLOW
MOD//AUS(C)MR REEVES
PS/NO 10
BANKE//MR HAYWARD
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10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

26 July 1994

Dear Sam,

MESSAGES TO PRESIDENT CLINTON: RWANDA AND HAITI

Thank you for your two letters of 25 July, enclosing messages to President Clinton about Rwanda and Haiti. The Prime Minister was grateful for this very prompt response to the messages which we received from the White House at the beginning of the day. He has approved both texts. I enclose copies in the form in which they issued.

I am sending copies of this letter and its enclosure by fax to Sir Robin Renwick in Washington, and also to Tim Laurence (Ministry of Defence) and Melanie Leech (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,

Roderic

RODERIC LYNE

S J Sharpe Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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PREM/Ch

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

25 July 1994

Dear John,

PRIME MINISTER'S BILATERAL WITH THE FOREIGN SECRETARY: 25 JULY

I am writing separately about Bosnia, senior appointments, and referenda.

The other subjects covered in today's bilateral were:

- **Membership of OPD(E)**: the Foreign Secretary was content with the proposal to appoint Mr Hunt and Mr Hanley to the Committee;

- **Rwanda**: the Prime Minister wanted MOD to look into a number of possible forms of help, perhaps including use of the Territorial Army. I have since spoken to MOD, who have written to Sam Sharpe about their reconnaissance mission;

- **Hong Kong**: a brief word before the Governor's call. The Foreign Secretary said that he would be seeing the Chinese Foreign Minister in New York, but had decided not to go to China ~~before~~ on his Far Eastern tour.

Yours ever,

Roderic.

RODERIC LYNE

R J Sawers Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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RESTRICTED

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB
Telephone 071-21 82111/2/3

SECRETARY OF STATE

MO 6/21J

25 July 1994

Dear Sam,

RWANDA

There have been a number of developments since the Foreign Secretary and Defence Secretary discussed possible assistance to Rwanda last week. This note is a brief update on where we stand.

The military situation has altered with the effective victory of the RPF. Kigali airport may soon be re-opened which would significantly improve the logistic position. There is also a growing political imperative.

I understand that the UN are likely to confirm that they want the fifty lorries they have been offered, and in order not to lose time Mr Rifkind has given instructions that work to service and repaint them should begin forthwith. It ought to be possible to complete this by the end of the week.

The UN have now enquired informally whether we might be able to provide REME support for UNAMIR to bridge the gap for some three months until their contractors, Brown and Root, are operational in Rwanda. This is essentially the same request as you made to us a week ago but the changed circumstances cast a different light on it. Officials have identified a number of other capabilities that might be useful, including a Royal Engineer Field Squadron, a Field Ambulance, a Command HQ and airfield specialists. Units are being brought to short readiness-to-move to meet all of these capabilities in case the need arises.

Sam Sharpe Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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Recycled Paper

It will of course be for the UN to decide what sort of help it requires, but it will be difficult for Ministers here to take informed decisions without a proper reconnaissance. We are in a position to despatch a recce party on Wednesday. I understand that the Foreign Secretary wishes us to proceed with this and we are making the necessary preparations. Costs, like those of the work on the lorries, would be subject to repayment under the normal Armstrong formula rules. Perhaps you could confirm that Mr Hurd is content for us to go forward on this basis.

Copies of this letter go to Roderic Lyne (10 Downing Street), Ivan Rogers (Treasury), Mark Lowcock (ODA) and Melanie Leech (Cabinet Office).

Yours,
Tim

(T J H LAURENCE)
Commander Royal Navy
Private Secretary

Prime Minister

Further details of MoD thoughts below.

Content with reply to Clinton, which I shall send by hot line? (Designed to show that we have been far from inactive).

Dear Roderic,

Roderic. 25

Foreign & Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

25 July 1994

Thank you for your letter of 25 July enclosing President Clinton's message on Rwanda. I now enclose a draft letter from the Prime Minister, agreed with the ODA and MOD.

You may wish to know that, as a result of the UN request in UKMis tel 2603, MOD are giving active thought to what we can do in response, both to this specific request and the outstanding UN request for logistic support for UNAMIR. A military recce team will be visiting Kigali shortly. The Foreign Secretary believes that the main priority must lie with boosting UNAMIR's capabilities to deploy as rapidly as possible, rather than contributing to the already substantial military effort undertaken by the French and the Americans. In the light of the initial military assessment, the Foreign Secretary is likely to write to OPD colleagues within the next 48 hours to outline a possible small British military contribution to UNAMIR.

I am copying this letter to Timothy Lawrence (Ministry of Defence), Paul Raynes (Chief Secretary's Office), Mark Lowcock (ODA) and Melanie Leech (Cabinet Office.

Yours ever,

Sam

(S J Sharpe)
Private Secretary

Roderic Lyne Esq CMG
10 Downing Street

[Via Cabinet Office Com. Con.]

MESSAGE DATED 26 JULY FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT CLINTON

~~DRAFT REPLY TO PRESIDENT CLINTON'S MESSAGE~~

DEAR BILL,

RWANDA

Thank you for your message of 23 July. The American response to the emergency in Rwanda has been characteristically impressive in helping to cope with the overwhelming humanitarian need.

We have been active on the ground in Rwanda from the earliest days of the crisis and have been contributing to the UNHCR airbridge at Mwanza, Tanzania, since early May. We have committed £11m in aid since April 1994 and announced a further £6.5m of emergency aid on 23 July. Including our contribution through the European Union, we have committed a total of £40m to Rwanda in the past four months.

We had an aid assessment mission in Rwanda the week before last. We have sent relief flights with vehicles, personnel, blankets, plastic sheeting and water carriers. We have recruited an additional air bridge team for the UNHCR airhead at Entebbe, and made available to UNHCR for a month two large transport planes to collect and deliver priority foods as part of the Goma airlift.

We have also given 2,000 tonnes of high protein food to WFP. We are arranging the transport of 500 tonnes and WFP have approached the US authorities for help to transport the remaining 1500 tonnes from the UK. I hope that this will be possible.

The Baroness

~~My~~ Minister for Overseas Aid, ~~Lynda~~ Chalker, is now visiting Uganda, Rwanda and the refugee camps at Goma in Zaire, and will make further recommendations. I expect these to focus principally on the task of resettling the refugees back in Rwanda. A summary of our overall effort is set out in the / attached note.

I, like you, believe the key lies in creating a secure environment for the refugees to return home as quickly as possible. UNAMIR will have an essential role to play. The UN has accepted a British offer of initial logistic support for UNAMIR. While we are not proposing to contribute military personnel to the humanitarian operation, I am looking at what further help we can offer to get UNAMIR off the ground as quickly as possible.

This is a huge and appalling problem, and we must continue to do what we can to help the United Nations and relief agencies deal with it, and try to restore normal life in Rwanda as soon as possible.

Yours ever,

John.

Annex

UK AID TO RWANDA REFUGEES
As at 25 July

1. In Zaire

i. Airlift

a. Ilyushin 76 (40 tonnes) ex-Sarajevo on Entebbe/Goma Shuttle

b. Antonov 12 (10 tonnes) loaded at Manston with Oxfam supplies, for UNHCR airlift to Goma/Bukavu

c. Antonov 124 (100 tonnes) lifting 5 x 100 tonnes WFP high protein biscuits into Goma

d. ODA tankers ex-Zagreb to Goma via USAF

ii. Airport Handling

a. Handling team relocated from Mwanza to Goma

b. Handling team plus eqipment ex-Zagreb now in Entebbe for UNHCR airlift

iii. On the Ground

£2.5m Grants to NGOs for immediate assistance to refugees, including:

a. £350K for MSF (first aid)

b. £400K for CARE (managing refugee camps)

c. £100K for IOM (transporting refugees)

d. £250K for CAFOD (relief supplies)

e. £400K for British Red Cross

f. and a large commitment planned for OXFAM for water supply.

Cite

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10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

25 July 1994

Dear Mr. Sharpe

MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON: RWANDA

I enclose President Clinton's message on Rwanda which the US Embassy transmitted on Saturday. I believe you have already had an advance copy.

I would be grateful for a draft reply from the Prime Minister, co-ordinated with the Ministry of Defence. If possible, could this reach me by **close today, 25 July**?

I am copying this letter by fax to John Pitt-Brooke (Ministry of Defence), Mark Lowcock (Overseas Development Administration) and Melanie Leech (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely

SLHughes-Hallett

pp **RODERIC LYNE**

Sam Sharpe, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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FAXED 22.7.94

From: **Roderic Lyne**
Date: **22 July 1994**

PRIME MINISTER **CC.** **Duty Press Officer**
Duty Clerk

RWANDA SITREP (FRIDAY EVENING)

With the television cameras showing ever more horrific pictures and Clinton having announced an eye-catching initiative, Rwanda looks set to dominate the news over the next few days. We shall be asked increasingly what we are doing. Here are the main points:

- Our aid so far (including our share of the EU package) totals around £40m. (Details on attached sheet from ODA).

- Lynda Chalker leaves for the region on Sunday. She will announce an additional £6½m in aid when she is there (or will bring the announcement forward if we come under a wave of public pressure). She has done some news interviews today, and I have encouraged ODA to put her before the cameras again tomorrow if, otherwise, our own significant efforts risk being under-reported.

- Douglas Hurd will speak to Lynda Chalker again before she goes. He will encourage her to bring back further ideas on what should be done, and not to hold back from reasonably expansive proposals for consideration. A humanitarian catastrophe on this scale might well justify even more help from us.

- MOD are in contact both with the Americans and, at Ministerial and official level, with FCO and ODA. An MOD Colonel will accompany Lynda Chalker, though we are not emphasising this in the publicity. MOD are trying to airlift the 50 lorries which they have offered to the

UN. The Defence Secretary will consider other reasonable proposals for military help.

Additional background

While the most immediate task is to stem the loss of life, the main objective must be to get the refugees back to their homes as soon as possible. There are fears that a huge influx of food and other emergency aid will encourage the refugees to stay put. The American initiative could have this effect. The Americans will deploy about a thousand troops to help distribute and police relief outside Rwanda, but they do not want to put troops into the country to give the refugees confidence that they can return safely.

The refugees do not have confidence in the French, because of their past involvement. The UN operation, UNAMIR, is structured to rely on contingents from different African countries, but these do not seem to be materialising. We could come under pressure, either domestically or from the UN or Americans, to send troops to be part of the UN operation. This would neither be desirable politically nor easy operationally, given our commitments in Bosnia, Northern Ireland etc. If a coherent, short-term operation is set up to assist the return of refugees, now that the fighting has effectively ended, we should look to others to play the leading part in it. We should look especially to those who do not have ground troops in Bosnia. Apart from the Americans, the Germans are no longer debarred by their constitution. Our contribution might conceivably be in the form of small specialist units, such as communicators, logistic experts, field hospitals, etc. This not yet a situation we have to address, but it could come at us fairly quickly.

Roderic

RODERIC LYNE

f\rwanda.jd

RWANDA: SUMMARY

6pm - replaces earlier version

22/7/94

Now:

funding two British Red Cross flights

one left Kent airport yesterday

one is loading today (Friday) - also from Kent airport

recruiting one aircraft handling team plus equipment in Entebbe. Hope to go out this Saturday from Mansten airport.

recruiting a smaller aircraft for shuttling around Bukavu. Available Sat.

Biscuits: got 2,000 metric tonnes of high protein biscuits. Ex-MAFF stock. At MAFF warehouse in Badminton in Gloucester. Will are sorting out how to tranport to the region. We are discussing with WFP and United States airforce and others on how to arrange this.

also sending down 2 grain mills to mill the maize to Goma next week. Already sent 2 grain mills to Ngara,Tanzania.

Already:

3 planes into the region:

2 in Goma

1 in Entebbe

containing

blankets, tents, poly sheeting, water carriers, vehicles and drivers, 2 logisticians - logisticians now in Goma, in UNHCR office with UNHCR staff.

One of the planes in the region for one month for shuttling priority loads

Total committed on current airlift £2,421,000

Brings total commitment to over £11 million

US TROOPS

Welcome initiative

Plans know so far all very sensible:

- Pre-positioning food in Rwanda

- Support for the RPF govt

- Setting up airhead at Entebbe

- Jamming the radio station

WHY NOT USE THE RAF

Need the largest capacity available. Antonov = 100 metric tonnes, Ilyushin 40 m.t.. Hercules 15 m.t.

- Only room for 4 planes to park at one time on Goma airstrip

WHY NO BRITISH TROOPS

Not been asked by the UN. If so, will consider.

WFP

WFP sending in 30 30-tonne lorries' worth of food (900 tonnes). Same as 20+ Ilyushins

EUROPEAN UNION

Our share of EU package of help = £28.6m from total 6 April to date. Total therefore around £40m.

FUTURE ASSISTANCE

React to needs which are assessed locally. We are approving substantial grants for NGOs' relief operations at Goma eg health, water and sanitation.

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SUBJECT: RWANDA

SUMMARY

1. U.S. ANNOUNCE MAJOR RELIEF EFFORT FOR RWANDAN REFUGEES.

DETAIL

2. PRESIDENT CLINTON ANNOUNCED ON 21 JULY A MAJOR RELIEF INITIATIVE TO ADDRESS THE PROBLEM OF THE RWANDAN REFUGEES IN ZAIRE. DETAILS WERE GIVEN BY ATWOOD (ADMINISTRATOR, USAID), WHO HAS JUST RETURNED FROM A VISIT TO THE REGION. MAIN POINTS OF HIS STATEMENT (FULL TEXT BY FAX TO AD(E)) WERE:

- THE U.S. WOULD CONTRIBUTE A FURTHER 41.4 MILLION DOLLARS IN RESPONSE TO THE UNSG'S APPEAL FOR RWANDA, IN ADDITION TO THE 35 MILLION ANNOUNCED EARLIER IN THE WEEK. THE NEW MONEY WOULD BE USED FOR 30,000MT OF GRAIN, DOD LOGISTICAL SUPPORT (LARGELY AIRLIFT), ASSISTANCE TO UN AND NGO RELIEF ORGANISATIONS AND A 6 MILLION DOLLAR GRANT TO ESTABLISH FACILITIES FOR THE CARE OF ORPHANS.

- THE PENTAGON WAS PREPARED TO ESTABLISH AN AIRHEAD FACILITY AT ENTEBBE, CAPABLE OF HANDLING LARGE QUANTITIES OF FOOD AND RELIEF SUPPLIES FOR THE ENTIRE AREA (ATWOOD RECALLED THAT LARGE NUMBERS OF REFUGEES REMAINED IN UGANDA AND TANZANIA IN ADDITION TO THOSE IN ZAIRE).

- WATER AND MEDICAL SUPPLIES WERE BEING SHIPPED BY MILITARY TRANSPORT FROM STOCKS IN GERMANY DIRECT TO GOMA, TO DEAL WITH THE IMMEDIATE SERIOUS THREAT OF CHOLERA. SUPPLIES WERE ALSO

BEING SHIPPED TO BUKAVU.

- THERE WAS A NEED TO EXPAND THE AIRPORT FACILITIES AT GOMA AND BUKAVU. IN GOMA THE PROBLEM WAS APRON AND CARGO-HANDLING CAPACITY: THE RUNWAY WAS ALREADY CAPABLE OF TAKING C-5 AIRCRAFT. IN BUKAVU THE RUNWAY ITSELF REQUIRED EXTENDING TO HANDLE LARGE AIRCRAFT. THE U.S. WAS EXAMINING WHAT MIGHT BE DONE, IN COOPERATION WITH THE FRENCH. (ATWOOD SUBSEQUENTLY SAID THE U.S. MIGHT TAKE OVER RUNNING OF THE AIRPORTS, ON THE LINES OF THE UN OPERATION AT SARAJEVO AIRPORT: CF DOWSE'S T/L TO SHAND, AD(E) OF 20 JULY).

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3. ATWOOD WAS QUESTIONED CLOSELY ON THE DEPLOYMENT OF U.S. TROOPS TO ASSIST THE RELIEF EFFORT. HE RESISTED GIVING A FIGURE, BUT THE PRESS HAVE QUOTED PENTAGON SOURCES AS SPEAKING OF ABOUT 3000 PERSONNEL.

RENWICK

YYYY

FILE MRM

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

22 July 1994

Dear Mark,

RWANDA

A Mr David Manning of the Sudan Air Lift telephoned me on the morning of 22 July. He said that the Prime Minister had supported his efforts in the Sudan. He was now collecting food for Rwanda. He would be grateful if the Prime Minister could place 6 RAF Hercules at his disposal to fly it out.

I asked Mr Manning to liaise with the ODA and with your Emergency Aid Department. All of our efforts over Rwanda were being co-ordinated by the ODA. You were the experts on the most effective way of getting aid there, including on whether or not it was best to use RAF aircraft (should the RAF have the capacity).

I am sending copies of this letter to Sam Sharpe (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and Peter Ryan (Ministry of Defence).

Yours ever,

Roderic

RODERIC LYNE

Mark Lowcock Esq
Overseas Development Administration

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UKMIS NEW YORK TELNO 2566

SUBJECT: RWANDA

SUMMARY

1. U.S. ANNOUNCE MAJOR RELIEF EFFORT FOR RWANDAN REFUGEES.

DETAIL

2. PRESIDENT CLINTON ANNOUNCED ON 21 JULY A MAJOR RELIEF INITIATIVE TO ADDRESS THE PROBLEM OF THE RWANDAN REFUGEES IN ZAIRE. DETAILS WERE GIVEN BY ATWOOD (ADMINISTRATOR, USAID), WHO HAS JUST RETURNED FROM A VISIT TO THE REGION. MAIN POINTS OF HIS STATEMENT (FULL TEXT BY FAX TO AD(E)) WERE:

- THE U.S. WOULD CONTRIBUTE A FURTHER 41.4 MILLION DOLLARS IN RESPONSE TO THE UNSG'S APPEAL FOR RWANDA, IN ADDITION TO THE 35 MILLION ANNOUNCED EARLIER IN THE WEEK. THE NEW MONEY WOULD BE USED FOR 30,000MT OF GRAIN, DOD LOGISTICAL SUPPORT (LARGELY AIRLIFT), ASSISTANCE TO UN AND NGO RELIEF ORGANISATIONS AND A 6 MILLION DOLLAR GRANT TO ESTABLISH FACILITIES FOR THE CARE OF ORPHANS.

- THE PENTAGON WAS PREPARED TO ESTABLISH AN AIRHEAD FACILITY AT ENTEBBE, CAPABLE OF HANDLING LARGE QUANTITIES OF FOOD AND RELIEF SUPPLIES FOR THE ENTIRE AREA (ATWOOD RECALLED THAT LARGE NUMBERS OF REFUGEES REMAINED IN UGANDA AND TANZANIA IN ADDITION TO THOSE IN ZAIRE).

- WATER AND MEDICAL SUPPLIES WERE BEING SHIPPED BY MILITARY TRANSPORT FROM STOCKS IN GERMANY DIRECT TO GOMA, TO DEAL WITH THE IMMEDIATE SERIOUS THREAT OF CHOLERA. SUPPLIES WERE ALSO

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RENWICK

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SUBJECT: RWANDA
OUR TELNO 817

SIC A3A

ODA FOR PS/LADY CHALKER

SUMMARY

1. French start aid air-drops in Rwanda. Pressing for aid delivery points to be set up in Uganda and Burundi to take strain off Goma. Pushing RPF to work for early return of Hutu refugees.

2. French now talking of 2000 UNAMIR troops deployed by end-August.

DETAIL

AID
3. On 20 July the French parachuted seven tonnes of aid, largely foodstuffs, at Kibeo, south of Gikongoro, where it was distributed to refugees by French forces on the ground. This brought the total of French deliveries to about 400 tonnes. The French also announced yesterday the release of new aid of FF8.2 million for Rwanda (bringing total bilateral aid in the last two months to more than FF 50 million). French Humanitarian Affairs Minister Mme Michaux Chevry met Brian Atwood, Administrator of USAID en route back from Goma, yesterday to coordinate aid efforts. A delegation from the UNHCR was in Paris also; Mrs Ogata will be seeing Balladur here on Friday.

4. We discussed the aid situation with Plum (Michaux Chevry Cabinet) on 21 July. He reiterated the importance of refugees returning to Rwanda. The new Rwandan government had the main responsibility for bringing this about. The French mission led by Quai Secretary General Dufourcq, now in Rwanda, would be pressing the RPF on this. The French had asked Hansen to pass the same message when he visits. We pointed to Lady Chalker's statement of today about the reversal of the exodus.

5. Plum said that the French had also asked Hansen to pursue the question of opening up other delivery routes into Rwanda. Goma simply could not take the strain. The French had pressed the Burundians at the highest level to allow an air delivery point to be set up at Bujumbura. Another was needed at Entebbe. Kigali was still delicate.

6. Plum said that he understood that we had agreed to help Hansen press other potential donors (UKMis New York telno 2566). This was very welcome; the French had done the same and would repeat their earlier massive lobbying exercise. Other countries and organisations were still proving slow to mobilise.

7. A French military spokesman said on 20 July that, by French estimates, there were now 2.7 million displaced Rwandans of whom 1.2 million were at Goma. Plum stressed to us the risk of destabilisation for surrounding countries.

MILITARY

8. Following yesterday's Council of Minsters, the government spokesman indicated that Balladur had spoken of the possibility of 2000 UNAMIR troops being deployed by the end of August due to the mobilisation of Ghanaian, Zimbabwean, Nigerien and Canadian contingents. The FMoD confirmed yesterday that the French were considering leaving a logistic support force of 2/300 men in Zaire after their withdrawal to assist the UNAMIR operation.

MALLABY

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SUBJECT: RWANDA
YOUR TELNO 104 TO KAMPALA

SIC A3A

SUMMARY

1. French hopeful that UNAMIR deployment will allow them to withdraw as planned. Will submit withdrawal plan to UNSC. See urgent need for aid to get into Rwanda itself and not just to camps in neighbouring countries. Welcome news of possible visit by Lady Chalker.

DETAIL

2. We discussed Rwanda on 20 July with Germanos, Chief of Operations (FMoD), and Colombier, Africa Adviser, Juppe Cabinet.

3. We asked about the very marked recent public and private references by the French to their intention not to extend their mandate in Rwanda. Germanos said that French planning still had 21 August as the final withdrawal date but that the humanitarian situation was the main concern. If it looked like a French withdrawal would worsen the situation, French Ministers might want to look again.

4. Colombier said that there were encouraging signs from Dallaire on the progressive deployment of UNAMIR II. It seemed that some 400 troops could be on the ground at the beginning of August. There was currently a team of some 30 UNAMIR personnel in the French zone looking at exact requirements. Dallaire and

Boutros Ghali both remained keen on transferring 2 battalions from UNOSOM to Rwanda, which could be done very quickly. They were puzzled by American reticence and were pressing Washington. The French and the UN continued to press those countries who had offered logistic support for UNAMIR to hurry it along. For instance the Ghanaian and Ethiopian troops needed lorries. Boutros Ghali had spoken Juppe on Monday about this point, mentioning in particular that the UN still did not have the British lorries. Colombier urged that we do everything possible to expedite their despatch.

5. Colombier concluded that the French were not without hope that UNAMIR could take over in late August. The French would, in any case, put their withdrawal plan to the UN Security Council.

6. We told Colombier of the possibility of Lady Chalker's visit to Rwanda (TUR) and said that she might telephone Mme Michaux Chevry once plans were firming up. Colombier welcomed this. The French were particularly concerned that aid should flow into Rwanda itself. Supplies were flooding into Goma, where people could now eat better than in Rwanda: people were starving to death at Butare. This was one of the reasons (see below) for the exodus which had to be slowed and reversed. This was particularly urgent as the harvest in Rwanda needed attention now; if the moment passed greater humanitarian problems lay ahead. Aid needed to reach all the main towns in Rwanda, including Kigali where nothing was functioning properly. The problems at the refugee camps needed addressing but aid which prevented more refugees leaving the country was critical.

7. We asked whether there was evidence of RPF exactions against Hutus worsening the exodus. Colombier said that Hutus were fleeing because of hunger and fear, fanned by extremist Hutu propaganda. The French were acting to try to stop the latter but it was proving tricky. Reports from NGOs, who did not wish to be named as they had to work with the RPF, suggested there was some truth to stories of violence against the families of FAR memebrs. Stories from Butare were horrific. It was all the more important that the RPF should make conciliatory and moderate statements. Their declaration this morning that they would purge the armed forces of "bad elements" did not help.

MALLABY

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RK first.

It is worth giving some help to UNAMIR. Defence Secretary has yet to respond.

MJ 12/VII

Foreign & Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

12 July 1994

Dear John,

UNAMIR IN RWANDA

The Foreign Secretary was grateful for Mr Rifkind's minute of 14 June and the positive response to the UN's request for 50 4-tonne trucks. A UN official has been to inspect them and we hope that arrangements for their deployment to theatre can now go ahead swiftly.

The pace of deployment of the expanded UNAMIR has been slow. A number of troop contributors have waited to see the outcome of the French intervention before committing themselves. Glynne Evans, Head of our UN Department, has visited UNAMIR in Kigali and has reported that it is the most under-resourced UN operation she has ever seen. There is one doctor for 450 men; there is no mechanic; most of the APCs are unserviceable; even flat tyres have to be sent to Nairobi for repair.

There has been no response to the UN Secretary General's request for logistic support, so the UN propose to award a contract to the US contractors, Brown and Root. But there will still be a delay. In the meantime the UN, Canada and France are pressing for the expansion of UNAMIR to go ahead urgently, so that the French can withdraw.

The Foreign Secretary proposes that, in response to the UN's request, the UK should offer a REME company and workshop to UNAMIR for about 8-10 weeks to cover the gap before the UN contractors are brought in. The UN logistic base will be Entebbe, so such a contingent would probably be based in Uganda, not at Kigali. Precise details would need to be worked out. It would be on the standard basis of UN reimbursement of troop and equipment costs.

Such a deployment would meet several foreign policy objectives. There is an urgent need for more UN forces on the ground to ensure that there is no resumption in the killings and that the vulnerable groups are protected. A British deployment would be a vote of confidence in UNAMIR's expansion. It would help provide the essential underpinning for the new force. It could have a galvanising effect on others. As a Permanent Member of the Security Council, it is right for us to give tangible support. Our absence from <u>any</u> UN operation in Africa has been noted.

The impact would be greater if, as the Foreign Secretary proposes, we could make this a Joint UK/South African venture. The South Africans are providing APCs but no logistic support. The Dutch, like ourselves, are providing trucks. A joint South African/British contingent could help prepare these new vehicles and the existing vehicle fleet for the arrival of the new forces. The South Africans have so far been reluctant to commit themselves to peacekeeping in Africa. The cover of a joint and time-limited action might encourage them to be more active. It could also promote our interest in military links with South Africa, and reinforce the Commonwealth flavour of UNAMIR.

If questioned about the limited deployment, we could draw attention to the overstretch facing our armed forces, as well as noting that the UN would eventually be taking over logistic support on a commercial basis.

The Foreign Secretary hopes that the Defence Secretary will look at this suggestion positively. In his view, such a contribution would offer major benefits for a relatively limited deployment, as it did in Cambodia. There could be beneficial impact in Africa as in New York. It would also earn us credit with the French. We would like if possible to make an early announcement. It would be helpful therefore to have an early response so that officials can start talking to the UN about the modalities.

I am copying this letter to Philippa Leslie-Jones (No 10) and to Melanie Leech (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,

(J S Smith)
Private Secretary

John Pitt-Brooke Esq
PS/Defence Secretary
Ministry of Defence

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SIC A3A

SUBJECT: RWANDA: FRENCH INITIATIVE

MY TELNO 768

SUMMARY

1. French determined to persevere but aware of risks. Some domestic anxiety. Failure would shake French but not cause them to give up peacekeeping operations. Relevance to Bosnia.

DETAIL

2. The French are involved in a high risk military undertaking in Rwanda. Their motives are probably mixed: demonstration of international stature and capability, proof of continued attachment to Africa (particularly Francophone), genuine humanitarian concern, sensitivity to criticism of past policy and a dose of internal political profiling. As Juppe told you on 4 July, Rwanda is now top of his agenda (that in itself is an interesting comment on how quickly he allowed Rwanda to displace Bosnia, about which he was long the driving force for early action).

3. Intensive media horror stories of the Rwandan massacres provided the backdrop for the French initiative. When it was launched three weeks ago, the public, NGO and political reception was mixed: plenty of column inches were given to the arguments against action (including a Le Monde editorial). France's

isolation, and particularly the OAU's opposition, hit hard. Once international cover was given and troops were on the ground, the public mood became generally supportive, although vocal critics remained, including the influential (particularly on Africa) former RPR Prime Minister Messmer. Then, with the continued advance of the rebel forces and the consequent risks and dilemmas for the French, anxiety crept back into media comments. Criticism of the move from "humanitarian" to "security" operations (in defending the secure zone) accentuated tensions. Yesterday Giscard joined the criticism, urging France to keep troops only at the Rwanda border. The apparent halt by the RPF forces over the past 24 hours has brought some relief, but the French are all too aware of how wrong things could go.

4. The French face four possible courses of events, which could make this operation turn sour for them.

(a) France suffers significant casualties; fundamental questioning as to why they are there at all: calls for withdrawal. The French military see this as a low risk given the nature of the Rwandan forces (both sides), and the limited French military objectives.

(b) The massacres continue despite humanitarian help; the French cannot do more than provide a safe haven in one part of the country; shocking television pictures return. The French might then be seen to have failed,not least by domestic opinion.

(c) International opinion turns against the French intervention. They were hit by the OAU rejection, and hurt by Mandela's criticism. The UN cover is important, and seems to be stable. But things could go wrong on this front too. If it appears that French troops are protecting GOR Hutu militias against RPF Tutsi attacks, France may stand accused of partisan involvement, renewing all the African suspicions about a hidden French agenda and a neo-colonial modus operandi.

(d) The French cannot get out. UNAMIR is not ready. No other forces are credibly capable of holding the ring. France gets sucked into staying in Rwanda beyond the initial deadline for exit. It already looks certain that France will be there after August and further extensions could well prove unavoidable. The longer the operation lasts the greater will be the debate here on why it started.

5. So Operation Turquoise could end in tears. In the short term, the French would no doubt blame the lack of solidarity and action by the international community. If the UK expressed doubts about the outcome, we would be criticised and blamed among others. In the medium term, failure of Turquoise would inevitably make the French more careful when they are next tempted to undertake a peacekeeping operation somewhere. But it matters to France to have a world-wide role and status. Isolationism would not follow a set-back in Rwanda. But the next time they would think harder and make sure they were in better company.

6. The read across to Bosnia is instructive. The French recognise the paradox of having started a major solo engagement in Rwanda at a time when they are looking hard for an exit strategy in Bosnia. But all the main players here will want to find an honourable exit strategy for Rwanda too. The timing of the crucial decisions on Bosnia and Rwanda could coincide. Presentation of exit from Bosnia would be in the context of failure of a wider international initiative - no agreement on the peace process, and unavoidable US pressure to lift the arms embargo. For Rwanda, a credible successor force (UNAMIR or pan-African) must be available if exit is to be honourable. There is a risk in all this of the sort of political storm or set-back to French prestige which, as the presidential elections next spring loom closer, could be really significant.

MALLABY

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FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

SUBJECT : FOREIGN SECRETARY'S VISIT TO GENEVA :
RWANDA

SUMMARY

1. JUPPE DESCRIBES RWANDA AS THE MAIN FOREIGN POLICY ISSUE FOR THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT (HELPFULLY TAKING SOME OF THE URGENCY OUT OF THE BOSNIA ISSUE). SEEKS BRITISH SUPPORT FOR FRENCH EFFORTS TO CREATE A SECURE ZONE IN SOUTH WESTERN RWANDA AND TO PROVIDE HUMANITARIAN SUPPORT THERE. FOREIGN SECRETARY AGREES TO LOOK INTO THE SCOPE FOR BRITISH HELP ON THE HUMANITARIAN SIDE.

DETAIL

2. THE FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER GAVE THE FOREIGN SECRETARY A BRIEFING ON THE SITUATION IN RWANDA AT THEIR LUNCH IN GENEVA ON 5 JULY. JUPPE SAID THE INITIAL OBJECTIVES OF THE OPERATION HAD BEEN ACHIEVED. THOUSANDS OF REFUGEES LIVES HAD BEEN SAVED AND THE PRESENCE OF 1500 TO 2000 FRENCH TROOPS WAS HAVING A CALMING INFLUENCE. THE AREAS OF CENTRAL RWANDA WHERE THE FIGHTING WAS TAKING PLACE WERE NOW VIRTUALLY EMPTY AS THE POPULATION HAD FLED IN ALL DIRECTIONS. BUT THERE WERE SOME 400,000 REFUGEES IN THE SOUTH WESTERN REGION. FRANCE WAS PROPOSING TO SET UP A SECURE HUMANITARIAN ZONE HERE. MOST OF THESE REFUGEES WERE HUTUS BUT THE GOVERNMENT FORCES WERE NOW CONCENTRATED IN THE NORTH WEST OF THE COUNTRY. FRANCE WAS WILLING TO PROTECT THE HUMANITARIAN ZONE FROM INCURSIONS BY BOTH THE RPF AND INTERIM GOVERNMENT FORCES. WHILE THEY HOPED TO BE ABLE TO WITHDRAW THEIR TROOPS BY THE END OF JULY THEY WERE DETERMINED TO HAND OVER THEIR RESPONSIBILITY STAGE BY STAGE TO THE UNAMIR FORCES AS THEY DEPLOYED AND THIS MAY MEAN STAYING IN RWANDA A LITTLE LONGER.

3. THE FOREIGN SECRETARY DESCRIBED OUR OWN HUMANITARIAN EFFORTS WHICH WERE LARGELY NEAR THE TANZANIAN/RWANDAN BORDER IN THE EAST OF THE COUNTRY WHERE HALF A MILLION REFUGEES FROM THE FIRST WAVE OF MASSACRES WERE LOCATED. WE HAD SUPPORTED FRANCE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON THEIR RWANDA INITIATIVE, AND WE WOULD CONTINUE TO SUPPORT THEM WITH THE PROPOSED NEW SCR TO ESTABLISH THE SECURE ZONE. WE WOULD ALSO SEE WHAT WE COULD DO TO HELP WITH HUMANITARIAN AID IN THE SOUTH WEST. HE HAD DISCUSSED RWANDA WITH PRESIDENT MUSEVENI WHO WAS A REASONABLE, INTELLIGENT MAN, AND NOT AT ALL ANTI-FRENCH AS HE WAS SOMETIMES PORTRAYED. JUPPE CONFIRMED THIS: MUSEVENI'S VISIT TO PARIS HAD GONE WELL. HE SHARED THE AIM OF ACHIEVING AN EARLY CEASEFIRE IN RWANDA. JUPPE ADDED THAT WHILE THE FRENCH DEPLOYMENT HAD BEEN GENERALLY WELCOMED BY THE RWANDAN GOVERNMENT, THEIR INTERVENTION HAD ALSO HELPED THE RPF AS THE FRENCH HAD BLOCKED THE MAIN ARMS SUPPLY ROUTE TO THE GOVERNMENT FORCES THROUGH GOMA ON THE ZAIRE BORDER.

COMMENT

4. IT WAS EVIDENT FROM JUPPE AND HIS PARTY THAT RWANDA HAS DISPLACED BOSNIA AS THE MAIN ISSUE ON JUPPE'S MIND. THE EARLY RIGIDITY OVER WITHDRAWING FRENCH FORCES FROM RWANDA BY THE END OF JULY IS SOFTENING AND IT WAS CLEAR THAT THEY WOULD NOT EASILY CONTEMPLATE A WITHDRAWAL WHICH LED TO THE COLLAPSE OF THEIR EFFORTS TO HELP CIVILIAN REFUGEES. EQUALLY, THEY ARE NO LONGER KEEN FOR BOSNIA TO COME TO A HEAD AT THE END OF JULY AND SEEMED WILLING, AT LEAST FOR THE MOMENT, TO CONTEMPLATE MAINTAINING THEIR CONTINGENT IN UNPROFOR AS LONG AS THE ARMS EMBARGO IS NOT LIFTED.

5. THE FOREIGN SECRETARY WOULD BE GRATEFUL IF ODA COULD CONSIDER URGENTLY WHAT FURTHER HUMANITARIAN SUPPORT WE CAN PROVIDE IN THE LIGHT OF THIS DISCUSSION.

WILLIAMS

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FOR UK DELEGATION CORFU

RWANDA - FRENCH INITIATIVE
OUR TEL NO 731

SUMMARY

1. SOME 2,700 FRENCH TROOPS DEPLOYED. FRENCH PLANNING FOR OPERATION OF NOT MORE THAN TWO MONTHS, BUT MILITARY KEEN TO GET OUT EARLIER IF POSSIBLE.

2. FRENCH HOPE TO AVOID CLASHES WITH RPF BUT SEE RISK THAT RPF WILL NOW SURGE FORWARD, AS ARMS FROM ZAIRE CEASE BUT THOSE FROM UGANDA CONTINUE.

3. QUAI EXPRESS GRATITUDE FOR BRITISH SUPPORT.

4. TUNISIANS CANCEL JUPPE VISIT PLANNED FOR NEXT WEEK.

DETAIL

5. ON 24 JUNE, WE SAW GERMANOS (DCDS(C)-EQUIVALENT), REGNAULT (DCDS(OPS)-EQUIVALENT), THE AFRICA ADVISER IN LEOTARD'S MILITARY CABINET AND GOURDAULT-MONTAGNE (JUPPE CABINET).

6. THEY CONFIRMED THAT HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS HAD STARTED. FRENCH TROOPS HAD CROSSED THE FRONTIER FROM BUKAVU IN ZAIRE TOWARDS CYANGUGU IN SW RWANDA AND ALSO TOWARDS KIBUYE. A THIRD RECCE MISSION HAD CROSSED FROM GOMA EN ROUTE FOR GISENYI.

7. FRENCH TROOPS IN THEATRE ARE EQUIPPED WITH SAGAIE LIGHT

RECCE VEHS, 120MM MORS AND SUPPORTED BY 2 GAZELLE AND 8 SUPER PUMA HELICOPTERS. THESE TROOPS ARE DRAWN PRINCIPALLY FROM UNITS ALREADY STATIONED IN THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC WITH REINFORCEMENTS AS FOLLOWS:

ONE COMPANY FROM 2ND PARA REGT FROM REUNION FOR BASE PROTECTION AT GOMA.

ONE COMPANY FROM FOREIGN LEGION AT DJIBOUTI FOR SIMILAR OPS AT BUKAVU.

ALL HELICOPTERS COME FROM 4 DAM AT NANCY WITH LOGISTIC SUPPORT FROM 17 REGT AT MAISONS LAFFITTE (HQ FAR) AND 511 SIGNALS REGIMENT BASED AT AUXONNE.

AIR SUPPORT CURRENTLY BASED AT KISANGINI IN ZAIRE (SOME 500 KMS FROM RWANDA FRONTIER) CONSISTS OF:

3 X C160 TRANSALL
3 X C130 HERCULES

IN ADDITION THERE WILL BE FURTHER AIR REINFORCEMENTS FROM METROPOLITAN FRANCE SHORTLY CONSISTING OF:

6 X C160 TRANSALL
3 X C130
1 X AIRBUS
1 X BOEING 747
2 X ANTONOV 124

THE FOLLOWING COMBAT AIRCRAFT ALSO ARRIVED AT KISANGINI YESTERDAY:

4 X GROUND ATTACK JAGUARS (FROM BANGUI CAR)
4 X MIRAGE F1 CT (FROM COLMAR)
4 X MIRAGE F1 CR (FROM REIMS)

8. ACCORDING TO REGNAULT THE ARRIVAL OF THESE TROOPS WAS ALREADY HAVING A CALMING EFFECT. THE QUAI TOOK A SIMILAR LINE, ADDING THAT, SINCE THE FRENCH ANNOUNCEMENT, THE MASSACRES HAD STOPPED ALTHOUGH NOT THE FIGHTING.

9. THE FRENCH AIM TO AVOID CLASHING WITH RPF BUT THEY RECOGNISE THAT THERE IS A RISK. LEOTARD'S MILITARY CABINET TOLD

US THAT THEY WERE CONCERNED THAT THE FRENCH INTERVENTION MIGHT ACTUALLY ACCELERATE THE RPF ADVANCE. HITHERTO UGANDAN SUPPLIES TO THE RPF HAD BEEN PARTLY BALANCED BY ZAIREAN SUPPLIES TO THE HUTU MILITARY. WITH THE ARRIVAL OF THE FRENCH MEDIA ON THE ZAIREAN BORDER THE ZAIREAN SUPPLIES HAD STOPPED. THIS MIGHT GIVE THE RPF AN ADDED ADVANTAGE. AS AN EXAMPLE OF UGANDAN SUPPLIES, THE CABINET CITED THE DAILY PASSAGE OF HALF A DOZEN "MILK" TANKERS FROM UGANDA TO RWANDA, OBVIOUSLY CONTAINING FUEL. FURTHERMORE IT WOULD HAVE BEEN IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE RPF TO SUSTAIN SUCH A CAMPAIGN WITHOUT SUPPLIES FROM UGANDA.

10. FOR THE MOMENT THE FRENCH NEED TO GAIN FURTHER INTELLIGENCE ON THE THREATENED POPULATIONS. THE LEOTARD CABINET CONFIRMED THAT THEY HAD THUS FAR FOUND FEW TUTSIS IN DIFFICULTY; MOST WERE BEING FED BY THE ICRC AND EVEN PROTECTED BY THE OFFICIAL RWANDAN ARMED FORCES. SUCH THREATENED CIVILIANS AS WERE FOUND WOULD EITHER BE REGROUPED, EVACUATED OR PROTECTED SUR PLACE DEPENDING ON THE SITUATION.

11. THE FRENCH STRESSED THAT THEY HAD A VERY STRICT TIME-LIMIT: THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF THE OPERATION LASTING MORE THAN 2 MONTHS. THEY WOULD LEAVE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. THE QUAI RECOGNISED THAT EXIT STRATEGY WAS CRUCIAL. THE AIM WAS TO TRAIN UP CONTINGENTS FROM OTHER COUNTRIES WHO WOULD STAY ON AS PART OF UNAMIR. THE FRENCH ALSO HAD TO GET THE RELIEF AGENCIES BACK INTO THE GAME, SO THAT THE REFUGEE EXODUS COULD BE SLOWED. THIS WAS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT IN BURUNDI WHERE THERE WAS A SERIOUS RISK OF DESTABILISATION.

12. THE QUAI EXPRESSED GRATITUDE FOR BRITISH SUPPORT, NOTING THAT WE HAD MOVED FROM A POSITION OF CONSIDERABLE SCEPTICISM.

13. THE TUNISIANS, AS OAU PRESIDENTS, HAVE CANCELLED A VISIT BY JUPPE EARLY NEXT WEEK ON THE GROUNDS THAT IT WOULD NOT BE APPROPRIATE IN THE WAKE OF THE RWANDA INTERVENTION. THE FRENCH ARE SUMMONING THE TUNISIAN AMBASSADOR TO PROTEST.

COMMENT

14. THE LEOTARD CABINET CONFIRMED TO US STORIES IN THE MEDIA THAT THE MILITARY WERE VERY SCEPTICAL ABOUT THIS OPERATION, SEEING IT AS INSPIRED BY INTERNAL FRENCH POLITICAL CONCERNS. THEY ARE IN A HURRY TO GET OUT.

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MY TELNOS 2215 AND 2216 AND YOUR TELNO 821

SUBJECT: RWANDA: FRENCH INITIATIVE

SUMMARY
1. Security Council adopts resolution 929 authorising a French-led multinational force to deploy to Rwanda for a period of two months to contribute to the security and protection of civilians at risk. Ten votes in favour and five abstentions. Clear that even those who voted in favour have reservations about the likely impact on the situation on the ground and in particular on UNAMIR. Secretariat tell us separately that in the light of RPF statements they are concerned for the safety of those nationals whose governments voted for the resolution. Senegalese UNAMIR observers already evacuated. UN and NGO personnel instructed to more out of areas of conflict. See my 2 IFTS.

DETAIL
2. As foreshadowed in TUR Security Council members held informal consultations on 22 June on the French initiative. Merimee (France) said that several delegations had raised the question of contacts between France and the RPF. He said it would be presumptuous to suppose that the RPF would make enthusiastic public statements supporting the French proposal. It had said publicly that it did not want foreign intervention, even on the part of the UN. Therefore France did not expect positive comments. It did, however, expect (and was

convinced), after the contacts already undertaken, that the RPF's position would change once the resolution had been adopted and that it would be prepared to enter a dialogue on some form of cooperation. It was envisaged that French representatives would have contact that day with representatives of the RPF on the border between Uganda and Rwanda. Merimee added that other governments which had been in contact with the RPF had supported the French analysis of the RPF's position.

3. Merimee said that Juppe had had, in Paris, a long series of meetings with the Deputy Prime Minister designated under the Arusha agreement who had said he would not make a public statement in support of the French initiative but did describe it as laudable and described France as a reliable partner with which his government would continue to have contacts. Finally, Merimee said that, contrary to what some countries had feared, the French initiative was not undermining UNAMIR. Canada, for example, had now offered a 350-man signals unit. Recruitment for UNAMIR was neither being frozen nor compromised.

4. Ayewah (Nigeria) said that he had no instructions for a vote on the draft resolution, and pleaded for a delay until early afternoon. He also suggested that it would be helpful to have the views of the OAU Secretary-General, who was on his way to New York. Merimee reacted with some irritation. He said that the Council had been discussing this question for some time and France had already made a demarche to Nigeria through its Ambassador in Lagos to the Nigerian Foreign Minister. He could not understand why Nigeria had no instructions. He suggested a vote take place at 1700Z.

5. The Secretary-General agreed with Merimee on the need for quick action. According to the latest reports from his Special Representative, if action was not taken soon to deal with the situation in Rwanda then the problem might spread to Burundi. Ould Abdallah had asked him to urge the Council to take quick action in Rwanda. Boutros-Ghali said he could only repeat what he had said in his letter to the Council; as long as there was no other way of assisting Rwanda quickly he welcomed the French offer of a multinational force to be deployed for a limited period. He did not want to underestimate the dangers but they were less than the dangers posed by Council inaction. Yanez (Spain) and Vorontsov (Russian Federation) spoke in support of

quick Council action the latter adding that the Council had been mistaken in its first reaction to the crisis in Rwanda and should not make the same mistake again. The effects on Burundi also had to be considered, and the Council would need to take this up after adopting the draft resolution on Rwanda.

6. I agreed with the Secretary-General. The Council did not have before it an easy decision but the moment had come when it had to make its views known. A delay would benefit no one, since it would only lead to uncertainty. The action proposed by France was not risk-free. There could be serious consequences but there were already such consequences resulting from our inaction.

7. The Security Council met at 1710Z to vote on the draft resolution in second TUR. There were ten votes in favour, and five abstentions (Brazil, China, New Zealand, Nigeria and Pakistan). The draft in second TUR was therefore adopted as SCR 929. My two IFTS summarise the statements made at the Council meeting and give the text of my statement.

8. Separately, the Secretariat told us that in the light of the RPF statements, UNAMIR were becoming very concerned about the safety of those nationals whose governments either voted for the resolution or had given explicit support for the French initiative. They had already had to evacuate the Senegalese UNAMIR observers. A directive had gone out from the Security Coordinator's office that all remaining UN agency and NGO personnel should move east out of the areas of conflict, including Kigali.

COMMENT

9. A less than brilliant outcome to a difficult negotiation and debate. It remains to be seen whether the flaws and risks in the French approach, of which those who voted for it were every bit as aware as those who abstained, outweigh the humanitarian benefits, which remain pretty speculative. A bad outcome will do further serious damage to the UN's somewhat battered peace-keeping reputation and to that of the Secretary-General, whose role in egging the French on and pushing their initiative in the face of considerable doubts and opposition (not least from his own staff) has been very prominent.

10. See my 2 IFTS.

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SIC A3A

SUBJECT: RWANDA: FRENCH INITIATIVE
OUR TELNO 703

SUMMARY

1. Balladur appears to be setting limits on French initiative, but remains firmly committed. French sensitive to opposition, particularly by OAU. Plans for operation being trimmed due to limited concrete support.

DETAIL

2. Speaking to members of his governing RPR on 21 June, Balladur stressed the strict conditions under which the French would take forward their operation. He set out five:
now secured
- UN approval;
- short duration; at most several weeks until UNAMIR reinforces;
- French troops would be positioned close to the frontier, on Zairean not Rwandan territory (see below);
- all action would be strictly humanitarian; under no circumstances would the forces undertake operations "in the heart of Rwanda";
- other countries contributing troops.

3. We have asked the Quai (Boivineau, Head of East Africa Dept) and the FMoD (Delfau, Policy Staff) whether Balladur's remarks signal a change in the planning of the operation. They said that the French HQ would be in Zaire but that short-term operations would be conducted from there into Rwanda. It was difficult at

this stage to know what form these would take. Much would depend on the situation on the ground. But, as Balladur's remarks about not going to the heart of Rwanda suggested, the French were limiting their ambitions; they would not be aiming for Kigali, for instance. Leotard may set out clearer parameters at a press conference this evening.

4. The French media are now focussing on the international opposition to the French operation. The negative reaction by the OAU has led to headlines such as "France abandoned by Africa". Domestic criticism is also growing, with even members of the majority voicing their doubts about France acting "alone". The Greens and Communists have come out firmly against. However, Kouchner, the high profile Socialist former Humanitarian Affairs Minister whose visit to Rwanda last week is said by some to have precipitated the French decision to act, described the French operation as "execrable but necessary".

5. Government spokesmen are focussing on the UN vote and the UNSG's support and reiterating the French commitment to act. Speaking after this morning's Council of Ministers, where Rwanda was the central issue, the Government Ministerial spokesman denied Press stories of tensions within government and between the President and government about the initiative. Mitterrand subsequently chaired a restricted defence council on Rwanda. Balladur will speak to the Assemblee this afternoon.

6. Although Bihozagara, RPF representative in Brussels, cancelled his visit yesterday (TUR), the Quai say that contacts with the RPF are taking place in Paris and are about to take place in Kampala.

7. The FMoD have confirmed the presence of a "technical precursor element" in Zaire (TUR) while firmly rebutting claims by the RPF and the Dutch and Belgian press that French military are already on Rwandan territory.

COMMENT

8. The French are very sensitive to African criticism, as their intervention was intended in part to demonstrate their continued commitment to Africa. This, along with the lack of major contributions from partners, may affect the nature of their intervention. But they are not to be diverted from a fast, French-led operation (ie I do not think, at this stage, that there is

the option of simply channelling all the French effort into expediting UNAMIR).

9. We have passed to all the main players here the text of your remarks to the press in New York. They will be well received as the first public expression of British support for the French initiative.

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SIC A3A

SUBJECT: RWANDA: FRENCH INITIATIVE
FCO TELNO 808 TO UKMIS NY AND UKMIS NY TELNO 2197

SUMMARY

1. French thinking of ad hoc coordination with UNAMIR on ground. Military evaluation mission in Zaire.

2. Some domestic criticism but Government still firmly committed to deployment once UN approval given.

3. French too far down road to don blue berets or wait for consent of parties. Their central objective is quick, decisive action.

DETAIL

4. We have spoken this morning to both the civil and military sides of the Elysee about coordination with UNAMIR. It is clear that the French are thinking in terms of two, quite separate, lines of command, with such ad hoc coordination with the current UNAMIR contingent as proves possible. They stress the parallels with UNITAF. They recognise that the mandates of the two forces will be different and that they will therefore have different rules of engagement (para 5 of my telno 706). The "dove-tailing" with the final, full deployment of UNAMIR can be worked out later on.

5. AFP reports that a French military evaluation mission has

arrived in Goma near the Rwanda-Zaire border. They are said to have instructions not to enter Rwanda.

6. Publicly the French are beginning to show frustration at the lack of concrete support they are receiving. Although French press briefing from the margins of today's WEU meeting suggests that several partners are willing to provide logistic support and the Italians to send troops under certain conditions, Cooperation Minster Roussin complained in a radio interview today that, with the exception of Senegal, no-one was responding to the French appeal in Europe or Africa.

7. Although there remains broad public acceptance of the French approach and outright support from the right wing Le Figaro, domestic opponents of the French action continue to get wide coverage. A group of more than twenty humanitarian NGOs, including Medecins du Monde and Pharmaciens sans Frontieres, have come out against French intervention, citing the risk of it worsening the violence.

8. The French have announced that they are part funding the establishment of a "humanitarian radio station" in Rwanda to counter-balance Radio "Mille Collines" which has incited bloodshed.

COMMENT

9. Second TUR (para 8) suggests that the best outcome would be for the French to accept blue berets and deployment with the consent of the parties. I fear that France has now gone too far for that to be politically feasible here. The main reason why the French did not launch their initiative in terms of a UN force was that they wanted to move faster than the UN was proving able to do and, less importantly, because they thought "their" force would need more robust rules of engagement to achieve its objective of protecting threatened populations. At this stage, having pinned their colours firmly to the mast of a rapid, protective intervention, they could not accept the time and command constraints necessary to make it a blue helmet operation.

10. The question of consent of the parties would be even more difficult. There is no sign of the RPF moderating their position, despite French efforts (a senior RPF representative, Bihozagara, is meeting the French Humanitarian Affairs Minister

in Paris today). It is reported here that the Arusha-designated Hutu Prime Minister, Twagiramungu, has also come out in opposition to the French intervention. The French would not be prepared to wait in the remote hope of winning universal support in Rwanda.

11. We are pursuing the question of French logistic requirements (para 10 of first TUR) with the FMoD and will report later. It is less the nature of the support than the political signal which is significant for the French.

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MY TELNOS 2161-2163

SUBJECT: RWANDA: FRENCH INITIATIVE

SUMMARY

1. French brief Security Council members on their initiative. Little by way of substantive response although Nigerians are more supportive than expected. RPF representative vehemently opposed to the French initiative and underline that if UN endorses it, the future of UNAMIR would be at risk. French circulate draft resolution endorsing their operation (see MIFT). Instructions requested.

DETAIL

INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS OF THE COUNCIL

2. During informal consultations on 17 June, Merimee (France) briefed Security Council members on the French initiative to deploy troops to Rwanda. The purpose of an intervention would be to stop the massacres. France hoped that she would have partners in her efforts. If she intervened alone then the decision could be given a political interpretation. The nature of the of the operation was purely humanitarian designed to save lives. It fitted squarely within the terms of OP4(a) of SCR 925, which authorised UNAMIR to provide protection for refugees, displaced persons and civilians. The French mission would go one step further and rescue people who were stranded in stadia, hotels, churches etc to bring them to safety. France was not seeking confrontation. But if militia or anyone else tried to impede the mission then French troops would

not hesitate to use force. It would be a brief operation: French troops would be on the ground for no more than two months. The idea was to fill the interval between now and when UNAMIR was reinforced, since the expanded UNAMIR would not be in theatre for at least 4 to 6 weeks. France was keen that the operation should be closely coordinated with the UN. But given the type of operation, the rules of engagement envisaged and the consequent risk of combat, it would be essential that it be under national command.

3. Merimee said he was aware of the criticism that might be levelled at this type of action. The RPF had already said they were against it. France could understand those fears. The RPF thought that French troops might reverse the military successes that interim government troops might be encouraged by the presence of French troops. But the French troops would have a purely humanitarian function and would not be there to help the interim government. Since the primary purpose of the intervention would be to save Tutsi lives and might involve conflict with Hutu militia, he wondered how long the RPF could oppose such a mission. There was no reason to think the French Government were not acting in good faith. As part of the Arusha agreement it had been decided that French troops in Rwanda should withdraw. They had withdrawn. When their troops had gone in to evacuate civilians, it had been underlined that this was a short term mission and it had been. But since the RPF did not seem inclined to accept the French Government's good faith, it would probably be best to try and avoid contact between French and RPF troops on the ground. Merimee concluded by saying that the French Government had not yet taken a final decision. That would depend on bilateral contacts now underway. Once a decision had been taken, the French delegation would submit a draft resolution for consideration by the Council along the lines of the resolution adopted authorising UNITAF in Somalia. Such a resolution would authorise Member States to take the necessary steps to protect civilians in Rwanda.

4. In the ensuing brief discussion amongst Council members, Rovensky (Czech Republic) said it was an important and timely initiative which offered a real possibility for stopping the carnage in Rwanda. He would have to consult Prague but anticipated no difficulty in supporting the French Government if they went ahead. Yanez (Spain) was concerned at the slowness of the international reaction to the crisis in Rwanda. The French initiative merited consideration. Any operation should be done

within the framework of the UN. He noted that Merimee had said the French initiative would not be necessary if there were guarantees that the expanded UNAMIR could deploy quickly and asked for an update.

5. Gharekhan (Secretary-General's Special Political Adviser) said that Secretariat had received a number of firm offers of troops. The only problem remained that of logistic support, particularly APCs. However the situation was improving. APCs had started to arrive in Rwanda. He hoped the remainder of the Ghanaian battalion would arrive in theatre towards the end of next week. He also had a reasonable hope of another battalion getting there quite quickly. As far as the French initiative was concerned, the Secretary-General would welcome anything which Member States could do to help Rwanda.

6. Ayewah (Nigeria) said the French initiative was courageous and was breaking the ice on international military involvement in Rwanda. He noted that the intention was to save lives and that the Tutsi population would be the first to be protected. Time was of the essence. The UN had not yet delivered on the promises and commitments it made in SCRs 918 and 925. Nigeria was interested in any efforts which sought to bring an end to the carnage. He asked how the French initiative would mesh with UNAMIR. Nigeria was generally receptive to the proposal, but in view of the traditional links between Rwanda and France they would need to look closely at the detail.

7. McKinnon (New Zealand) said consideration should be given to the French suggestion. But the situation on the ground was volatile and initial reactions from the parties to indications of possible actions of this kind had not been very positive. The implications of this for UNAMIR's future action would have to be considered.

8. Olhaye (Djibouti) said that anything which brought the carnage to an end was welcome. Djibouti would study the French proposal favourably.

9. Merimee responded to delegations who had questioned the relationship between the proposed operation and UNAMIR. If French troops went to Rwanda their actions would be very closely coordinated with UNAMIR. They would be able to protect UNAMIR if asked. But this would not be their primary objective. However,

there must be a clear distinction between the French forces and UNAMIR since the latter must not lose its neutral nature. Although the mandates would be similar the French operation would be under Chapter VII while the UNAMIR remained under Chapter VI.

RPF VIEWS

10. In the margins of the informal consultations the RPF representative asked to speak to Plumbly. Dusaidi said that the RPF had no faith in French intentions. They had dealt with the French for the past four years and had a very clear idea of their motives. Juppe's statement that France would intervene if massacres continued an invitation to the RGF to conduct further massacres in order to secure the French intervention they hoped would save them from total defeat (see the RPF letter to the Secretary-General, faxed to AD(E)). The attempt to put together a force under French command would only divert attention and resources from UNAMIR. If the French wanted to help, they should make available logistic support and airlift capacity for UNAMIR contingents. Plumbly suggested that the sensible thing for the RPF to do, if they had doubts about a separate French intervention force, would be to encourage the French to contribute troops to UNAMIR to bridge the gap until African UN contingents were able to deploy. Dusaidi said this was not an option. The RPF would not accept French troops in UNAMIR. (Comment: the language of the RPF letter is obscure on this point, but Dusaidi was quite categoric and his remarks are not inconsistent with the letter.) He added that, if the French did deploy, the RPF would fight them. They would shoot them down as they flew in. If the UN endorsed the French military presence it would put the whole of UNAMIR at risk. The French claimed that they had discussed their proposal with the RPF. This was not true. The RPF had checked with all its senior representatives. None had been approached.

11. Plumbly warned Dusaidi against inflammatory threats of the sort he had just made. He was wrong about French intentions. The cumulative impact of reporting of the massacres on public opinion in France and elsewhere in Europe must not be underestimated. The French wanted to help, and their willingness to help save Rwandan lives should be exploited to the full.

FRENCH DRAFT RESOLUTION

12. Later on 17 June the French circulated to all Council members

the draft SCR in MIFT (which is modelled closely on SCR 794 (UNITAF)).

COMMENT

13. Like the discussion in the WEU (UKDel WEU telno 67) that here in informal consultations today gave no real indication as to how easy the French are going to find it to get a Chapter VII resolution authorising a national humanitarian intervention in Rwanda through the Security Council. Apart from the Nigerian (whose strongly supportive intervention may have been a maverick personal one) all those who spoke were basically non-committal, albeit positive in tone. The New Zealanders, who have played a leading role in Council discussion of Rwanda to date, have begun to lobby quite hard against the initiative on the grounds inter alia of the likely negative impact on UNAMIR. The US Mission say that the African side of State are sceptical for this reason too. Some aspects of the operation have not yet really begun to sink in here eg the fact that it will need to be launched through Zaire, and the likelihood that it will therefore get tarred with an (unrespectable) Zairois brush.

14. This all seems to me to point to us still keeping a low profile for as long as we can. However, the French have now circulated a draft SCR and discussion in New York may resume on 20 June. I should be grateful for instructions on the draft resolution by 201400Z.

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SIC A3A

SUBJECT: RWANDA: FRENCH INITIATIVE
OUR TELNO 693

SUMMARY

1. French planning developed but no firm offers of troops from non-African partners. Envisage transitional force, under UN "cover" but French command, holding fort until possible redeployment of UNOSOM in 4-6 weeks, followed later by full UNAMIR deployment. Claim strong support of UNSG.

DETAIL

2. We have spoken today, 17 June, to Pin (Elysee Africa cell), Boivineau (Head of Quai East Africa section) and Germanos (DCDS(C)-equivalent).

3. The French have now extended their request for assistance to other Europeans, Africans and members of the Security Council. They have no offers of concrete support from non-Africans. The Quai said that the best they could hope for from the Belgians was logistic support. But Spanish and Italian reactions had been favourable, although there was no clear indication of what they might provide. Various African countries have expressed their support. The Beninois President, after calling on Balladur, offered whole-hearted support short of troops. Juppe has said that several African countries have agreed to participate militarily but the Zaireans and Senegalese are the only ones who have publicly made concrete offers. The French described Boutros

Ghali's position as very favourable.

4. The Quai said that, in the French view, the intervention force would use WEU coordination machinery but be under French command. It would be an interim force, as there had been in Somalia or Cambodia, acting in coordination with the existing UNAMIR contingent. The UN had said that it would take 4-6 weeks to re-deploy any UNOSOM troops, if that were agreed. The full UNAMIR would not be ready for a couple of months. The French-led force would hand over as soon as feasible.

5. French planning has gone as far as it can for the moment. Boivineau said that, in consultation with the ICRC, NGOs and the UN, the French had identified two or three main zones where there were populations under threat. These would be the target for the intervention force coming overland from Zaire (Burundi is now excluded). No detailed plan has been put to Ministers, pending the result of this afternoon's WEU meeting.

6. Both the Quai and Elysee said that there had been no progress in winning round the RPF despite the successful contacts over the humanitarian corridor. They had to realise that the French had no hidden agenda. The French were appealing to all those with influence to explain this to the RPF.

7. We have stuck closely to the line taken by FCO spokesman today. The French give no appearance of optimism about our contribution. Boivineau noted with disappointment that our statements had not taken a position on the French initiative even in principle.

8. Juppe is going to the Cote d'Ivoire and Senegal this weekend.

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MY TELNO 1485

SUBJECT: RWANDA: FRENCH INITIATIVE

SUMMARY

1. Americans agree to give diplomatic support to French, but no intention of contributing US troops. Preference for UNSCR (Chapter VII). Deep scepticism about diverting UNOSOM contingents.

DETAIL

2. We spoke again to State. They said that Deputy Secretary Talbott had spoken to his French counterpart and had agreed to support French efforts. This would primarily be on diplomatic channels. He had warned the French not to rely purely on Zaire. They would need to speak to RPF, Uganda, Burundi and probably Tanzania. The Americans undertook to follow up with these. Talbott had made clear that the Americans had no intention of contributing troops of their own. He had not ruled out logistic support. The French had spoken in terms of a force of 2,500.

3. Talbott had also underlined the American concern that the French initiative should not undermine UNAMIR and should avoid a shooting battle with RPF. It was therefore important that the initiative not be perceived as a unilateral French operation.

4. State told us that their preference was for a UNSCR welcoming the operation. Since it would in practice be an intervention force, and since it was questionable that there was a constituted authority in Rwanda able to give its consent, the operation would probably have to be under a Chapter VII mandate. Moreover, since the long-term problem was best addressed under UNAMIR, it would be necessary to ensure that the French proposal be presented as a bridge until UNAMIR's full deployment. The danger of course was that potential troop contributors to UNAMIR would feel under less pressure to make their forces available.

5. State said that they were deeply sceptical of the idea of diverting UNOSOM elements to Rwanda. There was no evidence that UNOSOM contributors were prepared to let their national contingents be used in this way. It was also doubtful, given the way that UNOSOM had reacted when challenged by the Technicals, that these contingents would be prepared to operate effectively in what was likely to be a more hostile Rwandan environment.

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SUBJECT: KAMPALA TELNO 180 TO FCO: RWANDA: POSSIBLE ITALIAN INITIATIVE AT THE G7

SUMMARY

1. ITALIANS CONFIRM THAT THEY ARE PREPARING AN INITIATIVE ON EUROPEAN HUMANITARIAN TASK FORCE.

DETAIL

2. FOLLOWING A DEBRIEFING TODAY ON THE NAC MEETING IN ISTANBUL DE MOHR (HEAD OF NATO DIVISION MFA) ADMITTED THAT THE ITALIANS WERE WORKING ON THE IDEA OF A EUROPEAN TASK FORCE TO RESPOND TO HUMANITARIAN SITUATIONS SUCH AS RWANDA. THE IDEA WAS STILL VERY MUCH IN THE PRELIMINARY STAGE AND HE WAS UNABLE TO GO INTO DETAIL ABOUT HOW SUCH A FORCE MIGHT OPERATE. THE ITALIANS SAW A LOGICAL LINK WITH THE CJTF IDEAS BEING DEVELOPED IN WEU (PARTICULARLY THE ITALY/FRANCE/SPAIN AIR/MARITIME FORCE) AND INDEED WITH NATO'S RAPID REACTION FORCE. THEY WERE HOWEVER CONCERNED NOT TO BLUR THE IMPORTANT DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE STRICTLY HUMANITARIAN ROLE WHICH THEY ENVISAGED AND UN ENFORCEMENT ACTION.

3. ACCORDING TO PRESS ACCOUNTS HERE OF THE KOHL/BERLUSCONI MEETING YESTERDAY THE IDEA WAS MENTIONED BY BERLUSCONI AS AN ITALIAN INITIATIVE FOR THE G7 NAPLES SUMMIT. THE AMERICANS TOO BELIEVE IT WILL COME UP (THOUGH THEY DOUBT WHETHER IT WILL GET MUCH DISCUSSION).

COMMENT

4. CLEARLY A POLITICAL INITIATIVE RISING OUT OF DOMESTIC ITALIAN PRESSURE TO DO SOMETHING ON RWANDA, BUT IT HAS YET TO BE PROPERLY THOUGHT THROUGH. AND AS WE HAVE REPORTED (OUR TELNO 281), THE ITALIANS CAN BE LESS THAN KEEN WHEN IT COMES TO ACTUALLY CONTRIBUTING SOLDIERS TO OPERATIONS OF THIS KIND.

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SUBJECT: RWANDA: FRENCH INITIATIVE

SUMMARY

1. More background to initiative. Strong political momentum but neutral reception by media. French establishing "humantiarian corridor" to Kigali from Uganda.

DETAIL

2. Dana, (Matignon, please protect) told us on 16 June that the idea of a French initiative had first been proposed by Juppe at a Restricted Defence Council, without Mitterrand, on 14 June. Balladur had agreed on strict condition that it was an international operation. At the following day's Restricted Council, Mitterrand had given his blessing, with enthusiasm. Juppe was driving the initiative but Balladur's condition still stood.

3. All of our contacts, military and civil, continue to stress the strength of French determination to "do something". They are encouraged by the Secretary General's positive response.

4. The initiative has received general support from the French political world, notably from Chirac in New York. External Trade Minister Longuet expressed concern about the apparent lack of a long term political plan. Responding to this while speaking to the Senate, Juppe stressed the time-limited nature of any intervention and the French aim of bringing about reconciliation in Rwanda.

5. The French press limit themselves to reporting the French initiative factually. There is no fanfare, in part because of

the muddle about what is actually proposed. Anonymous Quai sources are quoted as admitting that the initiative was put together very hurriedly in response to the continued masscres; there had not been pre-consultation of partners. The press continue to carry strong criticism of past French policy and give prominence to RPF objections to French intervention (interview with Kagame, RPF leader, who speaks of the French "wanting to do our job for us", by fax to AD(E)). The British response is seen as reticent, the Belgian as positive in principle.

6. On the evening of 16 June the Quai announced that a "humanitarian corridor" was being opened up from the Ugandan border to Kigali. The head of the Quai Humanitarian Action cell had reached agreement with the RPF in Rwanda for such a corridor. The first convoy carrying thirty tonnes of essential supplies, for distribution by UNAMIR, would leave from Uganda on Saturday.

COMMENT

7. Juppe's initiative flows from a perceived need to fend off criticism of past policy (as noted by the RPF, the French proposal is for the protection of those very people whose slaughter was being portrayed as in part French responsibility), and from a desire to heighten French profile. Despite widespread coverage here of recent massacres in Rwanda there was no great public pressure here for a French military initiative on these lines.

8. It is clear from the different versions of what the French envisage that they do not yet have an overall plan beyond doing something in an international context. Juppe's remark to you that the operation would be under a UN flag (your telno 266) shows a welcome drift in the right direction. Provided that this afternoon's WEU meeting does set any hares running, it should be possible to direct French energies into UN channels.

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SUBJECT: PARIS TELNO 689 TO FCO: RWANDA

SIC A3A

SUMMARY

1. ITALIANS PREPARED TO CONTRIBUTE YMALL ELITE GROUP OF PARATROOPS ON TWO CONDITIONS. FIRST, THAT A VERY LARGE NUMBER OF EUROPEAN COUNTRIES ALSO CONTRIBUTE FORCES TO WHAT IS A UN PEACEKEEPING FORCE. SECOND, THAT THE OPERATION IS CO-ORDINATED BY WEU TO FACILITATE THE LOGISTICS PROBLEMS.

DETAIL

2. GIANCARLO ARAGONA (NOW DEPUTY PRIVATE SECRETARY TO FOREIGN MINISTER MARTINO) HAS GIVEN ME THE OFFICIAL POSITION OF THE ITALIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY, WITH THE ADVICE THAT WE DISREGARD PREVIOUS PUBLIC STATEMENTS OF VARYING EMPHASES AND ORIGINS. THE ITALIAN POSITION WAS CONDITIONED BY THE FACT THAT ANY COMMITMENT OF ITALIAN TROOPS IN RWANDA POSED SEVERE LOGISTIC PROBLEMS GRANTED THAT THEY HAD NO POINTS D'APPUIS NEARBY AND RWANDA WAS TOO FAR FROM THE SEA TO BRING THEIR AMPHIBIOUS CAPABILITY TO BEAR (AS THEY HAD IN SOMALIA). DESPITE THE DIFFICULTIES, ITALY WOULD BE PREPARED TO CONTRIBUTE A SMALL BUT ELITE GROUP OF FORCES PROVIDED TWO CONDITIONS WERE MET. FIRST A VERY LARGE NUMBER OF EUROPEAN COUNTRIES ALSO CONTRIBUTE TO THE OPERATION WHICH WOULD BE UNDER UN AUSPICES. SECOND, THE OPERATION WAS CO-ORDINATED BY THE WEU, THIS TO ASSIST WITH THE SEVERE LOGISTICS PROBLEMS OF THE OPERATION. MINDFUL OF THEIR SOMALIA EXPERIENCE, THEY WOULD ALSO INSIST THAT THE FORCE HAVE CLEAR RULES OF ENGAGEMENT AND PROPER COMMAND AND CONTROL ARRANGEMENTS. THE FORCE WHICH THEY HAD IN MIND WAS A UNIT OF ASSAULT PARATROOPS.

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COMMENT

3. ITALIAN MINISTERS HAVE BEEN BLOWING HOT AND COLD ON RWANDA IN RECENT WEEKS, IN DIRECT RESPONSE TO PUBLIC OUTRAGE AT MEDIA COVERAGE OF THE ENDLESS ATROCITIES. AT ONE POINT BERLUSCONI HIMSELF IMPLIED THAT ITALY WAS READY TO TAKE PART IN A PEACEKEEPING OPERATION, ALTHOUGH THIS WAS SUBSEQUENTLY PLAYED DOWN BY THE DEFENCE AND FOREIGN MINISTRIES. DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER CAPUTO TOLD ME ON 8 JUNE THAT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF BERLUSCONI'S STATEMENT WAS PUBLICITY GIVEN TO THE ARRIVAL IN ITALY OF THE RWANDAN NATIONAL FOOTBALL TEAM, EACH OF WHOM HAD ONE OR MORE LIMBS CHOPPED OFF.

4. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND, FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER JUPPE'S INITIATIVE HAS RATHER PUT THE ITALIANS ON THE SPOT. HENCE THE STIFF CONDITIONS.

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French are now considering a WEU, rather than UN, umbrella.

FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

SUBJECT: YOUR TELNO 689: RWANDA: FRENCH INITIATIVE

SUMMARY

1. Juppe explains rationale behind French proposal for military intervention in Rwanda. They envisage a light force under a UN flag, but not under Dallaire, to be deployed for a short period until UNAMIR can be got off the ground. They are looking for other European countries to contribute troops. The Foreign Secretary makes clear that a British troop contribution is not in prospect, but agrees to look into the possibility of providing logistic support.
DETAIL

2. Juppe telephoned the Foreign Secretary on the afternoon of 16 June. He explained the thinking behind the French proposal for a military intervention in Rwanda. The situation had deteriorated rapidly in recent weeks, and the latest ceasefire had already been broken. The French had therefore decided that they could no longer stand idly by. They did not wish to act alone. There was a prospect of Senegal, Ghana or Benin joining them. But they were particularly keen to have European company. The Italians remained open. The Belgians had made an equivocal public statement which the French were trying to clarify. He would also be in touch with Warren Christopher. Any operation should be under a UN flag, but not under General Dallaire. It should be of short duration, with precise objectives.

3. The Foreign Secretary thanked Juppe for this clarification. We were already talking to the UN about supplying trucks for

UNAMIR. How did the French proposal relate to the UN's existing plans? Juppe said he envisaged the two dovetailing into each other. The French offer to contribute logistic support to UNAMIR still stood, and Boutros-Ghali was considering Juppe's idea of transferring troops from UNOSOM temporarily to Rwanda. But if this did not come off, the French proposal would fill the gap. They envisaged a relatively light operation, beginning with about 500 men and possibly going up to 1500 or 2000.

4. The Foreign Secretary said that he had not had an opportunity to consult Ministerial colleagues. However, Britain had no particular links with Rwanda. It was therefore very unlikely that we would provide troops. We could, however, look at the possibility of logistic support, although we would not wish this to cut across our discussions with the UN. He would ask our experts to talk to their French opposite numbers about the likely requirements.

5. The Foreign Secretary asked whether the French were satisfied that deployment of French troops to Rwanda would not revive local sensitivities. Juppe said that they were not planning to take on the RPF, and would not send paratroopers into Kigali. Their idea was to come in by road around the borders, and try to target areas where they could play a useful role.

6. Juppe added, in response to a question, that he was also worried about Burundi, where the situation was deteriorating, and which could quickly go the same way as Rwanda.

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SUBJECT: RWANDA: FRENCH INITIATIVE

SIC A3A

SUMMARY

1. JUPPE LAUNCHES INITIATIVE FOR EARLY INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION IN RWANDA. FRENCH HAVE SPOKEN TO UNSG ABOUT DEPLOYING SOME OF UNOSOM TO RWANDA, FAILING WHICH THEY PROPOSE SENDING TROOPS WITH THEIR EUROPEAN AND AFRICAN PARTNERS. IN THIS CONTEXT THEY ARE STUDYING FEASIBILITY OF DEPLOYING FORCE TO RWANDA AND ASK IF WE ARE PREPARED TO TAKE PART OR ASSIST.

DETAIL

2. SPEAKING TO THE PRESS YESTERDAY EVENING, 15 JUNE, JUPPE SAID THAT SOMETHING NEEDED TO BE DONE ABOUT THE CONTINUING CRISIS IN RWANDA. THE SITUATION HAD BEEN DISCUSSED IN A RESTRICTED MEETING OF MINISTERS WITH PRESIDENT MITTERRAND AND THEY HAD CONCLUDED THAT, IF THE MASSACRES CONTINUED OR THE LATEST CEASE-FIRE WAS NOT RESPECTED, FRANCE WOULD BE PREPARED TO MOUNT A FORCE, WITH ITS PRINCIPAL EUROPEAN AND AFRICAN PARTNERS, TO INTERVENE IN RWANDA. JUPPE ADDED THAT HE HAD ALSO SPOKEN TO BOUTROS GHALI ON 14 JUNE ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF REDEPLOYING TROOPS FROM SOMALIA TO RWANDA.

3. IN A SIGNED ARTICLE IN THIS MORNING'S PRESS (BY FAX TO AD(E), UND, UKMIS NEW YORK AND MOD) JUPPE CLARIFIES HIS PROPOSAL. AFTER A DEFENCE OF PAST FRENCH ACTION AND CRITICISM OF THE "GUILTY INACTION" OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNTIY, JUPPE SAYS THAT THERE IS NOW A "DUTY OF INTERVENTION" TO PROTECT THE MODERATES IN RWANDA WHO ARE TRYING TO RESTORE ORDER. HE HAD THEREFORE SUGGESTED TO THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL THAT, IF UNAMIR WAS GOING

TO TAKE TIME TO ARRIVE, PART OF UNOSOM SHOULD BE SENT AT ONCE TO KIGALI. THE UNSG HAD BEEN FAVOURABLE IN PRINCIPLE AND THE FRENCH WERE WORKING ON THIS POSSIBILITY IN NEW YORK. IF THIS DID NOT SUFFICE, FRANCE WAS READY, WITH ITS MAIN EUROPEAN AND AFRICAN PARTNERS, "TO PREPARE AN INTERVENTION ON THE GROUND TO PUT AN END TO THE MASSACRES AND TO PROTECT THE POPULATIONS THREATENED WITH EXTERMINATION".

4. THIS INITIATIVE CLEARLY FORMS THE BACKGROUND TO THE REQUEST MADE TO US BY MALLET (FMOD, DUS(P)-EQUIVALENT) YESTERDAY AFTERNOON. AS RECORDED IN LETTER PAKENHAM/MACLENNAN (AD(E)), MALLET ASKED WHETHER WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO CONTRIBUTE AT VERY LEAST TO SOME HUMANITARIAN OPERATION DESIGNED TO HELP REFUGEES, PREVENT FURTHER MASSACRES AND STOP EXTENSION OF THE FIGHTING.

5. MALLET SUBSEQUENTLY PHONED DA LATE YESTERDAY AND SAID THAT THE FRENCH WERE STUDYING THE VARIOUS OPTIONS FOR INTERVENTION INCLUDING DEPLOYMENT OF FRENCH FORCES IN CONCERT WITH ALLIES. HE PRESSED FOR A VERY EARLY INDICATION OF WHETHER THE UK WAS PREPARED TO TAKE PART. IF WE WERE NOT PREPARED TO SEND COMBAT FORCES, WOULD IT BE POSSIBLE AT THE LEAST TO ASSIST BY PROVIDING LOGISTIC SUPPORT IN THE FORM OF AIR TRANSPORT ETC?

6. MEDIA REPORTS HERE ARE ALREADY CLAIMING THAT THE UK IS RETICENT ABOUT HELPING WITH THE FRENCH INITIATIVE. GRATEFUL FOR EARLY GUIDANCE.

COMMENT

7. WE WILL SPEAK TO THE FRENCH THIS MORNING TO GET MORE PRECISION ON HOW THE PLANNING DESCRIBED BY MALLET FITS INTO THE SCHEMA SET OUT BY JUPPE AND WHETHER THE FRENCH ENVISAGE AN "ALLIED" OPERATION COMING UNDER UN AUTHORITY.

8. AS PREVIOUSLY REPORTED, THE FRENCH HAVE BEEN STUNG BY THE CONTINUED CRITICISM OF THEIR POLICY IN RWANDA AND CLEARLY FELT THE NEED TO TAKE ACTION OF SOME SORT. THEY WILL PROBABLY TRY TO WORK OUT THE PRACTICALITIES AS THEY GO ALONG. AN UNDERLYING ELEMENT FOR JUPPE IS LIKELY TO BE THE NEED FOR FRANCE AS UNSC PERMANENT MEMBER TO MAINTAIN A HIGH PROFILE ON PEACEKEEPING ISSUES.

MALLABY

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YOUR TELNO 763
SUBJECT: RWANDA: ADOPTION OF RESOLUTION 925

SUMMARY
1. Following further lengthy consultations Security Council adopts resolution 925 extending UNAMIR's mandate for six months and endorsing the Secretary-General's revised, more flexible concept of operations.

DETAIL
2. The draft resolution on Rwanda in my telno 2044 was discussed in two sessions of informal consultations of Security Council members on 8 May. The Russians quickly conceded on the length of the mandate, and the Chinese agreed to the preambular reference on the appointment of a human rights special rapporteur in exchange for a minor amendment to the preambular paragraph on genocide (which now refers to "reports of acts of genocide" rather than "reports of genocide"). The Brazilians contended that OP2 on the concept of operations had been agreed by the working group and that the square brackets had been included in the revised draft in error. No one disputed this and the language stood. The French sought amendments to OP3 (to make it clear that, although the Council was extending the mandate now for six months, it did not technically expire until 29 July) and OP10 (to tighten the language on UNAMIR cooperation with the human rights special rapporteur). These were agreed.

3. The Americans did not at that stage have instructions and asked for further informal consultations later in the afternoon. They then sought to reopen a number of the

paragraphs notably PPJ, OP2(c), OP4, OP5 and OP12. On OP5 (self-defence), they sought to replace 'recognises' with 'reaffirms'. I argued that, since we had only "recognised" in the last resolution we could not "reaffirm" in this one. Inderfurth accepted this. On OP2 (c) the Americans sought a clearer reference to the need for flexibility in order to ensure effective use of available resources to accomplish UNAMIR's tasks. This was accepted along with my suggestion that the paragraph refer to flexible implementation of all three phases of the operation, rather than flexible contingency planning as Inderfurth had suggested. A US attempt to limit OP12 to cover only the security and safety of UNAMIR personnel, on the grounds that experience had shown that warring parties treated blue-helmeted military personnel differently from NGO and agency personnel, was rejected. he most difficult negotiation was on the mandate paragraph (OP4) and linked to it, the "sunset clause" (PPJ). The US were not particularly clear in their reasons for seeking to reopen these paragraphs but seemed to want to emphasise the humanitarian over other aspects of UNAMIR's mandate. Other speakers, in particular New Zealand and Djibouti, opposed what they saw as an attempt to change the mandate. The compromise eventually reached was to amend PPA so that it clearly states the Council's reaffirmation of SCRs 912 and 918 which set out the mandate. This allowed consensus to be reached on the new US language for OP4 and PPJ.

4. The text in MIFT was adopted at a formal meeting later in the day. All Council members spoke. Report of debate follows.

5. See MIFT for text of resolution as adopted.

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INFO ROUTINE ACTOR

SUBJECT: UPDATE ON RWANDAN REFUGEE SITUATION IN TANZANIA

SUMMARY

1. SOME 2000-3000 RWANDANS STILL ARRIVING DAILY IN NGARA DISTRICT IN TANZANIA, ALMOST ALL HUTUS FROM RPF-HELD AREAS. RELIABLE REPORTS OF RPF KILLINGS OF CIVILIANS.

2. GRATEFUL FOR AN UPDATE ON THE PROPOSED EU TROIKA MINISTERIAL VISIT.

DETAIL

3. AS REPORTED TO ODA BY FAX, UNHCR AND NGOS IN NGARA DISTRICT OF NORTH WEST TANZANIA ARE STILL DEALING WITH A STEADY INFLUX OF RWANDAN REFUGEES. ALICE WALPOLE (CHANCERY), WHO WAS IN NGARA YESTERDAY, WATCHED A SINGLE FILE COLUMN OF SEVERAL HUNDRED STRAGGLING UP THE ROAD FROM THE BORDER TO BENACO REFUGEE CAMP. THERE ARE SOME TWENTY POINTS ALONG THE KAGERA RIVER AT WHICH PEOPLE CROSS BY CANOE, MOSTLY AT DAWN, AFTER WHICH THEY FOLLOW A NUMBER OF SMALL PATHS ACROSS HILLY AND WOODED COUNTRY TO THE MAIN ROAD. UNHCR/NGOS HAVE SET UP MEDICAL CHECK POINTS, AND STAGING POSTS DISPENSING WATER AND HIGH PROTEIN BISCUITS, AT THE POINTS WHERE MOST OF THE PATHS CONVERGE ON THE MAIN ROAD. ALL THE REFUGEES NOW ARRIVING ARE HUTUS FROM COMMUNES RELATIVELY CLOSE THE OTHER SIDE OF THE BORDER. MOST APPEARED TO HAVE LEFT IN A HURRY AND CARRIED FEW POSSESSIONS. (AID PERSONNEL REPORTED TO MS WALPOLE THAT THOSE WHO DID BRING POSSESSIONS WERE BEING RELIEVED OF THEM BY SMALL MARAUDING GROUPS OF TANZANIAN SOLDIERS PATROLLING THE AREA. THIS IS AN ISSUE WHICH IS CAUSING SOME TENSION BETWEEN UNHCR/NGOS AND THE TANZANIAN MILITARY COMMANDERS WHO DENY THAT THE ATTACKS ARE HAPPENING.)

4. PREPARATION OF TWO FURTHER REFUGEE CAMP SITES, AT MSUHURA AND LAMASI (EACH A FEW KILOMETRES FROM BENACO), IS GOING AHEAD, STARTING WITH THE INSTALLATION BY OXFAM OF WATER AND SANITATION FACILITIES. MOVEMENT OF REFUGEES FROM BENACO TO LAMASI IS SCHEDULED TO COMMENCE ON 8 JUNE. THE OVERALL PLAN IS TO RELOCATE SOME 100,000 PEOPLE AT EACH OF THE TWO NEW SITES, LEAVING UP TO 100,000 AT BENACO.

5. DANISH REFUGEE SERVICE PERSONNEL WHO ARE PATROLLING THE BORDER AREA AND PROVIDING THE FIRST POINT OF CONTACT FOR ARRIVING REFUGEES INDICATED TO MS WALPOLE THAT THEY HAD RELIABLE FIRST HAND REPORTS OF RPF KILLINGS OF CIVILIANS IN THE RPF CONTROLLED AREAS IMMEDIATELY OVER THE BORDER. EYEWITNESSES REPORTED THE ARRIVAL IN THEIR VILLAGES OF RPF SOLDIERS WHO CALLED FOR 'PEACE MEETINGS' AND WHEN THE VILLAGERS GATHERED, TIED THEM UP AND KILLED THEM WITH MACHETES (INTERNATIONAL MEDIA REPORTS THAT THE RPF USE GUNS BUT NO KNIVES WERE CONTRADICTED BY AID PERSONNEL). THE DANISH VOLUNTEERS CLAIMED THAT THEY HAD SEEN ROPE MARKS ON SOME ESCAPEES' WRISTS AND ANKLES. REFUGEES WERE ABLE INDEPENDENTLY TO NAME INDIVIDUAL

BUILDINGS WHERE BODIES WERE PILED. THE SOLDIERS ALLEGEDLY RETURN TO VILLAGES AT INTERVALS OF ABOUT SIX DAYS. THE DANISH VOLUNTEERS SAID THAT DESPITE THEIR INITIAL SCEPTICISM AND WARINESS ABOUT PROPAGANDA, THEY WERE CONVINCED, AFTER CAREFUL DEBRIEFING, THAT REFUGEE ACCOUNTS, PARTICULARLY THOSE GIVEN BY THE OLDER WOMEN, WERE ACCURATE.

6. MS WALPOLE SAW SOME THIRTY BODIES IN THE POOLS BELOW THE RUSUMO FALLS BORDER CROSSING (THE BORDER IS CLOSED), INCLUDING WOMEN WITH BABIES ON THEIR BACKS AND SMALL CHILDREN. AID PERSONNEL BELIEVE, FROM THEIR CONDITION, THAT MOST HAVE BEEN DEAD ABOUT A WEEK, BUT SOME ARE MORE RECENT. IF THIS LATTER IS THE CASE, TO REACH RUSUMO IN A COUPLE OF DAYS, THE BODIES MUST HAVE BEEN THROWN INTO THE RIVER RELATIVELY CLOSE UPSTREAM, IN THE RPF HELD AREAS.

7. (FOR UKREP BRUSSELS) GRATEFUL FOR AN INDICATION OF THE LIKELIHOOD OF THE PROPOSED EU TROIKA MINISTERIAL VISIT TO THE REGION GOING AHEAD, AND FOR ANY DATES.
WESTBROOK

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Foreign &
Commonwealth
Office

London SW1A 2AH

03 June 1994

Dear Robin,

Rwanda

Situation on the Ground.

Since I last wrote on 23 May, there has been no progress in efforts by the UN to broker a truce. The Rwandan Government Forces and the Rwandan Patriotic Front each now occupy half the country and are contesting control of the capital, Kigali. Massacres of the civilian population are still going on, particularly in areas controlled by the interim government. The UN estimate that anything between a quarter and half a million have now died (out of a total population of 7m). Something like 1.5 million people have been displaced within the country and another half million have fled to neighbouring countries, particularly Tanzania.

UN Activity

The Security Council is considering at a report from the Secretary-General outlining how he intends to proceed with the implementation of SCR 918 (which authorized an increase in UNAMIR's strength to 5,500). Boutros-Ghali envisages a three phase approach beginning with a deployment at battalion strength to Kigali and other locations to provide some security to major concentrations of displaced persons in the interior of the country. Although there have been offers of a total of about 4,000 troops from a number of African states, problems of equipment and logistics are unresolved. Boutros-Ghali has sought Western help and we understand has asked the Americans for helicopters and APCs, together with the personnel to operate them. It would be useful to know where the Americans stand on this. We are evaluating a request from the UN Secretary General for APCs and a quantity of trucks.

Boutros Ghali has said that even if the necessary equipment is forthcoming, it could take 4 - 6 weeks to implement the first stage of the deployment.

In recent discussions in New York the Americans have advocated a UN operation establishing safe areas only on borders of Rwanda. Other member states and the UN Secretariat have argued that a wider UN presence within the country is necessary to protect the civilian population at risk from Hutu extremist groups. At the same time we share the American concern that the deployment of the expanded UNAMIR force should be well prepared and effective.

The UN Commission on Human Rights met in Special Session in Geneva on 24-25 May to discuss Rwanda. The Commission decided to appoint a Special Rapporteur, Rene Degni Segui of Cote d'Ivoire to investigate the situation. He will be assisted by human rights field officers working on the ground.

Relief Operations

Following a visit to the region by a team of ODA officials, Baroness Chalker announced on 2 June an additional allocation of £5.23 million principally to assist the UN in improving the strategic planning and management in the region and to expand British NGO operations. This brings our bilateral contribution to more than £10 million since 6 April. We have said that we remain ready to do more in Rwanda itself when the aid agencies are able to gain access to all regions of the country. Some relief distribution is already taking place in RPF controlled areas.

Regional Efforts

There has been no significant progress in regional diplomatic efforts. President Moi has now entered the field and convened a regional summit in Nairobi on 6 June. However, it is not clear that he can achieve more than President Mwinyi. Rwanda may also figure at the OAU Summit which starts in Tunis on Monday.

Yours ever,

Stephen.

Stephen Smith
(Private Secretary)

• Roderic Lyne Esq
10 Downing Street

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT CLINTON

RWANDA

POINTS TO MAKE

- Grave situation, showing no sign of improvement.

- We must continue to work together to achieve effective UN action to stop the killings and deliver humanitarian assistance.

- Now studying the UN Secretary General's proposals for a phased deployment of an expanded UNAMIR. The operation will have to extend to the interior of the country, not just the border areas, if it is to be effective. Agree on need for careful planning and execution.

- What contributions do you see the US making to the peace-keeping effort? Understand you have been asked to help with APCs and helicopters.

- We are considering what logistic support we could offer. Not able to offer troops.

- Lady Chalker announced a further £5.23million of humanitarian aid on 2 June. Total since 6 April now well over £10million. We are playing our part.

- **IF RAISED: GENOCIDE/HUMAN RIGHTS**

Welcome appointment of Special Rapporteur by Special Session of Commission on Human Rights mandated to gather information on human rights violations including acts of genocide.


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SUBJECT: RWANDA

MY TELNO 1925

SUMMARY

1. Riza back in New York. First face to face meeting between RPF and RGF took place on 30 May. Following RPF demand at the meeting, interim government seem to have toned down their radio broadcasts. Exchange of displaced persons continuing. No real change in military position on either side although RPF reported to be continuing their advance south west of Kigali. Report on second phase of the UNAMIR operation to be sent to the Council later in the week. Less emphasis to be placed on Kigali. Newly available troops to be fed in as they become available across frontiers to guard concentrations of displaced persons and build up safe areas. Secretariat hope this will satisfy Americans.

2. Vatican ask Council to declare seminary at Kabgayi, where there are 30,000 refugees in extreme danger, a safe area.

DETAIL
SECRETARIAT SITREP

3. During informal consultations of the Security Council on 31 May, Gharekhan (Secretary-General's Special Political Adviser) gave a short briefing on developments in Rwanda. Riza (Assistant Secretary-General, DPKO) and Baril (Secretary-General's Military Adviser) returned to New York on 30 May and were now preparing a report for submission to the Council in the near future. During the visit both parties had agreed to begin cease-fire talks. The first face to face meeting took place on 30 May under the

chairmanship of the Deputy Force Commander. The Deputy Force Commander had given both sides a draft document containing suggestions and proposals for a cease-fire. The next meeting between the parties would take place on 2 June. At the 30 May meeting, the RPF had reiterated their demand that the interim government desist from broadcasting threats against Tutsis. It appeared that the interim government had since toned down its broadcasts.

4. Gharekhan said UNAMIR had transferred 246 displaced persons from the Hotel Mille Collines and 290 from the Stadium. The situation in Kigali was still tense. Heavy exchanges of fire had continued on 30 May. Some RGF militia and civilians were reported to be moving out of Kigali but there was no real change in the military position of either side. The RPF were reported to be continuing their advance south west of Kigali and were also reported to be in partial control of the road from Kigali to Gitarama. One UNAMIR military observer, a Senegalese captain, was killed on 31 May (the Secretary-General's press spokesman announced at a press conference earlier in the day that he was killed when his car was hit by a mortar bomb fired from the RPF area when he was at an RGF checkpoint). Gharekhan also said that there had been reports of a massacre of 500 civilians at a monastery north of Gitarama on 28 May. Four UNMOs had been sent to investigate.

TROOP CONTRIBUTIONS

5. Annan (Under Secretary-General, DPKO) had earlier given me an update on troop contributors and planning for the expanded UNAMIR. There were now offers of something like 3000 troops (Ethiopia, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Ghana, Senegal with a Nigerian offer still to be firmed up). There were no non-African troops on offer although there was just a possibility of Canadian signallers and Singaporean movement controllers. The so-called "offer" from Italy did not, so far as he knew, exist. It was still unclear just how much the Americans would do in the way of equipment and airlift. Boutros-Ghali had thought that President Clinton had offered not only APCs and helicopters but their drivers/crew as well. The US Mission had rapidly disabused the UN Secretariat of any chance of the equipment coming with personnel, in which case the delay in availability was likely to be several weeks. Annan said the second phase would be set out in the paper being sent this week to the Council and would place much less emphasis on Kigali. The newly available troops would be fed in as they became available across

the frontiers to guard concentrations of displaced persons and build up safe areas. But they would also have a countrywide mission. Annan hoped that this would be sufficient to bring the Americans on board. As he had told me last week (TUR refers) the last round of talks with the Americans had not been very constructive but he was going to have them in again later today and give then a hard sell on the new approach.

THE POPE'S APPEAL FOR CREATION OF A SAFE AREA

6. The Permanent Observer of the Holy See wrote to the Security Council President on 31 May on instructions from the Pope bringing to the Council's attention the desperate situation of 30,000 Tutsi and Hutu refugees at the seminary of Kabgayi. Archbishop Martino asks the Council to declare the religious centre of Kabgayi a safe area and send the necessary peacekeeping forces to protect the zone and those there who are presently in extreme danger.

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Prime Minister

An update on Rwanda.

Foreign & Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

23 May 1994

MJ 23/V

file

Dear Philippa,

Rwanda : SITREP

Situation on the Ground

Since I last wrote on 4 May, there has been no letup in the fighting between internal government forces and the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF). The latter have consolidated their control of most of the northern and eastern parts of the country and there are reports that they may have gained control of Kigali airport. Massacres of Tutsi civilians and opposition Hutus continue, mainly in the areas controlled by the interim government. But atrocities have also been reported from RPF controlled areas.

Relief Operations

The fighting continues to prevent any effective relief operations inside Rwanda itself where over a million people are now thought to have been displaced. The ODA emergency aid commitments since 6 April now come to £4.5 million. ODA officials travelled to the region on 21 May to assess the situation on the ground and determine priorities for ODA support for refugee relief operations for the next 3-6 months. The Troika of EU Development Ministers is also due to visit the region to assess humanitarian needs.

UN Activity

On 16 May the Security Council adopted Resolution 918, authorising an increase in UNAMIR strength to 5,500 with an expanded mandate to contribute to the security and protection of civilians at risk and provide support for humanitarian operations. The Council also agreed on an arms embargo. In the first phase some 100 UNAMIR military observers now in Nairobi will return to Kigali. The Ghanaian mechanised infantry battalion in Rwanda will also be brought back up to full strength of 800. The Secretary-General has been asked to report as soon as possible on subsequent deployment of the remainder of the force. We understand that Nigeria, Tanzania and Ethiopia have offered troops and a number of other, mainly, African countries are reported to be thinking of doing so. We are

considering with the MOD how to respond to a request by the UN for military equipment.

Prospects

Regional diplomatic efforts have made no progress. The UN's Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping is in Kigali to lend support to the peace process. However, due to lack of preparation, the President of Tanzania has had to abandon his plan for a further conference at Arusha on 24 May to be attended by all Rwandan political parties and religious leaders, by neighbouring Heads of State and by UN and OAU representatives. The Foreign Affairs Council issued a declaration on 16 May supporting UN and regional peace efforts.

Although there are reports that a truce may be in prospect, it seems unlikely that there will be an effective halt to the fighting until the RPF has exhausted the military option. Given the numerical superiority of the Hutu (85% of the population against 15% Tutsi) we doubt if the RPF could achieve outright military victory or, if they did, whether they could hold the country in the longer term. The power sharing formula in last year's Arusha agreement probably still offers the best basis for any settlement, although the precise terms might have to be renegotiated in the RPF's favour. This could be a protracted process.


I am copying this letter to John Pitt-Brooke (MOD) and Melanie Leech (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,

Stephen

(J S Smith)
Private Secretary

Ms Philippa Leslie-Jones
10 Downing Street


23.05.
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MIPT: RWANDA: DEVELOPMENTS IN NEW YORK

SUMMARY

1. Wide Council support for an expanded operation in Rwanda with a humanitarian mandate, but differences of opinion on size and scope of operation. US and Russia in particular keen to limit activity to the border areas. Agreement that consent of the parties necessary and that force would require robust rules of engagement. I urge flexibility in considering the concept of operations and underline the need for a formal report on which the Council can base its decision. Further informal consultations scheduled on 12 May. Instructions requested.

DETAIL

2. During informal consultations of Security Council members on 11 May there was a first round of discussions on the Secretariat non-paper (TUR refers). Merimee (France) agreed in full with the concept in the non-paper. The operation should have a clearly humanitarian mandate. But thought should be given to the use of force. France was in two minds whether the operation should take place under Chapter VI or Chapter VII. Whatever happened the forces would need robust rules of engagement. Given the possible difficulties in securing troop contributions, a phased deployment should be considered starting with the most vulnerable areas.

3. Albright (US) said the US were interested in exploring the creation of a protective zone along the Rwandan borders to provide security to refugees and displaced persons. The mission could provide security for the protective zone and the

distribution of humanitarian aid and could also help with the refugee repatriation and serve in a preventive capacity to deter the spread of violence to Burundi. She also underlined the need for robust rules of engagement. Such a mission would require fewer troops and be less complex logistically than that described in the Secretariat non-paper. In particular it would avoid the requirement for moving an entire force in through Kigali airport, which was at the epicentre of a civil war. She underlined US opposition to an enforcement operation; if capable troops were available and the mission considered viable, the US would support it politically and diplomatically and would endeavour to help by providing financial resources, some airlift capacity, equipment and humanitarian help (full text of US talking points by fax to AD(E)). Vorontsov (Russia) said the focus of any effort should be humanitarian. There was a need to clarify the mandate in the non-paper. Russia opposed enforcement. Since troops were to be deployed in the absence of a cease-fire it would be better to concentrate on the areas on the Tanzanian and Burundi borders. The Council should consider the establishment of a voluntary fund to finance the operation.

4. Yanez (Spain) agreed that the highest priority was humanitarian. Focussing on the border areas was sensible but we should not forget the large numbers of displaced people in need in Kigali. The non-paper did not emphasis sufficiently the need for support of the parties. A commitment to recognise the status of Kigali airport as a neutral zone under UNAMIR control was essential if the Secretariat's concept was to be fulfilled. Some provision for investigation of human rights abuses should be included. Van Bohemen (New Zealand) said the Secretariat proposal was broadly acceptable. There were a number of practical considerations to be addressed including the number of troops and equipment available as well as the status of Kigali airport. The concept of operations required the airport to be a neutral zone. But it was at the heart of the fighting. If it could not be secured then we should perhaps consider a deployment from neighbouring countries. Other Council members had mentioned robust rules of engagement. But it might not be sufficient to rely on the rules of engagement, particularly if no one controlled the militias. He agreed with Yanez that the mandate should include something on human rights violations.

3. Chen (China) agreed that the focus of the operation should be humanitarian but underlined that cooperation of the parties was needed. A revised mandate for UNAMIR should not envisage enforcement. Cardenas (Argentina) sought clarification on contacts with the parties. He agreed that attention should be paid to human rights abuses but now might not be the right time to start investigative work. Kovanda (Czech Republic) said that the top priority was to bring relief to the large concentrations of displaced persons in Rwanda, many of which were in the interior of the country. This objective should dictate the size of the force and the mandate. He also supported calls for the imposition of an arms embargo and for the investigation for crimes against humanity.

4. I said the non-paper was a good one which in principle the UK could support. I agreed the mandate should be humanitarian and should not include enforcement action. We attached importance to the consent of the parties, which would be essential if the operation was to work. Would a written welcome from both sides be possible? We also needed more information on likely troop contributions. The Council should not conduct a purely paper operation. On the concept itself, we had as yet no clear-cut views but underlined the need to be flexible. It was not likely to be feasible to base the whole operation in Kigali given the level of fighting. However there were thousands of civilians in danger in the city. UNAMIR needed to have a presence there, but it might not be possible for the whole operation to be supplied through Kigali. The idea of starting off with the border areas deserved consideration. As far as procedure was concerned, the Council would have to adopt a resolution. But we could not do so on the basis of a non-paper. There would need to be some kind of a formal document from the Secretary-General giving more detail on his proposals, including the financial aspects. This need not hold up the discussion; it could be produced in parallel with the draft resolution.

5. Gambari (President, speaking on behalf of Nigeria) underlined the need for the Council to take prompt action. The first priority was to bring relief to the Rwandan population and to promote security for displaced persons, but we should not forget the political process. The resolution should provide for a phased approach with the first phase focussing on humanitarian relief. But it must also address the wider

question of how to promote a cease-fire and a return to the peace process. Human rights abuse would also need to be considered at a later stage. Bizimana (Rwanda) reiterated his Government's willingness to cooperate fully with the UN in its efforts to restore peace. He called for increased aid and for the emphasis to be on achieving a cease-fire. Action on the humanitarian front was the most immediate priority and was needed throughout the country, not in small areas of humanitarian tragedy.

6. Gambari, speaking as Council President, concluded that the Council seemed to agree on a scale of priorities. The first was to bring relief to the concentrations of displaced persons within Rwanda and at the borders. Other possible elements for a resolution included an arms embargo, a cease-fire, the Arusha Agreement and human rights violations. The consent of the parties was also important.

7. Baril (Secretary-General's military adviser) gave a number of clarifications in response to questions asked. The airport was indeed crucial. Use of the airport would need to be agreed by both parties. The Secretariat were aware of the possible need to be flexible in deployment. The airport was technically by far the best means of access. But since it was at risk, the Force Commander was looking at other possibilities including other airports in Rwanda and road supply via Kampala. On rules of engagement, if the operation took place under Chapter VI then the rules of engagement would have to specify minimum use of force. However force could be used in self-defence. The instructions from the Force Commander to his men would be that self-defence must and did include defence of the mandate.

8. Gharekhan (Secretary-General's Special Political Adviser) said that the Secretary-General had as yet received no written responses from potential troop contributors, although like Gambari he had heard that four countries were planning to respond positively and a further two were still considering it. He accepted the need for a formal report before adoption of a resolution, but would welcome guidance from Council members on the extent to which, if at all, the report should differ from the non-paper. Gambari then circulated an amalgamated draft resolution prepared by his delegation (para 5 of my telno 1661 refers). Text is in MIFT.

COMMENT

5. Further informal consultations on Rwanda are scheduled for 1930Z on 12 May. It is likely that these will again focus on the non-paper although there may also be preliminary comments on the draft resolution. In addition, a Working Group on the draft resolution has been scheduled for 131500Z on 13 May. Grateful therefore for any further comments on the non-paper as well as your preliminary comments on the resolution (which is clearly in need of considerable improvement, including from a technical point of view), deskby 121700Z please.

HANNAY

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MY TELNO 1695: RWANDA: DEVELOPMENTS ON THE GROUND

SUMMARY

1. Secretariat brief on developments. Intensive fighting on 9 and 10 May in Kigali. RGF resisting RPF offensive in Kigali but signs that RPF are gaining ground. Fourth Ghanaian UNAMIR soldier killed. High Commissioner for Human Rights currently in Rwanda. Hundreds of refugees still fleeing to Tanzania daily.

DETAIL

2. During informal consultations of Security Council members on 11 May Gharekhan (Secretary-General's Special Political Adviser) briefed on developments on Rwanda. There had been a relative lull in fighting over the weekend but on 9 and 10 May there had been intensive fighting. There had been fierce exchanges of mortar, artillery, rocket and small-arms fire in the north and north-east of the city. The market and the city centre had been shelled, causing panic amongst civilians. A total of 40 civilians, including three local journalists, had been killed in the latest round of fighting. The area around UNAMIR headquarters had been shelled and the Rwandan Government TV station damaged. Another Ghanaian UNAMIR soldier had been killed when a mortar hit the Amahoro Stadium. The RGF were holding on to their positions in the city despite an RPF offensive, but there were some indications that the RPF might be gaining ground. The RPF and RGF were both consolidating their troops in Kigali.

3. Fighting also continued outside the city, particularly in Ruhengeri and Bugesera. Massacres of civilians in militia-controlled areas were reported to be still taking place, although with less intensity than previously, but UNAMIR

were unable to verify these reports. Despite calls for a cease-fire from, inter alia, the UN Secretary-General, the OAU Secretary-General and President Clinton, neither side seemed ready to end hostilities. The airport was frequently closed and relief flights from Nairobi could not always land. Gharekhan said that the Special Representative had returned to Kigali on 8 May. The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights had also arrived in Kigali. He had been briefed by UNAMIR and was visiting Byumba on 11 May to meet the commander of the RPF. He would meet interim government representatives on 12 May.

4. On the humanitarian front, UNAMIR and ICRC had been able to deliver food to a number of places in Kigali on 9 May. An ICRC surgical team had also been able to visit the King Feisal Hospital. But there had been no humanitarian aid distributed on 10 May in Kigali because of the poor security situation. The number of displaced persons in Rwanda was still assessed at some 1.2 million and a further 300,000 had fled to neighbouring countries. UNHCR had issued a $50 Million appeal for Rwandan refugees in neighbouring countries. UNHCR had also reported that between 400 and 1500 refugees were still crossing the border daily into Tanzania.

5. For the subsequent discussion in informal consultations see my 2 IFTS.

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PARIS TELNO 554: RWANDA

SUMMARY

1. U.S. WILL SUPPORT PROPOSAL TO REINFORCE UNAMIR. BUT SOME SCEPTICISM THAT ENLARGED FORCE CAN BE DEPLOYED IN TIME TO MAKE A DIFFERENCE.

DETAIL

2. WE ASKED NSC ON 11 MAY ABOUT PRESS REPORTS THAT VICE-PRESIDENT GORE HAD DISCUSSED "NEW IDEAS" ON RWANDA WITH THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL WHEN THEY MET IN PRETORIA ON 10 MAY. DESHAZER (DIRECTOR FOR AFRICA) SAID THERE WAS NOTHING STARTLING: GORE HAD MERELY TOLD BOUTROS GHALI THAT THE U.S. WOULD SUPPORT HIS PROPOSAL TO INCREASE UNAMIR'S STRENGTH TO 5500 AND AUTHORISE ITS USE OF FORCE IN SELF-DEFENCE WHEN PROTECTING CIVILIANS. DESHAZER STRESSED THAT U.S. SUPPORT WAS FOR A CHAPTER VI, NOT CHAPTER VII, OPERATION.

2. SEPARATELY, BRYNN (ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR AFRICA, STATE) TOOK A VERY PESSIMISTIC LINE ON RWANDA WITH WRIGHT (DUS, VISITING) ON 10 MAY. WHILE CONFIRMING THAT THE U.S. WOULD BE GENEROUS WITH LOGISTIC SUPPORT AND (PROBABLY) MONEY FOR ANY EXPANSION OF UNAMIR USING AFRICAN TROOPS, BRYNN WAS SCEPTICAL THAT AN ENLARGED FORCE COULD BE CONSTRUCTED IN TIME TO MAKE A DIFFERENCE ON THE GROUND.

3. BRYNN WAS SIMILARLY DOUBTFUL ABOUT SUGGESTIONS THAT THE SPECIAL CHR SESSION MIGHT CALL FOR UN HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORS TO BE DEPLOYED: THE PECULIAR NATURE OF SETTLEMENT IN RWANDA (WIDELY SCATTERED HUTS RATHER THAN VILLAGES) MEANT THAT A VERY LARGE NUMBER OF MONITORS WOULD BE REQUIRED TO DO AN EFFECTIVE

JOB.

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FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

FOREIGN SECRETARY'S VISIT TO SOUTH AFRICA, 9-10 MAY :
TALK WITH UN SECRETARY GENERAL :
RWANDA AND SOMALIA

SUMMARY

1. BOUTROS GHALI ARGUES THAT A UN PRESENCE IN RWANDA COULD HELP PREVENT THE KILLING AND ASSIST THE HUMANITARIAN AND PEACEMAKING EFFORT. SAYS THAT AFRICAN COUNTRIES ARE READY TO PROVIDE TROOPS. BUT WESTERN GOVERNMENTS MUST PROVIDE THE MONEY AND PUT UP A FEW HIGH QUALITY TROOPS OF THEIR OWN. SEES SIGNS OF PROGRESS IN SOMALIA.

DETAIL

2. BOUTROS GHALI SAID THAT MANY PEOPLE FOUND IT DIFFICULT TO UNDERSTAND WHY THE UN WAS ACTING IN BOSNIA BUT NOT IN RWANDA. THE FOREIGN SECRETARY SAID THAT EACH CASE WAS DIFFERENT. WHAT DID THE SECRETARY GENERAL THINK THE UN COULD ACTUALLY DO IN RWANDA?

3. BOUTROS GHALI SAID THAT A UN PRESENCE COULD HELP PROTECT PEOPLE FROM BEING KILLED, INCLUDING NGOS CARRYING OUT HUMANITARIAN WORK. THE PRESENCE OF UN TROOPS ALSO HELPED THE PEACE-MAKING PROCESS. AFRICAN COUNTRIES WERE PREPARED TO PUT IN TROOPS (HE MENTIONED TANZANIA) BUT THEY LACKED THE NECESSARY MONEY. WHAT WAS NEEDED THEREFORE FROM THE MAJOR COUNTRIES WAS MONEY AND A RELATIVELY SMALL NUMBER OF COMPETENT WESTERN TROOPS. THE FOREIGN SECRETARY QUESTIONED WHETHER WESTERN TROOPS WERE LIKELY TO BE FORTHCOMING. BOUTROS GHALI SAID THAT THE UN NEEDED SUPPORT. IF THOSE WHO HAD BETTER TROOPS WERE NOT PREPARED TO PUT THEM IN, THE SYSTEM WOULD DECAY AND COLLAPSE.

4. ON SOMALIA, BOUTROS GHALI SAID THAT DESPITE WHAT THE AMERICANS SAID, PROGRESS WAS BEING MADE ON THE PEACE-MAKING SIDE. HIS REPRESENTATIVE WAS DOING GOOD WORK.

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RWANDA : FRENCH VIEWS

SUMMARY

1. French firmly opposed to reliance on African force. Believe UN force, with primarily humanitarian mandate, should go to Rwanda as soon as there is a cease-fire. Launching diplomatic campaign in region in support of political solution.

DETAIL

2. In a parliamentary answer yesterday, 4 May, Juppe set out the French approach to the Rwandan crisis (text by fax to AD(E) and UKMIS New York). The French were taking action in the region, in New York and in Rwanda itself. The French Ambassador to Rwanda, who had been in France for several weeks, was being sent to the region to talk to the neighbouring states to bring pressure to bear for a political settlement. Emie (Juppe Cabinet) told us that the Ambassador would go to the Arusha meeting as well.

3. Juppe said that, in New York, the French were arguing for an international force to go to Rwanda as soon as there was a cease-fire. They were meeting some opposition to the sending of a UN force but the French considered this indispensable. Emie said that the French thought the idea of depending on an African force irresponsible. They disagreed strongly with the Americans on this. An African force, if ever it could be assembled, would be unacceptable for tribal reasons and would probably arrive after the event in any case. The French were going to push hard for a UN force with a primarily humanitarian mandate, which would nonetheless act as a restraining force on the belligerents simply by its presence. They were not impressed by the apparent apathy of the Nigerian Security Council President.

4. Juppe concluded that the French were stepping up humanitarian aid. Forty tonnes had already gone in from their base in Djibouti and extra money was being found from both the cooperation and foreign ministry budgets.

5. The French reject out of hand the criticism, largely by the RPF, of the Rwandan Foreign Minister's visit to Paris. Following Bicamumpaka's meeting at the Quai on 28 April, the French spokesman underlined the importance of maintaining contact with all the parties in order to encourage the resumption of dialogue. The meeting had been an opportunity to re-affirm the need to put an end to the massacres. The US Embassy have told us that Bicamumpaka has been refused a visa to visit Washington; he will get a limited visa to go to New York.

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RWANDA

SUMMARY

1. Top priority for Belgium is humanitarian assistance, on which they support major EU involvement to assist refugees. They will seek a UN lead on getting a ceasefire and ending the massacres. If an African force can be mobilised, (which they doubt) they want an EU financial contribution. The other alternative they see is a revamped UNAMIR with a strictly humanitarian mandate : but a large force would be needed.

DETAIL

2. First Secretary on 5 May called on the head of the MFA Africa Division. Jaenen began by refuting British press comment that Belgium's colonial policies had caused the problems in Rwanda and Burundi. Like all colonial powers (UK included), Belgium had to some extent built on existing tribal institutions in preparing its colonies for independence. But since 1990 Belgium had remained strictly neutral in the conflict in Rwanda. He then outlined Belgian policy as follows :

3. Top priority was humanitarian assistance. Belgium was in contact with the ICRC on what assistance it could usefully provide bilaterally. A Coreu to issue on 5 May would seek a special EU effort to assist refugees throughout the region.

4. On the political front, the priorities were :
a) a ceasefire between the GOR and FPR.
b) an end to the massacres.
c) renewed dialogue based on the spirit of the Arusha agreements, although some adaptations might have to be made.

Anti-Belgian sentiment within Rwanda and the reactions within Belgium to events there meant that Belgium would look to others to take a leading role. Public opinion simply would not allow the

Belgian government to take the lead. If the US was willing to take the lead, that was fine. But Belgium would prefer to see the UN in the lead. It supported the Secretary-General's approach (in his letter of 29 April to the Council President) seeking reinforcement for UNAMIR to allow it to protect civilians and stop the massacres. But this would need a large force. If the approach to African countries or the OAU yielded results, Belgium hoped the EU would provide financing. Speaking personally, he doubted whether the Africans could be mobilised quickly enough, if at all. The alternative might be to reinforce UNAMIR from elsewhere, giving it a mandate limited to the protection of hospitals, humanitarian staff, etc. A small force would simply not be able to defend protected zones or large numbers of refugees within Rwanda. These would in any case require the consent of both parties, which seemed unlikely to be forthcoming. Belgium supported the approach set out in the Dutch coreu (which we have not yet seen).

5. Jaenen said that Belgium supports the US call for an arms embargo. Belgium had operated a ban on arms sales since 1990. The French, he added pointedly, had not.

COMMENT

6. Jaenen advocated a UN lead partly as a means of restoring the organisation's credibility. But having had their fingers burned, it suits the Belgians to look to multilateral diplomacy, be it the UN or EU, to provide answers. They will be able to find some bilateral resources for humanitarian assistance, but budgetary pressures would prevent any significant bilateral contribution to an African peacekeeping force.

GRAY

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letter from Baroness Chalker.

cc PS/No.10

JSH 4/5

+ return.

From: Mark Lowcock
PS/Baroness Chalker

Extn: 917 0419

Date: 4 May 1994

cc. PS/PUS
PS/Mr Vereker*
Mr Ainscow*
Mr Ireton*
Mr Goodenough
Mr Freeman*
Mr Bearpark*
Mr MacLennan AD(E)
Mr Fish*

Private Secretary

RWANDA: OXFAM TELEPHONE LOBBYING TO NO 10

1. Further to our discussions earlier in the day, I have now spoken to David Bryer (Oxfam Director). He was in Geneva, and telephoned me (at the request of Oxfam headquarters) on leaving a meeting with Dr Boutros Ghali on the situation in Rwanda.

2. I said that we were amazed and angry that a reputable agency like Oxfam could be so irresponsible as to encourage people to block up operational communications by telephoning No 10 to lobby on Rwanda. This was not the way to persuade Ministers of the merits of Oxfam's case. Mr Bryer said there was a great deal of concern in Oxfam and among their supporters at the situation in Rwanda and at the failure of the UN, and HMG, to take any effective steps to bring the conflict to an end. Oxfam had indeed encouraged their campaigners to lobby HMG, but he was surprised that telephone calls were reaching such a level as to disrupt ordinary business. In response to my request, Mr Bryer agreed to instruct his colleagues no longer to give out telephone numbers, and to discourage people from lobbying by telephone rather than by letter. It might, however, be 24 hours or so before this advice reached everyone concerned, and it was not within his power to stop telephone calls instantaneously. Mr Bryer said that events in Rwanda were attracting a stronger reaction among Oxfam's supporters than anything since Cambodia in the 1970s, and we should not be surprised that people wanted HMG to do more to try to bring the situation under control. I said we naturally did not object if people wanted to lobby on the issue, but it was essential that they did so in a responsible way. Mr Bryer made clear that he would not want this incident to damage Oxfam's wider relationship with HMG and in particular with the ODA.

3. The No 10 switchboard are now transferring calls from Oxfam supporters to the ODA Disaster Unit. There were a constant stream of calls between 2.00 pm and 3.30 pm this afternoon. Most callers read out a 2 or 3 sentence lobbying statement clearly drafted by Oxfam.

4. We discussed the possibility of Lady Chalker writing to Mr Bryer to express her displeasure at this incident. I expect she will write from Brussels tomorrow.

5. Separately, in response to the letter from Mr Bryer and the heads of other aid agencies, I am writing to offer them a meeting with Lady Chalker on Monday 9 May.

Mark Lowcock
PS/Baroness Chalker

* by E-mail

R45

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Prime Minister

An update on Rwanda. Pressure is (understandably) growing for international action. US ideas are attached. Humanitarian assistance to the refugees is probably the most realistic help we can give.

Regards.

Foreign & Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

04 May 1994

Dear Philippa,

Rwanda: Sitrep

The picture on the ground remains confused, but the (predominantly Tutsi) Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) appear to have taken control of most of the north east of the country and key positions in the capital, Kigali. The Hutu dominated Interim Government are operating from the south west of the country. Fighting continues between Rwanda Government Forces (RGF) and the RPF in Kigali and elsewhere. Additionally militia groups and hard line Hutu activists continue to carry out indiscriminate attacks on civilians - mainly Tutsi and opposition Hutu. Most of the massacres which have been graphically recorded by the media and NGOs have taken place inside areas controlled by the interim government.

Because of the security situation, relief organisations are unable to carry out extensive operations inside Rwanda. However, some 250,000 refugees are thought to have crossed into Tanzania when the border was opened briefly last weekend, and a major effort is being mounted to provide this with humanitarian assistance. The ODA have committed over £1.15m in emergency aid funds in the last couple of weeks. This includes 2 relief flights since the weekend in support of ICRC and UNHCR operations in Tanzania, and help for British NGOs active in Tanzania and other neighbouring countries. We are seeking Ministerial authority to commit a further £2 million. We are publicising our contribution. We shall include full briefing on this in our material for tomorrow's PM's Questions.

Since its decision on 21 April to scale down the UN presence in Rwanda, the Security Council has continued to keep the situation under review and on 30 April issued a renewed call to the parties to halt the bloodshed. There is a growing sense in New York that something more needs to be done, particularly for the relief of the civilian population. However there is no support for a peace enforcement operation. Our approach has been to ensure that the UN remains engaged, but at a realistic level.

Consideration has begun in the Security Council of the possibility of setting up a regional force, perhaps with UN endorsement and international funding (for example on the lines of the Liberia operation - although the modalities are still far from clear). In principle, we can support such an approach, subject to a careful look at the financial aspects. The UN Secretary General has written to African leaders asking them if they can contribute troops, and further recommendations are now awaited from Boutros-Ghali. Other actions being considered by the Security Council include an arms embargo (probably no more than a token gesture) and a commission of enquiry into the atrocities. Amnesty International has called for a special session of the Commission for Human Rights.

Diplomatic efforts also continue at the OAU/regional level. In the longer term, these probably offer the best prospect of success. The President of Tanzania has tried again to convene a regional peace conference in Arusha. So far however the RPF and Interim Government have failed to re-engage in serious negotiation.

Baroness Chalker has sent personal messages to the Presidents of Tanzania and Uganda encouraging their efforts to broker a settlement.

Baroness Chalker has also offered to meet representatives of British voluntary organisations early next week, to discuss the situation and the contribution we are making. Oxfam in particular has been mounting a campaign for a greater international effort.

Yours ever,

Stephen

(J S Smith)
Private Secretary

Miss Philippa Leslie-Jones
10 Downing Street

file DS

(PLJ\Rwanda.DS)

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

4 May 1994

RWANDA: OXFAM PETITION

I enclose a copy of a letter to the Prime Minister which David Bryer, Director of Oxfam handed in to No 10 yesterday, together with a petition signed by representatives of charities and aid organisations and others. The letter seems urgent - UN action in Rwanda.

I should be grateful for a very early draft reply for the Prime Minister's signature. Bryer appeared on television to give his petition full publicity. He is likely to publish the response.

Your briefing for Prime Minister's questions on 5 May should take account of Oxfam's letters.

MS PHILIPPA LESLIE-JONES

J. S. Smith, Esq.
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

OXFAM
Working for a Fairer World

United Kingdom & Ireland
274 Banbury Road Oxford OX2 7DZ
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Fax: (0865) 31.....
Telex: 83610 OXFAM G
Direct Tel: (0865) 31.....

The Prime Minister,
The Rt Hon John Major MP,
10, Downing Street,
London,
SW1A 2AA

3rd May 1994

Dear Prime Minister,

I am writing to urge you to use all possible influence in persuading the international community to take urgent action regarding the situation in Rwanda.

Current reports suggest that since April 6th, up to 200,000 people have been slaughtered, most from the minority Tutsi tribe. If this is confirmed, it will represent genocide on an horrific scale with a level of killing the world has not seen since Cambodia in the 1970s.

Of course I accept that no international peace-keeping force could be expected to restore order when a country has descended into anarchy. But in the face of genocide, nor do I believe that the UN should stand idly by saying it can do nothing.

For the most part, the death squads are armed with clubs and machetes, not guns, so I believe that even a relatively small UN force could offer protection to civilians seeking refuge in Safe Areas.

I would like to end by letting the people of Rwanda speak for themselves. This week, I was sent the enclosed fax from people in hiding in the Hotel des Mille Collines in Kigali. The Hotel contains 500 people being protected by just 6 soldiers. Without urgent re-enforcements, their lives, and the lives of countless thousands of fellow citizens are at risk.

Please do all that you can to persuade fellow UN Security Council members to take action to stop this genocide.

Yours sincerely

David Bryer.

David Bryer,
Director, plus others

FOUNDED IN 1942, Oxfam works with poor people regardless of race or religion in their struggle against hunger, disease, exploitation and poverty in Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Middle East through relief, development, research overseas and public education at home.

Honorary Officers: **Mary Cherry** Chair; **Michael Gibbs** Vice Chair; **John Richards** Hon Treasurer; **Kate Kirkland** Hon Secretary.
Director: **David Bryer**.

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Letter from the Hotel Collines
Kigali
Rwanda

26 April 1994

It is already 10 days since we spoke. The lines were cut off. This afternoon we have been connected again to the outside world. This is a TRAGEDY. Genocide continues. In Kigali the killers are looking for those who are hiding and killing them. Yesterday they killed 70 at Nyaminambo (children, old people, pregnant women). At the same time shelling continues. In the country all the Tutsi have been savagely murdered by killers sent from Kigali - more than 250,000 people have been killed. No-one, especially Tutsi, have been spared. Even the old governors of Kibungo and Butare have just been killed. In the prefecture of Butare there have been over 100,000 killed. Yesterday it was Nyanza.

There are 500 of us in the hotel. There are six soldiers guarding us but several attempts have been made to kill us. We have been a week without water or food, the wounded here are not treated, women are giving birth - what can I say. Do something very soon. Cry out to the world our tragedy. We want to live, help others to live. Fidele, Ignace and Medand are all dead - Bernadette is still here.

Dr Kayijaho Josue

PS Excuse the writing - I am trembling - I have no strength left

Andrew G. Fenton.

Louise M Hogg

Christine Dowsett

Hilary Atchison

Michael Lutchk.

Ken H...

Graham Andrew

Jacob Eccleston

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Michael Hall Save the Children.

Helen Wimmer

Michael Taylor Christian Aid

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Nigel Twose Actionaid

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YOUR TELNO 635 TO UKMIS NEW YORK: RWANDA

SUMMARY

1. ADMINISTRATION FEEL STRONGLY THAT SOMETHING MUST BE DONE, BUT NOT SURE WHAT. FOCUSSING ON HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO REFUGEES, GETTING DIPLOMATIC PROCESS BACK ON TRACK, AND POSSIBILITY OF ESTABLISHING SECURE ZONES INSIDE RWANDA POLICED BY AFRICAN PEACEKEEPING FORCE. U.S. WOULD BE PREPARED TO CONTRIBUTE MONEY AND LOGISTIC SUPPORT FOR SUCH A FORCE, BUT NOT CLEAR WHO WOULD SUPPLY THE TROOPS. AMERICANS DO NOT THINK ARMS EMBARGO IS ENTIRELY SYMBOLIC, GIVEN CONTINUED REPORTS OF SUPPLIES FOR THE RWANDAN FACTIONS FROM UGANDA AND ZAIRE.

DETAIL

2. WE ASKED STATE (AFRICA AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS BUREAUX) ON 3 MAY ABOUT THE STATE OF ADMINISTRATION THINKING ON RWANDA. ALL OUR INTERLOCUTORS SAID THERE WAS A STRONG FEELING AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS OF THE ADMINISTRATION THAT SOMETHING MUST BE DONE TO STOP THE MASSACRES. THE INITIATIVE FOR PRESIDENT CLINTON'S APPEAL TO THE PARTIES ON 30 APRIL HAD COME FROM THE WHITE HOUSE. SOME ARGUED THAT CLINTON HAD RISKED HIS CREDIBILITY BY MAKING A PERSONAL APPEAL WHICH SO CLEARLY STOOD LITTLE CHANCE OF BEING HEEDED. BUT CLINTON HIMSELF HAD WANTED TO MAKE THE GESTURE (WHICH HAD GONE DOWN WELL WITH THE CONGRESSIONAL BLACK CAUCUS).

3. THAT SAID, THE ADMINISTRATION WERE STILL UNCERTAIN WHAT COULD BE DONE IN PRACTICAL TERMS. STATE SAID THEY WERE FOCUSSING ON:

(A) GETTING HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO THE REFUGEES,

PARTICULARLY THOSE IN TANZANIA WHO FACED THE WORST CRISIS;

(B) GIVING A PUSH TO THE DIPLOMATIC PROCESS. SHATTUCK (ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS) WAS ABOUT TO LEAVE FOR THE REGION. ORIGINALLY, HIS TRIP HAD BEEN INTENDED TO DEMONSTRATE U.S. INTEREST IN MAINTAINING THE FRAGILE PEACE IN BURUNDI, IN THE HOPE OF HELPING TO STABILISE THE SITUATION THERE. IT HAD NOW BEEN EXTENDED TO ENCOMPASS ADDIS ABABA (FOR TALKS WITH SALIM), KAMPALA AND ARUSHA IN ADDITION TO BUJUMBURA. IN ARUSHA, SHATTUCK WOULD TRY TO IMPRESS ON THE RWANDAN PARTIES THE URGENT NEED TO AGREE A CEASEFIRE AND GET THE POLITICAL PROCESS BACK ON TRACK. (STATE ADMITTED, HOWEVER, THAT IT WAS VERY UNCERTAIN WHETHER THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT NEGOTIATORS IN ARUSHA HAD ANY INFLUENCE OVER THE RGF WHICH WERE CARRYING OUT MOST OF THE MASSACRES).

(C) STOPPING THE BLOODLETTING. CONSIDERATION WAS BEING GIVEN TO THE FEASIBILITY OF ESTABLISHING SECURE ZONES INSIDE RWANDA WHERE CIVILIANS COULD BE PROTECTED BY AN INTERNATIONAL FORCE (THE AFRICA BUREAU REFERRED TO THREE POSSIBLE AREAS; IO SPOKE OF CONCENTRATING ON ONE ZONE IN THE SOUTH, WHICH COULD BE SUPPORTED LOGISTICALLY FROM BURUNDI AND MIGHT HAVE THE SIDE-EFFECT OF REDUCING TENSIONS IN BURUNDI CAUSED BY THE INFLUX OF REFUGEES WITH TALES OF ETHNIC SLAUGHTER).

(D) ESTABLISHING AN ARMS EMBARGO. STATE ADMITTED THAT THIS WOULD BE TO SOME EXTENT SYMBOLIC: MUCH OF THE KILLING WAS BEING DONE WITH MACHETES. BUT THEY REFERRED TO CONTINUED REPORTS OF SUPPLIES AND REINFORCEMENTS FLOWING TO THE RPF FROM UGANDA (THE FRENCH WERE TALKING OF 30,000 ADDITIONAL MEN, WHICH WAS IMPLAUSIBLE, BUT THE U.S THOUGHT THE RPF HAD DEFINITELY RECEIVED SOME ADDITIONAL TROOPS), AND TO THE GOVERNMENT SIDE FROM ZAIRE. AN EMBARGO MIGHT PROVIDE SOME ADDITIONAL DETERRENT TO THE NEIGHBOURING STATES FROM BECOMING INVOLVED.

4. WE ASKED WHO WOULD PROVIDE THE TROOPS FOR A PEACEKEEPING FORCE. STATE SAID THEY WANTED TO SEE THE OAU TAKE THE LEAD, WITH SOME SORT OF UN BLESSING (THOUGH NOT NECESSARILY BLUE HELMETS). THE AFRICA BUREAU CLAIMED TO HAVE INDICATIONS THAT NIGERIA, ZIMBABWE AND BOTSWANA WERE POSSIBLE TROOP-CONTRIBUTORS (THEY THOUGHT IT BEST TO AVOID INVOLVEMENT BY RWANDA'S NEIGHBOURS, WHO WERE TOO CLOSE TO THE DISPUTE IN EVERY SENSE). IO WERE LESS CONFIDENT, REFERRING ONLY TO INTEREST EXPRESSED BY

THE AFRICAN GROUP IN NEW YORK. IO ADMITTED THAT A MAJOR QUESTION WAS WHETHER ANY CREDIBLE FORCE COULD BE PUT TOGETHER IN TIME: BUT IF TROOP CONTRIBUTORS CAME FORWARD, THE U.S. WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY BE PREPARED TO GIVE FINANCIAL AND LOGISTIC SUPPORT, GIVEN THE ADMINISTRATION'S PUBLIC BACKING FOR THE IDEA.

5. STATE SAID THAT CONSULTATIONS WITH THE FRENCH AND BELGIANS WERE PLANNED FOR LATER ON 3 MAY, WITH A VIEW TO SEEKING FURTHER SUGGESTIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL ACTION.

6. ON BURUNDI, STATE NOTED THAT THEY HAD FEARED AN EXPLOSION SOME TEN DAYS AGO BUT THE LID HAD STAYED ON. ALL OUR INTERLOCUTORS WERE SCEPTICAL OF BOUTROS GHALI'S IDEA TO REINFORCE THE UN PRESENCE IN BURUNDI BY ADDITIONAL OBSERVERS (UKMIS NEW YORK TELNOS 1537 AND 1566). IO COMMENTED THAT THE INCREASED PRESENCE WOULD STILL BE NO MORE THAN SYMBOLIC, PARTICULARLY IF SPREAD AROUND THE COUNTRY IN PENNY PACKETS. THE AFRICA BUREAU THOUGHT THAT THE BURUNDI MILITARY WOULD BE LIKELY TO RESIST THE IDEA: THEY HAD ALREADY GOT THE SIZE OF THE EXISTING UN DEPLOYMENT REDUCED TO A MINIMUM, AND HAD BEEN EXTREMELY NERVOUS EVEN OF THE SHORT-TERM PRESENCE OF U.S. MARINES DURING THE EVACUATION OF FOREIGNERS FROM RWANDA.

RENWICK

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file
of 4 May

Foreign &
Commonwealth
Office

London SW1A 2AH

28 April 1994

Dear Philippa,

Letter from the Belgian Prime Minister

Thank you for your letter of 22 April enclosing a letter from the Belgian Prime Minister.

We agree that there is no need for the Prime Minister to write specifically to thank Mr Dehaene for the Rwanda evacuation operation (the Foreign Secretary has already thanked Mr Claes). However the Prime Minister might wish to thank Mr Dehaene orally when he sees him in the margins of the Channel Tunnel Inauguration.

Yours ever,

Olivia

(C R V Stagg)
Private Secretary

Ms Philippa Leslie-Jones
10 Downing Street

28.04. P194

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YOUR TELNO 5700: MY TELNO 1389: RWANDA

SUMMARY

1. Situation in Kigali continues to deteriorate. Government forces shell national stadium where large numbers of refugees sheltering and part of UNAMIR stationed. No UNAMIR casualties but at least 25 civilians killed and more wounded. Prospects for ceasefire bleak. Positions of both sides hardening. RPF now rejecting UNAMIR efforts to mediate. Secretary-General to submit his recommendations on the future of UNAMIR to the Security Council on 20 April. I underline need for the Council to take a substantive decision immediately on the basis of these recommendations. Secretariat tell us Secretary-General likely to recommend immediate withdrawal of all but 250-300 of UNAMIR's personnel. Force Commander believes it would be dangerous to announce complete withdrawal.

DETAIL

2. During informal consultations of the Security Council on 19 April, Gharekhan (Secretary-General's special political adviser) briefed on the latest developments in Rwanda. The situation in Kigali continued to deteriorate. Fighting had intensified late on 18 April, culminating in the direct shelling of the national stadium where 5,000 refugees were sheltering and where parts of UNAMIR were stationed. At least 25 people had been killed, 50 wounded and there were an unknown number of casualties outside the stadium: one shell had landed on the roof of the UNAMIR headquarters there but it did not explode. There had been no (no) UNAMIR casualties. The shelling had stopped after UNAMIR had protested to the Rwandan government forces (RGF) who were responsible for it. The wounded had been taken to King Feisal Hospital where there were already some 8,000 civilians sheltering.

The evacuation of foreigners continued with UNAMIR's assistance.

3. Gharekhan said the shelling of the stadium by the Rwandan government forces represented an escalation of the conflict with no regard to the consequences for the civilians inside or for UNAMIR personnel. The Force Commander and Special Representative (SRSG) were doing their best to encourage negotiations but the prospects for a ceasefire were becoming increasingly bleak. The positions of both sides were hardening and they seemed to be preparing for prolonged armed conflict. UNAMIR had put forward a draft ceasefire agreement which the RGF said they could agree. However the RPF had rejected it and said that UNAMIR should not pursue its mediation efforts until all their conditions for a ceasefire had been met. Their conditions were that the massacre of Tutsis by the RGF and broadcasts of anti-RPF propaganda must stop, the Presidential Guard be disbanded and the interim government be disavowed.

4. Gharekhan said that, in these circumstances, it was almost impossible for UNAMIR to carry out its mandate. There was also an increasing threat to UNAMIR personnel. The Secretary-General was considering reports from the Force Commander and the SRSG and expected to submit a report to the Security Council at the latest by 201600Z.

5. Keating (New Zealand, Council President) said he had had further discussions with the troop contributing countries (TCCs). The TCCs had appreciated the efforts made by the Secretariat to keep them informed of developments in Rwanda and welcomed the Security Council's recognition of their concerns. There was a wide range of views amongst the TCCs. The Ghanaians had said they wanted to stay come what may and urged others to do the same. At the other end of the spectrum a number of TCCs were extremely concerned at the lack of a clear mandate.

6. Cardenas (Argentina) asked whether it was correct that radio stations had been broadcasting anti-UNAMIR material. Gharekhan replied that there had been broadcasts critical of UNAMIR because UNAMIR had rejected RGF suggestions of joint UNAMIR/RGF control of the airport but so far neither side were overtly to hostile to UNAMIR. However, given the rapidly deteriorating situation, this could change at any time. Walker (US) asked whether UNAMIR still had the ability to extricate itself safely. Gharekhan said that they did, as of now, and probably also in the immediate future. But the situation could change at any point. The situation was

grave. The Secretary-General would be making a clear recommendation to the Council, not presenting options. The recommendation was unlikely to be for a total pullout (though he subsequently made a point of saying that no option could be ruled out) but rather for the maintenance of a smaller force.

7. I said the Council must take action on the future of UNAMIR before the end of the week. The situation had deteriorated significantly since our earlier discussion of UNAMIR's mandate (our telno 1374). We could not delay a decision further when UNAMIR personnel were exposed to such very real risks.

8. Gharekhan told me separately that elements of UNAMIR (principally unarmed military observers and civilian police observers) were already being withdrawn. Annabi (DPKO) told us later that Riza (ASG for Peacekeeping) had been inclined earlier in the day to recommend immediate and complete withdrawal. The Force Commander had however argued very forcefully indeed that announcing a complete withdrawal would precipitate an immediate battle between the parties for the airport and put UNAMIR at severe risk. His advice, which DPKO had accepted, was that the Secretary-General should recommend to the Security Council the immediate scaling down of UNAMIR. The Secretariat would no longer argue that a ceasefire was a necessary pre-condition for such scaling down. They envisaged a presence of 250-300, which should continue to be called UNAMIR: the alternative, suspending UNAMIR and talking of a UN presence under a different name, might help the Americans but would play badly in Rwanda. Annabi said that in practice the UN would keep a very close watch on the situation, and review the continued presence of the "rump" UNAMIR in no later than two weeks. He implied that he, at least, foresaw it too being withdrawn at that point unless there were unexpected developments in the interim, but that it would be better not to be specific at this stage. Annabi said that Gharekhan's slight change of tack on the question of the Secretary-General's likely recommendations reflected some wavering in his office, and arguments as to whether it might not be better to present the Security Council with a range of options. But he was clear as to DPKO's preference.

HANNAY

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BELGIAN DEATHS IN RWANDA

1. Please pass urgently the following message from the Prime Minister. There will be no signed original.

MESSAGE TO THE BELGIAN PRIME MINISTER

Dear Jean-Luc,

I was very sorry to hear about the heavy and tragic loss of life amongst the Belgian peacekeeping forces with the UN operation in Rwanda. I should like to extend my deepest sympathy to the families, friends and colleagues of those who have been killed.

The Belgian contribution to UNAMIR/UNOMUR is a commendable example of the contribution member states can make towards UN efforts in maintaining international peace and security. I hope that the peace process in Rwanda can be relaunched, so that Belgian lives will not have been lost in vain.

With every sympathy,

John

2. We have no objection to the message being released to the press but it is normal practice for this to be done by the recipient of the message.

HURD

YYYY

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MY TELNO 100 : RWANDA

SUMMARY

1. SITREP FROM UNOMUR: RPF ADVANCE CONTINUES: NO INCREASE IN CROSS-BORDER MOVEMENTS FROM RWANDA.

DETAIL

2. THE (BANGLADESHI) OC UNOMUR (PLEASE PROTECT), WHO IS IN CONTACT WITH UNAMIR IN KIGALI VIA NEW YORK BELIEVES THE SALIENT POINTS OF THE CURRENT SITUATION ARE :

(A) NEGOTIATIONS FOR A CEASE-FIRE IN KIGALI CONTINUE BUT, CONTRARY TO THE BBC REPORT THIS MORNING, NO TRUCE IS YET IN FORCE.

(B) UN PEOPLE ARE SAFE: NO INCREASE IN CASUALTIES.

(C) THE RPF HAVE STILL NOT REACHED KIGALI. THEY ARE ADVANCING ON THREE AXES. THEIR POSSIBLE AIM IS TO CONSOLIDATE THEIR POSITIONS AROUND THE CITY BEFORE ENGAGING THE RWANDAN GOVERNMENT FORCES (RGF).

(D) UN (GHANAIAN AND BANGLADESHI) TROOPS AT BYUMBA IN NORTHERN RWANDA ARE SAFE. THE RPF HAVE UNDERTAKEN TO AVOID UNAMIR FORCES.

(E) UNAMIR HAVE SUGGESTED A SCHEME FOR WITHDRAWING UN TROOPS/OBSERVERS FROM THE NORTH, BUT NEW YORK HAVE STILL TO GIVE INSTRUCTIONS.

(F) UNOMUR HAS INTENSIFIED ITS MONITORING OF THE UGANDA/RWANDA BORDER, INCLUDING WITH THEIR NEWLY ACQUIRED

HELICOPTER CAPABILITY. THE RPF ARE ALERT ON THE RWANDAN SIDE, AND THE NRA ARE ACTIVE NORTH OF THE BORDER. BORDER TRAFFIC IS AS USUAL. ALTHOUGH UNOMUR HAS NO MANDATE TO MONITOR THE UGANDA/ZAIRE FRONTIER, THEY ARE KEEPING AN EYE ON IT INFORMALLY: THEY HAVE SPOTTED NO INCREASED ACTIVITY THERE.

(G) THE NRA ARE REFUSING ENTRY BY REFUGEES FROM RWANDA.

CLAY

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2222

From: Philippa Leslie-Jones
Date: 8 April 1994

faxed.

PRIME MINISTER

BELGIAN DEATHS IN RWANDA: MESSAGE TO DEHAENE

Eleven Belgian soldiers in the UN peace-keeping force in Rwanda have been killed in the recent disturbances. The Belgians have been shocked by this heavy loss.

A personal message of condolence from you to Dehaene would be a welcome gesture. In your last letter to Dehaene on QMV you mentioned our admiration for Belgian peace-keeping efforts.

I attach a draft. If you are content, we would like to send it off as soon as possible.

PHILIPPA LESLIE-JONES

plj\belgian.kk

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With every sympathy,

John

2. We have no objection to the message being released to the press but it is normal practice for this to be done by the recipient of the message.

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Foreign & Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

08 April 1994

Dear Philippa.

Belgian Deaths in Rwanda

I enclose, as we discussed, a draft message of condolence which the Prime Minister might wish to send to Prime Minister Dehaene following the death of 11 Belgian soldiers who were killed on UN Peacekeeping duties in Rwanda. We should aim to despatch this as soon as possible.

Yours ever,

Dickie

(C R V Stagg)
Private Secretary

Ms Philippa Leslie-Jones
10 Downing Street

UNCLASSIFIED DESKBY

ZCZC
UNCLASSIFIED

FM FCO
TO DESKBY 081700Z BRUSSELS EMBASSY
TELNO
OF 081429Z APRIL 94

BELGIAN DEATHS IN RWANDA

1. Please pass urgently the following message from the Prime Minister. There will be no signed original.

MESSAGE TO THE BELGIAN PRIME MINISTER

Dear Jean-Luc,

I was very sorry to hear about the heavy and tragic loss of life amongst the Belgian peacekeeping forces with the UN operation in Rwanda. I should like to extend my deepest sympathy to the families, friends and colleagues of those who have been killed.

The Belgian contribution to UNAMIR/UNOMUR is a commendable example of the contribution member states can make towards UN efforts in maintaining international peace and security. I hope that the peace process in Rwanda can be relaunched, so that Belgian lives will not have been lost in vain.

With

WED R TURNER 270 2404

With every sympathy,

John

2. We have no objection to the message being released to the press but it is normal practice for this to be done by the recipient of the message.

HURD

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FM BREMB TO FCOLN
080819Z APR
GRS 266

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FM BRUSSELS
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TELNO 170
OF 080819Z APRIL 1994

PERSONAL FOR STAGG, PRIVATE OFFICE

UK-BELGIAN RELATIONS: BELGIAN DEATHS IN RWANDA

SUMMARY
1. Recommendation for message of condolence and support from Prime Minister.

DETAIL
2. In his recent letter to Dehaene contesting Belgian public statements on QMV, the Prime Minister took the opportunity to praise Belgian peacekeeping efforts. Those efforts have now resulted in at least eleven deaths among the Belgian peacekeeping forces in Rwanda. I recommend that the Prime Minister send a message of condolence to Dehaene and that I be authorised to distribute it to the Belgian media. The message might also commend Belgian peacekeeping efforts and express the hope that they will continue.

3. I had been asked by Dehaene's Diplomatic Adviser to call on him this afternoon (8 April) for a "tour d'horizon" (this has now been changed to Monday morning, 11 April - as an indirect consequence of the Rwanda killings). If the Prime Mnister agrees to send a message it would obviously be extremely useful if this could reach me before 1130 local time (0930Z) on 11 April so that I can hand it over to Struye.

COMMENT
4. At a time when UK-Belgian relations are emerging from a difficult period, it would be helpful to emphasise those areas where our policies march together and where we think the Belgians are doing a good job. A message of condolence should help to counterbalance the robust defence which I shall have to make if, as I expect, Struye raises the Prime Minister's letter with me.

GRAY

YYYY
ADVANCE 12
PS/NO 10
MR JAY 1
MR HOPE, WED 1

BWLNAN 5071

Draft message.

Philippa

Fco

We spoke. If you like the idea, I'll get a draft done which the PM can clear over the wire

Dickin

08.04. A194

CONFIDENTIAL

Prime Minister

There are a few (probably about 100) UK aid workers/nuns in Rwanda. They would be included in any Belgian evacuation operation.

114070
MDHIAN 9575

CONFIDENTIAL
FM BRUSSELS
TO DESKBY 080930Z FCO
TELNO 171
OF 080915Z APRIL 1994
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK (PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR)
INFO IMMEDIATE NAIROBI (PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR)
INFO IMMEDIATE KAMPALA (PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR)
INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK (MR JOHN CLARK, HEAD OF SEC (A5)

SIC JDA

Rod/Phillipa./.

PERSONAL FOR BONE, AUS, FCO

RWANDA

Of course we would agree — can we help in any other way? /.

SUMMARY
1. Belgians considering paratroop drop to secure strategic points in Kigali necessary to protect foreign residents. May wish to use RAF exchange officer. Recommend we agree.

DETAIL
2. We understand from Belgian MOD sources (please protect) that the Belgian government are actively considering the possibility of a Belgian paratroop drop on Kigali to secure strategic points necessary to protect foreign residents and their possible evacuation (we suspect the airport may be a target and that the UN may be involved). The plan would be to use an airfield in Kenya as a staging post. The Belgians would deploy their C130s. They have only a small number of pilots qualified to fly C130s, and have been using an RAF exchange officer, Flight Lt Wildeman, extensively on C130 flights to Bosnia, Somalia and Rwanda of late. They would wish to use him in any action against Kigali and my DA expects a request to that end imminently. I understand that Wildeman is keen to go.

3. I recommend that we agree. Given our concern to see the international community extend its contribution to peacekeeping efforts (and the possibility that British lives may be at risk in Kigali), it would be taken badly here if we were to respond negatively to a crisis in which Belgian interests are at stake: and vice-versa.

GRAY

YYYY

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113634
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FM BRUSSELS
TO DESKBY 081030Z FCO
TELNO 172
OF 081007Z APRIL 1994
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, KAMPALA, PARIS, DAR ES SALAAM
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

RWANDA AND BURUNDI

SUMMARY

1. Ten Belgian UN soldiers executed. Belgian Cabinet meets in emergency session. Prime Minister and Foreign Minister return early from abroad. Extremist Hutus probably responsible. Likelihood of limited military intervention to evacuate Belgian nationals. Decision likely this afternoon

DETAIL

2. The Belgian Cabinet met at 0100 hours this morning under the chairmanship of Vice Prime Minister Van Rompuy to discuss recent developments in Rwanda. It announced that it was considering appropriate measures to protect Belgian nationals in Rwanda and had made contact with other Governments involved, as well as the UN. Both the Prime Minister and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who were out of the country at present, would be returning immediately. We understand from the MFA that a decision on repatriation may be taken this afternoon.

3. Noterdaeme, Belgian Ambassador to the UN, told the press several hours earlier that Brussels did not exclude any option to try to stabilise the situation in Rwanda and ensure the security of Belgian nationals there following the death of at least ten Belgian UN soldiers. Asked whether the Belgian Government was thinking of deploying extra troops in Rwanda, he replied "we shall see: everything is possible".

4. The Belgian Ministry of Defence announced this morning the names of the ten soldiers killed yesterday by "Rwandan soldiers". They were all from the second commando battalion from Flawinne and had been in charge of the Rwandan Prime Minister's security. They were taken prisoner while attempting to secure her escape from her residence, disarmed and taken to a military camp in Kigali where they were executed.

COMMENT

5. Speculation in Belgium is rife on who carried out the rocket attack on the presidential aircraft. Most commentators believe that responsibility lay with Hutus to the right of the President who had much to lose from power sharing and more to gain from a continuation of the war. The possibility that the Rwandan Patriotic Front lost patience with the Arusha peace process and decided to take the law into their own hands is discussed but largely discounted given the difficulty the minority Tutsis would have in seizing power from the majority Hutus. What is certain is that the rioters in Kigali are mainly members of the Presidential Guard and of the Republican Defence Committees who had received weapons in December last year from the Presidency. It also looks more and more likely that the Presidential Guard are systematically eliminating all leading Tutsis.

6. Apart from the ten Belgian UN soldiers executed, there are so far no other reports of Belgian fatalities. However it seems increasingly likely that unless there is an early return to normality in Kigali, the Belgian Government will decide to send troops in to secure the airport and to evacuate Belgian nationals of whom there are about 1500 in all in the country and about 900 in Kigali.

GRAY

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UKMIS NEW YORK TELNO 1232 : ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENTS OF RWANDA AND BURUNDI

SUMMARY

1. AFTERMATH OF THE AIRCRASH AT KIGALI ON 6 APRIL. IMPLICATIONS FOR ARUSHA PROCESS.

DETAIL

2. THERE IS NO HARD EVIDENCE AVAILABLE HERE ABOUT THE PRECISE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CRASH. THE RWANDAN AMBASSADOR MAINTAINS THAT THE CRASH WAS IMMEDIATELY PRECEDED BY FIRING. HE IS SCEPTICAL OF THE RPF'S DENIAL OF RESPONSIBILITY, IF THE AIRCRAFT WAS INDEED SHOT DOWN, BUT ACCEPTS THAT THAT EXPLANATION IS ONLY THE MOST OBVIOUS OF A RANGE OF PLAUSIBLE THEORIES.

3. ACCORDING TO KANYARUSHOKE, THE VICTIMS OF THE CRASH INCLUDED, BESIDES THE TWO PRESIDENTS, THE RWANDAN CHIEF OF STAFF, HABYARIMANA'S PRIVATE SECRETARY (ALSO HIS BROTHER IN LAW), HIS POLITICAL ADVISER, DOCTOR AND ADC. THE BARUNDI MINISTERS ACCOMPANYING THEIR PRESIDENT WERE THE MINISTER OF INFORMATION AND A JUNIOR MINISTER FOR SECURITY. THESE DETAILS ARE, HOWEVER, UNCONFIRMED: IT IS STILL NOT SURE HERE WHETHER THE BODIES HAVE BEEN RECOVERED OR INVESTIGATIONS HAVE GOT UNDERWAY.

4. THE SITUATION IN KIGALI MEANTIME APPEARS TO BE CALM. WE HAVE SPOKEN TO OUR HONORARY CONSUL. HE AND KANYARUSHOKE BOTH SPEAK OF THERE HAVING BEEN SOME PROLONGED PERIODS OF SHOOTING. BUT KANYARUSHOKE BELIEVES THIS WAS THE PRESIDENTIAL GUARD REACTING HYSTERICALLY AND FIRING WILDLY IN THE AIR, RATHER THAN TO KILL.

5. THERE IS A DANGEROUS POWER VACUUM IN KIGALI: THE MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INTERIOR ARE STILL IN DAR ES SALAAM, AND THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE IS ALSO ABROAD (IN CAMEROON). THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE IS ISSUING REPEATED CALLS TO PEOPLE TO SAY INDOORS.

6. THE AMBASSADOR HAD SPOKEN TO MUSEVENI. THE LATTER HAD REPORTED IN POSITIVE TERMS ABOUT YESTERDAY'S TALKS IN DAR ES SALAAM AND SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN ASKED BY OTHERS TO WORK ON THE RPF TO HELP CLEAR THE WAY FOR THE SWEARING IN OF THE TRANSITIONAL ASSEMBLY.

COMMENT

7. RWANDA IS IN A VERY DANGEROUS CONDITION: THE SOLE TRANSITIONAL INSTITUTION - THE PRESIDENCY - IS NOW VACANT. IT IS EVEN MORE URGENT TO MOVE TOWARDS THE SWEARING IN OF TRANSITIONAL ASSEMBLY AND GOVERNMENT. ACCEPTANCE BY ALL PARTIES OF AN INTERIM PRESIDENT SHOULD BE THE PRECURSOR OF THAT. THE ARUSHA PROVISIONS - WHICH CANNOT YET BE IMPLEMENTED, OF COURSE - PROVIDE FOR THE SPEAKER OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY TO TAKE OVER THE PRESIDENCY ON AN INTERIM BASIS IN THE EVENT OF THE INCAPACITY OF THE PRESIDENT. THEREAFTER, THE PRESIDENT'S PARTY - IN PRACTICE THE MRND - WOULD HAVE TO OFFER TWO CANDIDATES, ONE OF WHOM WOULD BE ELECTED BY THE TRANSITIONAL ASSEMBLY AND THE GOVERNMENT VOTING TOGETHER. THE FORMER CONSTITUTION ALSO PROVIDES FOR THE SPEAKER OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY TO BECOME INTERIM PRESIDENT FOR THREE MONTHS. THERE IS SUCH A SPEAKER IN BEING. HE IS DOCTOR SINDIKUBWABO, WHO WAS ENGAGED IN POLITICS FROM SOON AFTER INDEPENDENCE UNTIL 1973, BUT THEN DROPPED OUT UNTIL HIS COME-BACK IN 1989. HE BELONGS TO THE MRND, AND COMES FROM BUTARE IN THE SOUTH OF THE COUNTRY. HE HAS NO REAL POWER BASE AND IS A RATHER INSUBSTANTIAL FIGURE. BUT THOSE CHARACTERISTICS MIGHT TURN OUT TO MAKE HIM ATTRACTIVE AS A STOP-GAP PRESIDENT.

8. PLEASE INSTRUCT ME IF YOU WISH ME TO TALK TO MUSEVENI AGAIN ABOUT EXERTING HIS INFLUENCE ON THE RPF. WE SHALL NEED TO BE CAREFUL TO AVOID APPEARING TO IMPLY THAT THE RPF WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DEATHS OF THE PRESIDENTS, OR EXAGGERATING MUSEVENI'S INFLUENCE OVER THEM.

CLAY

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SUBJECT

cc master ops

Rwanda

Rel DSG

CFCO

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

2 November 1982

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T 205/82

Dear Mr. President.

I should like to thank Your Excellency for the kind message brought to London by the Rwandan Minister for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, M. Francois Ngarukiyintwali.

It gave me great pleasure to read your letter and to find that we hold similar views on the state of the relations between our two countries. I feel sure that the recent visit to Britain by M. Ngarukiyintwali and the Honourable Anthony Berry's visit to Rwanda will have cemented further the friendly relations which our two countries enjoy.

I share Your Excellency's confidence that cooperation between our two countries will continue to flourish. As you will know, my Government has contributed both directly and indirectly to the development of Rwanda, and we shall continue to do so. Mr. Pym, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, was glad to be able to inform M. Ngarukiyintwali of our intention to increase our contribution to the development of Rwanda next year through the expansion of our scholarship programme for Rwandans to study in Britain.

I understand that M. Ngarukiyintwali and Mr. Pym had the opportunity of a very useful discussion of a number of international issues.

/ Permit me,

VR

Permit me, Your Excellency, to offer you my best wishes for the happiness and prosperity of yourself, your family and the people of Rwanda.

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher

His Excellency Major-General Juvenal Habyarimana.

Rwanda

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

The letter pl.

Dear John,

I enclose a letter to the Prime Minister from President Habyarimana of Rwanda. I also enclose a translation and draft reply.

The letter was handed to Mr Pym on 19 October by the Rwandan Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, M. François Ngarukiyintwali during a courtesy call which he made as part of a two day official visit to Britain.

The letter is worded in very general terms and largely concerns the state of bilateral relations between Britain and Rwanda. Our relations with Rwanda are friendly but slight. Our aid programme for 1983/84 should allow for the doubling of the present number of scholarships (approximately 3 or 4 per annum) for Rwandans to study in Britain. We also contribute indirectly to development in Rwanda through multilateral aid donors such as the EDF and UN.

Our Ambassador in Kinshasa, who is accredited to Rwanda, will deliver the reply to President Habyarimana.

Yours ever

(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

RESTRICTED

[redacted] (Revised)

DRAFT: LETTER minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:

THE PRIME MINISTER

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

Reference

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

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TO:

HE Major-General Habyarimana
President of the Republic of
Rwanda

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.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

SUBJECT:

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Enclosures—flag(s).....

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I understand that M. Ngarukiyintwali and Mr Pym had the opportunity of a very useful discussion of a number of international issues.

Permit me, Your Excellency, to offer you my best wishes for the happiness and prosperity of yourself, your family and the people of Rwanda.

SUBJECT

et master
ops

October, 2rd, I982

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T188C/82

His Excellency Mrs Margaret Thatcher
Prime Minister Of the United Kingdom
of Great Britain And Northern
Ireland

LONDON

Mrs the Prime Minister,

I have the honour to avail Myself of this happy opportunity of the visit, in Your country, of the Rwandese Minister of Foreign Affairs And Cooperation, Mr NGARUKIYINTWALI François, to entrust him with this message for Your Excellency withim the framework of the existing good relations between the United Kingdom of Great Britain And Northern Ireland and the Republic of Rwanda.

By this message, I am happy to express to You the firm determination of the rwandese Government and people to strenghten even more the privileged relations between our two countries by direct and more acting cooperation.

I am also happy to underline the high esteem the Rwandese Government has for the contribution Your country is bringing to the development of Rwanda within the framework of multilateral cooperation.

Finally, I would like to take this opportunity to renew to You my best wishes of happiness and prosperity for Yourself Your family and for all the friend british people.

While expressing to You my deep thanks for Your solicitude towards the bearer of this message, I present to you, Mrs the Prime Minister, the assurances of my highest consideration.

HABYARIMANA Juvénal
Major-General
President of the Republic of Rwanda
and Founder-Chairman of the National
Revolutionary Movement for Development.

REPUBLIQUE RWANDAISE

Kigali, le 2 Octobre 1982.

LE PRESIDENT DE LA REPUBLIQUE

Son Excellence Madame Margaret THATCHER
Premier Ministre du Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d'Irlande du Nord
L O N D R E S.

Madame le Premier Ministre,

J'ai l'honneur de saisir l'heureuse occasion de la visite, dans Votre pays, du Ministre Rwandais des Affaires Etrangères et de la Coopération, Monsieur François NGARUKIYINTWALI, pour lui confier le présent message destiné à Votre Excellence dans le cadre des bonnes relations existant entre le Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d'Irlande du Nord et la République Rwandaise.

Par ce message, il m'est agréable de Vous exprimer l'ardent désir du Gouvernement et du peuple rwandais de voir les relations privilégiées entre nos deux pays se renforcer davantage par une coopération directe plus intense.

Il me plaît également de souligner la haute appréciation du Gouvernement Rwandais pour la contribution dans le cadre de la coopération multilatérale, de votre pays à l'effort de développement du Rwanda.

Je voudrais enfin saisir cette heureuse opportunité pour Vous renouveler mes voeux de bonheur et de prospérité pour Vous-même, pour Votre famille et pour tout le peuple ami britanique.

Vous remerciant pour Votre sollicitude à l'égard du porteur de ce message, je Vous prie d'agréer, Madame le Premier Ministre, les assurances de ma plus haute considération.

HABYARIMANA Juvénal
Général-Major
Président de la République Rwandaise et
Président-Fondateur du Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le Développement.