

PART 2

MT

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SOVIET MILITARY EXPENDITURE + CAPABILITIES

SOVIET
UNION

Part 1: May 1979

Part 2: May 1983

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
12.2.90						5 4	
4.7.90							
24.1.92							
3.3.94							
PREM 19/5001							

① PLS
② D/C

Ms Lomax

c. Mr Betts
Wing Cdr Dove
DIO
Duty Clerk No 10 ✓

Errant Russian Space Vehicle

I have been informed by MOD that Progress M17 re-entered the earth's atmosphere at 0406 hrs today at 35°S and 46°W - a few hundred miles off the East Coast of South America.

If anyone wishes to comment on the passage of information during this incident please telephone me on Ext 0199.

The Home Office passed information to County Chief Executives in England and Wales via the COPOST electronic mail system at 1750 hrs yesterday and to Chief Officers of Police via the Police National Computer. No public announcement was made and I am not aware of any media interest in the UK.



BRIGADIER J A J BUDD
3 March 1994

Ms Lomax


RV ce pers
Rump.
c. Mr Betts
Wing Commander Dove
DIO
Duty Clerk No 10 ✓

Errant Russian Space Vehicle


1. I have just been informed by the MOD that a Russian space vehicle (Progress M17)- used to carry supplies to their space station, has gone out of control. On current information it is expected to return to earth at 3.20 pm tomorrow afternoon (3 March) but this prediction is subject to an error factor of ± 12 hours.
2. The space vehicle's orbit occasionally crosses the UK, South of the line between the Bristol Channel and the Thames Estuary. Should the return not be at 3.20 pm tomorrow the next orbit (about 4.50 pm) will track across UK on a line described above; the next orbit will cross the Scilly Isles. Subsequent orbits will not cross the UK during the + 12 hour period. MOD expect to reduce the ± 12 hour bracket progressively as time passes.
3. The Home Office are lead department. MOD are in touch with the Home Office. A draft press release has been prepared by MOD and will be faxed as soon as it has been cleared, to the Home Office and me. I will circulate a copy when it arrives. The Home Office intend to take action as they did some months ago when there was an errant Chinese satellite due to return to earth. All police forces will be notified by the Home Office and we then have to see how the orbit and time predictions develop.
4. The Home Office and MOD will work closely together on what is announced publicly and when. As far as I know there has been no radio or TV (Ceefax) coverage as yet (3.25 pm).
5. I will keep you updated as necessary.

BRIGADIER J A J BUDD
2 March 1994



A The National Archives

DEPARTMENT/SERIES <i>PREM 19</i>	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM <i>5001</i> (one piece/item number)	
Extract details: <i>minute from Craock to wall dated 24 January 1992</i>	
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Extract details: Minute from Craddock to Powell dated 27 June 1990	
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Rine Minister

(2)

An excellent paper which
Chris Donnelly has shot me.
The quotation at the end is very revealing.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
OR QUOTATION

THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOVIET MILITARY POLICY IN THE 1990s

May I have a copy please? not COM 24/2

The last six months have seen such drastic and rapid changes in the political institutions of Eastern Europe and the current situation in the USSR and the countries of the Warsaw Pact is so volatile that attempts at prediction are, frankly, futile. Even when we might have some degree of confidence in the direction of progress in a certain country or institution, estimates as to a likely time scale for any developments are likely to be little better than a wild guess, so great are the uncertainties.

It behoves us, therefore, in such an unsettled and unstable period, to return to first principles as a basis for our assessment, so that we can at least make a rapid and balanced revision of our assessments in response to unforeseen events.

In his five years in office, Gorbachev's style of rule has been characterized by two especial characteristics - the preparedness to take risks and a faithful adherence to certain ideological principles; viz the primacy of the Communist Party, the inviolability of the unitary Soviet state and the principle of public ownership of property.

Thus far, in the pursuance of his radical reforms to restructure the Soviet Union, Gorbachev has led from the middle political ground. He has established the strength of support for the extremes of policy to 'right' or 'left' by means of political stalking horses, whilst he himself has trodden what for the USSR today is the path of moderation. Alas for him, the political environment in the USSR has become so polarized that the political middle ground is now depopulated. It appears, moreover, that his policies have failed both to capture the imagination and gain the support of the people, and also to effect any real improvement in the nation's economy. It seems to me that Gorbachev is at a 'T' junction - he can no longer push on straight ahead. The reforms he set in motion over four years ago will, if allowed to develop unchecked, now destroy the three principles on which he has so far based his policies. He must now choose either to permit this to happen, and acknowledge that his principles are wrong or untenable, or he must act to halt the intensification of reform and impose his principles by dictatorial methods, ie, become a benevolent despot, reforming by decree rather than by liberalization.

His decision cannot have been an easy one. His recent proposals to the Central Committee plenum, whilst by no means the unequivocal abandonment of communism, does appear to indicate that he is in favour of moving down the path of fundamental

reform if the Party fails to rejuvenate itself. This is really communism's last chance. The failure of the Party to react to Gorbachev's earlier attempts to revitalize it do not augur well for this latest - and perhaps final - attempt. If current proposals are implemented, we are likely to see a very different USSR develop over the next decade. To exacerbate the problem Gorbachev faces, whichever way he had turned, he would have had to direct a nation in the grip of a deep social and economic crisis with a team of colleagues of dubious competence. Most sovietologists agree that there are very few men in the ruling echelons of the Party who have anything like the competence of Gorbachev, Yakovlev or Shevarnadze. Moreover, the constitutional reforms, dissipating as they have some of the previously total power of the Politburo, make it more difficult to impose control. Authority is now accruing to other institutions, giving them a greater measure of autonomy, particularly as long as Gorbachev and the Politburo remain preoccupied with the domestic crisis. One such institution is the Soviet General Staff.

Gorbachev's Approach to Military Matters

As befits a Leninist, Gorbachev's foreign policy is dictated by domestic considerations, and foreign policy includes military policy.

The classic Marxist-Leninist approach to war can be summarized in two quotations: firstly, as Lenin said, after Von Clausewitz, "war is a tool of policy". A nation will only go to war to achieve an essential policy objective which cannot be achieved by peaceful means. No sensible leader will, of course, engage in a war which he does not think he can win, nor will he run the risk of war unnecessarily, or for little gain.

Secondly, "war puts nations to the test" said Marx, likening the fatal shock of war on fragile societies and shaky social institutions to the destructive effect of fresh air on the Egyptian mummy exposed by the archeologist.

It must have been obvious to Gorbachev that the Soviet Union could not stand the shock of war, unless it were one of defence against an invasion. War was not a useable tool of policy. To use war to bring Eastern European nations under stricter control as had Brezhnev in 1968 and Khrushchev in 1956 would have destroyed the credibility of Gorbachev's policies in the West. War had been a spectacularly ineffective tool of policy against Afghanistan, and the Soviet Armed Forces could in no way be certain of victory against NATO as long as NATO nations continued to maintain a strong conventional force backed up by nuclear weapons. Even though NATO might be outnumbered, Soviet battlefield calculations showed that the current (1989) density of forces on a European battlefield would lead to stalemate.

So Gorbachev must have asked himself and his Generals - why was the USSR crippling itself to maintain such a massive military system when a great deal of that system was not useable? Furthermore, the Soviet Army's forward deployment in Eastern Europe - designed by military common sense to launch a high-speed pre-emptive offensive as the best means of winning a war against NATO in its conventional phase, should a war be necessary - was creating such tension between East and West that it both prevented the USSR from profiting from an influx of Western technology and expertise and it also spurred the West into an arms race. This was a race which, given the increasing technological sophistication of new weaponry and the West's technological lead, the West was in Soviet eyes bound to win. The military monopoly of high technology research and development posed a particular threat to the development of Soviet civil science and seriously hampered its efforts to keep up with the West.

"But the Soviet Armed Forces are essential for defence" - the Generals would argue - "look at 1941". Today, however, Gorbachev has pointed out that war is not imminent. The only weapons that can destroy the USSR are nuclear ones, and those are best deterred in kind if they cannot be abolished completely. As for a NATO conventional invasion of the USSR, it has no credibility whatsoever. Once this has been pointed out, it is tantamount to saying that "the King has no clothes" - it becomes very difficult to recreate the illusion. It is difficult now for the General Staff to claim with any credibility that there is a NATO threat which demands the present conventional Soviet force size, structure and deployment. What is needed is 'new thinking' on defence, and on the utility and cost-effectiveness of armed forces.

Eastern Europe and the Warsaw Pact

What, then, of the Soviet 'buffer zone' of Eastern Europe? It will not protect the USSR from nuclear destruction. If there is no conventional NATO threat then this buffer zone is no longer as essential to Soviet defence. If the USSR is not planning a conventional war against NATO (because it doubts it could win) then Eastern Europe is not necessary as a spring board for an offensive. Given the great economic and political cost of maintaining control over Eastern Europe, and given that Gorbachev might for a long time have had serious misgivings about his capability to maintain that control effectively as time went on, the attractiveness of ridding himself of this economic, political and military burden must have grown apace.

As reform in the USSR sparked off reform in Eastern European countries in 1989 and one-by-one the ruling Communist Parties lost some or all of their power, the problem arose of the future of the Warsaw Pact. The Warsaw Pact is not like NATO in that it is an almost purely military alliance. Designed by the Soviet Union as an extension of the Soviet General Staff, the Warsaw Pact was the means by which the Soviets could control the Eastern European armies in peace and war. Had NATO and the Pact gone to war, NATO would actually have faced a Soviet theatre offensive, into which each East European army would have been incorporated with a limited military task in a specific geographical area.

For 40 years the East European armies have been shaped in the Soviet mould, their senior officer staff specially chosen and trained in the USSR, and the armies' loyalties engendered in defence of socialism, rather than in defence of their own territorial integrity. As the Eastern European governments entered a period of rapid reform in 1989, their Armed Forces were not always immediately in support, and for a time it seemed that military support to help conservatives restore the old order might be a real possibility. However, the collapse of the East European Communist Parties has been so rapid and total that this has not yet happened, and now looks most unlikely. As soon as the new governments in East Europe have succeeded in switching the loyalty of their armies onto a national basis - a process which Czechoslovakia and Hungary at least should accomplish in 1990 - these countries will cease in fact if not in name to be useful members of the Warsaw Pact as it was conceived. That is, they can no longer be relied upon to do as they are told by Moscow. If this trend is duplicated in Poland and East Germany, the Warsaw Pact would become non-operational.

For many years Soviet politicians have called for the abolition of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact. From a military point of view, this would have destroyed the West's capability to wage strategic operations (as these depend on a multi-national NATO C3 system) whereas the Eastern bloc's capacity (based as it is on Soviet, not multi-national Warsaw Pact HQs) would be virtually unaffected. In late 1989, however, Soviet policy was modified, calling for the blocs 'to be turned into politico-military alliances', and stressing the need to build up the Warsaw Pact's political institutions to resemble those of NATO. Whilst at first this proposal must have seemed attractive to East European countries, so great has been the loss of Soviet influence in Eastern Europe recently that it now looks very unlikely indeed that any East European country will be prepared to exchange an institution designed for control of their armies into one designed to perpetuate some sort of Soviet political influence in their domestic affairs. So far, the USSR has not been able to suggest any way in which the Warsaw Pact could effectively be politicized - it seems that this has remained no more than a political slogan.

It would appear, therefore, that Gorbachev has concluded that Eastern Europe, however, desirable it might be, is not essential to the USSR, neither politically nor for effective defence. He is not, therefore, going to make unrealistic attempts to retain control of it. The highest price to be paid for this policy will be German unification. Here, too, the Soviet line has changed rapidly in response to the developing situation. From an original strong opposition, the USSR has moved to an acceptance of German unification, but will wish to extract a high security price from the West. However, so serious is the crisis within the USSR that, as 1990 progresses, it appears ever more possible that the USSR will soon take no active interest in what happens in Germany, domestic concerns seem likely to absorb all the leaderships' attention.

There remains the problem of Soviet forces stationed in East European countries. It seems only logical that the Soviet political withdrawal from Eastern Europe - which is now almost complete - should be followed by a military withdrawal. Czechoslovakia and Hungary had, by the end of January 1990 already demanded this, and Poland seemed likely to follow suit. Military withdrawal, however is not easy without increasing instability and the accelerating rate of change, especially in Germany. It might also be possible, too, to extract reciprocal force reductions from the Western Allies. At the time of writing, this is what it seems the USSR will attempt to do. However, if democratic reforms progress as fast in East Germany as they have in neighbouring Czechoslovakia, then before this can be accomplished the Soviet Western Group of Forces will take on the status of hostages to an increasingly uncertain fortune. Far from insisting on a demilitarized Germany as the price of permitting unification, it seems that the USSR may not be able to apply any realistic pressure on the course of events. Some Soviet officials have even suggested to me that, as the Warsaw Pact cannot be converted into a political organization, it would be better for a unified Germany to be incorporated in some way into NATO rather than becoming a 'free agent' in European politics, 'neutral' Germany being, in their eyes, virtually a contradiction in terms.

I think that, in fact, Gorbachev would be quite satisfied with a security arrangement in which all Soviet forces were withdrawn very soon within Soviet borders, and the countries of Eastern Europe adopted the same attitude as does Finland - ie, following a Western social and economic pattern, aggressively neutral, and maintaining a polite attitude to Moscow.

Military Technical Considerations

So far I have discussed issues of military policy. However, there are technical issues too which are influencing the process of Soviet military development. There is a very strong military argument for reducing forces and defusing East-West tension. This is because, as the General Staff recognizes, it will be essential to have an up-to-date industrial base and a well-motivated population if the USSR is going to maintain its military capacity in the next decade. At present, the USSR possesses formidable military might. But if as is expected technological developments in the near future produce radically new types of weapons, much of the Soviet Armed Forces' inventory will soon become obsolete. The country needs a good high technology industrial base to produce the weapons of the 21st Century, but it will never create such a base if it continues to cripple its scientific development by excessive military investment, because future weapons will be developed not from military projects but from advances in basic physics. Reducing tension with the West will help in that it should enable the USSR to acquire technology more easily, and to benefit from the Western industrial expertise so necessary to Soviet economic recovery.

There is, therefore, some congruence of interests - not only does Gorbachev need a rapid and drastic reduction in resources going into defence so as to fuel his domestic economic reforms, but the General Staff also recognizes the wisdom of this measure. However, this is easier said than done. Gorbachev wants massive reductions quickly - even the CFE agreements may be too slow - but the implications for the Soviet General Staff are very serious.

If the USSR is to reduce its forces drastically (perhaps to less than 50% of current strength) and adopt, as Gorbachev has indicated, a 'more defensive' posture, less provocative to NATO, and ultimately with the USSR alone, this requires a complete reorganization of Soviet military structures, mobilization and training, deployment and, ultimately equipment procurement. The model of adopting a strategic defensive posture, backed up by a limited counter-offensive capability and with a reliance on mobilization may sound all right, but it flies in the face of Soviet military tradition and would take, under normal circumstances, several years of theoretical work to establish how it should best be done. There is no evidence that the Soviet General Staff has yet decided how to implement this policy - yet Gorbachev needs results quickly. The result is tension between him and his military. His ideal model seems to be the Soviet army of the 1930s - maintained very small for economic reasons but of high quality, the General Staff putting their effort into experimentation to establish how to turn new technology into weaponry, how to develop tactics to exploit the effects of new

weapons best, and devising training schemes and ideal force structures to integrate the new weapons and tactics into operational plans. As weapons were developed, they were brought to prototype stage, but were not to be produced en masse until war seemed imminent. On the whole, this was a most successful policy, marred only by Stalin's interference, - his paranoia and fear leading to the 1937 purges of the officer corps.

The Soviet Armed Forces have been engaging in intense experimentation to establish improved force structures throughout the 1980s. These are designed to take account of the functions of new weapons currently coming into service. Attempts by Soviet Generals to explain these as 'defensive' restructuring is little more than deception. However, it is difficult not to sympathize with the General Staff's plight. They are being pressured to adopt reform so quickly that there is a great fear of them adopting for political expediency some restructuring that turns out to be a military nonsense.

In addition to wanting more time to conduct the reforms than Gorbachev wants to allow them, the General Staff is of the opinion that it will need a larger slice of the savings to be made from defence cuts in order to improve the quality of Soviet forces, and to maintain the process of weapons development as numbers fall. The Soviet Armed Forces as a whole are also very aggrieved by what they perceive as the unfair way in which they have been made scapegoats for Soviet economic failure. The Armed Forces have never been so unpopular as they are today. The public holds them in low esteem. Military living standards are falling, morale is low, young officers find it difficult to train men infected with the spirit of glasnost and democratization, and nationality problems threaten the cohesion of many sub-units. A great deal of effort will need to be made to return to an adequate degree of military discipline and efficiency.

Most significant of all, perhaps, is the deep-seated resentment (strong in the professional military but by no means confined to that group), emanating from the ethnic Russians, for whom recent events in the Baltic republics, Moldavia and Transcaucases have been truly traumatic. There is a growing sense of frustration at the potential disintegration of the USSR, at giving up so easily what was obtained so dearly in wartime, and a fear that Gorbachev is no longer in a position to control the country. The Soviet Armed Forces have never played an active political role in the way that armies do in South America, but they have been important in their support for alternative candidates for the leadership when these have emerged. The same is probably true today, and the most serious threat clearly comes from the right wing Russian 'backlash' to Gorbachev's reforms. The outcome of such a power struggle could have a positively fundamental effect on the

development of Soviet military policy, in the short and long term. If General Staff resentment, which is already encouraging the Soviet military to 'go slow' on Gorbachev's proposed changes and is delaying the implementation of cuts and restructuring, boils over into action, then it is a return to traditional Russian values, and with a firm hand at the helm of state, which it is likely to be seeking. The following quotation (Aleksandr Prokhanov, The Tragedy of Centralism, Literaturnaya Rossiya (05.01.90, pp 4-5) gives eloquent evidence of the depth of this feeling.

"At a stroke it has torn down the whole geopolitical architecture of Eastern Europe which our country had paid a huge price to establish. The internal European balance of power has been destroyed, with unpredictable results. The sentimental theory of 'our common European home' has led to the ruin of the East European Communist parties, changes in sovereignty, and the inevitable reunification of Germany. By the end of the 20th Century Central Europe will see the rise of a German industrial giant, filled with energy, inspired with pan-germanic ideals, its gravitational influence pulling in former German lands. The political map of Europe will change its colours and configurations, and the bones of Russian infantrymen will rattle in their forgotten graves."

Prime Minister (2)

Some interesting ideas from a Soviet expert on how the Soviet

HOW MUCH DEFENCE IS SUFFICIENT?

defence budget might be cut. CBN 13/6

By ALEKSEY ARBATOV in *Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn* 3/89 pp.33-47

The following is a summary of Academician Arbatov's discussion on how the defence budget might be cut. Arbatov states that using a cost-cutting recipe along the lines of his model, it should be possible to reduce defence expenditure by between 40-60% during the next five years without impairing relative security levels. The article is typical of the approach being cultivated by Gorbachëv; using civilian academics and think-tanks as platforms for voicing opinions on defence outside the exclusive forum of the General Staff.

The article is prefaced with a Gorbachëv quotation: "The problem is so acute that we will have to examine our expenditure on defence. Preliminary study shows that we can reduce it, without lowering the State's level of security and defence capability". *Pravda* Jan 8 1989

The army too has not escaped the effects of decades of stagnation. It is the epitome of the entire command-administrative system, with its institutional interests and lack of glasnost under the guise of all-embracing secrecy. Defence has got out of control of the society which it was created to serve.

Quotation from Shevardnadze speech (July 1988) - "Much expense could be saved, if the interpretation of the interests of national security had not become the monopoly of a few departments...".

Arbatov bemoans the lack of glasnost and open information on military matters. (He goes on to cite figures from "Soviet Military Power" and "The Military Balance") Are Soviet citizens less interested in defence than people in the West? He attributes the problem to the previous absence of democratic procedures of discussion in the defence sector. There is a need to re-appraise narrowly departmental approaches and coordinate more strictly present-day economic, international, and military- strategic realities.

The levels, structure and deployment of the SAF reflect the system which grew up in the 1950-70s. In many cases the building up of the SAF at home and abroad was justified, in others it was mistaken and superfluous. (Does not specify). Such a system based on confrontation and rivalry is now preventing the USSR from scaling down its military-political over-involvement in international conflicts, and exposing the country to economic and political damage.

Military interests often obstruct political paths. Reference to Soviet military's unwillingness to give up INF weaponry, and the limiting factor for

negotiations of traditional dislike of on-site inspection and national-technical means of verification, and the inviolability of the nuclear triad.

The Armed Forces' strategic plans and programmes are often viewed as something immovable, independent of external circumstances. Given the preferability of political over military means in guaranteeing security, Arbatov asks: how great is the input of diplomats, politicians, and scholars in the formulation of strategy and decisions on requirements for new weaponry?

The WP's new doctrine is a recognition of the unattainability of victory in all-out nuclear war, and in large-scale conventional war in Europe between the WP and NATO. It creates a fundamental directive on prevention of nuclear and conventional war, and on the restructuring of strategy, operational plans and military potential on defensive principles.

Outlining the practical desirability of "defensive sufficiency", Arbatov argues that simultaneous war on two fronts (against the United States and China) is extremely unlikely in the foreseeable future. There are no plans for the use of limited contingents of Soviet forces in Third World conflicts.

Priority must shift away from extensive to intensive methods of supplying security. USSR must recognise that the development of military potential by potential adversaries is a process which the USSR directly affects. Soviet actions can intensify opponents' programmes, and alternatively, slow them down. Negotiations on disarmament open up greater additional possibilities for strengthening Soviet security at less expense.

The new approach to security means that greater numbers of missiles, aircraft, tanks and other weaponry do not necessarily provide a stronger defence capability. If more weaponry is produced for unrealistic purposes, and is allowed to affect adversely the quality of technology, soldiers' living conditions and those of officers and their families, and if resources are deflected away from important aims, then defence capability may be weakened. The term "defensive/reasonable sufficiency" does not imply just numerical reductions of forces and armaments; it means a fundamental re-structuring of strategy, operational plans, and armed forces, including their reduction, the revision of modernisation programmes, redeployment - all with the primary aim of providing long-term strengthening of the country's defence capability.

The greater part of expenditure on strategic nuclear weapons is tied up in their development and testing. The volume of production is, in terms of cost, less significant. The arms race between the US and the USSR in strategic weapons is now stabilising at the quantitative level; instead of deploying greater numbers of weapons, both sides are modernising their existing arsenals by producing more effective, costlier replacements in smaller quantities. Economic savings will only be made by halting the development of new systems.

Until recently, the USSR has responded to every one new American developed system with two of its own; in response to MX, USSR produced SS-25, SS-24. US production of "B-1B" bomber gave rise to "Blackjack" (Tu-160), and the new

modification "Tu-95". (Other examples are given) If the USSR responded 1:1 (better still 1:2), then it could greatly reduce expenditure without undermining security, and even strengthening its negotiating position. The development of "Blackjack" is also questioned.

Arbatov also doubts the suitability of the costly Soviet air defence system (PVO); it is highly improbable that the system can provide comprehensive protection, particularly against cruise missiles deployed on heavy bombers; the system is susceptible to pre-emptive nuclear attack; land and sea-based ballistic missiles can strike directly almost all targets without the help of heavy bombers. In any case, the justification for the building of "Stealth" was that by forcing the USSR to invest heavily in modernising its air-defence system (PVO), it would be one of the best ways of bringing the Soviet economy to its knees.

What is needed is a smaller PVO system - for warning purposes, protection of air-space in peace-time, and defence against terrorists. Judging by recent events there is a need to work on it.

There is a need to re-think the practicality of the ABM system around Moscow: 100 anti-missile missiles are little use against a concentrated attack by strategic forces of US, UK and France: there is little merit in having a defence system around Moscow if Leningrad, Kiev, Tbilisi, Sverdlovsk et. al. remain hostage to other ballistic missiles.

Savings can be made on conventional weapons by producing smaller numbers of systems with fewer modifications. Emphasis must be on the qualitative dimension. The US spends 60% of its military budget on conventional forces - the USSR spends more. It produces more types and modifications of weapons systems in greater numbers. It up-dates its military technology more often. In the light of the new WP doctrine it should be possible to restructure all divisions manned at a low level of combat readiness, eliminating huge supplies of ageing equipment and abolishing the unwieldy system of industry being organised on a war footing* - given the reality of modern, fast-moving, highly technical war.

Given the improbability of a war on two fronts, it is difficult to justify keeping huge forces for independent, wide-scale combat in Europe, Asia and the Far East. Through demobilisation, it would be possible to reduce radically the number of divisions on the Chinese border and in the Far East. A different, intensive method of providing security would be to create a developed rear infrastructure, including stores of weaponry, and "material-technical supplies", and good ground and air communications (indispensable, in any case, for peace-time economic development). Such a system would allow for the switching of large forces in any direction.

Using a deeply echeloned defence against NATO (including forces in the Western USSR), the WP could probably reliably guarantee security with 50-60 divisions. Such a defence will set aside the possibility for counter-offensive actions, flank attack and encounter battle, at operational and tactical levels.

* Literal translation: System of mobilisation deployment of industry.

The Air Force has a role to play in this defensive strategy by providing reliable anti-air defence for the ground forces, as well as reliable support from the air, winning superiority in its own airspace, while reducing resources for offensive deep strikes on targets and aerodromes in the enemy rear.

It is possible to go beyond the unilateral cuts announced by Gorbachëv in December 1988, with further deep cuts on a mutual basis through negotiations between the WP and NATO on arms reduction from the Atlantic to the Urals.

The Navy can be scaled down in line with "defensive sufficiency", yielding great savings. The presence of the Navy in the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean, the South China Sea, and the South Atlantic is an unwinnable, and particularly expensive sphere of competition for the USSR. It is also peripheral to the country's security. It will be futile to try and match the US in surface ships, when the USSR has the submarine capability to sink all NATO aircraft-carriers on Soviet shores. This assessment openly calls into question plans for building a huge surface fleet. It would be more appropriate to concentrate on building qualitatively better multi-purpose submarines in smaller numbers and less variety.

Military production in all sectors needs to move away from extensive to qualitatively superior intensive methods. The Party faces the task of fundamentally transforming the wasteful practices of the past affecting military production and design bureaux: this has led to the manufacture of a variety of weapons systems which duplicate one another, and to the perpetual modification of these systems with only negligible improvements in their efficiency. Arbatov quotes from "Soviet Military Power" that the USSR is currently developing three types of tank, APC and AFV, and seven models of fighter-aircraft. Between 1977-86, the USSR outproduced the US in heavy and medium-range bombers by 13:1. Though these statistics cannot be believed, they reflect the truth to an extent. In future, there must be greater discussion of programmes from the angle of defensive sufficiency, and a rigorous selection of programmes based on a comparison of cost and efficiency. The defence sector also requires its own form of self-accounting.

SSRC/JEKL 12-05-89

PART ONE ends:-

CJP to pm 7-12-88

PART 2 begins:-

ARBATOV 'ARTICLE' 12.5.89