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FILE TITLE: LADY TH	EX-PRIME MINISTERS	
		PART: 2
PART BEGINS: May 1993	PART ENDS:	CAB ONE:
	19/6	222

SERIES CLOSED

END OF CONSERVATIVE ADMINISTRATION

1 MAY 1997



LADY THATCHER PT 2

				TS/S
17.3.97	PS/Lady T	PPS	Press announcements - Lady Thatcher's papers	
			PART CLOSED 1.5.97.	





	FROM	ТО	SUBJECT	S/TS
,				
27.9.95	PS/ Thatcher	PPS	Invitation for 16 October - 2nd Dinner invitation	
29.9.95	PPS	PM	The Second Thatcher Dinner	
4.1.96	PS/ Thatcher	PPS	Lady Thatcher Quotes from "The Gulf War" Programme	
9.1.96	PPS	PM	Times Article : Tory Party/ Next Election	
14.2.96	НО	HA/PS	Daily Mirror Article : Lady Thatcher's Security	
16.2.96	НО	HA/PS	Daily Mirror Article : Lady Thatcher's Security	
7.3.96	PS/Ldy T	FA/PS	Lady Thatcher's lecture in Missouri, 9 March	
8.3.96	PS/MOD	FA/PS	Lady Thatcher's 50th Anniversary Fulton Lecture	
11.5.96			Speech in Prague " The Common crisis : Atlantic solutions"	



EX-PRIME MINISTERS LADY THATCHER PART 2

DATE	FROM	ТО	SUBJECT	S/TS
12.5.93	PPS	PM	Cosgrove on Thatcher	
26.9.94	Thatcher	PM	Visit to India	
29.9.94	PM	Thatcher	Visit to India	
20.3.95	PPS	SOC	(M) - Dinner for Lady Thatcher	
10.5.95	PPS	FA/PS	Dinner for Lady Thatcher	
11.5.95	FA/PS	PPS	Dinner for Lady Thatcher	
22.5.95	PS/Thatcher	PPS	Press Release concerning volume 2 of Lady Thatchers memoirs	
22.5.95			Extract/Note from Thatchers' Memoirs	
24.5.95	PS/PRESS	H/PRESS	Lunch with Jones Grice Sunday Times : Memoirs	
17.8.95	fa/aps	pps	Lady Thatcher's Dinner	
31.8.95	PPS	PM	Thatcher Dinner	
25.9.95	INV/SEC	PPS	Dinner and reception for Lady T and Sir Dennis	
26.9.95			Seating plan	7/1891
	Lady T	PM	Invite to Lady T "at Home" on 16 October	The
26.9.95	PM	Lady T	Accept invitation to Dinner	



MARGARET, THE LADY THATCHER, O.M., P.C., F.R.S.

FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION

To : Alex Allan

From : Julian Seymour

Date : 17 March 1997

Number of pages : (including this one)

Our Fax no: 0171 259 5366 Our tel no: 0171 235 6600 ge MA J Haslam HJ AW

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MESSAGE:

Les Alen

Following is the text of the Press announcement from Lady Thatcher and Churchill College to be released tomorrow.

Please note that these announcements are embargoed until 11.00am Tuesday March 18 1997.

JULIAN SEYMOUR



Embargoed 11.00am Tuesday, 18 March 1997



PRESS RELEASE

THATCHER PAPERS TO GO TO CHURCHILL COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE

Lady Thatcher today announced that she will donate her papers to a new charity 'The Margaret Thatcher Archive Trust'.

- The charity will lend the papers to Churchill College, Cambridge who, subject to certain conditions of care, will keep them in perpetuity.
- The archive, including a large collection of photographic and audiovisual material, comprises more than 1000 boxes of Lady Thatcher's political and personal papers dating from 1945. Inevitably, the main part of the collection relates to her years as Leader of the Opposition and Prime Minister.
- The new charity, which will be formed shortly, will be responsible for ensuring that the papers are cared for, conserved and catalogued.
 The charity will also ensure that, in due course, public access is granted to the archive.

Lady Thatcher said:


"I have always wanted my papers to stay in the United Kingdom. I am therefore delighted that they are going to Churchill College where they will join the papers of many distinguished 20th Century figures, including of course those of Sir Winston Churchill himself. I hope they will be a valuable source for students and scholars who wish to study the great changes brought about by the Conservative governments that I had the privilege to lead."

- ENDS -

For further information, please contact

Julian Seymour or Mark Worthington on 0171 235 6600

THE RT. HON. THE BARONESS THATCHER, L.G., O.M., F.R.S.
HOUSE OF LORDS, LONDON SWIA 0PW





Churchill College

Cambridge CB3 0DS

From the Master
Sir John Boyd, KCMG

PRESS RELEASE

THATCHER PAPERS TO COME TO CHURCHILL COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE

Lady Thatcher announced today that her papers are to come to Churchill College, Cambridge, where they will remain alongside those of many distinguished 20th-century figures, notably Sir Winston Churchill, in the Churchill Archives.

- This is subject to formal signature of the documentation, once the Charity Commission have approved the new Charitable Trust.
- The decision confirms the position of the Churchill Archives Centre as the prime repository for papers bearing on the history of Britain in the 20th century. It will be hard to write the history of our times without consulting documents at the Centre.
- Churchill College is delighted at this development and will bend every effort to ensure that the papers, which are wide-ranging, are safely stored and preserved; and that appropriate access is afforded to scholars and the public.

The Keeper of the Archives Centre, Dr Piers Brendon, has warmly welcomed this decision. "This is without doubt the most important archive of our times, following that of Sir Winston himself. The arrival in Cambridge of the Thatcher papers will mark a formidable gain for scholars of our era. It opens the way to significant further development of the Archive Centre, organisationally and physically".

The College has warmly welcomed this development. The Master, Sir John Boyd, said "This is an event of momentous importance for Churchill College. It serves to confirm the special character of the place and to reaffirm the role conceived for it by Sir Winston Churchill and his contemporaries - as an energetic focus of modernisation which addresses contemporary problems, looks forward and seeks to contribute to a more capable Britain. Lady Thatcher's initiative is a generous one; we welcome it and will take good care of these papers".

- ENDS -

For further queries please contact:
Dr Piers Brendon, Keeper of the Churchill Archives Centre. 01223 336175

Prague on Saturday 11th May 1996.

"THE COMMON CRISIS: ATLANTIC SOLUTIONS"

Prague - the heart of Europe

I must begin by congratulating most warmly the organisers of this glittering Congress.

It is not, of course, the first European Congress. And in the past, I must admit, such Congresses have achieved mixed results.

The Congress of Vienna in 1815 was called to restore order in Europe after the Napoleonic Wars; it began a series of such gatherings designed to achieve a Concert of Europe. But, as is usually the case in European affairs, the concert was distinctly discordant. The style was too rigid and inflexible. And finally, amid Europe-wide upheaval, Austria's Chancellor Metternich, who had orchestrated the system, had to flee to England.

The Congress of Berlin in 1878 was called to resolve the Eastern Question, this time with Germany's Chancellor Bismarck holding court as an "honest broker". Again, great power politics was relied upon to manage awkward national aspirations, particularly in the Balkans. But the Eastern Question stayed unresolved, the Balkans became more Balkan, the shaky empires staggered on and, with fateful consequences, Germany emerged as the arbiter in Europe.

Here at our Congress in Prague, however, we have a very different purpose: the defence, entrenchment and extension of our Western inheritance of freedom. And the only concert we shall be hearing from is that performed this evening by the excellent Prague Symphony Orchestra.

The British, indeed, have a special fondness for Czech music: Dvorak and Janacek both spent some time in England. And although the phrase has since been used to rather different effect, it was Janacek who memorably remarked - on a visit to London - that the Czech nation was (I quote) "the heart of Europe - and Europe needs to be aware of its heart". Magnificent buildings, superb art galleries, in fact on every side the accumulated evidence of a continuously rich intellectual life - anyone visiting this most beautiful of the cities of Central Europe needs no persuading of the justice of Janacek's observation.

Moreover, here in Prague we are not just surrounded by beauty, but by beauty which was paid for by business success. In the last century, Bohemia was the industrial heartland of the Habsburg Empire. And before the last war Czechoslovakia was one of the world's leading economies, enjoying an income per head equal to that of France. It is in keeping with that tradition of industrial prowess that the Czech Republic today is the outstanding economic success story of central Europe: where others have flinched under the pressures of free enterprise reform, Vaclav Klaus - my other favourite Prime Minister - has kept going down the right track. And the results are internationally recognised and admired.

Yet, we know also the darker side of Central European history, whose shadows in successive generations fell over Prague. That too makes our meeting here appropriate. We dare not forget that the freedom of this cultured, enterprising people was snuffed out by each of the two monstrous, totalitarian systems of our century - intimidated, dismembered and absorbed by Nazi Germany; subverted, betrayed and enslaved by Communist Russia; and each time with the West standing impotently aside. These are blots on the history of the civilized world. They came about because the West was selfish and unprepared. And they confirm an important truth about international affairs. In the language of Hobbes: "Covenants without the sword are but words." No amount of promises by world leaders, no amount of guarantees by international bodies

with cfire-power, mattered when the tanks rolled in. Such experience provides a poignant lesson for today's multi-lateralists who retain a naive conviction that international institutions, rather than alliances of powerful nation states, can be relied upon to preserve the peace.

The Post-Cold War Crisis

The fact that now the Czech and Slovak peoples - and the Hungarians, the Poles and other former captives of the Evil Empire - are free to express their nationhood, rebuild their economies and rejoin the international community as sovereign states is, therefore, a cause not just for rejoicing but for deep reflection.

We should reflect that it was not the United Nations, or the World Bank, let alone the European Community, which overthrew communism. It was a united West, under American leadership, enjoying the support of brave dissident patriots in the lands of the Eastern bloc: together we applied irresistible pressures on the Soviet system. And it was the inherent and cumulative failures of that system that caused it to collapse in the face of our challenge. Had we waited upon international consensus and its diplomatic practitioners to win the Cold War for freedom, we would be waiting still.

But, as so often, with victory also came complacency. And it was not long before signs emerged that all was not well with the so-called New World Order. Even the expression, "New World Order", with its echoes of utopian euphoria from the League of Nations, should have sounded the alarm.

For the post-Cold War Western leaders had made a fatal confusion between two quite distinct propositions. The first - true - proposition was that international institutions, above all the United Nations, could at last begin to work as originally designed in a world free from Soviet obstruction and aggression. The second - untrue - proposition was that these institutions could themselves perform all the essential functions required to uphold global peace, prosperity and justice.

There was a counter-part of this post-Cold War confusion in the domestic policies of our own nation states. Again, the release of tension induced a slackness of political muscle. With the lifting of the forty-year threat to our very existence, the general cry was for governments to cultivate the arts of peace. The demand was for a peace dividend - and politicians were too timid to explain that the only true peace dividend is simply the dividend of peace itself. Furthermore, the dividend is only yielded if sufficient is first invested in defence. But, in any case, the resulting - often imprudent - reductions in defence spending did not lead to governments spending less over-all: quite the contrary. For the state-welfare complex proved more rapacious than the Left's favourite ogre, the defence-industrial complex, ever was. To pay for increased welfare, governments weakened their own financial disciplines, ran deficits and hiked taxes. And all these actions in turn worsened deep seated social problems like welfare dependency, family break-down and juvenile crime.

These tendencies, as the experts have been explaining during this morning's sessions, are so general - and their results so deleterious - that we can without exaggeration talk of a "common crisis". But it is not, of course, a crisis of capitalism.

Indeed, outside the hefty, unreadable tomes of the Marxist pseudo-economists, there was no crisis of capitalism, only a crisis of socialism - wherever and whenever it has been applied. Its sour fruits are still with us.

Where socialism has left its deepest impression - in most of the former Soviet Union - we see not Westernstyle democracy and free economies, but corruption, cartels and gangsterism. There is a pervasive lack of trust and civility, the breakdown of civil society in matters large and small. A dour Russian parable on the history of Soviet communism says it all:

That's how it is with a man. He makes a bad start in his youth by murdering his parents. After that he goes down hill: He takes to robbing people in the streets. Soon he sinks to telling lies and spreading gossip. Finally, he loses all shame, descends to the depths of depravity, and enters a room without knocking at the door first."

That's how it was with communism. It began in terror and mass murder and it ended in petty corruption, inefficiency, bad service, ill manners, the loss of every social grace, and a society pervaded by rampant egoism. And the social desert thus created was unpromising ground for the economic transition to a market economy.

All the more credit then to our hosts here in Prague, and to the democratic reformers in other central European countries (like my fellow patron Leszek Balcerowicz) that they succeeded so well in their market revolution.

Alas, in some countries we have seen a reversion. There is a progressive disillusionment among ordinary people with pseudo-capitalism and - worse - a growing nostalgia for the false security of socialism. Former communists, sometimes in disguise, are returning to power in ex-communist countries. In Russia itself, there is the possibility of a government that combines communist economics with an imperialistic foreign policy.

Such a reversion is not uncommon. Kipling wrote about this as a sort of natural law:

"As it will be in the future, it was at the birth of Man There are only four things certain since Social Progress began:
That the Dog returns to his Vomit and the Sow returns to the Mire,
And the burnt Fool's bandaged finger goes wabbling back to the Fire ...
... As surely as Water will wet us, as surely as Fire will burn,
The Gods of the Copybook Headings with terror and slaughter return!"

We can and must provide against the dangers - the "terror and slaughter" - that this reversion threatens. To do so effectively, we must turn to those Atlantic solutions - which our distinguished panels will be debating this afternoon.

Security Challenges

Mr Chairman, the world is today a freer, and in many ways better, place than it was when the two superpowers - America supported by her European allies - and the Soviet Union conscripting her European satellites - confronted each other. But the world is also more complex, more volatile and more dangerous. Let me give you three reasons why.

First of all, there was a kind of unholy symmetry in international affairs created by a balance of terror. Deterrence - above all nuclear deterrence - worked as it was designed to do. Neither the West nor the Soviets could afford to let any regional crisis so destabilise the system that either side was pushed to the brink; for beyond that brink lay the abyss of mutual destruction. This does not, of course, mean that the Soviet ideological commitment to global revolution in those years was mere bravado. Had they been able to achieve their goals at a sustainable cost they would undoubtedly have done just that. But, accepting that attrition was the only possible strategy, and regarding their client states as pawns not players, they kept those client states under firm control. The breakdown of Soviet power, however, brought that discipline to an end: it allowed rogue states, often connected with terrorist movements, to emerge and set their own violent agendas.

Seco with the collapse of the Soviet Union there was also a dispersal of weapons of mass destruction and of the technologies to produce them. This has gone much further than we envisaged; and it now constitutes quite simply the most dangerous threat of our times. Yet there is still a conspiracy of silence among Western governments and analysts about it. We have, of course, known for some time about the danger of the so-called "back pack" nuclear weapon. The ability of rogue states to produce chemical and biological weapons, without detection, is a constant worry.

But it is the proliferation of advanced missiles and missile technology that has fundamentally altered the threat over the last few years. The North Koreans have developed (and continue to develop) a range of missiles which are even available for sale in a catalogue to all comers. The mail order missile business is no fantasy of science fiction: it is a fact.

There are many imponderables in precisely assessing the timescale of the threat: but they should increase our vigilance. On present trends, it is likely that the United States will be threatened by such missiles early in the next century. And, once they are available in the Middle East and North Africa, all the capitals of Europe will be within target range. We thus face the appalling possibility - for which we are at present unprepared - of an attack on a Western city involving thousands of deaths.

It is not only the terrible consequences of their actual use, but the implications of their threatened use, that should disturb us. For that threat casts doubt on the ability of the West to project its power beyond our shores. The North Korean missiles are, for example, a threat to American defence of its allies in the Pacific. And would we have taken the punitive action we did against Libya in 1986, if Gaddafi had been able to strike with his missiles at the heart of our cities? Gadaffi himself has no doubt of the answer. (And I quote him):

"If [the Americans] know that you have a deterrent force capable of hitting the United States, they would not be able to hit you. Consequently, we should build this force so that they and others will no longer think about an attack".

Of course, the Gadaffis may be wrong. We must maintain all possible diplomatic pressure against proliferation. And we should not forswear the possibility of premptive strikes. But, in face of all this our response must also urgently include ballistic missile defence.

Third, we are seeing today a fundamental shift of economic power - which will certainly have political consequences - away from the West to Asia and the Pacific Rim. Unlike the first two challenges - the emergence of rogue states and the proliferation of weaponry - this should not be regarded in itself as a threat to us. Although Asian countries may initially grow wealthier at the expense of our industries by capturing our markets, they will increasingly themselves offer new markets for our goods. All the classic arguments for free trade and against protection remain valid.

The danger, though, lies in the fact that these Asian countries, which are making such rapid economic advances, generally lack the liberal traditions which we in the West take for granted. America is worthy of its superpower status because it has been not only economically but politically liberal. Therefore the advance of American interests in particular, and the West's in general, have been more or less synonymous with the advance of liberty. By contrast, China's extraordinary economic progress is occurring despite, not because of, its political tradition - which has always been one of tyranny. China's behaviour towards Taiwan demonstrates that the economic challenge from the Far East could easily become a security challenge too.

So the task we face now is to devise a framework of international cooperation which allows these and future threats to be met successfully. It is one which requires principle and shrewdness, tenacity and flexibility, resolve to apply our strength but prudence in conserving it. Above all, it requires the unity of the West under American leadership.



This, however, is far from universally recognised. Irving Kristol once wrote that: "No modern nation has ever constructed a foreign policy that was acceptable to its intellectuals". This was true during the Cold War years. It is true now. And in recent years we have heard repeated suggestions that the West was essentially a Cold War construct, rendered irrelevant by the end of a bi-polar world.

In fact, it was - and is - nothing of the sort. The distinctive features of the Western political, judicial, social and economic system existed before communism and will continue after it. Those features are - the long-standing historic commitment to human rights, the rule of law, representative democracy, limited government, private property and tolerance.

Attempts today to suggest that American civilization is antithetical and antipathetic to European civilization, which itself is portrayed by contrast as some homogenous whole, are bad history and worse politics. American civilization began its life as a branch of the English oak. It has since had the cultures and traditions of other European countries grafted onto it. It is today the centre of an English-speaking civilization with cultural and ethnic links to every European country. And in our present age, in which communications increasingly obliterate distance, culture is a more imporant fact of life than geography.

In truth America is a European power - and must remain one. And even if we could overlook our common history and cultural ties, we dare not ignore the politics of Atlantic cooperation. Any ideology that threatens Atlantic unity is one that ultimately imperils our collective security.

Europe - Dreams and Nightmares

And here I must touch on the relationship between the Atlantic countries and the European Union. I realize that there are some amongst us here today - and among supporters of Atlanticism outside this hall - who are strong devotees of European integration.

Now, I take it as a sign of the strength of the Atlantic idea - and as a sign of its broad political appeal - that it has captured the imagination of many people who differ on other political questions.

But imagination must also be complemented by clear thinking.

Of course, some of the lesser dreams which went into Europeanism are by no means ignoble.

The dream of peace in Europe by permanent reconciliation of the old enemies, France and Germany.

The dream of reuniting a continent divided by the Iron Curtain, so that nations like the Czechs could rejoin the free West.

The dream - of a less inspirational kind - of a single European market without barriers to trade.

But the overall European federalist project, which was envisaged by some from the start but which has only in recent years come out into the open, is in truth a nightmare. For the drive towards a European superstate - with its own government, its own laws, its own currency and its own citizenship - would achieve none of the goals which enthusiasts on either side of the Atlantic claim for it.

Were it to come about, another great power would have been born - equal or nearly equal in economic strength to the United States. Does anyone suppose that such a power would not soon become a rival to America? That it would not gradually discover different interests from those of the United States? That it

ot by degrees move toward a different public philosophy - one less liberal, more statist? And that it would not eventually seek to establish its own military forces separate from those of the United States?

If this new Europe were not to follow the path to separate great power status, it would be the first such power in history to renounce its independent role. It would have pioneered a new course in self-abnegation. It would have chosen moral influence over political power. The history of Europe - bloodstained as well as idealistic - should not encourage us in these fantasies.

Europe separated from the United States would in my view be unequivocally a bad thing - bad for America, bad for Europe, and bad for the world at large.

For America, it would transform an ally into a rival - or, at the very least, permanently threaten to do so.

For the world at large, it would increase instability by dividing the West and so hasten the move to a multipolar world.

And for Europe itself, it would remove from our continent the one power which has kept the peace for fifty years - and which no European really fears.

How quickly lessons are forgotten and deductions from events distorted! Two world wars have flowed from American disengagement from Europe. By contrast, the Cold War was won because America defended Western Europe's security as its own. So talk by some continental political leaders of the possibility of war unless Europe moves towards political unity is profoundly misguided - as well as unbelievably insensitive. Only if America, as a global superpower, remains directly engaged in Europe is there a guarantee against any Continental European power asserting dominance.

The shortcomings of a common European foreign and security policy have been shown by Europe's feebleness in the former Yugoslavia. There is no reason to believe that attempts to apply a common European defence policy would be any less risible or chaotic - though they could do untold harm to the Atlantic alliance.

All this means that our energies must be directed towards strengthening NATO, which is as important in the post-Cold War world as in the circumstances of its creation. NATO's role should be expanded. It must be prepared to go out-of-area, where so many of today's threats lie. It must be prepared to accept the Czech Republic and other Central European countries as full members, giving them much needed reassurance in a time of growing fear about future instability to the East. NATO can also coordinate support for the construction of that system of global ballistic missile defence which is now an imperative requirement. And if, as I hope, there is a renewed enthusiasm for such a system in the United States, Britain and other European countries must make a fair contribution.

Atlanticism

Mr Chairman, economic integration on an Atlantic basis can nurture this vital Atlantic relationship in defence and foreign policy. It will also help to counter some unwelcome trends in European economics. For Europe today is far from being synonymous with free enterprise and open trade: it too often also stands for burdensome controls. In fact, that classic victim of Austro-Hungarian bureaucracy, the Good Soldier Sweik, might have felt gloomily at home in today's highly regulated Europe where like then (and I quote) "every day brought new instructions, directives, questions and orders".

The most practical way forward, I believe, is to merge the North American Free Trade Area with the European Community, including the countries of Central and perhaps in time Eastern Europe. Of course, in terms of pure economic analysis global free trade is the ideal. But trade cannot be divorced from politics, no matter how hard we try: it is politically realistic as well as economically beneficial to concentrate now

on ing a Trans-Atlantic Free Trade Area. Such a bloc would be able to push effectively towards global trade liberalisation. It would prevent trans-Atlantic trade wars from jeopardising wider trans-Atlantic links. It would bring our Atlantic civilisation closer together.

Finally, as part of this endeavour we must try to develop a real Atlantic political consciousness and public opinion. Of course, this will take time to emerge. Such transformations come about organically and subtly or not at all. So, I am not talking here about cultural politics. The stupidities of attempts to remould old national identities into new artificial forms - whether ruthlessly in the Soviet Union, or absurdly in the European Union - should not be repeated. But the Atlantic political consciousness is different - for three reasons.

It reflects the realities of recent history. It does not seek to eliminate national identity, it respects it. And it makes excellent strategic and economic sense.

For that we may need new institutions; we may need revived ones; but we certainly need more contact. This will follow our Atlantic Initiative and it is not the least of its advantages - and pleasures.

Spring in Prague

Ladies and gentlemen, my first visit to Prague was as Prime Minister six years ago. Memories of communism's inelegant death throes were still fresh and the joy of national liberation still sweet. Vaclav Havel's translation from prison as dissident to Palace as President seemed to symbolise not so much a new era as a new world, in which the meek - and the brave and true - would finally inherit the earth.

We in the West won a great victory in the Cold War. Let us not now forget why we fought. The mission of this Congress is to recapture that sense of purpose and clothe it with practical action. Spring in Prague is the time - and the place - to do so.



SECRETARY OF STATE

MO 7/4/1J

PERSONAL

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

Telephone 0171-21 82111/2/3

Od Press office 1 to be drawn a me to weehend is 8 March 1996

@ Back pre gh 8/3.

Dear John.

In forwarding the advance copy of Lady Thatcher's 50th anniversary Fulton Lecture, you asked us to let you have briefing notes on the threat from weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles and on our ballistic missile defence programmes. These are attached and have been agreed with FCO officials.

Subsequently we agreed that it would also be helpful to have lines to take on the other points she raises which are at variance with Government policy: defence preparedness; UNSCOM; the former Yugoslavia; and NATO enlargement.

A copy of this letter, with the briefing notes, goes to William Ehrman (FCO).

Private Secretary

J Holmes Esq 10 Downing Street

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENCE

LINES TO TAKE

- UK and Allies have identified the danger that regional instability might be compounded by proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and the means of their delivery.
- currently assess that some dozen countries of concern have or are developing such weapons, and the means to deliver them.
- shouldn't just focus on ballistic missiles; not the sole method of delivery of WMD, nor necessarily the most likely. Many others: manned aircraft, cruise missiles, artillery shells, covert delivery also need to be considered.
- both UK and NATO are addressing a full range of potential responses to such proliferation. We are not complacent.
- in NATO, the Defence Group on Proliferation will report in June on any shortfalls in NATO's capability to deal with such threats, and recommend a way ahead.
- nationally our own pre-feasibility programme looking into ballistic missile defence will be complete by the summer, providing us with the technical information necessary before reaching important decisions on any UK requirement for procurement action.
- our first priority is to prevent proliferation by political and diplomatic means, including export controls and international agreements. Indefinite extension of the NPT a major step forward in the last year. South Africa's renunciation of nuclear weapons and, together with Argentina and Brazil, ballistic missile programmes, are also important successes.

BACKGROUND

- In the United States work has been undertaken to improve the performance of the PATRIOT air defence system (used in the Gulf Conflict, with limited success, as a ballistic missile defence (BMD) system), to give it an effective capability against short/ medium range ballistic missiles. The upgraded system, PAC 3, is intended to enter service by 1999. The US is also investing in giving a limited BMD capability to its Aegis equipped air defence ships and, in a slightly longer timescale (c2002/3), in producing an area defence system - capable against longer range missiles -Theatre High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD). There is a sizeable lobby in Congress which sees a need for the US to establish a National Missile Defence (NMD) to defend against the threat from roque third world states. This idea, if implemented, would have much broader implications for the ABM Treaty/START II and overall US/Russia relations. The current US government position is to progress work to a situation where, in three years time, it would be able to decide to deploy an NMD in a further three years, should circumstances warrant it.
- 2. In parallel with US work, both the UK and NATO are also addressing the problem. NATO has tasked the Defence Group on Proliferation (DGP) (under UK/US co-chairs) with assessing NATO's requirements in this field, assessing any current shortfalls in capability against an agreed threat assessment. It is due to report to Ministers in June. It is recommending a three tier approach to acquiring a capability. This would begin with point defence systems to provide protection for deployed forces against the most immediate threat the short/medium range SCUD based missile. The second tier would add some degree of area defence taking in that against longer range missiles still in the context of deployed forces. The final tier would look at an integrated defence for Alliance territory. These tiers are in priority order.
- 3. In the UK we have been conducting a Pre-Feasibility Study (PFS), led by British Aerospace, into BMD since October 1994. It is due to report by the summer. In parallel the Ministry of Defence has been producing a policy framework within which to judge the technical outcome of the PFS. This analysis reinforces, from a UK perspective, the case for giving priority to defence of deployed forces. Both these strands will be combined with Operational Analysis and Balance of Investment work to produce recommendations to Ministers by the end of the year.

DEFENCE PREPAREDNESS

LINES TO TAKE

- We remain determined to ensure that our forces are fully capable of undertaking the commitments we ask of them and are adequately resourced to do so.
- After the end of the Cold War, we and our NATO allies carried out a restructuring of our armed forces to take account of the collapse of the Berlin Wall, the scrapping of the Warsaw Pact and the implosion of the Soviet Union. For us, and for our NATO allies, to have kept our forces at Cold War levels would have been wasteful as well as being out of keeping with the new Europe we want to build.
- We were able in doing so to take account of the many welcome developments we have seen in European security over the past few years, including reduction and reform in Russia's armed forces, the implementation of the CFE Treaty and the building of new, cooperative agreements between states who were former adversaries.
- In the restructuring programmes we put in place, we were careful to proceed through a series of measured and carefully considered steps, matched to the changes we had seen in European security.
- That process is now complete: our front line is now correctly configured for today's uncertain world. We have a smaller force structure but one which is better able to respond effectively to the demands of the changed security environment, especially in its emphasis on mobility, flexibility and rapid reaction all attributes which are needed more than ever.
- We have made clear that, irrespective of short-term changes in our commitments, we intend to maintain our military capabilities and indeed, as recent equipment orders have shown, where possible to enhance them.

SUCCESS/FAILURE OF UNSCOM

LINE TO TAKE

- UNSCOM has been one of the most successful UN operations since the Korean War. This genuinely multinational mission has destroyed Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and its ability easily to reconstruct.
- following the destruction of Iraq's existing WMD and chemical agent stockpile, a monitoring and verification regime is close to completion and will identify any attempt to regenerate WMDs. Coupled with a post-sanctions import/export surveillance programme for dual-use equipment, Saddam will be very hard-pressed to establish a rearmament capability.
- there is evidence of Iraqi attempts to subvert the UNSCOM process by retaining a residual capability to develop further WMDs and by continuing to procure equipment for them. Confident that UNSCOM has successfully thwarted Saddam's aspirations which he will find still harder to achieve when the comprehensive verification and surveillance system and import/export regime is in place.
- a series of strongly phrased Security Council Resolutions,
 firmly implemented and with overwhelming international support,
 have successfully held Saddam in check and should continue to do so.

BACKGROUND

Establishing UNSCOM. SCR 687 established conditions for the Gulf War ceasefire and called for a UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) to supervise, with the IAEA, Iraq's WMD. UNSCOM inspectors come from over 30 countries (including Russia). UK has played a prominent part in the UN effort. Ambassador Rolf Ekeus has been an active and highly successful chairman of UNSCOM from the start.

<u>Declarations.</u> Under SCR 707 Iraq has been required to make Full Final and Complete Declarations (FFCDs) of its WMD programmes for the development and procurement of prohibited weapons. Several draft versions of the FFCDs have now been received and UNSCOM is confident that they are close to telling the whole story although there are still gaps and further investigation is required, particularly on BW.

Monitoring and Verification. With destruction complete and when all FFCDs are accepted, attempts to regenerate a WMD programme will be monitored by a surveillance system of fixed site monitors, surveillance centre, and ongoing inspections. The Monitoring and Verification regime is set up under SCR 715.

Import/Export. A regime is currently being negotiated under SCRs 687 and 715 to establish an import/export regime, post-sanctions, to inhibit the capability of Iraq to acquire WMD by monitoring dual-use equipment. In principle the regime has overwhelming international support. Details are being negotiated in New York with a view to establishing the regime early, in parallel with existing sanctions restrictions to ensure a seamless turnover.

<u>Destruction</u>. A success story. Iraq's post-war residual capability has been destroyed. This includes chemicals, missiles, weapons and the sites where they were, and could be, developed. Some destruction, particularly on the BW side, is still to be complete. Destruction of the chemical stockpile gives an indication of scale: over 5,000 Sarin filled 122mm rockets and 44,000 litres of chemical agent have been destroyed.

NBC PROLIFERATION

LINES TO TAKE

- we must never underestimate the difficulty of addressing the problem of NBC proliferation. The spread of technology continues to make acquisition of these capabilities ever easier.
- but in recent years we have taken important steps to address the problem: establishment of Australia Group, the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Missile Technology Control Regime have helped to slow the flow of NBC and related missile technology to proliferators. We are continually looking at ways to increase the effectiveness of these groups.
- the Non Proliferation Treaty is the most widely adhered to Arms Control Treaty in history. When it came into force it was generally believed that without the Treaty there would be as many as 20 states with a nuclear capability. It has been extremely successful in keeping the number of nuclear states well below that number and its indefinite extension last year was a major triumph. S. Africa, Argentina, Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan good examples of states which have turned their backs on the nuclear option, while it has provided the basis for concerted international action against N Korea and Iraq.
- Chemical Weapons Convention a huge step forward, not least because of its carefully crafted and intrusive verification provisions. Its entry into force, we hope later this year, will be a major watershed, although much will depend on securing the adherence of key states, in particular Russia.
- we are pressing ahead with the strengthening of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention with urgency. In particular the development of effective Compliance Measures, in which the UK is playing a leading role, will be vital.

BACKGROUND

The BTWC, which entered into force in 1975, was the first attempt to outlaw an entire class of weapons of mass destruction. However, it lacked any means of verification, and we assess that about 10 states took advantage of the Convention's weakness to pursue illicit BW programmes. A BTWC Ad Hoc Group is seeking to rectify this problem by the negotiation of a Protocol to strengthen the Convention. Reasonable progress is being made, albeit somewhat slowly.

The CWC, signed in 1992, has a lengthy verification Annex with provision for extensive declarations and intrusive inspections. It will enter into force 180 days after the 65th ratification; probably later this year. Legislation to enable the UK to ratify is currently before the House of Lords.

The NPT came into force in 1970, and was extended indefinitely in May 1995. Only 9 countries are not party to the Treaty.

NATO ENLARGEMENT

LINES TO TAKE

- process leading to NATO enlargement has begun and is going ahead.
- NATO Enlargement Study good start. Sets out clear guidelines as to why NATO will enlarge and how it will proceed. Generally welcomed across Europe, except Russia.
- no decisions taken on who might join, or when. Ministers will consider way ahead at December 96 Ministerials, after Russian and US elections.
- large body of practical work underway within NATO and with partners on practical implications before time comes to takes decisions. Will last through 1996.
- Russia has no veto over NATO decisions. But have to take Russia's <u>legitimate</u> security interests into account. Development of a cooperative NATO/Russia relationship will be important contribution to European security as a whole.

BACKGROUND

- 1. At January 1994 Summit, NATO took decision in principle to enlarge. December 1994 Ministerials set in hand study into how and why this would happen. Published on 28 September 1995. Summary of conclusions attached.
- 2. 18 Partners (including Russia) individually briefed on conclusions. Generally welcomed by all except Russia. Endorsed by December 1995 Ministerials, which set in hand three stage process for 1996:
 - intensified bi- and multilateral consultations with those Partners who wish, building on the Study and the presentations;
 - adoption through enhancement of Partnership for Peace of a programme of practical work to strengthen ties between NATO and all Partners;
 - internal Alliance consideration of the adaptations and other measures necessary to preserve NATO's effectiveness, and in particular the resource and staffing implications.

The NATO Enlargement Study

- 1. The study concluded that enlargement should:
- enhance security and stability in the whole of Europe without drawing new dividing lines;
- reinforce the tendency towards integration and cooperation in Europe based on shared democratic values;

promote good-neighbourly relations;

strengthen the Alliance;

contribute to building a new Euro-Atlantic community by:

consolidating democratic reforms;

discouraging ethnic and territorial disputes;

- de-nationalising defence; strengthening incentives to behave responsibly; promoting democratic control of the military;
- contribute to enhanced European integration and unity,
- complementing process of enlargement of the EU; accord with purposes and principles of the United Nations;
- accord strictly with Article 10 of the Washington Treaty; strengthen the Alliance's effectiveness and cohesion;
- preserve the military capability of the Alliance;
- be part of a broad European security architecture; be on a basis that new members will be full members;
- occur through a gradual, deliberate, and transparent process.

There is no list of criteria for inviting new members.

2. Additionally, the Study:

recognises the important contribution Russia makes to

European stability and security;

- highlights the continuing key role NACC and PfP will play in European security for those countries who are not early candidates for NATO membership;
- concludes that the Alliance has no a priori requirement for the permanent basing of Alliance troops or of nuclear weapons/forces on the territory of new members;
- does not make membership of the Integrated Military Structure a prerequisite of accession, but concludes that the way in which a possible new members intends to contribute to collective defence will be an important criterion in deciding whether to invite them to join;

reaffirms the crucial linkage between membership of NATO and full membership of the WEU.

UK AND UN ROLE IN FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

LINES TO TAKE

- we believe supply of arms to <u>any</u> area of tension likely to exacerbate that tension and <u>increase risk of conflict</u>. Supply of arms to the Bosnians would not have prevented conflict, but <u>would</u> have <u>risked</u> a wider and even bloodier war.
- problem has always been how to reach political reconciliation necessary for lasting settlement. Simple military victory could not achieve that goal.
- objective has always been stop the fighting and negotiate conditions in which all Bosnians can co-exist.
- do not underestimate what was achieved by UN when there was no consensus for large scale military intervention. Hundreds of thousands of Muslims and others have been kept alive by UN efforts and the conflict contained.



MARGARET, THE LADY THATCHER, O.M., P.C., F.R.S.

HOUSE OF LORDS

London SWIA OPW

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Magaret Mdr. March 1998

Can we have a ward? (Strictly kersmad)

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I mentioned to Alan that Lady Thatcher was giving the 50th anniversary Fulton lecture. I now enclose the speech which, as you will see, is embargoed until 8.00pm Saturday, 9 March. We will be releasing it to the press on Saturday morning so I would be grateful if you could keep it to yourself until then.

Julia

Julian Seymour Director, Lady Thatcher's Private Office

John Holmes Esq

EXTRACTS FROM THE JOHN FINDLEY GREEN FOUNDATION LECTURE DELIVERED BY THE RT HON THE BARONESS THATCHER LG OM FRS AT WESTMINSTER COLLEGE, FULTON, MISSOURI ON SATURDAY, 9 MARCH 1996

"NEW THREATS FOR OLD"

Speaking in Fulton, Missouri, fifty years on from Sir Winston Churchill's Fulton "Iron Curtain" speech, Lady Thatcher said:

"The Soviet collapse has aggravated the single most awesome threat of modern times: the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. These weapons - and the ability to develop and deliver them - are today acquired by middle-income countries with modest populations such as Iraq, Iran, Libya, and Syria, - acquired sometimes from other powers like China and North Korea, but most ominously from former Soviet arsenals, or unemployed scientists, or from organised criminal rings, all via a growing international black market.

"According to Stephen J. Hadley, formerly President Bush's assistant secretary for international security policy: 'By the end of the decade, we could see over 20 countries with ballistic missiles, 9 with nuclear weapons, 10 with biological weapons, and up to 30 with chemical weapons.'

"According to other official U.S. sources, all of northeast Asia, southeast Asia, much of the Pacific and most of Russia could soon be threatened by the latest North Korean missiles. Once they are available in the Middle East and North Africa, all the capitals of Europe will be within target range; and on present trends a direct threat to American shores is likely to mature early in the next century.

"Add weapons of mass destruction to rogue states, and you have a highly toxic compound. As the CIA has pointed out: "Of the nations that have or are acquiring weapons of mass destruction, many are led by megalomaniacs and strongmen of proven inhumanity or by weak, unstable or illegitimate governments." In some instances, the potential capabilities at the command of these unpredictable figures is either equal to - or even more destructive than - the Soviet threat to the West in the 1960s. It is that serious.

"Indeed, it is even more serious than that. We in the West may have to deal with a number of possible adversaries, each with different characteristics. In some cases their mentalities differ from ours even more than did those of our old Cold War enemy. So the potential for misunderstanding is great and we must therefore be very clear in our own minds about our strategic intentions, and just as clear in signalling these to potential aggressors."

"....Given the intellectual climate in the West today, it is probably unrealistic to expect military intervention to remove the source of the threat, as for example against North Korea - except perhaps when the offender invites us to do so by invading a small neighbouring country. Even then, as we now know, our success in destroying Saddam's nuclear and chemical weapons capability was limited.

"And we cannot be sure that the efforts by inspectors of the International Atomic Energy Authority to prevent Saddam putting civil nuclear power to military uses have been any more successful; indeed, we may reasonably suspect that they have not.

"What then can we do? There is no mysterious diplomatic means to disarm a state which is not willing to be disarmed. As Frederick the Great mordantly observed: 'Diplomacy without arms is like music without instruments.' Arms control and non-proliferation measures have a role in restraining rogue states, but only when combined with other measures.

"If America and its allies cannot deal with the problem directly by pre-emptive military means, they must at least diminish the incentive for the Saddams, the Gaddafis and others to acquire new weapons in the first place. That means the West must install effective ballistic missile defence which would protect us and our armed forces, reduce or even nullify the rogue state's arsenal, and enable us to retaliate.

"So the potential contribution of ballistic missile defence to peace and stability seems to me to be very great.

"First and most obviously it promises the possibility of protection if deterrence fails; or if there is a limited and unauthorised use of nuclear missiles.

"Second, it would also preserve the capability of the West to project its power overseas.

"Third, it would diminish the dangers of one country overturning the regional balance of power by acquiring these weapons.

"Fourth, it would strengthen our existing deterrent against a hostile nuclear super-power by preserving the West's powers of retaliation.

"And fifth, it would enhance diplomacy's power to restrain proliferation by diminishing the utility of offensive systems.

"Acquiring an effective global defence against ballistic missiles is therefore a matter of the greatest importance and urgency. But the risk is that thousands of people may be killed by an attack which forethought and wise preparation might have prevented.

Lady Thatcher also called for reforms to NATO: ... "opening NATO membership to Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, and extending NATO's role so that it is able to operate out of area.

"Both reforms will require a change in NATO's existing procedures. An attack on the territory of one member must, of course, continue to be regarded unambiguously as an attack on that of all; but that principle of universality need not apply to out-of-area activities. Indeed, it needs to be recognised that a wider role for NATO cannot be achieved if every member-state has to participate in an out-of-area operation before it can go ahead. What is required are flexible arrangements which, to use a fashionable phrase, permit the creation of 'coalitions of the willing'.

"Would NATO expansion mark a new division of Europe and give Russia the right to intervene in states outside the fold? Not in the least. Among other reasons, we could hold out the possibility of admitting those countries which subsequently demonstrate a commitment to democratic values and which have trained military forces up to an acceptable standard. That would be a powerful incentive for such states to pursue the path of democratic reform and defence preparedness.

"NATO also provides the best available mechanism for co-ordinating the contribution of America's allies to a global system of ballistic missile defence: that is, one providing protection against missile attack from whatever source it comes.

"If, however, the United States is to build this global ballistic defence system with its allies, it needs the assurance that the Alliance is a permanent one resting on the solid foundations of American leadership. That raises, in my view, very serious doubts about the currently fashionable idea of a separate European 'defence identity' within the Alliance."

End

THE JOHN FINDLEY GREEN FOUNDATION LECTURE DELIVERED BY

THE RT HON THE BARONESS THATCHER LG OM FRS

AT WESTMINSTER COLLEGE, FULTON, MISSOURI ON SATURDAY, 9 MARCH 1996

"NEW THREATS FOR OLD"

Mr Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen,

When my distinguished predecessor delivered his Fulton speech, exactly fifty years ago, he journeyed hither by train in the company of the President of the United States. On the way, they played poker to pass the time. And the President won \$75 dollars - quite a sum in those non-inflationary times for an unemployed former Prime Minister. But in view of the historic impact of his speech on American opinion and subsequently on U.S. foreign policy, Sir Winston Churchill later recorded that his loss was one of the best investments he had ever made.

I did not travel here by train; nor in the company of the President of the United States; nor did I play poker. I don't have the right kind of face for it. But there is some similarity in the circumstances of fifty years ago and today.

Mr. Churchill spoke not long after the second world war. Towards the end of that great conflict, the wartime allies had forged new international institutions for post-war cooperation. There was in those days great optimism, not least in the United States, about a world without conflict presided over benevolently by bodies like the United Nations, the IMF, the World Bank and the GATT. But the high hopes reposed in them were increasingly disappointed as Stalin lowered the Iron Curtain over Eastern Europe, made no secret of his global ambitions and became antagonist rather than ally. Churchill's speech here was the first serious warning of what was afoot, and it helped to wake up the entire West.

In due course, that speech bore rich fruit in the new institutions forged to strengthen the West against Stalin's assault.

The Marshall Plan laid the foundations for Europe's postwar economic recovery.

The Truman Doctrine made plain that America would resist communist subversion of democracy.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation mobilised America's allies for mutual defence against the Soviet steamroller.

And the European Coal and Steel Community, devised to help reconcile former European enemies, evolved over time into the European Community.

Stalin had overplayed his hand. By attempting to destroy international cooperation, he succeeded in stimulating it along more realistic lines - and not just through Western "Cold War" institutions like NATO. As the West recovered and united, growing in prosperity and confidence, so it also breathed new life into some of the first set of post-war institutions like the GATT and the IMF. Without the Russians to obstruct them, these bodies helped to usher in what the Marxist historian, Eric Hobsbawm, has ruefully

christened the "Golden Age of Capitalism". The standard of living of ordinary people rose to levels that would have astonished our grandparents; there were regional wars, but no direct clash between the superpowers; and the economic, technological and military superiority of the West eventually reached such a peak that the communist system was forced into, first reform, then surrender, and finally liquidation.

None of this, however, was pre-ordained. It happened in large part because of what Churchill said here fifty years ago. He spoke at a watershed: one set of international institutions had shown themselves to be wanting; another had yet to be born. And it was his speech, not the "force" celebrated by Marx, which turned out to be the midwife of history.

Today we are at what could be a similar watershed. The long twilight struggle of the Cold War ended five years ago with complete victory for the West and for the subject peoples of the communist empire - and I very much include the Russian people in that description. It ended amid high hopes of a New World Order. But those hopes have been grievously disappointed. Somalia, Bosnia, and the rise of Islamic militancy all point to instability and conflict rather than co-operation and harmony.

The international bodies, in which our hopes were reposed anew after 1989 and 1991, have given us neither prosperity nor security. There is a pervasive anxiety about the drift of events. It remains to be seen whether this generation will respond to these threats with the imagination and courage of Sir Winston, President Truman and the wise men of those years.

THE POST-COLD-WAR WORLD

But, first, how did we get to our present straits?

Like the break-up of all empires, the break-up of the Soviet empire wrought enormous changes way beyond its borders.

Many of these were indisputably for the good:

a more co-operative superpower relationship between the U.S. and Russia;

the spread of democracy and civil society in Eastern Europe and the Baltics;

better prospects for resolving regional conflicts like those in South Africa and the Middle East, once Soviet mischief-making had been removed;

the discrediting of socialist economic planning by the exposure of its disastrous consequences in Russia and Eastern Europe;

and the removal of Soviet obstruction from the United Nations and its agencies.

These were - and still are - real benefits for which we should be grateful.

But in the euphoria which accompanied the Cold War's end - just as in what Churchill's private secretary called "the fatal hiatus" of 1944 to 1946 - we failed to notice other, less appealing, consequences of the peace.

Like a giant refrigerator that had finally broken down after years of poor maintenance, the Soviet empire in its collapse released all the ills of ethnic, social and political backwardness which it had frozen in suspended animation for so long.

- Suddenly, border disputes between the successor states erupted into small wars in, for instance, Armenia and Georgia.
- Within these new countries the ethnic divisions aggravated by Soviet policies of Russification and forced population transfer produced violence, instability, and quarrels over citizenship.
- The absence of the legal and customary foundations of a free economy led to a distorted "robber capitalism," one dominated by the combined forces of the mafia and the old communist nomenklatura, with little appeal to ordinary people.
- The moral vacuum created by communism in everyday life was filled for some by a revived Orthodox Church, but for others by the rise in crime, corruption, gambling, and drug addiction all contributing to a spreading ethic of luck, a belief that economic life is a zero-sum game, and an irrational nostalgia for a totalitarian order without totalitarian methods.
- And, in these Hobbesian conditions, primitive political ideologies which have been extinct in Western Europe and America for two generations surfaced and flourished, all peddling fantasies of imperial glory to compensate for domestic squalor.

No one can forecast with confidence where this will lead. I believe that it will take long years of civic experience and patient institution-building for Russia to become a normal society. Neo-communists may well return to power in the immediate future, postponing normality; but whoever wins the forthcoming Russian elections will almost certainly institute a more assertive foreign policy, one less friendly to the U.S.

NEW THREATS FOR OLD

A revival of Russian power will create new problems - just when the world is struggling to cope with problems which the Soviet collapse has itself created outside the old borders of the USSR.

When Soviet power broke down, so did the control it exercised, however fitfully and irresponsibly, over rogue states like Syria, Iraq and Gadaffi's Libya. They have in effect been released to commit whatever mischief they wish without bothering to

check with their arms supplier and bank manager. Note that Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait took place after the USSR was gravely weakened and had ceased to be Iraq's protector.

The Soviet collapse has also aggravated the single most awesome threat of modern times: the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. These weapons - and the ability to develop and deliver them - are today acquired by middle-income countries with modest populations such as Iraq, Iran, Libya, and Syria, - acquired sometimes from other powers like China and North Korea, but most ominously from former Soviet arsenals, or unemployed scientists, or from organised criminal rings, all via a growing international black market.

According to Stephen J. Hadley, formerly President Bush's assistant secretary for international security policy: "By the end of the decade, we could see over 20 countries with ballistic missiles, 9 with nuclear weapons, 10 with biological weapons, and up to 30 with chemical weapons."

According to other official U.S. sources, all of northeast Asia, southeast Asia, much of the Pacific and most of Russia could soon be threatened by the latest North Korean missiles. Once they are available in the Middle East and North Africa, all the capitals of Europe will be within target range; and on present trends a direct threat to American shores is likely to mature early in the next century.

Add weapons of mass destruction to rogue states, and you have a highly toxic compound. As the CIA has pointed out: "Of the nations that have or are acquiring weapons of mass destruction, many are led by megalomaniacs and strongmen of proven inhumanity or by weak, unstable or illegitimate governments." In some instances, the potential capabilities at the command of these unpredictable figures is either equal to - or even more destructive than - the Soviet threat to the West in the 1960s. It is that serious.

Indeed, it is even more serious than that. We in the West may have to deal with a number of possible adversaries, each with different characteristics. In some cases their mentalities differ from ours even more than did those of our old Cold War enemy. So the potential for misunderstanding is great and we must therefore be very clear in our own minds about our strategic intentions, and just as clear in signalling these to potential aggressors.

And that is only the gravest threat. There are others.

Within the Islamic world the Soviet collapse undermined the legitimacy of radical secular regimes and gave an impetus to the rise of radical Islam. Radical Islamist movements now constitute a major revolutionary threat not only to the Saddams and Assads but also to conservative Arab regimes, who are allies of the West. Indeed they challenge the very idea of a Western economic presence. Hence, the random

acts of violence designed to drive American companies and tourists out of the Islamic world.

In short, the world remains a very dangerous place, indeed one menaced by more unstable and complex threats than a decade ago. But because the risk of total nuclear annihilation has been removed, we in the West have lapsed into an alarming complacency about the risks that remain. We have run down our defences and relaxed our guard. And to comfort ourselves that we were doing the right thing, we have increasingly placed our trust in international institutions to safeguard our future. But international bodies have not generally performed well. Indeed, we have learned that they cannot perform well unless we refrain from utopian aims, give them practical tasks, and provide them with the means and backing to carry them out.

INSTITUTIONAL FAILURE

The United Nations

Perhaps the best example of utopian aims is multilateralism; this is the doctrine that international actions are most justified when they are untainted by the national interests of the countries which are called upon to carry them out. Multilateralism briefly became the doctrine of several Western powers in the early nineties, when the United Nations Security Council was no longer hamstrung by the Soviet veto. It seemed to promise a new age in which the UN, would act as world policeman to settle regional conflicts.

Of course, there was always a fair amount of hypocrisy embedded in multilateralist doctrine. The Haiti intervention by U.S. forces acting under a United Nations mandate, for instance, was defended as an exercise in restoring a Haitian democracy that had never existed; but it might be better described in the language of Clausewitz as the continuation of American immigration control by other means. But honest multilateralism without the spur of national interest has led to intervention without clear aims.

No-one could criticise the humane impulse to step in and relieve the suffering created by the civil war in Somalia. But it soon became clear that the humanitarian effort could not enjoy long-term success without a return to civil order. And no internal force was available to supply this.

Hence, the intervention created a painful choice: either the UN would make Somalia into a colony and spend decades engaged in "nation-building", or the UN forces would eventually withdraw and Somalia revert to its prior anarchy. Since America and the UN were unwilling to govern Somalia for thirty years, it followed that the job of feeding the hungry and helping the sick must be left to civilian aid agencies and private charities.

Conclusion: Military intervention without an attainable purpose creates as many problems as it solves.

This was further demonstrated in the former Yugoslavia, where early action to arm the victims of aggression so that they could defend themselves would have been far more effective than the UN's half-hearted, multilateral intervention. A neutral peacekeeping operation, lightly-armed, in an area where there was no peace to keep, served mainly to consolidate the gains from aggression. Eventually, the UN peacekeepers became hostages, used by the aggressor to deter more effective action against him. All in all, a sorry episode, ended by the Croatian army, NATO air power and American diplomacy.

The combined effect of interventions in Bosnia, Somalia and, indeed, Rwanda has been to shake the self-confidence of key Western powers and to tarnish the reputation of the UN. And now a dangerous trend is evident: as the Haiti case shows, the Security Council seems increasingly prepared to widen the legal basis for intervention. We are seeing, in fact, that classically dangerous combination - a growing disproportion between theoretical claims and practical means.

Ballistic Missile Defence

Compare this hubris with the failure to act effectively against the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, and the means to deliver them. As I have already argued, these are falling into dangerous hands.

Given the intellectual climate in the West today, it is probably unrealistic to expect military intervention to remove the source of the threat, as for example against North Korea - except perhaps when the offender invites us to do so by invading a small neighbouring country. Even then, as we now know, our success in destroying Saddam's nuclear and chemical weapons capability was limited.

And we cannot be sure that the efforts by inspectors of the International Atomic Energy Authority to prevent Saddam putting civil nuclear power to military uses have been any more successful; indeed, we may reasonably suspect that they have not.

What then can we do? There is no mysterious diplomatic means to disarm a state which is not willing to be disarmed. As Frederick the Great mordantly observed: "Diplomacy without arms is like music without instruments." Arms control and non-proliferation measures have a role in restraining rogue states, but only when combined with other measures.

If America and its allies cannot deal with the problem directly by pre-emptive military means, they must at least diminish the incentive for the Saddams, the Gaddafis and others to acquire new weapons in the first place. That means the West

must install effective ballistic missile defence which would protect us and our armed forces, reduce or even nullify the rogue state's arsenal, and enable us to retaliate.

So the potential contribution of ballistic missile defence to peace and stability seems to me to be very great.

First and most obviously it promises the possibility of protection if deterrence fails; or if there is a limited and unauthorised use of nuclear missiles.

Second, it would also preserve the capability of the West to project its power overseas.

Third, it would diminish the dangers of one country overturning the regional balance of power by acquiring these weapons.

Fourth, it would strengthen our existing deterrent against a hostile nuclear super-power by preserving the West's powers of retaliation.

And fifth, it would enhance diplomacy's power to restrain proliferation by diminishing the utility of offensive systems.

Acquiring an effective global defence against ballistic missiles is therefore a matter of the greatest importance and urgency. But the risk is that thousands of people may be killed by an attack which forethought and wise preparation might have prevented.

It is, of course, often the case in foreign affairs that statesmen are dealing with problems for which there is no ready solution. They must manage them as best they can.

The European Union and Central Europe

That might be true of nuclear proliferation, but no such excuses can be made for the European Union's activities at the end of the Cold War. It faced a task so obvious and achievable as to count as an almost explicit duty laid down by History: namely, the speedy incorporation of the new Central European democracies - Poland, Hungary and what was then Czechoslovakia - within the EU's economic and political structures.

Early entry into Europe was the wish of the new democracies; it would help to stabilize them politically and smooth their transition to market economies; and it would ratify the post-Cold-War settlement in Europe. Given the stormy past of that region - the inhabitants are said to produce more history than they can consume locally - everyone should have wished to see it settled economically and politically inside a stable European structure.

Why was this not done? Why was every obstacle put in the way of the new market democracies? Why were their exports subject to the kind of absurd quotas that have until now been reserved for Japan? And why is there still no room at the Inn?

The answer is that the European Union was too busy contemplating its own navel. Both the Commission and a majority of member-governments were committed to an early "deepening" of the EU, (that is, centralising more power in the EU's supranational institutions), and they felt that a "widening" of it, (that is, admitting new members) would complicate, obstruct or even prevent this process.

So, while the "deepening" went ahead, they arranged to keep the Central Europeans out by the diplomats' favourite tactic: negotiations to admit them. In making this decision, the European Union put extravagant and abstract schemes ahead of practical necessities in the manner of doctrinaire "projectors" from Jonathan Swift down to the present.

And with the usual disastrous results. The "visionary" schemes of "deepening" either have failed or are failing.

The "fixed" exchange rates of the European Exchange Rate Mechanism have made the yo-yo seem like a symbol of rigidity; they crashed in and out of it in September 1992 and have shown no signs of obeying the diktats of Brussels since then.

The next stage of monetary union agreed at Maastricht - the single currency - is due in 1999 when member-states will have to achieve strict budgetary criteria. With three years to go, only Luxembourg fully meets these tests; the attempts by other countries to meet them on time have pushed up unemployment, hiked interest rates, depressed economic activity, and created civil unrest.

And for what? Across the continent businessmen and bankers increasingly question the *economic* need for a single currency at all. It is essentially a political symbol - the currency of a European state and people which don't actually exist, except perhaps in the mind of a Brussels bureaucrat.

Yet these symbols were pursued at a real political cost in Central Europe. The early enthusiasm for the West and Western institutions began to wane. Facing tariff barriers and quotas in Western Europe, the Central Europeans began to erect their own. And those politicians who had bravely pursued tough-minded policies of economic reform, believing that they were following the advice of European leaders, found themselves left in the lurch when the going got rough. Only the Czech Republic under the leadership of Vaclav Klaus has remained on course to a normal society.

In the last few years, the democratic reformers have fallen one by one in the former communist satellites, to be replaced by neo-communist governments promising the impossible: transition to a market economy without tears. This is a tragedy in itself,

and an avoidable one. But with Russia lurching politically into a more authoritarian nationalist course, and the question of Central Europe's membership of NATO still unsettled, it has more than merely economic implications.

NATO

Which brings me to my last example of institutional failure, mercifully a partial one counterbalanced by some successes, namely NATO. NATO is a very fine military instrument; it won the Cold War when it had a clear military doctrine. But an instrument cannot define its own purposes, and since the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, Western statesmen have found it difficult to give NATO a clear one.

Indeed, they have shilly-shallied on the four major questions facing the Alliance:

Should Russia be regarded as a potential threat or a partner? (Russia may be about to answer that in a clearer fashion than we would like).

Should NATO turn its attention to "out of area" where most of the post-Cold War threats, such as nuclear proliferation, now lie?

Should NATO admit the new democracies of Central Europe as full members with full responsibilities as quickly as prudently possible?

Should Europe develop its own "defence identity" in NATO, even though this is a concept driven entirely by politics and has damaging military implications?

Such questions tend to be decided not in the abstract, not at inter-governmental conferences convened to look into the crystal ball, but on the anvil of necessity in the heat of crisis. And that is exactly what happened in the long-running crisis over Bosnia.

At first, the supporters of a European foreign policy and a European defence identity declared the former Yugoslavia "Europe's crisis" and asked the U.S. to keep out. The U.S. was glad to do so. But the European Union's farcical involvement only made matters worse and, after a while, was effectively abandoned.

Then the United Nations became involved, and asked NATO to be its military agent in its peacekeeping operations.

Finally, when the UN-NATO personnel were taken hostages, the U.S. intervened, employed NATO air-power with real effect, forced the combatants to the conference table, for better or worse imposed an agreement on them, and now heads a large NATO contingent that is enforcing it.

In the course of stamping its authority on events, the U.S. also stamped its authority on the European members of NATO. And since the logistical supply chain goes through Hungary, it drew the Central Europeans into NATO operations in a small way. Whether NATO will apply the logic of this crisis in future strategic planning remains to be seen; but for the armchair theorists of a closed, passive and divided NATO, Bosnia has been no end of a lesson.

These various institutional failures are worrying enough in their own terms and in our own times. If we look ahead still further to the end of the twenty first century, however, an alarming and unstable future is on the cards.

The West and the Rest

Consider the number of medium-to-large states in the world that have now embarked on a free-market revolution: India, China, Brazil, possibly Russia. Add to these the present economic great powers: the USA and Japan, and, if the federalists get their way, a European superstate with its own independent foreign and defence policy separate from, and perhaps inimical to, the United States. What we see here in 2096 is an unstable world in which there are more than half a dozen "great powers", all with their own clients, all vulnerable if they stand alone, all capable of increasing their power and influence if they form the right kind of alliance, and all engaged willy-nilly in perpetual diplomatic manoeuvres to ensure that their relative positions improve rather than deteriorate. In other words, 2096 might look like 1914 played on a somewhat larger stage.

That need not come to pass if the Atlantic Alliance remains as it is today: in essence, America as the dominant power surrounded by allies which generally follow its lead. Such are the realities of population, resources, technology and capital that if America remains the dominant partner in a united West, and militarily engaged in Europe, then the West can continue to be the dominant power in the world as a whole.

WHAT IS TO BE DONE?

I believe that what is now required is a new and imaginative Atlantic initiative. Its purpose must be to redefine Atlanticism in the light of the challenges I have been describing. There are rare moments when history is open and its course changed by means such as these. We may be at just such a moment now.

Reviving the Alliance

First, security. As my discussion of the Bosnian crisis demonstrated, the key lies in two reforms: opening NATO membership to Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, and extending NATO's role so that it is able to operate out of area.

Both reforms will require a change in NATO's existing procedures. An attack on the territory of one member must, of course, continue to be regarded unambiguously as

an attack on that of all; but that principle of universality need not apply to out-ofarea activities. Indeed, it needs to be recognised that a wider role for NATO cannot be achieved if every member-state has to participate in an out-of-area operation before it can go ahead. What is required are flexible arrangements which, to use a fashionable phrase, permit the creation of "coalitions of the willing".

Would NATO expansion mark a new division of Europe and give Russia the right to intervene in states outside the fold? Not in the least. Among other reasons, we could hold out the possibility of admitting those countries which subsequently demonstrate a commitment to democratic values and which have trained military forces up to an acceptable standard. That would be a powerful incentive for such states to pursue the path of democratic reform and defence preparedness.

NATO also provides the best available mechanism for co-ordinating the contribution of America's allies to a global system of ballistic missile defence: that is, one providing protection against missile attack from whatever source it comes.

If, however, the United States is to build this global ballistic defence system with its allies, it needs the assurance that the Alliance is a permanent one resting on the solid foundations of American leadership. That raises, in my view, very serious doubts about the currently fashionable idea of a separate European "defence identity" within the Alliance.

Essentially, this is another piece of political symbolism, associated among European federalists with long-term aspirations for a European state with its own foreign and defence policy. It would create the armed forces of a country which does not exist. But, like the single currency, it would have damaging practical consequences in the here and now.

In the first place, it contains the germs of a major future Trans-Atlantic rift. And in the second, it has no military rationale or benefits. Indeed, it has potentially severe military drawbacks. Even a French general admitted that during the Gulf War the U.S. forces were "the eyes and ears" of the French troops. Without America, NATO is a political talking shop, not a military force.

Nor is that likely to be changed in any reasonably foreseeable circumstances. Defence expenditure has been falling sharply in almost all European states in recent years. Even if this process were now halted and reversed, it would take many years before Europe could hope to replace what America presently makes available to the Alliance by way of command and control facilities, airlift capacity, surveillance and sheer fire-power. Defence policy cannot be built upon political symbolism and utopian projects of nation-building which ignore or even defy military logic and fiscal prudence.

Trans-Atlantic Free Trade

But even a vigorous and successful NATO would not survive indefinitely in a West divided along the lines of trade and economics. One of the great threats to Atlantic unity in recent years has been the succession of trade wars, ranging from steel to pasta, which have strained relations across the Atlantic. So the second element of a New Atlantic Initiative must take the form of a concerted programme to liberalise trade, thereby stimulating growth and creating badly needed new jobs. More specifically, we need to move towards a Trans-Atlantic Free Trade Area, uniting the North American Free Trade Area with a European Union enlarged to incorporate the Central European countries.

I realise that this may not seem the most propitious moment in American politics to advocate a new trade agreement. But the arguments against free trade between advanced industrial countries and poor Third World ones - even if I accepted them, which I do not - certainly do not apply to a Trans-Atlantic Free Trade deal.

Such a trade bloc would unite countries with similar incomes and levels of regulation. It would therefore involve much less disruption and temporary job loss—while still bringing significant gains in efficiency and prosperity. This has been recognised by American labour unions, notably by Mr Lane Kirkland in a series of important speeches. And it would create a trade bloc of unparalleled wealth (and therefore influence) in world trade negotiations.

Of course, economic gains are only half of the argument for a TAFTA. It would also provide a solid economic underpinning to America's continued military commitment to Europe, while strengthening the still fragile economies and political structures of Central Europe. It would be, in effect, the economic equivalent of NATO and, as such, the second pillar of Atlantic unity under American leadership.

Political Foundations

Yet, let us never forget that there is a third pillar - the political one.

The West is not just some Cold War construct, devoid of significance in today's freer, more fluid world. It rests upon distinctive values and virtues, ideas and ideals, and above all upon a common experience of liberty.

True, the Asia-Pacific may be fast becoming the new centre of global economic power. Quite rightly, both the United States and Britain take an ever closer interest in developments there.

But it is the West - above all perhaps, the English-speaking peoples of the West - that has formed that system of liberal democracy which is politically dominant and which we all know offers the best hope of global peace and prosperity. In order to

uphold these things, the Atlantic political relationship must be constantly nurtured and renewed.

So we must breathe new life into the consultative political institutions of the West such as the Atlantic Council and the North Atlantic Assembly. All too often, they lack influence and presence in public debate. Above all, however - loth as I am to suggest another gathering of international leaders - I would propose an annual summit of the heads of government of all the North Atlantic countries, under the chairmanship of the President of the United States.

What all this adds up to is *not* another supra-national entity. That would be unwieldy and unworkable. It is something more subtle, but I hope more durable: a form of Atlantic partnership which attempts to solve common problems while respecting the sovereignty of the member States. In the course of identifying those problems and co-operating to solve them, governments would gradually discover that they were shaping an Atlantic public opinion and political consciousness.

FIFTY YEARS ON

The reaction, fifty years ago, to that earlier Fulton speech was swift, dramatic and, at first, highly critical. Indeed, to judge from the critics you would have imagined that it was not Stalin but Churchill who had drawn down the Iron Curtain.

But for all the immediate disharmony, it soon became evident that Fulton had struck a deeper chord. It resulted in a decisive shift in opinion: by May, the opinion polls recorded that 83 per cent of Americans now favoured the idea of a permanent alliance between the United States and Britain, which was subsequently broadened into NATO.

By speaking as and when he did, Churchill guarded against a repetition of the withdrawal of America from Europe which, after 1919, allowed the instability to emerge that plunged the whole world - including America - into a second war.

Like my uniquely distinguished predecessor, I too may be accused of alarmism in pointing to new dangers to which present institutions - and attitudes - are proving unequal. But, also like him, I have every confidence in the resources and the values of the Western civilisation we are defending.

In particular, I believe (to use Churchill's words) that: "If all British moral and material forces and convictions are joined with your own in fraternal association, the highroads of the future will be clear, not only for us but for all, not only for our time, but for a century to come".

That at least has not changed in fifty years.

From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY



cc - AA JH.

Home Office QUEEN ANNE'S GATE LONDON SWIH 9AT 16 FEB 1996

Der Rachael

The Home Secretary was very concerned last Wednesday's (Daily Mirror's) report about the bullets found at Lady Thatcher's home. He would like our Director of Communications to write to the Editor on the lines of the attached draft. Do you have any difficulties with this?

Perhaps you could let Ken Sutton know on Monday?

COLIN HARNETT

DRAFT

P Morgan Esq Editor Daily Mirror One Canada Square Canary Wharf London E14 5AP

The Daily Mirror, on Wednesday gave the address and carried a picture of Lady Thatcher's home. I realise that her home has been identified before, but the fact remains that needlessly bringing the details to public attention increases the risks she faces.

I am sure you would agree that omitting the full address would not have detracted from the story. 'London home' would have been sufficient.

I would be grateful for your assurance that future editions of the Daily Mirror will not carry such details which can threaten the personal safety of individuals in public life who may be at risk.

If you are ever in any doubt about the type of information which poses a risk, I would be happy to arrange advice for you.



RESTRICTED

HOME OFFICE
QUEEN ANNE'S GATE
LONDON SWIH 9AT

14 FEB 1998

Dear Machael

DAILY MIRROR: LADY THATCHER

You may find it helpful to have a copy of the briefing provided for the Home Secretary's use in today's Third Reading debate on the Security Service Bill about the front-page story on Baroness Thatcher.

COLIN HARNETT

Ms Rachael Reynolds

RESTRICTED

SECURITY SERVICE BILL: THIRD READING

Mre Thatcher: Bullets found opposite her private residence

Lines to take

General

I confirm that two live rounds were found on Monday 12 February in the gutter on the opposite side of the Square where Lady Thatcher lives. This is being investigated by the Metropolitan Police. A number of other measures have been taken. I understand that there is so far no evidence to link the find with any planned attack on Lady Thatcher.

Failure of Security?

The circumstances of the find are being investigated. Nothing has been established to suggest any security failing.

Level of Protection?

It is not appropriate to discuss the level of protection afforded to individuals.

Background

On Monday afternoon, 12 February, two council workmen, on the opposite side of the square where Lady Thatcher lives, found 2 \times 9mm live rounds such as might be used in a hand gun.

(They are described as "full jacketed". A point to note is that while, at present, the police operationally use "semi jacketed" rounds, they have used "full jacketed" in the past and intend to do so in the future. Apparently the full jacketed bullet is more

RESTRICTED

likely to pass through the individual than is the semi jacketed).

The bullets were found in the gutter next to a drain which had recently been pumped clean by the Council. There is a question mark, therefore, whether they have been dredged up by the pump.

The find is now being investigated:

- make and time of manufacture
- whether any markings are of significance.

The bullets are believed to have been in a gun at some point. One possibility indeed is that they may have been dropped by officers of the Diplomatic Protection Group who provide static protection for Lady Thatcher and patrol the area. However, it is all too early to say.

Protection

Police patrolling in the area has been increased. There has been no increase in the personal and static protection squads but there is heightened awareness.

A full search of the area was undertaken yesterday including three empty flats near where the bullets were found. No evidence to suggest any targeting of Lady Thatcher.

The police are also checking for registered gun holders in the area in case this provides a match between gun and bullets.

RESTRICTED - PERSONAL

From : Alex Allan Date : 9 January 1996

PRIME MINISTER

fle

cc : Christopher Meyer Howell James

LADY THATCHER

You may have already got this information from Howell (Tim Bell rang him and Julian Seymour rang me).

The Times tomorrow seem set to run a story that Lady Thatcher believes it is inevitable that the Conservative Party will lose the next election. They must have some source, though Lady T's office deny she has said this or believes it.

She has issued the attached statement to The Times denying the story.

She is delivering the Keith Joseph Memorial Lecture on Thursday evening (which is why she isn't coming to Paris for the Mitterrand service). This is described as a big set-piece. It will restate her views on Europe and will admit there are areas where she and you have differed. But—according to her office—it will be very supportive of you and of your position. It also contains a long and detailed criticism of Tony Blair's recent speeches and non-policies. We should see a copy of the finished version on Thursday morning.

On Saturday she is setting off on a trip to the Far-East, to Hong Kong, Taiwan and the Philippines.

ALEX ALLAN

Quote given by Baroness Thatcher's office to The Times

"It is certainly not inevitable that the Labour Party will win the next general election and in view of the lack of substance in the leader of the Opposition's recent speeches, Lady Thatcher believes that the chances of the Conservative Party winning the next election improve by the day."

9 January 1996



MARGARET, THE LADY THATCHER, O.M., P.C., F.R.S.

FACSIMILE

To: Alex Allan

From: Julian Seymour

Date: 4th January 1995

Our Fax: (44) 171 259 5366

Our Tel: (44) 171 235 6600


No. of Pages (including this one): one four

MESSAGE

(John Holmes Cof Christopher Meyer. Oh dear - I swell trouble "The Gulf War" Programme Four - "The Ragged End"

10.17.15 LADY THATCHER UK PRIME MINISTER 1979-90

Well I was no longer there, I think I might have argued it very differently if I had been, and very firmly. Er and I think that I might have said, look, em, maybe this thing would never have got started unless I was a firm enough ally to do it, and I can only tell you that in my experience, we've got to do the job properly, before we finish.



10.32.20

LADY THATCHER

UK PRIME MINISTER

1979-90

10.32.26

They should have surrendered their equipment, the lot.

When you are dealing with a dictator, he has got not only to be defeated, well and truly, but he's got to be seen to be defeated by his own people, so that they identify the privations they've had to go through with his actions. And we didn't do that.

"The Gulf War" Programme Four - "The Ragged End"

10.55.26

LADY THATCHER

UK PRIME MINISTER

1979-90

There is the aggressor, Saddam Hussein, still in power. There is the President of the United States, no longer in power. There is the Prime Minister of Great Britain who did quite a lot to get things there, no longer in power. I wonder who won?

Posma From: Alex Allan Date: 29 September 1995 PRIME MINISTER THE SECOND THATCHER DINNER

Julian Seymour has sent me the attached guest list for the Thatcher dinner at Claridges and asked who you and Norma would like to sit next to. The format is tables of 12, and the plan is for you not to be at the same table as the Thatchers and the Queen and Prince Philip (and for husbands and wives not to be on the same table).

My initial thought was that, in the spirit of healing, you might like to sit between Rosemary Lamont and Christine Hamilton < joke! >.

Boil one.

Arabella has consulted Norma, whose inclination was to suggest Dukie Hussey, Dwin Bramall and Freddie Forsyth as her preferences.

What preferences do you have? Possibilities that struck me (in alphabetical order) were: Lacly Luners.

Mary Archer

Aliai Forte

Carina Frost

Sue Hussey

Madelaine Lloyd-Webber

Diana Silk

but you may well have other thoughts.

frana felle

ALEX ALLAN

210 F

Acceptances for Claridge's 16 October 1995

Sir Denis and Lady Thatcher

HM The Queen and Prince Philip

The Prime Minister and Mrs John Major

Mr & Mrs Mark Thatcher

Miss Carol Thatcher and Mr Marco Grass

Lady Runcie

- Sir Antony and Lady Acland

The Rt Hon Jonathan Aitken & Mrs Aitken

Mr & Mrs Alex Allan

The Lord Archer of Weston-super-Mare and Dr Mary Archer

Mr & Mrs John Asprey

Mr & Mrs Christopher Bailey

Mr Frederick Barclay

Mr David Barclay

- Mr & Mrs Eddie Bell

Sir Tim and Lady Bell

Mr & Mrs Conrad Black

Countess Albina du Boisvouvray

= Field Marshall The Lord Bramall and Lady Bramall MM

Lord and Lady Brightman

Mr & Mrs Theodore Burgdorf

Sir Robin and Lady Butler

— Mr & Mrs Michael Caine

Mrs John Camden 48

Sir John and Lady Carter

Mr & Mrs Bill Cash

Sir George and Lady Christie

The Lord and Clark of Kempston and Lady Clark

Mr & Mrs Algy Cluff

Sir Alan and Lady Cockshaw

Mr & Mrs Ray Crawford

The Lord Deedes of Aldington and Lady Deedes

The Baroness Dunn & Mr Michael Thomas

Sir Robert and Lady Jane Fellowes

Mr & Mrs Frederick Forsyth

L- Bryte Downer.

Lord and Lady Forte Sir David Frost and Lady Carina Frost Mr & Mrs Jonathan Gaisman

- Mr & Mrs Ron Gerard
 Mr & Mrs Michael Gerson
 Sir James Goldsmith and Lady Annabel Goldsmith
 The Rt Hon the Earl of Gowrie and Countess Gowrie
- Sir Archibald and Lady Hamilton Mr & Mrs Neil Hamilton Lord & Lady Hamilton of Dalzell Lord and Lady Hanson Dr Robin Harris Lord Harris of High Cross and Lady Harris
- Sir Stephen Hastings and Lady Hastings
 Lord and Lady Hesketh
 Mr & Mrs Ron Hobson
 The Rev and Mrs Paul Hulme
- Sir Marmaduke Hussey and Lady Susan Hussey MM
 Mr Marvin Josephson
 Mr & Mrs Martin Kaindl
 Mr & Mrs Henry Keswick
 The Lord King of Wartnaby and Lady King
 Mrs Joy Koppier
 The Rt Hon Norman Lamont MP and Mrs Lamont
 Lord Lane of Horsell
- Sir Geoffrey and Lady Leigh
- Sir Andrew and Lady Lloyd-Webber
 Mr Noel Malcolm
 Lady McAlpine
 Prof & Mrs Gary McDowell
 The Lord Menuhin and Lady Menuhin
- Sir Ronald Millar MM
 Mrs Phee Miller
 Professor Patrick Minford and Mrs Minford
- Sir Fergus and Lady Montgomery
 The Hon Mary Anne Morrison

The Earl and Countess of Onslow

Baroness Oppenheim-Barnes and Mr John Barnes

Lord and Lady Parkinson

Lord Pearson of Rannoch

Sir Ian and Lady Percival

Mr & Mrs Rupert Ponsonby

Mr & Mrs Michael Portillo (MP may return to HoC briefly during dinner)

The Hon Charles and Mrs Price

Mr & Mrs John Profumo

The Rt Hon John Redwood MP and Mrs Redwood

Sir Gordon Reece

Lord and Lady Rees-Mogg

- Sir Robin and Lady Renwick

Sir Michael Richardson

Mr & Mrs Victor Roberts

Mr Patrick Robertson

Sir Evelyn and Lady de Rothschild

Mr & Mrs Johann Rupert

Lady Aliki Russell

Mr & Mrs Richard Ryder

Mr & Mrs Wafic Said

Mr & Mrs Julian Seymour

The Hon William Shawcross and The Hon Mrs Olga Polizzi

Lady Sieff

The Hon David and Mrs Sieff

Mr & Mrs Dennis Silk

Sir Peter and Lady Smithers

Mr & Mrs Thomas Sopwith

Lord and Lady Sterling of Plaistow

Mr Jocelyn Stevens and Mrs Vivien Duffield

Professor and Mrs Norman Stone

Mr Rana Talwar and Ms Renuka Singh

Mr David Tang

Lord and Lady Tebbit

Dame Sue Tinson

Mr & Mrs Steve Tipping

Lord and Lady Wakeham
Prof Sir Alan and Lady Walters
Lord and Lady Westbury
Mr & Mrs John Whittingdale
Lord and Lady Wolfson of Sunningdale
Mr & Mrs Peter Woo
Mr & Mrs David Wright
Lord and Lady Wyatt
Major-General Sir Brian and Lady Wyldebore-Smith
Sir Peter and Lady Yarranton
Mr and Mrs Paul Zetter

CLOSED UNDER THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 2009 Replies Outstanding

Dr Pauline Chan Mrs Kathy Ford The Hon Clare Lowther Mr John & Lady Sarah Aspinall Mr & Mrs Bruce Gyngell Refusals

HRH Princess Alexandra and Sir Angus Ogilvy

Lord Runcie

The Hon Walter Annenberg and Mrs Annenberg

The Rt Hon Kenneth Baker and Mrs Kenneth Baker

Mrs Freddie Barclay

Mrs David Barclay

Mr and Mrs Geoffrey Bible

Mr John Camden

Dr & Mrs Chang

Lord and Lady Colyton

Lord & Lady Cranborne

Mr & Mrs William Cullen

Mr & Mrs Tim Forbes

Sir Rocco and Lady Forte

Sir Donald Gosling

Sir Bernard and Lady Ingham

Mrs Marvin Josephson

Sir Emmanuel and Lady Kaye

Lord and Lady Kingsdown

Exec Dep President de Klerk and Mrs de Klerk

Lord and Lady Laing

Captain John Latsis

Mr Li Ka-Shing

The Hon Mr & Mrs Peter Lilley

Lord McAlpine

Mr & Mrs Rupert Murdoch

Mr & Mrs Harry Oppenheimer

Mr John O'Sullivan

Lord and Lady Palumbo

The Rt Hon Christopher and Mrs Patten

Sir Laurens and Lady van der Post

Sir Charles and Lady Powell

Lady Richardson

Lord Shawcross

Lord Sieff

Mr & Mrs John Snow

Dr & Mrs Anna Sohmen

Mr & Mrs Tung

Mr & Mrs Len Whitting

DRAFT

STRICTLY PRIVATE.

HMQ

John Profumo

Sir Denis

Alison Wakeham

Romilly McAlpine

Lord Bramall

Lord Hanson

Ann Hamilton

Lydia Dunn

Bill Deedes

Prince Philip

Lady Thatcher

Reserves: Mary Christie Lady Runcie 35 CHESHAM PLACE LONDON SW1X 8HB TEL: 071 235 6600 FAX: 071 259 5366

Sept 274.

Seer Alen, hand In hall your help in againing Last night! Thoughoutly Lacentul party. The Photoler adved it, as did everyne to when I have spoken ! Enclose the acceptance list and draft plan for LT's table for October 16th. The PM will be at the deat door tesse (all hand & for 12 people). Could he Meare Chrose a) who he would like a cither side and an indicenting of who else he would

like out the table? thursands & him are not with the osman enception of the Martcher, to se a the same table. Could dry May've also pich he Comparious and digget who the bould like a her table. I have to have a start on the Many New Treedong Lo I would be V. grateful of You Could come back to me before they think July mi Rs. Who would my and how hife like?



ce Tecs Mism (valle)

10 DOWNING STREET LONDON SW1A 2AA

The Prime Minister and Mrs. Major thank
Sir Denis Thatcher Bt MBE TD and the Rt. Hon. The
Baroness Thatcher LG OM FRS for their kind
invitation for Monday 16 October and have much
pleasure in accepting.

26 September 1995

The Rt Hon The Prime Ninister and Mrs Major

P30.8

Sir Denis Thatcher Bt MBE TD

The Pit Hon The Baroness Thatcher 1.G OM FRS at Home

P. Quen. Monday, 16th October 1995

RS. V. D. 35 Chesham Place London swix still

Dinner 7.30 for 8.00 o'clock Black Tie



The Rt Hon The Baroness Thatcher

THE PRIME MINISTER

The Rt Hon The Viscount Tonypandy

The Lady Whitelaw

MRS JOHN MAJOR

Sir Denis Thatcher

The Rt Hon The Lord Carrington
The Lady Thorneycroft

The Rt Hon The Lord Whitelaw

Mrs Howard

The Rt Hon The Viscount Eccles

Mrs Forsyth

The Rt Hon The Lord Colnbrook

Lady June Onslow

The Rt Hon The Lord Wakeham

The Lady Griffiths of Fforestfach

The Hon Sir Rocco Forte

Mrs Jopling

The Rt Hon Kenneth Baker

Lady Butler

Sir Charles Powell

Mrs Seymour

The Lady Boyd-Carpenter

The Rt Hon Peter Lilley

The Lady Carrington

The Rt Hon The Lord Tebbit

The Lady Tebbit

The Rt Hon The Lord Deedes

The Lady Wolfson of Sunningdale

The Rt Hon The Lord Parkinson

Lady Fieldhouse

cer Lady Coles

Mr Ray Crawford

The Hon Sir Mark Lennox-Boyd

Lady Ingham

Mrs Ryder

The Lady Deedes

The Rt Hon Michael Howard

The Lady Colnbrook

The Rt Hon Michael Forsyth

The Lady Wakeham

The Rt Hon Sir Cranley Onslow

The Lady Parkinson

Sir Robin Butler

Lady Forte

Sir John Coles Lady Fergusson

The Rt Hon Richard Ryder

Mrs Brooke

The Viscountess Eccles

The Rt Hon The Lord Boyd-Carpenter

The Lady Joseph

The Lord Wolfson of Sunningdale

Mrs Lilley

The Lord Griffiths of Fforestfach

Lady Ridley

The Rt Hon Peter Brooke

Mrs Baker

The Rt Hon Michael Jopling

Miss Carol Thatcher

Sir Bernard Ingham

Lady Lennox-Boyd

Mrs Crawford Mr Julian Seymour

ENTRANCE



DINNER

In Honour of
The Right Honourable
The Baroness Thatcher LG, OM, FRS
and Sir Denis Thatcher, Bt, MBE, TD

10 DOWNING STREET TUESDAY 26 SEPTEMBER 1995

The fil Hon
The Frime Minister

From: SUE GOODCHILD Date: 25 September 1995



DINNER AND RECEPTION FOR THE RT HON THE BARONESS THATCHER AND SIR DENIS THATCHER 26 SEPTEMBER

I attach the list of guests attending the Dinner and Reception tomorrow evening I also attach a revised draft seating plan and an outline programme for the evening.

Greeting the Thatchers on arrival at No. 10

The Thatchers are due to arrive at 1850 at No. 10. Will the Prime Minister and Mrs Major greet them at the Front Door?

Grace

Would the Prime Minister wish to invite Lord Tonypandy to say 'Grace'?

Sue

AS AT \searrow SEPTEMBER GUEST LIST FOR THE DINNER AND RECEPTION TO BE GIVEN BY THE PRIME MINISTER AND MRS JOHN MAJOR IN HONOUR OF THE RIGHT HON THE BARONESS THATCHER. LG, OM, FRS AND SIR DENIS THATCHER, Bt., MBE, TD AT 7.00 PM FOR 7.30 PM BLACK TIE

The Prime Minister and Mrs John Major

Rt Hon The Baroness Thatcher and Sir Denis Thatcher

Rt Hon Kenneth Baker, CH, MP and Mrs Baker

Sir Robin and Lady Butler

Rt Hon The Lord and Lady Carrington

Rt Hon The Lord and Lady Colnbrook

Mr and Mrs Ray Crawford

Rt Hon The Lord and Lady Deedes

Rt Hon Michael Forsyth, MP and Mrs Forsyth

Rt Hon Michael Howard, QC, MP and Mrs Howard

Sir Bernard Ingham and Lady Ingham

Rt Hon Michael Jopling, MP and Mrs Jopling

The Lady Joseph

Rt Hon Peter Lilley, MP and Mrs Lilley

Rt Hon Sir Cranley Onslow, KCMG, MP and Lady June Onslow

Rt Hon The Lord and Lady Parkinson

Sir Charles Powell Matheson & Co.

Lady Ridley

Rt Hon Richard Ryder. OBE, MP and Mrs Ryder

Mr and Mrs Julian Seymour Director Lady Thatcher's Private Office

Rt Hon The Lord and Lady Tebbit, CH

The Lady Thorneycroft, DBE

Rt Hon The Viscount Tonypandy, CH

Rt Hon The Lord and Lady Wakeham

Rt Hon The Lord and Lady Whitelaw

The Lord and Lady Wolfson of Sunningdale

The Rt Hon The Viscount and Viscountess Eccles

Lady Fergusson

Miss Carol Thatcher

The Rt Hon The Lord and Lady Boyd-Carpenter

The Lord and Lady Griffiths of Fforestfach

The Hon Sir Rocco and Lady Forte

Sir John and Lady Coles

Lady Fieldhouse

The Rt Hon Peter Brooke, MP and Mrs Brooke

The Hon Sir Mark Lennox-Boyd, MP and Lady Lennox-Boyd

As at 22 September

GUEST LIST FOR THE RECEPTION TO BE GIVEN BY THE PRIME MINISTER AND MRS JOHN MAJOR IN HONOUR OF THE RT HON THE BARONESS THATCHER, LG, OM, FRS AND SIR DENIS THATCHER, Bt., MBE, TD AFTER THE DINNER ON TUESDAY, 26 SEPTEMBER 1995 FROM 9.30 PM TO 11.00 PM BLACK TIE

Rt Hon Jonathan and Mrs Aitken, MP

The Lord and Lady Archer of Weston-super-Mare

The Rt Hon The Lord and Lady Armstrong of Ilminster

Mr Andy Bearpark, CBE Overseas Development Administration

Sir Tim and Lady Bell Lowe Bell Communications

Mr and Mrs Mark Benjamin Dentist

The Rt Hon Sir Adam and Lady Butler

The Rt Hon The Earl of Caithness

Sir Robin and Lady Catford, KCVO, CBE

Lieutenant Colonel The Rt Hon The Lord and Lady Charteris of Amisfield, GCB, GCVO, QSO, OBE

Rt Hon Kenneth Clarke, QC,MP

The Right Hon Sir Percy and Lady Cradock. GCMG

Rt Hon The Lord and Lady Denham, KBE

Colonel The Right Hon Sir Edward du Cann, KBE

The Rt Hon Sir Norman and Lady Fowler, MP

Sir George and Lady Gardiner, MP

Mr and Mrs Jonathan Gaisman, QC

Mr and Mrs Philip Gee Lithgow Nelson & Co.accountant The Rt Hon Sir Archibald and Lady Hamilton, MP

Sir Nicholas and Lady Henderson, GCMG, KCVO

The Rt Hon The Lord and Lady Hesketh

Sir John and Lady Hoskyns

Mr and Mrs Gerald Howarth

Mr Derek Howe, CBE

The Rt Hon David and Mrs Howell, MP

Rt Hon Douglas and Mrs Hurd, CBE, MP

The Rt Hon The Lord and Lady Jenkin of Roding

The Rt Hon Tom and Mrs King, CH, MP

The Rt Hon The Lord and Lady Lawson of Blaby

Mr and Mrs Oliver Letwin

Sir Nicholas and Lady Lloyd Editor Daily Express

The Rt Hon Sir Richard and Lady Luce Vice Chancellor University of Buckingham

Mr and Mrs John Marshall, MP

Sir Ronald Millar

The Rt Hon The Lord Moore of Lower Marsh

Mr and Mrs Ferdinand Mount

Sir Michael and Lady Neubert, MP

Lady Nott

Mr and Ars Richard Packard

Sir John and Lady Page

The Baroness Park of Monmouth, CMG, OBE

The Rt Hon Sir Ian and Lady Percival, QC

Mr and Mrs Rupert Ponsonby

Dr and Mrs Christopher Powell-Brett

Sir Gordon Reece

Sir Julian and Lady Ridsdale, CBE

Mr and Mrs Michael Scholar, CB Welsh Office

The Rt Hon The Lord St John of Fawsley

Sir William and Lady Shelton

Mr Stephen Sherbourne, CBE Lowe Bell Communications

Lady Stanley

Mr and Mrs Rod Tyler

Mr Richard and The Hon Mrs Webb

The Rt Hon Baroness Young

The Rt Hon The Lord and Lady Young of Graffham

Sir Robin and Lady Ibbs KBE Lloyds Bank plc

The Lord and Lady Alexander of Weedon, QC Chairman National Westminster Bank plc

Mr and Mrs John Gerson Foreign and Commonwealth Office Sir Niger and Lady Wicks, KCB, CVO, CBE HM Treasury

Dame Sue Tinson, DBE Independent Television News

Miss Elizabeth Buchanan Lowe Bell Communications

??Mr and Mrs Barry Strevens

Mr Bob Kingston and Ms Jean Balthasar

Mr and Mrs Dominic Giacon

The Lord Sterling of Plaistow

THE PRIME MINISTER

IE RT HON THE BARONESS THATCHER

The Viscountess Whitelaw

Rt Hon The Viscount Tonypandy

MRS JOHN MAJOR

SIR DENIS THATCHER

The Rt Hon The Lord Carrington

The Lady Thorneycroft

The Rt Hon The Viscount Whitelaw

Mrs Howard
The Rt Hon The Viscount Eccles

Mrs Forsyth

Rt Hon The Lord Colnbrook

Lady June Onslow
The Rt Hon the Lord Wakeham

The Lady Griffiths of Fforestfach

The Hon Sir Rocco Forte

Mrs Jopling

The Rt Hon Kenneth Baker

Lady Butler

Sir Charles Powell

Mrs Seymour

The Lady Boyd-Carpenter
The Rt Hon Peter Lilley

The Lady Carrington

The Rt Hon The Lord Tebbit
The Lady Tebbit

The Rt Hon The Lord Deedes

The Lady Wolfson of Sunningdale
The Rt Hon The Lord Parkinson

Lady Fieldhouse

Lady Coles

The Hon Sir Mark Lennox-Boyd

Lady Ingham

Mrs Ryder

The Lady Deedes

The Rt Hon Michael Howard

The Lady Colnbrook

Rt Hon Michael Forsyth
The Lady Wakeham

The Rt Hon Sir Cranley Onslow

The Lady Parkinson

Sir Robin Butler

Lady Forte

Sir John Coles

Lady Fergusson

The Rt Hon Richard Ryder

Mrs Brooke

Mrs Crawford

The Viscountess Eccles

The Rt Hon The Lord Boyd-Carpenter

The Lady Joseph

The Lord Wolfson of Sunningdale

Mrs Lilley

The Lord Griffiths of Fforestfach

Lady Ridley

The Rt Hon Peter Brooke

Mrs Baker

The Rt Hon Michael Jopling

Miss Carol Thatcher

Sir Bernard Ingham

Lady Lennox-Boyd

Mr Julian Seymour

Mr Ray Crawford

Entrance

DRAFT OUTLINE PROGRAMME DINNER AND RECEPTION ON TUESDAY 26 SEPTEMBER

1850 Arrival of the Thatchers Other guests held downstairs until Receiving Line in place. 1900 Receiving Line Government Butler to announce guests Drinks served in Pillared Room 1930 Dinner announced Prime Minister and Mrs Major lead Baroness Thatcher and Sir Denis into dinner. ?Grace [?Lord Tonypandy] Loyal Toast - The Prime Minister 2130 Arrival of Reception guests No Receiving Line 2200 approx Speeches 1. The Prime Minister 2. The Baroness Thatcher 2300 Guests depart

Avalella
Beth PM & Norma

Why go (grown!)

E MINISTER MQ

From : Alex Allan Date : 31 August 1995

PRIME MINISTER

ce: Arabella Warburton Howell James Lorne R-Calbeck

THATCHER DINNER

This is just to confirm our conversation on the phone this evening.

You are hosting a dinner and reception for the Thatchers here on 26 September. She is holding a dinner herself at Claridges on 16 October. This is the Monday after the Party Conference.

Your diary is clear that day, but I had tried to persuade you that there was no need to accept: you will be tired; you will have done Lady T proud by holding the dinner here; the cast list is not that attractive. You had said you would reconsider this when you got back from holiday.

I had a word today with Norman, Howell and Christopher. The consensus was that you *should* go: it would be well received by the Party at large; if you declined when you had no other engagement it would look like a snub, notwithstanding your own dinner.

Content on this basis to accept? Is Mrs Major free to go as well?

ALEX ALLAN

Gen you and his please

A think shill was

1.9.

From : Alex Allan Date : 31 August 1995

PRIME MINISTER

cc : Arabella Warburton Howell James Lorne R-Calbeck

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ALEX ALLAN



10 DOWNING STREET

Can he Kan Nor decine to one? He's horry this gran dime + lecep on 26 Sepren and Othose/Novem are - as jo trow arready looning grasm - 16 Olose To Morde innedrately brong TPC - bud

knows hear games She'll be playing there Glee !!! 3578



DEPARTMENT/SERIES REM 19 PIECE/ITEM 6222/3 (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract details: Attachnent to minute from Allan to the Pline Minuter dated 31 August 1995	
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RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	
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NUMBER NOT USED	
MISSING (TNA USE ONLY)	
DOCUMENT PUT IN PLACE (TNA USE ONLY)	



DEPARTMENT/SERIES ### 19 PIECE/ITEM 6222/3 (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract details: Minute from Oakden to Allan duted 17 August 1995	
CLOSED UNDER FOI EXEMPTION 37(1X4), 40(2), 41	zolzlzo Mr. Mr.
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	
MISSING AT TRANSFER	
NUMBER NOT USED	
MISSING (TNA USE ONLY)	
DOCUMENT PUT IN PLACE (TNA USE ONLY)	

PERSONAL: MR MEYER From: Tina Stowell 2

24 May 1995

ce: Prime Unisker at the request of request of the request of

SUNDAY TIMES - MRS THATCHER'S MEMOIRS

As you know, I had lunch with Michael Jones and Andy Grice today.

Lots of subjects were covered during lunch (nothing for you to worry about. As always, I got Michael to do most of the talking). But, you asked me to find out as much as I could about the Thatcher memoirs and so I record this part of the conversation below (my apologies if a lot of it is already common knowledge).

Firstly, the Sunday Times had not planned to run the now infamous story last weekend. The agreed date for the serialisation to begin was 4 June. But, last Friday the Sun told the Sunday Times that they were in possession of Lady Thatcher's book. Although the Sun did not intend to scupper the Sunday Times (because of their 'sistership'), the Sunday Times were naturally worried that, if the Sun had it, someone else might too. They therefore pulled Michael away from his holiday to write the story.

Michael said that Lady Thatcher's office were warned about the piece in advance. Once it had been published, they did not contact the paper until Monday. Michael emphasised that this was not until after the ensuing media attention and Monday morning's papers were on the street. Therefore, he assumed their initial reaction was pretty much OK.

I asked Michael what issues would be covered in this week's instalment-proper of the book. He replied that it would be Europe again. But, "in her own words".

Michael explained that Lady Thatcher's two books were serialised in the Sunday Times as part of a package, ie, they were not being charged again for volume 2. Murdoch owned the publishers of the book too, so it all tied up very nicely.

He went on to explain that 'volume 2' falls into two distinctive sections: her early years in Grantham and at University (the main section); and her life after leaving Number 10 (three or four chapters). There is, Michael said, a clear break between the two.

Michael said that Lady Thatcher had always intended to voice her opinions about the Party in the second book. But, once written, it was not up for discussion. He told me that he had interviewed Lady Thatcher recently, but had been told that he could <u>not</u> ask her about this section of the book.

Michael said that, in parts, she rambles all over the place: "sticking the knife in, taking it out, sticking it in again" and so on. He thought that maybe this was so she and her friends could try and get away with the sort of line they had taken on Monday afternoon. He said also that Lady Thatcher's response on Monday about a "distortion" was wrong. It was perfectly obvious what she was getting at when she talked about "it was now for others to deal with".

Incidentally, Michael was amused to report that, when the Sunday Times received a copy of the book, Witherow and the 'book editor' didn't think there was a news story in it. However, Michael soon spotted its potential (!).

Finally, Michael told me that he thought the Prime Minister was on good form when he saw him recently for his interview. From what I could tell, Michael is definitely a Major fan. Andy Grice was pretty quiet throughout the lunch.

TINA STOWELL

It's very easy to attack the Prime Minister of the day. And very tempting to reply.

But that just adds to your story.

Every Prime Minister learns that.

So don't waste your question asking me to comment now!

You've all had your story over this.

Don't expect me to add to it.

I am working to win the next election.and internal strife doesn't help! So don't expect me to add to your story because these disputes hurt the Conservative Party, upset our supporters, and make it more difficult to prevent the calamity of a Labour Government.

look to ta substantia rocars of

People should stop misrepresenting this Government.

We have the best inflation record of any Government for decades.

We're moving into strong, sustainable growth.

Unemployment is falling more surely than anywhere else.

Our education and health reforms are working.

Our public sector changes are opening up Government.

We're working against a federal Europe with more success than any previous Government.

We're doing all that and more with a bare majority.


People should put aside the misrepresentation.

The downright fibs.

Every Conservative should work together to support the Government and defeat the calamity that would be a Labour Government.

22 May 1995

be are here to lawn a Competitiveren WP.



Alex Allan Esq



MARGARET, THE LADY THATCHER, O.M., P.C., F.R.S. HOUSE OF LORDS LONDON SWIA OPW

TO

STATEMENT

Commenting on newspaper reports of extracts from Volume II of Lady Thatcher's memoirs, The Path to Power, a spokesman from her office said:

"The meaning of one particular sentence from The Path to Power quoted in newspapers has been seriously distorted because its full context was not given. The sentence is, 'It is now, however, for others to take the action required'. We now release the full passage as it appears in the book.

"This shows that Lady Thatcher is here referring to developments in the West as a whole, not just Britain. It also shows that Lady Thatcher is ruling herself out of the long-term task of taking the action needed to deal with the problems she outlines."





MARGARET, THE LADY THATCHER, O.M., P.C., F.R.S. HOUSE OF LORDS LONDON SWIA OPW

Extract from "THE PATH TO POWER" by Margaret Thatcher

It is hard to imagine as I write these words that the West so recently secured a great victory over communist tyranny, and free-enterprise economics a decisive triumph over socialism. The mood in the West now seems to oscillate between bravado, cynicism and fear. There are problems at home. In most Western countries public spending on social entitlement programmes is leading to swollen deficits and higher taxes. There are problems abroad. Western desences are being run down and the resolve to use them is dwindling. There is deep confusion about the future of Europe and Britain's place in it. The 'special relationship' with the United States has been allowed to cool to near freezing point. The West has failed to give the democrats in the post-communist world the support they needed; their place is being taken by too many dubious figures. First by our inaction, now by our weakness, we are encouraging the Russians to believe that they will only receive the respect and attention of the West if they behave like the old Soviet Union. In the former Yugoslavia aggression has been allowed to pay. And disarray grows in NATO, because it has destroyed an empire and not yet found a new role. Not that everything is bad. The world is a freer, if not necessarily safer, place than during the Cold War. But that most important element of political success is missing - a sense of purpose.

Of course, I would say that, wouldn't I? Perhaps. But others who often criticized me in Government are saying it too. In the pages which follow – on Europe, the wider international scene, social policy and the economy – I offer some thoughts about putting these things right. It is now, however, for others to take the action required.



From: Roderic Lyne Date: 11 May 1995

1. EDWARD OAKDEN

2. ALEX ALLAN

cc: Sue Goodchild Arabella Warburton Christopher Meyer

THATCHER DINNER

Comments on your minute of 10 May:

in the first list of possibles, from Brunei to Klaus, there is none we need steer away. On personal grounds, we should obviously bid for the Bushes. Nancy Reagan is a pain, but might take offence if not invited here. On foreign policy grounds, I would put Brunei*, Mahathir*, Oman*, and Klaus at the top of my list, the remainder being either retired or not the prime movers. It would be very handy to have an excuse to invite Mahathir to something, while burying him in a crowd; and also to gruntle the Sultans of Brunei and Oman, without having to allocate much time to them bilaterally. However, NB, we might have to concede separate business bilaterals to people in this category. Next in line in policy terms would be Lee Kuan Yew* (only semi-retired), Havel (mostly a figurehead President, while Prime Minister Klaus runs the show) and the Crown Prince of Kuwait (who is effectively Prime Minister under the Amir);

on <u>foreign businessmen</u>, grateful if Edward could seek a FCO view on Peter Wu and Lee Ka Shing. I would certainly steer away from Wafic Said;

- 2 -

no dissent from your suggestions on the names from Heffer to Amiel.

*Helpful if these invitations could be channelled through me, as I'd like to make political capital out of them: eg Lee's invitation to soften a refusal to see him in early June.

Romic

RODERIC LYNE

f\thatcher.dca

From : Alex Allan Date : 10 May 1995

RODERIC LYNE

cc : Sue Goodchild Arabella Warburton Christopher Meyer

THATCHER DINNER

I mentioned to you that Sue and I had had a meeting with Julian Seymour to discuss the arrangements for the Thatcher dinner. We had a preliminary discussion about the guest list: the plan is to have about 60 for a black tie dinner, followed by a black tie reception for about 200.

One of the issues we discussed was the guest list, and in particular the overseas dignitaries that the Thatchers might invite. There is also to be a separate dinner at Claridges in October, so there is the opportunity to split the guest list between the two, with those whom it might be awkward to invite here being invited to Claridges instead.

The full list of possibles (compiled by Lady Thatcher's staff, not yet shown to her) includes the following:

The Sultan of Brunei
George and Barbara Bush
Nancy Reagan (Ronald would not be able to come)
Dr Mahatir
The Sultan of Oman
The Crown Prince of Kuwait (I think, rather than the Emir)

President Mitterrand (sounds implausible, and I doubt he'd come)
Brian Mulroney

- 2 -

Cap Weinberger
Mikhail Gorbachev
Henry Kissinger
Lee Kwan Yew (excuse spelling!)
Helmut Schmidt (?)
Rud Lubbers
Vaclav Havel
President Klaus

-Bine Miniter

Grateful for your views on these. Any we should definitely steer towards Claridges rather than here? Any we should encourage on the PM's behalf (the Bush's for example)?

There are some other foreign businessmen who are potentially on the list, and I should similarly be grateful for comments:

Wafic Said (awkward if list also includes Mark Thatcher?)

Peter Wu (Howell might be keen)

Lee Ka Shing (a big inward investor, among other things)

Christopher might note that there are some others on the list who Julian and I thought we'd steer towards Claridges (though grateful for any views):

Simon Heffer

Bill Cash (though there is no reason he could not come here)

Tim Bell (marginal)

Jimmy Goldsmith

Alastair MacAlpine

Barbara Amiel (? + Conrad Black; if so should they come here?)

- 3 -

I might take this opportunity to record where we are with members of the Royal Family. The plan is to invite the Queen and Duke of Edinburgh to Claridges.

The possibility remains

that we might invite other members of the Royal Family—possibly Princess Margaret or Princess Alexandra.

We also discussed the finance. Lady Thatcher is against this being Government funded, as is Robin Butler. We could put up an arguable case that with lots of foreigners and other distinguished non-Party figures it was proper for the Government to fund. But we would inevitably run into controversy. Equally, though, I would not want it to be a Party funded event. It is not a Party function, and it would have the wrong resonance if we played up that side of things.

That leaves a privately funded event. I am pursuing how this might best be achieved, with help from others. We need, however, both to be discreet about sources of finance and to sort out what our public line will be.

In the meantime, please could Sue give me an idea of the all-up cost of the dinner and reception.

ALEY ALLAN

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FREEDOM OF INFORMATION
ACT 2000

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ALIX MEAN





Personal 21 st. Nauch

Dear Mayaret,

Johnsold very nucle like to invite you and Pours to No. 10 later the year to mark with your and Densi's kinklidges.

I know the one many people who would like to join me in marking the occasion and, in both your cases, We so much the most appropriate venus - and, is my went, it would good me great pleasure to host the event.

The best time neight he around late Refetuber or early October although, it the idea appends to you + Down in principle, our officer could have about duto, quest lest + other logistiss.

On a personal note, I can imagent how apretting it must be for you to have the autiming intrusor into Mark's activities. You may have seen the Poers turned their attention to James' private like (in a wholly distroted way) and 4 know from recent experience how upretting this west of thing can be. With worm reports, John

RESTRICTED - PERSONAL



pps/thatcher.as

SUBJECT

10 DOWNING STREET LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Principal Private Secretary

SIR ROBIN BUTLER CABINET OFFICE

LADY THATCHER

At your bilateral with the Prime Minister this afternoon, the Prime Minister raised with you how he might mark the 70th birthday of Lady Thatcher in October this year, and Sir Denis's 80th birthday on 26 May. The Prime Minister said he was minded to offer to host a dinner in Downing Street. You said you were sure this would be very much welcomed. A number of former No.10 staff were planning to give a dinner for Sir Denis Thatcher, which would be complementary to the Prime Minister's plans. After a brief discussion, the Prime Minister thought that a dinner in September or October would be most appropriate. He would write to Lady Thatcher soon.

ALEX ALLAN 20 March 1995



10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER POR Parel,

29 September 1994

Many manks for your very kind letter about India. I am delighted that you were able to go there, and I am sure that the Indians will have given you a rousing reception. I think we would make a serious mistake if we ignored India's huge potential. All sorts of possibilities seemed open to us when I went there last year to launch the Indo-British Partnership Initiative, and I am extremely keen to sustain its momentum. We had a return match here in London this year, as the Indians will have told you. Visits like yours can only contribute to our network of contacts, as well as demonstrating the interest of leading British figures in India.

Thank you, also, for your rapid help when I was in South Africa. It was transparently obvious that one or two journalists were trying to stir up trouble through selective and distorted quotation. I know, as do the leaders and business community in South Africa, of your strong support for that country. I am sorry that the press tried to put you in a false position, but your statement successfully knocked the story on the head as soon as it started running.

I had a fascinating time there, and in a different way, with Boris Yeltsin this weekend. I look forward to telling you about it when we next have an opportunity.

AS/KW



MARGARET, THE LADY THATCHER, O.M., P.C., F.R.S. HOUSE OF LORDS LONDON SWIA 0PW

26 September 1994

1. Rod 2. PrneMents

Vea Primi I histor.

Following my visit to India, I write to say how impressed I was by the standing of Britain and the British government in that country. In particular, the Finance Minister Dr Singh, with whom I had two fascinating meetings, asked me to convey his appreciation and thanks to you personally for all the support and help that Britain has lent India during the past three years.

I shall write separately to Douglas giving my more detailed impressions but there can be no doubt of the opportunities open to Britain in India, provided your initiatives are followed up.

I am so pleased that your visit to South Africa was successful and delighted that we managed jointly to control the malicious attempt by the media to cause difficulties.

Warm regards

() argard

The Rt Hon John Major MP

PRIME MINISTER

COSGROVE ON THATCHER

I think the reference you are after is

Pl. keep to hand

"The public opinion polls were set dead against her: for the first eighteen months after the 1979 election they showed both James Callaghan well ahead of her personally, and the Labour Party comfortably ahead of the Conservatives. Towards the end of 1981, indeed, Gallup carried out an elaborate poll which suggested that forty-eight per cent of the electorate believed she would be remembered as the worst Prime Minister ever". [Thatcher: The First Term, pp 130-131]

ALEX ALLAN

12 May 1993