

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

4 October 1985

Near In President.

As you will know, President Machel visited London on 27 September on his way back from the United States of America. He was in good spirits and pleased with the way his meeting with President Reagan had gone.

He told me he was well content with the arrangements now being made for the British military advisory and training team in Zimbabwe to begin training Mozambican personnel early next year. I was also glad to be able to offer him a further 14,000 tonnes of food aid (which will be additional to the film of additional programme aid which we pledged recently). In the afternoon he and his party, which included Ministers Chissano and Veloso, received calls from a number of British companies with interests in Mozambique. I am sure you will agree that all this represents a significant contribution to the Western economic and military co-operation with Mozambique which you urged in your letter of 2 May.

When we discussed the security situation, he described the successes which the joint operations with the Zimbabweans had achieved, and then naturally went on to talk about the discovery of documents detailing contacts between South Africa and Renamo after the Nkomati accord. The Mozambicans'

views will, of course, be familiar to you and I know that you have prepared a full response to their complaints. He stressed, however, that he did not wish this development to lead to the end of the Nkomati accord, and that he remained convinced of your good faith and that of your Foreign Minister. His view was that your armed forces had acted on their own initiative.

However that may be, you will appreciate that this episode has been a further serious embarrassment, not only to Mozambique and President Machel personally, but also to those in the West who wish to maintain sensible policies towards your country and the region's problems. I know you are concerned that the terms of the Nkomati accord should be strictly observed, and I am confident you will do your utmost to avoid any action which might appear to put this in question.

You are no doubt also disturbed, as I am, about the increasing drift in the international community towards economic sanctions. The decision by the United States Administration last month to impose a series of measures against South Africa has increased the pressure on others to follow suit. You will know that Britain recently decided to endorse the Luxembourg Agreement of 10 September. The measures which this Agreement covers are non-economic and most of them had been part of our policy for a number of years. In any case, I believe it useful for Europe to be able to speak with one voice on questions of this kind, particularly when (as here) it has enabled us to argue for a more restrained position than some of our partners.

We nevertheless face a difficult period which will include the Commonwealth Beads of Government Meeting in Nassau on 16 October and further sessions of the Security Council and General Assembly devoted to South Africa or Namibia. I remain firmly opposed to economic sanctions and trade boycotts, but the pressures for such measures are bound to go on increasing. Britain is by no means alone in holding

that view although we argue the case more firmly than others. In this situation, it is of the greatest importance, as I am sure you will recognise, that the South African Government should take no action which would undercut our efforts to resist these pressures.

I have, of course, followed very carefully the various reforms which you have announced in the past few months. I was particularly pleased to note your Government's decision to cancel the removal of black communities at Kwangema and Driefontein. The recommendation of the President's Council that steps should be taken to abolish the influx control laws also strikes me as very important and I hope that early action can be taken to implement this step.

One issue on which early progress would make a considerable impact on the international community is Namibia. When we discussed the subject during your last visit to London I was left with the impression that you too hoped for a swift settlement, not least for financial reasons. So the persistence of the stalemate has been all the more disappointing. I believe that the Americans remain ready to continue their efforts to promote an agreement on the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola. A decision by your Government to proceed on the basis of Resolution 435 could, of course, be expected to have a very significant impact on world opinion.

I would find it very helpful to know how you see future developments in South Africa. One of the problems is that many countries remain deeply sceptical that fundamental change in South Africa is truly under way. The more you can do to dispel this scepticism by taking concrete steps to implement your stated programme of reform, particularly as regards dialogue with black leaders about the involvement of the black community in the process of government, the more leading countries among the international community are

likely to be ready to reassess their attitude towards South Africa.

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The Honourable P.W. Botha, D.M.S.