

[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

28

IMMEDIATE

PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR D MAITLAND
MR DAY
SIR L ALLISON
~~MR ASPIN~~

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

SIR R ARMSTRONG)
MR R L WADE GERY)
MR P M MAXEY) CABINET
MR GOULTY) OFFICE
MR W N WENBAN SMITH)
DIO)

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HD/RHOD DEPT (4)

HD/C AF D

HD/S AF D

~~HD/UND~~
HD/PUSD (2)

HD/NEWS DEPT

~~HD/WAD~~

PS/SIR I SINCLAIR
MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER RMK200A
MR FIFOOT

IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL

IMMEDIATE

FM SALISBURY 041215Z MAR 80

Read in full

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 935 OF 4 MARCH

INFO IMMEDIATE CAPE TOWN PRIORITY LUSAKA DAR ES SALAAM GABORONE
MAPUTO LAGOS WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK

MY TELNO 932 (NOT TO ALL): RHODESIA: FORMATION OF THE GOVERNMENT

1. WALLS ASKED FOR A PERSONAL TALK WITH RENWICK THIS MORNING.

HE WAS LATER JOINED BY MCLAREN.

2. WALLS' MAIN CONCERN WAS THAT THE ELECTION RESULT WOULD CREATE
A CRISIS OF CONFIDENCE FOR THE WHITE COMMUNITY AND THE LARGE NUMBER
OF AFRICANS WHO, WHETHER IN THE SECURITY FORCES OR IN OTHER
CAPACITIES, HAD BEEN WORKING FOR THE PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT. HE WAS
UNDER PRESSURE FROM SOME ELEMENTS OF THE ARMED FORCES AND OF THE
RHODESIA FRONT TO TAKE SOME ACTION TO PREVENT A MUGABE-LED GOVERN-
MENT BEING INSTALLED. HE HAD REJECTED THIS, BUT HE NEEDED TO
KNOW OUR INTENTIONS IN TERMS OF TRYING TO GET MUGABE TO FORM A
BROADLY BASED GOVERNMENT; AND ABOVE ALL A WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER
PROLONGING OUR ROLE HERE FOR SUFFICIENT TIME TO ALLOW THE NEW
GOVERNMENT TO ESTABLISH ITSELF AND THE NECESSARY ADJUSTMENTS TO
BE MADE. THE PRESENT POSITION WAS THAT A GOOD MANY WHITES IN THE

BE MADE. THE PRESENT POSITION WAS THAT A GOOD MANY WHITES IN THE ARMED FORCES WERE THINKING OF LEAVING FORTHWITH. HIS INTENTION WAS TO SOLDIER ON WITH THE OTHER COMMANDERS FOR UP TO SIX MONTHS. THEREAFTER THEY WOULD LEAVE. THIS WOULD ALLOW TIME FOR MEMBERS OF THE WHITE COMMUNITY EITHER TO LEAVE RHODESIA IN AN ORDERLY FASHION AND NOT IN A PANIC; OR TO TAKE THEIR OWN DECISIONS TO STAY ON HERE. HE HAD NO DESIRE TO GO BACK OVER THE WAY THINGS HAD TURNED OUT. BUT HE FELT THAT WE HAD A RESPONSIBILITY TO HELP TO ENSURE AN ORDERLY TRANSITION; TO REDUCE THE DANGER OF CONFLICT BREAKING OUT AGAIN IN THE COUNTRY; AND THAT THE INEVITABLE WHITE EXODUS WAS AS ORDERLY AS POSSIBLE.

3. RENWICK SAID THAT SO FAR AS THE FORMATION OF THE GOVERNMENT WAS CONCERNED, WE WOULD BE HOPING TO EXERT OUR INFLUENCE TO ENSURE THAT NKOMO OCCUPIED A SENIOR POSITION IN THE GOVERNMENT; AND THAT IT WAS AS BROADLY BASED AS POSSIBLE. WALLS THOUGHT THAT IT WOULD BE ENORMOUSLY HELPFUL IF MUGABE COULD BE BROUGHT TO MAKE AN OFFER TO A SENIOR WHITE POLITICIAN, E G DAVID SMITH, BUT REALISED THAT THIS MIGHT NOT BE ATAINABLE. RENWICK SAID THAT WE WERE IMPRESSING ON MUGABE THE NEED FOR HIM TO ASK WALLS TO TAKE CHARGE OF THE PROCESS OF INTEGRATION OF THE FORCES.

4. WALLS AND MCLAREN BOTH ARGUED STRONGLY THAT WHAT WAS REQUIRED TO ENSURE AN ORDERLY TRANSFER OF POWER WAS A PROLONGATION OF OUR DIRECT RESPONSIBILITY FOR UP TO THREE MONTHS. RENWICK SAID THAT THIS WOULD NOT MAKE SENSE. ONCE A GOVERNMENT WAS INSTALLED, THERE WOULD BE NO USE IN HAVING A GOVERNOR AS A FIGUREHEAD, WITH NO REAL AUTHORITY. WE COULD NOT PRESERVE A CONSTITUTIONAL LINK ONCE THE NORMAL PROCESS LEADING TO INDEPENDENCE HAD BEEN COMPLETED. WALLS SAID THAT IF WE SIMPLY COMPLETED THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROCEDURES RAPIDLY AND THEN LEFT, THIS COULD LEAD TO PANIC AND CHAOS.

5. RENWICK SAID THAT WE HAD NO INTENTION OF RUSHING THROUGH THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESSES. WALLS AND MCLAREN SAID THAT THEY BELIEVED THAT IT WOULD BE OF GREAT HELP TO THEM AND PROBABLY ALSO TO MUGABE FOR THIS PROCESS TO TAKE A MONTH AT ANY RATE (AS IT HAD LAST TIME). THEY REMAINED VERY CONCERNED ABOUT THE POSITION THEREAFTER UNLESS WE WERE CLEARLY MAKING DISPOSITIONS TO PLAY SOME SORT OF CONTINUING ROLE

WE WERE CLEARLY MAKING DISPOSITIONS TO PLAY SOME SORT OF CONTINUING ROLE.

6. RENWICK SAID THAT SUCH A ROLE COULD NOT BE A CONSTITUTIONAL ONE. WHAT MIGHT, HOWEVER, BE POSSIBLE WOULD BE FOR US TO SEEK TO ASSIST IN THE TWO OR THREE MONTHS IMMEDIATELY AFTER INDEPENDENCE WITH A MILITARY TRAINING TEAM; AND POSSIBLY ALSO WITH SMALL TEAMS OF POLICE EXPERTS AND PERSONS WHO COULD HELP WITH THE PROCESS OF ADJUSTMENT AS BETWEEN THE INCOMING GOVERNMENT AND THE EXISTING CIVIL SERVICE. WALLS THOUGHT THAT THIS WOULD BE ENORMOUSLY HELPFUL, PARTICULARLY IF FOR THIS LIMITED PERIOD WE COULD CONSIDER APPOINTING A SENIOR FIGURE WHO COULD OVERSEE THE ACTIVITIES OF THESE TEAMS; ADVISE MUGABE IN THE CRUCIAL EARLY DAYS OF HIS GOVERNMENT; AND GENERALLY HELP TO ENSURE A PEACEFUL TRANSITION. RENWICK UNDERTOOK TO REPORT THESE IDEAS TO YOU.

7. WALLS' PERSONAL DISTRESS CAN EASILY BE IMAGINED. RENWICK POINTED OUT THAT IT HAD BEEN OUR ASSESSMENT IN AUGUST, BEFORE THE NEGOTIATIONS BEGAN, THAT THE WAR WAS SIMPLY NOT WINNABLE FROM THE RHODESIAN POINT OF VIEW. THE PATRIOTIC FRONT COULD NOT DEFEAT THE RHODESIAN ARMED FORCES; BUT WITHIN A YEAR OR TWO AT MOST THEY WOULD HAVE WORN DOWN THE WHITE COMMUNITY GENERALLY SUFFICIENTLY TO PROVOKE SOME KIND OF COLLAPSE. NOR WAS IT POSSIBLE TO EXPLAIN THE EXTENT OF MUGABE'S ELECTORAL VICTORY BY INTIMIDATION. THE FACT WAS THAT VIRTUALLY THE ENTIRE SHONA-SPEAKING POPULATION HAD VOTED FOR MUGABE. ANY ATTEMPT TO SEEK TO FRUSTRATE THE RESULT BY MILITARY ACTION WOULD BE DISASTROUS. WALLS SAID THAT HE ACCEPTED THIS, THOUGH SOME ELEMENTS OF THE ARMY DID NOT. HE NEEDED HELP FROM US IN TERMS OF (A) A GRADUAL APPROACH TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESSES LEADING TO INDEPENDENCE (B) A CONTINUING TRAINING ROLE, SUPERVISED BY A SENIOR FIGURE WHO WOULD OFFER SOME FURTHER REASSURANCE THEREAFTER. HE BELIEVED THAT MUGABE WOULD TAKE VERY MUCH THE SAME VIEW.

FCO PASS ALL

SOAMES