

CONFIDENTIAL

FALKLAND ISLANDS: FCO SITREP: 0730 HRS, 19 MAY 1982

United Nations

1. Sr Ros, the Argentine Deputy Foreign Minister, has now presented to the UN Secretary-General the Argentine response to our latest proposals. Sir A Parsons subsequently saw Mr Perez de Cuellar and was told that the Argentines had produced a ten-page paper which was a mixture of requests for clarification, a restatement of known positions and the introduction of new elements. Sir A Parsons made it clear that this would be regarded as unsatisfactory in London. The Ambassador was not at that stage given a copy of the Argentine response, but we understand that this would be made available later today.
2. Meanwhile, UKMIS New York have drafted a UN Security Council Resolution as part of its contingency planning for our future moves at the UN.

Washington

3. Sir Nicholas Henderson told Judge Clark (US National Security Adviser) where we stood in the present negotiations. The Ambassador said that the Americans should contact him immediately if a new Presidential move was afoot. Sir N Henderson stressed that a US initiative at this moment would be inappropriate. Mr Clark assured the Ambassador that we could rely on US support.

EC

4. COREPER agreed the text of a Regulation putting into effect the agreement by EC Foreign Ministers on arrangements to extend the embargo on Argentine imports until 24 May.

Military Situation

5. The differing units of the Task Force have now joined up. These include the ships 'Fearless' and 'Intrepid' together with 'Canberra' and 'Norland' which have over 4,000 troops on board. It is understood that this regrouping is taking place within the TEZ.
6. One Sea King helicopter from 'HMS Hermes' ditched in the sea earlier yesterday.

Emergency Unit

CONFIDENTIAL

FALKLAND ISLANDS : FCO SITREP (DETAILED VERSION) :0730 HRS, 19 MAY 1982UN Developments

UKMIS New York
telno.780 to
FCO (just
received))

[The following information is based on telephone calls from UKMIS New York before the arrival of relevant telegrams. If the telegrams arrive in time they will be appended to this SITREP.]

UKMIS New York
telno.781 to
FCO (not yet
arrived))

1. Overnight developments in New York amount to an Argentine rejection of our Draft Agreement. Late yesterday New York time, the UN Secretary-General saw Sr Ros and then Sir Anthony Parsons. The Secretary-General told Sir Anthony that the Argentines had produced a ten-page paper in Spanish containing a mixture of requests for clarification of the British draft, restatements of known Argentine positions and some new elements. They had said that the paper did not represent their final position and that in their view negotiations should continue. Sir Anthony Parsons made it clear that this response would be regarded as unsatisfactory in London. He expects to receive a copy of the Argentine paper from the Secretary-General later.

UKMIS New York
tel.769 to FCO
of 18 May)

2. In the meantime, at a private meeting with Sir Anthony late on 17 May the Secretary-General had agreed not to put forward a paper of his own at the conclusion of negotiations; but seeing that he could not simply let the negotiations peter out without something coming from him, he would probably put forward some oral proposals which he knew would be unacceptable to both sides.

UN Contingency Planning

D
(UKMIS New York
telno.777 to
FCO of 18 May)

3. Before his latest meeting with the Secretary-General Sir Anthony Parsons asked for urgent instructions on tactics in the Security Council if negotiations ended at midday New York time today.

4. He advised against having the Draft Interim Agreement formally circulated as a Security Council document, as it might then become a kind of benchmark for a solution which would not necessarily be appropriate once we had recovered the Islands. However, Sir Anthony would propose drawing on the document in the Security Council debate and making copies available on request to other delegations.

5. Sir Anthony foresees that following a breakdown in negotiations 'do-gooders' in the Security Council might propose a Resolution combining a call for implementation of Security Council Resolution 502 with a demand for an immediate cessation of hostilities and for negotiations; we would have to oppose such a Resolution because it would allow the Argentines to consolidate their position contrary to SCR 502 while tying our hands. To limit damage to our diplomatic position if forced to veto such a Resolution, Sir Anthony proposes that as soon as the Security Council's formal proceedings begin he should table

UKMIS New York
tel.778 to FCO
of 18 May)

a provisional draft Resolution of our own calling for a cease-fire after confirmation of Argentine agreement to withdraw. Although it would be unlikely to be adopted, this draft might nevertheless make it easier for us to justify having to veto an unacceptable Resolution.

Washington Developments

6. In meetings in Washington Sir Nicholas Henderson has been attempting to discourage any new US initiative immediately after the expiry of the 19 May deadline.

7. He told Stoessel (Under-Secretary for Political Affairs in the State Department) that we should emphatically not want Haig to come forward with another proposal at this stage, although further US intervention might be appropriate after the development of the military situation. Stoessel said that the State Department had discouraged White House agitation for further last minute action by the President, but there was still a certain amount of illusion in the White House. Stoessel also confirmed Haig's assurance that the US would veto any Security Council Resolution not calling for withdrawal as well as cease-fire.

8. In a later meeting with Judge Clark Sir Nicholas similarly discouraged any new US initiative at this stage and asked to be consulted if Mrs Jeane Kirkpatrick (who was said to be trying to reach Judge Clark urgently) should propose a Presidential move.

European Community

9. COREPER agreed the text of a Regulation putting into effect the agreement by EC Foreign Ministers on arrangements to extend the embargo on Argentine imports until 24 May. Italy, Ireland and Denmark made statements setting out the respective measures which they had agreed to take. The UK successfully resisted an attempt by Ireland and Italy to add to the preamble a statement that the measures were taken 'only' in support of a diplomatic solution.

10. In the meantime instructions have been sent to EC posts to lobby for the continuation of the embargo if necessary after 25 May.

/Comment


Comment

11. The details of the Argentine reply have now been received (at 0745 hours). Although they contain some points of relative forward movement, new negative elements are introduced and they in no way represent the definitive response requested by the Secretary-General. They appear to confirm that the Argentine tactic is simply to prevaricate.

12. The Secretary-General has told Sir A Parsons that he would now have to report to the Security Council. He is aware of the timing considerations for us in the context of tomorrow's Parliamentary debate. But it is not yet certain whether he intends to make proposals of his own (orally, as he had previously suggested, or formally) to bridge the gap.

13. Sir A Parsons's recommendations (which will be in UKMIS New York telno 781) have not yet been received. But points requiring action are:

- (a) Sir A Parsons will need instructions for providing the Secretary-General with a formal reaction to the Argentine proposals. He will be seeing Sr Perez de Cuellar this morning, New York time;
- (b) On tactics in the Security Council, Sir A Parsons will need instructions on his recommendation that he should pre-empt unhelpful resolutions by tabling a provisional UK resolution linking ~~the~~ ceasefire with withdrawal. The timing of action in the Security Council is however not yet clear.



P R Fearn
Emergency Unit

19 May 1982

14. Since this was typed, Sir A Parsons's further recommendations have been received. His instructions will also need to cover the following points:

- (a) In order to delay action in the Security Council, he proposes that he should give the Secretary-General a preliminary negative reaction this morning, New York time, with a formal reaction to follow later in the day. While this would not necessarily head off a formal Security meeting tonight, it would help to do so:

/(b)

A
UKMIS NY
tel 780

B
UKMIS NY
tel 781

Final (b) Sir A Parsons proposes a form of words for conveying our ~~formal~~ response to the Secretary-General for passing to Sr Ros:

(c) He will need guidance on a press line once our final reply has been delivered.

15. A point to note is his proposal that some warm words of appreciation for the Secretary-General should be included in the debate in the House of Commons on 20 May.

