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FM WASHINGTON 291820Z JANUARY 1980
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TEL NO 435 OF 28 JAN.

INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK, PARIS, BONN, ROME, TOKYO.

MIPTS: US FOREIGN POLICY: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ALLIES.

- Foreign Policy*
Read in full.
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1. IT IS CLEAR ENOUGH THAT THE NEW DIRECTIONS OF US FOREIGN POLICY REMAIN BLURRED AND THAT THEY ARE LOOKING TO THE ALLIES FOR SUPPORT, BOTH OVER THE MEANS OF ARRIVING AT A CHANGED RELATIONSHIP WITH THE COUNTRIES OF THE ARC OF CRISIS AND OVER THE ULTIMATE SHAPE THAT THIS SHOULD TAKE; THOUGH THEY ARE AWARE OF THE DIFFICULTIES OF CONCERTING POLICY, GIVEN THE DISPARITY OF VIEWS WITHIN THE ALLIANCE.
 2. BUT I SHOULD STRESS TO YOU, AS THE WHITE HOUSE HAVE DONE TO ME, THE IMPORTANCE OF THE PHRASE IN PRESIDENT CARTER'S STATE OF THE UNION ADDRESS WHEN HE CALLED FOR QUOTE COLLECTIVE EFFORTS UNQUOTE TO MEET THE NEW THREAT. HE SAID THAT THIS NEW THREAT QUOTE DEMANDS THE PARTICIPATION OF THOSE WHO RELY ON THE OIL FROM THE MIDDLE EAST AND ARE CONCERNED WITH GLOBAL PEACE AND STABILITY UNQUOTE. THIS SUBJECT MAY, I REALISE, HAVE BEEN DISCUSSED WITH NEWSOM AND OTHER AMERICANS IN LONDON LAST WEEK: IN WHICH CASE I ASK YOU TO OVERLOOK ANY DUPLICATION IN THIS PRESENT TELEGRAM. BUT IT MAY BE USEFUL IF I TELL YOU VERY BROADLY THE WAY AMERICANS SEEM TO BE SETTING ABOUT THE TASK AND HOW HMG MIGHT MOST USEFULLY RESPOND.
 3. THE US'S FIRST PRIORITY SEEMS TO BE TO SHORE-UP PAKISTAN: HENCE THE VISIT THERE LATER THIS WEEK BY BRZEZINSKI AND CHRISTOPHER AND THE EFFORT THAT THE ADMINISTRATION WILL BE MAKING TO GET ADDITIONAL FUNDS FOR PAKISTAN TUCKED INTO THE CURRENT BUDGET. BUT ON THE WIDER QUESTION, I GATHER - VERY CONFIDENTIALLY FROM WARREN CHRISTOPHER - THAT THE US GOVERNMENT ARE THINKING OF CALLING A MEETING SOON, PERHAPS IN THE FIRST HALF OF NEXT MONTH, OF THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE SEVEN. SUCH AN IDEA IMMEDIATELY GIVES RISE TO CERTAIN DANGERS: THE RESENTMENT OF OTHERS IN THE COMMUNITY WHO THINK THEY ARE BEING LEFT OUT (NOT TO MENTION THE AUSTRALIANS): AND THE HOSTILE REACTION THAT A MEETING OF THIS KIND (IF IT BECAME KNOWN, AS IT ALMOST CERTAINLY WOULD) COULD BE EXPECTED TO AROUSE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH WEST ASIA WHERE IT MIGHT BE SEEN AS THE FIRST STEP TO IMPOSING SOME FORM OF ASSOCIATION ON THE REGION FROM OUTSIDE.

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4. NEVERTHELESS THE AMERICANS BELIEVE THAT THE STUDY OF THIS SUBJECT MUST START SOMEWHERE, AND THAT THE COUNTRIES OF THE REGION, THOUGH THEY MUST OF COURSE BE CLOSELY INVOLVED, AND AT AN EARLY STAGE, DO NOT HAVE THE MATERIAL OR EXPERTISE AVAILABLE TO DO THE SORT OF PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS REQUIRED WHICH, BY ANALOGY, THE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES PERFORMED THEMSELVES IN THE EARLY DAYS OF THE MARSHALL PLAN. WHAT, I SUPPOSE, MAY EMERGE FROM THE AMERICANS IS THE IDEA OF SOME DIVISION OF LABOUR SO FAR AS EUROPEAN INVOLVEMENT IS CONCERNED. THIS MIGHT INVOLVE EITHER BUILDING ON REGIONAL LINKS SUCH AS THOSE BETWEEN THE EEC AND THE GULF STATES, OR INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES TAKING THE LEAD, AS THE FRG HAVE AGREED TO DO IN TURKEY. THE UK MIGHT UNDERTAKE A SIMILAR ROLE IN OMAN AND INDIA, FRANCE IN SYRIA AND LEBANON (AND IRAQ?) ITALY IN SOMALIA ETC. IT IS STRETCHING THE IMAGINATION TOO FAR AT THIS STAGE TO TRY TO DEFINE WHAT TAKING THE LEAD MIGHT MEAN: BUT IT IS POSSIBLE TO CONCEIVE OF THE LEAD-COUNTRY BEING RESPONSIBLE FIRST OF ALL FOR SOME ANALYSIS OF THE ECONOMIC AND STRATEGIC PROBLEMS OF THE COUNTRY INDICATED AND THEN EVENTUALLY TAKING THE MAIN RESPONSIBILITY FOR DISCUSSING REMEDIES WITH THAT COUNTRY AND COOPERATING IN THEIR IMPLEMENTATION.

5. AN ENORMOUS QUESTION MARK REMAINS OF COURSE ABOUT WHAT THE FRAMEWORK ITSELF AMOUNTS TO, WHAT THE LINK IS BETWEEN A SERIES OF BILATERAL UNDERSTANDINGS, AND WHAT IT IS THAT CAN POSSIBLY BRING COHESION TO THE COMPLETELY DIFFERENT PROBLEMS SAY OF THE ARAB/ ISRAEL DISPUTE AND THE THREAT TO PAKISTAN. BUT, WHATEVER THE UNCERTAINTIES, THE AMERICANS ARE CLEAR THAT THE COUNTRIES THEMSELVES NEED HELP FROM OUTSIDE AND THAT THE HELP FROM OUTSIDE HAS TO BE GIVEN IN SUCH A WAY THAT IT DOES NOT AMOUNT TO THE ASSERTION OR EVEN THE SUGGESTION OF CONTROL.

6. MY OWN PURELY PERSONAL REFLECTION IS THAT THE AMERICANS STILL TEND TO SEE THINGS RATHER IN TERMS OF RESISTANCE TO COMMUNISM AND TO THE SOVIET THREAT AND TO UNDERESTIMATE THE COMPLEX MENTALITIES OF THE POPULATIONS AND LEADERS IN THE ARC OF CRISIS. IT WILL NOT SURELY BE POSSIBLE FOR THE GENERAL PROBLEM OF INTERNAL STABILITY AND THE EXTERNAL THREAT TO BE SOLVED SIMPLY ALONG THE LINES OF STAVING OFF COMMUNISM: SOME OF THE ELEMENTS OF THE DISCREDITED NORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE WOULD HAVE TO BE INCORPORATED WITH THE RICH CIL COUNTRIES OF COURSE BEING PREVAILED UPON TO FORK OUT.

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7. ALL THIS IS HIGHLY SPECULATIVE AND WHAT I THINK WOULD BE IMMEDIATELY RELEVANT WOULD BE A MESSAGE FROM YOU TO VANCE TAKING UP CARTER'S CALL IN THE STATE OF THE UNION ADDRESS FOR COLLECTIVE EFFORTS AND THE PARTICIPATION OF ALLIES. YOU COULD SAY THAT YOU WOULD BE INTERESTED TO HEAR MORE ABOUT AMERICAN THINKING ON THIS SUBJECT AND INDEED TO OFFER TO BRING TO BEAR OUR INFORMATION AND EXPERTISE. FOR THIS PURPOSE YOU MIGHT SAY THAT THE FIRST THING THAT LOOKS TO US TO BE NECESSARY IS TO WORK TOGETHER TO COLLATE THE FACTS AND TO TAKE STOCK OF THE PROBLEMS OF EACH COUNTRY AND THE POSSIBLE REMEDIES. IF WE COULD OFFER TO SEND PEOPLE OVER HERE WITH SPECIFIC EXPERTISE, I AM SURE THAT THAT WOULD BE WELCOMED. THE MAIN POINT WOULD BE TO SHOW THAT WE ARE EAGER TO RESPOND TO THEIR WISH FOR COOPERATION AND THAT WHILE A WIDER FORUM MAY BE NECESSARY AT SOME STAGE, AS WELL AS ONE AT A VERY HIGH LEVEL, THE FIRST STEP MIGHT BEST INVOLVE SOMETHING MORE IN THE NATURE OF A WORKING PARTY, SUCH SEPCIALIST GROUPS ALREADY EXIST WITHIN NATO AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND IT MAY BE THAT OUR PROCEDURES HAVE TO EVOLVE TO DEAL WITH AN AREA THAT IS BOTH EXTREMELY VARIED AND NOT COVERED BY ANY EXISTING INSTITUTIONS.

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DAMASCUS, BEIRUT, DOHA
INFO SAVING TO E. EUROPEAN POSTS, KABUL

*Read in full**M*

MIPT: US FOREIGN POLICY - PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS

1. THERE ARE SIGNS OF CHANGE IN U S FOREIGN POLICY THAT REFLECT THIS NEW ANALYSIS AND I AM STRUCK BY THE WAY THINKING IS ALREADY MOVING FROM THE NEGATIVE PROBLEM OF PUNISHING THE RUSSIANS AND THREATENING THE IRANIAN TO THE POSITIVE TASK OF DEALING WITH THE UNDERLYING CAUSES OF INSTABILITY IN AN AREA THAT IS AT ONCE THE MOST EXPOSED TO THE SOVIET UNION AND THE MOST IMPORTANT TO THE USA.
2. THE RUSSIANS MUST OF COURSE, BE SHOWN THAT THEY CANNOT COMMIT ACTS OF AGGRESSION WITH IMPUNITY (HENCE ACTION ON GRAIN EXPORTS, OLYMPIC GAMES, ELIMINATION OF HIGH-LEVEL VISITS AND PROVISION OF TECHNOLOGY ETC). BUT I EXPECT THE AMERICANS TO GO SLOW NOW IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAN, UNLESS THERE IS SOME MARKED DETERIORATION IN THE POSITION OF THE HOSTAGES. THEY ARE CLEARLY HOPING THAT BANI SADR'S ELECTION AS PRESIDENT, COUPLED WITH IRAN'S PERCEPTION OF WHERE THE TRUE THREAT TO THEIR INTERESTS LIES, WILL LEAD TO THE RELEASE OF THE HOSTAGES BEFORE VERY LONG: AND THE U S ADMINISTRATION ARE FLEXIBLE ENOUGH TO BE PREPARED TO SHIFT GEAR COMPLETELY AND START WORKING AS HARD AS POSSIBLE TO BUILD UP IRAN AND PREVENT IT DISINTEGRATING.
3. SO FAR AS THE COMMUNIST WORLD ARE CONCERNED PUNISHMENT WILL BE SUBJECT TO QUALIFICATIONS:
 - (A) WHILE ONE OF THE CENTRAL PILLARS OF DETENTE - THE PURSUIT OF ARMS CONTROL, AND SALT, ETC - HAS BEEN RELEGATED, THE BELIEF IN THE CONCEPT OF DETENTE HAS NOT BEEN ENTIRELY ABANDONED. (NOR FOR THAT MATTER HAS CARTER'S OWN PARTICULAR DEVOTION TO HUMAN RIGHTS). IT REMAINS (AS DOES THE HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY) SOMEWHAT IN LIMBO, BUT ALIVE, WHICH INDEED IS VERY NECESSARY IF THE CONSTITUENCY OF MEN OF GOODWILL IS NOT TO BE FORFEITED.
 - (B) THE U S GOVERNMENT WILL TRY TO AVOID PUNISHING THE EAST EUROPEANS: THE PURPOSE WILL BE NOT SIMPLY TO AVOID THE INJUSTICE OF

BLAMING THEM FOR SOMETHING FOR WHICH THEY ARE NOT RESPONSIBLE BUT ALSO TO TRY TO SHARPEN THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN THEM AND THE SOVIET UNION.

4. BUT WHAT ARE THE NEW AND POSITIVE STEPS THAT THE U S ARE GOING TO TAKE IN FOREIGN AND DEFENCE POLICY? THE HOPES EXPRESSED BY PRESIDENT CARTER WHEN HE CAME TO POWER OF REDUCING ARMAMENTS' EXPENDITURE HAVE BEEN ABANDONED: NOT ONLY IS THE U S NOW COMMITTED TO A HEAVY INCREASE IN REAL DEFENCE EXPENDITURE AFTER A DECLINE THAT HAS LASTED OVER 15 YEARS, BUT THERE IS MUCH EMPHASIS ON THE RAPID DEPLOYMENT FORCE FOR NON-NATO CONTINGENCIES AND THE NEED FOR AN IMPROVED AIR AND SEA LIFT CAPABILITY TO GET THE FORCES QUICKLY INTO ACTION WHEREVER THEY MIGHT BE NEEDED. NOR WILL THE RUSSIANS OVERLOOK THE CALL FOR REGISTRATION FOR SELECTIVE SERVICE, A DECISION THAT I BELIEVE THE PRESIDENT MADE PERSONALLY, NOR THE INTENDED REHABILITATION OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. APART FROM THE INCREASE IN THE DEFENCE PROGRAMME AND THE STRENGTHENING OF THE U S NAVAL PRESENCE IN THE INDIAN OCEAN, THE MOST IMPORTANT NEW STEPS SEEM TO ME TO BE AS FOLLOWS:

- (I) THE NEW SECURITY GUARANTEE FOR THE PERSIAN GULF: AND
- (II) THE IDEA OF A FRAMEWORK OF COOPERATION FOR THE SECURITY OF THE ARC OF CRISIS.

5. THE PRACTICAL ACTION SO FAR TAKEN HAS BEEN

(A) THE CONFIRMATION OF THE 1959 AGREEMENT TO HELP PRESERVE THE INDEPENDENCE AND INTEGRITY OF PAKISTAN: AND THE URGENT EFFORT TO PUT TOGETHER A PROGRAMME OF MILITARY AND ECONOMIC AID FOR PAKISTAN.

(B) THE SEARCH THAT IS BEING MADE TO ESTABLISH DEFENCE FACILITIES IN THE REGION E.G. OMAN, SOMALIA AND KENYA, TO HELP SUPPORT ANY RAPID BUILD-UP THAT MAY BE NEEDED OF U S GROUND AIR AND NAVY REINFORCEMENTS. DIEGO GARCIA IS ALREADY IMPORTANT IN THIS RESPECT BUT CLEARLY THE U S ARE LOOKING TO CONSIDERABLE DEVELOPMENTS THERE.

(C) THE CLEAR TILT THAT THE U S ARE GIVING TOWARDS PEKING - BY THE GRANTING OF MFN TREATMENT AND THE AGREEMENT TO SUPPLY DUAL PURPOSE TECHNOLOGY AND SELECTED ITEMS OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT.

6. THE U S GOVERNMENT CAN BE EXPECTED TO EXPLOIT, WITH LESS INHIBITION THAN HITERTO, THE CHINA DIMENSION. BUT THEY WILL AVOID BEING PROVOCATIVE SO FAR AS THE SOVIET UNION ARE CONCERNED, AND THEY WILL BE VERY AWARE OF THE PSYCHOSIS THAT NEW DELHI HAS ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF A WASHINGTON/ISLAMABAD/PEKING TRIANGLE.

7. AS REGARDS THE SECURITY GUARANTEE FOR THE PERSIAN GULF THERE ARE TWO THINGS TO BE SAID ABOUT IT AT THIS STAGE. FIRSTLY IT MARKS A DECISIVE BREAK WITH THE POST-VIETNAMESE MOOD OF THE U S. CARTER HIMSELF ORIGINALLY ACCEPTED THAT RESPONSIBILITY FOR REGIONAL SECURITY

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SHOULD BE DEVOLVED AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE UPON THE LOCAL POWERS. BUT HE HAS NOW HAD TO MODIFY THIS AND TO ADOPT A POLICY OF DIRECT U S MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN ANOTHER DISTANT PART OF THE WORLD. CARTER'S COMMITMENT TO USE MILITARY FORCE IF NECESSARY TO PREVENT OUTSIDE CONTROL OF THE PERSIAN GULF REGION IS CATEGORICAL (IT IS IN SOME WAYS REMARKABLY CLOSE TO EISENHOWER'S 1957 DOCTRINE DECLARING READINESS TO USE ARMED FORCE TO DEFEND THE AREA AGAINST OVERT ARMED AGRESSION IN THE FACE OF A SERIOUS THREAT TO U S VITAL INTERESTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST): IT PUTS THE REGION ON A PAR WITH EUROPE AND THE FAR EAST AS KEY AREAS WHERE U S SECURITY COMMITMENTS CAN BE AUTOMATICALLY TRIGGERED. BUT THE SECOND MAIN FEATURE OF IT, SO FAR, IS THAT THE COMMITMENT, WHILE CERTAIN, IS ILL-DEFINED. IT LEAVE UNDETERMINED THE PRECISE CONDITIONS WHICH WOULD ELICIT A MILITARY RESPONSE FROM THE UNITED STATES, HOW THIS WOULD BE PROVIDED FOR AND, NO LESS IMPORTANT, HOW FAR THE COMMITMENT WOULD RELATE TO INTERNAL SUBVERSION AS WELL AS EXTERNAL THREAT.

B. THIS SAME IMPRECISION CHARACTERISES THE OTHER NEW MAIN PLATFORM, THE FRAMEWORK FOR COOPERATION. THE WORDS CARTER HAS USED HAVE BEEN THAT HE IS PREPARED TO WORK WITH OTHER NATIONS IN THE REGION TO FORM A QUOTE COOPERATIVE SECURITY FRAMEWORK UNQUOTE FOR THE INDEPENDENCE, SECURITY AND PROSPERITY OF ALL. THE ADMINISTRATION ARE WELL AWARE OF THE DIFFICULTIES OF TRYING TO LUMP TOGETHER SUCH DISPARATE ELEMENTS AS THE NEED FOR FACILITIES FOR U S FORCES IN THE AREA, THE ACUTE ECONOMIC PROBLEM OF TURKEY, THE MAJOR ANTAGONISM OF THE ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE AND THE INDO/PAKISTAN RELATIONSHIP AND THE UNREGENERATE NATURE OF SOME OF THE REGIMES. IN TALKING TO THE AMERICANS I AM STRUCK BY THEIR AWARENESS OF THE SCALE AND VARIETY OF THE PROBLEMS INVOLVED, SO MUCH SO THAT THEY DO NOT THINK THAT THEY CAN BE MET BY ANYTHING IN THE NATURE OF A SINGLE DOCTRINE. ALTHOUGH THIS WORD HAS BEEN PUT INTO CARTER'S MOUTH IT IS NOT ONE THAT THE US ADMINISTRATION WISH TO PROPAGATE. THE QUOTE FRAMEWORK UNQUOTE, AS WARREN CHRISTOPHER HAS PUT IT TO ME, IS INTENDED TO ALLOW FOR DIFFERENT SOLUTIONS FOR DIFFERENT PROBLEMS WITHIN THE GENERAL AMBIT OF SAFEGUARDING BOTH THE INTERESTS OF THE COUNTRIES CONCERNED AND THOSE OF THE WEST. THE AMERICANS CANNOT DEAL WITH THESE PROBLEMS ALONE. THEY ALSO BELIEVE THAT OTHERS ARE AFFECTED BY THEM AS MUCH AS THEY ARE. THE FIRST NEED THEREFORE IS TO GET TOGETHER WITH THE ALLIES AT AN EARLY STAGE TO CONSIDER HOW TO START TACKLING THEM: AND I SHALL BE DEALING WITH THIS IN MIFT.

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*Read in full**mb*US FOREIGN POLICY - THE REASONS FOR CHANGE.

1. WHEN PRESIDENT CARTER CAME TO POWER IN JANUARY 1977 HE WAS ANXIOUS TO SET US FOREIGN POLICY UPON A NEW COURSE INSPIRED BY A CERTAIN VISION OF THE WORLD AND BASED ON CLEAR PROPOSITIONS:

(A) UNITED STATES POWER AND INFLUENCE WERE TO BE USED FOR QUOTE HUMANE PURPOSES UNQUOTE. THE WORLD NEEDED A QUOTE NEW AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY BASED ON CONSTANT DECENCY IN ITS VALUES AND ON OPTIMISM IN ITS HISTORICAL VISION UNQUOTE.

(B) THE IDEA THAT THE MAIN EMPHASIS SHOULD BE TO CONTAIN THE SOVIET UNION BY KISSINGER'S WEB OF CONTRACTS AND CONTACTS WAS TO BE SUPPLANTED BY A BROADER BELIEF IN THE NEED TO FOCUS US ATTENTION ON COOPERATION WITH THE INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACIES, ON TACKLING THE PROBLEMS OF THE THIRD WORLD, AND ELEVATING TO HIGH PRIORITY INSISTENCE ON HUMAN RIGHTS SO AS TO ALIGN AMERICA WITH THE TIDE OF HISTORY. THUS CARTER DECLARED THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS NOW FREE OF QUOTE THAT INORDINATE FEAR OF COMMUNISM WHICH ONCE LED US TO EMBRACE ANY DICTATOR WHO JOINED US IN OUR FEAR UNQUOTE.

(C) IN PRACTICE THIS MEANT THAT A DETENTE SEEN AS TOO EXCLUSIVELY CONCERNED WITH ENMESHING THE USA AND THE SOVIET UNION CLOSELY TOGETHER SO AS TO REDUCE THE RISK OF WAR GAVE WAY TO A WIDER POLICY PERSPECTIVE: THIRD COUNTRIES' HUMAN RIGHTS PERFORMANCE WAS TO BE HIGH AMONG CRITERIA DETERMINING US POLICY TOWARD THEM, AND THERE WAS A HEIGHTENED EMPHASIS ON ARMS CONTROL IN ALL ITS FORMS, ON PREVENTING NU^{CLEAR} PROLIFERATION, ON LIMITING CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS, AND ON THE DIVERSION OF RESOURCES TO FIGHTING HUNGER, DISEASE, RACIAL HATRED AND ILLITERACY.

(D) THE USA WAS NOT TO OPPOSE CHANGE, BUT ON THE CONTRARY TO PROMOTE IT, BUT WITHIN A FRAMEWORK THAT TRANSLATED TO THE INTERNATIONAL SCENE THE MORAL VALUES THAT HAD IMBUEED AMERICAN HISTORY. ALL COUNTRIES WERE QUOTE TO RISE ABOVE NATIONAL INTERESTS UNQUOTE.

2. MUCH OF THIS HIGH-SOUNDING STUFF LOOKS PRETTY IRRELEVANT TODAY AND WHAT IS EXTRAORDINARY IS THE WAY EVENTS IN IRAN AND AFGHANISTAN HAVE ALMOST SIMULTANEOUSLY BROUGHT HOME TO THE UNITED STATES THE TWO MATTERS OF FUNDAMENTAL INTEREST TO THEM: THE REALITIES OF SOVIET POWER AND POLICY, AND THE GROWING US DEPENDENCE UPON MIDDLE EAST OIL AT A TIME WHEN THAT AREA OF THE WORLD IS BECOMING INCREASINGLY UNSTABLE.

3. IT WOULD BE GOING TOO FAR TO SAY THAT CARTER UNTIL RECENTLY HAS OVERLOOKED THE TRUE NATURE OF SOVIET POWER OR BEEN NAIVE ABOUT THEIR ULTIMATE OBJECTIVES. BUT HE HAS ALWAYS BELIEVED THAT THE SOVIET LEADERS, GOVERNED BY REASON, KNEW FROM THE SIGNALS THAT THE US WERE CONSTANTLY SENDING THROUGH THEIR VARIOUS MEANS WHAT IT WAS THAT THE USA WERE PREPARED TO ACCEPT IN SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY. THE US COULD TOLERATE, FOR EXAMPLE, SOVIET ATTAINMENT OF NUCLEAR PARITY, AND EVEN APPARENTLY SOVIET-BACKED COUPS OR PROXY ADVENTURES IN ETHIOPIA, SOUTH YEMEN, OR CAMBODIA. BUT DIRECT MASSIVE SOVIET MILITARY INTERVENTION OUTSIDE THE SOCIALIST CAMP AND IN A NON-ALIGNED COUNTRY CLOSE TO THE MOST SENSITIVE PARTS OF THE GULF AND THE MIDDLE EAST WAS ANOTHER MATTER. IT HAS BEEN THE FAILURE OF THE SOVIET UNION TO KEEP WITHIN WHAT THE US GOVERNMENT THOUGHT WERE CLEARLY DEFINED LIMITS BY INVADING AFGHANISTAN THAT HAS PRODUCED SUCH A SHOCK IN WASHINGTON.

4. THE FRENCH MAY THINK THAT THERE HAVE BEEN OTHER EVENTS SINCE THE WAR E.G. THE BERLIN BLOCKADE OR THE CUBA MISSILE CRISIS THAT HAVE BEEN MORE OF A THREAT TO PEACE THAN THE INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN. BUT I AM SURE THAT THE AUTHORITIES IN WASHINGTON DO NOT THINK THE RUSSIANS SHOULD HAVE BEEN IN ANY DOUBT ABOUT THE GRAVE VIEW THAT THE US GOVERNMENT WOULD TAKE OF THIS LATEST SOVIET ACTION: AND IT IS MOSCOW'S READINESS TO FLOUT THIS THAT SO DISTURBS THEM. IT MIGHT BE ASKED WHY AFGHANISTAN IS WORSE THAN CUBA. THE ANSWER INDICATES THE EXTENT TO WHICH DEPENDENCE ON MIDDLE EAST OIL AND THE CLOSENESS OF THE SOVIET THREAT IN THE REGION HAS NOW BECOME IDENTIFIED WITH AMERICAN VITAL INTERESTS.

5. TO THE REST OF US THERE IS CERTAINLY SOMETHING SURPRISING IN THE FACT THAT THE US SHOULD ONLY NOW HAVE SUDDENLY AWOKEN TO THE THREAT POSED TO US INTERESTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST, NOT ONLY BY THE NEW-FOUND FORCE OF ISLAM AND THE ADVANCE OF SOVIET POWER BUT BY THE INHERENT CONTRADICTION THAT HAS EXISTED FOR SO LONG IN US POLICY TOWARDS THE AREA. WE, THE BRITISH, KNOW BETTER THAN ANY OTHER PEOPLE HOW LONG-STANDING HAS BEEN THE PERVERSITY OF US POLICY TOWARD THE MIDDLE EAST- AN AMALGAM OVER THE YEARS OF BLINDNESS, SELF-INTEREST, IGNORANCE AND DOMESTIC US POLITICS THAT LED THEM FIRST OF ALL TO HELP

PUSH US OUT OF THE REGION AND THEN MOST RECENTLY TO UNDERESTIMATE THE PROBLEM OF SQUARING THE CIRCLE CREATED BY DEPENDENCE ON ARAB OIL AND FAVOURED RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL. I AM SURE IT WOULD BE WRONG TO ASSUME THAT EVERYTHING THAT CARTER IS NOW SUGGESTING AND DOING IS MOTIVATED MAINLY OR EVEN LARGELY BY ELECTORAL CONSIDERATIONS. WHAT HAS HAPPENED ABROAD WOULD HAVE REQUIRED A REVIEW OF US FOREIGN POLICY REGARDLESS OF THE ELECTION. A NEW MORE RATIONAL POLICY TOWARDS THE AREA IS GOING TO BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO CONSTRUCT, AND THE CHANCES OF THE US BEING ABLE TO IMPLEMENT A CONSISTENT OR SUCCESSFUL POLICY ON NEW LINES IS GREATLY COMPLICATED BOTH BY CARTER'S COMMITMENT TO CAMP DAVID AND BY THE INEVITABLE IMPACT OF THE JEWISH LOBBY ON THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY. BUT THIS ATTEMPT IS NOW ONE OF THE MAIN PRIORITIES OF US FOREIGN POLICY, UPON WHICH I SHALL BE COMMENTING IN MY TWO IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAMS. FCO PASS SAVING BUCHAREST SOFIA BELGRADE BUDAPEST PRAGUE WARSAW EAST BERLIN AND KABUL.

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REVIEW OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY.

1. COMING ON TOP OF MOUNTING CONCERN HERE ABOUT THE INCREASE IN SOVIET MILITARY POWER AND ABOUT THE GROWING AMERICAN DEPENDENCE ON MIDDLE EAST OIL AT A TIME WHEN THAT AREA IS SHOWING SEISMIC INSTABILITY, THE SOVIET OCCUPATION OF AFGHANISTAN HAS PRODUCED A SHOCK-WAVE HERE THE IMPACT OF WHICH DOES NOT SEEM TO BE NECESSARILY FELT OR UNDERSTOOD ELSEWHERE.

2. MANY OF THE ASSUMPTIONS HELD BY PRESIDENT CARTER WHEN HE TOOK OFFICE HAVE BEEN SHATTERED AND A REVIEW OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IS TAKING PLACE. FROM ALL THE LENGTHY PASSAGES OF CARTER'S STATE OF THE UNION ADDRESS LAST NIGHT DEVOTED TO FOREIGN POLICY I WOULD PICK OUT AS THE SINGLE MOST IMPORTANT HIS WARNING THAT QUOTE AN ATTEMPT BY ANY OUTSIDE FORCE TO GAIN CONTROL OF THE PERSIAN GULF REGION WILL BE REGARDED AS AN ASSAULT ON THE VITAL INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES UNQUOTE AND QUOTE WILL BE REPELLED BY USE OF ANY MEANS NECESSARY, INCLUDING MILITARY FORCE UNQUOTE.

3. AS HM AMBASSADORS IN BONN AND PARIS HAVE ALREADY INDICATED, THE CHANGE IN ATTITUDE HERE ABOUT EAST-WEST RELATIONS HAS FAR REACHING IMPLICATIONS FOR RELATIONS BETWEEN THE USA AND THEIR EUROPEAN ALLIES. I SHALL BE TRYING TO PUT TOGETHER AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE AN ANALYSIS OF THE NEW U.S. POLICY, THE CONSEQUENCES OF THIS FOR THE ALLIANCE AND THE PARTICULAR SCOPE THIS HOLDS OUT FOR HMG.

FCO PAS^S SAVING ANKARA ATHENS BRUSSELS COPENHAGEN LISBON LUXEMBOURG OSLO REYKJAVIK AND THE HAGUE.

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