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CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 050730Z

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 050044Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 652 OF 4 MAY

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, PARIS, MADRID, DUBLIN, MOSCOW, WARSAW, ACCRA, KINSHASA, KAMPALA, AMMAN, TOKYO, PANAMA CITY, GEORGETOWN, PEKING.

4 MAY 1982

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MY TELNO 642: FALKLAND ISLANDS: SECURITY COUNCIL


1. THE IRISH GOVERNMENT'S DECISION TO MOBILISE THE SECURITY COUNCIL (MY TELS NO 645 AND 647, NOT TO ALL) HAS CAUSED SOME CONSTERNATION HERE. THERE IS GENERAL AGREEMENT WITH THE VIEW I HAVE PUT FORECFULLY AND REPEATEDLY TO DORR (IRELAND) THAT PUBLIC PROCEEDINGS OF THE COUNCIL WOULD BE SO ACRIMONIOUS THAT THEY WOULD EFFECTIVELY KILL THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S INITIATIVE. IN PUTTING FORWARD THIS VIEW, I HAVE STRESSED THAT I AM NOT TRYING TO BLOCK A MEETING BUT RATHER SUGGESTING THAT ITS TIMING SHOULD BE VERY CAREFULLY CONSIDERED IN ORDER TO ENSURE THAT IT WILL NOT CUT ACROSS THE EFFORTS OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, OR OTHERS. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL HIMSELF HOLDS THIS VIEW STRONGLY AND HAS WORKED HARD DURING THE DAY ON DORR AND THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL. EVEN TROYANOVSKY (USSR) TOLD THE SECRETARY-GENERAL THAT THE RUSSIANS FAVOURED A MEETING "PROVIDED IT DOES NOT UNDERMINE YOUR EFFORTS". BUT, AS I FEARED, LING QING HAS FELT OBLIGED TO RESPOND TO THE IRISH REQUEST (WHICH WAS FORMALLY CONVEYED TO HIM IN THE EARLY AFTERNOON) AND HAS CONVENED INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS OF THE WHOLE COUNCIL AT 2000Z TOMORROW (5 MAY).
2. IN CONVERSATIONS THIS EVENING WITH DORR, OTUNNU (UGANDA) AND THE SECRETARY-GENERAL I HAVE SUGGESTED THAT, NOW THAT SECURITY COUNCIL PROCEEDINGS HAVE BEEN LAUNCHED, THE BEST WAY OF MINIMISING THE DAMAGE WOULD BE FOR THE COUNCIL TO CONTINUE TO MEET INFORMALLY (IE IN PRIVATE), HEARING REPORTS FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ABOUT HOW HIS INITIATIVE IS FARING AND

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MIPT: FALKLAND ISLANDS; SECURITY COUNCIL.

1. NOW THAT THE IRISH HAVE REACTIVATED THE SECURITY COUNCIL (I DO NOT THINK, INCIDENTALLY, THAT ANYONE ELSE WOULD HAVE DONE SO IF THEY HAD NOT), MY OBJECTIVE WILL BE TO DELAY AS LONG AS POSSIBLE A FORMAL AND PUBLIC MEETING. I THINK THERE IS A REASONABLE CHANCE THAT I WILL BE ABLE TO KEEP THE COUNCIL IN INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS FOR A FEW MORE DAYS, UNLESS THERE IS ANOTHER MAJOR MILITARY ENGAGEMENT. THE PRECEDENT OF THE US HOSTAGES AND THE IRAN/IRAQ WAR IS A VALID ONE AND THERE IS A GENERAL DESIRE NOT TO CUT ACROSS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S EFFORTS. I HAVE BEEN WORKING ON VARIOUS COUNCIL MEMBERS ON THESE LINES THIS AFTERNOON, WITH SEEMINGLY GOOD RESULTS.

2. MY INSISTENCE ON THE LATTER POINT - NOT CUTTING ACROSS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S EFFORTS - WILL OF COURSE BE ONLY A PRETEXT. I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S IDEAS PROVIDE THE BASIS FOR A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT; AND GIVEN THE INVOLVEMENT OF RAFAE AHMED, IT IS PROBABLY DESIRABLE TO KEEP THE UNITED NATIONS OUT OF THE GAME, AT THIS STAGE AT ANY RATE. MY REAL PURPOSE IN DELAYING A FORMAL COUNCIL MEETING WILL BE TO GAIN TIME FOR THE HAIG/BELAUNDE PROPOSALS TO MATURE AND, OF COURSE, TO PUT OFF AS LONG AS POSSIBLE A POSSIBLE UK VETO OF A SEEMINGLY MILD RESOLUTION CALLING FOR A CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES. SUCH A VETO WOULD SERIOUSLY UNDERMINE OUR POSITION HERE AND TRANSFER THE DIPLOMATIC ADVANTAGE TO THE ARGENTINES.

3. ONCE IT BECOMES CLEAR THAT FORMAL AND PUBLIC PROCEEDINGS OF THE COUNCIL ARE INEVITABLE, WE SHALL NEED TO DECIDE WHETHER TO CONTINUE TO TRY TO SPIN THINGS OUT (EG BY ASSEMBLING (AND PROVOKING) THE LONGEST POSSIBLE SPEAKERS LIST) OR TO GO FOR A SHORT SHARP DEBATE IN ORDER TO GET OUR VETO OVER WITH AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE. IF AND WHEN THE TIME COMES, I SHALL RECOMMEND ON THIS IN THE LIGHT OF THE THEN STATE OF HOSTILITIES AND OF DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVES.

4. ONE CONSEQUENCE OF RELYING ON THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S INITIATIVE AS A PRETEXT FOR DELAYING A FORMAL MEETING IS THAT WE SHALL GIVE IT ENHANCED STATUS. I THINK THAT THIS PRICE IS WORTH PAYING. PEREZ DE CUELLAR'S IDEAS ARE IN ANY CASE LIKELY TO BECOME PUBLIC SHORTLY BECAUSE WE HAVE REVEALED THEM TO OUR COLLEAGUES IN THE TEN (SEE MY TELNO 651) AND BECAUSE THE WHOLE UN PRESS CORPS IS TRYING TO SNIFF THEM OUT. BUT IF YOU ACCEPT THE TACTICS RECOMMENDED ABOVE, IT IS LIKELY TO BECOME NECESSARY FOR YOU TO BE READIER THAN YOU WERE IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS TODAY TO ADMIT THAT PEREZ DE CUELLAR DID PUT SOME SPECIFIC IDEAS TO YOU ON 2 MAY.

PARSONS

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