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GRS 820

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FROM FCO 181900Z NOVEMBER 1982

IMMEDIATE TO WASHINGTON

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2037 OF 17 NOVEMBER

REPEATED FOR INFORMATION PRIORITY TO BONN PARIS UKDEL NATO MOSCOW
EAST-WEST RELATIONS

1. PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM ME TO SHULTZ.
MESSAGE BEGINS: DEAR GEORGE. I HAVE BEEN THINKING ABOUT THE
CONVERSATION WE HAD IN MOSCOW WHEN WE WERE BOTH THERE FOR PRESIDENT
BREZHNEV'S FUNERAL AND ABOUT THE PROSPECTS FOR EAST-WEST
RELATIONS.

THREE THINGS STRIKE ME:

A. THERE HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANT SHIFTS IN THE LAST WEEK IN THE
SCENERY OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS. THE CHANGE OF LEADERSHIP IN
MOSCOW GAVE THE OPPORTUNITY FOR THE SIGNAL CONTAINED IN
PRESIDENT REAGAN'S MESSAGE OF CONDOLENCE AND FOR THE IMPORTANT
CONVERSATION WHICH GEORGE BUSH AND YOU HAD WITH
ANDROPOV AND GROMYKO AFTER THE FUNERAL:

B. THERE HAS BEEN A CONVERGENCE OF ATTITUDES TOWARDS EAST-WEST
RELATIONS AMONG THE MAJOR WESTERN ALLIES. THIS WAS FOR EXAMPLE
REFLECTED IN THE JOINT STATEMENT ISSUED BY PRESIDENT REAGAN AND
CHANCELLOR KOHL:

C. THE SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION OF THE PIPELINE EXERCISE ON THE
BASIS OF YOUR 'NON-PAPER' HAS CREATED BOTH THE OPPORTUNITY AND
THE URGENT NEED FOR THE WESTERN ALLIES TO CONCERT A COMMON LINE
ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS, INCLUDING BUT NOT MERELY THE ECONOMIC
DIMENSION.

IT IS VERY IMPORTANT THAT WE SHOULD SEIZE THE CHANCE WHICH I
BELIEVE THESE DEVELOPMENTS OFFER TO US, AND NOT LOSE A DAY MORE
THAN IS NECESSARY. THERE IS VERY LITTLE TIME BEFORE THE
DECEMBER NATO FOREIGN MINISTERS' MEETING, WHICH WILL OBVIOUSLY BE
OF EXCEPTIONAL IMPORTANCE THIS YEAR. I SHOULD LIKE TO SEE THAT
MEETING ADOPT, IN ADDITION TO THE USUAL COMMUNIQUE, A DECLARATION

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ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS, SETTING OUT IN AN ELOQUENT AND EYE-CATCHING FORM THE BASIC WESTERN APPROACH, AND REPEATING THE VARIOUS OFFERS AND PROPOSALS ALREADY MADE TO THE SOVIET UNION, SO AS TO BRING OUT PRESIDENT REAGAN'S POINT THAT A MORE CONSTRUCTIVE EAST-WEST RELATIONSHIP IS THERE FOR THE ASKING IF THE NEW SOVIET LEADERS WILL ONLY DO WHAT IS NECESSARY TO GRASP THE OPPORTUNITY. SUCH A DECLARATION MIGHT HAVE TO BE DRAFTED BY AN INNER GROUP OF ALLIES RATHER THAN IN THE USUAL NATO DRAFTING MACHINERY.

AT THE SAME TIME, I ALSO HOPE THAT WE CAN MOVE AHEAD RAPIDLY ON EAST-WEST ECONOMIC RELATIONS. THE FRENCH PROBLEM HAS, I HOPE, BEEN LARGELY IRONED OUT AS A RESULT OF A MEETING I HAD IN MOSCOW WITH CLAUDE CHEYSSON AND THE OTHERS CONCERNED. WE OURSELVES TAKE VERY SERIOUSLY ALL OUR COMMITMENTS IN THE 'NON-PAPER', AND HAVE CLEAR IDEAS ON HOW TO PURSUE THEM. I HAVE SENT INSTRUCTIONS TO OLIVER WRIGHT TO HELP MAINTAIN THE MOMENTUM.

ONE POINT STRUCK ME AS BEING OF PARTICULAR INTEREST IN YOUR AMBASSADOR'S ACCOUNT OF YOUR MEETING WITH ANDROPOV. I GATHER THAT ANDROPOV DROPPED A HINT ABOUT A POSSIBLE SUMMIT. IN NORMAL TIMES I WOULD GO ALONG WITH THE ARGUMENT THAT SUMMITS NEED TO BE VERY CAREFULLY PREPARED IF THEY ARE NOT TO AROUSE AND THEN DISAPPOINT PUBLIC EXPECTATIONS. BUT IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES, AND WITH ALL THE CHANGES IN THE EAST-WEST SCENERY OF WHICH I HAVE SPOKEN, IT SEEMS TO ME THAT THERE COULD BE SOMETHING TO BE SAID FOR AN EARLY SOVIET-AMERICAN SUMMIT. IT WOULD NEED TO BE PRESENTED NOT AS AN ATTEMPT TO REACH COMPREHENSIVE AGREEMENTS, BUT AS A CHANCE FOR THE TWO LEADERS TO GET TO KNOW ONE ANOTHER, AND ALSO TO ENABLE PRESIDENT REAGAN, AS LEADER OF THE WESTERN ALLIANCE, TO SPELL OUT TO ANDROPOV THE MAJOR AREAS OF WESTERN CONCERN - THE STRATEGIC BALANCE, AFGHANISTAN, POLAND AND HUMAN RIGHTS. LIKE THE DECLARATION ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS WHICH I HAVE SUGGESTED, THIS WOULD HELP TO UNDERLINE THE POINT THAT A MORE CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONSHIP IS POSSIBLE IF THE RUSSIANS WANT IT AND ARE READY TO WORK FOR IT. IDEALLY THE SUMMIT WOULD FOLLOW SOON AFTER THE NATO MEETING, FOR EXAMPLE EARLY NEXT YEAR.

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I HAVE CONSIDERED THE POSSIBLE EFFECT OF A SUMMIT ON EUROPEAN PUBLIC OPINION, AND IN PARTICULAR THE RISK THAT IT MIGHT ENCOURAGE ILLUSIONS ABOUT A BETTER EAST-WEST RELATIONSHIP WHICH WOULD MAKE IT MORE DIFFICULT TO GO AHEAD WITH INF DEPLOYMENT. BUT I BELIEVE THAT, PROVIDING IT WERE HELD REALLY EARLY IN 1983, A SUMMIT COULD HELP TO KEEP PUBLIC OPINION STEADY - PERHAPS ESPECIALLY IN GERMANY - BY DEMONSTRATING THAT THE UNITED STATES IS DOING EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO REACH AGREEMENT ON GENUINELY BALANCED MEASURES OF ARMS CONTROL, AT THE SAME TIME AS PUTTING THE OTHER HALF OF THE DOUBLE DECISION INTO EFFECT.

TO PUT THE IDEA IN ANOTHER FORM, WOULD THE PRESIDENT BE ABLE TO REJECT A SUMMIT IF ANDROPOV WERE TO PROPOSE ONE NOW, AS COULD HAPPEN IN CONNECTION WITH THE WARSAW PACT MEETING EARLY NEXT MONTH? IF THE ANSWER IS NO, PERHAPS THE RIGHT COURSE IS FOR THE UNITED STATES ITSELF TO TAKE THE INITIATIVE.

I HAVE NOT SO FAR HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO TALK THESE THINGS OVER WITH CLAUDE AND HANS-DIETRICH, BUT WOULD LIKE TO DO SO WHEN I SEE THEM ON 22-23 NOVEMBER AT ONE OF OUR REGULAR COMMUNITY MEETINGS. I HOPE YOU MAY BE ABLE TO LET ME HAVE A FIRST REACTION BEFORE THEN. YOURS, FRANCIS. MESSAGE ENDS.

PYM

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