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SCC ON POLAND

Purpose of the Meeting

To discuss specific contingency actions in the event the Soviets invade Poland. (S)

Discussion

This meeting, as requested by the President, is to examine the actions we might take to deter Soviet armed intervention in Poland, as well as our course of action if and when such a Soviet invasion does occur. Given our most recent inter-agency assessment of even odds that a Soviet intervention will indeed take place, as well as the fact that we probably would have comparatively little time to react to such an emergency when it happens, it is important that we attempt to think through at this stage just what specific actions we would take in such circumstances.

Allied Reaction

A crucial factor conditioning our own response will be the behavior of our allies. The nature and circumstances of a Soviet invasion would strongly influence European reaction and we must take account of this in our contingency planning. Even in the face of a Soviet invasion of Poland, we will probably still be forced to hold the Europeans' feet, especially the Germans, to the fire to take commensurate and tangible action. Obviously, the more brutal the Soviet intervention the easier to get the Europeans to act. Conversely, ambiguity would allow them -- again especially the Germans -- to argue that a stiff response, especially on economic matters, would invite the catastrophe which we would like to avoid. The current difficult economic situation in the FRG would make economic sanctions against the USSR particularly hard to swallow. In general, it is also likely that more military spending by the Europeans in the aftermath of a Soviet invasion of Poland would be difficult to obtain. France would probably be tougher than the FRG, partly because Giscard is in an election campaign and partly because of conviction. The French reaction would therefore be crucial not only in itself, but for the effect which it would have on the Germans and the rest of the Europeans. Thatcher will fully cooperate with us on sanctions but also suffers domestic constraints on more defense spending. (TS)

The Contingencies

Below are lists of possible actions which we might take:

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Classified/Extended by Z. Brzezinski
Review on October 21, 2000
Reason: NSC. 1.13(f)

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

PER 7/3/98 NSC RE NLC-76-61
BY [Signature] NARS, DATE 9/11/00

- Before Soviet intervention takes place, in an effort to deter Moscow;
- After a Soviet intervention or invasion which would be accompanied by a minimum level of violence (scenario I); and
- After an all-out invasion involving fighting and bloodshed over a comparatively extended period (scenario II).

The SCC should attempt to come up with recommendations for the President on how we would plan to meet each of these contingencies and what we might ask of our allies in such circumstances. (The list of actions is meant to be the basis for broad discussion and is hence as inclusive as possible.) (S)

I. Contingency Actions Before an Intervention Takes Place

A. U.S. Actions

1) Political Actions

- a) Demarches to the Soviets about maneuvers or other indicators of impending invasion;
- b) Publication of such demarches if no results are obtained;
- c) Statement that an invasion or intervention in Poland would be a clear violation of the CSCE process;
- d) Hot line message pointing out that an invasion of Poland would result in a total freeze in our relations;
- e) Request for Security Council action to forestall a threat to international peace and security;
- f) If the above fails because of Soviet veto, request a UNGA special session;
- g) Intensify consultation with concerned regional states, e.g., Romania, Yugoslavia; and
- h) Convene special ministerial session of North Atlantic Council.

2) Economic Actions

- a) Warn the Soviets that an invasion of Poland would mean the destruction of our remaining economic relations with the USSR.

all good possibilities. ascertain which the major allies will (likely) pursue

3) Military Action

- a) Increase military alert status of our forces in Europe, designed to match corresponding increases in Soviet readiness;
- b) Put Soviets on notice that we will match their level of military preparedness.

4) Pyschological Actions

- a) Message to the Pope asking that he exert good offices;
- b) Attempt to rally socialist international to the Polish cause;
- c) Request the international labor movement to help prevent a Soviet invasion;
- d) Appeal to the non-aligned movement to exert its influence on Moscow;
- e) Appeal to Castro, Ceaucescu, and Yugoslav leaders to exert good offices;
- f) Messages to Indira Gandhi and other third world leaders for the same purpose;
- g) Appeals to World Peace Council and similar groups to halt a Soviet invasion of Poland; and
- h) Discussion of Polish situation with the Chinese.

B. Allied Actions (Including Pacific Allies)

1) Political Actions

- a) Actions corresponding to 1a-h above.

2) Economic Actions

- a) Make the Soviets understand that an invasion of Poland will result in severe and world-wide economic sanctions which would effectively deny them the technology transfer they need to modernize their industry.

3) Military Actions

- a) Put all NATO forces in European theater on alert sta-

4) Psychological Actions

- a) Ask the allies to take corresponding actions to 4a-h above;
- b) Ask the Spanish, French, Italians and others to exert what influence they can with the Euro-Communist Parties to pressure the Soviets not to invade Poland.


II. Soviet Armed Intervention -- Scenario I

A. U.S. Actions

1) Political Actions

- ✓ a) Convene emergency meeting of NAC at Foreign Minister level;
- ✓ b) Call for UN condemnation of Soviet action;
- ✓ c) Public and private reassurances to Yugoslavia;
- ✓ d) Move to utilize CSCE Review Conference to condemn Soviet interference in Polish affairs;
- ✓ e) Announce reevaluation of existing US programs in Poland;
- f) Announce sanctions against new Polish government;
- g) Announce sanctions against other East European participants in a Polish invasion;
- h) Substantially cut the size of the Soviet Embassy and of the Soviet Consulate in San Francisco;
- i) Expel all officials of Soviet commercial enterprises operating in this country whom we have identified as suspected KGB operatives;
- j) Withdraw SALT from the Senate and suspend CTB, TNF, and all other bilateral negotiations with the Soviets.

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Possibilities

2) Economic Measures

- a) Abrogate US-Soviet Grain Agreement;
- b) Revoke all export licenses for grain already purchased but not shipped to the USSR;

- c) Abrogate US-Soviet Maritime Agreement;
- d) Stop all Soviet fishing in US waters;
- e) Deny all applications for export of any item to the USSR on the Commodity Control list, including oil and gas equipment technology; and
- f) Abrogate Civil Air Agreement.

3) Military Actions

- a) Bring our forces in Europe to full alert status;
- b) Announce intention to improve world-wide force posture;
- c) Send a REFORGER division to Europe in order to reassure and stabilize the Central Front; (this would be similar to the brigade sent to Berlin in 1961); and
- d) Agree to sell the Chinese defensive weaponry -- e.g., over-the-horizon radar, anti-tank rockets -- and technology.

B. Allied Actions (Including Pacific Allies)

1) Political Action

- a) Take corresponding actions to 1a-j above.

2) Economic Actions

- a) Stop all export credits;
- b) Accept COCOM "no exceptions" policy and the US process know-how proposal;
- c) Expand the COCOM list, especially computers, micro-circuitry, etc.;
- d) Stop European participation in the proposed Siberian natural gas deals;
- e) Freeze all major industrial projects in the USSR, including Creusot-Loire and Kloeckner;
- f) End EC food shipments to the USSR (soybeans, butter, poultry, meat, etc.); and
- g) Stop Japanese participation in Siberian development

*Pursue
3 allies -*

3) Military Action

- a) Join us in increasing NATO defense commitments (4 to 5 percent);
- b) Bring NATO forces to full alert status.

III. All-Out Invasion of Poland -- Scenario II

A. U.S. Actions in Addition to Those Outlined Above

1) Political Actions

- a) Cut Soviet embassy personnel in half;
- b) Close consulates in San Francisco and Leningrad;
- c) Expel all non-diplomatic officials of those Eastern European countries which cooperate with the USSR in invading Poland;
- d) Renounce the Helsinki Accords;
- e) Renounce the 1972 Agreement of Principles; and
- f) Renounce the 1973 Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War.

2) Economic Actions

- a) Embargo all trade with the USSR (i.e., similar treatment to that given to Iran, Cuba, Vietnam);
- b) Close Soviet commercial enterprises operating in this country and expel all Soviet officials from such enterprises;
- c) Freeze Soviet assets in US banks and in branches and subsidiaries of US banks operating abroad; and
- d) Prohibit port calls by Soviet ships.

3) Military Actions

- a) Raise readiness levels worldwide -- DEFCON III -- and begin deployment of POMCUS divisions to Europe.

B. Allied Action (Including Pacific Allies)

1) Political Actions

- a) Reduce size of Soviet official representation;
- b) Expel all identifiable KGB agents; and
- c) Renounce the Helsinki Accords.

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2) Economic Measures

Same

- a) Impose full trade embargo;
- b) Freeze Soviet assets in West European and Japanese banks;
- c) Expel officials of Soviet commercial enterprises and Soviet banks;
- d) Prohibit port calls by Soviet ships;
- e) Stop onward shipments to the USSR by air, sea, rail and road; and
- f) Suspend all bilateral trade agreements. (TS)