



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Prime Minister

This must be particularly galling for King Hussein after the "success" of his visit to W'bin. On balance I think the weight

23 November 1981

of the argument must be against your sending a message. Apes text of the telegram at Reagan's? Dear Michael,

Am 23/11

Jerusalem and US/Jordanian Relations

King Hussein has reacted sharply to President Reagan's recent public statement that he would prefer Jerusalem to remain unified under Israeli sovereignty. He has asked the Prime Minister for help in persuading President Reagan to undo the damage.

In a meeting in Washington with Jewish leaders on 19 November, President Reagan was trapped into making a statement that he would 'prefer Jerusalem to remain unified under Israeli sovereignty, with assured access for all to the Holy Places'. The White House subsequently issued a statement claiming that the President's response did not reflect any change in US policy, which is that Jerusalem should remain undivided, with free access to the Holy sites, but that the future status of the city should be determined through negotiations. The President's reference to Israeli sovereignty is described as his 'personal preference'. The State Department have advised their Middle East Embassies to review their security.

King Hussein, who had just returned to Amman from a successful visit to Washington, clearly feels badly betrayed. His messages to President Reagan and to Mr Haig (Amman telnos 447 and 448) describe the White House 'clarification' as inadequate, emphasize the difficult position in which the King is now placed as an advocate of US/Arab friendship, particularly just before the Fez Summit, and urge the Americans to produce a clear public statement to repair the damage. The US Charge d'Affaires has followed this up with a recommendation that President Reagan should send a message to King Hussein before the King's departure early on 24 November for Fez. He has told our Ambassador (Amman telno 449) that an independent approach from the Prime Minister to President Reagan might make the difference in persuading the President to send such a message. I attach, for ease of reference, copies of the Amman telegrams in question.

It is difficult to refuse a request from one who has deserved as well of us as King Hussein. Moreover our interests coincide with his in wanting to undo as much as possible of the damage done in relation to Arab opinion by President Reagan's

/remarks,



remarks, and in wanting to see the cause of moderation getting the best possible hearing at the Fez Summit. On the other hand, it is unlikely that the Americans will feel able to go very much further than the existing White House statement. If, moreover, we throw our full weight behind King Hussein's approach to President Reagan, there may be some at least in Washington who will suspect us of having engineered it. The Americans do not necessarily know that we have been given the full text of the King's messages.

Lord Carrington therefore believes that on balance it would be better for the Prime Minister not to send a message to President Reagan. He believes, however, that it would be useful to instruct Mr Hurd, who is now in Washington, to raise the issue in general terms at a high level in the State Department, to encourage the Americans to give the King as much reassurance as possible about US policy. I attach a telegram which, if the Prime Minister agrees, we would propose to send to Washington and to Amman.

Yours ever,

Francis Richards

(F N Richards)
Private Secretary

OUT TELEGRAM

A

Classification and Caveats

CONFIDENTIAL

Precedence/Deskby

IMMEDIATE

232300Z

ZCZC
GRS
CLASS
CAVEATS
DESKBY
FM FCO
PRE/ADD
TEL NO

1 ZCZC
2 GRS
3 CONFIDENTIAL
4
5 232300Z
6 FM FCO 23200Z
7 TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON
8 TELEGRAM NUMBER
9 AND TO IMMEDIATE AMMAN
10 REPEATED TO FOR INFO PRIORITY TEL AVIV, BEIRUT, JERUSALEM
11 SAVING TO (FOR INFO) CAIRO, DAMASCUS, JEDDA, RABAT, UKMIS NEW
12 YORK
13 For PS/Mr Hurd
14 AMMAN TELNOS 445-448 AND 449 (now being repeated to you):
15 JORDAN/US
16 1. The last TUR contains a suggestion by the US Charge
17 in confidence that an independent approach from the Prime Minister
18 to President Reagan might make the difference in persuading the
19 President to send a reassuring message to King Hussein.
20 2. We doubt if the Americans will be able to go much
21 further than their quote clarifying unquote statement
22 (Washington telno 3518) and I do not believe it would be
23 appropriate for the Prime Minister to act on this suggestion.
24 But in his talks with the State Department tomorrow morning Mr
25 Hurd could indicate tactfully that the King has made us aware

///
//
/

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword of
File number	Dept Private Office	Distribution
Drafted by (Block capitals) F N RICHARDS		
Telephone number 233 4831		
Authorised for despatch		
Comcen reference	Time of despatch	

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

Classification and Caveats

CONFIDENTIAL

Page

2

<<<<

1 of his anxieties, that we sympathize with the difficult
 2 position in which President Reagan's statement has placed him
 3 (despite the White House clarification) and that at this
 4 particularly sensitive time we believe it is important that the
 5 King should be given as much reassurance about US policy as
 6 possible. Exploitation of President Reagan's statement by
 7 the radicals at the Fez Summit will be to the disadvantage of
 8 us all and we shall do our best also to steady the King.

9 3. The Prime Minister does not intend to reply herself
 10 to King Hussein's message, until the US reaction (if any) to
 11 the King's messages is known. But HMA Amman should tell the
 12 King that the Prime Minister and I are very conscious of his
 13 difficulties, and that we are ready to do what we can to help.
 14 We have therefore decided to take advantage of Mr Hurd's
 15 presence in Washington to urge the Americans to give him any
 16 help they can.

17
 18 CARRINGTON

19 NNNN

20
 21
 22
 23
 24
 25
 26
 27
 28
 29
 30
 31 ///

32 //

33 /

34

NNNN ends
 telegram

BLANK

Catchword