

OUT TELEGRAM

	Classification and Caveats RESTRICTED	Precedence/Deskby IMMEDIATE
EZC	1 ZCZC	
RS	2 GRS	
CLASS	3 RESTRICTED	
CAVEATS	4	
DESKBY	5	
FROM FCO	6 FROM FCO 221145Z FEBRUARY 80	
RE/ADD	7 TO IMMEDIATE SALISBURY	
TEL NO	8 TELEGRAM NUMBER	
	9 SEE SHEET ATTACHED	
	10 CALL BY COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY-GENERAL	
	11 1. Ramphal was deputed by the Commonwealth Committee on	
	12 Southern Africa yesterday to express concern to me about events	
	13 in Rhodesia. I saw him for half an hour this morning, and began	
	14 by thanking him for his helpful remarks to Commonwealth	
	15 representatives at the UN recently.	
	16 2. Ramphal said that, although the Tanzanian High Commissioner	
	17 had taken the lead in the Committee, an unusually broad spread of	
	18 representatives had spoken up about Rhodesia. They included the	
	19 Indian, Sri Lankan, Bangladeshi, and even Pacific representatives	
	20 There was general anxiety that implementation of the Rhodesian	
	21 settlement did not appear to be even-handed, although the	
///	22 Tanzanian suggestion that the Commonwealth should be directly	
//	23 involved in supervision of the elections had been seen as a non-	
/	24 starter.	
	25 3. Ramphal suggested that we should get closer to the concept	
NNNN ends telegram		Catchword of
File number	Dept S/S OFFICE	Distribution POLICY DISTRIBUTION
Drafted by (Block capitals) R LYNE		FCO RHODESIA DEPARTMENT
Telephone number 233 4641		
Authorised for despatch <i>RuL 22/ii</i>		
Comcen reference	Time of despatch	

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2 of the non-deployment of the Security Forces and auxiliaries, and
3 should not rely too much on the fine print of the Lancaster
4 House Agreement. The Patriotic Front had "substantially"
5 assembled their forces. The non-assembly of 5000 guerillas should
6 not release the Security Forces from all their obligations. I
7 reminded Ramphal both of the precise wording of the Lancaster
8 House Agreement and of the specific warning which I had given
9 during the Conference that if breaches of the ceasefire took
10 place the Governor would have to deploy the forces ^{ac} ~~excepting~~ his
11 authority. Of course I should have preferred it if no
12 deployment had been necessary.

13 4. Ramphal referred to the danger that the guerillas would not
14 remain in the assembly places after the election. He suggested
15 that the Governor should not only appeal to the guerillas to
16 stay put, but should address a matching appeal to the Security
17 Forces to exercise restraint. He also hoped that we could keep
18 the monitoring concept alive after the election. I said that I
19 was worried both about the safety of the monitors at certain
20 assembly places and about the danger that their sudden
21 disappearance could lead to a general exodus. We were trying
22 to make the best possible arrangements on a camp by camp basis.
23 I told him of the proposals for a tour of Zipra camps by Walls
24 and Nkomo, and for offers of civil and military training.

25 5. Ramphal complained about the adversary tone of statements
26 made by Government House. I took strong exception to this. We
27 had received a flood of complaints of this nature. Those
28 making them, including the Commonwealth Committee, took no account
29 that eight out of the nine parties in the election had complained
30 to us that they could not campaign in certain areas. The absurd
31 protests made in the Commonwealth Committee about the use of
32 South African mine-protected vehicles was a further example of
33 one-sidedness. I reminded Ramphal that the South Africans had
34 provided vehicles for the CHGM at Lusaka; and that the MPVs

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Catchword

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1 <<<< *essential*
 2 were ~~central~~ to provide safe transport for election officials
 3 and observers, including Commonwealth observers. Who else could
 4 provide the vehicles? Ramphal appeared to accept that this was
 5 a foolish complaint, but said that any form of South African
 6 involvement was an emotive issue.
 7 6. Ramphal said that he had received a coded message from
 8 Dayal about intimidation. It expressed grave concern at the
 9 Governor's ordinances number 7 and 8: and said that the
 10 information supplied to Government House was at variance with
 11 the Commonwealth group's personal observers. Any ^{ations} ^{vo} indication of
 12 the ordinances would be a fundamental contradiction of the
 13 Lancaster House Agreement and would render the work of the
 14 Observer Group "infructuous". Dayal urged Ramphal to do all in
 15 his power to head off action under the Ordinances. I replied
 16 that I had no doubt that acts of intimidation had been committed
 17 by all the major parties: it would be astonishing if this had
 18 not occurred: but ~~the~~ ^{by} intimidation of Zanu (PF) made the ^{that}
 19 activities of the others pale into insignificance. I suggested,
 20 Ramphal should talk to Nkomo about this: ^{he} ^a was very angry.
 21 There was a significant danger that Muzorewa and Nkomo would
 22 repudiate an election affected by intimidation.
 23 7. I told Ramphal that it was most unhelpful that the
 24 Commonwealth Secretariat had briefed the press about a "Crisis of
 25 confidence over the Governor's administration" when the Committee
 26 had agreed not to issue a public statement on this subject.
 27 Ramphal was embarrassed and said that he would look into this.
 28 8. We also dealt briefly with the Commonwealth Committee's
 29 complaints about ^{the} continuing issue of Combined Operations
 30 Communiques; the removal of all South Africans from the
 31 Rhodesian Forces; and the recent South African press briefing on
 32 possible military intervention in Rhodesia. On the latter point,
 33 I said ^{for his personal information} that South African Ministers were clearly embarrassed, and
 34 there were signs that they were already acting to counter the

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Catchword

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 unauthorised press briefing. I ^{id} do not believe that the South
 Africans wished to intervene militarily in Rhodesia.

CARRINGTON
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