

Ref: B06496



Internal Admin.  
Technical Arrangements

PRIME MINISTER

c Sir Robert Armstrong

Falklands: OD(SA) on 16th MayMilitary Issues

Your meeting at Chequers at 10.00 am on Sunday should begin in the normal way with a report from the Chief of the Defence Staff on the latest military situation.

- folder 1
- 2. The Defence Secretary should then introduce his paper OD(SA)(82) 50 proposing a Ministry of Defence broadcasting operation in Spanish aimed at the Falklands garrison. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and Home Secretary should explain their doubts on this, to which they referred briefly this morning. A decision is urgent if the broadcasts are to start before the landing; the essence of the case for them is that they may reduce British casualties.

3. No need for other military decisions is foreseen. Rationalisation of the Rules of Engagement has been agreed to the satisfaction of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office as well as the Ministry of Defence, as

- folder 1
- OD(SA)(82) 47 records.

4. You may wish to probe the Chief of the Defence Staff on Admiral Fieldhouse's statement today that he could not recommend going ahead with Sutton if a carrier is lost before D-Day. Does that mean we should have to give up the military option altogether?

Diplomatic Issues

- folder 2
- 5. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary should introduce his paper OD(SA)(82) 51, suggesting the draft agreement we might table in New York (and subsequently publish) to show how reasonable we had been. Internationally this would help shift the blame for the breakdown onto Argentina; domestically it might prove divisive. The Home Secretary should comment on the latter consideration; and Sir Antony Parsons and Sir Nicholas Henderson on the former.



6. Sir Antony Parsons should then say when and in what circumstances he expects the United Nations negotiations to break down. Can the Secretary General be dissuaded from tabling his own compromise proposals? What more could we do to place the blame where it belongs? When and with what result will the Security Council meet? What will then happen at the United Nations.

- a. between breakdown and D-Day (which could be as long as 10 days)?
- b. after D-Day?

7. Sir Nicholas Henderson should follow this with an estimate of how the United States Government will behave, in private and in public, over the same period; and how American public opinion will evolve. What is General Walters up to? What influence are Mrs Kirkpatrick and the "hemisphere lobby" having on the White House? When will Mr Haig want to get back into the negotiating act (as he has told us he expects to do at some stage)? Looking further ahead, what attitude will the Americans take on decolonisation, independence and other long-term solutions? How far can they be expected to underwrite the Islands security? Are they interested in them strategically?

8. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary is now expected to circulate *folder 2.* - tomorrow a paper (OD(SA)(82) 52) on the consequence of the Falklands crisis for British interests and subjects in Latin America. This will be for information only, but will be relevant to Sunday's meeting. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary should therefore be asked if he wishes to speak to it.

9. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office paper on possible references to the *folder 2.* - International Court of Justice (OD(SA)(82) 48) has been circulated for information, not decision. But Sir Ian Sinclair could no doubt speak to it if required.

Next Meeting

10. The military decision-taking meeting has been arranged for 9.30 am on Tuesday 18th May, when the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary will be back; all four Chiefs of Staff will be present. In Mr Pym's absence, a meeting at 10.00 am on 19th May would be possible if required but does not at present look necessary.

14th May 1982

R L WADE-GERY