

		Classification and Caveats <b>SECRET</b>	Precedence/Deskby <b>FLASH</b>
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TEL NO

1 ZCZC  
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6 FM FCO 041930 MAY 82  
7 TO FLASH WASHINGTON  
8 TELEGRAM NUMBER  
9 ~~ADD~~ <sup>RT</sup> TO UKMIS NEW YORK. LIMA *for Ambassadors*  
10 ~~Personal for Ambassadors.~~  
11 Your telegram No 1589: Falklands  
12 1. Please deliver the message below and the attached list of  
13 points to Haig from me immediately.  
14 2. For Lima: Please take no action pending further  
15 instructions.  
16 Message begins:  
17 I found our discussions in Washington very useful and am  
18 grateful for the continuing efforts you are making to promote a  
19 peaceful settlement of the Falklands crisis.  
20 I have discussed with the Prime Minister and other  
21 colleagues the ideas you put to Nicko Henderson last night. I  
22 am conscious, like you, of the value of simplicity in any new  
23 diplomatic initiative. If further conflict is to be avoided  
24 and our essential aims are to be met, negotiations must not drag  
25 on. At the same time, we cannot accept a ceasefire on the basis

~~of an agreement that is too~~

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Telephone number		
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OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

		Classification and Caveats  SECRET	Page
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2 of an agreement that is too imprecise. Otherwise, Argentina  
3 could accept the proposal, and thus escape military pressure,  
4 and then play for time in negotiations and prolong the  
5 occupation.  
6 I attach a somewhat expanded version of your points, which  
7 takes account of this consideration. Because the provisions on  
8 withdrawal and the involvement of third parties in the interim  
9 period are expressed more fully, we have omitted your sixth  
10 point giving a role to the contact group in negotiations to  
11 carry out the interim agreement. We have also gone back to a  
12 contact group compos<sup>ed</sup> only of Brazil, Peru, the Federal  
13 Republic of Germany and the United States, which is the list  
14 given by Peru to our Ambassador on 3 May. I take it that the  
15 United States and Peru would approach Brazil and the FRG about  
16 their participation. In our view the Group should work by  
17 cons<sup>s</sup>ensus and have US or rotating chairmanship. We have also  
18 provided a version of the final point which takes account of  
19 the plain fact that it might prove impossible to reach agreement  
20 on the future of the Falklands Islands by 30 April 1983.  
21 If you and the Peruvian Government were to call upon  
22 Argentina and Britain to accept within 48 hours an agreement in  
23 the terms I am enclosing, the British Government would  
24 immediately announce that our naval forces in the South Atlantic  
25 had been given orders not to fire within or outside the TEZ  
26 unless directly threatened by Argentine ships or aircraft but  
27 that we would revert to earlier rules of engagement if Argentina  
28 failed to accept your proposals within 48 hours. We would need  
29 from you an advance assurance that Argentina at the same time  
30 would announce that the same orders had been issued to her forces  
31 and that her ships and aircraft would not be present in the TEZ  
32 in the 48 hour period.  
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OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

	Classification and Caveats <b>SECRET</b>	Page
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2 As you know it is essential for the British Government

3 that there should be a United States guarantee of the security

4 of the Falkland Islands. It would need to last from the 7th day

5 after the signature of an interim agreement until the

6 implementation of a definitive agreement about the future status

7 of the Islands, and perhaps beyond. For this to deter

8 Argentina, the Government in Buenos Aires must be in no doubt

9 of the guarantee. That suggests that it might take the form of a

10 public statement by the US Administration at the time when the

11 interim agreement entered into force.

12 Subject to your very early comments I would like out of

13 courtesy to give these ideas direct to the Peruvian President.

14 Message ends.

15 Enclosed list of points begins:

16 1. An immediate ceasefire, concurrent with:

17 2. Mutual withdrawal of forces:

18 a) Argentine and British forces to begin immediately to

19 withdraw from an area of 200 nautical miles radius from

20 the Falkland Islands and to refrain from introducing any

21 forces into that area.

22 b) The UK will ensure safe passage for the Argentine garrison

23 to the mainland.

24 c) All British and Argentine forces to be withdrawn within

25 7 days from the area of 200 nautical miles radius from the

26 Falklands and to remain outside that area.

27 3. The immediate introduction of a Contact Group composed of

28 Brazil, Peru, the Federal Republic of Germany and the United

29 States into the Falkland Islands on a temporary basis pending

30 agreement on a definitive settlement, the Group's tasks being:

31 a) to verify the withdrawal<sup>a</sup>;

32 b) to ensure that no actions are taken in the Islands, by

33 the restored administration or otherwise, which would

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OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

	Classification and Caveats	Page
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contravene this interim agreement.  
4. Britain and Argentina acknowledge the existence of differing  
and conflicting views regarding the status of the Falkland  
Islands.  
5. The two governments agree that the views of the Islands<sup>es</sup> must  
be determined, and that their interests and wishes must be  
respected in the definitive settlement of the status of the  
Islands.  
6. The two governments will make every possible effort in  
good faith to reach a definitive agreement prior to 30 April 1983.  
The countries represented in the contact group will give every  
assistance in this.  
List of points ends.  
PYM  
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