

Top Copy on: Zambia,
Visit of Kaunda,
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Rhodesia, Sir

RECORD OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND PRESIDENT KAUNDA
OF ZAMBIA AT 10 DOWNING STREET ON 9 NOVEMBER AT 1030

Present:

Prime Minister	His Excellency Dr. Kenneth Kaunda
Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary	His Excellency Mr. W. Chakulya, Foreign Minister
His Excellency Sir Len Allinson	His Excellency Mr. R. Kamanga, Member of the Central Committee
Mr. D.M. Day	Her Excellency the Zambian High Commissioner
Mr. C.A. Whitmore	
Mr. M.O!D!B. Alexander	Mr. Mark Chona

Having expressed his gratitude for the hospitality he had received during his visit, President Kaunda said that he was encouraged by the talks he had had so far. He would not have come to London if he had not been convinced of the sincerity and good faith of the British Government. He wanted to assist the Prime Minister in finding a solution that would stick. The Prime Minister and the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary deserved to succeed.

President Kaunda said that he wished to touch on a number of areas where, he thought, new proposals might be made. He recognised that some of the matters he was going to raise had not yet been the subject of negotiation.

President Kaunda said that he had been encouraged by what the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary had said at dinner the previous evening about the according of equal status to the participants in a Rhodesian election. He had noted the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's statement that the leaders of the various parties would have the use of Government aircraft. He was wondering whether the same principle could be applied elsewhere e.g. in the treatment of the armed forces. President Kaunda took the point that Bishop Muzorewa could not be expected to concede anything more. The vital point would be to succeed in making the members of the Patriotic Front feel that they were fully accepted and would receive the same treatment as the members of the Salisbury regime. The way to do this might be for a number of senior members of the Patriotic Front, perhaps ten or twelve, to be

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taken on to the Government payroll and to be given the same facilities as Bishop Muzorewa's team. This would help to ensure that they were seen by the Rhodesian electorate as a whole to have assumed a leading position in the Rhodesian community.

President Kaunda said that the same argument should apply to the members of the Patriotic Front armies. They would of course come under the direct authority of the Governor. But it would help to establish both their equal status and the Governor's control if they could be paid by the Governor. As regards the police, President Kaunda said that they could be left in being provided some of the more unacceptable elements, particularly those, like the Selos Scouts, ^{combined operations, were removed,} who had been involved in/ The police should be placed under British command. It would help if some British trained police from other Commonwealth countries, e.g. Tanzania and Zambia, could be introduced.

President Kaunda said that the Governor must, of course, have full control of the country. If a system could be established whereby both Bishop Muzorewa's colleagues and forces and those of the Patriotic Front were being paid by the Governor, there should be no problem in setting up an Electoral Council. The routine administration of the country would be the responsibility of the Governor, the Electoral Council would help him to run the elections. But the Electoral Council should have an active role. It should meet at regular intervals and should be seen to involve the participation of all the main political leaders. It would be an important means of building confidence.

Once the machinery had been set up, President Kaunda thought that the main problems left would be the return of the refugees and registration. The refugees to be considered were not only those in the neighbouring countries, but also those at present in Bulawayo and Salisbury who would have to return to their own villages. However, if free movement of the leaders of the various parties was ensured, the movement of refugees should not present insurmountable problems. HMG had suggested that two months might suffice; the Patriotic Front were arguing for six months. Four months might be a good compromise. As regards registration, HMG had claimed that it would take a long time. But in Zambia, which was a larger country, three weeks had proved sufficient.

/ If properly

If properly organised, it should prove possible to arrange registration of voters in Rhodesia within the sort of timescale now under discussion. As regards the voting process itself, President Kaunda recalled that Bishop Muzorewa favoured a five-day election, HMG one taking three days and the Patriotic Front one taking a single day. Perhaps two days would suffice.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that in considering his approach to the problems of the pre-independence period, he had been very conscious of the mistakes made in the past. One had been to attempt to do too much. The Anglo-American plan for instance had been much too complicated. A lot of what President Kaunda had said had been logical but was not negotiable. There was too much jealousy and suspicion. The only conceivable way of getting an acceptable, if not an ideal, interim agreement followed by a free and fair election was to be simple and quick. Power-sharing, which was what some of President Kaunda's ideas would seem to involve, was not negotiable because the Salisbury regime would not accept it. His way out of this dilemma had been to propose that there should be no power to be shared among the competing parties. The Governor, together with his Electoral Commissioner and staff and his Military Adviser and staff, would be responsible for everything. This had not been an easy decision to take.

The three armies would have nothing to do with the election. Assuming that there was a ceasefire, a Ceasefire Commission would be set up with the British Military Adviser in the chair. The army commanders would be represented on the Commission and responsible through the Military Adviser to the Governor. There would be absolute equality of status between each adviser.

The difficulty about paying the leaders of the Patriotic Front was that it would raise the question of power-sharing. This in turn would be bound to give rise to a great deal of trouble. It had already been agreed that Bishop Muzorewa should not participate in the administration of the country during the interim. This was the single most important concession made by any party to the negotiations. There was a limit beyond which one could not go in humiliating the Salisbury regime.

/ As regards

As regards the election, the Governor, through the Electoral Commissioner, would have to be in charge. The responsibility would be his although he would of course take action in consultation with the Electoral Council. All the parties would be represented on it and would be able to make representations to the Governor whenever they wished. Here again, the essence of the situation was that responsibility lay with Britain. Power-sharing would not be negotiable.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary agreed with President Kaunda about the need to get the refugees back to their homes as quickly as possible. He expected that the United States would be prepared to help. But it would be misleading to suggest that it would be possible to get all the refugees back before the election took place.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that he envisaged that the elections would be observed by a large number of British electoral commissioners, of Commonwealth observers and of members of the world Press. Moreover, each party would have a representative at each polling station. The ceasefire similarly would be supervised by monitors from outside. It would not be easy to find people who were acceptable to both sides. Bishop Muzorewa was suspicious of many members of the Commonwealth, the more so since Mr. Ramphal had adopted a partisan attitude throughout the Conference. However, we had a number of countries in mind who would be willing to offer monitors. The monitors would not, of course, be responsible for enforcing the ceasefire. They would report breaches to the Ceasefire Commission. It would then be for the commanders of the forces responsible for the breaches to deal with offenders. There would be a considerable number of monitors, probably several hundreds. In response to a question from President Kaunda, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that the number could not run into thousands, if only because of the difficulties of housing them and moving them around the country. The Prime Minister stressed that the arrangements we had proposed were as fair as could be envisaged in the circumstances. Moreover, the pressure on the Governor from the large numbers of observers, monitors, journalists, etc., to ensure that the interim was fairly administered and the election fairly run would be overwhelming.

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President Kaunda said that no-one questioned the importance of giving the Governor full powers. The problem was to devise a mechanism that would make his work easier and would solve the problem of giving equal status to the various participants in the election. It was not his intention to introduce power-sharing. The Governor would be a "father figure" and in full control of the situation.

Repeating that he was not talking about power-sharing, President Kaunda said that the arrangements must be fair and be seen to be fair. Everyone accepted that Muzorewa had given up a great deal. But he had retained his salary, his car, his house and his status. The Patriotic Front leaders would not have titles or powers, but they should be offered equal treatment. It would give them a sense of confidence and belonging.

President Kaunda agreed that the armies should have nothing to do with the elections. But it was necessary to have peace, not only at the time of the ceasefire, but throughout the interim and thereafter. The unification of the guerrilla army and the army of the Salisbury regime would be a major problem for the post-independence government. If in the interim period the ^{guerrillas} could be given, through their own channels, pay or allowances, they would acquire a sense of responsibility. It would begin the process of re-adjustment that would be so important for the future. It would ease the process of drawing together acceptable elements from both armies. Similarly, with the army commanders. All would be responsible to the Governor but there would remain a difference if one was being paid by the State and the others were not. Britain had a moral responsibility to see that peace was maintained after the election as well as before it; the suggestions that President Kaunda had made would assist in converting fear and suspicion into confidence.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that he agreed that the real problem was what happened after the election. He thought that the Ceasefire Commission might have a confidence-building rôle. The army commanders, who would be members of it, could start discussing the post-election period under the Chairmanship of the British military adviser. The point about the status of the various forces was a real one. But there was a major difference between continuing to

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pay an army and starting to pay a new one. The Prime Minister noted that there would be a problem of distinguishing between the permanent and the temporary fighting men. There ought to be a role for rehabilitation and resettlement payments. It would be essential to find some way of giving the political leaders equal status. Assistance in setting up party political headquarters might be one possibility. They would of course have equal time on television. (It was pointed out that this was a limited asset in Rhodesia.)

President Kaunda re-iterated that actions taken now would have a considerable effect on the post-election situation. Britain should not concentrate on getting out as quickly as possible. When tempted to do so, she should think of the reputation the Belgians now enjoyed in Africa. Rhodesia was the last and most difficult of Britain's colonial problems but "the last born is the dearest child". A lot of money was being spent already. If some of it could be diverted to buying uniforms for guerrillas and regularising them, it would help greatly with their psychological re-orientation. It would be a good investment. All this applied to those guerrillas already in Rhodesia. His government and that of President Machel in Mozambique would hold back the armed forces now in their countries until things had been sorted out. After the election, their return would be the responsibility of the new government in Zimbabwe. Surely the money could be found during a three- or four-month interim period to put some of these things in hand. The Prime Minister said that the interim period could not go on for four months. Things would start to fall apart if it was that long. It would not be possible to pay everyone in each army. Every penny spent by HMG on the sort of points President Kaunda had been raising would have to come out of money that would otherwise have gone on resettlement and rehabilitation. But the need to do something about the status of the various parties and about rehabilitation was understood.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that most of the points raised by President Kaunda had been thought about and discussed. He realised that there were points in the British proposals which both sides found unacceptable. But there was no proposal which would be wholly acceptable to everyone. The question of the status of the parties would be looked at again but he could not risk losing the Salisbury regime.

President Kaunda asked about the length of the interim period. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that the whole period from the signing of the agreement to the assumption of power by the new Government would be 11 or 12 weeks. In the course of the ensuing discussion about the likelihood of a breakdown during the interim period, Mr. Chakulya asked about violations of the ceasefire by the Salisbury regime's forces. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that if General Walls ordered his troops to cease fire, they would do so. Moreover, General Walls himself was a soldier and would certainly take orders from whoever was in power in Salisbury. Miss Chibesakunda commented that some elements of the Rhodesian forces were ill-disciplined. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary repeated that he was sure that General Walls could exert his authority if he wished to do so.

President Kaunda asked whether the replies he had been given earlier meant that Britain would give no consideration to providing money for clothing, feeding and medical treatment for the guerrillas inside Rhodesia. Mr. Day said that these points would be covered when the conference began to discuss the problems of the ceasefire. The Prime Minister said however that it was clear that something would have to be done to ensure that those in the field were properly cared for. Commenting on the question of pay for the guerrillas, Mr. Chona said that Bishop Muzorewa's auxiliaries were at present receiving \$90 a month from state funds. The Prime Minister repeated that Britain could not undertake to pay the guerrilla armies. Resettlement and rehabilitation was of course a different question.

The discussion ended at 1205.

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9 November 1979