

119/75T
SUBJECT

unofficial translation

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T119/75¹

ПОСОЛЬСТВО
СОЮЗА СОВЕТСКИХ
СОЦИАЛИСТИЧЕСКИХ РЕСПУБЛИК

Dear Mrs. Prime Minister,

I am sending You this letter in order to draw your attention to the questions of military detente and limitation of armaments in Europe.

I would like to summarise briefly the substance of our ideas and proposals on these questions laid down in my speech in Berlin on 6 October a.c.

1. The allegations that are disseminated in the West to the effect that the Soviet Union is building up its military strength on the European continent over and above its defence requirements have nothing in common with reality. They could not be regarded otherwise than an intention to cover up the development, adoption and carrying out the plans to deploy the new types of American nuclear missile weapons in Western Europe. In other words they have an end to break the balance of forces existing in Europe, to try to give military superiority to NATO.

One can say in advance that these attempts would hardly be successful. The Soviet Union and its allies would have to make the necessary additional steps to strengthen their security. No other option would be left for them.

It is quite clear however that the fulfilment of the mentioned plans by the NATO countries would inevitably lead to the aggravation of the situation in Europe and would to a great extent contaminate the international atmosphere as a whole.

I would like to express the hope, Mrs. Prime Minister, that your Government and You personally will consider over and over again all the aspects of this problem, will assess thoroughly the consequences hidden in the deployment on the territory of your country of new types of American nuclear missile weapons aimed at the USSR and its allies.

As for the Soviet Union, I have already repeatedly said and would like to say it again to You personally: we do not seek military superiority; we have never threatened and do not intend to threaten anybody. Our strategic doctrine is purely defensive in nature.

I also confirm again that the Soviet Union will never use nuclear arms against those states that renounce the production and acquisition of such arms and do not have them on their territory.

2. As I have most definitely stated in Berlin, the number of medium-range carriers of nuclear arms on the territory of the European part of the Soviet Union has not been increased by a single missile, by a single plane during the past ten years. On the contrary the number of launchers of medium-range missiles and also the yeild of the nuclear charges of these missiles have even been somewhat reduced. The number of medium-range bombers, too, has diminished. As for the territory of other states the Soviet Union does not deploy such means there at all. Already for a number of years now we have not been increasing the number of our armed forces stationed in Central Europe either. Those are indisputable facts, Mrs. Prime Minister, and I am sure that they are well known to the appropriate bodies in your country.

Moreover, we are prepared to reduce the number of medium-range nuclear weapons deployed in western areas of the Soviet Union as compared with the present level but, of course, only in the event of no additional medium-range nuclear weapons being deployed in Western Europe.

As is known, important talks on SALT-3 are impending. We are in favour of starting them immediately after the entry into force of the SALT-2 Treaty. Within the framework of these talks we agree to discuss the possibilities of limiting not only inter-continental but also other types of armaments, naturally, with due regard to all relevant factors and with strict observance of the principles of the equal security of the parties.

3. The Soviet Union motivated by a sincere desire to extricate from a blind alley the efforts made over many years to achieve military détente in Europe, to set an example of the transition from words to actual deeds, have decided, in agreement

with the leadership of the GDR and after consultations with other member-states of the Warsaw Treaty, unilaterally to reduce the number of Soviet troops in Central Europe. Up to 20,000 Soviet servicemen, a thousand tanks and also a certain amount of other military hardware will be withdrawn from the territory of the German Democratic Republic in the course of the next twelve months.

We hope that this new concrete manifestation of the peaceableness and good will of the Soviet Union and its allies will be duly assessed by the governments of countries-members of NATO and that they will follow our example.

4. Being in favour of a further strengthening of trust among states we are prepared in particular to reach agreement that prior notifications about big exercises of ground forces envisaged by the Helsinki Final Act, be made not three weeks but one month in advance and not from the level of 25,000 men as it is the case now but, say, from the level of 20,000 men. We are also prepared, on the basis of reciprocity, not to conduct military exercises involving more than 40,000-50,000 men. Besides that, we propose to notify timely not only about military exercises but also about movements of ground forces numbering more than 20,000 men in the area defined by the Helsinki Final Act.

I think, Mrs. Prime Minister, that the essence of the new initiatives, taken by the Soviet Union in consultation with other member-states of the Warsaw Treaty, speaks for itself. I would emphasize only one point - all of them are motivated by our desire to strengthen peace and security in Europe by supplementing political detente with measures of military detente, including the measures of concrete reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe.

Naturally, all the proposals made earlier by member-states of the Warsaw Treaty, remain in force, including those concerning the conclusion among all participants of the All-European conference of a treaty on the non-first use of both nuclear and conventional arms; the non-expansion of military political groupings in Europe; the notifications about major air force exercises and naval exercises staged near the territorial waters

of other states-participants in the All-European conference; the extension of the confidence - building measures to the region of the Mediterranean.

On our part we shall be prepared to consider other proposals aimed at strengthening trust among states and lessening the danger of war in Europe.

These are the considerations about military detente and arms limitation in Europe, which I and my colleagues wanted to bring to your attention, Mrs. Prime Minister. I shall be glad to receive, if possible, an early reply from You on the matters raised by me.

Yours sincerely,

L. Brezhnev

14 October 1979

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.
Prime Minister of Great Britain

Уважаемая госпожа Премьер-министр,

Направляю Вам это письмо с целью привлечь Ваше внимание к вопросам военной разрядки и ограничения вооружений в Европе.

Хочу кратко суммировать существо наших мыслей и предложений по этим вопросам, которые были изложены в моей речи в Берлине 6 октября с.г.

Первое. Распространяемые на Западе утверждения, будто Советский Союз наращивает на европейском континенте свою военную мощь в масштабах, не вызываемых потребностями обороны, не имеют ничего общего с действительностью. Их нельзя расценить иначе, как призванные служить прикрытием для разработки, принятия и осуществления планов размещения в Западной Европе новых видов американского ракетно-ядерного оружия. Другими словами - для того, чтобы сломать сложившееся в Европе равновесие сил, попытаться обеспечить блоку НАТО военное превосходство.

Из таких попыток, заранее можно сказать, вряд ли что получится. Советский Союз и его союзники были бы вынуждены осуществить необходимые дополнительные шаги по укреплению своей безопасности. Иного выхода у них не останется.

Совершенно ясно, однако, что реализация странами НАТО указанных планов неизбежно привела бы к обострению обстановки в Европе и во многом отравила бы международную атмосферу в целом.

Хотел бы выразить надежду, госпожа Премьер-министр, что Ваше правительство и Вы лично еще и еще раз обдумаете все стороны этой проблемы, тщательно взвесите, какими последствиями было бы чревато размещение на территории Вашей страны новых видов американского ракетно-ядерного оружия, нацеленного на СССР и его союзников.

Что касается Советского Союза, то я уже не раз говорил и хочу повторить вновь Вам лично: мы к военному превосходству не стремимся; никому не угрожали и угрожать не собираемся; наша стратегическая доктрина имеет сугубо оборонительную направленность.

Я также вновь подтверждаю, что Советский Союз никогда не применит ядерного оружия против тех государств, которые отказываются от производства и приобретения такого оружия и не имеют его на своей территории.

Второе. Как я заявил со всей определенностью в Берлине, за последние 10 лет на территории европейской части Советского Союза количество носителей ядерного оружия средней дальности не было увеличено ни на одну ракету, ни на один самолет. Наоборот, количество пусковых установок ракет средней дальности, как и мощность ядерных зарядов этих ракет, даже несколько уменьшились. Сократилось здесь и количество средних бомбардировщиков. На территориях же других государств Советский Союз такие средства вообще не размещает. Вот уже на протяжении ряда лет мы не увеличиваем также численность своих войск, размещенных в Центральной Европе. Таковы неопровержимые факты, госпожа Премьер-министр, и я уверен, что они хорошо известны соответствующим ведомствам Вашей страны.

Более того, мы выражаем готовность сократить по сравнению с нынешним уровнем количество ядерных средств средней дальности, развернутых в западных районах Советского Союза, но, конечно, только в том случае, если в Западной Европе не будет дополнительного размещения ядерных средств средней дальности.

Как известно, предстоят важные переговоры по ОСВ-3. Мы за то, чтобы начать их сразу после вступления в силу договора ОСВ-2. В рамках этих переговоров мы согласны обсудить возможности ограничений не только межконтинентальных, но и других видов вооружений, разумеется, с учетом всех относящихся сюда факторов и при строгом соблюдении принципа равной безопасности сторон.

Третье. Советский Союз, будучи движим искренним желанием вывести из тупика многолетние усилия по достижению военной разрядки в Европе и показать пример перехода от слов к реальным делам, по согласованию с ГДР и после консультаций с другими государствами-участниками Варшавского Договора, принял решение сократить в одностороннем порядке численность советских войск в Центральной Европе. В течение следующих 12 месяцев с территории ГДР будут выведены до 20 тысяч советских военнослужащих, тысяча танков, а также определенное количество другой военной техники.

Мы надеемся, что это новое конкретное проявление миролюбия и доброй воли Советского Союза и его союзников будет должным образом оценено правительствами стран-членов НАТО и что они последуют нашему примеру.

Четвертое. Будучи сторонниками дальнейшего укрепления доверия между государствами, мы готовы, в частности, договориться о

том, чтобы предусматриваемые Заключительным актом Совещания по безопасности и сотрудничеству в Европе предварительные уведомления о крупных военных учениях сухопутных войск делались не за три недели, а за месяц и не с уровня 25 тысяч человек, как сейчас, а, скажем, с уровня 20 тысяч человек. Мы готовы также на началах взаимности не проводить военных учений с участием более 40-50 тысяч человек. Кроме того, мы предлагаем заблаговременно уведомлять не только о военных учениях, но и о передвижениях сухопутных войск численностью более 20 тысяч человек в районе, который определен Заключительным актом.

Думается, госпожа Премьер-министр, что конкретное содержание новых инициатив, предпринятых Советским Союзом по согласованию с другими государствами-участниками Варшавского Договора, говорит само за себя. Подчеркну лишь одно - все они продиктованы заботой об укреплении мира и безопасности в Европе путем дополнения политической разрядки мерами военной разрядки, в том числе мерами реального сокращения вооруженных сил и вооружений в Центральной Европе.

Разумеется, остаются в силе и все ранее выдвинутые государствами-участниками Варшавского Договора предложения, в том числе относительно заключения между всеми участниками общеевропейского совещания договора о неприменении первыми друг против друга как ядерных, так и обычных вооружений, относительно нерасширения военно-политических группировок в Европе, относительно уведомления о крупных военно-воздушных учениях и военно-морских маневрах, проводимых вблизи территориальных вод других государств-участников общеевропейского совещания, относительно распространения мер доверия на район Средиземного моря.

Со своей стороны мы будем готовы рассмотреть и другие предложения, направленные на укрепление доверия между государствами и уменьшение опасности войны в Европе.

Таковы те соображения по вопросам военной разрядки и ограничения вооружений в Европе, которые я и мои коллеги хотели довести до Вашего сведения, госпожа Премьер-министр. Буду рад получить по возможности скоро Ваш ответ по затронутым мною вопросам.

С уважением,

Л. БРЕЖНЕВ

14 октября 1979 года

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

18 October 1979

Dear Michael,

Soviet Ambassador's Call

Thank you for your letter of 15 October. The Department have now compared the text of President Brezhnev's letter of 14 October with his speech of 6 October. The letter contains little that is new. I enclose a brief note of the main points of difference.

I also enclose a copy of the telegram which we have sent to brief out Embassy in Moscow, UKDEL NATO and selected other posts.

We are considering what advice to give to the Prime Minister about a reply. Our initial feeling, borne out by early reactions in NATO, is that it would be desirable to compare notes with our Allies in NATO, some of whom have already received similar messages, and to discuss with them how replies might be handled. We see no advantage in tying ourselves to a co-ordinated response. But it would be valuable to continue the process of discussing at NATO in what fora and on what general lines the Allies might reply to the speech. This would help to avoid the risk of some governments reacting at length and with important differences of nuance or argument which could later be exploited by the Russians. There is an emerging consensus at NATO that some reference to the TNF sections of the speech should be included in the Communique of the Ministerial Meeting of the Nuclear Planning Group on 14 November. As preparation for this, we would need to compare what Brezhnev said on 6 October with what he has since written to the various Allies.

In order to pursue this further, it would be helpful to have your agreement to our passing the text of President Brezhnev's letter to the Prime Minister to our NATO Allies (on the assumption of course that other recipients will do the same).

I am sending copies of this letter to Brian Norbury (Ministry of Defence) and to Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

Yours *GL*

Paul

Paul Lever

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street

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3

BREZHNEV'S PROPOSALS OF 6 OCTOBER AND BREZHNEV'S LETTER OF
14 OCTOBER

1. Apart from minor reordering and abbreviations, Mr Brezhnev's letter of 14 October to the Prime Minister differs from his speech of 6 October in the following ways:

- (1) the threatening remarks directed against West Germany in the speech have been replaced by the minatory reference in the last paragraph of page 1 of the letter to the "consequences hidden in the deployment of the territory of your country of new types of American nuclear weapons";
- (2) the letter says (middle of second page) that Brezhnev's claims about Soviet missile deployment are indisputable and well-known to us;
- (3) Brezhnev's remarks on SALT II are lumped together with his remarks on TNF. In the speech they were separate. The new order of thought is more logical and links the TNF issue more directly, but in an unspecific way, to the coverage of SALT III;
- (4) On CBMs the speech proposed that big ground force exercises be notified "even earlier". The letter defines this as "not 3 weeks but one month in advance". This adds precision to what amounts to Soviet acceptance of a Western proposal at Belgrade.
- (5) The reference on page 3 to "measures of concrete reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe "(the definite article in the translation is redundant) looks like an attempt to relate the Brezhnev proposals on troop reductions to MBFR. MBFR was not mentioned in the speech. (Soviet negotiators in Vienna have so far been at a loss to explain the link with MBFR and clearly await instructions.)

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- (6) Both the speech and the letter say that all earlier proposals remain on the table but the letter is more specific about what these earlier proposals are. In particular it mentions non-first use of force (NOFUF), non-enlargement of alliances and extension of CBMs to the Mediterranean.
- (7) The letter says that the Russians are prepared to consider "other proposals".

File No.....

Department DEFENCE

OUTWARD

Initiated by P J GOULDEN

TELEGRAM

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Tel. Extn.....

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[TEXT]

MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT BREZHNEV TO THE PRIME MINISTER

1. The Soviet Ambassador delivered to the Prime Minister on 15 October the text of a letter ostensibly from Brezhnev (full text by telegram to you and UKDEL NATO only). The letter is essentially a personalised version of Brezhnev's 6 October speech, with minor precisions and additions culled from familiar Soviet disarmament policies. (There is for example a brief reference to no first use of nuclear or conventional arms and to non-expansion of military groupings).
2. The main message is that the Prime Minister should reconsider TNF modernisation and "assess thoroughly the consequences " of the basing of new long range TNF in the

UK. There is however no reference to British nuclear capabilities.

3. Sir Clive Rose was instructed to give an outline of this message to NATO Permanent Representatives yesterday, 16 October, and to enquire if other NATO Governments have received similar messages. He has reported that the Danes and West Germans had already received them; the Belgians and Norwegians were expecting to receive theirs shortly. It seems as though the texts of the messages are very similar; for instance, Chancellor Schmidt's letter, like the Prime Minister's, also omits the "threats".

4. For your own information, we are considering whether to recommend a reply to Brezhnev's letter. There is nothing new in the text compared with the speech, on which we already have a broad Alliance consensus. Our initial feeling is against coordinating a single Alliance reply to follow-up letters from Brezhnev. But we hope that Allies intending to reply will stick to the general line agreed in NATO.



CONFIDENTIAL

Defence H/S
cc r/c
CO



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

22 October 1979

Soviet Ambassador's Call

You wrote to me on 18 October about the further handling of President Brezhnev's letter to the Prime Minister. There would be no objection to the text of President Brezhnev's letter being given to our NATO allies if the other recipients are doing the same.

I am sending copies of this letter to Brian Norbury (Ministry of Defence) and Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

Paul Lever, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be 'P. Lever', located in the bottom right corner of the page.