MAREDIAIL ADJANEL WATE 100 F-C-0-UKMIS NEW YORK 00 TEHRAN (DESKBY 280630Z) CO PARIS GR 500 \$10 Calint O SECRET DESKBY 280630Z TEHRAN FM WASHINGTON 280130Z DEC 79 TO IMMEDIATE F C O TELEGRAM NUMBER 4376 OF 27 DECEMBER 1979, INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, TEHRAN, PARIS. YOUR TELNOS 1990 AND 1991: IRAN 1. I SAW VANCE TODAY AND PUT TO HIM THE PRIME MINISTER'S AND YOUR PREFERENCE FOR A SLOWER TWO-STAGE APPROACH TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL. I UNDERLINED THE DANGER THAT A RUSHED SANCTIONS RESOLUTION MIGHT FAIL TO GET ENOUGH VOTES WHICH COULD MAKE THINGS MUCH MORE DIFFICULT FOR THE WEST. THE ADVANTAGE OF THE TWO-STAGE APPROACH WAS THAT

THERE SHOULD BE LITTLE TROUBLE IN GETTING A RESOLUTION THROUGH UNDER ARTICLE 39 AND THIS WOULD PUT THE IRANIAMS ON NOTICE THAT THEY HAD TO RELEASE THE HOSTAGES OR ELSE THERE WOULD BE A FURTHER RESOLUTION UNDER ARTICLE 41 WITH SPECIFIC SANCTIONS. IN THE MEANTIME THERE WERE ADDITIONAL MEASURES THAT COULD BE TAKEN SUCH AS A VISIT TO MHOMEINI BY THE COMMUNITY AMBASSADORS. MOREOVER THERE WOULD BE TIME TO RALLY MORE SUPPORT FOR A SANCTIONS RESOLUTION. IN OUR OPINION THE COMPOSITION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL WOULD BE NO WORSE NEXT YEAR THAN IT IS NOW.

2. VANCE TOCK CAREFUL NOTE. HE REFERRED TO ANOTHER VARIANT OF THIS TWO-STAGE IDEA WHICH MCHERRY HAD PUT TO HIM, FOLLOWING DISCUSSIONS IN NEW YORK, THIS WAS THAT THEY WOULD PROCEED NOW I E BEFORE THE END OF THE YEAR, TO PUT THROUGH A RESOLUTION WITH SANCTIONS UNDER ARTICLE 41 (AND MCHENRY BELIEVED THAT THERE WERE THE VOTES FOR THIS): BUT IT WOULD BE MADE CLEAR THAT THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS RESOLUTION WOULD BE DELAYED FOR A CERTAIN TIME. I REPEATED OUR DOUBTS ABOUT TRYING TO PUSH A SANCTIONS RESOLUTION THROUGH IMMEDIATELY. VANCE SAID THAT HE WOULD CERTAINLY CONSIDER YOUR OPINION AND MENTION IT WHEN HE TALKED THE WHOLE THING OVER WITH THE PRESIDENT AND MCHENRY

3. IN SUPPORT FOR THE VIEW THAT THE U S SHOULD BE ABLE TO MUSTER NINE VOTES FOR A SANCTIONS RESOLUTION, VANCE SAID THAT THE PRESIDENT WOULD BE TELEPHONING THE PRESIDENT OF NIGERIA AND THE PRIME MINISTER OF JAMAICA TOMORROW TO URGE THEIR SUPPORT AND PRESIDENT GISCARD D'ESTAING WOULD BE TELEPHONING THE PRESIDENT OF GABON.

4. AS REGARDS AMERICAN MOTIVES AND WHAT THEY INTEND DOING IF A SANCTIONS RESOLUTION FAILS, VANCE THAT THAT THEY WOULD LOOK TO THEIR FRIENDS TO TAKE THE ACTION ALONG THE LINES OF THE RESOLUTION. VANCE GAVE NO HINT THAT THE U S WERE CONTEMPLATING ANY OTHER FORM OF ACTION, AT ANY RATE UNTIL THE SANCTIONS ROUTE HAD BEEN PROPERLY TESTED.

- 5. ! LATER SPOKE TO BRZEZINSKI ON THE TELEPHONE ALONG THE SAME LINES. HIS FIRST REACTION WAS TO SAY THAT THIS WOULD BE SEEN BY THE AMERICAN PUBLIC. AS INDEED BY THE IRANIANS, AS A SIGN OF WEAKNESS, HE REITERATED THE AMERICAN VARIANT OF A TWO-STAGE APPROACH (PARA 2 ABOVE) AND SAID THAT HE THOUGHT IT PREFERABLE IN THAT IT WOULD NOT BE SEEN AS A CLIMB-DOWN. HE TOOK THE POINT THAT FAILURE TO ACHIEVE A SANCTIONS RESOLUTION COULD BE DAMAGING BUT SAID THAT IN THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES THE U S WOULD STILL HAVE TWO OPTIONS: THEY COULD LOOK TO THEIR FRIENDS TO ACT WITH THEM AS THOUGH THE RESOLUTION HAD BEEN PASSED. AND THEY COULD CONTEMPLATE UNILATERAL ACTION. I STRESSED TO BRZEZINSKI THE DIFFICULTIES THAT WE WOULD HAVE IN TAKING SOME OF THE ACTION REQUIRED UNDER SANCTIONS IN THE ABSENCE OF AN APPROVED SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION. HE SAID HE FULLY UNDERSTOOD THIS. 6. I REPEATED OUT DOUBTS ABOUT THE CHANCE OF A SANCTIONS RESOLUTION COING THROUGH AND OUR FEARS ABOUT THE CONSEQUENCES OF A FAILURE. BRZEZINSKI SAID THAT HE WOULD CERTAINLY DISCUSS THESE WITH HIS COLLEAGUES. BUT HE WAS DISTINCTLY LESS INCLINED TO TAKE THE POINT
- 7. I MENTIONED TO BOTH VANCE AND BRZEZINSKI THAT WE WOULD BE PULLING CUR REPRESENTATION OUT OF TEHRAN IN ADVANCE OF ANY SECURITY COUNCIL WOTE ON SANCTIONS (YOUR TELNO 1991).
- 8. I HAVE SUBSEQUENTLY SPOKEN TO THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR WHO IS GETTING IN TOUCH IMMEDIATELY WITH PARIS TO SUGGEST THAT THEY SUPPORT US IN OUR TWO-STAGE IDEA.

HENDERSON.

THAN VANCE.