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NOTE OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND PRESIDENT MOI OF KENYA AT PRESIDENT MOI'S BUNGALOW IN MULUNGUSHI VILLAGE, LUSAKA, ON 3 AUGUST 1979 AT 1900 HOURS

Present:

Prime Minister

Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary

Mr. B. G. Cartledge

H.E. Mr. Daniel T. Arap Moi, MP - President of Kenya

The Hon. Charles Njonjo, MP - Attorney-General

The Hon. Dr. Munyua Waiyaki, MP Minister for Foreign Affairs

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The <u>Prime Minister</u> asked President Moi what had happened during the restricted session earlier in the afternoon, after her departure. <u>President Moi</u> said that the question of the Secretary-Generalship had been discussed. India, alone, had expressed reservations about the present Secretary-General but everybody else present had agreed that Mr. Ramphal should continue in office for a further five years. The <u>Prime Minister</u> said that Mr. Mehta was a fine person who had loyally served a number of Indian Prime Ministers; but that Mr. Ramphal was doing very well and should continue.

The Prime Minister said that President Moi had asked her to look at the question of possible assistance to Kenya in easing the burden of her defence expenditure commitments. She had asked for advice on how the UK could help and had sent it back repeatedly for further consideration by officials. She wished very much that the UK could have done more: but the most that could be done was to accelerate the £15 million in programme aid which had already been agreed. The UK had massive debts of her own and, despite all her own efforts, the British Government could not possibly do any more.

The Prime Minister expressed her gratitude to President Moi for the moderate line which he had taken during the morning debate on Southern Africa. She felt very deeply indeed about the continuing bloodshed in Rhodesia; she had never believed that anybody had the right to pursue their aims by means of violence. She assured President Moi that the British Government would move very quickly on Rhodesia as soon as the Lusaka Conference had ended. There had already been a major debate in the House of Commons on Southern Africa and the intensive consultations which the Government had initiated were continuing during the CHGM. She asked President Moi to understand, however, that it was simply not possible for her, politically or constitutionally, to formulate final proposals about a Rhodesian settlement until after the Lusaka Conference. The Prime

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Minister commented that if she had formulated firm proposals in advance of Lusaka she would have been accused of refusing to listen to African opinion. But when she explained that she simply could not formulate specific proposals in advance of further consultation not only in Lusaka but with her colleagues in London, she was again attacked for not going far enough. In her speech that morning, she had tried to outline the UK approach more clearly. The British Government's aim was to give Rhodesia a constitution similar to those given to other newly independent states who were now colleagues within the Commonwealth. If all concerned adopted a reasonable approach, this objective could be achieved. The outcome, however, must not be determined on the basis of personal preferences for certain individuals rather than on that of a democratic constitution.

President Moi said that he wished to thank the British Government for all the help it had already given to Kenya, including the writing off of debts at a time of acute difficulty for his country. The acceleration of the new amount of programme aid already agreed by the UK would be of great assistance to Kenya. It might be that, in time, additional resources could be made available. The President recalled his recent visit to the UK with great pleasure, and said that he had been most appreciative of the warm reception accorded him by The Queen, by the Government and by all the people of the United Kingdom. The UK was providing Kenya with valuable technical assistance and also with trained teachers. Kenya herself gave help to Malawi, Lesotho and Zimbabwe in the field of vocational training, and especially in agriculture. The President said that he himself attached great importance to the development of youth and that his Government received significant help in this field from the UK. The UK was also helpful to Kenya in Brussels, in the context of her relations with the EEC.

Turning to Rhodesia, <u>President Moi</u> said that Kenya would help the UK as much as she could, both in public speeches and in private. President Moi said that following his discussions in Arusha, he had the impression that President Nyerere had very much come down to earth. He had emphasised, at Arusha, that a real change had taken place to which the appointment of a black President and a black Prime Minister gave testimony. President Nyerere had gone so far as to say (and the President asked not to be quoted) that he would welcome a visit by Bishop Muzorewa, whether in / or on neutral ground, in, for example, Kenya. President Moi said that he had not liked President Binaisa's remarks in the meeting about elections.

The <u>Prime Minister</u> said that there was no point in having a good constitution if it was never operated. Its value could be tested only in the light of practical experience. <u>President Moi</u> urged the Prime Minister to speed up the presentation of her case so that her critics had no time to concert their tactics. The <u>Prime Minister</u> agreed that this made sense.

President Moi said that it was essential to put an end to the loss of life in Rhodesia. The Prime Minister said that Sir Seretse Khama was sympathetic towards the UK's approach and as keen as anybody to get talks under way. It would probably be better if such talks were not to be held in Salisbury, but they could take place anywhere in East Africa or, of course, in London. The problem of integrating the guerrilla armies into Rhodesia's security forces was real and difficult. It should be approached step by step: the security forces were apprehensive of integration and the re-organisation should be approached with due care and deliberation.

President Moi went on to say that he was deeply concerned about Uganda. Mr. Lule was a pleasant man, but Kenyans knew Uganda and people there were suspicious of anybody who had any connection with Amin. Mr. Lule had been one of the few who had no such connection, having left the country before Amin seized power, and the people therefore trusted him. Kenya, however, had serious problems with the Sudan: Amin was there with between 35,000 and 40,000 troops, most of them massed on the South Sudanese border, but some of them positioned in Zaire. President Moi said that the Commonwealth should oblige the South Sudan to compel the rebels to respect frontiers. Ugandan people should be allowed to take the final decision on their political future but an imposed political/economic solution could not work.

The <u>Prime Minister</u> asked President Moi whether he thought that Amin would invade Uganda. <u>President Moi and his colleagues</u> said that this was virtually certain and commented that although Tanzania still had 30,000 troops in Uganda, the country had no other defensive military resources. The apparent acquiescence of the OAU in the removal of a fellow Head of State was an uncomfortable precedent.

Lord Carrington asked about Mr. Obote's plans. President Moi replied that Obote would definitely take over from Binaisa before too long. Existing disagreements should be resolved, but the bitterness of the Buganda against Obote was an obstacle. President Moi expressed the view that, given genuine freedom of choice, the people of Uganda would choose Mr. Lule as their President.

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Lord Carrington asked whether the Sudan would support Obote. President Moi said that the Sudan would not. Tanzania would continue to give Obote full support since President Nyerere greatly admired him. President Moi said that in the meantime his Government was trying to resolve their difficulties with the Somalis.

Reverting to the question of Rhodesia, <u>Lord Carrington</u> said that his real concern was that some members of the Commonwealth would pressure the Prime Minister into making her proposals more specific. If the Prime Minister and he were able to return to London with a clear picture of where she wanted to go and without conditions having been imposed upon her, there would be hope for a settlement. <u>President Moi</u> repeated that it would be essential to pick up speed in this process.

The discussion ended at 1935.