

FALKLAND ISLANDS: FCO SITREP: 0630 HOURS, 27 MAY

UN

(a) Security Council Resolution

1. The amended Irish draft was adopted unanimously on 26 May as Security Council Resolution 505. Sir A Parsons spoke in explanation of vote underlining our requirement that the only acceptable condition for a cease-fire was Argentine withdrawal. Subsequently, the Secretary General formally asked for a reply with 24 hours to the question 'what is HMG's definition of acceptable terms for a cease-fire'. The identical question has been put to the Argentines. Sir A Parsons will see the Secretary General at 2100 today.

(b) Prospects

2. The Ambassador is not hopeful of our chances of avoiding another Council Meeting within the next 2/3 days. The Secretary General will not allow himself to be used as a vehicle for buying time and if there is no shift in either UK or Argentine positions within the next day he will make an early report of failure to the Council. The result could well be a simple cease-fire Resolution which we would have to veto. We would be isolated.

Military Action

3. With the exception of a Harrier attack on Port Stanley Airport there have been no military operations for the past 24 hours. MOD have no information on US media reports that we have taken Goose Green.

27 May 1982

Emergency Unit

FALKLAND ISLANDS: FCO SITREP (DETAILED VERSION)
 0700 HRS 27 MAY 1982

UNSecurity Council adoption of Irish draft Resolution

A
 UKMIS New York
 telno 856

1. The Security Council yesterday (26 May) unanimously adopted the Irish draft resolution, as amended by the non-aligned members and ourselves. The Japanese did not press their draft to a Vote.

B
 UKMIS New York
 telno 857

2. The resolution, which was adopted as SCR 505, requests the Secretary General to submit an interim report to the Security Council as soon as possible, and in any case not later than seven days after the adoption of the resolution.

C
 UKMIS New York
 telno 858

In his explanation of vote, Sir Anthony Parsons stressed that the only acceptable British condition for a ceasefire is that it should be unequivocally linked with an immediate commencement of Argentine withdrawal.

D
 UKMIS New York
 telno 868

3. The Secretary General asked formally for HM Government's definition of acceptable terms for a ceasefire. He asked for an answer within 24 hours. Sir A Parsons has asked for guidance on this question. The Secretary General will be putting the same question to the Argentines.

Sir Anthony Parsons' assessment

E
 UKMIS New York
 telno 869

4. The Secretary General is likely to report to the President of the Security Council after 24 hours that he cannot make any progress with the mission, if we tell him that our position is unchangeable. He will not allow himself to be used as a vehicle for buying time and the likelihood is that the President will recall the Council. By the weekend we could be faced with having to veto a straightforward call for a ceasefire. We could be isolated. The Ambassador will be meeting the Secretary General at 2100 today.

Rio Treaty Meeting

F
 FCO telno 68
 to Asuncion

5. Posts in Latin American countries have been instructed to lobby the Governments in advance of the meeting of the Rio Treaty signatories in Washington, later today.

G
 Mexico City
 telno 439

6. The Mexican Foreign Minister feels that the situation is deteriorating and there are increasing pressures for some form of action against Britain in other Latin American countries.

H
 Brasilia telno
 210

7. The Brazilian Foreign Minister has stated that his country would not be able to stand out against the majority opinion, or to moderate the outcome.

/8. However,

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8. However, Paraguay, Costa Rica, Uruguay and the Dominican Republic suggest that they will be taking a moderate attitude and would be reluctant to go along with any retaliatory action at this stage.

Joint approach made by Colombia, Brazil and Peru

I
FCO telno 109
to Bogota

9. The Colombian Ambassador has delivered an oral message on behalf of the Presidents of Colombia, Brazil and Peru, proposing a 5-day truce. He said that the three Governments would not wish to put forward formal proposals for a settlement at this stage. However the Ambassador has since warned that President Turbay, after further consultation with his Brazilian and Peruvian colleagues, may be intending to send a formal message to the Prime Minister, setting out his proposals more fully.


Comment

10. Following Sir A Parsons's very firm Explanation of Vote, the UN Secretary General clearly sees little scope for further action by him. We could, therefore, find the issue back in the Security Council by the weekend, in which case we could find ourselves isolated. An early report of failure by the Secretary General would also harden attitudes at the Rio Treaty meeting, which starts today, and would thus increase the risks of Latin American action against us.

11. Sir A Parsons will need instructions, by 1900Z at the latest, on:

- (a) how to respond to the Secretary General's request for a definition by us of 'acceptable terms for a ceasefire';
- (b) whether, in order to buy time, he should encourage the Secretary General to visit or to send envoys to London and Buenos Aires.

12. It seems also clear that, if the matter is returned to the Security Council, we cannot count on firm US support if there is no movement from our present position. We may therefore also need to consider whether, in the light of our position on para 11 (a) and (b) above, we should take further action in Washington to stiffen the Americans.



P R Fearn
Emergency Unit

27 May 1982

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