

Afghanistan

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FM UKMIS NEW YORK 271814Z NOV 80
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1885 OF 27 NOVEMBER
INFO MOSCOW ISLAMABAD AND WASHINGTON.

M

MY TEL NO 1873 : AFGHANISTAN : FOLLOW UP TO GENERAL ASSEMBLY DEBATE.

1. I SAW WALDHEIM THIS MORNING. I SAID THAT YOU HAD SEEN AGA SHAHI IN LONDON YESTERDAY. MY INSTRUCTIONS IN THE LIGHT OF THE VERY STRONG VOTE IN FAVOUR OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION, WERE TO URGE THE EARLY APPOINTMENT OF A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE. OUR PREFERENCE WAS FOR A DISTINGUISHED NEUTRAL FIGURE FROM OUTSIDE THE SECRETARIAT. IT MUST BE CLEAR THAT THIS MOVE WAS NOT CONNECTED WITH THE SOVIET PROPOSALS OF 14 MAY. THERE WAS VERY STRONG FEELING IN LONDON THAT THE PROBLEM OF AFGHANISTAN MUST BE KEPT IN FRONT OF THE WORLD IN ORDER TO PRESSURISE THE RUSSIANS INTO DOING THE RIGHT THING. OTHERWISE THERE WAS A CONTINUING RISK TO PEACE AND SECURITY AND INEVITABLE DAMAGE TO DETENTE.

2. WALDHEIM SAID HE AGREED FULLY. HE HAD BEEN GIVING MUCH THOUGHT TO THE PROBLEM. HE WISHED THAT AGA SHAHI HAD ACCEPTED HIS ADVICE THAT IT WOULD HAVE BEEN MUCH EASIER IF THE RESOLUTION HAD QUOTE REQUESTED UNQUOTE THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO APPOINT A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE, BUT AGA SHAHI HAD SAID THAT HE DID NOT WANT TO PROVOKE THE SOVIET UNION. HE BELIEVED THEY WOULD BE MORE LIKELY TO COOPERATE UNDER THE PRESENT FORMULA. BUT WALDHEIM SAID HE HAD TALKED BEFORE THE RESOLUTION WAS PASSED TO TROYANOVSKY WHO WARNED HIM THAT IT WOULD BE CONTRARY TO NORMAL (AND RECENT) PRECEDENT TO APPOINT A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE WITHOUT THE AGREEMENT OF THE PARTIES. (THIS IS INDEED TRUE).

3. ALTHOUGH WALDHEIM HAD HEARD BEFORE THE RESOLUTION WAS PASSED FROM A RUSSIAN MEMBER OF THE SECRETARIAT THAT THE RUSSIANS MIGHT BE PREPARED TO ACCEPT A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE SUCH AS GUNNAR JARRING AND THAT THIS MESSAGE HAD EVEN BEEN PASSED TO THE AMERICANS AND THE PAKISTANIS, HE NOW BELIEVED THAT THIS WAS A TACTICAL MOVE BY THE RUSSIANS TO GET THE RESOLUTION MODIFIED. THUS WHEN WALDHEIM WARNED SYTENKO (SECRETARIAT) THAT HE MUST NOW PROCEED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE RESOLUTION, THE REACTION HAD BEEN NEGATIVE.

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/4. WALDHEIM

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4. WALDHEIM SAID THAT HE SAW TWO POSSIBILITIES. HE COULD APPOINT A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OR HE COULD VISIT THE PARTIES HIMSELF EARLY IN THE NEW YEAR AS HE HAD DONE IN THE CASE OF CAMBODIA. HE UNDERSTOOD THE WISH TO PUT THE RUSSIANS INTO A CORNER AND EMBARRASS THEM, BUT HE WONDERED WHAT PURPOSE THIS WOULD SERVE. HE HAD TALKED TO DOST, (AFGHAN FOREIGN MINISTER) BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE. HE HAD BEEN AGAINST A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE, BUT HAD SAID THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD WELCOME A VISIT BY WALDHEIM.

5. I SAID THAT I SAW THE DILEMMA. BUT I POINTED OUT THAT IF WALDHEIM VISITED KABUL HE WOULD LEND POLITICAL RESPECTABILITY TO THE KARMAL REGIME. A DISTINGUISHED NEUTRAL FIGURE, WHO MIGHT COME FROM THE THIRD WORLD, WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR THE RUSSIANS TO TURN DOWN, PARTICULARLY IF THE APPOINTMENT WAS WELCOME TO A MAJORITY OF THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES.

6. WALDHEIM CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT HE RECOGNISED THAT HE MUST DO SOMETHING CONCRETE. HE FELT THAT A MEMBER OF THE SECRETARIAT MIGHT BE EASIER FOR THE RUSSIANS TO ACCEPT THAN AN OUTSIDER, BUT HE HAD AN OPEN MIND. HE WOULD SEE TROYANOVSKY EARLY NEXT WEEK AND HE EXPECTED A TOUGH DISCUSSION. HE HAD SPOKEN TO SYTENKO IN ADVANCE SO THAT TROYANOVSKY WOULD BE PREPARED.

7. MY US AND CHINESE COLLEAGUES HAVE HAD SIMILAR SESSIONS WITH WALDHEIM. I AM KEEPING MY FRENCH COLLEAGUE INFORMED.

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TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1873 OF 25 NOVEMBER 1980

INFO PRIORITY MOSCOW, ISLAMABAD.

Read in full.

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MY TELNO 1827: AFGHANISTAN: FOLLOW UP TO GENERAL ASSEMBLY DEBATE

1. AGHA SHAHI HAS SEEN WALDHEIM TWICE RECENTLY. ON 20 NOVEMBER (BEFORE THE VOTE WAS TAKEN) HE URGED WALDHEIM TO TAKE IMMEDIATE ACTION TO APPOINT A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE. WALDHEIM HAD CLEARLY BEEN INFLUENCED BY TROYANOVSKY'S REPRESENTATIONS AND STRESSED THE DIFFICULTIES FACING HIM IN ANY FOLLOW-UP ACTION. HE THEN PROPOSED THAT HE ARRANGE A MEETING BETWEEN SHAHI AND DOST (THE AFGHAN FOREIGN MINISTER) ON THE SAME BASIS AS HE HAD ARRANGED FOR THE THAI AND VIETNAMESE FOREIGN MINISTERS TO MEET EARLY IN THE GA. (WALDHEIM HAD PREVIOUSLY SUGGESTED THIS TO DOST WHO HAD SIMPLY SAID HE WOULD NEED INSTRUCTIONS). SHAHI SAID THE PROPOSAL WAS PREMATURE AND THE FIRST REQUIREMENT WAS FOR THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO APPOINT A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE. THE REPRESENTATIVE SHOULD MAKE AN INITIAL TOUR OF ALL THE CAPITALS INVOLVED AND IF THEREAFTER IN THE LIGHT OF HIS REPORT WALDHEIM CONSIDERED THAT A CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES WOULD BE WORTHWHILE, PAKISTAN MIGHT BE PREPARED TO CONSIDER THE IDEA BUT ONLY IF IT WAS HELD STRICTLY UNDER THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S AUSPICES.

2. MY PAKISTANI COLLEAGUE (NAIK) HAS TOLD ME THAT SHAHI SAW WALDHEIM AGAIN TODAY (25 NOVEMBER). WALDHEIM SAID HE HAD BEEN SURPRISED AT THE SIZE OF THE VOTE IN FAVOUR OF THE DRAFT RESOLUTION, AS HAD THE RUSSIANS. BUT HE REMAINED WARY ABOUT TAKING POSITIVE ACTION. SHAHI THEN GAVE WALDHEIM A PEP TALK INSISTING ON HIS CARRYING OUT THE CLEAR MANDATE GIVEN TO HIM BY 111 MEMBER STATES. WALDHEIM SAID THAT HE WAS EXPECTING A DEMARCHE FROM THE OTHER FOUR PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND THAT HE WOULD THEN HAVE TO HAVE ANOTHER DIFFICULT MEETING WITH TROYANOVSKY WHOM HE HAD NOT SEEN SINCE BEFORE THE VOTE.

3. SHAHI DISCUSSED WITH WALDHEIM HIS IDEAS ON WHO THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE MIGHT BE. HE SAID THAT A MAN OF INTERNATIONAL STATURE WAS REQUIRED AND HAD IN MIND A NEUTRAL EUROPEAN. THE PAKISTANI PREFERENCE WOULD BE FOR ASTROM, CURRENTLY SWEDISH AMBASSADOR TO PARIS AND FORMERLY DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE SWEDISH MFA. ALTERNATIVELY SIGISMOND MARCUARD, THE SWISS PERMANENT OBSERVER HERE, WOULD BE A GOOD CHOICE. ISLAMIC COUNTRIES WERE CUT (TOO PARTI PRIS FOR THE RUSSIANS TO ACCEPT), AS WERE THE SOUTH AMERICANS (TOO REMOTE FROM THE AREA). THE ONLY AVAILABLE AFRICAN OF SUFFICIENT STANDING WOULD BE SALIM OF TANZANIA, BUT HIS AMBITIONS IN THE UN MIGHT COUNT AGAINST HIM. NAIK CONFIRMED

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TO ME TONIGHT THAT ALTHOUGH THE SECRETARY GENERAL MIGHT HAVE IDEAS ABOUT APPOINTING SOMEONE FROM WITHIN THE SECRETARIAT, THE PAKISTANIS' STRONG PREFERENCE REMAINED FOR A WELL-KNOWN OUTSIDER.

4. NAIK SAID THAT AGHA SHAHI LOOKED FORWARD TO DISCUSSING THE ABOVE WITH YOU TOMORROW.

5. THE AMERICANS HAVE SPOKEN TO THE FRENCH AND CHINESE ENCOURAGING THEM TO MAKE DEMARCHES TO WALDHEIM. THE FRENCH HAVE NOT YET REACTED BUT THE CHINESE HAVE RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS INDEPENDENTLY TO GO AHEAD AND WILL DO SO THIS WEEK. THEY WILL STRESS THAT THERE SHOULD BE AN IMMEDIATE APPOINTMENT; THAT THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE'S MANDATE SHOULD CONCENTRATE SOLELY ON WITHDRAWAL; AND THAT NOTHING SHOULD BE DONE TO IMPLY RECOGNITION OF THE KABUL REGIME.

6. THE AMERICANS THEMSELVES WILL SEE WALDHEIM TOMORROW (26 NOVEMBER). IN ADDITION TO THE POINTS THE CHINESE WILL BE MAKING, THE AMERICANS WILL SAY THAT THEIR PREFERENCE FOR THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE IS FOR AN OUTSIDE FIGURE WITH WORLD STATURE. THEY WILL POINT OUT THAT THE REJECTION OF SUCH AN ENVOY WOULD DISCREDIT THE UNCO-OPERATIVE COUNTRY RATHER THAN THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, WHILE REJECTION OF A LESSER KNOWN UN OFFICIAL COULD DAMAGE THE PRESTIGE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL. THEY WILL TELL WALDHEIM THAT THEY BELIEVE THAT, IN CARRYING OUT HIS MANDATE, THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE WILL NEED TO BE IN TOUCH WITH THE RUSSIANS, PAKISTANIS, AND AFGHAN NATIONALIST GROUPS, INCLUDING REFUGEES AND RESISTANCE LEADERS. THEY WILL ALSO EMPHASISE THAT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION ITSELF IS THE SOLE SOURCE FOR THE MANDATE AND THAT THEY WOULD FIND UNACCEPTABLE ANY ALLUSION, HOWEVER VAGUE, TO THE 14 MAY PROPOSALS.

7. I RECOMMEND THAT I SHOULD MAKE A SIMILAR DEMARCHE TO WALDHEIM ON THURSDAY OR FRIDAY.

F C O PLEASE PASS SEPARATE ADVANCE COPY FOR PS, SOS.

PARSONS

[ADVANCED AS REQUESTED]

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