

1 YPID12

(32)

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

~~(38)~~

PS  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/MR ONSLOW  
PS/PUS  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
MR URE  
MR GILLMORE

**FLASH**

PS NO 10 DOWNING ST. (2)

PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE

PS/CHANCELLOR )  
SIR K COUZENS )  
MR LITTLER )  
MR HASTIN )  
MR PERETZ ) TREASURY  
MR ILETT )  
MR MCINTYRE )

ED/S AM D (FOO DIST + A/D F/I)  
ED/DEF D  
ED/NEWS D  
ED/ORD  
ED/PLANNING STAFF  
MR ANTHONY WILLIAMS W60  
RESIDENT CLERK

MISS DICKSON (EEP DIV) D/EX

DIO CABINET OFFICE  
MR WADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE  
MR FULLER SAP/DIO " "

SIR M PALLISER CABINET OFFICE  
SIR R ARMSTRONG " "

(Copy passed to Emergency Staff)

FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 062007Z MAY 82  
TO FLASH F C O MAY  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 663 DATED 6 HUGEGPTNSLFIBOTON  
INFO - IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

YOUR TELNO 358: SECRETARY GENERAL'S PROPOSALS

1. I DELIVERED YOUR REPLY TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL AT 1630Z. HE HAD SEEN ROCA (ARGENTINA) AN HOUR BEFORE. ROCA HAD TOLD HIM THAT COSTA MENDEZ HAD JUST TELEPHONED THE PERUVIAN PRIME MINISTER TO SAY THAT THE UN WAS THE ONLY "CHANNEL" ARGENTINA COULD ACCEPT. (PEREZ DE CUELLAR CONFIRMED THAT THE PERUVIAN GOVERNMENT HAD TOLD HIM NOTHING ABOUT THEIR PROPOSALS). HE HAD ASKED ROCA FOR CLARIFICATION OF COSTA MENDEZ'S MESSAGE OF YESTERDAY: DID ARGENTINA OR DID IT NOT ACCEPT HIS IDEAS AND APPROACH? ROCA HAD REPLIED THAT ARGENTINA DID ACCEPT AND THAT THEY CONSIDERED PEREZ DE CUELLAR'S IDEAS TO BE "IN THE FRAMEWORK OF ARTICLE 40". PEREZ DE CUELLAR TOOK GREAT COMFORT FROM THIS REMARK, INTERPRETING IT TO MEAN THAT THE ARGENTINES WOULD NOT INSIST ON PRELIMINARY ACCEPTANCE OF THEIR POSITION ON SOVEREIGNTY. ROCA HAD GONE ON TO SAY THAT COSTA MENDEZ WAS AT PEREZ DE CUELLAR'S DISPOSAL IF HE WISHED HIM TO COME TO NEW



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2. WE THEN TURNED TO YOUR RESPONSE TO PEREZ DE CUELLAR'S IDEAS. PEREZ DE CUELLAR WAS CLEARLY PLEASED BY IT, SEEING IT AS A BASIS ON WHICH HE COULD START A NEGOTIATING PROCESS. HE READILY ACKNOWLEDGED THAT, WHEREAS ARGENTINA HAD PROVIDED HIM WITH ONLY A BRIEF AND AMBIGUOUS PROCEDURAL RESPONSE, YOU HAD GIVEN HIM IDEAS OF SUBSTANCE, WHICH MIGHT NOT BE INITIALLY ACCEPTABLE EITHER TO HIM OR THE ARGENTINES BUT WHICH GAVE HIM A REAL CHANCE OF BEGINNING A GENUINE NEGOTIATION.

3. RAFAE AHMED, ON THE OTHER HAND, WAS UNREMITTINGLY CRITICAL AND HOSTILE. IN AN HOUR OF DIFFICULT DISCUSSION, OVER WHICH PEREZ DE CUELLAR SOMETIMES HAD DIFFICULTY IN KEEPING CONTROL, AHMED RAISED THE FOLLOWING OBJECTIONS TO YOUR REPLY:

(A) IT LOOKED VERY SIMILAR TO THE HAIG/BELAUNDE PROPOSALS.

COULD HE HAVE AN ASSURANCE THAT THESE IDEAS HAD NOT ALREADY BEEN PUT TO THE ARGENTINES THROUGH SOME THIRD PARTY AND REJECTED BY THEM? I SQUASHED THIS AND PEREZ DE CUELLAR DID THE SAME BY SAYING THAT IT DID NOT MATTER IF THE IDEAS IN YOUR MESSAGE WERE NOT INITIALLY ACCEPTABLE TO THE ARGENTINES: WHAT MATTERED WAS TO GET A UN NEGOTIATING PROCESS GOING.

(B) YOUR RESPONSE AMOUNTED TO A "PHASED" PROGRAMME: PEREZ DE CUELLAR'S HAD PROVIDED FOR "SIMULTANEITY".

(C) THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S IDEAS REQUIRED A YES OR A NO: THEY LEFT ONLY FOUR POINTS TO BE DECIDED: THE DATE ON WHICH WITHDRAWAL ETC WOULD BEGIN; THE TARGET DATE FOR NEGOTIATION OF A SETTLEMENT; THE FORMAT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS; AND THE NATURE OF THE TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS. YOUR REPLY WAS LESS POSITIVE THAN THE ARGENTINES' BECAUSE IT DID NOT ACCEPT SIMULTANEITY AND MERELY TOOK SOME ELEMENTS FROM THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S IDEAS. PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT ON THE CONTRARY, HE SAW YOUR REPLY AS CONTAINING "COMMENTS" ON HIS IDEAS WHICH HE WOULD INITIALLY DISCUSS WITH HIS STAFF; HE MIGHT THEN SEEK CLARIFICATION FROM YOU BEFORE OPENING DISCUSSIONS OF SUBSTANCE WITH THE ARGENTINES, WITHOUT REVEALING THE CONTENTS OF YOUR REPLY. I WELCOMED THIS PROCEDURE, ENDORSING PEREZ DE CUELLAR'S DESCRIPTION OF YOUR REPLY AS "COMMENTS" AND REJECTING AHMED'S "COUNTER-PROPOSALS".

(D) YOU HAD NOT MATCHED COSTA MENDEZ'S OFFER TO COME TO NEW YORK



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TO TALK TO PEREZ DE CUELLAR EXCLAMATION MARK PEREZ DE  
CUELLAR AND I BOTH FIRMLY SQUASHED THIS. / h

(E) UNDER YOUR IDEAS, THE TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS WOULD TAKE  
A LONG TIME TO NEGOTIATE, DURING WHICH MORE LIVES WOULD BE  
LOST. IF YOUR PHASED APPROACH WAS TO BE ACCEPTED, THE  
COUNCIL WOULD HAVE TO ADOPT DORR'S PROPOSAL FOR A  
TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF HOSTILITIES WHILE THE SECRETARY  
GENERAL CONSIDERED YOUR AND THE ARGENTINE REPLIES. I FIRMLY  
RULED THIS OUT, USING THE SAME ARGUMENTS AS I HAD IN THE  
COUNCIL LAST NIGHT.

4. PEREZ DE CUELLAR AGREED THAT IN THE LIGHT OF YOUR REPLY IT  
WAS ALL THE MORE ESSENTIAL THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO FORMAL MEETING  
OF THE COUNCIL. WE AGREED, AGAINST DETERMINED OPPOSITION FROM  
RAFEE AHMED, THAT AT THIS AFTERNOON'S CONSULTATIONS PEREZ  
DE CUELLAR WOULD SAY THAT HE HAD RECEIVED A POSITIVE AND  
SUBSTANTIVE RESPONSE FROM YOU, THAT HE WAS STUDYING IT AND  
THAT HE INTENDED VERY SHORTLY TO START DISCUSSING WITH THE  
PARTIES HOW HIS IDEAS OF 2 MAY MIGHT BE IMPLEMENTED; HE WOULD  
TELL THE ARGENTINES THAT HE HAD RECEIVED BRITISH COMMENTS AND  
WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR THEIRS. HE HOPED THAT THIS WOULD STOP THE  
COUNCIL FROM DOING ANYTHING UNHELPFUL. WE SHALL SEE.

5. TO SUM UP, YOUR REPLY HAS HAD THE DESIRED EFFECT OF CASTING  
US, IN PEREZ DE CUELLAR'S MIND AT LEAST, IN A MORE POSITIVE  
LIGHT THAN THE ARGENTINES AND OF GIVING HIM SOMETHING TO WORK  
ON. BUT RAFEE AHMED IS A SINISTER AND MALEVOLENT INFLUENCE.  
I GAVE HIM VERY SHORT SHRIFT TODAY AND AM CONSIDERING URGENTLY  
THE IMPLICATIONS OF HIS DEPLORABLE AND TOTALLY PARTIAL  
PERFORMANCE.

PARSONS

ZZ F C O

GRS 850

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 062007Z MAY 82

TO FLASH F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 663 DATED 6 MAY 82

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

YOUR TELNO 358: SECRETARY GENERAL'S PROPOSALS