

#27

SECRET/SENSITIVE

March 27, 1980

VIA ALPHA CHANNEL

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

SUBJECT:

Messages to Schmidt and Thatcher

The President revised, as per enclosure, the above messages, and we have sent them by Cabinet Line. I thought you would want to see his changes, though they are not very major.

Zbigniew Brzezinski

Attachment

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
PER 10/17/96 NSC/HVRE MR-ALC-95-65  
BY [Signature] NARS DATE 1/21/97

SECRET/SENSITIVE  
Review March 27, 1986

#27A

SECRET/SENSITIVE

VIA CABINET LINE

Dear Helmut:

I have been reflecting on how we in NATO might best show to ~~our peoples and Parliaments, and to the Soviet Union,~~ <sup>ASSURE THAT</sup> that the Alliance is united, strong and credible as it responds to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and to Moscow's global challenge in the 1980s. I want to share with you my thoughts and seek your counsel, and that of Margaret Thatcher, before I contact any other Allied leaders.

As you and I have agreed from the beginning, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan confronts the West and the North Atlantic Alliance with a ~~great and unprecedented~~ <sup>SERIOUS</sup> challenge. That is why I ~~have thought it~~ <sup>is</sup> so important for the Allied reaction to be coherent, measured and concrete. Although we have made some progress in reaching a point where our reactions are tangible as well as rhetorical, ~~in my judgment~~ <sup>is completely clear and</sup> a good deal remains to be done before ~~our collective response~~ <sup>will</sup> have sufficient deterrent value in the Kremlin. At the same time, I ~~recognize~~ <sup>damaging to all of us</sup> it would be ~~in no one's interest except the Soviets!~~ if the Afghanistan crisis were to bring about dissension in the West -- ~~between~~ <sup>among</sup> the United States and its ~~European~~ <sup>our</sup> friends and Allies. I ~~want you to know that~~ I am determined to do all I can to avoid such Transatlantic discord.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
PER 10/17/96 NRC BY RE MR-NLC-95-65  
BY [Signature] NARS DATE 1/21/97



I would appreciate your advice on the idea of holding a NATO Summit in late May. We would be prepared to offer Washington as a site if everyone agreed. Alternatively, we could meet in late June either in Brussels or in Italy at the time of the Venice Summit. Such a <sup>meeting</sup> summit, if properly prepared, would give ~~our~~ ~~publics~~ and ~~Moscow~~ a vital and tangible demonstration of Western solidarity and will to resist Soviet aggression in the aftermath of Afghanistan. <sup>Proper preparation would be necessary because</sup> ~~I say properly prepared because I believe that~~ NATO Heads of Government should not get together if to do so would only reveal <sup>serious</sup> division and weakness among us. I would consider it both realistic and convincing if Allied leaders <sup>could</sup> ~~agree~~ on a package of measures at a NATO Summit Meeting which, at a minimum, would:

- condemn the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan;
- call for prompt and total Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan;
- indicate our support for a truly neutral and non-aligned Afghanistan;
- confirm that there will be no business as usual with the USSR until Soviet troops withdraw from Afghanistan and the situation of total repression there is ended;
- stress our intention to boycott the Moscow Olympics;
- underline our commitment to restrict through COCOM the transfer of high technology to the Soviet Union;
- emphasize the importance of the economic rescue effort for Turkey and the Federal Republic's leadership role in that endeavor;
- *express our desire to continue the mutual benefits of detente and arms control under mutually acceptable conditions;*

- renew our commitment to meet the three percent defense pledge we made at the 1978 Summit (~~as you know, several of our European Allies are falling short of this pledge~~);
- accelerate a select number of Long Term Defense Program measures and the NATO Infrastructure program;
- and finally, though this might not be possible in the formal communique, find a way to make clear that we in the West now regard the Persian Gulf as an area that is of critical importance to our long-term vital security interests.

Agreement in some form on all of the above should be feasible and would mark a notable display of Alliance vigor and solidarity.

Of course, a NATO Summit would raise that now familiar problem of the level of French participation, but we have gotten around this problem before. If you and Margaret believe a NATO Summit would be useful, we will want to discuss how best to approach Valery.

It would of course be best if he could find a way <sup>for the French to participate</sup> to attend.

*P* I would appreciate any thoughts you might have on this, *idea of*

~~If you find merit in a NATO Summit, I would be happy to discuss it further with you in this channel or to have Gy pursue it with Peter Hermes. I would appreciate your early reaction because I realize that timing is tight for changes in everyone's schedule.~~

*arrangements.*

Sincerely,

His Excellency  
Helmut Schmidt  
Chancellor of the Federal Republic  
of Germany



#27B

SECRET/SENSITIVE

VIA CABINET LINE

Dear Margaref:

*make same text as schmidt's*

I have been reflecting on how we in NATO might best show to our peoples and Parliaments, and to the Soviet Union, that the Alliance is united, strong and credible as it responds to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and to Moscow's global challenge in the 1980s. I want to share with you my thoughts and seek your counsel, and that of Helmut Schmidt, before I contact any other Allied leaders.

As you and I have agreed from the beginning, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan confronts the West and the North Atlantic Alliance with a great and unprecedented challenge. That is why I have thought it so important for the Allied reaction to be coherent, measured and concrete. Although we have made some progress in reaching a point where our reactions are tangible as well as rhetorical, in my judgment a good deal remains to be done before our collective response will have sufficient deterrent value in the Kremlin. At the same time, I recognize it would be in no one's interest except the Soviets' if the Afghanistan crisis were to bring about dissension in the West -- between the United States and its European friends and Allies. I want you to know that I am determined to do all I can to avoid such Transatlantic discord.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
PER 10/17/96 NKC BY RE MR ALK-45-65  
BY JK NARS. DATE 1/21/97

I would appreciate your advice on the idea of holding a NATO Summit in late May. We would be prepared to offer Washington as a site if everyone agreed. Alternatively, we could meet in late June either in Brussels or in Italy at the time of the Venice Summit. Such a Summit, if properly prepared, would give our publics and Moscow a vital and tangible demonstration of Western solidarity and will to resist Soviet aggression in the aftermath of Afghanistan. I say properly prepared because I believe that NATO Heads of Government should not get together if to do so would only reveal division and weakness among us. I would consider it both realistic and convincing if Allied leaders agreed on a package of measures at a NATO Summit Meeting which, at a minimum, would:

- condemn the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan;
- call for prompt and total Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan;
- indicate our support for a truly neutral and non-aligned Afghanistan;
- confirm that there will be no business as usual with the USSR until Soviet troops withdraw from Afghanistan and the situation of total repression there is ended;
- stress our intention to boycott the Moscow Olympics;
- underline our commitment to restrict through COCOM the transfer of high technology to the Soviet Union;
- emphasize the importance of the economic rescue effort for Turkey;



- renew our commitment to meet the three percent defense pledge we made at the 1978 Summit (as you know, several of our European Allies are falling short of this pledge);
- accelerate a select number of Long Term Defense Program measures and the NATO Infrastructure program;
- and finally, though this might not be possible in the formal communique, find a way to make clear that we in the West now regard the Persian Gulf as an area that is of critical importance to our long-term vital security interests.

Agreement in some form on all of the above should be feasible and would mark a notable display of Alliance vigor and solidarity.

Of course, a NATO Summit would raise that now familiar problem of the level of French participation, but we have gotten around this problem before. If you and Helmut believe a NATO Summit would be useful, we will want to discuss how best to approach Valery. It would of course be best if he could find a way to attend. I would appreciate any thoughts you might have on this.

If you find merit in a NATO Summit, I would be happy to discuss it further with you in this channel or to have Cy pursue it with Ambassador Henderson. I would appreciate your early reaction because I realize that the timing is tight for changes in everyone's schedule.

Sincerely,

The Right Honorable  
Margaret R. Thatcher, M.P.  
Prime Minister  
London