

Action

COS 19TH MEETING/82

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MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

ALQ 050/1

5 MAY 1982

File

CONFIDENTIAL ANNEX
TO
COS 19TH MEETING/82 HELD ON
WEDNESDAY 14 APRIL 1982 AT 10.00 am

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JW 14/4

OPERATION CORPORATE

ITEM 1. INTELLIGENCE MATTERS

1. SIR TERENCE LEWIN invited the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (Intelligence) to update them on the current situation in the Falkland Islands and South Georgia.
2. LIEUTENANT GENERAL GLOVER (Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (Intelligence)) reviewed the latest intelligence situation. In his report and in the subsequent discussion the following points were made:

a. Argentine Forces

(1) Navy. The majority of the Argentine Navy was still believed to be in mainland ports. The Type 42 HERCULES was believed to have relieved the SANTESSIMA TRINIDAD; the Type A69 GRANVILLE might now be en route for Puerto Belgrano; there was a report that two coastguard patrol boats, armed with 2 x 20mm guns each, were at Port Stanley; and the submarine SANTA FE was at sea.

(2) Army. There had been no significant change from the previous report (1).

(3) Air Force. A report had been received that one Tracker and 3 Mirage aircraft were now at Port Stanley airfield. Although Trackers could operate from Port Stanley, it was most unlikely that Mirages could do so until the existing runway had been extended.

b. Soviet Interest

(1) A Krivak class destroyer and an Alligator LST had left Luanda heading South.

Note:

1. COS 17th Meeting/82.

(2) Two Bear D aircraft, operating from Luanda, had carried out a further reconnaissance sortie that morning to within 50 miles East of Ascension.

(3) One AGI which had been shadowing SS CANBERRA and another which had left the Mediterranean were believed to be heading South.

(4) A Soviet fishing ship, reported to be at Ushuaia in Tierra del Fuego, had only a limited intelligence capability. It was unlikely to be relevant to this operation.

(5) The track of Soviet satellites was known, and the Task Force would be able to minimise the risk of detection by imposing electronic silence when a satellite was overhead. Surveillance by the Bear D's was probably the greater threat.

c. Latin America

(1) Brazil. The sailing of a Brazilian Naval Task Force, possibly including a carrier, was assessed to be for an exercise which had been planned some months ago; it was unlikely to be related to the current crisis.

(2) Peru. A BBC monitoring report that 6 Peruvian FBA aircraft, possibly Fitters, had deployed with Argentine units at Comodoro Rivadavia was discounted. The Rio Treaty had not been invoked and the Peruvian Government had denied alerting her forces.

(3) Bolivia. A report that the Bolivian Air Force had been put at the disposal of Argentina did not reflect official Bolivian Government policy and was discounted.

d. British Personnel

(1) Royal Marines. The 6 Royal Marines from the Falkland Islands had been moved to Buenos Aires on 13 April 1982; they were expected to return to the United Kingdom shortly. The location of the remaining 22 Marines from South Georgia was still unknown.

(2) Civilian and Royal Air Force Party. Thirty-one civilians and 2 Royal Air Force Chief Technicians from the Falkland Islands

were now in Montevideo, where they were being debriefed by our Defence Attache before flying to London.

ITEM 2. OWN FORCES

3. There had been no change to the Force Tote Sitrep (2) already published.

ITEM 3. PUBLIC RELATIONS

4. MR McDONALD (Deputy Chief of Public Relations) reviewed the major articles in the daily newspapers.
5. In discussion, the following points were agreed:
 - a. The Public Relations and Service Staffs should consult on the advisability of providing a limited facility for Task Force press reporters while in the vicinity of Ascension Island. If facilities were to be granted to the press they would need to be worthwhile, but not to the extent of embarrassing the United States.
 - b. The Public Relations Staff should stress the Soviet involvement but play down their capability; the Deputy Chief of Public Relations should consult with the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (Intelligence) on how best to achieve this.
 - c. Publicity should be given to Royal Air Force Harrier pilot training, particularly at RNAS Yeovilton.

ITEM 4. DECISIONS REQUIRED

6. The Committee reviewed the forecast of decisions which had been identified (3). It was agreed that Rules of Engagement for Operation PARAQUET, which were being prepared by the Navy Department, should be circulated as soon as possible for agreement out of committee, prior to submission to the Secretary of State.

Note by the Secretary

Circulated as CNS 7331/5 dated 14 April 1982.

Notes:

2. Force Tote Sitrep (Issue 20).
3. Annex to COS 18th Meeting/82.

ITEM 5. DEFENCE OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS - AN APPRECIATION
FROM THE ARGENTINE VIEWPOINT

7. LIEUTENANT GENERAL GLOVER gave the Committee an appreciation of the defence of the Falkland Islands from the Argentine viewpoint.

Note by the Secretary

The text of the appreciation has been circulated for information (4).

ITEM 6. AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS APPRECIATION

8. SIR TERENCE LEWIN said they would wish to consider a draft appreciation of the options for landing operations in the Falkland Islands (5) which had been prepared in accordance with their instructions (6) by the Assistant Chief of the Defence Staff (Policy).

9. In discussion the following points were made:

a. The appreciation was designed to give background guidance to the Force Commander. It would be his responsibility to decide on the course of action and make detailed plans.

b. Timing of the operation would be critical. It could not be mounted before 4 May 1982, nor could it be delayed long after that for reasons of both logistics and the physical fitness of the landing force. A complicating factor would be the probable political need to leave open as long as possible a decision whether or not to mount the operation; delay would impose the greatest difficulty if it occurred when the Task Force was off the Falkland Islands. 11

c. Thought would need to be given to a surprise and deception plan for the operation.

Notes:

4. COS(Misc) 119/742/1 dated 14 April 1982.
5. DP 9/82(Final Draft) attached to COS(Misc) 116/742/1 dated 13 April 1982.
6. COS 12th Meeting/82, Item 5.

d. The appreciation over-emphasised beach landings and gave insufficient weight to options involving a helicopter-mounted assault. However, care would

be necessary not to incur undue helicopter losses in the assault since this could inhibit subsequent operations.

e. Early tactical intelligence and reconnaissance would be essential to the success of the operation. Care would need to be taken not to forfeit surprise.

f. Destruction of the airfield and aircraft at Port Stanley were crucial to the success of the operation. N

10. The following points were agreed in discussion:

a. The appreciation fulfilled the aim they had set (7) and the conclusions were satisfactory in broad terms although they needed refining.

b. Our ability to sustain the operation needed further urgent examination. Logistic aspects were addressed in a Navy Department paper (8), but thought needed to be given to the possible need either to augment or relieve elements of the landing force. The Chief of the Naval Staff and the Chief of the General Staff should discuss out of Committee how best to meet such a contingency, with a view to including reference to it in the eventual submission to Ministers.

c. Morale was a relevant if equivocal factor in the appreciation.

d. They would wish to pass the appreciation to the Force Commander as an annex to a planning directive.

e. They would wish to continue further study of the options as the situation developed.

11. Summing up, SIR TERENCE LEWIN said they would wish to instruct the Assistant Chief of the Defence Staff (Policy) in conjunction with the Service Departments to revise

Note:

7. COS(Misc) 100/742/1 dated 9 April 1982.
8. COS(Misc) 110/742/1 dated 12 April 1982.

the appreciation in the light of their discussion, taking account of detailed comments to be submitted by the Service Departments; and to present it for their agreement out of committee. They would also wish to instruct the Assistant Chief of the Defence Staff (Operations) to prepare a draft planning directive to the Force Commander by 0900 the following day for their consideration at their next meeting. They would wish to consider at a future meeting the need to inform Ministers of their decisions.

Note by the Secretary

- a. The revised appreciation has been circulated (9).
- b. The draft planning directive has been circulated (10).

ITEM 7. OPERATION PARAQUET

12. Following a short discussion on the draft submission (11) prepared by their Secretary, SIR TERENCE LEWIN said he would circulate later that day an amended submission for their agreement out of committee.

Note by the Secretary

The submission has been forwarded (12).

ITEM 8. SPECIAL PROJECTS GROUP

13. The Committee agreed a paper (13) prepared for their consideration by the Special Projects Group.

ITEM 9. NATO

14. SIR TERENCE LEWIN said he intended to write personally to his NATO equivalents, informing them of the background to Operation CORPORATE and an outline of the UK's intentions. He had already written to SACEUR and SACLANT. His staff would consult the Defence Secretariat in drafting the letters.

Notes:

9. COS(Misc)122/742/1 dated 14 April 1982.
10. COS(Misc)121/742/1 dated 14 April 1982.
11. COS(Misc)117/742/1 dated 13 April 1982.
12. CDS 2038/1/1 dated 14 April 1982.
13. COS(Misc) 115/742/1 dated 13 April 1982.

OPERATION CORPORATE - FORECAST OF DECISIONS OR ACTIONS REQUIRED

| ITEM | ARISING FROM COS MEETING | DECISION OR ACTION REQUIRED | SPONSOR | ACTION/ DECISION BY | CONTINUED | CURRENT STATE |
|------------|-----------------------------|---|-----------|---------------------------|--|---------------------------------------|
| [REDACTED] | | | | | | |
| 0015 | 5/82 Item 1 para 7 | Sale of Hunter aircraft to Chile | AFD | FCO | | FCO have despatched signal |
| 0023 | 6/82 Item 1 | Op CORPORATE - Military Appreciation | COS | DS 11 | 7/82 Item 5 12/82 Item 6 | To be revised - |
| [REDACTED] | | | | | | |
| 0032 | 8/82 Item 1 | Publicity for bunkering facilities | FCO | FCO Ministers | | |
| 0033 | 8/82 Item 5 | Amphibious Operations Appreciation (Operation SUITON) | ACDS(Pol) | ACDS(Pol) | 11/82 Item 1 16/82 Item 4 17/82 Item 5 19/82 Item 6 | For COS o/c 15 Apr (see also 0053) |
| 0039 | 14/82 Item 1 | Confirmation of Argentine Naval dispositions | DCDS(I) | DCDS(I) | | |

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| ITEM | ARISING FROM COS MEETING | DECISION OR ACTION REQUIRED | SPONSOR | ACTION/ DECISION BY | CONTINUED | CURRENT STATE |
|------|-----------------------------|--|-----------|---------------------------|-----------|--------------------------------------|
| 0040 | 14/82 Item 1 | Argentine CAP capability over Falklands | AFD | AFD | | |
| 0041 | 14/82 Item 3 | Skeleton press releases for use if engagement | DCPR | COS/Ministers | | DCPR has circulated to S of S/COS |
| 0045 | 16/82, Item 1 | Update of any information of Argentine mining of the Falklands | DCDS(I) | DCDS(I) | | For COS |
| 0049 | 17/82, Item 6 | Maritime Exclusion Zone Terminology | | DS11 | | |
| 0050 | 17/82, Item 8 | Fuel on Ascension Island | AFD | AFD | | |
| 0051 | 17/82, Item 6 | ROE Op CORPORATE | ND | Ministers | | Submission sent 13 Apr 82 |
| 0052 | 19/82, Item 4 | ROE Op PARAQUET | ND | Ministers | | For COS o/c |
| 0053 | 19/82, Item 6 | Op SUTTON Planning Directive | ACDS(Ops) | ACDS(Ops) | | For COS 15 Apr 82 (see also 0033) |