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FM FCO 231800Z JULY 81

TO PRIORITY WASHINGTON

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1122 OF 23 JUL 81

INFO ROUTINE AMMAN, BAGHDAD, TEL AVIV, CAIRO, JEDDA, DAMASCUS,  
BEIRUT, UKMIS NEW YORK

US-ARAB RELATIONS

1. MR HURD GAVE THE MINISTER AT THE US EMBASSY ON 2L JULY AN ACCOUNT OF HIS VISITS TO IRAQ AND JORDAN. HE DREW ATTENTION IN PARTICULAR TO THE PARTICULARLY HARSH THINGS WHICH HAD BEEN SAID IN BOTH CAPTIALS ABOUT US POLICY. HE HAD BEEN STRUCK BY THE SIMILARITY OF JORDANIAN AND IRAQI ANALYSES AND THE REGARD HELD FOR IRAQ BY JORDAN. BOTH HAD EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT US POLICY WAS BASED ON A DANGEROUS MISUNDERSTANDING OF THE FACTS OF MIDDLE EAST LIFE. IT WAS NOT SIMPLY THAT A STRATEGIC CONSENSUS WAS IMPOSSIBLE WITHOUT PROGRESS ON THE ARAB/ISRAEL ISSUE. ACCORDING TO THEM, WASHINGTON DID NOT APPEAR TO UNDERSTAND THAT REGIMES COOPERATING WITH THE US, PARTICULARLY THE GULF STATES AND SAUDI ARABIA, WERE IN THE LONG TERM IN REAL DANGER OF BEING OVERTHROWN BY THE STRENGTH OF ANTI-AMERICAN POPULAR FEELING. MR HURD COMMENTED THAT BOTH JORDANIANS AND IRAQIS HAD REASON TO BE IRRITATED WITH THE SAUDIS, AND THIS SHOULD BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT. BUT THEIR VIEWS WERE AN IMPORTANT INDICATION OF THE ARAB MOOD. KING HUSSEIN, WHO HAD BEEN PLEASED BY SECRETARY HAIG'S VISIT IN APRIL, NOW SEEMED TO HAVE LOST FAITH IN THE US AND, IN THE WAKE OF RECENT EVENTS, TO BE DEEPLY GLOOMY AND FATALISTIC ABOUT THE FUTURE.

2. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION FROM STREATOR, MR HURD SAID THAT HE DID NOT HAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT THE IRAQIS AND JORDANIANS HAD WANTED HIM SPECIFICALLY TO CONVEY A WARNING TO THE US. NOR HAD WHAT THEY SAID BEEN IN ANY WAY PRO-SOVIET.

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