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TO IMMEDIATE UKDEL CANCUN  
TEL NO 015 OF 21 OCTOBER 1981

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FOLLOWING TELEGRAM NOW REPEATED TO YOU AT REQUEST OF P.O. WAS RECEIVED FROM UKMIS NEW YORK TEL NO 1079 OF 20/10

INFO WASHINGTON JEDDA PARIS  
INFO SAHARA CAIRO DAMASCUS AMMAN EC POSTS

ARAB/ISRAEL: POSSIBLE EUROPEAN ACTION AT THE SECURITY COUNCIL

1. RPINCE SAUD, IN HIS STATEMENT TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON 5 OCTOBER (MY TELS NOS 992 AND 993) CALLED ON THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO ADOPT A RESOLUTION WHICH WOULD SERVE AS A FRAMEWORK FOR A COMPREHENSIVE SOLUTION: HE PROPOSED THAT PRINCE FAHDS EIGHT POINTS COULD BE USED IN THE FORMULATION OF SUCH A RESOLUTION. I HAVE ALSO SEEN THE FRENCH PAPER ON POSSIBLE ACTION AT THE UN (COREU CPE/BK/ETR 300 OF 18 SEPTEMBER - RECEIVED HERE ON 12 OCTOBER). YOU MAY WISH TO HAVE MY COMMENTS IN ADVANCE OF YOUR VISIT TO RIYADH.

2. WHEN I TOOK MR HURD TO CALL ON BRIAN URQUHART ON 19 OCTOBER, URQUHART SAID THAT HE FELT, AS WE ALL DID, THAT THE ARABS WERE BECOMING INCREASINGLY FRUSTRATED AT THE TOTAL ABSENCE OF PROGRESS TOWARDS A SETTLEMENT OF THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM, DUE TO AMERICAN FAILURE TO FORMULATE A POLICY OTHER THAN STUCKING TO CAMP DAVID TRYING TO ESTABLISH A "STRATEGIC CONSENSUS", AND GRAPPLING WITH INDIVIDUAL CRISES SUCH AS THE BOMBING OF THE IRAQI REACTOR, AWACS ETC. HE THOUGHT THAT THE TIME MUST COME WHEN THE SECURITY COUNCIL WOULD HAVE TO REENGAGE ITSELF WITH THE MAIN ISSUE, IF ONLY TO REDUCE ARAB FRUSTRATIONS HAVING A DEBATE AND TABLING, BUT NOT NECESSARILY VOTING ON, A RESOLUTION MIGHT HELP IN THIS RESPECT, ALTHOUGH HE CONCEDED THAT SUCH AN EXERCISE COULD WELL GET OUT OF HAND AND THAT VERY CAREFUL AND LENGTHY PREPARATION WOULD BE REQUIRED BEFORE ANYONE ACTIVATED THE COUNCIL.

3. AS YOU KNOW, MY OWN VIEW IS THAT, IF WE WENT INTO THE COUNCIL WITHOUT ADEQUATE PREPARATION WITH THE INTENTION OF SECURING THE ADOPTION OF A RESOLUTION COMPLEMENTING SCR 242 IN TERMS OF PALESTINIAN SELF-DETERMINATION ETC, WE WOULD RUN STRAIGHT INTO AN AMERICAN VETO, SOMETHING WHICH IT WOULD BE UNTHINKABLE FOR US TO PRECIPITATE. AT THE SAME TIME, I SEE URQUHARTS POINT AND RECOGNISE THAT SOONER OR LATER THE WHOLE QUESTION WILL HAVE TO COME BACK TO THE COUNCIL AND THAT IT IS UNLIKELY THAT THE PLO WILL PUBLICLY DO WHAT WE ARE ASKING THEM TO DO EXCEPT IN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE COUNCIL.

4. IT SEEMS TO ME THAT THE FIRST THING WE MUST DISCOVER IS WHAT IF ANYTHING THE SAUDIS AND THE AMERICANS HAVE SAID TO EACH OTHER ABOUT THE EIGHT POINTS AND ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF ANY ACTION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON THE LINES PROPOSED IN PRINCE SAUDS STATEMENT. UNLESS IT TURNS OUT THAT THE SAUDIS AND AMERICANS HAVE BEEN HAVING PRODUCTIVE DISCUSSIONS, I SUGGEST THAT WE SHOULD DISSUADE THE SAUDIS FROM EITHER ACTIVATING THE COUNCIL THEMSELVES OR ENCOURAGING OTHER ARABS TO DO SO E.G. FOLLOWING THE RABAT SUMMIT IN CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH ARE BOUND TO LEAD TO AN AMERICAN VETO, THUS PUTTING US ALL IN AN EVEN WORSE POSITION THAN WE ARE NOW IN IN TERMS OF PROGRESS TOWARDS A SETTLEMENT.

5. PERHAPS THE BEST COURSE WOULD BE FOR US TO BE TH<sup>IN</sup>KING IN TERMS OF HAVING A THOROUGH DISCUSSION IN WASHINGTON WITH THE AMERICANS, AFTER YOUR VISIT TO RIYADH, ON HOW, IF AT ALL, THEY SEE PROGRESS ON THE FAHD PLAN OR ON ANY OTHER ACTIVITY, IN OR OUT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, RELATED TO BRINGING THE PALESTINIANS INTO THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS. IT WOULD BE VALUABLE TO EXPLORE THIS QUESTION THOROUGHLY WITH THE AMERICANS TO SEE IF THERE MAY BE A MINIMAL POSITION WHICH THEY MIGHT BE PREPARED AT LEAST TO CONSIDER AT SOME POINT IN THE NOT TOO DISTANT FUTURE AND WHICH IT MIGHT BE WORTH OUR FLOATING IN THE MOST TENTATIVE AND PRIVATE WAY WITH THE ARABS.

6. MR HURD HAS SEEN AND AGREED THIS TELEGRAM IN DRAFT.